IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMAL SHARIF (A-88447), )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 12-cv-05685

v. )

)

IMHOTEP CARTER, M.D., RONALD 

SCHAEFER, M.D., ANTHONY 

DUBRICK, M.D., ROYCE BROWNREED, LATONYA R. WILLIAMS, 

KEVIN HALLORAN, MARCUS 

HARDY, DARRYL EDWARDS, and 

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, 

INC., a corporation,

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Honorable Sara L. Ellis

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jamal Sharif, an inmate at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”), fractured 

his right ankle while playing basketball on October 6, 2011. Sharif filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

suit against Defendants Dr. Imhotep Carter, Dr. Ronald Schaefer, Dr. Anthony Dubrick, Ms. 

Latonya Williams, Mr. Kevin Halloran, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc., (“Wexford”) 

(collectively, “Defendants”)1 alleging that Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his 

serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Before the Court is Defendants’

motion to dismiss [59] the Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint”), which is granted in part 

and denied in part. 

Sharif does not contest the dismissal of all claims against Williams and Dubrick. The 

Court dismisses all claims against Schaefer because Sharif fails to adequately state a claim 

against him. The claims against Carter and Halloran in their individual capacities and against 

1 Sharif also names Royce Brown-Reed, Marcus Hardy, and Darryl Edwards as defendants to this action. 

Defendants Brown-Reed, Hardy, and Edwards did not join the motion to dismiss. 

 
Wexford are sufficient to proceed through discovery. However, because the official capacity 

claims against Carter and Halloran are redundant to the claim against Wexford, the Court 

dismisses those claims against Carter and Halloran.

Background2

On October 6, 2011, Sharif injured his right ankle playing basketball. His ankle, foot,

and toes were visibly swollen and discolored. Prison personnel instructed Sharif to return to and 

remain in his cell unit until medical help arrived. Later that day, a prison official noticed 

Sharif’s condition and escorted him to the Health Care Unit (the “HCU”) emergency room. The 

nurses in the HCU provided Sharif with a crutch, bag of ice, and pass to return to the HCU on 

October 10, 2011 for examination. Sharif was not permitted to return to the HCU until October 

11, 2011.

On October 11, Sharif sat in the HCU holding cage for 5–6 hours awaiting examination. 

At the end of the day, still awaiting examination, Sharif observed Defendants Williams and

Carter, Stateville’s nurse practitioner and Medical Director, exiting the facility. Before they left, 

Sharif explained to Williams and Carter that he was in pain and was waiting to see them about 

his injury. Williams and Carter told Sharif they were going home and would send another pass 

for the HCU. Sharif’s ankle was x-rayed on October 12, 2011.

Sharif was first examined by a doctor on October 14, 2011—8 days after the injury. At 

that time, Dr. Schaefer diagnosed Sharif with an undisplaced lateral malleolus fracture—i.e. a 

broken right ankle. Rather than sending Sharif to an outside hospital, Schaefer misapplied an 

ortho-glass splint. Schaefer also ordered the use of crutches for seven weeks and follow up x2 The facts in the background section are taken from Sharif’s Second Amended Complaint, including any 

attached exhibits, and are presumed true for the purpose of resolving Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See 

Virnich v. Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court may consider documents attached to 

the complaint as part of the complaint. Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 10(c).

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rays to be taken every two weeks. The follow up x-rays were never performed. Sharif was given 

800 mg of ibuprofen for the pain. On October 21, 2011, Sharif filed a grievance against the 

HCU because his persistent pain caused him to lose sleep and because HCU personnel denied his 

request to visit an orthopedic specialist. 

On October 24, 2011, Carter examined Sharif for the first time and discovered Schaefer 

had misapplied the splint. Carter reapplied the splint. HCU staff did not change Sharif’s splint 

bandages and allowed the bandages to degrade while refusing requests for new bandages. Carter

ordered follow up x-rays; however, those x-rays did not occur until January 12, 2012. Although 

Carter scheduled a December 2, 2011 splint removal, Carter removed the splint January 10, 

2012. 

When Carter removed the splint, he declared Sharif’s ankle healed and ordered follow up 

x-rays. Ten days later, Williams examined Sharif and discovered that the fracture remained. 

Williams told Sharif that surgery was required to repair the fracture. On January 25, 2012, 

Carter confirmed Williams’ diagnosis that Sharif’s ankle never healed. Carter scheduled an 

orthopedic specialist appointment to make arrangements for surgery. When Carter re-examined 

Sharif on February 1, 2012, he was surprised to find Sharif had not seen the specialist. During 

that exam, Carter told Sharif he would schedule another specialist appointment.

On February 27, 2012, Carter informed Sharif that he had recently spoken to the 

specialist and Sharif had been rescheduled. Sharif did not see a specialist until April 2, 2012. 

The orthopedic specialist decided that Sharif did indeed require surgery. When Sharif visited the 

orthopedic specialist again on June 5, 2012, the specialist told Sharif, “They cancelled the 

surgery! They rescheduled the surgery two days ago.” The surgery occurred on July 13, 2012—

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nearly ten months after the injury. Sharif’s right ankle became deformed as a result of the

surgical delays. 

Sharif filed several grievances against HCU personnel, claiming their errors caused him

constant pain and led to delays in surgery. Sharif also wrote complaint letters to Halloran, the 

CEO of Wexford, and Dr. Dubrick, a doctor employed by Wexford. All of Sharif’s complaints

went unanswered.

Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not 

its merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 

1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all wellpleaded facts in the plaintiff’s complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in 

the plaintiff’s favor. AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). To survive 

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a 

claim’s basis but must also be facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 

1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.

Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Analysis

Sharif alleges that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment, which protects against

cruel and unusual punishment and has been interpreted to guarantee an inmate’s right to adequate 

medical care. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976).

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a prisoner may bring a suit against any person who caused a 

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violation of the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights while acting under color of state law.” 

Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 2010). “Section 1983 creates a cause of action

based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the 

individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional violation. Vance v. Peters, 97 

F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Additionally, an official may be liable under 

the personal responsibility standard if he approved, facilitated, condoned or turned a blind eye to 

the offending conduct. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 757 (7th Cir. 2011). 

I. Deliberate Indifference Standard

Sharif contends that Defendants manifested deliberate indifference to his serious medical 

condition when their ineffective treatment delayed the healing of his broken ankle. To allege a 

prima facie case of deliberate indifference, Sharif must show: (1) that he suffered an objectively 

serious medical injury; and (2) that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to that injury, 

meaning Defendants were aware of the condition but refused to take reasonable measures to 

resolve it. Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S. Ct. 

1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994) (holding that a prison official must be both “aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must 

draw the inference”).

A medical need is sufficiently serious if the “inmate’s condition has been diagnosed by a 

physician as mandating treatment or is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need 

for a doctor’s attention.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 

To plead deliberate indifference, a plaintiff can allege “a treatment decision is so far afield of 

accepted professional standards as raise the inference that it was not actually based on medical 

judgment.” Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750–51. Additionally, facts demonstrating a delay in treatment,

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which results in prolonged and unnecessary pain, may also give rise to an inference of deliberate 

indifference. McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that a delay in 

treating a non-life threatening but painful condition may constitute deliberate indifference if the 

delay exacerbates or prolongs the prisoner’s pain).

Defendants do not dispute that Sharif’s fractured right ankle constitutes a serious medical 

condition. However, Defendants contend Sharif failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate 

deliberate indifference to his medical needs.

II. Dr. Anthony Dubrick and Ms. Latonya Williams 

In response to the motion to dismiss, Sharif does not contest the dismissal of Defendants 

Dubrick and Williams. The Court construes Sharif’s request as a Rule 41(a) voluntary dismissal

and dismisses without prejudice the claims against Dubrick and Williams. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a);

see McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir. 1985).

III. Dr. Imhotep Carter 

Sharif alleges Carter, as Stateville’s Medical Director and Sharif’s treating physician, denied 

and delayed Sharif’s access to adequate care to repair his ankle, including delaying Sharif’s 

surgery. Sharif contends that Carter knew about his ankle pain and knew the treatment provided

was ineffective, but denied and delayed Sharif’s surgery in order to “cut costs.” Additionally, 

Sharif alleges Carter’s willful inaction caused him to suffer from an untreated ankle fracture for 

nearly one year, which ultimately led to his foot deformity. Construing the facts in the light most 

favorable to Sharif as the Court must at this stage, the Court finds that the Complaint states a 

colorable deliberate indifference claim against Carter.

Carter acted as the Medical Director and as a physician at Stateville during 2011–2012. 

Id. ¶ 6. Carter first encountered Sharif on October 11, 2011, but refused to treat him that day

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even though Sharif informed Carter he had been waiting 5–6 hours for an examination and 

suffered from intense ankle pain. Id. ¶ 17. Carter did not actually treat Sharif until more than 

two weeks later when Carter reapplied the defective splint. Id. ¶¶ 15–20. Carter’s splinting 

technique did not heal Sharif’s fracture. Id. ¶ 22. Sharif also alleges that Carter did not remove 

his splint until nearly one month after it should have been removed and knew about the long 

delay in his visit to the specialist and surgery scheduling delays. Id. ¶ 20. As a result, Sharif 

suffered significant pain, which he documented in several grievances against Carter and the 

HCU. Id. ¶¶ 19, 26, Ex. G, M, N, V. All of these grievances, except one, were copied to the 

HCU for reply and response. Id. Ex. G, M, V. Sharif asks the Court to infer that Carter, as 

medical director at Stateville, received each grievance copied to the HCU. Id. ¶ 6; Resp. p. 5–6. 

Sharif also alleges that Carter knew about Sharif’s continuous pain through his various personal 

interactions with him during examinations and treatment. Id.

“Even a few days’ delay in addressing a severely painful but readily treatable condition 

suffices to state a claim of deliberate indifference.” Smith v. Knox County Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 

1040 (7th Cir. 2012)); see also Gaston v. Ghosh, 428 Fed. App’x 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(reversing dismissal of complaint of delayed treatment and undue pain); Grieveson v. Anderson, 

538 F.3d 763, 779 (7th Cir. 2008) (claim for deliberate indifference in one and a half day delay 

in treatment for a broken nose survives summary judgment). Based on the foregoing, Sharif

pleads sufficient facts to state a claim that Carter knew about Sharif’s serious medical condition 

and his prolonged pain leading up to surgery, yet allowed the delay in surgery. See Burns v. 

Fenoglio, 525 Fed. App’x 512, 515 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing dismissal of complaint alleging 

deliberate indifference on the part of defendant who personally examined inmate). 

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Carter argues that the delays in treatment resulted from negligence, which cannot support

a claim of deliberate indifference. See Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2006); 

see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. The Court must consider the “totality of an inmate’s medical 

care” when evaluating whether that care amounts to deliberate indifference. Reed v. McBride, 

178 F.3d 849, 855–56 (7th Cir. 1999). Even if some of Carter’s individual treatment decisions 

can be characterized as negligent, Sharif pleads sufficient facts to allege Carter’s course of 

conduct throughout Sharif’s treatment manifests indifference. Compare id. at 855–56 (numerous 

examples of neglect or mistreatment throughout the course of treatment sufficient for deliberate 

indifference), with Dunigan v. Winnebago County, 165 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 1999) (an isolated 

incident of negligence throughout otherwise adequate treatment insufficient for deliberate 

indifference). As discussed above, Sharif alleges multiple instances in which Carter delayed his 

treatment and prolonged his pain including when Carter: turned Sharif away on October 11, 2011

after learning he had been waiting for medical treatment for 5–6 hours and was in pain; delayed 

removing Sharif’s splint for one month; and failed to ensure surgery was scheduled in a timely 

manner. These multiple instances of alleged indifference to pain and suffering, taken together, 

sufficiently state a claim. 3

Finally, Carter argues that Sharif has pled himself out of court by faulting three parties—

