RENDERED: DECEMBER 15, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-1083-MR

JARROD MICHAEL WEISS APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE MITCH PERRY, JUDGE

ACTION NOS. 14-CR-002387-001 AND 14-CR-002531

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Jarrod Michael Weiss appeals from the Jefferson Circuit 

Court’s denial of his Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42 motion 

for post-conviction relief. We dismiss the appeal as being from a nonfinal order. 

Weiss was found guilty of murder, tampering with physical evidence,

and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. He was sentenced to 

thirty years’ imprisonment. Our Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. Weiss 

v. Commonwealth, No. 2016-SC-000183-MR, 2017 WL 5034472 (Ky. Nov. 2, 
-2-

2017) (unpublished). Weiss timely filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion. The trial 

court denied the motion without having first held a hearing, but the trial court’s 

terse order did not resolve all of Weiss’s claims. Specifically, the order did not 

address Weiss’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (“IAAC”) claim, nor 

did the order contain finality language. Weiss then filed this appeal. 

Weiss raises two issues. One of them involves whether trial counsel 

was ineffective for not subpoenaing a firearms expert. The trial court addressed 

that argument and determined it did not entitle Weiss to relief. Second, Weiss 

argues his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for not raising as an issue the 

Commonwealth having belatedly provided certain DNA results.

 Weiss has waived 

all the remaining issues contained in his RCr 11.42 motion which he did not 

discuss on appeal. Commonwealth v. Pollini, 437 S.W.3d 144, 148 (Ky. 2014).

We must dismiss this appeal as being from a nonfinal order. The 

parties did not raise that issue, but we must nonetheless ensure that we have 

jurisdiction before proceeding. Wilson v. Russell, 162 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Ky. 2005)

(“However, even though not raised, jurisdiction may not be waived, and it can not 

[sic] be conferred by consent of the parties. This [C]ourt must determine for itself 

whether it has jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

“Generally, our appellate jurisdiction is restricted to final judgments.” Steffan v. 

Smyzer by and through Rankins, 540 S.W.3d 387, 390 (Ky. App. 2018). 
-3-

Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 54.01 defines a final and 

appealable judgment as “a final order adjudicating all the rights of all the parties in 

an action or proceeding, or a judgment made final under Rule 54.02.” Even though 

this is a criminal law case, CR 54.01 applies. See, e.g., Dillard v. Commonwealth, 

475 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Ky. 2015) (“In both civil and criminal matters, finality is 

assessed under CR 54.01 . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 945 S.W.2d 420, 422 

(Ky. 1997) (“CR 54.01, applicable to criminal actions pursuant to RCr 13.04, 

defines a final or appealable judgment as ‘a final order adjudicating all the rights of 

all the parties in an action or proceeding.’”). See also RCr 13.04 (providing that 

“[t]he Rules of Civil Procedure shall be applicable in criminal proceedings to the 

extent not superseded by or inconsistent with these Rules of Criminal Procedure.”). 

The order from which Weiss appealed is not inherently final and 

appealable under CR 54.01 because it did not resolve all of Weiss’s claims for 

relief. Specifically relevant here, the order did not address his IAAC claim(s) and 

so it did not resolve “all the rights of all the parties . . . .” 

Moreover, the trial court did not attempt to make the otherwise 

interlocutory order final and appealable under CR 54.02. That rule generally 

allows a trial court to make an order conclusively resolving a portion of a case 

involving multiple parties or claims final and appealable by adding two clauses: 1) 

the order is final; and 2) there is no just cause for delay. “Strict compliance” with 
-4-

CR 54.02 is mandatory, so “[a] trial court’s failure to conclude both recitations in a 

judgment renders it interlocutory and nonappealable.” Vorherr v. Coldiron, 525 

S.W.3d 532, 540 (Ky. App. 2017). Here, the order contains neither recitation. 

In sum, the order at issue is not final. Consequently, though we regret 

the additional delay it will cause, we must dismiss this appeal. Common Cause of 

Kentucky v. Commonwealth, 143 S.W.3d 634, 635-36 (Ky. App. 2004) (“If the 

order from which review is sought is not final or otherwise immediately 

reviewable, then the Court is required, on its own motion if need be, to 

acknowledge its lack of authority and to dismiss the appeal.”). 

Where an underlying order appears to lack finality, we must raise the 

jurisdictional issue sua sponte. Since the order challenged by Weiss is not final 

and appealable, this appeal must be, and is hereby, dismissed.

ALL CONCUR.

ENTERED: _December 15, 2023

JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
-5-

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

David L. Stewart

La Grange, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Thomas A. Van De Rostyne

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky