Filed 10/10/23 In re Lilly R. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re LILLY R., A Person Coming Under the Juve nile Court Law. B315074

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP00722A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FAIZAH S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a n order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Pete R. Navarro

, Juvenile Court Referee

. Dismissed

.2 Maureen L. Keaney , under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison , County Counsel, Kim Nemoy

, Assistant Cou nty Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel

, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________

INTRODUCTION

Fai z ah S., mother of infant Lilly R., appeals from the juvenile court ’ s jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring Li lly a dependent child of the court, removing her from
Fai z ah, and placing Lilly with her father, Pedro R., with monitored visits by Fai z ah. The juvenile court sustained a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 360, subdivision (c)

, 1 assuming jurisdiction based on a previously sustained petition under former section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and proceeding to a new disposition hearing at which the court issued the challenged orders. While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court hel d a review hearing under section 364 and terminated its jurisdiction with orders awarding Pedro sole custody of Lilly and requiring
Fai z ah’s visits with Lilly to be monitored. Fai z ah separately appealed from the se order s terminating jurisdiction and
deter mining custody and visitation (exit orders)

. 2 This court

1 F urther statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code , unless otherwise indicated

.

2 “When terminating its jurisdiction over a child who has been declared a dependent child of the court, section 362.4 authorizes the juvenile court to issue a custody and visitation3

subsequently dismissed Fai z ah ’ s appeal from th e exit order s after
her counsel filed a no

- merit brief pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, and Fai z ah did not file a supplemental
brief raising issues for our consideration

. (See In re Lilly R.

, (July 27, 2023), B322321.) Because we cannot provide Fai z ah any effective relief

— that is, relief that “can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties ’ conduct or legal sta tus” ( In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 277)

— we conclude her appeal is moot. In addition, we invited the parties to file briefs addressing whether we should exercise our discretion to consider the merits of this moot appeal under In re
D.P. Neither party filed a response. Accordingly , we decline to
exercise our discretion to consider Fai z ah ’ s moot appeal on its
merits and dismiss.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Fai z ah and Pedro are Lilly ’ s parents. Lilly was born in February 2021

. Two days later the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services ( Department ) received a referral reporting that

, w hile a t the hospital for Lilly ’ s birth, Fai z ah tested positive for methamphetamine on two separate tests administered 12 hours apart. Lilly’s toxicology screen was negative

, and she had no medical issues. Fai z ah admitted past

order (commonly referred to as an ‘exit order’) that will become part of the relevant family law file and remain in effect in the family law action ‘until modified or terminated by a subsequent order.’” ( In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513.)4

use of methamphetamine but denied using any drugs during her

pregnancy. On February 17, 2021 the Department filed a petition on Lilly’s behalf under former sectio n 300, subdivision (b)(1)

, for
Fai z ah’s alleged substance abuse and Pedro’s alleged failure to
protect

. 3 The petition was subsequently amended to remove the

count pertaining to Pedro.
On April 5 , 2021 the juvenile court sustained the amended petition and found Lilly to be a person described by former section 300, subdivision (b)(1), based upon Fai z ah’s substance
abuse. The count sustained by the court stated: “The child Lilly

3 Former s ection 300, subdivision (b)(1)

, provided, in rel evant part, that a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of the child’s p arent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, . . . or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.” Effe ctive January 1, 2023, Senate Bill No. 1085 (2021

- 2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1) amended section 300

, subdivision (b)(1)

, by enumerating the existing bases for dependency jurisdiction in separate subparagraphs (b)(1)(A) through (D). The legi slation also added section 300, subdivision (b)(2), which now provides, “A child shall not be found to be a person described by this subdivision solely due to any of the following: [¶] (A) Homelessness or the lack of an emergency shelter for the family. [¶] (B) The failure of the child’s parent or alleged parent to seek court orders for custody of the child. [¶] (C) Indigence or other conditions of financial difficulty, including, but not limited to, poverty, the inability to provide or obtain cloth ing, home or property repair, or childcare.”5

