U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

51–662 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–33] 

FUTURE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 26, 2009 
(II) 

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

FRANK ROSE, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ZACH STEACY, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 26, 2009, Future Roles and Missions of the Missile Defense 

Agency ................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 26, 2009 ...................................................................................... 31 

THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 2009 

FUTURE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California, Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 1 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 2 

WITNESSES 

Ahern, David G., Director, Portfolio Systems Acquisition, Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 8 

Pendleton, John H., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 6 

Welch, Gen. Larry D., USAF (Ret.), President and CEO, Institute for Defense 

Analyses ................................................................................................................ 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Ahern, David G. ................................................................................................ 69 

Pendleton, John H. ........................................................................................... 46 

Welch, Gen. Larry D. ....................................................................................... 35 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

FUTURE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE MISSILE 

DEFENSE AGENCY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 26, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:33 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Ms. TAUSCHER. The committee will come to order. The Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee meets this morning to receive testimony on 

the future roles and missions of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). 

Let me start off by saying this: I strongly support deployment of 

operationally effective, suitable, and survivable missile defenses to 

defend the United States, its deployed forces, and its friends and 

allies against the full range of ballistic missile defense (BMD) 

threats we face. 

In short, that means I support deploying missile defenses that 

work. That is why it is imperative that we have adequate processes 

in place at the Department of Defense (DOD) to ensure that we 

provide our warfighters the right missile defense capabilities in 

adequate numbers to meet the current threats we face. 

Over the past several years, we have seen a rush to deploy an 

initial national missile defense system that addresses a future 

threat, but crowds out more urgent priorities that address the current threats. This occurred for a variety of reasons but, fundamentally, the Department of Defense failed to provide adequate oversight and guidance to the Missile Defense Agency. Without such direction, we had a program that did not design, test, and deploy 

against current threats. 

As a result, it took Congress—acting on a bipartisan basis, I 

would add—to direct the Missile Defense Agency to focus more attention on developing and deploying current missile defense capabilities to meet the warfighters’ operational requirements, and to 

meet the current threats we face. For example, it took congressional action to get the Department to implement the recommendations outlined in the Joint Capabilities Mix Study II (JCM II), 

which called for doubling the number of Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense (THAAD) and Standard Missile 3 (SM–3) interceptors. 
2 

After years of this dynamic, where Congress had to be the advocate for the warfighters’ current priorities, it became clear to me 

that the Department of Defense’s internal processes for oversight 

and review of the missile defense program were broken. This largely explains why Congress directed the independent study, the study 

on the future roles and missions of the Missile Defense Agency in 

the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 

2008. The results of this study will form the basis of our discussion 

this morning. 

At the heart of the recommendations outlined in the report is a 

need to more fully integrate the activities of the Missile Defense 

Agency with the overall Department of Defense. I agree with that 

assessment. This is a key issue that Congress and the Department 

of Defense need to address together. 

If we are going to have operationally effective, suitable, and survivable missile defense systems, we must not view missile defense 

as something isolated from the rest of the Department of Defense. 

Instead, missile defense must be fully integrated into our overall 

defense planning and doctrine. 

The Department has recently taken a number of steps to better 

integrate and coordinate Missile Defense Agency activities with 

other key DOD stakeholders, the most important of these steps 

being the establishment of the Missile Defense Executive Board 

(MDEB). While there is still ongoing work that needs to be done 

in this area, the Department is generally moving in the right direction. 

As the Obama Administration reviews the missile defense program, I hope that one of its key priorities will be to ensure that 

the Department of Defense establishes and maintains adequate 

processes to provide our warfighters with real capabilities we need 

to meet the current threats we face. Let me be clear: This is not 

about slowing things down; this is about getting it right. 

The threat of ballistic missiles cannot be ignored. Iran has the 

largest force of short- and medium-range missiles in the Middle 

East, and North Korea is poised to launch a long-range Taepodong 

missile, possibly this week. Addressing the ballistic missile threat, 

wherever it comes from, will require a combination of systems that 

work, and a smarter use of diplomacy that engage our allies and 

some of our adversaries. 

Let me now turn the floor over to my distinguished ranking 

member, my friend from Ohio, Mr. Turner, for his opening comments. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I would also like to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses, all 

of whom have served our Nation with distinction. In particular, I 

want to recognize General Welch, who will complete his service as 

President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Institute for 

Defense Analyses (IDA) on April 15th after over 15 years in the position. 
3 

The focus of today’s hearing is to examine potential improvements to the processes or organization and management structures 

that could enable further success in missile defense. I respectfully 

disagree with Madam Chairman that DOD processes were broken, 

but I do believe that systems can always be improved, and that is 

why it is excellent that we are proceeding with this hearing. 

We have some thorough reports and assessments from the Institute for Defense Analyses and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to use as a basis for our discussion today. And I want 

to commend our witnesses and the organizations they represent for 

their outstanding work. 

In 2002, President Bush issued a mandate: Deploy a set of initial 

missile defense capabilities beginning in 2004. The mandate was 

met and, seven years later, we have a fielded missile defense capability that our military commanders rely on. The rapid development in deployment of this capability was unique, and it was enabled by the flexibility of special authorities granted to MDA. 

However, as noted in the testimony of our witnesses, the success 

came at the expense of full warfighter involvement, DOD oversight, 

and transparency. The challenge ahead is balancing MDA’s needed 

flexibility, while providing more structure and enhancing the involvement of DOD stakeholders. 

I would appreciate our witnesses’ thoughts on how to strike this 

balance, as well as any areas of concern they may have. 

Furthermore, the increasing demands for more inventory, operations, and sustainment of existing assets detract from MDA’s primary focus on research and development (R&D). Efforts are underway in the Department to transfer the procurement, operations and 

sustainment of more mature missile defense assets to the military 

services. However, because these systems are so integrated and 

complex, transfer must be done smartly. 

A key issue in this process and its timing is transferring the responsibility for operations and management and follow-on procurement. I welcome our witnesses’ views on how we can maximize success throughout this transfer process, and any potential pitfalls 

that might negatively impact this success. 

The Department has done a commendable job, to date, recognizing and addressing these challenges. In 2007, the Missile Defense Executive Board was established to recommend and oversee 

implementation of missile defense policies, programs, and budgets. 

A few months ago, it developed a disciplined process and set of 

business rules, the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 

Lifecycle Management Process, to delineate roles and missions, and 

guide the transfer of missile-defense assets to the services. I look 

forward to hearing more about these efforts. 

Lastly, as we see in intelligence, our adversaries’ capabilities are 

continuously evolving. If we do not invest in long-term R&D or 

evolve our capabilities as well, they risk becoming obsolete. The 

IDA report recommends that, within the spectrum of our development, test, and evaluation (DT&E) activities, science and technology (S&T) should receive renewed emphasis and increased funding. I am interested in our witnesses’ thoughts on what aspects of 

S&T should receive more emphasis. 
4 

We want and demand success in our missile defense system. Our 

national security and the security of our allies depends on it. We 

must, therefore, ensure the Department has the right authorities, 

tools, resources, and flexibility to be successful. Today’s hearing is 

a step in that direction. 

Thank you, again, for being here today. 

Madam Chairman, I appreciate this hearing. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Turner. 

Let me now turn to our panel of witnesses. Our witnesses today 

include General Larry Welch, President and CEO of the Institute 

for Defense Analyses; Mr. John Pendleton, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management team, U.S. Government Accountability 

Office; and Mr. David Ahern, Director of Portfolio Systems Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L). Each of our witnesses have 

submitted a comprehensive statement, and their formal statements 

will be entered into the record. And I ask each of you to briefly 

summarize your remarks. Let me begin by recognizing General 

Welch. 

General Welch, once again, congratulations on your very long 

tenure at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and your great service 

to this country. As I said to you when I said hello earlier today, 

we have counted on you for so long to do so much, and we thank 

you very much, from the subcommittee, for all the work that you 

have done to provide us with good analysis. 

And the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. LARRY D. WELCH, USAF (RET.), 

PRESIDENT AND CEO, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES 

General WELCH. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson. I 

have submitted my opening statement for the record. I will just 

make a few comments about it. 

I do want to point out that my comments in the statement reflect 

the consensus of the study group, and where I depart from those 

or go beyond those, I will make it clear that they are my personal 

opinion. Otherwise, I am really reporting on the consensus of a 

group of people who have lots and lots of experience, both in missile defense and in acquisition in general. 

You have mentioned the January 2002 directive that required 

that the Missile Defense Agency begin to deploy a system in 2004. 

While it was not explicitly stated in the directive, the assumption 

was that this was to be a mid-course system capable of dealing 

with a limited attack from Korea—from North Korea. So, with that 

in mind, what was actually required to do that, and how well they 

did that is an issue; however, we were not asked to assess the performance of the Missile Defense Agency, and we did not do that. 

