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Advancing Strategic Thought Series

GOT VISION?

UNITY OF VISION IN POLICY AND STRATEGY:

WHAT IT IS, AND WHY WE NEED IT

Anna Simons

July 2010

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ISBN 1-58487-453-8
iii

FOREWORD

The premise of this monograph is simple: for all the 

talk of “unity of effort” and “unity of command,” without 

someone at the helm who has “unity of vision,” asymmetric confrontations are hard (if not impossible) to win. 

In this monograph, Dr. Anna Simons examines a range 

of individuals who proved adept at seeing the forest and

the trees, did not have to be taught to think in terms of 

branches and sequels, and did not need to be prodded by 

doctrine (or a President) to consider what the second, third, 

and fourth order effects of an action might be. Simons uses 

India’s extensive experience with insurgency to make the 

point that with the right who in charge, the right what will 

follow. She analyzes three exceptional Indians (K. P. S. Gill, 

S. K. Sinha, and Mahatma Gandhi). Yet, in doing so, she 

also makes the case that no one else can duplicate their approaches. So, what then might be gained by studying their 

lessons learned? For one, the Department of Defense and 

the Services should pay far greater attention to assessment, 

selection, reassessment, and deselection. Second, counterinsurgency (and related) field manuals will always be more 

useful as screening tools than teaching aides when it comes 

to identifying counterinsurgency (COIN) potential. 

Intentionally provocative, this monograph not only 

challenges current ways of doing business, but should add 

a new dimension to the COIN strategy debate.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ANNA SIMONS is a Professor of Defense Analysis 

at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), joining 

the faculty in 1998. Prior to teaching at NPS, she was 

an assistant and then associate professor of anthropology at the University of California at Los Angeles, as 

well as chair of the Masters in African Area Studies 

Program. At NPS, she teaches courses in the anthropology of conflict, military advising, low intensity 

conflict in Africa, and political anthropology. Dr. Simons is the author of Networks of Dissolution: Somalia 

Undone and The Company They Keep: Life Inside the U.S. 

Army Special Forces. She has written extensively about 

intervention, conflict, and the military from an anthropological perspective for a wide range of publications, 

such as The American Interest, The National Interest, Orbis, Third World Quarterly, and Parameters. Dr. Simons 

holds an A.B. from Harvard College and a Ph.D. in 

social anthropology from Harvard University. 
v

SUMMARY

What do we need when confronted by adversaries who do not adhere to our rule set or social code? 

Drawing on India’s extensive counterinsurgency experiences, as well as British and American examples 

of cross-culturally astute strategists, this monograph 

makes the case for frontloading selection. Its premise 

is that with the right individual(s) devising strategy, 

everything else should fall into place. The author contends that certain intuitive abilities are key—abilities 

that no amount of doctrine can instill or teach.

The argument made here moves beyond “unity of 

effort” and “unity of command” to identify an overarching need for “unity of vision.” Without someone 

at the helm who has a certain kind—not turn, not 

frame, but kind—of mind, asymmetric confrontations 

will be hard (if not impossible) to win. As with strategic insight, individuals either know what to use to 

strategic effect when dealing with another society, or 

they do not. Having prior cross-cultural experience of 

the players involved in the conflict is essential, but just 

understanding other players is insufficient. Equally 

important is being able to come up with a strategy that 

fits “us” as well. 

The monograph identifies a number of individuals who used unity of vision to considerable strategic 

effect. It then moves on to consider three exceptional 

Indians (K. P. S. Gill, S. K. Sinha, and Mahatma Gandhi) to further illustrate the point that with the right 

who in charge, the right what will follow. Among the 

conclusions reached is that the Department of Defense 

and the Services should be investing far more effort 

in assessment, selection, reassessment, and deselec-
vi

tion than they currently do, and that when it comes to 

identifying those with the right attributes, counterinsurgency (and related) field manuals should be used 

as screening tools—not teaching aides. 

In addition to unity of vision, the author introduces two other concepts. The Lawrence paradox refers 

to our propensity to turn unduplicable lessons into 

generic principles as if anyone should be able to apply them. In contrast, the Gladwell heuristic seems far 

more useful. Borrowing from Malcolm Gladwell’s notion of connectors, mavens, and salesmen, what this 

yields is that those responsible for policing or helping 

to police communities at the local level should be able 

to identify local connectors, mavens, and salesmen. 

At the operational level, counterinsurgency leaders should be able to think (and potentially act) like 

connectors, mavens, and salesmen themselves, while 

strategy itself calls for an individual who possesses the 

insights and abilities of a connector, maven, and salesman all rolled into one—akin to an K. P. S. Gill, an S. 

K. Sinha, a George Kennan, or an Edward Lansdale.
1

GOT VISION?

UNITY OF VISION IN POLICY AND STRATEGY:

WHAT IT IS, AND WHY WE NEED IT

For all the talk these days about the need for “unity 

of effort” and “unity of command” when confronting 

enemies (and working with allies), neither is likely to 

work without a coherent overarching policy. To come 

up with such a policy requires something altogether 

different: “unity of vision.”1

Visionary generals are said to possess “coup 

d’oeil”; they can size up the tactical, operational, and 

strategic dimensions of a battlefield and see scenes as 

both the sum of their parts and as wholes.2 My contention in this monograph is that individuals chosen 

to devise strategy in today’s asymmetric or irregular 

environment need a comparable kind of situational 

awareness. As in the past, we need individuals who 

see the forest and the trees, do not have to be taught 

to think in terms of branches and sequels, and do not 

need to be prodded by doctrine (or a President) to 

consider what the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order effects of an 

action might be. 

This monograph is not meant to challenge current 

conventional wisdom so much as push beyond it. It 

draws on recent research into India’s lessons learned 

regarding counterinsurgency (COIN).3

 Consequently, 

there is a COIN bias to what I describe, but the gist of 

this argument should hold for any asymmetric confrontation in which we face an enemy who fights us 

according to his rule set and social code—which is 

likely to be any enemy we face in the future, unless 

we return to set-piece battles fought only among uniformed professionals.
2

THE WHO VS. THE WHAT

Essentially, the argument to be outlined here is that 

far more attention should be paid to the who rather 

than the what of cross-cultural conflict. Bottom line up 

front: if we get the who right, the right what will follow. 

Unfortunately, Washington, the Department of 

Defense (DoD), and the Services lavish far more attention, money and, ironically, manpower on the 

what. Just witness the effort expended over the past 

several years hashing out Joint, never mind Servicespecific, definitions for irregular and unconventional 

warfare. But—perhaps the ground is beginning to 

shift. Take Andrew Krepinevich’s and Barry Watts’s 

recent assertion that it is “past time to recognize that 

not everyone has the cognitive abilities and insight to 

be a competent strategist.”4

 As they note, “strategy 

is about insight, creativity, and synthesis.”5 According to Krepinevich and Watts, “it appears that by the 

time most individuals reach their early twenties, they 

either have developed the cognitive skills for strategy 

or they have not.”6 As they go on to write:

If this is correct, then professional education or training are unlikely to inculcate a capacity for genuine 

strategic insight into most individuals, regardless of 

their raw intelligence or prior experience. Instead, the 

best anyone can do is to try to identify those who appear to have developed this talent and then make sure 

that they are utilized in positions calling for the skills 

of a strategist.7

Mark Moyar concurs. The point he makes again 

and again in his new book, A Question of Command: 

Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq, is that 

“counter-insurgency is ‘leader-centric’ warfare, a con-
3

test between elites in which the elite with superiority 

in certain leadership attributes usually wins.”8 Or, in 

plainer English, the better-led side tends to prevail. 

Moyar eschews the current debate between those 

who favor a population-centric (such as COIN) vs. 

enemy-centric (such as counterterrorism) approach. 

Of course, as most small unit leaders I know would 

say, to be effective on the ground clearly requires 

that you do both: you cannot secure the population 

without killing at least some of the bad guys. But, in 

a sense, this is exactly Moyar’s point: Give enough 

young leaders with the right stuff sufficient leeway, 

and they will figure out what to do in their areas of 

operation. As for how to determine who has the right 

stuff, Moyar identifies 10 attributes. Individuals have 

to have, or be good at, initiative, flexibility, creativity, 

judgment, empathy, charisma, sociability, dedication, 

integrity, and organization. While he acknowledges 

that “the surest way to test an individual’s suitability 

for counterinsurgency leadership is to put that person 

in command of a unit engaged in counterinsurgency 

operations,” he also says: 

The best way to predict the suitability of inexperienced candidates for counterinsurgency command or 

counterinsurgency leadership development programs 

is to screen them for the characteristics common to effective counterinsurgency commanders.9

His recommended screen is personality tests.

Krepinevich and Watts are not quite so bold as to 

list a set of attributes or recommend a screening technique for competent strategists, never mind for those 

who should help guide grand strategy at the national 

level, but their conclusion underscores the same point: 

selection is key.
4

Of course, identifying those rare individuals with the 

mindset and talent to develop strategy will not be 

easy. . . . The problem of selecting competent strategists is much the same as picking future air-to-air aces 

based on intelligence tests, educational records, personality traits, or even performance in undergraduate 

pilot training. We simply do not have very reliable 

predictors of performance other than waiting to see 

which pilots later excel in actual air-to-air combat. 

George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower had similar difficulties picking capable combat commanders 

during World War II. Nevertheless, as difficult as the 

problem of selecting competent strategists may be, it is 

one that the U.S. national security establishment needs 

to face.10

Unlike Moyar, who does not single out cross-cultural insight as a critical COIN aptitude (perhaps because he erroneously believes empathy and sociability 

are sufficient to help COIN leaders fill the “knowing 

the enemy” gap), Krepinevich and Watts believe it is 

essential that strategists know as much as possible 

about the adversary. They highlight the significance of 

cross-cultural expertise: “Looking ahead, the United 

States unquestionably needs to develop a cadre of experts on militant Islamic groups, China, and other key 

areas of concern such as Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.”11 Unfortunately, Krepinevich and Watts do not 

indicate whether they think strategists need to possess 

this cross-cultural expertise themselves, or should simply be able to tap into it. But tellingly, those they cite 

as “experienced national security hands” under President Eisenhower—Paul Nitze, Allan Dulles, George 

Marshall, Robert Lovett, and Charles Bohlen—were

veterans of experiencing life outside the United States, 

with time spent under the shadow of our then-and-
5

future adversaries. As it happens too, these were also 

individuals who pioneered “national security.” That is 

why it is more than just a little ironic that among their 

academic progeny today are very few policymaking 

defense intellectuals who have spent much time living 

in the non-West, despite the fact that all of our current 

(and likeliest future) adversaries hail from the nonWest. 

Yet, if one believes the devil—and failure and defeat—lie in the details, this points to a real problem, 

particularly if one also believes it is impossible to get 

a “feel for” or “feel about” a situation second-hand. 

Add to this the fact that it is never enough just to understand the enemy. As Sun Tzu is always cited as 

saying, there is also the need to understand us. And 

then there is the need to understand how the enemy 

understands us; the iterations of who understands 

what about whom demand constant attention. 

UNITY OF VISION DEFINED 

If, meanwhile, we examine those individuals who 

devised successful strategies for besting non-Western 

foes in the recent, post-imperial past, here is one thing 

we can say: all proved capable of developing a fingerspitzengefuhl (or fingertip feel) for another society 

organized significantly differently than their own.12

Without any formal training in anthropology, such 

disparate figures as T. E. Lawrence, Douglas MacArthur, Joseph Stilwell, George Kennan, and Edward 

Lansdale all proved adept at turning their insights 

about another culture to strategic effect. More significantly, the strategies they came up with succeeded as 

instruments of war. 

Take Containment, which is now regarded as a 

major 20th century success, a grand strategy so mas-
6

terful that everyone is casting about for its equivalent 

today. To figure out how best to thwart and counter 

the Soviets, George Kennan not only had to get the 

Soviets right, but his strategy had to fit them and fit us. 

