Present: All the Justices 

ANGELA MARIE CAROSI 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 100143 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

 November 4, 2010 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 

erred in finding that three convictions for child endangerment 

in violation of Code § 40.1-103(A) were supported by 

sufficient evidence that the defendant endangered the lives of 

her three children by permitting illegal drugs to be kept in 

her home in a place accessible to the children. 

BACKGROUND 

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on 

appeal of a criminal conviction, we review “the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing 

party in the circuit court, and we accord the Commonwealth the 

benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the 

evidence.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 523, 527, 685 

S.E.2d 43, 45 (2009). When so viewed, the evidence adduced at 

trial showed that shortly after 10 P.M. on February 28, 2008, 

Virginia State Police Special Agent Richard Boyd, Jr. executed 

a search warrant at 214 Oak Grove Lane in Stafford County. 

This residence is where Angela Marie Carosi lived with her 

three children, ages 10, 5 and 3, all of whom were present in 
the home at the time of the search. Cavell Thomas, the father 

of two of the children, also frequently stayed in the 

residence. However, Thomas was not present at the time of the 

search, as he was being held in custody on drug charges in 

another jurisdiction. 

In the master bedroom of the home, which Carosi shared 

with Thomas, Boyd found a glass jar containing marijuana, two 

“bongs” or smoking devices, a digital scale with a powdery 

residue, and plastic bags in an upper cabinet of an unlocked 

wardrobe. In an unlocked safe inside the wardrobe, Boyd also 

found prescription bottles containing oxycodone and 

methylenedioxymethamphetamine, commonly known as MDMA or 

ecstasy.1 On top of the safe was a plate with two razor blades 

and powdered cocaine. Boyd further observed that there was no 

lock on the master bedroom door and that all the drugs in the 

wardrobe would be within the reach of a small child. 

Boyd subsequently testified at trial that Carosi told him 

the smoking devices were in the wardrobe, that she kept 

clothing in the drawers of the wardrobe, and that the safe 

 

1

 There is conflicting testimony in the record as to the 

precise location of the safe and whether the locking mechanism 

of the safe was functional or not; however, it is undisputed 

that the safe was not locked and in a place accessible to the 

children when Boyd conducted the search. 

2
belonged jointly to her and Thomas. She denied any knowledge 

of the drugs that Boyd had found inside the safe. 

On August 4, 2008, the Stafford County Grand Jury 

indicted Carosi for three counts of child abuse in violation 

of Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1) and three counts of child 

endangerment in violation of Code § 40.1-103(A), both offenses 

being Class 6 felonies.2 Carosi was also indicted for 

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation 

of Code § 18.2-248.1 and three counts of possession of 

cocaine, oxycodone, and MDMA in violation of Code § 18.2-250. 

The Commonwealth subsequently dismissed the felony child abuse 

charges by nolle prosequi. 

On March 4, 2009, a two-day jury trial on the child 

endangerment and drug possession charges commenced in the 

Circuit Court of Stafford County. Boyd testified concerning 

 

2

 In its sentencing order, the circuit court used the term 

“Child Neglect” to describe the offense defined by Code 

§ 18.2-371.1(B)(1) and “Child Cruelty” to describe the offense 

defined by Code § 40.1-103(A). Although these terms track in 

part the titles of the respective code sections, they do not 

fully convey the nature or elements of the two offenses and 

the distinction between them. For use in this opinion, we 

have adopted the terms used by the Court of Appeals in its 

order refusing Carosi’s appeal and in King v. Commonwealth, 56 

Va. App. 133, 692 S.E.2d 249 (2010), in which the Court of 

Appeals determined that child abuse and child endangerment are 

not the same offense, nor is one a lesser-included offense of 

the other and, thus, convictions under both statutes in a 

single trial does not violate double jeopardy principles. Id.

at 138-39, 692 S.E.2d at 252. 

3
the February 28, 2008 search of Carosi’s home as described 

above. After presenting evidence from a forensic expert, who 

identified the marijuana, cocaine, oxycodone, and MDMA, the 

Commonwealth rested its case. 