We did find a very broad consensus within the Department to include the Department of Defense and the contractor community 

and our study group, that the special authorities and the centralized approach were essential to the rapid deployment that was required by the January 2002 directive. And while it did succeed in 

meeting that mandate, which was very difficult—and a lot of people, including myself, doubted that they would be able to make that 

mandate—it was much less successful in fostering the planning 
5 

and preparation and the cooperation and the understanding from 

the service that would eventually inherit those capabilities. And 

that is one of the major issues in the study and one of the major 

issues, I understand, of this hearing. 

It has been mentioned several times that the development and 

initial fielding was not subject to the 5,000 Series. It was our view 

that this set of programs is quite unique. And that is—the task 

was to integrate into a cohesive, coherent system parts and elements that come from systems from all three of the military departments, systems that were at varying degrees of maturity, and 

the task of integrating those into an operational system that had 

to respond in near-time was quite different from any other weapon 

system procurement that we have seen. 

And so we felt that the special authorities, and retaining some 

of those special authorities, were essential because of the nature of 

the Ballistic Missile Defense System. And I stress the word ‘‘system,’’ because it is made up of a series, as you know, of sensors, 

and interceptors, and Command and Control (C2). We have seen a 

response to the need for more oversight for the Department of Defense, and we are seeing, at least, plans to begin to transfer operational responsibilities to the military departments, and some 

plans, although not as clear, on transferring follow-on procurement. 

I would make a comment about that, Madam Chairperson. You 

mentioned the difficulty in persuading the Missile Defense Agency 

to buy more THAAD. I think that is a conflict that you will see 

until we resolve the issue of who is responsible for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and who is responsible for 

procurement. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. That is right. 

General WELCH. Because otherwise the Missile Defense Agency 

will always see the demand for more procurement of what they regard as mature systems as competing with the need for RDT&E. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. That is right. 

General WELCH. So some clarity as to who is responsible for 

what, I think, would go a long ways toward satisfying that particular requirement. 

We were also asked to comment on whether or not there were 

things currently in the Missile Defense Agency portfolio that, in 

whole or part, should be removed, or things that should be added. 

Our conclusion was that there was nothing that should be added, 

and we very specifically addressed the issue of cruise missile defense. And while cruise missile defense is a very important subject, 

adding that to the ballistic missile defense portfolio, we felt, would 

serve the needs of neither cruise missile defense nor ballistic missile defense. They are very different, and it is very complex. 

I would end my opening comments by reiterating what we regard 

as the three fundamental reasons why there need to be some continuing special authorities within the Missile Defense Agency. And 

that was, the first issue is the matter of integrating a complex set 

of capabilities into a cohesive system that has to respond effectively 

against missiles of all ranges in a very short time period. And that 

requires a degree of Command and Control integration that we 

don’t see elsewhere. 
6 

There will be the long-term issue, as these systems are inevitably 

upgraded, and most of these systems fulfill multiple purposes—that 

is, they serve a missile defense purpose, but they also serve a joint 

purpose within the larger, joint operation. So as these upgrades 

take place and these changes take place, the need to maintain configuration control over the evolving system to ensure it remains cohesive and coherent is, again, a special requirement. 

And finally, I have mentioned and will mention once again, the 

Command and Control and Battle Management System that brings 

together a complex set of sensors or complex set of interceptors on 

a global basis that must respond virtually instantly is a very unusual and demanding task, and that is another reason why there 

will need to be some special authorities. 

Make one last point, and that is, we recommend strongly that 

the Missile Defense Agency’s focus be RDT&E as their primary 

focus. However, we added a caveat in the definition of RDT&E in 

this case, in that in order to ensure that the deployed system has, 

in fact, been integrated into the Ballistic Missile Defense System, 

we believe RDT&E has to include the deployment of an initial capability, because until an initial capability is actually deployed and 

operating within the system, you have no assurance that even the 

first phase of RDT&E has been satisfactorily complete. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Welch can be found in the 

Appendix on page 35.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Pendleton, thank you again for your comprehensive statement, and I thank you for your staff’s hard work. We will submit 

your statement for the record. We ask you to summarize, and the 

floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN H. PENDLETON, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. PENDLETON. Yes, ma’am. 

Madam Chair, Mr. Turner, members of the subcommittee, I am 

pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s work on the Missile Defense Program. 

DOD may well be at a crossroads in missile defense, but no matter what path is taken, our work indicates that DOD will need to 

overcome serious management challenges. A better balance is needed between flexibility and oversight. Before describing the challenges, however, I want to acknowledge DOD’s progress. 

Since MDA was created in 2002, the United States has filled in 

several interconnected elements, ranging from radars in California 

and Japan to interceptors in Alaska, among others. Going forward, 

DOD will need to focus as much on management fundamentals as 

it does on harnessing new technologies. 

Our work over the past few years, much of it at this subcommittee’s request, has revealed problems in setting requirements, testing and buying systems, and in planning for long-term operations 

and support (O&S). I will briefly discuss each of these challenges. 

The first is associated with the process for determining what 

missile defense capabilities are needed. A key stakeholder should 
7 

be the geographic combatant commands, who specialize in various 

parts of the world and understand the threats in the region. However, we reported in 2008 that DOD does not yet have an effective 

process to ensure that the priorities of those combatant commands 

are considered when making development and investment decisions. 

A bit of history is important, though, to put this into context. 

During the first three years of MDA, from 2002 to 2005, no formal 

process existed to consider combatant command views. So the creation of such a process, called the Warfighter Involvement Process 

(WIP), in 2005 was certainly a step in the right direction. 

The second major challenge is the continuing difficulty in measuring progress on cost, schedule, and testing. In the absence of 

baselines, it has not been possible to measure the performance of 

most MDA programs. For example, MDA has not established baselines for cost, and such baselines are critical to assess progress. 

Furthermore, MDA’s difficulties in meeting testing baselines have 

sometimes caused production and fielding decisions to get ahead of 

testing and modeling, which leaves lingering concerns about the efficacy of some parts of the system. 

A third challenge is associated with the lack of planning for the 

long-term operations and support of the systems once they are developed. This is critical because two-thirds or more, at least historically, of the system’s costs are associated with operating and supporting it over a lifecycle. As systems come online, the question of 

who will operate and support them becomes more urgent. 

Typically, this function has been performed by the military services, but many questions about how this transition and transfer 

will occur remain unanswered. This is attributable primarily to uncertainty about cost. DOD has not required that full cost estimates 

for operations and support be developed, and since these costs are 

likely to be significant, the military services have been reluctant to 

take on an unknown liability, especially in today’s budget environment. 

A common thread through all of these challenges is the need for 

better oversight in the development of ballistic missile defenses. 

The creation of a Missile Defense Executive Board, or MDEB, in 

2007 has served to improve oversight some by reviewing and making recommendations on MDA’s acquisition strategy, plans, and 

funding, as well as bringing top-level leaders together from across 

the Department. The board’s adoption of a Lifecycle Management 

Process has served to clarify roles, but that process is still in its 

early stages and lacks important details, like how it will implement 

the new defense-wide funding accounts for ballistic missile defense, 

including allocating funds to the various players. 

In sum, Madam Chair, whether or not DOD continues to acquire, 

operate, and maintain missile defenses outside traditional DOD 

processes, the challenges we have found in our work will need to 

be addressed. Sustained DOD leadership will be needed to coordinate the divergent needs of the combatant commands, ensure that 

billions of dollars are spent wisely, and that MDA and the services 

work together in their planning long-term operations and support 

of these expensive and extraordinarily complex systems. 
8 

That concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any 

questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pendleton can be found in the 

Appendix on page 46.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Pendleton. 

Mr. Ahern, thank you again for your comprehensive statement, 

and your statement has been submitted for the record. And the 

floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID G. AHERN, DIRECTOR, PORTFOLIO SYSTEMS ACQUISITION, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. AHERN. Good morning, Madam Chairperson Tauscher, Ranking Member Turner, distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. As 

noted, I serve as the Director for Portfolio Systems Acquisition in 

the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Among my duties, of course, is responsibility 

for developing insight and supporting oversight of the Missile Defense Agency. 

I would like to take a moment to address the importance of the 

Ballistic Missile Defense System. Ballistic missile threat is evolving. Not only have the number of countries holding short- and medium-range ballistic missiles increased over the last 30-plus years, 

but also the range, sophistication, and accuracy of those missiles 

has improved. The Missile Defense Agency has achieved important 

successes in the development and employment of missile defense 

systems. 

Currently, our Nation’s missile defense capability includes 

Ground-based Mid-course (GMD) interceptors, Standard Missile 3 

sea-based interceptors, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense engagement 

aboard destroyers and cruisers, various radars, including a SeaBased X-band (SBX) Radar, and a forward-based transportable 

radar. As both the threat and BMDS capability have evolved, so too 

has the Department’s involvement in overseeing and directing 

MDA activity. 

The Honorable John Young, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, testified before this committee 

a year ago, stating his intention to use the Missile Defense Executive Board to provide all stakeholders visibility into the MDA programs, and to give them voice in the agency plans. He said he 

would ‘‘ensure that there is appropriate, independent DOD oversight of missile defense programs.’’ 

He met his goals by conducting eight Missile Defense Executive 

Board meetings over the last 12 months, making decisions on MDA 

programs and the budget, and on missile defense policy, requirements, and deployment plans. I mention the number of meetings 

just to give you a sense that we are actively engaged in overseeing 

MDA’s activities, meeting more often, frankly, than the Defense Acquisition Boards (DABs) do when reviewing other major defense acquisition programs. 

As part of the increased level of MDA oversight, Mr. Young led 

the development of the Ballistic Missile Defense System Lifecycle 
9 

Management Process, which the Deputy Secretary endorsed. The 

new process mandates the participation of the MDA, the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, the Strategic Command commander, 

other combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, the military departments in an annual, collaborative process to identify capability and 

support requirements, balance resources and technical capabilities, 

and prepare a program plan and budget. This process was exercised during the development of fiscal year 2010 budget and will 

have full effect as we develop the Department’s fiscal year 2011 

budget. 

I would like to mention examples of recent Missile Defense Executive Board reviews: A comprehensive program assessment of 

THAAD—the THAAD program—and a Joint Staff study on requirements for upper-tier missile defense interceptors. The purpose 

of the THAAD review is to determine program progress, maturity 

of planning, and preparation for acquisition and for operation and 

support by the Army as a designated lead in the military department. 

The board’s Joint Staff study—review of the Joint Staff study— 

involved capabilities balanced against available assets, and indicated a need for additional upper-tier interceptors. That is under 

consideration, and the program planning and budget processes are 

ongoing. 

I would also like to address the increasing importance of combatant commander involvement in determining the Nation’s missile 

defense posture. Strategic Command’s Warfighter Involvement 

Process ensures that desired operational capabilities are properly 

considered by MDA, the material developer. 

A significant output of this proposal is a Prioritized Capability 

List (PCL) that documents operator capability requests. MDA provides a formal response which, in turn, facilitates our assessment 

of MDA program plans against desired capabilities. This is another 

example of how the Department is ensuring warfighter involvement in the development of missile defense programs. 

I am grateful to the members of this committee for your support 

of the Defense Department’s missile defense program and look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ahern can be found in the Appendix on page 69.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Ahern. 

I will begin with a question to General Welch. One of the key 

issues that the Department of Defense and the Congress have been 

grappling with over the past several years is how to get the services to take full ownership of the missile defense mission. And we 

have had—Mr. Pendleton and others have talked about, and you 

certainly have, sir, about the need to bring the combatant commanders into a planning function, and I read ‘‘buy-in’’ also there. 

Besides the issue of funding, which is nontrivial—I mean, if you 

don’t have the money you are not going to find a way to cut something that you know you have to have, or something that you 

might have to have, and that is part of the problem that we have. 

Besides the issue of funding, what have been other impediments 

that have stood in the way of the services from fully embracing the 

missile defense mission, and what is your current assessment of 
10 

the services’ attitude toward the missile defense mission? And what 

can be done, assuming you have a sense that there is a negative, 

what can be done to improve these attitudes? 

General WELCH. I think that answer is different for individual 

pieces of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. In the case of the 

Patriot, for example, the Army always regarded the Patriot as part 

of their integrated maneuver battalion and so, therefore, they had 

an intense interest in the Patriot from the beginning, and it was 

easy to transfer it over. I think you will find a similar situation on 

the Aegis SM–3, simply because they use their ship as part of the 

Navy’s normal operations. SM–3 is operated by sailors on Navy 

ships, and so there is simply the matter of agreeing on what constitutes something as mundane as a Milestone C, because there are 

different test requirements. 

The THAAD has a different history. As you will recall, the 

THAAD was an Army program. It is funded by the Ballistic Missile 

Defense Organization (BMDO), but it was developed by the Army 

as part of the Army’s set of capabilities included under the joint operation. That program had some very difficult times, and it was 

transferred to the Missile Defense Agency. Again, while there are 

questions about what is the funding approach, and how do you actually transfer those responsibilities, we really don’t see any reason 

why the Army can’t assume full responsibility for the THAAD. It 

was an Army system; it is still painted green. 

But probably the most complex issue has to do with the Groundbased Interceptor (GBI), because the Ground-based Interceptor was 

never part of any of the service programs, and it is the mid-course 

system. So to try to make a blanket statement about what the difficulties are, I don’t think you can do that. You have to address 

each of these individually. And that is the reason why, in our report, we suggested one approach to transferring O&S responsibility 

to include funding and a more complicated approach to transferring 

the responsibility for follow-on procurement. 

All of this, of course, is complicated by how we come to agreement on who has the authorities for upgrades and configuration 

control, and maintaining the coherence of the system after it is 

transferred. We recommend the Joint Program Office (JPO). Currently, General O’Reilly is standing up Hybrid Program Office. 

There are some differences, but the Hybrid Program Office does 

get the military department involved from the outset; it gives them 

a set of responsibilities that are enduring; it gives them a set of 

accountabilities that are enduring. I think that is a huge step toward bringing MDA and the service interests together. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

I have one follow-on question about the report that talks about 

the need for MDA to maintain its capabilities-based acquisition approach with modifications, and you had just referred to it. My concern with a capabilities-based approach is that it does not fully 

take into account critical factors such as suitability and survivability, and may not have been fully synchronized with the overall 

DOD acquisition process. 

Can you talk a little bit about how you can ensure that the capabilities-based acquisition fully takes into account such important 

factors such as suitability and survivability? How do you do these 
11 

synchronizations of capabilities approach with the normal acquisition system that the rest of the Department of Defense operates 

under? 

And then, if I could ask both Mr. Pendleton and Mr. Ahern to 

comment on those questions after you finish, General Welch. 

General WELCH. The suitability and the issues surrounding with 

logistics and the other mundane issues that create such a major 

part of the things that military departments have to deal with is 

explicitly addressed in the Hybrid Program Office approach. And, 

in fact, I would say that is probably the central feature of the hybrid approach, so that as far as our recommendation for Joint Program Offices was that the responsibilities would transfer from 

MDA to the service—at a point in time. 

The hybrid approach retains the requirements from the very beginning. That is, the service element in the Hybrid Program Office 

has responsibility for the things you described as a part of the program office from the outset. 

The issue, of course, is how do we establish those things and get 

them up and running and make them effective for systems that are 

already quite mature. And that is part of the handover issue; that 

is part of how you actually transfer responsibility for O&S to the 

military departments. 

Again, though, when you look at it system-by-system, I think 

that is really only a major understanding issue with GBI. The 

other systems, there will be issues about, how do I know what the 

O&S costs are? And there has been a recommendation that there 

be a transition period whereby O&S is funded from a defense-wide 

account; I think that will work as a transition. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. How long do you think that would take? 

General WELCH. Well, we heard expert opinions that varied from 

a year to two years. I have no basis for arguing with a year to two 

years. I would state, though, that the idea that over the long term 

you can fund O&S from a defense-wide account would run into 

huge problems. 

For example, I don’t know how one decides how much of the 

Aegis cruiser O&S is due to SM–3, and how much is due to all the 

other things that you do with that cruiser or that destroyer. 

So in the first place, I think it is just impractical, but the transition period is probably necessary, simply for the military department to get their arms around, what is the additive cost? How does 

this impact our overall O&S cost program? 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. Pendleton. 

Mr. PENDLETON. That was a pretty comprehensive answer, but 

I would echo and agree with many of the things the General said. 

I think the hybrid offices will be important. Obviously, it provides 

a forum to bring together folks and talk about the details, because 

the devil is going to be in the details on this. 

Another thing that is happening is MDA and the services are 

hammering out Memoranda of Agreement (MOA), basically sort of 

laying out who is going to do what, and that kind of thing. But the 

annexes that go along with that that would describe a number of 

the things you are talking about are yet to be determined. So 
12 

again, I think that how well that is carried out is going to be real 

key over time. 