It had to be so suited to the Soviets that we could defeat them without precipitating a nuclear war, and so 

suited to us that we could continue to execute it for an 

indefinite period of time. Or, consider General Douglas MacArthur’s success as proconsul in post-war Japan. Somehow he had to figure out how to shatter the 

Japanese commitment to war without breaking the 

Japanese spirit or causing the country to veer toward 

communism. Each man faced nested sets of problems. 

As for T. E. Lawrence, he had to walk the fine line 

of keeping Faisal, the Hashemite prince, sufficiently 

restrained so as not to precipitate an Anglo-French 

rupture during World War I, while in World War II, 

Joseph Stilwell’s thankless task was to work through 

the reluctant Chinese to liberate the Burmese from the 

Japanese. To do so, each of these men had to overcome 

all sorts of other challenges, like too few resources and 

theaters full of ambitious rivals. 

However, try to compare across just this small 

group of individuals, and here is what you also find: 

Lawrence spoke fluent Arabic and could out-Bedouin 

the Bedouin. Lansdale spoke no foreign languages 

and could barely hit a target. MacArthur was a proven commander. Kennan was a mere Foreign Service 

Officer. Nonetheless, somehow, each proved able to 

identify that feature or set of features in another society that could be used as the fulcrum by, with, and 

through which to permanently alter conditions. And 

they did so as individuals, although none did so alone. 

Kennan had Charles Bohlen, who may have been an 

even more astute Sovietologist. Lawrence was hardly 
7

the only Arabist in the field. Lansdale’s partner was 

Filipino leader Ramon Magsaysay. Nonetheless, we 

still credit Kennan, Lawrence, and Lansdale with being the progenitors of successful policy. Being cynical, 

we might attribute this to their having written more, 

better, and/or first, thereby associating their names 

with “their” policy. But even if this is the case, they 

were still master codifiers. Somehow they were able to 

do more than just absorb the situational zeitgeist and 

operationalize it. They successfully explicated what 

others could not yet articulate. 

Perhaps it is too trite to suggest that these men 

routinized ideas by being forcefully persuasive. All, 

certainly, had healthy egos. But also, none could have 

accomplished what he did without a reflexive ability to understand “them” and “us,” and what to do 

to “them” without jeopardizing “us.” Consequently, 

unity of vision refers to more than just the repackaging and rebranding of conventional wisdom or, as has 

happened most recently with COIN, the rediscovery of 

forgotten lessons learned. It is not a paradigm shift in 

the sense that Thomas Kuhn initially used the term.13

Someone who can achieve unity of vision doesn’t only 

explain reality in a new way, but figures out how to get 

us from war to victory and thereby foresees how to 

change reality, too. 14

The Cross-Cultural Dimension.

In a sense, unity of vision begs a kind of understanding that is similar to what anthropologists might 

say all successful cross-cultural endeavors require. 

Typically, well-trained anthropologists take a bottom 

up approach; talk to anyone and everyone they can; 

compare what people say with what they do; and seize 
8

on connections, continuities, inconsistencies, and internal contradictions. Really good anthropologists are 

as interested in learning from the past as the present, 

are more interested in “why” than “how,” and do not 

study others so much as internalize their point of view. 

The best anthropologists go on to produce analyses 

that even their study subjects find revelatory.

Ruth Benedict, for instance, used just such modes 

of inquiry to investigate a situation she could not explore first-hand during World War II when she was 

asked to analyze the Japanese. She did this by talking 

to as many Japanese and people familiar with Japan 

as she could. She paid attention to how the Japanese 

raised their children; spent their days; and thought 

about honor, the Emperor, sleep, cleanliness, deprivation, auto-eroticism. Everything was fair game because anything might yield a critical insight. 

But the same could also be said of Edward Lansdale and how he went about gauging the Filipinos’ 

mood in the 1950s.15 He met no one from whom he 

did not think he could learn something. Presumably, 

Lawrence was equally sponge-like with the Bedouin.16

And, as Colonel George Lynch, commander of the 

15th Infantry said of Joseph Stilwell in 1937, “Stillwell 

knows China and the Far East better, in my opinion, 

than any other officer in the service”—a product of his 

“tireless curiosity.”17

What—we might wonder—prompted such crosscultural curiosity in men who never enrolled (or had 

to enroll) in cross-cultural awareness training classes? 

As facetious as it sounds, “who knows” is the only 

reasonable answer. Some individuals clearly feel certain affinities others do not, just as some have competencies others do not, which brings us back to the 

idea of attributes and the incomparable importance of 

selection. 
9

Consider, for instance, what Krepinevich and 

Watts say about strategy:

Strategy involves more than enumerating what one 

hopes to achieve: it entails crafting plausible ways of 

achieving one’s ultimate goals despite limited resources, despite political and other constraints, and despite 

the best efforts of opponents to prevail in achieving 

their own ends.18

“The best efforts of opponents,” emphasis on the 

word “opponents”—this implies that the mindset, the 

calculations, and the capabilities of the enemy have to 

be taken into account, which is precisely where (and 

why) one might think anthropologists’ methods of inquiry should be of service to strategists today. And indeed they are—but only up to a point. This is because, 

at best, anthropology’s contributions to assessing others’ strengths and vulnerabilities can only (maybe) get 

someone partway to understanding. One also needs 

a deep appreciation for history. But even with both 

approaches, what no social science method can help 

with is how to intuit which of their features to turn 

into our opportunity. 

This is where unity of vision comes in. For better 

or worse, unity of vision requires an intuitive leap by 

someone who already has enough of a feel for their 

and our realities, and can then go on to sketch a congruent, cohesive, sustainable plan, flexible enough at 

the level of implementation, but laser like in its focus. 

Conceptually too, such a plan needs to be easy enough 

for everyone up and down the chain of command and 

across government to understand.19 And, it has also 

got to be something our partners, whomever they are, 

will agree to.20
10

Do we have any such strategists today? Let me 

leave that question hanging for a moment to make the 

case for unity of vision from a slightly different angle.

INDIA’S EXAMPLE(S)

India has had to contend with a greater array of 

insurgencies than any other country in the postcolonial period and, while no military has a particularly impressive record of waging counterinsurgency 

abroad—and here India is no exception (it failed in 

Sri Lanka)—Indians have been relatively effective 

inside India.21 So, what might India’s successes teach 

us? First, that it would be wrong to conclude that success hinges on cultural familiarity, familiarity that we 

might then mistakenly believe can be taught and thus 

learned. While familiarity is surely necessary, it is 

hardly sufficient. Rather, a certain kind—not turn, not 

frame, but kind—of mind is also required.22

Take, for instance, K. P. S. Gill and S. K. Sinha.

K. P. S. Gill.

K. P. S. Gill is famous throughout India and beyond for helping crush militant Sikhs’ efforts to turn 

Punjab into the independent state of Khalistan during the 1980s and early 1990s. For a host of reasons, 

Sikh extremism was treated seriously by the Indian 

government; among them, a disproportionate number 

of Sikhs served in the Indian Army and the national 

police. But also, Indira Gandhi’s assassination by two 

of her Sikh bodyguards in retaliation for the military’s 

assault on the Golden Temple Complex during Operation BLUE STAR lent added urgency to the government’s efforts. 
11

Gill was not the first man to be put in charge of 

crushing Sikh extremism.23 Nor did he do so singlehandedly. He worked closely with both the Army and 

Punjab’s civilian authorities.24 But the winning strategy for rooting out the militants was largely his, based 

on a lifetime of police work.25

Gill never formally studied COIN. Instead, his 

knowledge was based on on-the-job learning, beginning with his assignment to the state of Assam as a 

member of the all-India Indian Police Service (IPS). 

This is noteworthy because after spending time listening to Gill describe his methods, two things about him 

become clear.26 First, from the outset of his police service, he excelled at catching people in their own lies. 

Either he would listen to what a culprit said, detect 

the weakness in his (or her) story, and then investigate the truth, or he would make sure he had gathered 

enough information before the discussion or interrogation even began to walk the guilty party right off 

the plank. Second, Gill did not just enjoy, but actually 

looked forward to, getting people to spring traps of 

their own making.27 In this regard, he bears an uncanny resemblance to Edward Lansdale.28 According 

to his own and others’ accounts, Lansdale applied 

considerable wit and wile to helping Ramon Magsaysay defeat the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines in the 

1950s. It is clear from Lansdale’s autobiography that 

he always tried to infuse humor into his operations. 

One gets the sense that he was also a great raconteur; 

Gill certainly is, which in turn suggests that there may 

be something more to a love of plot twists and punch 

lines than those writing textbooks about counterinsurgency realize. Perhaps thinking in terms of arcs, plots, 

and character development is critical to unity of vision. 
12

One thing often cited to explain Gill’s success (and 

something he cites) is that he was a Sikh and therefore understood Sikhs. He makes this point in The 

Knights of Falsehood: Not only was he from the same 

social stratum the militants were bent on radicalizing, 

but he knew the tenets of the Sikh religion better than 

they did, and therefore knew exactly how to turn their 

rhetoric against them. 29 He also had the forensic skills 

to make his charge stick—that they were perverting 

the Sikh religion and were “knights of falsehood.”

Thus, one lesson that could be distilled from Gill’s 

example is that it takes intimate familiarity with what 

insurgents are peddling to undo them. But this leaves 

two other points about his background unexplored. 

First, he was not just steeped in knowledge about the 

Sikh faith. He knew a lot about other religions as well. 

And he had a passion for poetry. Together, these avocations would have given him ways to express himself 

that he would not have acquired simply by studying 

his opponents alone. Second, as a lifelong policeman, 

he knew the police; he understood what made the 

rank and file (and their leaders) tick, and how they 

could be challenged to operate more effectively. 

In sum, Gill could not only plug into the psyches of 

all the key players in the Khalistan drama (to include 

journalists, politicians, community leaders, etc.), but 

he had a well-developed feel for how to appeal to 

and/or outwit them all equally well, and he relished 

doing so.

S. K. Sinha.

Unlike Gill, S. K. Sinha hails from a very distinguished police family, but chose to devote the bulk of 

his career to the Indian Army instead, entering it be-
13

fore Independence and retiring as a Lieutenant General in 1983.30 Sinha subsequently served as Ambassador to Nepal, Governor of Assam, and, most recently, 

Governor of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). Like Gill, Sinha 

spent time in India’s Northeast relatively early in his 

career. He also served in Punjab during an early phase 

of the insurgency. Another connection between the 

two men is that they are both extremely well-educated and extremely well-read. Beyond this, however, 

Sinha’s insurgency experiences—and the lessons he 

offers in his lectures and published writing—would 

seem to fly in the face of most of those that can be (and 

are being) distilled from Gill’s experiences.

For instance, before being posted to insurgencyridden Nagaland as a brigade commander, Sinha 

“read extensively all the available literature on counterinsurgency operations in Malaysia, Vietnam, and 

Kenya.”31 He also drafted India’s first COIN manual. 

As he put it, “Of course, the experience of security 

forces in other countries could not be applied in toto, 

and there was need to make suitable modifications 

to suit our conditions.”32 Among his innovations was 

an emphasis on what he came to call “psychological 

initiatives.” In the case of Assam, this meant paying 

homage to Assam’s rich culture and history.

Apart from the usual civic action programme [sic] 

like building roads, constructing bridges, organizing 

medical camps, providing veterinary cover and so on, 

the basic cause of insurgency has to be addressed in 

a subtle, sustained and specialized manner. In Assam 

the main cause of insurgency was alienation from the 

Nation through misconceptions. This was duly addressed through highlighting past cultural, civilizational, spiritual and historical links with the rest of the 

Nation.33
14

Sinha did this by showcasing Assamese contributions to Indian culture at every turn, both inside the 

state (and governor’s mansion) and outside as Assam’s 

chief booster. His goal was to make “the people of Assam proud of their past and the rest of India proud of 

Assam.”34 In his view, highlighting Assamese history 

and culture was as important to achieving security as 

was providing physical security and promoting economic development. Indeed, he considered all three 

equally critical to reincorporating the Assamese into

India, and together they comprised his “three-prong” 

approach to counterinsurgency.