R[.]’s mother, F[.]S[.] has a history of substance abuse including, amphetamine and methamphetamine and is a current abuser of methamphetamine and amphetamine, which renders the mother incapable of providing regular care of the child. On 02/11/2021, the mother had a positive toxicol ogy screen for amphetamine. The mother used methamphetamine and amphetamine during the mother’s pregnancy of the child. The child is of such young age requiring constant care and supervision and the mother’s substance abuse interferes with the mother pro viding regular care and supervision of the child. Such substance abuse by the mother, endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the child at risk of serious physical harm and damage. ” On April 21, 2021 the juvenile court held the disposi tion hearing. T he court found Lilly was a person described by former
section 300 and terminated its jurisdiction with an order for the parents to participate in a period of Department supervision. 4
The court terminated the case because it found no nexus between
concerns of Fai z ah’s drug use and Lilly’s safety. The court ordered Lilly released to Fai z ah and Pedro under the supervision
of the Department

. Both parents agreed to a voluntary family
maintenance services contract , in which Fai z ah agreed to participate in drug testing, a substance abuse program , and parenting and family preservation services

.

4 Section 360 , subdivision (b)

, provides that “[i] f the court finds that the child is a person described by Section 300, it may, without adjudicating the child a dependent child of the court, order that service s be provided to keep the family together and place the child and the child’s parent or guardian under the supervision of the social worker for a time period consistent with Section 301. ”6 In July 2021 the Department filed a section 360, subdivision (c)

, petition. 5 Th at petition alleged th e disposition
had been ineffective b ecause Fai z ah failed to submit to drug testing on nine occasions from April to July 2021, and “failed to consistently participate in a substance abuse program. The
mother and the child’s father

. . . have failed to consistently participate in Family Prese rvation causing Family Preservation
services to be terminated. Further, on 7/23/21 the mother and father refused Family Preservation services. Remedial services failed to resolve the family’s problems in [that] the parents have failed to participate in s ervices to address the mother’s substance
abuse. Such failure to comply with Juvenile Court ordered
services by the mother and the father endangers the child’s physical safety and places the child at risk of serious physical harm, damage and danger.”
On S eptember 10, 2021 the jurisdiction and disposition hearing s were held . T he juvenile court took notice of the prior sustained section 300 petition

, court findings

, and orders . The

court sustained the section 360, subdivision (c) petition and declared Lilly a dependent of the court. The court further
ordered that Lilly remain in Pedro’s custody under the

5 S ection 360, subdivision (c)

, provides that “[i]f the family subs equently is unable or unwilling to cooperate with the services being provided, the social worker may file a petition with the juvenile court pursuant to Section 332 alleging that a previous petition has been sustained and that disposition pursuant to subdi vision (b) has been ineffective in ameliorating the situation requiring child welfare services. Upon hearing the petition, the court shall order either that the petition shall be dismissed or that a new disposition hearing shall be held pursuant to subdiv ision (b).”7

Department’s supervision with monitored visits with Fai z ah

, ordered reunification services for Fai z ah, and ordered Fai z ah to participate in drug treatment , parenting and individual counseling, and drug testing

. The court admonished Fai z ah that
she had failed to hold up her end of the bargain by comply ing voluntarily with drug testing and the case plan

. Three days later Fai z ah filed the present appeal seeking
review of the juvenile court ’ s September 2021 jurisdiction findings and disposition order.
While th is appeal was pending, in July 2022 the juvenile court held a review hearing under section 364, terminated jurisdiction, awa rded Pedro sole legal and physical custody of Lilly , and ordered Fai z ah’s visits with Lilly to be monitored , with
no visit to occur if Fai z ah was under the influence of drugs or
alcohol

. 6 Fai z ah separately appeal ed from these order s

. ( In re Lilly R.

