J-A19043-23

2023 PA Super 168

COLLEEN MOFFITT 

Appellant

v.

CHRIS MILLER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 8 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 15, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 

2019-02299-TT

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2023

Colleen Moffitt (Moffitt) appeals from the judgment entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Chester County (trial court) following a jury trial in this

personal injury action filed against Chris Miller (Miller) arising from a motor 

vehicle accident. Moffitt challenges the trial court’s evidentiary rulings

including its allowance of testimony regarding her alcohol consumption before 

the accident, the court’s decision not to issue several proposed jury 

instructions, as well as contending that the jury’s verdict is against the weight 

of the evidence. We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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I.

A.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On 

August 5, 2018, at 1:15 a.m., Miller’s vehicle struck Moffitt as she attempted 

to cross East Lancaster Avenue (Route 30) in Downington on foot in the middle 

of the block as she walked home from a nearby bar. On March 4, 2019, Moffitt 

filed a complaint asserting one count of negligence seeking to recover 

damages for injuries and lost wages she allegedly sustained as a result of the 

accident.

Emergency room records showed that Moffitt’s blood alcohol content 

(BAC) was .313% at the time of the incident. Prior to trial, motions in in limine

were filed by both parties. The trial court denied Moffitt’s motion to exclude 

all references to her alcohol consumption but granted Miller’s motion in limine

to preclude testimony from Moffitt’s liability expert concerning the presence 

of “unmarked crosswalks” at the location of the accident.

B.

The case proceeded to a three-day trial on May 31, 2022, and the jury 

heard testimony from several witnesses including Moffitt; Miller; the police 

officer who responded to the scene, Officer Geoffrey Burkhart; Roy
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Pietrinferni, the bartender from the tavern; and Miller’s expert witness, 

Charles Dackis, M.D.1

Moffitt testified that at the time of the incident she resided with her two 

adult daughters and was working at a diner as a waitress earning about 

$16,000 per year. During the day leading up to the accident, Moffitt attended 

an afternoon wedding where she drank two to three beers, returned to her 

apartment, drank two shots of vodka with her daughter and later went to a 

bar located across the street and down one block from her apartment. Moffitt 

went to the bar dressed in the same clothes that she wore to the wedding and 

was scheduled to work the next morning at 7:00 a.m. Moffitt recounted that 

she drank one-and-a-half beers at the bar, was feeling “normal” when she left

and did not have any problems walking or talking. (N.T. Trial, 5/31/22, at 

67).

Moffit explained that she chose to cross Lancaster Avenue (Route 30) at 

the location she thought was the most well-lit area which was in the vicinity 

where Lancaster Avenue (Route 30) was intersected by Beech Street, a oneway street. However, Beech Street is the entrance to the Beech Street parking 

lot at Lancaster Avenue. No vehicles can enter Lancaster Avenue from Beech 

Street; they can only enter the parking lot from Lancaster Avenue and exit 

____________________________________________

1 The witnesses testified in person and by deposition/pre-recorded trial 

testimony.
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the parking lot onto Wood Alley. Lancaster Avenue has no stop sign or other 

traffic control device in Miller’s direction of travel.

Moffitt stated that before she stepped off the curb, she looked to the left 

and to the right for oncoming traffic and that she did not see any vehicles 

approaching from either direction. As Moffitt crossed the street, she was 

struck by Miller’s car and landed on the road. Emergency personnel responded 

to the scene and she was taken to the hospital.

Moffitt went on to testify that she sustained a fracture to her right leg 

necessitating surgery and cuts and bruises around her head. She stayed at

her sister’s home for about a week to recover and used a walker for a month. 

Moffitt attended follow up appointments with her physician as well as physical 

therapy treatment. Although she still experienced some pain, she stated she 

was working full-time as of her last doctor’s appointment in November of 

2018. Regarding her eyesight, Moffitt testified that she is blind in her right 

eye but is able to see through her left eye wearing glasses. Moffitt indicated 

that although she had vision issues before the collision, her ophthalmologist 

advised that her retina “totally shifted” after it and performed surgery. (Id.

at 78). Moffitt averred that she was out of work for approximately two months

and estimated her initial wage loss at $3,500.

Miller testified that as he was operating his motor vehicle eastbound on 

Route 30 on the night of the accident, he saw Moffitt on the sidewalk starting 

to cross the street. Miller did not slow down and continued to proceed forward 
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because he was unsure of what Moffitt was going to do. (See id. at 56-58). 

Miller explained that although he initially observed Moffitt on the sidewalk, he 

lost sight of her “because she disappeared . . . that’s how fast it happened.” 

(Id. at 58). The next time that he saw her, she was walking on the double 

yellow line.

Officer Burkhart testified that upon his arrival at the scene he noticed a 

strong odor of alcohol emanating from Moffitt’s person and breath. She 

appeared very agitated and angry and “was yelling but not due to pain.” (N.T.

Trial, 6/02/22, at 5). Moffitt was cursing and directed negative comments 

towards him and the ambulance crew as they were trying to help her. Officer 

Burkhart recounted that Moffitt “crossed the road in a dark area and appeared 

to be extremely intoxicated when we arrived.” (Id. at 8). He testified that 

there is no crosswalk where Moffitt walked across the street and the closest 

crosswalk is located about half a block away from where the accident occurred. 

Officer Burkhart’s understanding is that the accident was caused “because 

[Moffitt] was intoxicated and walking in front of a car.” (Id. at 11).

Roy Pietrinferni indicated that Moffitt drank one beer at the bar and

purchased a six pack of beer to go. (See N.T. Deposition, 4/18/22, at 11). 

Pietrinferni testified that Moffitt exhibited no visible signs of intoxication and 

described her condition as “fine.” (Id. at 12).

Dr. Dackis testified during voir dire that has been a psychiatrist for 40

years with a subspecialty in addiction, including alcohol and its effects. On 
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cross-examination during voir dire, Dr. Dackis indicated that he does not have 

a degree in toxicology and that he has not spoken at any conferences on that 

subject, although he has taught courses in pharmacology. Dr. Dackis

explained that his expertise lies in assessing the impact of a person’s blood 

alcohol level on their intoxication and impairment. (See N.T. Deposition, 

2/28/22, at 16). The trial court allowed the jury to hear his testimony over 

objection by counsel for Moffitt.

Dr. Dackis testified that he reviewed Moffitt’s hospital records which 

showed that her BAC was .313%, which is “a very, very elevated level, 

considering the fact that .08% is the legal level for drinking [while driving.] 

She was not acting normal. Her judgment was impaired. She was paranoid 

and she got into this accident.” (Id. at 38-39). Dr. Dackis opined that Moffitt 

was intoxicated to a point that impaired her ability to safely walk home and 

that her impairment contributed to the accident.

C.

On June 2, 2022, the jury issued its verdict finding each party 50 percent

causally negligent and awarding Moffitt a lump sum of $8,500 in damages.

Moffitt filed a motion for post-trial relief which the trial court denied on 

November 22, 2022, after consideration of the parties’ briefs and oral 

argument. In its opinion, the trial court stated its findings that it properly 

denied Moffitt’s motion in limine to preclude evidence of her alcohol use on 

the day of the accident; Moffitt’s challenge to Dr. Dackis’ testimony is 
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meritless, as he was qualified to testify about her blood alcohol level and the 

effects of those levels on a person’s behavior and conduct; it properly granted 

Miller’s motion in limine to preclude testimony pertaining to “unmarked 

crosswalks”; the court’s jury instructions were adequate and appropriate to 

the legal issues raised by the parties and it properly declined to give Moffitt’s 

proposed non-standard charges; and the jury’s decision to award damages 

totaling $8,500 is not against the weight of the evidence and was reasonable 

given the totality of the circumstances and all of the facts presented at trial. 

(See Trial Court Opinion, 11/22/22, at 2-3, 5-7).

Judgment was entered on the verdict on December 15, 2022. Moffitt 

timely appealed and she and the trial court complied with Rule 1925. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)-(b).