Perhaps not surprisingly, Sinha relied on the same 

three prongs in Kashmir where he similarly insisted 

on a unified command and on economic development. However, unlike in Assam where he focused 

on oil refineries and tube wells to boost local productivity, in Kashmir he concentrated on extending the 

railroad and bringing electricity to villages. He likewise tailored civic action to specific Kashmiri needs. 

For instance, he supported a Department of Kashmir 

Studies at Kashmir University and helped emphasize 

Sufi traditions and Kashmiryat. Same method—some 

might say—different tools. Yet, was Sinha really applying the same approach? If reincorporation meant 

reminding Assamese and Indians beyond Assam how 

tied together they had always been, reincorporation of 

Kashmir required gently underscoring differences instead—namely, between Kashmiri and Pakistani (and 

other “foreign” forms of) Islam. 

Here is where the devil lurks in the details, which 

means so might strategic insight. Imagine, for instance, if we wanted to distill Sinha’s approach into 

a principle that could then be turned into a replicable 

practice. How would we codify it? Maybe: Appreciate 
15

local history, religion, traditions, and priorities. Use what 

can be used for glue as glue and use what works as a wedge 

as a wedge. Or that, at any rate, would be one way to 

generically summarize something that could work 

equally well in regions as diverse as Assam and J&K. 

Yet, what does such a platitude really tell us? It 

conveys nothing about how to actually figure out what 

might work as either glue or wedge. It offers nothing 

concrete or actionable. It would not help assist anyone who could not already read the local culture for 

himself, while the supreme irony is that for these very 

reasons it is precisely the kind of tenet a Sinha or Gill 

would never need. 

THE LAWRENCE PARADOX

One problem with the U.S. military’s current 

fixation on collating and disseminating COIN principles and related tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(TTPs)—or, the what and the how—is that these are all 

retrospective, while (as most manuals acknowledge) 

to be successful requires that individuals innovate and 

improvise anew. This is what Gill and Sinha had to 

do—which is why what they did then became noteworthy. At a certain point, each man may have realized he was employing his own distinctive method. 

Clearly, Sinha came to think in terms of three prongs, 

and when he was assigned to J&K, he adapted what 

he felt had worked for him in Assam. Intuitively, Gill 

may have known only a Sikh policeman would be able 

to successfully crush the Khalistan movement. But not 

just any Sikh policeman managed that feat. He did—

a fact that will always be remembered once what he 

did is captured in the Gill Doctrine. However, as soon 

as such a distillation occurs, it also helps sweep from 
16

view the real source of his success, namely his coup 

d’oeil, which is the very thing no one else can duplicate.35

Maybe it is not fair to blame T. E. Lawrence for 

this paradox—of reducible but unduplicable insight. 36

Lawrence was, after all, quite specific that his “Twenty-seven Articles,” which represented his compilation 

of what worked among the Bedouin, should only be 

applied to Bedouin. But, did he really mean this? He 

knew at the time he published his list that the Bedouin were on the verge of change, thanks to the very 

Revolt he helped them orchestrate. Thus, it is hard not 

to conclude that Lawrence wanted people to carry his 

27 principles into other settings. He may even have 

hoped they would so that no one would have to reinvent his wheel. In other words, perhaps Lawrence did 

genuinely seek to prevent others from having to learn 

lessons the hard way themselves. But we also cannot 

ignore the fact that through disseminating his lessons, 

he was also ensuring that everyone would remember 

it was he who had invented the wheel. 

Lawrence belonged to a class and generation for 

whom blatant self-promotion or claims that he, T. E. 

Lawrence, was the real key to his success, would have 

been unseemly. Cleverly, he let others (along with the 

authorship of Seven Pillars of Wisdom) do this for him. 

But any form of positive publicity can help create the 

paradox: success attracts attention. Success signals 

that someone has done something new and different 

that works. It is only understandable that everyone 

will then want to know what worked and how to replicate it. Ergo, the keen interest in distilling lessons 

learned while, when these are good lessons, it seems 

only natural that they then be condensed into principles that can be taught. 
17

Here, however, is where it is instructive to return 

to the examples offered by Gill’s and Sinha’s accounts, 

since the real substance of their accomplishments is 

to be found in the details of their anecdotes. Ask Mr. 

Gill how he knew what to do in a particular situation, 

and he has to describe the particularities of that situation; invariably it was the specifics of that situation 

that led him to play his hand the way he did. Indeed, 

in listening to Gill and reading Sinha, it is doubtful 

that anyone else would have done what they did quite 

the way they did it. Nor did they have to refer to anyone else’s principles to know what to do or try to do. 

Instead, what comes through time and again is that 

these two men relished their ability to pull the rug out 

from under their opponents. They could no more not 

rise to that challenge than they could not read people. 

All of this was autonomic. 

But, if that is true, then is anything they did really 

replicable? Worth asking too, is to what extent was 

their vision context-specific. If someone has the ability to read people and the local scene in one setting, 

can s/he read any set of people and any local scene? 

Would Lawrence have been any good against the 

Huks? Could Lansdale have helped Prince Faisal best 

the Ottomans? 

As Brent Lindeman makes clear in a recent master's thesis that focuses on pre-Awakening successes 

achieved by two different U.S. Army Special Forces 

team sergeants working with tribal leaders in al Anbar Province (Iraq), individuals have to be considered 

in the round, and not just as the sum of a set of attributes.37 This is in no small measure because the kinds 

of traits everyone likes to list are precisely those that 

certain military units (like Special Forces) already say 

they screen for. Yet, everyone in these units clearly 

does not perform like a Gill or a Sinha—or like Lin-
18

deman’s two exceptional team sergeants. This is also 

why Malcolm Gladwell’s notion of connectors, mavens, 

and salesmen may offer a more useful heuristic than 

anything anyone writing about COIN has come up 

with thus far. 

According to Gladwell, connectors know lots of 

people in lots of different social circles; mavens know 

as much as it is possible to know about a particular 

subject; and salesmen know how to get people to 

change their minds.38 Apply this to counterinsurgency, and those responsible for policing or helping to 

police communities at the local level should be able 

to identify the connectors, mavens, and salesmen in 

the communities they are responsible for protecting. 

