IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHELE DICOSOLA,

Defendant.

Case No. 12 CR 446

Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Defendant Michele DiCosola’s Pretrial

Motions and Objections. For the reasons stated herein, the Motions

are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 12, 2012, a grand jury indicted Defendant Michele

DiCosola (hereinafter, “DiCosola” or “Defendant”) for devising and

participating in a scheme to defraud financial institutions,

(Counts I-IV), filing fraudulent tax returns (Counts V and VI), and

making fraudulent declarations in bankruptcy filings (Counts VII

and VIII). 

Count I of the indictment alleges that in or around June 2008,

Defendant participated in a scheme to defraud Amcore Bank in

Wheaton, Illinois. Allegedly, at this time, Defendant submitted

fraudulent loan applications for his business, CD Shape Cutters.

In his applications, Defendant sought two loans in the amounts of
$250,000 and $450,000. The indictment states that Defendant

submitted fraudulent tax returns with the loan application. The

tax returns represented that Defendant made in excess of $300,000

in adjusted gross income in 2006 and 2007. In addition to the

fraudulent personal tax returns, allegedly Defendant submitted a

fraudulent tax return for CD Shape Cutters which represented that

the business had more than $300,000 in business income in 2006, and

$500,000 in 2007. The indictment goes on to allege that these

representations induced Amcore Bank to fund both of Defendant’s

business loans, which he personally guaranteed, but then failed to

make payments on. Counts I and II charge Defendant with violating

18 U.S.C. § 1344 for each of the two loans. 

Count III of the indictment charges Defendant with violating

18 U.S.C. § 1014 and alleges that Defendant made false statements

to Amcore Bank for the purpose of influencing it to fund his two

business loans. 

Count IV of the indictment alleges that beginning around

August 2008, Defendant participated in a scheme to defraud

CitiMortgage, a financial institution in Schaumburg, Illinois. 

Specifically, the indictment states that Defendant sought a

mortgage loan in the amount of $417,000 and a home equity loan for

$263,000 and submitted the same fraudulent tax returns that he

submitted to Amcore Bank to obtain such loans. The indictment

alleges these false representations induced CitiMortgage to fund

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both the mortgage and home equity loans, and Defendant failed to

make payments on either loan. On or about September 15, 2008,

Defendant transmitted these fraudulent representations through wire

communication. 

Counts V alleges that on or about September 15, 2009,

Defendant submitted a fraudulent tax return to the Internal Revenue

Service (the “IRS”). The return claimed Defendant was entitled to

$5,506,099 in tax refunds. Count V charges Defendant with

violating 18 U.S.C. § 287. 

Count VI alleges that on or about September 15, 2009,

Defendant submitted a fraudulent tax return in the name of Taxpayer

P.W. which claimed a federal income tax refund in the amount of

$385,539. 

Count VII alleges that on or about June 14, 2010, Defendant

submitted a false declaration under penalty of perjury in relation

to a bankruptcy proceeding, In re: Michele DiCosola and Paula

DiCosola. Specifically, the indictment states that Defendant

represented that he was not an officer or director of any

businesses in the past six years, when in fact, Defendant knew he

had been an officer of CD Shape Cutters, Xtreme Music, Inc., Fight

Foreclosure Fraud, LLC, and Money Consultants within that time. 

Count VII charges Defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 152(3). 

Similarly, Count VIII alleges that Defendant made fraudulent

representations in relation to another bankruptcy proceeding, In

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re: Michele DiCosola. The indictment alleges that Defendant

represented that he did not have any financial accounts in his name

which were closed, sold or otherwise transferred in the past year,

when in fact he had closed financial accounts at Bank of America

and TCF Bank. It also alleges that Defendant stated that he was

not an officer or director of any business within the past six

years. Count VIII charges Defendant with violating 18 U.S.C.

§ 152(3). 

On or about June 29, 2012, Defendant was arrested pursuant to

the aforementioned charges. A few hours after his arrest,

Defendant appeared before the Honorable Sidney I. Schenkier for his

arraignment. ECF No. 9. At this time, Defendant was advised of

the charges against him, waived a formal reading of the indictment

and entered a plea of not guilty. Judge Schenkier also entered an

appearance for Defendant’s attorney at that time, Herbert Hill. 