II.

A.

Moffitt first contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of her 

alcohol consumption before the accident.2 Moffitt maintains that Pennsylvania 

courts have consistently precluded the mention of alcohol use absent evidence 

of unfitness to function at the time of an accident because such testimony is 

extremely prejudicial.

____________________________________________

2

In reviewing challenges to a trial court’s decisions on motions in limine we 

apply an abuse of discretion standard of review. See Coughlin, infra at 403.
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It is well-settled that a blood alcohol level alone may not be admitted 

for the purpose of proving intoxication. There must be other evidence showing 

the actor’s conduct which suggests intoxication establishing an impairment 

function. See, e.g., Billow v. Farmers Trust Co., 266 A.2d 92, 93 (Pa. 

1970); Fisher v. Dye, 125 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1956). In this case, the trial court 

applied Coughlin v. Massaquoi, 170 A.3d 399 (Pa. 2017), our Supreme 

Court’s most recent pronouncement on the issue.

Coughlin involved a personal injury action against a motorist who killed 

a pedestrian while he crossed the street and our Supreme Court considered 

the admissibility of evidence concerning the pedestrian’s BAC, the same BAC 

as here — 313%. See Coughlin, supra at 400. After providing an extensive 

history of the law regarding the admission of what additional evidence was 

necessary to allow BAC levels, our Supreme Court stated that evidence of 

alcohol consumption is admissible in cases were careless or reckless driving is 

at issue and will not be viewed as “unfairly prejudicial” so long as it reasonably 

establishes a degree of intoxication or, as in the Coughlin situation, unfitness 

to walk across the street.

In arriving at that holding, it stated, “We decline to adopt a brightline rule predicating admissibility on the existence of independent 

corroborating evidence of intoxication and, instead, hold that the 

admissibility of BAC evidence is within the trial court’s discretion 

based upon general rules governing the admissibility of evidence, see
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Pa.R.E. 401–403, and the court’s related assessment of whether the 

evidence establishes the pedestrian’s unfitness to cross the street.” 

Id. at 400-401 (emphasis added).

Regarding the use of expert testimony to establish impairment based on 

a BAC, it went on to hold that where “an expert testifies thoroughly regarding 

the effects that a given BAC has on an individual’s behavior and mental 

processes, and where that expert specifically opines that a particular BAC 

would render a pedestrian unfit to cross the street, we find the probative value 

of such evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Id. at 409.

Moffitt contends that the Coughlin holding that expert testimony can 

provide sufficient corroborating evidence to show impairment is not controlling 

because there are witnesses to her behavior who established that she was not 

impaired. Moffitt also claims that Coughlin is inapplicable “because the 

Supreme Court intended to limit that holding to situations when there were 

no witnesses.” In making that contention, Moffitt maintains that Coughlin

emphasized the importance of witnesses in determining whether to permit 

other retrospective testimony, when it stated that:

As this case illustrates, there will not always be witnesses to 

a car accident or to the parties’ behavior or demeanor leading up 

to that accident. In such cases, evidence of a pedestrian’s BAC, 

when combined with expert testimony explaining how the BAC 

correlates with certain behavior, is particularly valuable, as it is 

probative of intoxication and, perhaps, unfitness to cross a street. 

If we were to categorically exclude relevant BAC evidence from all 

cases which lack independent corroborating evidence of the 

pedestrian’s intoxication, we would be depriving juries of 

valuable insight, which, absurdly, would place pedestrians 
J-A19043-23

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—whose intoxication potentially contributed to the 

accident for which they are suing — at an unfair advantage 

simply because no one happened to witness the 

pedestrian’s behavior prior to the accident or the accident 

itself.

Coughlin, supra at 409 (emphasis supplied).

