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S. HRG. 111–503 

CONFIRMATION HEARING ON THE NOMINATION 

OF HON. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, TO BE AN 

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 

OF THE UNITED STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 13–16, 2009 

Serial No. J–111–34 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

(II) 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

MATT MINER, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

JULY 13–16, 2009 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., a U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland ............. 29 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 824 

Coburn, Hon. Tom, a U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma ........................ 38 

Cornyn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas ............................... 32 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 853 

Durbin, Hon. Richard J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois .................... 40 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 870 

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., a U.S. Senator from the State of Wisconsin ............. 19 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 884 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of California ................. 14 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 887 

Franken, Hon. Al, a U.S. Senator from the State of Minnesota .......................... 51 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 896 

Graham, Hon. Lindsey, a U.S. Senator from the State of South Carolina ......... 26 

Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa ..................... 16 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 916 

Hatch, Hon. Orrin G., a U.S. Senator from the State of Utah ............................ 11 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 926 

Kaufman, Hon. Edward E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware ............ 46 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 979 

Klobuchar, Hon. Amy, a U.S. Senator from the State of Minnesota ................... 43 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 991 

Kohl, Hon. Herb, a U.S. Senator from the State of Wisconsin ............................ 8 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 996 

Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona .................................... 21 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1005 

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 2 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1085 

Schumer, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of New York ............ 24 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1307 

Sessions, Hon. Jeff, a U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama .......................... 5 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1318 

Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania ................. 48 

Whitehouse, Hon. Sheldon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island ...... 35 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 1383 

PRESENTERS 

Gillibrand, Hon. Kirsten E., a U.S. Senator from the State of New York, 

presenting Sonia Sotomayor, Nominee to be an Associate Justice of the 

Supreme Court of the United States .................................................................. 55 

Schumer, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of New York 

presenting Sonia Sotomayor, Nominee to be an Associate Justice of the 

Supreme Court of the United States .................................................................. 54 

STATEMENT OF THE NOMINEE 

Sotomayor, Sonia, Nominee to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 

of the United States 

July 13, 2009 ..................................................................................................... 57 

Page

IV 

Sotomayor, Sonia, Nominee to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 

of the United States—Continued 

July 14, 2009 ..................................................................................................... 62 

July 15, 2009 ..................................................................................................... 325 

July 16, 2009 ..................................................................................................... 414 

Questionnaire .................................................................................................... 152 

opening statement ............................................................................................ 1343 

WITNESSES 

Askew, Kim J., ESQ., Chair, Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, 

American Bar Association, Accompanied by Mary M. Boies, Member, Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, American Bar Association .............. 470 

Bloomberg, Michael, Mayor, City of New York ..................................................... 482 

Canterbury, Chuck, President, National Fraternal Order of Police, Myrtle 

Beach, South Carolina ......................................................................................... 517 

Chavez, Linda, Chairman, Center for Equal Opportunity, Falls Church, Virginia ....................................................................................................................... 493 

Cone, David B., Professional Baseball player, New York .................................... 519 

Freeh, Louis J., former Director of the FBI .......................................................... 516 

Froman, Sandra S., Attorney, Gun Rights Advocate, and former President 

of the National Rifle Association, Tucson, Arizona ........................................... 525 

Henderson, Wade, President & CEO, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights .. 486 

Hynes, Patricia, Association of the Bar of the City of New York ........................ 588 

Jeffries, Tim, Scottsdale, Arizona ........................................................................... 543 

Kirsanow, Peter N., Partner, Benesch, Friedlander, Copland & Aronoff LLP 

and Commissioner, Commission on Civil Rights, Cleveland, Ohio .................. 491 

Kopel, David B., Research Director, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado, 

Associate Policy Analyst, Cato Institute, Washington, DC .............................. 527 

McDaniel, Dustin, Attorney General, State of Arkansas ..................................... 477 

McGinnis, John O., Professor, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois .......................................................................................................... 546 

Morgenthau, Robert, former District Attorney, New York, New York ................ 484 

Rao, Neomi, Professor, George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, 

Virginia ................................................................................................................. 545 

Ricci, Frank, New Haven Fire Department, New Haven, Connecticut ............... 488 

Rivkin, David B., Jr., Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Washington, DC ......... 564 

Rosenkranz, Nicholas Quinn, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC ...................................................................... 548 

Serrano, Jose ́ E., a U.S. Representative from New York ..................................... 562 

Shaw, Theodore M., Professor, Columbia Law School, New York, New York .... 540 

Somin, Ilya, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, 

Virginia ................................................................................................................. 529 

Stith, Kate, Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law, Yale Law School, New 

Haven, Connecticut .............................................................................................. 521 

Vargas, Ben, Lieutenant, New Haven Fire Department ...................................... 489 

Vela ́zquez, Nydia M., a Representative in Congress from the State of New 

York ....................................................................................................................... 538

Yoest, Charmaine, President and CEO, Americans United for Life, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 523 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Kim J. Askew to questions submitted by Senators Grassley 

and Sessions ......................................................................................................... 576 

Responses of Sandy Froman to questions submitted by Senator Hatch ............. 581 

Responses of Stephen Halbrook to questions submitted by Senators Coburn 

and Hatch ............................................................................................................. 585 

Responses of Peter Kirsanow to questions submitted by Senator Hatch ............ 596 

Responses of David Kopel to questions submitted by Senators Coburn and 

Hatch ..................................................................................................................... 599 

Responses of John O. McGinnis to questions submitted by Senator Hatch ....... 604 

Responses of Neomi Rao to questions submitted by Senators Sessions and 

Hatch ..................................................................................................................... 606 

Responses of David Rivkin to questions submitted by Senators Hatch and 

Sessions ................................................................................................................. 612 

Responses of Nicholas Rosenkranz to questions submitted by Senators Sessions, Hatch and Klobuchar ................................................................................ 615 

Page

V 

Responses of Ilya Somin to questions submitted by Senators Sessions, Grassley and Hatch ....................................................................................................... 624 

Responses of Sonia Sotomayor to questions submitted by Senators Sessions, 

Grassley, Kyl, Cornyn and Coburn ..................................................................... 633 

Cynthia Hogan, Counsel to the Vice President, letter .................................. 681 

Supplement questionnaire ............................................................................... 683 

Letters from Senator Sessions, July 8, 2009 .................................................. 703 

Responses to Senator Sessions letters ............................................................ 709 

Responses of Charmaine Yoest to questions submitted by Senator Coburn ...... 715 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Acosta, Raymond L., Federal Bar Association, Puerto Rico Chapter, resolution ........................................................................................................................ 718 

Alliance for Justice, Washington, DC, statement ................................................. 719 

Americans for Democratic Action, Darryl H. Fagin, Legislative Director, 

Washington, DC, letter ........................................................................................ 736 

Americans United for Life, Charmaine Yoest, Ph.D., President and CEO, 

Washington, DC: 

May 4, 2009, letter ........................................................................................... 737 

July 10, 2009, letter ......................................................................................... 738 

July 23, 2009, letter ......................................................................................... 741 

Comparison Chart ............................................................................................ 746 

Aponte, Mari Carmen, former Executive Director, Puerto Rico Federal Affairs 

Administration; Sandra Ruiz Butter, former President, VIP Community 

Services; Ernest J. Collazo, Collazo Carling & Mish LLP; George A. Davidson, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP; Dr. Ricardo Fernandez, President, 

Lehman College, City University of New York; Andres V. Gil; Davis, Polk 

& Wardwell, LLP; Ambassador Gabriel Guerra-Mondragon, former U.S. 

Ambassador to Chile; Dorothy James, former Provost and Dean of Faculty, 

Connecticut College; Harold S. Lewis Jr., Walter F. George Professor of 

Law, Mercer University Walter F. George School of Law; Benito Romano 

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP; Judah C. Sommer, Senior Vice President, UnitedHealth Group, Inc, July 7, 2009, letter ......................................... 757 

Aponte, Ricardo, Esq., Executive Director, Republican Part of Puerto Rico, 

San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 22, 2009, letter .................................................... 760 

Arizona Hispanic, Chamber of Commerce, Armando A. Contreras, President 

and CEO, Phoenix, Arizona, letter ..................................................................... 763 

Arizona Law School, Charles Calleros, June 10, 2009, letter .............................. 765 

Arredondo, Rudy, President and CEO, National Latino Farmers & Ranchers 

Trade Association, Washington, DC, May 6, 2009, letter ................................. 767 

Askew, Kim J., Esq., Chair, American Bar Association, Standing Committee 

on the Federal Judiciary, Washington, D.C., statement and attachment ....... 769 

ASPIRA Association Inc., Ronald Blackburn Moreno, President and CEO, 

Washington, DC, June 15, 2009, letter .............................................................. 801 

Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Patricia M. Hynes, President, 

New York, New York: 

June 30, 2009, letter ........................................................................................ 802 

June 30, 2009, article ....................................................................................... 807 

Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, Glenn F. Ivey, Chairman, and David 

R. LaBahn, President and CEO, Washington, DC, July 10, 2009, letter ........ 809 

Baca, Leroy D., Sheriff, Los Angeles County, Montereo Park, California, July 

7, 2009, letter ....................................................................................................... 810 

Bloomberg, Michael, Mayor of New York, New York, statement and letter ...... 812 

California Women Lawyers, Jean Pledger, President, Sacramento, California, 

July 11, 2009, letter ............................................................................................. 816 

Canterbury, Chuck, President, National Fraternal Order of Police, Myrtle 

Beach, South Carolina, statement ...................................................................... 817 

Center for Inquiry Office of Public Policy, Toni Van Pelt, Policy Director, 

Washington, DC, July 9, 2009, letter ................................................................. 828 

Chavez, Linda, Chairman, Center for Equal Opportunity, Falls Church, Virginia, statement ................................................................................................... 830 

Clinton, Hon. William Jefferson (Bill), U.S. State President, July 14, 2009, 

letter ...................................................................................................................... 841 

Club for Growth, Chris Chocola, President, Washington, DC, July 14, 2009, 

letter ...................................................................................................................... 842 

CNN, Ken Starr Backs Sotomayor Court Bid, June 19, 2009, article ................. 844 

Page

VI 

Concerned Women for America Legislative Action Committee, Wendy Wright, 

President, Washington, DC, July 9, 2009, letter ............................................... 845 

Cone, David B., Professional Baseball player, New York, statement ................. 848 

Corralejo, Jorge C., Chairman & CEO, Latino Business Chamber of Greater 

Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, June 2, 2009, letter .............................. 856 

C–SPAN, July, 10, 2009, article ............................................................................. 858 

Cuban American National Council, Inc., Guarione M. Diaz, President and 

CEO, Washington, DC, June 6, 2009, letter ...................................................... 861 

Cuomo, Andrew M., Attorney General, New York, New York, June 12, 2009, 

letter ...................................................................................................................... 863 

Diaz, Manuel A., Mayor, City of Miami, Miami, Florida, June 1, 2009, letter .. 864 

Diaz, Nelson A., Cozen O’Connor, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, June 3, 2009, 

letter ...................................................................................................................... 865 

Detectives’ Endowment Association, Inc., Michael J. Palladino, President, 

New York City Police Department, New York, New York, June 11, 2009, 

letter ...................................................................................................................... 867 

Doan, Lurita, Great Falls, Virginia, June 13, 2009, letter ................................... 868 

Earthjustice; Center for Biological Diversity; Center for International Environmental Law; Clean Water Action; Defenders of Wildlife; Endangered 

Species Coalition; Friends of the Earth; GreenPeace USA; International 

Fund for Animal Welfare; League of Conservation Voters; National Audubon Society; National Hispanic Environmental Council; National Wildlife 

Federation; Sierra Club; and The Wilderness Society, etc., July 9, 2009, 

joint letter ............................................................................................................. 873 

Epps, JoAnne A., Dean, Temple University Beasley School of Law, Co-Chair 

of the Committee for the Evaluation of Supreme Court Nominees, National 

Association of Women Lawyers, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, statement ....... 878 

Feldman, Richard J., Esq., statement .................................................................... 891 

Fortun ̃ o, Luis G., Governor, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto 

Rico, May 26, 2009, letter .................................................................................... 894 

FRC Action, Thomas McClusky, Senior Vice President, Washington, DC, July 

14, 2009, letter ..................................................................................................... 899 

Freeh, Louis J., former Director of the FBI, statement ....................................... 900 

Froman, Sandra S., Attorney, Gun Rights Advocate, and former President 

of the National Rifle Association, Tucson, Arizona, statement ........................ 904 

Garcia, Michael J., former Attorney for the Southern District of New York, 

New York City, New York, statement ................................................................ 910 

Gonza ́lez-Valentin, Katherine, President, Federal Bar Association, June 1, 

2009, letter ............................................................................................................ 913 

Gonza ́lez-Colon, Jennifer A., Vice Chair of Puerto Rico’s Republican Party, 

San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 9, 2009, letter ...................................................... 914 

Halbrook, Stephen P., Attorney, Fairfax, Virginia, statement ............................ 919 

Haynes, Patricia, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, statement ... 932 

Helmke, Paul, President, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, Washington, DC, July 16, 2009, letter ......................................................................... 940 

Henderson, Wade, President and CEO, Leadership Conference on Civil 

Rights, Washington, D.C., statement ................................................................. 941 

Hispanic Engineers Business Corporation, Rodrigo T. Garcia, P.E., Monterey 

Park, California, June 8, 2009, letter ................................................................. 948 

Hollman, K. Holly, General Counsel, Baptist Joint Committee for Religious 

Liberty, article ...................................................................................................... 949 

Holmes, George, Executive Director & Chief Operating Officer, CORE-Congress of Racial Equality, New York, New York, July 17, 2009 letter to 

Senator Cardin, duplicate letters to Senators Coburn, Cornyn, Durbin, 

Franken, Feingold, Feinstein, Graham, Grassley, Hatch, Kaufman, Klobuchar, Kohl, Kyl, Leahy, Sessions, Specter, Schumer and Whitehouse 

being retained in Committee files ....................................................................... 954 

Human Rights Campaign, Washington, DC, statement ....................................... 955 

Human Rights Institute, Columbia Law School, New York, New York, statement ...................................................................................................................... 959 

Iglesias, Elizabeth M., Professor, University of Miami School of Law, Center 

for Hispanic & Caribbean Legal Studies 

June 3, 2009, letter .......................................................................................... 963 

June 18, 2009, letter ........................................................................................ 967 

Jeffries, Tim, Scottsdale, Arizona, statement ........................................................ 974 

Page

VII 

Kirsanow, Peter N., Partner, Benesch, Friedlander, Copland & Aronoff LLP 

and Commissioner, Commission on Civil Rights, Cleveland, Ohio, statement ...................................................................................................................... 982 

Kopel, David B., Research Director, Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado, 

Associate Policy Analyst, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C., statement ......... 999 

Land, Richard D., President, The Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission, 

Washington, DC, July 14, 2009, letter ............................................................... 1008 

Latino Justice PRLDEF, statement ....................................................................... 1009 

Law Clerks, former, June 1, 2009, Letter .............................................................. 1011 

LDF Defend Education Empower, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 

Fund, Inc., statement ........................................................................................... 1015 

Law Professor, undersigned, letter and data table ............................................... 1046 

Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, Nicholas T. Christakos, Co-Chair and 

John S. Kiernan, Co-chair, Washington, DC, letter and attachment .............. 1075 

Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Washington, DC, July 7, 2009, joint 

letter ...................................................................................................................... 1082 

Leon, Lilia R., Councilwoman, City of Commerce, Commerce, California, June 

4, 2009, letter ....................................................................................................... 1088 

Major Cities Chiefs Association, William J. Bratton, Chief of Police, June 

7, 2009, letter ....................................................................................................... 1089 

MALDEF, Henry L. Solano, Interim President & General Counsel, Washington, DC, July 16, 2009, letter ......................................................................... 1090 

MANA de Albuquerque, Lydia Lopez Maestas, Albuquerque, New Mexico: 

June 2, 2009, letter .......................................................................................... 1093 

June 9, 2009, letter .......................................................................................... 1094 

Martinez, Iris Y., State Senator 20th District, Chicago, Illinois, letter and 

Resolution ............................................................................................................. 1196 

McDaniel, Dustin, Attorney General for the State of Arkansas, Little Rock, 

Arkansas, statement ............................................................................................ 1100 

McGinnis, John O., Professor, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois, statement ....................................................................................... 1106 

Mele ́ndez-Altieri, Maria E., DMD, Mayor of the City of Ponce, Ponce, Puerto 

Rico, June 5, 2009, letter ..................................................................................... 1125 

Morgenthau, Robert M., District Attorney, Manhattan, New York, statement . 1126 

NARAL Pro-Choice America Foundation, Nancy Keenan, President, statement ...................................................................................................................... 1130

National Advocacy Organizations, July 7, 2009, joint letter ................................ 1141 

National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, Arturo 

Vargas, Executive Director, Los Angeles, California, July 10, 2009, letter .... 1144 

National Association of Police Organizations, Inc, Thomas J. Nee, President, 

Alexandria, Virginia, June 5, 2009, letter ......................................................... 1146 

National Association of Social Workers, Elizabeth J. Clark, PhD, ACSW, 

MPH, Executive Director, Washington, DC, June 3, 2009, letter .................... 1147 

National Association of Women Lawyers, Lisa B. Horowitz, Washington, DC: 

July 7, 2009, letter ........................................................................................... 1148 

July 7, 2009, news release ............................................................................... 1158 

National Council of Jewish Women, Nancy Ratzan, Washington, DC, July 

13, 2009, letter ..................................................................................................... 1160 

National District Attorneys Association, Joseph I Cassilly, President, Alexandria, Virginia, June 8, 2009, letter ..................................................................... 1161 

National Fraternal Order of Police, Chuck Canterbury, National President, 

Washington, DC, June 9, 2009, letter ................................................................ 1163 

National Hispanic Christian leadership Conference, Dr. Jesse Miranda, President, Sacramento, California, letter ................................................................... 1165 

National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, Dr. Gabriela D. Lemus, Chair, Washington, DC, June 9, 2009, letter .......................................................................... 1167 

National Journal, Washington, DC, articles ......................................................... 1168 

National Latino Peace Officers Association, Art Acevedo, National President, 

Santa Ana, California, May 26, 2009, letter ...................................................... 1174 

National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, Joseph A. McMillan, National President, Alexandria, Virginia, June 8, 2009, letter .......... 1175 

National Puerto Rican Coalition, Inc., Rafael Fantauzzi, President & CEO, 

Washington, DC, July 13, 2009, letter ............................................................... 1176 

National Rifle Association of America, Chris W. Cox, Executive Director, 

Fairfax, Virginia, July 7, 2009, letters ............................................................... 1177 

National Sheriffs’ Association, Sheriff David A. Goad, President and Aaron 

D. Kennard, Executive Director, Alexandria, Virginia, June 8, 2009, letter .. 1182 

Page

VIII 

National Women’s Law Center, Washington, D.C. article ................................... 1183 

New York City Housing Authority, Ricardo Elias Morales, Chairman, New 

York, New York, May 28, 2009, letter ................................................................ 1187 

New York County District Attorney, former Colleagues, New York, New York, 

July 2, 2009, letter ............................................................................................... 1188 

New York Daily News, May 28, 2009, article ....................................................... 1190 

New York State Law Enforcement Council, New York, New York, letter .......... 1191 

New York Times: 

May 27, 2009, article ........................................................................................ 1192 

May 27, 2009, article ........................................................................................ 1196 

June 6, 2009, article ......................................................................................... 1198 

June 16, 2009, article ....................................................................................... 1202 

June 30, 2009, article ....................................................................................... 1204 

July 10, 2009, article ........................................................................................ 1207 

July 12, 2009, article ........................................................................................ 1210 

Ortiz, Felix W., Member of Assembly, Kings County, May 28, 2009 .................. 1221 

Pace Law School, Faculty Members, White Plains, New York, June 23, 2009, 

letter ...................................................................................................................... 1222 

People for the American Way, Michael B. Keegan, President, Marge Baker, 

Executive Vice President for Policy and Program Planning, Washington, 

DC, July 10, 2009 ................................................................................................. 1224 

Presente.org, Berkeley, California, July 11, 2009, letter (over 5,000 signatures 

being retained in Committee files) ..................................................................... 1230 

Primus, Richard, Professor of Law, John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellow in Constitutional Studies, Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 16, 

2009, letter ............................................................................................................ 1232 

Professors of Disability Law, Michael Waterstone, Professor of Law, Associate 

Dean of Academic Programs, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California, 

etc, June 30, 2009, letter ..................................................................................... 1241 

Quintana, Rachel, Representative, El Paso, Texas, June 29, 2009, letter .......... 1245 

Rao, Neomi, Professor, George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, 

Virginia, statement .............................................................................................. 1247 

Ricci, Frank, New Haven Fire Department, New Haven, Connecticut, statement ...................................................................................................................... 1255

Rivkin, David B., Jr., Partner, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Washington, DC, 

statement .............................................................................................................. 1259 

Roman, Encida, Esq., letter .................................................................................... 1270 

Romero, Ramona E., National President, Hispanic National Bar Association, 

statement .............................................................................................................. 1271 

Rosenkranz, Nicholas Quinn, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC, statement ................................................... 1284 

Rubin, Jennifer, June 16, 2009, article .................................................................. 1292 

Russo-Killeen, Carmela, Cardinal High School Spellman, Bronx, New York, 

June 26, 2009, letter ............................................................................................ 1299 

Rivera-O’Reilly, Nereida, Senator, Virgin Island, June 12, 2009, letter ............. 1300 

San Juan Municipal Legislature, Carmen M. Quin ̃ ones, San Juan, Puerto 

Rico, June 2, 2009, letter ..................................................................................... 1301 

Schoenke, Ray, President, American Hunters & Shooters, Association, June 

29, 2009, letter ..................................................................................................... 1305 

Scotusblog.com, May 29, 2009, posting .................................................................. 1310 

Serrano, Jose ́ E., a U.S. House of Representative from New York: 

statement .......................................................................................................... 1311 

October 2, 1998, article .................................................................................... 1314 

October 2, 1998, tribute ................................................................................... 1316 

Servera, Ivette, Chairperson, Connecticut General Assembly’s, Latino and 

Puerto Rican Affairs Commission, Hartford, Connecticut, June 17, 2009, 

letter ...................................................................................................................... 1317 

Shaw, Theodore M., Professor, Columbia Law School, New York, New York, 

statement .............................................................................................................. 1323 

Sierra Club, Carl Pope, Executive Director and Dr. Gabriela Lemus, Chair, 

National Latino Coalition on Climate Changes ................................................. 1330 

Society of American Law Teachers, Margaret Martin Barry, Co-President 

and Deborah Waire Post, Co-President, Central Islip, New York, June 

25, 2009, letter ..................................................................................................... 1331 

Somin, Ilya, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, 

Virginia, statement .............................................................................................. 1333 

Southern New York Female Lawyers, letter ......................................................... 1345 

Page

IX 

Stith, Kate, Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law, Yale Law School, New 

Haven, Connecticut, statement ........................................................................... 1352 

Trac Report Inc., report ........................................................................................... 1355 

United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, Washington, DC, June 23, 

2009, letter ............................................................................................................ 1359 

United States Senate, Judiciary Committee, Majority Staff, Washington, DC, 

study ...................................................................................................................... 1362 

Vargas, Ben, Lieutenant, New Haven, Connecticut, statement .......................... 1365 

Vela ́zquez, Nydia M., a Representatives in Congress from the State of New 

York, statement .................................................................................................... 1367 

Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2009, article ............................................................ 1369 

Walpin, Gerald, New York, New York, letter and statement .............................. 1371 

Washington, Post, July 9, 2009, article ................................................................. 1377 

Wexler, Chuck, Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC, June 8, 2009, letter .......................................................................... 1381 

Women of EL Barrio, Sandra Talavera, Chair, El Barrio, New York, May 

8, 2009, letter ....................................................................................................... 1386 

Yoest, Charmaine, President and CEO, Americans United for Life, Washington, DC, statement .......................................................................................... 1388 

ADDITIONAL SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Submissions for the record not printed due to voluminous nature, previously 

printed by an agency of the Federal Government, or other criteria determined by the Committee, list: 

Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, Monica 

Young, New York, New York, report 

Hispanic National Bar Association, Report 

Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, DC, Report 

Congressional Research Service, Anna C. Henning, Coordinator, Legislative 

Attorney and Kenneth R. Thomas, Coordinator, Legislative Attorney, June 

19, 2009, report 

Holmes, George, Executive Director & Chief Operating Officer, CORE-Congress of Racial Equality, New York, New York, July 17, 2009 duplicate 

letters to Senators Coburn, Cornyn, Durbin, Franken, Feingold, Feinstein, 

Graham, Grassley, Hatch, Kaufman, Klobuchar, Kohl, Kyl, Leahy, Sessions, 

Specter, Schumer and Whitehouse 

(1) 

NOMINATION OF HON. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, 

TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

MONDAY, JULY 13, 2009 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 09:58 a.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Kohl, Feinstein, Feingold, Schumer, 

Durbin, Cardin, Whitehouse, Klobuchar, Kaufman, Specter, 

Franken, Sessions, Hatch, Grassley, Kyl, Graham, Cornyn, and 

Coburn. 

Chairman LEAHY. I will give everybody a chance to get in place 

here. 

What we are going to do, we are going to have opening statements from members—and, of course, this is, as we all know, the 

confirmation hearing on the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor 

to be a Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 

Judge Sotomayor., welcome to the Senate Judiciary Committee. 

You have been before us twice before when President George H.W. 

Bush nominated you to be district judge and then, of course, when 

President Clinton nominated you as a court of appeals judge. 

Before we begin the opening statements of the Senators, I know 

you have family members here, and I do not know if your microphone is on or not, but would you please introduce the members 

of your family? 

Judge Sotomayor. If I introduced everybody that’s family-like, 

we’d be here all morning, so I’m—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Okay. I will tell you what. You know what I 

am going to do? 

Judge Sotomayor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Because someday this will be in the archives, 

this transcript. Introduce whomever you like, and then we will hold 

the transcript open for you to add any other names you want. 

[Laughter.] 

Judge Sotomayor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will limit myself 

to just my immediate family. 

Sitting behind me is my brother, Juan Sotomayor. Next to him 

is my mom, Celina Sotomayor. Next to her is my favorite husband 

of my mom, Omar Lopez. Next to him is my niece, Kylie 

Sotomayor. And next to her is her mom and my sister-in-law, Tracy 

2 

Sotomayor. Then there is Corey, Connor—Corey and Connor 

Sotomayor. I shouldn’t have said—I should have said their last 

name first together. And the remainder of that row is filled with 

godchildren and dear friends. But this is my immediate family. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, thank you very much. I remember reading about the marshals being surprised at your swearing-in as a 

district court judge because they had never seen such a large crowd 

of friends and supporters arrive. 

What we are going to do is each Senator will give a 10-minute 

opening statement. I would hope that all Senators would be able 

to be here today. If they are not, and if they want to give an opening statement, it will have to come out of their question time tomorrow. 

Senator Schumer will give a shorter opening statement than the 

others because he is going to reserve some of his time as a later 

introduction. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VERMONT, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

Chairman LEAHY. I would note for the record we are considering 

the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to be a Justice of the 

United States Supreme Court. Our Constitution is interesting in 

this regard. We have over 300 million Americans, but only 101 people get a chance to say who is going to be on the Supreme Court: 

first and foremost, of course, the President—in this case President 

Obama—who made the nomination; and then 100 Senators have to 

stand in place of all almost 320 million Americans in considering 

the appointment. The President has done his part. He has made a 

historic nomination. Now the Senate has to do its part on behalf 

of the Senate people—on behalf of the American people. 

President Obama often quotes Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s insight that ‘‘the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.’’ Each generation of Americans has sought that arc toward justice. We have improved upon the foundation of our Constitution through the Bill of Rights, the Civil War amendments, the 

19th Amendment’s expansion of the right to vote to women, the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the 

26th Amendment’s extension of the right to vote to young people. 

These actions have marked progress toward our more perfect 

union, and I believe this nomination can be another step along that 

path. 

Judge Sotomayor.’s journey to this hearing room is a truly American story. She was raised by her mother, Celina, a nurse, in the 

South Bronx. Like her mother, Sonia Sotomayor worked hard. She 

graduated as the valedictorian of her class at Blessed Sacrament 

and at Cardinal Spellman High School in New York. She was a 

member of just the third class at Princeton University in which 

women were included. She continued to work hard, including reading classics that had been unavailable to her when she was younger and arranging tutoring to improve her writing. She graduated 

summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa; she was awarded the M. Taylor Senior Pyne Prize for scholastic excellence and service to the 

3 

university. I would mention that is an honor that is given for outstanding merit. 

After excelling at Princeton, she entered Yale Law School, where 

she was an active member of the law school community. Upon 

graduation, she had many options, but she chose to serve her community in the New York District Attorney’s Office. And I might say 

parenthetically, every one of us who has had the privilege to be a 

prosecutor knows what kind of a job that is and how hard it is. 

There she prosecuted murders, robberies, assaults, and child pornography. 

The first President Bush named her to the Federal bench in 

1992, and she served as a trial judge for 6 years. President Clinton 

named her to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit where she has served for more than 10 years. She was confirmed each time by a bipartisan majority in the Senate. 

Judge Sotomayor’s qualifications are outstanding. She has more 

Federal court judicial experience than any nominee to the United 

States Supreme Court in nearly 100 years. She is the first nominee 

in well over a century to be nominated to three different Federal 

judgeships by three different Presidents. She is the first nominee 

in 50 years to be nominated to the Supreme Court after serving as 

both a Federal trial judge and a Federal appellate judge. She will 

be the only current Supreme Court Justice to have served as a trial 

judge. She was a prosecutor and a lawyer in private practice. She 

brings a wealth and diversity of experience to the Court. I hope all 

Americans are encouraged by Judge Sotomayor’s achievements and 

by her nomination to the Nation’s highest court. Hers is a success 

story in which all—all—Americans can take pride. 

Those who break barriers often face the added burden of overcoming prejudice, and that has been true on the Supreme Court. 

Thurgood Marshall graduated first in his law school class. He was 

the lead counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. He sat on the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; he served 

as the Nation’s top lawyer, the Solicitor General of the United 

States. He won a remarkable 29 out of 32 cases before the Supreme 

Court. But despite all of these qualifications and achievements, 

when he was before the Senate for his confirmation, he was asked 

questions designed to embarrass him, questions such as ‘‘Are you 

prejudiced against the white people of the South? ’’ I hope that is 

a time of our past. 

The confirmation of Justice Louis Brandeis, the first Jewish 

American to be nominated to the high Court, was a struggle rife 

with anti-Semitism and charges that he was a ‘‘radical.’’ The commentary at the time included questions about ‘‘the Jewish mind’’ 

and how ‘‘its operations are complicated by altruism.’’ Likewise, the 

first Catholic nominee had to overcome the argument that ‘‘as a 

Catholic he would be dominated by the pope.’’ 

We are in a different era, and I would trust that all members of 

this Committee here today will reject the efforts of partisans and 

outside pressure groups that have sought to create a caricature of 

Judge Sotomayor while belittling her record, her achievements, and 

her intelligence. Let no one demean—let no one demand—this extraordinary woman, her success, or her understanding of the constitutional duties she has faithfully performed for the last 17 years. 

4 

And I hope all Senators will join together as we did when we considered President Reagan’s nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor as 

the first woman to serve on the Supreme Court. There every Democrat and every Republican voted to confirm her. 

This hearing is an opportunity for Americans to see and hear 

Judge Sotomayor for themselves and to consider her qualifications. 

It is the most transparent confirmation hearing ever held. Her decisions and confirmation materials have been posted online and 

made publicly available. The record is significantly more complete 

than that available when we considered President Bush’s nominations of John Roberts and Samuel Alito just a few years ago. The 

judge’s testimony will be carried live on several television stations 

and also live via webcast—something that I have set for the Judiciary Committee website. 

My review of her judicial record leads me to conclude that she 

is a careful and restrained judge with a deep respect for judicial 

precedent and for the powers of the other branches of the Government, including the law-making role of Congress. That conclusion 

is supported by a number of independent studies that have been 

made of her record and shines through in a comprehensive review 

of her tough and fair record in criminal cases. She has a deep understanding of the real lives—the real lives—of Americans and the 

duty of law enforcement to help keep Americans safe and the responsibilities of all of us to respect the freedoms that define America. 

Now, unfortunately, some have sought to twist her words and 

her record and to engage in partisan political attacks. Ideological 

pressure groups began attacking her even before the President 

made his selection. They then stepped up their attacks by threatening Republican Senators who do not oppose her. That is not the 

American way, and that should not be the Senate way. 

In truth, we do not have to speculate about what kind of a Justice she will be because we have seen what kind of a judge she has 

been. She is a judge in which all Americans can have confidence. 

She has been a judge for all Americans, and she will be a Justice 

for all Americans. 

Our ranking Republican Senator on this Committee reflected on 

the confirmation process recently, saying: ‘‘What I found was that 

charges come flying in from right and left that are unsupported 

and false. It’s very, very difficult for a nominee to push back. So 

I think we have a high responsibility to base any criticisms that 

we have on a fair and honest statement of the facts and that nominees should not be subjected to distortions of their record.’’ I agree 

with Senator Sessions. As we proceed, let no one distort the judge’s 

record. Let us be fair to her and to the American people by not misrepresenting her views. 

We are a country bound together by our magnificent Constitution. It guarantees the promise that our country will be a country 

based on the rule of law. In her service as a Federal judge, Sonia 

Sotomayor has kept faith with that promise. She understands that 

there is not one law for one race or another. There is not one law 

for one color or another. There is not one law for rich and a different one for poor. There is only one law. And, Judge, I remember 

so well when you sat in my office, and you said that ‘‘ultimately 

5 

and completely’’ a judge has to follow the law, no matter what their 

upbringing has been. That is the kind of fair and impartial judging 

the American people expect. That is respect for the rule of law. And 

that is the kind of judge Judge Sotomayor has been. That is the 

kind of fair and impartial Justice she will be and that the American people deserve. 

Judge Sotomayor. has been nominated to replace Justice Souter, 

whose retirement last month has left the Court with only eight 

Justices. Justice Souter served the Nation with distinction for nearly two decades on the Supreme Court with a commitment to justice, an admiration for the law, and an understanding of the impact 

of the Court’s decisions on the daily lives of ordinary Americans. 

I believe that Judge Sotomayor will be in this same mold and will 

serve as a Justice in the manner of Sandra Day O’Connor, committed to the law and not to ideology. 

In the weeks and months leading up to this hearing, I have 

heard the President and Senators from both sides of the aisle make 

reference to the engraving over the entrance of the Supreme Court. 

I look at that every time I go up there. It is carved in Vermont 

marble, and it says: ‘‘Equal Justice Under Law.’’ Judge Sotomayor’s 

nomination keeps faith with those words. 

Senator SESSIONS. 

STATEMENT OF JEFF SESSIONS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

your leadership, and I believe you have set up some rules for the 

conducting of this hearing that are consistent with past hearings 

and I believe allow us to do our work together. And I have enjoyed 

working with you on this process. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. I hope this will be viewed as the best hearing 

this Committee has ever had. Why not? We should seek that. So 

I join Chairman Leahy, Judge Sotomayor, in welcoming you here 

today. 

It marks an important milestone in your life. I know your family 

is proud, and rightly so. And it is a pleasure to have them with us 

today. 

I expect this hearing and resulting debate will be characterized 

by a respectful tone, a discussion of serious issues, a thoughtful 

dialogue, and maybe some disagreements. But we have worked 

hard to set that tone from the beginning. 

I have been an active litigator in Federal courts. I have tried 

cases as a Federal prosecutor and as Attorney General of Alabama. 

The Constitution and our great heritage of law I care deeply 

about. They are the foundation of our liberty and our prosperity, 

and this nomination hearing is critical for two important reasons. 

First, Justices on the Supreme Court have great responsibility, 

hold enormous power, and have a lifetime appointment. Just five 

members can declare the meaning of our Constitution, bending or 

changing its meaning from what the people intended. 

Second, this hearing is important because I believe our legal system is at a dangerous crossroads. Down one path is the traditional 

American system, so admired around the world, where judges imVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
6 

partially apply the law to the facts without regard to personal 

views. 

This is the compassionate system because it is the fair system. 

In the American legal system, courts do not make the law or set 

policy, because allowing unelected officials to make law would 

strike at the heart of our democracy. 

Here, judges take an oath to administer justice impartially. That 

oath reads: ‘‘I . . . do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the rich and 

the poor, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and 

perform all the duties incumbent upon me . . . under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.’’ 

These principles give the traditional system its moral authority, 

which is why Americans respect and accept the rulings of courts— 

even when they disagree. 

Indeed, our legal system is based on a firm belief in an ordered 

universe and objective truth. The trial is the process by which the 

impartial and wise judge guides us to truth. 

Down the other path lies a Brave New World where words have 

no true meaning and judges are free to decide what facts they 

choose to see. In this world, a judge is free to push his or her own 

political or social agenda. I reject that view, and Americans reject 

that view. 

We have seen Federal judges force their own political and social 

agenda on the Nation, dictating that the words ‘‘under God’’ be removed from the Pledge of Allegiance and barring students from 

even private—even silent prayer in schools. 

Judges have dismissed the people’s right to their property, saying 

the Government can take a person’s home for the purpose of developing a private shopping center. 

Judges have—contrary to longstanding rules of war—created a 

right for terrorists, captured on a foreign battlefield, to sue the 

United States Government in our own country. 

Judges have cited foreign laws, world opinion, and a United Nations resolution to determine that a State death penalty law was 

unconstitutional. 

I am afraid our system will only be further corrupted, I have to 

say, as a result of President Obama’s views that, in tough cases, 

the critical ingredient for a judge is the ‘‘depth and breadth of one’s 

empathy,’’ as well as, his word, ‘‘their broader vision of what America should be.’’ 

Like the American people, I have watched this process for a 

number of years, and I fear that this ‘‘empathy standard’’ is another step down the road to a liberal activist, results-oriented, and 

relativistic world where laws lose their fixed meaning, unelected 

judges set policy, Americans are seen as members of separate 

groups rather than as simply Americans, and where the constitutional limits on Government power are ignored when politicians 

want to buy out private companies. So we have reached a fork in 

the road, I think, and there are stark differences. 

I want to be clear: 

I will not vote for—and no senator should vote for—an individual 

nominated by any President who is not fully committed to fairness 

and impartiality toward every person who appears before them. 

7 

I will not vote for—and no Senator should vote for—an individual 

nominated by any President who believes it is acceptable for a 

judge to allow their personal background, gender, prejudices, or 

sympathies to sway their decision in favor of, or against, parties 

before the court. In my view, such a philosophy is disqualifying. 

Such an approach to judging means that the umpire calling the 

game is not neutral, but instead feels empowered to favor one team 

over the other. 

Call it empathy, call it prejudice, or call it sympathy, but whatever it is, it is not law. In truth, it is more akin to politics, and 

politics has no place in the courtroom. 

Some will respond, ‘‘Judge Sotomayor would never say it’s acceptable for a judge to display prejudice in a case.’’ But I regret to 

say, Judge, that some of your statements that I will outline seem 

to say that clearly. Let’s look at just a few examples. 

We have seen the video of the Duke University panel where 

Judge Sotomayor says ‘‘It is [the] Court of Appeals where policy is 

made. And I know, and I know, that this is on tape, and I should 

never say that, and should not think that.’’ 

And during a speech 15 years ago, Judge Sotomayor said, ‘‘I willingly accept that we who judge must not deny the differences resulting from experience and heritage but attempt . . . continuously to judge when those opinions, sympathies, and prejudices are 

appropriate.’’ 

And in the same speech, she said, ‘‘my experiences will affect the 

facts I choose to see. . .’’ 

Having tried a lot of cases, that particular phrase bothers me. I 

expect every judge to see all the facts. 

So I think it is noteworthy that, when asked about Judge 

Sotomayor’s now-famous statement that a ‘‘wise Latina’’ would 

come to a better conclusion than others, President Obama, White 

House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, and Supreme Court Justice 

Ginsburg declined to defend the substance of those remarks. They 

each assumed that the nominee misspoke. But I do not think it— 

but the nominee did not misspeak. She is on record as making this 

statement at least five times over the course of a decade. 

I am providing a copy of the full text of those speeches for the 

record. 

[The speeches appear as a submission for the record.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Others will say that, despite these statements, 

we should look to the nominee’s record, which they characterize as 

‘‘moderate.’’ People said the same of Justice Ginsburg, who is now 

considered to be one of the most members of the Supreme Court 

in history. 

Some Senators ignored Justice Ginsburg’s philosophy and focused on the nominee’s judicial opinions. But that is not a good test 

because those cases were necessarily restrained by precedent and 

the threat of reversal from higher courts. 

On the Supreme Court, those checks on judicial power will be removed, and the judge’s philosophy will be allowed to reach full 

bloom. 

But even as a lower court judge, our nominee has made some 

troubling rulings. I am concerned by Ricci, the New Haven Firefighters case—recently reversed by the Supreme Court—where she 

8 

agreed with the City of New Haven’s decision to change the promotion rules in the middle of the game. Incredibly, her opinion consisted of just one substantive paragraph of analysis. 

Judge Sotomayor has said that she accepts that her opinions, 

sympathies, and prejudices will affect her rulings. Could it be that 

her time as a leader in the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, a fine organization, provides a clue to her decision 

against the firefighters? 

While the nominee was Chair of that fund’s Litigation Committee, the organization aggressively pursued racial quotas in city 

hiring and, in numerous cases, fought to overturn the results of 

promotion exams. It seems to me that in Ricci, Judge Sotomayor’s 

empathy for one group of firefighters turned out to be prejudice 

against another. 

That is, of course, the logical flaw in the ‘‘empathy standard.’’ 

Empathy for one party is always prejudice against another. 

Judge Sotomayor, we will inquire into how your philosophy, 

which allows subjectivity in the courtroom, affects your decisionmaking like, for example, in abortion, where an organization in 

which you were an active leader argued that the Constitution requires taxpayer money to fund abortions; and gun control, where 

you recently noted it is ‘‘settled law’’ that the Second Amendment 

does not prevent a city or State from barring gun ownership; private property, where you have ruled recently that the Government 

could take property from one pharmacy developer and give it to another; capital punishment, where you personally signed a statement opposing the reinstatement of the death penalty in New York 

because of the ‘‘inhuman[e] psychological burden’’ it places on the 

offender and the family. 

So I hope the American people will follow these hearings closely. 

They should learn about the issues and listen to both sides of the 

argument, and at the end of the hearing ask: ‘‘If I must one day 

go to court, what kind of judge do I wish to hear my case? ’’ 

‘‘Do I want a judge that allows his or her social, political, or religious views to change the outcome? Or do I want a judge that impartially applies the law to the facts and fairly rules on the merits, 

without bias or prejudice? ’’ 

It is our job to determine on which side of that fundamental divide the nominee stands. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Another housekeeping thing. We are going to try to keep these 

opening statements to 10 minutes. I will recognize Senators on the 

Democratic side based on seniority. I have told Senator Sessions I 

will—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Likewise. 

Chairman LEAHY. That is what you want on your side. Then they 

will be recognized on your side by the same way. So the next Senator is Senator Kohl. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HERB KOHL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

WISCONSIN 

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

9 

Judge Sotomayor, let me also extend my welcome to you and to 

your family. You are to be congratulated on your nomination. 

Your nomination is a reflection of who we are as a country, and 

it represents an American success story that we all can be proud 

of. Your academic and professional accomplishments—as prosecutor, private practitioner, trial judge and appellate judge—are 

exemplary. And as a judge, you have brought a richness of experience to the bench and to the judiciary which has been an inspiration for so many. 

Today, we begin a process through which the Senate engages in 

its constitutional role to ‘‘advise and consent’’ on your nomination. 

This week’s hearing is the only opportunity we—and the American 

people—will have to learn about your judicial philosophy, your temperament, and your motivations before you put on the black robe 

and are heard from only in your opinions. 

The President has asked us to entrust you with an immense 

amount of power—power which, by design, is free from political 

constraints, unchecked by the people, and unaccountable to Congress, except in the most extreme circumstances. 

Our democracy, our rights, and everything we hold dear about 

America are built on the foundation of our Constitution. For more 

than 200 years, the Court has interpreted the meaning of the Constitution and, in so doing, guaranteed our most cherished rights: 

the right to equal education regardless of race; the right to an attorney and a fair trial for the accused; the right to personal privacy; the right to speak, vote, and worship without interference 

from the Government. Should you be confirmed, you and your colleagues will decide the future scope of our rights and the breadth 

of our freedoms. Your decisions will shape the fabric of American 

society for many years to come. 

And that is why it is so important that over the course of the 

next few days, we gain a good understanding of what is in your 

heart and in your mind. We don’t have a right to know in advance 

how you will rule on cases which will come before you. But we 

need—and we deserve—to know what you think about fundamental 

issues such as civil rights, privacy, property rights, the separation 

of church and state, and civil liberties, just to name a few. 

Some believe that the confirmation process has become thoroughly scripted and that nominees are far too careful in cloaking 

their answers to important questions in generalities and with caveats about future cases. I recognize this concern, but I also hope 

that you recognize our need to have a frank discussion about these 

important issues. 

And these are not just concepts for law books. They are issues 

Americans care about. As crime plagues our communities, we navigate the balance between individual rights and the duty of law enforcement to protect and maintain order. As families struggle to 

make ends meet in these difficult times, we question the permissible role for Government in helping get the economy back on 

track. As we continue to strive for equal rights in our schools and 

workplaces, we debate the tensions between admissions policies 

and hiring practices that acknowledge diversity, and those that attempt to be colorblind. 

10 

These issues invite all Americans to struggle with the dilemmas 

of democracy and the great questions of our Constitution. If we discuss them with candor, I believe we will have a conversation that 

the American people will profit from. 

When considering Supreme Court nominees over the years, I 

have judged each one with a test of judicial excellence. 

First, judicial excellence means the competence, character, and 

temperament that we expect of a Supreme Court Justice. He or she 

must have a keen understanding of the law and the ability to explain it in ways that both the litigants and the American people 

will understand and respect, even if they disagree with the outcome. 

Second, I look for a nominee to have the sense of values which 

form the core of our political and economic system. No one, including the President, has the right to require ideological purity from 

a member of the Supreme Court. But we do have a right to require 

that the nominee accept both the basic principles of the Constitution and its core values implanted in society. 

Third, we want a nominee with a sense of compassion. This is 

a quality that I have considered with the last six Supreme Court 

Justices. Compassion does not mean bias or lack of impartiality. It 

is meant to remind us that the law is more than an intellectual 

game and more than a mental exercise. 

As Justice Black said, ‘‘The courts stand against any winds that 

blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered or because they are 

non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement.’’ 

A Supreme Court Justice must also be able to recognize that real 

people with real problems are affected by the decisions rendered by 

the Court. He or she must have a connection with and an understanding of the problems that people struggle with on a daily basis. 

For justice, after all, may be blind, but it should not be deaf. 

As Justice Thomas told us at his confirmation hearing, it is important that a Justice ‘‘can walk in the shoes of the people who are 

affected by what the Court does.’’ I believe this comment embodies 

what President Obama intended when he said he wanted a nominee with ‘‘an understanding of how the world works and how ordinary people live.’’ 

Some critics are concerned that your background will inappropriately impact your decision making. But it is impossible for any of 

us to remove ourselves from our life story with all the twists and 

turns that make us who we are. 

As you have acknowledged, ‘‘My experiences in life unquestionably shape my attitudes.’’ And I hope that we on this Committee 

can appreciate and relate to ourselves what you said next: ‘‘. . . 

but I am cognizant enough that mine is not the only experience.’’ 

You will have an opportunity before this Committee to assure us 

that your life experiences will impact but not overwhelm your duty 

to follow the law and Constitution. 

After your confirmation to the Court of Appeals in 1998, you said 

about the discussions at your confirmation hearing, ‘‘So long as 

people of good will are participating in the process and attempting 

to be balanced in their approach, then the system will remain 

healthy.’’ I hope our process will include a healthy level of balanced 

11 

and respectful debate, and I look forward to the opportunity to 

learn more about you and what sort of Justice you aspire to be. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator HATCH. Also a former Chairman of this Committee. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

UTAH 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge, welcome 

to you and your good family. We are grateful to have all of you 

here. 

Now, this is the 12th hearing for a Supreme Court nomination 

in which I have participated, and I am as struck today as I was 

the first time by the seriousness of our responsibility and its impact on America. I am confident that under this Committee’s leadership, from both you, Mr. Chairman, and the distinguished Ranking Member, this hearing will be both respectful and substantive. 

Judge Sotomayor comes to this Committee for the third time, 

having served in the first two levels of the Federal judiciary and 

now being nominated to the third. She has a compelling life story 

and a strong record of educational and professional achievement. 

Her nomination speaks to the opportunities that America today 

provides for men and women of different backgrounds and heritage. 

The liberty we enjoy here in America makes these opportunities 

possible and requires our best efforts to protect that liberty. Our 

liberty rests on the foundation of a written Constitution that limits 

and separates government power, self-government by the people, 

and the rule of law. Those principles define the kind of judge our 

liberty requires. They define the role judges may play in our system of government. 

I have described my basic approach to the judicial confirmation 

process in more detail elsewhere, so I ask unanimous consent that 

my article published this year in the Harvard Journal of Law and 

Public Policy, entitled ‘‘The Constitution Is the Playbook for Judicial Selection,’’ be placed in the record, Mr. Chairman, if I can. 

Chairman LEAHY. Without objection. 

[The article appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator HATCH. My approach includes three elements: 

First, the Senate owes some deference to the President’s qualified nominees; 

Second, a judicial nominee’s qualifications include not only legal 

experience but, more importantly, judicial philosophy. By that I 

mean a nominee’s understanding of the power and proper role of 

judges in our system of government; 

Third, this standard must be applied to the nominee’s entire 

record. I have also found guidance from what may seem to be as 

an unusual source. On June 8, 2005, then-Senator Barack Obama 

explained his opposition to the appeals court nomination of Janice 

Rogers Brown, an African American woman with a truly compelling life story, who then served as a justice on the California Supreme Court. Senator Obama made three arguments that I find 

relevant today. 

First, he argued that the test of a qualified judicial nominee is 

whether she can set aside her personal views and, as he put it, ‘‘deVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
12 

cide each case on the facts and the merits alone. That is what our 

Founders intended. Judicial decisions ultimately have to be based 

on evidence and on facts. They have to be based on precedent and 

on law.’’ 

Second, Senator Obama extensively reviewed Justice Brown’s 

speeches off the court for clues about what he called her ‘‘overreaching judicial philosophy.’’ There is even more reason to do so 

today. This is, after all, a nomination to the Supreme Court of the 

United States of America. 

Judge Sotomayor, if confirmed, will help change the very precedents that today bind her as a circuit court of appeals judge. In 

other words, the judicial position to which she has been nominated 

is quite different than the judicial position she now occupies. This 

makes evidence outside of her appeals court decisions regarding 

her approach to judging more, not less, important. Judge 

Sotomayor has obviously thought, spoken, and written much on 

these issues, and I think we show respect to her by taking her entire record seriously. 

Third, Senator Obama said that while a nominee’s race, gender, 

and life story are important, they cannot distract from the fundamental focus on the kind of judge she will be. He said then, as I 

have said today, that we should all be grateful for the opportunity 

that our liberty affords for Americans of different backgrounds. We 

should applaud Judge Sotomayor’s achievements and service to her 

community, her profession, and her country. Yet Senator Obama 

called it ‘‘offensive and cynical’’ to suggest that a nominee’s race or 

gender can give her a pass for her substantive views. He proved 

it by voting twice to filibuster Janice Rogers Brown’s nomination 

and then by voting against her confirmation. 

I share his hope that we have arrived at a point in our country’s 

history where individuals can be examined and even criticized for 

their views, no matter what their race or gender. If those standards 

were appropriate when Senator Obama opposed Republican nominees, they should be appropriate now that President Obama is 

choosing his own nominees. 

But today President Obama says that personal empathy is an essential ingredient in judicial decisions. Today we are urged to ignore Judge Sotomayor’s speeches altogether and focus only on her 

judicial decisions, which are extensive. I do not believe that we 

should do just that. 

I wish that other current standards had been applied to past 

nominees. Democratic Senators, for example, offer as proof of Judge 

Sotomayor’s moderation that she has agreed with her Republicanappointed Second Circuit colleagues 95 percent of the time. Joined 

by then—for which I congratulate her. Joined by then-Senator 

Obama, however, many of those same Democratic Senators voted 

against Justice Samuel Alito’s confirmation, even though he had 

voted with his Democrat-appointed Third Circuit colleagues 99 percent of the time during a more longer appeals court career. And although Justice Alito also received the ABA’s highest rating, Senator Obama joined 24 other Democrats on even voting to filibuster 

his nomination. And then he joined a total of 42 Democrats in voting against the confirmation of now-Justice Alito. 

13 

In fact, Senator Obama never voted to confirm a Supreme Court 

Justice. He even voted against the man who administered the oath 

of Presidential office, Chief Justice John Roberts, another distinguished and well-qualified nominee. 

Now, if a compelling life story, academic and professional excellence, and a top ABA rating make a convincing confirmation case, 

Miguel Estrada would be a U.S. circuit judge today. He is a brilliant, universally respected lawyer, one of the top Supreme Court 

practitioners in America. But he was fiercely opposed by groups 

and repeatedly filibustered by Democrat Senators, and ones who 

today say these same factors should count in Judge Sotomayor’s 

favor. 

Now, whether I vote for or against Judge Sotomayor, it will be 

by applying the principles that I have laid out, not by using such 

tactics and standards used against these nominees in the past. Judicial appointments have become increasingly contentious. Some of 

the things that have been said about Judge Sotomayor have been 

intemperate and unfair. There are now newspaper reports that leftwing groups supporting Judge Sotomayor—specifically, the extreme-left People for the American Way—are engaged in a smear 

campaign against the plaintiff in one of her more controversial 

cases, a man who will be testifying here later in the week. If that 

is true—and I hope it is not—it is beneath both contempt and the 

dignity that this process demands. But there must be a vigorous 

debate about the kind of judge America needs because nothing less 

than our liberty is at stake. 

Must judges set aside or may judges consider their personal feelings in deciding cases? Is judicial impartiality a duty or an option? 

Does the fact that judicial decisions affect so many people’s lives 

require judges to be objective and impartial? Or does it allow them 

to be subjective and sympathetic? 

Judge Sotomayor’s nomination raises these and other important 

issues, and I look forward to a respectful and energetic debate. The 

confirmation process in general, and this hearing in particular, 

must be both dignified and thorough. There are very different and 

strongly held views about the issues we will explore, in particular 

the role that judges should play in our system of government. 

The task before us is to determine whether Judge Sonia 

Sotomayor is qualified by legal experience, and especially by judicial philosophy, to sit on the Supreme Court of the United States 

of America. Doing so requires examining her entire record, her 

speeches and articles, as well as her judicial decisions. We must at 

the same time be thankful for the opportunity represented by 

Judge Sotomayor’s nomination and focus squarely on whether she 

will be the kind of judge required by the very liberty that makes 

that opportunity possible. 

Judge, I am proud of you and I wish you well. This will be an 

interesting experience, and I expect you to be treated with dignity 

and respect throughout. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. I yield to the Chair of the Senate Intelligence 

Committee, Senator Feinstein. 

14 

STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM CALIFORNIA 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good 

morning, Judge Sotomayor. I want to congratulate you on your 

nomination, and I also want to start out with a couple of personal 

words. 

Your nomination I view with a great sense of personal pride. You 

are indeed a very special woman. You have overcome adversity and 

disadvantage. You have grown in strength and determination, and 

you have achieved respect and admiration for what has been a brilliant legal and judicial career. 

If confirmed, you will join the Supreme Court with more Federal 

judicial experience than any Justice in the past 100 years. And you 

bring with you 291⁄2 years of varied legal experience to the Court. 

By this standard you are well qualified. 

In your 11 years as a Federal appellate court judge, you have 

participated in 3,000 appeals and authored roughly 400 published 

opinions. In your 6 years on the Federal court, you were the trial 

judge in approximately 450 cases. For 41⁄2 years, you prosecuted 

crimes as an assistant DA in New York City. And you spent 8 

years litigating business cases at a New York law firm. 

What is unique about this broad experience is that you have seen 

the law truly from all sides. 

On the district court you saw firsthand the actual impact of the 

law on people before you in both civil and criminal cases. 

You considered, wrote, and joined thousands of opinions clarifying the law and reviewing district court decisions in your time on 

the appellate court. Your 11 years there were a rigorous training 

ground for the Supreme Court. 

It is very unique for a judge to have both levels of Federal court 

experience, and you will be the only one on the current Supreme 

Court with this background. 

You were a prosecutor who tried murder, robbery, and child pornography cases. So you know firsthand the impact of crime on a 

major metropolis, and you have administered justice in the close 

and personal forum of a trial court. 

You also possess a wealth of knowledge in the complicated arena 

of business law with its contract disputes, patent and copyright 

issues, and antitrust questions. 

And as an associate and partner at a private law firm, you have 

tried complex civil cases in the areas of real estate, banking, and 

contracts law, as well as intellectual property law, which I am told 

was a specialty of yours. So you bring a deep and broad experience 

in the law to the Supreme Court. 

In my nearly 17 years on this Committee, I have held certain 

qualities that a Supreme Court nominee must possess: 

First, broad and relative experience. You satisfy that. 

Second, a strong and deep knowledge of the law and the Constitution. You satisfy that. 

Third, a firm commitment to follow the law. And you have in all 

of the statistics indicated that. 

Next, a judicial temperament and integrity. And you have both 

of those. 

15 

And, finally, mainstream legal reasoning. And there is everything in your record to indicate—— 

[Protestor outburst.] 

Chairman LEAHY. The Senate will—— 

[Protestor outburst.] 

Chairman LEAHY. The police will remove that man. 

Let me make very clear: There will be no outbursts allowed in 

this Committee, either for or against the nominee, either for or 

against any position that Senator Sessions or I or any other Senator have. This is a hearing of the United States Senate, and we 

will have order and we will have decorum. There are people who 

want to have this hearing. In fairness to Judge Sotomayor, it will 

be done orderly, and I will direct the police to remove anybody who 

does any kind of an outburst, either for or against the nominee, either for or against any member of this Committee. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your firm 

words. I support you 100 percent. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. And the record will show my comments outside of Senator Feinstein’s comments, and I yield back to 

her. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Bottom line, I believe your record indicates that you possess all 

of these qualities. 

Over the past years of my service on this Committee, I have 

found it increasingly difficult to know from answers to questions 

we ask from this dais how a nominee will actually act as a Supreme Court Justice, because answers here are often indirect and 

increasingly couched in euphemistic phrases. 

For example, nominees have often responded to our specific questions with phrases like ‘‘I have an open mind,’’ or yes, that is precedent ‘‘entitled to respect,’’ or ‘‘I have no quarrel with that.’’ 

Of course, these phrases obfuscate and prevent a clear understanding of where a nominee really stands. 

For example, several past nominees have been asked about the 

Casey decision, where the Court held that the Government cannot 

restrict access to abortions that are medically necessary to preserve 

a woman’s health. 

Some nominees responded by assuring that Roe and Casey were 

precedents of the Court entitled to great respect. And in one of the 

hearings, through questioning by Senator Specter, this line of cases 

was acknowledged to have created a ‘‘super-precedent.’’ 

But once on the Court, the same nominees voted to overturn the 

key holding in Casey—that laws restricting a woman’s medical care 

must contain an exception to protect her health. 

Their decision did not comport with the answers they gave here, 

and it disregarded stare decisis and the precedents established in 

Roe, in Ashcroft, in Casey, in Thornburgh, in Carhart I, and in 

Ayotte. 

So ‘‘super-precedent’’ went out the window, and women lost a 

fundamental constitutional protection that had existed for 36 years. 

Also, it showed me that Supreme Court Justices are much more 

than umpires calling balls and strikes and that the word ‘‘activist’’ 

is often used only to describe opinions of one side. 

16 

As a matter of fact, in just 2 years, these same nominees have 

either disregarded or overturned precedent in at least eight other 

cases: A case involving assignments to attain racial diversity in 

school assignments; a case overruling 70 years of precedent on the 

Second Amendment and Federal gun control law; a case which increased the burden of proof on older workers to prove age discrimination; a case overturning a 1911 decision to allow manufacturers 

to set minimum prices for their products; a case overruling two 

cases from the 1960s on time limits for filing criminal appeals; a 

case reversing precedent on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; 

a case overturning a prior ruling on regulation of issue ads relating 

to political campaigns; and a case disregarding prior law and creating a new standard that limits when cities can replace civil service exams that they may believe have discriminated against a 

group of workers. 

So I do not believe that Supreme Court Justices are merely umpires calling balls and strikes. Rather, I believe that they make the 

decisions of individuals who bring to the Court their own experiences and philosophies. 

Judge Sotomayor, I believe you are a warm and intelligent 

woman. I believe you are well studied and experienced in the law 

with some 17 years of Federal court experience involving 3,000 appeals and 450 trial cases. 

So I believe you, too, will bring your experiences and philosophies 

to this highest Court, and I believe that will do only one thing— 

and, that is, to strengthen this high institution of our great country. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

Senator Grassley. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM IOWA 

Senator GRASSLEY. Judge Sotomayor, I notice how attentive you 

have been to everything we are saying. Thank you very much. Congratulations on your nomination to be Associate Justice and welcome to the Judiciary Committee, and a warm welcome to you and 

your family and friends. They are all very proud of you, and rightly 

so. 

You have a distinguished legal and judicial record. No doubt it 

is one that we would expect of any individual nominated to the Supreme Court. You made your start from very humble beginnings. 

You overcame substantial obstacles and went on to excel at some 

of the Nation’s top schools. You became an assistant district attorney and successful private practice attorney in New York City. You 

have been on the Federal bench as a district court and appellate 

court judge since 1992. These are all very impressive legal accomplishments which certainly qualify you to be on the Supreme 

Court. 

However, an impressive legal record and superior intellect are 

not the only criteria that we on this Committee have to consider. 

To be truly qualified, the nominee must understand the proper role 

of a judge in society—that is, we want to be absolutely certain that 

the nominee will faithfully interpret the law and the Constitution 

17 

without bias or prejudice. This is the most critical qualification of 

a Supreme Court Justice—the capacity to set aside one’s own feelings so that he or she can blindly and dispassionately administer 

equal justice for all. 

So the Senate has a constitutional responsibility of advise and 

consent, to confirm intelligent, experienced individuals anchored in 

the Constitution, not individuals who will pursue personal and political agendas from the bench. 

Judge Sotomayor, you are nominated to the highest Court of the 

land which has the final say on the law. As such, it is even more 

important for the Senate to ascertain whether you can resist the 

temptations to mold the Constitution to your own personal beliefs 

and preferences. It is even more important for the Senate to ascertain whether you can dispense justice without bias or prejudice. 

Supreme Court Justices sit on the highest Court in the land so 

that they are not as constrained, as you know, to follow precedent 

to the same extent as district and circuit judges. There is a proper 

role of a judge in our system of limited government and checks and 

balances. Our democratic system of government demands that 

judges not take on the role of policymakers. That is a role properly 

reserved to legislators, who can be voted out of office if people do 

not like what they legislate, unlike judges not being voted out of 

office. 

The Supreme Court is meant to be a legal institution, not a political one. But some individuals and groups do not see it that way. 

They see the Supreme Court as ground zero for their political and 

social battles. They want Justices to implement their political and 

social agenda through the judicial process. That is not what our 

great American tradition envisioned. Those battles are appropriately fought in our branch of Government, the legislative 

branch. 

So it is incredibly important that we get it right and confirm the 

right kind of person for the Supreme Court. Supreme Court nominees should respect the constitutional separation of power. They 

should understand that the touchstone of being a good judge is the 

exercise of judicial restraint. Good judges understand that their job 

is not to impose their own personal opinions of right and wrong. 

They know their job is to say what the law is rather than what 

they personally think that it ought to be. 

Good judges understand that they must meticulously apply the 

law and the Constitution even if the results they reach are unpopular. Good judges know that the constitutional law constrains judges 

every bit as much as it constrains legislators, executives, and our 

whole citizenry. Good judges not only understand these fundamental principles; they live and breathe them. 

President Obama said that he would nominate judges based on 

their ability to empathize in general and with certain groups in 

particular. This empathy standard is troubling to me. In fact, I am 

concerned that judging based on empathy is really just legislating 

from the bench. 

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18 

tics, feelings, and preferences. This is contrary to what most of us 

understand to be the role of the judiciary. 

President Obama clearly believes that you measure up to his empathy standard. That worries me. I have reviewed your record and 

have concerns about your judicial philosophy. For example, in one 

speech you doubted that a judge could ever be truly impartial. In 

another speech, you argued that it is a disservice both to law and 

society for judges to disregard personal views shaped by one’s ‘‘differences as a woman or man of color.’’ 

In yet another speech, you proclaimed that the court of appeals 

is where policy is made. Your ‘‘wise Latina’’ comment starkly contradicts a statement by Justice O’Connor that a wise old man and 

a wise old woman would eventually reach the same conclusion in 

a case. 

These statements go directly to your views of how a judge should 

use his or her background and experience when deciding cases. Unfortunately, I fear they do not comport with what I and many others believe is the proper role of a judge or an appropriate judicial 

method. 

The American legal system requires that judges check their biases, personal preferences, and politics at the door of the courthouse. Lady Justice stands before the Supreme Court with a blindfold, holding the scales of justice. Just like Lady Justice, judges 

and Justices must wear blindfolds when they interpret the Constitution and administer justice. 

I will be asking you about your ability to wear that judicial blindfold. I will be asking you about your ability to decide cases in an 

impartial manner and in accordance with the law and the Constitution. I will be asking you about your judicial philosophy, 

whether you allow biases and personal preferences to dictate your 

judicial methods. 

Finally—or ideally, the Supreme Court shouldn’t be made up of 

men and women who are on the side of one special group or issue; 

rather, the Supreme Court should be made up of men and women 

who are on the side of the law and the Constitution. 

I am looking to support a restrained jurist committed to the rule 

of law and the Constitution. I am not looking to support a creative 

jurist who will allow his or her background and personal preferences to decide cases. 

The Senate needs to do its job and conduct a comprehensive and 

careful review of your record and qualifications. You are nominated 

to a lifetime position on the highest Court. The Senate has a tremendous responsibility to confirm an individual who has superior 

intellectual abilities, solid legal expertise, and an even judicial demeanor and temperament. Above all, we have a tremendous responsibility to confirm an individual who truly understands the 

proper role of a Justice. 

So I will be asking questions about your judicial qualifications. 

However, like all of my colleagues, I am committed to giving you 

a fair and respectful hearing as is appropriate for Supreme Court 

nominees. 

I congratulate you once again. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Grassley. 

Senator Feingold, I would yield to you. 

19 

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL FEINGOLD, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to welcome and congratulate the nominee, Judge Sotomayor. I greatly admire your accomplishments and your long record of public service. 

Let me also thank you in advance for the long week you’re about 

to spend in this room. 

The Supreme Court plays a unique and central role in the life 

of our nation. Those who sit as Justices have extraordinary power 

over some of the most important, and most intimate, aspects of the 

lives of American citizens. 

It is therefore not surprising at all that the nomination and confirmation of a Supreme Court Justice is such a widely anticipated 

and widely covered event. The nine men and women who sit on the 

court have enormous responsibilities, and those of us tasked with 

voting on the confirmation of a nominee have a significant responsibility as well. 

This is clearly one of the most consequential things that one does 

as a United States Senator and I’m honored and humbled to be 

given this role by the people of Wisconsin. 

The ultimate responsibility of the Supreme Court is to safeguard 

the rule of law, which defines us as a nation and protects us all. 

In the past eight years, the Supreme Court has played a crucial 

role in checking some of the previous administration’s most egregious departures from the rule of law. Time after time in cases 

arising out of actions taken by the Administration after September 

11, the court has said: ‘‘No. You have gone too far.’’ 

It said ‘‘no’’ to the Bush Administration’s view that it could set 

up a law-free zone at Guantanamo Bay. It said ‘‘no’’ to the Administration’s view that it could hold a citizen in the United States incommunicado indefinitely with no access to a lawyer. 

It said ‘‘no’’ to the Administration’s decision to create military 

commissions without congressional authorization, and it said no to 

the Administration and to Congress when they tried to strip the 

constitutional right to habeus corpus from prisoners held at Guantanamo. 

These were courageous decisions, and in my opinion, they were 

correct decisions. They made plain, as Justice O’Connor wrote in 

the Hamdi decision in 2004: ‘‘A state of war is not a blank check 

for the President when it comes to the rights of the nation’s citizens.’’ These were all close decisions, some decided by a 5 to 4 vote. 

That fact underscores the unparalleled power that each Supreme 

Court justice has. In my opinion, one of the most important qualities that a Supreme Court justice must have is courage. The courage to stand up to the President and Congress in order to protect 

the constitutional rights of the American people and preserve the 

rule of law. 

I have touched on the crucial recent decisions of the court in the 

area of executive power, but we know, of course, that there are 

countless past Supreme Court decisions that have had a major impact on aspects of our national life. 

The court rejected racial discrimination in education; it guaranteed the principle of ‘‘one person, one vote’’; it made sure that even 

the poorest person accused of a crime in this country can be repVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
20 

resented by counsel; it made sure that newspapers can’t be sued for 

libel by public figures for merely making a mistake. 

It protected the privacy of telephone conversations from unjustified government eavesdropping; it protected an individual’s right to 

possess afirearm for private use; and it even decided a presidential 

election. 

It made these decisions by interpreting and applying open-ended 

language in our Constitution. Phrases like ‘‘equal protection of the 

laws,’’ ‘‘due process of law,’’ ‘‘freedom of the press,’’ ‘‘unreasonable 

searches and seizures,’’ and ‘‘the right to bear arms.’’ 

Senator Feinstein just suggested these momentous decisions 

were not simply the result of an umpire calling balls and strikes. 

Easy cases where the law is clear almost never make it to the Supreme Court. The great constitutional issues that the Supreme 

Court is called upon to decide require much more than the mechanical application of universally accepted legal principles. That is why 

Justices need great legal expertise, but they also need wisdom, 

they need judgment, they need to understand the impact of their 

decisions on the parties before them and the country around them, 

from New York City to small towns like Spooner, Wisconsin. And 

they need a deep appreciation of and dedication to equality, to liberty and to democracy. 

That is why I suggest to everyone watching today that they be 

a little wary of a phrase that they are hearing at this hearing: ‘‘judicial activism.’’ That term really seems to have lost all usefulness, 

particularly since so many rulings of the conservative majority on 

the Supreme Court can fairly be described as ‘‘activist’’ in their disregard for precedent and their willingness to ignore or override the 

intent of Congress. 

At this point, perhaps we should all accept that the best definition of a ‘‘judicial activist’’ is a judge who decides a case in a way 

you don’t like. Each of the decisions I mentioned earlier was undoubtedly criticized by someone at the time it was issued, and 

maybe even today, as being ‘‘judicial activism.’’ Yet some of them 

are, as the judge well knows, among the most revered Supreme 

Court decisions in modern times. 

Mr. Chairman, every Senator is entitled to ask whatever questions he or she wants at these hearings and to look at whatever 

factors he or she finds significant in evaluating this nominee. 

I hope Judge Sotomayor will answer all questions as fully as possible. I’ll have questions of my own on a range of issues. Certainly, 

with the two most recent Supreme Court nominations, Senators did 

ask tough questions and sought as much information from the 

nominees as we possibly could get. And I expect nothing less from 

my colleagues in these hearings. I am glad, however, that Judge 

Sotomayor will finally have an opportunity to answer some of the 

unsubstantiated charges that have been made against her. 

One attack that I find particularly shocking is the suggestion 

that she will be biased against some litigants because of her racial 

and ethnic heritage. This charge is not based on anything in her 

judicial record because there is absolutely nothing in the hundreds 

of opinions she has written to support it. That long record, which 

is obviously the most relevant evidence we have to evaluate her, 

demonstrates a cautious and careful approach to judging. Instead, 

21 

a few lines from a 2001 speech, taken out of context, have prompted some to charge that she is a racist. I believe that no one who 

reads the whole Berkeley speech could honestly come to that conclusion. The speech is actually a remarkably thoughtful attempt to 

grapple with difficult issues not often discussed by judges: How 

does a judge’s personal background and experiences affect her judging? And Judge Sotomayor concludes her speech by saying the following: ‘‘I am reminded each day that I render decisions that affect 

people concretely and that I owe them constant and complete vigilance in checking my assumptions, presumptions and perspectives 

and ensuring that to the extent that my limited abilities and capabilities permit me, that I reevaluate them and change as circumstances and cases before me require.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, these are the words of a thoughtful, humble, and 

self-aware judge striving to do her very best to administer impartial justice for all Americans, from New York City to Spooner, Wisconsin. It seems to me that is a quality we want in our judges. 

Judge Sotomayor is living proof that this country is moving in 

the right direction on the issue of race, that doors of opportunity 

are finally starting to open to all of our citizens. And I think that 

nomination will inspire countless children to study harder and 

dream higher, and that is something we should all celebrate. 

Let me again welcome and congratulate you. I look forward to 

further learning in these hearings whether you have the knowledge, the wisdom, the judgment, the integrity, and yes, the courage, to serve with distinction on our nation’s highest court. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. I will recognize Senator 

Kyl, the Deputy Republican Leader of the United States Senate. 

Senator Kyl. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

ARIZONA 

Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would hope that every 

American is proud that a Hispanic woman has been nominated to 

sit on the Supreme Court. In fulfilling our advise and consent role, 

of course, we must evaluate Judge Sotomayor’s fitness to serve on 

the merits, not on the basis of her ethnicity. 

With a background that creates a prima facie case for confirmation, the primary question I believe Judge Sotomayor must address 

in this hearing is her understanding of the role of an appellate 

judge. From what she has said, she appears to believe that her role 

is not constrained to objectively decide who wins based on the 

weight of the law, but rather who in her personal opinion, should 

win. The factors that will influence her decisions apparently include her gender and Latina heritage and foreign legal concepts 

that as she said, get her creative juices going. 

What is the traditional basis for judging in America? For 220 

years, presidents and the Senate have focused on appointing and 

confirming judges and justices who are committed to putting aside 

their biases and prejudices and applying law to fairly and impartially resolve disputes between parties. 

This principle is universally recognized and shared by judges 

across the ideological spectrum. For instance, Judge Richard Paez 

22 

of the Ninth Circuit with whom I disagree on a number of issues 

explained this in the same venue where, less than 24 hours earlier, 

Judge Sotomayor made her now-famous remarks about a wise 

Latina woman making better decisions than other judges. 

Judge Paez described the instructions that he gave to jurors who 

were about to hear a case. ‘‘As jurors,’’ he said, ‘‘recognize that you 

might have some bias, or prejudice. Recognize that it exists, and 

determine whether you can control it so that you can judge the 

case fairly. Because if you cannot—if you cannot set aside those 

prejudices, biases and passions, then you should not sit on the 

case.’’ 

And then Judge Paez said, ‘‘The same principle applies to judges. 

We take an oath of office. At the federal level, it is a very interesting oath. It says, in part, that you promise or swear to do justice 

to both the poor and the rich. The first time I heard this oath, I 

was startled by its significance,’’ he said. ‘‘I have my oath hanging 

on the wall in the office to remind me of my obligations. And so, 

although I am a Latino judge and there is no question about that, 

I am viewed as a Latino judge. As I judge cases, I try to judge them 

fairly. I try to remain faithful to my oath.’’ 

What Judge Paez said has been the standard for 220 years. It 

correctly describes the fundamental and proper role for a judge. 

Unfortunately, a very important person has decided it is time for 

change, time for a new kind of judge, one who will apply a different 

standard of judging, including employment of his or her empathy 

for one of the parties to the dispute. 

That person is President Obama, and the question before us is 

whether his first nominee to the Supreme Court follows his new 

model of judging or the traditional model articulated by Judge 

Paez. 

President Obama, in opposing the nomination of Chief Justice 

Roberts said that ‘‘while adherence to legal precedent and rules of 

statutory or constitutional construction will dispose of 95 percent 

of the cases that come before a court, what matters on the Supreme 

Court is those 5 percent of cases that are truly difficult. In those 

5 percent of hard cases, the constitutional text will not be directly 

on point. The language of the statute will not be perfectly clear. 

Legal process alone will not lead you to a rule of decision.’’ 

How does President Obama propose judges deal with these hard 

cases? Does he want them to use judicial precedent, canons of construction, and other accepted tools of interpretation that judges 

have used for centuries? No, President Obama says that ‘‘in those 

difficult cases, the critical ingredient is supplied by what is in the 

judge’s heart.’’ 

Of course, every person should have empathy, and in certain situations, such as sentencing, it may not be wrong for judges to be 

empathetic. The problem arises when empathy and other biases or 

prejudices that are in the judge’s heart become the critical ingredient to deciding cases. As Judge Paez explained, a judge’s prejudices, biases, and passions should not be embraced, they must be 

set aside so that a judge can render an impartial decision as required by the judicial oath and as parties before the court expect. 

I respectfully submit that President Obama is simply outside the 

mainstream in his statements about how judges should decide 

23 

cases. I practiced law for almost 20 years before every level of state 

and federal court, including the U.S. Supreme Court, and never 

once did I hear a lawyer argue that he had no legal basis to sustain 

his client’s position, so that he had to ask the judge to go with his 

gut or his heart. 

If judges routinely started ruling on the basis of their personal 

feelings, however well-intentioned, the entire legitimacy of the judicial system would be jeopardized. 

The question for this committee is whether Judge Sotomayor 

agrees with President Obama’s theory of judging or whether she 

will faithfully interpret the laws and Constitution and take seriously the oath of her prospective office. 

Many of Judge Sotomayor’s public statements suggest that she 

may, indeed, allow, and even embrace, decision-making based on 

her biases and prejudices. 

The wise Latina woman quote, which I referred to earlier, suggests that Judge Sotomayor endorses the view that a judge should 

allow gender, ethnic and experience-based biases to guide her when 

rendering judicial opinions. This is in stark contrast to Judge 

Paez’s view that these factors should be set aside. 

In the same lecture, Judge Sotomayor posits that ‘‘there is no objective stance but only a series of perspectives. No neutrality, no 

escape from choice in judging’’ and claims that ‘‘the aspiration to 

impartiality is just that. It’s an aspiration,’’ she says, ‘‘because it 

denies the fact that we are by our experiences making different 

choices than others.’’ 

No neutrality, no impartiality in judging? Yet isn’t that what the 

judicial oath explicitly requires? 

Judge Sotomayor. clearly rejected the notion that judges should 

strive for an impartial brand of justice. She has already accepted 

that her gender and Latina heritage will affect the outcome of her 

cases. 

This is a serious issue, and it’s not the only indication that Judge 

Sotomayor has an expansive view of what a judge may appropriately consider. 

In a speech to the Puerto Rican ACLU, Judge Sotomayor endorsed the idea that American judges should use good ideas found 

in foreign law so that America does not lose influence in the world. 

The laws and practices of foreign nations are simply irrelevant 

to interpreting the will of the American people as expressed 

through our Constitution. 

Additionally, the vast expanse of foreign judicial opinions and 

practices from which one might draw simply gives activist judges 

cover for promoting their personal preferences instead of the law. 

You can, therefore, understand my concern when I hear Judge 

Sotomayor say that unless judges take it upon themselves to borrow ideas from foreign jurisdictions, America is ‘‘going to lose influence in the world.’’ That’s not a judge’s concern. 

Some people will suggest that we should not read too much into 

Judge Sotomayor’s speeches and articles, that the focus should instead be on her judicial decisions. I agree that her judicial record 

is an important component of our evaluation, and I look forward 

to hearing why, for instance, the Supreme Court has reversed or 

24 

vacated 80 percent of her opinions that have reached that body, by 

a total vote count of 52 to 19. 

But we cannot simply brush aside her extrajudicial statements. 

Until now, Judge Sotomayor has been operating under the restraining influence of a higher authority, the Supreme Court. If 

confirmed, there will be no such restraint that would prevent her 

from, to paraphrase President Obama, deciding cases based on her 

heart-felt views. 

Before we can faithfully discharge our duty to advise and consent, we must be confident that Judge Sotomayor is absolutely 

committed to setting aside her biases and impartially deciding 

cases based on the rule of law. 

Chairman LEAHY. Somewhat differently than normal, Senator 

Schumer will be recognized for five minutes and will reserve his 

other five minutes for later on when he will be introducing Judge 

Sotomayor. 

So Senator Schumer, you are recognized for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES SCHUMER, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM NEW YORK 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Sessions. 

I want to welcome Judge Sotomayor. We in New York are so 

proud of you and to your whole family, who I know are exceptionally proud to be here today to support this historic nomination. 

Now, our presence here today is about a nominee who is supremely well-qualified with experience on the District Court and 

the Appellate Court benches that is unmatched in recent history. 

It is about a nominee who, in 17 years of judging, has authored 

opinion after opinion that is smart, thoughtful, and judicially modest. 

In short, Judge Sotomayor has stellar credentials. There’s no 

question about that. Judge Sotomayor has twice before been nominated to the bench and gone through confirmation hearings with 

bipartisan support. The first time, she was nominated by a Republican President. 

But most important, Judge Sotomayor’s record bespeaks judicial 

modesty, something that our friends on the right have been clamoring for in a way that no recent nominee’s has. It is the judicial 

record, more than speeches and statements, more than personal 

background, that most accurately measures how modest a judicial 

nominee will be. 

There are several ways of measuring modesty in the judicial 

record. Judge Sotomayor more than measures up to each of them. 

First, as we will hear in the next few days, Judge Sotomayor 

puts rule of law above everything else. Given her extensive and 

even-handed record, I am not sure how any member of this panel 

can sit here today and seriously suggest that she comes to the 

bench with a personal agenda. Unlike Justice Alito, she does not 

come to the bench with a record number of dissents. 

Instead, her record shows that she is in the mainstream. She has 

agreed with Republican colleagues 95 percent of the time, she has 

ruled for the government in 83 percent of immigration cases 

against the immigration plaintiff, she has ruled for the government 

25 

in 92 percent of criminal cases, she has denied race claims in 83 

percent of cases and has split evenly on employment cases between 

employer and employee. 

Second, and this is an important point because of her unique experience in the District Court. Judge Sotomayor delves thoroughly 

into the facts of each case. She trusts that an understanding of the 

facts will lead, ultimately, to justice. 

I would ask my colleagues to do this: examine a sampling, a random sampling of her cases in a variety of areas. In case after case, 

she rolls up her sleeves, learns the facts, applies the law to the 

facts, and comes to a decision irrespective of her inclinations or her 

personal experience. 

In a case involving a New York police officer who made white supremacist remarks, she upheld his right to make them. In a case 

brought by plaintiffs who claimed they had been bumped from a 

plane because of race, she dismissed their case because the law required it, and she upheld the First Amendment right of a prisoner 

to wear religious beads under his uniform. 

In hot-button cases such as professional sports, she carefully adheres to the facts before her and upheld the NFL’s ability to maintain certain player restrictions, but also ruled in favor of baseball 

players to end the Major League Baseball strike. Third, Judge 

Sotomayor has hewed carefully to the text of statutes, even when 

doing so results in rulings that go against so-called sympathetic 

litigants. 

In dissenting from an award of damages to injured plaintiffs in 

a maritime accident, she wrote, ‘‘we start with the assumption that 

it is for Congress, not the federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, just short of four years ago, then-Judge Roberts 

sat where Judge Sotomayor is sitting. He told us that his jurisprudence would be characterized by modesty and humility. He illustrated this with a now well-known quote, ‘‘Judges are like umpires. 

Umpires don’t make the rules. They apply them.’’ 

Chief Justice Roberts was, and is, a supremely intelligent man 

with impeccable credentials. But many can debate whether during 

his four years on the Supreme Court he actually called pitches as 

they come—or whether he tried to change the rules. 

But any objective review of Judge Sotomayor’s record on the Second Circuit leaves no doubt that she has simply called balls and 

strikes for 17 years, far more closely than Chief Justice Roberts 

has during his four years on the Supreme Court. 

More important, if Judge Sotomayor continues to approach cases 

on the Supreme Court as she has for the last 17 years, she will be 

actually modest judicially. This is because she does not adhere to 

a philosophy that dictates results over the facts that are presented. 

So, in conclusion, if the number one standard that conservatives 

use and apply is judicial modesty and humility, no activism on the 

Supreme Court, they should vote for Judge Sotomayor unanimously. 

I look forward to the next few days of hearings, and to Judge 

Sotomayor’s confirmation. 

26 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. I am going to recognize 

Senator Graham and Senator Cardin and then we’re going to take 

a short break. 

Senator Graham. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LINDSEY GRAHAM, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, thank you. I have learned something already. The Schumer conservative standard. We will see how that 

works. 

No Republican would have chosen you, Judge. That is just the 

way it is. We would have picked Miguel Estrada. We would all 

have voted for him. I do not think anybody on that side would have 

voted for Judge Estrada, who is a Honduran immigrant who came 

to this country as a teenager, graduated from Columbia magna 

cum laude, Harvard 1986 magna cum laude and law review editor, 

a stellar background like yours. That is just the way it was. 

He never had a chance to have this hearing. He was nominated 

by President Bush to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals which I 

think most people agree is probably the second highest court in the 

land, and he never had this day. So the Hispanic element of this 

hearing is important, but I don’t want it to be lost that this is 

mostly about liberal and conservative politics more than it is anything else. 

Having said that, there are some of my colleagues on the other 

side that voted for Judge Roberts and Alito, knowing they would 

not have chosen either one of those. I will remember that. 

Now, unless you have a complete meltdown, you are going to get 

confirmed. I do not think you will, but the drama being created 

here is interesting. My Republican colleagues who voted against 

you I assure you could vote for a Hispanic nominee. They just feel 

unnerved by your speeches and by some of the things that you 

have said and some of your cases. 

Now, having said that, I do not know what I am going to do yet, 

but I do believe that you as an advocate with a Puerto Rican defense legal fund that you took on some cases that I would have 

loved to have been on the other side, that your organization advocated taxpayer funded abortion and said in a brief that to deny a 

poor black woman Medicaid funding for an abortion was equivalent 

to the Dred Scott case. That is a pretty extreme thing to say, but 

I think it was heartfelt. 

I would look at it the other way to take my taxpayer dollars and 

provide an abortion that I disagree with is pretty extreme. So there 

is two ways of looking at that. 

You were a prosecutor but your organization argued for the repeal of the death penalty because it was unfairly applied and discriminatory against minorities. Your organization argued for 

quotas when it came to hiring. 

I just want my colleagues to understand that there can be no 

more liberal group in my opinion than the Puerto Rican Defense 

Legal Fund when it came to advocacy. What I hope is that if we 

ever get a conservative President and he nominates someone who 

has an equal passion on the other side that we will not forget this 

27 

moment, that you could be the NRA General Counsel and still be 

a good lawyer. 

My point is I’m not going to hold it against you or the organization for advocating a cause from which I disagree. That makes 

America a special place. I would have loved to have been on those 

cases on the other side. I hope that would not have disqualified me. 

Now, when it comes to your speeches, that is the most troubling 

thing to me because that gives us an indication when you are able 

to get outside the courtroom without the robe and inside into how 

you think life works. This wise Latina comment has been talked 

about a lot, but I can just tell you one thing. If I had said anything 

remotely like that, my career would have been over. That’s true of 

most people here. You need to understand that and I look forward 

to talking with you about that comment. 

Does that mean that I think that you are racist? You have been 

called some pretty bad things. No. It just bothers me when somebody wearing a robe takes the robe off and says that their experience makes them better than someone else. I think your experience 

can add a lot to the core, but I don’t think it makes you better than 

anyone else. 

Now, when I look at your record, there is a lot of truth to what 

Senator Schumer said. I do not think you have taken the opportunity on the circuit to be a cause-driven judge. But what we are 

talking about here today is what will you do when it comes to making policy. I’m pretty well convinced I know what you are going to 

do. You are probably going to decide cases differently than I would. 

So that brings me back to what am I supposed to do knowing 

that? I do not think anybody here worked harder for Senator 

McCain than I did, but we lost and President Obama won, and that 

ought to matter. It does to me. 

Now, what standard do I apply? I can assure you that if I applied 

Senator Obama’s standard to your nomination, I wouldn’t vote for 

you. Because the standard that he articulated would make it impossible for anybody with my view of the law and society to vote 

for someone with your activism and background when it comes to 

judging. 

He said something about the 5 percent of the cases that we are 

all driven by. He said something to the effect, in those difficult 

cases, the critical ingredient is applied by what is in the judge’s 

heart. Well, I have no way of knowing what is in your heart anymore than you have knowing what is in my heart. So that to me 

is an absurd, dangerous standard. 

Maybe something good could come out of these hearings. If we 

start applying that to nominees, it will ruin the judiciary. I have 

no idea what is in your heart anymore than you have an idea of 

what is in my heart. I think it takes us down a very dangerous 

road as a country when we start doing that. 

Now, there was a time when someone like Scalia and Ginsburg 

got 95 plus votes. If you were confused about where Scalia was 

coming down, as a judge you should not be voting anymore than 

if you were a mystery about what Justice Ginsburg was going to 

do in these 5 percent of the cases. That is no mystery. 

There is some aspect of you that I’m not sure about that gives 

me hope that you may not go down the Senator Feingold road 

28 

when it comes to the war on terror. We will talk about that later 

on. 

But generally speaking, the President has nominated someone of 

good character, someone who has lived a very full and fruitful life 

who is passionate from day one from the time you got a chance to 

showcase who you are, you have stood out and you have stood up 

and you have been a strong advocate and you will speak your 

mind. 

The one thing I am worried about is that if we keep doing what 

we are doing, we are going to deter people from speaking their 

mind. I do not want milk toast judges. I want you to be able to 

speak your mind, but you have got to understand when you gave 

these speeches as a sitting judge, that was disturbing to me. 

I want lawyers who believe in something and are willing to fight 

for it. I do not want the young lawyers of this country feeling like 

there is certain clients they cannot represent because when they 

come before the Senate, it will be the end of their career. 

So I do not know how I am going to vote, but my inclination is 

that elections matter. I am not going to be upset with any of my 

colleagues who find that you are a bridge too far, because in many 

ways what you have done in your legal career and the speeches you 

have made give me great insight as to where you will come out on 

these 5 percent of cases. 

But President Obama won the election and I will respect that. 

But when he was here, he set in motion a standard I thought that 

was more about seeking the Presidency than being fair to the 

nominee. 

When he said the critical ingredient is supplied by what is in the 

judge’s heart, translated that means I am not going to vote against 

my base because I am running for President. 

We have got a chance to start over. I hope we will take that 

chance and you will be asked hard questions and I think you expect that. My belief is that you will do well because whether or not 

I agree with you on the big themes of life is not important. The 

question for me is have you earned the right to be here. 

If I give you this robe to put you on the Supreme Court, do I believe at the end of the day that you will do what you think is best, 

that you have courage and you will be fair. Come Thursday I think 

I will know more about that. Good luck. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Just so we make sure we are all 

using the same facts, Mr. Estrada was nominated when Republicans were in charge of the Senate, he was not given a hearing by 

the Republicans. 

He was given a hearing when the Democrats took back the majority and the Senate and then he was told at that time, there were 

a number of questions that were submitted to him by both Republicans and Democrats and before it could be set for a vote on the 

floor to answer those questions, he declined to, he may have been 

distracted by an offer of a very high paying law firm, but I do not 

know. 

He was not given a hearing when the Republicans were in 

charge. He was given a hearing when the Democrats were in 

charge. 

29 

Senator SESSIONS. If I may, Mr. Chairman, since you brought it 

up. 

Chairman LEAHY. I yield to Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. We had seven attempts to bring him up for a 

final vote and that was blocked. I think I spoke on his behalf more 

than any other Senator. 

I do feel like that it was a clear decision on the part of the Democrats. The objection over release of documents of course were internal memorandum—legal memorandum that he had provided that 

the former Solicitor General said it was not appropriate for the Department of Justice to produce. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. He should have had that hearing when the Republicans were in charge is what you are saying. 

Senator CARDIN. Once Senator Cardin is finished, we will take 

a 10-minute break. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Judge Sotomayor, welcome to the United States 

Senate. I think you will find that each member of this Committee 

and each member of the United States Senate wants to do what 

is right for our country. 

Now we may differ on some of our views, which will come out 

during this hearing, but I think we all share a respect for your 

public service. Thank you for your willingness to serve on the Supreme Court of the United States and I thank your family for the 

sacrifices they have made. 

I am honored to represent the people of Maryland in the U.S. 

Senate and to serve on the Judiciary Committee, as we consider 

one of our most important responsibilities, whether we should recommend to the full Senate the confirmation of Judge Sonia 

Sotomayor to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 

United States. 

The next term of the Supreme Court that begins in October is 

likely to consider fundamental issues that will impact the lives of 

all Americans. In recent years, there have been many important 

decisions decided by the Supreme Court by a 5–4 vote. Each Justice can play a critical role in forming the needed consensus in our 

nation’s highest court. 

A new Justice could and very well may have a profound impact 

on the direction of the court. 

Supreme Court decisions affect each and every person in our nation. I think of my own family’s history. My grandfather came to 

America more than 100 years ago. I am convinced that they came 

to America not only for greater economic opportunities, but because 

of the ideals expressed in our Constitution, especially the First 

Amendment guaranteeing religious freedom. 

My grandparents wanted their children to grow up in a country 

where they were able to practice their Jewish faith and fully participate in their community and government. My father, one of 

their sons, became a lawyer, state legislator, Circuit Court judge 

and President of his synagogue. And now his son serves in the U.S. 

Senate. 

30 

While our Founding Fathers made freedom of religion a priority, 

equal protection for all races took longer to achieve. I attended Liberty School No. 64, a public elementary school in Baltimore City. 

It was part of a segregated public school system that under the law 

denied every student in Baltimore the opportunity to learn in a 

classroom that represented the diversity of our community. 

I remember with great sadness how discrimination was not only 

condoned but, more often than not, actually encouraged against 

Blacks, Jews, Catholics, and other minorities in the community. 

There were neighborhoods that my parents warned me to avoid for 

fear of my safety because I was Jewish. The local movie theater denied admission to African Americans. Community swimming pools 

had signs that said, ‘‘No Jews, No Blacks Allowed.’’ Even Baltimore’s amusement parks and sports clubs were segregated by race. 

Then came Brown v. Board of Education and suddenly my universe 

and community were changed forever. 

The decision itself moved our nation forward by correcting grievous wrongs that were built into the law. It also brought to the forefront of our nation’s consciousness a great future jurist from Baltimore, Thurgood Marshall. Marshall had been denied admission to 

the University of Maryland Law School due to the color of his skin 

but went on to represent the plaintiffs in the 1954 landmark 

Brown v. Board of Education. And in 1967, it was Marshall, the 

grandson of a slave, who was appointed by President Lyndon Johnson as the first African American to serve on the Supreme Court. 

The nine justices of the United States Supreme Court have the 

tremendous responsibility of safeguarding the framers’ intent and 

the guiding values of our Constitution while ensuring the protections and rights found in that very Constitution are applied to and 

relevant to the issues of the day. At times, the Supreme Court has 

and should look beyond popular sentiment to preserve these basic 

principles and the rule of law. The next justice, who will fill Justice 

Souter’s place on the court will be an important voice on these fundamental issues. 

It is my belief that the Constitution and Bill of Rights were created to be living documents that stand together as the foundation 

for the rule of law in our nation. Our history reflects this. When 

the Constitution was written, African Americans were considered 

property and counted only as three-fifths of a person. Non-whites 

and women were not allowed to vote. Individuals were restricted by 

race as to whom they could marry. Laws passed by Congress and 

decisions by the Supreme Court undeniably moved our country forward, continuing the progression of Constitutional protections that 

have changed our Nation for the better. 

Before the Court ruled in Brown v. Board of Education that separate was not equal, the law permitted our society to have separate 

facilities for black and white students. Before the Court ruled in 

Loving v. Virginia, a state could prohibit persons from marrying 

based on race. Before the Court ruled in Roe v. Wade, women had 

no constitutional implied right to privacy. These are difficult questions that have come before the Court and that the Framers could 

not have anticipated. New challenges will continue to arise but the 

basic framework of protections remains. 

31 

I want to compliment President Obama in forwarding to the 

United States Senate a nominee, Judge Sonia Sotomayor, who is 

well qualified for our consideration. Her well-rounded background, 

including extensive experiences as a prosecutor, trial judge and appellate judge, will prove a valuable addition to our nation’s court. 

As a relatively new member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 

as I prepared for this week, I considered a few key standards that 

apply to all judicial nominations. First, I believe nominees must 

have an appreciation for the Constitution and the protections it 

provides to each and every American. She or he must embrace a 

judicial philosophy that reflects mainstream American values, not 

narrow ideological interests. 

They should have a strong passion to continue the Court’s advancements in Civil Rights. There is a careful balance to be found 

here. Our next Justice should advance the protections in our Constitution, but not disregard important precedent that has made our 

society stronger by embracing our civil liberties. 

I believe judicial nominees also must demonstrate a respect for 

the rights and responsibilities of each branch of government. These 

criteria allow me to evaluate a particular judge and whether she 

or he might place their personal philosophy ahead of the responsibility of the office. 

As this Committee begins considering the nomination of Sonia 

Sotomayor, I want to quote Justice Thurgood Marshall, who said, 

‘‘None of us got where we are solely by pulling ourselves up by our 

bootstraps.’’ Judge Sotomayor is a perfect example of how family, 

hard work, supportive professors and mentors, and opportunity all 

can come together to create a real American success story. 

She was born in New York, to a Puerto Rican family, and grew 

up in a public housing project in the South Bronx. Her mother was 

a nurse and her father was a factory worker with a third-grade 

education. She was taught early in life that education is the key 

to success, and her strong work ethic enabled her to excel in school 

and graduate valedictorian of her high school. 

She attended Princeton University, graduating cum laude and 

Phi Beta Kappa, and she received the highest honors Princeton 

awards to an undergraduate. At Yale Law School, she was editor 

of the Law Review, where she was known to stand up for herself 

and not to be intimidated by anyone. 

Nominated by both Democratic and Republican presidents, for 17 

years she has been a distinguished jurist and now has more federal 

judicial experience than any Supreme Court nominee in the last 

hundred years. 

This week’s hearings are essential. With some understanding of 

the context of Judge Sotomayor’s life and the role that she potentially is about to fill on the Supreme Court, I believe it is particularly important during these confirmation hearings to question 

Judge Sotomayor on the guiding principles she would use on reaching decisions. 

For example, it is important for me to understand her interpretation of established precedent, on protecting individual Constitutional rights. I believe it would be wrong for Supreme Court Justices to turn their back on landmark Court precedents protecting 

individual Constitutional rights. 

32 

It is likely that the Supreme Court will consider important protections in our Constitution for women, our environment and consumers, as well as voting rights, privacy, and the separation of 

church and state, among others, in coming years. The Supreme 

Court also has recently been active in imposing limits on executive 

power. It will continue to deal with the Constitutional rights in our 

criminal justice system, the rights of terror detainees and the 

rights of non-citizens. 

All of these issues test our Nation’s and the Supreme Court’s 

commitment to our founding principles and fundamental values. 

For this reason, we need to know how our nominee might approach 

these issues and analyze these decisions. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from Judge Sotomayor 

on these issues and I expect that she will share with this committee and the American people her judicial views and her 

thoughts on the protections in our Constitution. 

Once again, Judge Sotomayor, I want to thank you for your public service and readiness to take on these great responsibilities for 

our nation. I also again want to thank your family for their clear 

support and sacrifice that has brought us to this hearing today. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Cardin. After discussion 

with Senator Sessions, we will take a 10-minute break and come 

back. We are trying to figure out a lunch hour time. You have been 

very, very patient, Judge. 

One thing we will do in case the press wonders, there is a sign 

in front of you that has your name, which everybody knows here. 

It is angled in such a way that it is shining right in the eyes—no, 

don’t you worry about it. The sign will be gone. That will not mean 

that that is not your place when you come back. Thank you. We 

stand recessed for 10 minutes. 

[Recess 11:42 a.m. to 12:01 p.m.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Judge, you may have a broken ankle, but you 

beat me back to the hearing room. I am looking, Senator Sessions. 

It will be Senator Cornyn next. Is that right? 

Senator SESSIONS. Yes. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Cornyn, and then Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator Cornyn. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

TEXAS 

Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Judge Sotomayor, you will recall Justice Jackson said of the Supreme Court, ‘‘We are not final because we are infallible. We are 

infallible only because we are final.’’ Hence, the importance of these 

hearings and your nomination. 

I want to join my colleagues in extending a warm welcome to you 

and your family and, of course, join my other colleagues who have 

noted your distinguished career. As I have said as often as I have 

been asked about your nomination in the weeks since it occurred, 

I said your nomination should make us all feel good as Americans 

that people of humble origin can work hard, through sacrifice and 

love and support of their families, achieve great things in America. 

33 

That makes me feel very good about our country and about the opportunity it provides to each of us. 

In the history of the United States, there have only been 110 

people who served on the Supreme Court—110. It is amazing to 

think about that. This means that each and every Supreme Court 

nomination is a historic moment for our Nation. Each Supreme 

Court nomination is a time for national conversation and reflection 

on the role of the Supreme Court. 

We have to ask ourselves, those of us who have the constitutional 

obligation to provide advice and consent, what is the proper direction of the Supreme Court in deciding how we should vote and conduct ourselves during the course of the hearing. And, of course, I 

think it is always useful to recall our history, that the Framers created a written Constitution to make sure our constitutional rights 

were fixed and certain; that the State conventions who represented 

we, the people, looked at that written Constitution and decided to 

ratify it. And the idea was, of course, that our rights should not 

be floating in the ether but, rather, be written down for all to see 

so we could all understand what those rights, in fact, are. 

This framework gave judges a role that is both unique and very 

important. The role of judges was intended to be modest—that is, 

self-restrained and limited. Judges, of course, are not free to invent 

new rights as they see fit. Rather, they are supposed to enforce the 

Constitution’s text and to leave the rest up to ‘‘we, the people,’’ 

through the elected representatives of the people, such as the Congress. 

It is my opinion that over time the Supreme Court has often 

veered off the course established by the Framers. First, the Supreme Court has invented new rights not clearly rooted in any constitutional text. For example, the Supreme Court has micro managed the death penalty, recognized in 35 States and by the Federal 

Government itself, and created new rights spun from whole cloth. 

It has announced constitutional rules governing everything from 

punitive damages to sexual activity. It has relied on international 

law that you have heard some discussion about that the people 

have never adopted. 

The Supreme Court has even taken on the job of defining the 

rules of the game of golf. If you are curious, that is PGA Tour v. 

Martin from 2001. 

Some people have talked about judicial activism. In one sense, I 

think people say activism is a good thing if it is enforcing the 

rights and the laws that have been passed by the legislative 

branch. On the other hand, as you know, inventing new rights, 

veering off this course of enforcing a written text and pulling ideas 

out of the ether are pretty far from enforcing the written Constitution that the Framers proposed and that the people enacted. 

My opinion is that as the Supreme Court has invented new 

rights, it has often neglected others. This flip side is troubling to 

me, too. Many of the original important safeguards on Government 

power have been watered down or even ignored. Express constitutional limitations like the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 

designed to protect private property, and the Commerce Clause’s 

limitations on federal power, as well as the Second Amendment 

right to keep and bear arms, I believe have been artificially limVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
34 

ited, almost like they have been written out of the Constitution 

over time. On occasion, judges just have not enforced them like I 

believe the American people expected them to do. 

So what is the future like? Where should the Supreme Court go 

from here? I think there are two choices. 

First, the Supreme Court could try to get us back on course. That 

is, the Court could demonstrate renewed respect for our original 

plan of Government and return us slowly but surely to a written 

Constitution and written laws rather than judge-made laws. The 

Supreme Court’s recent Second Amendment decision in D.C. v. 

Heller I think is a good example of that. 

Or the Court could, alternatively, veer off course once again and 

follow its own star. It could continue to depart from the written 

Constitution. It could further erode the established rights that we 

have in the text of the Constitution, and it could invent even more 

brand-new rights not rooted in the text and not agreed to by the 

American people. 

Your Honor, I think the purpose of this hearing is to determine 

which path you would take us on, if confirmed to the United States 

Supreme Court. Would you vote to return to a written Constitution 

and laws written by the elected representatives of the people? Or 

would you take us further away from the written Constitution and 

laws legitimized by the consent of the governed? 

To help the American people understand which of these paths 

you would take us down, we need to know more about your record. 

We need to know more about the legal reasoning behind some of 

your opinions on the Second Circuit. And we need to know more 

about some of your public statements related to your judicial philosophy. 

In looking at your opinions on the Second Circuit, we recognize 

that lower-court judges are bound by the Supreme Court and by 

circuit precedent. To borrow a football analogy, a lower-court judge 

is like the quarterback who executes the plays, not the coach that 

calls them. That means many of your cases do not really tell us 

that much about your judicial philosophy or what it would be in 

action, if confirmed to the United States Supreme Court. But a few 

of your opinions do raise questions that I intend to ask you about, 

and they do suggest, I think, the kinds of plays you would call if 

you were promoted to the coaching staff. 

These opinions raise the question: Would you steer the Court in 

a direction of limiting the rights that generations of Americans 

have regarded as fundamental? So Americans need to know whether you would limit, for example, the scope of the Second Amendment and whether we can count on you to uphold one of the fundamental liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 

They need to know, we need to know, whether you would limit 

the scope of the Fifth Amendment and whether you would expand 

the definition of ‘‘public use’’ by which Government can take private property from one person and give it to another. And we need 

to know whether you will uphold the plain language of the Equal 

Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, promising that, ‘‘No 

State shall..deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 

protection of the laws.’’ 

35 

Judge, some of your opinions suggest that you would limit some 

of these constitutional rights, and some of your public statements 

that have already been mentioned suggest that you would invent 

rights that do not exist in the Constitution. 

For example, in a 2001 speech, you argue that there is no objectivity in law, but only what you called ‘‘a series of perspectives 

rooted in life experience of the judge.’’ 

In a 2006 speech, you said that judges can and even must change 

the law—even introducing what you called ‘‘radical change’’—to 

meet the needs of an ‘‘evolving’’ society. 

In a 2009 speech, you endorsed the use of foreign law in interpreting the American Constitution on the grounds that it gives 

judges ‘‘good ideas’’ that ‘‘get their creative juices flowing.’’ 

Judge Sotomayor, no one can accuse you of not having been candid about your views. Not every nominee is so open about their 

views. Yet many Americans are left to wonder whether these various—what these various statements mean and what you are trying to get at with these various remarks. Some wonder whether 

you are the kind of judge who will uphold the written Constitution 

or the kind of judge who will veer us off course—and toward new 

rights invented by judges rather than ratified by the people. 

These are some my concerns, and I assure you that you will have 

every opportunity to address those and make clear which path you 

would take us down if you are confirmed to the Supreme Court. 

I thank you very much and congratulations once again. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator Cornyn. 

Senator Whitehouse. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM RHODE ISLAND 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Judge Sotomayor, welcome. Welcome to you and to your family. 

Your nomination caps what has already been a remarkable legal 

career. And I join many, many Americans who are so proud to see 

you here today. It is a great country, isn’t it? And you represent 

its greatest attributes. 

Your record leaves no doubt that you have the intellectual ability 

to serve as a Justice. From meeting with you and from the outpouring of support I have experienced both personally and from organizations that have worked with you, your demeanor and your 

collegiality are well established. I appreciate your years as a prosecutor, working in the trenches of law enforcement. I am looking 

forward to learning more about the experience and judgment you 

are poised to bring to the Supreme Court. 

In the last 21⁄2 months and today, my Republican colleagues have 

talked a great deal about judicial modesty and restraint. Fair 

enough to a point, but that point comes when these words become 

slogans, not real critiques of your record. Indeed, these calls for restraint and modesty, and complaints about ‘‘activist’’ judges, are 

often codewords, seeking a particular kind of judge who will deliver 

a particular set of political outcomes. 

It is fair to inquire into a nominee’s judicial philosophy, and we 

will here have a serious and fair inquiry. But the pretense that Republican nominees embody modesty and restraint, or that DemoVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
36 

cratic nominees must be activists, runs starkly counter to recent 

history. 

I particularly reject the analogy of a judge to an ‘‘umpire’’ who 

merely calls ‘‘balls and strikes.’’ If judging were that mechanical, 

we would not need nine Supreme Court Justices. The task of an 

appellate judge, particularly on a court of final appeal, is often to 

define the strike zone, within a matrix of constitutional principle, 

legislative intent, and statutory construction. 

The umpire analogy is belied by Chief Justice Roberts, though he 

cast himself as an umpire during his confirmation hearings. Jeffrey 

Toobin, a well-respected legal commentator, has recently reported 

that—and this is a quote—‘‘[i]n every major case since he became 

the Nation’s 17th Chief Justice, Roberts has sided with the prosecution over the defendant, the state over the condemned, the executive branch over the legislative, and the corporate defendant over 

the individual plaintiff.’’ Some umpire. 

And is it a coincidence that this pattern, to continue Toobin’s 

quote, ‘‘has served the interests, and reflected the values of the 

contemporary Republican party’’ ? Some coincidence. 

For all the talk of modesty and restraint, the right-wing Justices 

of the Court have a striking record of ignoring precedent, overturning congressional statutes, limiting constitutional protections, 

and discovering new constitutional rights: the infamous Ledbetter 

decision, for instance; the Louisville and Seattle integration cases; 

the first limitation on Roe v. Wade that outright disregards the 

woman’s health and safety; and the D.C. Heller decision, discovering a constitutional right to own guns that the Court had not 

previously noticed in 220 years. Some balls and strikes. 

Over and over, news reporting discusses ‘‘fundamental changes 

in the law’’ wrought by the Roberts Court’s right-wing flank. The 

Roberts Court has not kept the promises of modesty or humility 

made when President Bush nominated Justices Roberts and Alito. 

So, Judge Sotomayor, I would like to avoid codewords and look 

for a simple pledge from you during these hearings: that you will 

respect the role of Congress as representatives of the American 

people; that you will decide cases based on the law and the facts; 

that you will not prejudge any case, but listen to every party that 

comes before you; and that you will respect precedent and limit 

yourself to the issues that the Court must decide; in short, that you 

will use the broad discretion of a Supreme Court Justice wisely. 

Let me emphasize that broad discretion. As Justice Stevens has 

said, ‘‘the work of Federal judges from the days of John Marshall 

to the present, like the work of the English common-law judges, 

sometimes requires the exercise of judgment—a faculty that inevitably calls into play notions of justice, fairness, and concern about 

the future impact of a decision.’’ 

Look at our history. America’s common law inheritance is the accretion over generations of individual exercises of judgment. Our 

Constitution is a great document that John Marshall noted leaves 

‘‘the minor ingredients’’ to judgment, to be deduced by our Justices 

from the document’s great principles. The liberties in our Constitution have their boundaries defined, in the gray and overlapping 

areas, by informed judgment. None of this is ‘‘balls and strikes.’’ 

37 

It has been a truism since Marbury v. Madison that courts have 

the authority to ‘‘say what the law is,’’ even to invalidate statutes 

enacted by the elected branches of government when they conflict 

with the Constitution. So the issue is not whether you have a wide 

field of discretion: you will. As Justice Cardozo reminds us, you are 

not free to act as ‘‘a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of 

[your] own ideal of beauty or of goodness,’’ yet, he concluded, 

‘‘[w]ide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains.’’ 

The question for this hearing is: Will you bring good judgment 

to that wide field? Will you understand, and care, how your decisions affect the lives of Americans? Will you use your broad discretion to advance the promises of liberty and justice made by the 

Constitution? 

I believe that your diverse life experience, your broad professional background, your expertise as a judge at each level of the 

system, will bring you that judgement. As Oliver Wendell Holmes 

famously said, the life of the law has not been logic, it has been 

experience. 

If your wide experience brings life to a sense of the difficult circumstances faced by the less powerful among us: the woman shunted around the bank from voicemail to voicemail as she tries to 

avoid foreclosure for her family; the family struggling to get by in 

the neighborhood where the police only come with raid jackets on; 

the couple up late at the kitchen table after the kids are in bed 

sweating out how to make ends meet that month; the man who believes a little differently, or looks a little different, or thinks things 

should be different; if you have empathy for those people in this 

job, you are doing nothing wrong. 

The Founding Fathers set up the American judiciary as a check 

on the excesses of the elected branches and as a refuge when those 

branches are corrupted or consumed by passing passions. Courts 

were designed to be our guardians against what Hamilton in the 

Federalist Papers called ‘‘those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes 

disseminate among the people . . . and which . . . have a tendency . . . to occasion serious oppressions of the minor party in 

the community.’’ In present circumstances, those oppressions tend 

to fall on the poor and voiceless. But as Hamilton noted, 

‘‘[c]onsiderate men, of every description, ought to prize whatever 

will tend to beget or fortify that temper in the courts: as no man 

can be sure that he may not be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of 

injustice, by which he may be a gainer to-day.’’ 

The courtroom can be the only sanctuary for the little guy when 

the forces of society are arrayed against him, when proper opinion 

and elected officialdom will lend him no ear. This is a correct, fitting, and intended function of the judiciary in our constitutional 

structure, and the empathy President Obama saw in you has a constitutionally proper place in that structure. If everyone on the 

Court always voted for the prosecution against the defendant, for 

the corporation against the plaintiffs, and for the government 

against the condemned, a vital spark of American democracy would 

be extinguished. A courtroom is supposed to be a place where the 

status quo can be disrupted, even upended, when the Constitution 

38 

or laws may require; where the comfortable can sometimes be afflicted and the afflicted find some comfort, all under the stern shelter of the law. It is worth remembering that judges of the United 

States have shown great courage over the years, courage verging 

on heroism, in providing that sanctuary of careful attention, what 

James Bryce called ‘‘the cool dry atmosphere of judicial determination,’’ amidst the inflamed passions or invested powers of the day. 

Judge Sotomayor, I believe your broad and balanced background 

and empathy prepare you well for this constitutional and proper judicial role. And I join my colleagues in welcoming you to the Committee and looking forward to your testimony. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Coburn. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TOM COBURN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

OKLAHOMA 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. 

Judge, welcome. It is truly an honor to have you before us. It 

says something remarkable about our country that you are here, 

and I assure you during your time before this Committee you will 

be treated with the utmost respect and kindness. It will not distinguish, however, that we will be thorough as we probe the areas 

where we have concerns. 

There is no question that you have a stellar re ́sume ́, and if 

re ́sume ́s and judicial history were all that we went by, we wouldn’t 

need to have this hearing. But, in fact, other things add into that. 

Equally important to us providing consent on this nomination is 

our determination that you have a judicial philosophy that reflects 

what our Founders intended. There is great division about what 

that means. I also wanted to note that I thought this was your 

hearing, not Judge Roberts’ hearing, and that the partial-birth 

abortion ban was a law passed by the United States Congress and 

was upheld by the Supreme Court. So I have a different point of 

view on that. 

As I expressed to you in our meeting, I think our Nation is at 

a critical point. I think we are starting to see cracks, and the reason I say that is because I think the glue that binds our Nation 

together is not our political philosophies. We have very different 

political philosophies. The thing that binds us together is an innate 

trust that you can have fair and impartial judgment in this country, that we better than any other nation, when we have been 

wrong, have corrected the wrongs of our founding; but we have instilled the confidence that, in fact, when you come before it, there 

is blind justice. And that, in fact, allows us the ability to overlook 

other areas where we are not so good because it instills in us the 

confidence of an opportunity to have a fair hearing and a just outcome. 

I am concerned, as many of my colleagues, with some of your 

statements, and I do not know if the statements were made to be 

provocative or if they are truly heart-felt in what you have said. 

But I know that some of those concerns will guide my questioning 

when we come to the questioning period. And you were very 

straightforward with me in our meeting, and my hope is that you 

will be there as well. 

39 

I am deeply concerned by your assertion that the law is uncertain—that goes completely against what I just said about the rule 

of law being the glue that binds us together—and your praise for 

an unpredictable system of justice. I think we want it to be predictable. We want it to be predictable in its fairness and the fact in 

how cases are viewed. And it shouldn’t matter which judge you get. 

It should matter what the law is and the facts are. 

I am worried that our Constitution may be seen to be malleable 

and evolving when I, as someone who comes from the heartland, 

seems to grasp and hold and the people that I represent from the 

State of Oklahoma seem to grasp and hold that there is a 

foundational document and there are statutes and occasionally 

treaties that should be the rule rather than our opinions. 

Other statements such as the court of appeals is where policy is 

made, that is surprising to me. And as I look at our Founders, the 

Court is to be a check, not a policymaker. Your assertion that ethnicity and gender will make someone a better judge, although I understand the feelings and emotions behind that, I am not sure that 

could be factually correct. Maybe a better judge than some, but not 

a better judge than others. 

The other statement, there is no objective stance but only a series of perspectives, no neutrality, no escape from choice in judging—what that implies, the fact that it is subjective implies that 

it is not objective. And if we disregard objective consideration of 

facts, then all rulings are subjective, and we lose the glue that 

binds us together as a Nation. 

Even more important is your questioning of whether the application of impartiality in judging, including transcending personal 

sympathies and prejudices, is possible in most cases or is even desirable is extremely troubling to me. 

You have taken the oath already twice and, if confirmed, will 

take it again. And I want to repeat it again. It has been said once 

this morning. Here is the oath: ‘‘I do solemnly swear or affirm that 

I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal 

right to the poor and to the rich, and will faithfully and impartially 

discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me under the 

Constitution and the laws of the United States, so help me God.’’ 

It does not reference foreign law anywhere. It does not reference 

whether or not we lose influence in the international community. 

We lost influence when we became a country in the international 

community to several countries. But the fact is that did not impede 

us from establishing this great republic. 

I think this oath succinctly captures the role of a judge, and I 

am concerned about some of your statements in regard to that. 

Your judicial philosophy might be—and I am not saying it is—inconsistent with the impartial, neutral arbiter that the oath describes. 

With regard to your judicial philosophy, the burden of proof rests 

on you, but in this case, that burden has been exaggerated by some 

of your statements and also by some of President Obama’s stated 

intent to nominate someone who is not impartial but instead favors 

certain groups of people. 

During the campaign, he promised to nominate someone who has 

got the heart and the empathy to recognize what it is like to be 

40 

a young teenage mom. The implication is that our judges today do 

not have that. Do you realize how astounding that is? The empathy 

to understand what it is like to be poor, to be African American or 

gay or disabled or old. Most of our judges understand what it is 

like to be old. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator COBURN. Senator Obama referred his ‘‘empathy standard’’ when he voted against Chief Justice Roberts. He stated, ‘‘The 

tough cases can only be determined on the basis of one’s deepest 

values, one’s core concerns, one’s broader perspective on how the 

world works, and the depth and breadth of one’s empathy.’’ 

I believe that standard is antithetical to the proper role of a 

judge. The American people expect their judges to treat all litigants 

equally, not to favor and not to enter the courtroom already prejudiced against one of the parties. That is why Lady Justice is always 

depicted blind and why Aristotle defined law as ‘‘reason free from 

passion.’’ 

Do we expect a judge to merely call balls and strikes? Maybe so, 

maybe not. But we certainly do not expect them to sympathize with 

one party over the other, and that is where empathy comes from. 

Judge Sotomayor, you must prove to the Senate that you will adhere to the proper role of a judge and only base your opinions on 

the Constitution, statutes, and, when appropriate, treaties. That is 

your oath. That is what the Constitution demands of you. You must 

demonstrate that you will strictly interpret the Constitution and 

our laws and will not be swayed by your personal biases or your 

political preferences—which you are entitled to. 

As Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist Paper No. 78, ‘‘The 

interpretation of the law is the proper and peculiar province of the 

courts. The Constitution, however, must be regarded by the judges 

as fundamental law.’’ He further stated it was indispensable in the 

courts of justice that judges have ‘‘an inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution.’’ A nominee who does not adhere to these standards necessarily rejects the role of a judge as 

dictated by the Constitution and should not be confirmed. 

I look forward to a respectful and rigorous interchange with you 

during my time to question you. I have several questions that I 

hope you will be able to answer. I will try not to put you in a case 

where you have to answer a future opinion. I understand your desire in that regard, and I respect it. 

I thank you for being here, and I applaud your accomplishments. 

May God bless you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator. 

We have been joined by the Deputy Majority Leader, Senator 

Durbin, and just so everyone can plan, especially you, Judge, we 

will hear from Senator Durbin. We will then recess until 2 o’clock, 

and we will come back at 2 o’clock, at which point Senator Klobuchar will be recognized. 

Senator Durbin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD J. DURBIN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM ILLINOIS 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

41 

Judge Sotomayor, welcome to you and your family. These nomination hearings can be long and painful, but after surviving a broken ankle and individual meetings with 89 different U.S. Senators 

in the past few weeks, you are certainly battle-tested. 

At the nomination hearing for Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 

1993, my friend Senator Paul Simon of Illinois asked the following 

question: ‘‘You face a much harsher judge . . . than this Committee and that is the judgment of history. And that judgment is 

likely to revolve around the question: Did she restrict freedom or 

did she expand it? ’’ 

I asked this question with respect to the nominations of Chief 

Justice Roberts and, Justice Alito, and I think it is an important 

question of any court nominee, particularly to the Supreme Court. 

The nine men and women on the Supreme Court serve lifetime 

appointments, and they resolve many of our most significant 

issues. It is the Supreme Court that defines our personal right to 

privacy and decides the restrictions to be placed on the most personal aspects of our lives. 

The Court decides the rights of the victims of discrimination, immigrants, consumers. The nine Justices decide whether Congress 

has the authority to pass laws to protect our civil rights and our 

environment. They decide what checks will exist on the executive 

branch in war and in peace. 

Because these issues are so important, we need Justices with intelligence, knowledge of the law, the proper judicial temperament, 

and a commitment to impartial justice. More than that, we need 

our Supreme Court Justices to have an understanding of the real 

world and the impact their decisions will have on everyday people. 

We need Justices whose wisdom—— 

[Protestor outburst.] 

Chairman LEAHY. The officer will remove the person. The officer 

will remove the person. As I have said before, and both Senator 

Sessions and I have said, you are guests of the Senate while you 

are here. Everybody is a guest of the Senate. Judge Sotomayor deserves the respect of being heard. The Senators deserve the respect 

of being heard. No outburst will be allowed that might interrupt 

the ability of the Senators or of the judge or, I might say, of our 

guests who are sitting here patiently listening to everything that 

is being said. 

I thank the Capitol Police for responding as quickly and as rapidly and as professionally as they always do. I apologize to Senator 

Durbin for the interruption, and I yield back to him. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

More than that, we need our Supreme Court Justices to have an 

understanding of the real world and the impact their decisions 

have on everyday people. We need Justices whose wisdom comes 

from life, not just from law books. 

Sadly, this important quality seems to be in short supply. The 

current Supreme Court has issued many decisions that I think represent a triumph of ideology over common sense. When Chief Justice Roberts came before this Committee in 2005, he famously said 

a Supreme Court Justice is like an umpire calling balls and strikes. 

42 

We have observed, unfortunately, that it is a little hard to see 

home plate from right field. 

If being a Supreme Court Justice were as easy as calling balls 

and strikes, we wouldn’t see many 5–4 decisions in the Court. But 

in the last year alone, 23 of the Supreme Court’s 74 decisions were 

decided by a 5–4 vote. 

The recent decision of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber is 

a classic example of the Supreme Court putting activism over common sense. The question in that case was simply, fundamental: 

Should women be paid the same as men for the same work? Lilly 

Ledbetter was a manager at a Goodyear Tire plant in Alabama, 

worked there for 19 years, did not learn until she was about to retire that her male colleagues in the same job were paid more. She 

brought a discrimination lawsuit. The jury awarded her a verdict. 

The Supreme Court in a 5–4 decision reversed it and threw out 

the verdict. The basis for it? They said Lilly Ledbetter filed her discrimination complaint too late. They said her complaint should 

have been filed within 180 days of the first discriminatory paycheck. 

That decision defied common sense in the realities of a workplace 

where few employees know what their fellow employees are being 

paid. It contradicted decades of past precedent. 

In the case Safford Unified School District v. Redding, a 13-yearold girl was strip-searched at her school because of a false rumor 

that she was hiding ibuprofen pills. At the oral argument in April 

several of the Supreme Court Justices asked questions about the 

case that, unfortunately, revealed a stunning lack of empathy 

about the eighth-grade victim. One of the Justices even suggested 

that being strip-searched was no different than changing clothes 

for gym class. Although Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg helped her 

eight male colleagues understand why the strip-search of a 13- 

year-old girl was humiliating enough to violate her constitutional 

rights, a majority of the Justices ruled that the school officials were 

immune from liability. 

In a 5–4 case in 2007, Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court 

again overturned past precedent and ruled for the first time it was 

permissible to place restrictions on abortion that do not include an 

exception regarding a woman’s health. 

Judge Sotomayor, you have overcome many obstacles in your life 

that have given you an understanding of the daily realities and 

struggles faced by everyday people. You grew up in a housing complex in the Bronx. You overcame a diagnosis of juvenile diabetes 

at age 8 and the death of your father at age 9. Your mother worked 

two jobs so she could afford to send you and your brothers to 

Catholic schools, and you earned scholarships to Princeton and 

Yale. I know how proud you are of your mom and your family. 

Your first job out of law school was as assistant district attorney 

where you prosecuted violent crime. You went on to work in a law 

firm representing corporations, which gave you another valuable 

perspective. In 17 years as a Federal judge, you have demonstrated 

an ability to see both sides of the issues. You earned a reputation 

as being restrained and moderate and neutral. 

Of the 110 individuals who have served as Supreme Court Justices throughout our Nation’s history, 106 have been white males. 

43 

Until Thurgood Marshall’s appointment to the Supreme Court a 

generation ago, every Justice throughout our Nation’s history had 

been a white male. President Obama’s nomination of you to serve 

as the first Hispanic and the third woman on the Supreme Court 

is historic. The President knows and we know that to be the first 

you have to meet a higher standard. Before you can serve on this 

Court, the American people, through their elected Senators, will be 

asked to judge you. We owe it to you and the Constitution to be 

a fair jury. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, and, Judge, thank you. 

Enjoy your lunch. We will look forward to coming back. And when 

you come back, we will hear from Senator Klobuchar, Senator 

Kaufman, Senator Specter, Senator Franken, and I welcome Senator Franken to the Committee. And we will then have an introduction of you, and what everybody has really been waiting to 

hear, we will hear from you. So thank you very, very much, Judge. 

[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the Committee recessed, to reconvene 

at 2:00 p.m., this same day.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. If we could get back order in the 

room. 

It’s good to have you back here. As I recall, we left at Senator 

Klobuchar. You’re next, and I will yield to Senator Klobuchar. 

STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. 

Welcome back, Judge. It’s a pleasure to see you again. I enjoyed 

our conversation. And what I most remembered about that, is that 

you confessed to me that you once brought a winter parka to Minnesota in June. 

[Laughter]. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And I promise I will not hold that against 

you during this week. 

I know you have many friends and family here, but it was really 

an honor for me to meet your mom. When President Obama first 

announced your nomination, I loved the story about how your mom 

saved all of her money to buy you and your brother the first set 

of encyclopedias in the neighborhood, and it reminded me of when 

my own parents brought us Encyclopedia Brittannicas. It always 

held this hallowed place in the hallway, and for me they were a 

window on the world and a gateway to knowledge, which they 

clearly were to you as well. 

From the time you were nine years old, your mom raised you and 

your brother on her own. She struggled to buy those encyclopedias 

on her nurse’s salary, but she did it because she believed deeply 

in the value of education. You went on to be the valedictorian of 

your high school class and to be tops in your class in college, and 

go to law school. 

After that, and this is an experience that we have in common, 

you became a local prosecutor. Most of my questions during this 

hearing will be about opinions you’ve authored and work that 

you’ve done in the criminal area. I believe having judges with realworld front-line experience as prosecutors is a good thing. 

44 

When I think about the inspiring journey of your life I’m reminded of other Supreme Court Justices who came from, in your 

own words, ‘‘modest and challenging circumstances’’. There is Justice O’Connor, who lived the first years of her life in a ranch in Arizona with no running water and no electricity. By sheer necessity, 

she learned how to mend fences, ride horses, brand cattle, shoot a 

rifle, and even drive a truck, all before she was 13 years old. 

I also think about Justice Thurgood Marshall, who was the 

great-grandson of a slave. His mother was a teacher, while his father worked as a Pullman car waiter before becoming a steward at 

an all-white country club. Justice Marshall waited tables to put 

himself through law school and his mom actually pawned her wedding and engagement rings to get the down payment to send him 

to Howard University Law School here in Washington. 

And then there’s Justice Blackman, who grew up in a St. Paul 

working-class neighborhood in my home State of Minnesota. He 

was able to attend Harvard College only because at the last minute 

the Harvard Club of Minnesota got him a scholarship, and then he 

went on to Harvard where he worked as a tutor and a janitor. 

Through four years of college and three years of law school, his 

family was never able to scrape up enough money to bring him 

back to Minnesota for Christmas. 

Each of these very different Justices grew up in challenging circumstances. No one can doubt that for each of these Justices, their 

life experiences shaped their work and they did—that they did on 

the Supreme Court. This should be unremarkable and, in fact, it’s 

completely appropriate. 

After all, our own Committee members demonstrate the value 

that comes from members who have different backgrounds and perspectives. For instance, at the same time my accomplished colleague Senator Whitehouse, son of a renowned diplomat, was growing up in Saigon during the Vietnam War, I was working as a car 

hop at the A&W Rootbeer stand in suburban Minnesota. 

And while Senator Hatch is a famed gospel music songwriter, 

Senator Leahy is such a devoted fan of the Grateful Dead that he 

once had trouble taking a call from the President of the United 

States because the Chairman was on stage with the Grateful Dead. 

[Laughter]. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. We have been tremendously blessed on this 

Committee with the gift of having members with different backgrounds and different experiences, just as different experiences are 

a gift for any court in this land. 

So when one of my colleagues questioned whether you, Judge, 

would be a Justice for all of us or just for some of us, I couldn’t 

help but remember something that Hubert Humphrey once said. 

He said, ‘‘America is all the richer for the many different and distinctive strands of which it is woven.’’ 

Along those lines, Judge, you are only the third woman in history 

to come before this Committee as a Supreme Court nominee, and 

as you can see there are currently only two women on this Committee, Senator Feinstein and myself. So I think it’s worth remembering that when Justice O’Connor graduated from law school, the 

only offer she got from law firms were for legal secretary positions. 

Justice O’Connor, who graduated third in her class from Stanford 

45 

Law School, saw her accomplishments reduced to one question: can 

she type? 

Justice Ginsberg faced similar obstacles. When she entered Harvard Law School, she was one of only nine women in a class of 

more than 500. One professor actually demanded that she justify 

why she deserved a seat that could have gone to a man. Later, she 

was passed over for a prestigious clerkship, despite impressive credentials. 

Nevertheless, both of them persevered, and they certainly prevailed. Their undeniable merits triumphed over those who sought 

to deny them opportunity. The women who came before you to be 

considered by this Committee helped blaze a trail, and although 

your record stands on your own, you also stand on their shoulders, 

another woman with an opportunity to be a Justice for all of us. 

As Justice Ginsburg’s recent comments regarding the strip 

search of a 13-year-old girl indicate, as well as her dissent in the 

Lilly Ledbetter Equal Pay case, being a Justice for all of us may 

mean bringing some real-world practical experience into the courthouse. 

As we consider your nomination, we know that you are more 

than a sum of your professional experiences. Still, you bring one of 

the most wide-ranging legal re ́sume ́s to this position: local prosecutor, civil litigator, trial judge, and appellate judge. Straight out 

of law school, you went to work as a prosecutor in the Manhattan 

D.A.’s office and you ended up staying there for five years. 

When you’re a prosecutor, the law ceases to be an abstract subject. It’s not just a dusty book in the basement. It’s real and it has 

an impact on real people’s lives, whether it’s victims and their families, defendants and their families, or the neighborhood where you 

live. 

It also has a big impact on the individual prosecutor. You never 

forget the big and difficult cases. I know in your case, one of those 

is the serial burglar-turned-murderer, the Tarzan murder case. In 

my case, it was a little girl named Taisha Edwards, an 11-year-old 

girl shot by stray gang fire as she sat at her kitchen table doing 

her homework. 

As a prosecutor, you don’t just have to know the law, you also 

have to know people. So, Judge, I’m interested in talking to you 

more about what you’ve learned from that job and how that job 

shaped your legal career and your approach to judging. 

I’m also interested in learning more about your views on criminal 

law issues. I want to explore your views on the Fourth Amendment, the confrontation clause, and sentencing law and policy. I’d 

like to know, in criminal cases as well as in civil cases, how you 

would balance the text of statutes and the Constitution and the 

practical things you see out there in the world. 

It seems to me in cases like Falso, Santa, and Howard that you 

have a keen understanding of the real-world implications of your 

decisions. I often get concerned that those pragmatic experiences 

are missing in judicial decision-making, especially when I look at 

the recent Supreme Court case in which the majority broadly interpreted the confrontation clause to include crime lab workers. I 

agree with the four dissenting Justices that the ruling has vast poVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
46 

tential to disrupt criminal procedures that already give ample protections against the misuse of scientific evidence. 

Your old boss, Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, 

called you a fearless and effective prosecutor. This is how he put 

it once in an interview: ‘‘We want people with good judgment because a lot of the job of a prosecutor is making decisions. I also 

want to see some signs of humility in anybody that I hire. We’re 

giving young lawyers a lot of power and we want to make sure that 

they’re going to use that power with good sense and without arrogance.’’ 

These are among the very qualities I’m looking for in a Supreme 

Court Justice. I, too, am looking for a person with good judgment, 

someone with intellectual curiosity and independence, but who also 

understands that her judicial decisions affect real people. 

With that, I think, comes the second essential quality: humility. 

I’m looking for a Justice who appreciates the awesome responsibility that she will be given, if confirmed, a Justice who understands the gravity of the office and who respects the very different 

roles that the Constitution provides for each of the three branches 

of government. 

Finally, a good prosecutor knows that her job is to enforce the 

law without fear or favor; likewise, a Supreme Court Justice must 

interpret the law without fear or favor. And I believe your background and experiences, including your understanding of front-line 

law enforcement, will help you to always remember that the cases 

you hear involve real people with real problems who are looking for 

real remedies. 

With excellent justice and excellent judgment, and a sense of humility, I believe you can be a Justice for all of us. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. 

Next, Senator Kaufman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Judge Sotomayor, and welcome to your family and 

friends. Congratulations on your nomination, and congratulations 

to your parents, who did such a good job on raising you to get to 

where you are today. 

We are beginning—now beginning the end of an extraordinarily 

important process, to confirm a Supreme Court Justice of the 

United States. Short of voting to go to war, the Senate’s constitutional obligation to advise and consent on Supreme Court nominees 

is probably our most important responsibility. 

Supreme Court Justices serve for life, and once the Senate confirms a nominee she is likely to be affecting the law and American 

lives much longer than many of the Senators who are here to confirm her. The advise-and-consent process for the nomination began 

after Justice Souter announced his intent to resign and President 

Obama consulted with members of both parties before making his 

selection. 

It has continued since then with the help from extensive public 

debate among analysts and commentators, scholars and activists, 

47 

both in the traditional press and in the blogosphere. This public 

vetting process, while not always accurate or temperate, is extremely valuable both to the Senate and to the public. 

One of the truly great benefits of a free society is our ability to 

delve deeply into an extensive public record. We have seen a wideranging discussion of the issues in which anyone—literally anyone—can help dissect and debate even the most minute legal issue 

and personal expressions of opinion. 

In another less public part of the process, Judge, you had the 

wonderful experience of meeting with 90 Senators, over 90 percent—almost 90 percent of the Senate. These meetings are also extremely useful. I know I learned a great deal from my meeting and 

I’m confident my colleagues did as well. 

For me, the critical criteria for judging a Supreme Court nominee 

are the following: a first-rate intellect; significant experience; unquestioned integrity; absolute commitment to the rule of law; unwavering dedication to being fair and open-minded; the ability to 

appreciate the impact of court decisions on the lives of ordinary 

people. 

Based on what we’ve learned so far, you are truly an impressive 

nominee. I’m confident this hearing will give this Committee, and 

the rest of the Senate, the information we need to complete our 

constitutional duty. As Senators, I believe we each owe you a decision based on your record and your answers to our questions. That 

decision should not turn on empty code words like ‘‘judicial activist’’, or on charges of guilt by association, or on any litmus test. Instead, we should focus on your record and your responses and determine whether you have the qualities that will enable you to well 

serve all Americans and the rule of law on our Nation’s highest 

court. 

As my colleagues have already noted, your rise from humble beginnings to extraordinary academic and legal achievement is an inspiration to us all. I note that you would bring more Federal judicial experience to the Supreme Court than any Justice in over 100 

years. You also have incredibly valuable practice experience not 

only as a prosecutor, but also a commercial litigator. 

In terms of your judicial record, you appear to have been careful, 

thoughtful, and open-minded. In fact, what strikes me most about 

your record is that it seems to reveal no biases. You appear to take 

each case as it comes, without predilection, giving full consideration to the arguments of both sides before reaching a decision. 

When Justice Souter announced his retirement in May, I suggested the court would benefit from a broader range of experience 

among its members. My concern at the time wasn’t the relative 

lack of women, or racial, or ethnic minorities on our court, although 

that deficit is glaring. I was pointing to the fact that most of the 

current Justices, whether they be black or white, women or men, 

share roughly the same life experiences. I am heartened by what 

you bring to the court based on your upbringing, your story of 

achievement in the face of adversity, your professional experience 

as a prosecutor and commercial litigator, and yes, the prospect of 

your being the first Latina to sit on the high court. 

Though the Supreme Court is not a representative body, we 

should hold as an ideal that it broadly reflect the citizens it serves. 

48 

Diversity shares many goals. Outside the courtroom, it better 

equips our institutions to understand more of the viewpoints and 

backgrounds that comprise our pluralistic society. Moreover, a 

growing body of social research suggests that groups with diverse 

experience and backgrounds come to the right outcome more often 

than do non-diverse groups which may be just as talented. I believe 

a diverse court will function better as well. 

Another concern I have about the current Supreme Court is its 

handling of business cases. Too often it seems they disregard settled law and congressional policy choices. Based on my education, 

my experience and my inclination, I am not anti-business, but 

whether it is preempting State consumer protection laws, striking 

down punitive damage awards, restricting access to the courts, or 

overturning 96 years of pro-consumer antitrust law, today’s court 

gives me the impression that in business cases the working majority is outcome-oriented and therefore too one-sided. 

Given our current economic crisis and the failures of regulation 

and enforcement that led to that crisis, that bias is particularly 

troubling. Congress can, and will, enact a dramatically improved 

regulatory system. The President can, and will, make sure that relevant enforcement agencies are populated with smart, motivated, 

and effective agents. 

But a Supreme Court, resistant to Federal Government involvement in the regulation of markets, could undermine those efforts. 

A judge or a court has to call the game the same way for all sides. 

Fundamental fairness requires that, in the courtroom, everyone 

comes to the plate with the same count of no balls and no strikes. 

One of the aspirations of the American judicial system is that it 

is a place where the powerless have a chance for justice on a level 

playing field with the powerful. We need Justices on the Supreme 

Court who not only understand that aspiration, but also are committed to making it a reality. 

Because of the importance of businesses cases before the Supreme Court, I plan to spend some time asking you about your experience as a commercial litigator, your handling of business cases 

as a trial judge and on the Court of Appeals, and your approach 

to business cases generally. From what I’ve seen of your record, 

you seem to recall these cases right down the middle without any 

bias or agenda. That is very important to me. 

Very soon, those of us up here will be done talking and you will 

have the chance to testify and answer our questions. I look forward 

to your testimony. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Kaufman. 

Another former Chairman of this Committee, Senator Specter. I 

yield to you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I join my colleagues, Judge Sotomayor, in welcoming you and 

your family here. I compliment the President for nominating an 

Hispanic woman. I think it was wrong for America to wait until 

1967 to have an African-American, Justice Thurgood Marshall, on 

49 

the court, waited too long, until 1981, to have the first woman, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. I think, as a diverse Nation, diversity 

is very, very important. 

You bring excellent credentials academically, professionally, your 

service on the court. The Constitution requires the process for this 

Committee, and then the full Senate, to consider in detail your 

qualifications under our consent function. Most of the questions 

which will be asked of you in the course of these hearings will involve decided cases. I intend to ask about decided cases, but also 

about cases that the Supreme Court decided not to decide and on 

the rejection of cases for decision. It’s a big problem. 

The court, I would suggest, has time for more cases. Chief Justice Roberts noted in his confirmation hearing that the decision in 

more cases would be very helpful. If you contrast the docket of the 

Supreme Court in 1886 with currently, in 1886 there were 1,396 

on the docket, 451 were decided. A century later, there were only 

161 signed opinions; in 2007, there were only 67 signed opinions. 

I start on the cases which are not decided, although I could start 

in many, many areas. I could start with the Circuit splits, where 

one Court of Appeals in one section of the country goes one way, 

another Court of Appeals goes the other way. The rest of the courts 

don’t know which way the precedents are, and the Supreme Court 

decides not to decide. 

But take the case of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, which 

was President Bush’s secret warrantless wire taps, and contrast it 

with congressional authority exercised under Article I on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, providing the exclusive way to 

have wire taps, perhaps the sharpest conflict in the history of this 

great country on the Article I powers of Congress and the Article 

II powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief. 

The Federal District Court in Detroit said that the Terrorist Surveillance Program was unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit decided 

2:1 that the plaintiffs did not have standing. I thought the dissenting opinion was much stronger than the majority opinion. 

Standing, as we all know, is a very flexible doctrine, and candidly, 

at least as I see it, used frequently by the court to avoid deciding 

a case. 

Then the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari 

and decided not to hear the case, didn’t even decide whether the 

lack of standing was a justifiable basis. This has led to great confusion in the law. And it’s as current as this morning’s newspapers 

reporting about other secret programs which apparently the President had in operation. Had the Supreme Court of the United States 

taken up the Terrorist Surveillance Program, the court could have 

ruled on whether it was appropriate for the President not to notify 

the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee about the program. 

We have a law which says all members of the Intelligence Committees are to be notified. Well, the President didn’t follow that 

law. Did he have the right to do so under Article II powers? Well, 

we don’t know. Or within the last two weeks, the Supreme Court 

denied hearing a case involving claims by families of victims of 

9/11 against Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia commissions, and for 

princes in Saudi Arabia. 

50 

The Congress decided what sovereign immunity was in legislation in 1976 and had exclusions for torts, but the Supreme Court 

denied an opportunity for those families who had suffered grievously from having their day in court. One of the questions, when 

my opportunity arises, will be to ask you what would be the standards that you would employ in deciding what cases the Supreme 

Court would hear. 

There is currently a major matter at issue on the Voting Rights 

Act, and the conflict has been present for many years, between the 

authority of Congress to decide what is the factual basis for legislation, a standard which Justice Harlan decided in the Wirtz case 

was a rational basis. The Supreme Court, more recently, has adopted a standard of congruently—congruence and proportionality, a 

standard which Justice Scalia has said is a ‘‘flabby test’’ which invites judicial lawmaking. 

You’ll hear a lot about—in this hearing about a judge’s responsibility to interpret the law and the statutes and not to make laws. 

And during the confirmation hearing of Chief Justice Roberts, he 

said in pretty plain terms that the court ought to allow the Congress to decide what the factual basis is, and for the court to do 

otherwise is to engage in judicial legislation. 

The Voting Rights case was decided on narrow grounds, but it 

certainly looks, if you read the record, that the court is about ready 

to upset the Voting Rights case just like it did in Alabama v. Garrett on the Americans With Disabilities Act, notwithstanding a vast 

record establishing the basis. 

So I would like to know what your standard will be, if confirmed, 

a rational basis which had been the traditional standard, or congruence and proportionality? If you tell me congruence and proportionality, then I’ll ask you what it means because it slips and slides 

around so much that it’s impossible to tell what a constitutional 

standard is. We Senators would like to know what the standards 

are so we know what to do when we undertake legislation. 

Your decision on the District—on the Circuit Court, in a case 

captioned Entergy Corporation v. Riverkeeper, Inc. involving the 

Environmental Protection Agency and the Clean Water Act, has a 

special prominence now that we are debating climate control and 

global warming. In the Second Circuit opinion, you were in the majority, deciding that it was the ‘‘best technology’’. 

The Supreme Court reversed, 5:4, saying that it turned on a 

‘‘cost-benefit analysis’’. It, I think, is worthy of exploration, although what you answer, obviously, is a matter of your discretion 

as to whether, on a 5:4 decision—it’s hard to say who’s really right, 

the 5 or the 4, as a matter of interpreting the Constitution or the 

statute. 

Having a different view, I’d be interested to know if you’d care 

to respond, when the time comes, as to whether you’d be with what 

had been the minority, and perhaps a voice as strong as yours in 

the conference room would produce a different result. It could have 

a real impact on what we’re legislating now on cap and trade. 

With the few seconds I have left, I’d like to preview some questions on televising the court. I don’t know why there’s so much interest here today. I haven’t counted this many cameras since Justice Alito was sitting where you’re sitting. You’ve had experience in 

51 

the District Court with television. You’re replacing Justice Souter, 

who said that if TV cameras were to come to court they’d have to 

roll over his dead body. If you’re confirmed, they won’t have to roll 

over his dead body. 

[Laughter]. 

Senator SPECTER. But the court decides all the cutting-edge questions of the day. The Senate is televised, the House is televised. A 

lot of people are fascinated by this hearing. I’d like to see the court 

televised; you can guess that. 

Thank you very much, Judge Sotomayor. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Specter. 

I understand, the next statement will be by Senator Franken, 

and then we’ll call forward the two people who are going to introduce you, and you, then, Judge, have a chance to say something. 

Senator Franken has been waiting patiently all day, and I appreciate having you here. Please go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF HON. AL FRANKEN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF MINNESOTA 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s an incredible 

honor to be here, less than week into my term as a United States 

Senator. My first major responsibility is here at this historic confirmation hearing. 

I am truly humbled to join the Judiciary Committee, which has 

played, and will continue to play, such an important role in overseeing our Nation’s system of justice. Chairman Leahy, for several 

years now, I have admired your strength and integrity in leading 

this Committee. I am grateful for your warm welcome and the consideration that you’ve given me, sir, and I am honored to serve 

alongside of you. 

Ranking Member Sessions, I want you to know that I plan to follow the example of my good friend and predecessor, Paul 

Wellstone, who was willing and ready to partner with his colleagues across the aisle to do the work of the American people. I 

look forward to working over the years with you and my other Republican colleagues in the Senate to improve the lives of all Americans. 

To all the members of this Committee, I know that I have a lot 

to learn from each of you. Like so many private citizens, I have 

watched at least part of each and every Supreme Court confirmation hearing since they’ve been televised. And I would note that 

this is the first confirmation hearing that Senator Kennedy has not 

attended since 1965. 

[Interruption from the audience.] 

Chairman LEAHY. The Senate will suspend. Officers, please remove whoever is causing the disturbance. 

Again, as Senator Sessions and I have said, this is a meeting of 

the United States Senate. We’ll show respect to everybody who is 

here. 

[Interruption from the audience.] 

Chairman LEAHY. We’ll show respect to everybody here, and certainly to Judge Sotomayor, to the Senators on both sides of the 

aisle, and we will have order in this room. 

52 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Senator Leahy. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Franken, please continue. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

What I was saying was, this is the first hearing since 1965 that 

Senator Kennedy has not been present, and I know he’s off the 

Committee now, but we do miss his presence. These televised hearings over the years have taught Americans a lot about our Constitution and the role that the courts play in upholding and defending it. I look forward to listening to all of your questions and the 

issues that you and your constituents care about. 

To Judge Sotomayor, welcome. Over the next few days I expect 

to learn from you as well. As has been said, you’re the most experienced nominee to the Supreme Court in 100 years. After meeting 

you in my office last week, I know that you’re not just an outstanding jurist, but an exceptional individual. And as others have 

said, your story is inspirational and one which all Americans 

should take great pride in, and I welcome your family as well. 

As most of you know, this is my fifth day in office. That may 

mean I’m the most junior Senator, but it also means that I am the 

Senator who most recently took the oath of office. Last Tuesday, I 

swore to support and defend the Constitution of the United States 

and to bear true faith and allegiance to it. I take this oath very 

seriously as we consider your nomination, Judge Sotomayor. 

I may not be a lawyer, but neither are the overwhelming majority of Americans. Yet all of us, regardless of our backgrounds and 

professions, have a huge stake in who sits on the Supreme Court, 

and we are profoundly affected by its decisions. 

I hope to use my time over the next few days to raise issues that 

concern the people of Minnesota, and the people of this Nation. 

This hearing will helps folks sitting in living rooms and offices in 

Winona, Duluth, and the Twin Cities to get a better idea of what 

the court is, what it does, and what it’s supposed to do, and most 

importantly, how it affects the everyday lives of all Americans. 

Justice Souter, whom you will replace if you are confirmed, once 

said, ‘‘The first lesson, simple as it is, is that whatever court we’re 

in, whatever we’re doing, at the end of our task some human being 

is going to be affected, some human life is going to be changed by 

what we do, and so we had better use every power of our minds 

and our hearts and our beings to get those rulings right.’’ I believe 

Justice Souter had it right. 

In the past months, I have spent a lot of time thinking about the 

court’s impact on the lives of Americans, and reading and consulting with some of Minnesota’s top legal minds. And I believe 

that the rights of Americans as citizens and voters are facing challenges on two separate fronts. 

First, I believe that the position of the Congress, with respect to 

the courts and the executive, is in jeopardy. Even before I aspired 

to represent the people of Minnesota in the United States Senate, 

I believed that the framers made Congress the first branch of government for a reason. It answers most directly to the people and 

has the legitimacy to speak for the people in crafting laws to be 

carried out by the executive branch. 

53 

I am wary of judicial activism and I believe in judicial restraint. 

Except under the most exceptional circumstances, the judicial 

branch is designed to show deep deference to the Congress and not 

make policy by itself. Yet, looking at recent decisions on voting 

rights, campaign finance reform, and a number of other topics, it 

appears that appropriate deference may not have been shown in 

the past few years and there are ominous signs that judicial activism is on the rise in these areas. 

I agree with Senator Feingold and with Senator Whitehouse. We 

hear a lot about judicial activism when politicians are running for 

office and when they talk about what kind of judge they want on 

the Supreme Court, but it seems that their definition of an activist 

judge is one who votes differently than they would like. For example, during the Rehnquist court, Justice Clarence Thomas voted to 

overturn Federal laws more than Justice Stevens and Justice 

Breyer combined. 

Second, I am concerned that Americans are facing new barriers 

to defending their individual rights. The Supreme Court is the last 

court in the land where an individual is promised a level playing 

field and can seek to right a wrong: it is the last place an employee 

can go if he or she is discriminated against because of age, or gender, or color; it is the last place a small business owner can go to 

ensure free and fair competition in the market; it is the last place 

an investor can go to try to recover losses from security fraud; it 

is the last place a person can go to protect the free flow of information on the Internet; it is the last place a citizen can go to protect 

his or her vote; it is the last place where a woman can go to protect 

her reproductive health and rights. 

Yet, from what I see on each of those fronts, for each of those 

rights, the past decade has made it a little bit harder for American 

citizens to defend themselves. As I said before, Judge, I’m here to 

learn from you. I want to learn what you think is the proper relationship between Congress and the courts, between Congress and 

the executive, I want to learn how you go about weighing the rights 

of the individual, the small consumer or business owner and more 

powerful interests, and I want to hear your views on judicial restraint and activism in the context of important issues like voting 

rights, open access to the Internet, and campaign finance reform. 

We’re going to have a lot more time together, so I’m just going to 

start listening. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very, very much, Senator Franken. 

What we’re going to do, we’re going to move a couple of chairs. 

Just stay there, please, Judge. We’re going to have two people who 

will speak, each for five minutes, to introduce you. I will then administer the oath of the Committee to you. 

[Laughter]. 

Chairman LEAHY. How about that? I’ll administer the oath before 

the Committee and then we will hear your testimony. 

So, going as we do by seniority, Senator Schumer, you are recognized for five minutes, and then Senator Gillibrand, you are recognized for five minutes. 

54 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, PRESENTING SONIA 

SOTOMAYOR, NOMINEE TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Today is a great national opportunity. It’s an opportunity to recognize that the nomination of one of the most qualified candidates 

to the Supreme Court in American history could not have happened anywhere else in the world. 

Judge Sotomayor’s story is a great American story and, I might 

add, a great New York story as well. Consider this: in no other 

country in the world could a woman from a minority group who 

grew up in a working-class family have received an education at 

the best institutions, and having thrived there, gone on to be a 

judge, and now a nominee to the highest court in the land. 

This is because we don’t have a caste system in this country, or 

even a class system. Two hundred fifty years ago, we threw away 

the centuries-old framework of gentry and nobility. We started 

fresh, with no ranks and no titles. Less than four score and seven 

years later, a farmer and self-taught lawyer from Illinois became, 

perhaps, our greatest President. And so the American story goes, 

and Judge Sonia Sotomayor from the Bronx, daughter of a singleparent practical nurse, has written her own chapter in it. 

Judge Sotomayor embodies what we all strive for as American 

citizens. Her life and her career are not about race, or class, or gender, although, as for all of us, these are important parts of who she 

is. Her story is about how race and class, at the end of the day, 

are not supposed to predetermine anything in America. What matters is hard work and education, and those things will pay off no 

matter who you are or where you have come from. It’s exactly what 

each of us wants for ourselves and for our children, and this shared 

vision is why this moment is historic for all Americans. 

Judge Sotomayor was born to parents who moved to New York 

from Puerto Rico during World War II. Her father was a factory 

worker with a third grade education; he died when she was nine. 

Her mother worked and raised Sotomayor and her brother, Juan, 

now a doctor practicing in Syracuse, on her own. 

Sonia Sotomayor graduated first in her high school class at Cardinal Spellman High School in 1971. She has returned to Cardinal 

Spellman to speak there and to encourage future alumni to work 

hard, get an education, and pursue their dreams the same way she 

did. When Sonia Sotomayor was growing up, the Nancy Drew stories inspired her sense of adventure, developed her sense of justice, 

and showed her that women could, and should, be outspoken and 

bold. Now in 2009, there are many more role models for a young 

Cardinal Spellman student to choose from, with Judge Sotomayor 

foremost among them. 

Judge Sotomayor went on to employ her enormous talents at 

Princeton, where she graduated summa cum laude, and received 

the Pyne Prize, the highest honor bestowed on a Princeton student. 

This is an award that is given not just to the smartest student in 

the class, but to the most exceptionally smart student who has also 

given the most to her community. She graduated from Yale Law 

School, where she was a Law Review editor. 

55 

And because we have such an extensive judicial record before us, 

I believe that these hearings will matter less than for the several 

previous nominees, or at the least that these hearings will bear out 

what is obvious about her, that she is modest and humble in her 

approach to judging. 

As we become even more familiar with her incisive mind and balanced views, I am certain that this hearing will prove to all what 

is already clear to many. This is a moment in which all Americans 

can take great pride, not just New Yorkers, not just Puerto Ricans, 

not just Hispanics, not just women, but all Americans who believe 

in opportunity and who want for themselves and their children a 

fair reading of the laws by a judge who understands that while we 

are a Nation of individuals, we are all governed by one law. 

Mr. Chairman, people felt at the founding of America that we 

were ‘‘God’s noble experiment.’’ Judge Sotomayor’s personal story 

shows that today, more than 200 years later, we are still God’s 

noble experiment. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Schumer. 

Now, Senator Gillibrand, the other Senator from New York. 

Please go ahead, Senator Gillibrand. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, PRESENTING SONIA 

SOTOMAYOR, NOMINEE TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Chairman Leahy, Ranking 

Member Sessions, and the other distinguished members of the Judiciary Committee, for the privilege to speak on behalf of Judge 

Sonia Sotomayor. 

President Obama has chosen one of the country’s outstanding 

legal minds with his nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the United 

States Supreme Court. As a New Yorker, I take great pride in 

Judge Sotomayor’s nomination, along with the rest of my State and 

our delegation, including Senator Schumer and my colleagues from 

the House, Congresswoman Nydia Vela ́zquez, who was the first 

person to introduce me to Judge Sotomayor and her record, and 

Congressman Jose ́ Serrano. 

As a woman, I take great pride in this historic nomination. In 

the words of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, ‘‘It took a very long 

time, about 171 years, to get the first woman on the Supreme 

Court,’’ and I thought that we’d very likely always have two, and 

eventually more. I’m very thankful for President Obama in his recognition of the importance of women’s voices on the Nation’s highest court. 

Sonia Sotomayor’s life and career are a study in excellence, commitment to learning, a dedication to the law, and the constant pursuit of the highest ideals of our country and Constitution. Her story 

is also the quintessential American and New York story: born to 

a Puerto Rican family, growing up in public housing in the South 

Bronx, and raised with a love of country and a deep appreciation 

for hard work. 

Judge Sotomayor demonstrated a devotion to learning, graduating summa cum laude from Princeton, and serving as an editor 

56 

on the Yale Law Journal before pursuing her career in the law. 

The breadth and depth of Judge Sotomayor’s experience make her 

uniquely qualified for the Supreme Court. 

Judge Sotomayor’s keen understanding of case law and the importance of precedent is derived from working in nearly every aspect of our legal system: as a prosecutor, as a corporate litigator, 

as a trial judge, and as an appellate judge. 

As prosecutor, Judge Sotomayor fought the worst of society’s ills, 

prosecuting a litany of crimes from murder, to child pornography, 

to drug trafficking. The Manhattan D.A., Bob Morgenthau, described her as ‘‘fearless’’ and ‘‘an effective prosecutor’’ and ‘‘an able 

champion of the law’’. 

Judge Sotomayor’s years as a corporate litigator exposed her to 

all facets of commercial law, including real estate, employment, 

banking, contracts, and agency law. Judge Sotomayor was appointed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 

York by President George Herbert Walker Bush, presiding over 

roughly 450 cases and earning a reputation as a tough, fair-minded, and thoughtful jurist. She would replace Justice Souter as the 

only member on the Supreme Court with trial experience. 

At the appellate level, Judge Sotomayor has participated in over 

3,000 panel decisions, offering roughly 400 published opinions, with 

only 7 being brought up to the Supreme Court, which reversed only 

3 of those decisions, two of which were closely divided. With confirmation, Judge Sotomayor brings more Federal judicial experience to the Supreme Court than any Justice in 100 years, and 

more judicial experience than any Justice confirmed in the court in 

70 years. 

As a testament to Judge Sotomayor, many independent national, 

legal, and law enforcement groups have already endorsed her nomination, including among them the ABA, voting unanimously and 

giving her the highest rating of ‘‘Well Qualified’’, complimenting 

not only her formidable intellect, but her mature legal mind and 

her record of deciding cases based on the precise facts and legal 

issues before her, also faithful in following the law as it exists, and 

that she has a healthy respect for the limited role of judges and 

the balance of powers for the executive and legislative branches. 

The President of the Fraternal Order of Police also stated, ‘‘She’s 

a model jurist: tough, fair-minded, and mindful of the constitutional protections afforded to all U.S. citizens.’’ 

A nominee’s experience as a legal advocate for civil rights certainly must not be seen as a disqualifying criteria for confirmation, 

but instead as the hallmark of an individual’s commitment to our 

founding principles of equality, justice, and freedom. Like Ruth 

Bader Ginsburg’s participation in the ACLU Women’s Rights 

Project or Thurgood Marshall’s participation on behalf of the 

NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Judge Sotomayor’s 

leadership role in the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund demonstrates her commitment to the Constitution, constitutional rights 

and core values of equality as being an inalienable right, an inalienable American right, and should not be ascribed based on gender or color. 

Judge Sotomayor’s entire breadth of experience uniquely informs 

her ability to discern facts as she applies the law and follows preceVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
57 

dent. Judge Sotomayor’s commitment to the Constitution is 

unyielding. As she described her judicial philosophy, saying, ‘‘I 

don’t believe we should bend the Constitution under any circumstance. It says what it says; we should do honor to it.’’ Judge 

Sotomayor’s record on the Second Circuit demonstrates the paramount importance of this conviction. 

The importance of Sonia Sotomayor’s professional and personal 

story cannot be understated. Many of our most esteemed justices 

have noted the importance of their own diverse backgrounds and 

life experiences in being an effective Justice. Like Judge 

Sotomayor, they also understand that their gender or ethnicity is 

not a determining factor in their judicial rulings, but another asset 

which they bring to the court, much like education, training, and 

previous legal work. 

Justice Anthony Scalia said, ‘‘I am the product of the melting pot 

in New York, grew up with people of all religious and ethnic backgrounds. I have absolutely no racial prejudices, and I think I am 

probably at least as antagonistic as the average American, and 

probably much more so, towards racial discrimination.’’ 

Justice Clarence Thomas said, ‘‘My journey has been one that required me to at some point touch on virtually every aspect, every 

level of our country, from people who couldn’t read and write to 

people who were extremely literate and—’’ 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator? Senator, we’re going to have to put 

your full statement in the record so that Judge Sotomayor can be 

heard. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. May I conclude my remarks? 

Chairman LEAHY. If it can be done in the next few seconds, Senator. 

Senator GILLIBRAND. One minute? 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, how about—— 

Senator GILLIBRAND. Twenty seconds. 

I strongly support Judge Sotomayor’s nomination and firmly believe her to be one of the finest jurists in American history. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Judge, now we will administer the oath. I’ll let the two Senators 

step back if they’d like. Please raise your right hand. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give before the 

Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth so help you God? 

Judge Sotomayor. I do. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Please be seated. 

And I thank my two colleagues from New York for the introduction. I appreciate it because I know both have known you for some 

time. Judge, you’ve also introduced a number of members of your 

family. Now the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, NOMINATED TO BE 

AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 

UNITED STATES 

Judge Sotomayor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I also want to thank Senators Schumer and Gillibrand for their 

kind introductions. 

58 

In recent weeks, I have had the privilege and pleasure of meeting 89 Senators, including all of the members of this Committee. 

Each of you has been gracious to me, and I have so much enjoyed 

meeting you. Our meetings have given me an illuminating tour of 

the 50 States and invaluable insights into the American people. 

There are countless family members and friends who have done 

so much over the years to make this day possible. I am deeply appreciative for their love and support. I want to make one special 

note of thanks to my mother. I am here, as many of you have 

noted, because of her aspirations and sacrifices for both my brother 

Juan and me. 

I am very grateful to the President, and humbled to be here 

today as a nominee to the United States Supreme Court. 

The progression of my life has been uniquely American. My parents left Puerto Rico during World War II. I grew up in modest circumstances in a Bronx housing project. My father, a factory worker 

with a third grade education, passed away when I was nine years 

old. On her own, my mother raised my brother and me. She taught 

us that the key to success in America is a good education and she 

set the example, studying alongside my brother and me at our 

kitchen table so that she could become a registered nurse. 

We worked hard. I poured myself into my studies at Cardinal 

Spellman High School, earning scholarships to Princeton University and then Yale Law School, while my brother went on to medical school. 

Our achievements are due to the values that we learned as children and they have continued to guide my life’s endeavors. I try 

to pass on this legacy by serving as a mentor and friend to my 

many godchildren and to students of all backgrounds. 

Over the past three decades, I have seen our judicial system from 

a number of different perspectives: as a big-city prosecutor, as a 

corporate litigator, as a trial judge, and as an appellate judge. My 

first job after law school was as an Assistant District Attorney in 

New York. There, I saw children exploited and abused. I felt the 

pain and suffering of families torn apart by the needless death of 

loved ones. I saw and learned the tough job law enforcement has 

in protecting the public. 

In my next legal job, I focused on commercial, instead of criminal, matters. I litigated issues on behalf of national and international businesses and advised them on matters ranging from 

contracts to trademarks. 

My career as an advocate ended and my career as a judge began 

when I was appointed by President George H.W. Bush to the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 

As a trial judge, I did decide over 450 cases and presided over dozens of trials, with perhaps my most famous case being the major 

league baseball strike in 1995. 

After six extraordinary years on the District Court, I was appointed by President Clinton to the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit. On that court I have enjoyed the benefit of 

sharing ideas and perspectives with wonderful colleagues as we 

have worked together to resolve the issues before us. I have now 

served as an appellate judge for over a decade, deciding a wide 

range of constitutional, statutory, and other legal questions. 

59 

Throughout my 17 years on the bench, I have witnessed the 

human consequences of my decisions. Those decisions have not 

been made to serve the interests of any one litigant, but always to 

serve the larger interests of impartial justice. 

In the past month, many Senators have asked me about my judicial philosophy. Simple: fidelity to the law. The task of a judge is 

not to make law, it is to apply the law. And it is clear, I believe, 

that my record in two courts reflects my rigorous commitment to 

interpreting the Constitution according to its terms, interpreting 

statutes according to their terms and Congress’ intent, and hewing 

faithfully to precedents established by the Supreme Court and by 

my Circuit Court. 

In each case I have heard, I have applied the law to the facts 

at hand. The process of judging is enhanced when the arguments 

and concerns of the parties to the litigation are understood and acknowledged. That is why I generally structure my opinions by setting out what the law requires and then explaining why a contrary 

position, sympathetic or not, is accepted or rejected. 

That is how I seek to strengthen both the rule of law and faith 

in the impartiality of our judicial system. My personal and professional experiences help me to listen and understand, with the law 

always commanding the result in every case. 

Since President Obama announced my nomination in May, I 

have received letters from people all over this country. Many tell 

a unique story of hope in spite of struggles. Each letter has deeply 

touched me. Each reflects a dream, a belief in the dream that led 

my parents to come to New York all those years ago. It is our Constitution that makes that dream possible and I now seek the honor 

of upholding the Constitution as a Justice on the Supreme Court. 

Senators, I look forward, in the next few days, to answering your 

questions, to having the American people learn more about me, and 

to being part of a process that reflects the greatness of our Constitution and of our Nation. 

Thank you all. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Judge. 

I thank all Senators for their opening statements this morning. 

I thank Senator Schumer and Senator Gillibrand for their introduction of you, but especially, Judge Sotomayor, I thank you for your 

statement. I look at the faces of your family; they appreciate it. We 

all do. 

We will stand in recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning. 

Thank you very, very much. 

[Whereupon, at 3:04 p.m., the Committee was adjourned, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, July 14, 2009.] 

(61) 

CONTINUATION OF THE NOMINATION OF 

HON. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 

OF THE UNITED STATES 

TUESDAY, JULY 14, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Kohl, Feinstein, Feingold, Schumer, 

Durbin, Cardin, Whitehouse, Klobuchar, Kaufman, Specter, 

Franken, Sessions, Hatch, Grassley, Kyl, Graham, Cornyn, and 

Coburn. 

Chairman LEAHY. Good morning, everybody. 

Just so we can understand what is going on, I am not sure 

whether we have votes or not today. If we do have votes, to the extent that we can keep the hearing going during votes and have different Senators leave between them, we will. If we can’t, then I will 

recess for those votes. 

With the way the traffic was today, I think some people are still 

having trouble getting in here. I have talked with Senator Sessions 

about this, and what we are going to do is have 30-minute rounds. 

We will go back and forth between sides, and Senators will be recognized based on seniority if they are there. If not, then we will 

go to the next person. 

And with that, as I said yesterday when we concluded, the American people finally have heard from Judge Sotomayor, and I appreciate your opening statement yesterday. You have had weeks of silence. You have followed the traditional way of nominees. I think 

you have visited more Senators than any nominee I know of for 

just about any position, but we get used to the tradition of the 

press is outside, questions are asked, you give a nice wave, and 

keep going. But finally you are able to speak, and I think your 

statement yesterday went a long way to answering the critics and 

the naysayers. And so we are going to start with the questions 

here. 

I would hope that everybody will keep their questions pertaining 

to you and to your background as a judge. You are going to be the 

first Supreme Court nominee in more than 50 years who served as 

a Federal trial court judge, the first in 50 years to have served as 

62 

both a Federal trial court judge and a Federal appellate court 

judge. 

Let me ask you the obvious one. What are the qualities that a 

judge should possess? You have had time on both the trial court 

and the appellate court. What qualities should a judge have, and 

how has that experience you have had, how does that shape your 

approach to being on the bench? 

STATEMENT OF HON. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 

STATES 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator Leahy, yesterday many of the Senators emphasized their—the values they thought were important 

for judging, and central to many of their comments was the fact 

that a judge had to come to the process understanding the importance and respect the Constitution must receive in the judging 

process and an understanding that that respect is guided by and 

should be guided by a full appreciation of the limited jurisdiction 

of the Court in our system of Government, but understanding its 

importance as well. That is the central part of judging. 

What my experience on the trial court and the appellate court 

have reinforced for me is that the process of judging is a process 

of keeping an open mind. It’s the process of not coming to a decision with a prejudgment ever of an outcome, and that reaching a 

conclusion has to start with understanding what the parties are arguing, but examining in all situations carefully the facts as they 

prove them or not prove them, the record as they create it, and 

then making a decision that is limited to what the law says on the 

facts before the judge. 

Chairman LEAHY. Let us go into some of the particulars. One of 

the things that I found appealing in your record is that you were 

a prosecutor, as many of us—both the Ranking Member and I had 

the privilege—and you worked on the front lines as assistant district attorney in the Manhattan DA’s office. Your former boss, District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, the dean of the American prosecutors, said one of the most important cases you worked on was 

the prosecution of the man known as ‘‘the Tarzan burglar.’’ He terrorized people in Harlem. He would swing on ropes into their 

apartments and rob them and steal and actually killed three people. 

Your co-counsel, Hugh Mo, described how you threw yourself into 

every aspect of the investigation and the prosecution of the case. 

You helped to secure a conviction, a sentence of 62 years to life for 

the murders. Your co-counsel described you as ‘‘a skilled legal practitioner who not only ruthlessly pursued justice for victims of violent crimes, but understood the root causes of crime and how to 

curb it.’’ 

Did that experience shape your views in any way, as a lawyer 

and also as a judge? This case was getting into about as nitty-gritty 

as you could into the whole area of criminal law. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I became a lawyer in the prosecutor’s office. 

To this day, I owe who I have become as—who I became as a lawyer and who I have become as judge to Mr. Morgenthau. He gave 

63 

me a privilege and honor in working in his office that has shaped 

my life. 

When I say I became a lawyer in his office, it’s because in law 

school, law schools teach you in hypotheticals. They set forth facts 

for you. They give you a little bit of teaching on how those facts 

are developed, but not a whole lot. And then they ask you to opine 

about legal theory and apply legal theory to the facts before you. 

Well, when you work in a prosecutor’s office, you understand that 

the law is not legal theory. It’s facts. It’s what witnesses say and 

don’t say. It’s how you develop your position in the record. And 

then it’s taking those facts and making arguments based on the 

law as it exists. That’s what I took with me as a trial judge. It’s 

what I take with me as an appellate judge. It is respect that each 

case gets decided case by case, applying the law as it exists to the 

facts before you. 

You asked me a second question about the Tarzan murderer 

case, and that case brought to life for me, in a way that perhaps 

no other case had fully done before, the tragic consequences of 

needless death. In that case, Mr. Maddicks was dubbed ‘‘the Tarzan murderer’’ by the press because he used acrobatic feats to gain 

entry into apartments. In one case, he took a rope, placed it on a 

pipe on top of a roof, put a paint can at the other end, and threw 

it into a window in a building below, and broke the window. He 

then swung himself into the apartment and on the other side shot 

a person he found. He did that repeatedly, and as a result, he destroyed families. 

I saw a family that had been intact with a mother living with 

three of her children, some grandchildren. They all worked at various jobs. Some were going to school. They stood as they watched 

one of their—the mother stood as she watched one of her children 

be struck by a bullet that Mr. Maddicks fired and killed him because the bullet struck the middle of his head. That family was destroyed. They scattered to the four winds, and only one brother remained in New York who could testify. 

That case taught me that prosecutors, as all participants in the 

justice system, must be sensitive to the price that crime imposes 

on our entire society. 

At the same time, as a prosecutor in that case, I had to consider 

how to ensure that the presentation of that case would be fully understood by jurors, and to do that it was important for us as prosecutors to be able to present those number of incidences that Mr. 

Maddicks had engaged in, in one trial so the full extent of his conduct could be determined by a jury. 

There had never been a case quite like that where an individual 

who used different acrobatic feats to gain entry into an apartment 

was tried with all of his crimes in one indictment. I researched 

very carefully the law and found a theory in New York law, called 

the ‘‘Molineaux theory’’ then, that basically said if you can show a 

pattern that established a person’s identity or assisted in establishing a person’s identity—I’m simplifying the argument, by the 

way—then you can try different cases together. This was not a conspiracy under law because Mr. Maddicks acted alone, so I had to 

find a different theory to bring all his acts together. 

64 

Well, I presented that to the trial judge. It was a different application of the law. But what I did was draw on the principles of the 

Molineaux theory, and arguing those principles to the judge, the 

judge permitted that joint trial of all of Mr. Maddicks’ activities. 

In the end, carefully developing the facts in the case, making my 

record—our record, I should say—Mr. Mo’s and my record complete, we convinced the judge that our theory was supported by 

law. That harkens back to my earlier answer, which is that’s what 

being a trial judge teaches you. 

Chairman LEAHY. So you see it from both ends, having obviously 

a novel theory as a prosecutor—a theory that is now well established in the law—but was novel at that time, and as a trial judge, 

you have seen novel theories brought in by prosecutors or by defense, and you have to make your decisions based on those theories. The fairly easy answer to that is you do see it from both ends, 

do you not? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, it’s important to remember that as a 

judge, I don’t make law, and so the task for me as a judge is not 

to accept or not accept new theories. It’s to decide whether the law 

as it exists has principles that apply to new situations. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, let’s go into that, because obviously the 

Tarzan case was a unique case, and as I said, Mr. Morgenthau singled that out as an example of the kind of lawyer you are. And I 

find compelling your story about being in the apartment. I have 

stood in homes at 3 o’clock in the morning as they are carrying the 

body out from a murder. I can understand how you are feeling. 

But in applying the law and applying the facts, you told me once 

that ultimately and completely the law is what controls, and I was 

struck by that when you did. And so there has been a great deal 

of talk about the Ricci case, Ricci v. DeStefano, and you and two 

other judges were reversed in this appeal involving firefighters in 

New Haven. The plaintiffs were challenging the city’s decision to 

voluntarily discard the result of a paper-and-pencil test to measure 

leadership abilities. 

Now, the legal issue that was presented to you in that case was 

not a new one—not in your circuit. In fact, there was a unanimous, 

decades-old Supreme Court decision as well. In addition, in 1991, 

Congress acted to reinforce that understanding of the law. I might 

note that every Republican member of this Committee still serving 

in the Senate supported that statement of the law. So you had a 

binding precedent. You and two other judges came to a unanimous 

decision. Your decision deferred to the district court’s ruling allowing the city’s voluntary determination that it could not justify using 

that paper-and-pencil test under our civil rights laws, you say it 

was settled judicial precedent. A majority of the Second Circuit 

later voted not to revisit the panel’s unanimous decision; therefore, 

they upheld your decision. 

So you had Supreme Court precedent. You had your circuit 

precedent. You were upheld within the circuit. Subsequently, it 

went to the Supreme Court, and five, a bare majority of five Justices reversed the decision, reversed their precedent, and many 

have said that they created a new interpretation of the law. 

Ironically, if you had done something other than followed the 

precedent, some would be now attacking you as being an activist. 

65 

You followed the precedent, so now they attack you as being biased 

and racist. It is kind of a unique thing. You are damned if you do 

and damned if you don’t. 

How do you react to the Supreme Court’s decision in the New 

Haven firefighters case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. You are correct, Senator, that the panel, 

made up of myself and two other judges, in the Second Circuit decided that case on the basis of a very thorough, 78-page decision 

by the district court and on the basis of established precedent. 

The issue was not what we would do or not do, because we were 

following precedent, and you—we’re now on the circuit court—are 

obligated on a panel to follow established circuit precedent. 

The issue in Ricci was what the city did or could do when it was 

presented with a challenge to one of its tests that—for promotion. 

This was not a quota case. This was not an affirmative action case. 

This was a challenge to a test that everybody agreed had a very 

wide difference between the pass rate of a variety of different 

groups. 

The city was faced with the possibility, recognized in law, that 

the employees who were disparately impacted—that’s the terminology used in the law, and that is a part of the civil rights amendment that you were talking about in 1991—that those employees 

who could show a disparate impact, a disproportionate pass rate, 

that they could bring a suit, and that then the employer had to defend the test that it gave. 

The city here, after a number of days of hearings and a variety 

of different witnesses, decided that it wouldn’t certify the test, and 

it wouldn’t certify it in an attempt to determine whether they could 

develop a test that was of equal value in measuring qualifications, 

but which didn’t have a disparate impact. 

And so the question before the panel was: Was the decision of the 

city based on race or based on its understanding of what the law 

required it to do? Given Second Circuit precedent, Bushey v. New 

York State Civil Services Commission, the panel concluded that the 

city’s decision in that particular situation was lawful under established law. 

The Supreme Court, in looking and reviewing that case, applied 

a new standard. In fact, it announced that it was applying a standard from a different area of law, and explaining to employers and 

the courts below how to look at this question in the future. 

Chairman LEAHY. But when you were deciding it, you had precedent from the Supreme Court and from your circuit that basically 

determined the outcome you had to come up with. Is that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Absolutely. 

Chairman LEAHY. And if today, now that the Supreme Court has 

changed their decision, without you having to relitigate the case, 

it would lay open, obviously, a different result. Certainly the circuit 

would be bound by the new decision. Even though it is only a 5– 

4 decision, a circuit would be bound by the new decision of the Supreme Court. Is that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Absolutely, sir. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That is now the statement of the Supreme 

Court of how employers and the Court should examine this issue. 

66 

Chairman LEAHY. During the course of this nomination, there 

have been some unfortunate comments, including outrageous 

charges of racism, made about you on radio and television. One 

person referred to you as being ‘‘the equivalent of the head of the 

Ku Klux Klan.’’ Another leader in the other party referred to you 

as being ‘‘a bigot.’’ And to the credit of the Senators, the Republican Senators as well as Democratic Senators, they have not repeated those charges. 

But you have not been able to respond to any of these things. 

You have had to be quiet. Your critics have taken a line out of your 

speeches and twisted it, in my view, to mean something you never 

intended. 

You said that you ‘‘would hope that a wise Latina woman with 

the richness of her experiences would reach wise decisions.’’ I remember other Justices, the most recent one Justice Alito, talking 

about the experience of the immigrants in his family and how that 

would influence his thinking and help him reach decisions. 

And you also said in your speech that you ‘‘love America and 

value its lessons and great things could be achieved if one works 

hard for it.’’ And then you said, ‘‘Judges must transcend their personal sympathies and prejudices and aspire to achieve a greater degree of fairness and integrity based on the reason of law.’’ And I 

will just throw one more quote in there—what you told me—that 

ultimately and completely, the law is what controls. 

So tell us. You have heard all of these charges and countercharges, the wise Latina and on and on. Here is your chance. You 

tell us what is going on here, Judge. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Thank you for giving me an opportunity to 

explain my remarks. No words I have ever spoken or written have 

received so much attention. 

[Laughter.] 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I gave a variant of my speech to a variety of 

different groups, most often to groups of women lawyers or to 

groups most particularly of young Latino lawyers and students. As 

my speech made clear in one of the quotes that you referenced, I 

was trying to inspire them to believe that their life experiences 

would enrich the legal system, because different life experiences 

and backgrounds always do. I don’t think that there is a quarrel 

with that in our society. I was also trying to inspire them to believe 

that they could become anything they wanted to become, just as I 

had. 

The context of the words that I spoke have created a misunderstanding, and I want—a misunderstanding, and to give everyone 

assurances, I want to state up front unequivocally and without 

doubt, I do not believe that any ethnic, racial, or gender group has 

an advantage in sound judging. I do believe that every person has 

an equal opportunity to be a good and wise judge regardless of 

their background or life experiences. 

The words that I used, I used agreeing with the sentiment that 

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was attempting to convey. I understood that sentiment to be what I just spoke about, which is that 

both men and women were equally capable of being wise and fair 

judges. 

67 

That has to be what she meant, because judges disagree about 

legal outcomes all of the time—or I shouldn’t say ‘‘all of the time.’’ 

At least in close cases they do. Justices on the Supreme Court come 

to different conclusions. It can’t mean that one of them is unwise— 

despite the fact that some people think that. 

So her literal words couldn’t have meant what they said. She had 

to have meant that she was talking about the equal value of the 

capacity to be fair and impartial. 

Chairman LEAHY. And isn’t that what you, having been on the 

bench for 17 years, set as your goal, to be fair and show integrity 

based on the law? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I believe my 17-year record on the two courts 

would show that in every case that I render, I first decide what the 

law requires under the facts before me, and that what I do is explained to litigants why the law requires a result. And whether 

their position is sympathetic or not, I explain why the result is 

commanded by law. 

Chairman LEAHY. And doesn’t your oath of office actually require 

you to do that? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That is the fundamental job of a judge. 

Chairman LEAHY. Let me talk to you about another decision, District of Columbia v. Heller. In that case, the Supreme Court held 

that the Second Amendment guarantees to Americans the right to 

keep and bear arms and that it is an individual right. I have 

owned firearms since my early teen years. I suspect a large number 

of Vermonters do. I enjoy target shooting on a very regular basis 

at our home in Vermont, so I watched that decision rather carefully 

and found it interesting. 

Is it safe to say that you accept the Supreme Court’s decision as 

establishing that the Second Amendment right is an individual 

right? Is that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. And in the Second Circuit’s decision in Maloney v. Cuomo, you, in fact, recognize the Supreme 

Court decided in Heller that the personal right to bear arms is 

guaranteed by the Second Amendment of the Constitution against 

Federal law restriction. Is that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It is. 

Chairman LEAHY. And you accepted and applied the Heller decision when you decided Maloney? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Completely, sir. I accepted and applied established Supreme Court precedent that the Supreme Court in its own 

opinion in Heller acknowledged answered a different question. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, in fact, let me refer to that, because Justice Scalia’s opinion in the Heller case expressly left unresolved and 

expressly reserved as a separate question whether the Second 

Amendment guarantee applies to the States and laws adopted by 

the States. Earlier this year, you were on a Second Circuit panel 

in a case posing that specific question, analyzing a New York State 

law restriction on so-called chukka sticks, a martial arts device. 

Now, the unanimous decision of your court cited Supreme Court 

precedent as binding on your decision, and the longstanding Supreme Court cases have held that the Second Amendment applies 

only to the Federal Government and not to the States. And I notice 

68 

that the panel of the Seventh Circuit, including Judge Posner, one 

of the best-known, very conservative judges, cited the same Supreme Court authority and agreed with the Second Circuit decision. 

We all know that not every constitutional right has been applied 

to the States by the Supreme Court. I know that one of my very 

first cases as a prosecutor was the question whether the Fifth 

Amendment guaranteed a grand jury indictment has been made 

applicable to the States. The Supreme Court has not held that applicable to the States. 

The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and the Eighth 

Amendment prohibition against excessive fines also have not been 

made applicable to the States. 

I understand that petitions seeking to have the Supreme Court 

apply the Second Amendment to the States are pending. So obviously I am not going to ask you, if that case appears before the Supreme Court and you are there, how you are going to rule. But 

would you have an open mind on the Supreme Court in evaluating 

the legal proposition whether the Second Amendment right should 

be considered a fundamental right and, thus, applicable to the 

States? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Like you, I understand how important the 

right to bear arms is to many, many Americans. In fact, one of my 

godchildren is a member of the NRA, and I have friends who hunt. 

I understand the individual right fully that the Supreme Court recognized in Heller. As you pointed out, Senator, in the Heller decision the Supreme 

Court was addressing a very narrow issue, which was whether an 

individual right under the Second Amendment applied to limit the 

Federal Government’s rights to regulate the possession of firearms. 

The Court expressly, Justice Scalia in a footnote, identified that 

there was Supreme Court precedent that has said that that right 

is not incorporated against the States. What that term of ‘‘incorporation’’ means in the law is that that right doesn’t apply to the 

States in its regulation of its relationship with its citizen. 

In Supreme Court parlance, the right is not fundamental. It’s a 

legal term. It’s not talking about the importance of the right in a 

legal term. It’s talking about is that right incorporated against the 

States. 

When Maloney came before the Second Circuit, as you indicated, 

myself and two other judges read what the Supreme Court said, 

saw that it had not explicitly rejected its precedent on application 

to the States, and followed that precedent, because it’s the job of 

the Supreme Court to change it. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. You asked me—I’m sorry, Senator. I didn’t 

mean to cut you off. 

Chairman LEAHY. No, no. Go ahead. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. You asked me whether I have an open mind 

on that question. Absolutely. My decision in Maloney and on any 

case of this type would be to follow the precedent of the Supreme 

Court when it speaks directly on an issue, and I would not prejudge any question that came before me if I was a Justice on the 

Supreme Court. 

69 

Chairman LEAHY. Let me just ask—and I just asked Senator Sessions if he minded. I want to ask one more question, and it goes 

to the area of prosecution. You have heard appeals in over 800 

criminal cases. You affirmed 98 percent of the convictions for violent crimes, including terrorism cases; 99 percent of the time at 

least one Republican-appointed judges of the panel agreed with 

you. Let me just ask you about one, United States v. Giordano. 

That was a conviction against the mayor of Waterbury, Connecticut. The victims in that case were the young daughter and 

niece of a prostitute, young children who, as young as 9 and 11, 

were forced to engage in sexual acts with the defendant. The mayor 

was convicted under a law passed by Congress prohibiting the use 

of any facility or means of interstate commerce to transmit contact 

information about a person under 16 for the purpose of illegal sexual activity. 

You spoke for the unanimous panel of the Second Circuit, which 

included Judge Jacobs and Judge Hall. You upheld that conviction 

against the constitutional challenge that the Federal criminal statute in question exceeded Congress’ power under the Commerce 

Clause. I mention that only because I appreciate your deference to 

the constitutional congressional authority to prohibit illegal conduct. 

Did you have any difficulty in reaching the conclusion you did in 

the Giordano case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. I am glad you reached it. 

And I appreciate Senator Sessions’ forbearance. 

Senator SESSIONS. It is good to have you back, Judge, and your 

family and friends and supporters, and I hope we will have a good 

day today. I look forward to a dialog with you. 

I have got to say that I liked your statement on the fidelity of 

the law yesterday and some of your comments this morning. And 

I also have to say had you been saying that with clarity over the 

last decade or 15 years, we would have a lot fewer problems today, 

because you have evidenced, I think it is quite clear, a philosophy 

of the law that suggests that a judge’s background and experiences 

can and should—even should and naturally will impact their decision, which I think goes against the American ideal and oath that 

a judge takes to be fair to every party, and every day when they 

put on that robe, that is a symbol that they are to put aside their 

personal biases and prejudices. 

So I would like to ask you a few things about it. I would just note 

that it is not just one sentence, as my Chairman suggested, that 

causes us difficulty. It is a body of thought over a period of years 

that causes us difficulty. And I would suggest that the quotation 

he gave was not exactly right of the ‘‘wise Latina’’ comment that 

you made. You have said, I think, six different times, ‘‘I would hope 

that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences 

would more often than not reach a better conclusion . . .’’ So that 

is a matter that I think we will talk about as we go forward. 

Let me recall that yesterday you said, ‘‘It’s simple: fidelity to the 

law. The task of a judge is not to make law. It’s to apply law.’’ I 

heartily agree with that. 

70 

However, you previously have said, ‘‘The court of appeals is 

where policy is made.’’ And you said on another occasion, ‘‘The law 

that lawyers practice and judges declare is not a definitive, capital 

‘L’ law that many would like to think exists.’’ So I guess I am asking today what do you really believe on those subjects: that there 

is no real law—that judges do not make law, or that there is no 

real law and the court of appeals is where policy is made? Discuss 

that with us, please. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I believe my record of 17 years demonstrates 

fully that I do believe that law—that judges must apply the law 

and not make the law. Whether I’ve agreed with a party or not, 

found them sympathetic or not, in every case I have decided I have 

done what the law requires. 

With respect to judges’ making policy, I assume, Senator, that 

you were referred to a remark that I made in a Duke law student 

dialog. That remark in context made very clear that I wasn’t talking about the policy reflected in the law that Congress makes. 

That’s the job of Congress to decide what the policy should be for 

society. 

In that conversation with the students, I was focusing on what 

district court judges do and what circuit court judges do, and I 

noted that district court judges find the facts and they apply the 

facts to the individual case. And when they do that, their holding, 

their finding doesn’t bind anybody else. 

Appellate judges, however, establish precedent. They decide what 

the law says in a particular situation. That precedent has policy 

ramifications because it binds not just the litigants in that case; it 

binds all litigants in similar cases, in cases that may be influenced 

by that precedent. 

I think if my speech is heard outside of the minute and a half 

that YouTube presents and its full context examined, it is very 

clear that I was talking about the policy ramifications of precedent 

and never talking about appellate judges or courts making the policy that Congress makes. 

Senator SESSIONS. Judge, I would just say I don’t think it is that 

clear. I looked at that tape several times, and I think a person 

could reasonably believe it meant more than that. But yesterday 

you spoke about your approach to rendering opinions and said, ‘‘I 

seek to strengthen both the rule of law and faith in the impartiality of the justice system,’’ and I would agree. But you had previously said this: ‘‘I am willing to accept that we who judge must 

not deny differences resulting from experiences and heritage, but 

attempt, as the Supreme Court suggests, continuously to judge 

when those opinions, sympathies, and prejudices are appropriate.’’ 

So, first, I would like to know, Do you think there is any circumstance in which a judge should allow their prejudices to impact 

their decision making? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Never their prejudices. I was talking about 

the very important goal of the justice system is to ensure that the 

personal biases and prejudices of a judge do not influence the outcome of a case. What I was talking about was the obligation of 

judges to examine what they’re feeling as they’re adjudicating a 

case and to ensure that that’s not influencing the outcome. 

71 

Life experiences have to influence you. We’re not robots to listen 

to evidence and don’t have feelings. We have to recognize those 

feelings and put them aside. That’s what my speech was saying. 

That’s our job. 

Senator SESSIONS. But the statement was, ‘‘I willingly accept 

that we who judge must not deny the differences resulting from experience and heritage, but continuously to judge when those opinions, sympathies, and prejudices are appropriate.’’ That is exactly 

opposite of what you are saying, is it not? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t believe so, Senator, because all I was 

saying is because we have feelings and different experiences, we 

can be led to believe that our experiences are appropriate. We have 

to be open-minded to accept that they may not be and that we have 

to judge always that we’re not letting those things determine the 

outcome. But there are situations in which some experiences are 

important in the process of judging because the law asks us to use 

those experiences. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I understand that. But let me just follow 

up. You say in your statement that you want to do what you can 

to increase the faith in the impartiality of our system. But isn’t it 

true this statement suggests that you accept that there may be 

sympathies, prejudices, and opinions that legitimately influence a 

judge’s decision? And how can that further faith in the impartiality 

of the system? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I think the system is strengthened when 

judges don’t assume they’re impartial but when judges test themselves to identify when their emotions are driving a result or their 

experiences are driving a result and the law is not. 

Senator SESSIONS. I agree with that. I know one judge that says 

that if he has a feeling about a case, he tells his law clerks to, 

‘‘Watch me. I do not want my biases, sympathies, or prejudices to 

influence this decision, which I have taken an oath to make sure 

is impartial.’’ 

I just am very concerned that what you are saying today is quite 

inconsistent with your statement that you willingly accept that 

your sympathies, opinions, and prejudices may influence your decision making. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, as I have tried to explain, what I try 

to do is to ensure that they’re not. If I ignore them and believe that 

I’m acting without them, without looking at them and testing that 

I’m not, then I could, unconsciously or otherwise, be led to be doing 

the exact thing I don’t want to do, which is to let something but 

the law command the result. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, yesterday you also said that your decisions have always been made to serve the larger interest of impartial justice. A good aspiration, I agree. But in the past, you have 

repeatedly said this: ‘‘I wonder whether achieving the goal of impartiality is possible at all in even most cases, and I wonder whether by ignoring our differences as women, men, or people of color we 

do a disservice to both the law and society.’’ 

Aren’t you saying there that you expect your background and 

heritage to influence your decision making? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. What I was speaking about in that speech 

was—harkened back to what we were just talking about a few minVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
72 

utes ago, which is life experiences do influence us, in good ways. 

That’s why we seek the enrichment of our legal system from life 

experiences. That can affect what we see or how we feel, but that’s 

not what drives a result. 

The impartiality is an understanding that the law is what commands the result. And so to the extent that we are asking the 

question—because most of my speech was an academic discussion—about what should we be thinking about, what should we be 

considering in this process, and accepting that life experiences 

could make a difference, but I wasn’t encouraging the belief or attempting to encourage the belief that I thought that that should 

drive the result. 

Senator SESSIONS. Judge, I think it is consistent in the comments 

I have quoted to you and your previous statements that you do believe that your background will affect the result in cases, and that 

is troubling me. So that is not impartiality. Don’t you think that 

is not consistent with your statement that you believe your role as 

a judge is to serve the larger interest of impartial justice? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. As I’ve indicated, my record shows 

that at no point or time have I ever permitted my personal views 

or sympathies to influence an outcome of a case. In every case 

where I have identified a sympathy, I have articulated it and explained to the litigant why the law requires a different result—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, Judge—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I do not permit my sympathies, personal 

views, or prejudices to influence the outcome of my cases. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, you said something similar to that yesterday, that ‘‘in each case I have applied the law to the facts at 

hand.’’ But you have repeatedly made this statement: ‘‘I accept the 

proposition’’—‘‘I accept the proposition that a difference there will 

be by the presence of women and people of color on the bench and 

that my experiences affect the facts I choose to see as a judge.’’ 

First, that is troubling to me as a lawyer. When I present evidence, I expect the judge to hear and see all the evidence that gets 

presented. How is it appropriate for a judge ever to say that they 

will choose to see some facts and not others? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It’s not a question of choosing to see some 

facts or another, Senator. I didn’t intend to suggest that, and in the 

wider context, what I believe I was—the point that I was making 

was that our life experiences do permit us to see some facts and 

understand them more easily than others. But in the end, you are 

absolutely right; that’s why we have appellate judges that are more 

than one judge, because each of us from our life experiences will 

more easily see different perspectives argued by parties. But judges 

do consider all of the arguments of litigants. I have. Most of my 

opinions, if not all of them, explain to parties why the law requires 

what it does. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, do you stand by your statement that 

‘‘My experiences affect the facts I choose to see’’ ? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. I don’t stand by the understanding of 

that statement that I will ignore other facts or other experiences 

because I haven’t had them. I do believe that life experiences are 

important to the process of judging; they help you to understand 

73 

and listen; but that the law requires a result, and it will command 

you to the facts that are relevant to the disposition of the case. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I would just note you made that statement in individual speeches about seven times over a number-ofyears’ span, and it is concerning to me. So I would just say to you 

I believe in Judge Cedarbaum’s formulation, and she said—and you 

disagreed, and this was really the context of your speech, and you 

used her statement as sort of a beginning of your discussion. And 

you said she believes that a judge, no matter what their gender or 

background, should strive to reach the same conclusion, and she 

believes that is possible. You then argued that you do not think it 

is possible in all, maybe even most cases. You deal with the famous 

quote of Justice O’Connor in which she says, ‘‘A wise old man 

should reach the same decision as a wise old woman.’’ And you 

push back from that. You say you do not think that is necessarily 

accurate, and you doubt the ability to be objective in your analysis. 

So how can you reconcile your speeches, which repeatedly assert 

that impartiality is a mere aspiration which may not be possible 

in all or even most cases with your oath that you have taken twice, 

which requires impartiality? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. My friend Judge Cedarbaum is here this 

afternoon, and we are good friends, and I believe that we both approach judging in the same way, which is looking at the facts of 

each individual case and applying the law to those facts. 

I also, as I explained, was using a rhetorical flourish that fell 

flat. I knew that Justice O’Connor couldn’t have meant that if 

judges reached different conclusions, legal conclusions, that one of 

them wasn’t wise. That couldn’t have been her meaning because 

reasonable judges disagree on legal conclusions in some cases. 

So I was trying to play on her words. My play was—fell flat. It 

was bad, because it left an impression that I believed that life experiences commanded a result in a case. But that’s clearly not what 

I do as a judge. It’s clearly not what I intended. In the context of 

my broader speech, which was attempting to inspire young Hispanic, Latino students and lawyers to believe that their life experiences added value to the process. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I can see that perhaps as a lay person’s 

approach to it, but as a judge who has taken this oath, I am very 

troubled that you would repeatedly over a decade or more make 

statements that consistently—any fair reading of these speeches 

consistently argues that this ideal and commitment—I believe 

every judge is committed, must be, to put aside their personal experiences and biases and make sure that that person before them 

gets a fair day in court. 

Judge, so philosophy can’t impact your judging. I think it is 

much more likely to reach full flower if you sit on the Supreme 

Court than it will on a lower court where you are subject to review 

by your colleagues on the higher Court. So with regard to how you 

approach law and your personal experiences, let’s look at the New 

Haven firefighters case, the Ricci case. 

In that case, the city of New Haven told firefighters that they 

would take an exam, set for the process for it, that would determine who would be eligible for promotion. The city spent a good 

deal of time and money on the exam to make it a fair test of a perVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
74 

son’s ability to serve as a supervisory fireman, which, in fact, has 

the awesome responsibility at times to send their firemen into a 

dangerous building that is on fire. And they had a panel that did 

oral exams—it was not all written—consisting of one Hispanic and 

one African American and one white. And according to the Supreme Court—this is what the Supreme Court held: The New 

Haven officials were careful to ensure broad racial participation in 

the design of the test and its administration. The process was open 

and fair. There was no genuine dispute that the examinations were 

job related and consistent with business purposes, business necessity. But after the city saw the results of the exam, it threw out 

those results because ‘‘not enough of one group did well enough on 

the test.’’ 

The Supreme Court then found that the city, and I quote, ‘‘rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring candidates 

were white. After the tests were completed, the raw racial results 

became the predominant rationale for the city’s refusal to certify 

the results.’’ 

So you have stated that your background affects the facts that 

you choose to see. Was the fact that the New Haven firefighters 

had been subject to discrimination one of the facts you chose not 

to see in this case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. The panel was composed of me and 

two other judges. In a very similar case, the Seventh Circuit, in an 

opinion authored by Judge Easterbrook—I’m sorry. I misspoke. It 

wasn’t Judge Easterbrook. It was Judge Posner—saw the case in 

an identical way. And neither judge—I have confused some statements that Senator Leahy made with this case, and I apologize. 

In a very similar case, the Sixth Circuit approached a very similar issue in the same way. So a variety of different judges on the 

appellate court were looking at the case in light of established Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent and determined that the 

city, facing potential liability under Title VII, could choose not to 

certify the test if it believed an equally good test could be made 

with a different impact on affected groups. 

The Supreme Court, as it is its prerogative in looking at a challenge, established a new consideration or a different standard for 

the city to apply, and that is, was there substantial evidence that 

they would be held liable under the law? 

That was a new consideration. Our panel didn’t look at that issue 

that way because it wasn’t argued to us in the case before us and 

because the case before us was based on existing precedent. So it 

is a different test—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Judge, there was apparently unease within 

your panel. I was really disappointed—and I think a lot of people 

have been—that the opinion was so short, it was per curiam, it did 

not discuss the serious legal issues that the case raised. And I believe that is a legitimate criticism of what you did. But it appears, 

according to Stuart Taylor, the respected legal writer for the National Journal, that—Stuart Taylor concluded that it appears that 

Judge Cabranes was concerned about the outcome of the case, was 

not aware of it because it was a per curiam unpublished opinion, 

but it began to raise the question of whether rehearing should be 

granted. 

75 

You say you are bound by the superior authority, but the fact is 

when the question of rehearing that Second Circuit authority that 

you say covered the case—some say it didn’t cover so clearly—but 

that was up for debate. And the circuit voted, and you voted not 

to reconsider the prior case. You voted to stay with the decision of 

the circuit and, in fact, your vote was the key vote. Had you voted 

with Judge Cabranes, himself of Puerto Rican ancestry, had you 

voted with him, you could have changed that case. So, in truth, you 

weren’t bound by that case had you seen it a different way. You 

must have agreed with it and agreed with the opinion and stayed 

with it until it was reversed by the Court. 

Let me just mention this: In 1997—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Was that a question or—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, that was a response to some of what you 

said, Mr. Chairman, because you misrepresented factually the posture of the case. In 19—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, I obviously will disagree with that, but 

we will have a chance to vote on this issue. 

Senator SESSIONS. In 1997, when you came before the Senate 

and I was a new Senator, I asked you this: ‘‘In a suit challenging 

a Government racial preference, quota, or set-aside, will you follow 

the Supreme Court decision in Adarand and subject racial preferences to the strictest judicial scrutiny? ’’ 

In other words, I asked you would you follow the Supreme 

Court’s binding decision in Adarand v. Pena? In Adarand, the Supreme Court held that all governmental discrimination, including 

affirmative action programs, that discriminated by race of an applicant must face strict scrutiny in the courts. In other words, this is 

not a light thing to do. When one race is favored over another, you 

must have a really good reason for it, or it is not acceptable. 

After Adarand, the Government agencies must prove there is a 

compelling state interest in support of any decision to treat people 

differently by race. 

This is what you answer: ‘‘In my view, the Adarand Court correctly determined that the same level of scrutiny, strict scrutiny, 

applies for the purpose of evaluating the constitutionality of all 

government classifications, whether at the State or Federal level, 

based on race.’’ So that was your answer, and it deals with the government being the city of New Haven. 

You made a commitment to this Committee to follow Adarand. In view of this commitment, you gave me 12 years ago, why are 

the words ‘‘Adarand,’’ ‘‘equal protection,’’ and ‘‘strict scrutiny’’ completely missing from any of your panel’s discussion of this decision? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Because those cases were not what was at 

issue in this decision, and, in fact, those cases were not what decided the Supreme Court’s decision. The Supreme Court parties 

were not arguing the level of scrutiny that would apply with respect to intentional discrimination. The issue is a different one before our court and the Supreme Court, which is, What is a city to 

do when there is proof that its test disparately impacts a particular 

group? 

And the Supreme Court decided, not on the basis of strict scrutiny, that what it did here was wrong, what the city did here was 

wrong, but on the basis that the city’s choice was not based on a 

76 

substantial basis in evidence to believe it would be held liable 

under the law. 

Those are two different standards, two different questions that a 

case would present. 

Senator SESSIONS. This case was recognized pretty soon as a big 

case. I noticed what perhaps kicked off Judge Cabranes’ concern 

was a lawyer saying it was the most important discrimination case 

that the circuit had seen in 20 years. They were shocked. They got 

a, basically, one paragraph decision, per curiam, unsigned, back on 

that case. 

Judge Cabranes apparently raised this issue within the circuit, 

asked for a rehearing. Your vote made the difference in not having 

a rehearing en banc. And he said, ‘‘Municipal employers could reject the results’’—and talking about the results of your test, the impact of your decision. ‘‘Municipal employers could reject the results 

of an employment examination whenever those results failed to 

yield a desirable outcome, i.e., failed to satisfy a racial quota.’’ 

So that was Judge Cabranes’ analysis of the impact of your decision. And he thought it was very important. He wanted to review 

this case. He thought it deserved a full and complete analysis and 

opinion. He wanted the whole circuit to be involved in it. And to 

the extent that some prior precedent in the circuit was different, 

the circuit could have reversed that precedent had they chose to do 

so. 

Don’t you think—tell us how it came to be that this important 

case was dealt with in such a cursory manner? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The panel decision was based on a 78-page 

District Court opinion. The opinion referenced it. In its per curiam, 

the Court incorporated it directly, but it was referenced by the circuit. And it relied on that very thoughtful, thorough opinion by the 

District Court. And that opinion discussed Second Circuit precedent in its fullest—to its fullest extent. 

Justice Cabranes had one view of the case; the panel had another. The majority of the vote—it wasn’t just my vote—the majority of the Court, not just my vote, denied the petition for rehearing. 

The court left to the Supreme Court the question of how an employer should address what no one disputed, was prima facie evidence that its test disparately impacted on a group. That was undisputed by everyone, but the case law did permit employees that 

had been disparately impacted to bring a suit. 

The question was, for the city, was it racially discriminating 

when it didn’t accept those tests or was it attempting to comply 

with the law. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, Your Honor, I think it is not fair to say 

that a majority—I guess it is fair to say a majority voted against 

rehearing, but it was 6 to 6, unusual that one of the judges had 

to challenge a panel decision. And your vote made the majority not 

to rehear it. 

Ricci did deal with some important questions, some of the questions that we have got to talk about as a nation. We have to work 

our way through. I know there is concern on both sides of this 

issue, and we should do it carefully and correctly. 

But do you think that Frank Ricci and the other firefighters, 

whose claims you dismissed, felt that their arguments and concerns 

77 

were appropriately understood and acknowledged by such a short 

opinion from the Court? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. We were very sympathetic and expressed our 

sympathy to the firefighters who challenged the city’s decision, Mr. 

Ricci and the others. We understood the efforts that they had made 

in taking the test; we said as much. 

They did have before them a 78-page thorough opinion by the 

District Court. They obviously disagreed with the law as it stood 

under Second Circuit precedent. That’s why they were pursuing 

their claims and did pursue them further. 

In the end, the body that had the discretion and power to decide 

how these tough issues should be decided, that along the precedent 

that had been recognized by our circuit court and another at least, 

the Sixth Circuit, but along what the Court thought would be the 

right test or standard to apply. And that’s what the Supreme Court 

did. It answered that important question because it had the power 

to do that. Not the power, but the ability to do that because it was 

faced with the arguments that suggested that. The panel was dealing with precedent and arguments that relied on our precedent. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Judge, and I appreciate this opportunity. I would just say, though, had the per curiam opinion 

stood without a rehearing requested by one of the judges in the 

whole circuit and kicked off the discussion, it is very, very unlikely 

that we would have heard about this case or the Supreme Court 

would have taken it up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Obviously, we can talk about your speeches, but, ultimately, will 

it determine how you act as a judge and how you make decisions? 

And I will put into the record the American Bar Association, which 

has unanimously given you the highest rating. 

I put into the record the New York City Bar, which said you are 

extremely well credentialed to sit on the Supreme Court. I will put 

that in there. 

I will put in the Congressional Research Service report analyzing 

your cases and found that you consistently deal with the law and 

with stare decisis, upholding past judicial precedents. 

I will put in that the nonpartisan Brennan Center found you solidly in the mainstream. And then in another analysis of more than 

800 of your cases, which found you called a traditional consensus 

judge on criminal justice issues. 

[The statements appear as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. I thought I would put those in. It is one thing 

to talk about speeches you might give. I am more interested about 

cases you might decide. 

Senator Kohl. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good 

morning, Judge Sotomayor. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Good morning. 

Senator KOHL. Just spent a great deal of time on the New Haven 

case, so I would like to see if we can put it into some perspective. 

Isn’t it true that Ricci was a very close case? Isn’t it true that 

11 of the 22 judges that reviewed the case did agree with you, and 

78 

that it was only reversed by the Supreme Court by a one vote 5 

to 4 margin? 

Do you agree, Judge, that it was a close case and that reasonable 

minds could have seen it in one way or another and not be seen 

as prejudiced or unable to make a clear decision? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. To the extent that reasonable minds can differ on any case, that’s true as to what the legal conclusion should 

be in a case. But the panel, at least as the case was presented— 

was relying on the reasonable views that Second Circuit precedent 

had established. 

And so, to the extent that one, as a judge, adheres to precedents, 

because it is that which dies and gives stability to the law, then 

those reasonable minds, who decided the precedent and the judges 

who apply it, are coming to the legal conclusion they think the 

facts and laws require. 

Senator KOHL. All right. 

Judge, we have heard several of our colleagues, now, particularly 

on the other side, criticize you because they believe some things 

that you have said in speeches show that you will not be able to 

put your personal views aside. But I believe rather than pulling 

lines out of speeches, oftentimes out of context, there are better 

ways to examine your record as a judge. 

In fact, when I ask now Justice Alito what sort of a justice he 

was going to make, he said, ‘‘If you want to know what sort of justice I would make, look at what sort of judge I’ve been.’’ 

So you have served now as a Federal judge for the past 17 years, 

the last 11 as an appellate court judge. We examined the record. 

I believe it is plain that you are a careful jurist, respectful of precedent, and author of dozens of moderate and carefully reasoned decisions. 

The best evidence I believe is the infrequency with which you 

have been reversed. You have authored over 230 majority opinions 

in your 11 years on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. But in 

only three out of those 230 plus cases have your decisions been reversed by the Supreme Court, a very, very low reversal rate of 2 

percent. 

Doesn’t this very low reversal rate indicate that you do have, in 

fact, an ability to be faithful to the law and put your personal opinions and background aside when deciding cases, as you have in 

your experience as a Federal judge? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I believe what my record shows is that I follow the law, and that my small reversal rate, vis-a-vis the vast 

body of cases that I have examined—because you’ve mentioned only 

the opinions I’ve authored. But I’ve been a participant in thousands 

more that have not been either reviewed by the Supreme Court or 

reversed. 

Senator KOHL. Well, I agree with what you are saying. And I 

would like to suggest that this constant criticism of you in terms 

of your inability to be an impartial judge is totally refuted by the 

record that you have compiled as a Federal judge up to this point. 

We have heard much recently about Chief Justice Roberts’ view 

that judges are like umpires simply calling balls and strikes. So finally, would you like to take the opportunity to give us your view 

about this sort of an analogy? 

79 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Few judges could claim they love baseball 

more than I do, for obvious reasons. But analogies are always imperfect, and I prefer to describe what judges do, like umpires, is to 

be impartial and bring an open mind to every case before them. 

And by an open mind, I mean a judge who looks at the facts of 

each case, listens and understands the arguments of the parties, 

and applies the law as the law commands. 

It’s a refrain I keep repeating because that is my philosophy of 

judging, applying the law to the facts at hand. And that’s my description of judging. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you. 

Judge, which current one or two Supreme Court justices do you 

most identify with and which ones might we expect you to be 

agreeing with most of the time in the event that you are confirmed? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, to suggest that I admire one of the 

sitting Supreme Court justices would suggest that I think of myself 

as a clone of one of the justices. I don’t. Each one of them brings 

integrity, their sense of respect for the law, and their sense of their 

best efforts and hard work to come to the decisions they think the 

law requires. 

Going further than that would put me in the position of suggesting that by picking one justice, I was disagreeing or criticizing 

another, and I don’t wish to do that. I wish to describe just myself. 

I’m a judge who believes that the facts drive the law and the conclusion that the law will apply to that case. And when I say drives 

the law, I mean determines how the law will apply in that individual case. 

If you would ask me—instead, if you permit me to tell you a justice from the past that I admire for applying that approach to the 

law, it would be Justice Cardozo. 

Now, Justice Cardozo didn’t spend a whole lot of time on the Supreme Court; he had an untimely passing. But he had been a judge 

on the New York Court of Appeals for a very long time. And during 

his short tenure on the bench, one of the factors that he was so 

well known for was his great respect for precedent, and his great 

respect for respect and deference to the legislative branch, and to 

the other branches of government and their powers under the Constitution. 

In those regards, I do admire those parts of Justice Cardozo, 

which he was most famous for, and think that that is how I approach the law, as a case-by-case application of law to facts. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you. Appreciate that. 

Judge Sotomayor, many of us are impressed with you in your 

nomination and we hold you in great regard. But I believe we have 

a right to know what we are getting before we give you a lifetime 

appointment to the highest court in the land. 

In past confirmation hearings, we have seen nominees who tell 

us one thing during our private meetings and in the confirmation 

hearings, and then go to the Court and become a justice that is 

quite different from the way they portrayed themselves at the 

hearing. 

So I would like to ask you questions about a few issues that have 

generated much discussion. First, affirmative action. 

80 

Judge, I would like to discuss the issue of affirmative action. We 

can all agree that it is good for our society when employers, schools 

and government institutions encourage diversity. On the other 

hand, the consideration of ethnicity or gender should not trump 

qualifications or turn into a rigid quota system. 

Without asking you how you would rule in any particular case, 

what do you think of affirmative action? 

Do you believe that affirmative action is a necessary part of our 

society to date? 

Do you agree with Justice O’Connor that she expects in 25 years 

the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to promote 

diversity? 

Do you believe affirmative action is more justified in education 

than in employment or do you think it makes no difference? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The question of whether affirmative action is 

necessary in our society or not and what form it should take is always first a legislative determination in terms of legislative or government employer determination in terms of what issue it is addressing and what remedy it is looking to structure. 

The Constitution promotes and requires the equal protection of 

law of all citizens in its Fourteenth Amendment. To ensure that 

protection, there are situations in which race in some form must 

be considered. The courts have recognized that. Equality requires 

effort, and so there are some situations in which some form of race 

has been recognized by the Court. 

It is firmly my hope, as it was expressed by Justice O’Connor in 

her decision involving the University of Michigan Law School admissions criteria, that in 25 years, race in our society won’t be 

needed to be considered in any situation. That’s the hope, and 

we’ve taken such great strides in our society to achieve that hope. 

But there are situations in which there are compelling state interests. And the admissions case that Justice O’Connor was looking 

at, the Court recognized that in the education field. And the state 

is applying a solution that is very narrowly tailored. And there the 

Court determined that the law school’s use of race as only one factor among many others, with no presumption of admission whatsoever, was appropriate under the circumstances. 

In another case, companion case, the Court determined that a 

more fixed use of race that didn’t consider the individual was inappropriate, and it struck down the undergraduate admissions policy. 

That is what the Court has said about the educational use of 

race in a narrow way. 

The question, as I indicated, of whether that should apply in 

other contexts has not been looked at by the Supreme Court directly. The holdings of that case have not been applied or discussed 

in another case. That would have to await another state action that 

would come before the Court, where the state would articulate its 

reasons for doing what it did, and the Court would consider if those 

actions were constitutional or not. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you. 

Judge, Bush v. Gore. Many critics saw the Bush v. Gore decision 

as an example of the judiciary improperly injecting itself into a political dispute. 

81 

In your opinion, should the Supreme Court even have decided to 

get involved in Bush v. Gore? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That case took the attention of the nation, 

and there’s been so much discussion about what the Court did or 

didn’t do. 

I look at the case, and my reaction as a sitting judge is not to 

criticize it or to challenge it, even if I were disposed that way, because I don’t take a position on that; that the Court took and made 

the decision it did. 

The question for me as I look at that sui generis situation—it’s 

only happened once in the lifetime of our country—is that some 

good came from that discussion. There’s been and was enormous 

electoral process changes in many states as a result of the flaws 

that were reflected in the process that went on. 

That is a tribute to the greatness of our American system, which 

is whether you agree or disagree with a Supreme Court decision, 

that all of the branches become involved in the conversation of how 

to improve things. And as I indicated, both Congress, who devoted 

a very significant amount of money to electoral reform in its legislation—and states have looked to address what happened there. 

Senator KOHL. Judge, in a 5:4 decision in 2005, the Supreme 

Court ruled in Kelo v. City of New London, that it was constitutional for local government to seize private property for private, 

economic development. 

Many people, including myself, were alarmed about the consequences of this landmark ruling because, in the words of dissenting Justice O’Connor, under the logic of the Kelo case, ‘‘Nothing 

is to prevent the state from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz 

Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.’’ 

This decision was a major shift in the law. It said that private 

development was a permissible ‘‘public use,’’ according to the Fifth 

Amendment, as long as it provided economic growth for the community. 

What is your opinion of the Kelo decision, Judge Sotomayor? 

What is an appropriate ‘‘public use’’ for condemning private property? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Kelo is now a precedent of the Court. I must 

follow it. I am bound by a Supreme Court decision as a Second Circuit judge. As a Supreme Court judge, I must give it the deference 

that the doctrine of the stare decisis would suggest. 

The question of the reach of Kelo has to be examined in the context of each situation. And the Court did in Kelo note that there 

was a role for the courts to play in ensuring that takings by a state 

did, in fact, intend to serve the public—a public purpose and public 

use. 

I understand the concern that many citizens have expressed 

about whether Kelo did or did not honor the importance of property 

rights, but the question in Kelo was a complicated one about what 

constituted public use. And there the Court held that a taking to 

develop an economically blighted area was appropriate. 

Senator KOHL. Yes. That is what they decided in Kelo. I asked 

you your opinion, and apparently you feel that you are not in a poVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
82 

sition to offer an opinion because it is precedent, and now you are 

required to follow precedent as an appellate court judge. 

But I asked you if you would express your opinion, assuming 

that you became a Supreme Court justice, and assuming that you 

might have a chance someday to review the scope of that decision. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t prejudge issues. 

Senator KOHL. All right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That is actually—I come to every case with 

an open mind. 

Senator KOHL. All right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Every case is a new for me. 

Senator KOHL. That is good. All right. Let’s leave that. 

As you know, Judge, the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut guarantees that there is a fundamental constitutional right 

to privacy as it applies to contraception. 

Do you agree with that? In your opinion, is that settled law? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That is the precedent of the Court, so it is 

settled law. 

Senator KOHL. Is there a general constitutional right to privacy, 

and where is the right to privacy, in your opinion, found in the 

Constitution? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. There is a right of privacy. The Court has 

founded in various places in the Constitution, has recognized rights 

under those various provisions of the Constitution. It’s founded in 

the Fourth Amendment’s right and prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures. 

Most commonly, it’s considered—I shouldn’t say most commonly 

because search and seizure cases are quite frequent before the 

Court. But it’s also found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the 

Constitution when it is considered in the context of the liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. 

Senator KOHL. All right. 

Judge, the Court’s ruling about the right to privacy in Griswold 

laid the foundation for Roe v. Wade. In your opinion, is Roe settled 

law? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood 

v. Casey reaffirmed the core holding of Roe. That is the precedent 

of the Court and settled in terms of the holding of the Court. 

Senator KOHL. Do you agree with Justices Souter, O’Connor and 

Kennedy in their opinion in Casey, which reaffirmed the core holding in Roe? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I said, Casey reaffirmed the holding in 

Roe. That is the Supreme Court’s settled interpretation of what the 

core holding is and its reaffirmance of it. 

Senator KOHL. All right. Let’s talk a little bit about cameras in 

the court. 

You sit on a court of appeals, which does allow cameras in the 

court. And from all indications, your experience with it has not 

been negative. In fact, I understand it has been somewhat positive. 

So how would you feel about allowing cameras in the Supreme 

Court, where the country would have a chance to view discussions 

and arguments about the most important issues that the Supreme 

Court decides with respect to our Constitution, our rights and our 

future? 

83 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I have had positive experiences with cameras. 

When I have been asked to join experiments using cameras in the 

courtroom, I have participated. I have volunteered. 

Perhaps it would be useful if I explained to you my approach to 

collegiality on a court. 

[Laughter.] 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It is my practice when I enter a new enterprise, whether it’s on a court or in my private practice or when I 

was a prosecutor, to experience what those courts were doing, or 

those individuals doing that job were doing, understand and listen 

to the arguments of my colleagues about why certain practices 

were necessary or helpful, or why certain practices shouldn’t be 

done, or new procedures tried, and then spend my time trying to 

convince them. 

But I wouldn’t try to come in with prejudgments, so that they 

thought that I was unwilling to engage in a conversation with 

them, or unwilling to listen to their views. I go in and I try to 

share my experiences, to share my thoughts, and to be collegial and 

come to a conclusion together. 

And I can assure you that if this august body gives me the privilege of becoming a justice of the Supreme Court, that I will follow 

that practice with respect to the tall issues of procedures on the 

Court, including the question of cameras in the courtroom. 

Senator KOHL. No. I appreciate the fact that if you cannot convince them, it will not happen. But how do you feel—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KOHL [continuing]. How do you feel about permitting 

cameras in the Supreme Court, recognizing that you cannot decree 

it by fiat? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. You know, I’m pretty good—— 

Senator KOHL. Do you think it is a good idea? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. I’m a pretty good litigator. I was 

a really good litigator. And I know that when I work hard at trying 

to convince my colleagues of something after listening to them, 

they’ll often try it for a while. I mean, we’ll have to talk together. 

We’ll have to figure out that issue together. 

Senator KOHL. All right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I would be, again, if I was fortunate enough 

to be confirmed, a new voice in the discussion, and new voices often 

see things, and talk about them, and consider taking new approaches. 

Senator KOHL. All right. 

Judge, all of us in public office, other than Federal judges, have 

specific fixed terms, and we must periodically run for reelection if 

you want to remain in office. Even most state court judges have 

fixed terms of office. The Federal Judiciary, as you know, is very 

different. You have no term of office; instead, you serve for life. 

So I would like to ask you, would you support term limits for Supreme Court justices, for example, 15, 20 or 25 years? Would this 

help ensure that justices do not become victims of a cloistered, 

ivory tower existence, and that you will be able to stay in touch 

with the problems of ordinary Americans? 

Term limits for Supreme Court justices? 

84 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. All questions of policy are within the providence of Congress first. And so, that particular question would 

have to be considered by Congress first. But it would have to consider it in light of the Constitution and then of statutes that govern 

these issues. And so, that first step and decision would be Congress’. 

I can only note that there was a purpose to the structure of our 

Constitution, and it was a view by the Founding Fathers that they 

wanted justices who would not be subject to political whim or to 

the emotions of a moment. And they felt that by giving them certain protections, that that would ensure their objectivity and their 

impartiality over time. 

I do know, having served with many of my colleagues who have 

been members of the court, sometimes for decades, I had one colleague who was still an active member of the court in his nineties. 

And at close to 90, he was learning the Internet and encouraging 

my colleagues of a much younger age to participate in learning the 

Internet. 

So I don’t think that it’s service or the length of time. I think 

there’s wisdom that comes to judges from their experience that 

helps them in the process over time. I think in the end, it is a question of, one, of what the structure are of our government is best 

served by. And as I said, the policy question will be considered first 

by Congress and the processes set forth by the Constitution. But 

I do think there is a value in the services of judges for long periods 

of time. 

Senator KOHL. All right, Judge. Finally, I would like to turn to 

antitrust law. Antitrust law is not some mysterious legal theory, as 

you know, that only lawyers can understand. Antitrust is just an 

old-fashioned word for fair competition, Judge, and it is a law we 

use to protect consumers and competitors alike from unfair and illegal trade practices. 

A prominent antitrust lawyer named Carl Hittinger was quoted 

in an AP story recently as saying that, ‘‘Judge Sotomayor has surprisingly broke the pro-business record in the area of antitrust. In 

nearly every case in which she was one of the three judges considering a dispute, the court ruled against the plaintiff bringing an 

antitrust complaint.’’ 

I would like you to respond to that and to one other thing I 

would like to raise. 

In 2007, Leegin case, in a 5–4 decision. Supreme Court overturned a 97-year-old precedent and held that vertical price fixing 

no longer automatically violated antitrust law. In effect, this means 

that a manufacturer is now free to set minimum prices at retail for 

its products, and thereby, prohibit discounting of its products. 

What do you think of this decision? Do you think it was appropriate for the Supreme Court, by judicial fiat, to overturn a nearly 

century-old decision, on the meaning of this Sherman Act, that 

businesses and consumers had come to rely on and which had been 

never altered by Congress? 

Those two things, antitrust. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I cannot speak, Senator, to whether Leegins 

was right or wrong; it’s now the established law of the Court. That 

case in large measure centered around the justices, different views 

85 

of the effects of stare decisis on a question which none of them 

seemed to dispute, that there were a basis to question the economic 

assumptions of the Court in this field of law. 

Leegins is the Court’s holding, its teachings and holding. And I 

will have to apply in new cases, so I can’t say more than what I 

know about it and what I thought the Court was doing there. 

With respect to my record, I can’t speak for why someone else 

would view my record as suggesting a pro or anti approach to any 

series of cases. All of the business cases, as with all of the cases, 

my structure of approaching is the same; what is the law requiring? 

I would note that I have cases that have upheld antitrust complaints and upheld those cases going forward. I did it in my Visa/ 

MasterCard antitrust decision, and that was also a major decision 

in this field. 

All I can say is that with business and the interest of any party 

before me, I will consider and apply the law as it is written by Congress and informed by precedent. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you very much, Judge Sotomayor, and 

thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Judge Sotomayor, this is probably an appropriate place to take 

a short break, and we will. And then we will come back. At some 

point, we will break for both the Republicans and the Democrats 

to be in caucus lunch, but also gives you a chance to have lunch. 

So we will take a 10-minute, flexible 10-minute, break. And I 

thank you for your patience here, Judge Sotomayor, and we will be 

back. 

[Whereupon, at 11:08 a.m., the hearing was recessed.] 

After Recess [11:27 a.m.] 

Chairman LEAHY. There has been some question during the 

break from the press about what our schedule will be, and I fully 

understand that they have to work out their own schedules. What 

I would suggest—Senator Kohl asked questions. We will go to— 

next is Senator Hatch, a former chairman of this committee. Following Senator Hatch, we will go to Senator Feinstein. And that 

will bring us to roughly 12:30. 

Because of the caucuses, we will break at 12:30, but then resume 

right at 2, which will mean—I have talked to Republicans and 

Democrats. It means everybody that wants to come back will leave 

their caucus a few minutes early. But I think everybody will understand that. 

Senator Hatch is a former chairman of this committee and a 

friend of many years. I recognize Senator Hatch. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, again, and to your lovely family. We are grateful to 

have you all here. 

Now, let me ask you a question about settled law. If a holding 

in the Supreme Court means that it is settled, you believe that 

Gonzalez v. Carhart, upholding the partial birth abortion ban, is 

settled law. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. All precedents of the Supreme Court I consider settled law subject to the deference with doctrine of stare decisis would counsel. 

86 

Senator HATCH. Now, I want to begin here today by looking at 

your cases in an area that is very important to many of us, and 

that is the Second Amendment, the right to keep and bear arms, 

and your conclusion that the right is not fundamental. 

Now, in the 2004 case entitled United States v. Sanchez-Villar, you handled the Second Amendment issue in a short footnote. You 

cited the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Toner for the 

proposition of the right to possess a gun is not a fundamental right. 

Toner in turn relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in United 

States v. Miller. Last year, in the District of Columbia v. Heller, the 

Supreme Court examined Miller and concluded that, ‘‘The case did 

not even purport to be a thorough examination of the Second 

Amendment,’’ and that Miller provided ‘‘no explanation of the content of the right.’’ 

You are familiar with that. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I am, sir. 

Senator HATCH. Okay. So let me ask you, doesn’t the Supreme 

Court’s treatment of Miller at least cast doubts on whether relying 

on Miller, as the Second Circuit has done for this proposition, is 

proper? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The issue—— 

Senator HATCH. Remember, I am saying at least cast doubts. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. Well, that is what I believe Justice Scalia implied in his footnote 23, but he acknowledged that the 

issue of whether the right, as understood in Supreme Court jurisprudence, was fundamental. It’s not that I considered it unfundamental, but that the Supreme Court didn’t consider it fundamental 

so as to be incorporated against the states. 

Senator HATCH. Well, it did not decide that point. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, it not only didn’t decide it, but I understood Justice Scalia to be recognizing that the Court’s precedent 

had held it was not—his opinion with respect to the application of 

the Second Amendment to government regulation was a different 

inquiry, and a different inquiry as to the meaning of U.S. Miller 

with respect to that issue. 

Senator HATCH. Well, if Heller had already been decided, would 

you have addressed that issue differently than Heller or would you 

take the position that the doctrine of incorporation is inapplicable 

with regard to state issues? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That’s the very question that the Supreme 

Court is more than likely to be considering. There are three cases 

addressing this issue, at least I should say three cases addressing 

this issue in the circuit courts. And so, it’s not a question that I 

can address. As I said, bring an open mind to every case. 

Senator HATCH. I accept that. 

In Sanchez-Villar, you identified the premise that a right to possess a gun is not fundamental, and the conclusion that New York’s 

ban on gun possession was permissible under the Second Amendment, but it is not a word actually connecting the premise to the 

conclusion. 

Without any analysis at all, that footnote that you wrote leaves 

the impression that unless the right to bear arms is considered fundamental, any gun restriction is necessarily permissible under the 

Second Amendment. 

87 

Is that what you believe? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir, because that’s not—I’m not taking an 

opinion on that issue because it’s an open question. Sanchez is—— 

Senator HATCH. So you admit it is an open question. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, I admit that Justice—I admit—I—the 

courts have been addressing that question. The Supreme Court in 

the opinion authored by Justice Scalia suggested that it was a 

question that the Court should consider. I am just attempting to 

explain that U.S. v. Sanchez was using fundamental in its legal 

sense, that whether or not it had been incorporated against the 

states. 

With respect to that question, moreover, even if it’s not incorporated against the states, the question would be would the states 

have a rational basis for the regulation it has in place. And I am— 

I believe that the question there was whether or not a prohibition 

against felons possessing firearms was at question, if my memory 

serves me correctly. If it doesn’t—but even Justice Scalia in the 

majority opinion in Heller recognized that that was a rational basis 

regulation for a state under all circumstances, whether or not there 

was a Second Amendment right. 

Senator HATCH. Well, in the District of Columbia v. Heller, the 

Supreme Court observed that, ‘‘It has always been widely understood that the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth 

Amendments, codified a preexisting right.’’ And the Court also observed this, ‘‘By the time of the founding, the right to have arms 

had become fundamental for English subjects.’’ 

Now, the Court also described the right to bear arms is a natural 

right. 

Do you recall that from that decision? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I do remember that discussion. 

Senator HATCH. All right. 

In what way does the Court’s observation that the Second 

Amendment codified the preexisting, fundamental right to bear 

arms affect your conclusion that the Second Amendment does not 

protect a fundamental right? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. My conclusion in the Maloney case or in the 

U.S. Sanchez-Villar was based on precedence and the holding of 

precedence that the Second Circuit did not apply to the states. 

Senator HATCH. Well, what is—excuse me. I am sorry. I did not 

mean to interrupt you. 

What is your understanding of the test or standard the Supreme 

Court has used to determine whether a right should be considered 

fundamental? I am not asking a hypothetical here. I am only asking about what the Supreme Court has said in the past on this 

question. 

I recall, for instance, the Court emphasizing that a right must 

be deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition, that it is 

necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty or that 

it is an enduring American tradition. 

I think I have cited that pretty accurately on what the Court has 

held with regard to what is a fundamental right. Now, those are 

different formulations from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but I 

think the common thread there is obvious. 

88 

Now, is that your understanding of how the Supreme Court has 

evaluated whether a right should be deemed fundamental? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The Supreme Court’s decision with respect to 

the Second Circuit incorporation—Second Amendment incorporation doctrine is reliant on old precedent of the Court. 

Senator HATCH. Right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And I don’t mean to use that as precedent 

that doesn’t bind when I call it old. I’m talking about precedent 

that was passed in the 19th century. 

Since that time, there is no question that different cases addressing different amendments of the Constitution have applied a different framework. And whether that framework and the language 

you quoted are precise or not, I haven’t examined that framework 

in a while to know if that language is precise or not. I’m not suggesting it’s not, Senator. I just can’t affirm—— 

Senator HATCH. Sure. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. That description. 

My point is, however, that once there’s Supreme Court precedent 

directly on point and Second Circuit precedent directly on point on 

a question, which there is on this incorporation doctrine and how 

it uses the word fundamental, then my panel, which was unanimous on this point—there were two other judges and at least one 

other—or one other panel on the Seventh Circuit by Justice—by 

Justice—by Judge Easterbrook, has agreed that once you have settled precedent in an area, on a precise question, then the Supreme 

Court has to look at that. 

And under the deference one gives to stare decisis and the factors one considers in deciding whether that older precedent should 

be changed or not, that’s what the Supreme Court will do. 

Senator HATCH. All right. As I noted, the Supreme Court put the 

Second Amendment in the same category as the First and the 

Fourth Amendments as preexisting rights that the Constitution 

merely codified. 

Now, do you believe that the First Amendment rights, such as 

the right to freely exercise religion, the freedom of speech, or the 

freedom of the press, are fundamental rights? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Those rights have been incorporated against 

the states. The states must comply with them. So to the extent that 

the Court has held that, then they are—they have been deemed 

fundamental as that term is understood legally. 

Senator HATCH. What about the Fourth Amendment about unreasonable searches and seizures? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As well. 

Senator HATCH. Same? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. But with respect to the holding as it relates 

to that particular amendment. 

Senator HATCH. I understand. 

Let me turn to your decision in Maloney v. Cuomo. And this is 

the first post-Heller decision about the Second Amendment to reach 

any Federal court, or Federal appeals court. I think I should be 

more specific. 

In this case, you held that the Second Amendment applies only 

to the Federal Government and not to the states. And this was 

89 

after Heller. And am I right that your authority for that proposition was the Supreme Court’s 1886 decision in Presser v. Illinois? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That plus some Second Circuit precedent that 

had held that it had not—that the amendment had not been—— 

Senator HATCH. But Plesser was definitely one of the cases you 

relied on. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It was. 

Senator HATCH. All right. In that case—or I should say, that case 

involved the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities 

clause. 

Now, is that correct? Are you aware of that? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It may have. I haven’t read it recently 

enough to remember exactly. 

Senator HATCH. You can take my word on it. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Okay. I’ll accept—— 

Senator HATCH. Thank you. 

Last year’s decision in Heller involved the District of Columbia, 

so it did not decide the issue of whether the Second Amendment 

applies to the states or is incorporated. But the Court did say that 

its 19th century cases about applying the Bill of Rights to the 

states ‘‘did not engage the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry 

required by our later cases.’’ 

Now, here is my question. 

Am I right that those later cases to which the Court referred involved the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause rather than 

its privileges and immunities clause? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I said, I haven’t examined those cases recently enough to be able to answer your question, Senator. But 

what I can say is that regardless of what those pieces address or 

didn’t address, the Second Circuit had very directly addressed the 

question of whether the Second—whether it viewed the Second 

Amendment as applying against the states. 

To that extent, if that precedent got the Supreme Court’s teachings wrong, it still would bind my court. 

Senator HATCH. I understand that. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And to the extent that—— 

Senator HATCH. I am talking about something beyond that. I am 

talking about what should be done here. 

Isn’t the Presser case that you relied on in Maloney—to say that 

the Second Amendment does not apply to the states, one of those 

19th century cases where they have used the privileges and immunities clause, not the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, 

to incorporate—see, the late cases have all used the Fourteenth 

Amendment, as far as I can recall. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I said, Senator, I just haven’t looked at 

those cases to analyze it. I know what Heller said about them. In 

Maloney, we were addressing a very, very narrow question. 

Senator HATCH. Right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And in the end, the issue of whether that 

precedent should be followed or not is a question the Supreme 

Court’s going to address if it accepts certiorari in one of the three 

cases in which courts have looked at this question, the Court of Appeals has. 

90 

Senator HATCH. The reason I am going over this is I believe you 

applied the wrong line of cases in Maloney, because you were applying cases that used the privileges and immunities clause and 

not cases that used the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. 

Let me just clarify your decision in Maloney. As I read it, you 

held that the Second Amendment does not apply to the state or 

local governments. You also held that since the right to bear arms 

is not fundamental, all that is required to justify a weapons restriction is some reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide 

a rational basis for it. 

Now, am I right that this is a very permissive standard that 

would be easily met, the rational basis standard? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, all standards of the Court are attempting to ensure that government action has a basis. 

Senator HATCH. Right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In some situations, the Court looks at the action and applies a stricter scrutiny to the government’s action. In 

others, if it’s not a fundamental right in the way the law defines 

that, but it hasn’t been incorporated against the states, then standard of review is of rational basis. 

Senator HATCH. And my point is, it is a permissive standard that 

can be easily met; isn’t that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, the government can remedy a social 

problem that it is identifying or difficulty—it’s identifying in conduct, not in the most narrowly tailored way. But one that reasonably seeks to achieve that result, in the end, it can’t be arbitrary 

and capricious. That’s a word that is not in the definition. 

Senator HATCH. Maybe I can use the words ‘‘more easily met’’ ? 

How is that? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I said, the rational basis does look more 

broadly than strict scrutiny may—— 

Senator HATCH. That is my point. That is my point. 

As a result of this very permissive legal standard, and it is permissive, doesn’t your decision in Maloney mean that virtually any 

state or local weapons ban would be permissible? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Sir, in Maloney we were talking about 

nunchuck sticks. 

Senator HATCH. I understand. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Those are martial art sticks. 

Senator HATCH. Two sticks bound together by rawhide or some 

sort of a—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Exactly. And when the sticks are swung, 

which is what you do with them, if there’s anybody near you, you’re 

going to be seriously injured because that swinging mechanism can 

break arms, it can bust someone’s skull—— 

Senator HATCH. Sure. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. It can cause not only serious but 

fatal damage. 

So to the extent that a state government would choose to address 

this issue of the danger of that instrument by prohibiting its possession in the way New York did, the question before our court, because the Second Amendment has not been incorporated against 

the state, was did the state have a rational basis for prohibiting 

the possession of this kind of instrument. 

91 

So it’s a very narrow question. Every kind of regulation would 

come to a court with a particular statute, which judicial—legislative findings as to why a remedy is needed. And that statute would 

then be subject to rational basis review. 

Senator HATCH. Well, the point that I am really making is, is 

that the decision was based upon a 19th century case that relied 

on the privileges and immunities clause, which is not the clause 

that we use to invoke the doctrine of incorporation today. And that 

is just an important consideration for you as you see these cases 

in the future. 

But let me just change the subject. In the Ricci case—and I am 

very concerned about that because of a variety of reasons—the 

Court split 5 to 4 on whether to grant summary judgment to the 

firefighters. And it was a summary judgment, meaning it didn’t 

have to be distributed to the other judges on the Court. 

The other reason that Judge Cabranes raised the issue is that he 

read it in the newspaper, and then said I want to see that case. 

Then he got it, and he realized, my gosh, this is a case of first impression. 

So the Court split 5 to 4 on whether to grant summary judgment 

to the firefighters. Now, even the four dissenters said that the firefighters deserved their day in court to find more facts. But all nine 

justices disagreed with your handling of that particular case. 

Now, thus, your decision in—I mean, even though it was a 5 to 

4 decision, all nine of them disagreed with your handling. All right. 

But, as you know, your decision in Ricci v. DeStefano has become 

very controversial. People all over the country are tired of courts 

imposing their will against one group or another without justification. 

Now, the primary response or defense so far seems to be that you 

have no choice because you were bound by clear and longstanding 

precedent. Most say you were bound by Second Circuit precedent; 

some say it was Supreme Court precedent. 

So I need to ask you about this. To be clear, this case involved 

not only disparate impact discrimination, but both disparate treatment and disparate impact. That is what made it a case of first impression. The city says that they had to engage in disparate treatment or they would have been sued for disparate impact. So it was 

how these two concepts of discrimination, disparate treatment and 

disparate impact, relate in the same case? 

The fact of the issue of whether you were bound by clear, longstanding precedent, as I recall your opinion in this case, whether 

it was the summary order or the per curiam opinion, did not cite 

any Supreme Court or Second Circuit Court precedent at all. 

Is that right? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I believe they cited the Bushey case. 

Senator HATCH. All right. The only case citation in your opinion 

was to the District Court opinion, because you were simply adopting what the District Court had said rather than doing your own 

analysis of the issues. And I think that is right, but you can correct 

me if I am wrong. I would be happy to be corrected. 

But didn’t the District Court say that this was actually a very 

unusual case? This is how the District Court put it. ‘‘This case presents the opposite scenario of the usual challenge to an employVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
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ment or promotional examination as plaintiffs attack not the use 

of allegedly racially discriminatory exam results, but defendants’ 

reason for their refusal to use those results.’’ 

Now, this seems complicated I know, but you know more about 

it than probably anybody here in this room. 

The District Court cited three Second Circuit precedents, but did 

not two of them, the Kirkland and the Bushey cases—didn’t they 

deal with race norming of test scores, which did not occur in this 

case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. They dealt with when employees could prove 

a disparate impact of a case, and it would be—— 

Senator HATCH. But based upon race norming. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. But the principles underlying 

when employees could bring a case are the same when they establish a prima facie case, which is can an employee be sued—employer be sued by employees who can prove a disparate impact. 

And the basic principles of those cases were the same regardless 

of what form the practice at issue took. 

Senator HATCH. All right. Well, the third case, the Hayden case, 

didn’t it present a challenge to the design of the employment test 

rather than the results of the test? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I’m sorry. Say this again. 

Senator HATCH. The Hayden case, didn’t it actually present a 

challenge to the design of the case rather than the results of the— 

design of the employment test rather than the results of the test? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Again, regardless of what the challenge is 

about, what test is at issue, the core holding of that precedent was 

that if an employee could show a disparate impact from a particular practice or test or activity by an employer, then that employee had a prima facie case of liability under Title VII. 

So the question is, was the city subject to potential liability because the employees, the city of New Haven, because the employees 

could bring a suit under established law challenging that the city 

of New Haven had violated Title VII. So that was the question. 

Senator HATCH. All right, as one of the reasons why. It is a very 

important case. 

When the Second Circuit considered whether to review the decision en banc, didn’t you join an opinion admitting that the case 

presents ‘‘difficult issues? ’’ 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, the District Court noted that it was a 

different scenario, but it evaluated its decision—it evaluated the 

case in a 78-page decision, and gave a full explanation, one which 

the panel agreed with my adopting the opinion of the District 

Court. 

Those questions, as I indicated, are always whether, given the 

risk the city was facing, the fact that it could face a lawsuit and 

its conclusion that perhaps a better test could be devised that 

would not have a disparate impact, whether it was liable for discrimination—disparate—not disparate—different treatment under 

the law. 

The Supreme Court came back and said, new standard. As I understood the dissenters in that case, what they were saying is, to 

the majority, if you’re going to apply a new standard, then give the 

Second Circuit a chance to look at the record and apply that standVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
93 

ard. It wasn’t disagreeing that the circuit wasn’t applying the law 

as it was understood at the time. The dissenters, as I read what 

they were doing, were saying, send it back to the circuit and let 

them look at this in the first instance. 

Senator HATCH. Well, as I understand it, Judge Cabranes basically did not know the decision was done until he read it in the 

newspaper and then asked to look at it. His opinion, joined by five 

other judges, supporting en banc review, opens with these words, 

‘‘This appeal raises important questions of first impression in our 

circuit, and, indeed, in the Nation, regarding the implication of the 

Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII’s prohibition on discriminatory employment practices.’’ 

Was he wrong? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That was his view. He expressed it in his 

opinion on his vote. I can’t speak for him. I know that the 

panel—— 

Senator HATCH. I am just asking you to speak for you. 

Look, when the Supreme Court reversed you, Justice Kennedy 

wrote, ‘‘This action presents two provisions of Title VII to be interpreted and reconciled with few, if any, precedents in the Courts of 

Appeals discussing the issue.’’ 

He was referring to the lack of precedent anywhere in the country, not just the Second Circuit. 

Was he wrong? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. He was talking about whether—I understood 

him to be talking about not whether the precedent that existed 

would have determined the outcome as the panel did, but whether 

the Court should be looking at these two provisions in a different 

way to establish a choice—a different choice in considerations by 

the city. 

As I indicated, that argument about what new standard or new 

approach to the questions that the city should consider before it denies certification of a test, yes, had not been addressed by other 

courts. But the ability of a city, when presented with a prima facie 

case, to determine whether or not it would attempt to reach a nondisparate impact have been recognized by the courts. 

Senator HATCH. Even the District Court felt that this was an unusual case. And if there was little or no Second Circuit precedent 

directly on point for a case like this—one of the questions I had is 

why did your panel not just do your own analysis and your own 

opinion? 

Judge Cabranes pointed out that the per curiam approach that 

simply adopts the District Court’s reasoning is reserved for cases 

that involve only ‘‘straightforward questions that do not require explanation.’’ 

As I asked you about a minute ago, you yourself joined an opinion regarding rehearing, saying the case raised difficult questions. 

Now, the issue I am raising is why did you not analyze the issues 

yourself and apply what law existed to the difficult and perhaps 

unprecedented cases or issues in the case? And whether you got it 

right or wrong—and the Supreme Court did find that you got it 

wrong because they reversed—I just can’t understand the claim 

that you were just sticking to binding, clear, longstanding precedent when all of that was part of the total decision and all nine 

94 

justices found it to be a flaw that you did not give serious, adequate consideration to what really turned out to be a case at first 

impression. 

It is easy always to look at these things in retrospect, and you 

are under a lot of pressure here. But I just wanted to cover that 

case because I think it is important that that case be covered. And 

I think it is also important for you to know how I feel about these 

type of cases, and I think many here in the U.S. Senate. These are 

important cases. These are cases where people are discriminated 

against. 

Let me just make one last point here. You have nothing to do 

with this, I know. But there is a rumor that people for the American Way, that this organization has been smearing Frank Ricci, 

who is only one of 20 plaintiffs in this case, because he may be willing to be a witness in these proceedings. 

I hope that is not true, and I know you have nothing to do with 

it. So don’t think I am trying to make a point against you. I am 

not. I am making a point that that is the type of stuff that does 

not belong in Supreme Court nomination hearings, and I know you 

would agree with me on that. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Absolutely, Senator. I would never, ever endorse, approve or tolerate, if I had any control over individuals, 

that kind of conduct. 

Senator HATCH. I believe that, and I want you to know I have 

appreciated this little time we have had together. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I’m 

puzzled why Mr. Estrada keeps coming up. 

Mr. Estrada had no judicial experience. The nominee before us 

has considerable judicial experience. Mr. Estrada wouldn’t answer 

questions presented to him. This nominee I think has been very 

straightforward. She has not used catchy phrases, she has answered the questions directly the best she could, and to me that 

gets points. 

I must say that if there is a test for judicial temperament, you 

pass it with an A++. I want you to know that because I wanted to 

respond and my adrenaline was moving along and you have just 

sat there very quietly and responded to questions that in their very 

nature are quite provocative. So I want to congratulate you about 

that. 

Now, it was just said that all nine Justices disagreed with you 

in the Ricci case. But I want to point out that Justice Ginsburg and 

three other Justices stated in the dissent that the Second Circuit 

decision should have been affirmed. Is that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. Also a Senator made 

a comment about the Second Circuit not being bound in the Ricci 

case that I wanted to follow up on because I think what he said 

was not correct. 

You made the point that the unanimous Ricci panel was bound 

by Second Circuit precedent, as we have said. The Senator said 

that you easily could have overruled that precedent by voting for 

the case to be heard en banc. 

95 

First, my understanding is that a majority of the Second Circuit 

voted not to rehear the case. Is that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That’s correct. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Second, it took a significant change in disparate impact law to change the result of the Second Circuit 

reached in this case. The Supreme Court itself in Ricci recognized 

that it was creating a new standard. Is my understanding correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes, Senator. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. You see? So what is happening here, ladies 

and gentlemen and members, is that this very reserved and very 

factual and very considered nominee is being characterized as 

being an activist when she is anything but. 

I have a problem with this because some of it is getting across 

out there, calls begin to come into my office. Wow, she’s an activist. 

In my view because you have agreed with your Republican colleagues on constitutional issues some 98 percent of the time, I don’t 

see how you can possibly be construed to be an activist. 

By your comments here, and as I walked in the room earlier, 

somebody asked you how you see your role and you said, ‘to apply 

the law as it exists with the cases behind it.’ That’s a direct quote. 

It’s a very clear statement. It does not say oh, I think it’s a good 

idea or it does not say any other cliche. It states a definitive statement. 

Later you said, ‘Precedent is that which gives stability to the 

law.’ I think that’s a very important statement. 

What we are talking about here is following precedent. So let me 

ask you in a difficult area of the law a question. 

The Supreme Court has decided on more than seven occasions 

that the law cannot put a woman’s health at risk. It said it in Rowe 

in ‘73, in Danforth in ‘76, in Planned Parenthood in ‘83, in Thornburg in ‘86, in Casey in ‘92, in Carhart in 2000 and in Ayotte in 

2006. 

With both Justices Roberts and Alito on the court, however, this 

rule seems to have changed because in 2007 in Carhart 2, the court 

essentially removed this basic constitutional right from women. 

Now here is my question. When there are multiple precedents 

and a question arises, are all the previous decisions discarded or 

should the court reexamine all the cases on point? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It is somewhat difficult to answer that question because before the court in any one case is a particular factual 

situation. So how the court’s precedent applies to that unique factual situation because often what comes before the court is something that’s different than its prior decision. Not always, but often. 

In the Carhart case, the court looked to its precedence, and as 

I understood that case, it was deciding a different question which 

was whether there were other means, safer means and equally effective means for a woman to exercise her right, the procedure at 

issue in the case. 

That was, I don’t believe, a rejection of its prior precedence. Its 

prior precedence are still the precedence of the court. The health 

and welfare of a woman must be a compelling consideration. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So you believe that the health of the woman 

still exists? 

96 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. You mentioned many cases. It has been a 

part of the court’s jurisprudence and a part of its precedence. Those 

precedents must be given deference in any situation that arises before the court. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. 

I’d also like to ask you your thoughts on how a precedent should 

be reviewed. In a rare rebuke of his colleagues, Justice Scalia has 

sharply criticized Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito for effectively overruling the court’s precedence without acknowledging that 

they were doing so. 

Scalia wrote in the Hein case, ‘Overruling prior precedent is a serious undertaking and I understand the impulse to take a 

minimalist approach. But laying just claim to be honoring Stare 

Decisis requires more than beating a prior precedent to a pulp and 

then sending it out to the lower courts weakened, denigrated, more 

incomprehensible than ever and yet somehow technically alive.’ 

In Wisconsin, Right to Life v. FEC, he said that Chief Justice 

Roberts’ opinion, ‘Effectively overruled a 2003 decision without saying so,’ and said this kind of quote follow judicial restraint was 

really ‘judicial obfuscation.’ 

Here is the question. When the court decides to overrule a previous decision, is it important that it do so outright and in a way 

that is clear to everyone? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The Doctrine of Starry Decisis which means 

stand by a decision, stand by a prior decision, has a basic premise. 

That basic premise is that there is a value in society to predictability, consistency, fairness, evenhandedness in the law. 

This society has an important expectation that judges won’t 

change the law based on personal whim or not. But they will be 

guided by a humility they should show and the thinking of prior 

judges who have considered weighty questions and determined as 

best as they could given the tools that they had at the time to establish precedent. 

There are circumstances under which a court should reexamine 

precedent and perhaps change its direction or perhaps reject it. But 

that should be done very, very cautiously and I keep emphasizing 

the verys because the presumption is in favor of deference to precedent. 

The question then becomes what are the factors you use to 

change it, and then courts have looked at a variety of different factors, applying each in a balance in determining where that balance 

falls at a particular moment. 

It is important to recognize, however, that the development of 

the law is step by step, case by case. There are some situations in 

which there is a principled way to distinguish precedent from application to a new situation. 

No, I do not believe a judge should act in an unprincipled way, 

but I recognize that both the Doctrine of Starry Decisis starts from 

a presumption that deference should be given to precedence and 

that the development of the law is case by case. It is always a very 

fine balance. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. 

I wanted to ask a question on Executive Power and national security. We have seen the executive branch push the boundaries of 

97 

power claiming sweeping authority, to disregard acts of Congress. 

That’s one way to collect communications of Americans without 

warrants and to detain people indefinitely without due process. 

Now, the President and literally hundreds of signing statements 

affixed to a signature on a bill indicated part of a bill that he would 

in essence disregard. He didn’t veto the bill, he signed the bill and 

said but there are sections that I—in so many words, will disregard. 

Most egregiously in 2005 when Congress passed a bipartisan bill 

banning torture, President Bush signed it. But he also issued a 

signing statement saying he would only enforce the law, ‘Consistent with the Constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch consistent with the Constitutional limitations on the judicial power.’ 

In other words, although he signed the bill, it was widely interpreted that he was asserting the right not to follow it. 

Does the Constitution authorize the President to not follow parts 

of laws duly passed by the Congress that he is willing to sign that 

he believes are an unconstitutional infringement on executive authority. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That’s a very broad question. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. It is one that we are grappling with, though. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And that is why I have to be very cautious 

in answering it. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. That’s fine. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Because not only is Congress grappling with 

this issue, but so are courts by claims being raised by many litigants who are asserting whether they are right or wrong would 

need to be addressed in each individual case that the President in 

taking some activity against the individual has exceeded Congress’ 

authorizations or his powers. 

The best I can do in answering your question because there is 

so many pending cases addressing this issue in such a different variety of ways is to say that the best expression of how to address 

this in a particular situation was made by Justice Jackson in his 

concurrence in the Youngstown seizure cases. That involved President Truman’s seizure of seal factories. 

There, Justice Jackson has sort of set off the framework and articulation that no one has thought of a better way to make it. 

He says that you always have to look at an assertion by the 

president that he or she is acting within executive power in the 

context of what Congress has done or not done. He always starts 

with first you look at whether Congress has expressly or implicitly 

addressed or authorized the president to act in a certain way. 

If the President has, then he is acting at his highest statute of 

power. 

If the President is acting in prohibition of an express or implied 

act of Congress, then he is working at his lowest edge. If he is acting where Congress hasn’t spoken, then we are in what Justice 

Jackson called the Zone of Twilight. 

The issue in any particular case is always starting with what 

Congress says or has not said and then looking at what the Constitution has, what it says about the powers of the President minus 

Congress’ powers in that area. 

98 

You can’t speak more specifically than that in response to your 

statement that we are part of your question, other than to say the 

President can’t act in violation of the Constitution. No one is above 

the law. 

But what that is in a particular situation has to be looked at in 

the factual scenario before the court. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. This is really very relevant to what we do and we have often discussed this Jackson case 

or the steel case. But we just recently passed a Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act and one of the amendments, because I did the 

amendment, was to strengthen the exclusivity clause of the law 

which has been in the bill since the beginning but that there are 

no exceptions from which the President can leave the four corners 

of this bill. So it will remain to be seen how that works out over 

time. 

But I can certainly say to you that it’s a most important consideration as we’ve looked at these matters of national security. 

So let me ask you this. You joined a second circuit opinion last 

year that held that the executives should not forbid companies that 

received national security letters to tell the public about those letters. 

The panel’s opinion in the case said, ‘The national security context in which NSL are authorized imposes on courts a significant 

obligation to defer to the judgments of executive branch officials.’ 

But also that under no circumstance should the judiciary become 

the hand maiden of the executive. That’s Doe v. Mukasey. Given that the executive branch has responsibility of protecting 

the national security, how should courts balance the executive 

branch’s expertise in national security matters with the judicial 

branches constitutional duty to enforce the Constitution and prevent abuse of power. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can talk about what we did in Doe as reflective of the approach that we used in that case. It is difficult to talk 

about an absolute approach in any case. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I understand. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Because each case presets its own actions by 

parties in its own set of competing considerations often. 

In Doe, the District Court had invalidated the Congressional 

statute all together, reasoning that the statute violated the Constitution in a number of different ways and that those violations 

did not authorize Congress to act in the manner it did. 

As the panel said that decision recognizing that deference to the 

executive is important in national security questions. In deference 

to Congress because the District Court was validating an Act of 

Congress. We had, as an appellate court, to be very cautious about 

what we were doing in this area and to balance and keep consistent with constitutional requirements the actions that were 

being taken. 

Giving back due deference, we upheld most of the statute. What 

we did was address two provisions of the statute that didn’t pass 

in our judgment, constitutional muster. 

One of them was that the law as Supreme Court precedence had 

commanded required that if the government was going to stop an 

individual from speaking in this particular context, that the govVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
99 

ernment had to come to court immediately to get court approval of 

that step. 

The statute instead required the individual who was restricted to 

come and challenge the restriction. We said no, government is acting. You have a right to speak. If you have a right to speak, you 

should know what the grounds for that right are and you should 

be told or brought to court to be given an opportunity to have that 

restriction lifted. 

The other was a question of who wore the burden of supporting 

that restriction and the statute held that it was the individual who 

was being burdened who had to prove that there wasn’t a reason 

for it. 

The government agreed with our court that that burden violated 

Supreme Court precedent and the premises of freedom of speech 

and agreed that the burden should not be that way and we read 

the statute to explain what the proper burden was. 

There is in all of these cases a balance and deference that is 

needed to be given to the executive and to Congress in certain situations. But we are a court that protects the Constitution and the 

rights of individuals under it and we must ensure and act with 

caution whenever reviewing a claim before us. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. One question on the 

Commerce clause in the Constitution. 

That clause as you well know is used to pass laws in a variety 

of contexts, from protecting schools from guns to highway safety to 

laws on violent crime, child pornography, laws to prevent discrimination and to protect the environment, to name just a few examples. 

When I questioned now Chief Justice Roberts, I talked about how 

for 60 years the court did not strike down a single Federal law for 

exceeding Congressional power under the Commerce clause. 

In the last decade, however, the court has changed its interpretation of the Commerce clause and struck down more than three 

dozen case. 

My question to the Chief Justice and now to you is do you agree 

with the direction the Supreme Court has moved in more narrowly 

interpreting Congressional authority to enact laws under the Commerce clause? General, not relating to any one case. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, I know. But the question assumes a prejudgment by me of what is an appropriate approach or not in a new 

case that may come before me as a Second Circuit judge or again 

if I’m fortunate enough to be a Justice on the Supreme Court. So 

it is not a case I can answer in a broad statement. 

I can say that the court in reviewing congressional acts as it relates to an exercise of powers under the Commerce clause has 

looked at a wide variety of factors and considered that in different 

areas. 

But there is a framework that those cases have addressed, and 

that framework would have to be considered with respect to each 

case that comes before the court. 

Now, I know that you mentioned a number of different cases and 

if you have one in particular that concerns you, perhaps I could 

talk about what the framework is that the court established in 

those cases. 

100 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I will give you one very quickly. Restricting 

the distance that somebody could bring a gun close to a school. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The Gun Free Zone School Act which the 

court struck down with Lopez. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Right, Lopez. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In that case and in some of its subsequent 

cases, the court was examining as I mentioned a wide variety of 

factors. They included whether the activity that the government 

was attempting to regulate was economic or non-economic, whether 

it was an area in which states traditionally regulated, whether the 

statute at issue had an interstate commerce provision as an element of the crime and then considered whether there was a substantial effect on commerce. 

It looked at the congressional findings on that last element, the 

court did, and determined that there weren’t enough in the factors 

that it was looking at to find that that particular statute was within Congress’ powers. 

That is the basic approach it has used to other statutes it has 

looked at. I would note that its most recent case in this area, the 

Raich case. The court did uphold a crime that was non-economic 

in the sense of that it involved just the possession of marijuana. 

There it looked at the broader statute in which that provision 

was passed and the intent of Congress to regulate a market in illegal drugs. 

So the broad principles established in those cases have been the 

court’s precedent. Its most recent holding suggests that another 

factor purports to look at and each situation will provide a unique 

factual setting that the court will apply those principles to. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. One last question on that point. One of the 

main concerns is that this interpretation which is much more restrictive now could impact important environmental laws, whether 

it be the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean 

Water Act or anything that we might even do with cap and trade. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In fact there are cases pending before the 

courts raising those arguments. So those are issues that the courts 

are addressing. I can’t speak much more further than that because 

of the restrictions on me. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I understand. It is just that Congress has to 

have the ability to legislate. In those general areas it is the Commerce clause that enables that legislation. 

Now as you pointed out, you did revise the Lopez case and make 

specific findings and perhaps with more care toward the actual 

findings that bring about the legislative conclusion that we might 

be able to continue to legislate in these areas, but my hope is that 

you would go to the court with the sensitivity that this body has 

to be able to legislate in those areas. They involve all of the states 

and they are very important questions involving people’s well 

being, control of the environment, the air, the water, et cetera. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I do believe that in all of the cases the court 

has addressed this issue that it pays particular attention to congressional findings. 

I know that individuals may disagree with what the court has 

done in individual cases, but it has never disavowed the imporVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
101 

tance of deference to legislative findings with respect to legislation 

that it is passing within its powers under the Constitution. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. I wish you best of luck. Thank 

you very much. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I want to correct one thing. I 

said I had a letter earlier from Miguel Estrada. That was not correct. It wasn’t a letter. 

Chairman LEAHY. If we could have a copy of whatever you put 

in the record. I did send Mr. Estrada a note last night about my 

earlier statement. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, we both made an error talking about it. 

Chairman LEAHY. We should remember that Mr. Estrada is not 

the nominee here, just as with all the statements made about 

President Obama’s philosophy, his confirmation hearing was last 

November, not now. It is just you, Judge Sotomayor, and have a 

good lunch and we will come back. Who is next? Senator Grassley 

will be recognized when we come back in and we will start right 

at 2:00. 

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the hearing was recessed.] 

After Recess [2 p.m.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Judge, I once, on a television interview, said 

if I could do anything I wanted to do in life, I said, well, if I ever 

have to work for a living I want to be a photographer, because I 

do. At which point, 2 minutes after the interview, the phone rings. 

My mom was still alive. She called. She said, don’t you ever say 

that. They’ll think you don’t work! 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Actually, I don’t. I just recognize Senators 

here. You’re doing all the work, and I appreciate how well you’re 

doing it. 

I turn, next, to Senator Grassley, and then after Senator Grassley, to Senator Feingold. 

Senator Grassley. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes. Welcome once again, Judge. I hope you 

had a good break. I appreciate very much the opportunity to ask 

you some questions. 

I’d like to start off my round with some questions about your understanding of individual property rights and how they’re protected 

by the Constitution. And let me say, as I observe property rights 

around the world, there’s a big difference between developed nations and developing nations, and respect for private property has 

a great deal to do with the advancement of societies. 

So I believe all Americans care about this right. They want to 

protect their homes and anything they own from unlawful taking 

by government. But this is also a right that is important for agricultural interests. As you know, besides being a Senator, I come 

from an agricultural State in Iowa and am a farmer as well. I’m 

sure that ordinary Americans, besides the economic interests that 

might be involved, are all very well concerned about where you 

stand on property rights. 

So some of these issues have been discussed, but I want to go 

into a little more depth on Kelo, as an example. Could you explain 

what your understanding is of the state of the Fifth Amendment’s 

Taking Clause jurisprudence after the Supreme Court decision in 

102 

Kelo? Senator Brownback said this, aptly, when Chief Justice Roberts was before this committee: ‘‘Isn’t it now the case that it is 

much easier for one man’s home to become another man’s castle? ’’ 

Your general understanding of the Taking Clause. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Good afternoon, Senator Grassley. And it’s 

wonderful to see you again. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I share your view of the importance of property rights under the Constitution. As you know, I was a commercial litigator that represented national and international companies, and it wasn’t even the case that it was a difference between 

developed and under-developed countries. Many of my clients who 

were from developed countries chose to, in part, to invest in the 

United States because of the respect that our Constitution pays to 

property rights in its various positions, in its various amendments. 

With respect to the Kelo question, the issue in Kelo, as I understand it, is whether or not a State who had determined that there 

was a public purpose to the takings under the Takings Clause of 

the Constitution that requires the payment of just compensation 

when something is—is condemned for use by the government, 

whether the Takings Clause permitted the State, once it’s made a 

proper determination of public purpose and use according to the 

law, whether the State could then have a private developer do that 

public act, in essence. Could they contract with a private developer 

to effect the public purpose? And so the holding, as I understood 

it in Kelo, was a question addressed to that issue. 

With respect to the importance of property rights and the process 

that the State must use, I just point out to you that in another case 

involving that issue that came before me in a particular series of 

cases that I had involving a village in New York, that I—I ruled 

in favor of the property rights—the property owner’s rights to challenge the process that the State had followed in his case and to 

hold that the State had not given him adequate notice of their intent to use the property—well, not adequate notice not to use the 

property, but to be more precise, that they hadn’t given him an 

adequate opportunity to express his objection to the public taking 

in that case. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Could I zero in on two words in the Kelo 

case? The Constitution uses the word ‘‘use’’, ‘‘public use’’, whereas 

the Kelo case talked about taking private property for public purpose. In your opinion, is public use and public purpose the same 

thing? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, as I understood the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Kelo, it was looking at the court’s precedents over time 

and determining that its precedents had suggested that the two informed each other, that public purpose in terms of developing an 

area that would have a public improvement and use, that the two 

would inform each other. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Do you believe that the Supreme Court overstepped their constitutional authorities when they went beyond the 

words of the Constitution, in other words, to the word ‘‘purpose’’, 

and thus expanded the ability of government to take an individual’s private property? Because I think everybody believes that 

Kelo was an expansion of previous precedent there. 

103 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I know that there are many litigants who 

have expressed that view, and in fact there’s been many State legislators that have passed State legislation not permitting State 

governments to take in the situation that the Supreme Court approved of in Kelo. The question of whether the Supreme Court overstepped the 

Constitution, as I’ve indicated, the court—at least my understanding of the majority’s opinion—believed and explained why it 

thought not. I have to accept, because it is precedent, that as precedent and so I can’t comment further than to say that I understand 

the questions and I understand what State legislatures have 

done—— 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And would have to await another situation, 

or the court would, to apply the holding in that case. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Then I think that answers my next question, 

but it was going to be to ask you whether you think that Kelo improperly undermines the constitutionally protected private property 

rights. I presume you’re saying that you believe that’s what the 

court said and it doesn’t undermine property rights? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can only talk about what the—the court 

said in the context of that particular case and to explain that it is 

the court’s holding, and so it’s entitled to stare decisis effect and 

deference. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Okay. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. But the extent of that has to await the next 

step, the next cases. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Well, then maybe it would be fair for 

me to ask you, what is your understanding of the constitutional 

limitations then on government entity—any government entity taking land for a public purpose? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, that was the subject of much discussion 

in the Kelo case among the Justices, and with certain Justices in 

the dissent, hypothesizing that the limits were difficult to see, the 

majority taking the position that there were limits. As I’ve indicated to you, opining on a hypothetical is very, very difficult for a 

judge to do. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And as a potential—as a potential Justice on 

the Supreme Court, but more importantly as a Second Circuit 

Judge still sitting, I can’t engage in a question that involves 

hypotheses. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Let me ask you a couple obvious, then. Does 

the—does the Constitution allow for takings without any compensation? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, it—the Constitution provides that when 

the government takes it has to pay compensation. As you know, the 

question of what constitutes an actual taking is a very complex one 

because there is a difference between taking a home and regulation 

that may or may not constitute a taking. So I’m not at all trying 

to not answer your question, Senator. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Well, then let me ask you another 

question that maybe you can answer. Would you strike down a 

takings that provided no compensation at all? 

104 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, as I explained, if the taking violates the 

Constitution, I would be required to—to strike it down. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Let me move on to the Didden case v. 

Village of Port Chester. It raised serious concerns about whether 

you understand the protection provided by the Constitution for individual property rights. In this case, Mr. Didden alleged that his 

local village government violated his Fifth Amendment rights when 

it took his property to build a national-chain drugstore. At a meeting with a government agency, another developer, Mr. Didden was 

told that he could give the developer $800,000 or a 50 percent interest in his pharmacy project, and if Mr. Didden did not accept either condition, the government would simply take his property. 

Two days after Mr. Didden refused to comply with these demands, the government began proceeding to take his land. The District Court denied Mr. Didden his day in court, and your panel affirmed that decision in a five-paragraph opinion. 

Why did you deny Mr. Didden his day in court? How can these 

facts—in essence, allegations of extortion—at least not warrant the 

opportunity to call witnesses to see if Mr. Didden was telling an 

accurate story? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The Didden case presented a narrow issue 

that the court below—— 

[Interruption by the audience.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Officer, remove that man immediately. We will 

stand in order. We will stand in order. Officers will remove that 

man. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Again, both Senator Sessions and I have said, 

as all previous Chairs and Ranking Members of this have said, this 

is a hearing of the U.S. Senate. The judge deserves respect. Senators asking questions deserve respect. I will order the removal of 

anyone who disrupts it, whether they are supportive of the nominee or opposed to the nominee, whether they are supportive of a 

position I take, or opposed to it. We will have the respect that 

should be accorded to both the nominee and to the U.S. Senate. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you’ve handled this well throughout, and I support you 100 percent. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Grassley, we did stop the clock there so it did not take 

from your time. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you. People always say I have the ability to turn people on. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator GRASSLEY. Maybe you could start over again with your— 

with your sentence, please. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. 

Chairman LEAHY. Now, where were we? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I hope I remember where we were. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, the right of property owners to have 

their day in court is a very important one, but there is a corollary 

to the right to have your day in court, which is that you have to 

bring it to court in a timely manner. 

105 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Because people who are relying on your assertion of rights should know when you’re going to make them. And 

so there’s a doctrine called the Statute of Limitations that says if 

a party knows, or has reason to know, of their injury, then that 

party has to come in to court and raise their arguments within that 

statute that sets the limits of the action. 

Senator GRASSLEY. I—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In the Didden case—oh, I’m sorry. 

Senator GRASSLEY. No. No, no, no. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, no, no. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Please, I interrupted you. I shouldn’t have interrupted you. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. I—I—— 

Senator GRASSLEY. Please go—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In the Didden case—— 

Senator GRASSLEY. Yeah. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. The question was whether Mr. 

Didden knew that the State was intending to take his property, 

and for what it, the State, claimed was a public use and that it had 

plans to have a private developer take his—they take his property 

and the private developer develop the land. 

So there was a full hearing by the village on this question of 

whether there was a public use of the land. Mr. Didden didn’t 

claim in the action before the courts that he didn’t have notice of 

that hearing, he did not raise a challenge in that hearing to the 

public taking, and he didn’t raise a challenge to the State’s intent 

to have a private developer develop the land. 

Now, in that case the developer was developing not just Mr. 

Didden’s property, it was one piece of property in a larger development project and that larger development project had been based 

on the village’s conclusions, from its very lengthy hearings in accordance with New York law, that the area was blighted and that 

the area needed economic development. 

So, too, that issue became the issue before the court in the sense 

of, had Mr. Didden, knowing that he could be injured by the State’s 

finding of public use and the State’s decision to let a private developer develop this land, did he bring his lawsuit in a timely manner? 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And the court below, and our court, ruled on 

that basis, that he hadn’t because he had reason to know about the 

injury that could occasion—that could come to him. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, since Mr. Didden’s claim was based on 

conduct of the developer, how could he ever have filed a successful 

claim under the standard that you just mentioned? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Mr. Didden alleged in his complaint that the 

private developer had extorted him. Extortion, under the law, is defined as ‘‘an unlawful demand for money’’. On this one piece of 

property within a larger development that the private developer 

was actively engaged in doing what he had contracted with the 

State to do, to revive the economic base by making investments in 

it, the private developer knew that Mr. Didden has his claims. 

106 

The private developer had his agreement with the State, and so 

he was doing, in—at least this was the private developer’s argument—what he was entitled to do, which is to say, we disagree. I’m 

claiming that I have a right under contract, you’re claiming that 

you have a right under the Takings Clause. Let’s settle this. I am 

going to lose X amount of money, so you pay me back for me not 

to do what I’m entitled to do under the law. 

That, however, was—those were the claims of the parties in the 

action. In the end, the decision of the court was, if you believe that 

the takings of your property were not proper under the public use, 

under the Takings Clause, and you knew that the State had entered a contract with this private developer, then you had knowledge that you could be injured and you should have come to court 

earlier. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Why was the situation in Didden not the 

kind of prohibited pretextual taking articulated in Kelo? How was 

this not some sort of form of extortion? And if there wasn’t a pretext in the Didden case where the developer says ‘‘give me the 

money personally or we’ll take your land’’, then what is a pretext? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, as I—as I have described the case—— 

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes, I understand. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The question comes up in the context of, 

what did Mr. Didden know? Did he have enough to know he could 

be injured? Was there no public use to which the property would 

apply, and what rights did the private developer have with the 

State? And so the extortion question came up in a legal context 

surrounding the relative rights of the parties. So as I said, extortion is a term, a legal term, which is someone demanding money 

with no lawful claim to it. I’m simplifying this because there’s different definitions of extortion that apply to different situations. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Sure. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. But in the context of this case, that’s the simplest description of the case, I believe. 

Senator GRASSLEY. The Second Circuit panel in Didden took over 

a year to issue its ruling, suggesting that you understood the novelty and importance of this case. Yet your opinion dealt with Mr. 

Didden’s Fifth Amendment claim in just one paragraph. Did you 

believe that this was an ordinary takings case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, cases present claims by parties, and to 

the extent that Mr. Didden was raising claims that sounded in the 

issues the court was looking at in Kelo, certainly if Kelo had not 

come out and the court had to—for whatever reason, determined 

that somehow the Kelo decision affected the Statute of Limitations 

question, it may have had to reach the question. 

But courts do often wait for Supreme Courts to act on cases that 

are pending in order to see if some form of its analysis changes or 

not, or inform whether a different look should be given to the case. 

But on the bottom-line issue, Kelo didn’t change, in the judgment 

of the panel, the Statute of Limitations question. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Regardless of the Statute of Limitations, I am curious why you didn’t elaborate on your Kelo analysis, 

and why wasn’t this opinion published? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, Kelo didn’t control the outcome, the 

Statute of Limitations did, so there was no basis to go into an 

107 

elaborate discussion of Kelo. The discussion of Kelo, really, was to 

say that we had understood the public taking issue that Mr. 

Didden had spent a lot of time in his argument about, but the ruling was based on the narrow Statute of Limitations ground so the 

Kelo discussion didn’t need to be longer because it wasn’t the holding of the case. The holding of the case was the Statute of Limitations. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. This—on another case, the Supreme 

Court reversed you 6:3 just 3 months ago in Entergy Corporation 

v. Riverkeeper. You had held that the Environmental Protection 

Agency, which is the agency with expertise, could not use a costbenefit analysis in adopting regulations from the construction of 

water structures that had an impact on fish. Rather, you interpreted the Clean Water Act to hold that EPA had to require upgrades to technology that achieved the greatest reduction in adverse environmental impact, even when the cost of those upgrades 

were disproportionate to benefit. 

Following long-established precedent, the Supreme Court held 

that the EPA was reasonable in applying a cost-benefit analysis 

when adopting regulations under the Clean Water Act. In reversing, the Supreme Court questioned your proper application of subtle law that agency regulations should be upheld so long as they’re 

reasonable. 

Under Chevron, agency interpretation of statutes are entitled to 

deference so long as they are reasonable, in other words, if they 

aren’t capricious and arbitrary. Do you find it unreasonable that 

the EPA was willing to allow money to be spent in a cost-effective 

manner by not requiring billions of additional dollars to be spent 

to save a minimal number of additional fish? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. To be able to answer your question I would 

need to explain a little bit more about the background. 

The Supreme Court has now ruled in that case that the conclusion of the Second Circuit would not be upheld on this narrow 

question, but the question the Second Circuit was looking at is, 

what did Congress intend or mean when, in the statute at issue, 

it said that the agency had to use the ‘‘best technology available 

to minimize an adverse environmental impact’’. Those were the 

statute’s words. In looking at that, the Circuit applied general statutory construction principles, which is, in our judgment, what was 

the ordinary meaning of that? And—— 

Senator GRASSLEY. Are you saying you’re not bound by Chevron, 

then? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Oh, no. Absolutely not. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Okay. Go ahead. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Chevron speaks to agency action or interpretation, but ultimately the task of a court is to give deference to 

what Congress wants. That’s the very purpose of Congress’ legislation. And so what the court was trying to do there was to see if 

the agency’s interpretation, in light of the words of the statute and 

how Congress has used cost-benefit analysis in other statutes in 

this area, and determine what Congress intended. And so we 

looked at the language and it said just what it said, ‘‘best technology available to minimize adverse environmental impact’’. 

108 

We looked at how Congress used cost-benefit in similar statutes 

and similar provisions—or I shouldn’t say similar, in other provisions. We noted that under the statutes at issue when Congress 

wanted the agency to use cost-benefit analysis, it said so. In this 

provision, Congress was silent but the language, in the panel’s 

judgment, was the language. 

And so in trying to discern what Congress’ intent was, we came 

to the conclusion not that cost had no role in the agency’s evaluation, but that Congress had specified a more limited role that costbenefit. We described it as cost-effectiveness. And, in fact, we voted 

to—voted past our decision, asked and sent the case back to describe to us exactly what the agency had done, and why. Had it 

used cost-benefit? Had it used cost-effectiveness? But cost was always going to be a part of what the agency could consider. The 

issue was more, in what approach did Congress’ words intend? And 

so agency deference is important, but Congress is the one who 

writes the statutes so you have to start as a court with, what did 

Congress intend? 

Senator GRASSLEY. It seems to me like you’re saying, in ignoring 

the expertise of the statute, that the agency was being arbitrary 

and capricious in—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Not—not at all, sir. We were trying to look 

at the statute as a whole and determine what Congress meant by 

words that appeared to say that ‘‘best technology available had to 

minimize environmental effect’’. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I said, that does have—and as our opinion 

said—considerations of cost. But given that Congress didn’t use the 

cost-benefit—give the agency cost-benefit approval in the terms of 

this particular provision while it had in others, we determined that 

the agency and precedent interpreting provisions limited the use of 

cost-benefit analysis. 

Senator GRASSLEY. In another 2004 administrative law case dealing with environmental issues, NRDC v. Abraham, you voted to 

strike down a Bush administration regulation and reinstate a Clinton administration environmental rule that had never even become 

final. In this case it appears you also fairly narrowly interpreted 

Chevron deference when striking down EPA adoptions of reasonable regulations. 

If you are elevated to the Supreme Court, do you intend to replace an agency’s policy decisions with your own personal policy 

opinions as it appears you did in both—in the Abraham case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. In that case we were talking about, 

and deciding, an issue of whether the agency had followed its own 

procedures in changing policy. We weren’t substituting our judgment for that of the agency, we were looking at the agency’s own 

regulations as to the procedure that it had to follow in order to 

change an approach by the agency. So, that was a completely different question. With respect to deference to administrative bodies, 

in case after case where Chevron deference required deference, I 

have voted in favor of upholding administrative—executive and administrative decisions. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. This will probably have to be my last 

question. 

109 

Since 2005, you have been presiding judge on the panel of an appeal filed by eight States and environmental groups, arguing that 

greenhouse gases are a public nuisance that warrant a court-imposed injunction to reduce emissions. Your panel, in Connecticut v. 

American Electric Power, has sat on that case for 45 months, or 

nearly three times the average of the Second Circuit. Why, after 4 

years, have you failed to issue a decision in this case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The American Bar Association rule on Code 

of Conduct does not permit me to talk about a pending case. I can 

talk to you about one of the delays for a substantial period of time 

in that decision, and it was that the Supreme Court was considering a case, the Massachusetts case, that had some relevancy, or 

at least had relevancy to the extent that the panel asked the parties to brief further the applicability of that case to that decision. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Grassley. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Judge, let me first say I don’t mind telling 

you how much I’m enjoying listening to you, both your manner and 

your obvious tremendous knowledge and understanding of the law. 

In fact, I am enjoying it so much that I hope when you go into 

these deliberations about cameras in the courtroom, that you consider the possibility that I, and other Americans, would like the opportunity to observe your skills for many years to come in the comfort of our family rooms and living rooms. I think it’s a—— 

[Laughter.] 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. You were a very good lawyer, weren’t you, 

Senator? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. But I’m not going to ask you about that one 

now; others have covered it. Let me get into a topic that I discussed 

at length with the two most recent Supreme Court nominees, Chief 

Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, and that’s the issue of executive 

power. 

In 2003, you spoke at a law school class about some of the legal 

issues that have arisen since 9/11. You started your remarks with 

a moving description of how Americans stood together in the days 

after those horrific events, and how people from small Midwestern 

towns and people from New York City found ‘‘their common 

threads as Americans,’’ you said. 

As you said in that speech, while it’s hard to imagine that something positive could ever result from such a tragedy, there was a 

sense in those early days of coming together as one community that 

we would all help each other get through this. It was something 

that none of us had ever experienced before, and something I’ve 

often discussed as well. 

But what I have also said is that, in the weeks and months that 

followed, I was gravely disappointed that the events of that awful 

day, the events that had brought us so close together as one nation, 

were sometimes used, Judge, to justify policies that departed so far 

from what America stands for. 

So I’m going to ask you some questions that I asked now-Chief 

Justice Roberts at his hearing. Did that day, 9/11, change your 

110 

view of the importance of individual rights and civil liberties and 

how they can be protected? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. September 11th was a horrific tragedy, for all 

of the victims of that tragedy and for the nation. I was in New 

York. My home is very close to the World Trade Center. I spent 

days not being able to drive a car into my neighborhood because 

my neighborhood was used as a staging area for emergency trucks. 

The issue of the country’s safety and the consequences of that 

great tragedy are the subject of continuing discussion among not 

just Senators, but the whole nation. In the end, the Constitution, 

by its terms, protects certain individual rights. That protection is 

often fact-specific. Many of its terms are very broad: so what’s an 

unreasonable search and seizure? What are other questions are 

fact-specific. 

But in answer to your specific question, did it change my view 

of the Constitution, no, sir. The Constitution is a timeless document. It was intended to guide us through decades, generation 

after generation, to everything that would develop in our country. 

It has protected us as a nation, it has inspired our survival. That 

doesn’t change. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate that answer, Judge. 

Are there any elements of the government’s response to September 11th that you think, maybe 50 or 60 years from now, we 

as a nation will look back on with some regret? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I’m a historian by undergraduate training. I 

also love history books. It’s amazing how difficult it is to make 

judgments about one’s current positions. That’s because history 

permits us to look back and to examine the actual consequences 

that have arisen, and then judgments are made. As a Judge today, 

all I can do, because I’m not part of the legislative branch—it’s the 

legislative branch who has the responsibility to make laws consistent with that branch’s view of constitutional requirements in its 

powers. It’s up to the President to take his actions, and then it’s 

up to the court to just examine each situation as it arises. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I can understand some hesitance on this. But 

the truth is that courts are already dealing with these very issues. 

The Supreme Court itself has now struck down a number of post9/11 policies, and you yourself sat on a panel that struck down one 

aspect of the National Security Letter statutes that were expanded 

by the PATRIOT Act. 

So I’d like to hear your thoughts a bit on whether you see any 

common themes or important lessons in the court’s decisions in 

Rasul, Hamdi, Hamdan, and Boumediene. What is your general 

understanding of that line of cases? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That the court is doing its task as judges. It’s 

looking, in each of those cases, at what the actions are of either the 

military, and what Congress has done or not done, and applied constitutional review to those actions. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And is it fair to say, given that line of cases, 

that we can say that, at least as regards the Supreme Court, it believes mistakes were made with regard to post-9/11 policies? Because in each of those cases there was an overturning of a decision 

made either by the Congress or the executive. 

111 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I smiled only because that’s not the way that 

judges look at that issue. We don’t decide whether mistakes were 

made, we look at whether action was consistent with constitutional 

limitations or statutory limitations. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And in each of those cases there was a problem with either a constitutional violation or a problem with a congressional action, right? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. 

Senator FEINGOLD. That’s fine. 

As I’m sure you are aware, many of us on the Committee discussed at length with the prior Supreme Court nominees the 

framework for evaluating the scope of executive power in the national security context. You already discussed this at some length 

with Senator Feinstein, including Justice Jackson’s test in the 

Youngstown case. 

And I and others on the Committee are deeply concerned about 

the very broad assertion of executive power that has been made in 

recent years—an interpretation that has been used to authorize the 

violation of clear statutory prohibitions—from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, to the anti-torture statute. 

You discussed with Senator Feinstein the third category, the lowest ebb category in the Youngstown framework, and that’s where, 

as Justice Jackson said, the President’s power is at its lowest ebb 

because Congress has, as you well explained it, specifically prohibited some action. 

I take the point of careful scholars who argue that, hypothetically speaking, Congress could conceivably pass a law that is 

plainly unconstitutional. For example, if Congress passed a law 

that said that somebody other than the President would be the 

Commander-in-Chief of a particular armed conflict and not subject 

to Presidential direction, presumably that would be out of bounds. 

But setting aside such abstract hypotheticals, as far as I’m 

aware—and I’m pretty sure this is accurate—the Supreme Court 

has never relied on the Youngstown framework to conclude that the 

President may violate a clear statutory prohibition. In fact, in 

Youngstown itself, the court rejected President Truman’s plan to 

seize the steel mills. 

Now, is that your understanding of the Supreme Court precedent 

in this area? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I haven’t had cases—or a sufficient a number 

of cases—in this area to say that I can remember every Supreme 

Court decision on a question related to this topic. As you know, in 

the Youngstown case, the court held that the President had not 

acted within his powers in seizing the steel mills in the particular 

situation existing before him at the time. 

But the question or the framework doesn’t change, which is, each 

situation would have to be looked at individually because you can’t 

determine ahead of time with hypotheticals what a potential constitutional conclusion will be. As I may have said to an earlier 

question, academic discussion is just that. It’s presenting the extremes of every issue and attempting to debate about, on that extreme of the legal question, how should the judge rule? 

Senator FEINGOLD. I’ll concede that point, Judge. I mean, given 

your tremendous knowledge of the law and your preparation, I’m 

112 

pretty sure you would have run into any example of where this had 

happened. And I just want to note that I am unaware of—and if 

anybody is aware of an example of where something was justified 

under the President’s power under the lowest ebb, I’d love to know 

about it. But I think that’s not a question of a hypothetical, that’s 

a factual question about what the history of the case law is. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can only accept your assumption. As I said, 

I—I have not had sufficient cases to—to—to have looked at what 

I know in light of that particular question that you’re posing. 

Senator FEINGOLD. All right. 

In August 2002, the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department 

of Justice issued two memoranda considering the legal limits on interrogation of terrorism detainees. One of these contained a detailed legal analysis of the criminal law prohibiting torture. It concluded, among other things, that enforcement of the anti-torture 

statute would be an unconstitutional infringement on the President’s Commander-in-Chief authority. 

Judge, that memo did not once cite to the Youngstown case or to 

Justice Jackson’s opinion in Youngstown. We just learned on Friday, in a new Inspector General report, that a November 2001 OLC 

memo providing the legal basis for the so-called Terrorist Surveillance Program also did not cite Youngstown. 

Now, I don’t think you would have to be familiar with those 

memos to answer my question. Does it strike you as odd that a 

complex legal analysis of the anti-torture statute, or the FISA Act, 

that considers whether the President could violate those statutes 

would not even mention the Youngstown case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I have never been an advisor to a President. 

That’s not a function I have served, so I don’t want to comment on 

what was done or not done by those advisors in that case. And it’s 

likely that some question—and I know some are pending before the 

court in one existing case, so I can’t comment. All I can—on whether that’s surprising or not. I can only tell you that I would be surprised if a court didn’t consider the Youngstown framework in a decision involving this question because it is—that case’s framework 

is how these issues are generally approached. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Good. I appreciate that answer. 

Let me go to a topic that Senator Leahy and Senator Hatch discussed with you at some length: the Second Amendment. 

I have long believed that the Second Amendment grants citizens 

an individual right to own firearms. Frankly, I was elated when 

the court ruled in Heller last year, and unified what I think had 

been a mistake all along and recognized it as an individual right. 

The question of whether Second Amendment rights are incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process 

of law, and therefore applicable to the states, as you pointed out, 

was not decided in Heller. A Supreme Court decision in 1886 specifically held that the Second Amendment applies only to the federal government. 

So in my view, it is unremarkable that, as a Circuit Court judge 

in the Maloney case, you would follow applicable Supreme Court 

precedent that directly controlled the case rather than apply your 

own guess of where the court may be headed after Heller. In other 

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words, I think that’s would be an unfair criticism of a case, and I 

think you needed to rule that way, given the state of the law. 

But let me move on from that, because many of my constituents 

would like to know more about how you would make such a decision as a member of the highest court, so I want to follow up on 

that. First of all, am I right that if you’re confirmed and the court 

grants cert in the Maloney case, you would have to recuse yourself 

from its consideration? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes, sir. My own judgment is that it would 

seem odd, indeed, if any Justice would sit in review of a decision 

that they authored. I would think that the Judicial Code of Ethics 

that govern recusals would suggest and command that that would 

be inappropriate. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Fair enough. 

What about if one of the other pending appeals comes to the 

court, such as the Seventh Circuit decision in NRA v. Chicago, 

which took the same position as your decision in Maloney? Would 

you have to recuse yourself from that one as well? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. There are many cases in which a Justice, I 

understand, has decided cases as a Circuit Court judge that are not 

the subject of review that raise issues that the Supreme Court 

looks at later. What I would do in this situation, I would look at 

the practices of the Justices to determine whether or not I—that 

would counsel to—to recuse myself. I would just note that many 

legal issues, once they come before the court, present a different series of questions than the one one addresses as a Circuit Court. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, let’s assume you were able to sit on one 

of these cases or a future case that deals with this issue of incorporating the right to bear arms as applied to the states. 

How would you assess whether the Second Amendment, or any 

other amendment that has not yet been incorporated through the 

Fourteenth Amendment, should be made applicable to the States? 

What’s the test that the Supreme Court should apply? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That’s always the issue that litigants are arguing in litigation. So to the extent that the Supreme Court has 

not addressed this question yet, and there’s a strong likelihood it 

may in the future, I can’t say to you that I’ve prejudged the case 

and decided this is exactly how I’m going to approach it in that 

case. 

Senator FEINGOLD. But what would be the general test for incorporation? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. I mean, what is the general principle? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. One must remember that the Supreme 

Court’s analysis in its prior precedent predated its principles of— 

or the development of cases discussing the incorporation doctrine. 

Those are newer cases, and so the framework established in those 

cases may well inform. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Okay. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I said, I—I am hesitant of prejudging and 

saying they will or won’t, because that will be what the parties are 

going to be arguing in the litigation. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, it—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. But it is—I’m sorry. 

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Senator FEINGOLD. No, no. Go ahead. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. I was just suggesting that I do recognize 

that the court’s more recent jurisprudence in incorporation with respect to other amendments has taken—has been more recent, and 

those cases, as well as stare decisis and a lot of other things, will 

inform the court’s decision on how it looks at a new challenge to 

a State regulation. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And, of course, it is true that despite that 

trend that you just described, the Supreme Court has not incorporated several constitutional amendments as against the states, 

but most of those are covered by constitutional provisions and state 

constitutions, and the Supreme Court decisions that refuse to—incorporate the federal constitutional protections like the case involving the Second Amendment, a 19th century case, date back nearly 

a century. 

So after Heller, doesn’t it seem almost inevitable that when the 

Supreme Court again considers whether the Second Amendment 

applies to the states, it will find the individual right to bear arms 

to be fundamental, which is a word that we’ve been talking about 

today? After all, Justice Scalia’s opinion said this: ‘‘By the time of 

the founding, the right to have arms—bear arms had become fundamental for English subjects.’’ 

Blackstone, whose works we have said constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the founding generation, cited 

the arms provision in the Bill of Rights as one of the fundamental 

rights of Englishmen. ‘‘It was,’’ he said, ‘‘the natural right of resistance and self-preservation and the right of having and using arms 

for self-preservation and defense.’’ 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I said earlier, you are a very eloquent advocate. But a decision on what the Supreme Court will do and 

what’s inevitable will come up before the Justices in great likelihood in the future, and I feel that I’m threading the line—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Okay. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. Of answering a question about 

what the court will do in a case that may likely come before it in 

the future. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me try it in a more—less lofty way then. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. You talked about nunchucks before. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Okay. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. That’s an easier kind of case. But what Heller 

was about, was that there was a law here in DC that said you 

couldn’t have a handgun if you wanted to have it in your house to 

protect yourself. It is now protected under the Constitution that the 

citizens of the District of Columbia can have a handgun. 

Now, what happens if we don’t incorporate this right and the 

people of the State of Wisconsin—let’s say we didn’t have a constitutional provision in Wisconsin. We didn’t have one until the 

1980s, when I and other State Senators proposed that we have a 

right to bear arms provision. But isn’t there a danger here that if 

you don’t have this incorporated against the States, that we’d have 

this result where the citizens of DC have a constitutional right to 

have a handgun, but the people of Wisconsin might not have that 

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right? Doesn’t that make it almost inevitable that you would have 

to apply this to the states? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It’s a question the court will have to consider. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate your patience. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And it’s meaning—— 

[Laughter.] 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, the Supreme Court did hold that 

there is, in the Second Amendment, an individual right to bear 

arms, and that is its holding and that is the court’s decision. I fully 

accept that. In whatever new cases come before me that don’t involve incorporation as a Second Circuit judge, I would have to consider those—those issues in the context of a particular State regulation of firearms or other instruments. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I accept that answer. 

I’m going to move on to another area, what I’d like to call ‘‘secret 

law’’, that is, the development of controlling legal authority that 

has direct effects on the rights of Americans but that is done entirely in secret. There are two strong examples of that. First, the 

FISA court often issues rulings containing substantive interpretation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, that with 

very few exceptions have been kept from the public, and until a recent change in the law, many of them were not available to the full 

Congress either, meaning that members had been called upon to 

vote on statutory changes without knowing how the court had interpreted the existing statute. Second, the Office of Legal Counsel 

at the Justice Department issues legal opinions that are binding on 

the executive branch, but are also often kept from the public and 

Congress. 

Now, I understand that these legal documents may sometimes 

contain classified operational details that would need to be redacted, but I’m concerned that the meaning of a law like FISA, 

which directly affects the privacy rights of Americans, could develop entirely in secret. I think it flies in the face of our traditional 

notion of an open and transparent American legal system. 

Does this concern you at all? Can you say a little bit about the 

importance of the law itself being public? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, the question for a judge as a judge 

would look at it, is to examine, first, what policy choices the Congress is making in its legislation. It is important to remember that 

some of the issues that you are addressing were part of congressional legislation as to how FISA would operate. And as you just 

said, there’s been amendments subsequent to that, and so a court 

would start with what Congress has—what Congress has done and 

whether the acts of the other branch of government is consistent 

with that or not. 

The issue of whether, and how, a particular document would affect national security or affect questions of that nature would have 

to be looked at in—with respect to an individual case. And as I understand it, there are review processes in the FISA procedure. I’m 

not a member of that court, so I am not intimately familiar with 

those procedures, but I know that this is part of the review process 

there, in part. 

And so when you ask concern, there is always some attention 

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116 

tions that a court is taking, but that also is tempered with the fact 

that there are situations in which complete openness can’t be had, 

for a variety of different reasons. 

So courts—I did as a District Court judge and I have as a Circuit 

Court judge—looked at situations in which judges have to have determined whether juries should be empaneled anonymously, and in 

those situations we do consider the need for public actions, but we 

also consider that there may be, in some individual situations, potential threats to the safety of jurors that require an anonymous 

jury. 

I am attempting to speak about this as—it’s always a question 

of balance—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. What most concerns—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. And you have to look at, first, 

what Congress says about that. 

Senator FEINGOLD. The concerns you just raised, don’t they have 

to do more with the facts that shouldn’t be revealed than the legal 

basis? It’s sort of hard for me to imagine a threat to national security by revealing properly redacted documents as simply referred to 

the legal basis for something. Isn’t there a distinction between 

those two things? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can’t—it’s difficult to speak from the abstract, in large measure, because as I explained, I’ve never been a 

part of the FISA court and so I’ve never had the experience of reviewing what those documents are and whether they, in fact, can 

be redacted or not without creating risk to national security. One 

has to think about what the—what explanations the government 

has. There’s so many issues a court would have to look at. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me go to something completely different. 

There’s been a lot of talk about this concept of empathy. In the context of your nomination, a judge’s ability to feel empathy does not 

mean the judge should rule one way or another, as you well explained. But I agree with President Obama that it’s a good thing 

for our country for judges to understand the real-world implications 

of their decisions and the effects on regular Americans, and to seek 

to understand both sides of an issue. 

Judge, your background is remarkable. As you explained yesterday, your parents came to New York from Puerto Rico during 

World War II, and after your father died your mother raised you 

on her own in a housing project in the South Bronx. You are a lifelong New Yorker and a Yankee fan, as I understand it. But many 

Americans don’t live in big cities. Many of my constituents live in 

rural areas and small towns—and they root for the Brewers and 

the Packers. Some might think that you don’t have a lot in common 

with them. 

What can you tell me about your ability as a judge to empathize 

with them—to understand the everyday challenges of rural and 

small-town Americans and how Supreme Court decisions might affect their lives? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes, I live in New York City and it is a little 

different than other parts of the country, but I spend a lot of time 

in other parts of the country. I’ve visited a lot of States. I’ve stayed 

with people who do all types of work. I’ve lived on—not lived, I’ve 

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taintops. I’ve lived and vacationed in all sorts—not lived. I’m using 

the wrong word. I’ve visited all sorts of places. 

In fact, one of my habits is, when I travel somewhere new, I try 

to find a friend I know to stay with them. 

And it’s often not because I can’t afford a hotel—usually the people who are inviting me would be willing to pay—but it’s because 

I do think it’s important to know more than what I live and to try 

to stay connected to people and to different experiences. 

I don’t think that one needs to live an experience without appreciating it, listening to it, watching it, reading about it, all of those 

things, experiencing it for a period of time, help judges in appreciating the concerns of other experiences that they don’t personally 

have. And as I said, I try very, very hard to ensure that, in my life, 

I introduce as much experience with other people’s lives as I can. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I realize I’m jumping back and forth to these 

issues, but the last one I want to bring up has to do with wartime 

Supreme Court decisions like Korematsu that we look back at with 

some bewilderment. I’m referring, of course, Korematsu v. United 

States, the decision in which the Supreme Court upheld the government policy to round up and detain more than 100,000 JapaneseAmericans during World War II. 

It seems inconceivable that the U.S. Government would have decided to put huge numbers of citizens in detention centers based 

on their race, and yet the Supreme Court allowed that to happen. 

I asked Chief Justice Roberts about this, and I’ll ask you as well: 

Do you believe that Korematsu was wrongly decided? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It was, sir. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Does a judge have a duty to resist the kind 

of war-time fears that people understandably felt during World 

War II, which likely played a role in the 1944 Korematsu decision? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. A judge should never rule from fear. A judge 

should rule from law and the Constitution. It is inconceivable to me 

today that a decision permitting the detention/arrest of an individual solely on the basis of their race would be considered appropriate by our government. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Now, some of the great justices in the history 

of our country were involved in that decision. How does a judge resist those kind of fears? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. One hopes, by having the wisdom of a Harlan 

in Plessy, by having the wisdom to understand, always, no matter 

what the situation, that our Constitution has held us in good stead 

for over 200 years and that our survival depends on upholding it. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Judge. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator 

Feingold. 

Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Could I return briefly to a series of questions that Senator Feingold asked at the very beginning relating to the Maloney decision 

relating to the Second Amendment? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Sure. Good afternoon, by the way. 

Senator KYL. I am sorry? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Good afternoon, by the way. 

118 

Senator KYL. Yes, good afternoon. You had indicated, of course, 

if that case were to come before the Court, under the recusal statute you would recuse yourself from participating in the decision. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In that case, yes. 

Senator KYL. Yes, and you are aware that—or maybe you are 

not, but there are two other decisions both dealing with the same 

issue of incorporation, one in the Ninth Circuit and one in the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit decided the case similarly to your 

circuit. The Ninth Circuit has decided it differently, although that 

case is on rehearing. 

If the Court should take all three—let’s assume the Ninth Circuit 

stays with its decision so you do have the conflict among the circuits, and the Court were to take all three decisions at the same 

time, I take it the recusal issue would be the same. You would 

recuse yourself in that situation. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I haven’t actually been responding to that 

question, and I think you’re right proposing it. I clearly understand 

that recusing myself from Maloney would be appropriate. The impact of the joint hearing by the Court would suggest that I would 

have to apply the same principle, but as I indicated, issues of 

recusal are left to the discretion of Justices because their participation in cases is so important. It is something that I would discuss 

with my colleagues and follow their practices with respect to a 

question like this. 

Senator KYL. Sure. I appreciate that, and I agree with your reading of the law; 28 U.S.C. Section 455 provides, among other things, 

and I quote, ‘‘Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United 

States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’’ And that, of course, 

raises the judge’s desire to consult with others and ensure that impartiality is not questioned by participating in a decision. 

I would think—and I would want your responses. I would think 

that there would be no difference if the Maloney case is decided on 

its own or if it is decided as one of two or three other cases all considered by the Court at the same time. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I said, that is an issue that is different 

than the question that was posed earlier—— 

Senator KYL. Would you not be willing to make an unequivocal 

commitment on that at this time? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It’s impossible to say I will recuse myself on 

any case involving Maloney. How the other cert. is granted and 

whether joint argument is presented or not, I would have to await 

to see what happened. 

Senator KYL. Let me ask you this: Suppose that the other two 

cases are considered by the Court, your circuit is not involved; or 

that the Court takes either the Seventh or Ninth Circuit and decides the question of incorporation of the Second Amendment. I 

gather that in subsequent decisions you would consider yourself 

bound by that precedent or that you would consider that to be the 

decision of the Court on the incorporation question. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Absolutely. The decision of the Court in Heller is—its holding has recognized an individual right to bear arms 

as applied to the Federal Government. 

119 

Senator KYL. If as a result—I mean, that was the matter before 

your circuit, and if as a result of the fact that the Court decided 

one of the other or both of the other two circuit cases and resolved 

that issue so that the same matter would have been before the 

Court, would it not also make sense for you to indicate to this Committee now that should that same matter come before the Court 

and you are on the Court, that you would necessarily recuse yourself from its consideration? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I didn’t quite follow the start of your question, Senator. I want to answer precisely. 

Senator KYL. Sure. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. But I’m not quite sure—— 

Senator KYL. You agreed with me that if the Court considered 

either the Seventh or Ninth Circuit or both decisions and decided 

the issue if incorporation of the Second Amendment to make it applicable to the States, you would consider that binding precedent 

of the Court. That, of course, was the issue in Maloney. As a result, 

since it is the same matter that you resolved in Maloney, wouldn’t 

you have to, in order to comply with the statute, recuse yourself 

if either or both or all three of those cases came to the Court? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, as I indicated, clearly the statute 

would reach Maloney. How I would respond to the Court taking 

certiorari in what case and whether it held—it took certiorari in 

one or all three is a question that I would have to await to see 

what the Court decides to do and what issues it addresses in its 

grant of certiorari. 

There is also the point that whatever comes before the Court will 

be on the basis of a particular State statute, which might involve 

other questions. It’s hard to speak about recusal in the abstract because there’s so many different questions that one has to look at. 

Senator KYL. And I do appreciate that, and I appreciate that you 

should not commit yourself to a particular decision in a case. If the 

issue is the same, however, it is simply the question of incorporation, that is a very specific question of law. It does not depend upon 

the facts. I mean, it did not matter that in your case you were dealing with a very dangerous arm but not a firearm, for example. You 

still considered the question of incorporation. 

Well, let me just try to help you along here. Both Justice Roberts 

and Justice Alito made firm commitments to this Committee. Let 

me tell you what Justice Roberts said. He said that he would 

recuse him, and I am quoting now, ‘‘from matters in which he participated while a judge on the court of appeals matters.’’ And since 

you did acknowledge that the incorporation decision was the issue 

in your Second Circuit case, and the question that I asked was 

whether if that is the issue from the Ninth and Seventh Circuits, 

you would consider yourself bound by that. It would seem to me 

that you should be willing to make the same kind of commitment 

that Justice Roberts and Justice Alito did. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I didn’t understand their commitment to be 

broader than what I have just said, which is that they would certainly recuse themselves from any matter. I understood it to mean 

any case that they had been involved in as a circuit judge. If their 

practice was to recuse themselves more broadly, then obviously I 

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ory is serving me correctly—and it may not be, but I think so—that 

Justice Alito as a Supreme Court Justice has heard issues that 

were similar to ones that he considered as a circuit court judge. 

So as I have indicated, I will take counsel from whatever the 

practices of the Justices are with the broader question of what—— 

Senator KYL. I appreciate that. ‘‘Issues which are similar’’ is different, though, from ‘‘an issue which is the same.’’ And I would just 

suggest that there would be an appearance of impropriety. If you 

have already decided the issue of incorporation one way, that is the 

same issue that comes before the Court, and then you, in effect, review your own decision, that to me would be a matter of inappropriate—and perhaps you would recuse yourself. I understand your 

answer. 

Let me ask you about what the President said and I talked about 

in my opening statement, whether you agree with him. He used 

two different analogies. He talked once about the 25 miles, the first 

25 miles of a 26-mile marathon, and then he also said in 95 percent 

of the cases, the law will give you the answer, and the last 5 percent, legal process will not lead you to the rule of decision; the critical ingredient in those cases is supplied by what is in the judge’s 

heart. 

Do you agree with him that the law only takes you the first 25 

miles of the marathon and that that last mile has to be decided 

what’s in the judge’s heart? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. That’s—I don’t—wouldn’t approach 

the issue of judging in the way the President does. He has to explain what he meant by judging. I can only explain what I think 

judges should do, which is judges can’t rely on what’s in their 

heart. They don’t determine the law. Congress makes the laws. The 

job of a judge is to apply the law. And so it’s not the heart that 

compels conclusions in cases. It’s the law. The judge applies the 

law to the facts before that judge. 

Senator KYL. I appreciate that. And has it been your experience 

that every case, no matter how tenuous it has been, and every lawyer, no matter how good their quality of advocacy, that in every 

case every lawyer has had a legal argument of some quality to 

make, some precedent that he cited. It might not be the Supreme 

Court. It might not be the court of appeals. It might be a trial court 

somewhere. It might not even be a court precedent. It may be a law 

review article or something. But have you ever been in a situation 

where a lawyer said, ‘‘I don’t have any legal argument to make, 

Judge. Please go with your heart on this, or your gut’’ ? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, I’ve actually had lawyers say something 

very similar to that. 

[Laughter.] 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I have had lawyers where questions have 

been raised about the legal basis of their argument. I had one lawyer throw up his hands and say, ‘‘But it’s just not right.’’ 

‘‘But it’s just not right’’ is not what judges consider. What judges 

consider is what the law says. 

Senator KYL. You have always been able to find a legal basis for 

every decision that you have rendered as a judge. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, to the extent that every legal decision 

has—this is what I do in approaching legal questions, is I look at 

121 

the law that’s being cited. I look at how precedent informs it. I try 

to determine what those principles are of precedent to apply to the 

facts in the case before me and then do that. 

And so one—that is a process. You use—— 

Senator KYL. Right, and all I am asking—this is not a trick question. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. I wasn’t—— 

Senator KYL. I can’t imagine that the answer would be otherwise 

than, yes, you have always found some legal basis for ruling one 

way or the other, some precedent, some reading of a statute, the 

Constitution, or whatever it might be. You haven’t ever had to 

throw up your arms and say, ‘‘I can’t find any legal basis for this 

opinion, so I am going to base it on some other factor.’’ 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. When you say, use the words ‘‘some legal 

basis,’’ it suggests that a judge is coming to the process by saying 

I think the result should be here—— 

Senator KYL. No, no. I—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR.—and so I’m going to use something to get 

there. 

Senator KYL. No. I am not trying to infer that any of your decisions have been incorrect or that you have used an inappropriate 

basis. I am simply confirming what you first said in response to my 

question about the President; that in every case the judge is able 

to find a basis in law for deciding the case. Sometimes there are 

not cases directly on point. That is true. Sometimes it may not be 

a case from your circuit. Sometimes it may be somewhat tenuous, 

and you may have to rely upon authority like scholarly opinions in 

law reviews or whatever. 

But my question was really very simple to you: Have you always 

been able to have a legal basis for the decisions that you have rendered and not have to rely upon some extra-legal concept such as 

empathy or some other concept other than a legal interpretation or 

precedent? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Exactly, sir. We apply law to facts. We don’t 

apply feelings to facts. 

Senator KYL. Right. Now—thank you for that. 

Let me go back to the beginning. I raise this issue about the 

President’s interpretation because he clearly is going to seek nominees to this Court and other courts that he is comfortable with, and 

that would imply who have some commonality with his view of the 

law and judging. It is a concept that I also disagree with, but in 

this respect, it is—the speeches that you have given and some of 

the writings that you have engaged in have raised questions because they appear to fit into what the President has described as 

this group of cases in which the legal process or the law simply 

doesn’t give you the answer. And it is in that context that people 

have read these speeches and have concluded that you believe that 

gender and ethnicity are an appropriate way for judges to make decisions in cases. That is my characterization. 

