Of the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. *

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

Nos. 06-1274, 06-2390, 06-2391, 06-2392, 06-2569, 07-1086

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

PAUL A. DECOLOGERO; JOHN P. DECOLOGERO, JR.; PAUL J. DECOLOGERO;

JOSEPH F. PAVONE,

Defendants, Appellants.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch, Chief Judge,

Merritt, Senior Circuit Judge, *

and Howard, Circuit Judge.

Alexander Bunin for appellant Paul A. DeCologero.

Mark W. Shea with whom Jean C. LaRocque and Shea, LaRocque &

Wood, LLP were on brief for appellant John P. DeCologero, Jr.

Jeanne M. Kempthorne with whom Doug Cannon and Law Office of

Jeanne M. Kempthorne were on brief for appellant Paul J.

DeCologero.

Raymond Mansolillo for appellant Joseph F. Pavone.

Kirby A. Heller, Attorney, Criminal Division, United States

Department of Justice, with whom Michael J. Sullivan, United States

Attorney, Timothy Q. Feeley, Assistant United States Attorney, and

Christopher F. Bator, Assistant United States Attorney, were on
brief for appellee.

June 23, 2008
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 1

U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.

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LYNCH, Chief Judge. Paul A. DeCologero ("Paul A."), his

nephews Paul J. DeCologero ("Paul J.") and John P. DeCologero, Jr.

("John Jr."), and their friend Joseph F. Pavone appeal their

assorted RICO, robbery, drug dealing, witness tampering, firearms, 1

and related conspiracy convictions. After a thirty-nine day trial

on eighteen counts, each defendant was found guilty on some and

acquitted on other of the charges. Each now raises multiple claims

on appeal regarding the management of the trial, evidentiary

rulings, the sufficiency of the evidence against them, and other

discrete matters.

We affirm the convictions and also reject John Jr.'s

sentencing appeal.

I.

Because three of the defendants question the sufficiency

of the evidence behind their convictions, we relate the facts in

the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. SotoBeníquez, 356 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2004). We trace the general

contours of the case here and leave further recounting for the

analysis of particular arguments.

Paul A. ran a criminal enterprise (the "DeCologero crew")

based out of a gym he operated in Woburn, Massachusetts. Paul J.,

John Jr., Pavone, and other associates assisted Paul A. in his
There was conflicting testimony about the exact date of 2

this criminal episode, but it appears to have occurred at some

point in 1995.

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efforts to control a portion of Boston's drug trade. Part of the

crew's modus operandi was to beat up and to steal drugs and cash

from other drug dealers. Aislin Silva, a young woman who was a

friend of crew member Stephen DiCenso, was murdered and dismembered

in an effort to protect the crew's activities.

Each defendant was convicted of conspiracy to engage in

a pattern of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), as well as

the substantive offense of engaging in a pattern of racketeering

activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). These convictions required that

each defendant be found to have committed at least two predicate

racketeering acts, which could be either state or federal crimes.

A table of the counts and racketeering acts is provided in the

appendix. We summarize the racketeering acts for which at least

some of the defendants were convicted.

A. Soccorso Robbery - 19952

In 1995, Paul A. sent John Jr. and Thomas Regan to the

house of Philip Soccorso, a marijuana dealer, to steal drugs from

him. Regan tricked Soccorso into leaving his house and then forced

him into their car at gun point. When Soccorso refused to disclose

the location of his drugs, Regan and John Jr. drove to Paul A.'s

house to pick him up and, as Regan recounted, Paul A. "read

[Soccorso] the riot act" about dealing drugs in Paul A.'s
This is Regan's version of the order of events. Soccorso 3

and Ramus testified that Paul A. was picked up after Ramus was

forced into the car.

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territory. To add emphasis, John Jr. hit Soccorso with a handgun.

Eventually Soccorso told them that his supplier, Gary Ramus, who

was back at Soccorso's house, might have some drugs. They returned

to the house, and Regan forced Ramus into the car at gunpoint.3

After some more haranguing (also at gunpoint), Soccorso and Ramus

agreed to give Paul A. the marijuana stashed at Soccorso's house.

Regan, Ramus, and Soccorso testified for the government

at trial. The jury found that Paul A. and John Jr. had committed

the racketeering acts of armed robbery, the kidnaping of Soccorso

and Ramus, and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

B. Pesaturo Robbery - November 1995

Around November 1995, Paul A. agreed with Regan that

Richie Pesaturo, another drug dealer, needed to be taught a lesson

because he owed Regan money and had been "running his mouth" about

the crew. On Paul A.'s orders, Regan, Paul J., and John Jr. went

to Pesaturo's apartment, where John Jr. and Regan beat Pesaturo and

Regan "read[] him the riot act." The three crew members then

ransacked the apartment until they found Pesaturo's cocaine supply

and $11,000. Before leaving, the three men bound Pesaturo and his

roommate Richard Bentley, who had returned home during the course

of the robbery, with duct tape. They then went to Paul A.'s place

to divide up the proceeds.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) ("Whoever in any way or degree 4

obstructs, delays or affects commerce or the movement of any

article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or

attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical

violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or

purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined

. . . or imprisoned . . . .").

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Regan and Bentley testified at trial about this robbery

and beating. The jury found that Paul A., John Jr., and Paul J.

had committed the racketeering acts of robbery under the Hobbs

Act, the kidnaping of Pesaturo and Bentley, and possession of 4

cocaine with intent to distribute.

C. Finethy Extortion - January/February 1996

In January or February 1996, Paul A. sent John Jr. and

Pavone to the house of Shane Finethy, who sold marijuana on Paul

A.'s behalf. Finethy had kept $8000 in proceeds from drug sales

without Paul A.'s permission, using it for a down payment on a

house, and had failed to pay Paul A. back. Upon arrival, John Jr.

realized that Finethy had sold the house in question and was

preparing to move. John Jr. became angry, and he and Pavone hit

Finethy until his face was covered with blood; after Finethy's wife

and baby came into the room, Finethy left the house and John Jr.

and Pavone followed. Out on the street, they attempted to force

Finethy into their car, with John Jr. threatening Finethy at

gunpoint. The arrival of a police cruiser broke up the scene, and

Finethy returned to his house.
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Finethy and his wife testified at trial, and the jury

found that Paul A., John Jr., and Pavone had committed the

racketeering act of extortion.

D. Sapochetti Robbery - October 1996

In the fall of 1996, Kevin Meuse and Derek Capozzi were

released from jail and joined the DeCologero crew. That October,

the crew planned to rob and kill Albert "Big Al" Sapochetti, a

bookmaker and drug dealer. With Paul A.'s agreement, John Jr. and

Meuse robbed Sapochetti at gunpoint and beat him, leaving him, his

neighbor, and his girlfriend hog tied with duct tape and wires.

John Jr. and Meuse threatened to return for more money and told

Sapochetti they were sparing his life because of his girlfriend's

presence.

Sapochetti's girlfriend testified at trial. In addition

to finding that Paul A. and John Jr. had committed the racketeering

acts of kidnaping all three victims, the jury also convicted them

of using or carrying a firearm, or aiding and abetting such use,

during the commission of a violent crime. The government alleged

that Paul J. participated in this robbery as well, but the jury

found his participation not proved.

E. Stevens Robbery - October 1996

Also in October 1996, the crew targeted Michael "Slim"

Stevens, who was selling marijuana in Paul A.'s territory. Paul A.

gave guns to Regan, Capozzi, and Meuse and sent them with Stephen
DiCenso testified that all three men were inside North's 5

apartment. Regan, however, testified that only he and DiCenso went

inside the apartment. Paul J.'s father, John P. DeCologero, Sr.,

also testified that his son had told him that he had remained

outside the apartment.

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DiCenso, another member of the DeCologero crew, to Stevens's

townhouse. Regan and Capozzi beat Stevens and threatened to cut

off his ear with a knife. Stevens eventually turned over what

money he had and led Regan and Capozzi to a stash of marijuana.

Before leaving, Regan and Capozzi tied up Stevens, his girlfriend,

and another friend of Stevens who had arrived during the robbery.

Stevens, his girlfriend, Regan, and DiCenso testified

about this incident at trial. The jury convicted Paul A. of

robbery under the Hobbs Act, possession of marijuana with the

intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm

during the commission of a violent crime. These crimes, along with

armed robbery and kidnaping, were also proved as to Paul A. as

racketeering acts under RICO.

F. North Burglary - October 1996

The crew also burgled the home of Jeffrey North, another

marijuana dealer, that same October. When DiCenso told Paul A.

that North was in jail pending bail, Paul A. sent DiCenso, Paul J.,

and Regan to burgle North's apartment. DiCenso broke into the

apartment and, with the help of the others, found a cache of

weapons, two safes, night vision goggles, and about ten pounds of

marijuana. The burglars packed most of the goods into duffel bags 5
DiCenso testified that other guns obtained in the North 6

robbery included an AK-47 (assault rifle), an AR-15 (semi-automatic

rifle), and a Desert Eagle (semi-automatic pistol), as well as some

handguns. Regan put the number of weapons removed from the

apartment, other than those in the safes, at six to eight rifles in

addition to a box of hand grenades.

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and heaved the safes over the balcony of the apartment to the yard

below. They then loaded "the bags, a box of grenades, and the

safes" into a car and returned to Paul A.'s house. There Meuse

pried open the safes in the presence of the others. The safes

contained various firearms, including two MAC-11s (submachine

gun/pistol), an Uzi (submachine gun), and another machine gun with

a silencer, as well as money and more drugs. Paul A. gave most of 6

the guns to DiCenso to store in the home of Aislin Silva, a

nineteen-year-old woman who permitted her friend DiCenso to keep

drugs in her apartment on behalf of the crew.

In connection with this burglary, Paul A. and Paul J.

were found guilty of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to

distribute, which the jury also found to be a racketeering act, and

of being felons in possession of a firearm.

G. Silva Witness Tampering and Murder - November 1996

Paul A. went to Silva's apartment later that month with

DiCenso and Vincent Marino (a.k.a. Gigi Portalla) to show Marino

the guns. On November 5, when DiCenso and Paul J. returned to

Silva's apartment on Paul A.'s instructions to pick up some of the

guns, they found the police, who had received a tip about the guns,
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already there. When DiCenso and Paul J. entered the apartment, the

guns were in plain view on the floor and the police were

questioning Silva; they questioned Paul J. and DiCenso as well and

then allowed them to leave.

DiCenso and Paul J. reported back to Paul A. and the crew

-- Pavone, Meuse, Regan, Capozzi, and John P. DeCologero, Sr.

("John Sr."), the father of John Jr. and Paul J. -- who were

gathered at Pavone's house. Paul A. instructed Pavone and Meuse to

rent a motel room and sent DiCenso and Capozzi to pick up Silva.

Also on Paul A.'s instructions, DiCenso stayed with Silva for the

next two nights in different motel rooms. On November 7, another

meeting was held at Pavone's house with Silva present. DiCenso

testified that he, Capozzi, Meuse, Pavone, and Paul A. were there,

though he could not remember at what point Pavone arrived. Paul A.

told Silva that their "attorneys were out of town, but they would

take care of everything," and that in the meantime, Paul A. would

arrange for Silva to be taken on a shopping spree in New York City,

accompanied by DiCenso. Pavone drove DiCenso and Silva to New York

that night in a limousine that Paul A. had borrowed from an

associate, Anthony ("Tony") Bucci. Pavone returned to Boston while

DiCenso and Silva spent five nights in New York City.

When DiCenso and Silva returned to Boston on November 12,

they went to Pavone's house, where the others were gathered.

There, DiCenso, Paul A., and Meuse spoke privately in the kitchen.
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DiCenso told Paul A. that he did not think Silva would "hold up"

under police questioning, to which Paul A. responded, "She has to

be killed." Paul A.'s first plan was for DiCenso to give Silva

some high-grade heroin, telling her it was "really good cocaine";

DiCenso was then to wait until Silva was dead before calling 911 to

report the overdose. If Silva did not ingest sufficient heroin to

cause a fatal overdose, Meuse was to blow more of it up her nose.

To this end, Paul A. sent Paul J. to Antonio Centeno, a heroin

dealer in Lowell. Centeno testified that Paul J. asked him for

heroin "strong enough for an overdose" and that he sold Paul J.

thirty bags of heroin. Although Silva did ingest some of this

heroin, it did not have its intended effect. Moving to a new plan,

Paul A. told Meuse to kill her.