Carosi moved to strike the child endangerment charges, 

contending that “[t]here is no evidence whatsoever that the 

children knew that there were drugs in the house. There is no 

evidence whatsoever that there was drug use going on in front 

of these children. There [is] no evidence whatsoever that 

[the children] actually had access to the bedroom and they 

could go in there.” Thus, Carosi contended that the jury 

would have to speculate as to whether the children had 

actually been placed in a situation endangering their lives 

through her alleged willful or negligent conduct. 

The Commonwealth responded that the children had “access 

to dangerous drugs” because there were no “locks or any 

prohibitions on the door to prohibit the [children] from 

coming into their mother’s room.” Thus, the Commonwealth 

asserted that the elements of Code § 40.1-103(A) could be 

satisfied “solely on the children’s access to the Schedule I 

or Schedule II drugs and marijuana.” 

Carosi responded that children merely having potential 

access to drugs was different from a case where “there is drug 

dealing going on in front of the children.” She contended 

4
that the possibility of access to drugs is “no different than 

having a cabinet under the sink where you keep dangerous . . . 

cleaning supplies.” She reiterated that the evidence did not 

show that “there was anything going on in front of the 

children or that the children even knew [the drugs were] there 

and had free access into the bedroom.” The circuit court 

denied the motion to strike the child endangerment charges. 

Thereafter, Thomas was called as a witness for the 

defense. Thomas took full responsibility for the drugs found 

in the home, stating that the wardrobe was his “and I wanted 

to hide [the drugs] there.” He denied that Carosi kept any 

belongings in the wardrobe and maintained that he did not use 

drugs in the home. On cross-examination, Thomas gave 

equivocal answers to a series of questions concerning whether 

any of Carosi’s clothing was kept in the wardrobe. 

Nevertheless, he insisted that “all the drugs were mine” and 

that, other than the marijuana, he had placed the drugs in the 

wardrobe the day before the search was conducted. 

Concerning ownership of the safe, Thomas testified that 

while he purchased the safe, Carosi might have told Boyd that 

she and Thomas owned the safe jointly because “everything like 

mines [(sic)], is basically hers . . . . if she wanted to 

claim the safe, she could.” He further testified that 

although there were two bongs in the wardrobe, both belonged 

5
to him. Asked why he would keep two bongs in the home if 

Carosi did not smoke marijuana, as he maintained, Thomas 

replied that the two were “total different instruments if you 

look at them clearly” and that they were of “[d]ifferent 

styles.” 

The Commonwealth concluded its cross-examination of 

Thomas by impeaching him through prior inconsistent statements 

he had made to a probation officer for a pre-sentence report 

following his conviction on drug trafficking charges. 

Specifically, the Commonwealth established that Thomas had 

denied using marijuana, cocaine, or other drugs recently. 

Thomas responded either that he could not recall what 

statements he had made or that he did not know what had been 

stated in the pre-sentence report. 

Carosi testified on her own behalf. She maintained that 

Thomas brought the wardrobe to the home. Carosi denied that 

she kept any clothing or other property in the wardrobe, 

though she conceded that she sometimes would borrow a pair of 

Thomas’ socks that were kept in the wardrobe. She further 

testified that while her children “[s]ometimes” would go into 

her bedroom, she had never seen them playing in the wardrobe. 

Carosi specifically denied having any knowledge of the 

drugs or the bongs, and denied that she smoked marijuana or 

used any type of illegal drugs. She further maintained that 

6
Thomas did not use drugs in the home, though she had “seen him 

take pills” for pain after he had two teeth pulled. 

On cross-examination, Carosi denied that she had told 

Boyd that she kept clothes in the wardrobe. She also denied 

having told Boyd that the bongs were located in the wardrobe. 

Asked whether she could offer a reason that Boyd would 

fabricate this testimony, Carosi replied that she had been 

“overcritical” of him during the search of her home and had 

“told him how to do his job better.” Carosi also testified 

that she had purchased the safe for Thomas as a gift and did 

not “know why he said he purchased it.” 

After the Commonwealth called the probation officer who 

had prepared Thomas’ pre-sentence report as a rebuttal 

witness, Carosi renewed her motion to strike the child 

endangerment charges, asserting that there was no evidence 

that the children “were actually effected in any way and that 

they even knew about” the drugs. The circuit court again 

denied the motion to strike. 

