12-5702.131-JCD June 26, 2013

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JEFFIE HILL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 5702

) 

OFFICER CARATACHEA and )

VILLAGE OF EAST HAZEL CREST, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss the

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

For the reasons explained below, the motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

In this § 1983 action, plaintiff, Jeffie Hill, alleges that on

July 18, 2010, defendant Jalye Caratachea, a police officer for the

Village of East Hazel Crest, Illinois (the “Village”), falsely

arrested him and subjected him to excessive force. Hill also

asserts a Monell claim against the Village. 

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that

plaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of

limitations. 
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DISCUSSION

The purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is to test the

sufficiency of the complaint, not to resolve the case on the

merits. 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 1356, at 354 (3d ed. 2004). Plaintiff

contends that defendants’ motion should be denied because

complaints are not required to anticipate affirmative defenses such

as a statute of limitations. But “[w]hile a statute of limitations

defense is not normally part of a motion to dismiss under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), when the allegations of the

complaint reveal that relief is barred by the applicable statute of

limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to

state a claim.” Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir.

2011); see also Andonissamy v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 547 F.3d 841,

847 (7th Cir. 2008).

The statute of limitations for plaintiff’s claims is

determined by state law. See Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake, 415

F.3d 693, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2005) (“For §[] 1983 . . . claims, the

statute of limitations is determined by the law of the state in

which the violation took place.”). The alleged violations took

place in Illinois; therefore, we apply its two-year statute of

limitations governing personal injury claims, 725 ILCS 5/13-202. 

Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2009); Williams v.

Lampe, 399 F.3d 867, 869-70 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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Defendants contend, and Hill does not dispute, that Hill’s

claims accrued on July 18, 2010, the date the complaint alleges

that the arrest and use of force occurred. Plaintiff filed the

complaint in this case on July 19, 2012. Hill does not dispute

that he filed this action one day after the statute of limitations

expired, but he does argue that the late filing occurred through 1

no fault of his own and that barring this action “would yield a

rather inequitable result.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 2.) 

We are unpersuaded. Plaintiff fails to develop any sort of

estoppel or tolling argument or explain why application of the

statute of limitations would otherwise be inequitable. There is

nothing inherently unfair about a statute of limitations, and

furthermore, as defendants point out, the Seventh Circuit has

remarked: “A statute of limitations confers rights on putative

defendants; judges cannot deprive those persons of entitlements

under a statute.” Lee v. Cook County, 635 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir.

2011). It is unfortunate that this action was filed just one day

late, but it is nonetheless time-barred. 

In determining whether the statute of limitations has run, courts apply 1/

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a), which describes how to compute time

periods. See, e.g., Henderson v. Bolanda, 253 F.3d 928, 931 n.2 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Rule 6(a)(1)(C) allows for “next day” filings with respect to periods of time

that are stated in days or longer units of time (here, years), but only if the

last day of the period at issue is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. July

18, 2012 was not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. 
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss the

complaint [35] is granted. This action is dismissed with prejudice

as time-barred. 

DATE: June 26, 2013

ENTER: _______________________________________________

John F. Grady, United States District Judge