Contrary to Moffitt’s claim, Coughlin’s allowance of expert testimony is 

not limited to when there are no witnesses or there are witnesses that stated 

that there was no impairment. In the above quoted statement, the Court did 

not limit the admission of such evidence only to circumstances where there 

are no witnesses, but was just commenting that it would be inequitable to 

exclude such probative evidence. Moffitt’s argument is also in conflict with 

the Court’s holding that expressly declined to adopt a bright line rule 

concerning the admissibility of evidence of alcohol consumption but, instead,

stated that Rules of Evidence 401-403’s3 balancing framework is to be applied 

____________________________________________

3 Pa R.E. 401 provides: “Whether evidence has a tendency to make a given 

fact more or less probable is to be determined by the court in the light of 

reason, experience, scientific principles and the other testimony offered in the 

case.”

Pa R.E. 402 provides: “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 

otherwise provided by law. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.”

Pa.R.E. 403 provides: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its 

probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: 

unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 

wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
J-A19043-23

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on a case-by-case basis in determining whether to admit BAC into evidence, 

with the decision on admissibility left to the discretion of the trial court.

In this case, the trial court explained its rationale for allowing evidence 

of Moffitt’s alcohol consumption before the accident as follows:

There was expert testimony detailing Appellant’s BAC and 

the significance of that result on Appellant’s behavior. The 

testimony and evidence was open to cross-examination by 

Appellant or criticism by a counter-expert. Appellant, however, 

did not offer such testimony. Furthermore, evidence of 

intoxication may be relevant where there is corroborating 

evidence, including evidence of consumption, blood alcohol 

results, expert testimony, or testimony of Appellant’s physical 

condition. At trial, there was testimony from Appellant, her 

daughter, and a bar owner regarding Appellant’s behavior on the 

night of the accident which the jury heard and the credibility of 

which the jury was able to assess. This is simply not a case where 

there is only the suggestion or ‘hint’ of alcohol consumption or 

intoxication such that what might be considered limited or 

unreliable evidence should be excluded. It was not a close call as 

to whether Appellant may have been intoxicated on the night of 

the accident.

(Trial Ct. Op., 1/25/23, at 3-4).

We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision that 

evidence concerning Moffitt’s alcohol consumption was relevant and probative 

to the issue of causation in this case. Moffitt’s own testimony reflected that 

she began consuming alcohol during the afternoon leading up to the accident, 

that she continued drinking upon returning home, and then drank beer at a

bar immediately before the incident. Dr. Dackis testified unequivocally that a 

.313% BAC level impaired her motor skills and sensory awareness. Given this 
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evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing BAC evidence 

to show that Moffitt was impaired when she crossed Lancaster Street.

B.

Moffitt also contends that Dr. Dackis was not qualified to testify 

regarding her alleged intoxication because he has no experience in 

toxicology.4 Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702 provides that an expert may 

testify if “scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge” beyond that 

possessed by a layperson will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence 

or to determine a fact in issue, “a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 

skill, experience, training or education may testify [thereto] in the form of an 

opinion or otherwise.” Pa.R.E. 702. Thus, “[i]n Pennsylvania, the standard 

for qualification of an expert witness is a liberal one.” Wright, supra at 976 

(citation omitted). “The test to be applied when qualifying a witness is 

whether the witness has any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge 

on the subject under investigation.” Id. (citation omitted). “The witness need 

not possess all of the knowledge in a given field but must only possess more 

knowledge than is otherwise within the ordinary range of training, knowledge, 

intelligence or experience.” Id. (citation omitted). “If he does, he may testify 

____________________________________________

4 Decisions regarding admission of expert testimony, like other evidentiary 

decisions, are within the sound discretion of the trial court and we may reverse 

only if we find an abuse of discretion or error of law. See Wright v. 

Residence Inn by Marriott, Inc., 207 A.3d 970, 974 (Pa. Super. 2019).
J-A19043-23

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and the weight to be given to such testimony is for the trier of fact to 

determine in view of the expert’s particular credentials.” Id. (citation 

omitted).

In this case, the trial court explained its decision relating to Dr. Dackis’ 

qualifications as follows:

Dr. Dackis testified that he has worked as an addiction 

specialist for 35 years. During voir dire, he discussed his clinical 

practice and experience treating those with alcohol use issues. He 

testified about his knowledge of alcohol abuse and his

understanding of the effect of alcohol use on individuals. Dr. 