, supra , B322321

. ) In that appeal, Fai z ah’s counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to In re Phoenix H. stating there were no arguable issues, and advis ing Fai z ah of her opportunity to
show that an arguable issue exists. Fai z ah did not file a

response. Because Fai z ah did not file a supplemental brief, this

court dismissed her appeal pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (See
In re Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1096.) That
dismissal is now final. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(1).)
This c ourt in vited the parties to submit letter briefs addressing whether this appeal is moot and whether this court

6 We take judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (d), and 459 of the record in Fai z ah’s appeal from the juvenile court’s July 2022 termination of jurisdiction and exit orders

. ( In re Lilly R. , supra , B322321

. )8

should exercise its discretion to reach the merits. (See In re D.P.

, supra , 14 Cal.5th at p. 276 .) Neither party filed a response.

DISCUSSION

A. The Mootness Doctrine in Dependency Appeals “A court is tasked with the duty “ ‘ to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect

, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions

, or to declare principles o r rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it. ’ ”” ( In re D.P., supra,

14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) In dependency cases, the reviewing court
decides on a case

- by

- case basis whether subsequent events
render a case moot and whether the court ’ s decision would affect the outcome of a subsequent proceeding. ( Ibid .) A dependency case becomes moot when events “render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ( Ibid

. ; see In re N.S. (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [“the critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error”].) To show the reviewing court ca n provide effective relief, the appellant first “must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome [the appellant] seeks.” ( In re D.P. , at p. 276.)
In In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 266

, the Supreme Court explained that “relief is effective when it ‘ can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties ’ conduct or legal status. ’ [Citation.] It follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from9

a change in legal status. Although a jurisdictional finding that a parent engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally stigmatizing, complaining of ‘ stigma ’ alone is insufficient to sustain an appeal. The stigma must be pa ired with some effect on the plaintiff

’ s legal status that is capable of being redressed by
a favorable court decision.” ( I d. at p. 277. ) Example s of non

- moot

cases include those where a jurisdiction finding affected parental custody rights, curtailed a parent ’ s contact with his or her child, or resulted in disposition orders that continued to adversely affect a parent. ( Id. at pp. 277

- 278.) In re D

. P

. further noted that “speculative future harm” is in sufficient to avoid mootness. ( Id. at p. 278.) But “when a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal,” however, “the case is not moot, and merits review is required.” ( Id. at p. 283.)

“ When a pa rent has not made such a showing, the case is moot, but the court has discretion to decide the merits
nevertheless.” ( In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5 th at p. 28 3 ; see id. at

p. 282 [reviewing court has “ ‘ inherent discretion ’ ” to reach the merits of an appeal even where the case is moot] .) A reviewing
court decides on a case

- by

- case basis whether to reach the merits of a moot appeal. ( Id. at p. 287.) G enerally “when ‘the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’
‘when there ma y be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for the court’s
determination’” courts may appropriately consider the merits of a moot appeal. ( Id . at p

. 282

. )
D ependency appeals are uniquely prone to mootness
, and
often “[ p ] arents may appeal an order that is later changed, or jurisdiction over the child may terminate before an appeal is10

finally resolved, as in this case. ” ( In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at

p. 285. ) Accordingly, In re D

. P

. identified s everal additional factors reviewing courts may consider when deciding whether discretionary review is warranted. ( Id. at pp. 284

- 286.) First,

w hether the challenged jurisdiction finding could impact current or future dependency proceedings ( for example

, by influencing a child protective agency ’ s decision to file a new dependency petition or a juvenile court ’ s determination about whether to
order further reunification services ). ( I d. at p. 285

. ) Second, “whether the jurisdictional finding is based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct.” ( Id. at pp. 285

- 286.) The

“ more egregious the findings against the parent, the greater the parent’s interest in challenging such findings.” ( Id. at p. 286.) Third, a court may also consider “why the app eal became moot” : “[p]rinciples of fairness” may favor discretionary review of cases rendered moot “by the prompt compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the parent challenging the jurisdictional finding on appeal.” ( Ibid .) In deciding whether to ex ercise th eir discretion, reviewing

court s “ should be guided by the overarching goals of the dependency system: ‘to provide maximum safety and protection
for children’ with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as well as the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well

being of the child.’ ” ( In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286; see § 300.2, subd. (a) .)

