COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton

WILLIE DESHAWN BROWN MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record Nos. 2529- 03-1 and PER CURIAM 25 30-03-1 MARCH 2, 2004 CITY OF NORFOLK, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK Everett A. Mar tin, Jr., Judge (Charles E. Vogan, Jr., on briefs), for appellant. (Bernard A. Pishko, City Attorn ey; Adam D. Melita, Assistant City Attorney, on briefs), for appellee. (Henry L. Sadler, III, Guardian ad litem for the minor children, on brief).

Willie Deshawn Brown a ppeals the decision of th e trial court to terminate her parental rights to her two children, J.M. and D.J., pursuant to Code §§ 16.1- 283(C)(2) and 16.1-283(E)(i). Appellant contends the trial court (1) did not have sufficient eviden ce to support the termination of her parental rights and (2) committe d reversible error in terminating her parental rights because the City of Norfolk, Department of Social Services (Department) did not provide placement options. Upon reviewing the records and brie fs of the parties, we conclude these appeals are without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decisions of the tr ial court. See Rule 5A:27.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - BACKGROUND We review the evidence in th e light most favorable to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human
Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1 991). So viewed, the evidence proved that Brown’s parental rights were term inated as to another child, J.B. , March 13, 2001. In June 2001, the Norfolk Juvenile and Domestic Relations Distri ct Court (JDR court) aw arded custody of J.M. and D.J. to the Department. Alth ough the Department’s goal was to “Return to Parent,” in June 2002, the Department requested a change in goal to “Adoption,” which th e JDR court approved. The JDR court ordered a termination of parental ri ghts in October 2002, vaca ted the order in April 2003, and then denied th e Department’s petition to terminate parental ri ghts. The Department appealed to the circuit court. At the trial de novo , the evidence establis hed that Brown had completed a substance abuse program, completed parenting classes, and had enro lled in anger management classes. Brown also had arranged for a relapse preventio n program and had twice tested ne gatively for drugs. From June
2001 to June 2002 , Brown was twice hospitalize d. She had also been diagnosed with a bipolar or psychotic disorder, for which she received medicat ion and established a treatment plan with the Norfolk Community Services Boar d. However, Brown failed to complete all of the ordered services and did not have stable housing. The evidence showed that her mental health issues prevented her from providing a st able environment for he r children. During visitation with her daughters, she would behave appr opriately, but would easily get up set, leading to chaotic visits. The evidence established that Brown’s parental rights were terminated as to another child, J.B., in 2001. The circui t court determined that it was in th e best interests of the children to terminate Brown’s parental rights pursuant to Code §§ 16.1-283(C)(2 ) and 16.1-283(E)(i).- 3 - ANALYSIS I. Sufficiency of Evidence to Terminate Recognizing that “[t]he termination of residu al parental rights is a grave, drastic and irreversible action,” Hele n W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Devel. , 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991), we, nevertheless, “‘presume[] [the tr ial court has] thoroughly weighed all the evidence [and] consid ered the statutory requirements.’” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S. E.2d 794, 796 (1990)). Code § 16.1-283 provides, in pertinent part, th at a court may terminate the residual parental rights of a parent of a child in foster care upon clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child and the fo llowing exists: The parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was pl aced in foster care to remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement , notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Proof that the parent or parents, without good cause, have failed or been unable to make substantial progress towards elim ination of the conditions which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement in accordance with their obliga tions under and within the time limits or goals set forth in a foster care plan filed with the court or any other plan jointly designed and agreed to by the parent or parents and a public or private so cial, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agency shall c onstitute prima facie evidence of this condition. The court shall take into consideration the prior efforts of such agencies to rehabil itate the parent or parents prior to the placement of the child in foster care. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) (emphasis added). The Department showed by clear and convincing evidence that after two years of foster care placement, Brown was unable to su bstantially remedy th e conditions that led to and required her children’s foster placement. Brow n has neither completed all the ordered servic es nor stabilized her living environment and mental health issues. “It is clearly not in the best intere sts of a child to- 4 - spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find ou t when, or even if, a pa rent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kayw ood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S. E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Further, Code § 16 .1-283(E)(i) provides [t]he residual parental rights of a parent or parents of a child who is in the custody of a lo cal board of licensed child-placing agency may be terminated by the court if th e court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child and that (i) the residual parental rights of the parent regarding a sibling of the child have previously been involuntarily terminated . . . . Because Brown’s parental rights earlier had been te rminated as to another child, the trial court had authority to terminate Brown’s ri ghts by this section alone. “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or withou t evidence to support it.’” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitte d). The record supports the trial court’s fi nding that the Department presented clear and convincing eviden ce satisfying the statutory requirements of Code §§ 16.1-283(C)(2) and 16.1-28 3(E)(i) and establishing that termina tion of mother’s pa rental rights is in the children’s best interests. II. Failure to Consider Place ment with Family Members. Brown argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court failed to consider placing the children with relatives. “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of A ppeals to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18. Appellant did not rais e this objection before the trial court. Therefore, Rule 5A:18 bars our consideration of this question on appeal. Moreover, the trial court received in evidence the Department’s findings that no suitable placem ent with relatives was available for J.M. and
D.J. See Hawthorne v. Smyth County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 33 Va. App. 130, 139, 531 S.E.2d- 5 - 639, 644 (2000) (holding statut e only requires court to “‘ give a consideration to granting custody to relatives of the child ’ prior to terminating parental rights and placing” in third party custody (emphasis added)). Therefore, the record does not reflect any reason to invoke the good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decisions of the tr ial court. See Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.