Dackis was not called as a toxicologist to decipher unknown blood 

alcohol levels or to interpret the results of lab tests. Plaintiff’s 

blood levels were already determined by a toxicologist and noted 

in her medical records. Rather, Dr. Dackis was called to testify 

about the effects of such levels on a person’s behavior and 

conduct.

(Trial Ct. Op., 11/22/22, at 3).

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Dr. Dackis was qualified 

to testify regarding Moffitt’s blood alcohol level and how that level likely 

impacted her conduct on the night of the accident including her ability to cross 

the road safely. Dr. Dackis’ testimony reflects that he met the standard of

“reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge” regarding the effects of 

alcohol use relative to Moffitt’s consumption to assist the jury in its factfinding. 

See Wright, supra at 976. We also emphasize, as did the trial court, that 

Moffitt had the opportunity to counter Dr. Dackis’ testimony by calling her own 

expert witness but did not do so.
J-A19043-23

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C.

Moffitt next contends the trial court erred by precluding testimony that 

the location of the accident was an “unmarked crosswalk at an intersection.” 

Moffitt claims that failure to permit this testimony created the prejudicial 

inference that she was “jaywalking.” She contends that because she was 

crossing the road where Beech Street intersected Lancaster Avenue that was 

an unmarked crosswalk within the meaning of 75 Pa.C.S. § 102,

5 which should 

be considered in conjunction with 75 Pa.C.S. 3542(a) which states that

“[w]hen traffic-control signals are not in place or not in operation, the driver 

of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway 

within any marked crosswalk or within any unmarked crosswalk at an 

intersection.” Moffitt goes on to contend that the trial court should have 

instructed the jury about the relative obligations of the parties when a 

pedestrian crosses the highway at an intersection. We disagree for two 

reasons.

____________________________________________

5 The Vehicle Code defines the word “Crosswalk” as “(1) That part of a roadway 

at an intersection included within the connections of the lateral lines of the 

sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway, measured from the curbs or, in 

the absence of curbs, from the edges of the traversable roadway; and, in the 

absence of a sidewalk on one side of the roadway, that part of a roadway 

included within the extension of the lateral lines of the existing sidewalk[; or] 

(2) Any portion of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly 

indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings on the surface.” 

75 Pa.C.S. § 102 (emphasis added).
J-A19043-23

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First, the evidence shows the location of the accident would not qualify 

as a crosswalk because there are no sidewalks on either side of Beech Street 

at this location that one could connect the lateral lines to the opposite side of 

Lancaster Avenue. Moreover, Officer Burkhart testified and Moffitt even 

admitted that there was no crosswalk on Lancaster Avenue where she crossed.

Second, the trial court explained that there was no need for this 

instruction because:

This was not a case where a pedestrian crossed a roadway 

within a crosswalk marked or unmarked, and a driver failed to 

yield to such pedestrian . . . The question for the jury was whether 

given all of the circumstances, Defendant acted negligently in the 

operation of his vehicle and whether Plaintiff acted reasonably in 

how and when she crossed the street that night. The jury 

answered the question of whether Defendant was negligent in the 

operation of his vehicle on the night of the accident in the 

affirmative. The jury concluded that Defendant breached his duty 

of care.

In her brief in support of her post-trial motion, Plaintiff cites 

to the comment following Pennsylvania Standard Suggested Jury 

Instructions 3.10 in support for the argument that it is proper to 

charge both parties with a duty of ordinary care under the 

circumstance. The court did so here. There was no suggestion 

by the court to the jury that Plaintiff did not have the right to cross 

the street. Rather, the jury was tasked with determining whether 

both parties acted reasonably in the circumstances leading up to 

the accident. Even if the area had been a marked crosswalk and 

the jury was so advised, if Plaintiff had acted unreasonably in 

deciding when to enter that crosswalk, she still could be found 

comparatively negligent. In this case, the jury concluded that 

both parties acted negligently on the night of the accident and 

apportioned that negligence equally.

(Trial Ct. Op., 11/22/22, at 6).
J-A19043-23

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After review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s decision to preclude Moffitt from constructing an argument that she 

was struck in an “unmarked crosswalk.” The record shows that Moffitt was 

crossing Lancaster Avenue mid-block, outside of any crosswalk, marked or 

otherwise.

D.

Moffitt next maintains the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury 

on multiple relevant issues which, when viewed in the context of the trial 

court’s decision to admit testimony relating to her intoxication and refusal to 

permit the crosswalk evidence, resulted in jury confusion during deliberations.

(See Moffitt’s Brief, at 27-31 (listing 11 proposed jury instructions)).6 Moffitt 

____________________________________________

6 The trial court declined to instruct the jury about:

• Negligence per se

• Violation of Section 3362 of the Motor Vehicle Code

(Speeding)

• Violating of Section 3361 of the Motor Vehicle Code (Assured 

Clear Distance Rule)

• Intoxication (Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instructions #22, 

#23, #24)

• Instructions regarding pedestrians in the roadway (Plaintiff’s 

Proposed First Jury Instructions #32)

• Defendant Driver’s Duty of Care in Regard to Pedestrians 

(Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instructions #35 and #36)

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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reiterates her argument that the trial court should have instructed the jury as 

to the parties’ respective obligations at an unmarked crosswalk and maintains 

that she is entitled to a new trial. (See id. at 31).7

We begin by observing that the purpose of a jury charge is to clarify the 

legal principles at issue and guide the jury in its deliberations. See 

Rittenhouse v. Hanks, 777 A.2d 1113, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

Additionally, “the trial court is not required to give every charge that is 

requested by the parties and its refusal to give a requested charge does not 

require reversal unless the Appellant was prejudiced by that refusal.” Amato, 

supra at 621 (citation omitted). “[A] charge will be found adequate unless 

____________________________________________

• Defendant’s Failure to Warn Plaintiff (Plaintiff’s Proposed 

Jury Instruction #41)

• Duty of Motorist When Approaching an Intersection 

(Plaintiff’s Proposed Supplemental Jury Instruction #3)

• Jury Instruction regarding Pedestrian in a Place of Danger 

(Plaintiff’s Proposed Supplemental Jury Instruction #4)

• Duty of Defendant to have his vehicle under control as part 

of the instruction on the “Assured Clear Distance Rule” (Plaintiff’s 

Proposed Third Supplemental Jury Instruction 1)

• Failure to See Pedestrian in his Path (Plaintiff’s Proposed 

Third Supplemental Jury Instruction 4)

7 “On appeal, this Court examines jury instructions to determine whether the 

trial court abused its discretion or offered an inaccurate statement of law 

controlling the outcome of the case.” Amato v. Bell & Gossett, 116 A.3d 

607, 621 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). “Consequently, the trial court 

has wide discretion in fashioning jury instructions.” Id. (citation omitted).
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the issues are not made clear to the jury or the jury was palpably misled by 

what the trial judge said or unless there is an omission which amounts to 

fundamental error.” Ruff v. York Hosp., 257 A.3d 43, 56 (Pa. Super. 2021), 

appeal denied, 266 A.3d 1064 (Pa. 2021).

In this case, the Court declined to give 11 of Moffitt’s proposed charges

on the basis of being unwarranted, explaining that it:

. . . declined to give any non-standard, or what the court often 

refers to as ‘self-created,’ jury instructions proposed by either 

party. It advised the parties that it would give the standard jury 

instructions regarding negligence, factual cause, comparative 

negligence, and recoverable damages. The standard jury 

instructions provided by the court adequately, accurately, and 

clearly stated the law. There also was no prejudice suffered by 

Plaintiff for the court’s omitted charges.

* * *

The jury instructions provided by the court covered the legal 

issues raised in Plaintiff’s proposed charges, namely that Plaintiff’s 

conduct was to be evaluated by the jury and included not only her 

duty of care but analysis of her actions as it relates to the issue of 

causation—all of which was then broken out for the jury in 

separate interrogatories on the verdict slip. Plaintiff has failed to 

demonstrate in what way the trial court’s charges were inadequate 

or erroneous or what prejudice was suffered.

(Trial Ct. Op., 11/22/22, at 6).

We discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s

decision not to instruct the jury on nearly a dozen non-standard charges in 

this case where the complaint included a single count of negligence. The trial 

court’s instructions fully and accurately stated the law, and Moffitt’s argument 
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to the contrary ignores the fact that the jury did find Miller partially negligent. 

Moffitt’s third issue does not merit relief.

E.

Last, Moffitt contends that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent with the 

evidence and shocks the conscience to a degree necessitating a new trial. 

Moffitt maintains the jury’s award is inadequate given the severity of her 

injuries, fails to compensate her for non-economic pain and suffering, and is 

against the weight of the evidence.8

____________________________________________

8

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the 

trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere 

conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts 

would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of 

the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, 

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them 

or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

It has often been stated that a new trial should be awarded when 

the [factfinder’s] verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock 

one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative 

so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.

An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with 

a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of 

review applied by the trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of 

whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 

Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and 

see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the 

gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced 

by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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“The amount of a jury verdict will rarely be held inadequate on appeal.” 

Dawson v. Fowler, 558 A.2d 565, 567 (Pa. Super. 1989). “Generally, a 

verdict will not be disturbed merely on account of the smallness of the 

damages awarded or because the reviewing court would have awarded more. 

A reversal based on the inadequacy of a verdict is appropriate only where 

‘injustice of the verdict stands forth like a beacon.’” Davis v. Mullen, 773 

A.2d 764, 766 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted). Moreover, “a jury verdict is set 

aside for inadequacy when it appears to have been the product of passion, 

prejudice, partiality, or corruption, or where it clearly appears from 

uncontradicted evidence that the amount of the verdict bears no reasonable 

relation to the loss suffered by the plaintiff.” Kiser v. Schulte, 648 A.2d 1, 

4 (Pa. 1994) (citing Elza v. Chovan, 152 A.2d 238 (Pa. 1959)). So long as 

the verdict bears a reasonable resemblance to the damages proved, it is not 

the function of the court to substitute its judgment for that of the jury. See 

Epstein v. Saul Ewing, LLP, 7 A.3d 303, 315 (Pa. Super. 2010).

In this case, the trial court determined after observing the demeanor of 

the witnesses, listening to the content of their testimony and assessing their 

____________________________________________

that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of 

the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new 

trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was 

not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial 

should be granted in the interest of justice.

Ruff, supra at 49 (citation omitted).
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credibility, that the jury’s verdict was not so contrary to the evidence to shock 

one’s sense of justice. It explained:

This is not a case where a jury has awarded a plaintiff zero 

dollars after having found a defendant negligent. As Plaintiff 

concedes, her medical bills totaled $7,940. Those bills, however, 

did not differentiate between any treatment of her leg injury and 

treatment of the right eye. There also was much questioning 

during the trial as to what may have caused the eye injury.

Similarly, although there was testimony from Plaintiff regarding 

an alleged wage loss of approximately $3,500, there was no 

documentary evidence to support that claim. The jury heard 

testimony that her wage loss claim was based upon her position 

as a server at a restaurant. The jury reasonably could have 

concluded that Plaintiff’s testimony was not reliable on this issue. 

Given the totality of circumstances and all of the facts as 

presented at trial, the jury’s verdict on damages does not shock 

the conscience and may be considered reasonable.

(Trial Ct. Op., 11/22/22, at 6).

As the trial court found, the jury award could have been calculated in 

any number of ways based on its discounting or accepting of evidence 

regarding those damages. The verdict sheet did not contain questions

requiring the jury to provide each element of damages in its total award. 

Rather, as fact-finder, it was tasked with assessing the credibility of the 

witnesses to calculate the total amount of damages. Although this may not 

be the result that Moffitt had hoped, the verdict does not shock one’s sense 

of justice.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the December 15, 

2022 judgment entered on the jury’s verdict.

Judgment affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/18/2023