Supreme Court 

No. 2021-51-Appeal. 

 (PC 19-283) 

Peter Scotti & Associates, Inc., et al. :

v. :

Seth Yurdin, in his official capacity 

as a Member of the City Council of 

the City of Providence, et al.

: 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or 

Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any 

typographical or other formal errors in order that 

corrections may be made before the opinion is published. 

June 23, 2022
- 1 - 

 Supreme Court 

 No. 2021-51-Appeal. 

 (PC 19-283) 

Peter Scotti & Associates, Inc., et al. :

v. :

Seth Yurdin, in his official capacity 

as a Member of the City Council of 

the City of Providence, et al.

: 

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ. 

O P I N I O N 

Justice Robinson, for the Court. We are confronted in this case with a 

contested amendment to the City of Providence Zoning Ordinance (the zoning 

ordinance) which would allow the construction of a new high-rise building in 

Providence’s Knowledge District, fundamentally altering the city’s skyline. We do 

not take such a review lightly but embark on it with due appreciation for the 

contested nature of the amendment at issue and the tremendous impact our 

decision will have on Providence and everyone interested in this case. 

The plaintiffs in the instant case, Peter Scotti & Associates, Inc. and 

Building Bridges Providence, seek review by this Court of a December 14, 2020 

judgment of the Providence County Superior Court denying and dismissing all 
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claims in plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. That judgment followed a 

decision of the Superior Court that it would not invalidate the zoning amendment 

at issue under G.L. 1956 § 45-24-71.1 The plaintiffs contend before this Court that 

“legislative deference should not apply to a § 45-24-71 challenge” and that the 

amendment is inconsistent with Providence’s comprehensive plan entitled 

“Providence Tomorrow: The Comprehensive Plan” (the Comprehensive Plan). 

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the 

Superior Court. 

I 

Facts and Travel 

The parties provided the Superior Court with stipulated facts, including 

numerous exhibits, with which to conduct its review in this case. In relating the 

1

 General Laws 1956 § 45-24-71(c) provides: 

“The review shall be conducted by the court without a 

jury. The court shall first consider whether the enactment 

or amendment of the zoning ordinance is in conformance 

with the comprehensive plan. If the enactment or 

amendment is not in conformance with the 

comprehensive plan, then the court shall invalidate the 

enactment or the amendment, or those parts of the 

enactment or amendment which are not in conformance 

with the comprehensive plan. The court shall not revise 

the ordinance to conform with the comprehensive plan, 

but may suggest appropriate language as part of the court 

decision.” 
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factual background of the dispute with which we are now confronted, we shall rely 

on those stipulated facts. 

A 

Stipulated Facts

 The defendants in this case are individuals named in their official capacities 

as members of the City Council of the City of Providence (collectively the City 

Council), as well as the I-195 Redevelopment District (the I-195 District),2 and 

Jason Fane.3

 The I-195 District owns Assessor’s Plat 20, Lot 397 located at 250 Dyer 

Street in Providence, “also known as Parcel 42 within the I-195 Redevelopment 

District” (the subject parcel), as well as Assessor’s Plat 20, Lot 399 located 

adjacent to the subject parcel, “also known as Parcel P4 within the I-195 

Redevelopment District.” Parcel P4 “is designated to serve as a park and green 

space * * *.” “The Fane Organization has proposed to purchase a portion of the 

Subject Parcel and a portion of Parcel P4 and develop thereon a high-rise 

2

 The I-195 District “is a statutorily created Rhode Island non-profit 

corporation pursuant to R.I.G.L. § 42-64.14-1, et seq. to oversee, plan, implement, 

and administer the development of the areas within the district,” which includes the 

parcels of land at issue in this case. 

3 The stipulated facts also provide greater detail concerning plaintiffs. Peter 

Scotti & Associates, Inc. is a “commercial and residential real estate appraiser, 

broker, and management company with its principal place of business” in 

Providence; and “Building Bridges Providence is a Rhode Island non-profit 

corporation consisting of Providence residents * * *.” 
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residential project not to exceed 600 feet to be called ‘Hope Point’ a/k/a ‘Fane 

Tower.’”4 

 At the time of both the petition for the amendment of the zoning ordinance 

at issue and the preparation and adoption of the Comprehensive Plan, “the Subject 

Parcel was zoned D-1-100” with a “maximum allowable building height under the 

Zoning Ordinance [of] 100 feet * * *.” The design concept for Fane Tower 

provides for a building well in excess of the one-hundred-foot limit on height 

prescribed in the zoning ordinance. See infra. 

Consequently, defendants Jason Fane and the I-195 District jointly 

petitioned for an amendment to the zoning ordinance (the Amendment). The 

petition proposed an amendment which would add a new D-1 district height 

sub-district called D-1-600, which would permit a maximum building height of 

600 feet and would change the Official Zoning Map by changing the designation of 

the subject parcel from D-1-100 to D-1-600. It further proposed amendments to 

the zoning ordinance which would allow the Downtown Design Review 

4

 The I-195 Redevelopment District Commission “has agreed to adjust the 

boundaries of Parcel P4” and “subdivide Parcel 42 so as to create two parcels: 

(a) one parcel comprising the northerly portion of Parcel 42 and a portion of Parcel 

P4 to contain a total of approximately 38,375 square feet on which Fane Tower 

would be built and (b) a second parcel consisting of the southerly portion of Parcel 

42 * * *.” 
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Committee to waive certain requirements with respect to height, massing, and 

transition lines for the new building.5 

At a May 15, 2018 hearing before the City Plan Commission with respect to 

the Amendment, the Planning Department provided a report which concluded that 

the Amendment was consistent with the Comprehensive Plan. That report noted 

that the Comprehensive Plan did “not designate height districts, but [left] it up to 

further planning processes and eventually to the City Council to determine the size, 

location and regulations for subdistricts.” The report found that the 

Comprehensive Plan supported “dense residential development” and “tall buildings 

in Downtown * * *.” It further noted that, while the Amendment was inconsistent 

with the Providence Downtown and Knowledge District Plan (the Knowledge 

District Plan), it was nonetheless consistent with the Comprehensive Plan. 

Consequently, it recommended that the City Plan Commission advise the City 

Council to that effect.6 

5

 Later in the course of the approval process relative to the Amendment 

(before the Ordinance Committee of the City of Providence), Jason Fane and the 

I-195 District submitted a new petition designated “Substitute A[.]” The zoning 

amendments sought in Substitute A are identical to those in the original petition; 

the only difference between the petitions is that, as was not the case in the original 

petition, Substitute A contains a recitation as to how the Amendment is purportedly 

in conformance with the Comprehensive Plan. 

6

 The report also contained conditions for the City Plan Commission to 

suggest to the City Council, but we need not relate them here.
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However, in spite of the contents of the just-summarized report, the City 

Plan Commission ultimately found that the Amendment was inconsistent with the 

Comprehensive Plan. Specifically, it found the Amendment not to be in 

compliance with the following portions of the Comprehensive Plan: (1) Section 

11.1, which states that “new development must take into consideration natural and 

man-made environmental constraints and focus on preserving those aspects of our 

environment that we hold dear, including * * * historic character;” (2) Section 1.2 

due to the fact that the design did not complement the existing scale of buildings in 

the area as discussed in that section; (3) Objective BE2, which “calls for new 

development to complement traditional character;” and (4) Objective H2, Strategy 

A, since the Amendment would “create housing whose costs would not be 

appropriate for the financial capabilities of city residents,” which would not be in 

conformance with the language in Strategy A. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

The City Plan Commission further found that the proposed building lacked 

“significant mixed use” and affordable housing; it also noted that the proposed 

building would encroach on a public park. In addition, it concluded that one 

hundred feet was the appropriate height zone for the subject parcel and that, if the 

city wished to effectuate a change in that regard, it should “undertake an orderly 

public process * * *.” 
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On July 18, 2018, the Amendment was considered by “the Ordinance 

Committee of the Providence City Council * * *.” The Ordinance Committee 

voted to recommend that the City Council deny the Amendment. On September 6, 

2018, the City Council received that recommendation and opted to refer the matter 

back to the Ordinance Committee for “further review and discussion.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) 

On October 22, 2018, the Ordinance Committee held a public hearing, 

which “included a presentation by the Fane team and public comment.” On 

November 8, 2018, the Ordinance Committee voted “to recommend the Petition to 

the full City Council.” 

Subsequently, on November 15, 2018, on the occasion of the first reading, 

the City Council voted to approve the Amendment. On November 20, 2018, at the 

second reading, the City Council again voted to approve the Amendment. 

Thereafter, on November 30, 2018, Providence Mayor Jorge Elorza vetoed 

the Amendment. However, on December 13, 2018, the City Council overrode the 

Mayor’s veto and approved the Amendment. 

The approved Amendment contained legislative findings detailing how the 

Amendment was in conformance with the Comprehensive Plan. In those findings, 

the City Council noted that the Comprehensive Plan declared that the relocating of 

I-195 presented “an unusual opportunity for an older built-out city to significantly 
- 8 - 

add to its downtown[.]” (Quoting the Comprehensive Plan.) It further recognized 

that the subject parcel was designated as a downtown/mixed-use area in the 

Comprehensive Plan, concerning which area the Comprehensive Plan stated that 

“greater residential density and building heights could be accommodated * * *.” 

(Quoting the Comprehensive Plan.) 

The City Council then found the Amendment to be in conformance with 

specific portions of the Comprehensive Plan. It found the Amendment to be 

consistent with Objective BE3, which expressed an intention “to incorporate the 

best urban design principles into new development patterns to achieve a higher 

concentration and greater mix of housing, employment and transit options in 

identified areas of the City * * *.” (Quoting the Comprehensive Plan.) Objective 

BE3 also contained a corresponding strategy “to [e]valuate and identify areas 

where increased height limits may be appropriate.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting the Comprehensive Plan). The City Council additionally noted 

that the Amendment was in conformance with Objective LU9, Strategy C, which 

expressed an intention to “[i]dentify areas that could support taller buildings and 

amend land use regulations to allow for greater height in those areas.” (Quoting 

the Comprehensive Plan.) 

In addition, the City Council further found the petition to be consistent with 

Objective H6, which included a strategy to “[a]mend the zoning to create nodes to 
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focus medium and high-density development * * * in transit oriented developments 

along high use transit lines.” (Quoting the Comprehensive Plan.) The City 

Council also found the Amendment to be in conformance with Objective LU4 and 

with a corresponding strategy to “promote the development of a mixture of 

commercial uses that serve city-wide needs and higher density residential uses in 

areas designated as General Commercial/Mixed Use on Map 11.2 * * *.” (Quoting 

the Comprehensive Plan.) 

The City Council went on to find the Amendment to be “consistent with” the 

purposes of the Downtown District, particularly the purpose of promoting 

“development that encourages day and night time activities that relate to the 

pedestrian and promote the arts, entertainment and housing * * *.” (Quoting the 

Comprehensive Plan.) The City Council further noted that the project would 

conform with the view corridors established in the zoning ordinance; it further 

commented that “because the Subject Parcel is uniquely situated in a former 

highway right of way, the impacts of a taller building are moderated by the absence 

of immediate proximity to historic places or structures * * *.” 

On January 17, 2019, “Fane and the I-195 Redevelopment District entered 

into a Purchase and Sale Agreement whereby the I-195 Redevelopment District 

agreed to sell a portion of the Subject Parcel, and a portion of Parcel P4, to 

Fane * * *.” 
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B 

Proceedings in Superior Court 

On January 11, 2019, plaintiffs filed suit in Superior Court, seeking review 

of the decision of the City Council. Subsequently, they filed a second amended 

complaint on October 9, 2019. The second amended complaint contained two 

counts. Count One was an appeal to the Superior Court, pursuant to § 45-24-71, 

from the City Council’s vote to approve the Amendment. Count Two sought a 

declaratory judgment.7

On September 6, 2019, plaintiffs moved for judgment upon stipulated facts 

to the effect that the Amendment was “invalid pursuant to R.I.G.L. § 45-24-71.” 

Mr. Fane objected to plaintiffs’ motion and filed a cross-motion for judgment on 

stipulated facts. The I-195 District joined in Mr. Fane’s motion. The City Council 

filed a motion similar to that of Mr. Fane and ultimately joined in his motion and 

memorandum of law. 

7

 The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment declaring that: (1) “[t]he 

Amendment provides the Subject Parcel privileges that are not extended to other 

land in the vicinity;” (2) “[t]he Amendment is inconsistent with the applicable City 

of Providence Comprehensive Plan;” (3) “[t]he Amendment is inconsistent with 

the zoning pattern in the area;” (4) “[t]he Amendment is not in the best interest of 

the community as a whole;” (5) “[t]he Amendment does not reasonably relate to 

the public health, safety, or welfare;” (6) “[t]he Amendment constitutes illegal spot 

zoning;” (7) “[t]he Amendment was made in violation of R.I.G.L. §45-24-30;” and 

(8) “[t]he Amendment is invalid.” 
- 11 - 

1. The First Decision 

On May 13, 2020, the hearing justice issued a written decision. The hearing 

justice began his decision by stating that the motions before him were “essentially” 

motions for summary judgment and that he would treat them as such. He then 

proceeded to address the appropriate standard of review under § 45-24-71, 

concluding that, contrary to plaintiffs’ argument that the review should be de novo, 

in his view amendments to zoning ordinances were entitled to a presumption of 

validity. He stated that the presumption that the Amendment was in conformance 

with the Comprehensive Plan was rebuttable, but that plaintiffs had the burden of 

demonstrating that the Amendment was not in conformance with the 

Comprehensive Plan. 