I want to go back through the—I have read your speeches, and 

I have read all of them several times. The one I happened to mark 

up here is the Seton Hall speech, but it was virtually identical to 

the one at Berkeley. You said this morning that the point of those 

speeches was to inspire young people, and I think there is some in 

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your speeches that certainly is inspiring. In fact, it is more than 

that. I commend you on several of the things that you talked about, 

including your own background, as a way of inspiring young people. Whether they are minority or not, and regardless of their gender, you said some very inspirational things to them. And I take 

it that, therefore, in some sense your speech was inspirational to 

them. 

But in reading these speeches, it is inescapable that your purpose was to discuss a different issue, that it was to discuss—in fact, 

let me put it in your words. You said, ‘‘I intend to talk to you about 

my Latina identity, where it came from, and the influence I perceive gender, race, and national origin representation will have on 

the development of the law.’’ 

And then after some preliminary and sometimes inspirational 

comments, you got back to the theme and said, ‘‘The focus of my 

speech tonight, however, is not about the struggle to get us where 

we are and where we need to go, but instead to discuss what it will 

mean to have more women and people of color on the bench.’’ 

You said, ‘‘No one can or should ignore asking and pondering 

what it will mean or not mean in the development of the law.’’ 

You cited some people who had a different point of view than 

yours, and then you came back to it and said, ‘‘Because I accept 

the proposition that, as Professor Resnick explains, to judge is an 

exercise of power; and because, as Professor Martha Minow of Harvard Law School explains, there is no objective stance but only a 

series of perspectives. No neutrality, no escape from choice in judging,’’ you said. ‘‘I further accept that our experiences as women and 

people of color will in some way affect our decisions.’’ 

Now, you are deep into the argument here. You have agreed with 

Resnick that there is no objective stance, only a series of perspectives, no neutrality—which, just as an aside, it seems to me is relativism run amok. But then you say, ‘‘What Professor Minow’s 

quote means to me is not all women or people of color or all in 

some circumstances or me in any particular case or circumstance, 

but enough women and people of color in enough cases will make 

a difference in the process of judging.’’ You are talking here about 

different outcomes in cases. And you go on to substantiate your 

case by, first of all, citing a Minnesota case in which three women 

judges ruled differently than two male judges in a father’s visitation case. You cited two excellent studies which tended to demonstrate differences between women and men in making decisions 

in cases. You said, ‘‘As recognized by legal scholars, whatever the 

cause is, not one woman or person of color in any one position, but 

as a group, we will have an effect on the development of law and 

on judging.’’ 

So you develop the theme. You substantiated it with some evidence to substantiate your point of view. Up to that point, you had 

simply made the case, I think, that judging could certainly reach— 

or judges could certainly reach different results and make a difference in judging depending upon their gender or ethnicity. You 

hadn’t rendered a judgment about whether they would be better 

judgments or not. 

But then you did. You quoted Justice O’Connor to say that a wise 

old woman and a wise old man would reach the same decision. And 

123 

then you said, ‘‘I am also not sure I agree with that statement.’’ 

And that is when you made the statement that is now relatively 

famous: ‘‘I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness 

of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion.’’ 

So here you are reaching a judgment that not only will it make 

a difference but that it should make a difference. And you went 

on—and this is the last thing that I will quote here. You said, ‘‘In 

short, I’’—well, I think this is important. You note that some of the 

old white guys made some pretty good decisions eventually—Oliver 

Wendell Holmes, Cardozo, and others—and you acknowledged that 

they made a big difference in discrimination cases. But it took a 

long time, to understand takes time and effort, something not all 

people are willing to give, and so on. And then you concluded this: 

‘‘In short, I accept the proposition that difference will be made by 

the presence of women and people of color on the bench and that 

my experiences will affect the facts that I choose to see.’’ You said, 

‘‘I don’t know exactly what the difference will be in my judging, but 

I accept that there will be some based on gender and my Latina 

heritage.’’ 

As you said in your response to Senator Sessions, you said that 

you weren’t encouraging that, and you talked about how we need 

to set that aside. But you didn’t in your speech say that this is not 

good, we need to set this aside. Instead, you seemed to be celebrating it. The clear inference is it is a good thing that this is happening. 

So that is why some of us are concerned, first with the President’s elucidation of his point of view here about judging, and then 

these speeches, several of them, including speeches that were included in law review articles that you edited that all say the same 

thing, and that would certainly lead one to a conclusion that, A, 

you understand it will make a difference and, B, not only are you 

not saying anything negative about that, but you seem to embrace 

that difference in concluding that you will make better decisions. 

That is the basis of concern that a lot of people have. Please take 

the time you need to respond to my question. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Thank you. I have a record for 17 years. Decision after decision, decision after decision, it is very clear that I 

don’t base my judgments on my personal experiences or my feelings 

or my biases. All of my decisions show my respect for the rule of 

law, the fact that, regardless about if I identify a feeling about a 

case, which was part of what that speech did talk about, there are 

situations where one has reactions to speeches, to activities. 

It’s not surprising that in some cases the loss of a victim is very 

tragic. A judge deals with those situations, and acknowledging that 

there is a hardship to someone doesn’t mean that the law commands the result. I have any number of cases where I have acknowledged a particular difficulty to a party or disapproval of a 

party’s action and said, no, but the law requires this. So my views, 

I think, are demonstrated by what I do as a judge. 

I am grateful that you took notice that much of my speech, if not 

all of it, was intended to inspire, and my whole message to those 

students—and that is the very end of what I said to them—was, 

‘‘I hope I see you in the courtroom someday.’’ I don’t know if I said 

124 

it in that speech, but I often end my speeches with saying, ‘‘And 

I hope someday you’re sitting on the bench with me.’’ 

And so the intent of the speech, its structure, was to inspire 

them to believe, as I do, as I think everyone does, that life experiences enrich the legal system. I used the words ‘‘process of judging,’’ that experience that you look for in choosing a judge, whether 

it is the ABA rule that says the judge has to be a lawyer for X 

number of years, or it’s the experience that your Committee looks 

for in terms of what’s the background of the judge. Have they undertaken serious consideration of constitutional questions? 

All of those experiences are valued because our system is enriched by a variety of experiences. And I don’t think that anybody 

quarrels with the fact that diversity on the bench is good for America. It’s good for America because we are the land of opportunity, 

and to the extent that we are pursuing and showing that all groups 

can be lawyers and judges, that’s just reflecting the values of our 

society. 

Senator KYL. And if I could just interrupt you right now, to me 

that is the key. It is good because it shows these young people that 

you are talking to that, with a little hard work, it doesn’t matter 

where you came from; you can make it. And that is why you hope 

to see them on the bench. I totally appreciate that. 

The question, though, is whether you leave them with the impression that it’s good to make different decisions because of their 

ethnicity or gender, and it strikes me that you could have easily 

said in here, ‘‘Now, of course, Blind Lady Justice doesn’t permit us 

to base decisions in cases on our ethnicity or gender. We should 

strive very hard to set those aside when we can.’’ I found only one 

rather oblique reference in your speech that could be read to say 

that you warned against that. All of the other statements seem to 

embrace it, or certainly to recognize it and almost seem as if you 

are powerless to do anything about it. ‘‘I accept that this will happen,’’ you said. 

So while I appreciate what you are saying, it still doesn’t answer 

to me the question of whether you think that these—that ethnicity 

or gender should be making a difference. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. There are two different, I believe, issues to 

address and to look at because various statements are being looked 

at and being tied together. But the speech, as it is structured, 

didn’t intend to do that and didn’t do that. Much of the speech 

about what differences there will be in judging was in the context 

of my saying or addressing an academic question, all the studies 

that you reference I cited in my speech, which is that studies, they 

were suggesting that there could be a difference. They were raising 

reasons why I was inviting the students to think about that question. Most of the quotes that you had and reference say that. 

We have to ask this question: Does it make a difference? And if 

it does, how? And the study about differences in outcomes was in 

that context. There was a case in which three women judges went 

one way and two men went the other, but I didn’t suggest that that 

was driven by their gender. You can’t make that judgment until 

you see what the law actually said. And I wasn’t talking about 

what law they were interpreting in that case. I was just talking 

about the academic question that one should ask. 

125 

Senator KYL. If I could just interrupt, I think you just contradicted your speech, because you said in the line before that, 

‘‘Enough women and people of color in enough cases will make a 

difference in the process of judging.’’ Next comment: ‘‘The Minnesota Supreme Court has given us an example of that.’’ 

So you did cite that as an example of gender making a difference 

in judging. 

Now, look, I am not—I do not want to be misunderstood here as 

disagreeing with a general look into the question of whether people’s gender, ethnicity, or background in some way affects their 

judging. I suspect you can make a very good case that that is true 

in some cases. You cite a case here for that proposition. Neither 

you nor I probably know whether for sure that was the reason, but 

one could infer it from the decision that was rendered. And then 

you cite two other studies. 

I am not questioning whether the studies are not valuable. In 

fact, I would agree with you that it is important for us to be able 

to know these things so that we are on guard to set aside prejudices that we may not even know that we have, because when you 

do judge a case—let me just go back in time. 

I tried a lot of cases, and it always depended on the luck of the 

draw what judge you got. Ninety-nine times out of a hundred, it 

didn’t matter. So what? We got Judge Jones. Fine. We got Judge 

Smith. Fine. It didn’t matter because you knew they would all 

apply the law. 

In the Federal district court in Arizona, there was one judge you 

didn’t want to get. All of the lawyers knew that, because they knew 

he had predilections that were really difficult for him to set aside. 

It is a reality. And I suspect you have seen that on some courts, 

too. 

So it is a good thing to examine whether or not those biases and 

prejudices exist in order to be on guard and to set them aside. The 

fault I have with your speech is that you not only do not let these 

students know that you need to set it aside. You don’t say that that 

is what you need this information for. But you almost celebrate it. 

You say if there are enough of us, we will make a difference—inferring that it is a good thing if we begin deciding cases differently. 

Let me just ask you one last question here. Have you ever seen 

a case where, to use your example, the wise Latina made a better 

decision than non-Latina judges? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. What I’ve seen—— 

Senator KYL. I mean, I know you like all of your decisions, 

but—— 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Let her answer the—— 

Senator KYL. I was just saying that I know that she appreciates 

her own decisions, and I don’t mean to denigrate her decisions, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I was using a rhetorical riff that harkened 

back to Justice O’Connor, because her literal words and mine have 

a meaning that neither of us, if you were looking at it, in their 

exact words make any sense. Justice O’Connor was a part of a 

Court in which she greatly respected her colleagues, and yet those 

wise men—I am not going to use the other word—and wise women 

126 

did reach different conclusions in deciding cases. I never understood her to be attempting to say that that meant those people who 

disagreed with her were unwise or unfair judges. 

As you noted, my speech was intending to inspire the students 

to understand the richness that their backgrounds could bring to 

the judicial process in the same way that everybody else’s background does the same. I think that’s what Justice Alito was referring to when he was asked questions by this Committee, and he 

said, ‘‘You know, when I decide a case, I think about my Italian 

ancestors and their experiences coming to this country.’’ I don’t 

think anybody thought that he was saying that that commanded 

the result in the case. These were students and lawyers who I don’t 

think would have been misled either by Justice O’Connor’s statement or mine in thinking that we actually intended to say that we 

could really make wiser and fairer decisions. I think what they 

could think and would think is that I was talking about the value 

that life experiences have, in the words I used, in the process of 

judging. And that is the context in which I understood the speech 

to be doing. 

The words I chose, taking the rhetorical flourish, it was a bad 

idea. I do understand that there are some who have read this differently, and I understand why they might have concern. But I 

have repeated more than once, and I will repeat throughout, if you 

look at my history on the bench, you will know that I do not believe 

that any ethnic, gender, or race group has an advantage in sound 

judging. You noted that my speech actually said that. And I also 

believe that every person, regardless of their background and life 

experiences, can be good and wise judges. 

Chairman LEAHY. In fact—— 

Senator KYL. Excuse me, if I may, just for the record. I don’t 

think it was your speech that said that, but that is what you said 

in response to Senator Sessions’ question this morning. 

Chairman LEAHY. When we get references made to Justice Alito, 

that was on January 11, 2006. When he said, ‘‘When I get a’’—this 

is Justice Alito speaking. ‘‘When I get a case about discrimination, 

I have to think about people in my own family who suffered discrimination because of their ethnic background or because of religion or because of gender, and I do take that into account.’’ 

We will take a 10-minute break. 

[Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., the committee was recessed.] 

After Recess [3:52 p.m.] 

The CHAIRMAN. First off, Judge, I compliment your family. You 

cannot see them sitting behind you, because they have all been sitting there very attentively, and I have to think that after a while, 

they would probably rather just be home with you. But I do appreciate it. 

So we are going to go to Senator Schumer, who did such a good 

job introducing you yesterday. Senator Schumer? 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of 

my colleagues. First, I am going to follow-up on some of the line 

of questioning of Senators Sessions and Kyl, but I would like to, 

first, thank my Republican colleagues. I think the questioning has 

been strong, but respectful. 

127 

I would also like to compliment you, Judge. I think you have 

made a great impression on America today. The American people 

have seen today what we have seen when you have met with us 

one-on-one. You are very smart and knowledgeable, but down to 

earth. You are a strong person, but also a very nice person. And 

you have covered the questions thoughtfully and modestly. 

So now I am going to go on to that line of questions. We have 

heard you asked about snippets of statements that have been used 

to criticize you and challenge your impartiality, but we have heard 

precious little about the body and totality of your 17-year record on 

the bench, which everybody knows is the best way to evaluate a 

nominee. 

In fact, no colleague has pointed to a single case in which you 

said the court should change existing law, in which you have attempted to change existing law, explicitly or otherwise, and I had 

never seen such a case anywhere in your long and extensive record. 

So if a questioner is focusing on a few statements or ‘‘those few 

words’’ and does not refer at all to the large body of cases where 

you have carefully applied the law, regardless of sympathies, I do 

not think that is balanced or down the middle. 

By focusing on these few statements rather than your extensive 

record, I think some of my colleagues are attempting to try and 

suggest that you might put your experiences and empathies ahead 

of the rule of law. But the record shows otherwise and that is what 

I now want to explore. 

Now, from everything I have read in your judicial record and everything I have heard you say, you put rule of law first. But I want 

to clear it up for the record, so I want to talk to you a little bit 

about what having empathy means and then I want to turn to your 

record on the bench, which I believe is the best way to get a sense 

of what your record will be on the bench in the future. 

Now, I believe that empathy is the opposite of indifference, the 

opposite of, say, having ice water in your veins rather than the opposite of neutrality, and I think that is the mistake, in concept, 

that some have used. 

But let us start with the basics. Will you commit to us today that 

you will give every litigant before the court a fair shake and that 

you will not let your personal sympathies toward any litigant overrule what the law requires? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That commitment I can make and have made 

for 17 years. 

Senator SCHUMER. Okay. Well, good. Let us turn to that record. 

I think your record shows extremely clearly that even when you 

might have sympathy for the litigants in front of you, as a judge, 

your fidelity is first and foremost to the rule of law, because as you 

know, in the courtroom of a judge who ruled based on empathy, not 

law, one would expect that the most sympathetic plaintiffs would 

always win. 

But that is clearly not the case in your courtroom. I am going 

to take a few cases here and go over them with you. For example, 

in In re: Air Crash Off Long Island, which is sort of a tragic, but 

interesting name for a case, you heard the case of families of the 

213 victims of a tragic TWA crash, which we all know about in 

New York. 

128 

The relatives of the victims sued manufacturers of the airplane, 

which spontaneously combusted in midair, in order to get some 

modicum of relief, though, of course, nothing a court could do would 

make up for the loss of the loved ones. 

Did you have sympathy for those families? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. All of America did. That was a loss of life 

that was traumatizing for New York State, because it happened off 

the shores of Long Island. And I know, Senator, that you were 

heavily involved in ministering to the families during that case. 

Senator SCHUMER. I was, right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Everyone had sympathy for their loss. It was 

absolutely tragic. 

Senator SCHUMER. Many of them were poor families, many of 

them from your borough in the Bronx. I met with them. But, ultimately, you ruled against them, did you not? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I didn’t author the majority opinion in that 

case. I dissented from the majority’s conclusion, but my dissent 

suggested that the court should have followed what I viewed as existing law and reject their claims or at least a portion of their 

claim. 

Senator SCHUMER. Right. Your dissent said that, ‘‘The appropriate remedial scheme for deaths occurring off the United States 

coast is clearly a legislative policy choice which should not be made 

by the courts.’’ Is that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes, sir. 

Senator SCHUMER. That is exactly, I think, the point that my colleague from Arizona and others were making about how a judge 

should rule. How did you feel ruling against individuals who had 

clearly suffered a profound personal loss and tragedy and were 

looking to the courts and to you for a sense of justice? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. One, in a tragic, tragic, horrible situation like 

that, can’t feel anything but personal sense of regret, but those personal senses can’t command a result in a case. As a judge, I serve 

the greater interest and that greater interest is what the rule of 

law supplies. 

As I mentioned in that case, it was fortuitous that there was a 

remedy and that remedy, as I noted in my case, was Congress and, 

in fact, very shortly after the second circuit’s opinion, Congress 

amended the law, giving the victims the remedies that they had 

sought before the court. And my dissent was just pointing out that 

despite the great tragedy, that the rule of law commanded a different result. 

Senator SCHUMER. And it was probably very hard, but you had 

to do it. Here is another case, Washington v. County of Rockland, 

Rockland is a county, a suburb of New York, which was a case involving black corrections officers who claimed that they were retaliated against after filing discrimination claims. Remember that 

case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I do. 

Senator SCHUMER. Did you have sympathy for the officers filing 

that case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, to the extent that anyone believes that 

they had been discriminated on the basis of race, that not only violates the law, but one would have—I wouldn’t use the word ‘‘symVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00140 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
129 

pathy,’’ but one would have a sense that this claim is of some importance and one that the court should very seriously consider. 

Senator SCHUMER. Right, because I am sure, like Judge Alito 

said and others, you had suffered discrimination in your life, as 

well. So you could understand how they might feel, whether they 

were right or wrong in the outcome, in filing. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I’ve been more fortunate than most. The discrimination that I have felt has not been as life-altering as it has 

for others. But I certainly do understand it, because it is a part of 

life that I’m familiar with and have seen others suffer so much 

with, as I have in my situation. 

Senator SCHUMER. Now, let me ask you, again, how did you feel 

ruling against law enforcement officers, the kind of people you have 

told us repeatedly you have spent your career working with, DA’s 

office and elsewhere, and for whom you have tremendous respect? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As with all cases where I might have a feeling of some identification with because of background of because of 

experiences, one feels a sense of understanding what they have experienced. But in that case, as in the TWA case, the ruling that 

I endorsed against them was required by law. 

Senator SCHUMER. Here is another one. It was called Boykin v. 

Keycorp. It was a case in which an African-American woman filed 

suit after being denied a home equity loan, even after her loan application was conditionally approved based on her credit report. 

She claimed that she was denied the opportunity to own a home 

because of her race, her sex, and the fact that her prospective home 

was in a minority-concentrated neighborhood. She did not even 

have a lawyer or anyone else to interpret the procedural rules for 

her. She filed the suit on her own. 

Did you have sympathy for the woman seeking a home loan from 

the bank? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Clearly, everyone has sympathy for an individual who wants to own their own home. That’s the typical dream 

and aspiration, I think, of most Americans. And if someone is denied that chance for a reason that they believe is improper, one 

would recognize and understand their feeling. 

Senator SCHUMER. Right. In fact, you ruled that her claim was 

not timely. Rather than overlooking the procedural problems with 

the case, you held fast to the complicated rules that keep our system working efficiently, even if it meant that claims of discrimination could not be heard. We never got to whether she was actually 

discriminated against, because she did not file in a timely manner. 

Is my summation there accurate? Do you want to elaborate? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes, in terms of the part of the claim that we 

held was barred by the statute of limitation. In a response to the 

earlier question—to an earlier question, I indicated that the law requires some finality and that’s why Congress passes or a state legislature passes statutes of limitations that require people to bring 

their claims within certain timeframes. Those are statutes and 

they must be followed if a situation—if they apply to a particular 

situation. 

Senator SCHUMER. Finally, let us look at a case that cuts the 

other way, with a pretty repugnant litigant. This is the case called 

130 

Pappas v. Giuliani, and you considered claims of a police employee 

who was fired for distributing terribly bigoted and racist materials. 

First, what did you think of the speech in question that this officer was distributing? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Nobody, including the police officer, was 

claiming that the speech wasn’t offensive, racist and insulting. 

There was a question about what his purpose was in sending the 

letter. But my opinion dissent in that case pointed out that offensiveness and racism of the letter, but I issued a dissent from the 

majority’s affirmance of his dismissal from the police department 

because of those letters. 

Senator SCHUMER. Right. As I understand it, you wrote that the 

actual literature that the police officer was distributing was ‘‘patently offensive, hateful and insulting.’’ But you also noted that, and 

this is your words in a dissent, where the majority was on the 

other side, ‘‘Three decades of jurisprudence and the centrality of 

First Amendment freedom in our lives,’’ that is your quote, the employee’s right to speech had to be respected. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In the situation of that case, that was the decision that I took, because that’s what I believe the law commanded. 

Senator SCHUMER. Even though, obviously, you would not have 

much sympathy or empathy for this officer or his actions. Is that 

correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t think anyone has sympathy for what 

was undisputedly a racist statement, but the First Amendment 

commands that we respect people’s rights to engage in hateful 

speech. 

Senator SCHUMER. Right. Now, I am just going to go to a group 

of cases here rather than one individual case. We could do this all 

day long, where sympathy, empathy would be on one side, but you 

found rule of law on the other side and you sided with rule of law. 

So, again, to me, analyzing a speech and taking words maybe out 

of context does not come close to analyzing the cases as to what 

kind of judge you will be, and that is what I am trying to do here. 

Now, this one, my office conducted an analysis of your record in 

immigration cases, as well as the record of your colleagues. In conducting this analysis, I came across a case entitled Chen v. Board 

of Immigration Appeals, where your colleague said something very 

interesting. This was Judge Jon Newman. He is a very respected 

judge on your circuit. 

He said something very interesting when discussing asylum 

cases. Specifically, he said the following, this is Judge Newman, 

‘‘We know of no way to apply precise calipers to all asylum cases 

so that any particular finding would be viewed by any three of the 

23 judges of this court as either sustainable or not sustainable. 

Panels will have to do what judges always do in similar circumstances—apply their best judgment, guided by the statutory 

standard governing review in the holdings of our precedents to the 

administrative decision and the record assembled to support it.’’ 

In effect, what Judge Newman is saying is these cases would entertain more subjectivity, let us say, because as he said, you could 

decide many of them as sustainable or not sustainable. 

131 

So given the subjectivity that exists in the asylum cases, it is 

clear that if you had wanted to be ‘‘an activist judge,’’ you could 

certainly have found ways to rule in favor of sympathetic asylumseekers, even when the rule of law might have been more murky 

and not have dictated an exact result. 

Yet, in the nearly 850 cases you have decided in the second circuit, you ruled in favor of the government, that is, against the petitioner seeking asylum, immigrant seeking asylum, 83 percent of 

the time. That happens to be the exact statistical median rate for 

your court. It is not one way or the other. 

This means that with regard to immigration, you were neither 

more liberal nor more conservative than your colleagues. You simply did what Judge Newman said. You applied your best judgment 

to the record at hand. 

Now, can you discuss your approach to immigration cases, explain to this panel and the American people the flexibility that 

judges have in this context, and your use of this flexibility in a very 

moderate manner? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Reasonable judges look at the same set of 

facts and may disagree on what those facts should result in. It 

harkens back to the question of wise men and wise women being 

judges. Reasonable people disagree. That was my understanding of 

Judge Newman’s comment in the quotation you made. 

In immigration cases, we have a different level of review, because 

it’s not the judge making the decision whether to grant or not 

grant asylum. It’s an administrative body. 

And I know that I will—I’m being a little inexact, but I think 

using old terminology is better than using new terminology. And by 

that, I mean the agency that most people know as the Bureau of 

Immigration has a new name now, but that is more descriptive 

than its new name. 

Senator SCHUMER. Some people think the new name is descriptive, but that is okay. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In immigration cases, an asylum-seeker has 

an opportunity to present his or her case before an immigration 

judge. They then can appeal to the Bureau of Immigration and 

argue that there was some procedural default below or that the immigration judge or the bureau itself has committed some error or 

law. 

They then are entitled by law to appeal directly to the second circuit. In those cases, because they are administrative decisions, we 

are required, under the Chevron Doctrine and other tests in administrative law, to give deference to those decisions. 

But like with all processes, there are occasions when processes 

are not followed and an appellate court has to ensure that the 

rights of the asylum-seeker have been—whatever those rights may 

be—have been given. There are other situations in which an administrative body hasn’t adequately explained its reasoning. There 

are other situations where administrative bodies have actually applied erroneous law. 

No institution is perfect. And so that accounts for why, given the 

deference—and I’m assuming you’re statistic is right, Senator, because I don’t add up the numbers. Okay? But I do know that in 

immigration cases, the vast majority of the Bureau of Investigation 

132 

cases are—the petitions for review are denied. So that means 

that—— 

Senator SCHUMER. Right. The only point I am making here, if 

some are seeking to suggest that your empathy or sympathy overrules rule of law, this is a pretty good body of law to look at. A, 

it is a lot of cases, 850; B, one would think—I am not going to ask 

you to state it, but you will have sympathy for immigrants and immigration; and, third, there is some degree of flexibility here, as 

Judge Newman said, just because of the way the law is. 

Yet, you were exactly in the middle of the second circuit. If empathy were governing you, I do not think you would have ended up 

in that position, but I will let everybody judge whether that is true. 

But the bottom line here, in the Air Crash case, in Washington, in 

Boykin, in this whole mass of asylum cases, you probably had sympathy for many of the litigants, if not all of them, ruled against 

them. 

The cases we just discussed are just a sampling of your lengthy 

record, but they do an effective job of illustrating the fact that in 

your courtroom, rule of law always triumphs. 

Would you agree? That seems to me, looking at your record, you 

know it much better than I do, that rule of law triumphing probably best characterizes your record in your 17 years as a judge. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I firmly believe in the fidelity to the law. In 

every case I approach, I start from that working proposition and 

apply the law to the facts before it. 

Senator SCHUMER. Has there ever been a case in which you ruled 

in favor of a litigant simply because you were sympathetic to their 

plight, even if rule of law might not have led you in that direction? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Never. 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you. Let us go on here a little bit to 

foreign law, which is an issue that has also been discussed. Your 

critics have tried to imply that you will improperly consider foreign 

law and sources in cases before you. 

You gave a speech in April that has been selectively quoted, discussing whether it is permissible to use foreign law or international 

law to decide cases. You stated clearly that, ‘‘American analytic 

principles do not permit us,’’ that is your quote, to do so. 

Just so the record is 100 percent clear, what do you believe is 

the appropriate role of any foreign law in the U.S. courts? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. American law does not permit the use of foreign law or international law to interpret the Constitution. That’s 

a given, and my speech explained that, as you noted, explicitly. 

There is no debate on that question. There is no issue about that 

question. The question is a different one, because there are situations in which American law tells you to look at international or 

foreign law, and my speech was talking to the audience about that. 

In fact, I pointed out that there are some situations in which 

courts are commanded by American law to look at what others are 

doing. So, for example, if the U.S. is a party to a treaty and there’s 

a question of what the treaty means, then courts routinely look at 

how other courts of parties who are signatories are interpreting 

that. 

There are some U.S. laws that say you have to look at foreign 

law to determine the issue. So, for example, if two parties have 

133 

signed a contract in another country that’s going to be done in that 

other country, then American law would say you may have to look 

at that foreign law to determine the contract issue. 

The question of use of foreign law then is different than considering the idea that it may, on an academic level, provide. Judges— 

and I’m not using my words. I’m using Justice Ginsberg’s words. 

You build up your story of knowledge as a person, as a judge, as 

a human being with everything you read. For judges, that includes 

law review articles and there are some judges who have opined 

negatively about that. You use decisions from other courts. You 

build up your story of knowledge. 

It is important, in the speech I gave, I noted and agreed with 

Justices Scalia and Thomas that one has to think about this issue 

very carefully, because there are so many differences in foreign law 

from American law. But that was the setting of my speech and the 

discussion that my speech was addressing. 

Senator SCHUMER. And you have never relied on a foreign court 

to interpret U.S. law nor would you. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In fact, I know that in my 17 years on the 

bench, other than applying it in treaty interpretation or conflicts 

of law situations, that I have not cited to foreign law. 

Senator SCHUMER. Right, and it is important. American judges 

consider many non-binding sources when reaching a determination. 

For instance, consider Justice Scalia’s well known regard for dictionary definitions in determining the meaning of words or phrases 

or statutes being interpreted by a court. 

In one case, MCI v. AT&T, that is a pretty famous case, Justice 

Scalia cited not one, but five different dictionaries to establish the 

meaning of the word ‘‘modify’’ in a statute. 

Would you agree that dictionaries are not binding on American 

judges? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. They are a tool to help you in some situations 

to interpret what is meant by the words that Congress or a legislature uses. 

Senator SCHUMER. Right. So it was not improper for Justice 

Scalia to consider dictionary definitions, but they are not binding, 

same as citing of foreign law, as long as you do not make it binding 

on the case. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. Well, foreign law, except in the situation—— 

Senator SCHUMER. Of treaties. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR.—which we spoke about and even then is not 

binding. It’s American principles of construction that are binding. 

Senator SCHUMER. Right. Okay. Good. Now, we will go to a little 

easier topic, since we are close to the end here. That is a topic that 

you like and I like and, that is, we have heard a lot of discussions 

about baseball in metaphorical terms, judges as umpires. We had 

a lot of that yesterday, a little of that today. 

But I want to talk about baseball a little more concretely. First, 

am I correct you share my love for America’s past-time? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It’s often said that I grew up in the shadow 

of Yankee Stadium. To be more accurate, I grew up sitting next to 

my dad, while he was alive, watching baseball and it’s one of my 

fondest memories of him. 

134 

Senator SCHUMER. So given that you lived near Yankee Stadium 

and you are from the Bronx, I was going to ask you, are you a Mets 

or a Yankee fan, but I guess you have answered that. Right? 

Chairman LEAHY. Be careful. You want to keep the Chairman on 

your side. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SCHUMER. No, no. As much as Judge Scalia might want 

to be nominated, I do not think she would adopt the Red Sox as 

her team as you have, Mr. Chairman. Judge Sotomayor, I am 

sorry. What did I say? I do not know who Judge Scalia roots for, 

but I know who Judge Sotomayor roots for. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I know many residents of Washington, D.C. 

have asked me to look at the Senators for—— 

Senator SCHUMER. Anyway, I do want to ask you just about the 

1995 players strike case, which comes up, but it is an interesting 

case for everybody. You will not have to worry about talking about 

it, because I do not think the Mets v. Yankees will come up or the 

Red Sox v. the Yankees will come up before the court, although the 

Yankees could use all the help they can get right now. 

But could you tell us a little bit about the case and why you listed it in your questionnaire that you filled out as one of your 10 

most important cases? 

And that will be my last question, Mr. Chairman. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That was and people often forget how important some legal challenges seem before judges decide the case. Before the case was decided, all of the academics and all of newspapers and others talking about the case were talking about the 

novel theory that the baseball owners had developed in challenging 

the collective bargaining rights of players and owner. 

In that case, as with all the cases that I approach, I look at what 

the law is, what precedent says about it, and I try to discern it a 

new factual challenge how the principles apply, and that’s the process I used in that case. 

And it became too clear to me, after looking at that case, that 

that process led to affirming the decision of the National Labor Relationships Board, that it could and should issue an injunction on 

the grounds that it claimed. 

So that, too, was a case where there’s a new argument, a new 

claim, but where the application of the law came from taking the 

principles of the law and applying it to that new claim. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator Schumer. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. And then we will go to Senator Durbin. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Thank you, Judge. I know it’s been a 

long day, and we’ll try to keep it moving here. I think you’re one 

Senator after me away from taking a break. 

My problem, quite frankly, is that, as Senator Schumer indicated, the cases that you’ve been involved in, to me, are left of center, but not anything that jumps out at—at me, but the speeches 

really do. I mean, the speech you gave to the ACLU about foreign 

law—we’ll talk about that probably in the next round—was pretty 

disturbing. And I keep talking about these speeches because what 

I’m trying—and I listen to you today, and I think I’m listening to 

135 

Judge Roberts. I mean, I’m, you know, listening to a strict constructionist here. 

So we’ve got to reconcile in our minds here to put the puzzle together to go that last line, is that you’ve got Judge Sotomayor, who 

has come a long way and done a lot of things that every American 

should be proud of. You’ve got a judge who has been on a Circuit 

Court for a dozen years. Some of the things trouble me, generally 

speaking, left of center, but within the mainstream, and you have 

these speeches that just blow me away. Don’t become a speech 

writer if this law thing doesn’t work out, because these speeches 

really throw a wrinkle into everything. And that’s what we’re trying to figure out: who are we getting here? You know, who are we 

getting, as a Nation? 

Now, legal realism. Are you familiar with that term? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I am. 

Senator GRAHAM. What does it mean, for someone who may be 

watching the hearing? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. To me it means that you are guided in reaching decisions in law by the realism of the situation, of the—the— 

it’s less—it looks at the law through the—— 

Senator GRAHAM. It’s kind of touchy-feely stuff. 

[Laughter.] 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It’s not quite words that I would use, because 

there are many academics and judges who have talked about being 

legal realists. I don’t apply that label to myself at all. I—as I said, 

I look at law and—and precedent and discern its principles and 

apply it to the situation before me. 

Senator GRAHAM. So you would not be a disciple of the legal realism school? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. All right. 

Would you be considered a strict constructionist, in your own 

mind? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t use labels to describe what I do. 

There’s been much discussion today about what various labels 

mean and don’t mean. 

Senator GRAHAM. Uh-huh. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Each person uses those labels and gives it 

their own sense of what—— 

Senator GRAHAM. When Judge Rehnquist says he was a strict 

constructionist, did you know what he was talking about? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I think I understood what he was referencing. 

Senator GRAHAM. Uh-huh. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. But his use—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Uh-huh. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR.—is not how I go about looking at—— 

Senator GRAHAM. What does ‘‘strict constructionism’’ mean to 

you? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, it means that you look at the Constitution as it’s written, or statutes as is—as they are written and you 

apply them exactly by the words. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. Would you be an originalist? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Again, I don’t use labels. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

136 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And—because—— 

Senator GRAHAM. What is an originalist? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In my understanding, an originalist is someone who looks at what the founding fathers intended and what the 

situation confronting them was, and you use that to determine 

every situation presented—not every, but most situations presented 

by the Constitution. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe the Constitution is a living, 

breathing, evolving document? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The Constitution is a document that is immutable to the sense that it’s lasted 200 years. The Constitution has 

not changed, except by amendment. It is a process—an amendment 

process that is set forth in the document. It doesn’t live, other than 

to be timeless by the expression of what it says. What changes, is 

society. What changes, is what facts a judge may get presented. 

Senator GRAHAM. What’s the—what’s the best way for society to 

change, generally speaking? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well—— 

Senator GRAHAM. What’s the—what’s the most legitimate way for 

society to change? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t know if I can use the word ‘‘change’’. 

Society changes because there’s been new developments in technology, medicine, in—in society growing. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think judges—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. There’s—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think judges have changed society by 

some of the landmark decisions in the last 40 years? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, in the last few years? 

Senator GRAHAM. Forty years. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I’m sorry. You said the—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Forty. I’m sorry. Forty, 4–0. Do you think Roe 

v. Wade changed American society? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Roe v. Wade looked at the Constitution and 

decided that the Constitution, as applied to a claimed right, applied. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is there anything in the Constitution that says 

a State legislator or the Congress cannot regulate abortion or the 

definition of life in the first trimester? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The holding of the court as—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I’m asking, the Constitution. Does the Constitution, as written, prohibit a legislative body at the State or Federal level from defining life or regulating the rights of the unborn, 

or protecting the rights of the unborn in the first trimester? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The Constitution, in the Fourteenth Amendment, has a—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I’m talking about, is there anything in the document written about abortion? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. There—the word ‘‘abortion’’ is not used in the 

Constitution, but the Constitution does have a broad provision concerning a liberty provision under the due process—— 

Senator GRAHAM. And that gets us to the speeches. That broad 

provision of the Constitution that has taken us from no written 

prohibition protecting the unborn, no written statement that you 

can’t voluntarily pray in school, and on, and on, and on, and on. 

137 

And that’s what drives us here, quite frankly. That’s my concern. 

And when we talk about balls and strikes, maybe that’s not the 

right way to talk about it. 

But a lot of us feel that the best way to change society is to go 

to the ballot box, elect someone, and if they’re not doing it right, 

get rid of them through the electoral process. And a lot of us are 

concerned, from the left and the right, that unelected judges are 

very quick to change society in a way that’s disturbing. Can you 

understand how people may feel that way? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Certainly, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Now, let’s talk about you. I like you, by the way, for whatever 

that matters. Since I may vote for you, that ought to matter to you. 

One thing that stood out about your record is that when you look 

at the almanac of the Federal judiciary, lawyers anonymously rate 

judges in terms of temperament. 

And here’s what they said about you: ‘‘she’s a terror on the 

bench’’; ‘‘she’s temperamental, excitable’’; ‘‘she seems angry’’; ‘‘she’s 

overly aggressive, not very judicial’’; ‘‘she does not have a very good 

temperament’’; ‘‘she abuses lawyers’’; ‘‘she really lacks judicial temperament’’; ‘‘she believes in an out-of-control—she behaves in an 

out-of-control manner’’; ‘‘she makes inappropriate outbursts’’; ‘‘she 

is nasty to lawyers’’; ‘‘she will attack lawyers for making an argument she does not like’’; ‘‘she can be a bit of a bully’’. 

When you look at the evaluation of the judges on the Second Circuit, you stand out like a sore thumb in terms of your temperament. What is your answer to these criticisms? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I do ask tough questions at oral argument. 

Senator GRAHAM. Are you the only one that asks tough questions 

in oral argument? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. No, not at all. I can only explain what 

I’m doing, which is, when I ask lawyers tough questions, it’s to give 

them an opportunity to explain their positions on both sides and 

to persuade me that they’re right. I do know that in the Second 

Circuit, because we only give litigants 10 minutes of oral argument 

each, that the processes in the Second Circuit are different than in 

most other circuits across the country, and that some lawyers do 

find that our court—which is not just me, but our court generally— 

is described as a ‘‘hot bench’’. It’s a term of art lawyers use. It 

means that they’re peppered with questions. Lots of lawyers who 

are unfamiliar with the process in the Second Circuit find that 

tough bench difficult and challenging. 

Senator GRAHAM. If I may interject, Judge, they find you difficult 

and challenging more than your colleagues. And the only reason I 

mention this is that it stands out when you—you know, there are 

many positive things about you, and these hearings are—are—are 

designed to talk—talk about the good and the bad. And I—I never 

liked appearing before a judge that I thought was a bully. It’s hard 

enough being a lawyer, having your client there to begin with, 

without the judge just beating you up for no good reason. 

Do you think you have a temperament problem? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. I can only talk about what I know of 

my relationship with the judges of my court and with the lawyers 

who appear regularly from our Circuit. And I believe that my repVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00149 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
138 

utation is—is such that I ask the hard questions, but I do it evenly 

for both sides. 

Senator GRAHAM. In fairness to you, there are plenty of statements in the record in support of you as a person that—that do not 

go down this line. But I would just suggest to you, for what it’s 

worth, Judge, as you go forward here, that these statements about 

you are striking. They’re not about your colleagues; you know, the 

10-minute rule applies to everybody. Obviously you’ve accomplished 

a lot in your life, but maybe these hearings are a time for self-reflection. This is pretty tough stuff that you don’t see from—about 

other judges on the Second Circuit. 

Let’s talk about the ‘‘wise Latino’’ comment yet again. And the 

only reason I want to talk about it yet again is that I think what 

you said—let me just put my biases on the table here. One of the 

things that I constantly say when I talk about the war on terror 

is that one of the missing ingredients in the Mideast is the rule of 

law that Senator Schumer talked about, that the hope for the Mideast, Iraq and Afghanistan, is that there will be a courtroom one 

day that, if you find yourself in that court, it would be about what 

you allegedly did, not who you are. It won’t be about whether 

you’re a Sunni, Shia, a Khurd or a Pastune, it will be about what 

you did. 

And that’s the hope of the world, really, that our legal system, 

even though we fail at times, will spread. And I hope one day that 

there will be more women serving in elected official and judicial offices in the Mideast, because I can tell you this from my point of 

view: one of the biggest problems in Iraq and Afghanistan is a 

mother’s voice is seldom heard about the fate of her children. And 

if you wanted to change Iraq, apply the rule of law and have more 

women involved in having a say about Iraq. And I believe that 

about Afghanistan, and I think that’s true here. I think for a long 

time a lot of talented women were asked, ‘‘Can you type,’’ and we’re 

trying to get beyond that and improve as a Nation. 

So when it comes to the idea that we should consciously try to 

include more people in the legal process and the judicial process 

from different backgrounds, count me in. But your speeches don’t 

really say that to me. They—along the lines of what Senator Kyl 

was saying, they kind of represent the idea, there’s a day coming 

when there will be more of us, women and minorities, and we’re 

going to change the law. And what I hope we’ll take away from this 

hearing, is there needs to be more women and minorities in the law 

to make a better America, and the law needs to be there for all of 

us if, and when, we need it. 

And the one thing that I’ve tried to impress upon you, through 

jokes and being serious, is the consequences of these words in the 

world in which we live in. You know, we’re talking about putting 

you on the Supreme Court and judging your fellow citizens, and 

one of the things that I need to be assured of is that you understand the world as it pretty much really is, and we’ve got a long 

way to go in this country. And I can’t find the quote, but I’ll find 

it here in a moment, the ‘‘wise Latino’’ quote. Do you remember it? 

[Laughter.] 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. 

139 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Say it to me. Can you recite it from 

memory? I’ve got it. All right. ‘‘I would hope that a wise Latina 

woman, with the richness of her experience, would, more often 

than not, reach a better conclusion than a white male.’’ And the 

only reason I keep talking about this is that I’m in politics, and 

you’ve got to watch what you say because, 1) you don’t want to offend people you’re trying to represent. But do you understand, 

ma’am, that if I had said anything like that, and my reasoning was 

that I’m trying to inspire somebody, they would have had my head? 

Do you understand that? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I do understand how those words could be 

taken that way, particularly if read in isolation. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I don’t know how else you could take 

that. If Lindsey Graham said that I will make a better Senator 

than X because of my experience as a Caucasian male, makes me 

better able to represent the people of South Carolina, and my opponent was a minority, it would make national news, and it should. 

Having said that, I am not going to judge you by that one statement. I just hope you’ll appreciate the world in which we live in, 

that you can say those things meaning to inspire somebody and 

still have a chance to get on the Supreme Court; others could not 

remotely come close to that statement and survive. Whether that’s 

right or wrong, I think that’s a fact. Does that make sense to you? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It does. And I would hope that we’ve come, 

in America, to the place where we can look at a statement that 

could be misunderstood and consider it in the context of the person’s life and the work we have done. 

Senator GRAHAM. You know what? If that comes of this hearing, 

the hearing has been worth it all, that some people deserve a second chance when they misspeak, and you would look at the entire 

life story to determine whether this is an aberration or just a reflection of your real soul. If that comes from this hearing, then 

we’ve probably done the country some good. 

Now, let’s talk about the times in which we live in. You’re from 

New York. Have you grown up in New York all your life? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. My entire life. 

Senator GRAHAM. What did September 11, 2001 mean to you? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It was the most horrific experience of my personal life, and the most horrific experience in imagining the pain 

of the families of victims of that tragedy. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you know anything about the group that 

planned this attack, who they are and what they believe? Have you 

read anything about them? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I’ve followed the newspaper accounts, I’ve 

read some books in the area. So, I believe I have an understanding 

of that—— 

Senator GRAHAM. What would a woman’s life be in their world 

if they can control a government or a part of the world? What do 

they have in store for women? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I understand that some of them have indicated that women are not equal to men. 

Senator GRAHAM. I think that’s a very charitable statement. 

Do you believe that we’re at war? 

140 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. We are, sir. We have—we have tens and 

thousands of soldiers in the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq. 

We are at war. 

Senator GRAHAM. Are you familiar with military law much at 

all? And if you’re not, that’s Okay. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, no, no, no. I—I’m thinking, because I’ve 

never practiced in the area. I’ve only read the Supreme Court decisions in this area. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I’ve obviously examined, by referencing cases, 

some of the procedures involved in military law. But I—I’m not 

personally familiar with military law. 

Senator GRAHAM. From which—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I haven’t participated. 

Senator GRAHAM. I understand. 

From what you’ve read and what you understand about the 

enemy that this country faces, do you believe there are people out 

there right now plotting our destruction? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Given the announcements of certain groups 

and the messages that have been sent with videotapes, et cetera, 

announcing that intent, then the answer would be on—based on 

that, yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Under the Law of Armed Conflict—and this is 

where I may differ a bit with my colleagues—it is an international 

concept, the Law if Armed Conflict. Under the Law of Armed Conflict, do you agree with the following statement, that if a person is 

detained who is properly identified through accepted legal procedures under the Law of Armed Conflict as a part of the enemy 

force, there is no requirement based on a length of time that they 

be returned to the battle or released. In other words, if you capture 

a member of the enemy force, is it your understanding of the law 

that you have to at some point of time let them go back to the 

fight? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I—it’s difficult to answer that question in the 

abstract, for the reason that I indicated later. I’ve not been a student of the law of war. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Other than to—— 

Senator GRAHAM. We’ll have another round. I know you’ll have 

a lot of things to do, but try to—try to look at that. Look at that 

general legal concept. And the legal concept I’m espousing is that, 

under the law of war, Article 5, specifically, of the Geneva Convention, requires a detaining authority to allow an impartial decisionmaker to determine the question of status, whether or not you’re 

a member of the enemy force. And see if I’m right about the law, 

that if that determination is properly had, there is no requirement 

under the Law of Armed Conflict to release a member of the enemy 

force that still presents a threat. I would like you to look at that. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, let’s talk about—thank you. 

Let’s talk about your time as a lawyer. The Puerto Rican Legal 

Defense Fund. Is that right? Is that the name of the organization? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It was then. I think it—I—I know it has 

changed names recently. 

141 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. How long were you a member of that organization? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Nearly 12 years. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. If not 12 years. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. During that time you were involved in 

litigation matters. Is that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The Fund was involved in litigations. I was 

a board member of the Fund. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Are you familiar with the position that 

the Fund took regarding taxpayer-funded abortion, the briefs they 

filed? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. I never reviewed those briefs. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, in their briefs they argued—and I will 

submit the quotes to you—that if you deny a low-income woman 

Medicaid funding, taxpayer funds to have an abortion, if you deny 

her that, that’s a form of slavery. And I can get the quotes. 

Do you agree with that? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I wasn’t aware of what was said in those 

briefs. Perhaps it might be helpful if I explain what the function 

of a board member is and what the function of the staff would be 

in an organization like the Fund. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In a small organization, as the Puerto Rican 

Legal Defense Fund was back then, it wasn’t the size of—of other 

Legal Defense Funds, like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. Or the Mexican-American Legal 

Defense Fund, which are organizations that undertook very similar 

work to PRLDF. In an organization like PRLDF, a board member’s 

main responsibility is to fund-raise, and I’m sure that a review of 

the board meetings would show that that’s what we spent most of 

our time on. To the extent that we looked at the organization’s 

legal work, it was to ensure that it was consistent with the broad 

mission statement of the Fund. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is the mission statement of the Fund to include taxpayer-funded abortion? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Our mission—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Was that one of the goals? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Our mission statement was broad like the 

Constitution. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yeah. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Which meant that it—its focus was on promoting the equal opportunities of Hispanics in the United States. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, Judge, I’ve got—and I’ll share them with 

you and we’ll talk about this more—a host of briefs for a 12-year 

period where the Fund is advocating to the State court and to the 

Federal courts that to deny a woman taxpayer funds, low-income 

woman taxpayer assistance in having an abortion, is a form of slavery, it’s an unspeakable cruel—cruelty to the life and health of a 

poor woman. Was it—was it or was it not the position of the Fund 

to advocate taxpayer-funded abortions for low-income women? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I wasn’t, and I didn’t as a board member, review those briefs. Our lawyers were charged with—— 

142 

Senator GRAHAM. Would it bother you if that’s what they did? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, I know that the Fund, during the years 

I was there, was involved in public health issues as it affected the 

Latino community. It was involved—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Is abortion a public health issue? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, it was certainly viewed that way generally by a number of civil rights organizations at the time. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you personally view it that way? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It wasn’t a question of whether I personally 

viewed it that way or not. The issue was whether the law was settled on what issues the Fund was advocating on behalf of the community it represented. And—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, the Fund—I’m sorry. Go ahead. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And so the question would become, was there 

a good-faith basis for whatever arguments they were making, as 

the Fund’s lawyers were lawyers. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, yeah. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. They had an ethical obligation. 

Senator GRAHAM. And quite frankly, that’s—you know, lawyers 

are lawyers and people who have causes that they believe in have 

every right to pursue those causes. And the Fund, when you look— 

you may have been a board member, but I’m here to tell you, that 

filed briefs constantly for the idea that taxpayer-funded abortion 

was necessary and to deny it would be a form of slavery, challenged parental consent as being cruel, and I can go down a list 

of issues that the Fund got involved in, that the death penalty 

should be stricken because it has—it’s a form of racial discrimination. 

What’s your view of the death penalty in terms of personally? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The issue for me with respect to the death 

penalty is that the Supreme Court, since Gregg, has determined 

that the death penalty is constitutional under certain situations. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I have rejected challenges to the Federal law 

and it’s application in the one case I handled as a District Court 

judge, but it’s a reflection of what my views are on the law. 

Senator GRAHAM. As an advocate—as an advocate, did you challenge the death penalty as being an inappropriate punishment because the effect it has on race? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I never litigated a death penalty case personally. The Fund—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Did you ever sign the memorandum saying 

that? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I send the memorandum for the board to take 

under consideration what position, on behalf of the Latino community, the Fund should take on New York State reinstating the 

death penalty in the State. You—it’s hard to remember because so 

much time has passed in the 30 years since I—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Yeah. Well, we’ll give you a chance to look at 

some of the things I’m talking about because I want you to be 

aware of what I’m talking about. 

Let me ask you this. We’ve got 30 seconds left. If a lawyer on 

the other side filed a brief in support of the idea that abortion is 

the unnecessary and unlawful taking of an innocent life and public 

143 

money should never be used for such a heinous purpose, would that 

disqualify them, in your opinion, from being a judge? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. An advocate advocates on behalf of the client 

they have, and so that’s a different situation than how a judge has 

acted in the cases before him or her. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. And the only reason I mention this, 

Judge, is that the positions you took, or this Fund took, I think, 

like the speeches, tell us some things, and we’ll have a chance to 

talk more about your full life. But I appreciate the opportunity to 

talk with you. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator Graham. 

Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge, good to see 

you again. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Hello, Senator. Thank you. And I thank you 

again for letting me use your conference room when I was as hobbled as I was. 

Senator DURBIN. You were more than welcome there and there 

was more traffic of Senators in my conference room than I have 

seen since I was elected to the Senate. 

This has been an interesting exercise today for many of us who 

have been on the Judiciary Committee for a while, because the people new to it may not know, but there has been a little bit of a role 

reversal here. The Democratic side is now, largely speaking, in 

favor of our president’s nominee. The other side is asking questions 

more critical. In the previous two Supreme Court nominees, the tables were turned. There were more critical questions coming from 

the Democratic side. 

There is also another obvious contrast. The two previous nominees that were considered while I was on the committee, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, are white males, and, of course, you 

come to this as a minority woman candidate. 

When we asked questions of the white male nominees of a Republican president, we were basically trying to make sure that they 

would go far enough in understanding the plight of minorities, because, clearly, that was not in their DNA. 

The questions being asked of you from the other side primarily 

are along the lines of: will you go too far in siding with minorities? 

It is an interesting contrast, as I watch this play out. 

Two things have really been the focus on the other side, although 

a lot of questions have been asked. One was, your speeches, one or 

two speeches. I took a look here at your questionnaire. I think you 

have given hundreds of speeches. So that they would only find fault 

in one or two to bring up is a pretty good track record from this 

side of the table. 

If, as politicians, all we had were one or two speeches that would 

raise some questions among our critics, we would be pretty fortunate. And when it came down to your cases, it appears that you 

have been involved, at least as a Federal judge, in over 3,000 cases 

and it appears that the Ricci case really is the focus of more attention than almost any other decision. 

I think that speaks pretty well of you for 17 years on the bench 

and I want to join, as others have said, in commending the other 

144 

side, because although the questions have sometimes been pointed, 

I think they have been fair and I think you have handled the responses well. 

I would like to say that on the speech which has come up time 

and again, the wise Latina speech, the next paragraph in that 

speech, I do not know if it has been read to the members, but it 

should be, because after you made the quote which has been the 

subject of many inquiries here, you went on to say, ‘‘Let us not forget that wise men like Oliver Wendell Holmes and Justice Cardozo 

voted on cases which upheld both sex and race discrimination in 

our society. Until 1972, no Supreme Court case ever upheld the 

claim of a woman in a gender discrimination case.’’ 

You went on to say, ‘‘I, like Professor Carter, believe that we 

should not be so myopic as to believe that others of different experiences or backgrounds are incapable of understanding the values 

and needs of people from a different group. Many are so capable.’’ 

‘‘As Judge Cedarbaum,’’ who may still be here, ‘‘pointed out to 

me, nine white men on the Supreme Court in the past have done 

so on many occasions and on many issues including Brown.’’ That, 

to me, tells the whole story. 

You are, of course, proud of your heritage, as I am proud of my 

own. But to suggest that a special insight and wisdom comes with 

it is to overlook the obvious. Wise men have made bad decisions. 

White men have made decisions favoring minorities. Those things 

have happened when people looked at the law and looked at the 

Constitution. 

So I would like to get into two or three areas, if I might, to follow-up on, because they are areas of particular interest to me. I 

will return to one that Senator Graham just touched on and that 

is the death penalty. 

A book, which I greatly enjoyed, I do not know if you ever had 

a chance to read, is ‘‘Becoming Justice Blackmun,’’ a story of Justice Blackmun’s career and many of the things that happened to 

him. Now, late in his career, he decided that he could no longer 

support the death penalty and it was a long, thoughtful process 

that brought him to this moment. 

He made the famous statement, maybe the best known line attributed to him, in a decision, Callins v. Collins, ‘‘From this day 

forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.’’ The 

1994 opinion said: 

‘‘Twenty years have passed since this court declared that the 

death penalty must be imposed fairly and with reasonable consistency, or not at all, see Furman v. Georgia, and despite the effort 

of the States and courts to devise legal formulas and procedural 

rules to meet this daunting challenge, the death penalty remains 

fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice and mistake.’’ 

Judge Sotomayor, I know that you have thought about this issue. 

Senator Graham made reference to the Puerto Rican Legal Defense 

and Education Fund memo that you once signed on the subject. 

What is your thought about Justice Blackmun’s view that despite 

our best legal efforts, the imposition of the death penalty in the 

United States has not been handled fairly? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. With respect to the position the fund took in 

1980–1981 with respect to the death penalty, that was, as I noted, 

145 

a question of being an advocate and expressing views on behalf of 

the community on a policy choice New York State was making: 

Should we or should we not reinstitute the death penalty? 

As a judge, what I have to look at and realize is that in 30 years 

or 40, actually, there has been—excuse me, Senator. I’m sorry—— 

Senator DURBIN. It is all right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. Enormous changes in our society, many, many cases looked at by the Supreme Court addressing 

the application of the death penalty, addressing issues of its application and when they’re constitutional or not. 

The state of this question is different today than it was when 

Justice Blackmun came to his views. As a judge, I don’t rule in an 

abstract. I rule in the context of a case that comes before me and 

a challenge to a situation and an application of the death penalty 

that arises in an individual case. 

I’ve been and am very cautious about expressing personal views 

since I’ve been a judge. I find that people who listen to judges 

give—express their personal views on important questions that the 

courts are looking at; that they have a sense that the judge is coming into the process with a closed mind; that their personal views 

will somehow influence how they apply the law. 

It’s one of the reasons why, since I’ve been a judge, I’ve always 

been very careful about not doing that and I think my record 

speaks more loudly than I can—— 

Senator DURBIN. It does. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. About the fact of how careful I 

am about ensuring that I’m always following the law and not my 

personal views. 

Senator DURBIN. Well, you handled one death penalty case as a 

district court judge, United States v. Heatley, after, you had signed 

on to the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund memo 

in 1981 recommending that the organization oppose reinstituting 

the death penalty in New York. 

After you had done that, some years later, you were called on to 

rule on a case involving the death penalty. Despite the policy concerns that you and I share, you denied the defendant’s motion to 

dismiss and you paved the way for the first Federal death penalty 

case in Manhattan in more than 40 years. 

Now, the defendant ultimately accepted a plea bargain to a life 

sentence but you rejected his challenge to the death penalty and 

found that he had shown no evidence of discriminatory intent. So 

that makes your point. Whatever your personal feelings, you, in 

this case at the district court level, ruled in a fashion that upheld 

the death penalty. 

I guess I am trying to take it a step beyond and maybe you will 

not go where I want to take you, and some nominees do not, but 

I guess the question that arises, in my mind, is how a man like 

Justice Blackmun, after a life on the bench, comes to the conclusion 

that despite all our best efforts, the premise of your 1981 memo is 

still the same, that, ultimately, the imposition of the death penalty 

in our country is too arbitrary. 

Minorities in America today have accounted for a disproportionate 43 percent of executions, that is a fact, since 1976. And 

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tims, 80 percent of death penalty cases involve victims who are 

white. 

This raises some obvious questions we have to face on this side 

of the table. I am asking you if it raises questions of justice and 

fairness on your side of the table. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In the Heatley case, it was the first prosecution in the Southern District of New York of a death penalty case 

in over 40 years. Mr. Heatley was charged with being a gang leader of a crack and cocaine enterprise who engaged in over—if the 

number wasn’t 13, it was very close to that—13 murders to promote that enterprise. 

He did challenge the application of the death penalty, charges 

against him, on the ground that the prosecutor had made its decision to prosecute him and refused him a cooperation agreement on 

the basis of his race. 

The defense counsel, much as you have Senator, raised any number of concerns about the application of the death penalty and in 

response to his argument, I held hearings not on that question, but 

on the broader question of what had—on the specific legal question—what had motivated this prosecutor to enter this prosecution 

and whether he was denied the agreement he sought on the basis 

of race. I determined that that was not the case and rejected his 

challenge. 

With respect to the issues of concerns about the application of 

the death penalty, I noted for the defense attorneys that, in the 

first instance, one back question of the effects of the death penalty, 

how it should be done, what circumstances warrant it or don’t in 

terms of the law, that that’s a legislative question. 

And, in fact, I said to him—I acknowledged his concerns, I acknowledged that many had expressed views about that, but that’s 

exactly what I said, which is, ‘‘I can only look at the case that’s before me and decide that case.’’ 

Senator DURBIN. There is a recent case before the Supreme 

Court I would like to make reference to, District Attorney’s Office 

v. Osborne, involving DNA. It turns out there are only three states 

in the United States that do not provide state legislated post-conviction access to DNA evidence that might exonerate someone who 

is in prison. 

I am told that since 1989, 240 post-conviction DNA exonerations 

have taken place across this country, 17 involving inmates on 

death row. Now, the Supreme Court, in the Osborne case, was 

asked, What about those three states? Is there a Federal right to 

post-conviction access to DNA evidence for someone currently incarcerated? It asked whether or not they were properly charged 

and convicted. And the court said, no, there was no Federal right. 

But it was a 5–4 case. 

So though I do not quarrel with your premise that it is our responsibility on this side of the table to look at the death penalty, 

the fact is, in this recent case, this Osborne case, there was a clear 

opportunity for the Supreme Court, right across the street, to say, 

We think this gets to an issue of due process, regarding someone 

sitting on death row in Alaska, Massachusetts or Oklahoma, where 

their state law gives them no post-conviction right of access to 

DNA evidence. 

147 

So I ask you, either from the perspective of DNA or from other 

perspectives, is it not clear that the Supreme Court does have some 

authority in the due process realm to make decisions relating to 

the arbitrariness of the death penalty? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The court is not a legislative body. It is a reviewing body of whether a particular act by a state in a particular 

case is constitutional or not. 

In a particular situation, the court may conclude that the state 

has acted unconstitutionally and invalidate the act. But it’s difficult to answer a question about the role of the court outside of 

the functions of the court, which is we don’t make broad policies. 

We decide questions based on cases and the principles implicated 

by that particular case before you. 

Senator DURBIN. I follow you and I understand the limitations on 

policy-related questions that you are facing. So I would like to go 

to another area relating to policy and ask your thoughts on it. 

We have, on occasion, every 2 years here, a chance to go across 

the street for an historic dinner. The members of the U.S. Senate 

sit down with the members of the U.S. Supreme Court. We look 

forward to it. It is a tradition that is maybe six or 8 years old, Mr. 

Chairman, I do not think much older. 

Chairman LEAHY. It is a great tradition. 

Senator DURBIN. Great tradition, and we get to meet them, they 

get to meet us. I sat down with one Supreme Court justice, I won’t 

name this person, but I said at the time that I was chairing the 

Crime Subcommittee in Judiciary and said to this justice, ‘‘What 

topic do you think I should be looking into as a Senator when it 

comes to justice in the United States? ’’ And this justice said, ‘‘Our 

system of corrections and incarceration in America, it has to be the 

worst.’’ 

It is hard to imagine how it could be much worse if we tried to 

design it that way. Today, in the United States, 2.3 million people 

are in prison. We have the most prisoners of any country in the 

world, as well as the highest per capita rate of prisoners in the 

world. 

In America today, African-Americans are incarcerated at six 

times the rate of white Americans. Now, there is one significant 

reason for this and you have faced at least an aspect of it as a 

judge, and that is the crack-powder disparity in sentencing. 

I will readily concede I voted for it, as did many members of the 

House of Representatives, frightened by the notion of this new narcotic called crack that was so cheap and so destructive that we had 

to do something dramatic. We did. We established a 100-to-1 ratio 

in terms of sentencing. 

Now, we realize we made a serious mistake. Eighty-one percent 

of those convicted for crack offenses in 2007 were African-American, although only about 25 percent of crack cocaine users are African-Americans. I held a hearing on this and Judge Reggie Walton, the former associate director of the Office of National Drug 

Control Policy, testified and he basically said that this sentencing 

disparity between crack and powder has had a negative impact in 

courtrooms across America. 

Specifically, he stated that people come to view the courts with 

suspicion as institutions that mete out unequal justice, and the 

148 

moral authority of not only the Federal courts, but all courts, is diminished. I might say, for the record, that this administration has 

said they want to change this and make the sentencing ratio oneto-one. We are working on legislation on a bipartisan basis to do 

so. 

You face this as a judge, at least some aspect of it. You sentenced 

Louis Gomez, a non-violent drug offender, to a 5-year mandatory 

minimum and you said, when you sentenced him, ‘‘You do not deserve this, sir. I am deeply sorry for you and your family, but I 

have no choice.’’ 

May I ask you to reflect for a moment, if you can, beyond this 

specific case or using this specific case, on this question of race and 

justice in America today? It goes to the heart of our future as a nation and whether we can finally come to grips and put behind us 

some of the terrible things that have happened in our history. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It’s so unsatisfying, I know, for you and probably the other Senators, when a nominee to the court doesn’t engage directly with the societal issues that are so important to you, 

both as citizens and Senators. And I know they are important to 

you, because this very question you just mentioned to me is part 

of bipartisan efforts that you’re making, and I respect that many 

have concerns on lots of different issues. 

For me, as a judge, both on the circuit or potentially as a nominee to the Supreme Court, my role is a very different one. And in 

the Louis Gomez case, we weren’t talking about the disparity. We 

were talking about the quantity of drug and whether I had to follow the law on the statutory minimum that Congress required for 

the weight of drugs at issue. 

In expressing a recognition of the family’s situation and the 

uniqueness of that case, it was at a time when Congress had not 

recognized the safety valve for first-time offenders under the drug 

laws. That situation had motivated many judges in many situations to comment on the question of whether the law should be 

changed to address the safety valve question, then make a statement, making any suggestions to Congress, I followed the law. 

But I know that the attorney general’s office, many people spoke 

to Congress on this issue and Congress passed a safety valve. 

With respect to the crack-cocaine disparity, as you may know, 

the guidelines are no longer mandatory as a result of a series of 

recent Supreme Court—not so recent, but Supreme Court cases 

probably almost in the last 10 years. I think the first one, 

Apprendi, was in 2000, if my memory is serving me right, or very 

close to that. 

At any rate, that issue was addressed recently by the Supreme 

Court in a case called U.S. v. Kimbro and the court noted that the 

Sentencing Commission’s recommendation of sentences was not 

based on its considered judgment that the 100-to-1 ratio was an appropriate sentence for this conduct and the court recognized that 

sentencing judges could take that fact into consideration in fashioning an individual sentence for a defendant. 

And, in fact, the Sentencing Commission, in very recent time, 

has permitted defendants who have been serving prior sentences, 

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149 

fied under the procedures established by the Sentencing Commission. 

This is an issue that I can’t speak further about, because it is 

an issue that’s being so actively discussed by Congress and which 

is controlled by law. But as I said, I can appreciate why not saying 

more would feel unsatisfying, but I am limited by the role I have. 

Senator DURBIN. One last question I will ask you. I would like 

to hear your perspective on our immigration courts. A few years 

ago, Judge Richard Posner from my home state of Illinois brought 

this problem to my attention. 

In 2005, he issued a scathing opinion criticizing our immigration 

courts in America. He wrote, ‘‘The adjudication of these cases at 

the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards 

of legal justice.’’ 

For those who do not know this Judge Posner, he is an extraordinary man. I would not know where to put him exactly on the political spectrum, because I am not sure what his next book will be. 

He has written so many books. He is a very gifted and thoughtful 

person. 

In 2002, then Attorney General John Ashcroft issued so-called 

streamlining regulations that made dramatic changes in our immigration courts, reducing the size of the Board of Immigration Appeals from 23 to 11. This board stopped using three-member panels 

and board members began deciding cases individually, often within 

minutes and without written opinions. 

In response, immigrants began petitioning the Federal appellate 

court in large numbers. In 2004, immigration cases constituted 17 

percent of all Federal appeals, up from 3 percent in 2001, the last 

year before the regulations under Attorney General Ashcroft. 

I raised this issue with Justice Alito during his confirmation 

hearing and he told me, ‘‘I agree with Judge Posner that the way 

these cases are handled leaves an enormous amount to be desired. 

I have been troubled by this.’’ 

What has been your experience on the circuit court when it came 

to these cases and what is your opinion of Judge Posner’s observation in this 2005 case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. There’s been 4 years since Judge Posner’s 

comments and they have to be placed somewhat in perspective. Attorney General Ashcroft’s—what you described as streamlining procedures have been by, I think, all of the circuit courts that have 

addressed the issue, affirmed and given Chevron deference. 

So the question is not whether the streamlined procedures are 

constitutional or not, but what happened when he instituted that 

procedure is that, with all new things, there were many imperfections. New approaches to things create new challenges and there’s 

no question that courts faced with large numbers of immigration 

cases, as was the second circuit—I think we had the second largest 

number of new cases that arrived at our doorsteps, the ninth circuit being the first, and I know the seventh had a quite significantly large number—were reviewing processes that, as Justice 

Alito said, left something to be desired in a number of cases. 

I will say that that onslaught of cases and the concerns expressed in a number of cases by the judges, in the dialog that goes 

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sulted in more cooperation between the courts and the immigration 

officials in how to handle these cases, how to ensure that the process would be improved. 

I know that the attorney general’s office devoted more resources 

to the handling of these cases. There’s always room for improvement. The agency is handling so many matters, so many cases, has 

so many responsibilities, making sure that it has adequate resources and training is an important consideration, again, in the 

first instance, by Congress, because you set the budget. 

In the end, what we can only do is ensure that due process is 

applied in each case, according to the law required for the review 

of ths cases. 

Senator DURBIN. Do you feel that it has changed since 2005, 

when Judge Posner said the adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal 

justice? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, I wouldn’t—I’m not endorsing his views, 

because he can only speak for himself. I do know that in, I would 

say, the last two or 3 years, the number of cases questioning the 

processes in published circuit court decisions has decreased. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very, very much Senator Durbin. I 

have discussed this with Senator Sessions and, as I told him earlier, also, at his request, we have not finished the first round, but 

once we finish the first round of questions, we will have 20-minute 

rounds on the second. 

I am going to urge Senators, if they do not feel the need to use 

the whole round, just as Senator Durbin just demonstrated, that 

they not. 

But here will be the schedule. We will break for today. We will 

begin at 9:30 in the morning. We will finish the first round of questions, the last round will be asked by Senator Franken, and then 

we will break for the traditional closed door session with the nominee. 

So for those who have not seen one of these before, we do this 

with all Supreme Court nominees. We have a closed session just 

with the nominee. We go over the FBI report. We do it with all of 

them. I think we can generally say it is routine. We did it with 

Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito and Justice Breyer and everybody else. 

Then we will come back for a round of 20 minutes each, but during that round, I will encourage Senators, if they feel all the questions have been asked—I realize sometimes all questions may have 

been asked, but not everybody has asked all of the questions—that 

we try to ask at least something new to keep up the interest and 

then we can determine whether we are prepared—depending on 

how late it is—whether we can do the panels or whether we have 

to do the panels on Thursday. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Chairman Leahy. I do think that 

the scheme you arranged for this hearing is good, the way we have 

gone forward. I thank you for that. We have done our best to be 

ready in a short timeframe, and I believe the members on this side 

are ready. 

151 

Talking of questions, there is not any harm in asking. Is that not 

a legal rule? To get people to reduce their time. But there are still 

some important questions and I think we will certainly want to 

use—most members would want to use that 20 minutes. 

I appreciate that and look forward to being with you in the morning. 

Chairman LEAHY. That is why I asked the question. I probably 

have violated the first rule that I learned as a trial lawyer—you 

should not ask a question if you do not know what the answer is 

going to be. But then I also had that other aspect where hope 

springs eternal. As we have a whole lot of other things going on 

in the Senate, I would hope we might. 

Senator Cardin, Senator Whitehouse, Senator Klobuchar, Senator Specter and Senator Franken, I am sorry that we do not get 

to you yet, but we will before we do the closed session. 

Judge, thank you very much. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. We stand in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 5:26 p.m., the Committee was recessed.] 

[The biographical information of Sonia Sotomayor follows.] 

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(325) 

CONTINUATION OF THE NOMINATION OF 

HON. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 

OF THE UNITED STATES 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Kohl, Feinstein, Feingold, Schumer, 

Durbin, Cardin, Whitehouse, Klobuchar, Kaufman, Specter, 

Franken, Sessions, Hatch, Grassley, Kyl, Graham, Cornyn, and 

Coburn. 

Chairman LEAHY. Good morning, everyone. Judge, it is good to 

see you back, and your family. 

Judge Sotomayor, yesterday you answered questions from 11 

Senators. Frankly, I feel you demonstrated your commitment to the 

fair and impartial application of law. You certainly demonstrated 

your composure and patience and your extensive legal knowledge. 

Today we will have questioning from the remaining eight members of the Committee, and then just to set the schedule, once we 

finish that questioning, we will arrange a time to go into the traditional—something that we do every time for the Supreme Court 

nominee—closed-door session, which is usually not very lengthy, 

and then go back to others. I have talked with Senator Sessions. 

We will then go to a second round of questions of no more than 20 

minutes each. I have talked with a number of Senators who have 

told me they will not use anywhere near that 20 minutes, although 

every Senator has the right to do it. Then I would hope we might 

be able to wrap it up. 

But we are going to go to Senator Cornyn, himself a former 

member of the Texas Supreme Court and former Attorney General. 

And, Senator Cornyn, it is yours. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, 

Judge. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 

STATES 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Good morning, Senator. It’s good to see you 

again. 

326 

Senator CORNYN. Good to see you. I recall when we met in my 

office, you told me how much you enjoy the back-and-forth that 

lawyers and judges do, and I appreciate the good humor and attitude that you brought to this. And I very much appreciate your 

willingness to serve on the highest Court in the land. I am afraid 

that sometimes in the past these hearings have gotten so downright nasty and contentious that some people are dissuaded from 

willingness to serve, which I think is a great tragedy. And, of 

course, some have been filibustered. They have been denied the opportunity to have an up-or-down vote on the Senate floor. 

I told you when we visited in my office, that is not going to happen to you, if I have anything to say about it. You will get that upor-down vote on the Senate floor. 

But I want to ask your assistance this morning to try to help us 

reconcile two pictures that I think have emerged during the course 

of this hearing. One is, of course, as Senator Schumer and others 

have talked about, your lengthy tenure on the Federal bench as a 

trial judge and court of appeals judge. And then there is the other 

picture that has emerged from your speeches and your other 

writings, and I need your help trying to reconcile those two pictures, because I think a lot of people have wondered about that. 

The reason why it is even more important that we understand 

how you reconcile some of your other writings with your judicial experience and tenure is the fact that, of course, now you will not be 

a lower-court judge subject to the appeals to the Supreme Court. 

You will be free as a United States Supreme Court Justice to basically do what you want with no court reviewing those decisions, 

harkening back to the quote we started with during my opening 

statement about the Supreme Court being infallible only because 

it is final. 

So I want to just start with the comments that you made about 

the wise Latina speech that, by my count, you made at least five 

times between 1994 and 2003. You indicated that this was really— 

and please correct me if I am wrong, I am trying to quote your 

words—‘‘a failed rhetorical flourish that fell flat.’’ I believe at another time you said they were ‘‘words that don’t make sense.’’ And 

another time I believe you said it was ‘‘a bad idea.’’ 

Am I accurately characterizing your thoughts about the use of 

that phrase that has been talked about so much? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes, generally, but the point I was making 

was that Justice O’Connor’s words, the ones that I was using as a 

platform to make my point about the value of experience generally 

in the legal system, was that her words literally and mine literally 

made no sense, at least not in the context of what judges do or— 

what judges do. 

I didn’t and don’t believe that Justice O’Connor intended to suggest that when two judges disagree, one of them has to be unwise. 

And if you read her literal words that wise old men and wise old 

women would come to the same decisions in cases, that’s what the 

words would mean. But that’s clearly not what she meant. And if 

you listen to my words, it would have the same suggestion, that 

only Latinos would come to wiser decisions. But that wouldn’t 

make sense in the context of my speech either, because I pointed 

out in the speech that eight, nine white men had decided Brown 

327 

v. Board of Education. And I noted in a separate paragraph of the 

speech that no one person speaks in the voice of any group. 

So my rhetorical flourish, just like hers, can’t be read literally. 

It had a different meaning in the context of the entire speech. 

Senator CORNYN. But, Judge, she said that a wise man and a 

wise woman would reach the same conclusion. You said that a wise 

Latina woman would reach a better conclusion than a male counterpart. 

What I am confused about is, are you standing by that statement? Or are you saying that it was a bad idea and are you disavowing that statement? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It is clear from the attention that my words 

have gotten and the manner in which it has been understood by 

some people that my words failed. They didn’t work. The message 

that the entire speech attempted to deliver, however, remains the 

message that I think Justice O’Connor meant, the message that 

prior nominees including Justice Alito meant when he said that his 

Italian ancestry he considers when he’s hearing discrimination 

cases. I don’t think he meant, I don’t think Justice O’Connor meant 

that personal experiences compel results in any way. I think life 

experiences generally, whether it’s that I’m a Latina or was a State 

prosecutor or have been a commercial litigator or been a trial judge 

and an appellate judge, that the mixture of all of those things, the 

amalgam of them, helped me to listen and understand. But all of 

us understand, because that’s the kind of judges we have proven 

ourselves to be, we rely on the law to command the results in the 

case. 

So when one talks about life experiences and even in the context 

of my speech, my message was different than I understand my 

words have been understood by some. 

Senator CORNYN. So do you stand by your words of yesterday 

when you said it was ‘‘a failed rhetorical flourish that fell flat,’’ 

that they are ‘‘words that don’t make sense,’’ and that they are ‘‘a 

bad idea’’ ? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I stand by the words. It fell flat. And I understand that some people have understood them in a way that I 

never intended and I would hope that in the context of the speech 

that they would be understood. 

Senator CORNYN. You spoke about the law students to whom 

these comments were frequently directed and your desire to inspire 

them. If, in fact, the message that they heard was that the quality 

of justice depends on the sex, race, or ethnicity of the judge, is that 

an understanding that you would regret? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I would regret that because for me the work 

I do with students—and it’s just not in the context of those six 

speeches. As you know, I give dozens more speeches to students all 

the time, and to lawyers of all backgrounds, and I give—and have 

spoken to community groups of all types. And what I do in each 

of those situations is to encourage both students and, as I did when 

I spoke to new immigrants that I was admitting as students, to try 

to encourage them to participate on all levels of our society. I tell 

people that that’s one of the great things about America, that we 

can do so many different things and participate so fully in all of 

the opportunities America presents. And so the message that I deVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00339 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
328 

liver repeatedly as the context of all of my speeches is: I have made 

it. So can you. Work hard at it. Pay attention to what you’re doing 

and participate. 

Senator CORNYN. Let me ask about another speech you gave in 

1996 that was published in the Suffolk University Law Review 

where you wrote what appears to be an endorsement of the idea 

that judges should change the law. You wrote, ‘‘Change, sometimes 

radical change, can and does occur in the legal system that serves 

a society whose social policy itself changes.’’ You noted with apparent approval that, ‘‘A given judge or judges may develop a novel approach to a specific set of facts or legal framework that pushes the 

law in a new direction.’’ 

Can you explain what you meant by those words? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The title of that speech was ‘‘Returning Majesty to the Law.’’ As I hope I communicated in my opening remarks, I’m passionate about the practice of law and judging, passionate in the sense of respecting the rule of law so much, the 

speech was given in the context of talking to young lawyers and 

saying, ‘‘Don’t participate in the cynicism that people express about 

our legal system.’’ I—— 

Senator CORNYN. What kind of—excuse me. I am sorry. I didn’t 

mean to interrupt you. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And I was encouraging them not to fall into 

the trap of calling decisions that the public disagrees with, as they 

sometimes do, ‘‘activism’’ or using other labels; but to try to be 

more engaged in explaining the law and the process of law to the 

public. And in the context of the words that you quoted to me, I 

pointed out to them explicitly about evolving social changes, that 

what I was referring to is Congress is passing new laws all the 

time, and so whatever was viewed as settled law previously will 

often get changed because Congress has changed something. 

I also spoke about the fact that society evolves in terms of technology and other developments, and so the law is being applied to 

a new set of facts. 

In terms of talking about different approaches in law, I was talking about the fact that there are some cases that are viewed as 

radical, and I think I mentioned just one case, Brown v. Board of 

Education, and explaining and encouraging them to explain that 

process, too. And there are new directions in the law in terms of 

the Court. The Court, the Supreme Court, is often looking at its 

precedents and considering whether in certain circumstances—because precedent is owed deference for very important reasons. But 

the Court takes a new direction, and those new directions rarely, 

if ever, come at the initiation of the Court. They come because lawyers are encouraging the Court to look at a situation in a new way, 

to consider it in a different way. 

What I was telling those young lawyers is, ‘‘Don’t play into people’s skepticism about the law. Look to explain to them the process.’’ 

I also, when I was talking about returning majesty to the law, 

I spoke to them about what judges can do, and I talked about, in 

the second half of that speech, that we had an obligation to ensure 

that we were monitoring the behavior of lawyers before us so that 

when questionable ethical or other conduct could bring disrepute to 

329 

the legal system, that we monitor our lawyers, because that would 

return a sense—— 

Senator CORNYN. Judge, if you would let me—I think we are 

straying away from the question I had talking about oversight of 

lawyers. Would you explain how, when you say judges should—I 

am sorry. Let me just ask. Do you believe that judges ever change 

the law? I take it from your statement that you do. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. They change—we can’t change law. We’re not 

lawmakers. But we change our view of how to interpret certain 

laws based on new facts, new developments of doctrinal theory, 

considerations of whether—what the reliance of society may be in 

an old rule. We think about whether a rule of law has proven workable. We look at how often the Court has affirmed a prior understanding of how to approach an issue. But in those senses, there’s 

changes by judges in the popular perception that we’re changing 

the law. 

Senator CORNYN. In another speech in 1996, you celebrated the 

uncertainty of the law. You wrote that the law is always in a, and 

I quote, ‘‘necessary state of flux.’’ You wrote that the law judges declare is not ‘‘a definitive, capital ‘L’ law that many would like to 

think exists,’’ and ‘‘that the public fails to appreciate the importance of indefiniteness in the law.’’ 

Can you explain those statements? And why do you think indefiniteness is so important to the law? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It’s not that it’s important to the law as much 

as it is that it’s what legal cases are about. People bring cases to 

courts because they believe that precedents don’t clearly answer 

the fact situation that they are presenting in their individual case. 

That creates uncertainty. That’s why people bring cases. And they 

say, Look, the law says this, but I’m entitled to that. I have this 

set of facts that entitle me to relief under the law. 

It’s the entire process of law. If law was always clear, we 

wouldn’t have judges. It’s because there is indefiniteness not in 

what the law is, but its application to new facts that people sometimes feel it’s unpredictable. That speech, as others I’ve given, is 

an attempt to encourage judges to explain to the public more of the 

process. 

The role of judges is to ensure that they are applying the law to 

those new facts, that they’re interpreting that law with Congress’ 

intent, being informed by what precedents say about the law and 

Congress’ intent and applying it to the new facts. 

But that’s what the role of the courts is, and obviously, the public 

is going to become impatient with that if they don’t understand 

that process. And I’m encouraging lawyers to do more work in explaining the system, in explaining what we are doing as courts. 

Senator CORNYN. In a 2001 speech at Berkeley, you wrote, 

‘‘Whether born from experience or inherent physiological or cultural differences, a possibility I abhor less or discount less than my 

colleague Judge Cedarbaum, our gender and national origins may 

and will make a difference in our judging.’’ 

A difference is physiological if it relates to the mechanical, physical or biochemical functions of the body, as I understand the word. 

What do you mean by that? 

330 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I was talking just about that. There are in 

the law—there have been upheld in certain situations that certain 

job positions have a requirement for a certain amount of strength 

or other characteristics that maybe a person who fits that characteristic can have that job. But there are differences that may affect a particular type of work. We do that all the time. You need 

to—— 

Senator CORNYN. We are talking about judging, though, 

aren’t—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. Be a pilot who has good eyesight. 

Senator CORNYN. We are not talking about pilots. We are talking 

about judging, right? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, no, no, no. What I was talking about 

there, because the context of that was talking about the difference 

in the process of judging, and the process of judging for me is what 

life experiences bring to the process. It helps you listen and understand. It doesn’t change what the law is or what the law commands. 

A life experience as a prosecutor may help me listen and understand an argument in a criminal case. It may have no relevancy 

to what happens in an antitrust suit. It’s just a question of the 

process of judging. It improves both the public’s confidence that 

there are judges from a variety of different backgrounds on the 

bench, because they feel that all issues will be more—better at 

least addressed—not that it’s better addressed, but that it helps 

that process of feeling confidence that all arguments are going to 

be listened to and understood. 

Senator CORNYN. So you stand by the comment or the statement 

that inherent physiological differences will make a difference in 

judging? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I’m not sure—I’m not sure exactly where that 

would play out, but I was asking a hypothetical question in that 

paragraph. I was saying, look we just don’t know. If you read the 

entire part of that speech, what I was saying is let’s ask the question. That’s what all of these studies are doing. Ask the question 

if there’s a difference. Ignoring things and saying, you know, it 

doesn’t happen isn’t an answer to a situation. It’s consider it. Consider it as a possibility and think about it. But I certainly wasn’t 

intending to suggest that there would be a difference that affected 

the outcome. I talked about there being a possibility that it could 

affect the process of judging. 

Senator CORNYN. As you can tell, I am struggling a little bit to 

understand how your statement about physiological differences 

could affect the outcome or affect judging and your stated commitment to fidelity to the law as being your sole standard and how any 

litigant can know where that will end. 

Let me ask you on another topic, there was a Washington Post 

story on May 29, 2009, that starts out saying, ‘‘The White House 

scrambled yesterday to assuage worries from liberal groups about 

Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s scant record on abortion rights.’’ And it 

goes on to say, ‘‘The White House Press Secretary said the President did not ask Sotomayor specifically about abortion rights during their interview.’’ 

Is that correct? 

331 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. It is absolutely correct. I was asked no 

question by anyone, including the President, about my views on 

any specific legal issue. 

Senator CORNYN. Do you know then on what basis, if that is the 

case—and I accept your statement—on what basis the White House 

officials would subsequently send a message that abortion rights 

groups do not need to worry about how you might rule in a challenge to Roe v. Wade? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir, because you just have to look at my 

record to know that in the cases that I addressed, on all issues I 

follow the law. 

Senator CORNYN. On what basis would George Pavia, who is apparently a senior partner in the law firm that hired you as a corporate litigator, on what basis would he say that he thinks support 

of abortion rights would be in line with your generally liberal instincts? He is quoted in this article saying, ‘‘I can guarantee she’ll 

be for abortion rights.’’ On what basis would Mr. Pavia say that, 

if you know? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I have no idea, since I know for a fact I never 

spoke to him about my views on abortion, frankly, my views on any 

social issue. George was the head partner of my firm, but our contact was not on a daily basis. I have no idea why he’s drawing that 

conclusion because if he looked at my record, I have ruled according to the law in all cases addressed to the issue of the termination 

of abortion rights—of women’s right to terminate their pregnancy, 

and I voted in cases in which I have upheld the application of the 

Mexico City policy, which was a policy in which the government 

was not funding certain abortion-related activities. 

Senator CORNYN. Do you agree with his statement that you have 

generally liberal instincts? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. If he was talking about the fact that I served 

on a particular board that promoted equal opportunity for people, 

the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, then you 

could talk about that being a liberal instinct in the sense that I 

promote equal opportunity in America and the attempts to ensure 

that. But he has not read my jurisprudence for 17 years, I can assure you. He’s a corporate litigator, and my experience with corporate litigators is that they only look at the law when it affects 

the case before them. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CORNYN. Well, I hope, as you suggested, not only liberals 

endorse the idea of equal opportunity in this country. That is, I 

think, a bedrock doctrine that undergirds all of our law. But that 

brings me, in the short time I have left, to the New Haven firefighter case. As you know, there are a number of the New Haven 

firefighters who are here today and will testify tomorrow. And I 

have to tell you, Your Honor, as a former judge myself, I was 

shocked to see the sort of treatment that the three-judge panel you 

served on gave to the claims of these firefighters by an unpublished 

summary order, which has been pointed out in the press would not 

be likely to be reviewed or even caught by other judges on the Second Circuit, except for the fact that Judge Cabranes read about a 

comment made by the lawyer representing the firefighters in the 

332 

press that the court gave short shrift to the claims of the firefighters. 

Judge Cabranes said, ‘‘The core issue presented by this case, the 

scope of a municipal employer’s authority to disregard examination 

results based solely on the successful applicant, is not addressed by 

any precedent of the Supreme Court or our circuit.’’ And looking at 

the unpublished summary order, this three-judge panel of the Second Circuit doesn’t cite any legal authority whatsoever to support 

its conclusion. 

Can you explain to me why you would deal with it in a way that 

appears to be so—well, ‘‘dismissive’’ may be too strong a word—but 

that avoids the very important claim such that the Supreme Court 

ultimately reversed you on, that was raised by the firefighters’ appeal? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, I can’t speak to what brought this 

case to Judge Cabranes’ attention. I can say the following, however: 

When parties are dissatisfied with a panel decision, they can file 

a petition for rehearing en banc. And, in fact, that’s what happened 

in the Ricci case. Those briefs are routinely reviewed by judges, 

and so publishing by summary order—or addressing an issue by 

summary order or by published opinion doesn’t hide a party’s 

claims from other judges. They get the petitions for rehearing. 

Similarly, parties, when they are dissatisfied with what a circuit 

has done, file petitions for certiorari, which is a request for the Supreme Court to review a case, and so the Court looks at that as 

well. And so regardless of how a circuit decided a case, it’s not a 

question of hiding it from others. 

With respect to the broader question that you are raising, which 

is why do you do it by summary order or why do you do it in a 

published opinion or in a per curiam, the question—or the practice 

is that about 75 percent of circuit court decisions are decided by 

summary order, in part because we can’t handle the volume of our 

work if we were writing long decisions in every case; but, more importantly, because not every case requires a long opinion if a district court opinion has been clear and thorough on an issue. And 

in this case, there was a 78-page decision by the district court. It 

adequately explained the question that the Supreme Court addressed and reviewed. 

And so to the extent that a particular panel considers that an 

issue has been decided by existing precedent, that’s a question that 

the court above can obviously revisit, as it did in Ricci, where it 

looked at it and said, well, we understand what the circuit did, we 

understand what existing law is, but we should be looking at this 

question in a new way. That’s the job of the Supreme Court. I 

would—— 

Senator CORNYN. But, Judge, even the district court admitted 

that a jury could rationally infer that city officials worked behind 

the scenes to sabotage the promotional examinations because they 

knew that the exams—they knew that were the exams certified, 

the mayor would incur the wrath of Reverend Boise Kimber and 

other influential leaders of New Haven’s African American community. You decided that based on their claim of potential disparate 

impact liability that there was no recourse, that the city was justified in disregarding the exams and, thus, denying these fireVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00344 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
333 

fighters, many of whom suffered hardship in order to study and to 

prepare for these examinations and were successful, only to see 

that hard work and effort disregarded and not even acknowledged 

in the court’s opinion. And ultimately, as you know, the Supreme 

Court said that you just can’t claim potential disparate impact liability as a city and then deny someone a promotion based on the 

color of their skin. There has to be a strong basis in evidence. But 

you didn’t look to see whether there was a basis in evidence to the 

city’s claim. Your summary opinion, unpublished summary order, 

didn’t even discuss that. 

Don’t you think that these firefighters and other litigants deserve 

a more detailed analysis of their claims and an explanation for why 

you ultimately denied their claim? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As you know, the court’s opinion, issued after 

discussions en banc, recognized, as I do, the hardship that the firefighters experienced. That’s not been naysayed by anyone. 

The issue before the court was a different one, and the one that 

the district court addressed was what decision the decision makers 

made, not what people behind the scenes wanted the decision makers to make, but what they were considering. And what they were 

considering was the state of the law at the time. And in an attempt 

to comply with what they believed the law said and what the panel 

recognized as what the Second Circuit precedent said, that they 

made a choice under that existing law. 

The Supreme Court in its decision set a new standard by which 

an employer and lower court should review what the employer is 

doing by the substantial evidence test. That test was not discussed 

with the panel. It wasn’t part of the arguments below. That was 

a decision by the Court, borrowing from other areas of the law and 

saying we think this would work better in this situation. 

Senator CORNYN. My time is up. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

I will put in the record a letter of support for Judge Sotomayor’s 

nomination from the United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce on behalf of its 3 million Hispanic-owned business members, 

16 undersigned organizations, including the El Paso Hispanic 

Chamber of Commerce, Greater Dallas Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the Houston Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the Odessa 

Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, and a similar letter from the Arizona Hispanic Chamber of Commerce. I had meant to put those in 

the record before. We will put them in the record now. 

[The letters appear as a submission for the record.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I would offer a letter for the 

record from the National Rifle Association in which they express 

serious concern about the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor. 

Also I noticed that the head of that organization, Mr. LaPierre, 

wrote an article this morning raising increased concern after yesterday’s testimony, and I would also offer for the record a letter 

from Mr. Richard Land, of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, also raising concerns. 

Chairman LEAHY. Without objection, those will be made part of 

the record. 

[The letters appear as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Do you have anything else? 

334 

Senator SESSIONS. Nothing else. 

Chairman LEAHY. I will yield to Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge Sotomayor, 

good morning. Welcome back to our committee. I just want you to 

know that the baseball fans of Baltimore knew there was a judge 

somewhere that changed in a very favorable way the reputation of 

Baltimore forever. You are a hero and they now know it is Judge 

Sotomayor. You are a hero to Baltimore baseball fans. 

Let me explain. The major league baseball strike, you allowed 

the season to continue so Cal Ripken could become the iron man 

of baseball in September 1995. So we just want to invite you—as 

a baseball fan, we want to invite you to an Orioles game and we 

promise it will not be when the Yankees are playing, so you can 

root for the Baltimore Orioles. 

[Laughter.] 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That’s a great invitation, and good morning, 

Senator. You can assure your Baltimore fans that I have been to 

Camden Yards. It’s a beautiful stadium. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, we think it is the best. Of course, it was 

the beginning of the new trends of baseball stadiums, and you are 

certainly welcome. 

Before this hearing, the people of this country knew that the 

president had selected someone with incredible credentials to be a 

Supreme Court member. Now, they know the person is able and is 

capable and understands the law and has been able to understand 

what the appropriate role is for a judge in interpreting the law and 

has done very well in responding to the members of the U.S. Senate, which I think bodes well for your interaction with attorneys 

and your colleagues on the bench in having a thorough discussion 

of the very important issues that will affect the lives of all people 

in our nation. 

I do want to, first, start with the judicial temperament issue and 

the reference to the Almanac on the Federal Judiciary. I just really 

want to quote from other statements that were included in that almanac, where they were commenting about you and saying that 

she is very good, she is bright, she is a good judge, she is very 

smart, she is frighteningly smart, she is intellectually tough, she 

is very intelligent, she has a very good commonsense approach to 

the law, she looks at the practical issues, she is good, she is an exceptional judge overall, she is engaged in oral argument, she is well 

prepared, she participates actively in oral argument, she is extremely hardworking and well prepared. 

And I want to quote from one of the judges on your circuit, Judge 

Miner, who was appointed by President Reagan, when he said, ‘‘I 

don’t think I go as far as to classify her in one camp or another. 

I think she just deserves the classification of an outstanding 

judge.’’ 

I say that because maybe you would like to comment to these 

more favorable comments about how the bar feels about your service on the bench. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I thank those who have commented in the 

way they did. I think that most lawyers who participate in argument before me know how engaged I become in their arguments 

and trying to understand them. And as I indicated yesterday, that 

335 

can appear tough to some people, because active engagement can 

sometimes feel that way. 

But my style is to engage as much as I can so I can ensure myself that I understand what a party is intending to tell me. I am, 

in terms of what I do, always interested in understanding, and so 

that will make me an active participant in argument. 

As I noted yesterday, I have colleagues who never ask questions. 

There are some judges on the Supreme Court who rarely ask questions and others ask a lot of questions. Judges approach issues in 

different ways, with different styles, and mine happens to be on 

one end of the style and others choose others. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I thank you for that response. I agree 

with you that the Constitution and Bill of Rights are timeless documents and have served our nation well for over 200 years and are 

the envy of many other nations. 

Now, there are many protections in the Constitution, but I would 

like to talk a little bit about civil rights and the basic protections 

in our Constitution and how we have seen a progression in the 

Constitution and Bill of Rights through constitutional amendments, 

including the 13th, 14th, 15th and 19th, through congressional action, through the passage of such bills as the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Supreme Court decisions that 

we have talked about that have changed civil rights in America 

and made it possible for many people to have the opportunities of 

this country that otherwise would have been denied. 

We have made a lot of progress since the days of segregated 

schools and restrictions on people’s opportunities to vote. But I 

think we would all do well to remember the advice given to us by 

our colleague, Senator Edward Kennedy, the former chairman of 

this Committee, as we talk about the civil rights struggle; he says, 

‘‘The work goes on, the cause endures, the hope still lives, and the 

dream shall never die.’’ 

So I say that as an introduction to one area of civil rights, and 

that is the right to vote, a fundamental right. My own experience 

in 2006, that is just a few years ago, causes me to have concerns. 

In my own election, I found that there were lines longer in the African-American precincts to vote than in other precincts, and I was 

curious as to why this took place. They did not have as many voting machines. There were a lot of irregularities, and it caused a lot 

of people who had to get back to work to be denied their right to 

participate. 

We also found, on election day, fraudulent sample ballots that 

were targeted to minority voters in an effort to diminish their importance in the election. I mention that because that happened not 

50 years ago, but happened just a few years ago. 

Congress renewed the Voting Rights Act by rather large votes, 

98–0 in the U.S. Senate, 390–33 in the House of Representatives; 

this reflects a clear intent of Congress to continue to protect voters 

in this country. 

In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. 

Holder, one justice on the court, in dictum, challenged Congress’ 

authority to extend the civil rights case. Now, I say that knowing 

your view about giving due deference to Congress, particularly as 

it relates to expanding and extending civil rights protections. 

336 

So my question to you is tell me a little bit about your passion 

for protecting the right to vote, to make sure that the laws are enforced as Congress intended, to guarantee to every American the 

right to participate at the voting place. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. When we speak about my passion, I don’t 

think that the issue of guaranteeing each citizen the right to vote 

is unique to me or that it’s different among any Senator or among 

any group of people who are Americans. 

It is a fundamental right and it is one that you’ve recognized, 

Congress has addressed for decades and has done an amazing job 

in passing a wide variety of statutes in an effort to protect that 

right. 

The question that a court would face in any individual situation 

is whether an act of Congress conflicts with some right of either 

the state or an individual with respect to the issue of voting. There 

could be other challenges raised on a wide variety of different 

bases, but each case would present its own unique circumstance. 

There is one case involving the Voting Rights Act where I addressed the issue of the right to vote and in that case, I issued a 

dissent on an en banc ruling by my court. For the public who may 

not understand what en banc ruling means, when the whole court 

is considering an issue. 

In that case, if it wasn’t 13, it may have been 12 members of the 

court, we’re a complement of 13 judges, but I, right now, can’t remember if we were a full complement at the time, considering an 

issue. The majority upheld a state regulation barring a group of 

people from voting. 

I dissented on a very short opinion, one-paragraph opinion, saying, ‘‘These are the words of Congress in the statute it passed, and 

the words are that no state may impose a—and I’m paraphrasing 

it now. I’m not trying to read the statute, but no condition or restriction on voting that denies or abridges the right to vote on the 

basis of race. 

I noted that given the procedural posture of that case, that the 

plaintiff had alleged that that’s exactly what the state was doing, 

and I said that’s the allegation on the complaint. That’s what a 

judge has to accept on the face of the complaint. We’ve got to give 

him a chance to prove that, and that, to me, was the end of the 

story. 

To the extent that the majority believed that—and there was a 

lot of discussion among the variety of different opinions in the case 

as to whether this individual could or could not prove his allegation 

and there was a suggestion by both sides that he might never be 

able to do it. 

My point was a legal one. These are Congress’ words. We have 

to take them at their word. And if there’s an end result of this 

process that we don’t like, then we have to leave that to Congress 

to address that issue. We can’t fix it by ruling against what I 

viewed as the express words of Congress. 

Senator CARDIN. Let me use your quote there, because I thought 

it was particularly appropriate. You said, ‘‘I trust the Congress 

would prefer to make needed changes itself rather than have the 

courts do so for it,’’ and I think the members of this Committee 

would agree with you. 

337 

As you responded to Senator Grassley in regard to the 

Riverkeeper case, you said you give deference to Congress. I think 

we all share that. One of my concerns is that we are seeing judicial 

activism in restricting the clear intent of Congress in moving forward on fundamental protections. 

Let me move, if I might, to the environment, which is an area 

that is of great concern to all of us. In the past 50 years, Congress 

has passed important environmental laws, including the Clean Air 

Act, the Clean Water Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, 

the Endangered Species Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and 

Superfund. 

Despite the progress we have made over the years, it is important that we keep advancing the protections in our environment. 

During your testimony yesterday, you made it clear that you understand that Senators and Members of Congress elected by the 

people are the ones making policy by passing laws and you also 

made it clear that judges apply the laws enacted and that they 

should do so or least they should do so with deference to the intent 

of Congress. 

Yet, we have seen, in recent decisions of the Supreme Court, like 

the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Corps of 

Engineers and Rapanos v. United States, that they have forced the 

EPA to drop more than 500 cases against alleged polluters. 

These decisions have impact and it is clear to many of us that 

they reject longstanding legal interpretations and ignore the 

science that served as the foundations for the laws passed by Congress and the intent of Congress to protect American people by providing them with clean water, clean air and a healthy environment. 

As a Senator from Maryland, I am particularly concerned about 

that as it relates to the efforts that we are making on the Chesapeake Bay. 

Now, I understand that these decisions are now precedent and 

they are binding and that it may very well require the Congress 

to pass laws further clarifying what we meant to say so that we 

can try to get back on track. I understand that. 

But I would like you to comment and, I hope, reinforce the point 

that you have said that in reaching decisions that come to the 

bench, whether they are environmental laws or other laws to protect our society, you will follow the intent of Congress and will not 

try to supplant individual judgment that would restrict the protections that Congress has passed for our community. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I believe my cases, my entire record shows 

that I look at the acts of Congress, as I think the Supreme Court 

does, with deference, because that is the bedrock of our constitutional system, which is that each branch has a different set of constitutional powers; that deference must be given to the rights of 

each branch in each situation; that it is exercising its powers; and, 

to the extent that the court has a role, because it does have a role, 

to ensuring that the Constitution is followed, it attempts to do that. 

When I say ‘‘attempt,’’ but it always attempts it with a recognition of the deference it owes to the elected branches in terms of setting policy and making law. 

338 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you for that response. Let me turn, if I 

might, to our personal backgrounds. There has been a lot of discussion here about what each of us brings to our position in public life. 

Progress for women in this country has not come easily or quickly. At one time, women could not vote, could not serve on juries, 

could not hold property. I sit here today wanting to feel confident 

that the Supreme Court and its justices who make key decisions 

on women’s rights in society will act to ensure continued progress 

for equality between men and women. 

Now, we all agree that in rendering an individual decision, gender or ethnic backgrounds should not affect your judgment. There 

is an importance to diversity which I think we have all talked 

about. Each of us brings our life experiences to our job. 

Your life experience at Princeton, I think, serves as an example. 

You attended the school that F. Scott Fitzgerald 90 years ago called 

‘‘the pleasantist country club in America,’’ with very restrictive 

policies as to who could attend Princeton University. By 1972, your 

freshman class, it was a different place, but still far from where it 

should be. 

And I admire your efforts to change that at Princeton and you 

were actively involved in improving diversity at that school, and 

Princeton is a better place today because of your efforts. 

I think of my own experiences at law school, University of Maryland Law School, which denied admission to Thurgood Marshall 

and, in my class, had very few women. Times have changed. 

Justice Ginsberg said, referring to the importance of women on 

the bench, ‘‘I think the presence of women on the bench made it 

possible for the courts to appreciate earlier than they might otherwise that sexual harassment belongs under Title 7.’’ 