The morning of November 13, Meuse arrived at DiCenso's

apartment, where Silva was staying, and sent DiCenso to the

hardware store to buy a hacksaw and sheet metal cutters. When

DiCenso returned, Silva was dead, and Meuse told DiCenso he had

broken her neck. Capozzi arrived to help, and the three men

dismembered Silva's body in the bathtub and packed her remains into

trash bags. They drove north, stopping at a Home Depot to purchase

lime and a shovel, and buried Silva's remains in the woods along

the North Shore. They then disposed of the remaining evidence in

a dumpster in Danvers, washed the car, and stopped at a department

store to buy three pairs of sneakers and three sweatsuits.
On the government's motion, a seventh co-defendant, 7

Daniel Tsoukalas, was severed from the case and tried separately.

Shortly after Silva's murder, DiCenso and his friends

overdosed on the heroin originally intended to kill Silva. Two of

the friends died; DiCenso survived but suffered serious and

permanent injuries. Once the government was able to prove Dicenso

was still competent enough to stand trial, DiCenso agreed to plead

guilty and testified at this trial through the use of special

equipment. 

Regan also agreed to testify for the government as part

of a plea agreement. Meuse hanged himself in 1997. 

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DiCenso testified to the details of the murder described

above at trial; his testimony was supported by physical evidence

recovered by the police. Paul A., Paul J., and Pavone were all

convicted of conspiracy to tamper with a witness and tampering with

a witness by misleading conduct; Paul A. and Paul J. were also

convicted of tampering with a witness by attempted murder, and Paul

A. was convicted of tampering with a witness by murder. These

crimes, along with the state-law crimes of murder, attempted

murder, and conspiracy to murder, were also found as racketeering

acts under the substantive RICO charge.

II.

Paul A., Paul J., John Jr., Pavone, John Sr., and Capozzi

were indicted by a federal grand jury in the District of

Massachusetts on October 17, 2001.7

Paul A. moved to dismiss the RICO charges against him on

double jeopardy grounds, an argument based on an earlier trial.

The motion was denied; the denial was appealed. In United States
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v. DeCologero, 364 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2004), this court rejected

that appeal. We explain the background. 

In an earlier trial, United States v. Carrozza, No. 4:97-

cr-40009-NMG (D. Mass. 1999), Paul A. was prosecuted for helping

the Carrozza faction of the Patriarca crime family undertake a

violent "war" between 1989 and 1994 in an attempt to wrest control

of that criminal organization from Frank Salemme's faction. See

United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 19-21 (1st Cir. 2002)

(describing the factual background of the Carrozza case). Paul A.

was acquitted of all charges in that case, and he argued in his

pre-trial motion in this case that the present indictment violated

his double jeopardy rights because it alleged the same conspiracy.

DeCologero, 364 F.3d at 16-17. The district court disagreed, and

on interlocutory appeal this court affirmed, holding that the two

cases dealt with different patterns of racketeering activity. Id.

at 19. That double jeopardy claim is renewed here based on the

evidence actually introduced at trial.

John Sr. pled guilty to a RICO charge on February 28,

2003, and testified for the government at trial. United States v.

Capozzi (Capozzi II), 486 F.3d 711, 714 (1st Cir. 2007). In July

2004, Capozzi moved to disqualify the attorneys for Paul A., Paul

J., and John Jr., arguing they had conflicts of interests. Id.

The attorneys for the three defendants then withdrew, and because

of the delay required for the new attorneys to prepare for trial,
The government asserts that John Jr. waived these 8

arguments because his attempt to incorporate the arguments of his

co-defendants under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(i) was

insufficient. We do not reach this or other waiver questions as we

do not find an abuse of discretion on the merits.

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the district court, on the government's motion, severed Capozzi's

case so that his trial could begin as planned in September 2004.

Id. The court gave the remaining four defendants fifteen months to

prepare, with the present trial beginning on January 9, 2006. The

jury returned its verdict on March 20, 2006. The district court

sentenced Paul A. to life imprisonment, Paul J. to 25 years

imprisonment, John Jr. to 210 months imprisonment, and Pavone to 72

months imprisonment. This appeal followed.

III.

Because Paul J., John Jr., and Pavone raise similar and

overlapping issues on appeal, we consider their claims together.

A. Severance and Mistrial

Paul J., John Jr., and Pavone argue that the district

court abused its discretion in denying their motions, based on

several grounds, to sever their trial from that of Paul A. or to

declare a mistrial. Those grounds include Paul A.'s alleged 8

admission to being a gang leader, his odd behavior in the

courtroom, his responsibility for the heinous act of the murder of

Aislin Silva, and the risk of jury confusion. We find no abuse of

discretion.
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1. Standard of Review

Trial judges' decisions regarding severance and mistrial

are treated with a considerable amount of deference because

appellate courts lack the "first-hand exposure to a case" that

better enables trial judges to "strike the delicate balance between

fending off prejudice, on the one hand, and husbanding judicial

resources, on the other hand." United States v. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d

21, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1993). Thus we review a district court's

denial of a motion for severance or motion for mistrial under the

same standard: manifest abuse of discretion. United States v.

Tejeda, 481 F.3d 44, 54 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.

612 (2007); United States v. Glenn, 389 F.3d 283, 287 (1st Cir.

2004).

The risks of prejudice and jury confusion in this case

were not negligible, but they were not uncommon either. By their

nature, RICO cases involve many defendants, sometimes with family

relationships, and often include multiple repulsive acts. There

are ways, with skillful trial management and diligent counsel, to

prevent these risks from growing into actual harm. Trial judges

"have broad power to cope with the complexities and contingencies

inherent in the adversary process." Geders v. United States, 425

U.S. 80, 86 (1976). The trial judge in this case was particularly

aware of and sensitive to the complexity of this case and the

possibility of jury confusion. DeCologero, 364 F.3d at 20. (An
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earlier case management order splitting off some of the charges

into a separate trial was vacated by this court to avoid double

jeopardy problems. Id. at 21-25.)

As to severance, "the general rule is that those indicted

together are tried together to prevent inconsistent verdicts and to

conserve judicial and prosecutorial resources." Soto-Beníquez, 356

F.3d at 29. The district court can, however, sever defendants'

trials or provide other relief if "there is a serious risk that a

joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the

defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment

about guilt or innocence." Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534,

539 (1993); see also Fed R. Crim. P. 14(a). If the district court

decides not to sever the trial, the defendant bears the burden of

making a strong showing that prejudice resulted from the denial of

severance, and prejudice in this context "means more than just a

better chance of acquittal at a separate trial." United States v.

Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 246 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v.

Martinez, 479 F.2d 824, 828 (1st Cir. 1973)) (internal quotation

mark omitted); accord Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540. "This is a

difficult battle for a defendant to win." Boylan, 898 F.2d at 246.

2. Severance Based on Antagonistic Defenses

Paul J., John Jr., and Pavone argue strenuously that as

the trial went on it became clear that Paul A.'s defense was

antagonistic to theirs. Antagonistic defenses can require
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severance when they are truly irreconcilable, or at least

substantially incompatible. Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 55; United States

v. Peña-Lora, 225 F.3d 17, 34 (1st Cir. 2000). "[W]here there is

merely some dissonance," however, "we will usually not reverse a

trial court's denial of severance." Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 55. Here,

the defenses were not truly irreconcilable, nor were they

substantially incompatible. 

The other defendants characterize Paul A.'s testimony as

admitting that he ran a criminal enterprise during the time in

question. This, they say, was incompatible with their defense of

non-criminality. The record does not support their

characterization. 

Paul A. testified that he had originally, back in the

1980s, delivered drugs on behalf of Whitey Bulger and Stephen

Flemmi, two infamous Boston-area organized crime bosses, but he

described his connection with them as minimal and explained that he

had refused to continue even in this minimal role after he served

his first term in prison (from 1984 to 1992). Paul A. asserted

that his refusal irked the mob leaders. His primary defense was

that Regan worked for what had become the Salemme faction of the

Patriarca Family and was thus motivated to testify falsely against

Paul A., setting him up to take the fall for crimes in fact

committed by Regan and other followers of Salemme.
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In developing this defense, Paul A. did bring up his

prior indictment in the Carrozza case, as well as the allegation

that the Carrozza and Salemme factions were at odds. In Paul A.'s

cross-examination of Regan, there were also some references to "the

DeCologero crew," but these were references to what others had

alleged, such as the language of the indictment. While this tack

might have muddied the waters for the jury, it did not (contrary to

his co-defendants' arguments) set Paul A. up before the jury as "an

open and notorious underworld figure."

Instead, the jury heard Paul A. flatly deny running a

criminal enterprise (the alleged DeCologero crew), insist that he

was not affiliated with any organized criminals, and explain

repeatedly that only his son (and, on rare occasion, his brother

John Sr.) assisted him in his drug deals after his release from

prison. While Paul A. admitted that he had continued some limited

drug dealing in the mid-1990s, he explained that he stopped such

activity once his side business selling high-protein muffins to

other gyms started doing well enough to meet his gym's operating

deficit. Paul A. admitted knowing Regan, DiCenso, and Meuse, but

he denied ever asking them for assistance in any criminal conduct.

The jury could accept Paul A.'s testimony that he was an

occasional drug dealer, and even that he was disliked and targeted

by mob leaders, while also accepting the other defendants' claims

that they had engaged in no criminal wrongdoing. Paul A. did not
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implicate the others, nor did his defense as presented to the jury,

if accepted, preclude acquittal of the others. There was no

substantial incompatibility.

3. Severance Based on "Spillover" Effects and

Mistrial Based on Paul A.'s Courtroom Antics

At the core, these three defendants argue that Paul A.'s

admitted criminality, the more severe crimes with which he was

charged, and his inappropriate courtroom behavior cast a pall over

all four defendants, prejudicing his co-defendants before the jury.

This tack also fails.

As Justice Jackson famously noted, co-defendants in a

conspiracy trial like this one occupy "an uneasy seat. There

generally will be evidence of wrongdoing by somebody. It is

difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its own

merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds

of a feather are flocked together." Krulewitch v. United States,

336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). Such

uneasiness is inherent in joint RICO trials, and the unsavoriness

of one's co-defendant (including past criminal conduct) is not

enough, by itself, to mandate severance. Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 56.

Defendants must still make a strong showing of prejudice to

overturn the trial court's decision not to sever.

Paul J., John Jr., and Pavone have also not met that

burden with their argument that they suffered from a "spillover"

effect due to Paul A.'s prosecution for Aislin Silva's gruesome
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murder. While only Paul A. was on trial for the actual murder of

Silva, Paul J. and Pavone were charged with closely related crimes

(attempted murder and tampering with a witness) involving the same

victim. Further, all four men were convicted of RICO conspiracy,

and the scope of that conspiracy included protecting their criminal

enterprise by silencing witnesses like Silva. Thus even if some of

the defendants were not directly charged with Silva's murder, the

murder was still relevant to the RICO counts as it tended to prove

the existence and nature of the RICO enterprise and conspiracy.

See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 103 (2d Cir. 1999).

As a result, even if the defendants had received separate trials,

evidence of the murder would have been independently admissible

against each, and it is far from clear that the potentially

prejudicial impact of that evidence would have rendered it

inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See SotoBeníquez, 356 F.3d at 29-30. This is why, "[i]n the context of

conspiracy, severance will rarely, if ever, be required" due to

evidentiary spillover. United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 36

(1st Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d

319, 325 (1st Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The defendants' fear of being found guilty by association

with Paul A. has a third aspect: his distracting courtroom

behavior. Paul A.'s testimony was often unresponsive or

tangential, provoking repeated objections from the prosecution and
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rebukes from the bench. During the prosecution's case, the judge

admonished Paul A. for interfering with the work of his defense

counsel, warning that his disruptive behavior was hurting rather

than helping him in the eyes of the jury. Generally, however, if

"a defendant misbehaves in the jury's presence, the misbehavior

usually will not compel a separate trial for his codefendants";

rather, the co-defendant seeking severance or mistrial must

"demonstrate the existence of some special prejudice" that the

court could not remedy through other means. United States v.

Pierro, 32 F.3d 611, 616 (1st Cir. 1994). If the rule were

otherwise, co-defendants could provoke mistrials at will. United

States v. Tashjian, 660 F.2d 829, 838 (1st Cir. 1981). 

Paul A.'s co-defendants do not point to any specific

prejudice, asserting more generally that they "were prejudiced by

his conduct and the court's inability to rein him in." Nor do they

provide any case law to support their argument that such behavior

warrants a mistrial. Rather, under the case law, Paul A.'s conduct

is not comparable to the severity of other co-defendant outbursts

analyzed in prior cases in which we upheld denials of severance

motions. See United States v. Mazza, 792 F.2d 1210, 1224 (1st Cir.

1986) (no abuse of discretion in refusal to sever even though codefendant shouted in middle of witness testimony, "He is lying. I

got shot for you, you mother piece of shit. This is my pay

back."); Tashjian, 660 F.2d at 837 (no abuse of discretion in
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denial of mistrial even though defendant threatened a witness in

front of the jury and yelled that his co-defendants were in the

mafia). Paul A.'s unruly behavior in the courtroom was

unfortunate, but his co-defendants have not made a sufficient

showing of prejudice. 

Paul A.'s conduct also did not go unchecked by the

district court. The court, outside the presence of the jury, told

Paul A. to change his behavior, and this had at least some effect

on him. For example, before Paul A. began his second day of

testimony, the court warned him -- again outside the presence of

the jury -- that:

[T]his is not fun and games. . . .

This is a court of law, and there are rules .

. . . [Y]ou will answer only the questions

that are put to you and not blurt out a whole

bunch of other stuff.

I do believe that you are doing that on

purpose.

Number one, it doesn't help you. You

may wish to look at the jury at times, and you

will see that they are not buying it; and,

number two, it is improper and inappropriate

for you to do that.

It is important for you that the story

be told in some reasonably coherent fashion,

and you're making it impossible for the story

to be told in a coherent fashion; apart from

which you are violating the orders of the

Court every time you go off on a frolic of

your own. So stop doing that. If you don't

stop doing it, I will need to take further

steps.
Defendants also accuse the trial court of refusing to 9

consider their motions for mistrial, and they cite to one instance

where the judge denied a mistrial motion on the spot. This

argument is off the mark: an instantaneous ruling does not mean

that a judge has refused to exercise her discretion. A trial judge

immersed in a case is quite capable of ruling on in-court motions

quickly, even immediately. 

-23-

Paul A.'s subsequent testimony, though still subject to objections

and occasional reprimands, was more restrained.9

4. Severance Based on Jury Confusion

In another line of arguments, Paul J., John Jr., and

Pavone assert that severance was warranted because of Paul A.'s

much greater degree of culpability, the number of crimes for which

only Paul A. was on trial, and the similarity of the defendants'

names. All of these factors, defendants argue, could easily lead

to jury confusion, a type of prejudice that can be grounds for

severance. See United States v. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1, 26

(1st Cir. 2004). Again, we cannot say that the district court

abused its discretion.

It is true that "markedly different degrees of

culpability" among co-defendants can "heighten[]" the risk of

prejudice. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539. But again, disparity between

the relative culpability of co-defendants does not entitle a

defendant to severance. Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d at 30; United

States v. Welch, 15 F.3d 1202, 1210 (1st Cir. 1993). Prejudice

must be shown, and "[e]ven where large amounts of testimony are

irrelevant to one defendant, or where one defendant's involvement
-24-

. . . is far less than the involvement of others, we have been

reluctant to secondguess severance denials." Boylan, 898 F.2d at

246. 

Further, such disparity is not uncommon in RICO cases,

nor is it unusual in such cases for a co-defendant to be charged

with only a subset of the crimes alleged in the indictment. In

Flores-Rivera, for example, this court found no abuse of discretion

in the denial of severance for a defendant "named in less than ten

percent of all overt acts charged in the indictment." 56 F.3d at

325; see also United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 142, 147 (6th Cir.

1996) (no abuse of discretion in denial of severance even though

defendant was only charged with three of the twenty-nine counts of

the indictment). The RICO counts, of which all defendants were

charged and all were convicted, provided the logical scope and

overarching unity for the indictment. See, e.g., United States v.

Turkette, 656 F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1981).

As for the defendants' similar names, defendants appear

to assume that the similarities resulted in jury confusion. We

cannot make such an assumption, especially as the jury spent two

months in the same room with these defendants and their distinct

personalities. See United States v. Castillo, 77 F.3d 1480, 1491

n.20 (5th Cir. 1996) (dismissing defendants' arguments of jury

confusion in trial involving a Thomas Brown, Sr., and a Thomas

Brown, Jr., in addition to three other defendants who shared the
-25-

last name of Castillo). The defendants here have failed to

demonstrate any prejudice greater than the "possible risk of

prejudice that almost always exists when multiple defendants with

different roles are tried together." United States v. Cresta, 825

F.2d 538, 554-55 (1st Cir. 1987).

Two additional factors cut against the defendants' jury

confusion argument. First, the district court noted to the jury at

the outset of the trial that the jury must be careful to consider

each defendant separately, a point repeated several times during

the jury instructions at the trial's close. See, e.g., Zafiro, 506

U.S. at 540-41 (noting that proper jury instructions can alleviate

risk of prejudice). 

Second, and more tellingly, the jury returned highly

individualized verdicts: there were some charges for which the jury

acquitted all defendants, and others for which the jury convicted

some defendants while acquitting others. Even within some of the

charged racketeering acts under the substantive RICO count, the

jury found some but not all of the individual, closely related

predicate acts proved. See Appendix. These were not the verdicts

of a jury confused about the identity and culpability of the

individual defendants. See United States v. Houle, 237 F.3d 71, 75

(1st Cir. 2001) ("With regard to the jury's ability to segregate

the evidence and understand the judge's instructions, the verdict

itself is often quite telling. . . . This discriminating verdict
-26-

shows that the jury was able to compartmentalize evidence and apply

it to each defendant . . . ."); Boylan, 898 F.2d at 246; Turkette,

656 F.2d at 9. Given the considerable discretion a district court

has to decide a motion for severance or mistrial, these additional

factors further indicate that the district court did not abuse that

discretion. In sum, we will not second guess the court's decision

without a greater showing of prejudice. See United States v.

DeLeon, 187 F.3d 60, 63-64 (1st Cir. 1999). 

B. Judge's Trial Demeanor

Paul J., John Jr., and Pavone next argue that the

district court judge's criticisms of their counsel in the presence

of the jury deprived them of a fair trial. With allegations of

judicial bias, we consider whether the comments were improper and,

if so, whether the complaining party can show serious prejudice.

Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 66 (1st Cir. 2007). "Charges

of partiality should be judged not on an isolated comment or two,

but on the record as a whole." United States v. Polito, 856 F.2d

414, 418 (1st Cir. 1988); accord United States v. Candelaria-Silva,

166 F.3d 19, 35 (1st Cir. 1999). As the Supreme Court has noted in

the context of the recusal of judges, "judicial remarks during the

course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even

hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not

support a bias or partiality challenge. . . . A judge's ordinary

efforts at courtroom administration -- even a stern and short-
-27-

tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration --

remain immune." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56

(1994). This was a complex and lengthy trial, handled with skill

by a seasoned trial judge who did not let things get out of

control. The defendants have exaggerated; the record does not

support their claims. The comments of which defendants complain

were few (eleven comments spread over thirty-six days of

testimony), balanced, and reasonable in context. 

Defendants first argue that the judge referred to their

objections as "picky" in front of the jury. During the

government's direct examination of DiCenso, defense counsel

repeatedly objected to leading questions, objections which the

court sustained. After the fourth sustained defense objection in

a brief stretch of questioning, the judge addressed the jury:

Let me explain, members of the jury. I told

you yesterday that leading questions in

general are a no-no when counsel conducted

direct examination, but you can also be too

picky about that. So, part of the reason that

I have not always sustained the objection is

because I thought at times it was a bit too

picky. There is a certain judgment call that

one has to make. However, at the moment, [the

prosecutor] is leading [DiCenso] rather too

much.

Immediately thereafter, the court ruled sua sponte that the

government was asking another leading question. The court's

"picky" comment had very little to do with the defense; if

anything, the court was reprimanding the government. 
-28-

Defendants also accuse the court of unfair, sua sponte

rulings that defense questions were argumentative. The court was

even-handed: at times it raised sua sponte concerns about the

government's questioning. There was no preferential treatment.

Further, the rulings were correct. The court was trying, in this

difficult case, to keep the focus on the evidence. 

We do not address additional exchanges regarding

objections, but we do note that the court emphasized in its final

instructions to the jury that it should not take into account the

exchanges between counsel and the bench regarding evidentiary

matters:

In the course of the trial, you have heard

many times when counsel rose to object. You

should not hold that against them or their

clients. It is their right to do that.

Indeed, it is their duty to do it. It's the

way in which counsel bring to the attention of

the Court when they think one or another of

what you now know are very complicated rules

are not being adhered to.

See Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d at 36 ("Assuming arguendo that the

trial court exhibited frustration from time to time during this

rather lengthy, heated trial, the strong instructions given by the

trial court . . . should have eliminated any conceivable

prejudice."); Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1046-47 (1st Cir. 1997)

("jury instructions can be a means of allaying potential prejudice"

in this context). In sum, the court's treatment of objections

raised by both sides was even-handed and not unfair.
-29-

The three defendants also take issue with comments by the

court that, they argue, suggested they curtail their crossexamination of witnesses. These comments, too, when taken in

context, were appropriate. Defendants do not argue, nor could

they, that the district court cut their cross-examination short at

any point. Instead, the court at times encouraged counsel to move

more rapidly after lengthy questioning about minimally relevant

information. We read a comment that counsel should limit his

cross-examination to "thirty seconds" as a reflection of the late

hour; the court dismissed the jury shortly thereafter, and when

questioning resumed the next day, the attorney -- who indeed had

very few questions -- was given all the time he needed, without

further comment. The same explanation holds for a similar incident

earlier in the trial, when the court asked defense counsel to try

to conclude cross-examination of a witness that day: the judge's

comment that some defense counsel might skip cross-examination

altogether might have been a light quip, a reference to the

imminent end of the trial day, or an acknowledgment that the

remaining counsel might have few or no questions for the witness --

indeed, one counsel did not have any questions, the other two had

very few, and no one's questioning was curtailed by the judge.

"Trial judges are justifiably accorded broad latitude to

ensure proper courtroom behavior." United States v. RodríguezRivera, 473 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v.
-30-

Gomes, 177 F.3d 76, 80 (1st Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Even if such comments could be read as rebukes, a judge,

in managing a trial, may rebuke counsel for inappropriate behavior

and may reasonably limit cross-examination. Id.; see also Boylan,

898 F.2d at 254. The comments of concern here were appropriate

exercises of the court's responsibilities to manage the trial. As

the comments were not improper, we do not reach the question of

prejudice.

C. Evidentiary Rulings

1. Testimonial Exclusions

Paul J., John Jr., and Pavone argue that several of the

trial court's evidentiary rulings were in error and were

prejudicial. We review the district court's interpretation of the

rules of evidence de novo, but we review the court's application of

those rules for abuse of discretion. United States v. MuñozFranco, 487 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2007). We start with their

objections to the court's exclusion of certain testimony.

a. Hearsay. Defendants object that the court

excluded as hearsay statements which were not. The hearsay rule

applies to out-of-court statements "offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted." Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). However,

"[i]f the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the

fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of

anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay." Fed. R.
Paul A. also objects to the district court's hearsay 10

rulings pertaining to these two conversations, and we incorporate

his arguments here.

-31-

Evid. 801(c) advisory committee's note. Defendants argue that two

conversations that allegedly occurred at Paul A.'s gym fall into

this latter category. The district court's rulings to the contrary

were not an abuse of discretion.

Paul A. attempted to introduce these gym conversations

through his own testimony and the testimony of his sister JoAnne

and a gym employee named Peter Ippolito. We summarize the 10

testimony that defendants desired to introduce. In the first

conversation, DiCenso and Silva allegedly came to Paul A. at his

gym to seek his help because the guns had been discovered in

Silva's apartment and because DiCenso was afraid of how Regan would

respond. Paul A., who claimed the guns were not his, asserted that

he got angry when he learned that DiCenso was storing the guns for

Bobby Luisi, a member of the Salemme faction; Paul A. yelled out

Luisi's name and told them, "Get out of here. Those people are

trying to kill me." In the end, Paul A. agreed to help DiCenso get

a lawyer and called Tony Bucci to request a limousine on their

behalf. In the second conversation, Meuse and Regan came to Paul

A. and, in a heated argument, told him to "stay out of their

business, that that business with Stephen DiCenso and Aislin Silva

was their business and had nothing to do with [Paul A.]."
-32-

The court allowed Ippolito to testify that DiCenso and

Silva came to the gym, that Paul A. got angry, and that Paul A.

yelled out someone's name. But the court did not allow testimony

as to the name he yelled out (allegedly "Bobby Luisi"). Ippolito

was also allowed to testify that the conversation between Meuse,

Regan, and Paul A. took place and that they were "very, very

angry," but not to the content of that conversation. Paul A.

testified that the conversation with DiCenso and Silva took place,

that he tried calling an attorney for them, and that he called

Bucci to order the limousine for DiCenso. JoAnne was allowed to

testify to much more regarding the first conversation: that the

three of them were talking about guns, that Paul A. yelled at

DiCenso, "Well, why are you coming to me" because "these are people

who are after us," that Paul A. told them to leave the gym, and

that he then tried to help DiCenso get in touch with an attorney

and called for a limousine.