The hearing justice then proceeded to discuss many of the relevant portions 

of the Comprehensive Plan (specifically, Maps 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, Section 11.2.2, 

Objective LU9, and Objective BE3) before concluding that it was clear that “the 

Comprehensive Plan contemplates increases in building heights and densities” and 

“permits the establishment of sub-districts to address building height.” He 

specifically found that “the addition of sub-districts to the D-1 zone would be in 

conformance with the Comprehensive Plan.” The hearing justice then proceeded 

to detail the legislative findings of the City Council. However, he ultimately held 

that there were “insufficient facts” for the court to determine whether or not 
- 12 - 

plaintiffs had met their burden of rebutting the presumption that the Amendment 

was in conformance with the Comprehensive Plan. He specifically mentioned that 

he had not been provided with any of the transcripts of the proceedings before the 

City Council. 

The hearing justice denied the cross-motions before him, stating that 

“[a]lthough there appear to be genuine issues of material fact as to whether 

Plaintiffs can demonstrate that [the] Amendment is not in conformance with the 

Comprehensive Plan, th[e] lack of evidence before the Court precludes it from 

making such a finding.” 

Numerous transcripts of the proceedings before the City Plan Commission, 

the Ordinance Committee, and the City Council were then filed with the Superior 

Court; and the parties filed supplemental memoranda relative to plaintiffs’ motion 

and defendants’ cross-motions for judgment on stipulated facts. 

2. The Second Decision 

On December 8, 2020, the hearing justice issued a second decision in the 

case, in which he stated that he was reviewing the parties’ motions “in light of the 

expanded record.” In detailing the facts, the hearing justice noted that the 

Knowledge District Plan “was prepared by a group of residents, business owners, 

institutional representatives, and the Providence Planning Department, and was 

intended to serve as a guideline for future development, zoning regulations, and 
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areas for further investigation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The hearing 

justice then reiterated his previous ruling with respect to the rebuttable 

presumption of validity to which the Amendment was entitled and the other 

determinations set forth in his May 13, 2020 decision. 

The hearing justice began his analysis by addressing the significance of 

Maps 11.2 and 11.3 in the Comprehensive Plan. He noted that the Comprehensive 

Plan defines Map 11.2 as “‘the official Land Use Map of the city’ which ‘provides 

the basis for the Zoning Ordinance.’” (Quoting the Comprehensive Plan.) He then 

noted that Map 11.2 designated the subject parcel as downtown/mixed-use and did 

not indicate height requirements. According to the hearing justice, Map 11.3, on 

the other hand, was meant to “identify ‘inconsistencies between the City’s existing 

zoning ordinance and the proposed future land use.’” (Quoting the Comprehensive 

Plan.) He noted that Map 11.3 showed the subject parcel as having a D-1-100 

zoning designation. 

Ultimately, the hearing justice determined that “in order for an Amendment 

to comply with the Comprehensive Plan, it must be consistent with Map 

11.2 * * * which does not contain specific height designations.” He noted that he 

had already held that the Comprehensive Plan contemplated increases in building 

height and allowed for height sub-districts in the downtown/mixed-use area, and he 

stated that it would be “inconsistent to then hold that Map 11.3 sets forth specific 
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height restrictions triggering a requirement to amend the Comprehensive Plan for 

any increase or added sub-district.” He concluded that plaintiffs’ evidence with 

respect to Map 11.3 was insufficient to rebut the presumption of the Amendment’s 

validity. 

The hearing justice then proceeded to address the issue of the Amendment’s 

compliance with the Knowledge District Plan and Objective IMP3. The hearing 

justice indicated that Objective “IMP3 states that a strategy for implementation is 

to ‘[m]aintain existing uses, density and character in Areas of Change designated 

on Map 11.1 Areas of Stability and Change until the relevant neighborhood or 

specific plans and corresponding amendments to the Comprehensive Plan and 

Zoning Ordinance have been adopted.’” (Quoting the Comprehensive Plan.) He 

also noted that the Knowledge District Plan labeled zoning for the subject parcel as 

D-1-100. He found that neither the language of Objective IMP3 nor the zoning 

designation in the Knowledge District Plan rendered the Amendment inconsistent 

with the Comprehensive Plan because the Comprehensive Plan already took 

account of “the important ideas and concepts which arose from the neighborhood 

planning process.” (Quoting the Comprehensive Plan.) He went on to note that 

the Knowledge District Plan itself stated that “it was meant to ‘establish an 

inspirational vision that will spur investment and facilitate new growth and 

prosperity in Providence.’” (Quoting the Knowledge District Plan.) In contrast, 
- 15 - 

according to the hearing justice, the Comprehensive Plan was more than an 

“innocuous general-policy statement,” but rather created a “binding framework or 

blueprint * * *.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) He further noted that it was 

required that the Comprehensive Plan be adopted in the same manner as an 

ordinance. 

Ultimately, the hearing justice stated that, while the Comprehensive Plan did 

make reference to neighborhood plans, he did not read the Comprehensive Plan “as 

incorporating by reference mandatory zoning designations from the Knowledge 

District Plan * * *.” Accordingly, he held that plaintiffs had not demonstrated that 

the Amendment was inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan based on the height 

designations in the Knowledge District Plan. He further held that there was “at 

least some discussion” of the Knowledge District Plan during the Amendment 

approval process and that therefore there had not been a “wholesale failure to 

‘consider’ certain factors as described in that objective.” 

The hearing justice then discussed plaintiffs’ argument that the 

Comprehensive Plan was not in accordance with Objective BE2, Section 11.1, and 

Objective H2. The hearing justice detailed the legislative findings made by the 

City Council and noted that “the Amendment faced a robust and lengthy review 

process * * *.” He then stated that a “municipality has discretion in choosing 

options for conforming its ordinances or land use decisions to its comprehensive 
- 16 - 

plan,” and he held that plaintiffs had “not met their burden of rebutting the 

Amendment’s presumption of validity by putting forth specific evidence that the 

Amendment is not consistent with the Comprehensive Plan.” (Internal quotation 

marks omitted.) The hearing justice then denied plaintiffs’ motion, granted 

defendants’ motions, and stated that he would not invalidate the Amendment 

pursuant to § 45-24-71. 

Thereafter, on December 14, 2020, an order issued, which stated that 

plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on stipulated facts was denied and defendants’ 

motions for judgment on stipulated facts were granted. Final judgment entered the 

same day, and a timely notice of appeal was filed. 

II 

Analysis 

A 

Appropriate Method of Review 

 Before addressing the parties’ contentions before this Court, we must first 

address the method by which plaintiffs sought review of the judgment of the 

Superior Court. The plaintiffs chose to file an appeal to this Court rather than 

filing a petition for a writ of certiorari. We are confronted with the question of 

whether or not that was the correct procedural means of seeking review. 
- 17 - 

 We have not heretofore specifically addressed the precise procedural issue 

presented in the instant case with respect to this Court’s review of decisions made 

by the Superior Court pursuant to an appeal under § 45-24-71. Indeed, we have in 

the past reviewed cases that have come before us pursuant to those two different 

procedural routes (appeal and a writ of certiorari) without commenting on which 

was the appropriate route. Compare Dallman v. Isaacs, 911 A.2d 700, 703 (R.I. 

2006) (an appeal), with Smithfield Voters for Responsible Development, Inc. v. 

LaGreca, 755 A.2d 126, 128 (R.I. 2000) (a petition for a writ of certiorari). 

However, after requesting that the parties address the issue at oral argument before 

this Court and considering the relevant statutory scheme and precedent, we are of 

the opinion that this issue can be easily resolved. 

A review of § 45-24-71 indicates that it allows for an “appeal” to the 

Superior Court from an amendment of a zoning ordinance. However, it is silent as 

to the method by which review should be sought in this Court. We have 

specifically stated that “[b]ecause of the absence of a statutory provision for review 

by this court of the Superior Court’s judgments in zoning cases, we have held that 

‘[s]uch judgments are only reviewable in this court by common law certiorari.’” 

Kirby v. Planning Board of Review of Town of Middletown, 634 A.2d 285, 289 

(R.I. 1993) (quoting Gaschen v. Zoning Board of Review of Town of Cumberland, 

499 A.2d 419, 419 (R.I. 1985) (mem.)). What is more, it is worth noting that this 
- 18 - 

Court reviews city council actions (to which § 45-24-71 is not applicable) by 

means of a petition for a writ of certiorari. See, e.g., Preservation Society of 

Newport County v. City Council of City of Newport, 155 A.3d 688, 689 (R.I. 2017) 

(reviewing the denial of two victualing licenses by a city council pursuant to a writ 

of certiorari); Cullen v. Town Council of Town of Lincoln, 850 A.2d 900, 901-02 

(R.I. 2004) (reviewing a town council’s denial of an application to tie into the 

town’s sewer system pursuant to a writ of certiorari); Gornall v. Bray, 644 A.2d 

833, 833 (R.I. 1994) (reviewing a city council’s denial of applications for licenses 

to operate an auto-repair shop and a used-car dealership pursuant to a writ of 

certiorari). 

 In light of that precedent, we can unequivocally state that this case is before 

this Court in an incorrect procedural posture; plaintiffs should have sought review 

through a petition for a writ of certiorari. Henceforth, when the Superior Court 

reviews a case pursuant to § 45-24-71, review of that Superior Court judgment 

must be sought in this Court through a petition for a writ of certiorari. 

Nevertheless, given the fact that we have not previously addressed this issue, 

we shall treat this appeal as the equivalent of a petition for a writ of certiorari, and 

we shall deem such petition has having been granted. See Tarbox v. Zoning Board 

of Review of Town of Jamestown, 142 A.3d 191, 195 (R.I. 2016). 
- 19 - 

However, before proceeding to discuss the merits of this case, we wish to 

specifically address plaintiffs’ argument that this case is properly here as an appeal 

due to the presence of a declaratory judgment count in the second amended 

complaint. While it is true that the decision to grant or deny declaratory relief by 

the Superior Court is reviewed on appeal, that is simply not the situation with 

which we are presently confronted. See, e.g., Estate of Hopkins v. Hopkins, 251 

A.3d 888, 889 (R.I. 2021). The second amended complaint in this case contained a 

count providing for an appeal pursuant to § 45-24-71 and a second count seeking a 

declaratory judgment. But, it is clear that the decision of the hearing justice which 

we are called upon to review was made under § 45-24-71. He specifically stated as 

much at the close of his second decision in the case—he concluded that he would 

not invalidate the Amendment under § 45-24-71. The hearing justice did not issue 

a declaratory judgment, nor did he specifically decide not to issue such a judgment. 

What is more, the parties’ filings before this Court focus solely on the appeal to 

Superior Court pursuant to § 45-24-71; the declaratory judgment issue is not raised 

or discussed.8 Therefore, it is abundantly clear that we are reviewing the Superior 

8

 We note that plaintiffs contended at oral argument that, because the 

judgment from which they are appealing denied and dismissed all claims in their 

second amended complaint, that permitted them to seek review before this Court 

by means of an appeal. However, all claims were denied and dismissed because it 

was unnecessary for the hearing justice to rule on the declaratory judgment count 

in the second amended complaint following his refusal to invalidate the 

Amendment pursuant to § 45-24-71. The language of the judgment does not 
- 20 - 

Court’s judgment of an appeal from an amendment to a zoning ordinance pursuant 

to § 45-24-71; we are not being asked to review anything with respect to the 

declaratory judgment count.9 

B 

Standard of Review Before This Court 

“Our review of a case on certiorari is limited to an examination of the record 

to determine if an error of law has been committed.” Verizon New England Inc. v. 

Savage, 267 A.3d 647, 652 (R.I. 2022) (quoting State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 423 

(R.I. 2013)); see also Atryzek v. State, 268 A.3d 37, 41 (R.I. 2022). We have stated 

that, “[i]n addition to examining the record for judicial error, ‘we inspect the record 

to discern if there is any legally competent evidence to support the findings of the 

hearing justice below.’” Verizon New England Inc., 267 A.3d at 652 (quoting 

Poulin, 66 A.3d at 423); see also Atryzek, 268 A.3d at 41. As such, “[w]e shall not 

disturb the findings of the trial justice unless it is established that he or she 

change what was and was not decided by the hearing justice, nor does it alter what 

was and was not briefed before this Court. 

9

 It should also be noted that some of the cases cited by the parties at oral 

argument, which state that “certiorari will not lie to review proceedings purely 

legislative or administrative in character,” predate the statutory scheme at issue by 

many years (§ 45-24-71 was enacted in 1991) and are not relevant to the 

procedural issues before us in this case. R.I. Home Builders, Inc. v. Hunt, 74 R.I. 

255, 258, 60 A.2d 496, 498 (1948); see, e.g., Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc. 

v. Zoning Board of Review of City of Pawtucket, 91 R.I. 464, 468, 165 A.2d 510, 

511-12 (1960); Siegl v. Town Council & Zoning Board of Review of North 

Kingstown, 75 R.I. 502, 506, 67 A.2d 369, 370 (1949). 
- 21 - 

misconceived or overlooked relevant and material evidence or was otherwise 

clearly wrong.” Verizon New England Inc., 267 A.3d at 652 (quoting WMS 

Gaming, Inc. v. Sullivan, 6 A.3d 1104, 1111 (R.I. 2010)). 