B. Fai z ah ’

s Appeal Is Moot As noted above, in this appeal Fai z ah challenges the September 2021 jurisdiction and disposition orders declaring Lilly a dependent child of the court, removing Lilly from Fai z ah,11

and placing Lilly with Pedro, with monitored visits by Fai z ah

. But her appeal from those orders was rendered moot by the subsequent July 2022 orders terminating jurisdiction and

a warding Pedro sole custody of Lilly . Although Fai z ah appealed from the July 2022 exit orders, her appeal was dismissed under
In re Phoenix H. and that dismissal is now final. An exit order is a final judgment and is not subject to collateral attack through an appeal from a previous disposition order. ( See § 302, subd. (d) [“Any custody or visitation order issued by the juvenile court at the time the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction

. . . shall be a final judgment and shall remain in effect after that jurisdiction is terminated.”]; see also Heidi S. v. David H. (2016)

1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1165 [where the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction and issues an exit order, “the exit order ‘shall be a final judgment and shall remain in effect a fter [ the juvenile
court’s ] jurisdiction is terminated’”].)
Because Fai z ah’s appeal from the exit orders was dismissed and is now final, we do not have jurisdiction to review and change them, and “the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to conduct
further hearings in the now

- closed case.” ( In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164; see In re Michelle M. (1992)
8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330 [“where jurisdiction has been terminated and is final . . . jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the appellate court”] ; see also § 304 [juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear proceedings regarding custody “until the time that the petition is dismissed or dependency is terminated”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.620(a) [same].) Accordingly, even if we

were to rev erse the September 2021 jurisdiction and disposition orders, that would have no effect on the July 2022 exit orders.12 In short, b ecause we cannot provide Fai z ah any effective
relief

— that is, relief that “ ‘ can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties ’ conduct or legal status ’ ” ( In re D.P. , supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277)

— we conclude this appeal is moot.

C. Discretionary Review of Fai z ah’s Moot Appeal Is Not
Warranted Despite our request for additional briefing, Fai z ah did not submit a response ask ing us to exercise our discretion to decide this moot appeal on the merits

. Additionally, Fai z ah’s appeal does not present circumstances that generally warrant discretionary review of a moot case, such as an issue of broad public inte rest that is likely to recur, the likelihood of a recurrence of the controversy between the parties, or a material question that remains for the court ’ s determination. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) Further, t his is not a case rendered moot “by the prompt compliance or otherwise laudable behavior o f the parent challenging the jurisdictional finding on appeal.” ( In re D.P.,

supra , 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) Rather, t he juvenile court restricted
Fai z ah’s custody and visitation rights because she failed to
submit to drug test ing and comply with court

- ordered substance abuse and parenting program s and counseling. Denying merits
review in this case would not “perversely incentivize noncompliance” with a juvenile court ’ s orders. ( Ibid

. ) Finally , t he jurisdiction findings based on Fai z ah’s drug use are not sufficiently “ egregious ” or “ stigmatizing ” conduct warranting exercise of our discretion to reach the merits of this

moot case

. While dependency jurisdiction by definition necessarily involves conduct harmful to children, our assessment13

of severity or perniciousness is a relative analysis

. W e do not
find the jurisdiction findings against Fai z ah to be based on particularly stigmatizing or pernicious conduct such that our

con cerns over not insulating erroneous and stigmatizing jurisdiction finding s from review would prompt us to review the
merits in light of all other factors

. Therefore, on balance the factors the Supreme Court identified in In re D.P

. do not warrant
discreti onary review of Fai z ah’s moot appeal.
We note that Fai z ah is not without a remedy. Under section 302, subdivision (d), she may seek modification of the exit
order s if she can “demonstrate ‘there has been a significant change of circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order
and modification of the order is in the best interests of the child.’” ( In re Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 165, fn. 7.)

DIS POSITION

The appeal is dismissed as moot.

MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

SEGAL, J.