And I think in terms of breaking ties, a lot is going to be riding 

on the MDEB. If someone needs a reclama, if someone needs to cry 

foul, the MDEB is going to be probably where they go. And the 

MDEB can go to the Deputy Secretary’s desk. So I think that system can work, but there is a lot yet to be determined. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Ahern. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, ma’am. You have hit on two perfect issues, and 

we have spent an awful lot thinking about it. And the first issue 

is the service involvement. And that starts with the Lead Service 

designation, and it has been done for 100 percent of the elements 

that we have right there. All the services are represented in the 

MDEB. Then transferring over to the lifecycle management plan 

paradigm, they are all involved both in the establishment of the requirements in the first portion of it, working with Strategic Command (STRATCOM), then they get involved in the budgeting and 

planning subcommittee, and then, of course, in the MDEB as we 

develop the annual budget. 

And so they are 100 percent involved in that whole process with 

their own specific element at the beginning, and then through the 

annual process to put together the budget that addresses the 

standard Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) kind 

of thinking—what should we do within the requirements and the 

technology that we have that is affordable? And so we work 

through that process, as I said. We exercised it in 2010, we are 

going to live in 2011, informed by the Warfighter Improvement 

Committee. 

But when we get to the elements themselves, that is the real 

challenges, as both the General and Mr. Pendleton have mentioned. We have the Lead Service designated, but then the devil is 

in the details, as Mr. Pendleton said. 

We do have the overarching MOAs, and there are MOAs developed for each one of the elements. For instance, the SBX, which we 

expect to have that transfer in the next couple of years, that annex 

is either under development or developed. They will recognize how 

the service plans to support that entity within its boundaries—the 

way it does its business, the way it operates. 

And that is going to be a—as was mentioned, again, by the General and Mr. Pendleton, there will be a learning period there of informing the MDA and the service beginning to work with something that they didn’t develop and that they have not had practice 

with, or the experience with, before. So that is why there is that 

transition period of a couple of years, or it could be possibly as long 

as five years, depending upon the maturity of the system as we go 

forward. But by using the defense-wide fund, we have taken that 

issue of money competition within the services off the table for that 

period of time, where they are developing that transition plan and 

beginning to bring it into their service. 

And I will finish in one note, I mentioned that we did a THAAD 

review recently. One of the things that we worked very hard on in 

that particular review was a joint review between the MDA and 

the Army of what are the criteria that the Army has established 

to—what processes did the Army expect this system to go through 
13 

before they will accept it? And the MDEB will absolutely monitor 

that as we go forward. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. AHERN. I realize that that is a long answer, but this is a passionate part of the job that I do. And I think we have set up a process; with discipline, we will make it work. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I am going to turn to Mr. Turner, but Mr. Ahern, 

I want to come back to you on the second round and ask, how do 

you accommodate the combatant commands (COCOMs). 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. We understand now we have got these MOAs 

with the services, but now there is another intersection with the 

COCOMs, and I am going to come back in the next round and ask 

you about that. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I have been on this committee now for slightly over six years, 

and in this committee we have had discussions over evolving 

threats that are now major topics in the news. Iran has launched 

a satellite; North Korea now has a missile that has grabbed the 

topic of the news, where people’s major questions now are, you 

know, what are they doing? What is the threat? But then, more importantly, the next question, which is, what do we have to defend 

ourselves from this evolving threat? 

General Welch and Mr. Ahern, I had an opportunity to speak to 

you before this hearing, and one of the things that I thought was 

really important about the discussions that we had was the way 

that you so clearly described the uniqueness of this whole assignment that MDA has; that, in this process, we are inventing something that didn’t exist, either in pieces of a system or in integrating 

systems, in order to ensure that as Iran and North Korea grab the 

news, that we actually have some answer. 

In looking at the directive from the Administration in 2002, you 

know, Iran didn’t have a satellite, North Korea was not grabbing 

our thoughts as it is at this very moment, as we are assessing what 

it is that North Korea is doing. Could you speak a moment to that 

uniqueness of the inventive process? 

General WELCH. I guess I would start with, without giving you 

a threat briefing, which would be inappropriate and outside the 

classification of the hearing, the one thing I think we can all agree 

on, and that is, you can develop offensive ballistic missile capabilities much faster than you can develop defenses against them. You 

may remember when the Rumsfeld Commission did the study on 

the ballistic missile threat to the United States, in which I participated. We said any nation who decides they want to do it can field 

a ballistic missile capability within five years from the time they 

decide it, and you will not know when they decided. 

There is a lot of skepticism about that, but 90 days after we published the report, then North Korea fired a ballistic missile that nobody knew they had. So it tended to add to the credibility. We did 

not have a relationship with North Korea, by the way. 

But my point is that we know for each of these systems where 

our vulnerabilities are to development within the kinds of countries 

that we are concerned about, that on the mid-course system we are 
14 

well aware of what counter measures can do to the effectiveness of 

that system. And we certainly know how to improve our capability 

to deal with that, but it is not currently funded. That is, we currently do not have the resources allocated to that particular issue. 

On other parts of the system, like the THAAD or the Patriot, I 

think we are all quite confident that those systems are, in fact, effective, and there is no reason that they won’t be effective for sometime, but they still will require continued upgrades. 

The complex issue is, every time you do something to one of 

those systems, every time you add any upgrade to one of those systems, you have to understand what it does to the whole system, because none of those operate as an individual element alone from 

the others within the Ballistic Missile Defense System. And that is 

part of the reason why we think it is absolutely essential that configuration control and, in fact, control of any upgrade that affects 

the Ballistic Missile Defense System, has to remain in a centralized 

fort. 

Did I address your question? 

Mr. TURNER. Yes, you certainly have. Yes. Thank you. 

Mr. Ahern. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. 

It is a portfolio; it is a system of systems. I pulled out my picture, 

and I look, and I can’t do any better than General Welch’s, I would 

only amplify what he said, because we need the tip-off at the beginning from whatever sensors are available; we need to track it 

across its flight; we need to, of course, shoot it down—engage it and 

shoot it down. We have no time in which to do that, and it is way 

away from the United States, basically, and we want to keep it way 

away from the United States. 

So it does require that integrated end-to-end system of a number 

of elements—two, three, four, five elements acting simultaneously 

and perfectly, in order to affect that defense that we need, all orchestrated by that Command and Control system that the MDA 

has developed, with the communication system that they have also 

developed. So that integrated network that will evolve over time as 

the technology evolves and as the threat evolves is unique across 

the military department, as I see it. 

Developing that capability from nothing, and continuing to evolve 

it as we go forward requires that continued, I think, special authorities—not a lack of discipline; not a focus on what we are doing 

and cost, schedule, and performance—but a recognition that the capabilities across the portfolio have to be monitored very carefully 

so that we maintain that integrated capability as we go forward. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, General Welch, you started with, ‘‘Missiles 

can be developed faster than defenses,’’ and then went on to the 

second area that my question was going to go into. In recognizing 

the uniqueness of the processes of invention and the timeline being 

longer for creating defenses, as opposed to systems that can be created more quickly by adversaries, and looking at if what we have 

now is sufficient as deployed for our current threats, the evolution, 

as you were discussing, of those threats means that we are going 

to still have to have a system that permits that uniqueness of the 

invention for defenses to thrive. 
15 

You have talked about that future and how we tried to address 

it—what are some of your concerns? What could we do, as Congress, to screw it up that would make it more difficult for that 

uniqueness to thrive? Because we want to make sure that we don’t 

do that. 

General WELCH. I will answer your question explicitly, but I 

think that when we stop talking about ‘‘theater’’ and ‘‘national’’ and 

begin to talk about them as if they were the same thing, there is 

value to that but there is also a problem with that, because they 

are not the same thing. That is, the state of our needs and capabilities for many of the theater defense systems are quite different 

than the mid-course intercept system that is designed to deal with 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) that are intercontinental, or even long-range missiles. 

But having said that, I guess the thing that I would think would 

do the greatest damage to the ability to respond in an agile fashion 

to technological opportunities and to respond to technological disappointments, which always occur, the thing I would worry about 

the most if we pressed this system into the standard mold of the 

5000 Series and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)—it is not a criticism of the 5000 Series and 

JCIDS, although I might do that at another hearing. It is not a 

criticism in this hearing. It is, instead, a recognition that that system is designed to carefully define what you want an individual 

weapon system to be able to do, it is to get complete agreement 

among the joint users and the services as to what those characteristics should be, what they should cost, when they should be delivered; it does not lend itself to adapting technological opportunity or 

dealing with technological disappointment. It is just not designed 

for that. 

And if you tried to do what has been done so far in either of the 

theater systems—that is, Patriot, or THAAD, or the intermediate, 

the Aegis SM–3 or the GBI—if you tried to develop those systems 

within the constraints that I just described, you wouldn’t be nearly 

as far along as you are in any of those systems. So I think that 

would just be highly damaging—press this into that mold it works 

fine, but what is it designed for? It is not designed for this system 

of systems integrated kind of demand. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Ahern. 

