[Cite as State v. Craine, 2024-Ohio-2501.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

 No. 23AP-359

v. : (C.P.C. No. 18CR-5321)

Deshawn D. Craine, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellant. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on June 28, 2024

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Sheryl L. Prichard, for appellee. Argued: Sheryl L. Prichard.

On brief: Soroka & Associates, L.L.C., and Katherine 

Memsic, for appellant. Argued: Katherine Memsic.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

BEATTY BLUNT, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Deshawn D. Craine, appeals the judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas following a plea of no contest1 to possession of 

heroin with one-year firearm specification and money forfeiture specification, trafficking 

in heroin with firearm specification and money forfeiture specification, possession of 

cocaine with firearm specification and money forfeiture specification, trafficking in cocaine 

with firearm specification and money forfeiture specification, and having weapons under 

disability. The court sentenced him to an aggregate definite term of nine years.2 Craine 

1 Craine’s May 22, 2023 judgment entry indicates that he entered a plea of guilty, but the transcript of the plea 

hearing reveals he did indeed preserve his claims in this case by entering a plea of no contest. (Compare 

June 15, 2023 Jgmt. Entry at 1 with Mar. 13, 2023 Tr. at 10-31.)

2 In its judgment entry and at both the plea and sentencing hearings, the trial court declined to issue an 

indeterminate sentence, “having concluded that the indeterminate sentencing structure of S.B. 201 is 
No. 23AP-359 2

asserts four assignments of error with the trial court’s judgment, challenging the trial 

court’s decisions to deny his motions to suppress, to deny his request for a hearing pursuant 

to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and to declining to disclose the identity of the 

state’s confidential informant for purposes of his motion to suppress. 

{¶ 2} Whitehall Police Department Sergeant Jonathan Earl began investigating

Craine in early 2018, when he encountered two confidential informants who claimed that 

Craine was selling heroin and methamphetamine from 791 S. 17th Street in Columbus. 

Sergeant Earl researched Craine and determined he had a child with L.W., who lived at 

437 Cumberland Drive in Whitehall. Sergeant Earl was then contacted by Lieutenant 

Feeney of the Knox County Sheriff’s Office, who indicated that an individual arrested by 

that office had stated that Craine was transporting methamphetamine from the Columbus 

area to Mt. Vernon. 

{¶ 3} Whitehall police then initiated a trash pull at the Cumberland Drive property 

and conducted three similar pulls at points over the following month. Those pulls revealed 

discarded paperwork addressed to L.W., Craine’s child, S.C., and Craine himself; a Mt. 

Vernon newspaper; and multiple plastic baggies with torn corners. Three of the four plastic 

baggies retrieved from the trash pull on January 24, 2018 showed positive field test reaction 

for methamphetamine, and while baggies obtained on other dates appeared to contain

residue consistent with narcotics, there is no indication that they were tested to confirm the 

presence of contraband substances.

{¶ 4} On February 13, 2018, Detective John Slosser, with the Whitehall Police 

Department Narcotics Unit, witnessed Craine and a woman matching the description of 

L.W. swap vehicles in the parking lot of a United Dairy Farmers gas station and observed 

Craine transfer a grey bag from his original vehicle to the swapped vehicle. Detectives then 

followed Craine to an Edible Arrangements store, and then to 306 E. Ohio Street, which he 

entered carrying the grey bag. On February 22, 2018, Lieutenant Feeney again spoke with

Sergeant Earl and stated that he had witnessed Craine conduct a hand-to-hand transaction 

with an individual whom he subsequently stopped, questioned, and arrested, and from 

unconstitutional.” (May 22, 2023 Jgmt. Entry at 2.) The state objected to this conclusion at the plea hearing 

but has not filed a cross-appeal or raised the issue in its brief. (Mar. 13, 2023 Tr. at 25.) Based on the Supreme 

Court of Ohio’s decisions in State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, and State v. Henderson, 

161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, we decline to sua sponte address Craine’s definite sentence.
No. 23AP-359 3

whom he had recovered heroin, and that the individual claimed they had purchased the 

heroin from Craine.

{¶ 5} Finally, at some point during the period between February 7, 2018 and 

March 2, 2018, Sergeant Earl met with a confidential informant, whom he instructed to go 

to 791 S. 17th Street and purchase heroin, methamphetamine, or cocaine from Craine. The 

informant was observed meeting with Craine at 791 S. 17th Street, where they stayed for 

less than three minutes. The informant returned to Sergeant Earl and turned over a 

substance that tested positive for heroin. 

{¶ 6} Based on this investigation, Sergeant Earl concluded that Craine was living 

at 437 Cumberland Drive and using 791 S. 17th Street to sell narcotics—he subsequently 

obtained search warrants for each residence based on this evidence. Sergeant Earl’s 

affidavit in support of the search warrant stated that within the 72 hours prior to the 

March 2, 2018 issuance of the warrant, a 2003 GMC Yukon (“Yukon”) belonging to Craine 

was parked in front of 791 S. 17th Street. Following March 5, 2018 execution of the 

warrants, Craine was indicted for the five felony counts stated above. 

{¶ 7} Craine filed a motion to disclose the identity of the state’s confidential 

witnesses for purposes of a suppression hearing, and for a hearing on the validity of the 

search warrant based on Franks. He asserted that two witnesses would provide credible

evidence that Craine was not present at 791 S. 17th Street at the times alleged in the search 

warrant affidavit:

[I]t is alleged in the search warrant affidavits that Surveillance 

was conducted at 791 S. 17th Ave from 1145 hours to 1300 hours 

by Detective Slosser, Detective Grinstead, and Sergeant Earl. 

The aforementioned individuals allege that they witness 

Deshawn Craine participate in several hand to hand 

transactions. A male individual named Harry Campbell resides 

at 791 S. 17th Ave, was present at the residence during the hours 

in questions and has offered to provide credible evidence 

during the Franks Hearing scheduled for September 4, 2019 

that Deshawn Craine was not at 791 S. 17th Ave during the time 

in question. [B.H.] will further corroborate the fact that Mr. 

Craine was not at 791 S. 17th Ave. because he was staying with 

her at * * * E. Ohio Avenue, Mt. Vernon, Ohio during this period 

of time, and on the days in question. The search warrant affiant 

represented that he witnessed Craine participate in hand to 

hand transactions, and hence these hand to hand transactions 

either never occurred, or refer to an individual other than 
No. 23AP-359 4

Deshawn Craine. Regardless, this specific information used to 

the support the receipt of a search warrant should not have 

been considered.

(July 19, 2019 Mot. for Franks Hearing & to Suppress Evidence at 5.) Craine further argued 

that the Yukon was not present at 791 S. 17th Street during the 72-hour period alleged. He 

presented a towing receipt allegedly showing that on February 28, 2018, the Yukon was 

towed from Mt. Vernon to 572 Nelson Rd. in Columbus because of engine knock, as well as 

an automobile rental contract for the period between March 1-8, 2018, allegedly for an 

automobile rented by L.W. for Craine because the Yukon was being repaired. 

{¶ 8} In sum, Craine contended that neither he nor his Yukon were at 791 S. 17th 

Street at the times alleged in the warrant affidavits, that evidence presented at a Franks 

hearing would establish that the statements in the search warrant affidavits were false, and 

that he was entitled to suppression of the fruits of the search warrants under the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. But on review, the trial court denied 

Craine’s motion to disclose the state’s confidential informants and determined Craine’s 

Franks motion was deficient and therefore lacked merit:

The Court denies Defendant Craine’s Motion for a Franks

Hearing for three reasons: 1) Defendant’s Motion is not 

supported by sworn affidavits creating a genuine issue of fact 

regarding the truth of statements contained in the Search 

Warrant Affidavits; 2) [Defendant’s Exhibits], [the towing and 

rental receipts], even if supported by affidavits, do not create a 

genuine issue of fact regarding the statements contained in the 

Search Warrant Affidavits; and 3) even if the challenged 

statements regarding the observation of Defendant Craine on 

February 27, 2018 are disregarded, the Affidavits are [still] 

sufficient to support the Search Warrants issued on March 6, 

2018.

(Oct. 23, 2019 Decision & Entry at 3.) 

{¶ 9} Craine then filed a motion to reconsider the court’s decisions, attaching two 

affidavits and an additional receipt for the auto work on the Yukon. Witness Harry 

Campbell averred he resided at 791 S. 17th Street and that Craine was not present at the 

house between February 27, 2018 and March 2, 2018. Witness L.W. averred that the Yukon 

broke down on February 28, 2018 and that she rented a car for Craine to drive on March 1, 

2018. And an invoice for the Yukon repairs indicated that repairs were ordered by Craine 
No. 23AP-359 5

on March 1, 2018 and completed on March 17, 2018 by “Wells Auto Repair” but did not 

indicate any address. (See Nov. 1, 2019 Mot. to Reconsider Def.’s Mot. for Franks Hearing 

& to Suppress Evidence, Exs. A, B, & C.) 

{¶ 10} On January 6, 2020, the trial court denied Craine’s motion to reconsider “for 

three reasons,” holding first that “the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure make no provision 

for the serial filing of multiple motions to suppress evidence;” second, that the initial 

Franks motion was not properly supported by affidavits; and third, that “the Affidavits filed 

in support of Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration do not directly contradict any of the 

challenged statements in the search warrant affidavits:”

The Campbell Affidavit makes no statement regarding the 

2003 GMC Yukon and admits that in the period February 27, 

2018 to March 2, 2018, Defendant Craine would visit 791 S. 

17th Avenue on what Campbell describes as “rare occasions to 

visit.” (Campbell Aff. ¶ 5.) Consequently, the Campbell 

Affidavit does not make a prima facie showing that the search 

warrant affidavits contain knowingly false statements of fact. 

Rather, the Campbell Affidavit appears to be consistent with 

the search warrant statements that C[r]aine was not living at 

791 S. 17th Avenue, but Defendant Craine occasionally visited 

791 S. 17th Avenue between February 27, 2018 and March 2, 

2018, where he could have been observed by detectives as 

stated in the search warrant affidavits. Defendant’s argument 

regarding the alleged “proper” interpretation of the Campbell 

Affidavit is in direct conflict with the text of the Affidavit. 

Rather than undermine the link between Defendant Craine and 

791 S. 17th Avenue, the Campbell Affidavit confirms such a link.

The [L.W.] Affidavit does not make a prima facie showing that 

the search warrant affidavits contain knowingly false 

statements of fact. The [L.W.] Affidavit does not purport to 

make a statement regarding the location of Defendant Craine’s 

GMC Yukon on February 27, 2018 or whether Defendant 

Craine was present at 791 S. 17th Avenue on one or more 

occasions between February 27, 2018 to March 2, 2018, where 

he could have been observed by detectives as stated in the 

search warrant affidavits.

(Emphasis omitted.) (Jan. 6, 2020 Decision & Entry at 3-5.)

{¶ 11} Accordingly, the trial court found no merit to Craine’s motions to identify the 

state’s confidential witnesses for a Franks hearing and ultimately to suppress the fruits of 

the searches of 791 S. 17th Street and 437 Cumberland Drive. Upon the denial of his 
No. 23AP-359 6

motions, Craine entered a plea of no contest to all of the charges. He was found guilty and 

sentenced. This appeal followed, and he asserts four assignments of error with the trial 

court’s judgment:

[I.] The trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion 

for a Franks hearing.

[II.] The trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to 

disclose identity of confidential informants.

[III.] The trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to 

suppress and finding sufficient probable cause for the search of 

791 South 17thth Street.

[IV.] The trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to 

suppress and finding sufficient probable cause for the search of 

437 Cumberland Drive.

{¶ 12} In Craine’s first assignment of error, he challenges the trial court’s decision 

to refrain from holding a Franks hearing. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the 

Unites States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a hearing on a 

motion to suppress where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a 

false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was 

included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if that allegedly false statement is 

necessary to the finding of probable cause. See id. at 155-56. See, e.g., State v. Saxton, 10th

Dist. No. 18AP-925, 2019-Ohio-5257, ¶ 27-29 (trial court did not err in declining to hold a 

separate Franks hearing where defendant failed to make threshold showing requiring 

hearing). At the hearing, the defense must establish by a preponderance of the evidence 

the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard. Once the falseness of the statement is 

established, as well as the affiant’s requisite mental state, the false material contained in 

the affidavit must be excised, and the affidavit’s remaining content must be scrutinized to 

determine whether there are sufficient facts and circumstances remaining to establish 

probable cause. Only if the remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, 

the search warrant must be voided, just as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the 

affidavit. See generally State v. Parsons, 68 Ohio App.3d 323, 327-28 (10th Dist.1990), 

citing Franks at 171-72 and State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1989). 
No. 23AP-359 7

{¶ 13} Moreover, there is a general presumption of validity with respect to affidavits

supporting the search warrant, and a defendant is not necessarily entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing on a motion to suppress evidence secured following a search with a warrant. To 

mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s attack must be more than conclusory and 

must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine—there must be allegations 

of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be 

accompanied by an offer of proof. See Parsons at 327. “This offer of proof should include 

the submission of affidavits or otherwise reliable statements, or their absence should be 

satisfactorily explained.” State v. Roberts, 62 Ohio St.2d 170, 178 (1980). Only if the 

defendant satisfies this preliminary burden is he or she entitled to a hearing on the Franks

motion. See Parsons at 327. See also Saxton at ¶ 27, citing Franks at 156. If the defendant 

does not allege falsity in the statements contained in the affidavit, an evidentiary hearing is 

not required where the trial court finds a search warrant valid on its face. See, e.g., State v. 

Brewer, 10th Dist. No. 84AP-852, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5752, *6 (10th Dist.1986). 3 

{¶ 14} Based on the foregoing, Craine was not entitled to a Franks hearing because 

he did not provide an offer of proof that he was not present at 791 S. 17th Street at the time 

of the confidential informant’s alleged purchase of heroin from him on March 1, 2018. His 

initial motion made such an allegation, but that allegation was unsupported by the 

“affidavits or otherwise reliable statements” required by Roberts. And his motion to 

reconsider, which did include such affidavits, did not directly contradict the confidential 

informant’s claim of purchase—as held by the trial court, the affidavit of L.W. does not 

address “the location of Defendant Craine’s GMC Yukon on February 27, 2018 or whether 

Defendant Craine was present at 791 S. 17th Avenue on one or more occasions between 

February 27, 2018 to March 2, 2018,” (Jan. 6, 2020 Decision & Entry at 5) and while the 

Campbell affidavit does state in paragraph four that “Deshawn Craine was not at 791 South 

17th Street, Columbus, Ohio 43206 between February 27, 2018 and March 2, 2018,”

(Emphasis added) (Id., Ex. A) it goes on in paragraph five to state that “[d]uring that period 

3 In United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295 (6 C.A. 2002), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that 

“the circuits are split as to the proper standard of review of the denial of an evidentiary hearing under Franks.” 

Id. at 304 (citing cases). But it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the proper standard is de novo or 

review for clear error, as both are satisfied in this case. Compare e.g. State v. Kilbarger, 2d Dist. No. 25584, 

2013-Ohio-2577, ¶ 23, fn. 4 (quoting U.S. v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408, 415 (6 C.A. 2008), fn. 2, and observing that 

while several “ ‘circuits employ a clear error standard, while others review the denial de novo * * *.’ ” “[w]here 

the ‘more exacting [de novo ] standard of review is satisfied,’ an appellate court need not resolve the dispute.”).
No. 23AP-359 8

of time, Deshawn Craine was staying in Mt. Vernon and would only come back on rare 

occasions to visit.” (Emphasis added.) (Id.) Furthermore, the Campbell affidavit states in 

paragraph two that “[o]n March 1, 2018, Deshawn Craine asked me to rent a car for him,” 

but does not indicate whether this request was in person or by some other means. 

(Emphasis added.) (Id.) The internal tensions between, and vagueness of, these statements 

in the Campbell affidavit were consistent with the facts and theory asserted in the search 

warrant affidavit that Craine was witnessed conducting several hand-to-hand transactions 

at 791 S. 17th Street on February 27, 2018, were consistent with the allegation that Craine 

sold drugs to a confidential informant during the period between February 27, 2018 and 

March 2, 2018, and were ultimately consistent with the theory and allegation that Craine 

was not living at the 791 S. 17th Street location but was intermittently using it to conduct 

drug transactions. 

{¶ 15} Accordingly, as the trial court correctly held, “the Campbell Affidavit does not 

make a prima facie showing that the search warrant affidavits contain knowingly false 

statements of fact. * * * Rather than undermine the link between Defendant Craine and 

791 S. 17th Avenue, the Campbell Affidavit confirms such a link.” (Emphasis omitted.) 

(Jan. 6, 2020 Decision & Entry at 5.) Given this understanding of the evidence in support 

of his motions, the trial court did not err in overruling Craine’s motion for a Franks hearing, 

as his required offer of proof did not demonstrate a legitimate question as to the knowing 

or reckless falsity of statements in the search warrant affidavit. Craine’s first assignment of 

error therefore lacks merit and is overruled. 

{¶ 16} In his second assignment of error, Craine argues that the trial court erred by 

failing to compel the state to disclose the identity of the confidential informant who 

conducted the controlled drug buy prior to determining Craine’s suppression motion. 

{¶ 17} In general, a trial court’s decision whether to compel the state to identify a 

confidential informant is subject to a balancing of factors. Under State v. Williams, 4 Ohio 

St.3d 74 (1983), “the identity of an informant must be revealed to a criminal defendant 

when the testimony of the informant is vital to establishing an element of the crime or 

would be helpful or beneficial to the accused in preparing or making a defense to criminal 

charges.” But Williams only compels such disclosure prior to a trial, not to a suppression 

hearing, as “the right to confrontation, which includes the right to physically face and cross-
No. 23AP-359 9

examine witnesses, is not a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial proceedings.” State 

v. Jordan, 8th Dist. No. 80851, 2002-Ohio-5086, ¶ 30, citing State v. Williams, 97 Ohio 

App.3d 289, 291 (1994), and Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 54 (1987). Because a

trial court can properly rely on hearsay testimony to determine secondary issues at pretrial 

hearings, the state is not necessarily obligated to produce a confidential witness at a

suppression hearing, and a defendant is not necessarily entitled to cross-examination of 

such witnesses prior to trial. Jordan at ¶ 33 (holding that because the trial court could rely 

on hearsay testimony to determine whether officer had probable cause for investigatory 

stop and search, the state had no obligation to produce witness and defendant had no right 

to cross-examine witness prior to trial). Accordingly, the decisions whether to compel 

identification or appearance of confidential witnesses at a pretrial hearing is within the 

discretion of the trial court. Compare Crim.R. 16(F) and State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 

261, 2016-Ohio-5735 (trial court rulings on discovery matters are reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion standard). 

{¶ 18} Because Craine was not charged with any crimes related to the controlled 

drug buy, we cannot say that the trial court erred by declining to compel the disclosure of 

the informant at the pretrial phase of the case. Had the case proceeded to trial, Craine’s 

attorney could have cross-examined Sergeant Earl regarding his investigation, and might 

then have been able to establish that the identity and testimony of the informant 

was “vital to establishing an element of the crime or would be helpful or beneficial to the 

accused in preparing or making a defense.” State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St.3d 74, 77 (1983). 

{¶ 19} But the case before us, following Craine’s no contest plea, relates only to the 

validity of the searches, not evidence acquired through the controlled drug buys. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refraining from ordering the

disclosure of the confidential witness’s identity, and therefore Craine’s second assignment 

of error lacks merit and is overruled. 

{¶ 20} In his third and fourth assignments of error, Craine argues that the trial court 

erred by overruling his motions to suppress the evidence obtained from the searches of 791 

S. 17th Street and 437 Cumberland Drive. 

{¶ 21} Appellate review of a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress 

involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-
No. 23AP-359 10

Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. The trial court is in the “best position to resolve factual questions and 

evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 

(1992). Therefore, when reviewing whether there is sufficient probable cause to support 

the issuance of a search warrant, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that 

of the issuing magistrate or engage in a de novo review of the facts. E.g., State v. George, 

45 Ohio St.3d 325, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 

(1983). Rather, the reviewing court is “simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 

substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. at paragraph two of the 

syllabus. Appellate courts afford deference to the trial court’s factual determinations and 

accept such determinations if they are supported by “competent, credible evidence.”

Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). But the appellate court 

“reviews the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.” State v. LaRosa, 165 Ohio St.3d 346, 

2021-Ohio-4060, ¶ 17, citing Burnside at ¶ 8. 

{¶ 22} Moreover, even if a search warrant is deemed to be invalid, that is not 

necessarily the end of the question of whether the evidence obtained pursuant to that 

warrant may be admitted. “The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred * * * does 

not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 

135, 140 (2009). In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the United States Supreme 

Court held that “the exclusionary rule should not be applied to suppress evidence obtained 

by police officers acting in objectively reasonable, good faith reliance on a search warrant 

issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid.” State v. 

Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251, 255. Under Leon, suppression remains appropriate if “ ‘the 

magistrate or judge * * * was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was 

false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth,’ ” if “ ‘the 

issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role,’ ” if “ ‘an officer purports to rely upon 

* * * a warrant based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 

official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” ’ ” or if the warrant is “ ‘so facially 

deficient * * * that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.’ ” George

at 331, quoting Leon at 923. But where none of those indicia are present, application of the 

exclusionary rule is unnecessary—“[w]hen police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack 

of probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted ‘in objectively 
No. 23AP-359 11

reasonable reliance’ on the subsequently invalidated search warrant.” Herring at 142, 

quoting Leon at 922. 

{¶ 23} Here, the trial court reviewed the probable cause affidavits submitted in 

support of the search warrants, and concluded as follows:

(1) Two informants known to Whitehall police to be reliable 

provided information about Defendant’s alleged drug 

trafficking.

(2) The informants each identified Defendant, and 

independent police investigation conducted by the Knox 

County Sheriff corroborated many of the details provided such 

as the car Defendant drove and the fact that he resided in 

Whitehall and sold narcotics on 17th Street.

(3) Police conducted a trash pull at the Cumberland Drive 

address and discovered mail addressed to Defendant at that 

address as well as plastic bags with residue that tested positive 

for amphetamines.

(4) Police also conducted a controlled narcotics purchase 

from Defendant at the 17th Street address.

* * * 

[T]he Court finds: (1) corroboration of the two informants 

demonstrates the informants’ veracity and reinforces their 

reliability; (2) the controlled buy at the 17th Street address and 

the discovery of plastic baggies containing amphetamines and 

consistent with drug trafficking at the Cumberland Drive 

address provide sufficient nexus between criminal activity and 

the places to be searched. The Court finds the informants’ tips, 

corroborated by the Knox County Sherriff’s independent 

investigation, along with the trash pull and controlled buy, 

provided the Municipal Court Judge who issued the search 

warrants with a substantial basis to find probable cause in the 

search warrant affidavits. 

(May 10, 2019 Decision & Entry at 2-4.) 

{¶ 24} Given the standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Gates

and Leon, as well as by the Supreme Court of Ohio in George, we simply cannot conclude 

that the trial court’s decision to deny suppression of the searches of 791 S. 17th Street and 

437 Cumberland Drive was in any way erroneous. The evidence set forth in the affidavits 

and recited by the trial court is clearly sufficient to establish probable cause to search. 
No. 23AP-359 12

Craine argues that the evidence for the search of 437 Cumberland Drive was stale, in that 

no drug-related activity was established in the 30 days prior to the issuance of the warrant. 

But because the evidence that was presented showed a fair probability that criminal drug 

activity occurred on those premises, that Craine’s drug activity and use of those premises 

was ongoing, and that further evidence of other criminal activity would be discovered upon 

a search of those premises, his staleness argument fails. Compare with State v. Morales, 

10th Dist. No. 17AP-807, 2018-Ohio-3687, ¶ 24 (In a case involving continued drug sale 

activity, the defendant “has not demonstrated that the approximate one-month span 

between the drug activity stated in the affidavit and the application for the search warrant

* * * demands reversal on the facts of this case.”). And even assuming for argument the 

evidence fails to surmount that probable cause bar, because Craine does not assert any 

facial error with the warrant and has not established any misconduct on the part of the 

officers in question, the evidence is undoubtedly sufficient to permit the officers who 

executed the warrant to rely upon the Municipal Court Judge’s authorization of the 

warrants in good faith. The trial court did not err in either its finding of the facts to support 

the search warrants or in its legal conclusion to deny suppression of the fruits of the 

searches, and we therefore overrule Craine’s third and fourth assignments of error. 

{¶ 25} For the foregoing reasons, Craine’s four assignments of error are overruled, 

and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed.

DORRIAN and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.