The rest of the conversations the court excluded on

hearsay grounds. Further details from the first conversation, it

ruled, were only offered for "the truth that DiCenso had another

agenda": that is, to establish that the guns were not Paul A.'s and

that DiCenso was not working for Paul A. As for the second

conversation, Paul A. argued it was relevant because it showed he

"was not in a conspiracy with Regan and Meuse. He was not the

leader of an organization where he gave them orders, that they had
-33-

their own thing going." The court reasoned, however, that this

proffered relevance required the content of the statements -- that

the guns and Silva had nothing to do with Paul A. -- to be true.

These exclusion rulings were correct.

Defendants argue that the statements should have been

admitted as verbal acts, but that label applies to statements which

"affect[] the legal rights of the parties." Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)

advisory committee's note; see also United States v. Stover, 329

F.3d 859, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[Verbal] acts are limited to

statements that have independent legal significance, such as

contractual offers or inter vivos gifts.").

The defendants perhaps mean to refer more broadly to the

category of statements that are not hearsay because they are not

offered for their truth. See Stover, 329 F.3d at 870. At trial,

Paul A. argued that the conversations were offered to provide

context for other actions and events, not to prove the truth of the

statements. See United States v. Page, 521 F.3d 101, 106-07 (1st

Cir. 2008); United States v. Meserve, 271 F.3d 314, 319 (1st Cir.

2001). Statements that provide "context" only if they are true,

however, are still considered hearsay. See Stover, 329 F.3d at

870.

The only relevant context the defendants could point to

here was the need to explain why Paul A. called a lawyer for

DiCenso. Based on this argument, the court allowed into evidence
It is also not immediately clear how the exclusion of 11

this testimony, which was meant to further Paul A.'s defense,

caused any harm to the other three defendants.

-34-

testimony to the effect that Paul A. called a lawyer for DiCenso,

not because DiCenso worked for him, but as a favor when DiCenso

came to him with legal troubles. Defendants have put forward no

further argument as to what other contextual background the

remaining, excluded statements might provide without relying on the

truth of those statements.

Contrary to defendants' assertion, the court did not make

broad rulings regarding hearsay, but carefully parsed each proffer,

often ruling in defendants' favor in unclear situations. There was

no abuse of discretion.11

b. Impeachment. In arguments that overlap with their

hearsay arguments, defendants assert that the district court

improperly excluded testimony meant to challenge the credibility of

government witnesses.

The ability to use extrinsic evidence to impeach a

witness by contradiction is linked to the question of hearsay.

Generally, extrinsic evidence (such as the testimony of another

witness) cannot be used to impeach a witness if it relates only to

a collateral matter. Marino, 277 F.3d at 24. This common law rule

is a manifestation of the district court's general discretion to

exclude otherwise relevant evidence "if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
For this reason, the gym conversations excluded on 12

hearsay grounds could also not be used to attack the credibility of

Regan or DiCenso: the conversations only bear on the witnesses'

motive to lie if the content of those conversations is true.

-35-

confusion of the issues, . . . or by considerations of undue delay

[or] waste of time." Fed. R. Evid. 403; see also United States v.

Beauchamp, 986 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing United States v.

Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Evidence is

collateral if it is relevant only because it contradicts the incourt testimony of another witness. Marino, 277 F.3d at 24. If

what makes the statement otherwise relevant and thus not collateral

relies on the truth of the statement, then the statement is hearsay

and inadmissable on that ground. See 28 Wright & Gold, Federal 12

Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6206, at 537 n.14 (1993). The

decision on whether a matter is collateral or material is within

the district court's discretion. Marino, 277 F.3d at 24. 

Defendants take issue with the court's refusal to let a

defense witness recount a conversation in which Agent John Mercer

allegedly tried to coerce him into testifying for the government.

The court ruled that the testimony was only relevant to the extent

it bore on Mercer's credibility and was thus collateral.

Defendants note that "a witness's self-interest or motive to

testify falsely is generally considered to be a non-collateral

issue." Beauchamp, 986 F.2d at 4. If the argument is that the

defendants were attempting to impeach Mercer not through
The court also did not abuse its discretion in 13

determining that it was not material whether DiCenso's sister had

told State Trooper Robert Irwin that she knew DiCenso was dating

-36-

contradiction but by establishing his bias against defendants and

his motive to lie, this argument was not fully developed on appeal

and is thus waived. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17

("[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner [on appeal],

unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed

waived."). Further, while extrinsic evidence is admissible to show

bias, the trial judge still has discretion under Rule 403 to

exclude such evidence if it would distract from the main issues of

the case. Gomes, 177 F.3d at 81. This ruling was well within the

court's discretion given the court's interest in avoiding a minitrial on Mercer's conduct, which could distract the jury in an

already complex case. See Beauchamp, 986 F.2d at 4.

Defendants also argue that the district court should have

issued bench warrants for three witnesses. The court refused to do

so because the witnesses would only testify to collateral matters

in order to contradict government witnesses, such as DiCenso and

Regan. The court was correct that the witnesses would not be

allowed, under the rules of evidence, to testify on those

collateral matters. Further, the court did not abuse its

discretion in determining that the proposed testimony of the

witnesses, as proffered by Paul A., regarded only collateral

matters.13
Silva, so it was not improper for the court to curtail the crossexamination of Irwin on this point. Defendants note additional

instances of defense witnesses not being allowed to testify to

conversations but do not explain why those conversations were

relevant, how the court abused its discretion, or why they were

prejudiced as a result. See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17. 

-37-

2. Pre-Trial Identification

John Jr. appeals the denial of his motions to suppress

pre-trial identifications made by Soccorso and Bentley, which he

argues were based on an impermissibly suggestive photo array.

There was no violation of John Jr.'s due process rights in the

presentation of this identification evidence to the jury.

Our review of a district court's decision to deny a

suppression motion as to identification is plenary, but with the

usual deference to any findings of fact. United States v.

Brennick, 405 F.3d 96, 99-100 (1st Cir. 2005). A court should

exclude an out-of-court identification based on a photo array only

in those "extraordinary cases" where there is "a very substantial

likelihood of irreparable misidentification," a situation which

could result in an unfair trial in violation of the defendant's due

process rights. United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 100 (1st

Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. de Jesus-Rios, 990 F.2d 672,

677 (1st Cir. 1993)); see also United States v. Holliday, 457 F.3d

121, 125 (1st Cir. 2006). "Short of that point, such evidence is

for the jury to weigh . . . , for evidence with some element of

untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are
-38-

not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the

weight of identification testimony that has some questionable

feature." Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977).

John Jr. moved before trial to suppress the Bentley and

Soccorso pretrial identifications, but the district court denied

both motions, holding that "these matters are properly addressed

through cross-examination." The district court did not explicitly

go through the two-step analysis described below.

At trial, Soccorso and Bentley both testified that they

picked John Jr. out of a six-photo array, more than three years

after the robbery in Soccorso's case and over two years later for

Bentley. That photo array was provided for the jury. John Jr.'s

counsel cross-examined both witnesses extensively. He walked each

of them through the characteristics of the six photographed men,

arguing that four of them clearly did not match the age or hairstyle descriptions that the witnesses had provided the police.

Under defense counsel's questioning, Soccorso acknowledged that it

was dark at the time of his abduction and that John Jr. was sitting

behind him for much of their encounter; from Bentley, counsel drew

a description of the pain medications Bentley had been taking at

the time he made the identification as well as during the trial,

and Bentley acknowledged that his doctor had written a letter to

the effect that Bentley should not testify because the medications

severely affected his recall.
-39-

John Jr. also produced an expert witness, Dr. Steven

Penrod, to testify about factors that decrease the reliability of

witness identifications, many of which factors John Jr. argued to

the jury were present in this case. Neither Bentley nor Soccorso

made an in-court identification.

John Jr. renewed his motion to suppress before the court

charged the jury; that motion was also denied. John Jr.'s counsel

then argued repeatedly and at length during his closing that the

identifications were unreliable and should be discredited. The

court, during its charge, instructed the jury that "if the

government's theory is that a particular defendant was a principal,

. . . then you need to decide whether the evidence shows he was

there, and if so, was he identified by the victim, was it a good or

a questionable identification."

We use a two-step analysis when considering whether a

pretrial identification procedure raises a "very substantial

likelihood of irreparable misidentification": we first determine

whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive,

and if it was, we then look to the totality of the circumstances to

decide whether the identification was still reliable. Henderson,

320 F.3d at 100; see also Holliday, 457 F.3d at 125. At the first

step, we consider whether the photo array included, as far as was

practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance

to the suspect. Holliday, 457 F.3d at 125-26. "The police
-40-

authorities are required to make every effort reasonable under the

circumstances to conduct a fair and balanced presentation of

alternative possibilities for identification. The police are not

required to search for identical twins . . . ." Id. at 126 n.5

(quoting Wright v. State, 175 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Wisc. 1970))

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

As for the second step's totality-of-the-circumstances

analysis, the Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188

(1972), enumerated five factors for consideration:

(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the

criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the

witness' degree of attention to the crime; (3)

the accuracy of the witness' prior description

of the defendant; (4) the level of certainty

demonstrated by the witness at the

confrontation; and (5) the length of time

between the crime and confrontation.

Henderson, 320 F.3d at 100 (summarizing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-

200).

Starting with the first step, the photo array for John

Jr. was impermissibly suggestive. John Jr. has no unusual features

that might complicate the search for others with similar

appearances, yet the other photos in the array were not of men who

looked similar to John Jr. beyond being white men with short hair.

Comparison with the eight-photo array used for the identification

of Paul J. is informative. In that array, the eight men appear to

be of the same age group, seven of the eight have fairly similar

hair, and the overall impression is one of resemblance. The array
-41-

used for John Jr., however, included only six photos, two of which

are of men who appear younger than John Jr. and two of which are of

men clearly older; one of the latter has a noticeably receding

hairline. Two of the men appear more heavyset than John Jr., and

at least two have hair that is markedly different and not

interchangeable with that of the defendant. In all, only one of

the five photos depicts a man as similar to John Jr. as the photos

in Paul J.'s array are to Paul J. Further, given the familial

resemblance between the brothers, the existence of the other photos

in Paul J.'s array makes all the more clear that the police should

not have had trouble locating men who resembled John Jr. more

closely.

However, given the totality of the circumstances, we

conclude that the array did not raise a substantial likelihood of

misidentification and that the remaining question of reliability

was appropriately left to the jury. Cf. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 200-

01. Soccorso spent a substantial amount of time in the car with

his assailant; Bentley watched as the crew ransacked his apartment

and tied him up. Both witnesses were victims of the crimes and not

accidental eyewitnesses whose attention might have been distracted.

On cross-examination, despite thorough questioning, both witnesses

stood by their identifications. Some of the Bigger factors cut in

defendant's favor -- Bentley did incorrectly describe two of the

robbers as being the same height, and (more significantly) there
-42-

was a lengthy time delay between the crimes and the identifications

-- but not all the Biggers factors must point in one direction for

an identification to be upheld. See Henderson, 320 F.3d at 100.

"[I]t is only in extraordinary cases that identification evidence

should be withheld from the jury," id. (quoting de Jesus-Rios, 990

F.2d at 677), and this is not one of them. 

The weighing of the factors in this case, however, is a

close question, so we also note that the jury was provided with

extensive information about the identifications with which to make

its own reliability determination. The defendant's counsel did a

highly competent examination, eliciting testimony from multiple

witnesses that cast doubt on the identifications of John Jr.,

especially in terms of the Biggers factors. The jury was clearly

and properly instructed on the question and had before it a

thorough record of why the identification might be untrustworthy.

We are thus further reassured that John Jr.'s due process rights

were not violated by the submission of the identification evidence,

with all of defendant's caveats, to the jury. 

3. Pavone's Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct

Pavone argues that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights

were violated by prosecutorial misconduct. We start by describing

the underlying dispute.