C 

Conformance with the Comprehensive Plan 

 We now turn to the substantive issue before us: Did the hearing justice err in 

concluding that plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of rebutting the 

presumption that the Amendment is in conformance with the Comprehensive Plan? 

 The Rhode Island Zoning Enabling Act (ZEA) “requires that zoning 

ordinances be developed and maintained in accordance with a comprehensive plan 

prepared pursuant to the Rhode Island Comprehensive Planning and Land Use 

Regulation Act (CPLURA).” P.J.C. Realty, Inc. v. Barry, 811 A.2d 1202, 1204 

(R.I. 2002); see also § 45-24-30(a). A comprehensive plan “is a statement (in text, 

maps, illustrations, or other media of communication) that is designed to provide a 

basis for rational decision making regarding the long term physical development of 

the municipality.” P.J.C. Realty, Inc., 811 A.2d at 1204 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). A comprehensive plan is not an “innocuous general-policy statement,” 

but rather such a plan “establishes a binding framework or blueprint that dictates 

town and city promulgation of conforming zoning and planning ordinances.” 

Town of East Greenwich v. Narragansett Electric Co., 651 A.2d 725, 727 (R.I. 
- 22 - 

1994) (emphasis added). A municipality “is legally compelled to enact or to 

amend its zoning ordinance in conformity” with its comprehensive plan. Id. at 

728. 

 The operative statute in this case—§ 45-24-71—provides a means by which 

an “aggrieved party,” “any legal resident or landowner of the municipality,” or 

“any group of residents or landowners whether or not incorporated[] of the 

municipality” may appeal to the Superior Court from the amendment of a zoning 

ordinance. Section 45-24-71(a). 

1. Applicable Standard in Superior Court 

We begin our analysis by addressing what standard the Superior Court 

should have applied to an appeal pursuant to § 45-24-71. We must determine 

whether the review should have been de novo or whether the City Council’s 

decision to approve the Amendment was entitled to legislative deference. 

The plaintiffs contend that “legislative deference should not apply to a 

§ 45-24-71 challenge” because “the oversight and review that § 45-24-71 

contemplates does not implicate the concerns that animate legislative deference.” 

They further posit that § 45-24-71 “does not contain any suggestion that the 

Superior Court should apply a deferential standard,” and they point out that the 

Supreme Court case law stating that a presumption of validity should apply 

predates the enactment of the CPLURA and the ZEA. They further aver that those 
- 23 - 

two acts altered the law in “material ways.” They contend that the language of 

§ 45-24-71(c) demands a “more exacting review * * *.” 

In order to address plaintiffs’ contentions that the hearing justice erred by 

according deference to the City Council’s decision to approve the Amendment, we 

must look first to the language of the operative statutory section. 

Section 45-24-71(c) provides as follows: 

“The review shall be conducted by the court without a 

jury. The court shall first consider whether the 

enactment or amendment of the zoning ordinance is in 

conformance with the comprehensive plan. If the 

enactment or amendment is not in conformance with the 

comprehensive plan, then the court shall invalidate the 

enactment or the amendment, or those parts of the 

enactment or amendment which are not in conformance 

with the comprehensive plan. The court shall not revise 

the ordinance to conform with the comprehensive plan, 

but may suggest appropriate language as part of the court 

decision.” 

We have stated that “when a statutory section is clear and unambiguous, we apply 

the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute and we need not delve into any 

further statutory interpretation.” Grasso v. Raimondo, 177 A.3d 482, 489 (R.I. 

2018). “It is only when a statute is ambiguous that we apply the rules of statutory 

construction and examine the statute in its entirety to determine the intent and 

purpose of the Legislature.” State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 548 (R.I. 2014) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “We end the process of statutory construction 

upon concluding that a statute has a plain meaning because our ultimate goal is to 
- 24 - 

give effect to the General Assembly’s intent and we have repeatedly observed that 

the plain language of the statute is the best indicator of [legislative] intent.” Id. at 

550 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Our reading of the operative statutory language leads us to the determination 

that the statute is silent as to the standard of review to be applied by the Superior 

Court. It is true that the statute makes invalidation of a zoning amendment 

mandatory if it is found by the Superior Court not to conform with the 

comprehensive plan, but it does not contain any indication of what standard is to be 

applied in determining whether or not a particular amendment is in conformance 

with a comprehensive plan. Rather, it merely instructs the Superior Court what to 

do once that determination is made. 

 This Court opined on numerous occasions prior to the 1991 enactment of 

§ 45-24-71 that “amendments to zoning * * * ordinances[] enjoy a presumption of 

validity.” Johnson & Wales College v. DiPrete, 448 A.2d 1271, 1279 (R.I. 1982); 

see also Skelley v. Zoning Board of Review of Town of South Kingstown, 569 A.2d 

1054, 1058 (R.I. 1990); Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 117 R.I. 134, 146, 364 

A.2d 1277, 1286 (1976); Willey v. Town Council of Town of Barrington, 106 R.I. 

544, 557, 261 A.2d 627, 634 (1970). We also explained that “[t]his presumption of 

validity includes the presumption that the zoning enactments were in accordance 

with a comprehensive plan * * *.” D’Angelo v. Knights of Columbus Building 
- 25 - 

Association of Bristol, R.I., Inc., 89 R.I. 76, 83, 151 A.2d 495, 498-99 (1959) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Camara v. City of Warwick, 116 R.I. 

395, 407, 358 A.2d 23, 31 (1976). And we have stated that the “challengers of the 

amendment, have the burden of proving that it was not made in accordance with a 

comprehensive plan.” Camara, 116 R.I. at 407, 358 A.2d at 31. 

In addition, since the enactment of § 45-24-71, we have explained that 

“actions taken by a city or town council involving the amendment or repeal of 

zoning ordinances are purely legislative.” Maynard v. Beck, 741 A.2d 866, 872 n.3 

(R.I. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Willey, 106 R.I. at 557, 261 

A.2d at 634. And, “[t]his Court has consistently afforded deference to legislative 

enactments, which we presume are constitutional and valid.” Smiler v. Napolitano, 

911 A.2d 1035, 1038 (R.I. 2006); see also Rhode Island Economic Development 

Corp. v. The Parking Co., L.P., 892 A.2d 87, 100 (R.I. 2006); In re Advisory 

Opinion to House of Representatives (Casino II), 885 A.2d 698, 702 (R.I. 2005); 

Parkway Towers Associates v. Godfrey, 688 A.2d 1289, 1293 (R.I. 1997). We 

have also stated that legislative rules “have the force and effect of law, and the 

party challenging a legislative rule must rebut the presumption of validity [which] 

attaches to [the] * * * rule.” Chariho Regional School District v. Gist, 91 A.3d 

783, 791 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). What is more, we have 

“recognize[d] that a municipality has discretion in choosing options for 
- 26 - 

conforming its ordinances or land use decisions to its comprehensive plan * * *.” 

