NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL REGENOLD, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0436 PRPC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-113190-001

The Honorable Michael W. Kemp, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix

By Gerald R. Grant

Counsel for Respondent

Christopher Michael Regenold, Florence

Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

FILED 9-26-2017
STATE v. REGENOLD

Decision of the Court

2

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Christopher Michael Regenold petitions this court for review 

from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief of-right. We 

have considered the petition for review and, for the reasons stated, grant 

review and deny relief.

¶2 Regenold, who had previously been convicted of luring a 

minor for sexual exploitation, was charged with ten counts of sexual 

exploitation of a minor after authorities found numerous images of child 

pornography on his computer. Regenold pled guilty to one count of sexual 

exploitation of a minor, a dangerous crime against children, and three 

counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, also dangerous crimes 

against children. The superior court accepted the plea and sentenced 

Regenold to a 20-year prison term for the sexual exploitation of a minor 

offense, followed by lifetime probation for the attempted offenses.

¶3 Regenold timely commenced post-conviction relief of-right 

proceedings, and elected to represent himself. He presented three claims, 

all of which rested on his mistaken belief that an identified victim is an 

element of sexual exploitation of a minor pursuant to Arizona Revised 

Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-3553(A)(2). He asserted that (1) because the 

State failed to present any evidence of the identities of the victims depicted 

in the images he possessed, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law 

to support a factual basis for his convictions; (2) because the indictment 

failed to allege the victims' identities, the indictment was jurisdictionally 

defective and the superior court lacked jurisdiction to render judgment or 

impose sentence; and (3) because the evidence was insufficient as a matter 

of law to support a factual basis for his convictions, he is actually innocent 

and entitled to relief pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.1(h).

¶4 The State responded that neither the relevant statutes nor case 

law require proof of the identity of the minor depicted in the image as an 

element of sexual exploitation of a minor. The superior court agreed, 

finding that the "statutes in question (A.R.S. § 13-3551 and 13-3553) do not 

require any such identification. The only requirement is that the victim 

must be under the age of eighteen years and be an actual human being 

rather than a fictitious or simulated person." The court denied Regenold's 

motion for rehearing, and this petition for review followed.

¶5 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, we will not 

disturb a superior court's ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief. 
STATE v. REGENOLD

Decision of the Court

3

State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012). Regenold has not shown 

any abuse of discretion or error of law.

¶6 On review, Regenold argues that the superior court abused its 

discretion when it failed to follow State v. Olquin, 216 Ariz. 250 (App. 2007), 

which Regenold claims directly supports his position that the identity of 

the "actual minor" depicted in the image is an element of sexual exploitation 

of a minor. This argument lacks merit. Olquin stands for the proposition 

that a victim's identity is an element of a criminal offense when the 

language of the statute defining the offense provides that the prohibited 

conduct is committed against another person. Id. at 254, ¶ 21. Regenold's 

crimes were not committed "against another person." His crimes were 

committed by possessing contraband. In other words, the relevant portion 

of A.R.S. § 13–3553(A)(2) does not prohibit conduct against another person. 

It only requires proof that Regenold "possess[ed] . . . any visual depiction 

in which a minor is engaged in exploitative exhibition or other sexual 

conduct." A.R.S. § 13–3553(A)(2).

¶7 To the extent Regenold relies on the fact that his crimes were 

dangerous crimes against children to support his argument, we reject the 

argument because a "dangerous crime against children" is not a criminal 

offense; it is merely a classification and designation of certain criminal 

offenses subject to more severe penalties. See A.R.S. § 13–705; State v. 

Wagstaff, 164 Ariz. 485, 490 (1990) (explaining that the legislature’s purpose 

in enacting the Dangerous Crimes Against Children Act was to protect 

children and provide for more severe punishments for crimes against 

them).

¶8 Based on the foregoing, we grant review and deny relief.