Pavone alleges that an old acquaintance, John Dana, and

his colleague Wayne David Collins approached him around the time of
-43-

his indictment and offered to hire an attorney on his behalf. That

attorney, John Cicilline, did briefly take over Pavone's case.

According to Pavone, Collins claimed to have a special,

preferential relationship with the FBI, and Dana and Cicilline

repeatedly asked Pavone to cooperate with the government. After

his initial detention hearing, Pavone was approached by another

inmate, Arlindo Dossantos, who warned Pavone that Collins and Dana

were FBI informants who hired attorneys for criminal defendants in

order to obtain confidential information that they could then pass

on to the government. Pavone confronted Cicilline, Cicilline

withdrew as counsel, and Pavone's former counsel was reappointed.

Pavone moved to dismiss the indictment against him. He

asserted that he had shared confidential information with

Cicilline, that Cicilline transmitted that information to Collins

and Dana, and that all three "acted with the knowledge and approval

of the government." He supported this motion with his own

affidavit and that of his mother, who had spoken with Dana on

multiple occasions during the time in question. Pavone also moved

for discovery of sealed documents filed in Dossantos's prosecution

regarding similar accusations against Collins, Dana, and the U.S.

Attorney's Office. 

In response, the government submitted affidavits from the

three Assistant U.S. Attorneys who prosecuted this case. They

denied having ever met or communicated with Dana or Collins and
-44-

asserted that, to the best of their knowledge, no one involved in

the investigation had obtained any information from Dana, Collins,

or Cicilline. One of them also explained that the case was

investigated not by the FBI, but by the Drug Enforcement Agency

("DEA"), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives

("ATF"), and the Massachusetts State Police. The lead

investigators from the ATF (Mercer) and the Massachusetts State

Police (Irwin) also submitted affidavits, stating that neither they

nor, to the best of their knowledge, anyone else working on the

investigation had ever sought or received information from Dana,

Collins, or Cicilline.

The district court denied Pavone's motions to dismiss the

indictment. Based on the government's affidavits "and in the

absence of any contradictory factual support," the court was "not

persuaded" that Pavone could show that the government received any

confidential information, even if he were allowed access to

documents in the Dossantos case. It is this denial that Pavone

appeals.

"[T]he government's intrusion into the attorney-client

relationship" is not a per se Sixth Amendment violation; there must

also be some demonstration of resulting prejudice. United States

v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907 (1st Cir. 1984). Because such

intrusions pose a serious risk to defendants' constitutional

rights, and because it would be unreasonably difficult for most
-45-

defendants to prove prejudice, we only require defendants to make

a prima facie showing of prejudice by "prov[ing] that confidential

communications were conveyed as a result" of the government

intrusion into the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 907-08.

The burden then shifts to the government to show that the defendant

was not prejudiced; that burden is a demanding one. Id. at 908.

Even taking all his allegations as true, Pavone did not

show or even allege that Collins and Dana passed any confidential

information they received from Cicilline on to the government.

"[U]nless [the informant] communicated the substance of the

[attorney-client] conversations [to the government] and thereby

created at least a realistic possibility of injury to [the

defendant] or benefit to the State, there can be no Sixth Amendment

violation." Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558 (1977); see

also Greater Newburyport Clamshell Alliance v. Pub. Serv. Co. of

N.H., 838 F.2d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Only information

communicated to the prosecutor is capable of prejudicing a criminal

defendant's sixth amendment rights at trial."); United States v.

Dyer, 821 F.2d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 1987) (where "no confidential

attorney-client information was relayed to, or obtained by, the

prosecution," "[t]he defense suffered no prejudice" and thus no

Sixth Amendment violation). We affirm the denial of Pavone's

motion to dismiss.
-46-

Pavone also makes a related argument that the government

improperly withheld Brady material (the Dossantos files) which he

claims "contain[] certain and definitive exculpatory material,"

presumably evidence that Collins and Dana were government

informants. Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), "the

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused

upon request violates due process where the evidence is material

either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or

bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87. But "Brady did not

create" a "general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal

case." Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 559. "To establish a violation of

Brady, a defendant must provide the court with some indication that

the materials to which he or she needs access contain material and

potentially exculpatory evidence." United States v. Brandon, 17

F.3d 409, 456 (1st Cir. 1994). 

"[M]ethods of enforcing disclosure requirements in

criminal trials are generally left to the discretion of the trial

court," and we review Brady determinations for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Caro-Muñiz, 406 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2005). The

district court here concluded that the Dossantos documents would

not "suffice to sustain Pavone's burden" in establishing his prima

facie case of a Sixth Amendment violation. In light of the record

created by the prosecution that there was no contact by the

prosecution with Collins and Dana in this case, and in the absence
-47-

of any allegation by Pavone to the contrary, this ruling was

plainly correct. 

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Paul J., John Jr., and Pavone all appeal their

convictions on one or more charges, arguing that the government

presented insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find them

guilty.

We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo,

scrutinizing the record as a whole, drawing all reasonable

inferences in favor of the verdict, and avoiding any credibility

judgments, to determine whether any rational factfinder could have

found each element of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d at 41. "To uphold a conviction, the court

need not believe that no verdict other than a guilty verdict could

sensibly be reached, but must only satisfy itself that the guilty

verdict finds support in 'a plausible rendition of the record.'"

United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 677 (1st Cir. 1993)

(quoting United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 711 (1st Cir.

1992)). Further, "evidence sufficient to convict may be entirely

circumstantial, with the factfinder remaining free to choose among

reasonable interpretations of the evidence." United States v.

Wight, 968 F.2d 1393, 1395 (1st Cir. 1992).
-48-

1. Tampering with Witness by Misleading Conduct

Pavone and Paul J. argue there was insufficient evidence

to convict them of witness tampering (of Silva) by misleading

conduct. The witness-tampering law prohibits "engag[ing] in

misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to . . .

hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement

officer . . . of the United States of information relating to the

commission . . . of a Federal offense." 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3).

"Misleading conduct" is further defined, as relevant here, as

"knowingly making a false statement" or "intentionally omitting

information from a statement and thereby causing a portion of such

statement to be misleading, or intentionally concealing a material

fact, and thereby creating a false impression by such statement."

Id. § 1515(a)(3)(A)-(B). These two defendants were indicted for

and convicted of conspiracy to tamper with a witness through

misleading conduct, as well as the substantive crime of tampering

with a witness or aiding and abetting another to do so; tampering

with a witness was also found to be a racketeering act for each

under RICO.

At trial, the government argued that the relevant

misleading conduct was the isolation of Silva, "all the while

telling her that everything would be okay, their lawyers would take

[] care [of everything] -- their lawyers would be back in town

soon, telling her those things to mislead her about her situation."
-49-

According to the government's trial theory, Pavone and Paul J.

furthered that plan by being at the meetings where decisions about

what to do with Silva were made, by renting hotel rooms, and by

obtaining the heroin.

The jury heard testimony that Paul A. and the crew were

worried about what Silva had already told the police, made

significant efforts to keep her away from the police while weighing

the likelihood that she would betray them, and, to encourage her

continued isolation and silence, reassured her repeatedly that

their lawyers were away temporarily but would take care of

everything upon their return. 

As for Pavone specifically, DiCenso testified that Pavone

was present at the first meeting of the crew right after Silva had

been discovered talking with the police; that DiCenso and Paul J.

told "everybody [present] what had happened in relation to the

discovery of the guns"; and that the mood of that meeting was "[a]n

overall general feeling of shock." Regan and DiCenso both

testified that following the first meeting and at Paul A.'s behest,

Pavone rented a motel room for Silva (which removed her from the

apartment where she had met with the police), and Pavone did not

deny driving DiCenso and Silva from Boston to New York (an act

which made it even less likely that the police could find her).

Given that Pavone participated in multiple parts of the scheme,

that he spent several hours in a confined space with DiCenso and
-50-

Silva during the drive to New York, that all three meetings about

how to handle Silva occurred at Pavone's house, and that he was in

the right place at the right time on multiple occasions to have

heard the crew discuss the problem of Silva, a reasonable jury

could have inferred that he knew the crew was misleading Silva to

keep her from talking further with the police. The jury could have

easily concluded that Pavone, rather than acting as a simple

"gofer," was knowingly assisting with that scheme.

As for Paul J., he was with DiCenso when they went to

Silva's apartment and discovered Silva being questioned by the

police. He and DiCenso debriefed the crew about Silva's contact

with the police at the first meeting. It was reasonable for the

jury to infer that the plan to prevent Silva from talking further

with the police was hatched at this meeting and that Paul J. was

privy to it. Further, when the crew decided to kill Silva with an

overdose to ensure that she would not betray them to the police, it

was Paul J. who went to buy the heroin. He knew what it was for

(he asked Centeno, the dealer, for heroin "strong enough for an

overdose"), and it is a permissible inference that he knew the

heroin would be provided to Silva under the guise of being a nonlethal drug. From all of this, a reasonable jury could have

concluded that Paul J. knew of the scheme to convince Silva not to

talk to the authorities and to prevent her from doing so, and that

he knowingly assisted with that effort. 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) provides that "[i]t shall be 14

unlawful for any person -- (1) who has been convicted in any court

of [] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one

year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce,

or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or

to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or

transported in interstate or foreign commerce." 

-51-

These convictions of Pavone and Paul J. are affirmed.

2. Felon in Possession of a Firearm

Paul J. also appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He does 14

not dispute that he is a felon under the terms of the statute or

that the firearms in question were related to interstate commerce.

See Wight, 968 F.2d at 1397. Instead he argues that the government

did not provide sufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed the

six firearms, derived from the North burglary, that it accused him

of possessing.

Knowing possession under § 922(g)(1) can be established

by proving that the defendant had constructive possession of a

firearm; that is, that he "knowingly ha[d] the power and the

intention at a given time of exercising dominion and control over

a firearm . . . , directly or through others." Id. at 1398

(emphasis added). Constructive possession can be joint, does not

require actual ownership of the firearm, and can be established

through circumstantial evidence, though "mere presence or

association with another who possessed the contraband is

insufficient." Id. at 1397; see also United States v. Liranzo, 385
-52-

F.3d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 2004). Possession, whether actual or

constructive, can be extremely brief: "a minute of possession is as

much an offense as a year of possession." United States v. Zavala

Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1994).

There was enough evidence for the jury to find that Paul

J. knowingly possessed the North firearms at some point. While

other testimony was to the contrary, DiCenso testified that Paul J.

was with him in North's apartment during the burglary. See Wight,

968 F.2d at 1395 (credibility issues resolved in favor of

government). Even if Paul J. was outside the apartment and helped

the other two burglars load the stolen goods into the car, the jury

could have reasonably inferred that he knew the duffel bags with

the stolen goods contained guns. Paul A. sent them to search for

drugs and guns, the weight and shape of the duffel bags would have

belied their contents, and the box of grenades, which was loaded

into the car separately, would have made clear that the expected

weaponry had been found and stolen. The jury could have concluded,

then, that Paul J. physically possessed the guns at that time.

Second, a jury could have found that after the North

robbery, when the crew was opening the safes in the garage and

examining the weapons, Paul J. constructively possessed the

firearms. A defendant has the power to exercise dominion over a

firearm if he was "close enough to pick it up at any time." United

States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492, 504 (1st Cir. 2005). Regan
-53-

described the guns as laid out "all over the garage floor" and

specified that at least he and Meuse were physically handling the

weapons; it could be inferred that Paul J. had the same access to

them. As for the intent to exercise dominion over the firearms,

although Paul A. stopped Regan from keeping some of the weapons,

the jury could still have concluded that the weapons were being

kept for the use of the crew as a whole. As DiCenso put it,

"because the guns belonged to the crew, . . . that means they

belonged to me, too," as a member of the crew. 

The basis for a joint possession finding is also

demonstrated by Paul J. and DiCenso having gone to retrieve the

weapons from Silva's apartment on behalf of the crew: they assumed

that they would be able to remove the weapons at will. The weapons

did not belong to Silva; the weapons belonged to the crew, and Paul

J. acted as a member of the crew.

We affirm this conviction.

3. Use of a Firearm in Relation to Crime of Violence

John Jr. appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

for using or carrying a firearm "during and in relation to any

crime of violence . . . for which he may be prosecuted in a court

of the United States." The government based its § 924(c) charge on

John Jr.'s robbery of Sapochetti in alleged violation of the Hobbs

Act. Thus the government had to prove that John Jr. used or

carried a firearm, that his use of the firearm was in relation to
This standard is unaffected by United States v. Lopez, 15

514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598

(2000). Capozzi I, 347 F.3d at 336 & n.3.