So on behalf of myself, on behalf of my daughter and two granddaughters, I want to hear from you the importance of different 

voices in our schools, in our Congress, and on the Supreme Court 

of the United States as to how having diversity, the importance of 

diversity, and your views as to what steps are appropriate for government to take in helping to improve diversity. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Your comments about your daughter and 

granddaughter makes me remember a letter I received when I was 

being nominated to the circuit court. It was from a woman who 

said she had 19 daughters and grandchildren and how much pride 

she took in knowing that a woman could serve on a court like the 

second circuit. 

And I realized then how important the diversity of the bench is 

to making people feel and understand the great opportunity American provides to all its citizens, and that has value. That’s clear. 

With respect to the issue of the question of what role diversity 

serves in the society, it harkens back almost directly to your previous question. I’ve been overusing that word ‘‘harkens,’’ sorry. It 

almost comes around to your earlier question, which is that issue 

is one that starts with the legislative branches and the government, the executive bodies, and employers who look at their workforce, that look at the opportunities in society, and make policy decisions about what promotes that equal opportunity in the first instance. 

339 

The court then looks at what they have done and determines 

whether that action is constitutional or not. And with respect at 

least to the education field, in a very recent set of cases, the Supreme Court looked at the role of diversity in educational decisions 

as to which students they would admit, and the court upheld the 

University of Michigan’s law school admissions policy, which 

would—because the school believed that it needed to promote as 

wide a body and diverse a body of students to ensure that life perspectives, that the experience of students would be as fulsome as 

they wished. 

And they used race there as one of many factors, but not one 

that compelled individual choices of the student. The court upheld 

that. And Justice O’Connor, in the opinion she wrote, authored, expressed the hope that in 25 years, race wouldn’t even need to be 

considered. 

In a separate case, the University of Michigan’s undergraduate 

admissions policy, the court struck that down and it struck it down 

because it viewed the use of race as a form of impermissible quota, 

because it wasn’t based on an individual assessment of the people 

applying, but as an impermissible violation of the equal protection 

clause and of the law. 

These situations are always looked at individually and, as I said, 

in the context of the choices that Congress, the executive branch, 

an employer is making and the interest that it’s asserting and the 

remedy that it’s creating to address the interest it’s trying to protect. All of that is an individual question for the courts. 

Senator CARDIN. And you need to look at all the facts in reaching 

those decisions, which you have stressed over and over again. I 

want a justice who will continue to move the court forward in protecting those important civil rights. 

I want a justice who will fight for people like Lawrence King, 

who, at the age of 15, was shot in school because he was openly 

gay. I want a justice who will fight for women like a 28-year-old 

Californian who was gang raped by four people because she was a 

lesbian. And I want a justice who will fight for people like James 

Byrd, who was beaten and dragged by a truck for two miles because he was black. So we need to continue that focus. 

You talked about race and I think about the Gant case, where 

a 6-year-old black child was removed from school and was treated 

rather harshly with racial harassment. And in your dissent, you 

stated that the treatment this lone black child encountered during 

his brief time in Cook Hill’s first grade to have been not merely arguable, unusual, indisputable discretion, but unprecedented and 

contrary to the school’s established policy. 

Justice Blackmun spoke, ‘‘In order to get beyond racism, we first 

must take an account of race.’’ And if you ignore race completely, 

aren’t you ignoring facts that are important in a particular case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, it depends on the context of the case 

that you’re looking at. In the Gant case, for example, there were 

a variety of different challenges brought by the plaintiff to the conduct that was alleged the school had engaged in. I joined the majority in dismissing some of the claims as not consistent with law. 

But in that case, there was a disparate treatment element and 

I pointed out to the set of facts that showed or presented evidence 

340 

of that disparate treatment. That’s the quote that the quote that 

you were reading from, that this was a sole child who was treated 

completely different than other children of a different race in the 

services that he was provided with and in the opportunities he was 

given to remedy or to receive remedial help. 

That is obviously different, because what you’re looking at is the 

law as it exists and the promise that the law makes to every citizen of equal treatment in that situation. 

Senator CARDIN. I agree. I think you need to take a look at all 

the facts and circumstances and to ignore race, you are ignoring an 

important fact. 

Let me talk a little bit about privacy, if I might. Justice Brandeis 

describes privacy as the right to be left alone. In other words, if we 

must restrict this right, it must be minimal and protections must 

occur before any such action occurs. 

The Supreme Court has advanced rights of privacy in the Meyer 

case and the Loving case, which established the fundamental rights 

of persons to raise families and to marry whom they please, regardless of race; the Lawrence case, which held that states cannot criminalize homosexual conduct; Griswold, which held that allowed for 

family planning as a fundamental right; and, of course, Roe v. 

Wade, which gave women the right to control their own bodies. 

I just would like to get your assessment of the role the court 

faces on privacy issues in the 21st century, recognizing that our 

Constitution was written in the 18th century and the challenges 

today are far different than they were when the Constitution was 

written as it relates to privacy. The technologies are different today 

and the circumstances of life are different. 

How do you see privacy challenges being confronted in the 21st 

century in our Constitution and in the courts? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The right to privacy has been recognized, as 

you know, in a wide variety of circumstances for more than probably 90 years now, close to 100. That is a part of the court’s precedence in applying the immutable principles of the Constitution, the 

liberty provision of the due process clause, and recognizing that 

that provides a right to privacy in a variety of different settings. 

You have mentioned that line of cases and there are many others 

in which the court has recognized that as a right. 

In terms of the coming century, it’s guided by those cases, because those cases provide the courts precedence and framework, 

and with other cases, to look at how we will consider a new challenge to a new law or to a new situation. 

That’s what precedent’s do. They provide a framework. The Constitution remains the same. Society changes. The situations it 

brings before courts change, but the principles are the words of the 

Constitution guided by how precedence gives—or has applied those 

principles to each situation and then you take that and you look 

at the new situation. 

Senator CARDIN. In the time that I have remaining, I would like 

to talk about pro bono. I enjoyed our conversation when you were 

in my office talking about your commitment to pro bono. I think, 

as attorneys, we all have a special responsibility to ensure equal 

justice and that requires equal access. 

341 

The Legal Aid lawyers, per capita, are about 61 per 6,800. For 

private attorneys, it is one per 525. This is not equal justice under 

the law as promised by the etching on the entrance to the United 

States Supreme Court. 

Now, it makes a difference if you have a lawyer. If you have a 

lawyer, you are more likely to be able to save your home, to get 

the health care that you need, to be able to deal with consumer 

problems. 

I had the honor of chairing the Maryland Legal Services Corporation. I chaired a commission that looked into legal services in 

Maryland. I am proud of the fact that we helped establish, at the 

University of Maryland Law School and University of Baltimore 

Law School, required clinical experiences for our law students so 

they not only get the experience of handling the case, but understand the need to deal with people who otherwise could not afford 

an attorney. 

Congress needs to do more in this area. There is no question 

about that, and I am hopeful that we will reauthorize the Legal 

Service Act and provide additional resources. But I would like to 

get your view as to what is the individual responsibility of a lawyer 

for equal justice under the law, including pro bono, and how you 

see the role of the courts in helping to establish the efforts among 

the legal community to carry out our responsibility. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I know that there’s been a lot of attention 

paid to one speech and its variants that I’ve given. If you look at 

the body of my speeches, public service and pro bono work is probably the main topic I speak at—I speak about. 

Virtually every graduation speech I give to law students, speeches I’ve given to new immigrants being sworn in as citizens, to community groups of all types is the importance of participation in 

bettering the conditions of our society, active involvement in our 

communities. 

It doesn’t have to be active involvement in politics. I tell people 

that. Just get involved in your community, work on your school 

boards, work in your churches, work in your community to improve 

it. 

The issue of public service is a requirement under the code of the 

American Bar Association. Virtually every state has a requirement 

that lawyers participate in public service in some way. I have given 

multiple speeches in which I’ve talked to law school bodies and 

said, ‘‘Make sure your students don’t leave your school without understanding the critical importance of public service in what they 

do as lawyers.’’ 

In that, we are in full agreement, Senator. To me, that’s a core 

responsibility of lawyering. Our founding fathers, they became 

what they became, our founding fathers, because of their fundamental belief of involvement in their society and public service, and 

it’s, to me, a spirit that is the charge of the legal profession, because that’s what we do, we help people; in a different way than 

doctors do, but helping people receive justice under the law is a 

critical importance of our work. 

Senator CARDIN. Very, very well said. I look forward to working 

with Congress and the courts in advancing a strategy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

342 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin. 

Senator Coburn. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d ask unanimous 

consent to put an article from the newspaper this morning, The 

Washington Times. 

Chairman LEAHY. Without objection it will be placed in the 

record. 

Senator COBURN. Welcome again. First of all, let me apologize to 

you because I was not able to hear, although I got to read some 

of your testimony yesterday. We have a schedule that says we must 

finish health care within a certain time whether we get it right or 

wrong, we’ve got to get it done in a certain time. And so I was involved with that and I apologize. 

No. 2 is I apologize to you for the outbursts that have occurred 

in this committee. Anybody who values life like I do and who is 

pro-life recognizes that the way you change minds is not yell at 

people, you love them and you care about their concerns and you 

create to a level of understanding, not condemnation. So for that, 

I apologize. I admire your composure and I thank the Chairman 

and the Ranking Member for the way they handled that as well. 

I want to spend a few moments with you, but I kind of want to 

change the tone here a little bit in terms of what we talk about. 

A lot of Americans are watching this hearing and when I get together with a couple of doctors, they don’t understand half of what 

I say. When two lawyers talk, most of us who aren’t lawyers, like 

I’m not, have trouble following. So I want us to use words that the 

American people can truly understand as I both ask you questions 

and as you answer them. I will try to do that and I hope that you 

will as well because I think it benefits our country to do that. 

You have been asked a lot of questions about abortion and you 

have said that Roe v. Wade has set a law. Where are we today? 

What is the settle law in America about abortion? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can speak to what the court has said in its 

precedent. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the court reaffirmed 

the court holding of Roe v. Wade that a woman has a constitutional 

right to terminate her pregnancy in certain circumstances. 

In Casey, the court announced that in reviewing state regulations 

that may apply to that right, that the court considers whether that 

regulation has an undue burden on the woman’s constitutional 

right. That is my understanding of what the state of the law is. 

Senator COBURN. Let me give you a couple of cases. Let’s say I’m 

38 weeks pregnant and we discover a small spina bifida sac on the 

lower sacrum, the lower part of the back on my baby and I feel like 

I just can’t handle a child with that. 

Would it be legal in this country to terminate that child’s life? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can’t answer that question in the abstract 

because I would have to look at what the state of the state’s law 

was on that question and what the state said with respect to that 

issue. 

I can say that the question of the number of weeks that a woman 

is pregnant has been approached to looking at a woman’s act as 

was changed by Casey. The question is is the state regulation regulating what a woman does an undue burden. And so I can’t answer 

343 

your hypothetical because I can’t look at it as an abstract without 

knowing what state laws exist on this issue or not. 

And even if I knew that, I probably couldn’t opine because I’m 

sure that situation might well arise before the court. 

Senator COBURN. Well, does technology in terms of the advancement of technology, should it have any bearing whatsoever on the 

way we look at Roe v. Wade? For example, published reports most 

recently of a 21-week, 21-week, that’s 142 days, fetus alive and well 

now at 9 months of age with no apparent complications because the 

technology has advanced so far that we can now save children who 

are born prematurely at that level. 

Should that have any bearing as we look at the law? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The law has answered a different question. It 

has talked about the constitutional right of women. 

Senator COBURN. I understand that. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In certain circumstances. As I indicated, the 

issue becomes one of what is the state regulation in any particular 

circumstance. 

Senator COBURN. I understand. But all I’m asking is should it 

have any bearing? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can’t answer that in the abstract because 

the question as it would come before me wouldn’t be in the way 

that you form it as a citizen. It would come to me as a judge in 

the context of some action that someone is taking, whether if it is 

the state, the state, if it is a private citizen being controlled by the 

state challenging that action. Those issues are—— 

Senator COBURN. But viability is a portion of a lot of that, and 

a lot of the decisions have been made based on liability. If we now 

have liability at 21 weeks, why would that not be something that 

should be considered as we look at the status of what can and cannot happen in terms of this right to privacy that has been granted 

in Roe v. Wade? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. All I can say to you is what the court has 

done. 

Senator COBURN. Right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And the standard that the court has applied, 

what factors it may or may not look at within a particular factual 

situation can’t be predicted in a way to say yes, absolutely, that’s 

going to be considered. No, this won’t be considered. 

Senator COBURN. All I’m asking is whether it should. Should viability, should technology at any time be considered as we discuss 

these very delicate issues that have such an impact on so many 

people. Your answer is that you can’t answer it. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can’t because that’s not a question that the 

court reaches out to answer. That is a question that gets created 

by a state regulation of some sort or an action by the state that 

may or may not according to some claimant, place an undue burden on her. 

We don’t make policy choices in the court. We look at the case 

before us with the interests that are argued by the parties, look at 

our precedent and try to apply its principles to the arguments parties are raising. 

Senator COBURN. I’m reminded of one of your coats that says you 

do make policy and I won’t continue that. 

344 

I’m concerned and I think many others are. Does a state legislature have the right under the Constitution to determine what is 

death? Have we statutorily defined, and we have in 50 states and 

most of the territories, what is the definition of death. You think 

that’s within the realm of the Constitution that states can do that? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It depends on what they are applying that 

definition to. So there are situations in which they might and situations where that definition would or would not have applicability 

to the dispute before the court. 

All state action is looked at within the context of what the state 

is attempting to do and what liabilities it is imposing. 

Senator COBURN. But you would not deny the fact that states do 

have the right to set up statutes that define, that give guidance to 

their citizen, what constitutes death. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I said, it depends on in what context they 

are attempting to do that. 

Senator COBURN. They are doing it so they limit the liability of 

others with regard to that decision which would inherently be the 

right of a state legislature as I read the Constitution. You may 

have a different response to that. 

Which brings me back to technology again. As recently as 6 

months ago, we now record fetal heartbeats at 14 days post conception, we record fetal brain waves at 39 days post conception. I don’t 

expect you to answer this, but I do expect you to pay attention to 

it as you contemplate these big issues. 

We have this schizophrenic rule of the law as we have defined 

death as the absence of those, but we refuse to define life as the 

presence of those. 

All of us are dependent at different levels on other people during 

all stages of our development from the very early in the womb, outside of the womb, to the very late. It concerns me that we are so 

inaccurate, or inaccurate is an improper term. Inconsistent in 

terms of our application of logic. 

You said that Roe v. Wade did set a law yesterday and I believe 

it is settled under the basis of the right to privacy which has been 

there. So the question I’d like to turn to next is in your ruling, the 

Second Circuit ruling, and I’m trying to remember the name of the 

case, Maloney, the position was that there is not an individual fundamental right to bear arms in this country. Is that a correct understanding of that? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. 

Senator COBURN. Okay. Please educate me if you would. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, it 

recognized an individual rights to bear arms as a right guaranteed 

by the second amendment, an important right, and one that limited 

the actions the Federal Government could take with respect to the 

position of firearms. In that case we are talking about handguns. 

The Maloney case presented a different question. That was 

whether that individual right would limit the activities that states 

could do to regulate the possession of firearms. That question is addressed by a legal doctrine. 

That legal doctrine uses the word fundamental, but it doesn’t 

have the same meaning that common people understand that word 

345 

to me. To most people the word by its dictionary term is critically 

important, central, fundamental, it is sort of rock basis. 

Those meanings are not how the law uses that term when it 

comes to what the states can do or not do. The term has a very 

specific legal meaning which means is that amendment of the Constitution incorporated against the states. 

Senator COBURN. Through the Fourteenth Amendment? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And others. But generally, and I shouldn’t 

say and others, through the 14th. The question becomes whether 

and how that amendment to the Constitution, that protection, applies or limits the states to act. 

In Maloney, the issue for us was a very narrow one. We recognized that Heller held, and it is the law of the land right now in 

the sense of precedent that there is an individual right to bear 

arms as it applies to Federal Government regulation. 

The question in Maloney was different for us. Was that right incorporated against the states. We determined that given Supreme 

Court precedent, a precedent that had addressed that precise question and said it is not, so it wasn’t fundamental in that legal doctrine sense, that was the court’s holding. 

Senator COBURN. Did the Supreme Court say in Heller that it 

was not, or did they just fail to rule on it? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, they failed to rule on it, you’re right. 

But I—— 

Senator COBURN. There is a very big difference there. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I agree. 

Senator COBURN. Let me continue with that. So I sit in Oklahoma in my home, and what we have today as law on the land as 

you see it is I do not have a fundamental incorporated right to bear 

arms, as you see the law today. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It is not how I see the law. 

Senator COBURN. Well, as you see the interpretation of the law. 

In your opinion of what the law is today, is my statement a correct 

statement? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, it’s not my interpretation. I was applying 

both Supreme Court precedent deciding that question and Second 

Circuit precedent that had directly answered that question and 

said it’s not incorporated. 

The issue of whether or not it should be is a different question, 

and that is the question that the Supreme Court may take up. In 

fact, in his opinion, Justice Scalia suggested it should, but it is not 

what I believe. It is what the law has said about it. 

Senator COBURN. So what does the law say today about the 

statement? Where do we stand today about my statement that I 

have—I claim to have a fundamental, guaranteed, spelled out right 

under the Constitution that is individual and applies to me the 

right to own and bear arms. Am I right or am I wrong? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can’t answer the question of incorporation 

other than to refer to precedent. Precedent says—— 

Senator COBURN. I understand. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. As the Second Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s precedent—— 

Senator COBURN. I understand. 

346 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. That it is not incorporated. It is 

also important to understand that the individual issue of a person 

bearing arms is raised before the court in a particular setting. 

Senator COBURN. Context, yes. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And by that, I mean what the court will look 

at is a state regulation of your right and then determine can the 

state do that or not. So even once you recognize a right, you are 

always considering what the state is doing to limit or expand that 

right and then decide is that Okay constitutionally. 

Senator COBURN. It is very interesting to me. I went back and 

read the history of the debate on the Fourteenth Amendment, and 

for many of you who don’t know, what generated much of the Fourteenth Amendment was in reconstruction. Southern states were 

taking away the right to bear arms by freed men, recently freed 

slaves. 

Much of the discussion in the Congress was to restore that right 

of the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment to 

restore an individual right that was guaranteed under the Constitution. 

So one of the purposes for the Fourteenth Amendment, one of the 

reasons it came about is because those rights were bring abridged 

in the southern states post Civil War. 

Let me move on. In the Constitution we have the right to bear 

arms. Whether it is incorporated or not, it is stated there. I’m having trouble understanding how we got to a point where a right to 

privacy which is not explicitly spelled out but it spelled out to some 

degree in the Fourth Amendment, which has set a law and is fixed, 

and something such as the Second Amendment which is spelled out 

in the Constitution has not set a law and fixed. 

I don’t want you to answer that specifically. What I would like 

to hear you say is how did we get there? How did we get to the 

point where something that is spelled out in our Constitution isn’t 

guaranteed to us, but something that isn’t spelled out specifically 

in our Constitution is? 

Would you give me your philosophical answer? I don’t want to tie 

you down on any future decisions, but how did we get there when 

we can read this book and it says certain things and those aren’t 

guaranteed, but the things that it doesn’t say are? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. One of the frustrations with judges and their 

decisions by citizens is that, and this was an earlier response to 

Senator Cornyn. 

What we do is different than the conversation that the public has 

about what it wants the law to do. We don’t, judges, make law. 

What we do is we get a particular set of facts presented to us, we 

look at what those facts are, what in the case of different constitutional amendments is, what states are deciding to do or not do, and 

then look at the Constitution and see what it says and attempt to 

take its words and the principles and the precedents that have described those principles and apply them to the facts before you. 

In discussing the Second Amendment as it applied to the Federal 

Government, Justice Scalia noted that there had been long regulations by many states on a variety of different issues related to the 

possession of guns. 

347 

He wasn’t suggesting that all regulation was unconstitutional. 

He was holding in that case that DC’s particular regulation was illegal. 

As you know, there are many states that prohibit felons from 

possessing guns. So does the Federal Government. So it’s not that 

we make a broad policy choice and say this is what we want, what 

judges do. What we look at is what other actors in the system are 

doing, what their interest in doing it is and how that fits to whatever situation they think they have to fix, what Congress or state 

legislature has to fix. 

All of that is the court’s function. So I can’t explain it philosophically. I can only explain it by its setting and what the function of 

judging is about. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. Let me follow up with one other 

question. 

As a citizen of this country, do you believe innately in my ability 

to have self-defense of myself? Personal self-defense. Do I have a 

right to personal self-defense? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I’m trying to think if I remember a case 

where the Supreme Court has addressed that particular question. 

Is there a constitutional right to self-defense? I can’t think of one. 

I could be wrong, but I can’t think of one. 

Generally, as I understand, most criminal law statutes are 

passed by states. I’m also trying to think if there is any Federal 

law that includes a self-defense provision or not. I just can’t. 

What I was attempting to explain is the issue of self-defense is 

usually defined in criminal statutes by the state’s laws. I would 

think, although I haven’t studied all of the state’s laws. I’m intimately familiar with New York. 

Senator COBURN. But do you have an opinion or can you give me 

your opinion of whether or not in this country I personally as an 

individual citizen have the right to self-defense? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I said, I don’t know. I don’t know if that 

legal question has been ever presented. 

Senator COBURN. I wasn’t asking about the legal question. I’m 

asking about your personal opinion. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. But that is sort of an abstract question with 

no particular meaning to me outside of—— 

Senator COBURN. Well, I think that’s what American people want 

to hear, Your Honor. They want to know, do they have a right to 

personal self-defense. Could the Second Amendment mean something under the Fourteenth Amendment? Does what the Constitution, how they take the Constitution, not how our bright legal 

minds, but what they think is important. 

Is it Okay to defend yourself in your home if you’re under attack? 

In other words, the general theory is do I have that right? And I 

understand if you don’t want to answer that because it might influence your position that you might have in a case, and that’s a fine 

answer with me. Those are the kinds of things that people would 

like for us to answer and would like to know. 

Not how you would rule or what you are going to rule, and specifically what you think about it, but just yes or no. Do we have 

that right? 

348 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I know it’s difficult to deal with someone like 

a judge who is so sort of—whose thinking is so cornered by law. 

Senator COBURN. I know. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Could I—— 

Senator COBURN. Kind of like a doctor. I can’t quit using doctor 

terms. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That’s exactly right. But let me try to address 

what you are saying in the context that I can, which is what I have 

experience with, which is New York criminal law because I was a 

former prosecutor. 

I am talking in very broad terms, but under New York law, if 

you are being threatened with imminent death or very serious injury, you can use force to repel that. That would be legal. 

The question that would come up and does come up before juries 

and judges is how imminent is the threat? If the threat was in this 

room, I’m going to come get you and you go home and get, or I go 

home, I don’t want to suggest I am by the way. Please, I don’t want 

anybody to misunderstand what I’m trying to say. 

If I go home, get a gun, come back and shoot you, that may not 

be legal under New York law because you would have alternative 

ways to defend—— 

Senator COBURN. You will have lots of explaining to do. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I’d be in a lot of trouble then. But I couldn’t 

do that under a definition of self-defense. So that is what I was trying to explain in terms of why in looking at this as a judge, I’m 

thinking about how that question comes up and how the answer 

can differ so radically given the hypothetical facts before you. 

Senator COBURN. The problem is we doctors think like doctors. 

It is hard to get out of the doctor’s skin. Judges think like judges, 

lawyers think like lawyers. 

What American people want to see is inside, what your gut says. 

Part of that is why we are having this hearing. 

I want to move to one other area. You have been fairly critical 

of Justice Scalia’s criticism of the use of foreign law in making decisions. I would like for you to cite for me either in the Constitution 

or in the oath that you took outside of treaties the authority that 

you can have to utilize foreign law in deciding cases in a court’s 

law in this country. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I have actually agreed with Justice Scalia 

and Thomas on the point that one has to be very cautious even in 

using foreign law with respect to the things American law permits 

you to. That is in treaty interpretation or in conflicts of law because it is a different system of law. 

Senator COBURN. But I accepted that. I said outside of those. In 

other areas where you will sit in judgment, can you cite for me the 

authority either given in your oath or the Constitution that allows 

you to utilize laws outside of this country to make the decisions 

about laws inside this country? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. My speech and my record on this issue, because I have never used it to interpret the Constitution or to interpret American statute is that there is none. My speech has made 

that very clear. 

349 

Senator COBURN. So you stand by it. There is no authority for 

a Supreme Court Justice to utilize foreign law in terms of making 

decisions based on the Constitution or statutes? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Unless the statute requires you or directs you 

to look at foreign law, and some do by the way, the answer is no. 

Foreign law cannot be used as a holding or a precedent or to bind 

or to influence the outcome of a legal decision interpreting the Constitution or American law that doesn’t direct you to that law. 

Senator COBURN. Well, let me give you one of your quotes. ‘To 

suggest to anyone that you can outlaw the use of foreign or international law is a sentiment that is based on a fundamental misunderstanding. What you would be asking American judges to do 

is to close their mind to good ideas. Nothing in the American legal 

system prevents us from considering those ideas.’ 

We don’t want judges to have closed minds, just as much as we 

don’t want judges to consider legislation and foreign law that is developed through bodies, elected bodies outside of this country to influence either rightly so or wrongly so, against what the elected 

representatives and Constitution of this country says. 

So would you kindly explain the difference that I perceive in both 

this statement versus the way you just answered? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. There is none. If you look at my speech, you 

will see that repeatedly I pointed out both that the American legal 

system was structured not to use foreign law, it repeatedly underscored that foreign law could not be used as a holding as precedent 

or to interpret the Constitution of the statute. 

What I pointed out to in that speech is that there is a public misunderstanding of the word use. What I was talking about, one 

doesn’t use those things in the sense of coming to a legal conclusion 

in a case. 

What judges do, and I cited Justice Ginsburg, is educate themselves. They build up a story of knowledge about legal thinking, 

about approaches that one might consider. But that is just thinking. It’s an academic discussion when you’re talking about thinking 

about ideas. Then it is how most people think about the citation 

of foreign law in a decision. 

They assume that if there is a citation to foreign law, that is 

driving the conclusion. In my experience when I have seen other 

judges cite foreign law, they are not using it to drive the conclusion, they are using just to point something out about a comparison 

between American law or foreign law. But they are not using it in 

the sense of compelling a result. 

Senator COBURN. I’m not sure I agree with that on certain 

Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment cases. 

Let me go to another—I have just a short period of time. Do you 

feel—it has been said that we should worry about what other people think about us in terms of how we interpret our own law, and 

I’m paraphrasing not very well I believe. 

Is it important that we look good to people outside of this country? Or is it more important that we have a jurisprudence that is 

defined correctly and followed correctly according to our Constitution? And whatever the results may be, it is our result rather than 

a politically correct result that might please other people in the 

world? 

350 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. We don’t render decisions to please the home 

crowd or any other crowd. I know that because I have heard 

speeches by a number of Justices, that in the past, Justices have 

indicated that the Supreme Court hasn’t taken many treaty cases, 

that maybe it should think about doing that because we are not 

participating in the discussion among countries on treaty positions 

that are ambiguous. 

That may be a consideration to some Justices. Some have expressed that as a consideration. My point is you don’t rule to please 

any crowd. You rule to get the law right under its terms. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Coburn. 

Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome 

again, Your Honor. I have to say, before I get into the questions 

that I have for you, that I, like many, many, many Americans, feel 

enormous pride that you are here today. And I was talking with 

some friends in Providence when I was home about your nomination, and I said, ‘‘It actually gives me goose bumps to think about 

the path that has brought you here today and, more importantly, 

to think about’’—because it is not about you—more important to 

think what that means about America, that path. And they said, 

‘‘No, no. You can’t say ‘goose bumps.’ You have to say ‘piel de 

gachina.’ ’’ And so I promised them that I would, so I am keeping 

that promise right now. 

But I want to tell you that I think in the way you have handled 

yourself in this Committee so far, you have done nothing but to 

vindicate and reinforce the pride that so many people feel in you. 

And I hope that as this process continues—I know these days are 

long, and it can be a bit of an order—I hope that you very much 

feel buoyed and sustained by that pride and that optimism and 

that confidence that people across this country feel for you and that 

so many people in this room feel for you. So I wanted to say that. 

I also wanted to fulfill another promise, which is the one I made 

to you, that in my opening statement I said I would ask you to 

make a simple pledge, and that simple pledge is that you will decide cases on the law and the facts before you; that you will respect 

the role of Congress as representatives of the American people; 

that you will not prejudge any case, but will listen to every party 

that comes before you; and that you will respect precedent and 

limit yourself to the issues that the Court must decide. 

May I ask you to make that pledge? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can. That’s the pledge I would take if I 

was—that I took as a district court judge, as a circuit court judge, 

and if I am honored to be confirmed by this body, that I would take 

as a Supreme Court Justice, yes. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you. 

Some of my colleagues have raised questions about your role at 

the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund many years 

ago before you left that organization to become a Federal trial 

judge in 1992, I guess it was. I just want to clarify. That was clearly a part of your history and your package that came to the Senate 

at the time of those confirmations, when you were confirmed both 

351 

in 1992 and 1997, so this is nothing new to the Senate. Is that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That’s correct. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And in terms of the way that the Puerto 

Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund operated, you were a 

member of the board. Is that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I was. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Did the attorneys for the Puerto Rican 

Legal Defense and Education Fund make it a practice to vet their 

legal filings with the board first? Did the board approve individual 

briefs and arguments that were made by attorneys for the organization? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, because most of us on the board didn’t 

have civil rights experience. I had actually—when I was a prosecutor in private practice, that wasn’t my specialty of law. Even if 

they tried to show it to me, I don’t know that I could have made 

a legal judgment even if I tried. That was not our function. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And I think that is customary in charitable organizations for the board not to sign off specifically on 

briefs and other legal filings that the attorneys make. Certainly in 

the years I have spent on the boards of charitable organizations, 

it has never been something presented to me. So I appreciate that. 

In 1992 and in 1997, when the Senate was, again, fully aware 

of all that, was there, to your recollection, the objection made in 

those confirmations? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t believe any question was asked about 

my service on the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund. 

The fund is an organization that has and has been considered in 

the mainstream of civil rights organizations like the NAACP and 

the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, promotes the civil rights of its community. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Let me turn to some more general questions, if I may, and one has to do with the role of the jury—not just 

in trials. Obviously, you are eminently familiar with the role of juries in trials. I think you will be the only member of the United 

States Supreme Court, if you are confirmed, to actually have had 

Federal trial judge experience, which I think is a valuable attribute. But I am not thinking so much about the role of the jury 

in the courtroom as I am about the role of the jury in the American 

system of government. 

When the Constitution was set up, as you know so well, the 

Founders made great efforts to disaggregate power, to create 

checks and balances, and the matrix of separated powers that they 

created has served us very, very well. 

In the course of that, or as a part of that, the Founders also revealed some very strongly felt concerns about the hazards of both 

unchecked power and of the vulnerability of the legislative and executive branches to either corruption or to being consumed and 

overwhelmed by passing passions. And I would love to hear your 

thoughts on the importance of the jury in that American system of 

Government, and if you could, with particular reference to the concerns of the Founders about the vulnerabilities of the elected 

branches. 

352 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Like you, I am—and perhaps because I was 

a State prosecutor and I have been a trial judge, and so I’ve had 

very extensive experience with jury trials in the American criminal 

law context. I have had less in the civil law context as a private 

practitioner, but much more as a district court judge. 

I can understand why our Founding Fathers believed in the system of juries. I have found in my experience with juries that virtually every juror I have ever dealt with, after having experienced 

the process, came away heartened, more deeply committed to the 

fundamental importance of their role as citizens in that process. 

Every juror I ever dealt with showed great attention to what was 

going on, took their responsibilities very seriously. 

I had a juror who was in the middle of deliberations, on her way 

to my courtroom—not on her way to my courtroom—on her way 

home from court on the previous day broke her leg, was in the hospital the entire night, came back the next morning on time, in a 

wheelchair, with a cast that went up to her hip. What a testament 

both to that woman and to the importance of jury service to our 

citizens. I was very active in ensuring that her service was recognized by our court. 

It has a central role. Its importance to remember is that it hasn’t 

been fully incorporated against the States. Many States limit jury 

trials in different ways. And so the question of what cases require 

a jury trial and what don’t is still somewhat within the discretion 

of States. But it is a very important part of a sense of protection 

for defendants accused in criminal cases, and one that I personally 

value from my experience with it. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And does the Founders’ concern about the 

potential vulnerabilities or liabilities about the elected branch illuminate the importance of the jury system? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, I—as I see the jury system, I don’t 

know exactly—I don’t actually—and I’ve read the Federalist Papers 

and I’ve read other historical accounts. The jury system was—I 

thought the basic premise of it was to ensure that a person subject 

to criminal liability would have a group of his or her peers pass 

judgment on whether that individual had violated the law or not. 

To the extent that the Constitution looked to the courts to determine whether a particular act was or was not constitutional, it 

seems to me that that was a different function than what the jury 

was intended to serve. The jury, as I understood it, was to ensure 

that a person’s guilt or innocence was determined by a group of 

peers. To the extent that that has a limit on the elected branches, 

it’s to ensure that someone is prosecuted under the law and that 

the law is applied to them in the way that the law is written and 

intended. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And where the jury requirement applies to 

civil trials, the argument would be the same. Correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Again, on the question of the American 

system of Government, how would you characterize the Founders’ 

view of any exercises of unilateral or unchecked power by any of 

the three branches of Government in the overall scheme? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The Constitution by its terms sets forth the 

powers and limits of each branch of Government, and so to the exVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00364 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
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tent that are limits recognized in the Constitution, that is really 

what the Constitution intends. The Bill of Rights, the Amendments 

set forth there are often viewed as limits on Government action. 

And so it’s a question always of looking at what the Constitution 

says and what kind of scope it is for a Government action at issue. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Would you feel, in light of all of the attention—very, very careful and thoroughly thought out attention—that 

the Constitution gives to establishing and enforcing a whole variety 

of different checks and balances among the different powers of Government, that a judge who was presented with an argument that 

a particular branch of Government should exercise or have the authority to exercise unilateral unchecked power in a particular area 

should approach that argument with a degree of heightened caution or attention? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The best framework that has been set out on 

this question of a unilateral act by one branch or another—but usually the challenge is raised when the Executive is doing something, 

because the Executive executes the law, takes the action, typically. 

The best description of how to approach those questions was done 

by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in the Youngstown 

case. And that opinion laid out a framework that generally is applied to all questions of Executive action, which is that you have 

to look at the powers of each branch together. You have to start 

with what has Congress said, express or implicitly. And if it’s authorized to do something, to let the President do something, then 

the President’s acting at the height of his powers. If Congress has 

implicitly prohibited—expressly or implicitly prohibited something, 

then the President’s acting at the lowest ebb of his powers. 

There is a zone of twilight, which is the zone in between, which 

is: Has Congress said something or not said something? 

In all of the situations, once you’ve looked at what Congress has 

done or not done, you then are directed to look at what the President’s powers may be under the Constitution minus whatever powers Congress has in that area. So the whole exercise is really, in 

terms of Congress and the Executive, an exercise of the two working together. And, in fact, that’s the basic structure of our system 

of Government. That’s why Congress makes the laws. The President can veto them, but he can’t make them. He can regulate if the 

Congress gives him the authority to do so, and within other delegated authorities or—I shouldn’t use the word ‘‘delegated’’ because 

it has a legal meaning. But the point is that that question is always looked at in light of what Congress has said on the issue and 

in light of Congress’ power as specified in the Constitution. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Let me change to a more law enforcementoriented topic. I appreciate, first of all, very much your service in 

District Attorney Morgenthau’s office. It is an office that prosecutors around the country look at with great pride and sense of its 

long tradition and of the very great capability of the prosecutors 

who serve in it. It is a very proud office, and I am delighted that 

you served there, and I think it says a great deal about you that, 

coming out of law school and college with the stellar academic 

record that you had and an entire world of opportunities open to 

you, you chose that rather poorly paid office. And since you have 

met 89 of us, I doubt you remember all of our conversations, but 

354 

when you and I had the chance to meet, we compared who had the 

worst office as a new prosecutor, and I think you won. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And so it was a very important moment 

for, at that point, a quite new lawyer to make a very significant 

statement about who you were and what your purpose was. And 

so I very much appreciate that you made that choice, and I think 

prosecutors like my colleagues Senator Klobuchar and many others 

around this country, our Chairman, Senator Leahy, made that 

choice over the years, and it is one that I think merits a salute. 

One of the things that prosecutors have to deal with all the time 

is search and seizure and warrants, and my question has to do 

with the warrant requirement under the Constitution. I see the 

Constitution as being changeless, timeless, and immutable. What 

changes is society, as you pointed out in your testimony earlier, 

and technology. And so new questions arise, and I would be interested in your reaction to the difference between the experience of 

society and the technology of society when the Founders set up the 

warrant requirement originally, and today. 

When the Founders set up the warrant requirement originally, 

when the sheriff or somebody went to seize property, to bring it in 

as evidence for a trial or to condemn it as contraband, that was 

sort of the end of it. If it was evidence, when it was done it was 

returned and went back; particularly papers were returned, and 

that was the end of it. Then came the Xerox machine, and now the 

Government could make copies of what they took, and it was returned, as always, just as the Founders had intended, but copies 

were sprinkled throughout Government files, very often ones that 

ended up in archives buildings in dusty boxes that would have 

taken enormous effort to locate. But, nevertheless, they remained 

available. 

And nowadays, with electronic databases and electronic search 

functions, matters that once would have been returned to the individual and that envelope of privacy that was opened by the warrant would have been closed again are now potentially eternally 

available to Government, eternally searchable, and it raises some 

very interesting privacy questions that we will have to face in this 

Congress and in this Senate as we begin to take on issues particularly of cyber security, cyber attack, cyber terrorism, and take advantage of what technology can bring to bear in the continued 

struggle against terrorist extremists. 

So I would be interested in your thoughts on how the Constitution, which is unchanged through all of that, what analysis you 

would go through to see whether the change from a quickly opening and closing privacy envelope to one that is now essentially open 

season forever, how would you go about analyzing that as a judge, 

given that the Constitution is a fixed document? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I think, as I understand your question, Senator, that there are two issues—if not more, but the two that I note 

as more starkly for me in your question is the one of the search 

and seizure and the Fourth Amendment as it applies to taking evidence from an individual and use it against him or her in a current 

proceeding. 

355 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Yes, which is a constant. That stayed the 

same. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That is the structure. 

Not so long ago, the Supreme Court dealt with a technologically 

new situation, which was whether an individual had a right to expect a warrant to be gotten before law enforcement flew over his 

or—I think it was a ‘‘his’’ in that case—his home and took readings 

of the thermal energy emanating from his home, and then going in 

to see if the person was growing marijuana. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. The FLIR case. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Exactly. And in that case, the reason for that 

case is that apparently—I’m not an expert in marijuana growing, 

but apparently, when you’re growing marijuana, there’s certain 

heating lights that you need. At least that’s what the case was describing. And it generates this enormous amount of heat that 

wouldn’t generally come from a home unless you were doing something like this. 

And what the Court did there—in an opinion by Justice Scalia, 

I believe it was—is it looked at the embedded questions of privacy 

in the home that underlied the unreasonable search and seizure, 

and the Court there, as I mentioned, determined that acts taken 

in the privacy of one’s home would commonly not be expected to 

be intruded upon unless the police secured a warrant. And to the 

extent that the law had generally recognized that if you worked actively to keep people out of your home—you locked your windows, 

you locked your doors, you didn’t let people walk by and peek 

through, you didn’t stand at your front door and show people what 

you were doing—that you were exhibiting your expectation of privacy. 

And to the extent that new technology had developed that you 

wouldn’t expect to intrude on that privacy, then you were protected 

by the Warrant Clause, and the police had an obligation to go talk 

to a magistrate and explain to them what their evidence was and 

let the magistrate—I use ‘‘the magistrate’’ in that more global 

sense. It would be a judge, but you would let a judge decide whether there was probable cause to issue the warrant—reasonable suspicion, probable cause—probable cause to issue the warrant. 

That’s how the courts addressed the unreasonable—or have addressed, the Supreme Court has, the unreasonable search and seizure, and balance the new technology with the expectations of privacy that are recognized in the Fourth Amendment. 

Yes, I thought a separate question which in my mind is different 

than the right to privacy with respect to personal information that 

could be otherwise available to the public as a byproduct of a criminal action or as a byproduct of your participation in some regulated 

activity of the Government. There are situations in which, if your 

industry is regulated, you are going to make disclosures to the Government, and then the question becomes how much and what circumstances can then Government make copies, put it in an electronic data base or use it in another situation. 

So much of that gets controlled by the issues you are saying Congress is thinking about, which is, What are people’s rights of privacy in their personal information? Should we as Congress as a 

matter of policy regulate that use? 

356 

The Court itself had been commanded by Congress to look at certain privacy information of individuals and guard it from public 

disclosure in the data bases you are talking about. So we have been 

told, ‘‘Don’t go using somebody’s Social Security number and putting it in a data base.’’ That is part of a public document, but we 

have been told, ‘‘Don’t do that.’’ And there is a reason for that: because there is not only the issues of identity theft but other harms 

that come to people from that situation. 

So that broader question, as we many, is not one that one could 

talk about a philosophy about. As a judge, you have to look at the 

situation at issue, think about what Congress has said about that 

in the laws, and then consider what the Constitution may or may 

not say on that question, depending on the nature of the claim before the Court. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Your Honor, I thank you. I wish you well. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And I congratulate you on your appearance before this Committee so far. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Whitehouse, thank you. I appreciate 

the comments getting into the area of criminal law. 

Of course, Senator Whitehouse has served as both a U.S. Attorney and as an Attorney General and brings a great depth of knowledge, as do several on both the Republican and Democratic side, to 

this Committee. And I also appreciate you taking less than your 

time. I hope maybe you will be setting a standard as we go forth. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LEAHY. We will take a 15-minute break. 

[Recess at 11:35 a.m. to 11:53 a.m.] 

Chairman LEAHY. There has been an interest expressed by—I 

was going to say by all the Senators, but most Senators have left 

the hearing room. Do not think that does not mean that there is 

not going to be more questions, Judge, because there will be this 

round and another round and if it is a case of all the questions having been asked, but not everybody has asked all the questions, 

some will come back and ask them again. 

What we are going to do, we are going to have Senator Klobuchar and Senator Kaufman ask questions. We will then break for 

lunch. We will then have Senator Specter and Senator Franken ask 

questions. I am saying this for the purpose, also, of those who have 

to schedule and plan. 

We will take a break for lunch after these two Senators. We will 

then go into the traditional closed door session, which will be held 

in the Senate Judiciary Committee room. 

So, Senator Klobuchar, we seem to be heavy on prosecutors here. 

She is also a former prosecutor. I yield to you. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good 

afternoon, Judge. Thank you, again, for all of your patience and 

your thoughtful answers. Really, everyone has been focusing on you 

sitting there. I have been focusing on how patient your mother has 

been through this whole thing, because I ran into her in the restroom just now and, I can tell you, she has a lot she would like to 

say. She has plenty of stories that she would like to share about 

you. I thought I might miss my questioning opportunity. 

357 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, don’t give her the chance. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. But I was thinking she is much more patient than my mother has been, who has been waiting for this moment, for me to ask these questions, and leaving messages, like, 

‘‘How long do these guys have to go on? ’’ 

My favorite one, the recent one, was, ‘‘I watched Senator Feinstein and she was brilliant. What are you going to do? ’’ So let us 

move on. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. We should introduce our mothers. Okay? 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Exactly. I have some quick questions here 

at the beginning just to follow-up on some of the issues raised by 

my colleagues. Senator Coburn was asking you about the Heller 

case and Second Amendment issues, and I personally agree with 

the Heller case. But I remember that yesterday that you said that 

in Maloney, your second circuit case, that you were bound by precedent in your circuit, but that you would keep an open mind if the 

Supreme Court takes up the question of whether the Second 

Amendment can be incorporated against the states. Is that right? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes, Senator. I take every case case-by-case 

and my mind is always open and I make no prejudgments as to 

conclusions. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Okay. Then a follow-up on a question that 

Senator Whitehouse was asking you about the Puerto Rican Legal 

Defense Fund. You were on that board. One just minor follow-up. 

But isn’t it true that the ABA, that their code of conduct, the 

American Bar Association code of conduct bars board members 

from engaging in litigation because of a lack of an actual lawyerclient relationship? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Then, finally, just one point. We have heard 

so much about your speech in which you used the phrase ‘‘wise 

Latina,’’ and I am not going to go over that again. But I did want 

to note for the record that you made a similar comment in another 

speech that you gave back in 1994, which you have provided not 

only in this proceeding, but you also provided it when you came before the Senate for confirmation to the circuit court in 1997 and 

1998. 

No Senator at that time—do you remember them asking you 

about it or making any issue about it at the time? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. All right. Thank you. Now, we can move on 

to what I want to talk about, which is your work as a criminal 

prosecutor. Senator Whitehouse initially asked a few questions 

about that. 

You were quoted in the New York Times a while back about your 

time there and you said, ‘‘The one thing I have found is that if you 

come into the criminal justice system on a prosecutorial or defense 

level thinking that you can change the ills of society, you are going 

to be sorely disappointed. This is not where those kinds of changes 

have to be made.’’ 

Do you want to elaborate on that a little bit? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. By the time a criminal defendant ends up in 

court, they’ve been shaped by their lives. If you want to give people 

the best opportunity of success at life, it’s a message I deliver freVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00369 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
358 

quently to my community, it has to be through early childhood forward. 

If you’re waiting to do that once they’re before a judge in court, 

your chances of success have diminished dramatically. And so one 

of my messages in many of my speeches to my community groups 

is pay attention to education. 

It’s the value mom taught me, but her lesson was not lost on me 

when I became a prosecutor and it’s a lesson that I continue to promote, because I so fervently believe it. 

The success of our communities depends on us improving the 

quality of our education of our children and parental participation 

in ensuring that that happens in our society. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. It also reminded me of that comment about 

some of the comments you have made about the limited roles, that 

a prosecutor has one role, and the limited role that a judge may 

have to respect that judicial role of not making the laws, but interpreting the laws. Would that be a correct summary? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That is. In the statement I made to the newspaper article, I was focusing on a different part of that, but it is. 

As a prosecutor, my role was not to look at what I thought the punishment should have been, because that was set in law. 

Sentences are set by Congress within statutory ranges, and my 

role was to prosecute on behalf of the people of the State of New 

York. And that role is different than one that I would do if I were 

a defense attorney, whose charge is to do something else to ensure 

that a defendant is given a fair trial and that the government has 

proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 

But we cannot remedy the ills of society in a courtroom. We can 

only apply the law to the facts before us. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I think Justice Ginsberg made a similar 

comment in an article this weekend, in an interview she did, as she 

was talking about—this was her exact quote, ‘‘The legislature can 

make the change, can facilitate the change, as laws like the Family 

Medical Leave Act do’’—she was talking about family arrangements—‘‘but it is not something a court can decree.’’ ‘‘A court can’t 

tell the man,’’ she said, ‘‘ ‘you’ve got to do more than carry out the 

garbage.’ ’’ 

I thought that was another way of—you do not have to comment 

on that, but it was another way of making the same point. 

The other thing that I wanted to focus on was just that role as 

a prosecutor, some of the difficult decisions you have to make about 

charging cases, for instance. Sometimes you have to make a difficult decision to charge a family member maybe in a drunk driving 

case where someone kills their own child because they were drunk 

or you have to make a decision when the court of public opinion 

has already decided someone is guilty, but you realize you do not 

have enough evidence to charge the case. 

Do you want to talk about maybe a specific example of that in 

your own career as a prosecutor or what goes into your thinking 

on charging? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I was influenced so greatly by a television 

show in igniting the passion that I had as being a prosecutor, and 

it was Perry Mason. For the young people behind all of you, they 

may not even know who Perry Mason was. 

359 

But Perry Mason was one of the first lawyers portrayed on television and his storyline is that in all of the cases he tried, except 

one, he proved his client innocent and got the actual murderer to 

confess. 

In one of the episodes, at the end of the episode, Perry Mason, 

with the character who played the prosecutor in the case, were 

meeting up after the case and Perry said to the prosecutor, ‘‘It 

must cause you some pain having expended all that effort in your 

case to have the charges dismissed.’’ And the prosecutor looked up 

and said, ‘‘No. My job as a prosecutor is do justice and justice is 

served when a guilty man is convicted and when an innocent man 

is not.’’ 

And I thought to myself that’s quite amazing to be able to serve 

that role; to be given a job, as I was, by Mr. Morgenthal, a job I’m 

eternally grateful to him for, in which I could do what justice required in an individual case. 

And it was not without bounds, because I served a role for society and that role was to ensure that the public safety and public 

interests were fully represented. But prosecutors, in each individual case, at least in my experience particularly under the tutelage of Mr. Morgenthal, was we did what the law required within 

the bounds of understanding that our job was not to play to the 

home crowd, not to look for public approval, but to look at each 

case, in some respects, like a judge does, individually. 

And that meant, in some cases, bringing the tough charge, and 

I was actually known in my office for doing that often, but that’s 

because I determined it was appropriate often. But periodically, I 

would look at the quality of evidence and say there’s just not 

enough. 

I had one case with an individual who was charged with committing a larceny from a woman and his defense attorney came to me 

and said, ‘‘I never ever do this, but this kid is innocent. Please look 

at his background. He’s a kid with a disability. Talk to his teachers. Look at his life. Look at his record. Here it is,’’ and he gave 

me the file. 

Everything he said was absolutely true. This was a kid with not 

a blemish in his life. And he said, ‘‘Please look at this case more 

closely.’’ And I went and talked to the victim and she—I had not 

spoken to her when the case was indicted. This was one of those 

cases that was transferred to me, and so it was my first time in 

talking to her, and I let her tell me the story and it turned out she 

had never seen who took her pocketbook. 

In that case, she saw a young man that the police had stopped 

in a subway station with a black jacket and she thought she had 

seen a black jacket and identified the young man as the one who 

had stolen her property. 

The young man, when he was stopped, didn’t run away. He was 

just sitting there. Her property wasn’t on him. And he had the 

background that he did. And I looked at that case and took it to 

my supervisor and said, ‘‘I don’t think we can prove this case.’’ And 

my supervisor agreed and we dismissed the charges. 

And then there are others that I prosecuted, very close cases, 

where I thought a jury should decide if someone was guilty and I 

prosecuted those cases and, more often than not, got conviction. 

360 

My point is that that is such a wonderful part of being a prosecutor. That TV character said something that motivated my 

choices in life and something that holds true. 

And that’s not to say, by the way, and I firmly, firmly believe 

this, defense attorneys serve a noble role, as well. All participants 

in this process do, judges, juries, prosecutors and defense attorneys. 

We are all implementing the protections of the Constitution. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. That was very well said. I want 

to take that pragmatic experience that you had not just as a civil 

litigator, but also as a prosecutor. A lot has been said about whether judges’ biases or their gender or their race should enter into decision making. 

I actually thought that Senator Schumer did a good job of asking 

you questions where, in fact, you might have been sympathetic to 

a particular victim or to a particular plaintiff, but you ruled 

against them. That actually gave me some answers to give to this 

baggage carrier that came up to me at the airport in Minneapolis. 

It was about a month ago, after you had just been announced, 

and he came up and he said, ‘‘Are you going to vote for that 

woman? ’’ At first, I did not even know what he was talking about. 

I said, ‘‘What? ’’ He said, ‘‘Are you going to vote for that woman? ’’ 

I said, ‘‘Well, I think so, but I want to ask her some questions.’’ 

He said, ‘‘Well, aren’t you worried that her emotions get in front 

of the law? ’’ I thought if anyone had heard the cases, the TWA 

case, where you decided against—had to make a decision from 

some very sympathetic victims, of families of people who had been 

killed in a plane crash, and a host of other cases where you put 

the law in front of where your sympathies lie, I think that would 

have been a very good answer to him. 

But another piece of it, but it is a very different part of it, is the 

practical experiences that you have had, the pragmatic works that 

you have done. I just wanted to go through some of the cases that 

you have had, the criminal cases that you have handled as a judge 

and talk to you a little bit about how that pragmatic experience 

might be helpful on the courts; not leading you to always side with 

the prosecution, obviously, but helping you to maybe ferret through 

the facts, as you have been known to be someone that really focuses on the facts. 

One of them is the United States v. Falso case and this is a case 

where child pornography was found in a guy’s home and on his 

computer. You ruled that although the police officers did not have 

probable cause for the search warrant, that the evidence obtained 

in the search, the child pornography and the computer, should still 

be considered under the good faith exception to the inclusionary 

rule, because the judge had not been knowingly misled. In other 

words, it was a mistake. 

Can you talk about that case and how perhaps having that kind 

of experience on the front line helps you to reach that decision, because there was someone, I believe, that dissented in that case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That case presented a very complicated question in second circuit law. There had been two cases addressing 

how much information a warrant has to contain and what kind in 

order for the police to search a defendant’s home or—I shouldn’t 

361 

say a home—a computer to see if the computer contained images 

of child pornography. 

The two cases—I should say the two panels—I wasn’t a member 

of either of those panels—had very extensive discussion about the 

implications of the cases because they involved the use of the Internet and how much information the police should or should not have 

before they looked to get a warrant to search someone’s computer, 

because the computer does provide people with freedom of speech, 

at least with respect to accessing information and reading it and 

thinking about it. 

In the case before me, I was looking at it in the backdrop of the 

conflict that it appeared to contain in our case law and what our 

case law said was important for a police officer to share with a 

judge and examined the facts before my case, looking at the information that the police had before them and considering whether, 

in light of existing second circuit law, as it addressed this issue, 

had the police actually violated the Constitution—I hope I can continue. 

Chairman LEAHY. You can continue. That was not a comment 

from above. I have certain powers as Chairman, but not that much. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Please go on. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Whether they should get a warrant or not. 

And one member of the court said yes and they had violated the 

Constitution and I joined that part of the opinion because I determined, examining all of the facts of that case and the law, that 

that was the way the law—the result the law required. 

But then I looked at what the principles underlying the unreasonable search and seizures are without a warrant and looked at 

the question of what was the doctrine that underlay there, and 

what doctrine it underlays is that you don’t want the police violating your constitutional rights without a good faith basis, without 

probable case. 

And that’s why you have a judge make that determination. It’s 

why you require them to go to a judge. And so what I had to look 

at was whether we should make the police responsible for what 

would have been otherwise a judge’s error, not their error. 

They gave everything they had to the judge and they said to the 

judge, ‘‘I don’t know.’’ Even if they thought they knew, that isn’t 

what commands the warrant. It’s the judge’s review. 

So I was the judge in the middle. One judge joined one part of 

my opinion. The other judge joined the other part of the opinion. 

And so I held that the act violated the Constitution, but that the 

evidence could still be used because the officers had—there was, in 

law, a good faith exception to the error in the warrant. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I think you made a similar finding with different underlying facts in United States v. Santa, when that involved a clerical error, and then that was a case where the underlying arrest warrant—where someone had been arrested, they 

found cocaine, and you allowed that in on the basis that the underlying arrest warrant, even though it was false, there had not been 

a warrant out there, it had been removed, that that was a clerical 

error and they could still use the cocaine. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, in fact, it’s a holding the Supreme 

Court—an issue the Supreme Court addressed just this term. 

362 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Exactly. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And came out—or I came out the way the Supreme Court did on that. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. The Herring case. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Yes. Very good. The piece of that case in 

the Supreme Court that is most interesting to me in terms of that 

issue we have been talking about, the practical knowledge and how 

that plays into decisions, is the Melendez-Diaz case, which you 

were not involved in. It was a U.S. Supreme Court case. 

But this is just from my own practical work as a prosecutor and 

it was a contested case with the Supreme Court. It did not divide 

ideologically. In fact, both Justice Breyer and Justice Roberts were 

in the dissent that Justice Kennedy wrote. It was a 5–4 decision. 

In that case, the issue was whether or not, with the confrontation clause, whether or not lab workers, crime lab workers should 

be called in to have to testify for drugs and what the tests showed 

within the drugs and things like that. 

I just wondered what your reaction was to that case, how you 

would have analyzed it. I agree with the dissent in that case. I 

think that this could really open up 90 years of precedent. I think 

it is unreasonable for what we should expect of the criminal justice 

system, and there has been some pretty strong language in the dissent of a fear that this will create some difficulty for prosecutors 

to follow through on their cases and get the evidence in. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It’s always difficult to deal with people’s disappointments about cases, particularly when they have personal 

experiences and have their own sense of the impact of a case. 

I was a former prosecutor, it’s difficult proving cases as it is, calling more witnesses adds some burdens to the process. But at the 

end, that case is a decided case and so it’s holding now. It is holding and that’s what guides the court in the future on similar 

issues, to the extent there can be some. 

As I said, I do recognize that there can be problems, as a former 

prosecutor, but that also can’t compel a result. And all of those 

issues have to be looked at in the context of the court’s evaluation 

of the case and the judge’s view of what the law permits and 

doesn’t permit. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I will say there was an interesting story a 

few weeks ago about jokes that you have been tenacious about getting to the bottoms of facts when you have cases and there were 

actually some experts that criticized you for spending too much 

time trying to figure out the facts, which I thought was a pretty 

unique criticism in the halls of criticism. 

In fact, you were defended by a former clerk to Clarence Thomas 

who said that you are extraordinarily thorough and a judge would 

ordinarily be praised for writing thorough opinions. 

So when we were talking about Melendez-Diaz and some of those 

issues, it seems to me that when you have looked at cases involving 

criminal justice or really any issue, whether it is that Vermont 

Ferry case that you did or other ones, you really did delve into the 

facts. 

Do you want to talk a little bit about why that is important? 

363 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The facts are the basis for the legal decision. 

A judge deals with a particular factual setting and applying the 

law to those facts. To the extent that there’s any criticism that I 

do that on the court of appeals, we’re not fact-finders, but we have 

to ensure that we understand the facts of the case to know what 

legal principle we’re applying it to. 

A judge’s job, whether it’s on the trial level, the circuit court or 

even the Supreme Court, is not to create hypothetical cases and answer the hypothetical case. It’s to answer the case that exists. 

And so in my view, and I’m not suggesting any justice does this 

or doesn’t do it, but I do think that my work as a state prosecutor 

and a trial judge sensitizes me to understanding and approaching 

cases starting from the facts and then applying the law to those 

facts as they exist. 

And, again, I don’t want to suggest that not all judges do that, 

but because I—because of my background, perhaps like Justice 

Souter, who also has the reputation of carefully looking at the facts 

and applying the law to the facts, it’s maybe that background that 

people are noticing and noticing where we picked up that habit. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Very good. In a report issued last week, 

The Transactional Record Access Clearinghouse, I did not know 

there was such a thing, found that you sent more convicts to prison 

and handed out longer sentences than your colleagues did when 

you were a district court judge. 

One statistic found that you handed out sentences of greater 

than 6 months to 48 percent of convicted criminals in white collar 

cases, while your colleagues gave out sentences of 6 months or 

more to just 36 percent. 

You were also twice as likely as your colleagues to send white 

collar criminals to 2 years or more in prison. I have found the 

white collar cases to be some of the most challenging cases that we 

had in our office when I was a prosecutor. They were challenging 

because there was oftentimes sympathy. 

Maybe this is dating myself, 10 years ago, there used to be more 

sympathy, but there was sympathy to people who were pilots. We 

had tax evasion cases with pilots or we had a judge that we prosecuted who had a half-day of his friends come and testify that he 

should not go to jail, including the former Miss America. 

So I have found those cases to be difficult. Could you talk a little 

bit about your view of sentencing, in general, and sentencing of 

white collar defendants, in particular? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It should be remembered that when I was a 

district court judge, the sentencing laws were different than they 

have become during my 12 years on the court of appeals. That— 

and it makes me sound ancient, but back in the days when I was 

a district court judge, the sentencing guidelines were focused on 

the amount of a fraud and didn’t consider the number of victims 

or the consequences on the number of victims of a crime. 

Perhaps because of my prosecutorial background, perhaps because I considered the perspective of prosecutors who came before 

me, that the guidelines—and their arguments—that the guidelines 

didn’t adequately consider the number of victims and that that 

should be a factor, because someone who commits 100,000 $1—not 

$1—$1,000 crimes may be as culpable as the person who does a 

364 

one-time act of $100,000, and depending on the victims and the impact on the victims. 

Those are factors that one should consider. And so many of the 

white collar sentences that you are talking about were focused on 

looking at the guidelines and what the guideline were addressing 

and ensuring that I was considering, as the sentencing statutes require the court to do, at all of the circumstances of the crime. 

I suspect that may drive one of the reasons why I may have 

given higher white collar crime sentences than some of my colleagues; not to suggest they didn’t listen to the argument, but they 

may have had a different perspective on it. 

I should tell you that my circuit endorsed that factor as a consideration under the guidelines, somewhat after I had started imposing sentences on this view, but they also agreed that this was a 

factor that courts could consider in fashioning a sentence. 

Crime is crime and to the extent that you’re protecting the interests of society, you take your cues from the statute Congress gives 

and the sentencing range that Congress sets. And so to the extent 

that in all my cases I balanced the individual sentence with, as I 

was directed to, the interests that society sought to protect, then 

I applied that evenhandedly to all cases. 

So it’s important to remember the guidelines were mandatory. 

And so I took my charge as a district court judge seriously at the 

time to only deviate in the very unusual case, which was permitted 

by the guidelines. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. What do you think about the change now 

that they are guidelines, suggested guidelines, and not mandatory? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As you know, there’s been a great number of 

cases in the Supreme Court, the Booker/Fanfan line of case. The 

Booker/Fanfan case determined they were guidelines. 

My own personal experience as an appellate judge is that because the Supreme Court has told the district courts to give serious 

consideration to the guidelines, there’s been a little bit—not a little 

bit—there’s been discretion given to district courts, but they are basically still staying within the guidelines and I think that’s because 

the guidelines prove useful as a starting point to consider what an 

appropriate sentence may be. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Just one last question, Mr. Chairman. All 

these guys have been asking about your baseball case and they 

have been talking about umpires and judges as umpires. 

Did you have a chance to watch the all-star game last night? Because most of America did not watch the replay of your hearing, 

they might have been watching it. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I haven’t seen television for a very long time. 

But I will admit that I turned it on for a little while last night. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Because I will say—and maybe you did not 

turn it on on this moment, but your Yankee, Derek Jeter, tied it 

up, but you must know that he scored only because there was a hit 

by Joe Mauer of the Minnesota Twins. I just want to point that 

out. 

All right. Thank you very much, Judge. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That’s what teamwork helps you with. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Okay. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. I am resisting any Red Sox comment. 

365 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I should beg you all not to hold that against 

me. 

Chairman LEAHY. I am not going to use that against you. I did 

see a photograph of the president throwing out the ball. I know the 

photographer well, and he did a very good shot of two pictures. 

Senator Kaufman is probably as knowledgeable as anybody on 

this Committee, having run it for years before becoming a Senator. 

I have said before, Judge, that Senators are merely constitutional 

requirements or impediments to the staff. We know who really 

runs the place. 

Senator Kaufman, it is over to you, sir. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. And I should make one announcement. You 

have been hearing some banging going on here. Apparently the air 

conditioning went out which will probably come as welcome news 

to some of the press who are freezing in the sky boxes up here. 

But it is not welcome news here with the crowd going on and 

they are working on it, but we are going to keep going as long as 

we can. Senator Kaufman? 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the toughest assignments—I have been here long enough to know the toughest assignment is to stand between the audience and lunch, so I 

am going to try to gear up under that. Good afternoon, Judge. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Good afternoon, Senator. It is good talking to 

you again. 

Senator KAUFMAN. It is good to see you. And I want to kind of 

take a different track. I think Senator Whitehouse and Senator 

Klobuchar talked a lot about your time as a prosecutor. I would 

like to move on to kind of your time as a commercial litigator. You 

were a prosecutor for 5 years, then you decided to go into commercial practice. 

What were the thoughts behind you deciding when you left the 

DA’s office to go into commercial practice? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, actually it is a continuation of what I 

explained to Senator Klobuchar. I had in the DA’s office realized 

that in the criminal law system, we could not affect changes of opportunity for people. We were dealing with a discreet issue and applying the law to the situation at hand. 

But if there was going to be an increase of opportunity for all 

people, that that had to involve an increase in economic opportunity and in economic development for different communities. 

So that in combination with my desire to broaden my own personal understanding of as many aspects of law as I could, I decided 

that I should change my focus and concentrate on commercial matters rather than criminal matters. 

It also guided much of the pro bono work I did thereafter which 

also involved questions of finances and economic opportunities. And 

so I served on the New York State Mortgage Board and the New 

York State Mortgage Office was involved in giving individuals affordable housing or loans for affordable housing. 

I was a board member of the New York City Campaign Finance 

Board. Those were activities that motivated in large measure because of my growing belief that economic opportunities for people 

were the way to address many of the growth needs of communities. 

366 

Senator KAUFMAN. Can you tell us a little bit about your commercial practice? What actually were you dealing with as a litigator? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It was a wonderful practice because unlike 

some of my law school friends, I very much wanted to go into a 

small law firm where I could have hands on practice. Having been 

a prosecutor and having made all of the decisions, individual decisions I made, I thought to myself as I was leaving the DA’s office, 

I do not think I can go to those firms where I would be the fifth 

guy on the totem pole, that I wanted to have more hands on experience. So I went to a smaller firm where I actually until I became 

a partner tended to work directly with the partner and would often 

counsel businesses. I did a wide variety of commercial issues. 

I was involved in grain commodity trading, people buying home 

grown grains of all kinds, you can name them all, including orange 

peels as feed for animals, and the contracts that they were involved 

in in doing those trades. 

Our firm represented a very impressive list of client, including 

Ferrari the car manufacturer. I did a great deal of their work as 

it related to their dealer relationships and to their customer relationships. So I involved myself in those commercial transactions 

which were different focus, different emphasis. 

I also represented—not me, but the firm, but I counseled the client on many of its dealer relations issue of Pirelli Tire Corporation. 

These are names I suspect many people know. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And from the fashion designer, and I think 

there are many people who know how famous that fashion house 

design is, had trademark questions. I participated with the partner 

who founded that practice within the law firm and she had a very 

untimely death. 

Actually she came from her home ill to vote on my partnership 

at the firm and I became a partner and a couple of months later, 

she passed away. But she had worked with me and introduced me 

to the intellectual property area of law. 

I worked on real estate matters, I worked on contract matters of 

all kinds, licensing agreements, financing agreements, banking 

questions. There was such a wide berth of issues that I dealt with. 

Senator KAUFMAN. And how did that practice help you on the 

District Court and then on the Circuit Court of Appeals? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Actually, one of the lessons I learned from my 

commercial practice, I learned in the context first of my grain commodity trading, but in the work as it related to all commercial disputes, one main lesson. 

In business, the predictability of law may be the most necessary 

in the sense that people organize their business relationships by 

how they understand the court’s interpret their contracts. 

I remember being involved in any number of litigations where at 

the end of the litigation as part of a settlement, I would draft up 

a settlement agreement between the parties. Quite often it involved 

creating an ongoing new business relationship or a temporary continuation of a business relationship until they could wind down. 

I would draft up the agreement like a litigator, like the judge I 

try to be. Say it in simple works. I would give it to my corporate 

367 

partners, and I should not say it this way. I would get back stuff 

that sometimes I would look at and say, what does this gobbly goop 

mean? They would laugh at me and say, it has meaning. This is 

how the courts have interpreted it. It is very important to the relationship of the parties that they know what the expectations are 

in law about their relationship. 

Then I understood why it was important to phrase things in certain ways. It made me very respectful about the importance of predictability in terms of court interpretation of business terms because that was very, very critical to organizing business relationships in our country. 

Senator KAUFMAN. The other basic job as a District Court judge 

is to kind of avoid trial, kind of get people settled before they get 

to trial. How did your commercial experience help you deal with 

that? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It is interesting because I remember one case, 

and I cannot give you details because I would be breaching confidentiality. 

But I remember a client coming in to me with a fairly substantial litigation and I looked at the client and I said, ‘‘I evaluated the 

case.’’ I said, ‘‘There are some novel theories here. I really think 

you can win, but there is a serious question about the cost to get 

there because these are all the things that we would have to do to 

get there and it is going to cost you,’’ it was millions of dollars that 

I estimated. 

The client went to another lawyer who gave them a different 

evaluation. They went with that other lawyer. My firm lost all that 

income. But the client came back afterwards. The figure I put on 

the litigation was exactly what they spent and more. 

Settlements are generally in the business world economic decisions, balancing both the cost of litigation and the right of the 

issue. But business has a different function than courts. Business 

function is to do business, to do their work, to sell products,—relationships and litigation are different. 

As a judge when I was a District Court judge, most of my focus 

was on doing what I used to do as a lawyer, to talk to parties not 

about the merits of their case, but about the consideration of thinking about creative and new ways to approach a legal dispute so 

they could avoid the cost of litigation. 

As a Circuit Court judge, I am very cognizant of the cost of litigation and look at what parties are doing in the courts below, bearing 

that in mind. 

Senator KAUFMAN. You talked about your experience as Circuit 

Court judge. How did your being a District Court judge help you 

when you became a Circuit Court judge? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, no question that it made me more sensitive to the importance of facts and looking at the facts the court 

has found and the facts that the parties are arguing and looking 

at the record to understand what went on. 

I often point to this example. When I sit on panels, and our court 

is blessed by having judges with a wide variety of circumstances. 

I know for me because I was a trial judge, I would read all the 

briefs in a case, I would read the District Court decision. 

368 

If parties were arguing something and the District Court didn’t 

address it, my first question to my law clerks were, go back to the 

record and tell me why not. Most judges address arguments that 

people are raising and I would get to oral argument and if I was 

the only judge with a trial experience, I would look at the parties 

and say, did you argue this before the District Court? 

I could see some of the antennas going up for those colleagues 

who hadn’t had that experience. They said, I never even thought 

of that. Look in fact if that was the case. 

There are all sorts of doctrines that do not permit parties to 

argue new things on appeal. And so that is how the experience 

comes in, both the sensitivity to facts and the sensitivity to ensure 

that you’re applying law to those facts. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I know you have this commercial experience 

because as I said in my opening statement, I am concerned about 

business cases. I think they are really important and I am also concerned that the current courts, being in court too often, seems to 

disregard law and congressional policy choices when it comes to 

business cases. 

I think in light of economic crisis, Congress probably, not probably, will definitely pass a financial regulatory reform package. 

I would just like to make sure that the system is not undermined 

by the court because they have a different view of what government regulation’s all about. 

Do you believe that Congress has the constitutional authority to 

regulate financial markets? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. You have just raised the very first question 

that will come up when Congress passes an Act. 

I can assure you, knowing every time that Congress passes an 

Act, there is a challenge by somebody. As soon as it is applied to 

someone in a way that they do not like, they are going to come into 

court. So I cannot answer that question. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I am sympathetic to that and I really should 

have phrased it—just in general. Not with regard to any case, anything at all about Congress’ constitutional authority to regulate financial markets. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, I cannot answer that question because 

it invites an answer to the potential challenge. 

What I can say to you is that Congress has certain constitutional 

powers. One of them is to pass laws affecting interstate commerce. 

So the question will be the nature of whatever statute Congress 

passes, what facts it relies upon and the remedy that it institutes. 

So the question would depend on the nature of the statute and 

what it is doing. 

Senator KAUFMAN. But Congress does basically have the ability 

to regulate markets. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, it has the ability to—the constitutional 

terms are to make laws that involve commerce between the states. 

Those are the words and generally that has been interpreted to 

mean pass laws that affect commercial interstate transaction. 

Senator KAUFMAN. To get to a more broader question about laws 

enacted by Congress, what should a judge’s role be in viewing the 

wisdom of the statute, in interpreting it? 

369 

When Congress passes a law, what is needed to whether the 

judge thinks it is a good law or bad law, the wisdom in passing it. 

What role does that play in the law? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I am trying to think if there is any situation 

in which a judge would have occasion to judge in that way. Policymaking, making of laws is up to Congress. A judge’s personal views 

as to whether that policy choice is good or bad has no role in evaluating Congress’ choice. 

The question for us is always a different one, which is what has 

Congress done? Is it constitutional in the manner in which it has 

done it. But policy choices are Congress’ choices. In all areas, deference has to be given to that choice. 

Senator KAUFMAN. How about regulation adopted by regulatory 

agencies? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Deference has been given in that area by the 

courts as well. Generally one looks at what Congress has said 

about that question because executive agencies have to apply and 

talk about regulations in light of what Congress has commanded. 

But those are also entitled to deference in different factual situations. 

Senator KAUFMAN. We’ve been talking for a few minutes about 

securities law. 

What characterizes the securities law docket in the southern district of New York in the Second Circuit? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Everything. We are the home of New York 

City. Our jurisdiction is, and I am sure that another state is going 

to complain, but we are the business capital of the world. That is 

how it has been described by others. 

So we deal with every variant of securities law as one could 

imagine, from investment questions to misleading statements to investors to whatever Congress has regulated, our circuit will have 

a case on it. Or I should say it usually starts with the District 

Courts and it will perk up to the Circuit Court. But if you have 

a securities law, we will likely eventually hear the argument. 

Senator KAUFMAN. And this will be valuable if you are confirmed. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I presume so because it has been a part of 

my work both as a District Court and a Circuit Court judge. 

Senator KAUFMAN. You had a case with a suit against the New 

York Stock Exchange where the plaintiff sued the New York Stock 

Exchange for failure to effectively regulate the market. 

You ruled to give the New York Stock Exchange immunity from 

the suit even though you noted that the alleged misconduct appeared egregious. 

To reach that sort of decision, how do you reconcile the rationale 

for immunity with the fact that it deprives the plaintiffs of a remedy in situations where they have been wronged? As you said, egregiously wronged. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It is somewhat important to recognize the 

limited role that courts serve and the issue of remedy also is one 

where one has to talk about remedy against whom and for what. 

In the ways that these individuals were injured, they were injured by third parties who had done allegedly illegal acts against 

them. The court’s ruling did not affect their ability to take action 

370 

against those individuals and clearly that is always difficult in 

some situations when the individual has been arrested, et cetera. 

But they are still remedies that law provides in terms of whatever 

assets those individuals have, whatever criminal actions the government may take, often funds are created to reimburse victims. 

The question here was whether an agency that in case law was 

seen to have a quasi governmental function, whether you could sue 

that agency for conduct that—for not regulating the other individuals adequately in helping to prevent the activity. 

But regulation comes in different forms by the quasi governmental agencies and what they can do depends on the exercise of 

discretion under the laws as they exist at the time. 

So the immunity doctrine wasn’t looking at the issue of how to 

recompense the individuals, it was looking at the quasi functions 

of government. So there is a different perspective that was given 

to the judges in that case. 

Senator KAUFMAN. In another securities case that interests me, 

Press v. Quake & Riley, in that case you and your fellow panel 

members deferred to the SEC’s interpretation of its own regulation 

even though you seemed somewhat skeptical of the interpretation. 

Tell us about how you came to the conclusion you did in that 

case. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, there is a doctrine of Chevron deference 

and it goes to the issue of who makes the decisions and that goes 

to policy questions. 

To the extent that an agency interpretation is not inconsistent 

with congressional commands, express commercial commands, a 

judge cannot substitute their own judgment of what policies should 

be or regulations should be, but is commended to give deference. 

There are obviously in every situation a set of exceptions to when 

you do not, but you have to then apply a consideration of each of 

those exceptions in the particular circumstance before you. 

There have been other situations in which I have ruled and said 

no, the agency is not interpreting the statute in accordance with 

what the panel viewed was Congress’ intent. Yesterday I believe 

one of the other Senators asked me about the Riverkeeper case. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The Supreme Court came to a different view 

of what the words Congress used meant. But the point is that the 

role of course is not to substitute their own judgments. It is to 

apply the principles of law in accordance with the acts that agencies are doing. 

Senator KAUFMAN. And one more securities question. In recent 

years it seems like regulators were often too lax when it came to 

ferreting out securities fraud. 

What role do the private rights of action, that is cases brought 

by investors rather than government have in enforcing our securities laws? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It is a right Congress has given presumably 

because Congress has made a policy choice that it is a way to ensure that individual’s injuries are remedied. 

That is a part of many of our securities laws and our anti-trust 

laws. Government doesn’t have unlimited resources to pursue all 

individual injuries. And so in some situations, Congress makes a 

371 

choice to grant a private cause of action and in some it doesn’t. 

That is a legislative choice. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Turning to the anti-trust law, what was your 

experience in the anti-trust law? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As a—— 

Senator KAUFMAN. Both in practice and a judge, both of them. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I am trying to think—I do not remember having direct experience in anti-trust law when I was in private practice. I do not think I did. So I had very little. 

I am trying to think of any of my cases on the District Court and 

major league baseball strike was one of them. It is the one that I 

can think of. 

I had anti-trust cases there as well. Often the cases settled actually, and so managing those cases was the prime function I had as 

a District Court judge. 

If you will give me a chance to look at my District Court decisions again to see if—and what other cases in the anti-trust area 

I may have ruled upon in District Court, I can get back to you, 

Senator, either at the next round or in a written question. I just 

do not—— 

On the Circuit Court it is different. I have participated directly 

in writing opinions and joining panels on opinions. So I’ve had at 

least two if not three or four or five of those cases. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Yesterday Senator Kohl asked about the 

Leegin case which is striking and it overturned 96 years of precedent that effectively legalized private agreements to prevent discount retailing. 

You said that both the majority and the—case had reason to 

question the economic theory underlining the original precedent. I 

do not want you to comment on Leegin in particular, but what is 

the role of the court in using economic theory to interpret acts of 

Congress? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, you do not use economic theory to determine the constitutionality of congressional action. That is a different question I think than the one that Leegin addressed. What 

Leegin addressed was how the court would apply congressional act, 

the anti-trust laws to a factual question before it. That’s a different 

issue because that doesn’t do with questioning the economic choices 

of Congress. That goes to whether or not in reviewing the action 

of a particular defendant what view the court is going to apply to 

that activity. 

In the Leegin case, the court’s decision was look, we have prior 

case law that says that this type of activity is always anti-competitive. The court in reconsidering that issue in the Leegin case said 

well, there has been enough presented in the courts below to show 

that maybe it is not in some activity as anti-competitive. So we are 

not going to subject it to an absolute bar, we are going to subject 

it to a review under rule of reason. 

That is why I said it is not a question of questioning Congress’ 

economic choices or the economic theories that underlay its decisions in a legislation. They weren’t striking down the anti-trust 

laws. 

What the court was trying to do was figure out how it would 

apply that law to a particular set of facts before it. 

372 

Senator KAUFMAN. In Illinois Brick, a Supreme Court case dealing with anti-trust law, one of the classic cases, Justice White 

wrote, ‘‘You can say whether to overturn precedent, we must bear 

in mind the considerations of Stare Decisis weigh heavily in the 

area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change 

this court’s interpretation of its legislation.’’ 

Do you agree with Justice White? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I think that that—as you may know, the doctrine of Stare Decisis is not dependent on one factor. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The court considers a variety of different factors, including the administrative workability of a law, the reliance 

factor that society has put into that rule, that precedent, the cost 

to change it, whether the underlying doctrines in related areas, the 

underlying framework of related areas would lead a court to question whether the prior precedent really has a framework that’s consistent with an understanding in this area that has been developed 

in other cases. And finally, has there been a change in society that 

shows that the factual findings upon which the older case was premised may be wrong. 

There is always the question as part of that analysis and other 

factors the courts may think about as to whether the older rule has 

been affirmed by the court and how often, over what period of time. 

To the extent that Justice White is talking about a factor that 

the court should put into that mix, the court has recognized in its 

Stare Decisis jurisprudence that all of the factors weigh into the 

decision. You think about why and under what circumstances you 

should alter the course of the court’s interpretation as set forth in 

prior precedent. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I am concerned because recently there has 

been erosion in anti-trust, both in the courts and the enforcement. 

It has made it much easier for financial institutions to become so 

massive, they are in effect too big to fail. 

Should a court sitting on anti-trust consider the systemic risk to 

the marketplace as injected by a financial institution being too big 

to fail? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, the purposes of the anti-trust theory is 

premised on ensuring competition in the marketplace. The question, like the one you pose, is one that would come to the court in 

a particular context and a challenge to some approach the court 

has used in this area. 

I obviously cannot say absolutely yes in a hypothetical, but obviously the court is always looking at what activity is claimed to be 

illegal under the anti-trust laws and what effect is has on anti-competitive behavior. 

The question frequently in anti-trust is is a particular area subject to per se barring or is it subject to the rule of reason, and the 

two have different approaches to the question. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Judge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator Kaufman. I 

mentioned before, it is almost 1. We will take a break until 2. At 

2, we will recognize first Senator Specter and then Senator 

Franken. 

373 

When their questions are finished, we will go into the traditional 

closed door session which will be held not in this room, but in the 

Senate Judiciary Committee room. Following that, we will come 

back in here and if there are Senators that have further questions, 

they will be recognized not to exceed 20 minutes each. 

I would hope that if the question has already been asked and answered, they may want to resist the temptation to do it again, but 

they have that right to take the full 20 minutes if they do. 

I realize a lot of the questions have been asked, but not everybody has asked the same question and so they may want to. But 

they have that right. That’s what we will do. We will stand recessed until then. 

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the meeting recessed for lunch.] 

After Recess [2:03 p.m.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Judge, what did you do with your mother? 

[Laughter.] 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. She needed a short break, but it wasn’t because of Senators Specter or Franken. 

Chairman LEAHY. Like Amy Klobuchar, I had a nice chat with 

her this morning, and she was talking about when she first became 

a nurse and compared notes with my wife, and they both agreed 

that that is when nurses truly had to be nurses. Now they are 

nurses-plus, with the advances in medicine. 

I just discussed this again with Senator Sessions. We will go first 

to Senator Specter, then to Senator Franken, and then we will recess and go into the other room for the closed session. 

Senator Specter, of course, is a former Chairman of this Committee, one of the most senior Members of the Senate, and one of 

the most experienced. Senator Specter. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome back, Judge Sotomayor. You have held up very well. Of 

all of the proceedings in the Senate, this is the most exacting on 

the witness. Years ago, as you know, in the case of Ashcraft v. Tennessee, they said it was unconstitutional to subject a suspect to 

relay grilling, but that doesn’t apply to nominees. And your family 

has been here. My wife, Joan Specter, who has been a soldier in 

her own right, says it is a lot harder to listen to me than it is to 

make a speech herself. And you are engaged. 

I think beyond doing very well on stamina, you have shown intellect and humor and charm and pride and also modesty. So it has 

been a very good hearing. Notwithstanding all of those qualities, 

the Constitution says we have to decide whether to consent, and 

that requires the hearing process and the questions. 

Before going into a long list of issues which I have on the agenda—separation of power and warrantless wiretaps and secret CIA 

programs and voting rights and the Americans with Disabilities 

Act and a woman’s right to choose and the Environmental Protection Agency and the Clean Water Act and television and the Second Amendment—I would like to make an observation or two. 

There has been a lot of talk about a wise Latina woman, and I 

think that this proceeding has tended to make a mountain out of 

a molehill. We have had a consistent line of people who are nominees who make references to their own backgrounds. We all have 

our perspective. Justice O’Connor talked about her life experience. 

374 

Justice Alito talked about his family suffering from ethnic slurs. 

Justice Thomas from Pin Point, Georgia, emphasized, talked about 

putting himself in the shoes of other people. And Justice Scalia 

talked about being in a racial minority. 

The expectation would be that a woman would want to say something to assert her competency in a country which denied women 

the right to vote for decades, when the glass ceiling has limited 

people, where there is still disparagement of people on ethnic background. 

Just this month in a suburb of Philadelphia, Hispanic children 

were denied access to a pool for whites only, as were African American children, so I can see how someone would take pride in being 

a Latina woman and assert herself. 

A lot has been made of the issue of empathy, but that characteristic is not exactly out of place in judicial determinations. We 

have come a long way on the expansion of constitutional rights. 

Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous statement that the life of the law 

is experience, not logic; Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut 

talked about changing values; and the Warren Court changed the 

Constitution practically every day, which I saw, being at the district attorney’s office—the changes in search and seizure, confessions, Miranda, right to counsel. Who could have thought that it 

would take until 1963 to have the right to counsel in Gideon v. 

Wainwright? 

We have heard a lot of talk about the nomination proceeding of 

Judge Bork, and they have tried to make ‘‘Bork’’ into a verb, somebody being Bork’d. Well, anybody who looks at that record will see 

that it is very, very different. We had a situation where Judge Bork 

was an advocate of original intent from his days writing a law review article in the Indiana Law Review. And how can you have 

original intent when the 18th Amendment was written by a Senate 

on equal protection with the Senate galleries which were segregated, or where you have Judge Bork who believed that equal 

protection applied only to race and ethnicity, didn’t even apply to 

women? 

But it was a very, very thorough hearing. I spent, beyond the 

hearing, days in three long sessions, 5 hours with Judge Bork, so 

it was his own approach to the law which resulted there. But you 

had an evolution of constitutional law which I think puts empathy 

in an Okay status, in an Okay category. 

Now on to the issues. 

I begin with an area of cases which the Court has decided not 

to decide, and those cases can be even more important than many 

of the cases which the Court decides. The docket of the Court at 

the present time is very different from what it was a century ago. 

In 1886, the docket had 1,396 cases, decided 451. A hundred years 

later, there were only 161 signed opinions in 1985; in 2007, only 

67 signed opinions. 

During his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts said the 

Court ‘‘could contribute more to the clarity and uniformity of the 

law by taking more cases.’’ 

Judge Sotomayor, do you agree with that statement by Chief 

Justice Roberts? 

375 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I know, Senator Specter, that there is questions by many people, including Senators and yourself, of Justice 

Roberts and other nominees about this issue. Can the Court take 

on more? To the extent that there is concern about it, not that public opinion should drive the Justices to take more cases just to take 

them, but I think what Justice Roberts was saying is the Court 

needs to think about its processes to ensure that it’s fulfilling 

its—— 

Senator SPECTER. Judge Sotomayor, how about more cases? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, perhaps I need to explain to you that 

I don’t like making statements about what I think the Court can 

do until I’ve experienced the process. 

Senator SPECTER. Then let me move on to another question. 

One case that the Court did not take involved the Terrorist Surveillance Program, which I think, arguably, posed the greatest conflict between congressional powers under Article I in enacting the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which provided for the exclusive way to get wiretaps. The President disregarded that in a secret program called the Terrorist Surveillance Program, didn’t even 

tell the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, which is the required practice or accepted practice; didn’t tell the Intelligence 

Committees where the law mandates that they be told about such 

programs. It was only disclosed by the New York Times. Those 

practices confront us to this day with reports about many other secret cases not disclosed. 

The Federal District Court in Detroit found the Terrorist Surveillance Program unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit in a 2–1 opinion 

said there was no standing. The dissent I think pretty conclusively 

had the much better of it on asserting standing. The Supreme 

Court of the United States denied certiorari, didn’t even take up 

the case to the extent of deciding whether it shouldn’t take it because of lack of standing. 

I wrote you a letter about this, wrote a series of letters, and gave 

you advance notice that I would ask you about this case. I am not 

asking you how you would decide the case, but wouldn’t you agree 

that the Supreme Court should have taken that kind of a major 

conflict on separation of powers? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I know it must be very frustrating to you 

to—— 

Senator SPECTER. It sure is. I was the Chairman who wasn’t notified. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. I am sure—— 

Senator SPECTER. And he was the Ranking Member who wasn’t 

notified. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can understand not only Congress’ or your 

personal frustration, and sometimes of citizens, when there are important issues that they would like the Court to consider. The 

question becomes what do I do if you give me the honor to serve 

on the Court. If I say something today, is that going to make a 

statement about how I am going to prejudge someone else’s—— 

Senator SPECTER. I am not asking you to prejudge. I would like 

to know your standards for taking the case. If you have that kind 

of a monumental, historic conflict, and the Court is supposed to deVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00387 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
376 

cide conflicts between the executive and the legislative branches, 

how can it possibly be justified not to take that case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. There are often, from what I understand— 

and that’s from my review of Supreme Court actions and cases of 

situations in which they have or have not taken cases, and I’ve 

read some of their reasoning as to this. I know that with some important issues they want to make sure that there isn’t a procedural 

bar to the case of some type that would take away from whether 

they’re, in fact, doing what they would want to do, which is to—— 

Senator SPECTER. Well, was there a procedural bar? You had 

weeks to mull that over because I gave you notice. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, I’m sorry. I did mull this over. My 

problem is that without looking at a particular issue and considering the cert. brief style, the discussion of potential colleagues as 

to the reasons why a particular issue should or should not be considered, the question about—— 

Senator SPECTER. Well, I can tell you are not going to answer. 

Let me move on. 

On a woman’s right to choose, Circuit Judge Luttig in the case 

of Richmond Medical Center said that v. Planned Parenthood v. 

Casey was ‘‘super-stare decisis.’’ Do you agree with Judge Luttig? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t use the word ‘‘super.’’ I don’t know 

how to take that word. All precedent of the Court is entitled to the 

respect of the doctrine of stare decisis. 

Senator SPECTER. Do you think that Roe v. Wade has added 

weight on stare decisis to protect a woman’s right to choose by virtue of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, as Judge Luttig said? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That is one of the factors that I believe courts 

have used to consider the issue of whether or not a new direction 

should be taken in the law. There is a variety of different factors 

the Court uses, not just one. 

Senator SPECTER. But that is one which would give it extra 

weight. How about the fact that the Supreme Court of the United 

States has had 38 cases after Roe v. Wade where it could have reversed Roe v. Wade? Would that add weight to the impact of Roe 

v. Wade on stare decisis to guarantee a woman’s right to choose? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The history of a particular holding of the 

Court and how the Court has dealt with it in subsequent cases 

would be among one of the factors as many that a Court would 

likely consider. Each situation, however, is considered in a variety 

of different viewpoints and arguments but, most importantly, factors that the Court applies to this question of should precedent be 

altered in a way. 

Senator SPECTER. Well, wouldn’t 38 cases lend a little extra support to the impact of Roe and Casey where the Court had the issue 

before it, could have overruled it? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In Casey itself—— 

Senator SPECTER. Just a little impact? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Casey itself applied—or an opinion authored 

by Justice Souter talked about the factors that a Court thinks 

about in whether to change precedent, and among them were 

issues of whether or not or how much reliance society has placed 

in the prior precedent; what are the costs that would be occasioned 

by changing it; was the rule workable or not; have either factual 

377 

or doctrinal basis of the prior precedent altered, either from developments in related areas of law or not, to counsel a re-examination 

of a question, and—— 

Senator SPECTER. I am going to move on—go ahead. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And the Court has considered in other cases 

the number of times the issue has arisen and what actions the 

Court has or not taken with respect to that. 

Roe is—Casey did reaffirm the core holding of Roe, and so my understanding would be that the issue would be addressed in light of 

Casey on the stare decisis—— 

Senator SPECTER. Do I hear you saying there would be at least 

a little bit of—let me move on. Let me move on to another separation of powers argument, and, that is, between Congress and the 

Court. 

In 1997, in the case called Boerne, suddenly the Supreme Court 

of the United States found a new test called ‘‘congruence and proportionality.’’ Up to that time, Judge Harlan’s judgment on a rational basis for what Congress would decide would be sufficient. 

And here for the benefit of our television audience, we are talking 

about a record that the Congress maintains. 

Take the Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, where 

there was a task force of field hearings in every State attended by 

more than 30,000 people, including thousands who had experienced 

discrimination with roughly 300 examples of discrimination by 

State governments. Notwithstanding that vast record, the Supreme 

Court of the United States in Alabama v. Garrett found Title I of 

the Americans with Disabilities Act unconstitutional. 

The other title, Title II, of the Americans with Disabilities Act 

in Tennessee v. Lane, the Court found it constitutional on the same 

record. 

Justice Scalia in dissent said that it was a ‘‘flabby test,’’ that it 

was an ‘‘invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decision making.’’ 

In a second round, if we have time, I will ask you—to give you 

some advance notice, although I wrote you about these cases—if 

you can find a distinction on the Supreme Court’s determination. 

But my question to you is: Looking at this brand-new standard of 

proportionality and congruence, for whatever those words mean— 

and if we have time in the second round, I will ask you to define 

them, but there are other questions I want to come to. Do you 

agree with Justice Scalia that it is a flabby test and that, with having such a vague standard, the Court can do anything it wants and 

really engages in policy-driven decision making? Which means the 

Court, in effect, legislates. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, the question of whether I agree with 

a view of a particular Justice or not is not something that I can 

say in terms of the next case. In the next case that the Court will 

look at and a challenge to a particular congressional statute—— 

Senator SPECTER. Well, not the next case. This case. You have 

these two cases. They have the same factual record. And the Supreme Court, in effect, legislates, tells us what is right and what 

is wrong on this standard that nobody can understand. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I understand the congruence and proportionality test, it is the Supreme Court’s holding on that test, as I 

378 

understand it, that there is an obligation on the Court to ensure 

that Congress is working—working—is legislating within its legislative powers. 

The issue is not—and these are Section 5 cases, essentially, 

which are the clause of the Constitution under the 14th Amendment that permits Congress to legislate issues involving violations 

of the 14th amendment. The Court in those cases has not said that 

Congress can’t legislate. What it has looked at is the form of remedy Congress can order and what it—— 

Senator SPECTER. But it doesn’t tell us how to—let me move on 

to a Voting Rights Act case, and just pose the case, and I will ask 

you about it in the next round. 

When Chief Justice Roberts testified at his confirmation hearings, he was very deferential to the Congress—not so, I might add, 

when he heard arguments in the voting rights case, but when he 

appeared here 3 years ago. He said this, and it is worth reading: 

‘‘I appreciate very much the differences in institutional competence 

between the judiciary and the Congress when it comes to basic 

questions of fact finding, development of a record, and also the authority to make the policy decisions about how to act on the basis 

of a particular record. It’s not just disagreement over a record. It’s 

a question of whose job it is to make a determination based on the 

record. . . . As a judge . . . you may have the beginning to transgress into the area of making a law is when you are in a position 

of re-evaluating legislative findings because that doesn’t look like 

a judicial function.’’ 

Now, that is about as deferential as you can be when you are 

nominee. But when Chief Justice Roberts presided over the voting 

rights case, he sound very, very different. 

My question to you is: Do you agree with what Chief Justice Roberts said when he was just Judge Roberts that it is an area of making laws to transgress into what Congress has done by way of finding the facts? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I would find it difficult to agree with someone 

else’s words. I can tell you how much I understand the deference 

that Congress is owed, and I can point you at least to two cases— 

and there are many, many more—that shows how much I value the 

fact that we are courts that must give deference to Congress in the 

fields that are within its constitutional power. 

Senator SPECTER. Well, do you agree with Chief Justice Roberts—I sent you that quotation a long time ago and told you I 

would ask you about it. Do you agree with him or not? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I agree to the extent that one’s talking about 

the deference that Congress is owed. I can’t speak for what he intended to say by that. I can speak to what I—— 

Senator SPECTER. Well, not what he intended to say. What he did 

say. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I heard what he said, sir, but I don’t know 

what he intended in that description. I do know what I can say, 

which is that I do understand the importance to Congress’ factual 

findings, that my cases and my approach in my cases reflect that. 

I’ve had any number of cases where the question was deference to 

congressional findings, and I have upheld statutes because of that 

deference. 

379 

Senator SPECTER. Is there anything the Senate or Congress can 

do if a nominee says one thing seated at that table and does something exactly the opposite once they walk across the street? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That, in fact, is one of the beauties of our 

constitutional system, which is we do have a separation of—— 

Senator SPECTER. Beauty is in the eyes of the beholder. It is only 

Constitution Avenue there. 

[Laughter.] 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, the only advantage you have in my case 

is that I have a 17-year record that I think demonstrates how I approach the law and the deference with which—or the deference I 

give to the other branches of Government. 

Senator SPECTER. I think your record is exemplary, Judge 

Sotomayor. Exemplary. I am not commenting about your answers, 

but your record is exemplary. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SPECTER. And you will be judged more on your record 

than on your answers, Judge Sotomayor. 

For those who are uninitiated, your preparation appropriately is 

very careful. They call them ‘‘murder boards’’ at the White House. 

I don’t know what you did and I am not asking. We have had a 

lot of commentary. And you studied the questions, and you have 

studied the record, and your qualification as a witness is terrific in 

accordance with the precedents there. You are following the precedents there very closely. 

Let me move to television and the courts, and it is a question 

that many of us are interested in. I always ask it. I have introduced legislation twice, come out of Committee twice, to require the 

Court to televise. The Court does not have to listen to Congress. 

The Court can say separation of powers precludes our saying anything. But the Congress does have administrative procedural jurisdiction. We decide the Court convenes the first Monday in October. 

We decide there are nine Justices. We tried to make it 15 once in 

the Court-packing era, six Justices for a quorum, et cetera; the 

Speedy Trial Act telling the courts how they have to move at a certain speed, habeas corpus on time limits. 

Justice Stevens has said that it is worth a try. Justice Ginsburg 

at one time said that if it was gavel to gavel, it would be fine. Justice Kennedy said it was inevitable. 

The record of the Justices appearing on television is extensive. 

Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Stevens were on Prime time 

ABC, Justice Ginsburg on CBS, Justice Breyer on Fox News and 

so forth down the line. 

We all know that the Senate and the House are televised, and 

we all know the tremendous, tremendous interest in your nominating process, and it happens all the time. There is a lot of public 

interest. But the Court is the least accountable. In fact, you might 

say the Court is unaccountable. 

When Bush v. Gore was decided, then-Senator Biden and I wrote 

to Chief Justice Rehnquist asking that television be permitted and 

got back a prompt answer: ‘‘No.’’ And that was quite a scene across 

the street. The television trucks were just enormous, all over the 

place. You had to be the Chairman of the Committee to get a seat 

inside the chamber. 

380 

The Supreme Court decides all the cutting-edge questions of the 

day: the right of a woman to choose abortion, the death penalty, 

organized crime—every cutting-edge question. And Bush v. Gore 

was one of the biggest cases—arguably, the biggest case. More than 

100 million people voted in that election, and the Presidency was 

decided by one vote. 

And Justice Scalia had this to say about irreparable harm: ‘‘The 

counting of votes that are of questionable legality does in my view 

threaten irreparable harm to’’—referring to President Bush, or 

Candidate Bush—‘‘and to the country, by casting a cloud upon 

what he claims to be the legitimacy of the election. . . .[P]ermitting the Court to proceed on that erroneous basis 

will prevent an accurate recount from being conducted on a proper 

basis later.’’ 

It is hard to understand what recount there was going to be 

later. I wrote about it at the time saying that I thought it was an 

atrocious accounting of irreparable harm, hard to calculate that. 

And my question, Judge Sotomayor: Shouldn’t the American people 

have access to what is happening in the Supreme Court to try to 

understand it, to have access to what the judges do by way of their 

workload, by way of their activities when they adjourn in June and 

reconvene in October, this year in September? Wouldn’t it be more 

appropriate in a democracy to let the people take a look inside the 

Court through television? 

The Supreme Court said in the Richmond Newspapers case decades ago that it wasn’t just the accused that had a right to a public 

trial; it was the press and the public as well. And now it is more 

than newspapers. Television is really paramount. Why not televise 

the Court? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As you know, when there have been options 

for me to participate in cameras in the courtroom, I have. And as 

I said to you when we met, Senator, I will certainly relay those 

positive experiences, if I become fortunate enough to be there to 

discuss it with my colleagues. And that question is an important 

one, obviously. There is legislation being considered both by—or 

has been considered by Congress at various times, and there is 

much discussion between the branches on that issue. 

It is an ongoing dialog. It is important to remember that the 

Court because of this issue has over time made public the transcripts of its hearing quicker and quicker, if I am accurate, now. 

It used to take a long time for them to make those transcripts 

available, and now they do it before the end of the day. 

It is an ongoing process of discussion. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Judge Sotomayor. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator Specter. 

And last in this round of questioning will be Senator Franken, 

the newest member of the Committee. Senator, I didn’t officially 

welcome you the other day as I should have when we have new 

members, but welcome to the Committee. I offer you congratulations and condolences at the same time to come in on one of 

the—— 

Senator FRANKEN. I will take the congratulations. 

381 

Chairman LEAHY. Okay. Well, then was most heartfelt. I am glad 

you are here. Please go ahead. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Judge Sotomayor, for sitting here so patiently and for all your 

thoughtful answers throughout the hearing. 

Before lunch, our senior Senator from Minnesota, Amy Klobuchar, asked you why you became a prosecutor, and you mentioned ‘‘Perry Mason.’’ I was a big fan of ‘‘Perry Mason.’’ I watched 

‘‘Perry Mason’’ every week with my dad and my mom and my 

brother. And we would watch the clock, and we knew when it was 

2 minutes to the half-hour that the real murderer would stand up 

and confess. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. It was a great show. And it amazes me that 

you want to become a prosecutor based on that show, because in 

‘‘Perry Mason,’’ the prosecutor—Burger—lost every week. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. With one exception, which we will get to later. 

But I think that says something about your determination to defy 

the odds. And while you were watching ‘‘Perry Mason’’ in the South 

Bronx with your mom and your brother, I was watching ‘‘Perry 

Mason’’ in suburban Minneapolis with my folks and my brother, 

and here we are today. And I am asking you questions because you 

have been nominated to a Justice of the United States Supreme 

Court. I think that is pretty cool. 

As I said in my opening statement, I see these proceedings both 

as a way to take a judgment of you and of any nominee’s suitability 

for the high Court, but also as a way for Americans to learn about 

the Court and its impact on their lives. Right now, people are getting more and more of their information on the Internet, getting 

newspapers and television and blogs and radio. Americans are getting all of it online, and it plays a central role in our democracy 

by allowing anyone with a computer connected to the Internet to 

publish their ideas, their thoughts, their opinions, and reach a 

worldwide audience of hundreds of millions of people in seconds. 

This is free speech, and this is essential to our democracy, and to 

democracy, we saw this in Iran not long ago. 

Now, Judge, you are familiar with the Supreme Court’s 2005 

Brand X decision, are you? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I am. 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay. Well, then you know that Brand X deregulated Internet access services, allowing service providers to act 

as gatekeepers to the Internet, even though the Internet was originally Government funded and built on the notion of common carriage and openness. In fact, we have already seen examples of 

these companies blocking access to the Web and discriminating on 

certain uses of the Internet. This trend threatens to undermine the 

greatest engine of free speech and commerce since the printing 

press. 

Let’s say you are living in Duluth, Minnesota, and you only have 

one Internet service provider. It is a big mega corporation, and not 

only are they the only Internet service provider, but they are also 

a content provider. They own newspapers. They own TV networks 

or a network. They have a movie studio. 

382 

They decide to speed up their own content and slow down other 

content. The Brand X decision by the Supreme Court allows them 

to do this. And this is not just Duluth. It is Moorhead, Minnesota; 

it is Rochester, Minnesota; it is Youngstown, Ohio. It is Denver, it 

is San Francisco, and, yes, it is New York. This is frightening— 

frightening to me and to millions of my constituents or lots of my 

constituents. 

Internet connections use public resources, the public airways, the 

public rights of way. Doesn’t the American public have a compelling First Amendment interest in ensuring that this can’t happen 

and that the Internet stays open and accessible—in other words, 

that the Internet stays the Internet? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Many describe the telephone as a revolutionary invention, that changed our country dramatically. So did 

television. And its regulation of television and the rules that would 

apply to it were considered by Congress, and those regulations 

have—because Congress is the policy chooser on how items related 

to interstate commerce and communications operate. And that 

issue was reviewed by the courts in the context of the policy choices 

Congress made. 

There is no question in my mind as a citizen that the Internet 

has revolutionized communications in the United States, and there 

is no question that access to that is a question that society—that 

our citizens as well as yourself are concerned about. 

But the role of the court is never to make the policy. It is to wait 

until Congress acts and then determine what Congress has done 

and its constitutionality in light of that ruling. 

Brand X, as I understood it, was a question of which Government 

agency would regulate those providers, and the Court, looking at 

Congress’ legislation in these two areas, determined that it thought 

it fit in one box, not the other, one agency instead of another. 

Senator FRANKEN. Is this Title I and Title II? Or as I understand 

it, Title II is subject to regulation and Title I isn’t. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Exactly, but the question was not so much 

stronger regulation or not stronger regulation. It was which set of 

regulations, given Congress’ choice, controlled. 

Obviously, Congress may think that the regulations the Court 

has in its holding interpreted Congress’ intent and that Congress 

thinks the Court got it wrong. We are talking about statutory interpretation and Congress’ ability to alter the Court’s understanding by amending the statute if it chooses. 

This is not to say that I minimize the concerns you express. Access to Internet, given its importance in everything today—most 

businesses depend on it. Most individuals find their information. 

The children in my life virtually live on it now. And so its importance implicates a lot of different questions—freedom of speech, 

freedom with respect to property rights, Government regulation. 

There’s just so many issues that get implicated by the Internet that 

what the Court can do is not choose the policy. It just has to go 

by interpreting each statute and trying to figure out what Congress 

intends. 

Senator FRANKEN. I understand that, but isn’t there a compelling 

First Amendment right here for people? No matter what Congress 

does—and I would urge my colleagues to take this up and write 

383 

legislation that I would like. But isn’t there a compelling, overriding First Amendment right here for Americans to have access to 

the Internet? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Rights by a court are not looked at as overriding in the sense that I think a citizen—or a citizen would think 

about it, should this go first or should a competing right go second. 

Rights are rights, and what the Court looks at is how Congress balanced those rights in a particular situation and then judges whether that balance is within constitutional boundaries. 

Calling one more compelling than the other suggests that they’re 

sort of—you know, property interests are less important than First 

Amendment interests. That’s not the comparison a court makes. 

The comparison the court makes starts with what balance does 

Congress choose first, and that we’ll look at that if it—and see if 

it’s constitutional. 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay. So we have got some work to do on this. 

Let me get into judicial activism. I brought this up in my opening 

statement. As I see it, there is kind of an impoverishment of our 

political discourse when it comes to the judiciary. I am talking in 

politics. When candidates or office holders talk about what kind of 

judge they want, it is very often just reduced to, ‘‘I don’t want an 

activist judge. I don’t want a judge that is going to legislate.’’ And 

that is sort of it. That is it. It is a 30-second sound bite. 

As I and a couple other Senators mentioned during our opening 

statements, judicial activism has become a codeword for judges 

that you just do not agree with. 

Judge, what is your definition of ‘‘judicial activism’’ ? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It’s not a term I use. I don’t use the term because I don’t describe the work that judges do in that way. I assume the good faith of judges in their approach to the law, which 

is that each one of us is attempting to interpret the law according 

to principles of statutory construction and other guiding legal principles, and to come in good faith to an outcome that we believe is 

directed by law. When I say ‘‘we believe,’’ hopefully we all go 

through the process of reasoning it out and coming to a conclusion 

in accordance with the principles of law. 

I think you are right that one of the problems with this process 

is that people think of activism as the wrong conclusion in light of 

policy. But hopefully judges—and I know that I don’t approach 

judging in this way at all—are not imposing policy choices or their 

views of the world or their views of how things should be done. 

That would be judicial activism in my sense if a judge was doing 

something improper like that. 

But I don’t use that word because that’s something different than 

what I consider to be the process of judging, which is each judge 

coming to each situation trying to figure out what the law means, 

applying it to the particular fact before that judge. 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay. You don’t use that word or that phrase. 

But in political discourse about the role of the judiciary, that is almost the only phrase that is ever used. And I think that there has 

been an ominous increase in what I consider judicial activism of 

late, and I want to ask you about a few cases and see if you can 

shed some light on this for us and for the people watching at home 

or in the office. 

384 

I want to talk about Northwest Austin Utility District Number 

One v. Holder, the recent Voting Rights Act, and Senator Cardin 

mentioned it, but he did not get out his pocket Constitution, as I 

am. 

The 15th Amendment was passed after the Civil War and specifically gave Congress the authority to pass laws to protect all citizens’ right to vote, and it said, Section 1—Amendment XV, Section 

1, ‘‘The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 

denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account 

of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’’ 

Section 2, and this one is important: ‘‘The Congress shall have 

power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.’’ The Congress. 

Well, Congress used that power, the power vested in it under 

Section 2, when it passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Now, the 

Voting Rights Act has a specially strong provision, Section 5, that 

requires States with a history of discrimination to get preapproval 

from the Justice Department on any changes that they make in 

their voting regulations. Congress has reauthorized this four times, 

as recently as—the last time was 2006, and the Senate supported 

it by a vote of 98–0. Every single Senator from a State covered by 

Section 5 voted to reauthorize it. 

So now it is 2009, and we have this case, the Northwest Austin 

Utility District Number One, and Justice Thomas votes to hold Section 5 unconstitutional. He said it went beyond the mandate of the 

15th Amendment because it wasn’t necessary anymore. That is 

what he said. 

Now, when I read the 15th Amendment, it does not contain any 

limits on Congress’ power. It just says that we have it. It does not 

say, ‘‘If necessary, the Congress shall have power to enforce this article.’’ It just says that we have the power. 

So it is my understanding that the 15th Amendment contains a 

very strong, very explicit and unambiguous grant of power to the 

Congress, and because of that the courts should pay greater deference to it. And my question is: Is that your view? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As you know, some of the Justices in that recent decision expressed the view that the Court should take up the 

constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act and review its continuing 

necessity. Justice Thomas expressed his view. That very question, 

given the decision and the fact that it left that issue open, is a very 

clear indication that that’s a question that the courts are going to 

be addressing, if not immediately the Supreme Court, certainly the 

lower courts. And so expressing a view, agreeing with one person 

in that decision or another, would suggest that I have made a prejudgment on this question. I consider—— 

Senator FRANKEN. So that means you are not going to tell us. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. I didn’t mean to finish your sentence. I think 

that is where you are going. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. All I can say to you is—I have one decision 

among many, but one decision on the Voting Rights Act, and not 

the recent reauthorization by Congress, but a prior amendment 

where I suggested that these issues needed—issues of changes in 

385 

the Voting Rights Act should be left to Congress in the first instance. 

My jurisprudence shows the degree to which I give deference to 

Congress’ findings. Whether in a particular situation that compels 

or doesn’t or leads to a particular result is not something that I can 

opine on, because particularly the issue you are addressing right 

now is likely to be considered by the courts. The ABA rule says no 

judge should make comments on the merits of any pending or impending case, and this clearly would be an impending case. 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay. It is fair to say, though, in your own decisions you gave deference to Congress, just like you answered my 

neutrality saying it is up to Congress, it feels like this is very explicitly up to Congress. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I gave deference to the exact language that 

Congress had used in the Voting Rights Act and how it applied to 

a challenge in that case. 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay. Now, voting to overturn Federal legislation, to me at least, seems to be one definition of what people understand as judicial activism. But I want to talk about some cases 

that I have seen that I think show judicial activism functioning on 

a more pernicious level. 

First, let’s take a look at a case called Gross v. FBL Financial 

Services that the Supreme Court issued last month. Are you familiar with that? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I am. 

Senator FRANKEN. Now, Gross involved the Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act, or ADEA. Before Gross, you could bring an age 

discrimination suit whenever you could show that age was one of 

the factors an employer considered in choosing to fire you. When 

the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, it said it would consider just one question: whether you needed direct evidence of age 

discrimination to bring this kind of lawsuit or whether indirect evidence would suffice. That is the issue that they said that they 

would consider when they took the case. 

But when the Supreme Court handed down its decision, it ruled 

on a much larger matter: whether a worker could bring a suit 

under ADEA if age was only one of several reasons for being demoted or fired. The Supreme Court barred these suits saying that 

only suits alleging that age was the determinative factor for the firing, only those could be brought under the ADEA. 

This change has significantly eroded workers’ rights by making 

it much harder for workers to defend themselves from age discrimination, including getting fired just before they were to have seen 

a large increase in their pension. You were not fired because you 

are too old; you are fired because your pension is going to increase 

soon. So this is a big deal. 

When you go to court to defend your rights, you have to know 

what rights you are defending. The parties in the Gross case 

thought they were talking about what kind of evidence was necessary in a decision suit. Then the Court said, ‘‘No, we are banning 

that kind of suit altogether.’’ 

I think that is unfair to everyone involved. It is especially unfair 

to the man who is trying to bring the discrimination suit. So let 

me ask you a couple of questions on this. 

386 

First, as an appellate court judge, how often have you decided a 

case on an argument or a question that the parties have not 

briefed? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t think I have, because to the extent 

that the parties have not raised an issue and the circuit court for 

some reason the panel has thought that it was pertinent—most 

often that happens on questions of jurisdiction. Can the Court hear 

this case at all? Then you issue—or we have issued a direction to 

the parties to brief that question, so it is briefed and part of the 

argument that is raised. 

There are issues that the parties brief that the briefing itself 

raises the issue for the Court to consider. So it is generally the 

practice, at least on the Second Circuit, to give a party an opportunity to be heard on a question. And we also have a procedure on 

the circuit that would give a party to be heard because they can 

also file the petition for rehearing, which is the panel enters a decision that the party disagrees with and thinks the court has not 

given it an adequate opportunity to present its arguments. Then it 

can file that at the circuit. 

I don’t have—I am familiar with the Northwest case. I am familiar with the holding of that case. I am a little less familiar and 

didn’t pay as much attention—— 

Senator FRANKEN. With Gross. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. To the briefing issue. I do know 

there that, like the Brand X case, what the Court says it was attempting to do is to discern what Congress’ intent was under the 

ADEA, whether it intended to consider mixed motive or not as a 

factor in applying the statute. And the majority holding, as I understood it, was, look, Congress amended Title VII to set forth the 

mixed motive framework and directed the courts to apply that 

framework in the future. But having amended that, it didn’t apply 

that amendment to the age discrimination statute. And so that 

would end up in a similar situation to the Brand X case, which is 

to the extent that that Congress determines that it does want 

mixed motive to be a part of that analysis, that it would have the 

opportunity and does have the opportunity to do what it did in 

Title VII, which is to amend the act. 

Senator FRANKEN. In Title VII, they amended the act because 

they had to, they were forced to. Right? Congress was compelled to, 

in a sense, but not on ADEA. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t like characterizing the reasons for 

why Congress acts or doesn’t act. 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay. Let me jump ahead to something. Yesterday a member of this Committee asked you a few times whether 

the word ‘‘abortion’’ appears in the Constitution, and you agreed 

that, no, the word ‘‘abortion’’ is not in the Constitution. Are the 

words ‘‘birth control’’ in the Constitution? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. 

Senator FRANKEN. Are you sure? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay. Are the words ‘‘privacy’’ in the Constitution? Or the word. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The word ‘‘privacy’’ is not. 

387 

Senator FRANKEN. Senators Kohl, Feinstein, and Cardin all 

raised the issue of privacy, but I want to hit this head on. Do you 

believe that the Constitution contains a fundamental right to privacy? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It contains, as has been recognized by the 

courts for over 90 years, certain rights under the liberty provision 

of the Due Process Clause, that extend to the right to privacy in 

certain situations. This line of cases started with a recognition that 

parents have a right to direct the education of their children and 

that the State could not force parents to send their children to public schools or to bar their children from being educated in ways a 

State found objectionable. Obviously, States do regulate the content 

of education, at least in terms of requiring certain things with respect to education that I don’t think the Supreme Court has considered. But that basic right to privacy has been recognized and was 

recognized. And there have been other decisions. 

Senator FRANKEN. So the issue of whether the word actually appears in the Constitution is not really relevant, is it? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Certainly there are some very specific words 

in the Constitution that have to be given direct application. There 

are some direct commands by the Constitution. You know, Senators 

have to be a certain age to be Senators, and so you got to do what 

those words say. But the Constitution is written in broad terms, 

and what a court does is then look at how those terms apply to a 

particular factual setting before it. 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court 

found that the fundamental right to privacy included the right to 

decide whether or not to have an abortion. And as Senator Specter 

said, that has been upheld or ruled on many times. 

Do you believe that this right to privacy includes the right to 

have an abortion? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The Court has said in many cases—and as I 

think has been repeated in the Court’s jurisprudence in Casey— that there is a right to privacy that women have with respect to 

the termination of their pregnancies in certain situations. 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay. We are going to have a round two, so 

I will ask you some more questions there. 

What was the one case in ‘‘Perry Mason’’ that Burger won? 

[Laughter.] 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I wish I remember the name of the episode, 

but I don’t. I just was always struck that there was only one case 

where his client was actually guilty and—— 

Senator FRANKEN. And you don’t remember that case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I know that I should remember the name of 

it, but I haven’t looked at the episode—— 

Senator FRANKEN. Didn’t the White House prepare you for—— 

[Laughter.] 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. You’re right, but I was spending a lot of time 

on reviewing cases. But I do have that stark memory because, like 

you, I watched it all of the time, every week as well. I just couldn’t 

interest my mother the nurse and my brother the doctor to do it 

with me. 

Senator FRANKEN. Oh, Okay. Well, our whole family watched it, 

and because there was no Internet at the time, you and I were 

388 

watching at the same time. And I thank you, and I guess I will talk 

to you in the follow-up. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Is the Senator from Minnesota going to tell us 

which episode that was? 

Senator FRANKEN. I don’t know. That is why I was asking. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FRANKEN. If I knew, I wouldn’t have asked her. 

Chairman LEAHY. All right. So because of that, Judge, we will 

not hold your inability to answer the question against you. 

I just discussed this with Senator Sessions, but I will make the 

formal request. Is there any objection that the Committee now proceed to a closed session, which is a routine practice we have followed for every nominee since back when Senator Biden was Chairman of this Committee? 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I think that is the 

right thing to do, and there will be no objection that I know of. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. I appreciate the comment, and so hearing none, the Committee will proceed to a closed 

session, and we will resume public hearings later this afternoon. 

And for the sake of those who have to handle all electronic kinds 

of things, we will try to give you enough of a heads-up. 

We will stand in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the hearing was recessed for a closed 

session.] 

After Recess [3:37 p.m.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Judge, why don’t we try it again? We’ll use— 

all right. This is not working either? 

Senator SESSIONS. You’ve got a chance to be on history here. 

Chairman LEAHY. Back to what is—— 

Senator SESSIONS. That’s the quickest ride of any Senator in history. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Back to what it—— 

Senator FRANKEN. I shouldn’t do this. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LEAHY. No, no. Stay right there. 

Back to what Dr. Branda said. He wrote about Judge Sotomayor, 

that ‘‘she reflects, via her career on the bench, the type of tempered 

restraint and moderation necessary for appropriate application of 

the rule of law, and without a doubt, Judge Sotomayor serves with 

a moderate voice without displays of bias toward any party based 

on affiliation, background, sex, color, or religion.’’ The letter concludes, ‘‘Even moderate and conservative evangelicals within our 

ranks find no reason to conclude that the nomination and confirmation of Judge Sonia Sotomayor would diminish the collective application of constitutional rights and freedoms to a religious community committed to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’’, and 

goes on to urge us to confirm you. 

Second, the Committee has received a joint letter of support for 

Judge Sotomayor’s nomination from more than 1,200 law professors from all States—all 50 States and the District of Columbia, as 

well as from the Society of American Law Teachers. 

389 

And they write, ‘‘Her opinions reflect careful attention to the 

facts of each case and a reading of the law that demonstrates fidelity to the types of statutes and the Constitution. She plays close 

attention to precedent. She has proper respect for the role of courts 

and other branches of government in our society.’’ And the Society 

of American Law Teachers writes, ‘‘Far from being an activist 

judge,’’ you, Judge Sotomayor, ‘‘decide cases on the basis of her understanding of the law and applicable legal principles.’’ 

I’m going to put that—those letters in the record. 

[The letters appear as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. And now I will try one more time to see if the 

microphone will work before my friends in the press get too—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, Mr. Chairman, could I—I believe you 

were not on the clock then, is that right? So I would like to offer 

a few documents for the record, if that would be all right. 

Chairman LEAHY. Go ahead. 

Senator SESSIONS. I’d offer a letter from Club for Growth, raising 

serious concern about the Didden v. Village of Port Chester condemnation case where the Judge approved the taking of a property 

that was going to have one drugstore built on it and so another 

company could build on it. The Family Research Council, the letter 

raising serious concerns, and without more, they must stand in opposition to the nomination. The Concerned Women of America 

write in opposition to this nomination. I’d offer that into the record. 

The American Center for Law and Justice, expressing concerns 

about the nomination. The Americans United For Life have written 

about the nomination, as well as the Gun Owners of America. I 

would just offer those for the record at this time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Without objection, they will be included in the 

record. That time will not count against either Senator Sessions or 

myself. 

[The letters appear as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Now, on the clock. 

Judge, one need look no further than the Lilly Ledbetter case or 

the Diana Levine case, a woman from Vermont, to understand the 

impact each Supreme Court case has on the lives and freedoms of 

countless Americans. In Lilly Ledbetter’s case, five Justices on the 

Supreme Court struck a severe blow to the rights of working families across our country and required the Congress to pass legislation basically overruling the Supreme Court case to say, yes, 

women should be paid the same as men. 

Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in that case criticized the narrow majority for making a cramped interpretation of our civil rights law. 

In a different context, you sat on a three-judge panel in a case 

involving strip searches of girls in a juvenile detention center. The 

parents of two girls challenged a policy of strip searching all those 

admitted to juvenile detention centers as a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches; two of 

your male colleagues upheld that search. 

In a dissent, you said a controlling Circuit precedent described 

what is involved in strip searches of these girls without individual 

suspicion, who’d never been charged with a crime, and warned that 

courts should be especially wary of strip searches of children, since 

youth is a time and condition of life when a person may be most 

390 

susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. As a parent 

and a grandparent, I agree with you. 

You also emphasized that many of these girls had been victims 

of abuse and neglect and may be more vulnerable mentally and 

emotionally than other youths their age. 

The Supreme Court recently considered a similar case involving 

an intrusive strip search of young Savanna Redding because of 

school officials looking for ibuprofen tablets. During oral argument 

in that case, one of the male Justices compared the girl’s strip 

search to changing for gym class. Several of the other Justices’ reaction was simply laughter. 

Justice Ginsburg, the sole female Justice on the court, described 

the search as humiliating, something that most parents realize. 

Justice Souter, writing for the court, concluded that school officials 

violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Savanna Redding, adopted Justice Ginsburg’s position and reasoning. 

I believe these cases underscore the need for diversity. They underscore having judges with different life experiences on the Federal bench, including the Supreme Court. It’s been said several 

times here, citing cases doesn’t just take a computer, otherwise we 

don’t need real people. It does need real-life experiences. You are 

a role model and a mentor to many young people. We’ve heard that 

in all kinds of letters and statements. 

How do you think it affects these young people to see only one 

woman on the Supreme Court today? How would it affect the confidence in the judicial system of litigants like young Savanna Redding? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, I think that it’s one of the reasons 

that every President in the last two—or say 20 years, 25 years, has 

attempted to promote diversity on a basic understanding that our 

society is enriched by its confidence that our legal system is—includes all members of society. I know that Justice Ginsburg has 

spoken about the fact of how much she misses Justice O’Connor, 

and not because she does not have a good relationship with her colleagues. 

I understand that she and Justice Scalia have a very, very close 

friendship and attend the opera together and travel together, so it’s 

not a question, I don’t think, of whether there’s any question about 

the importance of the confidence that Americans have in our system because they see that everyone’s represented as a part of our 

legal system, both as judges, as lawyers, as participants on every 

level of our work. 

Chairman LEAHY. When John Roberts, now Chief Justice Roberts, was before the Committee I asked him about a precedent that 

moved me a great deal: Gideon v. Wainwright. I thought about it 

later when I was a young lawyer being assigned to defend cases, 

and later when I was a prosecutor, prosecuting cases. As a young 

law student, I had an opportunity—in fact, my wife and I had an 

opportunity. I was at Georgetown Law School. We had lunch with 

Hugo Black shortly after getting reversed in Wainwright. It’s one 

of the most memorable times I had in my law school career. 

Now, Hugo Black went on there as a former Senator and he recognized the Constitution’s guarantee to counsel in a criminal case 

was a fundamental right to a fair trial. He called it an ‘‘obvious 

391 

truth in an adversary system of criminal justice. Any person 

hauled into court who is too poor to hire a lawyer can’t have a fair 

trial unless counsel is provided for them.’’ 

There’s a wonderful book, Gideon’s Trumpet, that Anthony Lewis 

wrote. I still have that book. I still have it. I can almost recite, 

word for word, that book. 

So I’m going to ask you exactly the same question I asked thenJudge Roberts: doesn’t Gideon stand for the principle that to be 

meaningful, such a fundamental right as the right to counsel requires assurances that can be exercised? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That is a part of the holding of Gideon. It has 

been reaffirmed in terms of the right to counsel, not only the right 

to counsel and the representation of criminal issues, but the court 

has recognized that right with respect to a competent counsel, the 

question of whether incompetent counsel has caused the defendant 

damage as assessed under a legal standard. But the question is, 

the right to counsel was the core holding of Gideon. 

Chairman LEAHY. If the Constitution guarantees a person the 

ability to exercise a certain fundamental constitutional right, whatever it might be, and if they say—the court says they’re guaranteed 

that right, these rights are only meaningful if an American can 

then enforce those rights in a court. Is that not correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Their rights are meaningful and they are 

rights that we work at ensuring are given meaning in the courts. 

I know for a fact that one of the activities—I know for a fact. I 

know, because I lived it. When I became a judge on the Second Circuit I was given responsibility for the Second Circuit’s Committee 

on the Criminal Judge Act and Pro Bono Service. Generally, that— 

the chair of the committee is the most recent addition to the court, 

and immediately upon the confirmation of another judge, that 

judge takes over the chairpersonship. 

I, because of my belief in the meaningfulness of representation 

and its importance to the justice system, have held that position 

probably for the longest judge in the Second Circuit. With the 

agreement of judges who came after me, I served as the chair of 

that committee. I don’t know—remember exactly the number of 

years, but it was certainly a very long period of time, and I worked 

very hard to improve both the processes of selection of Criminal 

Justice Act attorneys—those are the attorneys that represent indigent defendants in criminal actions—and to ensure that there was 

adequate review of their qualifications and regular review of their 

performance. 

Chairman LEAHY. I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but 

is it safe to say that if you have a constitutional right, as a practical effect, that only works if you can enforce that constitutional 

right? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Clearly, that’s—in terms of the—it’s given 

meaning through actions, and actions by the legislature, who have 

provided funds for the retention of qualified counsel, and the 

court’s obligation to ensure that that right is meaningful in practice. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. I’ve used just barely over half my 

time. I’ll reserve time. 

Senator SESSIONS. And hope that sets an example. 

392 

Senator SESSIONS. I’m impressed, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

You know, we talked a little earlier about judicial activism. Senator—our new Senator raised that. We have a good definition. Our 

former chairman, Senator Hatch. He’s given us a definition for a 

number of years, and that is when a judge allows their personal, 

political, or other biases to overcome their commitment to the rule 

of law. That’s not as well as he said it, but that’s pretty close. 

Senator HATCH. That’s better than I said it. 

Senator SESSIONS. But I think that’s—and you can have, Senator 

Franken, a liberal or conservative activist judge, and judges need 

to be watched, as we all do, to make sure that they stay faithful 

to the law. 

I really believe in this legal system. I think it’s so fabulous. I’ve 

traveled the world with the Armed Services Committee and I see 

these countries and it just breaks your heart. You think you can 

go in and write a code of law and they can make it work, and it’s 

just—you can write them all day, but it—making it actually be real 

in every village, hamlet, and farm, and city in these countries is 

so, so hard. We are so blessed. 

So I just want to say, Judge, I appreciate you and look forward 

to questioning. But I—I just—my approach is to try to do the best 

thing we can for America in this fabulous system we’ve got. 

We’ve—I think our side is committed to being fair throughout 

this hearing, and trying to be thoughtful in our questions. Nobody’s 

perfect, but I think everybody’s done a pretty good job at that. 

Now, I’ve listened to your testimony carefully, looked at some 

transcripts, and I have to say, I’m still concerned about some of the 

issues that have been raised. You’re seeking a lifetime appointment. This is the one chance we have to ask those questions and 

we must do that. 

With regard to the ‘‘wise Latina’’ quote where you said that 

they—they should make decisions that are better than a white 

male, you—and the question of Senator—Justice O’Connor’s comment about a, wise old woman and a wise old man should—would 

reach the same conclusion. 

I would just say there’s a difference. Both may well be a rhetorical flourish or rhetorical approach to stating a truth, but I think 

Justice O’Connor’s approach, in truth, was that judges, under the 

American ideal, should reach the same decision if—if they can put 

aside all their biases and prejudices. And you seem to say in your 

approach, and throughout that speech, that backgrounds, sympathies and prejudices can impact how you rule, and you could expect a different outcome. 

How would you respond to that? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, I want to give you complete assurance that I agree with Senator Hatch on his decision—his definition of activism. If that’s his definition, that judges should not be 

using their personal biases, their personal experiences, their personal prejudices in reaching decision and that’s how he defines activism, then I’m in full agreement with him. 

To the extent that my words have led some to believe that I 

think a particular group has—has—is better than another in reaching a decision based on their experiences, my rhetorical device 

failed. It failed because it left an impression that I believe someVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00404 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
393 

thing that I don’t. And as I have indicated, it was a bad choice of 

words by me in—because it left an impression that has offended 

people and has left an impression that I didn’t intend. As I indicated earlier, I—— 

Senator SESSIONS. But did it not—could I just briefly interrupt? 

Did it not suggest that your approach to the question of objectivity 

and commitment to it was different than Justice O’Connor’s? Didn’t 

you cite it in—in opposition to her view? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I—I can explain it, is I didn’t understand 

her to mean that she thought that if two judges reached a different 

conclusion, that one of them was unwise because judges disagree 

as to conclusions. And I know that there’s an aspiration that the 

law would be so certain that that would never happen, but it’s not 

that certain. Laws are not written clearly, on occasion, by Congress. Courts apply principles of construction that suggest an approach to a particular set of facts that might differ. All of that 

doesn’t make one or the other judge wise. So—— 

Senator SESSIONS. I would agree with that. And I—I think one 

judge—you can have honest disagreements. I think that she was 

expressing the ideal that if everybody were perfectly wise, they 

may reach the same decision. 

With regard to the Second Amendment, this is a hugely important issue. Isn’t it true, Judge, that the decision that you and your 

panel rendered, if it were to be the law of the United States and 

if it is not reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court, would say that the 

Second Amendment is subject to—is not—the Second Amendment 

does not protect the right of the people to keep and bear arms in 

any city, county, and State in America. That is that New York, or 

Atlanta, or Philadelphia, or Houston, Los Angeles, or any State in 

between could pass a law that barred firearms within those States, 

and isn’t this a really big issue right now for the United States Supreme Court coming up soon? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It may well come up. And I’m not familiar 

enough with the regulations in all 50 States to know whether 

there’s an absolute prohibition in any one city or State against the 

possession of firearms. All I can speak about is that, as in the case 

the panel looked at, the question for the court would not be whether the government action in isolation is constitutional or not. The 

question—in isolation. It would be, what’s the nature of the government interest in the statute it’s passing? And depending on the—— 

Senator SESSIONS. That’s the rational basis test? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Exactly. And so—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, but the rational basis test could very 

well be fairly interpreted to say that since guns kill people, it’s rational for a city to vote to eliminate all guns. 

I would just say to you, isn’t it true that if a city could pass that 

very low test they could ban firearms if your decision is not reversed by the Supreme Court? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Because that question of incorporation before 

the court will arise, I don’t feel that I can comment on the merits 

of the hypothetical. All I can say is, regardless of what standard 

of review the court uses, it has struck down regulations under 

every standard of review used, whether it’s rational basis, or in 

394 

some instances strict scrutiny, et cetera. There is the constitutional—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Judge, I would just say that you held, following some law in the 1800’s—you held, though, that the Second 

Amendment does not apply to the States, even though it uses the 

words ‘‘the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be 

infringed’’. So I’m—I think we have a—this is a big issue and I— 

in your opinion, you said it was settled law. 

You used some very strong language. You said it was not ‘‘a fundamental right’’, and you said that in your testimony earlier, that 

‘‘in Supreme Court parlance, the right is not fundamental.’’ You 

said that, I believe, to Senator Leahy in this hearing. So I guess 

my question is, have you made up your mind such that if you were 

on the Supreme Court and it was not your case that came up—and 

it could be your case—don’t you feel that you should recuse yourself 

since you’ve already opined on this fundamental issue? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I have not prejudged the question that the 

Supreme Court left open in Heller, and the question the court left 

open itself was, should it reexamine the issue of whether this right 

should be incorporated against the States or not? It didn’t, in large 

measure, because the issue before the court at that moment was 

the right with respect to Federal Government regulation. 

I have not made up my mind. I didn’t say that I believed it 

wasn’t fundamental or that I hold a view that it’s not. I don’t hold 

a view about whether it should be incorporated or not. The issue 

before me and the panel in Maloney was whether the Supreme 

Court had said that and what Second Circuit had said about that 

issue. 

Senator SESSIONS. Has any other Circuit said it was not a fundamental right, other than your—your panel’s decision? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. There is one Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, in 

a decision written by Judge Easterbrook, who came to the same 

conclusion. 

Senator SESSIONS. Did he say—did he say it was not a fundamental right, though, in that opinion? I don’t believe they did. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. He may not have because—— 

Senator SESSIONS. And that was a question—my question I was 

asking. So it’s a problem for people. We ask about abortion. It’s not 

explicitly referred to in the Constitution, but you say that’s a fundamental right. And we have in the Constitution language that 

says ‘‘the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be 

infringed’’, and there’s a question about that, that it’s not a fundamental right. So I think that’s what makes people worry about our 

courts and our legal system today and whether agendas are being 

promoted through the law rather than just strictly following what 

the law says. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, may I—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Yes. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR.—address my use of the word ‘‘fundamental’’ ? 

Fundamental is a legal term that I didn’t make up, it was the Supreme Court’s term. And it used it in the context—and uses it in 

the context—of whether a particular constitutional provision binds 

the States or not. And so I wasn’t using the word—I. The panel 

395 

wasn’t using the word in Maloney in the sense of its ordinary 

meaning. 

Senator SESSIONS. I know you were using the constitutional legal 

meaning, but that’s hugely important because if it’s not a fundamental right, it’s not incorporated. Isn’t that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well—— 

Senator SESSIONS. And it will not apply to the States fundamentally. Isn’t that the bottom line? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, when the court looks at that issue it 

will decide, is it incorporated or not, and it will determine, by applying the test that it has subsequent to its old precedent, whether 

or not it is fundamental, and hence, incorporated. But the Maloney 

decision was not addressing the merits of that question, it was addressing what precedent said on that issue. 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. Well, we’ll review that. 

On the question of foreign law, you, yesterday, said that—said 

this: ‘‘Unless the statute requires or directs you to look at foreign 

law,’’ and some do—some statutes do, by the way. You go on to say, 

‘‘The answer is no. Foreign law cannot be used as a holding, or a 

precedent, or to bind or influence the outcome of a legal decision 

interpreting the Constitution or American law.’’ That’s a pretty 

good statement, I think. But this is what you said before in your 

speech to the American Civil Liberties Union, actually in April, just 

two or 3 months ago in Puerto Rico. 

You said this: ‘‘International law and foreign law will be very important in the discussion of how we think about unsettled issues 

in our own legal system. It is my hope that judges everywhere will 

continue to do this, because within the American legal system 

we’re commanded to interpret our law in the best way we can, and 

that means looking to what other—anyone else has said to see if 

it has persuasive value.’’ So that’s troubling. 

Now, you also said, yesterday, that you agreed with Justice 

Scalia and Justice Thomas on the point that one has to be very 

cautious, even in using foreign law with respect to things American 

law permits you to do. I don’t think that’s exactly correct or a fair 

summary of the import of your speech. 

This is what you said before the ACLU group a month or two 

ago: ‘‘And that misunderstanding’’, about using foreign law, ‘‘is, unfortunately, endorsed by some of our Supreme Court Justices.’’ 

Both—‘‘unfortunately endorsed’’. Both Justice Scalia and Justice 

Thomas have written extensively, criticizing the use of foreign and 

international law in Supreme Court decisions. They have somewhat a valid point, and you point that out. 

But then you go on to say, ‘‘But I think I share more the ideas 

of Justice Ginsburg and her thinking in believing that unless 

American courts are more open to discussing the ideas raised in 

foreign cases and by international cases, that we’re going to lose influence in the world.’’ 

So everybody knows. There’s been a fairly robust, roaring debate 

over this question. There are basically two sides, one led by Justice 

Ginsburg and one led by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Don’t you 

think a fair reading of this statement is that you came down on 

the side of Justice Ginsburg? 

396 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. Because these conversations were in 

the context—and discussions were in the context of my pointing 

out, just as she had, that foreign law can’t be a holding, it can’t 

be precedent, it can’t be used in that way. She is talking about the 

way I was to—and what I said in my speech at the beginning and 

the end, ideas. What are you thinking about? Judges use Law Review articles, they use statements by other courts. The New York 

Court of Appeals, in a recent case, looked to foreign law to address 

an issue that it was considering, not in terms of a holding for the 

court, but a way of thinking about it that it would consider. 

My point is that I wasn’t advocating that it should ever serve as 

precedent or ever serve as a holding. I was talking about the dialog 

of ideas and—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, you know, we go—I just think that you 

laid out positions and you came down on one side, and I think 

that’s a fair summary of that speech which other people—others 

can read and make up their own mind. 

You ask about the PRLDF, the Legal Defense Fund of which you 

were a member and a member of the board for 12 years. And in 

response to Senator Graham’s question, you say you’ve never seen 

any briefs and that the main focus of your work at the organization 

was fund raising. Is that accurate? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. When I was responding to the Senator I was 

talking about the board in general. I belonged to many committees, 

and so I did other things besides fund raising. But I was beginning 

to explain what the structure of the board was and what the primary responsibility of board members is. But clearly, board members serve other functions in an organization. 

Senator SESSIONS. You did serve on the Litigation Committee, 

and boards are supposed to, I would think—and legally are required—to superintend the activities of the organization that 

they’re a member of. And then you have committees of the board 

who do various things. I’m looking at a June 1987 document, reported minutes of the board, the Litigation Committee: ‘‘Sonia 

Sotomayor reported that the committee, in addition to reviewing 

and recommending a litigation program, had identified three initiatives.’’ 

In October 1987—I’m just looking at some of the documents we 

were given—litigation report. ‘‘Chairman Sotomayor summarized 

the activities of the committee over the last several months, which 

included the review of the litigation efforts of the past and present, 

and initial exploration of potential areas of emphasis. Member 

Sotomayor advised that a preliminary report would be provided at 

January meeting.’’ And then at the January meeting, there’s about 

a 50-page document summarizing 30 or more cases that the board 

had undertaken. 

A number of them are pretty significant and very consistent with 

the kind of case that we had in the Firefighters case, where the 

board had filed litigation to really basically insist that you have 

perfect harmony between the applicants for a job and those who 

are selected for promotions. 

Isn’t that true that you were more active than you may have suggested to Senator Graham yesterday? 

397 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, because, as I said, I was—I started to describe the role of the board generally and we were not addressing 

the question of what I did or how I participated. That memo has 

to be examined in context. The memo was a moment in our 12-year 

history where the board was planning a retreat to think about 

what directions, if any, we should consider moving into or not. We 

were not reviewing the individual cases to see if the individual 

cases—what positions were taken, the type of strategies that 

we—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Didn’t you know the cases that—that you— 

the position—the organization was—well my time was running out. 

Chairman LEAHY. Your time has run out. I was wondering if 

you’d like to finish your answer. 

Senator SESSIONS. I’ll let you answer. But I’m just want to—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The end of my answer was, the Fund had 

been involved in a series of areas, employment, public health, education, and others. And so the broader question for the Fund was, 

should we be considering some other areas of interest to the community? We held a retreat in which speakers from a variety of different civil rights organizations, academics, a number of people 

came and just talked to us. I don’t actually remember there being 

a firm decision that followed that, but it was a part of a conversation, the sort of retreats that even my court has engaged in: what 

are we doing; what are we thinking about? But it wasn’t a review 

of each individual case to judge its merits. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Judge, there’s been a lot of talk about the 

Maloney case. I should note, it’s not what you said. It’s what Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Supreme Court said in his decision, left 

in place the 123-year-old Supreme Court precedent on guns, did it 

not? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Justice Scalia, in a footnote in the Heller decision, noted the court’s holding that the Second Amendment 

wasn’t incorporated against the States. 

Chairman LEAHY. The only reason I mention that, I’ve been a 

gun owner since I was probably 13 years old. I’ve seen nothing 

done by the Supreme Court, by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, by the Congress, or by our State legislature that is going to 

change, one way or the other, the ownership that I have of the 

guns I now have. 

Senator Kohl. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you very much, Senator Leahy. 

Judge Sotomayor, you’ve told us that you will follow the law and 

follow precedent, and you’ve made a very big point of this and that 

is all well and good. 

But some of the court’s most important landmark hearings— 

landmark rulings overruled longstanding precedent, like Brown v. 

Board of Education, which ended legal segregation. Now, as an appellate judge, as we know, you’re required to always follow precedent. But as a Supreme Court Justice, you will have the freedom 

to depart from precedent. 

So tell us how you will decide when it is appropriate to alter, 

amend, or even overrule, precedent. 

398 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The doctrine of stare decisis is a doctrine that 

looks to the value in the stability, consistency, predictability of 

precedent and it starts from the principles that precedent are important values to the society because it helps those goals. It also 

guides judges in recognizing that those who have become before 

them, the judges who have looked at these issues, have applied 

careful thought to the question and view things in a certain way, 

and a court should—a judge should exercise some humility and 

caution in disregarding the thoughts and conclusions of others who 

came—who came in that position before them. 

But that’s not to suggest that the doctrine says that precedence 

is immutable. And, in fact, I believe that England had an experiment with that question and—and it was not horribly successful. 

Precedents are precedents. They’re not immutable, they have to 

change in certain circumstances. And those circumstances generally have been described by Justice Souter in the Casey case, are 

probably the best articulation people have come to in sort of talking 

about the factors that courts think about. 

And it starts with, well, how much reliance has the society put 

into the precedent? What are the costs of changing it? I shouldn’t 

say ‘‘start’’. He put them in a different order. There’s no real importance to the order because all are factors that you put into the 

weighing as a judge looks at an existing precedent. It looks to 

whether the—whatever the court has said. Is it providing enough 

guidance to the court’s below and to—and for people to determine 

what they can or can’t do? Is the precedent administratively workable? 

Number three—and as I said, there’s no ordering to this—are the 

facts that the court assumed in its older precedents. Have those 

changed so that it would raise a question about the court revisiting 

a precedent? Also, has—are the—there are developments in related 

fields to precedents and approaches that are developed in those 

cases that may bring into question the foundation of an older 

precedent. 

Brown v. Board of Education has often been described as a radical change by some, and the public perceives it as a radical 

change. When you actually look at its history, you realize there had 

been jurisprudence for over 20 years by the court striking down 

certain—certain schemes that provided ‘‘separate but equal’’, but in 

fact didn’t achieve their stated goal. 

And so there was underpinnings in Brown v. Board of Education 

that, in those precedents that came before Brown that obviously 

gave the court some cause, some reason to re-think this issue of 

‘‘separate but equal’’. They also had before them the—probably one 

of the most famous dissents in American history, which was the 

dissent by Justice Harlan in Plessy. 

And Justice Harlan so carefully laid out what the Constitution 

said, what the principles of the Constitution were that motivated 

the—the Congress to pass those amendments. He laid out the 

court’s precedents in that area and he said, separate but equal is 

just not consistent with the Constitution. 

Now, this isn’t an opinion where he described another group of 

people as different, and so it wasn’t that he was being motivated 

399 

by his personal views. He was being motivated by a view of the law 

that the court, in Brown, made a change about. 

One final factor the court obviously looks at is the number of 

times a precedent has been reaffirmed by the court, but all of these 

things are decided on the basis of judgment of a particular case 

and the arguments that are raised before a judge, and recognizing 

as a judge that precedent is deserving of deference, precedent, and 

changing it should be done cautiously by a court, but precedent 

can’t stand if other things counsel that it not. 

Senator KOHL. Good. 

Judge, I’d like to return to the topic of antitrust. Two years ago 

in the Twombly case, Justice Souter wrote an opinion that sharply 

departed from precedent when it held that a plaintiff must show 

extensive evidence to support an antitrust case before the opportunity for any discovery, otherwise the case would be dismissed. 

This decision makes it very difficult for any plaintiff to bring an 

antitrust action, particularly a consumer or small business without 

the resources to develop extensive economic evidence. 

What is your assessment of this decision? Do you share the concern of many that this does serious damage to enforcement of antitrust law? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As with all issues of statutory construction, 

my charge as a judge would be, how do I apply a court’s holding 

in a particular case in the next situation before me? The concern 

that you express is one that I have heard about that expressed by 

some, but as a judge I don’t make policy. I don’t make the policy 

choices for Congress. I’m charged with looking at a particular situation that comes before me, looking at the court’s precedent and 

applying it to that situation. 

With respect to that case, I—I—that case, as I understand the 

case, had to do with how much had to be pled. I didn’t understand 

it to mean that there had to be the presentation of evidence at the 

pleading stage, just what had to be pled to withstand a motion to 

dismiss in the case. 

Senator KOHL. Well, my understanding of his decision is that, in 

the future, plaintiffs must show extensive evidence to support an 

antitrust case before the opportunity for any discovery or else the 

case will be dismissed. Now, assuming that’s correct—and I’m not 

telling I’m positive, but assuming that’s correct—does that cause 

you concern? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I said, the issue of concern is not how I 

look at the court’s precedents, because what I’m doing in looking 

at the court’s precedent is thinking about how it applies to another 

case. The question of how to do that and whether that’s right by 

the court would be a question that Congress, who has passed the 

antitrust laws, would have to, in the first instance, think about 

changing. 

Senator KOHL. So then are you saying in a case that would follow 

you would necessarily be bound by Justice Souter’s decision in 

Twombly? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The court considers its various precedents in 

the context of a new situation. In the cases decided by the courts, 

they’re applied to the facts of the particular case. Twombly is conVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00411 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
400 

sidered, as are all the court’s precedent in a new case, that examines the issue of what a complaint must allege or not allege. 

Senator KOHL. So you would not be bound by the Twombly precedent, is that what you’re saying? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. It’s precedent. 

Senator KOHL. So you would be bound? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It must be applied, as is all the court’s existing precedents that have not been rejected by the court. It has to 

be considered and has to be weighed in the situation presented. 

Senator KOHL. All right. I think maybe we can talk about that 

subsequently to understand your meaning and what I’m saying, my 

reading of Twombly versus your reading of Twombly, as it will affect future antitrust cases. My understanding is that it will have 

a very negative effect on—a negative impact on the average person 

or small business’ ability to bring an antitrust case that might otherwise have merit, because of the requirement that they present 

enormous amounts of evidence even before they can go to discovery 

or the case is dismissed. 

Now, if I’m speaking accurately, then I think that that’s a precedent that needs to be thought about very carefully, and that’s why 

I asked the question. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And Senator, the one thing I do know as a 

judge is that every argument gets made to the courts not on one 

occasion, but many. The question that will arise is: what’s the extent of the court’s application in the next case? 

Senator KOHL. All right. Finally, Judge, the Supreme Court not 

only has the power, as you know, to decide cases and to construe 

the Constitution, but it also has the sole and absolute power to decide which cases it hears. If you are confirmed, only you and three 

other Justices can decide whether a case will be heard to begin 

with by the Supreme Court. In recent times, the Supreme Court 

has received appeals in nearly 7,000 cases each year and it only 

hears about 70 or 80 cases, as you know. In other words, the Justices choose to hear only about 1 percent of the appeals that they 

receive. This is obviously a very, very crucial power that Justices 

have. 

Now, I recognize that one of the criteria for choosing cases is to 

resolve disagreement among the Circuit Courts about a particular 

aspect of the law, but many of the most important and prominent 

cases in the history of the Supreme Court did not involve splits 

into Circuit Courts, but were instead cases of national importance. 

So how will you determine which cases are so important as to 

warrant review by the Supreme Court? In other words, which 1 

percent of those appeals will you consider? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. What I know, and you did accurately describe 

one aspect of the Supreme Court’s local rules that suggest just that 

Justices will consider a variety of factors in whether to grant cert 

or not, and one of those listed factors is disagreement among the 

Circuits, disagreements among the Circuits and Circuits and State 

courts and issues that have not been adequately addressed but require being addressed for a variety of different reasons. 

It is very difficult to talk in the abstract about when cert should 

be granted because each situation presents a different set of facts 

and each question about whether a case is in the right posture to 

401 

look at an issue—as I said yesterday, sometimes there—yesterday 

I said—I may have explained earlier in a response to Senator Specter, and I know that you had stepped away, there are procedural— 

there are cases that present other arguments than the one that the 

Circuit split exists on, and those other arguments might dispose of 

the case in the way the Circuit Court did and not necessitate the 

reaching of an issue. 

There’s a question, at least as some Justices have defined it, of 

whether there’s been enough percolation among the Circuit Courts 

so that all of the views of a particular issue have been fully explored. The circumstances and the issues that each Justice uses depends on the facts and the posture of what comes before it. I would 

obviously consider the court’s local rules. I would give consideration 

to the point that some have raised, that the court is not doing 

enough. 

But that can’t counsel taking cases. That could only be—look at 

my—look at the workload and see, can the case—can the court do 

this if it meets all the other criteria that goes into the mixture of 

whether to grant cert or not? You don’t, like Congress, think about 

policy, we’re going to decide 150 cases this year. You look at the 

cases that come before you and you figure out which ones are in 

a place to be reviewed. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. 

Senator Hatch, we’ll turn to you and then we will—and then we 

will take a break after you’re finished. 

[Recess at 4:55 p.m. to 5:08 p.m.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Welcome back, Judge. We will skip over one 

and go to Senator Feingold. You are recognized for up to 20 minutes. I keep adding the ‘‘up to’’ hoping somebody will follow my example. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I—— 

Chairman LEAHY. But I do mean nobody will be cut off before 20 

minutes. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand, and 

I’d like to begin using my time by asking that a letter from former 

members of PRLDEF’s Board describing the role of board members, 

which does not include choosing or controlling litigation—I’d ask 

unanimous consent. 

Chairman LEAHY. Without objection it will be part of the record. 

[The letter appear as a submission for the record.] 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Judge, again, thanks for your tremendous patience. I’d like to 

start by talking for a moment about the recent Supreme Court decision in Caperton v. Massey. I consider this a significant case that 

bears upon the flood of special interest money that threatens to undermine public confidence in our justice system. The facts of this 

case are notorious: John Grisham used them as an inspiration for 

his novel, The Appeal. A jury in West Virginia returned a $50 million verdict for a large 

coal company, and pending the appeal, the company’s CEO spent 

$3 million to elect an attorney named Brent Benjamin to the state 

supreme court. That was a huge amount of money, relatively 

speaking—more than the amount spent by all of Benjamin’s other 

402 

financial supporters combined. Benjamin won the election, became 

a West Virginia Supreme Court Justice, and lo and behold, he 

voted to overturn that $50 million verdict against his main campaign contributor. Twice, he refused to recuse himself in the case, 

despite his obvious conflict of interest. 

Last month, the Supreme Court held that Benjamin’s failure to 

recuse himself was intolerable under our Constitution’s guarantee 

of due process of law. The court also noted approvingly that most 

states have adopted codes of judicial conduct that prevent this kind 

of conflict, and to that end, I commend the Wisconsin Supreme 

Court’s plan to revise its recusal rules to provide additional safeguards that protect judicial impartiality. 

You’ve been a judge for many years and you may have seen examples when you thought a judge should have withdrawn, although hopefully none were as egregious as this case. In your opinion, what additional steps should judges and legislators take to ensure that the judiciary is held to the highest ethical standards and 

that litigants can be confident that their cases will be handled impartially? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, I would find it inappropriate to 

make suggestions to Congress about what standards it should hold 

judges to or litigants to. That’s a policy choice that Congress will 

consider. 

I note that the American Bar Association has a Code of Conduct 

that applies to litigants. The Judicial Code has a Code of Conduct 

for judges. And as you noted in—in the State system where judges 

are elected, many States are doing what I just spoke about, making 

and passing regulations. 

Caperton was a case that was taken under the local rules of the 

Supreme Court, presumably, that exercises supervisory powers 

over the functioning of the courts and it presented, obviously, a significant issue because the court took it and decided the case. 

At issue fundamentally is that judges, lawyers, all professionals 

must, on their own, abide by the highest standards of conduct. And 

I have given a speech on this topic to students at Yale at one point 

where I said the law is only the minimum one must do. Personally, 

one must act in a way in cases to ensure that you’re acting consistent with your sense of meeting the highest standards of the profession. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Judge. 

As I’m sure you know, on the last day of the term, the Supreme 

Court ordered that a pending case involving federal election law 

called Citizens United v. FEC be re-argued in September. It’s quite 

possible that you will be a member of the court by then. I do not 

intend to ask you how you would rule in that case, but I do want 

to express my very deep concern about where the Supreme Court 

may be heading, and then pose a general question to you. 

In 2003, the court, in a 5–4 ruling, upheld the McCain-Feingold 

bill against constitutional challenge. I believe that ruling accurately applied the court’s previous precedents and recognized that 

Congress must have the power to regulate campaign finance to address serious problems of corruption and the appearance of corruption. 

403 

Since the arrival on the court of its two newest members, the 

court seems to have started in another direction on these issues, 

striking down or significantly narrowing two provisions of the law: 

the Millionaire’s Amendment in the Davis case and the issue ad 

provision in Wisconsin Right to Life. Several Justices have even argued that corporations and living persons should have the same 

constitutional rights to support their chosen candidates and that 

Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a case rejecting that 

idea, should be overruled. 

Austin is premised on what I believe is an absolutely reasonable 

conclusion that the political activities of corporations may be subjected to greater regulation because of the legal advantages given 

to them by the states that allow them to amass great wealth. In 

scheduling re-argument in the Citizens United case, the court specifically asked the parties to address whether Austin should be 

overruled. If the court does that, and depending on how exactly it 

rules, Judge, it may usher in an era of unlimited corporate spending on elections that the nation has not seen since the 19th century. 

Without addressing the specifics of the Citizens United case, I’d 

like to ask you what the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s 

precedents generally provide about the rights of corporations, and 

what the current state of the law is as far as corporate participation in elections, as you understand it. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, I have attempted to answer every 

question that’s been posed to me. You have noted that Citizens 

United is on the court’s docket for September. I think it’s September 9th. If I were confirmed for the—to the court, it would be 

the first case that I would participate in. 

Given that existence of that case, the very first one, I think it 

would be inappropriate for me to do anything to speak about that 

area of the law because it would suggest that I’m going into that 

process with some prejudgment about what precedent says and 

what it doesn’t say, and how to apply it in the open question the 

court is considering. I appreciate what you have said to me, but 

this is a special circumstance given the pendency of that particular 

case. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And frankly, Judge, I probably would say the 

same thing if I were in your shoes, given—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator FEINGOLD.—given the facts as they are. I appreciate the 

opportunity to express what I wanted to say about that. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I’m going to use up less than half 

of my time. 

Chairman LEAHY. All right. Thank you. I think you’ve set a fantastic example. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LEAHY. I commend you. I say that in a totally nonpartisan fashion. 

Senator Grassley. 

Senator GRASSLEY. I assume that I get the time that he didn’t 

use? 

Chairman LEAHY. No. 

[Laughter.] 

404 

Chairman LEAHY. No. After your demonstrator, was it yesterday—your demonstrator, that you tend to turn people on, we don’t 

need any more. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. 

Chairman LEAHY. We don’t need any more excitement, Senator 

Grassley. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Yeah. 

Chairman LEAHY. We want it as low-key as possible. But you— 

you do have up to 20 minutes. The opportunity is up to 20 minutes. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Now, I believe that I’m going to ask you 

something you’ve never been asked before during this hearing, I 

hope. I’d like to be original on something. 

I want to say to you that there’s a Supreme Court decision called 

Baker v. Nelson, 1972. It says that the Federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear due process and equal protection challenges to State 

marriage laws ‘‘for want of substantial Federal question’’, which obviously is an issue the courts deal with quite regularly, I mean, the 

issue of is it a Federal question or not a Federal question. 

So do you agree that marriage is a question reserved for the 

States to decide based on Baker v. Nelson? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That also—— 

Senator GRASSLEY. I thought I’d ask a very easy—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR.—is a question that’s pending and impending 

in many courts. As you know, the issue of marriage and what constitutes it is a subject of much public discussion, and there’s a 

number of cases in State courts addressing the issue of what—who 

regulates it, under what terms. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Can I please interrupt you? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Uh-huh. 

Senator GRASSLEY. I thought I was asking a very simple question 

based upon a precedent that Baker v. Nelson is, based on the proposition that yesterday, in so many cases, whether it was Griswold, 

whether it was Roe v. Wade, whether it was Chevron, whether it’s 

a whole bunch of other cases that you made reference to, the Casey 

case, the Gonzalez case, the Leegan Creative Leather Products case, 

the Kelo case. You made that case to me. You said these are precedents. Now, are you saying to me that Baker v. Nelson is not a 

precedent? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. I just haven’t reviewed Baker in a 

while, and so I actually don’t know what the status is. If it is the 

court’s precedent, as I’ve indicated in all of my answers, I will 

apply that precedent to the facts of any new situation that implicates it. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Always the first question for a judge. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, then tell me—tell me what sort of a 

process you might go through if a case, a marriage case, came to 

the Supreme Court of whether Baker v. Nelson is precedent or not, 

because I assume if it is precedent, based on everything you told 

us yesterday, you’re going to follow it. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The question on a marriage issue will be, two 

sides will come in. One will say Baker applies, another will say this 

court’s precedent applies to this factual situation, whatever the facVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00416 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
405 

tual situation is before the court. They’ll argue about what the 

meaning of that precedent is, how it applies to the regulation that’s 

at issue, and then the court will look at whatever it is that the 

State has done, what law it has passed on this issue of marriage, 

and decide, Okay, which precedent controls this outcome? It’s not 

that I’m attempting not to answer your question, Senator Grassley. 

I’m trying to explain the process that would be used Again, this 

question of how, and what is constitutional or not, or how a court 

will approach a case and what precedent to apply to it, is going to 

depend on what’s at issue before the court. Could the State do what 

it did? 

Senator GRASSLEY. Can I interrupt you again? Following what 

you said yesterday, that certain things are precedent, I assume 

that you’ve answered a lot of questions before this Committee 

about—even after you said that certain things are precedent, of 

things that are going to come before the court down the road 

when—if you’re on the Supreme Court. You didn’t seem to compromise or hedge on those things being precedent. Why are you 

hedging on this? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I’m not on this because the holding of Baker 

v. Nelson is it’s holding. As a holding, it would control any similar 

issue that came up. It’s been a while since I’ve looked at that case 

so I can’t—— 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay 

Judge SOTOMAYOR.—as I could with some of the more recent 

precedent of the court or the more core holdings of the court on a 

variety of different issues, answer exactly what the holding was 

and what the situation that it applied to. I would be happy, Senator, as a follow-up to a written letter, or to give me the opportunity to come back tomorrow and just address that issue. I’d have 

to look at Baker again. 

Senator GRASSLEY. I would appreciate it. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It’s been too long since I’ve looked at it. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Yeah. You—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. So it may have been, sir, as far back as law 

school, which was 30 years ago. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Oh, were you probably in grade school, you 

were at that time. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yeah. It was—I know that I looked at it, sir. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Okay. 

I want to go on, but I would like to have you do that, what you’d 

suggested you’d answer me further after you’ve studied it. 

I have a question that kind of relates to the first question. In 

1996, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed into law, the 

Defense of Marriage Act which defined marriage for the purpose of 

Federal law as between one man and one woman. It also prevents 

a State or territory from giving effect to another State that recognizes same-sex marriages. Both provisions have been challenged as 

unconstitutional and Federal courts have upheld both cases, one is 

the Wilson case, one is the Bishops case, in District Court. 

Do you agree with Federal courts which have held that the Defense of Marriage Act does not violate the full faith and credit 

clause and is an appropriate exercise of Congress’ power to regulate conflicts between laws in different States? 

406 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That’s very similar to the Austin situation, 

but the ABA rules would not permit me to comment on the merits 

of a case that’s pending or impending before the Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of that 

statute, and to the extent that lower courts have addressed it and 

made holdings, it is an impending case that could come before the 

Supreme Court. So, I can’t comment on the merits of that case. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. Have you ever made any rulings on the 

full faith and credit clause? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I may have. But if your specific question is, 

have I done it with respect to a marriage-related issue—— 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, I’m not—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. 

Senator GRASSLEY. On any—on anything in the full faith and 

credit clause. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I actually have no memory of doing so. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. That’s Okay. No, you can stop there. 

That’s Okay. 

Now, I’m going to go to a place where Senator Hatch left off, but 

I’m not going to repeat any of the questions that he asked. But 

there’s one that I want to ask, and I feel a little bit guilty on this. 

My dad used to have a saying to us kids when we were harping 

on something. He says, ‘‘When are you going to quit beating a dead 

horse? ’’ But I want to ask you anyway. You—you also wrote, ‘‘I 

wonder whether achieving that goal is possible in all, or even in 

most, cases, and I wonder whether, by ignoring our differences as 

women and men of color, we do a disservice both to the law and 

to society.’’ 

So the concern I have about the statement is it’s indicating that 

you believe judges should, and must, take into account gender, ethnic background, or other personal preferences in their decision 

making process. Is that what you meant? And I want to follow it 

up so I don’t have to ask two questions: how is being impartial a 

disservice to the law and society? Isn’t justice supposed to be blind? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, I do not believe that judges should use 

their personal feelings, beliefs, or value systems or make their—to 

influence their outcomes, and neither do I believe that they should 

consider the gender, race, or ethnicity of any group that’s before 

them. I absolutely do not believe that. 

With respect to, yes, is the—is the goal of justice to be impartial, 

that is the central role of a judge. It—the judge is the impartial decision maker between parties who come before them. My speech 

was on something else, but I have no quarrel with the basic principles that you have asked me to recognize. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Now, no quarrel sounds equivocal. They—I do 

believe in those things absolutely, and that’s what I have proven 

I do as a judge. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. 

Then the last one on this point of another remark you made. You 

also stated that you ‘‘further accept that our experiences as women 

and people of color affect our decisions’’. And then, further, ‘‘that 

personal experiences affect the facts that judges choose to see,’’ and 

407 

that, further, ‘‘there will be some (differences in my judging) based 

on my gender and Latina heritage.’’ 

Do you believe that it is ever appropriate for judges to allow 

their own identity/politics to influence their judging? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. Absolutely not. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. 

Then I want to move on to another area. This question comes 

from your 1992 Senate questionnaire. You wrote in response to a 

question about judicial activism that ‘‘intrusions by a judge upon 

the functions of other branches of government should only be done 

as a last resort and limitedly’’. Is this still your position? And let 

me follow up: when would such an intrusion be justified? For example, what is an example of last resort? What is an example of limited—‘‘limitedly’’ ? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The answer is, judges and—and the manner 

in which that question was responded to was, to the extent that 

there has been a violation of the Constitution in whatever manner 

of court identifies in a particular case, it has to try to remedy that 

situation in the most narrow way in order not to intrude on the 

functions of other branches or actors in the process. 

The case that I—was discussed in my history has been the Doe 

case, in which I joined the panel decision where the District Court 

had invalidated a statute that found unconstitutional a statute 

that the legislator—legislature had passed on national security letters. Our panel reviewed that situation and attempted to discern, 

and did discern, Congress’ intent to be that despite a—isolation 

provisions that might have to be narrowly construed to survive constitutional review, it held that the other provisions of the Act were 

constitutional. 

So the vast majority, contrary to what the District Court did— 

and I’m not suggesting it was intending to violate what I’m describing, but the court took a different view than the Circuit did—we 

upheld the statute in large measure. To the extent that we thought 

there were, and found that there were two provisions that were unconstitutional, we narrowly construed them in order to assist in effecting Congress’ intent. That’s what I talked about ‘‘limitedly’’ in 

that answer. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. 

A little bit along the same line, in your Law Review articles you 

wrote that, ‘‘Our society would be straitjacketed were not the 

courts, with the able assistance of the lawyers, constantly overhauling’’—and I don’t know whether that’s your emphasis or mine, 

but I’ve got it underlined—‘‘the law and adapt’’—maybe I’d better 

start over again. 

‘‘Our society would be straitjacketed were it not—were not the 

courts, with the able assistance of the lawyers, constantly overhauling the law and adapting it to the realities of ever-changing social, industrial, and political changes.’’ 

The explanation of the statement from you. I think you’re saying 

that judges can twist the law regardless of what the legislature, 

the elected branch of government, has enacted into law. It’s kind 

of my interpretation of that. Obviously I think you’re going to tell 

me you don’t mean that, but at least you know where I’m coming 

from. 

408 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. That interpretation was clearly not my 

intent, and if—I don’t actually remember those particular words, 

but I do remember the speech. I’m assuming you’re talking about 

returning majesty to the law. And there I was talking about a 

broader set of questions, which was how to bring the public’s respect back to the function of judges. 

And I was talking about—that judges—that lawyers have an obligation to explain to the public the reasons why what seems unpredictable in the law has reasons, and I mentioned in that speech 

that one of the big reasons is that Congress makes new laws. That 

was the very first reason I discussed. And also that there’s new 

technology, there’s new developments in society, and what lawyers 

do is come in and talk to you about, okay, we’ve got these laws, 

how do you apply them to this new situation? 

And what judges do—and that’s why I was talking about the assistance of judges of lawyers—is what you do, is you look at the 

court’s precedent, you look at what a statute says and you try to 

understand the principles that are at issue and apply them to what 

the society is doing, and that was the focus of my speech, which 

was, talk to the public about the process. Don’t feed into their cynicism that judges are activists, that judges are making law. Work 

at explaining to the—to the public what the process is. I also talk 

to—part of my speech is what judges can do to help improve respect of the public in the legal process. 

Senator GRASSLEY. So the use of the word ‘‘overhaul’’ does not in 

any way—‘‘overhaul the law’’—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Right. 

Senator GRASSLEY.—does not in any way imply usurpation of legislative power by the courts? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. And if you look at what I was talking 

about, it was, the society develops. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Yeah. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. We are not, today, what we were 100 years 

ago in terms of technology, medicine, so many different areas. 

There are new situations that arise and new facts that courts look 

at. You apply the law to those situations, but that is the process 

of judging which is sort of trying to figure out, what does the law 

say about a set of facts that may not have been imagined at the 

time of the founding of the Constitution, but it’s what the judge is 

facing then: how do you apply it to that? 

Senator GRASSLEY. Yeah. 

I want to go back to Didden based upon my opportunity to reflect 

on some things you said yesterday. The time limit to file a case in 

Didden was 3 years. Mr. Didden was approached for what he classified as extortion in November 2003. Two months later, in January of 2004, he filed his lawsuit. But under your ruling, Mr. Didden 

was required to file his lawsuit in July 2002, close to a year and 

a half before he was actually extorted. So that doesn’t make sense 

to require someone to file a lawsuit on a perceived chance that an 

order might occur. 

You also testified that the Supreme Court’s Kelo decision was not 

relevant to the Didden holding, but your opinion, in cursory fashion, which is a problem that we addressed yesterday, states that 

409 

if there was no Statute of Limitations issue, Kelo would have permitted Mr. Didden’s property to be taken. 

It’s hard to believe that an individual’s property can be seized 

when he refuses to be extorted without any constitutional violation 

taking place. It’s even harder to believe that, under these circumstances, Mr. Didden—Mr. Didden did not deserve his day in 

court or at least some additional legal analysis. 

Could you please explain how Mr. Didden could have filed his 

lawsuit July 2002 before he was extorted in November 2003? And 

also please explain why a July 2002 filing would not have been dismissed because there was no proof that Mr. Didden had suffered 

an injury, only an allegation that he might be injured in the future. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The basis of Mr. Didden’s lawsuit was, the 

State can’t take my property and give it to a private developer, 

and—because that is not consistent with the Takings Clause of the 

Constitution. 

To the extent he knew the State—and there’s no dispute about 

this—that the State had found a public use for his property, that 

it had a public purpose, that it had an agreement with a private 

developer to let that developer take the property, he knew that he 

was injured because his basic argument was, the State can’t do 

this. It can’t take my property and give it to a private developer. 

The Supreme Court, in Kelo, addressed that question and said 

under certain circumstances the State can do that if it’s for a public 

use and a public purpose. And so his lawsuit essentially addressing 

that question came 5 years after he knew what the State was 

doing. The issue of extortion was a question of whether the private 

developer, in setting a lawsuit with them, was engaging in extortion, and extortion is an unlawful asking of money with no basis. 

But the private developer had a basis. He had an agreement with 

the State. And so that is a different issue than the timeliness of 

Mr. Didden’s complaint. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Cardin? We’ll recognize Senator 

Cardin. And then for those who have to plan, we will then recess 

until 9:30 tomorrow morning. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Judge, let me first say that since this will 

be my last time in this hearing to address you, to say this has been 

my first confirmation hearing for a—Supreme Court Justice. You 

have set a very high standard for me and for those I might have 

to consider, because there’s always a possibility of future vacancies 

on the Supreme Court. As for responding to our questions, being 

very open with us, and I think really demonstrating the type of respect for the process that has really shown dignity to you and to 

our committee, I thank you for that. 

I thanked you in the beginning for your willingness to serve the 

public as a prosecutor and as a judge, and now willing to take on 

this really incredible responsibility. I just really want to emphasize 

that again. I don’t know if you thought when you were being considered for this what you would have to go through as far as the 

appearance before the Judiciary Committee, but it gets better after 

our hearings, I believe. 

410 

So let me ask you one or two questions, if I might. I want to follow up on Senator Kohl’s question on the selection of cases under 

certiorari. As has been pointed out earlier, maybe 1 percent of the 

cases that are petitioned to the Supreme Court actually recieve an 

opinion. 

Now, Senator Kohl asked you what standards you would use in 

choosing cases and one factor I believe is important to look at is 

the impact that a Supreme Court case can have on society. I’m 

going to refer to one of your cases, the Boykin case, which was the 

housing case where you allowed that borrower to go forward, African-American, on a discrimination issue. And we’ve seen throughout history discrimination against minorities in housing, with redlining and predatory lending. It led to the Fair Housing Act enacted by Congress. 

The Supreme Court has long recognized Title 7 and 8 of the Federal Housing Act as part of the coordinated scheme of the Federal 

civil rights laws enacted to end discrimination. But there are still 

major challenges that are out there. Predatory lending still takes 

place. It’s happened during this housing crisis with the subprime 

mortgage market targeted toward minority communities. 

I say that in relationship to the Boykin case, which I agreed with 

your conclusion that it not only could affect the litigants that were 

before you, but could have an impact on industry practice if, in 

fact, there was discrimination and the case was decided by your 

court. 

And the same thing is true in the Supreme Court, more so in the 

Supreme Court. It is the highest judgment of our land. And yes, 

you have to be mindful when you take a case on cert as to the impact it will have on the litigants. Certainly you have to take into 

consideration if there’s been different, inconsistent rulings in the 

different Circuits. 

But it seems to me that one of the standards I would hope you 

would use in choosing cases is the importance of deciding that particular case for the impact it can have on a broader group of people 

in our Nation, whether it’s a housing case that could affect communities’ ability to get fair access to mortgages for home ownership, 

or whether it’s a case that could have an impact on a class of people, on environmental or economic issues. And I just would like to 

ask you whether this, in fact, is a reasonable request as you consider certiorari requests, that one of the factors that is considered 

is the impact it has on the community at large. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I indicated earlier, we don’t make policy 

choices. That means that I would think it inappropriate for a court 

to choose a case because—or a court—a judge to choose a case 

based on some sense of, I want this result on society. A judge takes 

a case to decide a legal issue, understanding its importance to an 

area of law and to arguments that parties are making about why 

it’s important. 

The question of—of impact is different than what a judge looks 

at, which is what’s the state of the law and this question, and 

how—and what clarity is needed, and other factors. But as I said, 

there’s a subtle but important difference in separating out and 

making choices based on policy and how you would like an issue 

411 

to come out than a question that a judge looks at in terms of assessing the time at which a legal argument should be addressed. 

Senator CARDIN. And I respect that difference and I don’t want 

you to be taking a case to try to make policy. But I do think the— 

need for clarity for the community as to what is appropriate conduct well beyond the litigants of a particular case is a factor where 

clarification is needed and should weigh heavily on whether the 

court takes that type of case or not. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. There’s just no one factor that controls the 

choice where you say, I’m going to look at every case this way. As 

I said, judges in—in—well, I shouldn’t talk because I haven’t—I’m 

not there. 

Senator CARDIN. All right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. But my understanding of the process is that 

it’s not based on those policy implications of an outcome. 

Senator CARDIN. Uh-huh. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It’s based on a different question than that. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, let me conclude on one other case that you 

ruled on where I also agree with your decision, and that’s in Ford 

v. McGinnis, where you wrote a unanimous panel opinion overturning a District Court summary judgment, finding in favor of the 

Muslim inmate who was denied, by prison officials, access to his religious meals marking the end of Ramadan. You held that the inmate’s fundamental rights were violated and that the opinions of 

the Department of Corrections and religious authorities cannot 

trump the plaintiff’s sincere and religious beliefs. 

Religious Freedom is one of the basic principles in our Constitution. As I said in my opening comments, it was one of the reasons 

my grandparents came to America. The freedom of religion expression is truly a fundamental American right. Please share with us 

your philosophy as to—maybe that’s the wrong use of terms, but 

the importance of that provision in that Constitution and how you 

would go about dealing with cases that could affect this fundamental right in our Constitution. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I—I don’t mean to be funny, but the court 

has held that it’s fundamental in the sense of incorporation against 

the States. 

[Laughter.] 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. But it is a very important and central part 

of our democratic society that we do give freedom of religion, of 

practice of religion, that the Constitution restricts the—the State 

from establishing a religion, and that we have freedom of expression and speech as well. 

Those freedoms are central to our Constitution. The four cases, 

others that I have rendered in this area, recognize the importance 

of that in terms of one’s consideration of actions that are being 

taken to restrict it in a particular circumstance. Speaking further 

is difficult to do, again, because of the role of a judge. To say it’s 

important, that it’s fundamental, that it’s legal in common meaning, is always looked at in the context of a particular case. What’s 

the State doing? 

In the Ford case that you just mentioned, the question there before the court was, did the District Court err in considering whether or not the religious belief that this prisoner had was consistent 

412 

with the established traditional interpretation of a meal at issue? 

Okay. 

And what I was doing was applying very important Supreme 

Court precedent that said it’s the subjective belief of the individual. 

Is it really motivated by a religious belief? That’s one of the reasons we recognize conscientious objectors, because we’re asking a 

court not to look at whether this is orthodox or not, but to look at 

the sincerity of the individual’s religious belief and then look at 

what the State is doing in light of that. So that was what the issue 

was in Ford. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you for that answer. Again, thank 

you very much for the manner in which you have responded to our 

questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Thank you very much, Senator 

Cardin. 

As I noted earlier, we will now recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning. I wish you all a pleasant evening. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m. the Committee was recessed.] 

(413) 

CONTINUATION OF THE NOMINATION OF 

HON. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT 

OF THE UNITED STATES 

THURSDAY, JULY 16, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Kohl, Feinstein, Feingold, Schumer, 

Durbin, Cardin, Whitehouse, Klobuchar, Kaufman, Specter, 

Franken, Sessions, Hatch, Grassley, Kyl, Graham, Cornyn, and 

Coburn. 

Chairman LEAHY. Judge, thank you. Judge Sotomayor, welcome 

back to the Committee for a fourth day. If this seems long, it is a 

day more than either Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito was 

called upon to testify. But you seem to have weathered it well, and 

I hope the Senators have, too. 

Yesterday we completed the extended first round of questions, 

and an additional eight Senators got approximately halfway 

through a follow-up round. This morning we can continue and 

hopefully conclude. 

Senator Kyl is recognized next for 20 minutes, or as I say with 

hope springing eternal—I keep saying ‘‘up to 20 minutes.’’ Nobody 

is required to use the full 20 minutes, but I would hasten to add, 

everybody is certainly entitled to. 

Senator Kyl. 

Senator KYL. Mr. Chairman, before I begin, for those who are 

watching this on television, I would just note that I don’t think we 

put Judge Sotomayor on the hot seat with our questions, but we 

certainly did with the temperature in this room yesterday, and for 

that I apologize. And I note that it could get a little steamy this 

morning, too. I know it is cold back there, but it is not at all cool 

where we are. 

Chairman LEAHY. If I could respond—— 

Senator KYL. If there is ever a question about Judge Sotomayor’s 

stamina in a very hot room, that question has been dispelled without any doubt whatsoever. 

Chairman LEAHY. If I might—and I will ask them to set the clock 

back to the 20 minutes so this does not go into your time—it is 

really an interesting thing, because anybody who has gone up 

414 

where the press are, it is like an icebox up there. And I am hoping 

we can get this—but at least the microphone is working. I want to 

thank Senator Sessions for offering me his microphone yesterday, 

but that did not work. And I want to thank Senator Franken for 

letting me use his. 

So if we start the clock back over so I do not take this out of Senator Kyl’s time, Senator Kyl, please go ahead, sir. 

Senator KYL. Thank you, and good morning, Judge. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Good morning. 

Senator KYL. In response to one of Senator Sessions’ questions 

on Tuesday about the Ricci case, you stated that your actions in 

the case were controlled by established Supreme Court precedent. 

You also said that a variety of different judges on the appellate 

court were looking at the case in light of established Supreme 

Court and Second Circuit precedent. And you said that the Supreme Court was the only body that had the discretion and the 

power to decide how these tough issues should be decided. Those 

are all quotations from you. 

Now, I have carefully reviewed the decision, and I think the reality is different. No Supreme Court case had decided whether rejecting an employment test because of its racial results would violate the civil rights laws. Neither the Supreme Court’s majority in 

Ricci nor the four dissenting judges discussed or even cited any 

cases that addressed the question. In fact, the Court in its opinion 

even noted—and I am quoting here—that ‘‘this action presents two 

provisions of Title VII to be interpreted and reconciled with few, if 

any, precedents in the court of appeals discussing the issue.’’ 

In other words, not only did the Supreme Court not identify any 

Supreme Court cases that were on point; it found few, if any, lower 

court opinions that even addressed the issue. 

Isn’t it true that you were incorrect in your earlier statement 

that you were bound by established Supreme Court and Second 

Circuit precedent when you voted each time to reject the firefighters’ civil rights complaint? 

STATEMENT OF HON. SONIA SOTOMAYOR, TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 

STATES 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, I was—let me place the Ricci decision back in context. The issue was whether or not employees who 

were a member of a disparately impacted group had a right under 

existing precedent to bring a lawsuit. Did they have a right to 

bring a lawsuit on the basis of prima facie case and what would 

that consist of? 

That was established Second Circuit precedent and had been, at 

least up to that point, concluded from Supreme Court precedents 

describing the initial burden that employees had. That was—— 

Senator KYL. Well, are you speaking here—you said had the 

right to bring the lawsuit. It is not a question of standing. There 

was a question of summary judgment. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Exactly. Exactly, which is, when you speak 

about a right to bring a lawsuit, I mean what’s the minimum 

amount of good-faith evidence do they have to actually file the complaint. And established precedent said you can make out, an emVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00426 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
415 

ployee, a prima facie case of a violation of Title VII under just 

merely by—not ‘‘merely.’’ That’s denigrating it. By showing a disparate impact. 

Then the city was faced with the choice of, OK, we’re now facing 

two claims, one—— 

Senator KYL. If I could just interrupt, we only have 20 minutes 

here, and I am aware of the facts of the case. I know what the 

claims were. The question I asked was very simple. You said that 

you were bound by Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent. 

What was it? There is no Supreme Court precedent, and as the 

Court itself noted, they could find few, if any, Second Circuit precedents. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The question was the precedent that existed 

and whether, viewing it, one would view this as the city discriminating on the basis of race or the city concluding that because it 

was unsure that its test actually avoided disparate impact but still 

tested for necessary qualifications, was it discriminating on the 

basis of race by not certifying the test? 

Senator KYL. So you disagree with the Supreme Court’s characterization of the precedents available to decide the case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It’s not that I disagree. The question was a 

more focused one that the Court was looking at, which was saying—not more focused. It was a different look. It was saying, OK, 

you have got these precedents. It says employees can sue the city. 

The city is now facing liability. It is unsure whether it can defeat 

that liability. And so it decides not to certify the test and see if it 

could come up with one that would still measure the necessary 

qualifications—— 

Senator KYL. Let me interrupt again because you are not getting 

to the point of my question, and I know as a good judge, if I were 

arguing a case before you, you would say, ‘‘That is all fine and 

dandy, counsel, but answer my question.’’ 

Isn’t it true that—two things—first, the result of your decision 

was to grant summary judgment against these parties? In other 

words, it wasn’t just a question of whether they had the right to 

sue. You actually granted a summary judgment against the parties. 

And, second, that there was no Supreme Court precedent that required that result? And I am not sure what the Second Circuit 

precedent is. The Supreme Court said ‘‘few, if any.’’ And I don’t 

know what the precedent would be. I am not necessarily going to 

ask you to cite the case, but was there a case? And if so, what is 

it? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It was the ones that we discussed yesterday, 

the Bushey line of cases that talked about the prima facie case and 

the obligations of the city in terms of defending lawsuits claiming 

disparate impact. And so the question then became: How do you 

view the city’s action? Was it—and that’s what the district court 

had done in its 78-page opinion to say you have got a city facing 

liability—— 

Senator KYL. All right. So you contend that there was Second 

Circuit precedent. Now, on the en banc review, of course, the question there is different because you are not bound by any threejudge panel decision in your circuit. So what precedent would have 

bound—and yet you took the same position in the en banc review. 

416 

For those who are not familiar, a three-judge court decides the 

case in the first instance. In some situations, if the case is important enough, the other judges on the circuit—there may be 9 or 10 

or 20; I think in the Ninth Circuit there are 28 judges in the circuit. And you can request an en banc review. The entire circuit 

would sit. And in that case, of course, they are not bound by a 

three-judge decision because it is the entire circuit sitting of 10 or 

12 or 20 judges. 

So what precedent then would have bound the court in the en 

banc review? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The panel acted in accordance with its views 

by setting forth and incorporating the district court’s analysis of 

the case. Those who disagreed with the opinion made their arguments. Those who agreed that en banc certification wasn’t necessary voted their way, and the majority of the court decided not 

to hear the case en banc. 

I can’t speak for why the others did or did not take the positions 

they did. Some of them issued opinions. Others joined opinions. 

Senator KYL. But you felt you were bound by precedent? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That was what we did in terms of the decision, which was to accept the—not accept but incorporate the district court’s decision analyzing the case and saying we agreed with 

it. 

Senator KYL. Understood. But the district court decision is not 

binding on the circuit court, and the en banc review means that the 

court should look at it in light of precedents that are stronger than 

a three-judge decision. So I am still baffled as to what precedent 

you are speaking of? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Perhaps it is just one bit of background needs 

to be explained. When a court incorporates, as we did in a per curiam, a district court decision below, it does become the court’s 

precedent. And, in fact, when I—— 

Senator KYL. The three judges? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes, but when I was on the district court, I 

issued also a lengthy decision on an issue, a constitutional issue, 

a direct constitutional issue, that the circuit had not addressed and 

very few other courts had addressed on the question of whether 

AEDPA’s statute of limitations on habeas were—— 

Senator KYL. Okay. Excuse me. I apologize for interrupting, but 

I have now used half of my time, and you will not acknowledge 

that even though the Supreme Court said there was no precedent, 

even though the district court judgment and a three-judge panel 

judgment cannot be considered precedent binding the en banc 

panel of the court, you still insist that somehow there was precedent there that you were bound by. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I explained, when the circuit court incorporated the district court’s opinion, that became the court’s holding. 

Senator KYL. Of course. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. So it did become circuit holding. With respect 

to—— 

Senator KYL. By three judges. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. With respect—yes. I’m sorry. With respect to 

the question of precedent, it must be remembered that what the 

Supreme Court did in Ricci was say: There isn’t much law on how 

417 

to approach this. Should we adopt a standard different than the 

circuit did? Because it is a question that we must decide, how to 

approach this issue to ensure that two provisions of Title VII are 

consistent with each other. 

That argument of adopting a different test was not the one that 

was raised before us, but that was raised clearly before the Supreme Court. And so that approach is different than saying that 

the outcome that we came to was not based on our understanding 

of what it made out a prima facie case. 

Senator KYL. Well, if it is a matter of first impression, do judges 

on the Second Circuit typically dispose of important cases of first 

impression by a summary, one-paragraph order, per curiam opinion? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Actually, they did in one case I handled when 

I was a district court judge. 

Senator KYL. Would that be typical? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t know how you define ‘‘typical,’’ but if 

the district court opinion in the judgment of the panel is adequate 

and fulsome and persuasive, they do. In my Rodriguez v. Artuz 

case, when I was at district court, on the constitutionality of an act 

by Congress with respect to the Suspension Clause of the habeas 

provision, the court did it in less than a paragraph. They just incorporated my decision as the law of the circuit or the holding of the 

circuit. 

Senator KYL. Well, let me quote from Judge Cabranes’ dissent. 

He said, ‘‘The use of per curiam opinions of this sort, adopting in 

full the reasoning of a district court without further elaboration, is 

normally reserved for cases that present straightforward questions 

that do not require exploration or elaboration by the court of appeals. The questions raised in this appeal cannot be classified as 

such as they are indisputably complex and far from well settled.’’ 

I guess legal analysts are simply going to have to research and 

debate the question of whether or not the cases of first impression 

or complex, important cases are ordinarily dispensed of that way. 

Let me just say that the implications—the reason I address this 

is the implications of the decision are far-reaching. I think we 

would all agree with that. It is an important decision, and it can 

have far-reaching implications. Let me tell you what three writers, 

in effect, said about it and get your reaction to it. 

Here is what the Supreme Court said in Ricci about the decision, 

about the rule that your court endorsed. It said that the rule that 

you endorsed—and I am quoting now—‘‘allowing employers to violate the disparate treatment prohibition based on a mere good-faith 

fear of disparate impact liability would encourage race-based action 

at the slightest hint of disparate impact.’’ This is the Supreme 

Court. 

‘‘Such a rule,’’ it said, ‘‘would amount to a de facto quota system 

in which a focus on statistics could put undue pressure on employers to make hiring decisions on the basis of race. Even worse, an 

employer could discard test results or other employment practices 

with the intent of obtaining the employer’s preferred racial balance.’’ 

Your colleague on the Second Circuit Judge Cabranes said that 

under the logic of your decision—and I quote again—‘‘municipal 

418 

employers could reject the results of an employment examination 

whenever those results failed to yield a desirable racial outcome’’— 

in other words, ‘‘failed to satisfy a racial quota.’’ 

That is why the case is so important. I would imagine you would 

hope that that result would not pertain. I guess I can just ask you 

that, that you would not have rendered this decision if you felt that 

that would be the result. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I argued—argued. As I stated earlier, the 

issue for us, no, we weren’t endorsing that result. We were just 

talking about what the Supreme Court recognized, which was that 

there was a good-faith basis for the city to act. It set a standard 

that was new, not argued before us below, and that set forth how 

to balance those considerations. That is part of what the Court 

does in the absence of a case previously decided that sets forth the 

test. And what the Court there said is good faith is not enough. 

Senator KYL. Understood. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Substantial evidence is what the city has to 

rely on. Those are different types of questions. 

Senator KYL. Of course. And the point is you don’t endorse the 

result that either Judge Cabranes or the Supreme Court predicted 

would occur had your decision remained in effect. I am sure that 

you would hope that result would not pertain. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. But I didn’t—that wasn’t the question 

we were looking at. We were looking at a more narrow question, 

which was: Could a city in good faith say we’re trying to comply 

with the law, we don’t know what standard to use, we have good 

faith for believing that we should not certify? 

Now the Supreme Court has made clear what standard they 

should apply. Those are different issues. 

Senator KYL. Well, I am just quoting from the Supreme Court 

about the rule that you endorsed in your decision. And, again, it 

said, the Supreme Court said about your rule that, ‘‘Such a rule 

would amount to a de facto quota system in which a focus on statistics could put undue pressure on employers to make hiring decisions on the basis of race. Even worse, an employer could disregard 

test results or other employment practices with the intent of obtaining an employer’s preferred racial balance.’’ 

I guess we both agree that that is not a good result. 

Let me ask you about a comment you made about the dissent in 

the case. A lot of legal commentators have noted that while the 

basic decision was 5–4, all nine of the Justices disagreed with your 

panel’s decision to grant summary judgment, that all nine of the 

judges believed that the court should have been—that the district 

court should have found the facts in the case that would allow it 

to apply a test. Your panel had one test. The Supreme Court had 

a different test. The dissent had yet a different test. But, in any 

case, whatever the test was, all nine of the Justices believed that 

the lower court should have heard the facts of the case before summary judgment was granted. 

I heard you to say that you disagreed with that assessment. Do 

you agree that the way I stated it is essentially correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It’s difficult because there were a lot of opinions in that case, but the engagement among the judges was varied 

on different levels. And the first engagement that the dissent did 

419 

with the majority was saying if you are going to apply this new 

test, this new standard, then you should give the circuit court an 

opportunity to evaluate the evidence—— 

Senator KYL. Well, Judge, I have to interrupt you there. The 

Court didn’t say if you are going to apply a new standard you need 

to send it back. All nine Justices said that summary judgment was 

inappropriate, that the case should have been decided on the facts. 

There were three different tests: the test from your court, the test 

of the majority of the Supreme Court, and the test of the dissent. 

Irrespective of what test it was, they said that the case should 

not have been decided on summary judgment. All nine Justices 

agreed with that, did they not? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t believe that’s how I read the dissent. 

It may have to speak for itself, but I—Justice Ginsburg took the 

position that the Second Circuit’s panel opinion should be affirmed, 

and she took it by saying that no matter how you looked at this 

case, it should be affirmed. And so I don’t believe that—that was 

my conclusion reading the dissent, but obviously it will speak for 

itself. 

Senator KYL. Well, it will, and I guess commentators can opine 

on it. I could read commentary from people like Stuart Taylor, for 

example, who have an opinion different from yours, but let me ask 

you one final question in the minute and a half that I have remaining. 

I was struck by your response to a question that Senator Hatch 

asked you about yet another speech that you gave in which you 

made a distinction between the justice of a district court and the 

justice of a circuit court, saying that the district court provides justice for the parties, the circuit court provides justice for society. 

Now, for a couple of days here, you have testified to us that you 

believe that not only do district and circuit courts have to follow 

precedent but that the Supreme Court should follow precedent. So 

it is striking to me that you would suggest—and this goes back to 

another comment you made, perhaps flippantly, about courts of appeals making law. But it would lead one to believe that you think 

that the circuit court has some higher calling to create precedent 

for society. 

In all of my experience—you have Smith v. Jones in the district 

court. The court says the way we read the law, Smith wins. It goes 

to the court of appeals. The court has only one job to decide: Does 

Smith win or does Jones win? It doesn’t matter what the effect of 

the case is on society. That is for legislators to decide. You have 

one job. Who wins, Smith or Jones, based on the law? And you decide, yes, the lower court was right; Smith wins. 

You are applying precedent and you are deciding the case between those parties. You are not creating justice for society except 

in the most indirect sense that any court that follows precedent 

and follows the rule of law helps to build on this country’s reliance 

on the rule of law. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I think we are in full agreement. When precedent is set, it is set—it follows the rule of law. And in all of the 

speeches where I have discussed this issue, I have described the 

differences between the two courts as one where precedents are set, 

420 

that the precedents have policy ramifications, but not in the meaning that the legislature gives to it. 

The legislature gives it a meaning in terms of making law. When 

I am using that term, it is very clear that I am talking about having a holding, it becomes precedent, and it binds other courts. You 

are following the rule of law when you are doing that. 

Senator KYL. Mr. Chairman, I am over the time, but just a final 

follow-up question, if I could. 

You yourself noted that you have created precedent as a district 

court judge. Both district courts and circuit courts created precedent simply by deciding a case, but they are both required to follow 

precedent. Isn’t that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. 

Chairman LEAHY. Only because the Senator went over, I would 

note the district court in that case did cite the Reeves case, which 

is a year 2000 Supreme Court case, as precedent, and a binding 

Second Circuit case, the Hayden case, as precedent. And as the 

judge has noted, the per curiam decision incorporated the district 

court decision. 

Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have 

great respect for Senator Kyl. I have worked with him, I guess, for 

about 12 years now on a subcommittee of this committee. 

But I think there is a fundamental misreading of the Supreme 

Court decision if I understand it. It is my understanding that the 

court was 5–4, is that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It was. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And that the four dissenters indicated that 

they would have reached the same conclusion as the Second Circuit 

did, is that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That was my understanding. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Let me clear one thing up. I am 

not a lawyer and I have had a lot of people ask me, particularly 

from the west coast who are watching this. What is per curiam? 

Would you please in common, everyday English explain what 

through the court means? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It is essentially a unanimous opinion where 

the court is taking an Act where it is not saying more than either 

incorporating a decision by the court below, because it is not adding anything to it. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In some cases, it is when there is—Judge 

Cabranes in his dissent pointed out in some cases it is simply used 

to denote that an issue is so clear and unambiguous that we are 

just going to—the law. 

It can be used in a variety of different ways, but it is generally 

where you are doing something fairly—in a very cursory fashion either because a District Court judge has done a thorough job—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Which was the case in this case with a very 

voluminous opinion that I believe was over 50 pages. Is that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I keep saying 78 because that is what I—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Over 50. 

421 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. And as I said, my circuit did that in a case 

where I addressed as a District Court judge a case of first impression on a direct constitutional issue, the suspension clause. Or it 

can have—one of the meanings can be that given by Judge 

Cabranes. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Right. Now, my understanding also is that 

there is precedent in other courts. I am looking at a decision, Oakley v. City of Memphis written by the Circuit Court. Essentially 

what it does is uphold the lower court that did exactly the same 

thing. Are you familiar with that case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. It is an unpublished opinion, I believe. Is 

that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And it was a racially mixed group of male 

and female lieutenants. They took the test, the results came in, the 

test was canceled and the court upheld the cancellation. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So your case is not starkly out of the mainstream. The reason I say this is going back to my days as mayor, 

particularly in the 1980’s when there were many courts and many 

decisions involving both our police and fire departments. It was a 

very controversial area of the law. 

But the point I wanted to make is there is precedent and this 

is certainly one of them. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I would agree that it was precedent. I will not 

choose to quarrel with the Supreme Court’s description of the situation. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Right. I am not asking you to. Now, many 

have made comments regarding your wise Latina comment. I 

would just like to take a minute to put your comments in the context of the experiences of women. 

This country is built on very great accomplishments. We forged 

a new country, we broke away from the British, we wrote documents that have stood the test of time, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights. But we also have a 

history of slavery, of segregated schools, of employment discrimination, of hate crimes and unspoken prejudices that can make it very 

hard for individuals to be treated fairly or even to believe that they 

can do well in this society. 

So I understand empowerment and the role that it plays. Everything has been hard fought. We as women did not have the right 

to vote until 1920 and that was after a tremendous battle waged 

by a group of very brave women called suffragettes. 

We graduated law school in 1979. There had never been women 

on the Supreme Court. Today, women represent 50.7 percent of the 

population, 48 percent of law school graduates and 30 percent of 

American lawyers. But there are only 17 women Senators and only 

one woman currently serving on the Supreme Court and we still 

make only $.78 on the dollar that a man makes. 

So we are making progress, but we are not there yet and we 

should not lose sight of that. 

My question is, as you have seen this, and you must have seen 

how widely broadcast this is, that you become an instant role 

422 

model for women. How do you look at this, your appointment to the 

court affecting empowerment for women? 

And I’d be very interested in any comments you might make, and 

this has nothing to do with the law. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I chose the law because it is more suited to 

that part of me that has never sought the kind of attention that 

other public figures get. 

When I was in law school, some of my friends thought I would 

go into the political arena not knowing that what I sought was 

more the life of a judge, the thinking involved in that and the process of the rule of law. 

My career as a judge has shown me that regardless of what my 

desires were, that my life, what I have accomplished, does serve as 

an inspiration for others. It is a sort of awesome sense of responsibility. It is one of the reasons that I do so many activities with people in the community. Not just Latinas, but all groups because I 

understand that it is women, it is Latinas, it is immigrants. 

It is all kinds and all backgrounds. Each one of us faces challenges in their life. Whether you were born rich or poor, of any 

color or background, life’s challenges place hurdles every day. 

One of the wonderful parts of the courage of America is that we 

overcome them. I think that people have taken that sense that on 

some levels I have done some of that at various stages in my life. 

So for me, I understand my responsibility. That is why I understand and have tried as much as I can to reach out to all different 

kinds of groups and to make myself available as much as I can. 

Often I have to say no, otherwise I’d never work. But I meet my 

responsibilities and work very hard at my job, but I also know I 

have a responsibility to reach out. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, for whatever it is worth, I think that 

you are a walking, talking example of the best part of the United 

States of America. 

I just want to say how very proud I am that you are here today 

and it is my belief that you are going to be a great Supreme Court 

Justice. I just wanted to say that to you directly and publicly. 

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Senator Graham. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Something I would 

like to say to you directly and publicly and with admiration for 

your life story is that a lot of the wrongs that have been mentioned, some have been righted, some have yet to come. Judge, I 

hope you understand the difference between petitioning one’s government and having a say in the electoral process and voting for 

people that, if you do not like, you can get rid of and the difference 

of society being changed by nine unelected people who have a lifetime appointment. 

Do you understand the difference in how those two systems 

work? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Absolutely, sir. I understand the Constitution. 

Senator GRAHAM. The one thing I can tell you—and this will 

probably be the last time we get to talk in this fashion. I hope to 

423 

have a chance to get to know you better and we will see what your 

future holds, but I think it is going to be pretty bright. 

The bottom line is one of the problems the court has now is that 

Mr. Ricci has a story to tell, too. There are all kinds of stories to 

tell in this country and the court has, in the opinion of many of 

us, gone into the business of societal change, not based on the plain 

language of the Constitution, but based on motivations that can 

never be checked at the ballot box. 

Brown v. Board of Education is instructive in the sense that the 

court pushed the country to do something politicians were not 

brave enough to do. Certainly, we are not brave enough in my 

state. And if I had been elected as a Senator from South Carolina 

in 1955, the year I was born, I would be amazed if I would have 

had the courage of a Judge Johnson in the political arena. 

But the court went through an analysis that separate was not 

equal. It had a basis in the Constitution, after fact-finding, to reach 

a reasoned conclusion in the law and the courage to implement 

that decision, and the society had the wisdom to accept the court’s 

opinion, even though it was contentious and, literally, people died. 

We are going to talk about some very difficult societal changes 

that are percolating in America today, like who should get married 

and what boundaries there are on the definition of marriage, and 

who is best able or the most capable of making those fundamental 

decisions. 

The full faith and credit clause, in essence, says that when a 

valid enactment of one state is entered into, the sister states have 

to accept it. But there is a public policy exception in the full faith 

and credit clause. Are you aware of that? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I am, applied in different situations. 

Senator GRAHAM. Some states have different age limits for marriage. Some states treat marriage differently than others, and the 

courts deferred based on public policy. 

The reason these speeches matter and the reasons elections matter is because people now understand the role of the court in modern society when it comes to social change. That is why we fight 

so hard to put on the court people who see the world like us. That 

is true from the left and that is true from the right. 

Let me give you an example of why that is important. We have 

talked a lot about the Second Amendment, whether or not it is a 

fundamental right. We all now agree it is an individual right. Is 

that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, that is groundbreaking precedent in the 

sense that just until a few months ago or last year, I guess, that 

was not the case. But it is today. It is the law of the land, by the 

Supreme Court, the Second Amendment is an individual right, and 

you acknowledge that. That is correct? The Heller case. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That was the decision and it is what the 

court has held, and so it is unquestionably an individual right. 

Senator GRAHAM. But here is the next step for the court. You will 

have to, if you get on the court, with your fellow justices, sit down 

and discuss whether or not it is a fundamental right to the point 

that it is incorporated through the due process clause of the 14th 

Amendment and applied to every state. 

424 

Is it not fair to say, Judge, that when you do that, not only will 

you listen to your colleagues, you will read whatever case law is 

available, you are going to come down based on what you think 

America is all about? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. So what binds you when it comes to a fundamental right? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The rule of law. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is not the rule of law, when it comes to what 

you consider to be a fundamental right, your opinion as to what is 

fundamental among all of us? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. In fact, the question that you raise, is it 

fundamental in the sense of the law. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That is a legal term. It’s very different and 

it is important to remember that the Supreme Court’s precedent on 

the Second Amendment predated its more closely developed—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I hate to interrupt, but is there sort of a legal 

cookbook that you can go to and say this is a fundamental right, 

A, and B is not? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, there’s not a cookbook, but there’s 

precedent that was established after the older precedent that has 

talked and described that doctrine of incorporation. That’s a set of 

precedents that—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Are you talking about the 1890 case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. Well, no. The 1890 case was the Supreme Court’s holding on this issue. But since that time, there has 

been a number of number of decisions discussing the incorporation 

doctrine, applying it to different provisions of the Constitution. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is there any personal judgment to be relied 

upon by a Supreme Court justice in deciding whether or not the 

Second Amendment is a fundamental right? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, you hire judges for their judgment, not 

their personal views or what their sense of what the outcome 

should be. You hire your point judges for the purpose of understanding whether they respect law, whether they respect precedent 

and apply it in a—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I do not doubt that you respect the law, but 

you are going to be asked, along with eight other colleagues, if you 

get on the court, to render a decision as to whether or not the Second Amendment is a fundamental right shared by the American 

people. There is no subjective judgment there? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The issue will be controlled by the court’s 

analysis of that question in the case, fundamental as defined by incorporation, in—likely will be looked at by the court in a case that 

challenges a state regulation. 

At that point, I would presume that the court will look at its 

older precedent in the way it did in Heller, consider whether it controls the issue or not. It will decide, even if it controls it, whether 

it should be revisited under the doctrine of stare decisis. 

It could decide it doesn’t control and that would be its decision. 

It could decide it does control, but it should revisit it. In revisiting 

it, it will look at a variety of different factors, among them, have 

425 

there been changes in related areas of law that would counsel questioning this. 

As I’ve indicated, there was a lot of law after the older cases on 

incorporation. I suspect, but I don’t know, because I can’t prejudge 

the issue, that the court will consider that with all of the other arguments that the parties will make. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, maybe I have got it wrong then. Maybe 

I am off base here. Maybe you have got the seven the circuit talking about the Heller case did not decide the issue of whether it 

should be incorporated to the states, because it has only dealt with 

the District of Columbia. 

You have got the ninth circuit—and I never thought I would live 

to hear myself say this—look at the ninth circuit. They have a pretty good rationale as to why the Second Amendment should be considered a fundamental right and they talked about the longstanding relationship of the English man, and they should have 

put woman, at least in South Carolina that would have applied, to 

gun ownership. 

They talked about it was this right to bear arms that led to our 

independence. It was this right to bear arms that put down a rebellion in this country. And they talked about who we are as a people 

and our history as a people. 

And, Judge, that is why the Supreme Court matters. I do believe, 

at the end of the day, you are not going to find a law book that 

tells you whether or not a fundamental right exists vis-a-vis the 

Second Amendment, that you are going to have to rely upon your 

view of America, who we are, how far we have come and where we 

are going to go, and our relationship to gun ownership. That is why 

these choices are so important. 

And here is what I will say about you and you may not agree 

with that, but I believe that is what you are going to do and I believe that is what every other justice is going to do. 

And here is what I will say about you. I do not know how you 

are going to come out on that case, because I think, fundamentally, 

Judge, you are able, after all these years of being a judge, to embrace a right that you may not want for yourself, to allow others 

to do things that are not comfortable to you, but for the group, they 

are necessary. 

That is my hope for you. That is what makes you, to me, more 

acceptable as a judge and not an activist, because an activist would 

be a judge who would be chomping at the bit to use this wonderful 

opportunity to change America through the Supreme Court by taking their view of life and imposing it on the rest of us. 

I think and believe, based on what I know about you so far, that 

you are broad-minded enough to understand that America is bigger 

than the Bronx, is bigger than South Carolina. 

Now, during your time as an advocate, do you understand identity politics? What is identity politics? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Politics based simply on a person’s characteristics, generally referred to either race or ethnicity or gender, religion. It is politics based on—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you embrace identity politics personally? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Personally, I don’t, as a judge, in any way 

embrace it with respect to judging. As a person, I do believe that 

426 

certain groups have and should express their views on whatever social issues may be out there. 

But as I understand the word ‘‘identity politics,’’ it’s usually denigrated because it suggests that individuals are not considering 

what’s best for America, and that I don’t believe in. 

I think that whatever a group advocates, obviously, it advocates 

on behalf of its interests and what the group thinks it needs, but 

I would never endorse a group advocating something that was contrary to some basic constitutional right as it was known at the 

time, although people advocate changes in the law all the time. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe that your speeches, properly 

read, embrace identity politics? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I think my speeches embrace the concept that 

I just described, which is, groups, you have interests that you 

should seek to promote; what you’re doing is important in helping 

the community develop; participate, participate in the process of 

your community; participate in the process of helping to change the 

conditions you live in. 