The Government agreed to set Defendant’s bond at $4,500, and

Defendant was released on his own recognizance on June 29, 2012. 

ECF No. 9-11. 

On July 23, 2012, Defendant filed a number of motions,

including one asking the Court to discharge his attorney. On

July 31, 2012, this Court granted Defendant’s motion to discharge

his attorney and continued Defendant’s other motions until

August 30, 2012, the deadline the Court gave Defendant to obtain

new counsel. ECF No. 24. 

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On August 22, 2012, Defendant filed approximately 14

additional motions, seeking, among other things, an order from the

Court to “Set Aside Waiver of Indictment” and “Set Aside Waiver of

Finding of Probable Cause Hearing by a Grand Jury.” ECF No. 25,

Page ID # 120. On August 27, 2012, Defendant filed a motion

seeking a list of the members of the grand jury. ECF No. 52. 

On his August 30, 2012 status hearing, Defendant presented his

new motions, and orally moved for a personal court reporter. At

this time, Defendant was not represented by counsel. The Court

denied Defendant’s oral motion and held Defendant’s other motions

in abeyance. The Court granted Defendant additional time to obtain

legal counsel, instructing him to do so by September 27, 2012. ECF

No. 54. 

On September 26, 2012, Defendant filed four additional

motions, which among other things, sought to modify the conditions

of his bond to permit him to travel. See ECF No. 55, 57. 

At a status hearing on September 27, 2012, Defendant appeared

again without legal counsel and informed the Court he intended to

proceed pro se. However, at this hearing, Defendant refused to

approach the bench to present his new motions properly. Because of

this, the Court denied the motions without prejudice. With the

Government’s agreement, the Court permitted Defendant to travel

from September 29, 2012 to October 7, 2012. ECF No. 64. 

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On November 6, 2012, Defendant appeared for another status

hearing. ECF No. 65. At this time, the Court appointed an

attorney from the Federal Defender to assist Defendant as stand-by

counsel. Id. 

From November 13, 2012 to December 3, 2012, Defendant filed

various documents with the Court including copies of court

documents which are stamped and signed by Defendant (ECF No. 66),

a notice of appointment of fiduciaries and trustees (ECF No. 67),

and various objections and affidavits. ECF No. 67, 68, 69, 70, 75,

76-81. Defendant also filed a motion for a bill of particulars. 

ECF No. 71, 72. 

On December 6, 2012, at a status hearing, the Court denied

Defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars. The Court then

directed the Government to respond to Defendant’s other motions by

December 20, 2012 and granted Defendant until January 10, 2013 to

file a reply. 

Pursuant to the Court’s instructions, the Government filed its

response on December 18, 2012. ECF No. 83. Rather than filing a

timely reply, Defendant filed a plethora of additional motions,

amended motions, memoranda, affidavits, and other documents which

Defendant has noticed for presentment on February 12, 2013. See

ECF No. 84-115. On January 17, 2013, (seven days beyond the time

the Court permitted Defendant to reply), Defendant filed his reply

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brief to the Government’s response. These fully briefed motions

are currently before the Court. 

II. ANALYSIS

Prior to ruling on the merits of Defendant’s motions, the

Court will address briefly the effect of Defendant’s failure to

abide by the Local Rules. 

As previously mentioned, Defendant failed to file his reply

brief within the time allotted by the Court. While his reply brief

is dated January 10, 2013, it was not filed until January 17, 2013. 

This is seven days beyond the deadline the Court provided. Because

of this, the Court could ignore the reply entirely and find

Defendant has waived his right to file a reply. See L.R. 78.3

(stating that a litigant’s failure to “file a reply memorandum

within the requisite time shall be deemed a waiver of right to

file”). However, the Court is cognizant of the fact that Defendant

is proceeding pro se (or as Defendant prefers “sui juris”), and

therefore will excuse Defendant’s failure to abide by the local

rules in this instance. See Schulz v. Serfilco, Ltd., 965 F.2d

516, 519 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that it is within the courts

discretion to strictly enforce the local rules). Nonetheless,

Defendant should not assume that the Court will be this lenient

with respect to his future filings. If Defendant files other

untimely briefs or motions, the Court will refuse to consider the

merits of those filings. 