-54-

the robbery, and that he did in fact commit a Hobbs Act robbery.

To prove a Hobbs Act robbery, the government had to establish that

the Sapochetti robbery "in any way or degree obstruct[ed],

delay[ed], or affect[ed] commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). John Jr.

argues the government failed to prove this nexus with interstate

commerce.

"The Hobbs Act's scope extends to the limit of Congress'

Commerce Clause authority." United States v. Capozzi (Capozzi I),

347 F.3d 327, 335 (1st Cir. 2003). Because of this, and because

the Hobbs Act by its terms criminalizes robberies that affect

interstate commerce "in any way or degree," the government need

only show that the robbery created "a realistic probability of a de

minimis effect on interstate commerce." Id. (quoting United 15

States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 80 n.2 (1st Cir. 1992)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). This required showing is "not onerous."

Capozzi II, 486 F.3d at 726 (quoting United States v. DiGregorio,

605 F.2d 1184, 1191 (1st Cir. 1979)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

A reasonable jury could have concluded that John Jr.

robbed Sapochetti and that the probable effect of that robbery was

an impact on interstate commerce, albeit largely illicit commerce.

The robbing of a drug dealer typically has the required nexus with
Thus, contrary to John Jr.'s assertion, under the 16

depletion-of-the-assets theory the government did not have to

provide specific proof that the stolen money was connected to

Sapochetti's interstate commerce activity. 

-55-

interstate commerce. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Parkes, 497

F.3d 220, 231 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1320 (2008);

United States v. Ostrander, 411 F.3d 684, 692 (6th Cir. 2005);

United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 355 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Drug

dealing . . . is an inherently economic enterprise that affects

interstate commerce."); United States v. Bailey, 227 F.3d 792, 798-

99 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Box, 50 F.3d 345, 353 (5th

Cir. 1995). A robbery can affect interstate commerce when it

depletes the assets of a business, even if the business is that of

drug dealing. See, e.g., Capozzi II, 486 F.3d at 726; Williams,

342 F.3d at 354-55; Bailey, 227 F.3d at 798. It was sufficient for

the government to demonstrate that the robbery of cocaine dealers

generally affects interstate commerce and that John Jr. intended to

rob Sapochetti of money he believed was derived from or intended to

finance cocaine sales. See Bailey, 227 F.3d at 798. 

16

DiCenso and Regan both testified that Sapochetti was a

known cocaine dealer. The interstate aspect was nailed down by a

DEA agent who, testifying as an expert witness, explained that the

coca plant from which cocaine is derived is native to South America

and is not (to his knowledge) capable of being grown in

Massachusetts. From this the jury could conclude that Sapochetti
-56-

was engaged in a business that affected interstate commerce.

Further, the government presented plentiful evidence that the

crew's modus operandi was to rob rival drug dealers of their drugs

and drug proceeds, both to decrease competition and to increase the

crew's supplies for their own sales. Both DiCenso and Regan

testified that the crew obtained around $18,000 from Sapochetti.

The jury could have reasonably inferred that John Jr. intended to

and did deplete Sapochetti's business assets, thereby affecting

interstate commerce to some degree.

John Jr. makes a related argument that the jury's

"inconsistent" verdict demonstrated that it did not find an effect

on interstate commerce but was confused about the elements of

§ 924(c) because the judge's instructions on this charge were

convoluted. This argument fails. Although the jury did acquit

John Jr. on the substantive offense of a Hobbs Act robbery of

Sapochetti, "inconsistent verdicts are not sufficient grounds for

reversing a criminal conviction as long as the appellate court is

satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to support the

conviction." United States v. Richard, 234 F.3d 763, 768 (1st Cir.

2000). This is so even where, as here, the jury acquits the

defendant of a predicate felony while convicting on the compound

felony. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67-68 (1984). We

have held that a defendant can be convicted under § 924(c) even if

he was acquitted of the drug trafficking crime on which the
We also see no error in the court's instructions. The 17

court explained the Hobbs Act, including its jurisdictional

element, clearly and at length; contrasted it to the state law

-57-

§ 924(c) charge was premised. United States v. FigueroaEncarnacion, 343 F.3d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 2003). At least one other

circuit has addressed the specific situation presented by this case

and affirmed a § 924(c) conviction where the jury acquitted on the

predicate Hobbs Act robbery. United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 452,

458 (6th Cir. 1999). Because there was sufficient evidence to

establish the jurisdictional element of a Hobbs Act robbery, John

Jr.'s conviction for using or carrying a firearm during the

commission of that offense must be affirmed. See generally 3

Wright, King & Klein, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal

§ 514, at 27-28 (3d ed. 2004) (collecting cases).

Further, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected any

role for individualized assessments of inconsistent verdicts when

a defendant argues the inconsistency was caused by a trial error,

such as the argument here that the jury instructions were unclear.

This is because such inquiries "would be based either on pure

speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury's

deliberations that courts generally will not undertake." Powell,

469 U.S. at 66. Indeed, much of defendant's argument on this point

takes the form of speculation about what the jury might or might

not have believed about the law or concluded about the facts of the

case.17
crime of armed robbery; and explained that a Hobbs Act robbery

constituted a violent federal crime under § 924(c). While the

instructions were complicated, so was the case, and the jury had to

assist it the redacted indictment and a chart of elements for each

crime charged.

-58-

John Jr.'s conviction under § 924(c) is affirmed.

E. Sentencing

Finally, John Jr. appeals his sentence on one basis. The

jury found that the government had not proved John Jr.'s

involvement in racketeering act 13, possession of cocaine with

intent to distribute. However, John Jr. had pled guilty to the

same offense conduct in 1997 and was sentenced to 249 days of

imprisonment. John Jr. argues that the time he served for that

crime -- in which calculation he also includes the twenty-one

months he served for violating the terms of his supervised release

following his 249-day sentence -- should have been taken into

account as a sort of mitigating factor in his sentencing in this

case. As he put it in his sentencing memorandum to the district

court, "[a]t a minimum, an innocent man who serves time should be

remunerated for the time he served. [The district court] should

sentence below the guideline sentencing range by the same amount of

time that the defendant served for the crime that he did not

commit, 29 months . . . ." The district court, however, concluded

that it "cannot give credit for time served on a sentence that

someone else imposed in a case in which Mr. DeCologero admitted

guilt" and sentenced John Jr. to 210 months of imprisonment. 
-59-

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence

for abuse of discretion, but we first consider whether the court

below committed a "significant procedural error, such as . . .

treating the Guidelines as mandatory." Gall v. United States, ___

U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). To the extent that John Jr.

argues that the trial court did not believe it could grant him a

variance based on this particular factor, that argument is

preserved. On appeal, John Jr. focuses on the trial judge's use of

the word "cannot" in her decision not to take the prior conviction

into account.

When considering a sentencing appeal, however, we do not

look at comments in isolation but consider the sentencing record as

a whole. Cf. United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519

(1st Cir. 2006) (en banc) ("[A] court's reasoning can often be

inferred by comparing what was argued by the parties or contained

in the pre-sentence report with what the judge did."). It is clear

that the trial court did not consider the Guidelines to be

mandatory. The court sentenced John Jr. below the Guidelines

range, which it calculated to be between 324 and 405 months. It

based this lower sentence on a number of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

factors, especially § 3553(a)(1), and on other factors specific to

John Jr.'s case: that the conviction came ten years after the

commission of the crimes, that Paul A. and other "elders"

(presumably including his father) had "subjected" John Jr. "to
-60-

cruel control . . . most of his life," that John Jr. had "made

strides" in changing his life, and that the formal Guidelines

calculation double-counted some of the underlying offenses,

resulting in an "artificially high" Guidelines range. We do not

doubt that the trial court recognized its discretion to take John

Jr.'s prior conviction and imprisonment into account; the court

simply did not agree with defendant that his previous incarceration

for a crime to which he pled guilty should lead to a sentence

reduction.

To the extent that John Jr. argues that the district

court committed a Guidelines error by not taking into account a

possible downward departure under U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.3 and 5K2.23, he

did not present that argument to the trial court. We thus review

the sentence on this ground for plain error only. United States v.

Goodhue, 486 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Wallace,

461 F.3d 15, 35 & n.11 (1st Cir. 2006). We pass over the questions

of which Guidelines apply (the trial court applied the 1995

Guidelines, in effect at the time of the offense conduct) and

whether, if the 1995 Guidelines do apply, the later amendments

relevant here were retroactive. Even taking these questions in

defendant's favor, John Jr.'s argument does not survive the plain

terms of § 5G1.3.

Under the current Guidelines, § 5G1.3(b) provides for an

adjustment of the sentence to account for an undischarged term of
The language in the 1995 Guidelines differs slightly but 18

not in a material way. The older version of § 5G1.3(b) covered an

"undischarged term of imprisonment [that] resulted from offense(s)

that have been fully taken into account in the determination of the

offense level for the instant offense." Again, the alleged offense

conduct covered by racketeering act 13 was not taken into account

in the trial court's Guidelines determination.

The parties also dispute whether that offense conduct, to

which John Jr. pled guilty in 1997, was relevant conduct to the

instant offense. We do not need to resolve that question.

-61-

imprisonment that "resulted from another offense that is relevant

conduct to the instant offense of conviction . . . and that was the

basis for an increase in the offense level for the instant

offense." Id. (emphasis added). Application note 4, which crossreferences and uses the same language as § 5K2.23, approves the use

of a downward departure when the prior term of imprisonment has

been fully discharged, as long as the other requirements of

§ 5G1.3(b) are met. Neither section is applicable here, then, as

the offense underlying racketeering act 13 was not taken into

account in the Guidelines calculation; much less was it a "basis

for an increase in the offense level" in this case. See United 18

States v. Kornegay, 410 F.3d 89, 99 (1st Cir. 2005); see also

United States v. Parker, 512 F.3d 1037, 1040 (8th Cir. 2008).

The sentence is affirmed.

IV.

We turn to Paul A.'s appeals but find them likewise

unavailing.
-62-

A. Double Jeopardy

This court rejected Paul A.'s pre-trial double jeopardy

claims. DeCologero, 364 F.3d at 19. Paul A. renews his double

jeopardy claim in this post-conviction appeal based on the evidence

actually presented at trial. See United States v. Laguna-Estela,

394 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2005). Our review is de novo. United

States v. Cartagena-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 714 (1st Cir. 1995).

In our prior consideration of this issue, we noted that

"double jeopardy only bars successive RICO charges involving both

the same enterprise and the same pattern of racketeering activity."

DeCologero, 364 F.3d at 18. The court recognized that it was

perhaps a "hard question" whether the enterprises in the Carrozza

case and this case were the same, but concluded that the patterns

of racketeering activity were not. Id. Having assessed the

evidence post-trial, we reach the same conclusion.

In comparing the charged patterns of racketeering, we

consider the totality of the circumstances, including the

similarities of "the time, the place, the people, and the nature

and scope of the activities involved in each indictment." Id.

Paul A. first argues that the time periods covered by the two

trials overlap. We recognized in our earlier opinion the overlap

in the time periods covered by the two indictments but found it

insubstantial. Id. at 19. We noted then that the Carrozza

indictment focused on 1989 to 1994 but that the Carrozza trial

included evidence of events occurring as late as 1998. Id. The
-63-

DeCologero indictment focused on the years 1995 to 1997, but the

prosecution introduced evidence reaching back to 1994. For

example, there was conflicting testimony about whether the Soccorso

robbery occurred in late 1994 or late 1995, and the prosecution

sought to establish that Finethy incurred his drug debt in 1994 as

background for the alleged 1996 extortion. These exceptions were

minor, however, and Paul A. points to no other instances of

proffers of pre-1995 evidence. We again conclude that the overlap

between the time periods is insubstantial. Cf. United States v.

Ciancaglini, 858 F.2d 923, 929 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding distinct

patterns of racketeering activity despite overlap of twenty-five

months).

Paul A. concedes that he is the only common defendant

between the two indictments, but he argues that does not end the

analysis of common participants. We need not address his premise,

for in any event, the only common character Paul A. points to is

Vincent Marino, a Carrozza defendant, who Paul A. argues is a

missing link in the Silva murder. That connection is tenuous, and

it does not even suggest that the two indictments charged the same

pattern of racketeering activity. Cf. United States v. Russotti,

717 F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding different patterns of

racketeering activity even though two individuals were named in

both indictments).