N & M Properties, LLC v. Town of West Warwick ex rel. Moore, 964 A.2d 1141, 

1147 (R.I. 2009). 

 When faced with a statute that is silent as to this issue, we see no error of 

law in the hearing justice’s decision not to deviate from this Court’s consistent 

precedent on this issue.10 Indeed, we note that the General Assembly “is presumed 

to be aware of the state of existing relevant law when it enacts or amends a statute” 

and thus, presumably, was aware of the state of the law with respect to legislative 

deference when it enacted the ZEA and the CPLURA. P.J.C. Realty, Inc., 811 

A.2d at 1206. The General Assembly chose not to provide for a different, less 

deferential standard of review in § 45-24-71(c).11 We shall not now read one into 

that statutory section in contravention of our consistent precedent. See Shine v. 

Moreau, 119 A.3d 1, 10 (R.I. 2015) (“[I]t is not within our power to read language 

into a statute which the General Assembly chose not to put there.”); see also Dodd 

10 The plaintiffs rely heavily on a decision of the Superior Court in the case of 

Sullivan v. Carney, No. WC 05-744, 2008 WL 693616 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 

2008), which came to the opposite conclusion with respect to the standard of 

review to be applied pursuant to cases under § 45-24-71. Sullivan, 2008 WL 

693616, at * 12. However, we are not bound by that decision, nor do we find it to 

be persuasive. 

11 Our conclusion is not altered by plaintiffs’ contention that the enactment of 

the ZEA and the CPLURA materially altered the state of the law. The enactment 

of those statutes did not change this Court’s consistent precedent, nor did it change 

the fact that § 45-24-71 does not expressly provide for a less deferential standard 

of review.
- 27 - 

v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (stating that a court is simply “not free 

to rewrite [a] statute that Congress has enacted”). 

 We shall proceed to address the specific contentions of plaintiffs with 

respect to alleged error on the part of the hearing justice, keeping in mind the 

hearing justice’s determination that the Amendment was due legislative deference. 

2. Map 11.3 

The plaintiffs assign error to the hearing justice in not finding persuasive 

their argument that Map 11.3 was proof that the Comprehensive Plan establishes a 

maximum height on the subject parcel of one hundred feet and that the 

Amendment therefore is not in conformance with the Comprehensive Plan. They 

add that Map 11.3 does not contemplate any future zoning change for the subject 

parcel. 

They further contend that Map 11.3 is meant to “designate those areas 

wherein the Comprehensive Plan contemplates future zoning changes, and those 

that are to remain the same” and that the hearing justice found it not to be binding 

“without any plausible discussion.” Lastly, they further aver that “[c]ompletely 

absent from the Record is any consideration of Map 11.3,” and they add that 

“counsel for Fane incorrectly represented during the approval process that the 

Comprehensive Plan did not contain height designations.” 
- 28 - 

Section 45-22.2-6(b)(2)(ii) requires that a comprehensive plan include a map 

providing for “[f]uture land use illustrating the desired patterns of development, 

density, and conservation as defined by the comprehensive plan[.]” It is clear from 

a review of the Comprehensive Plan that this describes Map 11.2. The 

Comprehensive Plan titles Map 11.2 “Future Land Use” and states that that map 

“depicts specific land use designations for each area of the city and is the Official 

Land Use Map.” It further states that Map 11.2 “provides the basis for the Zoning 

Ordinance.” 

Section 45-22.2-6(b)(2)(iii) requires that a comprehensive plan include a 

map identifying “discrepancies between future land uses and existing zoning use 

categories.” It is clear to us that this statutory section refers to Map 11.3, which is 

entitled “Future Zoning Change Areas Map.” The Comprehensive Plan itself notes 

that “there are inconsistencies between the City’s existing zoning ordinance and 

the proposed future land use,” and it provides that those inconsistencies are 

identified in Map 11.3. Map 11.3 does designate the subject parcel as D-1-100 and 

does not include it in a “proposed zoning map change area[.]” 

After extensive review of the Comprehensive Plan, the two maps in 

question, and the record in this case, we are of the opinion that the hearing justice 

did not err in concluding that plaintiffs’ assertions with respect to Map 11.3 were 

not sufficient to rebut the presumption of validity of the Amendment. The 
- 29 - 

Comprehensive Plan itself states that Map 11.3 is meant only to illustrate 

discrepancies between current zoning and proposed future land use; rather, it is 

Map 11.2 which “illustrat[es] the desired patterns of development, density, and 

conservation,” § 45-22.2-6(b)(2)(ii), and is the “Official Land Use Map.” It does 

not appear to us, after reviewing the Comprehensive Plan, that Map 11.3 was 

intended to provide a specific height requirement for all future zoning of the area 

in question. 

Our conclusion in this regard is buttressed by the fact that Map 11.2 

designates the subject parcel as “Downtown/Mixed Use” and by the fact that Table 

11.2 specifically notes that in downtown/mixed-use areas, “[i]n order to promote 

economic development while maintaining compatibility between uses, sub‐districts 

may be established to address building height * * *.” The Comprehensive Plan 

also states that, in mixed-use areas, “greater residential density and building[] 

heights could be accommodated to create a more efficient pattern of development 

and protect the character of the residential neighborhoods.” It would be illogical to 

interpret Map 11.3 as providing a cap on building height while Map 11.2—the 

Official Land Use Map—and Table 11.2 specifically allow for sub-districts to 

address building height in the same area. 

What is more, the Comprehensive Plan refers on numerous occasions to the 

possibility of having greater building heights in some areas. Objective LU9, 
- 30 - 

Strategy C articulates an objective as being to “[i]dentify areas that could support 

taller buildings and amend land use regulations to allow for greater height in those 

areas” and Strategy D articulates an objective as being to “[a]mend regulations as 

needed to establish incentives for greater height and density in exchange for 

affordable units, public space investment, support for neighborhood amenities, 

sustainable design, etc.” In addition, Objective BE3, Strategy A articulates an 

objective as being to “[i]dentify and evaluate those areas of the city where 

increased building height and density can be accommodated, allowing for 

compatible transition to surrounding areas.” 

The plaintiffs contend that, by not reading Map 11.3 to require a height limit 

of one hundred feet for the subject parcel, the hearing justice violated the canon of 

statutory construction to the effect that “[t]he Legislature is presumed to have 

intended each word or provision of a statute to express a significant meaning, and 

the Court will give effect to every word, clause, or sentence, whenever possible.” 

Koback v. Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island, 252 A.3d 

1247, 1251 (R.I. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, we note that 

that canon of construction is not absolute, and to give it the effect which plaintiffs 

seek would be to interpret Map 11.3 without reference to the context of the rest of 

the document of which it is a part, without any evidence that it was intended to be 

so interpreted. See Ryan v. City of Providence, 11 A.3d 68, 71 (R.I. 2011) (stating 
- 31 - 

that “it would be foolish and myopic literalism to focus narrowly on one statutory 

section without regard for the broader context” and that “[w]e * * * consider the 

entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context of 

the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other 

sections”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, the hearing justice did not err in determining that plaintiffs’ 

“evidence as to Map 11.3” was “insufficient to rebut the presumption of validity” 

of the Amendment.12

3. The Knowledge District Plan 

The plaintiffs contend that the Amendment is not in conformance with the 

Comprehensive Plan because the height change in the Amendment is violative of 

what is provided for in the Knowledge District Plan. They aver that the 

Comprehensive Plan places “heavy emphasis upon adherence with the planning 

processes for defined areas of the city, and in particular, the Knowledge District 

12 We pause to address plaintiffs’ contention that Map 11.3 was not discussed 

during the amendment process and was not given “plausible discussion” by the 

hearing justice. The plaintiffs make the contention with respect to the amendment 

process in a summary fashion in their brief without any further discussion of the 

issue or how it affects this Court’s review. They simply go on just to state that 

“Fane incorrectly represented during the approval process that the Comprehensive 

Plan did not contain height designations.” However, our review of the 

Comprehensive Plan with respect to the subject parcel leads us to the conclusion 

that it indeed does not contain height designations. Additionally, it is abundantly 

clear from a review of the hearing justice’s decision that he did in fact thoroughly 

address plaintiffs’ contentions with respect to Map 11.3. 
- 32 - 

Plan.” They specifically rely on the fact that the Comprehensive Plan states that 

the Knowledge District Plan “will create a model development code for the area” 

and “inform the rezoning of all of Downtown.” They further rely on portions of 

the Comprehensive Plan which state that neighborhood plans should be used to 

define building height, and they note that Objective IMP3 lists as a 

“mandatory * * * consideration” with respect to zoning amendments 

“[c]onsistency with the principles and design vision of adopted specific plans in 

Areas of Change.” (Quoting the Comprehensive Plan.) The plaintiffs also take 

issue with the hearing justice’s determination that the Knowledge District Plan is 

aspirational. 

It is undisputed that the Knowledge District Plan labels the subject parcel, in 

Figure 7-4 “New Downtown Zoning Map,” as being within an area zoned D-1-100. 

It is also true that the Comprehensive Plan does on numerous occasions discuss the 

importance of neighborhood plans. The Comprehensive Plan mentions that the 

Knowledge District Plan would “create a model development code” for the area in 

question and would “inform the rezoning of all of Downtown.” Objective LU1, 

Strategy A of the Comprehensive Plan provides that neighborhood plans should be 

used to review “[d]evelopment patterns,” preservation of “[s]ignificant buildings 

and view corridors,” and “[p]otential redevelopment opportunities[.]” Objective 

LU2, Strategy A states that neighborhood plans should be used to review “the 
- 33 - 

preferred pattern and character of development including mass, scale, building 

height, design, use, and density,” and Strategy B further states that any update to 

regulations should “[r]eflect design vision adopted as part of the neighborhood 

plans.” 

Objective IMP3, Strategy D of the Comprehensive Plan states that, when 

amending the zoning ordinances, the City should evaluate the “[c]onsistency with 

the principles and design vision of adopted specific plans in Areas of 

Change * * *.” It is plaintiffs’ contention that this section of the Comprehensive 

Plan is mandatory and intentionally incorporates the Knowledge District Plan into 

the Comprehensive Plan. 

However, upon reflection, we simply cannot agree. While the 

Comprehensive Plan certainly references neighborhood plans and their role in 

future development in Providence, plaintiffs have not pointed us to any language 

which specifically incorporates the Knowledge District Plan into the 

Comprehensive Plan. None of the just-discussed language remotely evidences an 

express intention to incorporate the Knowledge District Plan into the 

Comprehensive Plan to such an extent that the failure to adhere to the height 

restrictions in Figure 7-4 in the Knowledge District Plan would be enough to 

render the Amendment invalid. 
- 34 - 

What is more, the Comprehensive Plan itself states, in the Foreword, that in 

updating the Comprehensive Plan, the Department of Planning and Development 

already “incorporate[d] the important ideas and concepts which arose from the 

neighborhood planning process * * *.” The Knowledge District Plan states that it 

is “an inspirational vision that will spur investment and facilitate new growth and 

prosperity in Providence.”13 (Emphasis added.) The Knowledge District Plan 

labels its zoning plan as “Framework Recommendations for Zoning;” it goes on to 

state, in the “Implementation” section, that it provides “the conceptual structure 

and a long range vision for the redevelopment of the district” and that its “authority 

comes only from the power of its ideas and the collaboration and support of the 

public officials and private stakeholders that went into the creation of those ideas.” 

Additionally, it is worth noting that the Comprehensive Plan must go through an 

exhaustive statutorily prescribed development and approval process—something 

that was certainly not required for the formulation of the Knowledge District Plan. 

See §§ 45-22.2-8 and 45-22.2-9; see also West v. McDonald, 18 A.3d 526, 539 

(R.I. 2011) (“A municipality must adopt its comprehensive plan in the same 

manner in which it adopts ordinances.”). 

13 We further note that the Knowledge District Plan provides that “[o]ne of the 

many goals for this plan is to provide for the full development potential of [the 

former I-195] land to attract investment, which will drive long-term growth for the 

entire city of Providence.” 
- 35 - 

For these reasons, in our judgment, the hearing justice did not err in 

ultimately concluding that he was “not persuaded” that plaintiffs had met their 

burden of rebutting the presumption of validity of the Amendment as a result of it 

not having complied with the Knowledge District Plan, even in light of the 

numerous references to neighborhood plans in the Comprehensive Plan. Without 

language expressly incorporating the Knowledge District Plan into the 

Comprehensive Plan (and being mindful of some of the language in both plans 

suggesting the contrary), we are unable to come to any other conclusion. 

The plaintiffs further aver that the Comprehensive Plan “requires that the 

City ‘[m]aintain existing uses, density and character in Areas of Change * * * until 

relevant neighborhood or specific plans and corresponding amendments to the 

Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance have been adopted;’” and, according 

to plaintiffs, the Comprehensive Plan provides that the term “character” includes 

allowable building height. The plaintiffs posit that the “failure to seek an 

amendment to the Comprehensive Plan or Knowledge District Plan, consequently, 

means that the Amendment is invalid.” 

The plaintiffs accurately represent what is contained in Objective IMP3, 

Strategy C in the Comprehensive Plan—“[m]aintain existing uses, density and 

character in Areas of Change * * * until the relevant neighborhood or specific 

plans and corresponding amendments to the Comprehensive Plan and Zoning 
- 36 - 

Ordinance have been adopted.”14 However, we note that the Knowledge District 

Plan was published in 2012—before the final Comprehensive Plan; and the 

Comprehensive Plan “incorporate[d] the important ideas and concepts which arose 

from the neighborhood planning process * * *.” What is more, we simply cannot 

read the just-quoted language to require amendment to the Comprehensive Plan for 

any zoning amendment that may not be in accordance with the Knowledge District 

Plan. See Grasso, 177 A.3d at 489 (“When a statutory section is clear and 

unambiguous, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute and we need 

not delve into any further statutory interpretation.”). Thus, Objective IMP3, 

Strategy C does not dissuade us from the conclusion that the Comprehensive Plan 

does not incorporate the Knowledge District Plan. 

Finally, the plaintiffs contend that “entirely lacking from the approval 

process was any consideration of the Knowledge District Plan,” particularly by the 

Ordinance Committee and the City Council. However, the record reflects that the 

Knowledge District Plan was referenced (albeit not at any great length) at various 

times throughout the approval process relative to the Amendment before the City 

Plan Commission, the Ordinance Committee, and the City Council. 

The Planning Department Report noted that the Knowledge District Plan 

“recommend[ed]” D-1-100 for the subject parcel and that the Amendment was 

14 It is also true that the Comprehensive Plan states that the “preferred pattern 

and character of development” includes building height. 
- 37 - 

inconsistent with the Knowledge District Plan (but consistent with the 

Comprehensive Plan). This conclusion was reiterated by planning officials at 

some of the public hearings on the Amendment. In particular, before the City Plan 

Commission, Robert Azar, Deputy Director of the Providence Department of 

Planning and Development, stated that the Knowledge District Plan was “separate” 

from the Comprehensive Plan, was “not incorporated” into the Comprehensive 

Plan, and was not adopted by the City Council. Bonnie Nickerson, the Director of 

the Department of Planning and Development, conceded before the City Plan 

Commission that the Amendment was inconsistent with the Knowledge District 

Plan, but she added that it was nonetheless consistent with the Comprehensive 

Plan. Conversely, the Knowledge District Plan was also referenced in a comment 

by Sam Shamoon, a “professional land use and zoning expert” retained by the 

attorney for two entities opposed to the Amendment. Mr. Shamoon testified that 

the Knowledge District Plan and the Comprehensive Plan were “companion 

documents” and together “constitute the comprehensive plan.” 

Accordingly, it is clear to this Court that the amendment approval process 

was not “entirely lacking” in discussion of the Knowledge District Plan. Although 

it was not extensively discussed, it was certainly referred to on several occasions. 

Given the language of the Comprehensive Plan and the Knowledge District Plan 

that we have just discussed, we do not consider it to have been error on the part of 
- 38 - 

the hearing justice to have held that plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden to 

rebut the presumption of validity of the Amendment based on the supposed failure 

of consideration of the Knowledge District Plan during the approval process. 

4. Remaining Issues 

The plaintiffs further contend that the Amendment violates additional 

sections of the Comprehensive Plan including those on which the City Plan 

Commission relied in its conclusion that the Amendment was not in conformance 

with the Comprehensive Plan: Section 11.1; Objective BE2; and Objective H2, 

Strategy A. 

Section 11.1 states that “[n]ew development must take into consideration 

natural and man-made environmental constraints and focus on preserving those 

aspects of our environment that we hold dear, including * * * historic character.” 

Objective BE2 calls for promoting “design innovation and architectural diversity 

while preserving Providence’s traditional character.” And Objective H2, Strategy 

A expresses an intent to “[p]rovide for diversity in the type, density and location of 

housing within the city to provide an adequate supply of safe, sanitary housing at 

price levels appropriate to the financial capabilities of city residents.” However, 

after giving these sections of the Comprehensive Plan due consideration, they do 

not alter our conclusion that the hearing justice did not err. 
- 39 - 

The Amendment at issue was accorded, as the hearing justice observed, “a 

robust and lengthy review process * * *.” At the conclusion of those proceedings, 

the City Council voted to approve the Amendment and made numerous legislative 

findings as to how the Amendment conformed with the Comprehensive Plan. For 

example, it found that the subject parcel was designated as downtown/mixed-use 

and that the Comprehensive Plan stated that in such areas “greater residential 

density and building heights could be accommodated * * *.” The City Council 

further found the Amendment to be in conformance with Objective BE3; Objective 

LU9, Strategy C; Objective H6; and Objective LU4. 

While this case is by no means simple and there appear to be sections of the 

Comprehensive Plan which could lead to different interpretations, we have 

recognized “that a municipality has discretion in choosing options for conforming 

its ordinances or land use decisions to its comprehensive plan * * *.” N & M 

Properties, LLC, 964 A.2d at 1147. What is more, when the Comprehensive Plan 

is considered as a whole, taking into account all the relevant sections of the 

Comprehensive Plan to which the parties have directed this Court’s attention, we 

are unable to say that the hearing justice committed an error of law or was without 

the support of legally competent evidence when he concluded that plaintiffs had 
- 40 - 

failed to meet their burden to rebut the presumption that the Amendment was 

valid.15 See Verizon New England Inc., 267 A.3d at 652. 

 Before concluding, we pause to note that we are tasked in this case with 

evaluating the Amendment and the Comprehensive Plan through the prism of the 

applicable standard of review; we have looked to whether or not the hearing justice 

committed clear error or lacked legally competent evidence to support his 

conclusion. See id. This Court follows where the law leads; and, in this case, it 

leads us to the conclusion that we must affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 

III 

Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the 

Superior Court. The record may be remanded to the Superior Court with our 

opinion endorsed thereon. 

15 The defendants contend before this Court that plaintiffs’ claims have 

become “moot by reason of [the Rhode Island] Special Economic District Enabling 

Act of 2019[.]” Given our holding in this case, we need not address the application 

of that act to the facts of this case. See Grady v. Narragansett Electric Co., 962 

A.2d 34, 42 n.4 (R.I. 2009) (referencing “our usual policy of not opining with 

respect to issues about which we need not opine”). 
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case

Peter Scotti & Associates, Inc., et al. v. Seth Yurden, 

in his official capacity as a Member of the City 

Council of the City of Providence, et al.

Case Number No. 2021-51-Appeal.

(PC 19-283)

Date Opinion Filed June 23, 2022

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and 

Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice William P. Robinson III

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court 

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Brian P. Stern

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Plaintiffs:

Armando E. Batastini, Esq.

For Defendants:

William R. Landry, Esq.

Patrick J. McBurney, Esq.

Mark W. Freel, Esq.