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The Court also instructs Defendant to review Local Rule 7.1. 

This rule instructs parties to limit their motions and briefs to 15

pages. Many of Defendant’s filings far exceed this limitation. In

the future, if Defendant wishes to file a brief or a motion which

exceeds 15 pages, he must do so by filing a motion requesting the

Court’s leave to file an oversized brief and obtain the Court’s

approval. L.R. 7.1. If Defendant fails to make such a request,

the Court will strike all filings which exceed 15 pages. For the

purpose of these motions, the Court will excuse Defendant’s failure

and consider the merits of all motions and briefs regardless of

their length. 

A. Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Waiver of Indictment

and Waiver of Probable Cause Hearing (ECF No. 25)

On August 22, 2012, Defendant filed a motion titled “Michele’s

Objection to Out of Order Arraignment and Motion to Set Aside

Waiver of Indictment and Waiver of Finding of Probable Cause

Hearing Before a Grand Jury.” ECF No. 25, Page ID # 108. The

motion provides the details surrounding Defendant’s arrest and

describes his arraignment proceedings before the Honorable Sidney

I. Schenkier.

Defendant contends that during the arraignment, he informed

Magistrate Judge Schenkier that he did not understand the charges

filed against him. Because of this, Judge Schenkier called a

recess and provided Defendant a copy of the indictment. Defendant

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claims he had a limited amount of time to review the indictment and

alleges that his lawyer instructed him to tell Judge Schenkier he

understood the charges against him even if he did not and that this

would not have the effect of waiving any of his other rights. 

Defendant argues that his counsel gave him false advice and

concealed things from him during his arraignment. Specifically, he

claims Mr. Hill concealed from him that by waiving a formal reading

of the indictment, he had waived a probable cause hearing. Because

of this, Defendant argues he is entitled to a probable cause

hearing before a grand jury. 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 10 governs arraignments.

It requires a defendant to receive a copy of the indictment and

have the indictment read unless the defendant waives a formal

reading. FED. R. CRIM. P. 10. 

As the Government points out, the requirements of Rule 10 were

satisfied because Defendant admits he was provided a copy of the

indictment, and counsel waived a formal reading. While Defendant

admits he was provided a copy of the indictment, he argues that his

motion should be granted since he was not provided with the

indictment until after Judge Schenkier called for a recess. This

argument is meritless. It is undisputed that Defendant had a copy

of the indictment and pled not guilty to the charges against him. 

While Defendant argues the copy of the indictment he was provided

was “really an Information in the guise of an indictment,” this is

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not true. Def.’s Reply at 3. A copy of the indictment is

available online and the first line provides, “The SPECIAL FEBRUARY

2011-1 GRAND JURY charges: At times material to this Indictment.” 

ECF No. 1 at 1 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court finds the

requirements of Rule 10 have been met. 

Moreover, while Defendant claims his lawyer’s waiver of a

formal reading of the indictment impacted his other rights,

including a right to a probable cause hearing, this assertion lacks

merit. In this case, Defendant was arrested pursuant to an

indictment. See ECF No. 1 & 2. The Seventh Circuit has held that

“an indictment establishes probable cause[.] . . .” Park Manor

Ltd. v. HHS, 495 F.3d 433, 437 (7th Cir. 2007). Thus, Defendant is

not entitled to a probable cause hearing. This is true regardless

of Defendant’s decision to waive a formal reading of the

indictment. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to

Set Aside Waiver of the Indictment and Set Aside Waiver of Probable

Cause Hearing. 

As an aside, Defendant’s assertion that the factual

allegations contained in his motion are conclusive evidence

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 is erroneous. Federal

Rule of Evidence 201 provides that a court may take judicial notice

of adjudicative facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute”

because they are either generally known within the . . . court’s

territorial jurisdiction,” or “can be accurately and readily

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determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned.” FED. R. EVID. 201 (b). While Defendant argues the

facts he sets forth in his motion are uncontested since the

Government did not respond to such facts, this is inaccurate. 