Finally, Paul A. points to references in the Carrozza

case to robberies of drug dealers in arguing that the two cases
-64-

dealt with the same types of crime. First, the references in

Carrozza are not new information, derived from the actual

prosecution of this case, and thus would not affect the conclusion

we reached in the interlocutory appeal. Second, the overlap of

some types of crimes between two indictments does not necessarily

mean the indictments charge the same pattern of racketeering

activity. See, e.g., United States v. Ruggiero, 754 F.2d 927, 933-

34 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding different patterns of racketeering

activity even though both indictments charged crimes under the same

gambling, drug, and robbery statutes). Third, the alleged overlap

was minimal.

We thus conclude again that, whether or not the same

enterprise was involved, the indictments did charge and the

government did try two different patterns of racketeering activity.

Taken as a whole and based on the trial records, the Carrozza case

"focused on the systematic murder of rival mafia members . . . to

seize control of the Patriarca family," while this case focused on

"a more conventional collection of robberies and drug trafficking

offenses, the single murder being merely a means of protecting the

conspiracy from the police." DeCologero, 364 F.3d at 18-19. There

has been no violation of Paul A.'s double jeopardy rights by his

standing trial in this case.

B. Ability to Present Defense

Paul A. raises several arguments pertaining to his

ability to present his defense theory in full. He claims that the
-65-

district court curtailed the testimony of witnesses in violation of

his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, that the court failed to

compel the production of a witness in violation of his Sixth

Amendment rights, and that the prosecution withheld exculpatory

evidence in contravention of its Brady duties and in violation of

his Fifth Amendment rights. These arguments all fall short.

1. Trial Management and Evidentiary Rulings

Paul A.'s primary defense was that Regan was aligned with

the Salemme faction of the Patriarca Family and thus would not have

been working with Paul A. if Paul A. was, as the government had

previously alleged, aligned with the Carrozza faction. Paul A.

complains that the trial judge curtailed his ability to present

this defense by restricting his cross-examination of Regan and

other witnesses and by cutting short his own testimony. He argues

that these rulings violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to

present his defense.

"Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the

[Fifth] Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation

clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees

criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete

defense.'" Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 682, 690 (1986) (quoting

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)) (citations

omitted). What constitutes the "basic elements" of a fair trial

under the Fifth Amendment is determined "largely through the
As relevant here, the Sixth Amendment protects the 19

accused's right, in a criminal trial, "to be confronted with the

witnesses against him" and "to have compulsory process for

obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. Const. amend. VI.

-66-

several provisions of the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).19

However, "[a] defendant's right to present relevant

evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable

restrictions." United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308

(1998). For example, the Supreme Court has "never questioned the

power of States to exclude evidence through the application of

evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness

and reliability -- even if the defendant would prefer to see that

evidence admitted." Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. Thus, "federal

rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish

rules excluding evidence from criminal trials. . . . so long as

[those rules] are not 'arbitrary' or 'disproportionate to the

purposes they are designed to serve.'" Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308

(quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)).

The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle recently,

emphasizing that "well-established rules of evidence [that] permit

trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is

outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury" do not

normally breach defendants' constitutional rights. Holmes v. South

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006). In Holmes, the Court
Paul A. also complains of restrictions on his ability to 20

present evidence that Regan was somehow involved in Silva's murder,

but he does not specify any objectionable rulings. Regardless, the

evidence in question is highly tangential and circumstantial; there

would have been no abuse of discretion in its exclusion. 

-67-

specifically noted as one such "well-established rule" the rule

that a court may exclude a defendant's evidence proffered to show

that someone else committed the crime in question if that evidence

is too speculative, remote, or immaterial. Id. at 327, 330.

Paul A. argues that he was unable to question Regan fully

during cross-examination about his affiliation with Salemme's

group. But the court did allow Regan to be questioned about the

structure of the Patriarca family, his association with Frank

Salemme Jr., and related issues despite continued objections by the

prosecution. The limits which were placed on questioning were

based on the judge's well-founded concerns about relevance and were

within her discretion. The prohibited questions pertained

primarily to events that occurred before 1995 and thus before the

crimes alleged in the indictment. There was a risk of jury

confusion from this line of questioning in an already complex and

confusing case. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219

F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2000) ("The district court 'retains wide

latitude to impose reasonable limits' on cross-examination in order

to avoid confusion of the issues or extended discussion of

marginally relevant material." (quoting United States v. Twomey,

806 F.2d 1136, 1139 (1st Cir. 1986))).20
Paul A. also alleges that the trial court curtailed his 21

opening and closing arguments, but our review of the record

revealed no basis for these allegations.

-68-

Paul A.'s objection to the court's curtailing of his own

testimony is also misplaced. Regardless of what theory a defendant

might wish to present, that does not entitle him to provide nonresponsive (and provocative) answers, even to his own attorney's

questions. In addition, much of the information pertinent to Paul

A.'s defense came in through the cross-examination of Regan.

Finally, Paul A. complains of the court's rulings on the

inadmissibility of most testimony pertaining to the gym

conversations, but we have already found those rulings not to be in

error.21

Paul A. was able to present his defense, and the court

did not abuse its discretion in restricting the admission of a

fraction of his evidence. Cf. O'Brien v. Marshall, 453 F.3d 13,

19-20 (1st Cir. 2006) (no constitutional violation where

defendant's evidence that someone else committed the crime was

restricted based on traditional hearsay rules); DiBenedetto v.

Hall, 272 F.3d 1, 7-9 (1st Cir. 2001) (no constitutional violation

where defendant's evidence that others had motive in mob killing

and that key government witness was lying to regain favor with mob

faction was excluded because it was unreliable and tangential).

2. Denial of Compulsory Process
-69-

Paul A. also attempted at trial to show that Vincent

Marino, a.k.a. Gigi Portalla, was involved in the North burglary

and in Silva's murder, a showing presumably meant to exonerate Paul

A. He argues that the district court's refusal to expedite

Marino's transport from a federal penitentiary in Pennsylvania or

to provide a continuance until Marino's presence could be secured

deprived him of compulsory process under the Sixth Amendment.

Paul A. filed his motion for Marino's transport to

testify on February 28, two days before the prosecution rested.

The district court allowed the motion, but refused to order the

U.S. Marshals to expedite their transport process or to provide

extra funds to do so. Paul A. moved for a continuance, which the

court also denied.

If the court had denied Paul A.'s motion to transport

Marino, our review would be for abuse of discretion. United States

v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1117 (1st Cir. 1989). As the court

granted the motion but simply refused to expedite the request, we

see no reason why a more stringent standard of review should be

used. Trial judges are best situated to weigh the competing

demands of trial management -- "factors such as timeliness,

materiality, relevancy, competency, practicality, and utility" --

and thus we accord the trial court's determinations in these areas

"considerable respect." Id. at 1118.

As the trial court noted, Paul A. submitted his request

quite belatedly. There was no reason for that delay. Other
-70-

circuits faced with similar circumstances have found no abuse of

discretion. Where a defendant waited until seven business days

before the trial started to request the production of an

incarcerated witness, the Eighth Circuit concluded that, "[i]n view

of the modest benefit that [the] testimony might have offered, . .

. the district court correctly ruled that the countervailing public

interests in the efficient administration of justice were

sufficient reason to deny the motion for a continuance of the

trial." United States v. Sparkman, 500 F.3d 678, 683 (8th Cir.

2007). The Eighth Circuit also found no abuse of discretion where

the trial court denied a further continuance when the marshals

could not locate witnesses subpoenaed at government expense (under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b)), given that the defendant

had waited until the day before trial to request the subpoena.

United States v. DeCoteau, 648 F.2d 1191, 1192-93 (8th Cir. 1981).

As the Second Circuit succinctly stated, where the defendant had

waited until two business days before the beginning of trial to

request a continuance so that an incarcerated prisoner could be

produced, "any detriment suffered by [the defendant] resulted from

his own dilatory conduct and not from the court's ruling." United

States v. King, 762 F.2d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 1985). In all these

cases, the defendants' efforts to secure the testimony of

incarcerated witnesses were considered tardy even though they were

made prior to the commencement of trial; Paul A. waited until the

twenty-ninth day of trial to make his request. The comparison is
This included alerting the defense in 2001 and 2002 that 22

a witness (DiCenso) linked Marino to a gun deal gone bad and that

a confidential informant had linked Marino to the guns being stored

by Silva.

-71-

not in his favor. Further, the proffered testimony of Marino was

tangential and potentially cumulative. Any benefit of the

testimony would have been slight.

The Compulsory Process Clause is more a sword than a

shield because "[t]he decision whether to employ it in a particular

case rests solely with the defendant. The very nature of the right

requires that its effective use be preceded by deliberate planning

and affirmative conduct." Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410

(1988). The fault here lies with Paul A.

3. Brady Disclosures

Finally, Paul A. alleges that the prosecution withheld

exculpatory evidence in contravention of its Brady obligations.

Again, we review Brady determinations for abuse of discretion.

Caro-Muñiz, 406 F.3d at 29. Paul A. repeatedly requested materials

pertaining to investigations of Vincent Marino, specifically

evidence linking Marino to Silva's death, but the prosecution

opposed and the court denied the motions.

The prosecution represented that it had disclosed all

potentially exculpatory material. Paul A. points to no specific 22

materials or information he believes are in the prosecution's

possession that would exculpate him. Without such a specific

request, it is the prosecution "that decides which information must
-72-

be disclosed. Unless defense counsel becomes aware that other

exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court's

attention, the prosecutor's decision on [Brady] disclosure is

final." Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987) (footnote

omitted); see also Brandon, 17 F.3d at 456 (finding insufficient a

defendant's "speculat[ion] that the . . . files might contain

exculpatory evidence" without "any supporting evidence or arguments

to indicate this was, in fact, the case"). There was no abuse of

discretion in crediting the prosecution's adamant assertion that it

had no further material and exculpatory evidence.

C. Conflict of Interest

Paul A. requests a new trial based on his trial

attorney's alleged conflicts of interest and the trial court's

unwillingness to hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter. We

review this question de novo. Reyes-Vejerano v. United States,

276 F.3d 94, 97 (1st Cir. 2002).

 Paul A. alleges that his counsel, John Salsberg, suffered

from two conflicts of interests: that his law partner previously

represented Jon Minotti, a potential defense witness, and that his

associate had previously worked for an attorney who had represented

Vincent Marino in the Carrozza case. See United States v. RamirezBenitez, 292 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Representation of coindictees by members of the same law firm may create a conflict of

interest similar to that when a single attorney represents two or

more co-defendants."). Paul A. argues there was some evidence that
-73-

Minotti had additional information about Silva's murder, owned some

of the guns found in Silva's apartment, and had told an

acquaintance that he had participated in the Stevens robbery.

Salsberg's partner withdrew his representation of Minotti when

Salsberg was appointed to represent Paul A. Salsberg's motion for

a writ of habeas corpus to procure Minotti's testimony was denied

because the court concluded that his testimony would be

inadmissible. As for Marino, Paul A. does not describe what, if

any, work Salsberg's associate might have done on Marino's case at

his prior firm. The court did approve Salsberg's motion requesting

Marino's transport from prison to testify but did not order the

marshals to expedite the process; as a result, Marino never

testified.

Prior to jury impanelment, Paul A. filed a pro se motion

requesting new counsel, but that motion and the in-court discussion

it generated focused on whether Salsberg was prepared for trial.

Towards the very end of the trial, Paul A. filed a series of pro se

motions requesting new counsel; those motions focused on Salsberg's

alleged conflicts of interest. The court summarily denied these

later pro se motions.