They should want to do this not only because it is the 

most effective way for them to generate intelligence, 

but because it is the most expedient means by which 

to keep their fingers on the pulse. 

If we were to then think about foreign internal 

defense more broadly—say regionally within a country or even nationally—what should we want those 

at the operational level to be able to do? Presumably 

we would want them to be able to think (and potentially act) like connectors, mavens, and salesmen themselves. After all, these are the individuals who need 

to stitch together the big picture. Consequently, they 

need to be able to think (and/or operate) comfortably 

across communities (plural) and know more than just 

a cursory amount about their allies and the enemy.39

Push on this further and what does this suggest 

about those responsible for devising strategy? Ideally, 

those who devise strategy should possess the insights 

and abilities of a connector, maven, and salesman all 

rolled into one. Is it a coincidence that this describes 

the very varied individuals who have achieved unity 

of vision in the past? That seems unlikely.
19

One More Indian Example.

Or just consider for a moment the man who may 

have been the 20th century’s greatest insurgent and

counter to an armed insurgency: Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Unlike Mao (who often earns the 

title as the 20th century’s preeminent guerrilla warfare leader), Gandhi did not simply adopt and then 

adapt tried and true guerrilla warfare methods. He 

pioneered—invented, actually—militant nonviolence. 

Not only did he use nonviolence to help Indians secure their independence, but, in doing so, inspired 

nonviolent movements around the world, to include 

the civil rights movement in the United States. Whether it should be Gandhi or Mao who is judged to have 

had a more lasting impact on modern perceptions of 

effective struggle, of the two, Gandhi was the clear 

cross-cultural master. He had to be to both galvanize 

Indians and hoist the British on their own petard.

By taking what he learned from having studied 

for the bar in England, Gandhi was able to cleverly 

use the Brits’ own legal system against them. In addition to understanding how important it was for the 

British to retain the moral high ground, he recognized 

how game-changing it would be if he could cut this 

out from under them. What makes his insights even 

more impressive is that to do so in the court of law 

was one feat. But to do so in the court of Indian public opinion—at the same time that he was shaping 

that opinion—meant Gandhi also had to understand 

groups and castes he would not have been exposed to 

without purposely seeking them out. 

As hagiographic as Richard Attenborough’s 1982 

film, Gandhi, might be, it is still instructive to watch. 

It is hard to come away without admiring Gandhi for 
20

being able to bait the British so effectively. By all accounts, Gandhi possessed a keen sense of humor. He 

was also brilliant at improvisation. Even when he was 

only just beginning to feel his way toward Satyagraha 

in South Africa, it could be said: “he did not quite 

know yet what he was going to do, but he had already 

created an expectancy from which he would take his 

cues.”40 For instance, he certainly had not planned 

on rallying the Indian community in Johannesburg, 

South Africa, to take an oath of solidarity in September 1906, but, improvising on the spot, that is exactly 

what he got Indians in Johannesburg to do. Only as 

this happened did Gandhi realize, as he said later, that 

“some new principle had come into being to which at 

first he gave the name ‘passive resistance’.”41

What is critical to note is not just that Gandhi intuitively understood how to build his own momentum, but that he did so by always teasing, testing, and 

probing. Anything could be turned into an opportunity—to include the British urge to throw him into 

jail—though of course what helped him turn British 

strength into a weakness while highlighting Indians’ 

weakness as their strength, were his own strengths: 

his caste (upper), his networks of friends and followers, his deep knowledge of the law, and his gift for 

being able to communicate with people from all walks 

of life. In other words, it was his attributes as a connector, maven, and salesman across different cultures 

that granted him the unity of vision to see how Indians would, could, and should prevail. 

IMPLICATIONS

How far can we push this Gladwell heuristic, or the 

Gill, Sinha, and Gandhi examples? Probably not too far 
21

or they will tempt us to devise another “checklist.” At 

best, being a connector, maven, and salesman is suggestive. One thing it suggests is that more should be 

made of individuals’ singularity, just as more should 

be done to mitigate the Lawrence Paradox. 

For a host of reasons, the United States should 

rethink the usefulness of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare doctrine. Without question, most Soldiers and Marines need some sort of guide, or at the 

very least, left and right limits. TTPs, and “dos and 

don’ts” help serve these purposes. At the same time, 

few veterans would want anyone to have to learn (or 

relearn) lessons the hard way if this can be helped. 

But consider what doctrine draws on. There are entire shelves full of books about best practices in COIN, 

unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, etc. Ironically, the best of these collate lessons from first-person 

accounts. In fact, this is exactly how the works now 

considered classic were first put together during the 

Vietnam era: writers drew on examples from World 

War II, Kenya, Malaya, and Algeria. Since September 

11, 2001 (9/11), many of these classics have been reissued or their material has been repackaged and updated by new authors. Indeed, there are now so many 

of these works in addition to new field manuals that 

no one has to go back to read first-person narratives 

at all. Plus, why wade through so much specificity? 

First-person accounts are too particular to time and 

place. Better to cut to the chase with genericized lessons learned instead.42

However, as this monograph has argued, the penchant to genericize in and of itself teaches the wrong 

lesson. It implies that once the right lessons have 

been taught and trained, anyone should be able to 

apply them. Yet, history suggests this is hardly the 

case. More to the point, those who orchestrated suc-
22

cessful campaigns in the past invariably broke new 

ground. That is why their campaigns succeeded. This 

was usually in the wake of something old and tried, 

which means such individuals came to the situation 

able to read and analyze it differently than their predecessors, or they saw different possibilities, or both. 

Not everyone can do this. Nor can everyone assemble 

what amounts to their own doctrine from the vectors 

that others’ doctrine strips away—and especially not 

when the vectors are comprised of arc, plot, and character. Worse, strip out the specificity, and there goes 

the neighborhood, along with all the necessary context. Or to put this in even more basic terms, if you do 

not already know who you can trust and/or do not 

have what it takes yourself to be able to quickly identify trustworthy connectors, mavens, and salesmen in 

someone else’s culture, it is doubtful that you will succeed. Arguably this does not just hold at the tactical 

on-the-street level, but at “god” level, too. 