The case was submitted to the jury, which returned 

verdicts acquitting Carosi of the four drug possession 

offenses, but convicted her of the three child endangerment 

charges. The jury fixed her punishment at a fine of $500 for 

each offense. Carosi waived the preparation of a pre-sentence 

report. After receiving testimony from Carosi and her sister, 

7
the circuit court confirmed the jury’s verdict and imposed 

$1500 in fines on Carosi. 

Carosi filed a petition for appeal to the Court of 

Appeals. The sole issue asserted in her petition was that the 

evidence was insufficient to support the three convictions for 

felony child endangerment. In a per curiam order, the Court 

of Appeals refused Carosi’s petition. Citing Barnes v. 

Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 105, 110-11, 622 S.E.2d 278, 281 

(2005), the Court noted that proof of child endangerment 

“requires only a threshold mens rea showing of ‘criminal 

negligence.’” Carosi v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0738-09-4, 

slip op. at 2 (October 7, 2009). Relying upon Jones v. 

Commonwealth, 272 Va. 692, 700, 636 S.E.2d 403, 407 (2006), 

the Court held that the jury could have reasonably found that 

the “act of leaving illegal narcotics in a place accessible to 

her children was grossly negligent” and was sufficient to 

prove the mens rea necessary to establish Carosi’s criminal 

negligence “based on common knowledge[] that there are 

inherent dangers in placing [illegal drugs] within reach of an 

unattended child.” Carosi, slip op. at 3 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Carosi requested a review of this judgment 

by a three-judge panel, which refused the petition for the 

reasons stated in the per curiam order. This appeal followed. 

8
DISCUSSION 

In relevant part, Code § 40.1-103(A) provides, “It shall 

be unlawful for any person . . . having the custody of any 

child willfully or negligently to cause or permit the life of 

such child to be endangered.”3 Although the Court of Appeals 

has reviewed many convictions under Code § 40.1-103(A), we 

last considered the application of the child endangerment 

statute in Lovisi v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 848, 188 S.E.2d 206 

(1972). Since that time, we have considered a number of cases 

involving the felony child abuse statute, Code § 18.2-

371.1(B)(1), including most recently Jones and Morris v. 

Commonwealth, 272 Va. 732, 636 S.E.2d 436 (2006). Although 

the two statutes define separate offenses, it is clear that 

the mens rea for each offense can be satisfied by a showing of 

 

3

 In Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 Va. App. 150, 155, 462 

S.E.2d 582, 585 (1995), the Court of Appeals held that a 

further provision of the statute providing that the offense 

would also apply to a circumstance where the “life, health or 

morals [of the child] may be endangered” was 

unconstitutionally vague, but found that the offending 

language was severable from the statute. (Emphasis added.) 

The statute also makes it an offense “to cause or permit such 

child to be overworked, tortured, tormented, mutilated, beaten 

or cruelly treated.” There is no dispute, however, that the 

Commonwealth’s contention in this case was that Carosi 

actually endangered the children through her criminal 

negligence. 

9
criminal negligence on the part of the defendant.4 Cf. Ellis 

v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 548, 556-57, 513 S.E.2d 453, 457 

(1999) (child endangerment); Jones, 272 Va. at 701, 636 S.E.2d 

at 408 (child abuse). 

Carosi contends that the Commonwealth’s evidence was 

insufficient as a matter of law because it failed to show that 

she actually endangered the life of her children as proscribed 

by Code § 40.1-103(A). Carosi advances two separate 

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, contending that 

the Commonwealth failed to prove both the necessary scienter, 

in that the evidence did not show that she had actual 

knowledge of the presence and character of the illegal drugs 

in her home, and the requisite mens rea, in that the evidence 

did not show that her acts or omissions rose to a level of 

criminal negligence. We will address Carosi’s contentions in 

that order. 

With respect to the issue of scienter, Carosi asserts 

that “the only facts before the [jury] are that there were 

drugs and drug paraphernalia in a closed cabinet belonging to 

 

4

 The two statutes are sufficiently similar that the 

legislature has included identical provisions for an 

affirmative defense to each offense where the prosecution is 

“based solely on the accused parent having left the child at a 

hospital or rescue squad . . . within the first 14 days of the 

child’s life.” Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(2); Code § 40.1-103(B). 

10
[Carosi’s] boyfriend.” Because the jury acquitted Carosi of 

all the drug possession charges, she contends that there was 

no evidence that she was actually aware that the drugs were 

present in the wardrobe. Absent that knowledge, she asserts 

the evidence that she permitted the children to occasionally 

enter and play in the master bedroom would be insufficient to 

prove that she knowingly permitted the children’s lives to be 

endangered. We disagree. 

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence on appeal “[i]t is the appellate court’s duty to 

examine the evidence that tends to support the conviction and 

to uphold the conviction unless it is plainly wrong or without 

evidentiary support.” Carter v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 100, 

104, 694 S.E.2d 590, 593 (2010) (citing Code § 8.01-680). 

Moreover, when, as in this case, “a defendant elects to 

introduce evidence in [her] own behalf after the denial of a 

motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence, any further 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial or on 

appeal is to be determined from the entire record” including 

the defendant’s own testimony. Murillo-Rodriguez v. 

Commonwealth, 279 Va. 64, 74, 688 S.E.2d 199, 204-05 (2010). 

Applying this standard of review, we hold that Carosi’s 

contention that by failing to establish her guilt for the drug 

possession charges, the Commonwealth necessarily also failed 

11
to prove she had knowledge that drugs were present in the 

wardrobe is not supported by the record when viewed in its 

entirety. 

“To support a conviction based upon constructive 

possession [of illegal drugs], ‘the Commonwealth must point to 

evidence of acts, statements, or conduct of the accused or 

other facts or circumstances which tend to show that the 

defendant was aware of both the presence and character of the 

substance and that it was subject to [her] dominion and 

control.’ ” Drew v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 473, 338 

S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986) (quoting Powers v. Commonwealth, 227 

Va. 474, 476, 316 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1984)); accord McMillan v. 

Commonwealth, 277 Va. 11, 19, 671 S.E.2d 396, 399 (2009). 

Boyd’s testimony that Carosi told him that the two bongs were 

in the wardrobe, that she kept clothing in it, and that the 

safe belonged jointly to her and Thomas would give rise to a 

reasonable inference by the trier of fact that Carosi was also 

aware of the presence and character of the marijuana and other 

drugs in the wardrobe and safe and that she jointly exercised 

dominion and control over them with Thomas. This evidence was 

sufficient for the Commonwealth to establish a prima facie 

case for constructive possession of the drugs and overcome 

Carosi’s motion to strike those charges at the conclusion of 

the Commonwealth’s case in chief. The evidence presented by 

12
the defense, specifically Carosi’s adamant denial that she 

used the wardrobe or was aware of what Thomas stored in it and 

that she had not made the statements during the search that 

Boyd attributed to her, as well as Thomas’ assertion that all 

of the drugs and drug paraphernalia were his alone, thus 

created a question of fact to be resolved by the jury based 

upon its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. 

A jury is not required to accept the self-serving 

testimony of the defendant or of witnesses with a potential 

bias in favor of the defendant, but may rely on such testimony 

in whole, in part, or reject it completely. See Durham v. 

Commonwealth, 214 Va. 166, 169, 198 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1973); 

Upshur v. Commonwealth, 170 Va. 649, 655, 197 S.E. 435, 437 

(1938). Thus, the jury reasonably could have accepted Thomas’ 

assertion that the drugs were his, while rejecting Carosi’s 

assertion that she was ignorant of the fact that the drugs 

were being stored in the wardrobe. Accordingly, while the 

jury may have found that the Commonwealth had not proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Carosi exercised dominion and 

control over the drugs, it could also have found the evidence 

was sufficient to prove that she was nonetheless aware of the 

presence and character of the drugs for purposes of 

determining whether she was guilty of the child endangerment 

charges. 

13
We now turn to the central question of this appeal, which 

is embodied in Carosi’s contention that the mens rea element 

of Code § 40.1-103(A) cannot be established solely upon the 

fact that a parent or other custodian knowingly permitted a 

child to be present in a home where illegal drugs were kept 

unsecured in an area accessible to the child. Carosi contends 

that unlike in Jones, where the mens rea of criminal 

negligence was supported by evidence that the child had actual 

access to heroin as well as by the “substantial risk of 

serious injury from the dangers inherent in the illicit drug 

trade” that was ongoing in the home, 272 Va. at 701-02, 636 

S.E.2d at 408, here the evidence showed only that the illegal 

drugs were kept in a place where the children could have 

obtained access to them. Thus, even if the jury could have 

found that Carosi was aware that drugs were being stored in 

the wardrobe, she contends that “knowledge of a dangerous 

substance closed away in a cabinet by itself should not rise 

to the level of criminal negligence.” As she did in the 

circuit court, Carosi asserts that keeping illegal drugs in 

this manner was no more likely to endanger her children than 

would “the possession of sharp knives in the kitchen, 

chemicals under the sink, prescription drugs in the medicine 

cabinet, and a lawfully possessed unloaded gun in the closet.” 

We disagree. 

14
Carosi is correct that in Jones we held that “[b]y 

engaging in the routine sale of drugs from her home and

permitting her unattended young child access to those drugs, 

Jones committed willful acts and omissions” sufficient to 

prove her criminally negligent for purposes of establishing 

the mens rea element of Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1). Id. at 702, 

636 S.E.2d at 408 (emphasis added). Moreover, we further 

stated that our decision in that case did not establish “a per 

se rule” that a violation of the statute would occur whenever 

the evidence showed that a “child is living in the environment 

of the drug trade.” Id. Contrary to Carosi’s contention, 

however, neither does our decision in Jones stand for the 

proposition that the mens rea for criminal negligence could 

not be established based upon permitting a child to have 

access to illegal drugs in the absence of any evidence of drug 

trafficking. 

Criminal negligence is established by showing that the 

defendant’s acts or omissions were “of a wanton or willful 

character . . . show[ing] a reckless or indifferent disregard 

of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably 

calculated to produce injury, or which make it not improbable 

that injury will be occasioned, and the offender knows, or is 

charged with the knowledge of, the probable result of [her] 

acts.” Brown, 278 Va. at 528-29, 685 S.E.2d at 46 (internal 

15
quotation marks omitted). Such a determination necessarily 

will be specific to the circumstances of each case and, thus, 

whether a defendant’s conduct is criminally negligent is 

usually a question for the trier of fact, unless reasonable 

minds could not differ. See, e.g. Noakes v. Commonwealth, 54 

Va. App. 577, 586, 681 S.E.2d 48, 52 (2009), aff’d, 280 Va. 

338, 669 S.E.2d 284 (2010); cf. Griffin v. Shively, 227 Va. 

317, 320, 315 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1984). 

Initially, we reject Carosi’s broad contention that a 

parent or other person having custody of a child cannot be 

held criminally liable for negligently permitting the child to 

be in an environment where illegal drugs are readily 

accessible because this circumstance is no different than 

permitting the child to be in an environment where there are 

“sharp knives in the kitchen, chemicals under the sink, 

prescription drugs in the medicine cabinet, and a lawfully 

possessed unloaded gun in the closet.” It is self-evident 

from Carosi’s own characterization of the two circumstances 

that they differ in the important respect that the latter 

items, though unquestionably dangerous if left accessible to 

unsupervised children, are possessed by the parent or 

16
custodian for lawful purposes, whereas drugs that are 

illegally present in the home are not.5 

Finally, in order to accept Carosi’s argument that the 

evidence was insufficient to establish the mens rea of 

criminal negligence in this case, we would have to conclude 

that reasonable minds could not differ on whether rearing 

children in a home where illegal drugs are readily accessible 

may constitute endangering the children for purposes of Code 

§ 40.1-103(A). The myriad factors to be considered in such 

cases – such as the ages of the children, the length of the 

exposure, the level of supervision or lack thereof, and the 

quantity and variety of the drugs – suggest that as with most 

cases where criminal negligence is at issue, this 

determination is necessarily fact-specific. Such 

determination is best left to the jury, which is in the best 

position to assess the weight and credibility of the evidence. 

In that respect, and considering the totality of the evidence, 

we cannot say that the jury’s finding of criminal negligence 

 

5

 Moreover, Carosi provides no support for the implicit 

inference in her argument that a charge of child endangerment 

could never be supported by evidence that a parent or other 

custodian negligently permitted a child to have access to a 

legally-possessed dangerous substance. The facts of this case 

do not require us to decide that issue. 

17
in this case was plainly wrong or without support in the 

record. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals did 

not err in refusing Carosi’s petition for appeal. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be 

affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

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