Carter, the warden, and the prison administration—for the surgical scheduling delay when only 

one party could be responsible. “[A] party may plead itself out of court by pleading facts that 

establish an impenetrable defense to its claims.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1086 

(7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). However, by faulting Carter for the surgical scheduling 

3 Carter also points to the multiple rounds of HCU treatment to dispute that he ignored Sharif’s medical 

needs. Sharif is “not required to show that he was literally ignored.” Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 

611 (7th Cir. 2000). To the contrary, even if a physician provides some treatment, a deliberate 

indifference claim arises if the physician’s delays in treatment caused the inmate unnecessary or 

prolonged pain. Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750–51, 753. 

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delays, Sharif merely pleads an alternative theory. See Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1086–87 (holding a 

plaintiff does not establish an impenetrable defense to her claims by pleading additional facts 

that suggest an alternative theory of liability, even if it makes another theory less likely to 

succeed). Carter’s position as Medical Director of Stateville and Sharif’s allegations that Carter 

told Sharif he was handling scheduling with the orthopedic specialist support Sharif’s claim that 

Carter possessed the authority to delay his surgery. Compl. ¶¶ 22–24. While further fact

discovery may establish that Carter was not responsible for the delay, his administrative role in 

scheduling the surgery is not a question to be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim against Carter is denied.

IV. Dr. Ronald Schaefer

Wexford employed Schaefer as a physician at Stateville during 2011. Compl. ¶ 7. 

Schaefer was the first physician to examine and treat the ankle. Id. ¶ 18. Sharif alleges Schaefer 

improperly applied an ankle splint, then ordered x-rays at two week intervals. Id. The x-rays 

were never performed and the 800 mg of ibuprofen provided to Sharif failed to alleviate his pain.

Id. ¶ 18, Ex. G. Additionally, Sharif alleges that Schaefer failed to timely remove the splint 

reapplied by Carter. Id. ¶ 20.

Sharif’s claims against Schaefer fail to support a § 1983 claim. See Arnett, 658 F.3d at 

750–51, 753. Evidence of negligence in diagnosis or treatment does not equate to a valid

deliberate indifference claim. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Schaefer only interacted with Sharif 

once, on the initial visit, during which time Schaefer misapplied the splint. Sharif states Carter 

corrected Schaefer’s error by reapplying the splint, which indicates that the medical community

recognizes splinting as appropriate treatment for fractures. Therefore, Schaefer’s decision to 

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apply the splint was not “so far afield of accepted professional standards” to rise to the level of 

deliberate indifference. See Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750–51.

Furthermore, Sharif’s contention that Schaefer forgot to remove the reapplied splint does

not support a claim of deliberate indifference. Sharif pleads no facts to indicate Schaefer

participated in any delay that exacerbated or prolonged his pain, refused to remove the splint on

December 2, 2011, or even knew that the splint was to be removed that day. At best, these 

allegations rise to the level of negligence. The claim against Schaefer is dismissed.

V. Mr. Kevin Halloran

Sharif sues Halloran, the CEO of Wexford, even though Halloran was not personally 

involved with Sharif’s medical care. Sharif can successfully state a claim for deliberate 

indifference by alleging Halloran knew “about the conduct and facilitate[d] it, approve[d] it, 

condone[d] it, or turn[ed] a blind eye.” Arnett, 658 F.3d at 757. Sharif allegedly wrote Halloran 

two complaint letters regarding his injury. Compl. ¶ 26, Ex. R. In the April 20, 2012 letter,

Sharif describes his worsening and prolonged pain, his suspicion that Dr. Carter lied to him 

about his injury, and his frustration with Carter’s inaction and delays in scheduling surgery. Id.

Ex. R. Sharif also requests that surgery be performed without further delay. Id.

The Seventh Circuit has concluded that not every public official in receipt of letters 

alleging constitutional violations is liable for deliberate indifference under § 1983. Burks v. 

Raesmisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). As our sister court noted, Halloran is in a 

different position from “unrelated” public officials like the Governor, the Director of Prisons, or 

even the Warden. Mims v. Wexford Health Sources, No. 11 C 6049, 2012 WL 6187117, at *4 

(N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2012). Distinguishing Halloran’s role from the public officials referenced in 

Burks, several district courts have drawn the inference that as CEO of Wexford, Halloran could 

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have intervened or investigated allegations of unconstitutional conduct brought to his attention 

through complaint letters. See, e.g., Reliford v. Ghosh, No. 10 C 3555, 2011 WL 3704747, at *4 

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2011); Thomas v. Ghosh, No. 08 C 4644, 2009 WL 910183, at *5 (E.D. Ill. 

March 31, 2009).

Defendants argue that the Court should follow Sharif v. Ghosh, No. 12 C 2309, 2013 WL 

228239 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2013). In Sharif v. Ghosh, the court found Sharif’s complaint letters to 

Halloran merely indicated that the prison doctors possessed differing opinions about the best 

treatment. Id. at *5. Because Halloran was not a medical professional capable of choosing the 

best treatment, the court concluded Halloran did not refuse to take the reasonable steps in his 

power to resolve Sharif’s condition. Id. at *5. In this case, Sharif’s doctors only prescribed one 

method of treatment: surgery. Compl. Ex. R. Sharif asked Halloran to help secure the 

recommended treatment. The contents of the letters sufficiently raise the inference that Halloran 

knew about Sharif’s serious medical condition and the delays, yet did not act. See e.g., Mims,

2012 WL 6187117, at *4 (denying Halloran’s motion to dismiss); Young v. Wexford Health 

Sources, No. 10 C 8220, 2012 WL 621358, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2012) (refusing to dismiss on 

defense that Halloran had no personal involvement in an inmate’s medical treatment).

Halloran also argues that as Wexford’s chief corporate officer, he was not involved in the 

day-to-day operations of Stateville’s HCU or Sharif’s medical treatment. Further factual 

development may establish that Halloran had no role in individual medical decisions or in 

perpetuating a policy of refused medical care. But the extent of Halloran’s involvement remains

a matter for summary judgment. The claim against Halloran in his individual capacity remains. 

VI. Dr. Imhotep Carter and Mr. Kevin Halloran in their Official Capacities

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Sharif also brings suit against Carter and Halloran in their official capacities. “[A]n 

official capacity suit is another way of pleading an action against an entity of which the officer is 

an agent.” Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Monell v. 

New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). 

When an individual is sued in his official capacity alongside a local government entity or 

municipality, the official capacity claim is redundant. Jungels v. Pierce, 825 F.2d 1127, 1129 

(7th Cir. 1987). District courts routinely dismiss official capacity claims when paired with

claims against a municipality, local government, or private corporations contracted to perform 

municipal services. See, e.g., Sharif v. Ghosh, No. 12 C 2309, 2014 WL 1322820, at *3 (N.D. 

Ill. Apr. 1, 2014); Brown v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 973 F. Supp. 2d 870, 875 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 25, 

2013).

Wexford, although a private corporation, may be treated like a municipality for the 

purposes of § 1983 claims. Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 832 (7th Cir. 2010) (treating 

private contractors that provide medical services to prisoners like municipalities for § 1983 

claims). Therefore, official capacity claims against Wexford employees amount to claims 

against Wexford itself. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165–66. Accordingly, by bringing claims against 

Carter and Halloran in their official capacities, while also suing Wexford, Sharif essentially sues

Wexford three times over. See Brown, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 875. The Court grants Defendants’

motion to dismiss these redundant claims.

VII. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. 

As discussed above, although a private corporation contracted by the Illinois Department 

of Corrections (“IDOC”) to provide medical services to Stateville, Wexford may be subject to

§ 1983 liability. Minix, 597 F.3d at 832. To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show 

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that an official policy or governmental custom exists, which both causes and constitutes the 

“moving force” behind the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Teesdale v. City of Chicago, 

690 F.3d 829, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff can show deprivation directly by alleging facts 

to show “(1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a 

widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is 

so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) an 

allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking 

authority.” Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 594–95 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Wexford incorrectly contends that a claim for deliberate indifference can only arise if the 

constitutional violation was the direct cause of Sharif’s harm and resulted from an express policy 

or custom attributable to the company. A plaintiff is not required to identify an express policy;

rather, he may succeed in stating a claim under Monell by asserting facts that identify a series of 

bad actions taken by the municipality from which the court can infer that an unconstitutional 

custom or practice exists. Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004). 

Sharif alleges that Wexford maintains a custom or policy of ignoring inmates’ serious medical 

needs, refusing to refer inmates to specialists for consultations and treatment, and delaying 

surgery, all to serve the interest of “cost-cutting.” Compl. ¶¶ 11, 38–39, 46. Sharif claims that 

this policy or practice is responsible for Wexford’s failure to provide him timely access to 

treatment, including surgery, for his broken ankle. Sharif offers factual support from his own 

experience with Wexford, and supplements his claims with citation to findings about Wexford’s 

medical delays and mistreatment of prisoners from a 2011 outside association prison monitoring 

report. This is sufficient to infer that an alleged policy of “cost-cutting” exists, leading to delays 

in medical treatment, understaffing, and improper treatment of inmate medical conditions—all 

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factors that Sharif alleges directly contributed to his harm. See Young, 2012 WL 621358, at *6–

7 (denying Wexford’s motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged Wexford’s cost-cutting policy 

was responsible for his inadequate treatment); McDonald v. Wexford Health Sources, No. 09 C 

4196, 2010 WL 3034529, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 2010) (same).

Wexford also states that the “cost-cutting” rationale fails to allege a concrete policy of 

unconstitutional behavior. See Olive v. Wexford Corp., 494 Fed. App’x 671, 672–74 (7th Cir. 

2012) (holding generic allegations about unconstitutional policies are inadequate to state a claim 

of deliberate indifference under Monell). In Olive, the deliberate indifference claim against 

Wexford asserting only a “bi-coastal policy and practice . . . of denying prison inmates adequate 

medical care.” Id. at 673. In this case, however, Sharif has alleged with specificity that Wexford

has a custom or policy of ignoring inmates’ serious medical needs by failing to refer to 

specialists or schedule expensive treatments. Courts in this district have found allegations of

similar “cost-cutting” policies sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference. See, e.g., 

Young, 2012 WL 621358, at *6–7; McDonald, 2010 WL 3034529, at *3.

Finally, Wexford argues that Sharif ultimately received specialist treatment, thereby 

undermining the claim that Wexford had a policy of denying such consultations. Sharif’s 

allegations are broader than the failure to refer—he also alleges delayed access to surgery and 

other necessary medical treatment. As discussed above, even though a plaintiff receives some 

treatment, he still may have a claim for deliberate indifference due to delay. Viewing in the light 

most favorable to him, Sharif’s complaint alleges sufficient facts to defeat dismissal of this 

claim. See Neely v. Randle, No. 12 C 2231, 2013 WL 3321451, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2013) 

(allegations of routine delays, denials, and non-responsiveness to requests for medical care 

sufficiently stated Monell claims against Wexford); Ford v. Wexford, No. 12 C 4558, 2013 WL 

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414494, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2013) (finding allegations of delayed delivery of medical permits, 

failure to administer medication, and delayed scheduling of appointments sufficiently stated a 

Monell claim). Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim against Wexford is denied.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in 

part. The claims against Williams and Dubrick are dismissed without prejudice. The claim

against Schaefer is dismissed with prejudice. The claims against Carter and Halloran in their 

official capacities are dismissed with prejudice. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims 

against Carter and Halloran in their individual capacities and against Wexford is denied. Carter, 

Halloran, and Wexford are given until October 10, 2014 to answer the Second Amended 

Complaint. 

Dated: September 26, 2014 ______________________

SARA L. ELLIS

United States District Judge

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