A second problem with doctrine as it relates to 

cross-cultural contexts (as opposed to doctrine designed to help mesh and organize men and machines) 

is that it requires too much updating. As it is, DoD 

is forever changing terms, which then requires that 

training be realigned with whatever are the new terms’ 

points of reference. In contrast, how much effort does 

the military expend on refining its assessment and selection tools? Ask most of those who have served on 

advisory teams in Iraq about this. Or ask why so few 

of the military’s preeminent advisors—Special Forces 

Soldiers and Officers—have volunteered for military 

transition teams (MiTTs).

The law of averages alone suggests that somewhere in the field right now are individuals with the 

abilities of an K. P. S. Gill or an S. K. Sinha. But what is 
23

being done to try to identify, let alone, promote them? 

Many might point to career progression and pipeline 

challenges as the problem. But integral to the wrong 

incentive structure is a more fundamental recognition 

problem.43

Among the things that could be done to ameliorate 

this situation is to use doctrine as a screening tool for 

assessment and selection. For instance, if COIN principles do not strike individuals as generic common 

sense—if individuals do not respond to advice about 

the importance of establishing rapport or securing 

trust with “well, duh”—then these individuals should 

not lead others in COIN environments. In other 

words, COIN doctrine should probably be relegated 

to little more than a screening mechanism—which is 

not to suggest that COIN doctrine and history should 

not be taught. Rather, it is to take seriously the prospect that if coup d’oeil is a trait and not a skill, then, as 

with the strategic competence Krepinievich and Watts 

describe, people either have this ability or they do not. 

Certainly, individuals thrown into novel situations 

might discover they have hidden talents they were 

not previously aware of, just as people’s vision can 

expand or contract with experience. But not even this 

will be able to be gauged if assessment and reassessment, or as Moyar notes of COIN leadership generally, selection and deselection, are not taken seriously. 

If it turns out that coup d’oeil is context-specific, 

which it may well be for some individuals—like a 

Lawrence but not necessarily a Gandhi (who was as 

effective in South Africa as he was in India)—then 

“fit” and determining who belongs where becomes 

all the more important, if not all-important. That, in 

turn, makes selection even trickier, but hardly insurmountable since there are not that many people who 
24

can combine the attributes of connector, maven, and 

salesman all in one, let alone also possess a fingerspitzengefuhl for the enemy.44 Again, the latter is not just 

critical for getting the enemy to undo himself, but no 

amount of COIN study, regardless of how many cases 

someone reads about, or Ph.D.s he has advising him, 

will suffice for being able to know what to do oneself.

Could this help explain why we have had so much 

difficulty since 9/11? Have we had anyone with these 

capabilities at the helm? 

To be fair, no one with the right kind of mind may 

have known enough about Iraq or Afghanistan prior 

to our return to these theaters, or those who knew 

enough may not have had the right kind of mind. 

Either way, what we did not have available in 2001 

or 2003—or, arguably, still—should speak volumes 

about the need to begin assessing and selecting now

for the individuals from among whom we will need 

unity of vision in the future. One of the few silver linings to the protracted nature of both conflicts is that we 

have a very large pool of young Americans with considerable experience abroad in difficult circumstances. 

Among them already will be those who do not like 

“them,” others who do not get “us,” many who cannot triangulate cross-culturally, and some who have 

almost everything it takes but still will not be able to 

make that final leap of wanting to out-wile the enemy. 

If history is any guide, individuals with the right stuff 

sometimes make themselves stand out. At other times, 

the sun, the moon, and the stars have to align just so. 

Consequently, self-selection may require more than 

just a few strategic nudges, though overarching what 

we desperately need—a new emphasis on selection, 

assessment, and reassessment—remains the cautionary proviso that there is nothing prescriptive we can 
25

be sure will work, not even when it comes to finding 

the right who to be in charge. But—get those who "get" 

this right and we will be that much closer to having 

the right whos from which to choose. 

ENDNOTES

1. Not the most felicitous term, except as it can serve to trump 

those other two unities, “unity of command” and “unity of effort.”

2. William Dugan, Coup d’oeil: Strategic Planning in Army Planning, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2005.

3. Thanks are owed to Thomas Mahnken for funding this research when he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Policy Planning; as well as to Steve Whitmarsh, Wade Ishimoto, Chandi Duke Heffner, Ajai Sanhi, K. P. S. Gill, and Tanveer 

Ahmed for their invaluable assistance in India. Points made here 

were initially written up in a research report on “Anthropology 

and Irregular Warfare” co-authored with Mike Weathers, further 

refined in a conference paper, “Unity of Vision: What It Is and 

Why We Need It,” presented at the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society, 

October 2009. 

4. Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts, “Regaining Strategic Competence,” Strategy for the Long Haul Series, Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), 

2009, p. 41. 

5. Ibid., p. 17.

6. Ibid., p. 18.

7. Ibid., p. 19.

8. Mark Moyar, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency 

from the Civil War to Iraq, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 

2009, p. 3.
26

9. Ibid., p. 7.

10. Krepinevich and Watts, p. 40.

11. Ibid., p. 41.

12. It is important to distinguish between colonial era crosscultural encounters and post-colonial conflict for two reasons: different goals and different methods. 

13. Ironically, the Pentagon may be among the most chronic 

misusers of his concept. Many in the military, along with their 

civilian counterparts, seem to be under the impression that people 

can decide to shift a paradigm and, by dint of their decision, shift 

it. But according to Kuhn, paradigms shift when the gap between 

what theory can and cannot explain becomes too noticeable to be 

ignored, and an alternative—already in the wings—does the job 

better. 

14. Or, for another way to think about unity of vision, consider this description of Warren Buffet’s method: “invert, always 

invert. Turn a situation or problem upside down. Look at it backward. What’s in it for the other guy? What happens if all our 

plans go wrong? Where don’t we want to go, and how do you 

get there? Instead of looking for success, make a list of how to fail 

instead”—from Paul Carroll’s review of Alice Schroeder’s biography of Warren Buffet (Paul Carroll, “Why Panic Passes Him By,” 

The Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2008, p. A17.) 