I don’t describe it as identity politics, because it’s not that I’m 

advocating that groups do something illegal. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, Judge, to be honest with you, your record 

as a judge has not been radical, by any means. It is, to me, left 

of center. But your speeches are disturbing, particularly to conservatives, quite frankly, because they do not talk about get involved, 

go to the ballot box, make sure you understand that American can 

be whatever you would like it to be, there is a place for all of us. 

Those speeches, to me, suggested gender and racial affiliations in 

a way that a lot of us wonder will you take that line of thinking 

to the Supreme Court in these cases of first precedent. 

You have been very reassuring here today and throughout this 

hearing that you are going to try to understand the difference between judging and whatever political feelings you have about 

groups or gender. 

Now, when you were a lawyer, what was the mission statement 

of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. To promote the civil rights and equal opportunity of Hispanics in the United States. 

Senator GRAHAM. During your time on the board, and you had 

about every job a board member could have, is it a fair statement 

to say that all of the cases embraced by this group on abortion advocated the woman’s right to choose and argued against restrictions by state and Federal Government on abortion rights? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can’t answer that question, because I didn’t 

review the briefs. I did know that the fund had a health care—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Judge? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. Docket that included challenges 

to certain limitations on a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy under certain circumstances. 

Senator GRAHAM. Judge, I may be wrong, but every case I have 

seen by the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund advocated against restrictions on abortion, advocated Federal taxpayer funding of abortion for low income women. 

427 

Across the board, when it came to the death penalty, it advocates 

against the death penalty. When it came to employment law, it advocates against testing and for quotas. 

That is just the record of this organization. The point I am trying 

to make is that whether or not you advocate those positions and 

how you will judge can be two different things. I have not seen, in 

your judging, this advocate that I saw or this board member. 

But when it came to the death penalty, you filed a memorandum 

with the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund in 1981, and I would 

like to submit this to the record, where you signed this memorandum and you basically said that the death penalty should not 

be allowed in America because it created a racial bias and it was 

undue burden on the perpetrator and their family. 

What led you to that conclusion in 1981? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The question in 1991—— 

Senator GRAHAM. 1981. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. 1981, I misspoke about the year, was an advocacy by the fund, taking a position on whether legislation by the 

State of New York outlawing or permitting the death penalty 

should be adopted by the State. 

I thank you for recognizing that my decisions have not shown me 

to be an advocate on behalf of any group. That is a different, dramatically different question than whether I follow the law. And in 

the one case I had as a district court judge, I followed the law completely. 

Senator GRAHAM. The only reason I mention this is when Alito 

and Roberts were before this panel, they were asked about memos 

they wrote in the Reagan administration, clients they represented, 

a lot to try to suggest that if you wrote a memo about this area 

of the law to your boss, Ronald Reagan, you must not be fit to 

judge. 

Well, they were able to explain the difference between being a 

lawyer in the Reagan administration and being a judge and, to the 

credit of many of my Democratic colleagues, they understood that. 

I am just trying to make the point that when you are an advocate, when you were on this board, the board took positions that 

I think are left of center and you have every right to do it. 

Have you ever known a low income Latina woman who was devoutly pro life? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Have you ever known a low income Latino 

family who supported the death penalty? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. So the point is there are many points of view 

within groups based on income. You have, I think, consistently, as 

an advocate, took a point of view that was left of center. You have, 

as a judge, been generally in the mainstream. 

The Ricci case, you missed one of the biggest issues in the country or you took a pass. I do not know what it is. But I am going 

to say this, that as Senator Feinstein said, you have come a long 

way. You have worked very hard. You have earned the respect of 

Ken Starr, and I would like to put his statement in the record, and 

you have said some things that just bugged the hell out of me. 

428 

The last question on the wise Latina woman comment. To those 

who may be bothered by that, what do you say? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I regret that I have offended some people. I 

believe that my life demonstrates that that was not my intent to 

leave the impression that some have taken from my words. 

Senator GRAHAM. You know what, Judge? I agree with you. Good 

luck. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Senator Durbin has actually responded to my so far vain request that Senators may want to pass 

on the basis that all questions may have been asked, not everybody 

has asked them. 

But Senator Klobuchar, yesterday, had some very serious and 

succinct areas that she was asking. I know time ran out and I 

would like to yield to Senator Klobuchar, because she may want to 

follow on those. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and 

thank you again, Judge. I think they have turned the air conditioning on, so this is good. I just have two quick follow-ups following Senator Graham’s question. 

The first is that the only death penalty case that I know of— 

there may be another one that you ruled on—the Heatley case, you, 

in fact, sustained the death penalty in that case. Is that correct? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I sustained—well, I rejected the challenges of 

the defendant that the application of the death penalty to him was 

based on race, yes. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Okay. Thank you. And then, just the second 

one, Senator Graham mentioned the issues of Justice Roberts and 

the difference between an advocate and a judge. And I just came 

across the quote that Justice Roberts gave about his work during 

the Reagan administration, and he said, ‘‘I can give the commitment that I appreciate that my role as a judge is different than my 

role as a staff lawyer for an administration. As a judge, I have no 

agenda. I have a guide in the Constitution and the laws and the 

precedents of the Court, and those are what I would apply with an 

open mind after fully and fairly considering the arguments and assessing the considered views of my colleagues on the bench.’’ 

Would you agree with that statement? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Wholeheartedly. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. All right. Thank you. 

There were some letters that have not yet been put on the 

record, and they are quite a collection of letters. I considered reading them all on the record but thought better of that. So I thought 

I would ask the Chair if I could put these letters on the record, and 

these are letters of support for you from, first of all, the National 

Fraternal Order of Police in support of your nomination, the Police 

Executive Research Forum, the National Association of Black Law 

Enforcement Executives, the National Latino Peace Officers Association, the New York State Law Enforcement Council, the National District Attorneys Association, the Association of Prosecuting 

Attorneys, the National Association of Police Organizations, the 

National Sheriffs Association, the Major City Chiefs Association, 

the Detectives Endowment Association, and then also a letter from 

40 of your past colleagues in the Manhattan D.A.’s Office, former 

429 

district attorney colleagues. And all of these groups have given you 

their support. 

[The letters appear as a submission for the record.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And I did want to note just two very brief 

portions from the letter. The one from the Police Executive Research Forum reads, ‘‘Sonia Sotomayor went out of her way to 

stand shoulder to shoulder with those of us in public safety at a 

time when New York City needed strong, tough, and fair prosecutors.’’ 

And then also, the letter from your colleagues I found very enlightening. It was much more personal. It said that, ‘‘She began as 

a rookie in 1979, working long hours, prosecuting an enormous 

caseload of misdemeanors before judges managing overwhelming 

dockets. Sonia so distinguished herself in this challenging assignment that she was among the very first in her starting class to be 

selected to handle felonies. She prosecuted a wide variety of felony 

cases, including serving as co-counsel at a notorious murder trial. 

She developed a specialty in the investigation and prosecution of 

child pornography cases. Throughout all of this, she impressed us 

as one who was singularly determined in fighting crime and violence, for Sonia’s service as a prosecutor was a way to bring order 

to the streets of a city she dearly loves. We are proud to have 

served with Sonia Sotomayor. She solemnly adheres to the rule of 

law and believes that it should be applied equally and fairly to all 

Americans.’’ 

‘‘As a group,’’ your former colleagues say, ‘‘we have different 

worldviews and political affiliations, but our support for Sonia is 

entirely nonpartisan. And the fact that so many of us have remained friends with Sonia over three decades speaks well, we 

think, of her warmth and collegiality.’’ 

A pretty nice letter. 

In reading these letters from these law enforcement groups, 

there was just one follow-up case that you had that I wanted to 

allow you to enlighten the country about, and this is one that 

former New York Police Detective Chris Montanino spoke about recently in an article, and he spoke about a case you worked on as 

district attorney. He talked about—it was a child pornography 

case—how he had gone to various prosecutors to try to get them 

interested in the case, and he could not get them interested. And 

I have some guesses. Some of these cases, as you know, can be very 

involved with a lot of evidence and sometimes computer forensics 

and things like that. But he was not able to interest them in taking 

on the case. But you were the one that was willing to take on the 

case, and it led to the prosecution of two perpetrators. 

Could you talk a little bit about that case, why you think others 

didn’t and why you decided to take on the case? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, I can’t speak to why others decided to 

pass on the case. I can talk to you about my views at the time. 

The New York Court of Appeals had invalidated the New York 

statute on child pornography on the ground of a constitutional violation, Federal constitutional violation, that the statute did not 

comport with the Federal Constitution. 

The Supreme Court took that case directly from the court of appeals, as is its right to review all issues of Federal constitutional 

430 

law, and reversed the New York Court of Appeals and reinstated 

the statute. 

My sense is because there were still so many open questions 

about both the legality of the statute and the question of the difficulty in proving the particular crime at issue that involved two 

men who worked in a change of—chain of adult bookstores in the 

then-Times Square area. Times Square has changed dramatically 

since that time. 

It was mostly circumstantial. We had some tapes, but their 

knowledge of what those tapes contained, their intent to sell and 

distribute child pornography involving children below a certain 

age—it was a difficult, difficult legal and factual case. But it was 

clear that it was a serious case. We’re talking about the distribution of films that show children who were anywhere from 8 years 

old to 12 years old being explicitly sexually abused. And it seemed 

to me that, regardless of the outcome of the case, whether I secured 

the convictions or not, whether it was held up on appeal or not, 

that the issues it raised had to be presented in court because of the 

importance of the crime. 

And so I brought the prosecution. I had a co-counsel in that case 

who was second-seating me in that case, meaning she was assisting 

me. And the case took a while at trial because, as I said, it was 

circumstantial. 

The jury returned a verdict against both defendants. They were 

sentenced quite severely, and the cases held up on appeal. It was 

an enormously complicated case. I assisted in the appeal because 

it was so complicated that one of the heads of the Appeals Division 

of the New York County District Attorney’s Office had to become 

involved in it. But the convictions were sustained. 

And so the effort resulted in a conviction of two men who were 

distributing films that had the vilest of sexual acts portrayed 

against children. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And one last case I wanted to ask you 

about, which the Chairman had briefly mentioned in his opening, 

and it was a troubling case because it involved an elected official. 

It was U.S. v. Giordano, and this case—it happened when you were 

a judge, and it involved very troubling facts with the mayor of Waterbury, Connecticut, in a variety of crimes stemming from his repeated sexual abuse of a minor daughter and a niece of a prostitute. And you wrote for the majority in that case. There was actually a dissent from one of your fellow judges on the Second Circuit, 

and you held in part that the mayor could, in fact, be charged with 

the crime of violating the young girl’s civil rights under color of 

State law. And I think—and I do not want to put words in your 

mouth, but the reason you were able to use that theory is that you 

noted how frequently the mayor reiterated to his young victims 

that they would be trouble with law enforcement if they didn’t submit to what he wanted them to do. 

Could you talk about how that case fits into your overall approach to judging? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I have indicated, the role of a judge is to 

look at Congress’ words in a statute and discern its intent. And in 

cases that present new facts, you must take existing precedents 

and apply the teachings of those precedents to those new facts. 

431 

In the Giordano case, there had not been another situation quite 

like this one. This was a mayor who, working through a woman, 

secured sexual acts by very young girls that were taking place in 

his office. And through the woman he was working with and also 

through his own exhortations, ‘‘Don’t tell anybody, you’ll get into 

trouble,’’ and the woman’s exhortations to the child, the person he 

was conspiring with, that they would get in trouble with the police 

because the police wouldn’t believe them, they would believe him 

because he was a mayor, the question for the court became: Is that 

acting under color of State law? Is he using his office to promote 

this illegal activity against these young girls? 

The majority, viewing these facts, said yes, that’s the principles 

we discern from precedent about what the use of State law 

means—of acting under State law means. 

The dissent disagreed and it disagreed using its own rationale 

about why the law should not be read that way. But these are 

cases that rely upon an understanding both of what the words say 

and how precedent has interpreted them, and that’s what the majority of the panel did in that case. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, and I think it has 

been enlightening for people to hear about some of your views on 

these criminal cases. And I would just like to ask one last question, 

and it is the exact question that my friend and colleague Senator 

Graham asked Chief Justice Roberts at his confirmation hearing. 

And he said, ‘‘What would you like history to say about you when 

all is said and done? ’’ 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can’t live my life to write history’s story. 

That will be the job of historians long after I’m gone. Some of them 

start now, but long after I’m gone. 

In the end, I hope it will say I’m a fair judge, that I was a caring 

person, and that I lived my life serving my country. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I think you can’t say much more than that. 

Thank you very much, Judge. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Judge. I appreciate that. Thank 

you, Senator Klobuchar. 

Senator Cornyn, who, as I mentioned yesterday, is a former Supreme Court Justice of Texas as well as former Attorney General, 

valued member of this Committee, Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, 

Judge. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Good morning, Senator. 

Senator CORNYN. Judge, when we met the first time, as I believe 

I recounted earlier, I made a pledge to you that I would do my best 

to make sure that you were treated respectfully and this would be 

a fair process. 

I just want to ask you up front, do you feel like you have been 

given a chance to explain your record and your judicial philosophy 

to the American people? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I have, sir, and every Senator on both sides 

of the aisle that have made that promise to me have kept it fully. 

Senator CORNYN. And Judge, you know the test is not whether 

Judge Sonia Sotomayor is intelligent. You are. The test is not 

whether we like you. I think speaking personally, I think we all do. 

432 

The test is not even whether we admire you or respect you, although we do admire you and respect what you have accomplished. 

The test is really what kind of Justice will you be if confirmed 

to the Supreme Court of the United States? Will you be one that 

adheres to a written Constitution and written laws and respect the 

right of the people to make their laws to their elected representatives, or will you pursue some other agenda? Personal, political, 

ideological, that is something other than enforcing the law? I think 

that is really the question. 

Of course the purpose of these hearings as you have gone 

through these tedious rounds of questioning is to allow us to clear 

up any confusion about your record and about your judicial philosophy. Yet so far I find there is still some confusion. 

For example, in 1996, you said the idea of a stable ‘Law’ was a 

public myth. This week you said that fidelity to the law is your 

only concern. In 1996, you argued that indefiniteness in the law 

was a good thing because it allowed judges to change the law. 

Today you characterize that argument as being only that ambiguity 

can exist and that it is Congress’ job to change the law. 

In 2001, you said that innate physiological differences of judges 

would or could impact their decisions. Yesterday you characterized 

that argument as being only that innate physiological differences 

of litigants to change decisions. 

In 2001, you disagreed explicitly with Justice O’Connor’s view of 

whether a wise man and a wise woman would reach the same decision. Yet during these hearings you characterize your argument as 

being that you agreed with her. 

A few weeks ago in your speech on foreign law to the American 

Civil Liberties Union, you rejected the approach of Justices Alito 

and Thomas with regard to foreign law, and yet it seems to me 

that during these hearings you have agreed with them. 

So Judge, what should I tell my constituents who are watching 

these hearings and saying to themselves, in Berkeley and in other 

places around the country she says one thing, but at these hearings 

you are saying something which sounds contradictory if not diametrically opposed to some of the things you have said in speeches 

around the country? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I would tell them to look at my decisions for 

17 years and note that in every one of them, I have done what I 

say that I so firmly believe in. I prove my fidelity to the law, the 

fact that I do not permit personal views, sympathies or prejudices 

to influence the outcome of cases, rejecting the challenges of numerous plaintiffs with undisputably sympathetic claims, but ruling 

the way I have on the basis of law, rejecting those claims. 

I would ask them to look at the speeches completely, to read 

what their context was and to understand the background of those 

issues that are being discussed. 

I didn’t disagree with what I understood was the basic premise 

that Justice O’Connor was making, which was that being a man or 

a woman doesn’t affect the capacity of someone to judge fairly or 

wisely. What I disagreed was with the literal meaning of her words 

because neither of us meant the literal meaning of our words. 

433 

My use of her words was pretty bad in terms of leaving a bad 

impression, but both of us were talking about the value of experience and the fact that it gives you equal capacity. 

In the end, I would tell your constituents, Senators, look at my 

record and understand that my record talks about who I am as a 

person, what I believe in, and my judgment and my opinion, that 

following the rule of law is the foundation of our system of justice. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you for your answer. Judge, I actually 

agree that your judicial record strikes me as pretty much in the 

main stream of judicial decision making by District Court judges 

and by Court of Appeals judges on the Federal bench. 

While I think what is creating this cognitive dissonance for many 

of us and for many of my constituents who I have been hearing 

from is that you appear to be a different person almost in your 

speeches and in some of the comments that you made. 

So I guess part of what we need to do is to try to reconcile those, 

as I said earlier. 

I want to pivot to a slightly different subject and go back to your 

statement that the courts should not make law. You have also said 

that the Supreme Court decisions that a lot of us believe made law 

actually were an interpretation of the law. So I would like for you 

to clarify that. 

If the Supreme Court in the next few years holds that there is 

a constitutional right to same sex marriage, would that be making 

the law? Or would that interpreting the law? 

I’m not asking you to prejudge that case or the merits of the arguments, but just to characterize whether that would be interpreting the law or whether that would be making the law. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, that question is so embedded with 

its answer, isn’t it? Meaning if the court rules one way and I say 

that is making law, then it forecasts that I have a particular view 

of whatever arguments may be made on this issue suggesting that 

it is interpreting the Constitution. 

I understand the seriousness of this question. I understand the 

seriousness of same sex marriage. But I also know as I think all 

America knows, that this issue is being hotly debated on every 

level of our three branches of government. It is being debated in 

Congress and Congress has passed an Act relating to same sex 

marriage. It is being debated on various courts on the state level, 

certain higher courts have made rulings. 

This is the type of situation where even the characterizing of 

whatever the court may do as one way or another suggests that I 

have both prejudged an issue and that I come to that issue with 

my own personal views suggesting an outcome. Neither is true. I 

would look at that issue in the context of a case that came before 

me with a completely open mind. 

Senator CORNYN. Forget the same sex marriage hypothetical. Is 

there a difference in your mind between making the law and interpreting the law? Or is that a distinction without a difference? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Oh, no. It is a very important distinction. The 

laws are written by Congress. It makes factual findings, it determines in its judgment what the fit is between the law it is passing 

and the remedy that it is giving as a right. 

434 

The courts when they are interpreting always has to start with 

what does the Constitution say? What is the words of the Constitution? How has precedent interpreted those? What are the principles 

that it has discussed govern a particular situation? 

Senator CORNYN. How do you reconcile that answer with your 

statement that Courts of Appeals make policy? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In both cases in which I have used that word 

in two different speeches, one was a speech, one was a remark to 

students. This is almost like the discussion about fundamental, 

what does it mean to a non- lawyer and fundamental what it 

means in the context of Supreme Court legal theory. 

Senator CORNYN. Are you saying it is only a discussion that lawyers could love? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Not love, but in the context in both contexts. 

It is very, very clear that I am talking about completely the difference between the two judgings and that Circuit Courts when 

they issue a holding, it becomes precedent on all similar cases. 

In both comments, that statement was made absolutely expressly 

that that was the context of the policy I was talking about which 

is the ramifications of a precedent on all similar cases. 

When Congress talks about policy, it is talking about something 

totally different. It is talking about making law, what are the 

choices that I am going to make in making the law. Those are two 

different things. 

I was not talking about courts making law. In fact, in the Duke 

speech, I used making policy in terms of its ramifications on existing cases. I never said in either speech we make law in the sense 

that Congress would. 

Senator CORNYN. Let me turn to another topic. In 1996 after you 

had been on the Federal bench for 4 years, you wrote a law review 

article in the Suffolk University Law Review that pertains to campaign financing. 

You said, ‘Our system of election financing permits extensive private, including corporate financing of candidate’s campaigns, raising again and again the question of what the difference is between 

contributions and bribes and how legislators or other officials can 

operate objectively on behalf of the electorate.’ 

You said, ‘Can elected officials say with credibility that they are 

carrying out the mandate of a democratic society representing only 

the general public good when private money plays such a large role 

in their campaigns’ ? 

Judge Sotomayor, what is the difference in your mind between 

a political contribution and a bribe? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The context of that statement was a question 

about what was perking through the legal system at the time it 

has been, as you know, before the Supreme Court since Buckley v. 

Valeo. 

Senator CORNYN. I agree, Your Honor. But my question is what 

in your mind is the difference between a political contribution and 

a bribe? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The question is a contributor seeking to influence or to buy someone’s vote, and there are situations in which 

elected officials have been convicted of taking a bribe because they 

435 

have agreed in exchange for a sum of money to vote on a particular 

legislation in a particular way. 

That violates the Federal law. The question that was discussed 

there was a much broader question as to where do you draw that 

line as a society? What choices do you think about in terms of what 

Congress will do, what politicians will do. 

I have often spoken about the difference between what the law 

permits and what individuals should use to guide their conduct. 

The fact that the law says that you can do this doesn’t always 

mean that you as a person should choose to do this. In fact, we operate within the law, we should not be a law breaker, but you 

should act in situations according to that sense of what is right or 

wrong. 

We have the recent case that the Supreme Court considered of 

the judge who was given an extraordinary amount of money by a 

campaign contributor dwarfing everything else in his campaign in 

terms of contributions, funding a very expensive campaign. 

Senator CORNYN. In fact, that was not a direct contribution to 

the judge, was it? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, it was not a direct contribution, but it 

was a question there where the Supreme Court said the appearance of impropriety in this case would have counseled the judge the 

get off. 

Senator CORNYN. Let us get back to my question, if I can. Let 

me ask you this. 

Last year, President Obama set a record in fund raising from private sources, raising an unprecedented amount of campaign contributions. Do you think, given your law review article, that President Obama can say with credibility that he is carrying out the 

mandate of a democratic society? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That was not what I was talking about in 

that speech. 

Senator CORNYN. Well, he was not elected in 1996. But what I 

am getting at is whether you are basically painting with such a 

broad brush when it comes to people’s rights under the First 

Amendment to participate in the political process, either to volunteer their time, make in kind contributions, make financial contributions. Do you consider that a form of bribery or in any way 

improper? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. No, sir. 

Senator CORNYN. Okay. Thank you for your answer. In the short 

time we have remaining, let me return to the New Haven firefighter case briefly. 

As you know, two witnesses I believe will testify after you are 

through, and I am sure you will welcome being finished with this 

period of questioning. A lot of attention has been given to the lead 

plaintiff, Frank Ricci, who is dyslexic, and the hardship he has endured in order to prepare for this competitive examination only to 

see the competitive examination results thrown out. 

But I was struck on July 3rd in the New York Times when they 

featured another firefighter who will testify here today, and that 

was Benjamin Vargas. 

Benjamin Vargas is the son of Puerto Rican parents, as you probably know, and he found himself in the odd position to say the 

436 

least of being discriminated against based on his race, based on the 

decision by the Circuit Court panel that you sat on. 

At the closing of the article, Lieutenant Vargas—who hopes to be 

Captain Vargas as a result of the Supreme Court decision because 

he scored sixth on the competitive examination—at the very last 

paragraph in this article it says, ‘‘Gesturing toward his three sons, 

Lieutenant Vargas explained why he had no regrets. He said, ‘I 

want to give them a fair shake. To get a job on the merits, not because they are Hispanic or to fill a quota.’ He said, ‘What a lousy 

way to live.’ ’’ That is his testimony. 

So I want to ask you in conclusion, do you agree with Chief Justice John Roberts when he says the best way to stop discriminating 

based on race is to stop discriminating based on race? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The best way to live in our society is to follow 

the command of the Constitution, provide equal opportunity for all. 

I follow what the Constitution says, that is how the law should be 

structured and how it should be applied to whatever individual circumstances come before the court. 

Senator CORNYN. With respect, Judge, my question was do you 

agree with Chief Justice John Roberts’ statement, or do you disagree? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The question of agreeing or disagreeing suggests an opinion on what the ruling was in the case that he used 

it in. I accept the court’s ruling in that case. That was a very recent case. 

There is no quarrel that I have, no disagreement. I do not accept 

that in that situation that statement the court found applied. I just 

said the issue is a constitutional one, equal opportunity for all 

under the law. 

Senator CORNYN. I understand that you might not want to comment on what Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in an opinion even 

though I don’t think he was speaking of a specific case but rather 

an approach to the law which would treat us all as individuals with 

equal dignity and equal rights. 

But let me ask you whether you agree with Martin Luther King 

when he said he dreamed of a day when his children would be 

judged not by the color of their skin but by the content of their 

character. Do you agree with that? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I think every American agrees with that. 

Senator CORNYN. Amen. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. Just so we will 

know for the schedule, we are going to go to Senator Specter, who 

is a long-time member of this committee and one of the most senior 

members here. 

Once Senator Specter’s questions are finished, we will take a 

very short break. Does that work for you, Judge? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It most certainly does. 

Chairman LEAHY. Okay. So Senator Specter is recognized for up 

to 20 minutes. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge Sotomayor, 

you have been characterized as running a hot courtroom, asking 

tough questions. We see popping out of the Supreme Court opinions 

from time to time, statements about pretty tough ideological battles 

in their conference room. 

437 

Justice Scalia was quoted as saying, ‘‘The court must be living 

in another world. Day-by-day, case-by-case, it is busy designing a 

Constitution for a country I do not recognize.’’ 

Referring to a woman’s right to choose, in Roe v. Wade, he said 

this, ‘‘Justice O’Connor’s assertion that a fundamental rule of judicial restraint requires us to avoid reconsidering Roe cannot be 

taken seriously.’’ 

Do you think it possible that, if confirmed, you will be a litigator 

in that conference room, take on the ideological battles which pop 

out from time to time, from what we read in their opinions? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t judge on the basis of ideology. I judge 

on the basis of the law and my reasoning. That’s how I have comported myself in the circuit court. When my colleagues and I, in 

many cases, have initially come to disagreeing positions, we’ve discussed them and either persuaded each other, changed each other’s 

minds, and worked from the starting point of arguing, discussing, 

exchanging perspectives on what the law commands. 

Senator SPECTER. Well, perhaps you will be tempted to be a 

tough litigator in the court. Time will tell, if you are confirmed, if 

you have some of those provocative statements. 

Let me move on to a case which you have decided. You have been 

reluctant to make comments about what other people have said, 

but I want to ask you about your view as to what you have said. 

In the case of Entergy v. Riverkeeper, which involved the question 

which is very important to matters now being considered by Congress on climate control and global warming, you ruled in the second circuit that the best technology should be employed, not the 

cost-benefit. The Supreme Court reversed 5–4, saying it was costbenefit. 

Could we expect you to stand by your interpretation of the Clean 

Water Act when, if confirmed, you get to the Supreme Court and 

can make that kind of a judgment because you are not bound by 

precedent? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, I am bound by precedent to the extent 

that all precedence is entitled to the respect it—to respect under 

the doctrine of stare decisis. And to the extent that the Supreme 

Court has addressed this issue of cost-benefit and its permissibility 

under the Clean Water Act, that’s the holding I would apply to any 

new case that came and the framework—it establishes the framework I would employ to new cases. 

Senator SPECTER. Let me return to a subject I raised yesterday, 

but from a different perspective, and that is the issue of the Supreme Court taking on more cases. 

In 1886, there were 451 cases decided by the Supreme Court; 

1985, 161 signed opinions; and, in 2007, only 67 signed opinions. 

The court has not undertaken cases involving circuit splits. 

In the letter I wrote to you, which will be made a part of the 

record, listing a great many circuit splits and the problems that 

that brings when one circuit decides one way and another circuit 

another and the other circuits are undecided, and the Supreme 

Court declines to take cases. 

Do you agree with what Justice Scalia said dissenting in Sorich, 

where the court refused to take a key circuit split; that when the 

438 

court decides not to, ‘‘It seems to me quite irresponsible to let the 

current chaos prevail with other courts not knowing what to do? ’’ 

Stated differently, do you think the Supreme Court has time to 

and should take up more circuit splits? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It does appear that the Supreme Court’s 

docket has lessened over time, its decisions that it’s addressing. Because of that, it certainly does appear that it has the capacity to 

accept more cases. 

And the issue of circuit splits is one of the factors that the court’s 

own local rules set out as a consideration for justices to think about 

in the cert process. 

So in answer to your question, the direct answer is, yes, it does 

appear that it has the capacity. 

Senator SPECTER. The current rule in the Supreme Court is that 

petitions for certiorari are applied and there is a so-called cert pool 

where seven of the nine justices, excluding only Justice Stevens 

and Justice Alito, do not participate in the cert pool. So that the 

people applying for a cert don’t have the independent judgments. 

When Chief Justice Roberts, before he became Chief Justice, he 

said the cert pool’s powers are a little disquieting. 

Would you join the cert pool or would you maintain an independent status, as Justice Stevens and Justice Alito do, in having 

their own clerks and their own individual review as to whether a 

cert ought to be granted? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I would probably do what Justice Alito did, 

although I haven’t decided, if I’m given the honor of becoming a 

member of the Supreme Court, I haven’t decided anything. I’m not 

even sure where I would live in New York if this were to happen— 

in Washington. 

But putting that aside, Senator, my approach would probably be 

similar to Justice Alito, which is experience the process, take, for 

a period of time, consider its costs and benefits, and then whether 

to try the alternative or not and figure out what I think works best 

in terms of the functioning of my chambers and the court. 

I can’t give a definitive answer, because I generally try to keep 

an open mind until I experience something and can then speak 

from knowledge about whether to change it or not. 

Senator SPECTER. Judge Sotomayor, you have had some experience on the pilot program conducted by Federal Judicial Conference. These were the conclusions reached by the pilot program. 

They said, ‘‘Attitudes of judges toward electronic media coverage 

of civil proceedings are initially neutral and became more favorable 

after experience under the pilot program.’’ 

‘‘Judges and attorneys who had experience with electronic media 

coverage under the program generally reported observing a small 

or no effects of the camera presence on participants in the proceedings, courtroom decorum, or the administration of justice.’’ 

Would you agree with that, based on your own personal experience having television in your courtroom? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. My experience was limited. So I can’t speak 

to the more broad conclusion of that report. I can say that, as we 

discussed when I met with you, Senator, mine was positive. 

In the two cases—I believe I only had two cases where the media 

asked to record a proceeding. I may not remember others, but I do 

439 

remember two. And on the circuit court, we do provide tapes upon 

request and some media has asked to record our oral arguments. 

But my experience has generally been positive and I would certainly be able to recount that. 

Senator SPECTER. C–SPAN has conducted a survey which shows 

that 61 percent of the American people would like to see the Supreme Court televised. In the survey, it disclosed how little the 

American public knows about the Supreme Court. 

Mr. Chairman, I would ask consent this be included in the 

record. 

Chairman LEAHY. Without objection, it will be included in the 

record. 

[The information appear as a submission for the record.] 

Senator SPECTER. The interest that has been generated by this 

confirmation proceeding, encouraged by the television, shows the 

enormous interest that people have in what the court does. 

There has been a fair amount of coverage by the justices on television. As I cited yesterday, many have appeared on television. Justice Kennedy says he believes that television is inevitable. 

Everybody has said who has testified that there is a grave concern about the collegiality and people do not want to make a judgment before talking to their colleagues, and the sense has been derived that if anybody really has a strong objection—and Justice 

Souter has expressed that view, as noted on his widespread comment that if TV cameras were to come to the court, they would 

have to come in over his dead body; and, if confirmed, Justice 

Souter’s body won’t be there at all. 

Would you tell your colleagues the favorable experience that you 

have had with television in your courtroom and perhaps take a role 

in encouraging your colleagues to follow that experience for the Supreme Court? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I would certainly relay my experiences. To 

the extent some of them may not know about the pilot study in 

many courts, I would share that with them, although I suspect 

they do know, and will participate in discussions with them on this 

issue. Those things I would do, Senator. 

Senator SPECTER. Some of my colleagues have questioned whether, as you stated, your panel in the Maloney case was really bound 

by Supreme Court precedent. The seventh circuit reached the same 

decision your panel did and in that opinion, written by a highly respected Republican judge, Frank Easterbrook, the seventh circuit 

pointed out that Heller specifically declined to reconsider older Supreme Court cases which have held that the Second Amendment 

applies only to the Federal Government. 

Judge Easterbrook wrote, ‘‘That does not license the inferior 

courts to go their own ways; it just notes that [the older precedent] 

is open to reexamination by the Justices themselves when the time 

comes.’’ 

That was your court’s conclusion, also, wasn’t it? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It was and I understand, having reviewed 

Justice Easterbrook’s opinion, that he agreed with the reasoning of 

Maloney on that point. 

440 

Senator SPECTER. I want to return to the issue of the basic authority and responsibility of the Supreme Court to decide the major 

cases on separation of power. 

There was a case which the Supreme Court decided certiorari 

just a couple of weeks ago involving claims for damages brought by 

survivors and victims of September 11 against certain individuals 

in Saudi Arabia, and this case posed a classic conflict between executive and legislative responsibilities. 

Congress had legislated under sovereign immunity in 1976 that 

tort claims, like flying an airplane into the World Trade Center, 

were an exception to sovereign immunity and the executive branch 

interposed objections to having that case decided because of the 

sensitivity of matters with Saudi Arabia. 

The case involved circuit splits and very, very important matters 

in that tragedy, which, you have commented, reached you, being 

very close to the incident. Do you not think that that is the kind 

of a case the Supreme Court should have heard to decide that kind 

of a very basic conflict between Article 1 powers of the Congress 

and Article 2 powers of the executive? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, obviously, issues related to September 11 and national security are very important issues to the 

country as a whole. For the reasons I mentioned earlier, I lived 

through September 11, so I understand its great tragedy and effect 

on America. 

The question you asked me, though, is one that asks me to make 

judgment about an act the Supreme Court has done and I didn’t 

participate in their discussions. I didn’t review the cert petitions. 

I didn’t talk about with them their reasons. 

It would seem and is inappropriate to me to comment on a question that I wasn’t a party to in making the decision. 

Senator SPECTER. Well, would you not at least agree with a proposition that conflicts between the Congress and the executive 

branch are of the highest duty for the Supreme Court to consider 

and to decide? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. All conflicts under the Constitution, all issues 

arising from the Constitution are important. 

Senator SPECTER. Well, I know that, but that is a pretty easy 

question to answer. I am not asking you to agree with Justice Roberts that the court ought to take more cases, which would seem, 

to me, to be pretty easy, or the question about Justice Scalia saying 

that there is turmoil when the circuits split and you do not have 

the Supreme Court taking cert. 

But is that not of the highest magnitude? Our discussions here 

have involved a great many issues, but I would suggest to you that 

on separation of powers and when you undertake the role of the 

Congress contrasted with the role of the President, Congress is Article 1. It was placed with primacy because we are closest to the 

food bowl. 

And when you have a question, which you would not comment 

on yesterday, like the terror surveillance program, which flatly contradicts the congressional enactment of the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act, that the only way you get a wiretap is with court 

approval, and the cases declared unconstitutional in the Detroit 

district court and the sixth circuit dodges the case on standing or 

441 

very questionable grounds and the Supreme Court will not even 

hear it and you have a case involving September 11 and a very blatant conflict between Congress’ powers expressed under Article 1 

with the Sovereign Immunities Act and the President stepping in 

under foreign powers, is that not a category of the highest magnitude? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It is so difficult to answer that question in 

the abstract. For the reason I’ve just explained, the issue is much, 

much more complicated than an absolute that says if a case presents this question, I’m always going to take it. 

That’s not how a judge looks at the issue of granting or not 

granting certiorari, I assume, because the court is weighing so 

many different factors at the time that decision is made. 

Senator SPECTER. Judge, I do not want to interrupt you, but I 

have got a minute and a half left and there are a couple of comments I want to make in conclusion. 

I would ask you to rethink that and I would also ask you to 

rethink the issues you did not want to answer yesterday about conflict between the Congress and the court. Even though the Constitution made Congress Article 1 and the President Article 2, the 

Supreme Court has really reversed the order. The judiciary is now 

really in Article 1, if the powers were to be redefined. 

But I would ask you to take a look. You have said repeatedly 

that the job of the court is to apply the law, not to make the law. 

Take a look again at the standard of proportional and congruent 

and see if you do not agree with Justice Scalia that that is another 

way for the court to make law. 

Take a look, too, at what Justice Roberts said here in the confirmation hearings, that there would be deference and respect to 

congressional fact-finding and how that is not done in the Garrett 

case and in the voting rights case. 

Out of consideration for the people who are going to appear here 

later, I am not prepared yet to announce my own vote, but it is my 

hope that the conventional wisdom is very strong for your confirmation, that you will use some of those characteristics of your 

litigation experience to battle out the ideas that you believe in, because I have a strong hunch that they are closer to the ones that 

I would like to see adopted by the court. 

And do not let the issues of separation of powers skip by. The 

Congress is entitled to deference on these big issues and at least 

they ought to be decided by the court. 

Thank you very much, Judge Sotomayor. You have done quite an 

outstanding job as a witness. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Specter. Judge, we are 

going to take a short break. Thank you for all of this. When we 

come back, I will recognize Senator Coburn, who is next. Thank 

you. 

[Whereupon, the hearing was recessed at 11:22 a.m.] 

After Recess [11:35 a.m.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Judge, thank you, and I do want to thank the 

press for cooperating. We have tried to make it possible for TV and 

print and photographers, and you have been very gracious in that 

regard. We are coming close to the end of this round. Whether it 

will be the last round or not will be up to the Republican side. But 

442 

I would yield now to Senator Coburn who has been waiting patiently. Senator Coburn. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Judge Sotomayor, good morning again. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Good morning. 

Senator COBURN. Yesterday, when I was asking you about foreign law, you said I should read your speech, so I did. I read your 

speech. So I want to come back to that for a minute because I want 

to ask you the same question I have asked the only other two Supreme Court nominees that have come before the Committee while 

I have sat on this Committee. And I want to ask you the same 

question. My first statement yesterday was asking you about 

whether you disagreed with Alito and Thomas, and you said basically you agreed. 

So on the basis of that agreement, will you affirm to this Committee and the American public that, outside of where you are directed to do so through statute or through treaty, refrain from 

using foreign law in making the decisions that you make that affect 

this country and the opinions that you write? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I will not use foreign law to interpret the 

Constitution or American statutes. I will use American law, constitutional law to interpret those laws, except in the situations 

where American law directs a court. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. I want to ask you also—another 

question that I asked both Justice Alito and Justice Thomas—and 

it is a problem I have with my colleagues here in the Senate. You 

have written extensively about some of the ambiguity that is in 

law. Would it be your opinion that we could do a much better job 

by being much clearer about what our intent is when we write statutes? Feel free to offend us, because we sorely need it. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Coburn, speak for yourself. 

Senator COBURN. I am speaking for the vast majority of the 

American people. We do not do a thorough job in making clear our 

intent or the background of our intent when we—and I will give 

you an example. Two hundred and twenty times in the bill that 

just came out of the HELP Committee we gave full shrift to the 

Secretary of HHS to write all the regulations, without our intent, 

none of our intent. 

So as you sit, if you sit, on the Supreme Court, I am sure many 

of those are going to come before you without our intent but with 

a bureaucracy’s intent or an executive branch intent. 

So the question I am asking you: In your experience, since you 

have noted the ambiguity that is in the law, would you make it a 

recommendation to your friends you have now established, all 19 

of us here on the Judiciary Committee, that we might do a better 

job of being much more clear in what we intend? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It would be presumptuous of me to tell you 

how to do your job, but I do know in my conversations virtually 

with all 89 Senators—perhaps not all of them, but the vast majority of them, somewhere in the conversation there was reference to 

their feelings, like yours, that a better job could be done by Congress in making its intent clearer. I think that that’s a question 

that Senators think about, at least the ones that I’ve spoken to. 

443 

And I think that the process is always better for a court when Congress’ intent is more clearly stated. 

Senator COBURN. And there is no doubt in your mind that if we 

were much more clear, guidance would be better given to the Supreme Court as conflicts over the statutes and laws come forward? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. When Congress’ intent is clear, the Court applies that clear intent. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you. I want to go back to a couple other 

areas that we talked about. One is some answers to questions that 

you gave to—questions from Senator Hatch. 

Senator Hatch asked you to describe your understanding of the 

test or standard that the Supreme Court uses to determine whether a right should be considered fundamental. Specifically, he noted 

that when determining whether a right is fundamental, the Supreme Court determined whether the right is deeply rooted in our 

Nation’s history and tradition, that it is necessarily to an AngloAmerican regime of ordered liberty, or that it is an enduring American tradition. 

You refused to answer him, asserting that you responded that 

you haven’t examined that framework in a while to know if that 

language is precise or not. ‘‘I’m not suggesting it’s not,’’ you said, 

‘‘Senator, I just can’t affirm that description.’’ 

Similarly, you refused to describe to me the test the Court used 

to determine whether a right is a fundamental right. 

But, in contrast to that, when Senator Kaufman asked you to 

give a very detailed description of the fact the Court’s considering 

when determining the doctrine of stare decisis, you stated and 

went through a long litany of the items with which the Court uses 

with which to determine stare decisis. And you gave a fairly detailed analysis of that process and the doctrine of stare decisis. 

And so I ask you again: Why can’t you give us your description 

of what you think the parameters are that the Court uses to determine a fundamental right in light of the 14th Amendment, incorporation right? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. All right. That language has been used in 

certain cases respecting the question of the incorporation of certain 

amendments. The question of—and the general framework will be 

used with respect to any consideration of incorporation. That 

wasn’t, I thought, the question that was being asked of me. I don’t 

remember that being the specific question. All I’m saying to you is 

that the framework has been discussed by the Court in jurisprudence that’s developed over the last hundred years, subsequent to 

its established precedents on the Second Circuit. 

One of the questions that the Court will address if it decides to 

address the incorporation of the Second Amendment is whether in 

those related areas it will use or not use the doctrines or framework of that precedent. There may be arguments on one side why, 

on another side why not. What I’m trying to do is not prejudge an 

issue that is so pending before the—— 

Senator COBURN. Well, I am not asking you to prejudge the 

issue. I am asking you under what basis, what is the—what are 

the steps and the considerations, not the details of the case. In 

other words, you can describe that for us in terms of stare decisis, 

but you can’t describe that for us in terms of a fundamental right. 

444 

And to me that is concerning because we should understand—that 

should be transparent to the people in this country how that works. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Because that’s the very issue the Court’s 

going to look at. The question of stare decisis is a general framework that one uses not in a particular context of a case, I am going 

to choose always to look at the outcome of the case in this way. 

It’s—— 

Senator COBURN. Your Honor, I understand that. If I can’t get 

you to go there, I want to quit and go on to something else, if I 

can. 

I also asked you yesterday—I want you to understand. You were 

raised in the Bronx. I was born in Wyoming and raised in Oklahoma. They are really different, both geographically and culturally, 

different areas. And so I want you to understand why I am spending so much time talking with you about the Second Amendment. 

My constituents in Oklahoma understand, as do most Americans, 

that the right to own guns hangs in the balance, may very well 

hang in the balance with your ascendancy to the Supreme Court. 

For us, one wrong vote on what we consider—regardless of what 

you consider, but what we consider a fundamental right, could gut 

the holding of Heller. And I have some serious concerns on that 

issue, and I want to ask you a few more questions. 

Yesterday you said that clearly a constitutional right only works 

if you can enforce it. And I agree. Tell me how American citizens 

would be able to enforce their individual constitutional right to 

bear arms if you are holding that it does not apply to the States 

in your previous case at the appellate level becomes the law of the 

land. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The only statement I can start with is Maloney was decided on the basis of precedent. It was decided on precedent. The Supreme Court in Heller recognized that it’s precedent. 

It was based on Second Circuit precedent that had interpreted the 

constitutional—the Supreme Court’s prior precedent. 

It may well be—may not be—that Senator Hatch was right that 

the old precedent should be distinguished in a certain way. Others 

may be right that it shouldn’t. That issue was not the one that the 

Maloney court decided Maloney on. It decided it on the rule of law. 

It was a rule of law that led Judge Easterbrook in the Seventh Circuit decision to say it is not what we should be doing; it is what 

the Supreme Court should do, is to re-examine a precedent that’s 

directly on point. 

I can assure your constituents that I have a completely open 

mind on this question. I do not close my mind to the fact and the 

understanding that there were developments after the Supreme 

Court’s rulings on incorporation that will apply to this question or 

be considered. I have a completely open mind. 

Senator COBURN. Do you not consider it ironic that the majority 

of the debate about the 14th Amendment in this country was about 

the taking of guns from freed slaves? Is that not ironic that we now 

have some kind of conflict that we are going to say that the whole 

reason and the debate about the 14th Amendment originated from 

States taking away the rights of people’s fundamental right to defend themselves? Is that not an irony to you? 

445 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, would you want a judge or a nominee who came in here and said, ‘‘I agree with you. This is unconstitutional’’ before I had a case before me, before I had both sides discussing the issue with me, before I spent the time that the Supreme Court spent on the Heller decision? And that decision was 

mighty long, went through 2 years of history, did a very thorough 

analysis and discussion back and forth on the prior opinions of the 

Committee. I don’t know that that’s a Justice that I can be. I can 

only come to this process—— 

Senator COBURN. I agree with you, Your Honor. I don’t want you 

to tell us how you’re going to rule. But I asked you: Isn’t it ironic 

that in this country where our law comes from Blackstone forward, 

comes from English law, which our founding was perpetrated and 

carried out under this fundamental right, and that we have a 14th 

Amendment right, and that we have through legal, what I would 

consider as a physician, schizophrenia have decided that we can’t 

decide whether this is a fundamental right? 

I will finish with that point other than to note the pressure reference was to privilege and immunity, not due process. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I understand the importance of the right. It 

was recognized in Heller, and all I can continue to say, Senator, is 

I keep an open mind on the incorporation doctrine. 

Senator COBURN. I appreciate that, Your Honor. Thank you very 

much. 

Let me go back to an area that I know not everybody wants to 

hear about, but I think it is important. I asked you about where 

we were in terms of settled law on Roe and Doe, and today I only 

want to focus on Roe and Doe, not Casey. What was the state of the law, say, in 1974, 1 year after Roe? 

Where did we stand in that issue? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That women have the right to terminate their 

pregnancy in some situations, without Government regulation, and 

in others, there would be permissible Government regulation. 

Senator COBURN. Did any of the—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That’s generally, because the Court did look 

at other questions in terms of Government regulation. 

Senator COBURN. Then let me ask you this: Did any of the laws 

of the 50 States regulating abortion survive the decision in Roe? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t know that I could answer that question because I don’t—— 

Senator COBURN. Okay. That’s fair. They didn’t. 

Was there any limit to the right to abortion either in the age of 

the child in the womb or the reasons for electing that surgery? And 

if so, what are those limits, according to Roe and Doe? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, I don’t actually remember the Court 

addressing that because my studies have been on the undue burden test established in Casey. So my experience in this area or my 

knowledge really has been most particularly concentrated on the 

Casey standard, which is—— 

Senator COBURN. I understand that. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR [continuing]. What Casey did was change the 

Roe standard. 

Senator COBURN. Which goes back to why I asked you those two 

hypothetical, not abstract but hypothetical cases yesterday, of the 

446 

28-week and a 38-week infant. The truth is ever since January 22, 

1973, you can have an abortion for any reason you want in this 

country. And even though Carhart II has now been ruled, that is, 

a procedure that will eliminate that pregnancy is still legal and 

viable everywhere in this country. 

And so what I was trying to draw out to you is where do we 

stand in this country when 80 percent of the rest of the world allows abortion only before 12 weeks—only before 12 weeks—and yet 

we allow it for any reason at any time for any inconvenience under 

the ‘‘health of the woman’’ aspect. 

And that is the other reason why I raised the viability because 

technology and the States’ interest under the Supreme Court ruling 

starts with viability. That is when a State can have interest. It is 

guaranteed, and there is limited ability States can have to control 

that after that. 

Is the Casey ruling, the undue burden ruling test, is that a policy 

choice? I know it is the supreme law of the land today, but in your 

mind, would that represent a policy choice? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I understood that that was the Court’s framework for addressing both the woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy under the Constitution and the State’s rights to legislate and 

regulate in areas within its jurisdiction. So it was the Court’s way 

of attempting to address those two interests. 

Senator COBURN. And Justice Ginsburg is not real happy with 

those tests, and neither was—neither are several other members on 

the Court. 

I want to end up, our conversation when we had a private conversation, I approached you about the importance of the cases that 

you would decide to take if you are on the Court. Let me ask you 

a few questions, and I just want your opinion. And this is not to 

put you in any box, and if you think it is, please say so, ‘‘You’re 

trying to put me in a box.’’ 

Do you believe that the Court’s abortion rulings have ended the 

national controversy over this issue? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. 

Senator COBURN. Okay. You don’t have to name them, but do you 

think there are other similarly divisive issues that could be decided 

by the Court in the future? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That I can’t answer. I—— 

Senator COBURN. I don’t want you to name any. I am just saying 

as you think through your mind, do you think there are other similarly divisive issues that we could have that would divide the country so remarkably—you know, assisted suicide, euthanasia? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can only answer what exists. People are 

very passionate about the issues they believe in, and so almost any 

issue could find an audience or a part of our population that’s fervent about it. 

Senator COBURN. Which is a great answer, because on these divisive issues, is it better that the Court decides them or elected representatives? If you had a preference, if you were King tomorrow 

and you said we are going to decide this either in the Supreme 

Court or force Congress to make the decision, which would you 

think would be better for us? 

447 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In the first instance, it’s always Congress or 

State passing regulation that the Court is reviewing and determining whether it complies with constitutional limits. It’s not a 

choice of either/or. It’s always Congress’ first instance or the State 

legislators’ first interest with the non-veto of a—— 

Senator COBURN. I have got 30 seconds left. I want to ask you 

another question. You said just a minute ago people are passionate 

about what they believe in. And I have read your speeches and 

your publications and your—and I believe you are passionate. And 

I believe your speeches reflect your passions. 

I look at myself when I give a speech. You know, I let it all go, 

what I really believe. I am more measured—some people wouldn’t 

believe that up here, but I am more measured when I am here. But 

when I give a speech—and the problem I am having is I really see 

a dissonance about what you said outside of your jurisprudence. 

And the only ability we have to judge is what that passion has relayed in the past and your statements here in combination with 

your judicial practice. 

And so you are an admirable judge, an admirable woman. You 

have very high esteem in my eyes for both your accomplishments 

and your intellect. I have yet to decide where I am going on this 

because I am still deeply troubled because of the answers that I 

could not get in the 50 minutes that I have been able to ask, and 

also deeply troubled because I believe what you have spoken to the 

law students, what you have spoken in your writings truly reflect 

your real passions, which I sometimes find run in conflict with 

what I think the Constitution has to say. 

But I thank you for giving us such a cordial response, and I am 

mightily impressed. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Senator Coburn, the Republican 

side has asked for a third round of those who want another 10 minutes, and so you will have a chance for more questions if you wish, 

because I am trying to be fair to both sides, and I will allow that. 

Before we go to Senator Franken, though, and while you are still 

here, Senator Coburn, I had reserved about 10 minutes of my time, 

and I will use just a minute or so of it. You spoke about the Second 

Amendment, which is a significant issue, and it is one people care 

about. And you spoke about gun owners out West and your life in 

both Wyoming and then Oklahoma. I look at that, of course, because both Wyoming and Oklahoma have more restrictive gun laws 

than my own State of Vermont. I could say that virtually every 

State has more restrictive gun laws than we do in Vermont. 

I have been a gun owner since my early teens. I target-shoot at 

my home in Vermont as a way of relaxation all the time. I own numerous weapons, hand guns and long guns. I have not heard anything or read anything in the judge’s writings or speeches that 

would indicate to me that in any way I have to worry that Vermont 

gun owners—and many Vermonters are gun owners; it is a way of 

life—that that is going to change. It is not going to change for me. 

It is not going to change what weapons my two sons, one a former 

Marine, own. If Judge Sotomayor is on the Supreme Court, I expect 

448 

I will still be back in my home—and you are welcome any time you 

would like to come and go target shooting with me there. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I would just say briefly but it 

is a real pivotal time we are in. If the decision by Judge Sotomayor 

becomes law, any city—maybe not Vermont, but any city or State 

in America could virtually, I believe, fully ban all firearms. And 

that is just where we are, and we can discuss how much precedent 

had to bound you to reach that conclusion. But this is not a little 

bitty issue. It is very important. 

Chairman LEAHY. But States made laws as they have gone 

along. Vermont has decided not to have the restrictive laws that 

you have in Alabama. But States have made up their mind. 

Senator Franken. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a letter 

here from several former U.S. attorneys from the Southern District 

of New York. Some of them Republican appointed and supporting 

the judge’s confirmation. I will read a little bit from it. 

It says they each had personal experience including appearing 

before Judge Sotomayor. She came to our cases without any apparent bias, probed counsel actively with insightful and at times tough 

questions and demonstrated time and again that she not only listens, but is often persuaded by counsel. 

In our matters, Judge Sotomayor’s opinions reflect clear—it is 

great. It is a great letter. I would ask that it be entered into the 

record. Sir? Can I enter it into the record? Thank you. 

Thank you, Judge Sotomayor, for your patience and your terrific 

answers. 

We have heard a lot about your thoughts on specific cases and 

on principles of jurisprudence. I would like to ask a much more 

general question and one that I think is a really good question at 

job interviews. 

That is why do you want to be a Supreme Court Justice? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. You are going to hate me for taking a few 

minutes, but can I tell you a story? 

Senator FRANKEN. I would love it. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Because it will explain who I am and why. 

When Senator Moynihan first told me that he would consider sending my name to Senator D’Amato for consideration as a District 

Court judge, he asked me to keep it quiet for a little bit of time 

and I asked permission to tell my mom, Omar. This is short. 

So they were visiting and I told them and mom was very, very 

excited. She then said how much more money are you going to 

earn? I stopped and I said I’m going to take a big pay cut. Then 

she stopped and she stopped and she said, are you going to do as 

much foreign travel as you do now? I was flying all over the U.S. 

and abroad as part of my private practice work. 

I said probably not because I am going to live in a courthouse 

in lower Manhattan near where I used to work as a Manhattan 

DA. Now the pause was a little longer. She said, Okay. Then she 

said, now all the fascinating clients that you work with, as you 

may have heard yesterday, I had some fairly well known clients, 

you are going to be able to go traveling with them with the new 

people you meet, right? 

449 

I said, no. Most of them are going to come before me as litigants 

to the cases I am hearing and I cannot become friends with them. 

Now the pause is really long. She finally looked up and she said, 

why do you want this job? 

And Omar, who was sitting next to her said, Selena, you know 

your daughter. This is in Spanish. You know your daughter and 

her stuff with public service. It really has always been the answer. 

Given who I am, my love of the law, my sense of importance 

about the rule of law, how central it is to the functioning of our 

society, how it sets us apart as many Senators have noted, from 

the rest of the world, have always created a passion in me. 

That passion led me to want to be a lawyer first and now to be 

a judge because I can’t think of any greater service that I can give 

to the country than to be permitted the privilege of being a Justice 

of the Supreme Court. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. Well, I for one have been very impressed with you, Judge, and I certainly intend to support your 

confirmation for the court. 

I guess there is another round. I thought I was going to be the 

only thing between you and the door. So I planned to just yield all 

the rest of my time. But since I am not I would like to ask you— 

no. I am going to yield the rest of my time if that is okay. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator Franken. I will 

reserve my time. We will have—Senator Sessions has asked us. 

Ten minute rounds. I think they will be primarily on the Republican side. I may speak again when they finish. We will begin with 

you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Leahy. I believe we have tried to meet our goal. I had a goal at the beginning 

and people would say this is one of the most fair and effective hearings we have ever had. I hope that has been the case. 

It is a great issue, the choice of putting someone on the United 

States Supreme Court. Our nominee has a wonderful group of 

friends and a long and distinguished record, but a number of questions arose that are important. 

American people rightly are concerned that on important social 

issues that are not clearly stated in the Constitution on important 

legal issues not clearly stated in our law seem to be decided by 

unelected lifetime appointed courts. Those are big, big issues that 

we have discussed here today I hope in a way that is healthy and 

positive. 

Judge, one thing I will ask you, I asked Justice Roberts and I 

am not sure how much good it did because he came back asking 

for a pay raise the next week, I think. But can you live on that salary that you are paid? We are having the largest deficit in the history of the Republic. A lot of people are going to have to tighten 

their belts. Are you prepared to do so also? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I have been living on the salary for 17 years, 

so I will suffer through more of it. It is difficult for many judges. 

The pay question is a significant one for judges who haven’t received pay raises I think it is more than 20 years now if I am not 

mistaken. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, you are saying pay raises based on— 

they are getting pay raises almost every year really, the cost of livVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00461 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
450 

ing and that kind of thing. But there was a big pay raise about 20 

years ago. 

I think that it is about four times the average family income in 

America. I hope that you can live on it. If not, you probably 

shouldn’t take the job. 

All judges, whether they are activists or not, if asked are going 

to say they follow the law. They just have a different view of the 

law. They just have a more looser interpretation of the law. So that 

is why we press some of these issues. 

We want to determine as best we can just how tightly you believe you are bound by the law and how much flexibility you might 

think that you have as a judge to expand the law to suit perhaps 

a—in some policy area or another. 

Attorney General Holder recently said that he thought we lacked 

courage in discussing the race issue. I think that is something that 

we should take seriously. That was a valid comment. 

In my opinion, we had a higher level of discussion of that issue 

since I have been in this committee and I hope we have done it in 

a way that’s correct. This is so sensitive and it is so important and 

we need to get it right and we must be fair to everybody. 

We know that there are cases when people have been discriminated against. They are entitled to a remedy and the Supreme 

Court has been quite clear that when you can show a history of discrimination, and we have had not just in the south, but in the 

south, the jurisprudence has developed that it is appropriate for a 

judge to have a remedy that would encourage a move forward to 

a better opportunity those who have been held back. So that is 

good. 

But the Supreme Court has also said that this is a dangerous 

philosophy because when you do that, you have identified one racial group and you have given them a preference over another. So 

it can be done in a legitimate way that is remedial. 

We still have vestiges of discrimination still in our society and 

there will still be needs for remedial remedies. But I do think, as 

Justice Roberts said, the best way to end discrimination is quit 

doing it. A lot of our orders and court decisions are such that they 

benefit one race over another solely because of their race. It has to 

be tied to a remedy. The Supreme Court has made clear that when 

you do that, it must meet the highest scrutiny as the courts are 

supposed to review that very carefully and the language they use 

is strict scrutiny. 

You don’t favor one group over another without meeting that 

high standard. I am glad we began to discuss that and we will have 

the firefighters and they will be able to express their view on it in 

a little bit. 

Judge, let me just say before I go forward that you have done a 

good job. You have a good humor, you have been direct in your answers and we appreciate that. 

I will not support, and I do not think any member of this side 

will support a filibuster or any attempt to block a vote on your 

nomination. It is a very important vote. We all need to take our 

time and think it through and cast it honestly as the occasion demands. 

451 

But I look forward to you getting that vote before we recess in 

August. 

Let me discuss, Judge, I will just express this as we go forward. 

In your handling of the Ricci case, I think it is fair to say that it 

was not handled in the regular order. 

You said in your opening statement that, ‘The process of judging 

is enhanced when the arguments and concerns of the parties 

through litigation are understood and acknowledged and that is 

why I generally structure my opinions by setting out what the law 

requires and then by explaining why a contrary position, sympathetic or not, is accepted or rejected. That is how I seek to strengthen both the rule of law and faith in the impartiality of our justice 

system.’ 

I think that is a good statement. But I think what the panel did 

in this case did not meet that standard. 

I think it was action I would conclude fairly, I think, contrary to 

the rule to the Second Circuit, Rule 32–1 says that summary orders are only appropriate where ‘a decision is unanimous and each 

judge of the panel believes no jurisprudential purpose would be 

served by an opinion.’ 

Your clerk of your court there to the New York Times said this 

order ‘Ordinarily issues when the termination of the case revolves 

around well settled principles of law.’ 

I would note that it was not a pro curium opinion at first. It was 

a summary order which is even less of an impactful decision than 

the other. But I think the Supreme Court made clear and I think 

most Americans understand that the firefighters case was more 

than that. It had tremendous jurisprudential impact and I think 

you were wrong to attempt to use the summary order which because it was objected to within your circuit which resulted in a 

pretty roaring debate and discussion and that you went forward, 

you then did it in a pro curium way, which at least gave it a little 

higher credence, but you did not write an in-depth opinion at all. 

In fact, it was still a pro curium and short opinion. 

I understand according to some of the writers that Judge Sack, 

New York Times, I believe, quoted—National Journal that he was 

most reluctant to join the opinion. Judge Pooler was in the middle, 

and I guess it didn’t reference the third judge, but apparently you 

were the third judge that was pushing for this kind of result. 

Did you fail to show the courage that Attorney General Holder 

has asked us to show and discuss this issue openly with an indepth opinion and wouldn’t we have been better off if the case 

hand been handled in that fashion? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Sir, no. I didn’t show a lack of courage. The 

court’s decision was clear in both instances on the basis for the decision. It was a thorough, complete discussion of the issues as presented to the District Court. The Circuit Court’s ruling was clear 

in both instances. No, I did not lack courage. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I don’t think it was a great District 

Court opinion, so I would disagree on that. Mr. Chairman, you 

have been fair to us throughout. I do not know that every member 

of our side would use the time that they are allotted, but I am glad 

that you are allowing them the opportunity to do so. 

452 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you for that compliment, Senator. I 

should compliment Senator Specter here when he was Chairman I 

was Ranking Member and we had two Supreme Court nominations. We tried to work out a time to be fair to everybody and we 

did and we were told by both Republicans and Democrats that nobody had to complain about the amount of time. 

I have tried to do the same thing. It is a lifetime appointment. 

I have been very impressed of course with our nominee and that 

has been obvious. Incidentally, she was originally nominated by 

President H. W. Bush and then by President Bill Clinton and now 

by President Barack Obama. 

President Clinton nominated her to the Second Circuit and I 

have a letter addressed to the members of the committee, well, actually to you and I, Senator Sessions, from former President Clinton. He speaks of her being able to make a unique contribution to 

the bench through her experience as a prosecutor and trial judge 

and hopes that we will have a speedy confirmation of her. I will 

put that in the record. 

One of the things in also trying to make sure everybody gets a 

balanced time, but we have had a lot of us that have served as either Chairman or Ranking Member of this committee and we know 

how important that is. I use that to yield to Senator Hatch who has 

had also the problem of having to schedule how things go. I yield 

to you. But thank you, Jeff, I appreciate that. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I echo Jeff’s 

statement here. 

Judge, you have been great throughout this process and I appreciate it, but I have some questions that I’d like to ask that I think 

you can answer yes or no, of course you can qualify if you feel like 

it. But I would like to get through these because they are important questions to me and millions of other people that I represent. 

Judge, from 1980 from 1992 you were actively involved with the 

Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund. It is a well 

known Civil rights organization in our country. 

Among many other activities, this group files briefs in Supreme 

Court cases. You served in nearly a dozen different leadership positions there, including serving on and chairing a litigation committee. 

The New York Times has described you as a ‘tough policymaker’ 

with the group and said that you would meet frequently with the 

legal staff, review the status of cases and played an active role in 

the fund’s litigation. 

Lawyers of the fund described you as, ‘An involved and ardent 

supporter of their various legal efforts during your time with the 

group.’ The Associated Press looked at documents from your service 

with the fund that showed that you were, ‘involved in making sure 

that the cases handled were in keeping with its mission statement 

and were having an impact.’ 

When Senator Gillibrand introduced you to this committee on 

Monday, she compared your leadership role at the fund to Justice 

Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s participation in the ACLU Women’s Rights 

Project or Justice Thurgood Marshall’s participation on behalf of 

the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. 

453 

So let me ask you just about a few abortion cases in which the 

Fund filed briefs. I do believe you can answer these yes or no, but 

again, certainly qualify if you feel like it. 

I am not asking for your present views, either personal or legal, 

let’s get that straight, on these issues, nor am I asking you how 

you might rule on these issues in the future. I just want to make 

that clear. 

I might say that these are important issues. In one case, Wemus 

v. Lavars and Harris v. McCray, the Fund joined an Amicus brief 

asking the Supreme Court to overturn restrictions on taxpayer 

funding for abortion. 

The brief compared refusing to use Medicaid Funds to pay for 

abortions to the Dred Scott case, the Dred Scott v. Sanford decision 

that refused citizenship to black people in our society and treated 

them terribly. 

At the time, did you know that the Fund was filing this brief? 

At the time did you know—well, let me just ask each one. At the 

time, did you know the fund was filing this brief? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. 

Senator HATCH. At the time, did you know that the brief made 

this argument? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, sir. 

Senator HATCH. At the time did you support the Fund filing this 

brief that made this argument? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. 

Senator HATCH. At the time did you voice any concern, objection, 

disagreement or doubt about the Fund filing this brief or making 

this argument? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I was not like Justice Ginsburg or Justice 

Marshall. I was not a lawyer on the Fund as they were with respect to the organizations they belong to. I was a board member 

and it was not my practice and not that I know of any board member, although maybe one with Civil Rights experience would have. 

I didn’t have any in this area, so I never reviewed the briefs. 

Senator HATCH. All right. In another case, Ohio v. Aquin Center 

for Reproductive Health, the Fund argued that the First Amendment right to freely exercise religion undermines laws requiring 

parental notification for minors getting abortion. 

Now, at the time did you know that the Fund was filing this 

brief? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No. No specific brief. Obviously it was involved in litigation, so I knew generally they were filing briefs. But 

I wouldn’t know until after the fact that the brief was actually 

filed. But I wouldn’t review it. 

Senator HATCH. The same questions on this. At the time did you 

know that the brief made this argument? At this time did you support the Fund filing this brief that made this argument? And at the 

time did you voice any concern, objection, disagreement or doubt 

about the Fund filing this brief or making this argument? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No because I never reviewed the brief. 

Senator HATCH. That’s fine. I’m just going to establish this. 

In another case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Fund argued 

against a 24-hour waiting period for obtaining an abortion. So 

again, those questions. At the time did you know that the Fund 

454 

was filing this brief? Did you know that the brief made this argument? Did you support the Fund filing this brief that made this argument? And did you voice any concern, objection, disagreement or 

doubt about the Fund filing this brief or making this argument? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. For the same reason, no. 

Senator HATCH. Now, Judge, I am going to be very easy on you 

now because I invited constituents in Utah to submit questions and 

got an overwhelming response. Many of them submitted questions 

about the Second Amendment and other issues that have already 

been discussed. 

One constituent asked whether you see the courts, especially the 

Supreme Court as an institution for resolving perceived social injustices and equities and disadvantages. 

Now, please address this both in terms of a Justice’s intention 

and the effect of their decisions. That was the question and I 

thought it was an interesting question. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. No, that’s not the role of the courts. The role 

of the courts is to interpret the law as Congress writes it. It may 

be the effect in a particular situation that in the court doing that 

and giving effect to Congress’ intent, it has that outcome. 

But it is not the role of the judge to create that outcome. It is 

to interpret what Congress is doing and do what Congress wants. 

Senator HATCH. Great. One final question, Judge. Describe your 

judicial philosophy in terms of the phrase ‘Fidelity to the Law.’ 

Would you agree with me that both majority and descending Justices in last year’s gun rights decision in District of Columbia v. 

Heller were doing their best to be faithful to the text and history 

of the Second Amendment? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Text and history, how to analyze, yes. 

Senator HATCH. In other words, do you believe that they were exhibiting fidelity to the law as they understood it? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes. 

Senator HATCH. Then I take it that you would agree that the 

Justices in the majority were not engaging in some kind of right 

wing judicial activists in the—characterized the decision. Is that 

fair to say? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It is fair to me to say that I do not view what 

a court does as activism. I view it as each judge principally interpreting the issue before them on the basis of the law. 

Senator HATCH. Great. Let me just ask you one other constituent 

question. It is a short one. 

Another constituent asked, which is more important or deserves 

more weight? The constitution as it was originally intended or 

newer legal precedent? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. What governs always is the Constitution. 

Senator HATCH. Which is more important or deserves more 

weight? The actual wording of the Constitution as it was originally 

intended or newer legal precedent? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The intent of the founders were set forth in 

the Constitution. They created the words, they created the document. It is their words that is the most important aspect of judging. 

You follow what they said in their words and you apply it to the 

facts you are looking at. 

455 

Senator HATCH. Thank you, Judge. I will give back the remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. I just would note we do have this letter in the 

record from the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund 

in which they say neither the board as a whole nor any individual 

member selects litigation to be undertaken or controls ongoing litigation. 

I just think that we should be very, very clear here. It is probably why they get support from the United Way and a number of 

other organizations. 

Senator Grassley. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Good morning, Justice—Judge Sotomayor. 

Yesterday you said you would take a look at Baker v. Nelson, so 

I will ask this question. You said you hadn’t read Baker in a long 

time and would report back. You added that if Baker was precedent, you would uphold it based upon stare decisis consistent with 

your stance in cases like Kato, Roe v. Wade, Griswold, and many 

others that you mentioned this week. 

Baker involved an appeal from the Minnesota Supreme Court 

which held that a Minnesota law prohibiting same sex marriage 

did not violate the First, the Eighth, the Ninth, or the 14th amendment to the Constitution. The Supreme Court in a very short ruling concluded on its merits that, ‘‘The appeal is dismissed for want 

of substantial Federal question.’’ Baker remains on the books as 

precedent. Will you respect the Court’s decision in Baker based 

upon stare decisis? And if not, why not? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. As I indicated yesterday, I didn’t remember 

Baker, and if I had studied it, it would have been in law school. 

You raised a question, and I did go back to look at Baker. In fact, 

I don’t think I ever read it, even in law school. 

Baker was decided at the time where jurisdiction over Federal 

questions was mandatory before the Supreme Court, and the disposition by the Supreme Court, I believe was what you related, 

Senator, which is a dismissal of the appeal raised on the Minnesota 

statute. 

What I have learned is the question of—it’s what the meaning 

of that dismissal is, is actually an issue that’s being debated in existing litigation. As I indicated yesterday, I will follow precedent 

according to the doctrine of stare decisis. I can’t prejudge what that 

precedent means until the issue comes before—what a prior decision of the Court means and its applicability to a particular issue 

is until that question is before me as a judge—or a Justice, if that 

should happen. 

So, at bottom, because the question is pending before a number 

of courts, the ABA would not permit me to comment on the merits 

of that. But as I indicated, I affirm that with each holding of the 

Court, to the extent it is pertinent to the issues before the Court, 

it has to be given the effects of stare decisis. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Am I supposed to interpret what you just said 

as anything different than what you said over the last 3 days in 

regard to Kato or Roe or Griswold or any other precedent you said, 

or precedents? Or would it be exactly in the same tone as you mentioned in previous days with previous precedents under stare decisis? 

456 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, those cases have holdings that are not 

open to dispute. The holdings are what they are. Their application 

to a particular situation will differ on what facts those situations 

present. The same thing with the Nelson case, which is what does 

the holding mean, and that’s what I understand is being litigated, 

because it was a one-line decision by the Supreme Court, and how 

it applies to a new situation is what also would come before a 

court. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Okay. My last question for your appearance 

before our Committee involves a word I don’t think that showed up 

here yet—‘‘vacuums’’—and it is a question that I asked Judge Roberts and Justice Alito, and it comes from a conversation I had, a 

dialog I had at a similar hearing when Judge Souter was before us, 

now Justice Souter, involving the term ‘‘vacuums in law.’’ And I 

think the term ‘‘vacuums in law’’ comes from Souter himself, as I 

will read to you in just a moment. 

I probed Judge Souter about how he would interpret the Constitution and statutory law. In his response, Justice Souter talked 

about the Court filling vacuums left by Congress, and there are 

several quotes that I can give you from 19—I guess it was 1990, 

but I will just read four or five lines of Judge Souter speaking to 

this Committee: 

‘‘Because if, in fact, the Congress will face the responsibility that 

goes with its 14th Amendment powers, then by definition, there is, 

to that extent, not going to be a kind of vacuum of responsibility 

created, in which the courts are going to be forced to take on problems which sometimes, in the first instance, might be better addressed by the political branches of Government.’’ 

Both prior to that and after that, Judge Souter talked a lot about 

maybe the courts needed to fill vacuums. 

Do you agree with Justice Souter, is it appropriate for the courts 

to fill vacuums in the law? And let me quickly follow it up. Do you 

expect that you will fill in vacuums in the law left by Congress if 

you are confirmed to be an Associate Justice? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator Grassley, one of the things I say to 

my students when I’m teaching brief writing, I start by saying to 

them, ‘‘It’s very dangerous to use analogies because they’re always 

imperfect.’’ I wouldn’t ever use Justice Souter’s words because 

they’re his words, not mine. 

I try always to use—and this is what I tell my students to do, 

is use simple words. Explain what you’re doing without analogy. 

Just tell them what you’re doing. And what I do is not described 

in the way—or I wouldn’t describe it in the way Justice Souter did. 

Judges apply the law, they apply the holdings of precedent, and 

they look at how that fits into the new facts before them. But 

you’re not creating law. If that was an intent that Justice Souter 

was expressing—and I doubt it—that’s not what judges do. Judges 

do what I’ve just described, and that’s not in my mind acting for 

Congress. It is interpreting Congress’ intent as expressed in a statute and applying it to the new situation. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you. 

I am done, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator Grassley. 

Senator Kyl, did you want another round? 

457 

Senator KYL. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure how 

long this will take, but, Judge, I think maybe we are—to use the 

President’s analogy that we talked about in my very first question 

to you, we may be in about the 25th mile of the marathon, and I 

might even be persuaded to have a little empathy for this last mile 

here. I think you are just about done. 

I wanted to go over three quick things, if I could. The first is the 

exchange that we had this morning regarding the decision in Ricci 

in which you insisted that you were bound by Supreme Court and 

Second Circuit precedent. I quoted from the Supreme Court decision to the effect that I believe that that contradicted your answer. 

If you have anything different to say than what you said this 

morning, I wanted to give you another opportunity to say it. We 

don’t need to re-plow the same ground. But is there anything different that you would like to offer on that? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Senator, after each round, I go to the next 

moment. Without actually looking at the transcript, I couldn’t answer that question. It is just impossible to right now. I’m glad 

you’re giving me the opportunity, but I would need a specific question as to something I said and what I meant before I could respond. 

Senator KYL. All right. Since we will probably have a few questions as follow-up in writing and you will be providing us answers 

to those, maybe the best thing is just to ask a general question, or 

if there is something specific that I can related it to, and then you 

can respond in that way. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Thank you, sir. 

Senator KYL. You are very welcome. 

Now, the second question has to do with the Second Amendment. 

In the Maloney case, you held that it was not incorporated into the 

14th Amendment, and what—well, maybe I should ask you what 

that means. Let me ask then two separate situations as a practical 

matter. 

If the Supreme Court does not review that issue, then is it the 

case that at least in the Second Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, 

the States that are in the Seventh and Second Circuit, those States 

could pass laws that restrict or even prohibit people from owning 

firearms? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I did not hold it was not incorporated. I was 

on a panel that—— 

Senator KYL. Fair enough. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR.—viewed Supreme Court precedent and Second Circuit precedent as holding that fact. 

Senator KYL. Right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. You can’t talk in an absolute. There always 

has to be a reason for why a State acts, and there also has to be 

a reason for the extent of the regulation the State passes. And so 

the question in Maloney for us was a very narrow question, which 

was: Are these nunchuk sticks—and I have described them previously as these martial arts sticks tied together by a belt that 

when you swing them, if somebody comes by, there could be, if not 

serious, deadly force in some situations—whether the State had a 

reason recognized in law for determining that it was illegal to own 

those sticks. 

458 

The next issue that would come up by someone who challenged 

the regulation would be, What’s the nature of the regulation and 

how does it comport with the reason the State gives for the actions 

it did? 

So absolute regulation is not what I would answer. I would answer what this—— 

Senator KYL. Let me—excuse me. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR.—regulation is. 

Senator KYL. I appreciate your answer. What would be the test 

that would be applied by a court in the event that a State said because of the danger that firearms present to others, we are going 

to require that only law enforcement personnel can own firearms 

in our State? And someone challenged that as an affront to their 

rights, they would say the Federal Government can’t take that 

right away from us because of the Second Amendment. What would 

the test be that the Court would apply to analyze the regulation 

of the State? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, that’s very similar, although not exactly, if I understood it, to Heller, the facts in Heller. And the Court 

there said that the regulation in D.C. was broader than the interest asserted. 

That question in a different State would depend on the circumstances of its barring—— 

Senator KYL. Well, excuse me for interrupting. Is there no standard—I mean, we are familiar with strict scrutiny, the reasonable 

basis test and so on. Is there a standard of which you are aware 

that the Court would use to examine the State’s right to impose 

such a restriction given that the Second Amendment would be 

deemed not incorporated? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In Maloney, the Court addressed whether 

there was a violation of the equal protection statute—equal protection of the 14th Amendment, and determined that rational basis 

review—now that I understand that you are asking about—— 

Senator KYL. Sure. I am sorry. I didn’t—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR.—a standard of review that’s—— 

Senator KYL. Now, of the tests that the Court applies traditionally, the rational basis is the least difficult of States to meet in justifying a regulation, is it not? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I’m not going to be difficult with you. It’s the 

one where you don’t need an exact fit between the exact injury that 

you are seeking to remedy in the legislation. 

Senator KYL. Could I—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. So it does have more—— 

Senator KYL. Flexibility for the state? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, ‘‘flexibility’’ is the wrong—more deference to congressional findings about what—— 

Senator KYL. Or State law. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Exactly. 

Senator KYL. Right. You know the general rule that the rational 

basis test is the least intrusive on a State’s ability to regulate, 

whereas strict scrutiny is the most intrusive on the State’s ability. 

Is that a fair characterization? 

459 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. It’s a fair characterization that when you 

have strict scrutiny, the Government’s legislation must be very 

narrowly tailored. 

Senator KYL. Right. So—— 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In rational basis there is a broader breadth 

for the States to act. 

Senator KYL. So wouldn’t it be correct to say that as between the 

application of the Second Amendment to the District of Columbia, 

for example, compared to a situation in which a State or a city imposed a regulation on the control of firearms, that it would be 

much more likely that the Court would uphold the State’s ability 

or the city’s ability to regulate that than it would—in the abstract 

I am talking about here—than it would a Federal attempt to regulate it under the Second Amendment? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That’s the problem within the abstract, because what the Court would look at is whatever legislature—State 

legislative findings there are in the fit between those findings and 

the legislation. 

Senator KYL. Right, and I appreciate that you are not going to— 

without knowing the facts of every case, you can’t opine. But just 

as a general proposition, obviously if the amendment is incorporated, it will be much more difficult for a government to impose 

a standard than if it is not incorporated. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Well, the standard of review, even under the 

incorporation doctrine, was actually not decided in Heller, and that 

issue wasn’t resolved. So what that answer will be is actually an 

open question that I couldn’t even discuss in a broad term other 

than to just explain—— 

Senator KYL. All right. Again, to interrupt, because we are less 

than 2 minutes now. If Senator Leahy says, gee, in Vermont, he 

is not worried about the fact that the Second Amendment isn’t incorporated, maybe if I lived in New York or Massachusetts or some 

other State I would be worried. The question I guess I would ask 

here is: Can you understand why someone who would like to own 

a gun would be concerned that if the amendment is not deemed incorporated into the 14th Amendment as a fundamental right, that 

it would be much more likely that the State or city in which that 

individual lived could regulate his right to own a firearm? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Very clear to me from the public discussions 

on this issue that that is a concern for many people. 

Senator KYL. Final question. You are familiar—this goes to the 

foreign law issue. You are familiar with the difference in the treatment of foreign law by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Louisiana on the one hand and in Roper v. Simmons on the other 

hand. In Roper, the Court ruled it was cruel and unusual to apply 

the death penalty and drew substantially on foreign law. In Kennedy v. Louisiana, an adult was convicted of raping an 8-year-old 

child. And the same five Justices who wrote the opinion in Roper 

ruled that it was cruel and unusual to sentence the individual to 

death, but cited no foreign law whatsoever. 

Some have said that a discussion of foreign law was left out of 

the Kennedy case because it actually cut against the majority’s 

opinion. What do you think? 

460 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can’t speak for what they did. I can only do 

what you did, which is to describe what the courts did and what 

they said. It’s impossible for me to speak about why a particular 

court acted in a particular way or why a particular Justice analyzed an issue outside of what the opinion says. 

Senator KYL. I will just tell you my view is it kind of tells me 

that if a court can find some foreign law that supports its opinion, 

it might use it. If the opinion is on the other side, then it doesn’t. 

In my view, that is one of the problems with using foreign law, and 

I gather from what you said earlier you don’t think the Court 

should use foreign law either except in cases of treaty and other 

similarly appropriate cases. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I do not believe that foreign law should be 

used to determine the result under constitutional law or American 

law, except where American law directs. 

Senator KYL. Thank you very much. Thank you, Judge. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Judge, I guess we do get to talk 

again. When you look at the fundamental right aspect of the Second Amendment, you will be looking at precedent, you will be looking at our history, you will be looking at a lot of things. Hopefully, 

you talk to your godchild, who is an NRA member. 

You can assimilate your view of what America is all about when 

it comes to the Second Amendment. But one thing I want you to 

know is that Russ Feingold and Lindsey Graham have reached the 

same conclusion. So that speaks strong of the Second Amendment, 

because we do not reach the same conclusion a lot. 

So I just want you to realize that this fundamental right issue 

of the Second Amendment is very important to people throughout 

the country, whether you own a gun or not, and it is one of those 

things that I think, when you look at it, you will find that America, 

unlike other countries, has a unique relationship with the Second 

Amendment. 

Today, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is appearing in a military tribunal in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He will be appearing before a 

military judge and he will be represented by military lawyers and 

there will be a military prosecutor. 

The one thing I want to say here is that I have been a judge advocate, a member of the military legal community, for well over 25 

years and to America and the world who may be watching this, I 

have nothing but great admiration and respect for those men and 

women who serve in our judge advocate corps who will be given the 

obligation by our nation to render justice against people like Khalid 

Sheikh Mohammed. 

I just want to say this, also, on this historic day. To those who 

wonder why we do this, why do we give him a trial? Why are we 

so concerned about him having his day in court? Why do we give 

him a lawyer when we know what he would do to our people in 

his hands? 

I would just like to say that it makes us better than him. It 

makes us stronger for us to give the mastermind of 9/11 his day 

in court, represented by counsel, and any verdict that comes his 

461 

way will not be based on prejudice or passion or religious bigotry. 

It will be based on facts. 

Now, let us talk about what this nation is facing. This Congress, 

Judge, is trying to reauthorize the Military Commission Act, trying 

to find a way to bring justice to the enemies of this country in a 

way that will make us better in the eyes of the world and, also, 

make us safer here at home. 

Have you had an opportunity to look at the Boumediene, Hamdan, Hamdi, Rasul cases? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I have. 

Senator GRAHAM. You will be called upon in the future, if you get 

on the court, to pass some judgment over the enactments of Congress. When it comes to civilian criminal law, do you know of any 

concept in civilian law that would allow someone to be held, in 

criminal law, indefinitely without trial? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. When you’re talking about civilian criminal 

law, you’re talking about—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Domestic criminal law. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR.—domestic criminal prosecution. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. After conviction, defendants are often sentenced—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I am talking about you are held in jail without 

a trial. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The Speedy Trial Act and there are constitutional principles that require a speedy trial. So in answer, no, there 

is no—— 

Senator GRAHAM. That is a correct statement of the law, Judge, 

in my opinion. You cannot hold someone in domestic criminal settings indefinitely without trial. 

Under military law, the law of armed conflict, is there any requirement to try, in a court of law, every enemy prisoner? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. There, you have an advantage on me, because 

I—I’m sorry. 

Senator GRAHAM. Fair enough. The point I am trying to make, 

and check if I am wrong, you will have some time to do this, as 

I understand military law, if we, as a nation, one of our airman is 

downed on a foreign land, held by an adversary, it is my understanding we cannot demand, under the Geneva Convention, that 

that airman or American soldier go to a civilian court. 

That is not the law. If we have a pilot in the hands of the enemy, 

there is no requirement of the detaining force to take that airman 

before a civilian judge. I think that is the law. 

There is no requirement under military or the law of armed conflict to have civilian judges review the status of our prisoners. That 

is a right that we do not possess. 

The question for the country and the world, if people operate outside the law of armed conflict that do not wear uniforms, are they 

going to get a better deal than people that play by the rules? 

As we discuss these matters, I hope you take into account that 

there is no requirement to try everyone held as an enemy prisoner. 

Do you believe that there is a requirement in the law that at a certain point in time, that a prisoner has to be released, an enemy 

prisoner, just through the passage of time? 

462 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I can only answer that question narrowly, 

and narrowly because the court’s holdings have been narrow in this 

area. First, military commissions and proceedings under them have 

been a part of the country’s history. And so there’s no question that 

they are appropriate in certain circumstances. 

Senator GRAHAM. And, Judge, they will have to render justice. 

They will have to meet the standards of who we are. My point to 

some critics on the right who have objected to my view that we 

ought to provide more capacity is that wherever the flag flies, in 

whatever courtroom, there is something attached to that flag. 

So we are going to work hard to create a military commission 

consistent with the values of this country. But I just want to let 

you know that under traditional military law, it is not required to 

let someone go who is properly detained as part of the enemy force 

because of the passage of time. 

Judge, it would be crazy for us to capture someone, give them 

adequate due process, independent judicial review, and the judges 

agree with the military, ‘‘You’re part of al Qaeda, you represent a 

danger,’’ and say, at a magic point in time, ‘‘Good luck, you can go 

now.’’ 

The people that we are fighting, if some of them are let go, they 

are going to try to kill us all and it does not make us a better nation to put a burden upon ourselves that no one else has ever accepted. 

So my goal, working with my colleagues, is to have a rational 

system of justice that will make sure that every detainee has a 

chance to make the argument, ‘‘I am being improperly held,’’ have 

a day in court, have a review by an independent judiciary, but we 

do not take it so far that we can not keep an al Qaeda member 

in jail until they die, because some of them deserve to be in jail 

until they die. 

I want the world to understand that America is not a bad place 

because we will hold al Qaeda members under a process that is 

fair, transparent, until they die. My message to those who want to 

join this organization or thinking about joining it is that you can 

get killed if you join and you may wind up dying in jail. 

As this country and this Congress comes to grips with how to 

deal with an enemy that does not wear a uniform, that does not 

follow any rules, that would kill everybody they could get their 

hands on in the name of religion, that not only we focus, Senator 

Whitehouse, on upholding our values, that we focus on the threat 

that this country faces in an unprecedented manner. 

So, Judge, my last words to you will be if you get on this court 

and you look at the Military Commission Act that the Congress is 

about pass, when you look at whether or not habeas should be applied to a wartime battlefield prison, please remember, Judge, that 

we are not talking about domestic criminals who robbed a liquor 

store. 

We are talking about people who have signed up for a cause 

every bit as dangerous as any enemy this country has ever faced 

and that this Congress, the voice of the American people who stand 

for reelection has a very difficult assignment on its hands. 

There are lanes for the executive branch, the judicial branch and 

the congressional branch, even in a time of war. Please, Judge, unVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00474 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
463 

derstand that 535 Members of Congress cannot be the commander 

in chief and that unelected judges cannot run the war. Thank you 

and Godspeed. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. You are almost through, Judge. I just want to 

ask three relatively quick items that I was not able to get to earlier, just for your brief comment. 

You wrote in 2001 that neutrality and objectivity in the law are 

a myth. You said that you agreed that ‘‘there is no objective stance, 

but only a series of perspectives, no neutrality, no escape from 

choice in judging.’’ Would you explain what that means? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In every single case, and Senator Graham 

gave the example in his opening statement, there are two parties 

arguing different perspectives on what the law means. That’s what 

litigation is about. 

And what the judge has to do is choose the perspective that’s 

going to apply to that outcome. So there is a choice. You’re going 

to rule in someone’s favor. You’re going to rule against someone’s 

favor. 

That’s the perspective of the lack of neutrality. It’s that you can’t 

just throw up your hands and say I’m not going to rule. Judges 

have to choose the answer to the question presented to the court. 

And so that’s what that part of my talking was about, that there 

is choice in judging. You have to rule. 

Senator CORNYN. You characterized, in your opening statement, 

that your judicial philosophy is one of fidelity to the law. Would 

you agree that both the majority and the dissenting justices in last 

year’s landmark gun rights case, the D.C. v. Heller case, were each 

doing their best to be faithful to the text and the history of the Second Amendment? 

In other words, do you believe that they were exhibiting fidelity 

to the law? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I think both were looking at the legal issue 

before them, looking at the text of the Second Amendment, looking 

at its history, looking at the court’s precedent over time and trying 

to answer the question that was before them. 

Senator CORNYN. Do you think it is fair to characterize the five 

justices who affirmed the right to keep and bear arms as engaged 

in right-wing judicial activism? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t use that word for judging. I eschew labels of any kind. That’s why I don’t like analogies and why I prefer, 

in brief-writing, to talk about judges interpreting the law. 

Senator CORNYN. What about the 10 Democratic Senators, including Senator Feingold, who has been mentioned earlier, who 

joined the brief, the amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court urging 

the court to recognize the individual right to keep and bear arms? 

Do you think, by encouraging an individual right to keep and bear 

arms, that somehow these Senators were encouraging the court to 

engage in right-wing judicial activism? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t describe people’s actions with those labels. 

Senator CORNYN. I appreciate that. You testified earlier today 

that you would not use foreign law in interpreting the Constitution 

464 

and statutes. I would like to contrast that statement with an earlier statement that you made back in April, and I quote, ‘‘International law and foreign law will be very important in the discussion of how to think about unsettled issues in our legal system. It 

is my hope that judges everywhere will continue to do this.’’ 

Let me repeat the words that you used 3 months ago. You said 

‘‘very important’’ and you said ‘‘judges everywhere.’’ This suggests 

to me that you consider the use of foreign law to be broader than 

you indicated in your testimony earlier today. 

Do you stand by the testimony you gave earlier today, do you 

stand by the speech you gave 3 months ago, or can you reconcile 

those for us? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Stand by both, because the speech made very 

clear, in any number of places, where I said you can’t use it to interpret the Constitution or American law. I went through—not a 

lengthy, because it was a shorter speech, but I described the situations in which American law looks to foreign law by its terms, 

meaning it’s counseled by American law. 

My part of the speech said people misunderstand what the word 

‘‘use’’ means and I noted that ‘‘use’’ appears to people to mean if 

you cite a foreign decision, that means it’s controlling an outcome 

or that you are using it to control an outcome, and I said no. 

You think about foreign law as a—and I believe my words said 

this. You think about foreign law the way judges think about all 

sources of information, ideas, and you think about them as ideas 

both from law review articles and from state court decisions and 

from all the sources, including Wikipedia, that people think about 

ideas. Okay. 

They don’t control the outcome of the case. The law compels that 

outcome and you have to follow the law. But judges think. We engage in academic discussions. We talk about ideas. 

Sometimes you will see judges who choose—I haven’t, it’s not my 

style, but there are judges who will drop a footnote and talk about 

an idea. I’m not thinking that they’re using that idea to compel a 

result. It’s an engagement of thought. 

But the outcome—you could always find an exception, I assume, 

if I looked hard enough, but in my review, judges are applying 

American law. 

Senator CORNYN. Your Honor, why would a judge cite foreign law 

unless it somehow had an impact on their decision or their decision-making process? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I don’t know why other judges do it. As I explained, I haven’t. But I look at the structure of what the judge has 

done and explains and go by what that judge tells me. There are 

situations—that’s as far as I can go. 

Senator CORNYN. You said, at another occasion, that you find foreign law useful because it ‘‘gets the creative juices flowing.’’ What 

does that mean? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. To me, I am a part academic. Please don’t 

forget that I taught at two law schools. I do speak more than I 

should and I think about ideas all the time. And so for me, it’s fun 

to think about ideas. 

You sit in a lunchroom among judges and you’ll often hear them 

say, ‘‘Did you see what that law school professor said’’ or ‘‘did you 

465 

see what some other judge wrote and what do you think about it,’’ 

but it’s just talking. It’s sharing ideas. 

What you’re doing in each case, and that’s what my speech said, 

is you can’t use foreign law to determine the American Constitution. It can’t be used either as a holding or precedent. 

Senator CORNYN. Do you agree with me that if the American people want to change the Constitution, that is a right reserved to 

them under the Constitution to amend it and change it rather than 

to have judges, under the guise of interpreting the law, in effect, 

change the Constitution by judicial fiat? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. In that regard, the Constitution is abundantly clear. There is an amendment process set forth. It controls 

how you change the Constitution. 

Senator CORNYN. I would just say if academics or legislators or 

anybody else who has got creative juices flowing from the invocation of foreign law, if they want to change the Constitution, my 

contention is the most appropriate way to do that is for the American people to do it through the amendment process rather than for 

judges to do it by relying on foreign law. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. We have no disagreement. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much, Your Honor. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Senator Coburn. 

Senator COBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to go 

into an area that we have not covered, no one has covered yet. I 

am reminded of Senator Sessions talking to you about pay. 

I would predict to you, in about 15 or 18 years, judicial pay, we 

will not be able to pay your salary. Nine years from now, we are 

going to have $1 trillion worth of interest on the national debt. It 

is not very funny. 

What it does is it undermines the freedom and security of our 

children and our grandchildren. I want to go to Madison. Madison 

is the father of our Constitution. 

I want to get your take on three issues; one, the commerce 

clause; two, the general welfare clause; and, No. 3, the 10th 

Amendment. I don’t know if you have read the Federalist Papers, 

but I find them very interesting to give insight into what our 

founders meant, what they said when they wrote our Constitution. 

In Federalist 51, Madison expressed the importance of a restrained government by stating, ‘‘In framing a government which 

is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in 

this, you must first enable the government to control the governed, 

and, in the next place, oblige to control itself.’’ 

Do you believe that our Federal courts enable the Federal Government to exceed its intended boundaries by interpreting Article 

I’s commerce clause and necessary and proper clause to delegate 

virtual unlimited authority to the Federal Government? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. The Supreme Court, in these two rulings or 

one, has said there are limits to all powers set forth in the Constitution and the question for the court in any particular situation 

is to determine whether whatever branch of government or state is 

acting within the limits of the Constitution. 

Senator COBURN. Let me read you another Madison quote, again, 

the father of our Constitution. ‘‘If Congress can employ money indefinitely to the general welfare and are the sole and supreme 

466 

judges of general welfare, they may take the care of religion into 

their own hands; they may appoint teachers in every state, county 

and parish and pay them out of the public treasury; they may take 

into their own hands the education of our children, establishing in 

like manner schools throughout the union; they may assume the 

provision for the poor; they may undertake the regulation of all 

roads other than post roads.’’ 

‘‘In short, everything from the highest object of state legislation 

down to the most minute object of police would be thrown under 

the power of Congress. Were the power of Congress to be established and the latitude contended for, it would subvert the very 

foundations and transmute the very nature of the limited government established by this Constitution and the American people.’’ 

I guess my question to you is do you have any concerns, as we 

now have a $3.6 trillion budget, $11.4 trillion worth of debt, $90 

trillion worth of unfunded obligations that are going to be placed 

on the backs of our children, that maybe some reining in of Congress in terms of the general welfare clause, the commerce clause, 

and reinforcement of the 10th Amendment under its intended purposes by our founders, which said that everything that was not specifically listed in the enumerated powers was left to the states and 

the people, do you have any concerns about where we are heading 

in this nation and the obligations of the Supreme Court maybe to 

relook at what Madison and our founders intended as they wrote 

these clauses into our Constitution? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. One of the beauties of our Constitution is the 

very question that you ask me, is the dialog that’s left in the first 

instance to this body and to the House of Representatives. 

The answer to that question is not mine in the abstract. The answer to that question is a discussion that this legislative body will 

come to an answer about as reflected in laws it will pass. And once 

it passes those laws, there may be individuals who have rights to 

challenge those laws and will come to us and ask us to examine 

what the Constitution says about what Congress did. 

But it is the great beauty of this nation that we do leave the lawmaking to our elected branches and that we expect our courts to 

understand its limited role, but important role in ensuring that the 

Constitution is upheld in every situation that’s presented to it. 

Senator COBURN. I believe our founders thought that the Supreme Court would be the check and balance on the commerce 

clause, the general welfare clause, and the insurance of the 10th 

Amendment, and that is the reason I raised those issues with you. 

I wonder if you think we have honored the plain language of the 

Constitution and the intent of the founders with regard to the limited power granted to the Federal Government. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. That’s almost a judgment call. I don’t know 

how to answer your question, because it would seem like it would 

lead to the natural question, did the courts do this in this case, and 

that would be opining on a particular view of the case. And that 

case would have a holding and I would have to look at that holding 

in the context of another case. 

I’m attempting to answer your question, Senator, but our roles 

and the ones we choose to serve, your job is wonderful. It is so, so 

467 

important. But I love that you’re doing your job and I love that I’m 

doing my job as a judge. I like mine better. 

Senator COBURN. I think I would like yours better, as well, although I doubt that I could ever get to the stage of a confirmation 

process. 

Well, let me just end up with this. People call me simple because 

I really believe this document is the genesis of our success as a 

country and I believe these words are plainly written and I believe 

we ignore them at our peril. 

My hope is that the Supreme Court will relook at the intent of 

our founders and the 10th Amendment, where they guaranteed 

that everything that wasn’t spelled out specifically for the Congress 

to do was explicitly reserved to the states and to the people. 

To do less than that undermines our future and all we have to 

do is take a little snapshot of where we are today economically, financially and leadership-wise, to understand we ignored their plain 

words and we find ourselves near bankruptcy because of it. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. It is almost over. There is one 

question that I withheld the balance of my time before and I want 

to make sure I ask this question, because I asked it of Chief Justice 

Roberts and Justice Alito when they were before this Committee. 

As you know, in death penalty cases, it takes five justices to stay 

an execution, but only four to grant certiorari to hear a case. You 

could grant certiorari to hear a case, but if the execution is not 

stayed, it could become a moot point. The person can be executed 

in between. 

So usually if there are four justices willing to hear a case, somebody agrees to the fifth vote to stay an execution just as a matter 

of courtesy, so the cert does not become moot. So the person is not 

executed in the few weeks that might be in between granting of 

cert and the hearing of the case. 

Now, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito agreed that 

this rule was sensible, the rule of five or the courtesy fifth. It appears, according to a study done by the New York Times, that very 

reasonable rule and the rule that both Chief Justice Roberts and 

Justice Alito said was very reasonable, and I think the majority of 

us on the Committee thought it was reasonable, they suggest that 

that rule has not been adhered to, the rule of four, because there 

have been a number of cases where four justices voted for cert and 

wanted to stay the execution, but the fifth would not and the person was executed before the case was heard. 

If you were on the Supreme Court, and this is basically the same 

thing I asked Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, if you were on the 

Supreme Court, four of your fellow justices said they would like to 

consider a death penalty case and they asked you to be a fifth vote 

to stay the execution, even though you did not necessarily plan to 

vote for cert, how would you approach that issue? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. I answer the way that those two justices did, 

which is I would consider the rule of the fifth vote in the way it 

has been practiced by the court. It has a sensible basis, which is 

that if you don’t grant the stay, an execution can happen before 

you reach the question of whether to grant certiorari or not. 

468 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, I thank you. I have applauded both Chief 

Justice Roberts and Justice Alito for their answers. It appears that 

perhaps somewhere between the hearing room and the Supreme 

Court, their minds changed. 

Now, in 2007, Christopher Scott Emmett was executed even 

though four justices had voted for a stay of execution. Justice Stevens wrote a statement, joined by Justice Ginsberg, calling for a 

routine practice of staying executions scheduled in advance of our 

review of the denial of a capital defendant’s first application—first 

application—for a Federal writ of habeas corpus. 

I am not asking for a commitment on what Justices Stevens and 

Ginsberg said, but is that something that ought to at least be considered? 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Unquestionably. As I said, there is an underlying reason for that practice. 

Chairman LEAHY. And there is an understanding that when the 

case is reviewed, the sentence may well be upheld and the execution will go forward. But this is on the various steps for that hearing. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Just briefly, I thank you again for your testimony. I know judges come before these committees and they make 

promises and they mean those things and then, if they are lucky, 

they get a lifetime appointment and I think, most likely, their judicial philosophy will take over as the years go by, 10, 20, 30 years 

on the bench. 

So this is an important decision for us to reach and to consider 

and we will all do our best. I hope you felt that it has been a fairly 

conducted hearing. That has been my goal. 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Thank you, Senators, to all Senators. I have 

received all the graciousness and fair hearing that I could have 

asked for and I thank you, Senator, for your participation in this 

process and in ensuring that. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. You are very courteous. I think, 

for the record, a number of significant articles should be in the 

record. 

Chairman LEAHY. Without objection. 

Senator SESSIONS. One from the Washington Post on July 9, 

‘‘Uncommon Detail.’’ Wall Street Journal, ‘‘Defining Activism 

Down,’’ July 15. New York Times, ‘‘New Scrutiny on Judge’s Most 

Controversial Case’’ by Adam Liptak. New York Times, ‘‘Nominee 

Rulings are Exhaustive, But Often Narrow.’’ The Ninth Justice, 

‘‘How Ricci Almost Disappeared.’’ The Ninth Justice, ‘‘Justices Reject Sotomayor Position 9–0.’’ And the Wall Street Journal, ‘‘The 

Wise Latina’’ article of June 15, which is an important analysis. 

[The articles appear as a submission for the record.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I would also 

offer a letter from Sandra Froman, former president of National 

Rifle Association, and a series of other people who cosigned that 

letter, making this point. I think it is important, Sandra Froman, 

herself a lawyer. 

‘‘Surprisingly, Heller was a 5:4 decision, with some justices arguing that the Second Amendment does not apply to private citizens 

469 

or, if it does, even a total gun ban could be upheld if a legitimate 

government interest could be found. The dissenting justices also 

found D.C.’s absolute ban on handguns within the home to be a 

reasonable restriction. If this had been the majority view, then any 

gun ban could be upheld and the Second Amendment would be 

meaningless.’’ 

It goes on to say, ‘‘The Second Amendment survives today by a 

single vote in the Supreme Court. Both its application to the states 

and whether there will be a meaningful strict standard of review 

remain to be decided. Justice Sotomayor has revealed her views on 

these issues and we believe they are contrary to the intent and 

purposes of the Second Amendment and the Bill of Rights. As the 

Second Amendment leaders, we are deeply concerned about preserving all fundamental rights for current and future generations. 

We strongly oppose this nominee.’’ 

I offer that and a letter from the Americans United for Life, a 

60-plus association, North Carolina Property Association. 

[The information appear in the index.] 

Chairman LEAHY. We will hold the record open until 5 tonight 

for any other material people wish to submit to the record. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

your courtesy throughout. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. We will also hold the record open 

until 5 tomorrow for additional questions that Senators wish to 

ask. 

Now, Judge Sotomayor, this hearing has extended over 4 days. 

On the first day, you listened to our opening statements rather extensively. You shared with us a very concise statement about your 

own fidelity to the law and I suspect it will be in law school texts 

in years to come. 