Indisputability is required before the Court takes judicial notice. 

See Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 926 (7th Cir. 2003). The fact

that the Government did not contest every fact Defendant alleged in

his motion does not automatically mean such facts are conclusive

evidence appropriate for judicial notice. Therefore, the Court

refuses to take judicial notice of Defendant’s allegations. 

B. Defendant’s Motion for Discovery Pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and 29 and

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (ECF No. 28)

Defendant filed a motion for discovery pursuant to Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 29 and Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 16. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 29 govern

civil litigation and are not applicable in Defendant’s criminal

case. 

With respect to Defendant’s motion under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 16, the Rule requires the Government to allow

Defendant to inspect documents and objects that “are within the

government’s possession, custody, or control” and “material to

preparing the defense.” See United States v. Caputo, 373 F.Supp.2d

789, 793-94 (N.D. Ill. 2005). A defendant is only entitled to

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production of such documents or information “if he makes at least

a prima facie showing of materiality.” Id. 

Here, Defendant has not identified any documents or

information which are material to his defense. Moreover, the

Government has acknowledged its obligations to provide discovery

and states that it has “already produced the Rule 16 discovery and

will supplement the discovery if it acquires additional evidence

against the defendant.” Govt.’s Cons. Resp. to Def.’s Pretrial

Motions at 2. Thus, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for

discovery. 

C. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Production of

Rule 404(b) Material (ECF No. 30) and Defendant’s

Motion Regarding Other Crimes Evidence (ECF No. 37)

On August 22, 2012, Defendant filed a motion to compel

Rule 404(b) material. ECF No. 30. On the same date, he filed a

motion requiring the Government to give notice of its intention to

use other crimes or bad acts as evidence. ECF No. 37. The Court

finds these motions address the same Rule 404(b) evidence. 

The Government responded to these motions stating its

intention to disclose such evidence within two weeks of trial. 

Defendant argues this is a late disclosure and a violation of due

process. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) requires “reasonable

notice . . . of the general nature of any such evidence [the

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prosecution] intends to introduce at trial.” United States v.

Rusin, 889 F.Supp. 1035, 1036 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (emphasis in

original). With respect to what constitutes reasonable notice, the

advisory note to Rule 404(b) states that “[o]ther than requiring

pretrial notice, no specific time limits are stated in recognition

that what constitutes a reasonable request . . . [and that] will

depend largely on the circumstances of each case.” Id. 

In this case, Defendant has not argued why the circumstances

here require early notice. Instead, Defendant asserts he is

entitled to advanced notice for due process reasons. The Court

does not find this argument persuasive. Cf. United States v.

Lillie, No. 08-CR-717, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42940 at *8 (N.D. Ill.

May 15, 2009) (ordering the Government to disclose relevant

Rule 404(b) evidence no less than 35 days prior to trial because

the events at issue took place more than five years earlier). 

Therefore, since Defendant failed to articulate a valid reason

requiring early production, the Court denies Defendant’s motions.

D. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Disclosure

of Favorable Evidence (ECF No. 32) & Motion to Compel

Immediate Disclosure of Jencks Material (ECF No. 41)

Next, Defendant seeks disclosure of favorable evidence

pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v.

United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) and immediate disclosure of

Jencks material. See ECF No. 32 & 41.

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In particular, Defendant requests that the Government produce

the names, identities, and last known addresses of witnesses,

criminal records of witnesses, misconduct attributed to witnesses,

witness plea agreements, exculpatory statements of witnesses,

potential prosecutions of witnesses, personnel files for all

witnesses, and evidence of a witness’ alcoholism or drug use. In

response, the Government acknowledges its obligations under Brady

and Giglio, and represents that it has complied (and will continue

to comply) with these obligations. The Government also addressed

Defendant’s specific requests and stated that it intends to turn

over:

Prior inconsistent statements of the

particular witness; evidence concerning a

witness’ addiction to alcohol or drugs;

promises of reward to a witness; statements of

advice concerning future prosecutions,

including proffer letters and non-subject

letters; promises of leniency or favorable

treatment; grants of immunity; criminal

records; things of value provided to witnesses

(other than statutory witness fees, costs of

transporting witnesses, and the like); prior

acts of misconduct which the witness has

acknowledged or which have been established to

the satisfaction of the government; plea

agreements; results of polygraph examinations;

and placement in a witness relocation or

protection program. 

Govt.’s Cons. Resp. to Def.’s Pretrial Mot. at 3-4. 

The Government also represents its intention to provide any

Giglio material to Defendant at least two weeks prior to trial. 

“[W]here the government has made assurances it will comply with

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Giglio and Brady, those assurances are sufficient” and a

Defendant’s discovery motion should be denied as moot. United

States v. Johnson, No. 12-CR-40004-JPG, 2012 WL 1994848 at *3 (S.D.

Ill. June 4, 2012). Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s

motion. The Government is reminded, however, that if it has doubts

as to whether disclosure is required, such doubts should be

resolved in favor of disclosure. 

The Court also denies Defendant’s motion with respect to his

request for immediate disclosure of Giglio or Jencks material. As

the Government points out, unlike disclosure of Brady material,

Giglio and Jencks information is not required to be disclosed prior

to trial. See United States v. Sharp, No. 04-CR-797, 2005 WL

2124488 at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2005). Notwithstanding this, the

Government has agreed to provide Defendant this information at

least two weeks prior to trial. The Court finds this amount of

time sufficient and denies Defendant’s motion. The Court also

notes that to the extent Defendant seeks a list of all potential

witnesses, this request is also denied. See United States v.

Patel, No. 01-CR-715, 2002 WL 1750948 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2002)

(denying a defendant’s discovery motion which requested disclosure

of a list of all prospective witnesses because unlimited discovery

of this kind is inappropriate where the Government agrees to

disclose Giglio and Jencks material prior to trial). 

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E. Defendant’s Motion for Disclosure of

All Witnesses (ECF No. 34) & Motion for Disclosure 

of All Informants (ECF No. 39)

Defendant also requests that the Government disclose the names

of all witnesses and informants. In response, the Government

states its intention to provide Defendant a witness list 30 days

before trial. The Court finds this more than sufficient and denies

Defendant’s motion as moot.

F. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Release of 

Organizational Defendant Statements Pursuant

to Rule 16 (ECF No. 45)

Next, Defendant seeks the release of organizational defendant

statements pursuant to Rule 16. The Government represents that

there are no organizational defendants in this case. 

In his motion, Defendant lists examples of potential

organizational defendants to include “A CPA . . . [or] the IRS.” 

ECF No. 45, Page ID #169. These are not examples of organizational

defendants. An organizational defendant is a person that “was

personally involved in the alleged conduct constituting the offense

and was legally able to bind the defendant regarding that

conduct . . .” FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a)(1)(C). As such, the Court

denies Defendant’s motion. 

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G. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Immediate

Production of Reports of Examinations

and Tests (ECF No. 43)

Defendant also moves to compel the Government to produce

reports and examinations under Rule 16 immediately. The Government

states that to date, there have been no examinations or tests

completed. It further represents that if any tests are completed,

it will comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule

16(a)(1)(F). Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is denied. 

If the Government is to complete an examination at a later

date, the Court directs the Government to disclose this to

Defendant immediately. The Court finds Defendant’s motion to

consist of an ongoing request for the purposes of Rule 16(a)(1)(F)

and will not require Defendant to renew this request. 

H. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Release and Inspection

of All Original Documents and Tangible Objects

Pursuant to Rule 16 (ECF No. 47)

Defendant requests that the Government release all original

documents and tangible objects for Defendant’s inspection. The

Government represents that it has sent Defendant a discovery letter

which stated that all “original documents, tangible objects, and

other items within the scope of Fed. R. Crim. 16(a)(1)(E). . . are

available for inspection by the defense [Defendant] at a mutually

convenient time.” Govt.’s Cons. Resp. to Def.’s Pretrial Mots.

at 5-6. Thus, the Court denies Defendant’s motion. If Defendant

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wishes to inspect original documents or tangible items within the

Government’s possession, the Court instructs to Defendant to meet

and confer with the Government. See Local Criminal Rule 16.1. 

I. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Government to

Provide a List of Expert Witnesses and a Summary

of Expert Witness Testimony (ECF No. 49)

Defendant also moves for disclosure of expert witness

testimony under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E). 

The Government responds stating that it intends to make such

disclosures at least 30 days prior to trial. In these disclosures,

the Government claims it will describe the expert witnesses’

opinions, the bases and the reasons for these opinions, and the

expert’s qualifications. The Court finds this appropriate and

therefore denies Defendant’s motion as moot. 

The Court reminds Defendant of his duties to provide the

Government reciprocal discovery pursuant to Rule 16(b). “If a

defendant requests disclosure under Rule 16(a)(1)(E) and the

government complies, then the defendant must permit the government,

upon request to inspect and to copy photograph, books, papers,

documents data . . . if: (I) the item is within the defendant’s

possession, custody or control; and (ii) the defendant intends to

use the item in the defendant’s case-in-chief at trial.” FED. R.

CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). As such, the Court directs Defendant

to abide by this Rule and reciprocate discovery. 

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J. Defendant’s Motion to Order Clerk to Release

Sealed Indictment (ECF No. 35) & Defendant’s

Motion for a List of All Special Grand Jury Panel

Members and Juror Member Material (ECF No. 52)

Defendant also filed a motion to order the clerk to release

the sealed indictment and a motion seeking production of a list of

all special grand jury panel members. However, the indictment in

this case is not sealed. Defendant has a copy and there is also a

copy available online. See ECF No. 1. Thus, the Court finds

Defendant’s motion to order the clerk to release the sealed

indictment moot. 

“Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) codifies the

centuries-old requirement that grand jury proceedings be kept

secret.” In re EyeCare Physicians of Am., 100 F.3d 514, 518 (7th

Cir. 1994). The secrecy afforded to the grand jury process is

“available only where the material is related directly to

identifiable litigation . . . and the party requesting the

information demonstrates a compelling need for the material.” 

United States v. Campbell, 294 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2002); see

also FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(ii). The Court does not find the

names of the grand jury members to be related even tangentially to

Defendant’s case or defense. Furthermore, Defendant has failed to

demonstrate a compelling need for such material. Thus, the Court

denies Defendant’s motions.

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K. Defendant’s Challenge to Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In his reply, Defendant challenges this Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. The Court notes that typically, arguments raised for

the first time in reply briefs are waived. Perdue v. RBC Mortgage

Co., 156 Fed.Appx. 824, 826 (7th Cir. 2005). However, the Court

will address the merits of Defendant’s argument briefly. 

Subject matter jurisdiction is the “courts’ statutory or

constitutional power to adjudicate a case.” Steel Co. v. Citizens

for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998). Article III

Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that “judicial

power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under

this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties

made, or which shall be made, under their authority.” U.S. CONST.

ART. III SEC. 2. Pursuant to this provision, Congress enacted 18

U.S.C. § 3231 which conveys subject matter jurisdiction in criminal

cases to federal district courts. It provides that “[t]he district

courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction,

exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the

laws of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 

Defendant argues that the Court “has obtained unlawful

jurisdiction by way of undisclosed waiver of indictment. . . .” 

Def.’s Reply at 7. Defendant is confused. 

Defendant was charged pursuant to an indictment. He was

provided a copy and a copy is available online. See ECF No. 1. At

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Defendant’s arraignment, his attorney waived a formal reading of

the indictment. Waiving a formal reading of the indictment does

not have the effect of waiving the right to be charged by an

indictment. Indeed, such a proposition defies logic. If Defendant

was not charged by an indictment, there would be no indictment to

read, let alone waive a formal reading of. 

Therefore, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument the Court

lacks of subject matter jurisdiction. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies Defendant’s

pretrial motions. [ECF Nos. 25, 28, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 39, 41,

43, 45, 47, 49, and 52]. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge

United States District Court

Date: 2/12/2013

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