15. According to Jonathan Nashel, Edward Lansdale’s Cold War, 

Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005, this is 

how Lansdale operated whenever he was abroad.

16. Article #2 of T. E. Lawrence’s “Twenty-seven Articles,” 

Arab Bulletin #60, August 20, 1917, states: “Learn all you can 

about your Ashraf and Bedu. Get to know their families, clans 

and tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills, and roads. Do all this 

by listening and by indirect inquiry. Do not ask questions. Get to 

speak their dialect of Arabic, not yours. Until you can understand 

their allusions avoid getting deep into conversation, or you will 

drop bricks. Be a little stiff at first.”
27

17. Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in 

China 1911-45, New York: Bantam Books, 1978 (originally 1971), 

p. 206; “tireless curiosity” is Tuchman’s term, p. 46.

18. Krepinevich and Watts, p. 13, emphasis by the author.

19. Or at least enough people and/or key principals.

20. Under certain kinds of foreign policy, it could even be how 

we decide whom to partner with.

21. Tribal insurgencies have been ongoing in India’s Northeast since Independence. Insurgencies involving religion have engulfed Punjab and Kashmir. Most recently, Naxalism—a version 

of Maoism—has posed a threat in multiple states.

22. Equally critical and worthy of examination is India’s administrative structure which, as sclerotic as it has become, still 

offers a compelling model for how an otherwise communally divided country can: (a) organize itself to thwart insurgents, and (b) 

support a meritocratic, apolitical civil service, national police, and 

professional army. 

23. Mr. Gill himself contends that he waged war against terrorists and criminals, not insurgents, and makes a marked distinction between the two.

24. Who, at the time, were also Sikhs—a nontrivial fact.

25. For more, see Mark Tully, “Operation Black Thunder,” in 

No Full Stops in India, London, UK: Penguin Books, 1991.

26. In February 2008.

27. Akin to the Coyote in Wile Coyote and Roadrunner cartoons, but with the difference that Gill would catch Roadrunners

(plural). Wile—seeing the humor in the trap one devises, and setting traps that will be the stuff of stories—may be an absolutely 

essential, woefully under-remarked trait.
28

28. As conveyed in Lansdale’s autobiography, In the Midst of 

Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia, New York: Fordham University Press, 1991, as well as in accounts about him.

29. K. P. S. Gill, The Knights of Falsehood, available from satp.

org/satporgtp/publication/nightsoffalsehood/falsehoodl.htm.

30. I am drawing on Sinha’s written accounts: Lieutenant 

General S. K. Sinha, A Soldier Recalls, New Delhi, India: Lancer 

International, 1992; and Lieutenant General (Ret.) S. K. Sinha, A 

Governor’s Musings: Soldier Statesman Speaks, New Delhi, India: 

Manas Publications, 2006; and I am treating S. K. Sinha as a successful COIN strategist not only because Indians do, but because 

he made major strides as Governor even though insurgency persists. Assam and J&K are considerably different from each other 

and from Punjab, where K. P. S. Gill had the full backing of the 

state, for a variety of reasons already alluded to, and achieved 

total success.

31. Sinha, A Soldier Recalls, p. 204.

32. Ibid.

33. Sinha, A Governor’s Musings, pp. 234-235.

34. Ibid., p. 26.

35. Without question, the lessons they learned merit teaching. 

But by focusing on the product of their trial and error—the lessons 

learned—it is too easy to lose sight of what they came to the situation already knowing, and knowing how to do. For Gill’s doctrine, 

see The Knights of Falsehood. Also see Prem Mahadevan, “The Gill 

Doctrine: A Model for 21st Century Counter-terrorism?,” Faultlines, Vol. 19, April 2008, available from www.satp.org/satporgtp/

publication/faultlines/volume19/Articlel.htm.

36. First published in Arab Bulletin #60, August 20, 1917. 

Granted, Lawrence helped spearhead an insurgency, not a counterinsurgency, but his “articles” have inspired an endless number 

of COIN spin-offs. 
29

37. Brent Lindeman, Better Lucky Than Good: A Theory of Unconventional Minds and the Power of ‘Who,’ master's of science thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009.

38. Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point, New York: Little, 

Brown, 2000.

39. None of which is to say that those at ground level should 

not be able to think strategically, too. But, at a minimum, this 

seems to be what is needed to operate tactically, coordinate operations, and devise strategy. Needing to be able to operate across 

communities is also required when it comes to the Interagency, as 

does (maybe?) being familiar with the ‘enemy.’

40. Erik Erikson, Gandhi’s Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence, New York: W. W. Norton, 1993 (originally 1969), p. 199.

41. Ibid., p. 200.

42. For example, here is a summary description from a very 

good paper delivered to a COIN-oriented American audience 

about India’s COIN lessons learned. Colonel Behram A. Sahukar, 

“The Indian Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations,” unpublished/undated manuscript circulated in Spring 2008: “This 

document has attempted to formalize the conduct of COIN operations and has emphasized that all military [actions] in COIN operations all actions [sic] must [be] people-centric, confirm [sic] to the 

laid down laws, use minimum force and aim at restoring civilian 

control, while at the same time acting aggressively against those 

elements who receive foreign support and are bent on confronting the government and exploiting the laws of war,” emphasis 

by the author). The aim, clearly, is for doctrine to be widely applicable. Tellingly, while the paper cites occasional individuals—

like S. K. Sinha—it does not discuss the significance of particular 

individuals for, or in, COIN. This could reflect a military tic: selection of the right individuals to serve in the right billets is presumably reflected in rank, and context and “fit” should not matter and 

should not need to be taken into account, at least not by anyone 

outside the unit. 
30

43. For a slightly different take on incentive challenges, see 

Brent Clemmer, Aligned Incentives: Could the Army’s Award System 

Inadvertently Be Hindering Counterinsurgency Operations, master's 

of science thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 

2009.

44. To reiterate: “expertise” in COIN is no substitute. All 

COIN expertise encourages is parachute assessments.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. Anna Simons

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil