This company specialized in equipment decontamination, and was well organized and

equipped. Immediately upon being briefed on the scheme of maneuver and concept of

operations, the lOls Chemical realized that they would also be expected to do

decontamination of personnel as well. After mission analysis and detailed planning, they

were told to be prepared to decon chemical casualties, evacuate chemical casualties from

AAVs, and bury contaminated remains. Each new mission got a resounding "Hooah"

and the company reviewed the procedures in the manuals or made it up as they went

along. At one point the Soldiers of the lOls asked, "While we are doing decon, who is

providing our security?" The response went, "Well, in the Marine Corps we have a

saying that every Marine is a rifleman.., welcome aboard." The hard-chargers from the

gave another "Hooah" and embarked on a two-week crash course on infantry

training, immediate action to convoy ambushes, and basic tactics. The Company

Commander, Captain Kerr, and First Sergeant Edick were committed to mission

accomplishment, and what the soldiers lacked in formal infantry training, they made up

for in enthusiasm. A strong bond developed between the two services and by the end of

the campaign, the Marines of the AA battalion were referring to the 101st Chemical as the

'Devil Doggies'.

Another addition to the Marine's task organization was six M93A3 Nuclear,

Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance Systems, or 'Fox Vehicles'. Six decon

sections from the Joint NBC Regiment of the 1st UK Division were also made available.

These units would provide a robust and accurate detection capability. Collectively, the

NBC team would be prepared to accurately detect any chemical or biological agents

employed by the enemy and conduct operational decontamination as required.

Rehearsal of Concept — Jersey

Drill Number One

The first comprehensive rehearsal

for the Opening Gambit was held on

7 February in Camp Matilda, Kuwait.

Positioned on a gently sloping

hillside nestled between sandstone

outcroppings, the natural arena was

made into a miniaturized version of

southern Iraq and Northern Kuwait,

at a scale large enough for human

players to walk through the steps of

the attack. This was the first of the

Marines observe the first 'Jersey Drill' near 'Jersey drill' series that was born from

LSA Matilda in central Kun-'ait. The Jersey Drill . the Lego Drills conducted earlier in helped key participants in the Opening Gambit

visualize their role in the attack.

In stunned disbelief, the hardcharging terrain model detail, directed by Master Sergeant Mark Choates and Staff

Sergeant Ken Costine, watched as the boundaries of the sand table were laid out, 80

meters on a side. The team quickly designated the project the 'mother of all terrain

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models' and commenced digging. The hard charging team spent several days at LSAMatilda constructing a terrain model depicting major terrain features, objectives, enemy

units, and control measures for the first 96 hours of the operation, down to the Kuwaiti

berms and the electric fence. Representatives from all Division units attended, as well as

key leaders from 3d MAW, the MEG, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, the UK 1st

Armoured Division, Task Force Tarawa and the MEF.

Individual commanders represented their units by donning their respective color and

number coded jerseys, and then talked through their initial organization, task, and

purpose. The RCT commanders each talked through his scheme of maneuver while the

subordinate battalion representatives simultaneously walked the terrain model. Through

a series of exercise turns, the entire Opening Gambit was rehearsed. The exercise

successfully oriented participants and attendees to the Division's scheme of maneuver

and reinforced the Commander's intent.

The Jersey drill also helped the situational awareness of senior commanders. Major

General Stalder, I MEF Deputy CG, Major General Amos from 3d MAW, and Rear

Admiral Kubic from the MEG each emphasized the critical importance of these rehearsal

events. General Amos noted that he would have more assets than any other Wing in

history to support I MEF ground forces, and was glad for the opportunity to gain

situational awareness for his aircrews. Major General Stalder noted the importance of the

drill in helping to integrate I MEF planning and efforts.

Training and Calibration in Kuwait

The Division continued a robust plan of combat training, weapons calibration, and

weapons zeroing at the extensive ranges in western Kuwait. The Udairi range complex

constituted a significant portion of the land area of western Kuwait. It took an integrated,

detailed effort from division, regiment, and battalion staffs to coordinate training on these

ranges. Deconflicting training with Army units and the Kuwaitis proved difficult at

times, but with a common goal of combat readiness, all parties worked through the issues

of airspace coordination, surface danger zones, and safety limits. In many cases, the

RCTs coordinated to set up their own small arms ranges just north of the LSAs. This

allowed the Marines the opportunity to fully integrate and test the new weapons systems

they had recently received.

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Marine snipers calibrate their weapons on hasty firing ranges set up near the LSAs in central

Kuwait.

One of the significant issues for the Division was calibration of artillery and tank

systems. 1 1thi Marines conducted a full-court press to ensure accurate ammunition

powder/projectile and muzzle velocity data was obtained, a calibration process that

ensured the combinations of ammunition and firing conditions produced the most

accurate artillery fires possible. Calibration required firing rounds of each expected type,

with various propellants, and carefully measuring muzzle velocities using radar. This can

be a tedious process, but is a critical requirement for first-round accuracy in war. Later,

in combat, the Marines of the Division learned it was well worth the time and effort to

achieve the last critical points of accuracy when required to silence hidden enemy

mortars, urban ambushes, and other targets. These were often prosecuted at 'danger

close' ranges, and with a high potential for friendly or civilian casualties.

For tankers, this calibration was equally important in order to ascertain the firing

characteristics of the various combinations of ammunition and conditions. For both

artillery and tank ammunition, however, the Division faced significant challenges in

getting war reserve ammunition released for the calibration process. Because of concerns

with expending war reserve stocks prior to combat and environmental concerns with

depleted uranium ammunition expenditure, getting tank ammunition released for

calibration proved difficult.

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A similar issue arose with the Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-guided (TOW)

antitank missiles. The Marines had conducted all their training using the TOW-hA, with

the TOW-JIB reserved for war stocks. When the Marines opened the crate to fire TOWJIB's for the first time, there were a number of misses. This caused significant concern

that the new missiles were defective in either software or hardware. Repeated firings

could not determine the cause. Finally, CWO Charles Colleton, the RCT-5 Weapons

Officer, discovered the cause of the misses. Because the Marines had only fired the

TOW-hA in training, they had not adjusted to the different aim point required when

firing the TOW-JIB. Because the TOW-JIB uses a significantly different flight profile

and attack mechanism, using the sighting method the Marines were used to with the

TOW-hA caused the missile to overfly the target. Although easily corrected once

discovered, this incident was a warning of the risk of reserving new weapons for combat

only and not fully integrating them into the Marine's experience. 'In case of war, break

glass' weapons systems can have dangerous unintended consequences.

Each of the battalions trained their TOW Marines to overcome this potential gunnery

error. Chief Warrant Officer Thomas Parks, the Weapons Officer for 1/4, trained two

Marines, Sergeant David Smith and Sergeant David Kaufer, to serve as 'TOW Snipers'.

These Marines received focused training on TOW-JIB gunnery and were allocated all of

the battalion's TOW-JIB missiles, while the remaining TOW gunners were allocated

TOW-HA missiles. Iraqi troops and foreign paramilitaries would soon know firsthand

the tactical prowess of these two Marines.

Marines test-fire a Javelin missile in Kuwait. This would be one offew opportunities many

gunners would have to gain hands-on experience with this lethal new weapon.

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The Combat Engineers knew that combined arms rehearsals were the key to any

successful deliberate breaching operation. While the breach of the Kuwait border

obstacles was expected to be lightly opposed, the breach of the Iraqi border obstacle

system was more uncertain. To ensure the quality and thoroughness of the Division's

preparations, CEB constructed a full-scale mock up of the Kuwaiti border obstacles near

LSA-Ripper. Each Obstacle Clearing Detachment (OCD) performed combined-arms

rehearsals through the breach lanes with their supported battalions. The rehearsals

allowed the engineers and infantry to practice the complexities of a deliberate breach and

work out timing and control issues prior to combat. During this period, the new Towed

Assault Bridges (TABs) arrived in theater, and CEB and MARCORSYSCOM trained

RCT-5 and RCT-7 on the employment of this new type of bridge over wet and dry gaps.

Marine Engineers created a full-scale mockup of the border obstacles to rehearse breaching and

bridging techniques.

The training also had a material cost on men and machines. The Division carefully

balanced the desire to train with the necessity of keeping all of the AAVs, tanks, and

other equipment ready to reorient to the north. Maintaining the AAVs was a special

challenge, as the Division was in the process of transitioning from the old AAV7A1

'straight leg' track, to the upgraded model, the 'RAM/RS'. Old 'straight leg' parts were

no longer stocked in the supply system in anticipation of the completion of the upgrades.

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Many of the vehicles contained on MPS ships, however, were the old models. For the

year prior, 3" Assault Amphibian Battalion had systematically built up very large Pre

Expended Bins (PEBs) of parts. These stocks of high usage, low cost items also included

large stocks of oil, fuel, and air filters. The Amphibian Vehicle Test Branch (AVTB)

also gave the AA battalion all of its 'straight leg' parts to add to their stocks a few months

prior to their deployment. The battalion also stockpiled parts scrounged from AAVs

going to the depot for upgrade. The battalion embarked and mobile loaded all these parts

and expendables and brought them into theater. The Division immediately began low

mileage mechanized infantry training in the local Kuwaiti desert, designed to limit wear

and tear. Despite the low mileage, this hard training expectedly took a toll on the MPS

amtracs that had sat in storage on ships at sea. The AAV Company and battalion

maintenance crews worked often around the clock to keep all these vehicles in top

running condition. The supply system for repair parts in Kuwait was not functioning

anywhere near capacity and the only parts to be had were the ones the battalion had

embarked themselves, or parts selectively interchanged off of dead AAVs. A month

later, 3d AA Battalion's parts and supplies were down to only 10% remaining. Because

of a lack of resupply in theater, a good share of the items they had painstakingly laid in

for combat operations had been required just to ensure the Division was ready to cross

the LD at a moment!s notice. The repair parts challenge, identified early on, would

continue to bedevil Division and CSS Marines in the months ahead.

The Desensitization Plan

The Division's actions in Kuwait would likely be observed and reported by a welldeveloped Iraqi intelligence network, including observers on Jabal Sanam. Nothing the

Division did in Northern Kuwait north of the LSAs would go unobserved by the enemy.

By the same token, this network was susceptible to deception, or saturation of the

network with repeated reports of US forces repositioning in Kuwait. The G-2 laid it out

quite simply, "Since we cannot hide, we must deceive." The Division crafted a

'desensitization' plan to accustom the Iraqis to large-scale ground movements in Kuwait.

This desensitization plan became a significant theme of the Division's planned rehearsals

prior to crossing the Line of Departure.

Since late February, the Division had been conducting rehearsals across Northern

Kuwait. Combat elements of the Division in transit between the LSAs and Udairi range

areas began to take detours through more northern areas. Small units of Marines became

a regular presence near the Kuwaiti berms (At one point, this presence became too

aggressive when the United Nations (UN) observers complained vigorously to the UN

Headquarters, and alerted the international press. After this, Marines pursued their

reconnaissance in a less overt manner.) The Division also took the opportunity to

habituate the Iraqis to the presence of the Pioneer UAV, as missions began to fly over

southern Iraq.

The Division continued to lean forward, and took advantage of each day of

diplomatic maneuvering as an opportunity to train for military action. This training

included several CP displacements for the Division Forward and Main CPs as well as all

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of the RCTs and separate Battalions. During combat operations, the Division planned to

employ the Main and Forward CPs in a leapfrog manner, each displacing as far forward

as possible in an attempt to extend communications ranges as the Division moved into

and through Iraq. As each CP displaced in succession, it would travel just behind the

lead element of the column to ensure Division C2 was continuous. The idea of

'desensitizing' the Iraqi border forces became an operational reality, as the Division

conducted a CP displacement exercise on 23 February.

Although moving the CPs and maneuver units forward to the border area then moving

back to the LSAs was designed to have the affect of desensitizing enemy observers both

in Kuwait and on Jabal Sanam, these movements to and from the training areas also

provided excellent opportunities for all CPs to refine their movement plans, convoy

procedures, CP setups, communications support plans, communications equipment

installations and operation. During this drill, the Division moved the Forward CP to a

position in northern Kuwait. Once the Forward had assumed control, the Division Main

CP displaced to a point even further to the north, at the outer limits of the range fans of

the Iraqi's long-range tube artillery (and well within the line-of-sight from Jabal Sanam.)

After operating for several days from this location, the Division Main retrograded to

Camp Matilda. The Division Forward followed, returning to Camp Matilda on 1 March.

As they departed these northern Kuwait areas, the Marines registered the terrain in their

minds. All knew that the next time they stood on this ground, it would be to direct the

Division across the LD into the face of the enemy.

Even as war tensions heightened, Marine Corps business continued as usual. Here, a promotion

ceremony is held at the Division Forward CP, very near the Iraqi border.

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The Division Forward CF exercises in northern Kuwait as part of the 'Desensitization 'plan. This

isolated stretch of desert was referred to by the Marines as 'Camp Nowhere.'

As part of the desensitization plan, the Division developed an Emissions Control

(EMCON) plan that ensured there would be no unexpectedly abrupt change in the level

of the Division's communications during any portion of the rehearsal phase. Lieutenant

Colonel Brian Barton, the Deputy G-6, drafted a series of EMCON standards. These

EMCON Standards were designed to control the Division radio emissions to support the

Division scheme of maneuver while also providing the ability to mask movements by

limiting the Iraqi Signals Intelligence gathering ability. Prior to the commencement of

hostilities, the Division also implemented the I MEF G-6 Information Assurance plan

called 'River City'. This plan imposed three different security levels on non-secure data

transmission within the MEF. The rotating restriction on the non-secure data was

designed to keep a level of uncertainty on the network as a primary defense against

hackers from outside of the Division and I MEF.

Final Preparation Efforts - Intelligence

As a result of the successful teaming effort with 3d MAW at the Jersey drills, another

successful teaming effort between the Wing and Division was born. Major General

Amos had been a tremendous advocate for the Division to date, and the employment of

VM1J was no exception. Through the strong support of Gen Amos, the VMTJ

employment scheme was finalized, with both VMIJ's flying in direct support of the

Division as they seized their initial objectives. As a result of the shared vision, a special

relationship was established between the Division and both of the Marine Corps Pioneer

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) squadrons (VMU-1 and VMU-2.) These squadrons

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would be operating in direct support of the Division for much of the operation,

leapfrogging forward to fly off improved airstrips, paved roads, and even dirt strips. The

cooperation and aggressive spirit of the VMU's were to play an important role in

supporting the Division fight. The Division G-2 convened a special UAV planning

conference, where the VMU staffs and the Division G-2 were able to devise a support

scheme that included the attachment of Remote Receive Teams (RRTs) directly to two of

the Division's maneuver RCTs and the Division CP. This placed an additional burden on

the G-6 to establish an unplanned communications link to the VIvIU Squadrons in order

to tie them into the Division's voice and data systems, as they would typically be too far

forward to receive, support from 3d MAW during combat operations. For the Opening

Gambit, this allowed for a direct support relationship between each attacking RCT and a

supporting VMU squadron. An airfield was identified near Camp Matilda in central

Kuwait that would allow the

Pioneers to cover the Division's

initial objectives. An airfield was

identified in Camp Matilda in central

Kuwait that would allow the

Pioneers to cover the Division's

initial objectives. In March,

permission was granted for UAV

operations over Iraq, and the VMUs

began providing the Division with

their first real-time look at the

battlespace. Having both VIVIUs fly

in support of the Opening Gambit

was essential. The Division was

willing to accept the corresponding The Pioneer UA V system was used extensively in

gap in Pioneer coverage afterward, direct support of the Division. The VMU squadrons

as the VIv[IJ squadrons displaced gave the Division its first look at the battlespace in

from the southern airfield to real time.

positions that could support the

attack further to the north.

Final Preparation Efforts - Force Flow

As February turned to March, units anxiously awaited the arrival of Follow On

Echelon (FOE) shipping to round out their combat requirements. The Division had

received most of its combat equipment from MPS ships, amphibious shipping, or intertheater airlift, but critical components remained on FOE shipping. The FOE was carried

on a mix of US Naval Service (USNS) and contracted ships, and included much-needed

1 and 4th Marine Division communications equipment, the balance of weapon systems,

and a large portion of unit logistics trains. RCT 1, in particular, looked forward to the

arrival of the AAVs that would mechanize two of their battalions. Faced with the

possibility that the FOE shipping would not arrive before G-day, Division planners

redistributed medium lift trucks from RCT-5 and RCT-7 to motorize all of RCT- 1 's

battalions. This belt tightening had a ripple effect, as the RCTs took most of the trucks

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from their logistics trains. The burden of carrying their now-stranded supplies fell to

CSSG 11 who also awaited assets from the FOE. Colonel Pomfret's gung-ho team took

this challenge in stride, just as they had the previous ones. Much to the relief of operators

and logisticians across the Division, the arrival of the USNS Soderman on 12 March and

the MV Greenlake on 17 March eased this burden by bringing over 140 AAVs and

hundreds of trucks. The continuing diplomatic dialogue had provided time that the

Marines took full advantage of. The much needed assets that these and other FOE ships

brought enabled the Division to move itself in a single lift and supported the equipment

requirements of multiple CPs operating independently of each other. This capability

would be essential in the fight on the road to Baghdad, unleashing significant Division

fighting power.

The G-4's Breach Lane Movement Matrix gave traffic management and logistics Marines a reliable

indicator of the sequence of units crossing the breaches.

Final Preparation Efforts - Logistics

The G-4 joined in the staff effort to refine the first hours of the Opening Gambit as

depicted on the Execution Checklist. Led by Major Chris Snyder, the G-4 produced the

breach lane movement matrix for flow of units through the breach into Iraq. This single

page document graphically depicted when, and by which route, every US and UK unit

would cross the LD. It would prove especially useful for tactical movement control

Marines who could know at a glance how to deconflict movements at their breach lane.

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It became clear that fuel would be the Division's greatest concern in the first 48

hours, so the G-4 staff reviewed and updated its fuel culminating point analysis. Taking

each unit's equipment density list, they projected fuel usage in order to more precisely

place Rapid Refueling Points (RRP). With more than 5000 Division vehicles (plus those

non-Division vehicles from units in direct support of the Division) consuming 220,000

gallons of fuel daily, precision was crucial. Set up in an assembly-line fashion, the RRPs

were important as pre-staged fuel distribution points, positioned at critical points in the

fight. RRPs would serve as a transfer points for fuel, water, food, and ammunition from

the CSSG to the supporting CSSCs and their units. This rigorous analysis revealed the

need to focus on RRP-7 near Jalibah airfield in order to sustain the Division's momentum

during the Opening Gambit. CSSG-1 1 displayed the first of many instances of

operational flexibility and readjusted their concept of support. The addition of Highway

1 to the Division's scheme of maneuver not only provided new maneuver opportunities,

but also provided CSSG-11 options for locating and establishing RRPs that Iraqi forces

would have a hard time locating. It also obviated the requirement to send half-loaded

fuel and ammo trucks over unimproved roads that would have severely limited the speed

of advance by Division forces. Shifting the anticipated Division main effort to Highway

1 also dictated that RCT- 1, operating along the Highway 7 corridor, would have to exist

on a radical 'logistics light' diet in order to accomplish its mission of fixing the Baghdad

RG Division in Al Kut.

By this time, most of the CSSCs had been fully integrated into the RCT they were

supporting, fully participating in staff meetings and planning sessions. The habitual

relationships thus established were crucial. The CSSCs were also doing their own final

preparations for crossing the LD. In addition to completing combat skills training, they

had been providing CSS on a daily basis. In the final days before leaving the dispersal

positions, the CSSC's ensured each RCT was fully supplied, giving them a 48-hour

capability to operate without any re-supply. To enhance the logistics capability of the

CSSCs, they were augmented by a detachment from CSSB-10. By adding this extra

capability, the CSSCs were able to carry enough additional supplies to completely sustain

the Division for the first 96 hours of the fight.

Current Operations - Final Adjustments

By late February, the Division was combat-capable, and prepared to respond to the

President's direction, or to react if the Iraqis decided to initiate actions themselves. RCT7 and RCT-5 were both combat capable, each having at least three mechanized/tank

battalion maneuver elements (plus supporting capabilities.) RCT-1 was still steaming to

Kuwait on schedule and 1l Marine Regiment had two battalions with five batteries each

and its organic counter-fire capability.

When the offload of the FSS was completed on 13 March, the Division had the

capability to mechanize two additional infantry battalions, and it gained the requisite

mobility for both the Division's Main CP and 1 1th Marine Regiment's Main CP. The

additional 'Cannon Cockers' allowed 1 1th Marines to reorganize into four battalions.

Additionally, the US Army's 1st Field Artillery Detachment with two 'Firefinder' Q-37

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At Camp Matilda, the CG, ADC, and Regimental Commanders make final preparations.

radars joined the 11th Marines team. By the first of March, RCT-1, 1st CEB, and ls

Reconnaissance Battalion had also become combat ready with the offload and integration

of their remaining gear from the FSS West ships and the arrival of ATF West. The

arrival of additional FOE shipping would continue to enhance the Division's combat

capabilities. Piece by piece, the Division's combat power came together at the 1 1th hour.

The Marines could always use more time to integrate and train with fully equipped units,

but were now ready to fight when the call came.

When the offload of the FSS was completed on 13 March, the Division had the

capability to mechanize two additional infantry battalions, and it gained the requisite

mobility for both the Division's Main CP and 1 1th Marine Regiment's Main CP. The

additional 'Cannon Cockers' allowed 11th Marines to reorganize into four battalions.

Additionally, the US Army's 1st Field Artillery Detachment with two 'Firefinder' Q-37

radars joined the 11th Marines team. By the first of March, RCT-1, 1st CEB, and 1st

Reconnaissance Battalion had also become combat ready with the offload and integration

of their remaining gear from the FSS West ships and the arrival of ATF West. The

arrival of additional FOE shipping would continue to enhance the Division's combat

capabilities. Piece by piece, the Division's combat power came together at the 1 l" hour.

The Marines could always use more time to integrate and train with fully equipped units,

but were now ready to fight when the call came.

The Division's C2 plan was flexible enough to handle any number of situations that

might arise. As the plan stood, the Division Forward CP would move forward and

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establish control immediately upon receipt of a Warning Order. The Forward CP would

be in control while units pushed to their Dispersal Areas, allowing the Division Main CP

to break down and displace. The Main CP would be pushed as far forward in northern

Kuwait as possible, in a risk trade-off between communications coverage of the

battlespace and the threat of enemy indirect fires. The ability of the Division Main to

move to its battle position without drawing indirect fire would depend on the success of

the desensitization plan. The Main CP would have time to 'burn-in' communications

links and gain situational awareness while the Division moved from Dispersal Areas to

Attack Positions. The Main CP would also coordinate actions against the Jabal Sanam

outposts. The Division Forward CP would break down during this period and stage with

RCT-7, prepared to move across the border quickly to establish the first Division CP in

Iraq. If the desensitization plan had been effective, these movements would match the

patterns the Traqis had seen previously, and would not draw a large reaction from them.

The Division adjusted its expected timing to the new attack dates.

Jersey Drill Two — Amphitheater in the Desert

The second Jersey drill was held just east of LSA-Matilda on 27 February. This drill

was to be the capstone event for the planning efforts up to this point. The terrain model

was to be expanded and the ground prepared such that it would have a greater

'amphitheater' effect. This time, no mere shovels and picks would do, and the Division's

engineers prepared the ground with D-7 bulldozers. By pushing around a great deal of

sand, they expertly constructed a multi-tiered amphitheater in the desert, complete with

an angled sand table surface, 100 meters on a side, with plenty of seating around the

perimeter. There was a 'vulture's row' for key leaders, allowing them to look down on

The second Jersey Drill was the capstone event for planning efforts. The scale of the terrain

model required a major preparation effort on the part of Division engineers and intelligence

Marines.

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