Mr. AHERN. Thank you, sir. 

I cannot do any better than General Welch. And my concern 

would be any activity that broke it up as a system. You have a 

right to expect us to develop the Ballistic Missile Defense System 

as a system. The capabilities that we have right now, the authorities that we have right now, make that achievable. Our job, I 

think, is to utilize the discipline that we have, develop the processes through the MDEB and through the Life Cycle Management 

Plan so that we are responsive to the warfighter, address evolving 

technologies, are affordable, do the right thing by the services, but 

always maintain that focus on the need for the integrated system 

that is evolving toward the capability. 

Mr. TURNER. You would concur with General Welch—— 

Mr. AHERN. I cannot say it any better than he did. I tried a couple minutes, but that is exactly what I say. We need to keep it as 
16 

a system. You have a right to expect us to do it the right way within what we have. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I will go to Mr. Pendleton when we go to the second round. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I am happy to go to the gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen, for five minutes. 

Mr. LARSEN. I personally don’t think we can screw it up for you, 

because I think it took a lot of questions from this committee to 

help you all get it—not you all, but for MDA to get it right. So I 

think the record over here is pretty good, from the oversight perspective. 

But getting on to MDEB, Mr. Ahern, is MDEB—is that going to 

be an interim step, or is this now permanent? Or will you all be 

experimenting with MDEB and let it evolve, or should it evolve in 

its oversight role? It has been a positive step, I think, toward it, 

but is that an—is it an interim step to something much more permanent within the Pentagon? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. 

I have served under two under secretaries now, and both of them 

have—Mr. Kreig initiated the MDEB and Mr. Young has certainly 

used it. I think it is a good forum; I think it will evolve in the level 

of attention to the individual elements I discussed, the work that 

we have done with the THAAD. I think we will be doing progressively more of that oversight—insight and then oversight on the individual elements. 

I think it will stay, essentially, with the composition that it is, 

where we have this senior under secretary and assistant secretaries from across the board, representation from all the stakeholders, plus the uniformed services, the JCS, STRATCOM. 

Though it will probably change, sir, I think right now I don’t have 

any specific changes in mind. Our job is to run the agenda for that 

MDEB so that we do get that insight and the opportunity for oversight that is required. 

Mr. LARSEN. This gets at a question for Mr. Pendleton. 

On page 10 of your report, the last full sentence: ‘‘Until DOD establishes a transition and transfer process that adheres to key 

principles for lifecycle management, DOD will be unable to ensure 

that individual elements will be sustained in the long term, and 

DOD’s long-term support planning will continue to face challenges.’’ Based on what Mr. Ahern has testified to both in writing 

and his last comment, does GAO—is this report a little late, or do 

you still see some challenges with the transition and transfer process for the management of the program? 

Mr. PENDLETON. Sir, I think only time is going to tell. The 

Lifecycle Management Process was adopted in September of 2008, 

so it is relatively new. A lot of things are happening right now, and 

so I think the important issue as I look to the future is whether 

the attention is going to be sustained. 

MDEB—there is a lot of personalities involved, lots of very senior 

people, and ballistic missile defense has gotten a lot of attention 

lately. If that were to wane and not as much focus on this, you 

might not see the follow-through to handle what I am talking about 

here. 
17 

Now having said that, there are steps in place. That is from a 

report that we did last year and, we, later in the testimony talk 

about some of the steps that they are taking. But only time is going 

to tell if, in fact, they follow through and sustain their efforts. 

Mr. LARSEN. Can you talk a little bit more about your comment 

in your oral testimony about a better balance needed between balance and flexibility? The MDEB process, again, I think is a positive 

step. The WIP program is very positive. 

But a gnawing thing in the back of my head is that, so long as 

there is a multibillion dollar pool of money for missile defense, the 

services themselves, if they have the responsibility for what they 

wanted, where would these—where would missile defense capabilities for those particular services fit in their entire world of priorities? I just don’t know where they would, you know. 

I am missing a Seapower hearing right now about ship building, 

and, you know, if the Navy had to pick between building ships and 

investing just in Aegis, where would they go with it? If the Army 

had to choose between Future Combat Systems (FCS) and Patriot, 

where would they go? So, I can see where having MDA and MDEB 

in a place to help the services fund and then field those capabilities 

is important, but by the same token, moving forward in the 

sustainment part of it, it seems that it could easily fall apart as 

well. Can you talk about that balance and the—— 

Mr. PENDLETON. Yes, absolutely. And I think you are putting 

your finger on one of my concerns, again, looking forward, and I 

mentioned it in my oral statement, and that is how the defensewide accounts are going to be implemented. In the Lifecycle Management Process, there was an agreement that the services’ O&S 

could be funded out of these central accounts, and I think it is fair 

to say that has helped get them to the table to talk about this, because someone else would, potentially, be paid someone else’s 

money. 

But over the long term, how that works is going to, I think, tell 

the tale here. I mean, under the current plan, as I understand it, 

MDA will still have responsibility for pulling the budget together. 

But one of the key things that is changing is that it is not all 

one color of money. You are going to have different pots of money 

within this central account, so that will help improve transparency. 

But I think it is an open question, as we talked about, how long 

that would last. Is it just a year or two, or is it in perpetuity? 

And where this would fall in service priorities may be different 

today than it was yesterday, because I understand they are going 

through a pretty vigorous budget drill over there. So that would 

probably be dependent on what their top lines were. 

So that part of the question is hard to answer. And I think it is 

a philosophical question about—and it could be made to work either way, whether the services ought to have this money or to have 

to compete within the services, because that creates peril, too, potentially. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Larsen, I think that is where the combatant 

commanders come in, too. 
18 

I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Arizona, 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Madam Chair. And Madam Chair, I 

think the first thing I would like to do is just associate myself with 

some of the perspective and insightful questions that Mr. Turner 

put forward, and take up, if I could, where Mr. Larsen left off. 

One of the critical concerns I have is, if we place some of these 

critically important missile defense systems into the Lead Services, 

it sort of puts them in the difficult position of making some of the 

hard choices that Mr. Larsen spoke of, and I don’t fault them at 

all, I think we put them in extremely hard positions sometimes, in 

a tight budget, to try to make it all work. 

And I am concerned that they may use some of the missile defense—these may become bill-payer programs. And how does the 

DOD plan to approach the integration of these large systems into 

the budget cycle, and how are you going to assure that the appropriate funding will follow? You know, these funding strings are in 

place now for missile defense; will they follow the Lead Service so 

the new system doesn’t become a burden on them and they don’t 

have to essentially pay for the system at the cost of other priorities? 

Mr. Ahern. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. I would be glad to answer that question, or 

address that question. 

The Lead Service is designated at the birth when we decide, or 

when the Department decides, we are going to field that component, as I said. But in the beginning, and for a number of years, 

they have no fiscal responsibilities in the funding of the RDT&E 

up through, and including, the initial procurement and the fielding 

of it. But they will be operating it, and that is the neat transition, 

I think, that we have been talking about this morning. 

And by going with the defense-wide funding in RDT&E, military 

construction (MILCON), procurement, and O&S, particularly as we 

migrate to the O&S, what the vision is, or what the thought process is, is establish what the O&S requirement for that system is 

under the defense-wide umbrella, so it is not fighting within the 

service for resources as it is being birthed at the beginning of the 

fielding; develop that experience in the service and with MDA, because MDA is budgeting—it is part of the MDA budget, the O&S 

for the first couple of years, actually for all—through the fit-up, for 

those like the SBX; and then at the appropriate time, when the 

service and MDA have agreed, through the MOA process, through 

the annex, that the system is ready to be deployed; and that is a 

DOT&E call on effectiveness, survivability, and suitability, the 

service’s call on, yes, you have met my criteria for all the things 

that I want, then the TOA will be transferred from the money, the 

funding in O&S would be transferred—— 

Mr. FRANKS. I am sorry. 

Madam Chair, TOA? 

Mr. AHERN. TOA, I am sorry. Yes, sir. TOA, the Total Obligation 

Authority, a budget for that period of time. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. The money. 

Mr. AHERN. For a year. The money. Thank you, ma’am. 
19 

The money will be transferred to the service. In the beginning, 

of course, the money would be sent over to the service on an annual 

basis. But when that handshake is done and the service has accepted, the transfer is complete, then whatever money is in the books 

goes over to the service, and from there on out the service will be 

funding, will be budgeting, for the lifecycle support. 

Will there be tension in the service? Will that activity have to 

compete with, as mentioned, Aegis ships in the future—yes, sir. 

But I think that it will always have the visibility that it deserves. 

And as we go forward, I want to be sure to make the point that 

the RDT&E for the Ballistic Missile Defense System, the improvement part of it, the evolving part of it—that is always going to be 

with the Missile Defense Agency. 

Mr. FRANKS. Sure. I understand. Well, thank you. 

You know, I also understand that the upcoming 2010 budget, the 

President’s Budget (PB), has constraints that may lead to pretty 

hard decisions by the Department for funding far-term BMD programs, such as, you know, our Satellite Tracking Surveillance System (STSS), Airborne Laser (ABL), Kinetic Energy Interceptor 

(KEI), Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV), and I kind of prefer to call 

these systems sort of national security investment programs, because I believe that is exactly what they are. 

You know, if we had not been able to turn on our GMD when 

North Korea began to field missiles—we called that a far-term program even at the time. And I think we have to start investing in 

these programs now to ensure that we stay ahead of these very 

clearly evolving threats. 

So my question is, once the mature BMD programs like Aegis 

BMD, THAAD, and GMD are fielded, what will the future hold for 

MDA? You know, how will we begin to focus on some of these 

emerging threats and what we are—I think should more likely be 

calling these investment programs, and we need to start now, so 

that we will be prepared to answer the threats in the future. 

And Mr. Ahern, I will go ahead and pick on you again. 

Mr. AHERN. It is a continuing part of the process, sir. 

STRATCOM, as I mentioned earlier, is part of the lifecycle management. STRATCOM puts together their priority lists, their Integrated Priority List (IPL)—it is passed, too. And that is not just 

done by STRATCOM. It is STRATCOM as well as the other combatant commanders, the services, the Integrated Priority List. 

It is passed to the MDA, and again, the services, and the PPBS 

kind of a system, and those requirements are addressed, then, by 

the MDA from a standpoint of technology to begin with and affordability. There is a dialogue back and forth, and it has been noted 

by GAO, as a matter of fact, that the process that we have been 

working on, of having the IPL come in and MDA respond to it, has 

had an impact on what MDA is working on and brings forward in 

a budgeting sense, and we will continue in that process in addressing the warfighters’ needs as identified in their IPL on an annual 

basis as we move forward in the budget. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you. 

Madam Chairman, my light is pretty red. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Yes, it is. Thank you. 
20 

I am happy to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Andrews, for five minutes. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

And thank the witnesses. I apologize for not hearing your oral 

testimony, but I read what you submitted, and I appreciate the 

work that you have done. 

This morning is an echo of a decision made seven years and $56 

billion ago to exempt this agency and this procurement process 

from the general rules that apply to just about everything else, and 

I wanted to walk through the consequences of those exemptions so 

the committee may learn how to avoid some of the problems that 

we are talking about here today. 

Mr. Pendleton, the summary of the report that you have issued 

touches on the three perennial problems we have in this program: 

the inadequate input from the combatant command structure; the 

inadequacy of metrics or meaningful criteria to measure how well 

or how poorly the systems are doing, perhaps by design, perhaps 

by accident; and then the, what I think we could characterize as 

inadequate preparation by the services to actually use these systems once they are fieldable. 

General Welch, I want to ask, if we could go back to 2002, which 

we can’t, and not do the pre-Milestone C exemption that Secretary 

Rumsfeld then created, what would have been different with respect to the interaction with this agency and the combatant commands in the last seven years? How different would the interaction 

have been with those combatant commanders? 

General WELCH. I think to address that you have to take your 

three points individually, because they are quite different in the response. As for the inadequate input from the combatant commands, 

there was no combatant commands assigned any responsibility for 

ballistic missile defense. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

General WELCH. It wasn’t assigned before 2002; it wasn’t assigned in 2002. 

Mr. ANDREWS. And that would have been different had we not 

had this Milestone C exemption, correct? 

General WELCH. No, I don’t believe that would have been different at all. I think it would have been different if someone had 

simply assigned it to a combatant command, because it was eventually assigned to a combatant command with a Milestone C exemption. So I really don’t believe there is a connection there. 

Now, once it was assigned to a combatant command, 

USSTRATCOM, then we began the process by which 

USSTRATCOM collects the other combatant command input. It is 

an imperfect, immature process that is currently evolving, but the 

key to getting the combatant command inputs was to assign the responsibility to someone to collect those inputs. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Why wasn’t that done? 

General WELCH. I have no idea. 

Mr. ANDREWS. We don’t know either. 

General WELCH. I can’t imagine why it wasn’t done. But, and I 

can say—I can give you a stack of studies about that high recommending that it be done. 
21 

Mr. ANDREWS. Had it been done, where do you think we would 

be today that would be different? I know it is impossible that—you 

can’t tell us with certainty, but what is a probable prediction? 

Where would we be today if that assignment had been made? 

General WELCH. I don’t know that we would be in a great deal 

different—a much different place regarding the current physical capabilities. I think we would be in a lot better place in terms of integration within the theaters. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I would think so. 

General WELCH. But on your second point, the metrics. Again, 

we fall into this issue of lumping all of these systems as if they 

were one, and they are not. They are a system of systems. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

General WELCH. And there are metrics for a number of the systems. There are metrics for Aegis SM–3 and for THAAD and—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. But how about GMD? 

General WELCH. For GBI, GMD, I remember the description of 

the initial desire for the initial deployed capability was that it 

should be better than nothing. So that was the metric. And it is. 

Mr. ANDREWS. $56 billion for—or part of the $56 billion for better 

than nothing. 

General WELCH. Well, that money was spent on a lot of 

things—— 

But as for the service preparation, the initial direction, you may 

recall, in the 2002 directive that established MDA, directed that 

MDA do RDT&E and that the services fund both O&S and procurement. It turned out that was simply impractical. Now, the first evidence of the impracticality was the initial deployment of the GBI 

in Alaska because, remember, those missiles were deployed to give 

you an operational capability, but they were also the test assets. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I appreciate that. If I may, because my time is 

about to expire, I appreciate your answers and the written testimony of all three of you. 

I think where this leads us is that, you know, fact-based decision-making was in place in the regular process. It was imperfect; 

our panel is trying to perfect it. But when you exempt something 

from that fact-based decision-making, you are inviting trouble. And 

I think that is what we have here, and it is why we are sitting here 

this morning and hearing from these gentlemen. 

Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Andrews. 

I am now happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Some have expressed concern that, once missile defense assets 

and budget authority are transferred to the military services, the 

services may use missile defense resources to support other mission 

areas. What processes or specific recommendations do you have to 

address this concern? And we will start with Mr. Ahern first. 

Mr. AHERN. As I indicated earlier, we do have the Lifecycle Management Plan process in place, where we develop the budget that 

does include the operations and support. Currently it is in the defense-wide funding, but as we go forward and one or more of the 

elements are—in addition to the Patriot Advanced Capability–3 
22 

(PAC–3)—are transferred to the services, it hasn’t happened yet, 

sir, but I expect that the process will look at the support of that 

element and factor it in; again, because the Ballistic Missile Defense System is a portfolio, a system of systems, where the MDEB, 

which is made up of senior stakeholders from the services and the 

operating forces, including STRATCOM, have to ensure that the 

level of support for the activity for all the elements is valid. I am 

sure that the insight and oversight of the support of the elements, 

as they are fielded and go into O&S, will be robust. It has to be. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Do either of you other gentlemen have something 

to add to that? 

Mr. PENDLETON. Well, we don’t have any specific recommendations about how to keep the services from moving money in the future, but what we have called for is for the systems, as soon as you 

can, to estimate what it will cost to support them, have that independently verified, and then decide how it is going to be funded. 

Then you monitor the execution. So, I mean, that is kind of where 

we focused our work to deal with, I think, the concern that you are 

raising. 

General WELCH. And while it has been a long time, I was once 

a service programmer and service chief, and I remember funding 

a lot of things that I didn’t think were very important, but the Secretary of Defense did think they were important, and therefore, 

they were funded. Now, if that is not the case in the Department 

of Defense anymore, we are in very serious trouble, but I believe 

it is. 

So the priorities are not set by the services. The services have 

their priorities, and there are other priorities set by the Secretary 

of Defense and the President, and those are overriding and should 

be overriding. 

I would also add, I don’t think you should have an institutionalized priority. If there are priority conflicts between the Army funding of a piece of the missile defense system and the Army funding 

of other things that the Army thinks are very important, I think 

that is a very natural tension, and that needs to be sorted out 

above the Army, not within the Army, and the process exists to do 

that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. And by the way, congratulations on your award last night. I was there to see you receive that. 

My second question has to do with a statement that President 

Obama made during the State of the Union—so-called State of the 

Union address. He said that we need to reform our defense budget 

so that we are not paying for Cold War-era weapons systems we 

don’t use—Cold War-era weapons systems we don’t use. And I am 

trying to figure out what that means. I think we will have more 

guidance—we all will—in a few weeks or a couple of months, even, 

when we get his proposed budget for defense, we will know better 

what he means by that, but I would not characterize missile defense as anywhere near a Cold War-era system that we don’t use. 

It is cutting-edge technology; it has been deployed just in the last 

few years. It still needs to be improved, but we are working rapidly 

on that, and when I think of Cold War-era systems, I think of some 

things from the 1960s or 1970s. But would any of you characterize 

missile defense as a ‘‘Cold War-era weapons system we don’t use’’? 
23 

General WELCH. Well, in a way I would, and I would say that 

is a very positive statement. The whole purpose of most of the Cold 

War weapons is to not to ever have to use them. And in fact, the 

greatest outcome of all would be if we have an effective missile defense system that we never use. I think that is the objective. 

Mr. LAMBORN. I don’t think we could improve on that, so I am 

going to yield the rest of my time. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. 

We are going to start round two questioning. I want to get back 

to the issue of the combatant commanders. Last year, the GAO reported that DOD had failed to establish an effective process for 

identifying, adjudicating, and addressing the combatant commanders’ priorities for ballistic missile defense capabilities. 

What role have the combatant commands played in shaping the 

development of Ballistic Missile Defense Systems? Are we meeting 

the COCOMs’ requirements? If not, can we provide specific examples, and what needs to be done? And I guess I would like to 

have—since GAO has already spoken up, I would like to have General Welch and Mr. Ahern address that. 

General WELCH. Well, again, I think to address that you have to 

look at the individual systems, and I won’t go through them all but, 

for example, clearly the missile defense capabilities that are in the 

Aegis SM–3 are systems that came from combatant command requirements. Clearly, the Patriot came from combatant command 

requirements. So, most of the sensors and, certainly all of the 

warning systems, came from combatant command requirements. 

So the issue is this set of new capabilities that were introduced 

with the increased emphasis, and they are—once the WIP program 

was underway, after the responsibility was assigned to 

USSTRATCOM, immediately they came up with the Priority Capabilities List, and then how the Priority Capabilities List became the 

Achievable Capabilities List (ACL). I think, initially, that was a 

one-circuit process and the combatant commanders weren’t happy 

with it, because they didn’t see their PCLs adequately reflected in 

the ACL. 

Now it has become an integrative process, and I think over time 

will much better reflect what the combatant commanders believe 

they need. And it is a fact of life that before combatant commanders get very serious about saying they want something, they 

have to have some indication that they could actually have it—that 

is, it actually exists. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Ahern. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, ma’am. I think we have set up the process. And 

again, as many times I have said this morning, now it is our job 

to make that process work. STRATCOM has issued an instruction 

in June, I think it is, organizing the WIP. We have sent out—Secretary England sent out that paper on how we will do the planning. 

We exercised it in 2010; we are going to get started shortly for 

2011. 

And then I would say, finally, if the COCOMs don’t feel that they 

are being heard, my experience in the building is that they are not 

reluctant to call him directly. Though I do think—and I am not 

being facetious—that the PCL, to the ACL, to the dialogue where 

we have the operations committee, we have the planning and budg-
24 

et committees, they are going to be responsive to the COCOMs’ 

needs as organized by STRATCOM and, as General Welch said, affordable and that technology is available to answer their requirement. I think we have the process to make it work. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Pendleton, in the past, GAO has been critical 

of DOD’s approach to management and oversight of the Missile Defense Agency, claiming that the flexibility MDA has enjoyed has 

come at the cost of oversight and accountability. And, you know, I 

think that the issue of making sure that we don’t break the systems up and all of that, you know, is almost a red herring. I think 

the real question is, how do we have the environment for very aggressive innovation at the same time that we can have accountability and responsibility? 

They are not mutually exclusive. We have done it before; we can 

do it again. And I think that that is what this subcommittee’s 

record is. The record is that we understand what the challenges of 

the science and the technology, and especially the need to integrate 

systems of systems, that you also have to—because we are the 

United States Government, have responsibility fiduciarily to the 

American people. You have to also have accountability. And so I 

think that what has happened over the time that we have created 

the—that the MDEB has been created, that it has the real potential to improve DOD oversight. 

How does the MDEB, Mr. Pendleton, compare to the previous 

missile defense oversight body, such as the Missile Defense Support Group? What is your current assessment of the MDEB’s ability to provide oversight sufficiently? Do you have any recommendations—and actually, these recommendations on how you make 

MDEB better can be in writing; you don’t have to talk about them 

unless you integrate them. 

Mr. PENDLETON. We have talked some about it, and it does look 

promising. You have got senior-level leaders, and as I have said before, efforts are going to have to be sustained. MDEB has been 

more active than the previous group. They have, as Mr. Ahern indicated, had several meetings. 

And what I saw in reviewing the documents—I requested, and 

they provided, a number of documents that laid out the results of 

all the meetings. There were no minutes kept, and the agendas 

seemed to be fairly fluid, but I did see a number of decisions taken. 

And so you saw a—I saw an evolution even from the early days of 

the MDEB where MDA seemed to be dominating the agenda—they 

were documenting the results—to Mr. Young—Dave, you can correct me if I have got this wrong—became very active—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I agree. 

Mr. PENDLETON [continuing]. And started taking actions. 

In terms of recommendations about the MDEB itself, other than 

the sort of obvious transparency—you know, I am in the oversight 

business, so, you know, I am always in favor of transparency. I 

think the acid test for me is going to be: Over time, does the MDEB 

ensure that the kind of structural, basic management problems 

that we have laid out in our reports, and that we have been talking 

about here today, get dealt with? That it is not the issue of the day, 

it is not an ad hoc, you know, kind of deal, and that attention is 

paid to making sure that all the various stakeholders have their 
25 

say, that costs are managed and acquisitions managed appropriately, and that planning is done for where the real costs of some 

of these systems are going to be, and that is in the back end. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Right. 

Mr. Ahern, do you have—— 

Mr. AHERN. I would add a couple of points. We talked earlier 

about the hybrid, or the Joint Program Offices, that are initiated 

right as the Lead Service has designated, and that is an important 

way to begin to cast that light on the O&S. 

The other thing we haven’t talked about this morning is the Missile Defense Agency has established a vigorous set of meetings, on 

a quarterly basis, with each one of the services, called their board 

of directors, so that the Navy board of directors and Air Force 

board of directors. I go to them—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. That is relatively new. 

Mr. AHERN. Very new. And it focuses on every program and 

every detail of interest to the service when they are there. So we 

do get that track on where we are, and it is a great thing to see, 

because it is not DOD or OSD looking over their shoulder, it is the 

two getting together and exchanging information and status. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. That is an innovation of General O’Reilly’s. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes. Well, I think they were there, but he certainly 

has upped the game. So I recognize what Mr. Pendleton is saying, 

and it is like the rest of the programs across the Department of Defense: We have to walk the walk that we talk. And that is what 

my job is. We have the support, the MDEB, the stakeholders, we 

have the rules, and now we have to make them work. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

Oh, you are not Mr. Turner. 

Mr. FRANKS. He is much more handsome than I am. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, I am not too sure about that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Most people are. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General Welch, I want to just, if I could for a moment, to touch 

on something you spoke to Mr. Lamborn about. Obviously, you 

know, I agree with you completely: The best system—the best missile defense system is one that impresses upon a potential adversary its efficacy to the degree that they simply don’t challenge it, 

and you hope that it never has to be used. I have said many times, 

you know, that if the day comes when we have to stand before the 

American people to apologize for building an expensive missile system that we never had to use, I would be happy to stand in the 

front of that line and humbly apologize. But, God save us from the 

day when we face a tragedy that could have been averted if we had 

built a system that was within our priority to build. 

But isn’t it true, I mean—and again, I don’t challenge your fundamental statement at all, in fact, I agree with you completely— 

but in a sense, strategic weapons might be considered relics of the 

Cold War. We use them every day because they, just by existing, 

are a very critical part of our defense. And of course, I am concerned that, you know, if we don’t have equal insight into the future, that we may face some perfect challenges. 
26 

Now, let me just say in significant deference to everyone on the 

committee here, my next statement indicts Republicans as much as 

it does Democrats, but I am concerned now that we didn’t move 

quickly enough in the European missile defense site, and that we 

should have made more progress quicker, and it could have put 

downward pressure on Iran’s nuclear ambitions in a much more effective way. And now we face the situation where I am very afraid 

that this Administration may either cancel or delay or put that system where it is so far out that it will not have any effect on Iran’s 

program, and that that may change the paradigm of our future in 

a pretty profound way. 

So let me try to get to my question here. In terms of what are 

called far-term systems and sciences that we need to emphasize, let 

me just quote the report the IDA report recommends. It says, 

‘‘Within the spectrum of MDA RDT&E activities, science and technology should receive renewed emphasis and increased funding.’’ 

What MDA science and technology efforts do you believe require 

particular emphasis and funding, especially as it relates to future 

threats that we may face? 

General WELCH. Among the more critical issues, of course, are 

dealing with countermeasures. And while staying at the unclassified level, there are clearly understood capabilities that we need to 

deal with those countermeasures, some of which we are quite confident in the technologies, and some of which we are not, some of 

which require increased S&T—to provide those capabilities. That 

would be at the top of my list. 

There are actually some almost—I guess I would characterize 

them S&T issues—that have to do with Command and Control and 

battle management. Simply moving the information around and integrating the information and moving it at the pace it needs to be 

moved. 

Again, it is fairly unique to the demands of the global missile defense issue. So I think those would be the two on the top of my list, 

but they are pretty big issues. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, maybe I would just follow up, General, because I think you are absolutely right. You know, there was a time 

when those were strong missile defense advocates had to try to 

break through the argument that we could never hit a bullet with 

a bullet, you know, the technology itself was impossible to achieve. 

And now we kind of face that same paradigm when we are talking about countermeasures. You know, there is just no way we will 

ever be able to come up with a system that will deal with the potential adversary’s advantage, because it is a lot easier to create 

countermeasures than it would be to create a system to deal with 

them. But I still think that is the equation in front of us, and of 

course I, again, at the non-classified level, believe that we are moving in some very positive directions in that area and believe that 

we will prevail there. 

One example would be, you know, our boost-phase programs. I 

believe Airborne Laser is another thing that I—again, this might 

be a little bit more controversial, but I am very concerned about 

Airborne Laser. I am concerned that we may see that system cancelled under this Administration, and I think that is an extremely 

dangerous thought because the laser technology, I believe, is to 
27 

missile defense what the computer chip was to the computer industry. It travels at Mach 870,000. I mean, it gives us the ability to, 

essentially, do away with most of the countermeasure arguments 

because they are never deployed in the first place if Airborne Laser 

is taken. 

That will be my last question, Madam Chair. 

Do you think, General, that systems like Airborne Laser are important to the debate related to the countermeasure challenge that 

we face? I am putting you on the spot, and I am sorry. 

General WELCH. That is okay. That is why I am happy to answer. I think there are, because it is very much related to the way 

you started this conversation. There are huge technological issues 

associated with effective laser systems. And while the Airborne 

Laser, in my view, is something that we need to have, we need to 

be flying, and we need to be learning about it, but there are also 

advanced technologies that would make a system order of magnitude more effective, and we need to be making investments in 

those technologies. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I would agree with that completely. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Turner—you are not Mr. Turner. 

I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Pendleton, on page 12 of your testimony you discuss one of 

three concerns and challenges you have. I won’t read the whole 

paragraph there; it is fairly lengthy. But again, the last sentence— 

you guys seem to put all your main statements in the last sentence, not the first. I write differently than you all. 

‘‘As a result of these limitations, DOD and the services would 

face unknown financial obligations for supporting ballistic missile 

defense fielding plans, and that most of these costs would not be 

reflected in DOD’s future years’ spending plan for fiscal years 2010 

through 2015.’’ And the basis of that conclusion is some of the research you have done, but also it certainly relates to the Lifecycle 

Management Process that the DOD has established. 

I am going to do a little switch here. The question is actually for 

Mr. Ahern on there. But I am curious on how the Lifecycle Management Process looks beyond, say—will look beyond the next 

year’s budget and into years three, four, five, six, seven, and so on? 

It seems to me that the basis of the criticism and the challenge 

that GAO is reporting here is that you may not have a good enough 

handle looking farther out in this process. Can you talk a little bit 

about how this process looks a little further out than this? 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. As it looks to me, there are going to be fixed 

and variable costs in the O&S regime, in the same way we do with 

any standard system. And I think the way we are looking at it 

right now is, as we can—for some of the fixed sites, we will be able 

to get the fixed cost fairly quickly, I think, and then the variable 

costs will be the operations, the sustainment, the manpower, that 

sort of thing that I mentioned earlier we need to gain some experience on before we are able to lock it down. 

So I think the first budget inflow, when asked for the elements, 

it will be in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 10 and in 
28 

O&S. It is going to be refined, improved upon when we get to 2012, 

and refined again when we get to 2014. And I would say, analogous 

to what we do with the other weapons systems as we move forward 

and gain experience moving from initial deployment to full-rate 

production and forward on. 

I hope I have answered your question. That is nontrivial; it is 

going to be something that we will start with based on the lifecycleestimating expertise that we have and then, as we gain that experience, inform the budget in the subsequent POM cycles, which I 

think is one of the reasons why starting to do this with defensewide is attractive, so that we do nail it down before the services 

are responsible for that funding. 

Mr. LARSEN. To put a little different light, or a little different 

spin, just for myself, this would be like interpreting TOA into 

money for me. 

Mr. AHERN. I am sorry. I am sorry I did that to you earlier. 

Mr. LARSEN. I am going to interpret this a little bit to say that 

the reality is, you are doing this as a pilot in 2010; you are testing 

it in 2010. 2011 becomes more firm, and 2012 more firm, and 2014 

more firm; and you are going to learn along the way how to better 

incorporate these longer-term costs into the program. 

Mr. AHERN. Yes, sir. For every one of the systems. Some of them 

aren’t yet ready to go out into field, so the O&S cost for the Ballistic Missile Defense System will be an event in every budget, as 

was mentioned here in the room earlier, really, of—I think General 

Welch mentioned it again—of the priorities in the system. And 

every year we will be able to establish a baseline for the system, 

there is no doubt about that, as we have done with the other weapons. 

But then it will, every year, based on utilization, one thing or another, there will be whether it is 2010, 2012, 2014, as we add more 

systems, move more Aegis, and have that capability go up. So every 

year, just as with every other weapons system, we will be going 

through the O&S. 

Mr. LARSEN. And then, Mr. Pendleton, in the short time I have, 

then is that on your work plan, then, over the next several years— 

GAO? 

Mr. PENDLETON. Yes. We have an annual mandate to look at the 

progress of the program. We have done the work for this subcommittee under individual requests, so certainly the subcommittee can continue to have us look at that operations and support, how that is managed in the budget, and we would be happy 

to do that. I certainly think that would be worthwhile. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, great. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Franks, do you have any further questions? 

Mr. FRANKS. No, ma’am. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, gentlemen, thank you very much for appearing before the committee today. I just want to, for the record, 

set some parameters for what I think it is important for us to be 

talking about. And I know that there is sensitivity among significant promoters of missile defense that President Obama’s budget 

is going to trim some of the investments that are being made and, 

considering the fact that we have raging deficits and debt and 
29 

other things, I think that the President is going to make the right 

decisions on what these investments will be, and I think that missile defense will not be singled out to take any cuts. I think that 

there will be cuts across the board, and that is a decision that Congress will be part of, and that the American people will weigh in 

on as we go through the budgetary process. 

But I think the question really isn’t whether the long-range system that was proposed in Europe, whether that is going to be funded or not. The Congress has made very clear what their parameters 

for that is. 

The Congress, in the last defense bill, said that there will be no 

further deployment of the long-range system in Europe until three 

things happen. The first is that we had a study to make sure that 

the system proposed was the appropriate system; the second was 

that the Secretary certify that the system was tested sufficiently; 

and that the system, having everybody agreeing that it hasn’t been 

tested sufficiently, be tested sufficiently. So I think that that is the 

status of things. 

But I think, most importantly, regarding Europe, the question 

really shouldn’t be whether we are going to deploy the long-range 

system in Europe any time soon. The question is, why haven’t we 

deployed the short-range system to protect our allies, our assets, 

and our forward deployed troops, against existing threats? 

The largest holder of short- and medium-range missiles in that 

theater, in the Middle East, are the Iranians. Right now, we currently have no missile defense system deployed to protect our forward deployed troops, our warfighters, our assets. And that is, I 

think, the real question. 

So I think it is important for us to look at the long-range threat 

from Iranian missile; they certainly have not abated. As they have 

watched us build a long-range system, they certainly—extensive 

system—they certainly have not abated, in my opinion, in their 

ambitions either for a ballistic missile capability or for, perhaps, a 

nuclear weapon, which we certainly cannot tolerate. But the real 

question is, why haven’t we deployed short- and medium-range systems to defeat their existing threat? 

And so, we thank you very much for appearing before us today. 

We depend on your work and your patriotism. The subcommittee 

thanks you, and the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 26, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 26, 2009 

(35) 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 

Æ