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Filed 3/23/23 P. v. Dhillon CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RAVINDEER DHILLON,

Defendant and Appellant.

C095702

(Super. Ct. No. 21FE005314)

A jury found defendant Ravindeer Dhillon guilty of felony identity theft, and the 

trial court found true allegations that defendant was previously convicted of two strike 

offenses. After denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the prior strike allegations under 

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), the trial court 

sentenced defendant to an aggregate four years in state prison.

Defendant now contends (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction for identity theft, and (2) the trial court erred in ruling that changes to Penal 

Code section 13851 enacted by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, 

ch. 721, § 1) (Senate Bill 81) do not apply to prior strike offenses.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

After responding to a report of a vehicle blocking traffic, California Highway 

Patrol Officer Liz Dutton found a black 2013 Mercedes Benz in the road with its flashers 

activated and engine running. Defendant was asleep in the driver’s seat and Officer 

Dutton saw what appeared to her to be a rifle in the back seat. It was actually a BB gun. 

There was a black backpack on the front passenger seat.

Officer Dutton looked inside the backpack where, among other things, she found 

five blank checks belonging to Olivehurst Public Utility District along with debit and 

credit cards belonging to people other than defendant. Officer Dutton also found a recent 

bill of sale for the vehicle made out to defendant and a notebook with the personal 

information of numerous individuals.

California Highway Patrol Special Investigations Unit Officer William Mason 

conducted a further investigation. Officer Mason observed that the notebook was tabbed 

on the right-hand side; each tab corresponded to identifying information for a different 

person. There were 38 handwritten profiles that included names, dates of birth, social 

security numbers, e-mail addresses, phone numbers, driver’s license numbers, and home 

addresses. Ten of those profiles corresponded to personal identifying information for 

DMV applicants.

The People charged defendant with the identity theft of 10 or more people

(§ 530.5, subd. (c)(3).) The People further alleged defendant had two prior strike 

convictions pursuant to section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i).

At trial, four people testified that the notebook contained their personal identifying 

information. They also testified that they do not know defendant and did not give him 

permission to possess their information. Officer Mason testified the information 

contained in the notebook could be used to open a bank account, a credit card, or a debit 

card. The information also could be used to obtain a loan. In addition, the manner in 
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which the information was stored allowed defendant quick access to a specific person and 

all their identifying information.

The jury found defendant guilty of felony identity theft. The trial court found true 

the prior strike allegations. At sentencing, the trial court denied defendant’s Romero

motion: 

“Along with the papers and arguments, the Court has considered the constitutional 

rights of the defendant, as well as the interests of society as represented by the People. 

The Court has also considered various individualized factors relative to the defendant, the 

circumstances of the current offense, the nature of the prior strike and convictions, and 

the defendant’s other criminal history.

“The Court is mindful of its duty to consider all relevant factors and look at the 

totality of the circumstances. The Court is also aware of the recent amendments to Penal 

Code Section 1385. In particular, the addition of subdivision “C,” effective January 1 of 

this year, by way of [Senate Bill] 81.

“With that backdrop, having considered and weighed all required and relevant 

factors, the Court declines to exercise its authority to strike the strikes in this case.”

The court explained its reasons for denying defendant’s motion, and concluded: 

“This is not a close call today. [Defendant] clearly does not fall outside the spirit of the 

three-strikes law at this time.” The court also rejected “any argument that [Senate Bill]

81’s addition of Penal Code Section 1385[, subdivision] (c) mandatorily applies to 

[defendant’s] Romero invitation. [Senate Bill] 81 does not apply to alternative 

sentencing schemes.

“As our Supreme Court stated in Romero -- specifically at page 527 -- threestrikes law is considered an alternative sentencing scheme, not an enhancement.”
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DISCUSSION

I

Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for 

identity theft. We disagree.

To determine the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether, “ ‘after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. 

Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 272, italics omitted.) We resolve neither credibility issues 

nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 

6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) “Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or 

inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction. 

[Citation.]” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) “ ‘ “ ‘If the circumstances 

reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the 

circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not 

warrant a reversal of the judgment.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Casares (2016) 

62 Cal.4th 808, 823-824, overruled in part on other grounds as stated in People v. Dalton

(2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 214.) Thus, reversal is not warranted unless there is no hypothesis 

on which there exists substantial evidence to support the conviction. (People v. Bolin

(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)

“Every person who, with the intent to defraud, acquires or retains possession of

the personal identifying information, as defined in subdivision (b) of section 530.55, of 

10 or more persons,” is guilty of identity theft. (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(3).)

Defendant argues there is insufficient evidence that he intended to use the personal 

identifying information he possessed to defraud anyone. But police found defendant

sleeping in his car with the personal identifying information of at least 10 people. The 

information was organized and stored in a manner that allowed quick access. It was the 

kind of information needed to open bank accounts, apply for credit cards, and apply for 
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loans. A jury could reasonably infer based on the volume of information, the type of 

information, and the way the information was organized and stored, that defendant 

intended to use the information to defraud. The evidence is circumstantial, but direct 

evidence of an intent to defraud is not required; indeed, intent is often established by 

circumstantial evidence. (See People v. Truong (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 551, 558 [finding 

a jury could reasonably infer intent to defraud based on surrounding circumstances].) 

The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

II

Defendant argues the amendments to section 1385 made by Senate Bill 81 apply 

to prior strike convictions. The People respond that the plain language of the statute 

unambiguously applies only to enhancements, and the three strikes law is an alternative 

sentencing scheme, not an enhancement. We find the People’s argument more 

convincing.

Whether the amendments to section 1385 apply to a prior strike conviction is a 

question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. (People v. Tirado (2022) 

12 Cal.5th 688, 694 (Tirado).) To resolve whether defendant’s interpretation of the 

statute is correct, “we are guided by familiar canons of statutory construction. ‘[I]n 

construing a statute, a court [must] ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to 

effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citation.] In determining that intent, we first 

examine the words of the respective statutes: ‘If there is no ambiguity in the language of 

the statute, “then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain 

meaning of the language governs.” [Citation.] “Where the statute is clear, courts will not 

‘interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does not exist.’ [Citation.]” ’ 

[Citation.] If, however, the terms of a statute provide no definitive answer, then courts 

may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the 

legislative history. [Citation.] ‘We must select the construction that comports most 

closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than 
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defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to 

absurd consequences.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151.)

Under section 1385, subdivision (a), the trial court “may, . . . in furtherance of 

justice, order an action to be dismissed.” This authority under section 1385, 

subdivision (a) includes the power to “strike or vacate an allegation or finding under the 

Three Strikes law that a defendant has previously been convicted of a serious and/or 

violent felony . . . .” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158.)

Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 81 amended section 1385 to add specific 

mitigating factors the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike 

enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (c); 

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674.) Section 1385, subdivision (c) now 

provides: “(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if 

it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is 

prohibited by any initiative statute. [¶] (2) In exercising its discretion under this 

subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the 

defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances . . . are present. Proof of the 

presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the 

enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger 

public safety.” (Italics added.)

Subdivision (c) of section 1385 applies to the dismissal of an enhancement. 

(§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) “Ordinarily words used in a statute are presumed to be used in 

accordance with their established legal or technical meaning.” (People v. Carter (1996) 

48 Cal.App.4th 1536, 1540.) The term “enhancement” has a well-established technical 

meaning in California law. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 526-527.) “A sentence 

enhancement is ‘an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.’ [Citation.]” 

(People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101; see also Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at 

p. 695, fn. 9; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.405(5).) It is equally well-established that 
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the three strikes law does not provide for an enhancement; it is an alternative sentencing 

scheme for the current offense. (Romero, at p. 527; People v. Williams (2014) 

227 Cal.App.4th 733, 744.) We presume the Legislature was aware of, and acquiesced

in, this established judicial definition of enhancement as well as the distinction between 

an enhancement and an alternative sentencing scheme like the three strikes law. (People 

v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 89-90.) The Legislature did not define the word 

“enhancement” differently in section 1385. Because the statutory language is clear and 

unambiguous, we follow its plain meaning and do not consider the legislative history 

cited by defendant.2 (People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1277.) The plain 

language of section 1385, subdivision (c) applies only to an enhancement, and a prior 

strike is not an enhancement, but part of the three strikes alternative sentencing scheme. 

Section 1385, subdivision (c)’s provisions regarding enhancements do not apply to prior 

strike conviction allegations.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

 /S/

MAURO, J.

We concur:

 /S/

ROBIE, Acting P. J.

 /S/

BOULWARE EURIE, J.

2 If the legislative history reflects a legislative intent different than that expressed in the 

plain language of the bill, that is a matter for the Legislature.