On appeal, Paul A. is mistaken as to the law: reversal is

not automatic when a trial judge fails to conduct a proper inquiry

into a potential conflict of interest. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535

U.S. 162, 170-73 (2002); United States v. Newton, 326 F.3d 253,

263-64 (1st Cir. 2003). This is because, as the Supreme Court has
Contrary to Paul A.'s assertions, nothing in Mickens 23

suggests that the Court intended its holding to apply to only those

cases in which the defendant did not raise a conflict of interest

concern during the trial, nor does the automatic reversal rule of

Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) -- which the Mickens

Court cabined very narrowly -- apply here where counsel did not

himself object at trial. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168 (Holloway's

automatic reversal rule applies "only where defense counsel is

forced to represent codefendants over his timely objection, unless

the trial court has determined that there is no conflict" (emphasis

added)). While Salsberg did raise other concerns before the trial

court about his ability to represent Paul A., he never informed the

court that he himself believed that he was unable to represent Paul

A. due to a conflict of interest. 

-74-

explained, "defects in assistance [of counsel] that have no

probable effect upon the trial's outcome do not establish a

constitutional violation." Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166. Even if the

possibility of a conflict of interest was apparent enough to

require the trial court to conduct a formal inquiry into the issue

-- a question that is not immediately clear on the facts of this

case -- "the trial court's failure to make [that] inquiry does not

reduce [Paul A.'s] burden of proof." Id. at 173-74; see also id.

at 168-69 (discussing when a court has a duty to inquire into a

potential conflict of interest). Paul A. still bears the burden

of showing that the conflict of interest he alleges went beyond a

"mere theoretical division of loyalties" and in fact "adversely

affected his counsel's performance." Id. at 171, 174.23

This showing by a defendant of an actual conflict is less

burdensome than that required to establish ineffective assistance

of counsel claims. United States v. Burgos-Chaparro, 309 F.3d 50,

52 (1st Cir. 2002). Here the defendant must demonstrate that his
The Supreme Court in Mickens expressly did not reach the 24

question of whether this "actual conflict" standard, requiring some

showing of an actual adverse effect but not of prejudice, should

apply to cases of successive representation, such as this one.

Mickens, 535 U.S. at 176. Like the Mickens Court, we reserve this

question for another day and grant Paul A. the benefit of the

assumption that the actual conflict standard is available to him;

from the record before us, we doubt Paul A. could otherwise muster

a showing of prejudice. 

-75-

counsel's performance was affected by the conflict, but need not

also establish that the difference in performance prejudiced him in

the same sense as in an ineffective assistance claim. Id.24

Showing an adverse effect, however, still requires more than mere

speculation, id. at 53; the defendant "must show that [the

attorney] might plausibly have pursued an alternative defense

strategy, and that the alternative strategy was in conflict with,

or may not have been pursued because of, [the attorney's] other

loyalties or interests," Ramirez-Benitez, 292 F.3d at 30; see also

United States v. Lachman, 521 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2008). This

Paul A. fails to do.

Paul A. makes no viable argument as to what Salsberg

might have done differently. He accuses Salsberg of not obtaining

Minotti's testimony, but Salsberg did attempt to procure Minotti's

testimony; that the court denied the request for evidentiary

reasons is unrelated to the question of Salsberg's allegedly

divided loyalties. As for Marino, Paul A. accuses Salsberg of not

actively interviewing Marino or requesting his appearance in a

timely manner. This, however, is not an accusation that Salsberg
Such allegations might instead go to the effectiveness of 25

Salsberg's representation, but that tack would likely fail for lack

of prejudice -- required to establish an ineffectiveness of counsel

claim -- resulting from these alleged shortcomings. 

Paul A.'s argument that the failure of Tony Bucci to 26

testify for the defense had anything to do with Salsberg's alleged

conflicts of interest is simply not borne out by the record. The

debate over Bucci's testimony revolved primarily around Bucci's

Fifth Amendment rights; there is no indication that Salsberg tried

to prevent Bucci from testifying due to the role of Minotti as a

government witness in Bucci's concurrent criminal case.

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failed to pursue an alternative defense strategy, but that he did

not pursue Paul A.'s desired strategy to Paul A.'s satisfaction.

Cf. Lachman, 521 F.3d at 21-22 (finding no conflict of interest

where counsel did present defendant's desired defense theory).25

Nor does Paul A. clarify how any inaction on Salsberg's part was in

fact the manifestation of divided loyalties. Cf. Burgos-Chaparro, 26

309 F.3d at 53 (defendant must offer some showing that attorney's

alleged shortcomings were in fact due to divided loyalties). 

There is thus no showing of an actual conflict of

interest. This claim fails. 

D. Pre-Indictment Delay

Paul A. complains that the government could have brought

the robbery- and drug-related charges in this case at the same time

as the charges prosecuted in the Carrozza trial. He asserts that

the failure to press these charges earlier was a tactical decision

by the government and that he was prejudiced by having to mount a

separate defense at the later DeCologero trial. We review the

district court's refusal to dismiss the charges due to pre-
-77-

indictment delay for abuse of discretion. Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d

at 58. The court correctly determined there was no constitutional

violation here.

Pre-indictment delay does not implicate the Sixth

Amendment's Speedy Trial provision, but the Supreme Court has

acknowledged that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

"has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive [preindictment] delay." United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789

(1977) (summarizing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324

(1971)). The Due Process Clause has only a limited role in this

context because the statutes of limitations provide the primary

protection against undue pre-indictment delays. Id.; SotoBeníquez, 356 F.3d at 25. To rise to the level of a due process

violation despite the applicable statute of limitations not having

run, the delay (1) must have "caused substantial prejudice to

[defendant's] rights to a fair trial" and (2) "was an intentional

device" used by the prosecution "to gain tactical advantage over

the accused." Marion, 404 U.S. at 324; see also Soto-Beníquez, 356

F.3d at 25. "Substantial prejudice" means more than inconvenience;

it requires a showing of actual prejudice, and even the

unavailability of witnesses or evidence might not be sufficient to

meet this burden. See Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d at 59.

Paul A. argues that the separate trials prevented him

from developing his defense -- that Regan worked for Salemme and

was framing Paul A. in the context of the war between the Carrozza
-78-

and Salemme factions -- in the second case. The exclusion of some

evidence in the present trial did not cause Paul A. substantial

prejudice, as he was still allowed to present his defense theory to

the jury, even if not to the full extent he desired. 

There is also no evidence suggesting a prosecutorial

purpose of obtaining tactical advantage as there is no evidence

that the prosecution knew in 1997 what Paul A.'s defense would be

in the present case. 

There is, on the other hand, a reasonable explanation for

the prosecution's delay. As Lovasco makes clear, prosecutors

retain discretion to delay charges until investigations are

complete and all other considerations have been weighed. Lovasco,

431 U.S. at 790-91. Paul A. attempts to distinguish Lovasco by

arguing that the delay here was not due to an ongoing

investigation. First, ongoing investigations are not the only

constitutionally acceptable explanations for pre-indictment delays.

See id. 792-95. Second, Paul A. concedes that the investigation

into Silva's murder was not completed at the time of the Carrozza

trial. Contrary to Paul A.'s characterization, that crime was

closely related to the other crimes charged in the present

indictment: Silva's murder was an effort to avoid prosecution for

and was thus part of the conspiracy to commit the robberies, drug

dealing, and other crimes that Paul A. argues should have been

prosecuted sooner. There was no unconstitutional pre-indictment

delay.
-79-
-80-

E. Denial of Continuances

We turn to the final issue on appeal. After the court

appointed Paul A. a new lawyer on September 23, 2004, it pushed the

trial back from that week until January 9, 2006 -- a delay of

fifteen months. Defense counsel requested a further six-month

continuance in November 2005, which the court denied. On January

6, 2006, Paul A.'s attorney sought a one- or two-week continuance,

which the court again denied. Paul A. argues on appeal that the

court's refusal to grant these continuances violated his Sixth

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.

We review for abuse of discretion a district court's

denial of a motion for continuance. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d at

21-22. "[B]road discretion must be granted trial courts on matters

of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary 'insistence upon

expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay'

violates the right to assistance of counsel." Morris v. Slappy,

461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575,

589 (1964)). "A defendant is generally not entitled to a new trial

unless he or she can identify specific ways in which the court's

erroneous denial of a continuance prejudiced his or her defense."

Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d at 22.

Paul A. points to no such prejudice. Instead, he argues

in general terms that his counsel did not have enough time to

prepare. This was a complex case with extensive discovery.

However, counsel was given twice as long as Paul A.'s formal
Paul A. also argues that the district court abused its 27

discretion in denying his motion for a continuance on the first day

of trial so he could seek advice on his lawyer's potential conflict

of interest, see supra. This motion was untimely, especially as

the question of his representation had been thoroughly canvassed in

pre-trial motion practice. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d

at 22. It was also, in the district court's view, a purely

dilatory tactic.

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counsel had estimated would be necessary (even accounting for the

new counsel's participation in another lengthy trial during those

fifteen months). As the district court pointed out, conscientious

lawyers will always feel that they could do more to prepare. The

district court's decision to go forward after a fifteen-month delay

was well within its discretion.27

 V.

After careful review, we deny all appeals and affirm the

district court and the convictions on all counts.
-82-

Appendix

Key:

G = Guilty

NG = Not Guilty

RA = Racketeering Act

(Some counts for which no defendants were convicted are not

discussed in this opinion.)

Count Crime Paul A. Paul J. John Jr. Pavone

1 RICO Conspiracy G G G G

2 Substantive RICO G G G G

RA 1-A: Conspiracy

to Murder (Silva)

G G

RA 1-B: Attempted

Murder (Silva)

G G

RA 1-C: Murder

(Silva)

G

RA 1-D: Witness

Tampering (Attempt

to Kill)

G G

RA 1-E: Witness

Tampering (Killing)

G

RA 2: Witness

Tampering

(Misleading)

G G G

RA 3: Hobbs Act

Conspiracy (Robbery)

G G G NG

RA 4-A: Hobbs Act

Robbery (Godreau)

NG NG NG

RA 4-B: Possession

of Marijuana with

Intent to Distribute

NG NG NG

RA 4-C: Kidnaping

(Godreau)

NG NG
Count Crime Paul A. Paul J. John Jr. Pavone

This RA charged a robbery of North prior to the October 28

1996 burglary of North's apartment.

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RA 4-D: Armed

Robbery (Godreau)

NG NG NG

RA 5-A: Hobbs Act

Robbery (Stevens)

G

RA 5-B: Possession

of Marijuana with

Intent to Distribute

G

RA 5-C: Kidnaping

(Stevens)

G

RA 5-D: Armed

Robbery (Stevens)

G

RA 5-E: Kidnaping

(Diaz)

G

RA 5-F: Kidnaping

(Mahlo)

G

RA 6-A: Hobbs Act

Robbery (Sapochetti)

NG NG NG

RA 6-B: Kidnaping

(Sapochetti)

G NG G

RA 6-C: Kidnaping

(Bolger)

G NG G

RA 6-D: Kidnaping

(Sullivan)

G NG G

RA 7: Hobbs Act

Robbery (North)28

NG NG

RA 8-A: Hobbs Act

Robbery (Soccorso)

NG NG

RA 8-B: Armed

Robbery (Soccorso)

G G

RA 8-C: Kidnaping

(Soccorso)

G G

RA 8-D: Kidnaping

(Ramus)

G G
Count Crime Paul A. Paul J. John Jr. Pavone

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RA 8-E: Possession

of Marijuana with

Intent to Distribute

G G

RA 9-A: Hobbs Act

Robbery (Pesaturo)

G G G

RA 9-B: Hobbs Act

Robbery (Bentley)

G G G

RA 9-C: Kidnaping

(Pesaturo)

G G G

RA 9-D: Kidnaping

(Bentley)

G G G

RA 9-E: Possession

of Cocaine with

Intent to Distribute

G G G

RA 10-A: Attempted

Hobbs Act Robbery

(Pollard)

NG NG

RA 10-B: Kidnaping

(Pollard)

NG NG

RA 11: Conspiracy to

Possess Marijuana

with Intent to

Distribute (North)

G G

RA 12: Conspiracy to

Possess Cocaine with

Intent to Distribute

(Silva)

G G

RA 13: Possession of

Cocaine with Intent

to Distribute

G NG

RA 14: Extortion

(Finethy)

G G G

3 Conspiracy to Tamper

with a Witness

G G G

4 Tampering with a

Witness (Misleading)

G G G
Count Crime Paul A. Paul J. John Jr. Pavone

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5 Tampering with a

Witness (Attempted

Murder)

G G

6 Tampering with a

Witness (Murder)

G

7 Hobbs Act Conspiracy

(Robbery)

G G G NG

8 Hobbs Act Robbery

(Stevens)

G

9 Possession of

Marijuana with

Intent to Distribute

(Stevens)

G

10 Using/Carrying a

Firearm (Stevens)

G

11 Hobbs Act Robbery

(Sapochetti)

NG NG NG

12 Using/Carrying a

Firearm (Sapochetti)

G NG G

13 Hobbs Act Robbery

(Godreau)

NG NG NG

14 Possession of

Marijuana with

Intent to Distribute

NG NG NG

15 Using/Carrying a

Firearm (Godreau)

NG NG

16 Conspiracy to

Possess Marijuana

with Intent to

Distribute (North)

G G

17 Felon-in-Possession

of a Firearm

G G

18 Conspiracy to

Possess Cocaine with

Intent to Distribute

(Silva)

G G