Over the last 3 days, you have answered our questions from Senators on both sides of the aisle. I hope I speak for all the Senators, 

both Republican and Democratic, on this Committee when I thank 

you for answering with such intelligence, grace and patience. 

I also thank the members of your family for sitting here, also, 

with such intelligence, grace, and especially patience. 

During the course of this week, almost 2,000 people have attended this hearing in person, 2,000. Millions more have seen it, 

heard it or read about it thanks to newspapers and blogs, television, cable, Webcasting. I think through these proceedings, the 

American people have gotten to know you. 

Even though I sat on two different confirmation hearings for you 

over the past 17 years, I feel I have gotten to know you even better. 

The President told the American people in his Internet address 

back in May, as a justice of the Supreme Court, you would ‘‘bring 

knowledge and experience acquired over the course of a brilliant 

legal career, with the wisdom accumulated over the course of an 

extraordinary journey, a journey defined by hard work, fierce intelligence, and enduring faith in America, all things are possible.’’ 

We bore witness to that this week. Experience and wisdom will 

benefit all Americans. When you walk under that piece of Vermont 

marble over the door of the Supreme Court, speaking of equal justice under law, I know that will guide you. 

Judge Sotomayor, thank you, Godspeed. 

470 

Judge SOTOMAYOR. Thank you all. 

Chairman LEAHY. We stand in recess for 10 minutes. 

[Whereupon, the Committee was recessed at 1:24 p.m.] 

AFTER RECESS 

[1:42 p.m.] 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Good afternoon, everyone. The Ranking 

Member has joined us, and the hearing will now come to order. 

We have a considerable number of witnesses to get through 

today, so I would ask Ms. Askew and Ms. Boies and the witnesses 

who will follow them to please be scrupulous about keeping your 

oral statements to 5 minutes or under. Your full written statement 

will be put in the record, and Senators will each have 5 minutes 

to ask questions of each panel. Along with Ranking Member Sessions, I am very glad to welcome ABA witnesses Kim Askew and 

Mary Boies. 

Kim Askew is the Chair of the ABA Standing Committee on the 

Federal Judiciary, and Mary Boies is the ABA Standing Committee’s lead evaluator on its investigation into Judge Sotomayor’s 

qualifications to be an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of 

the United States. The Ranking Member and I both look forward 

to their testimony, and if I could ask them please to stand and be 

sworn, we will begin. 

Do you affirm that the testimony you are about to give before the 

Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you God? 

Ms. ASKEW. I do. 

Ms. BOIES. I do. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Please be seated. You may proceed with 

your statements. 

STATEMENT OF KIM J. ASKEW, ESQ., CHAIR, STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ACCOMPANIED BY MARY M. BOIES, MEMBER, 

STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 

Ms. ASKEW. Thank you. Good afternoon and thank you for having us. I am Kim Askew of Dallas, Texas, Chair of the Standing 

Committee on the Federal Judiciary. This is Mary Boies. Mary 

Boies is our Second Circuit representative, and as you mentioned, 

she was the lead evaluator on the investigation of Judge Sonia 

Sotomayor. We are honored to appear here today to explain the 

Standing Committee’s evaluation of this nominee. The Standing 

gave her its highest rating and unanimously found that she was 

‘‘Well Qualified.’’ 

For 60 years, the Standing Committee has conducted a thorough, 

non-partisan peer review in which we do not consider the ideology 

of the nominee, and we have done that with every Federal judicial 

nominee. We evaluate the integrity, the professional competence, 

and the judicial temperament of the nominee. The Standing Committee does not propose, endorse, or recommend nominees. Our sole 

function is to evaluate the professional qualifications of a nominee 

and then rate the nominee either ‘‘Well Qualified,’’ ‘‘Qualified,’’ or 

‘‘Not Qualified.’’ 

471 

A nominee to the Supreme Court of the United States must possess exceptional professional qualifications—that is, a high degree 

of scholarship, academic talent, analytical and writing ability, and 

overall excellence. And because of that, our investigations of Supreme Court nominees is more extensive than the nominations to 

the lower Federal courts and are procedurally different in two 

ways. 

First, all circuit members participate in the evaluations. An investigation is conducted in every circuit, not just the circuit in 

which the nominee resides. 

Second, in addition to the Standing Committee reading the 

writings of the nominee, we commission three reading groups of 

distinguished scholars and practitioners who also review the nominee’s legal writings and advise the Standing Committee. Georgetown University Law Center and Syracuse University School of 

Law formed reading groups this year, and these groups were comprised of professors who are all recognized experts in their substantive areas of law. Our practitioners reading group was also 

formed, and that group was also comprised of nationally recognized 

lawyers with substantial trial and appellate practices. All of them 

are familiar with Supreme Court practices, and many have clerked 

for Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. 

In connection with Judge Sotomayor’s evaluation, we initially 

contacted some 2,600 persons who were likely to have relevant 

knowledge of her professional qualifications. This included every 

United States Federal judge, State judges, lawyers, law professors 

and deans, and, of course, members of the community and bar representatives. We received 850 responses to our contacts, and we 

personally interviewed or received detailed letters or emails from 

over 500 judges, lawyers, and others in the community who knew 

Judge Sotomayor or who had appeared before her. We also analyzed transcripts, speeches, other materials, and, of course, Ms. 

Boies and I interviewed her, and it is on that basis that we reached 

the unanimous conclusion as a Standing Committee that she was 

well qualified. 

Her record is known to this distinguished Committee. She has 

been successful as a prosecutor, a lawyer in private practice, a 

judge, a legal lecturer. She has served with distinction for almost 

17 years on the Federal bench, both as a trial court judge and an 

appellate judge. She has taught in two of the Nation’s leading law 

schools, and her work in the community is well known. 

She has a reputation for integrity and outstanding character. She 

is universally praised for her diligence and industry. She has an 

outstanding intellect, strong analytical abilities, sound judgment, 

an exceptional work ethic, and is known for her courtroom preparation. Her judicial temperament meets the high standards for appointment to the Court. 

The Standing Committee fully addressed the concerns raised regarding her writings and some aspects of her judicial temperament. 

Those are set forth in detail in our correspondence to this Committee, and we ask that they be made a part of the record. 

[The information appear as a submission for the record.] 

Ms. ASKEW. In determining that these concerns did not detract 

from the highest rating of ‘‘Well Qualified’’ for the judge, the StandVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00483 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
472 

ing Committee was persuaded by the overwhelming responses of 

lawyers and judges who praised her writings and overall temperament. 

On behalf of the Standing Committee, Ms. Boies and I thank you 

for the opportunity to be present today and present these remarks, 

and we are certainly available to answer any questions you may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Askew appear as a submission 

for the record:] 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you so much. 

Ms. Boies, do you have a separate statement you wish to make? 

Ms. BOIES. I do not, Senator. We are happy to answer your questions. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Very good. I appreciate it. 

I just want to summarize a few conclusions from the report and 

then ask you a little bit about the scope of the effort that went into 

it in terms of the numbers of people who were interviewed and the 

duration and nonpartisan nature of the effort, if you would. 

On page 6, you conclude that Judge Sotomayor ‘‘has earned and 

enjoys an excellent reputation for integrity and outstanding character. Lawyers and judges uniformly praised the nominee’s integrity.’’ 

On page 11, you report that Judge Sotomayor’s opinions show 

‘‘an adherence to precedent and an absence of attempts to set policy based on the judge’s personal views. Her opinions are narrow 

in scope, address only the issues presented, do not revisit settled 

areas of law, and are devoid of broad or sweeping pronouncements.’’ 

On page 13, you report that ‘‘the overwhelming weight of opinion 

shared by judges, lawyers, courtroom observers, and former law 

clerks is that Judge Sotomayor’s style on the bench is: A, consistent 

with the active questioning style that is well known on the Second 

Circuit’’—and which, as a personal aside, I will say I liked as a 

practitioner; ‘‘B, directed at the weak points in the arguments of 

parties to the case even though it may not always seem that way 

to the lawyer then being questioned; C, designed to ferret out relative strengths and shortcomings of the arguments presented; and, 

D, within the appropriate bounds of judging.’’ 

And, finally, the Committee unanimously found an absence of 

any bias in the nominee’s extensive work. Lawyers and judges 

overwhelmingly agree—this is your quote—that ‘‘she is an absolutely fair judge. None, including those many lawyers who lost 

cases before her, reported to the Standing Committee that they 

have ever discerned any racial, gender, cultural, or other bias in 

her opinions, or in any aspect of her judicial performance. Lawyers 

and judges commented that she is open-minded, thoroughly examines a record in far more detail than many circuit judges, and listens to all sides of the argument.’’ 

Could you tell us a little bit about the scope of the review that 

took place that enabled you to reach those firm conclusions? 

Ms. BOIES. Unlike with most Federal judicial nominees, in the 

case of a Supreme Court nominee, the entire 15-member Committee writes letters to the entire judiciary throughout the country 

and also to lawyers throughout the country. We go through her 

473 

opinions, and we look to see what lawyers appeared in front of her, 

and we write many letters to those people. In addition, we write 

to, as Chair Askew said, to law school deans and law professors. 

And as she mentioned, we commissioned three reading groups of 

professors and practitioners. There were 25 law professors from 

Syracuse Law School and from Georgetown Law Center who read 

her opinions, as did 11 practitioners, many of whom themselves 

were former Supreme Court law clerks. And the standards that we 

look at and the only standards are the professional competence, judicial temperament, and integrity. 

And each circuit member interviews all the judges and lawyers 

who respond to our letters or whom they identify as someone who 

knows or has worked with Judge Sotomayor. Those interviews are 

then collected. I review them. The Chair and I had a personal 

interview with Judge Sotomayor in her chambers in New York. We 

met for over 3 hours, and we discussed with her in detail every 

criticism that we had heard of her judging and the factors that we 

look at. 

And following that, we received the reading group reports which 

were, each one, hundreds and hundreds of pages that went through 

her opinions one by one. They didn’t merely give an overall summary. We read those. In addition, I read every opinion that she 

wrote on the Second Circuit and many that she wrote on the district court. 

In addition, we took many of her—we, the Standing Committee, 

took many of her opinions, and we divided them among themselves 

so that we, too, read those opinions, not merely the reading groups. 

And I think that is a snapshot of the scope of our review, but I will 

give you one example, if I may, of how we operate, and that is, we 

received a critical review from a lawyer about her conduct at a particular oral argument. We identified the date of that argument and 

the case. We then went through the court records and the opinions 

that were written, and we identified all of the lawyers who were 

involved in that case. We identified the docket sheet from the Second Circuit for that date so that we could identify any other lawyers who might have been present in the courtroom even though 

they were not there for that particular case. And we identified all 

of the lawyers who had any argument that day, because maybe 

they would have a view of the panel. And then, finally, we talked 

to the other members of the panel to ask what their view was on 

her judicial temperament because we had received a fairly important criticism. And so we not only reviewed that criticism, but we 

looked to see how others viewed the same conduct. 

Now, you may say that this is stacking the deck against her, because we know we have a critical comment, and maybe she was 

having a very bad day, and maybe she wasn’t up to her—the way 

she normally would be on the bench. But we talked to at least ten 

other lawyers and another member of the panel. 

Ms. ASKEW. And that is what the peer review process is. Much 

of what you will read anecdotally, if you talk to, you know, the 

legal press, you may not have personal knowledge necessarily of 

what the judge does, or you may not have been the lawyer who actually participated in that argument. The reason we talk to lawyers 

is because we examine whether you have personal knowledge of 

474 

what you are telling us. We will ask you about the case that you 

were in because then we can go forward and investigate. 

So we talked to all the lawyers. We talked to the judges. In some 

instances, we even had the pleasure of listening to the transcript 

because one of the allegations here was a lack of temperament. 

That cannot always be picked up from the written record. Luckily, 

we were able to find out there so we could hear the tone and the 

tenor of the ‘‘hot courtroom’’ that has been described before this 

Committee. 

And so when we come to this distinguished Committee and say 

that this was in keeping with the practice of the Second Circuit, 

we have looked at it in every way that we possibly can to ensure 

what took place. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Well, let me conclude by thanking you for 

the thoroughness of your evaluation, and as I understand it, the ultimate conclusion was to evaluate her as ‘‘Well Qualified,’’ which is 

the highest available ranking, which was unanimous, and you considered her conduct as a judge over 17 years to be, and I quote, 

‘‘exemplary.’’ 

Ms. BOIES. That is correct. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you very much. 

The Ranking Member, Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. New Chairman. It is good to 

be with you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And you, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. The American Bar Association was critical of 

former President Bush—well, former former President Bush—for 

not asking for evaluations before the nomination was made. President Obama followed that same process. Since that time, have you 

changed your view about the viability or the advisability of conducting the—asking the President to give the names—a name or 

names before a final decision is made? 

Ms. ASKEW. As Chair of the Committee, let me answer that. The 

Committee does not take a stand on that. The ABA may take a 

stand on whether it thinks it is a better idea for a President to 

nominate or to pre- or post-nomination basis, but the Standing 

Committee is divorced of the policy side of the ABA. It is our position, and always has been, that we will conduct a neutral, nonpartisan peer review whenever the President gives us that information. 

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to the temperament question, 

there were some questions you asked about that, and I guess the 

Almanac or whatever that Judge Sotomayor turned out, they have 

quite a—much more negative feedback from the lawyers: ‘‘a terror 

on the bench,’’ ‘‘a bit of a bully,’’ a lot of statements like that. And 

yet you still gave her the highest rating. So you talked to those 

people, and you are Okay with that? 

Ms. ASKEW. We absolutely are. And just to give you a sense, we 

talked to over 500 lawyers, and not to minimize any comment, because sometimes one criticism can be the most important comment 

that we get on a nominee. But of the 500 lawyers that we spoke 

to, we received comments on the temperament issue from less than 

10 lawyers. They were mostly lawyers and judges who were outside 

475 

of the Second Circuit and were not as familiar with Second Circuit 

precedent. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, you know, I hope the Second Circuit 

doesn’t approve of beating up lawyers too much. 

Ms. ASKEW. Well, they do not—— 

Senator SESSIONS. But, anyway—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Just enough. 

Senator SESSIONS. Let me ask you, did you—I was troubled by 

the handling of the Ricci case. That was a summary order at first 

until other judges on the panel objected, and then was a per curiam opinion. But I think the process of making that a summary 

opinion was—to me, pretty much takes you back. How did you conclude—did you look at that precisely? 

Ms. BOIES. We did look at that case, Senator. We do not take a 

position on whether an opinion is right or is wrong. That is not 

what our function is. However, we did look at the procedure that 

was followed in the Ricci case, and that is a case in which the Second Circuit panel heard full briefing and oral argument, and following which the panel—which was not presided over by Judge 

Sotomayor, but the panel decided to adopt, in effect, the district 

court ruling because they affirmed the ruling and they agreed with 

its reasoning, and they did not—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, that is basically true. However, one 

judge was quite reluctant, another one moderated, and the judge 

apparently wanted to do it this way and prevailed. But the only 

thing I was asking about—and if you are prepared to make an expression of opinion—is the decision to decide it as a summary matter, not even a per curiam opinion. Did you deal with that issue 

and specifics? 

Ms. ASKEW. We are aware of how the Second Circuit handles 

summary opinions. We did not talk to her about that. We did not 

believe that was within the criteria that we evaluate with judges. 

We did read the opinion in great detail. Members of the reading 

groups, all three reading groups—indeed, we were very lucky to receive the Supreme Court opinion on this before our report was finalized, so we got a complete briefing on that case. And we—— 

Senator SESSIONS. One more thing. A recent group of political 

scientists did a study of the ABA nomination process from 1985 to 

2008 and found that the ABA must take affirmative steps to 

change its system for rating nominees to avoid favor and—bias in 

favor of liberal nominees. Do you take that seriously? Are you willing to look at how you handle these things? 

Ms. ASKEW. We take any critique of our process seriously. I can 

tell you that we judge every nominee based on the record that is 

presented to us and the background and experience of the nominee. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, let me just say this: I think it is a valuable contribution to the process. 

Ms. ASKEW. Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. When you talk to lawyers and sometimes— 

most people are very—tend very much to be supportive of any 

nominee, especially if—you know, they just tend to be supportive 

and minimize problems. But sometimes I think you could pick up 

things that other people wouldn’t that could be valuable to this 

process, and I thank you. 

476 

Ms. ASKEW. Thank you. 

Ms. BOIES. Senator, if I may, I would like just to go back briefly 

to the Ricci decision. One thing that I did look at is that in calendar year 2008, the Second Circuit issued 1,482 opinions, not 

counting the non-argued asylum cases. And of those 1,482, 1,081 

were decided by summary order. Only 401 full opinions were 

issued. 

And as I read the record, one of the reasons the panel believed 

it could proceed by summary order is because it believed that there 

was controlling Second Circuit precedent which a panel is not in 

a position to change. 

So I don’t mean to open the issue, but I would like to put it into 

some context as to how the Second Circuit normally operates. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, that is a nice way to say it. But this was 

a—the rule said if it has jurisprudential importance, you should 

have an opinion. I think it was in violation of the rule. I don’t know 

why they did it, but it was in violation of the rule, in my judgment 

as a practicing lawyer. I would have thought you would have 

agreed, Ms. Boies. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. We will hear next from the distinguished 

Senator from Pennsylvania, Senator Specter. 

Senator SPECTER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. No questions, 

just a comment to thank you for your service. There have been occasions when the American Bar Association was not consulted, and 

I think that the ABA has a special status. The Judiciary Committee is hearing from all interested parties. It is not possible to 

invite all interested parties to appear in person, but we welcome 

comments from anyone in a free society to tell us what they think 

of the nominee. 

But the ABA performs this function regularly with all Federal 

judges, and you interview a lot of people who are knowledgeable 

and have had contact, and I think it is very, very useful. So thank 

you for your service. 

I have no questions, Mr. Chairman, on the substance. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Then we will turn to Senator Cardin of 

Maryland. 

Senator CARDIN. I also do not have any questions, but I do want 

to make an observation, because I very much respect the opinions 

of the American Bar Association and fellow lawyers. 

I think it is the highest compliment when your peers give you 

the highest rating. They are your toughest critics. I know that lawyers who are selecting a jury will almost always strike lawyers 

from that jury list because they are the toughest audience that you 

have. So this, I think, speaks to the nominee. 

And as I understand it, the manner in which you go about rating 

a judge is not only her experience but also the way that she has 

gone about reaching her decisions from the point of view of the appropriate role of a judge, her judicial temperament, and the absence of bias in rendering those decisions. And they are exactly 

what we are looking for from the next Justice on the Supreme 

Court. 

So I just really want to thank you for giving us this information 

and participating in the process. 

Ms. ASKEW. Thank you, Senator. 

477 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to welcome our two witnesses, and thank you for your assistance to the 

Committee, and particularly to say how good it is to see Kim 

Askew, my constituent from Dallas, Texas. She does great work as 

Chair of the Committee, and welcome. Thank you for your assistance to the Committee in performing its constitutional function. 

Ms. ASKEW. Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. There being no further questions, the 

panel is excused with our gratitude for a commendable and very 

diligent effort. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. We will take a 5-minute recess while the 

next panel assembles. 

[Whereupon, at 2:08 p.m., the Committee was recessed.] 

After Recess [2:12 p.m.] 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. The hearing of the Judiciary Committee 

will come back to order. 

We are awaiting the arrival of Mayor Bloomberg and District Attorney Morgenthau, who are coming down from New York. I’m told 

that they are 5 minutes away, but the 5 minutes that people are 

away can be a longer 5 minutes than a regular 5 minutes. So in 

the interest of the time of the proceeding and of the other witnesses, we will proceed and come to them when they arrive and 

have a chance to take their seats. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, in the Mayor’s defense, he probably 

thought we would be operating under Senate time and we would 

certainly be late and he could have a little extra time. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. That is our custom. 

Senator SESSIONS. But we’re moving along well. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Our first witness then will be Dustin 

McDaniel. He is the Attorney General for the State of Arkansas 

and the Southern Chair of the National Association of Attorneys 

General. Previous to his election as Attorney General, he worked 

in private practice in Jonesboro, Arkansas. Prior to taking office, 

Mr. McDaniel also served as a uniformed patrol officer in his hometown of Jonesboro, Arkansas. He is a graduate of the University of 

Arkansas Little Rock Law School. 

Attorney General McDaniel, will you please stand to be sworn? 

Do you affirm that the testimony you are about to give before the 

Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you God? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. I do. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Please be seated. 

Attorney Morgenthau, please be seated. 

Attorney General McDaniel, please proceed with your statement. 

STATEMENT OF DUSTIN MCDANIEL, ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

STATE OF ARKANSAS 

Mr. MCDANIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Sessions. My name is Dustin McDaniel and I’m the Attorney General of the State of Arkansas. I am here today to speak in support 

478 

of the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court 

of the United States. 

We’ve all heard all week about her compelling life story and impressive accomplishments. I have the highest respect and admiration for her and I’m proud to testify on behalf of this person who 

was first appointed by President George H.W. Bush, and then by 

my most famous predecessor in the Arkansas Attorney General’s 

Office, President Bill Clinton. 

More specifically, I’m here to rebut any assertion that her participation in the matter of Ricci v. DeStefano in any way reflects 

upon her qualifications or abilities to serve as a Justice on the 

United States Supreme Court. 

When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Ricci case, I, 

on behalf of the State of Arkansas, joined with five other attorneys 

general in support of the Second Circuit. Before I address the case 

and the brief, let me address the parties and their issues. 

I entered the world of public service long before I became an 

elected official. After college, I turned down my admission into law 

school and took a civil service exam in my hometown of Jonesboro, 

Arkansas. I became a police officer and I saw firsthand the heroism 

and dedication of the men and women who protect and serve our 

communities very day. Firefighters like Frank Ricci and his colleagues run into homes and buildings when everyone else is running out. I have the highest respect and gratitude for all who serve 

our communities, States, and Nation. They are heroes among us 

and they deserve to be treated fairly by our system. 

My personal experience with the civil service exam was a favorable one, but not all are so lucky. I understand the frustration that 

the firefighters felt with this process. I also understand the city’s 

fear of litigation and unfair results. I am for a process that is fair. 

No one should be given an unfair advantage, but no one should be 

subject to an unfair disadvantage either. 

As Attorney General, I represent hundreds of State agencies, 

boards and commissions in matters of employment law. My job is 

to allow my clients to do their job without fear of unreasonable litigation. The law had, until recently, allowed for flexibility, necessary for public employers. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this 

case will likely increase costly litigation and the taxpayers will ultimately pay the bill. 

All who have commented on the nomination process in recent 

years have been critical of those who have been labeled an ‘‘activist’’ judge. It’s important to note that the Second Circuit’s ruling in 

this case was not judicial activism at work; to the contrary, they 

followed existing law. 

In Ricci, the panel adopted the lengthy analysis of the District 

Court, which they called ‘‘thorough, thoughtful and well-reasoned’’. 

The District Court cited cases dating back some 28 years. The ruling was consistent with the law and the doctrine of stare decisis. 

Granted, the Supreme Court, in a closely divided opinion, ruled differently, but in doing so it set new precedent. 

It is also important to note that the Second Circuit’s ruling was 

supported by many prestigious groups, including the EEOC, the 

Department of Justice, the National League of Cities, the National 

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479 

tion, and the Republican and Democratic Attorneys General of 

Alaska, Iowa, Arkansas, Maryland, Nevada, and Utah. There’s a 

large body of research available on Judge Sotomayor’s record. 

No allegation that she rules based on anything other than the 

law can stand when cast in the light of her actual record. The Congressional Research Service concluded, ‘‘Perhaps the most consistent characteristic of her approach as an appellate judge could 

be described as an adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis’’, that 

is, upholding past judicial precedents. 

One only has to look so far as to her own words. In Hayden v. 

Pataki, she wrote in a dissent, ‘‘It is the duty of a judge to follow 

the law, no question its plain terms.’’ She concluded by saying, 

‘‘Congress would prefer to make any needed changes itself rather 

than have courts do so for it. In my opinion, Judge Sotomayor is 

abundantly qualified and is an excellent nominee. I believe that the 

people of the United States would be well served by her presence 

on the courts. 

It is my great honor and privilege to be here at this Committee, 

and I thank you ever so much for the opportunity to appear here 

today. Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you very much, Attorney General 

McDaniel. 

We will do a round of questions for the Attorney General and 

then once the—since the panel is completely assembled, I will have 

all the witnesses sworn and then we will proceed to Mayor 

Bloomberg, to District Attorney Morgenthau, and on across the 

panel, with one brief interruption to allow the distinguished Senator from the State of New York, Senator Schumer, to introduce 

Mayor Bloomberg. 

Attorney General McDaniel, as a—as an experienced lawyer, is— 

let me ask you, is it not the case that it’s the Supreme Court’s task 

very frequently to resolve conflicts between the Circuit Court of Appeal? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. Yes, of course it is, Senator. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And if a Circuit Court is bound by its own 

prior precedent and therefore the doctrine of stare decisis controls 

a particular decision, that does not in any way inhibit the Supreme 

Court from reviewing that second decision against conflicting decisions from other circuits in its task in resolving those conflicts, correct? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. That’s—that is correct. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Is it your sense that that is what occurred 

in this case, that the Second Circuit, in Ricci, felt itself bound by 

stare decisis as a result of its prior precedent, but that the Supreme Court took the case to resolve issues of conflict with other 

circuits? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. Well, it certainly seems clear that the—the binding law from the Supreme Court, which dated back up to 28 years, 

made it clear that remedial actions, although race-conscious, raceneutral, were permissible. I think that that is precisely what the 

case demonstrated and how the court ruled, and why the States 

that—that participated, Arkansas included, thought that it was important to preserve for our clients the ability to try to avoid litigation if they think they cannot defend an existing practice. If they 

480 

cannot defend it, no lawyer would tell their client, oh, go do it anyway. But clearly the Supreme Court thought that it was ripe for 

review, and they also thought that it was ripe to change the law, 

which is their purview, and that’s what they did. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. That’s an interesting point. And many observers, including prominent observers who have had their views 

expressed in the public media about this, have indicated that that 

decision changed the landscape of civil rights law. If a judge is a 

cautious and conservative jurist on a Circuit Court, do you believe 

it’s appropriate for the Circuit Court to change the landscape of 

civil rights law? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. Absolutely not. I don’t think that the Second Circuit did anything short of what it had to do, which was to apply 

the existing law. The fact that the majority—a bare majority—in 

the United States Supreme Court decided to change existing law, 

frankly, that would have been inappropriate for the Second Circuit 

to take that responsibility on itself. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Attorney General. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. McDaniel. I was a 2-year Attorney General, and it was a great honor. 

With regard to the Ricci case, are you aware that the panel attempted to decide this case on a summary order, writing no opinion, not even a pro curium opinion? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. I am aware of that, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. And are you aware that by chance one of the 

other members of the Circuit found out about that and an uproar 

of sorts occurred because the people—the other members—other 

members of the Circuit were very concerned about the opinion and 

thought it was an important opinion. Are you aware of that? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. I know that the—I know that the panel, or at 

least the body of judges, chose to review the matter and they voted 

not to meet en banc, and that there was—— 

Senator SESSIONS. That’s correct. 

Mr. MCDANIEL.—a pro curium that was issued. 

Senator SESSIONS. That’s correct. Now, by you—now, you say 

that there was Second Circuit opinion and authority to uphold this 

case. But—but on re-hearing, the slate is wiped clean and the 

panel can develop or formulate new authority or determine clearly 

whether or not that previous case may have applied. And are you 

aware that when they voted, the vote was 6:6 and Judge Sotomayor 

was the key vote in deciding not to re-hear the case? Therefore, we 

can conclude that not only did she decide this case, but it’s really 

not accurate to say she was just following authority since it was 

her vote that didn’t allow that authority to be reevaluated. 

Mr. MCDANIEL. Well, Senator, she was in the majority, so it’s 

fair to say that any one of those judges could be the deciding vote 

that—— 

Senator SESSIONS. That is correct. But it’s not fair, I think, to say 

that she didn’t have an opportunity to reevaluate it. She was simply applying a law that she was bound to follow when she could 

have—if she felt differently, she could have called—she could have 

allowed it to have been re-discussed. 

Mr. MCDANIEL. Well, I also think that there were Supreme Court 

cases, not just Second Circuit cases. 

481 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, are you aware that the Supreme Court 

says there were not? Are you aware the Supreme Court, in their 

opinion, said there was no Supreme Court authority on this matter? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. I have read their opinion and I tend to agree 

with the minority, that this was, in fact, squarely within the—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Okay. Now, you filed—which I give you credit 

for. I did some of these things when I was Attorney General. You— 

you joined with 32 other State attorneys general in submitting an 

amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court on the Heller case. You 

took the provision—the brief argues that ‘‘the right to keep and 

bear arms is among the most fundamental of rights because it is 

essential to securing all other liberties’’. I see the Mayor not happily listening to that. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SESSIONS. You—but—so you believe that the Second 

Amendment is a fundamental right. Are you aware that Sandy 

Froman, the former president of NRA—you’re probably not familiar 

with this letter. But she’s a lawyer, and—and pointed out that 

Heller was just a 5:4 opinion, with some Justices arguing that the 

Second Amendment does not apply to private citizens, or that if it 

does, even a total gun ban would be upheld if a legitimate government interest could be found. The dissenting Justices also found 

that DC’s absolute gun ban on handguns within the home a reasonable restriction. That wouldn’t play too well in Alabama, and probably not Arkansas, Oklahoma, or Texas. But most places. 

So I guess I’m saying, are you concerned that—and are you 

aware, of course, of the Maloney case in which Judge Sotomayor— 

and I think she can contend there was authority in that case that 

justified her concluding the Second Amendment does not apply to 

the States, but I was disappointed in the breadth, and the way she 

wrote it gave me concern. 

So are you aware that one vote on the Supreme Court can make 

the difference on the question of whether or not the right to keep 

and bear arms is protected against mayors or legislatures of States 

who disagree? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. Well, I was proud to join Arkansas into the brief 

on Heller v. District of Columbia. I intend to join again in the NRA 

v. Chicago in the attempt to have the Supreme Court review and 

take up the question, which I believe is ripe, as to whether or not 

the Second Amendment is applied to the States as incorporated by 

the Fourteenth Amendment. I do believe that the Second Amendment is a fundamental right, and I do believe that it is an individual right, not one tied to participation in a militia. 

The Attorney General, the current Attorney General in Texas, 

Senator Cornyn’s successor, and I have spent some time on that 

issue, even recently. And I am not, nonetheless, concerned with 

Judge Sotomayor’s position. I am confident that her answers that 

she’s provided to this Committee and her record are consistent with 

one another, and I do not believe that the right to keep and bear 

arms is at risk with this nominee, or frankly I wouldn’t testify for 

her. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, thank you. I think it is. 

482 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Now that the panel is assembled, I will 

swear the entire panel in. We will return to regular order. You can 

all give your opening statements, and then questioning will begin 

at the conclusion of those opening statements. 

Would you please stand to be sworn? You may sit. 

Do you affirm that the testimony you’re about to give before the 

Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you God? 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. I do. 

Mr. MORGENTHAU. I do. 

Mr. HENDERSON. I do. 

Mr. RICCI. I do. 

Mr. VARGAS. I do. 

Mr. KIRSANOW. I do. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. I do. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Please be seated. 

I will recognize Senator Schumer for a moment to welcome his 

constituent and the mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg. 

Senator SCHUMER. Well, it’s my honor to welcome two very distinguished constituents here. I want to thank every witness for 

coming, but particularly extend a welcome to two of New York’s 

greatest public servants, Mayor Bloomberg and District Attorney 

Morgenthau. As you know, this nomination is the source of enormous pride to all New Yorkers, and your support for Judge 

Sotomayor has been extremely helpful to this Committee, to the 

Senate as a whole, and to the Nation in understanding what kind 

of Justice she will be, and very much appreciate your being here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Welcome. 

Mayor Bloomberg is the mayor of New York City. He is currently 

serving in his third term as mayor. He founded Bloomberg, LP, a 

New York City company that now has employees in more than 100 

cities. Mayor Bloomberg is a graduate of Johns Hopkins University 

located in Baltimore, Maryland and Harvard Business School. 

We look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL BLOOMBERG, MAYOR, CITY OF 

NEW YORK 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Ranking Member 

Sessions, thank you very much. Senator, Senator, Senator. Senator 

Sessions, I must say, as a former gun owner, a former member of 

the NRA, and also a staunch defender of the Second Amendment, 

we probably don’t disagree very much if we really had a chance to 

talk. 

In any case, I wanted to thank everyone for the opportunity to 

testify before you today. I’m Mike Bloomberg and I’m here not only 

as the mayor of New York City, the city where Judge Sonia 

Sotomayor has spent her entire career, but also as someone who 

has appointed or reappointed more than 140 judges to New York 

City’s criminal and family courts. So, I do appreciate the job before 

you. 

About 3 months ago when President Obama invited Governor 

Schwarzenegger, Ed Rendell, and me to the White House to discuss 

infrastructure policy, I did find an opportunity to tell him what 

483 

many of the best legal minds in New York were telling me: Judge 

Sonia Sotomayor would be a superb Supreme Court Justice. I 

strongly believe that she should be supported by Republicans, 

Democrats and independents, and I should know because I’ve been 

all three. 

[Laughter.] 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. Judge Sotomayor has all the key qualities 

that I look for when I appoint a judge. First, she is someone with 

a sharp and agile mind, as her distinguished record and her testimony, I think, made clear. And as a former prosecutor, commercial 

litigator, District Court judge and appellate judge, she certainly 

brings a wealth of unique experience. 

Second, she is an independent jurist who does not fit squarely 

into an ideological box. A review of her rulings by New York University’s Brennan Center found that judges on the Second Circuit 

court who were appointed by Republicans agreed with her more 

than 90 percent of the time when overruling a lower court decision, 

and when ruling a governmental action unconstitutional. So this is 

clearly someone whose decisions have cut across party lines, which 

is something I think the Supreme Court could use more of. 

And third, whether you agree or disagree with her on particular 

cases, she has a record of sound reasoning. In interviewing judicial 

candidates, I like to ask questions that have no easy answers and 

then listen to how they develop their responses. I want to know 

that they are open-minded enough to change their views if they 

hear compelling evidence and to see if they can provide a strong 

rationale for their legal conclusions, even if I disagree with it. 

The fact is, you’re never going to agree with a judicial candidate 

on every issue. I’ve appointed plenty of judges whose answers I 

don’t agree with at all, and I should point out that includes times 

when Judge Sotomayor has ruled against New York City, as she 

has done in a number of cases. So I’m not here as someone who 

agrees with the outcome of her decisions 100 percent of the time, 

and I don’t think that that should be the standard. 

Now, I’m not a lawyer or a constitutional scholar, but I think the 

standard should be: does she apply the law based on rational legal 

reasoning and is she within the bounds of mainstream thinking on 

issues of basic civil rights? And on both questions, I think the answer is, unequivocally, yes. It’s impossible to know how she will 

rule on cases in the future, or even what those cases might be. 

Given that a Supreme Court judge is likely to serve for decades, 

focusing on the issues de jour rather than intellectual capacity, analytical ability, and just plain common sense would miss what this 

country clearly needs: someone who has the ability to provide us 

with the legal reasoning and guidance that will be necessary to 

navigate the uncharted waters of tomorrow’s great debates. And 

I’m very confident that Judge Sotomayor has that ability. 

Finally, as the mayor of her hometown I would just like to make 

two brief points. First, on the issue of diversity; The Supreme 

Court currently includes one member who grew up in Brooklyn and 

one who grew up in Queens, and so there’s no doubt that adding 

someone who comes from the Bronx would improve the diversity of 

this court. 

[Laughter.] 

484 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. And if you disagree with me, you haven’t 

been to Brooklyn, Queens, or the Bronx. 

[Laughter.] 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. But seriously, Sonia Sotomayor is the quintessential New York success story. She has beaten all the odds and 

rose to the top. If that’s not the American dream, I don’t know 

what is. However, I don’t believe she should be confirmed on the 

strength of her biography, but I do think that her life’s story tells 

you an awful lot about her character and ability. 

And second, I just want to add a caution against those who 

would suggest that Judge Sotomayor’s service to the Puerto Rican 

Legal Defense and Education Fund is somehow a negative. That’s 

an organization that is well-respected for its civil rights work in 

New York City, and although I certainly have not always seen eyeto-eye on every issue with them, there’s no question that they have 

made countless contributions to our city, and Judge Sotomayor 

should be based solely on her record and not on the record of others 

in the group. 

So, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify, and I 

urge you to confirm Sonia Sotomayor as a Justice of the United 

States Supreme Court. 

Senator CARDIN. Mayor Bloomberg, thank you very much for 

your testimony. 

We’ll now hear from Robert Morgenthau. Mr. Morgenthau has 

been the District Attorney of New York County since 1975 and is 

the longest-serving incumbent of that position. During his nine 

terms in office, his staff has conducted about 3.5 million criminal 

prosecutions in homicides in Manhattan, and has a rate of 90 percent success. A graduate of Yale Law School, District Attorney 

Morgenthau served aboard a Naval destroyer through World War 

II. 

It’s a real pleasure to have you before our Committee. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT MORGENTHAU, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 

NEW YORK COUNTY, NEW YORK 

Mr. MORGENTHAU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 

opportunity of testifying today, and I’m pleased to join those who 

endorse the nomination of Judge Sotomayor to the United States 

Supreme Court. 

I first came to know Judge Sotomayor when I was on a recruiting 

trip to the Yale Law School. At that time, Jose ́ Cabranes was 

Yale’s general counsel. He also tought at the law school. I asked 

him if there was anyone special I should speak with and he said, 

yes. He said a remarkable student named Sonia Sotomayor was deciding where to work, and while he did not know whether she’d 

given any thought to being a prosecutor, it would be well worth my 

while to meet her. He was decidedly correct. 

I’m happy to be able to say that the Judge joined my office and 

remained with us for 5 years. In my conversations with her, I 

learned about the compelling story of her life with which you are 

now familiar. In a nutshell, she was raised by her mother in a 

working-class home in South Bronx, and as a teenager worked the 

evening shift in a garment factory to help make ends meet. She 

went on through hard work and force of will to overcome her initial 

485 

difficulties with English composition to win Princeton University’s 

highest undergraduate honor, the Pyne Prize, and to graduate with 

Honors from the Yale Law School. 

In the District Attorney’s Office, the Judge was immediately recognized by trial judges—and supervisors as someone ‘‘a step ahead 

of her colleagues’’, ‘‘one of the brightest and most mature, hardworking, stand-out’’, ‘‘was marked for rapid advancement. Ultimately, she took on every kind of criminal case that comes into an 

urban courthouse, from turnstile jumping to homicide. 

One of those cases, the ‘‘Tarzan’’ murder case, involved an addicted burglar named Richard Maddicks, who had terrorized the 

neighborhood during crime sprees that left three dead and involved 

his swinging into apartment windows from rooftops, shooting anyone in his way. He is now serving a 137 years to life sentence. 

Another case prosecuted by Assistant D.A. Sotomayor in 1983 involved a Times Square child pornography operation. That was the 

first child prosecution in New York after a landmark 1982 Supreme 

Court decision, People v. Furman, upholding New York’s new child 

pornography laws. 

Assistant D.A. Sotomayor left the jurors in tears over what the 

defendants had done to child victims. These cases happened to grab 

the public attention, but Judge Sotomayor—Assistant D.A. 

Sotomayor—understood that every case is important to the victim 

and appropriately gave undivided attention to the proper disposition of all of them. 

Assistant District Attorney Sotomayor soon developed a reputation. Unlike many beginning prosecutors, she simply would not be 

pushed around, by judges or by attorneys. Some judges were eager 

to dispose of cases cheaply to clear their calendars. ADA 

Sotomayor, instead, fought for the right conclusion in each case. 

Maybe that experience in the criminal court in New York City 

helped her prepare for these hearings. 

After leaving my office, Judge Sotomayor joined a prominent law 

firm and also accepted a part-time appointment of the New York 

City Campaign Finance—there she continued to earn a reputation 

for being tough, fair, nonpolitical in an arena where those characteristics were sorely needed, and she has taken those characteristics with her to the Federal bench, where they are equally important. 

Judge Sotomayor’s career in the law has spanned three decades 

and she has worked in almost every level of our judicial system: 

prosecutor, private litigator, trial court judge, and an appellate 

court judge in what I think is the second-most important court in 

the world. She has been an able champion of the law and her depth 

of experience will be invaluable on our highest court. 

Judge Sotomayor is highly qualified for any position in which a 

first-rate intellect, common sense, collegiality, and good character 

would be assets. I might add that the Judge will be the only member of the Supreme Court with experience trying criminal cases in 

the State courts. The overwhelming majority of American prosecutions occur in State courts. 

Judge Sotomayor will bring to the court a full understanding of 

problems faced by prosecutors in those cases, as well as a firsthand knowledge of the trauma faced by victims and of the legitiVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00497 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
486 

mate needs of police officials that work in the State law enforcement system. She will also understand the impact of Federal judicial decisions on State prosecutions. 

In short, the Judge is uniquely qualified, by intellect, experience, 

and commitment to the rule of law to be an outstanding—and I repeat, outstanding—member of the court. President Obama, and for 

that matter the United States, should be proud to see once more 

the realization of that simple American credo, that in this country 

a hardworking person with talent can rise from humble beginnings 

to one of the highest positions in the land. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

We’ll now hear from Wade Henderson, a familiar person to this 

Committee. Wade Henderson is the president and CEO of the 

Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and counsel to the Leadership Conference Education Fund. He is a professor of public interest law at the University of the District of Columbia. Prior to his 

role with the Leadership Conference, Mr. Henderson was the 

Washington Bureau Director of the NAACP. Mr. Henderson is a 

graduate from Rutgers University School of Law. 

Mr. Henderson. 

STATEMENT OF WADE HENDERSON, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 

Mr. HENDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Sessions, members of the Committee. I have the privilege of representing the views of the Leadership Conference, the Nation’s 

leading civil and human rights coalition, consisting of more than 

200 organizations working to build an America that’s as good as its 

ideals. 

This afternoon I will briefly address four of the points that have 

figured in the debate about Judge Sotomayor’s nomination: first, 

her qualifications for serving on the Nation’s highest court; second, 

her personal background and her empathy for others who have had 

to work hard to succeed; third, her role in the unanimous ruling 

by a three-judge panel in the case of Ricci v. DeStefano; and fourth, 

her past membership on the board of one of the Leadership Conference’s member organizations, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense 

and Education Fund. 

First, let me rejoice in what is self-evident. The nomination of 

Judge Sotomayor to be an Associate Justice on our Nation’s highest 

court is a milestone by many standards. The Nation’s first AfricanAmerican President has nominated the first Hispanic-American, 

only the third woman, and only the third person of color to serve 

on the Supreme Court. While great challenges remain on our Nation’s quest for equal opportunity, we have truly reached an historic marker on the journey toward our goal of ‘‘Equal Justice For 

All’’, the phrased inscribed not far from here on the front of the Supreme Court building. 

But hopeful and historic as her nomination has been, Judge 

Sotomayor should herself be just not by who she is, but by what 

she has done. Now, let me be as clear as I can: there is no question 

that she is qualified. Judge Sotomayor’s eloquent and thoughtful 

testimony before this Committee speaks for itself. 

487 

Her distinguished career at Princeton and Yale Law School have 

been much stated. She then spent 5 years as a prosecutor, as we’ve 

heard, in Manhattan, working for the legendary District Attorney 

Robert Morgenthau—pleased to have him here today—and 8 years 

as a corporate litigator. Seventeen years as a Federal District 

Court judge and appellate court judge add up to an individual who 

is one of the most qualified to have ever come before this Committee. 

Second, as with other nominees across the philosophical spectrum, including Justice’s Thomas and Alito, Judge Sotomayor has 

spoken of her family history and her personal struggles. These experiences help her to understand others and to do justice. They further qualify her for the highest court, and she has said and done 

nothing that could reasonably be understood otherwise. 

Third, Judge Sotomayor has participated in thousands of cases 

and authored hundreds of opinions, but much of the debate about 

her nomination has concentrated on the difficult case of Ricci v. 

DeStefano. Whatever one may feel about the facts of this case, we 

all agree that the Supreme Court, in its Ricci decision, set a new 

standard for interpreting Title 7 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 

Using this one decision to negate Judge Sotomayor’s 17 years on 

the bench does a disservice to her record and to this country. 

Fourth, I must speak to the attacks on Judge Sotomayor because 

of her service on the board of one of our Nation’s leading civil 

rights organizations. These attacks do an injustice not only to 

Judge Sotomayor and to the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, but also to the entire civil rights community and to 

all those who look to us for a measure of justice. 

Make no mistake, legal defense funds play an indispensable role 

in American life. They are private attorneys general that assist individuals, often those with few resources and no other representation, to become full shareholders in the American dream. 

When Justice Thurgood Marshall was nominated there were 

those who questioned his role with the NAACP Legal Defense 

Fund, but history does not remember their quibbles kindly. Judge 

Sotomayor has lived the American dream and she understands all 

who aspire to it. Her qualifications are unquestioned and the lessons that she has learned in her life, as well as in libraries, will 

serve her and our country well in the years ahead. All those who 

walk through the entrance to the Supreme Court seeking what is 

inscribed above its door, ‘‘Equal Justice Under Law’’, can be confident that a Justice Sotomayor will continue to do her part to keep 

the promise of our courts and our country. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you very much—for your testimony. 

We’ll now hear from Frank Ricci, a name that’s been mentioned 

second only to Sotomayor during this hearing. Frank Ricci has over 

a decade of experience as a firefighter with the New Haven Fire 

Department and was a plaintiff in the case of Ricci v. DeStefano. 

He’s a contributing author of two books on firefighting. 

It’s a pleasure to have you before the Committee. 

488 

STATEMENT OF FRANK RICCI, DIRECTOR OF FIRE SERVICES, 

CONNECTICOSH (CONNECTICUT COUNSEL ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH) 

Mr. RICCI. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before this distinguished Committee. I accepted, with 

honor, the invitation to tell my story. Many others have a similar 

story and I feel I’m speaking for them as well. 

The New Haven firefighters were not alone in their struggle. 

Firefighters across the country have had to resort to the Federal 

courts to vindicate their civil rights. Technology and modern 

threats have challenged our profession. We have become more effective and efficient, but not safer. The structures we respond to 

today are more dangerous, constructed with lightweight components that are prone to early collapse, and we face fires that can 

double in size every 30 to 60 seconds. 

Too many think that firefighters just fight fires. Officers are also 

responsible for mitigating vehicle accidents, hazardous material incidents, and handling complicated rescues. Rescue work can be 

very technical. All of these things require a great deal of knowledge 

and skill. 

Lieutenants and Captains must understand the dynamic fire environment and the critical boundaries we operate in. They are 

forced to make stressful decisions based on imperfect information 

and coordinate tactics that support our operational objectives. Almost all our tasks are time-sensitive. When your house is on fire 

or your life is in jeopardy, there are no time for do-overs. 

The lieutenant’s test that I took was, without a doubt, a job-related exam that was based on skills, knowledge, and abilities needed to ensure public and the firefighters’ safety. We all had an equal 

opportunity to succeed as individuals and we were all provided a 

road map to prepare for the exam. Achievement is neither limited 

nor determined by one’s race, but by one’s skills, dedication, commitment, and character. Ours is not a job that can be handed out 

without regard to merit and qualifications. 

For this reason, I, and many others, prepared for these positions 

throughout our careers. I studied harder than I ever had before, 

reading, making flash cards, highlighting, reading again, all while 

listening to prepared tapes. I went before numerous panels to prepare for the oral assessment. I was a virtual absentee father and 

husband for months because of it. 

In 2004, the city of New Haven felt not enough minorities would 

be promoted and that the political price for complying with Title 

7, the city’s civil service rules, and the charter would be too high, 

therefore they chose not to fill the vacancies. Such action deprived 

all of us the process set forth by the rule of law. Firefighters who 

earn promotions were denied them. 

Despite the important civil rights and constitutional claims we 

raised, the Court of Appeals panel disposed of our case in an unsigned, unpublished summary order that consisted of a single paragraph that made mention of my dyslexia, and thus led many to 

think that this was a case about me and a disability. This case had 

nothing to do with that. It had everything to do with ensuring our 

command officers were competent to answer the call and our right 

to advance in our profession based on merit, regardless of race. 

489 

Americans have the right to go into our Federal courts and have 

their cases judged based on the Constitution and our laws, not on 

politics or personal feelings. The lower court’s belief that citizens 

should be reduced to racial statistics is flawed. It only divides people who don’t wish to be divided along racial lines. The very reason 

we have civil service rules is to root out politics, discrimination, 

and nepotism. Our case demonstrates that these ills will exist if 

the rules of merit and the law are not followed. 

Our courts are the last resorts for Americans whose rights are 

violated. Making decisions on who should have command positions 

solely based on statistics and politics, where the outcome of the decision could result in injury or death, is contrary to sound public 

policy. 

The more attention our case got, the more some people tried to 

distort it. It bothered us greatly that some perceived this case as 

involving a testing process that resulted in minorities being completely excluded from promotions. That was entirely false, as minority firefighters were victimized by the city’s decision as well. As 

a result of our case, they should now enjoy the career advancement 

that they’ve earned and deserve. 

Enduring over 5 years of court proceedings took its toll on us and 

our families. The case was longer—was no longer just about us, but 

about so many Americans who had lost faith in the court system. 

When we finally won our case and saw the messages we received 

from every corner of the country, we understood that we did something important together: we sought basic fairness and even-handed enforcement of the laws, something all Americans believe in. 

Again, thank you for the honor and privilege of speaking to you 

today. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Ricci, thank you very much for your testimony. 

We’ll now hear from Lieutenant Ben Vargas. Benjamin Vargas is 

a lieutenant in the New Haven Fire Department and was a plaintiff in the case of Ricci v. DeStefano. He also worked part-time as 

a consultant for a company that sells equipment to firefighters. 

Mr. Vargas. 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT BEN VARGAS, NEW HAVEN FIRE 

DEPARTMENT 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. Members of this Committee, it is truly 

an honor to be invited here today. 

Notably, since our case was summarily dismissed by both the 

District Court and the Court of Appeals panel, this is the first time 

I’m being given the opportunity to sit and testify before a body and 

tell my story. I thank you for this—Committee for the opportunity. 

Senators of both parties have noted the importance of this proceeding because decisions of the United States Supreme Court can 

greatly impact the everyday lives of ordinary Americans. I suppose 

that I and my fellow plaintiffs have shown how true that is. I never 

envisioned being a plaintiff in a Supreme Court case, much less 

one that generated so much media and public interest. I am Hispanic and proud of the heritage and background that Judge 

Sotomayor and I share, and I congratulate Judge Sotomayor on her 

nomination. 

490 

But the focus should not have been on me being Hispanic. The 

focus should have been on what I did to earn a promotion to captain, and how my own government and some courts responded to 

that. In short, they didn’t care. I think it important for you to know 

what I did, that I played by the rules and then endured a long 

process of asking the courts to enforce those rules. 

I am the proud father of three young sons. For them, I sought 

to better my life and so I spent 3 months in daily study preparing 

for an exam that was unquestionably job-related. My wife, a special 

education teacher, took time off from work to see me and our children through this process. 

I knew we would see little of my sons during these months when 

I studied every day at a desk in our basement, so I placed photographs of my boys in front of me. When I would get tired and went 

to stop—wanted to stop, I would look at the pictures, realize that 

their own futures depended on mine, and I would keep going. At 

one point, I packed up and went to a hotel for days to avoid any 

distractions, and those pictures came with me. 

I was shocked when I was not rewarded for this hard work and 

sacrifice, but I actually was penalized for it. I became not Ben 

Vargas the fire lieutenant who proved himself qualified to be captain, but a racial statistic. I had to make decisions whether to join 

those who wanted promotions to be based on race and ethnicity or 

join those who would insist on being judged solely on their qualifications and the content of their character. I am proud of the decision I made, and proud of the principle that our group vindicated 

together. 

In our profession, we do not have the luxury of being wrong or 

having long debates. We must be correct the first time and make 

quick decisions under the pressure of time and rapidly unfolding 

events. Those who make these decisions must have the knowledge 

necessary to get it right the first time. Unlike the judicial system, 

there are no continuances, motions or appeals. Errors and delays 

can cost people their lives. 

In our profession, the racial and ethnic make-up of my crew is 

the least important thing to us and to the public we serve. I believe 

that countless Americans who had something to say about our case 

understand that now. Firefighters and their leaders stand between 

their fellow citizens and catastrophe. Americans want those who 

are the most knowledge and qualified to do the task. I am willing 

to risk, and even lay down, my life for fellow citizens, but I was 

not willing to go along with those who placed racial identity over 

these more critical considerations. 

I am not a lawyer, but I quickly learned about the law as it applied to this case. Studying it as much as I studied for my exam, 

I thought it clear that we were denied our fundamental civil rights. 

I expected Lady Justice with the blindfolds on, and a reasoned 

opinion from a Federal Court of Appeals telling me, my fellow 

plaintiffs, and the public that the court’s view on the law—what 

the court’s view on the law was, and do it in an open and transparent way. Instead, we were devastated to see a one-paragraph, 

unpublished order summarily dismissing our case, and indeed even 

the notion that we had presented important legal issues to that 

Court of Appeals. 

491 

I expected the judges who heard my case along the way to make 

the right decisions, the ones required by the rule of law. Of all that 

has been written about our case, it was Justice Alito who best captured our own feelings. We did not ask for sympathy or empathy, 

we asked only for even-handed enforcement of the law, and prior 

to the majority Justice opinion in our case, we were denied just 

that. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you for your testimony. 

We’ll now hear from Peter Kirsanow. Peter Kirsanow serves on 

the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. He’s a member of the National Labor Relations Board, where he received a recess appointment from President George W. Bush. Previously, he was a partner 

with the Cleveland law firm of Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & 

Aronoff. Mr. Kirsanow received his law degree from Cleveland 

State University. 

STATEMENT OF PETER KIRSANOW, COMMISSIONER, U.S. 

COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 

Mr. KIRSANOW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, 

members of the Committee. I am Peter Kirsanow, member of the 

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. I am currently back at Benesch, 

Friedlander in the Labor Employment Practice Group. I’m here in 

my personal capacity. 

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights was established by the—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Is that microphone on? 

Mr. KIRSANOW. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights was established by the 1957 Civil Rights Act to, among other things, act as 

a national clearinghouse for information related to denials of equal 

protection and discrimination. 

In furtherance of the clearinghouse process, my assistant and I 

reviewed the opinions in civil rights cases in which Judge 

Sotomayor participated while on the Second Circuit in the context 

of prevailing civil rights jurisprudence, and with particular attention to the case of Ricci v. DeStefano. Our review revealed at least 

three significant concerns with respect to the manner in which the 

three-judge panel that included Judge Sotomayor handled the case. 

The first concern was, as you’ve heard, the summary disposition 

of this particular case. The Ricci case contained constitutional 

issues of extraordinary importance and impact. For example, the 

issues of—that are very controversial and volatile—racial quotas 

and racial discrimination. This was a case of first impression, no 

Second Circuit or Supreme Court precedent on point. Indeed, to the 

extent there were any cases that could provide guidance, such as 

Wygant, Crowson, Adderand, even private sector cases such as 

Johnson Transportation, Frank v. Xerox, Rubber v. Steelworkers, 

would dictate or suggest a result opposite of that reached by the 

Sotomayor panel. 

The case contained a host of critical issues for review, yet the 

three-judge panel summarily disposed of the case, as you’ve heard, 

in an unpublished, one-paragraph pro curium opinion that’s usually reserved for cases that are relatively simple, straightforward, 

and inconsequential. 

492 

The second concern is that the Sotomayor panel’s order would inevitably result in proliferation of de facto racial and ethnic quotas. 

The standard endorsed by the Sotomayor panel was lower than 

that adopted by the Supreme Court’s test of strong basis in evidence. Essentially, any race-based—decision evoked to avoid a disparate impact lawsuit would provide immunity from Title 7 review. 

Under this standard, employees who fear the prospect or expense 

of litigation, regardless of the merits of the case, would have a 

green light to resort to racial quotas. 

But even more invidious is the use of quotas due to racial politics, and as Judge Alito’s concurrence showed, there was glaringly 

abundant evidence of racial politics in the Ricci case. Had the 

Sotomayor panel decision prevailed, employees would have license 

to use racial preferences and quotas on an expansive scale. Evidence introduced before the Civil Rights Commission shows that 

when courts open the door to preferences just a crack, preferences 

expand exponentially. 

For example, evidence adduced before hearings of the Civil 

Rights Commission in 2005 and 2006 show that despite the fact 

that Adderand was passed more than—or decided more than 10 

years ago, Federal agencies persist in using race-conscious programs in Federal contracting, governmental contracting as opposed 

to race-neutral alternatives. Moreover, even though the Supreme 

Court had struck down the use of raw numerical rating in college 

admissions in Gratz v. Bollinger, thereby requiring that race be 

only a mere plus factor, a thumb on the scale in the admissions 

process, powerful preferences show no signs of abating. 

A study by the Center for Equal Opportunity showed that at a 

major university, preferences were so great that the odds that a 

minority applicant would be admitted over a similarly situated 

white comparative were 250:1, at another major university, 1,115:1. 

That’s not a thumb on the scale, that’s an anvil. And had the reasoning of the Ricci case in the lower court prevailed, what happened to Firefighter Ricci and Lieutenant Vargas would happen to 

innumerably more Americans of every race throughout the country. 

The third concern is that the lower court’s decision that would 

permit racial engineering by employers would actually harm minorities who are purported beneficiaries of that particular decision. 

Evidence adduced at a 2006 Civil Rights Commission hearing 

shows that there’s increasing data that preferenced—preferences 

create mismatch effects that actually increase the probabilities that 

minorities will fail if they receive beneficial treatment or preferential treatment. 

For example, black law students who are admitted under preferences are 2.5 times more likely not to graduate than a similarly 

situated white or Asian comparative, 4 times as likely not to pass 

the bar exam on the first try, and 6 times as likely never to pass 

the bar exam, despite multiple attempts. 

Mr. Chairman, it is respectfully submitted that if a nominee’s interpretive doctrine permits an employer to treat one group preferentially today, there’s nothing that prevents them from treating 

another group or shifting the preferences to another group tomorrow, and that’s contrary to the colorblind ideal contemplated by the 

493 

1964 Civil Rights Act, Title 7, which was the issue decided in the 

Ricci case. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. And thank you for your testimony. 

We’ll now hear from Linda Chavez, who is chairman of the Center for Equal Opportunity and a political analyst for Fox News 

Channel. She’s held a number of appointed positions, among them 

White House Director of Public Liaison, and Staff Director of U.S. 

Commission on Civil Rights. 

STATEMENT OF LINDA CHAVEZ, PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR 

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

Committee. I testify today not as a wise Latina woman, but as an 

American who believes that skin color and national origin should 

not determine who gets a job, a promotion, or a public contract, or 

who gets into colleges or receives a fellowship. 

My message today is straightforward: Mr. Chairman, do not vote 

to confirm this nominee. I say this with some regret, because I believe Judge Sotomayor’s personal story is an inspiring one, which 

proves that this is truly a land of opportunity where circumstances 

of birth and class do not determine whether you can succeed. Unfortunately, based on her statements both on and off the bench, I 

do not believe Judge Sotomayor shares that view. 

It is clear from her record that she has drunk deep from the well 

of identity politics. I know a lot about that well, and I can tell you 

that it is dark and poisonous. It is, in my view, impossible to be 

a fair judge and also believe that one’s race, ethnicity and sex 

should determine how someone will rule as a judge. Despite her assurances to this Committee over the last few days that her ‘‘wise 

Latina’’ woman statement was simply a ‘‘rhetorical flourish that 

fell flat’’, nothing could be further from the truth. All of us in public life have at one time or another misspoken, but Judge 

Sotomayor’s words weren’t uttered off the cuff. They were carefully 

crafted, repeated not just once or twice, but at least seven times 

over several years. 

As others have pointed out, if Judge Sotomayor were a white 

man who suggested that whites or males made better judges, 

again, to use Judge Sotomayor’s words, ‘‘whether born from experience or inherent physiological or cultural differences’’, we would 

not be having this discussion because the nominee would have been 

forced to withdraw once those words became public. 

But of course, Judge Sotomayor’s offensive words are just a reflection of her much greater body of work as an ethnic activist and 

judge. Identity politics is at the core of who this woman is. And let 

me be clear here. I’m not talking about the understandable pride 

in one’s ancestry or ethnic groups, which is both common and natural in a country as diverse and pluralistic as ours. Identity politics 

involves a sense of grievance against the majority, a feeling that 

racism permeates American society and its institutions, and the belief that members of one’s own group are victims in a perpetual 

power struggle with the majority. 

From her earliest days at Princeton University and later Yale 

Law School, to her 12-year involvement with the Puerto Rican 

494 

Legal Defense and Education Fund, to her speeches and writings, 

including her jurisprudence, Judge Sotomayor has consistently displayed an affinity for such views. 

I have outlined at much greater length in my prepared testimony—which I ask permission be included in the record in full— 

the way in which I believe identity politics has permeated Judge 

Sotomayor’s life’s work. But let me briefly outline a few examples. 

As an undergraduate, she actively pushed for race-based goals and 

time tables for faculty hiring. In her much-praised senior thesis, 

she refused to identify the U.S. Congress by its proper name, instead referring to it as the ‘‘North American Congress’’, or the 

‘‘mainland Congress’’. 

During her tenure as chair of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense 

and Education Fund’s Director Litigation Committee, she urged 

quota-seeking lawsuits challenging civil service exams, seeking 

race-conscious decision making similar to that used by the city of 

New Haven in Ricci. She opposed the death penalty as racist. She supported racebased government contracting. She made dubious arguments in 

support of bilingual education and, more broadly, in trying to 

equate English language requirements as a form of national origin 

discrimination. As a Judge, she dissented from an opinion that the 

Voting Rights Act does not give prison inmates the right to vote, 

and she has said that as a witness—a witness’ identification of an 

assailant may be unconstitutional racial profiling, in violation of 

the Equal Protection Clause, if race is an element of that identification. 

Finally, she has shown a willingness to let her policy preferences 

guide her in the Ricci case. 

Although she has attempted this week to back away from some 

of her own intemperate words and has accused her critics of taking 

them out of context, the record is clear: identity politics is at the 

core of Judge Sotomayor’s self-definition. It has guided her involvement in advocacy groups, been the topic of much of her public writing and speeches, and influenced her interpretation of law. There 

is no reason to believe that her elevation to the Supreme Court will 

temper this inclination, and much reason to fear that it will play 

an important role in how she approaches the cases that will come 

before her if she is confirmed. 

I, therefore, respectfully urge you not to confirm Judge 

Sotomayor as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Thank 

you. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you for your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chavez appear as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator CARDIN. Let me, first, recognize our Chairman, Chairman Leahy, who I understand wants to reserve his place. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Cardin. One, I thank you 

and the other Senators who have filled in on this part. I was here 

throughout the—throughout all the testimony by Judge Sotomayor 

and the questions asked by both Republicans and Democrats, so I 

will reserve my time. 

I do welcome all the witnesses, both for and against the nominee. 

Senator Sessions and I joined together to make sure that everybody 

495 

was invited, everybody was given a chance to testify. And if you 

wish to add to your testimony, the record will be open for 24 hours 

for you to do that. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mayor Bloomberg, let me start with you, if I might, in my questioning. There’s been a lot of discussion about the Puerto Rican 

Legal Defense and Education Fund, including during this panel 

discussion. And Judge Sotomayor served on the board, had nothing 

to do with the selection of individual cases from the point of view 

of its content, but served in a voluntary capacity with that board. 

And first I’m going to quote from you and then give you a chance, 

perhaps, to expand upon it. You have been quoted saying, ‘‘Only in 

Washington could someone’s many years of volunteer service to a 

highly regarded nonprofit organization that has done so much good 

for so many be twisted into a negative and that that group has 

made countless important contributions to New York City.’’ 

I just want to give you a chance to respond to Judge Sotomayor’s 

service on the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. Well, this is an organization that has defended people who don’t have the wherewithal to get private counsel, don’t have traditions of understanding the law, and it happens 

to focus on people mainly who come from Puerto Rico and have language problems in addition to a lack of, perhaps, understanding of 

how our court system works. 

And it provides the kind of representation that we all, I think, 

believe that everybody that appears before a judge and before the 

law deserves. They raise money privately to pay lawyers to defend, 

and I don’t agree with some of their positions, and I agree with 

other ones. But having more of these organizations is a lot better 

than having less. At least people do have the option of getting good 

representation. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Henderson, during the hearing of Judge Sotomayor we had 

a chance to talk a little bit about voting rights and the recent case 

before the Supreme Court, and the fact that one Justice questioned 

the constitutionality, in fact, pretty well determined the constitutionality of the—reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, saying it 

was no longer relevant. 

Judge Sotomayor, during her testimony, talked about deference 

to Congress, the fact that it was passed by a 98:0 vote in the U.S. 

Senate, and by a lopsided vote in the House of Representatives, the 

25-year extension. I just want to get your comments as to whether 

the Voting Rights Act is relevant today and your confidence level 

of Judge Sotomayor as it relates to advancing civil rights for the 

people of our Nation. 

Mr. HENDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your question. 

Let me back up for just a minute and say that these hearings have 

really been a testament to the wisdom of the founding fathers in 

setting up a three-part system of government, with the President 

making a nomination for an Associate Justice on the Supreme 

Court and the Senate Judiciary Committee providing its advice and 

consent. Under our system of government, the Senate and the 

House have a particular responsibility to delve deeply into the conVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00507 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
496 

stitutional rights of all Americans, particularly around the right to 

vote. 

Voting really is the language of democracy. If you can’t vote, you 

don’t count. And the truth is that, notwithstanding the Fifteenth 

Amendment to the Constitution, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 

Amendments, African-Americans, Latinos, women, other people of 

color, were often denied their right to vote well into the 20th century. 

It took not just those amendments, but actually a statute enacted 

by this Congress to ensure that the rights of Americans to vote, indeed, could be preserved, and it was only in the aftermath of the 

1965 Voting Rights Act that we have seen the expansion of the 

franchise and democratization of our, you know, Republic in a way 

that serves the interest of the founders. 

Having said that, Congress reached a decision and we authorize 

in the Voting Rights Act in 2006 that this law was necessary. Sixteen thousand pages of a congressional record speak eloquently to 

that important interest. The fact that this issue was held, both 

with congressional review and also a national commission set up by 

the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights and others in the civil 

rights community, holding hearings around the country, added to 

the record that was created. 

The fact that this bill passed, rather the reauthorization of the 

Voting Rights Act, 390:33 in the House and 98:0 in the Senate 

speaks eloquently about the important need of this Act, and the 

continuing need for it. So the fact that some on the Supreme Court 

found otherwise doesn’t disturb me at all. There is a need for it. 

That need continues, and notwithstanding evidence. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you for correcting my numbers on— 

the number that it voted by. I appreciate that. 

I just wanted to ask Mr. McDaniel a quick question. That is, during the confirmation hearings both Democratic and Republican 

Senators have been urging from our nominee to look at what the 

law is, and not judge based upon an emotion. You have to follow 

the precedents of the court. 

I have a simple question to you in the Ricci case. Do you believe 

that the Sotomayor decision with the three-judge panel was within 

the mainstream of judicial decision making when that decision was 

reached? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. Senator, I do believe that. And to hear the stories of these—these firefighters in person, I—I don’t have any reason not to use the word ‘‘empathy’’. I have a great deal of empathy 

for the circumstances that they have described, and I don’t know 

that I have a great deal for how the city fathers handled the matter. But by the time it made it to the Second Circuit, I believe that 

the panel did what the law required and I don’t think that there 

is a grant—a just legal criticism for the way that the panel handled 

the matter, and the fact that the Supreme Court chose to change 

the law in a bare majority also is their prerogative. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. I thank all of you. This is a very 

important panel. Actually, much of your testimony was moving and 

I appreciate it, and I think you’re calling us to a higher level of disVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00508 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
497 

cussion on these issues because they go to the core of who we are 

as Americans, and I just want to share that. 

We are worried about the Second Amendment. I will just as the 

Mayor, you signed a brief in favor of the DC gun ban, which would 

bar even a handgun in someone’s home, so I would assume you 

would be agreeable with the opinion of Judge Sotomayor and her 

view. We’ve got different views about these things. 

Mayor, I want to tell you, I appreciate your leadership. It’s a 

tough job to be Mayor of New York. You’re showing strength and 

integrity. 

Mr. Morgenthau, you’re the dean of prosecutors. I hear many 

people over the years that have worked for you and they’re very 

complimentary of you, and I know you’re proud of this prote ́ge ́e of 

yours who’s moved forward. 

Mr. MORGENTHAU. Senator, may I tell you that my grandmother 

was born in Montgomery, Alabama? 

Senator SESSIONS. I am impressed to hear that. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SESSIONS. I feel better already. Oh, that’s good. 

Mr. Attorney General, thank you for your able comments. And 

Mr. Henderson, it’s good to work with you. Senator Leahy and I— 

I’m talking, during these hearings, we’re going to do that crack cocaine thing that you and I have talked about before. We’ve got to. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. HENDERSON. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate it. 

Senator SESSIONS. I may want to restate that. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Let me correct the record. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Please rephrase it, Senator. Please rephrase. 

Senator SESSIONS. I misspoke. 

Mr. HENDERSON. No. Quite all right. 

Senator SESSIONS. We’re going to reduce the burden of penalties 

in some of the crack cocaine cases and make them fairer. 

So Mr. Ricci, thank you for your work. I would say, Mr. Henderson, that I said the PRLDEF Legal Defense Fund is a good organization in my opening statement, and I think it has—it—it has 

every right to advocate those positions that it does. But the nominee was on the board for a long time and it did take some positions 

that she rightly was asked about, whether or not she agreed to it, 

especially during some of those times she was chairman of the Litigation Committee. But I value these—I value that groups can come 

together and file lawsuits and take the matter to the court. 

Just briefly, Mr. Kirsanow, on a slightly different subject than 

you started, I think you probably know this answer, but could you 

tell us, for the purpose of this hearing, as briefly as you can, what 

the concern is in the Voting Rights Act? It’s not that we’re 

against—anybody is against voting rights. I voted for it. But there 

are some constitutional concerns. 

Could you share precisely what that is? 

Mr. KIRSANOW. Sure. And specifically with respect to the latest 

Supreme Court decision related to that, what was articulated is 

that the pre-clearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act pertain 

to a legacy of discrimination that occurred in many States where 

poll taxes and literacy tests were being imposed on black citizens. 

498 

However, in this particular case the Austin political subdivision 

came into existence after all of the—the legacy of this discrimination had actually occurred, or even after the Voting Rights Act 

itself had been passed. 

The question is, how can it be that you’ve got a preexisting law 

that is almost, for lack of a better term, ex-post facto, applying to 

an organization that came into existence after the law was in effect. There was no history of discrimination or denials of equal protection or denial of voting rights by this particular political subdivision, so it was peculiar in that regard, and I think there were several justices who evinced some concern about the approach in that 

particular case. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. It’s just, there are two sides to 

that story. We passed the bill and we extended it, and all of us had 

some angst and worry. I said I wanted to vote for it, and we did. 

We extended it for probably longer than we should have. Not that 

it would ever end. Huge portions of it would—may never end. But 

some portions of it may not have been needed to continue. 

Mr.—Lieutenant Vargas, that was a moving story you gave us. 

Let me just ask you this. Do you think that other members of the 

fire department, had they study as—studied as hard as you and 

mastered the subject matter as well as you did, could have passed 

the test—more of them would have passed if they’d studied as hard 

as you? 

Mr. VARGAS. Absolutely. 

Senator SESSIONS. You think you—— 

Mr. VARGAS. Absolutely. I studied with a group of them and they 

all supported me on what I was doing because they knew the effort 

that I put in and—and they were right there. We really weren’t all 

that far behind. And, you know, minorities would have been promoted. That’s something that—that continues to get left out. There 

would have been minorities promoted to captain, minorities promoted to lieutenant as well, and, you know, when you take these 

exams, sometimes you have winners and sometimes—you know, 

but you go into that situation knowing that that’s going to be the 

case. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Kirsanow, you indicated that all the 

judges, I believe your phrase was, on the Supreme Court, rejected 

the standard of review that the panel, Justice Sotomayor’s panel, 

set for the firefighter exam. Is that right? 

Mr. KIRSANOW. Senator, even the dissent had a different standard. It was a good cause standard which would have given a little 

bit more definitiveness to the approach that defendants could take 

in defending. As you know, Title 7 has a safe harbor of job-related, 

consistent with business necessity. If you can establish that in fact 

the test that the firefighters took were job-related, consistent with 

business necessity, then only under those circumstances—the only 

way you could show a disparate impact if—is if those tests weren’t 

made. Even the dissent said it should have been sent back on remand. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Ms. Chavez, I noticed one thing. According to the ABA statistics, 

only 3.5 percent of lawyers in America in 2000 were Hispanic, yet 

499 

Hispanics make up 5 percent of the Federal District Court judges 

and 6 percent of Circuit Court judges. Would you comment on that? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Well, first of all, I think it’s important—you know, 

there’s been a lot of attention focused on the phrase ‘‘a wise Latina 

woman’’. I used it myself, obviously, ironically, in testifying today. 

But I think it’s important to read Judge Sotomayor’s entire 

speech because, in fact, it wasn’t just that she was saying a wise 

Latina woman would make a better judge. What she was saying 

was that the race, ethnicity and gender of judges would, and 

should, make a difference in their judging. 

And she says in the speech itself, she says she doesn’t know always how that’s going to happen, but she even cites some studies, 

sociological studies, that took—take a look at the way in which 

women judges have handed down decisions and makes the case 

that women judges decide cases differently than men do, and she 

speaks of this approvingly. And she talks about statistics and how 

few Latinos there are on the bench. And the statistics that you just 

cited come from an article that I wrote in Retort to the statistics 

that she used. 

I bring that up because inherent in that analysis of hers is the 

notion that there ought to be proportional representation on judicial panels, that we ought to be selecting judges based on race, ethnicity and gender, and that we ought to have more or less proportional representation. 

And I have to say that, you know, that really I think comes very 

close to arguing for quotas, a position, by the way, that she has 

taken with—when she was with the Puerto Rican Legal Defense 

and Education Fund. By the way, she was not just on the board, 

she actually signed some memoranda. Those are in the record, and 

I’ve cited some instances of that in my written testimony. And the 

point is that if there is so-called under representation of some 

groups, it means there’s over-representation of others. 

And I said in my testimony that if we are concerned about the 

number of Latino judges, the first thing you need to be a judge is 

a college degree and a law degree. And, in fact, if just using Judge 

Sotomayor’s own statistics, if anything, if you look at the number 

of attorneys who are Latino at the time that she was writing, Hispanics were actually somewhat over-represented on the judicial 

bench. I reject all of that. That doesn’t bother me in the least that 

they are over-represented. I think we should not be making ethnicity and race or gender a qualification for sitting on the bench, 

or being a firefighter, or being a captain or a lieutenant on a firefighting team. I think we ought to take race, ethnicity and gender 

out of the equation. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Ms. Chavez, do you think that Judge 

Sotomayor’s being awarded the Pyne Award at Princeton for high 

academic achievement and good character, being summa cum laude 

and Phi Beta Kappa was because it was a quota, that they wanted 

to make sure there was a Latina who received that? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. No, I don’t. And, in fact, what is interesting about 

Judge Sotomayor’s tenure at Princeton University is that she has 

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500 

cause her test scores were not comparable to that of her peers. But 

she also has talked about what happened to her when she got 

there, and that she recognized that in fact she was not particularly 

well-prepared, that she did not write well and that one of her professors pulled her aside and said she had to work on her writing 

skills. 

Senator DURBIN. So that would have been—— 

Ms. CHAVEZ. I admire—— 

Senator DURBIN. Excuse me. That would make it a pretty amazing story then. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. That’s right. And I wish that that was the story 

that she was telling Latinos, that she—— 

Senator DURBIN. I think that’s the story of her life that I’m describing. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Well, it—I wish that what she was telling Latinos 

is that if you do what Ben Vargas has done, if you do what Frank 

Ricci has done, if you take home the books and you study them and 

you memorize what you need to know so that you can pass the test 

like I did when I took home grammar books—— 

Senator DURBIN. Well, I—— 

Ms. CHAVEZ.—and learned how to write standard English, that 

that should be the story, not that she should be insisting on racial 

quotas and racial preferences. 

Senator DURBIN. Ms. Chavez, I think that—I think that the story 

of her life is one of achievement, overcoming some odds that many 

people have never faced in her family life and personal life. 

Mr. Morgenthau, when you were alerted about her skills in law 

school, did they tell you that they had an opportunity here for you 

to hire a wise Latina lawyer? Is that what you were in the market 

for? 

Mr. MORGENTHAU. Absolutely not. 

Senator DURBIN. Would you—if you could speak in the microphone, I’d sure appreciate it. 

Mr. MORGENTHAU. I’m sorry. Absolutely not. I mean, I took one 

look at her resume, you know, summa cum laude at Princeton, the 

Yale Law Journal, and I said—and then I talked to her and—and 

I thought she had common sense and judgment and willingness to 

work. The fact that she was Latino or Latina had absolutely nothing to do with it. 

And may I just use this opportunity to say that I was one of the 

founding directors of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund and the 

reason I did that was I thought it was important to represent a 

way under-represented minority—you know, you’re looking back 

35, 40 years—to have an organization which was dedicated to help 

people in Housing Corp discrimination cases. 

So I urged her to join the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund. I 

mean, I had become a life member of the NAACP in 1951. I’ve been 

on the National Commission of the Anti-Defamation League. I 

think that one of the great strengths of the United States is its diversity and—and—but we’ve got to help people from the various 

minority groups make their way and advance. I must say, I’m very 

critical of some of my friends and relatives who want to forget 

where they came from, and it’s to her credit that she remembers 

where she came from. 

501 

Senator DURBIN. And Mayor Bloomberg, I believe you had a 

quote that I read about Washington being maybe the only place— 

would you recall that quote on the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and 

Education Fund? 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. Yes. I think that public service is something 

that certainly you, Senator, know the value of and the satisfaction 

when you do it. And in New York City, we value those who are 

willing to give their time and help others. They walk away in many 

cases from lucrative careers to serve as public defenders or outside 

of the legal profession in myriad other ways, and the fact that the 

organizations that they work for sometimes do things that you or 

I disagree with doesn’t take away from the value that they provide 

in other things that they do. 

Senator DURBIN. I’ve been honored to serve on this Committee to 

consider three Supreme Court nominees. The two previous nominees, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, were both white 

males, and the questioning really came to this central point: do 

you, as a white male have sensitivity to those unlike yourself, such 

as minorities and disadvantaged people? Those questions were 

asked over and over again. In this case where we have a minority 

woman seeking a position on the Supreme Court, it seems the 

question is, are you going to go too far on the side of minorities and 

not really use the law in a fair fashion? 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. Senator, isn’t the reason that the founding 

fathers—or at least I assume the reason the founding fathers said 

nine justices is that they wanted a diverse group of people with different life experiences who could work collaboratively and collectively to understand what the founding fathers meant generations 

later on. And so the fact that I—I said before in my testimony, I 

do not think that no matter how compelling Judge Sotomayor’s life 

experience and biography is, that’s not the reason to appoint her. 

Certainly we benefit from having a diverse group of people on the 

court, in the same way as my city benefits from a diverse group 

of citizens. 

Senator DURBIN. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask one last question. 

I might say, Mr. Mayor, you’re getting dangerously close to empathy. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator DURBIN. But I happen to agree with you. 

Mr. Morgenthau, when Judge Sotomayor worked in your office, 

did you notice whether or not she treated minorities any differently? 

Mr. MORGENTHAU. She was right down the middle, Senator. She 

didn’t treat minorities any differently than she treated everybody 

else. Right down the middle, looked at the law. She’s tough, but 

fair. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you very much. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Senator Sessions indicated Senator Graham will be next to inquire. 

Senator GRAHAM. I’d like to thank my colleagues for the courtesy 

here. I’ve got to run back and do some things. 

502 

This has been a very good panel, by the way. I think we’re sort 

of grappling with issues right here in the Senate the country is 

grappling with, and I’ll try to put it in perspective the best I can. 

Ms. Chavez, identity politics. I think I know what you’re talking 

about. I asked the judge about it. It’s a practice of politics I don’t 

agree with, and I think overall is not the right way to go. But having said that, I’ve tried to look at the judge in totality. 

The Well Qualified rating from the American Bar Association, 

when it was given to Judge Alito and Roberts, we all embraced it 

and I used it a couple of times to say that if you thought this person had a rigid view of life or the law, it would have been very 

hard for the ABA to give them a well qualified rating. 

Does that impress you all that the ABA had a different view in 

terms of how she might use identity politics on the bench? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Well, I’m not sure they dealt with that question. I 

think they did deal with her record as a judge and the decisions 

that she has made as a judge. The ABA and I often disagree on 

matters, so—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Yeah. I totally understand. 

Ms. CHAVEZ.—it’s not—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I totally understand. But I guess the point I’m 

making, I don’t want to sit here and try to have it both ways, you 

know, say the ABA is a great thing one day and means nothing the 

next. 

Have you ever known a Republican political leader to actively try 

to seek putting a minority in a position of responsibility to help the 

party? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. I think that the idea of giving due deference to 

making sure that people are representative in diverse ways is a 

standard way of operating in political circles. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, the only reason I mention that, the statement you made, ‘‘the way we pick our judges should be based on 

merit, the way we pick our firefighters’’—I totally agree with that. 

But politics is politics in the sense that I know that Republicans 

sit down and think, Okay, we’ve got some power now, let’s make 

sure that we let the whole country know the Republican party is 

just not a party of short white guys. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. I think that’s different, though, Senator, than, as 

she suggested in her speech, that there ought to be some sort of 

proportional representation. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yeah. That’s right. You can go—that’s right. I 

totally agree. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. And I think that’s farther. And I also think it matters that we’re not just doing that because we want to see diverse 

opinions, but it seems to me that what she was saying in her 

speech was that we do that because blacks, Latinos and women are 

different, think differently, and will behave differently. I mean, she 

said that explicitly. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yeah. 

Ms. CHAVEZ. She said it may be as a result of physiological differences. I think any white man that said such a thing about minorities or women would be laughed out of this room. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, since I’m the white guy that said that, 

I agree with you. 

503 

[Laughter.] 

Senator GRAHAM. But the point is that I’m trying to get the country in a spot where you’re not judged by one thing, that we just 

can’t look at her and say ‘‘that’s it’’. You know, when I look at her 

I see speeches that bug the hell out of me, as I said before. But 

I also see something that very much impresses me, and the ABA 

apparently sees something, and Louis Freeh sees something, and 

Ken Starr sees something, and, you know, what I want to tell the 

country is that Republicans very much do sit down and think about 

political picks and appointments in a political sense to try to show 

that we’re a party that looks at all Americans and wants to give 

an opportunity, and that’s just life, and that’s not a bad thing. 

Now, Mr. Ricci, I would want you to come to my house if it was 

on fire. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator GRAHAM. And I appreciate how difficult this must have 

been for you to bust your ass and to study so hard and—and to 

have it all stripped at the end. But I just want you to know, as a 

country, that we’re probably one generation removed to where, no 

matter how hard you studied, based on your last name or the color 

of your skin, you’d have no—no shot. And we’re trying to find some 

balance. And in your case, I think you were poorly treated and you 

did not get the day in court you deserved, but all turned out well. 

It was a 5:4 decision. Maybe we can learn something through your 

experience. But please don’t lose sight of the fact, not so very long 

ago the test was rigged a different way. 

Mr. Vargas, you’re one generation removed from where your last 

name wouldn’t have been it. Do you understand that? 

Mr. VARGAS. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. What did you go through personally to stand 

with Mr. Ricci? What came your way? Did anybody criticize you? 

Mr. VARGAS. I received lots of criticism. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, tell me the kind of criticisms you received. 

Mr. VARGAS. But I—I’ve got thick skin. I believe that I’m a person with thick skin. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, did people call you an Uncle Tom? 

Mr. VARGAS. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. People thought you were disloyal to the Hispanic community? 

Mr. VARGAS. Absolutely. Yes. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, quite frankly, my friend, I think you’ve 

done a lot for America and the Hispanic community. My hat’s off 

to you. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator GRAHAM. Finally, Mayor, having to govern a city as diverse as New York must be very, very difficult. Is it also a pleasure? 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. It is a pleasure. And we—I said before you 

came in that some of the—Judge Sotomayor’s views, I don’t happen 

to agree with. Some of her decisions, I think, were wrong. We—for 

example, I disagreed with what the city of New Haven did. In New 

York City, you should know that our city is a defendant in a case, 

class action suit in the Justice Department where the challenge is 

504 

two entry-level tests for our fire department, one given in 1999 before I became mayor, and one afterwards in 2002, and we’re defending it on the ground—the suit alleges that the written portions 

of the test were not germane to the job and it had a disparate impact. I’ve chosen to fight this. 

I think that, in fact, the tests were job-related and were consistent with business necessity. This is a case that’s going to go to 

trial sometime later this year. What we’ve tried to do is to approach it from a different point of view: aggressive recruiting to try 

to get more minorities to apply to be firefighters, and we have revised our test. 

We’ve had a substantial increase in the number of minorities 

taking the test, passing the test, and joining our fire department. 

And I really do believe that that’s a better way to solve the diversity problem, which does affect an awful lot of fire departments 

around this country, rather than throwing out tests and thereby 

penalizing those who pass the test. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Klobuchar. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. I’m going to let Senator Specter, who is—I guess I’m more senior to him only because of a technicality, but also he’s been here longer. So I’m going to let him go, 

and then I will go after. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Specter. 

Senator SPECTER. No, no. I’ll defer to Senator Klobuchar. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Okay. Here we go. I, first, wanted to thank 

both firefighters for your service. As a prosecutor, we worked extensively on arson cases and I just got a little sense of what you 

go through every day and how dangerous your job is. So, thank you 

for that. 

I just wanted to follow up on one thing, Ms. Chavez, when you 

talked about—you clearly know Ms. Sotomayor’s history and her 

record. But when you talked about how she got into Princeton, you 

didn’t point out the one thing that I think Mr. Morgenthau did, 

and that is that she ended up graduating from there summa cum 

laude, and that certainly is all about numbers and grades, I would 

think, and not affirmative action. Would that be correct? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. That’s absolutely right. And I wish that was the 

message that she was giving to her Hispanic audiences, that she 

was able to do it, that she was able to overcome adversity, that she 

was able, because she applied herself and worked hard and put in 

the hours studying, to be able to succeed, and that is not the message that she gives. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Okay. But she also was valedictorian of her 

high school class. Where I went to high school, that was all numbers and grades and nothing to do with anything else. Isn’t that 

true? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. I’m only quoting what she has said herself. I don’t 

have any idea what her test scores were. I don’t think anyone but 

she does. But she has said that she got into Princeton, and also 

Yale, based on the affirmative action programs at those universities. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Okay. 

505 

Mr. Morgenthau, it’s just an honor to meet you. When I was District Attorney, I hired a number of people that learned everything 

they knew from you and your office, so thank you for that. And, 

in fact, when I did my opening statement I talked about a quote 

you gave once about how you hired people, and you say, ‘‘we want 

people with good judgment because a lot of the job of a prosecutor 

is making decisions’’. 

You said, ‘‘I also want to see some signs of humility in anybody 

that I hire. We’re giving young lawyers a lot of power and we want 

to make sure that they’re going to use that power with good sense 

and without arrogance’’. Could you talk about those two qualities, 

the good judgment and the humility, and how you think those 

qualities may be or may not be reflected in our nominee? 

Mr. MORGENTHAU. Well, I mean, I think she met all those standards. I—I interviewed her and talked to her, thought she was a 

hard worker. I thought she would relate to—to the victims and witnesses. I thought she had humility. I thought she was fair. I 

thought she would apply the law. She met all of those standards 

that I thought were important to me. I hired her entirely on the 

merits. Entirely on the merits. Nothing to do with her ethnic background or anything else. She was an outstanding candidate on the 

merits. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. There is also a letter that we received from 

40 of her colleagues, and one of the things I’ve learned is that 

while maybe sometimes someone does well in the workplace by 

their superiors, sometimes their colleagues think something else. 

And here you have her colleagues talking about the long hours she 

worked, how she was among the very first in her starting class to 

be selected to handle felonies. Could you describe how your process 

works in your office and how certain people get to handle felonies 

sooner than others? 

Mr. MORGENTHAU. Well, we have six trial bureaus with about 50, 

55 lawyers in each one, and it’s up to the bureau chief, the deputies, to decide who should move along. I know one of those people 

who wrote that letter have gone to—to Princeton and to Yale Law 

School and studied for the bar with Sonia. I said, ‘‘Damn, I guess 

she was a little bit ahead of you.’’ And he said, ‘‘She was a full step 

ahead of us.’’ And she had the—the judgment, the common sense, 

the knowledge of people, the ability to persuade victims and witnesses testifying, and we thought she was a natural to move up to 

the Supreme Court. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Very good. 

Mayor Bloomberg, I noted today earlier that the—that Judge 

Sotomayor has the support of so many law enforcement organizations in New York, National District Attorneys Association. Could 

you talk about the—what that support means and how—I know 

you’ve had success, along with Mr. Morgenthau’s amazing record of 

bringing crime down in New York, working with the police, working with the county attorneys as a team, and while our nominee 

was a small part of that, one—one Assistant District Attorney, as 

part of the big effort, what difference that has made to New York. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. Well, I think, Senator, the reason that we’ve 

been able to bring crime down and improve the schools and the 

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506 

body or considered their ethnicity, their marital status, orientation, 

gender, religion, or anything else. I just try to get the best that I 

possibly can to come to work for the city, and I think the results 

are there. 

When I interview for judges—and I’ve appointed something like 

140 so far in the last seven-and-a-half years—I look for integrity 

and professional competence and judicial temperament, and how 

well they write, and their appellate records, and their reputation 

for fairness and impartiality, but also we extensively talk to members of the bar and the bench to see what professionals who have 

to work with the candidate day in and day out think. It’s very easy 

to be on your best behavior when you come to Washington and 

have to testify before a group like this. But the truth of the matter 

is, your real character comes out when you do it day in and day 

out over a long period of time, and that’s what your contemporaries 

see. And so the fact that a lot of people who have worked with this 

judge think that she is eminently qualified to move up carries an 

awful lot of weight with me. They can find—they know a lot more 

about her and her abilities than you or I could ever find out with 

the short period of time that we interact with her or read of her— 

read about her decisions, take them out of context of what was 

going on at the time and we don’t have the ability to do all of the 

research that her contemporaries have been doing. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. So you’re saying that you’d give that a lot 

more weight than all the questions we’ve been asking for the last 

3 days? 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. No, I wouldn’t—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. I wouldn’t go quite that far. But I do think 

that people who work with somebody for a long period of time really do get to know them. And most importantly, people who are on 

the other side of the issues, on the other side of the bench, if they 

think that even though sometimes they win and sometimes they 

lose, their views, to me, matter an awful lot more. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I would agree. Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Hatch. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mayor, it’s always good to see you. I appreciate the joy and the 

verve with which you run New York City. I know that it’s a tough 

city to run, but you do a great job. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. Thank you. 

Senator HATCH. Mr. Morgenthau, we all respect you. You know 

that, I know that. You’ve given a long public service that is of great 

distinction. 

It’s always good to have attorneys general from any State here, 

and we’re grateful to have you here, Mr. McDaniel. 

Mr. Henderson and I have been friends for a long time. We sometimes oppose each other, but it’s always been with friendship and 

kindness. 

We’re grateful to have you two great people here who do such 

very important work in the city of New Haven. I know it takes guts 

to come here, and we appreciate you being here. 

507 

Mr. Kirsanow, let me just—and certainly Mr. Kirsanow, and 

Linda Chavez, we’ve—we recognize your genius, too, and the things 

that you bring to the table. 

Let me just ask you this, Mr. Kirsanow, because I was the one 

who raised the Ricci case to begin with. I have two related questions about the Ricci case. Do you agree with what Judge Cabranes 

and the other five judges who agreed with him, that this was a 

case of first impression in the Second Circuit, which means that 

there was no precedent? 

Mr. KIRSANOW. That’s correct, Senator. We took a very strong 

look as to whether or not there was anything on point. There may 

have been some peripheral cases that wouldn’t provide any definitive guidance. As I indicated in my statement, to the extent there 

were cases to provide guidance, really EPC—Equal Protection 

Clause cases, Wygant, so on and so forth, those were the kind of 

cases you’d have to look to, but none under Title 7. 

Senator HATCH. Well, explain what was the issue of first impression that these six judges found—— 

Mr. KIRSANOW. It was—— 

Senator HATCH [continuing]. In the minority, 7:6, but they— 

they—— 

Mr. KIRSANOW. Right. 

Senator HATCH. Judge Cabranes got very alarmed because this 

was a summary order that ordinarily they wouldn’t have seen, but 

he caught it in the newspaper, asked to see it, and then said, my 

gosh, this is a case of first impression, we ought to do more than 

just a summary order on it, which is something that I’ve been very 

critical of. 

Mr. KIRSANOW. Senator, it was the tension between two provisions of Title 7, and that is—— 

Senator HATCH. You’re talking about disparate treatment and 

disparate impact? 

Mr. KIRSANOW. Precisely. 

Senator HATCH. And this was—— 

Mr. KIRSANOW. If I could balance the two. And keep in mind that 

the 1991 amendments were really a product of Griggs v. Duke 

Power and its progeny. 

Senator HATCH. Right. 

Mr. KIRSANOW. And remember that Griggs was really a response 

to the difficulty in demonstrating intentional discrimination so that 

there was a resort to disparate impact to try to help prove the case. 

So whether you give primacy to intentional discrimination or disparate impact was what was trying to be determined here, or not 

necessarily primacy, but trying to evaluate both consistently with 

the purposes of Title 7. 

Senator HATCH. Well, please explain the difference between what 

the Supreme Court split 5:4 and what all nine of the Justices on 

the Supreme Court—why they criticized Judge Sotomayor’s decision. 

Mr. KIRSANOW. It had to do with the process by which the decision was reached. Even the dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted in 

Footnote 10 that this is something that ordinarily should have been 

sent back on remand because it was to determine whether or—that 

508 

is, to determine whether or not there was good cause for taking the 

decision New Haven took. 

The majority, on the other hand, said the city of New Haven had 

to have a strong basis in evidence before it discarded the test results. So there were two separate standards by both the majority 

and the dissent, but neither agreed with the manner in which the 

Sotomayor panel disposed of the case. 

Senator HATCH. So all nine Justices on the court agreed that the 

appropriate law wasn’t followed. 

Mr. KIRSANOW. Correct. 

Senator HATCH. And five of them said the city of New Haven was 

wrong. 

Mr. KIRSANOW. Correct. 

Senator HATCH. So the firefighters won. 

Now, Mr. Vargas, I just want to make that clear, because I don’t 

think a lot of people realize that, and that’s a very, very big thing 

to me. Mr. Vargas, your comments about your sons were powerful. 

What difference does it make for them whether merit or race determines opportunity? What difference does this case mean for them? 

Mr. VARGAS. I believe this is going to be a greater opportunity 

for them in the future because they’re not going to be stigmatized 

that way. They’re not going to be looked at that way, and they’re 

going to rise and fall on their own merits and—— 

Senator HATCH. And that’s one reason why you brought this 

case. 

Mr. VARGAS. That’s absolutely right. 

Senator HATCH. Mr. Ricci, I only have a few seconds, but let me 

say this. I want to thank you for your service, for protecting your 

fellow citizens up there. As I understand it, the city of New Haven 

went to great lengths to devise this promotion test that was—the 

lengths were fair and objective, the test was fair and objective, and 

not tilted toward or against any demographic group. In fact, I understand that the test was not a question. They worked on the kind 

and content of the questions so that they were relevant to the job 

but would not create a hurdle for anyone. They used both a written 

and an oral exam format, right? 

Mr. RICCI. Yes. 

Senator HATCH. Is your understanding of how they worked to put 

together the test and did—that’s the way they put it together. Did 

that make you believe that you would be judged on your merits? 

Mr. RICCI. Yes, Senator. The rules of the game were set up, and 

we have a right to be judged fairly. And just by taking the test we 

knew that the test—we didn’t even need to go any further. Just by 

taking the test we knew that the test was job-related and measured the skills, ability and knowledge needed for a competent fire 

officer. 

Senator HATCH. Well, did that make you see this as a genuine 

opportunity that might indeed be open to you? 

Mr. RICCI. Yes, Senator. 

Senator HATCH. Now, tell me more about your expectations when 

you looked at this opportunity. You were, no doubt, familiar with 

the racial dynamics that existed in New Haven at the time. Anyone 

involved in their community anywhere would be aware of that. Did 

you think that at all, that because the test was so rigorously and 

509 

fairly designed, that any of those outside racial dynamics would become an obstacle to your future service in the fire department as 

long as you were qualified for the job? 

Mr. RICCI. No. Myself, and all 20 plaintiffs, including other firefighters that didn’t join the suit, including African-Americans and 

Hispanics, I think we all had the expectation when we took the test 

that the test would be fair, job-related, and that it was going to be 

dictated by one’s merit on how well you did on the exam, not by 

the color of your skin. 

Senator HATCH. Okay. 

Now, gentlemen, I just have one statement to make. You made 

the comment that the Supreme Court changed the law by a majority. They didn’t change the law, they actually recognized there was 

a case of first impression here that had to be decided, and they decided it. They didn’t change any laws. Now, it wasn’t by a bare majority. I mean, nine of them said the case should be reexamined, 

five of them said that New Haven was wrong. 

I just wanted to make that clear so that everybody would understand it, because this is not some itty-bitty case. This is one of the 

most important cases in the country’s history, and that’s why it’s 

caused such a furor. I want to compliment all of you firemen for 

being willing to stand up in this issue, because this is an important 

issue for people of whatever race, or gender, or ethnicity. You 

know, you’ve taken a lot of flack for it, and you shouldn’t. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Senator Specter. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ricci, I agree with just about everything you said, that you 

had a right to go to Federal court and get justice; that racial statistics are wrong; what we sought was even-handed justice. And as 

the court finally decided, you had been deprived of your rights, and 

made a change. 

The question that I have for you, do you have any reason to 

think that Judge Sotomayor acted in anything other than good 

faith in trying to reach a fair decision in the case? 

Mr. RICCI. That’s beyond my legal expertise. I’m not an attorney 

or a legal scholar. I simply welcomed an invitation by the U.S. Senate to come here today and—because this is our first time that 

we’ve gotten to testify about our story. So I can’t comment on—— 

Senator SPECTER. Well, I think that it’s really good that you’ve 

been here and have had a chance to testify. I agree with that totally. And there is enormous appreciation for the work the firefighters do. I had a lot of association with the firefighters in my 

days as a city official in Philadelphia. On the homeland security, 

I’ve been on the forefront of funding for firefighters. And what the 

firefighters did on 9/11 was—words are inadequate, the heroism 

and the bravery and the loss of lives and suffering. 

Lieutenant Vargas, again, I agree with all of your testimony. In 

your work, you have to get it right the first time. Well, when you 

have 5:4 decisions, it’s hard to say which way the ball bounces, especially when they get reversed from time to time. But I would ask 

you the same question I asked of Mr. Ricci, whether you have any 

510 

reason to doubt the good faith of Judge Sotomayor in coming to the 

conclusion that she did. 

Mr. VARGAS. I would have to defer to pretty much the same response. We were invited here to give our story and—and we wanted to focus on that, and I really didn’t put much to that. So—— 

Senator SPECTER. Okay. Well, that’s fair enough. It’s up to the 

Senate. We hope we get it right. But all anybody can use is their— 

is their best judgment. 

Ms. Chavez, when you place so much reliance on Ricci v. 

DeStefano as a basis for opposing Judge Sotomayor, isn’t that case 

just overloaded with subtlety and nuance and could have gone the 

other way? Can you really place much reliance on criticism of 

Judge Sotomayor as a disqualifier? 

Ms. CHAVEZ. Well, first of all, Senator Specter, I think I actually 

went back to criticize Judge Sotomayor’s activities going all the 

way back to Princeton University, so I don’t think I relied exclusively. I think what—and I would answer the question that you 

asked Mr. Vargas and Mr. Ricci. I do think that Judge Sotomayor, 

based on her history, her involvement with the Puerto Rican Legal 

Defense and Education Fund, her writings, her activism, has indicated a preference to eliminate testing. She has fought to—to get 

rid of civil service testing. 

She has challenged tests as being inherently—standardized tests 

as being inherently unequal and, as always, arriving at a disparate 

impact. And I think that activism, that involvement going back 

decades, did in fact influence the way she approached this case. So 

I think it is relevant, and that is the reason I’m criticizing it. It 

is not just her one decision in one case, it is her whole body of 

work, her whole life experience and the views that she has expressed over several decades. 

Senator SPECTER. Well, we consistently have nominees for the 

Supreme Court come to this panel, Justice Alito, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, on both sides of the ideological divide. And 

what they do in an advocacy position is customarily set aside to 

make an evaluation as to their—their competency. When you talk 

about being a woman or being an Hispanic, it’s my view that that 

kind of diversity is enormously helpful. 

I go back to a question I asked Attorney General Meese more 

than 25 years ago. The debate was raging on affirmative action 

even more than it is now. If you have two people of equal competency and one is a minority, Attorney General Meese, not known 

for being a flaming liberal, took—took the minority position. My 

own view is that it’s time we had more women and we had more 

diversity, and we have to have qualifications. Have to have qualifications. And I think that’s what ultimately determines this nomination. 

Attorney General McDaniel, I’m going to ask you a loaded question. You can handle a loaded question. Do you think, with all of 

the critical issues we have to face on separation of powers and 

what the Congress does by way of fact finding and what is done 

on the Americans With Disabilities Act and trying to find out about 

warrantless wire taps and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

and compensation for the survivors of the victims of 9/11, and the 

intricate relationship to the State Department influencing the way 

511 

Congress interprets the foreign sovereign immunity, that there is 

a little too much attention paid to the Ricci case? Not that it’s not 

very important, but there are a lot of matters that are important. 

Isn’t this a little heavy on one case? 

Mr. MCDANIEL. Senator, not—not only do I agree with you about 

the other issues that should be given ample attention because of 

their enormous weight, I think that perhaps the wrong focus of attention, even on this case, has been applied. Chief Justice Roberts 

has said that he would like to narrow standing analyses and he 

would like to be a conservative Justice who wants to look only at 

the disagreements between two parties and not go beyond the 

scope of that. 

One of the important issues in the Ricci case was a standing 

issue, which was their standing to bring action if one had not been 

denied promotion. Senator Hatch’s own attorney general joined 

with me in the brief because we thought that that was among the 

issues that were important and should have been followed under 

stare decisis. Instead, the court expanded standing to someone who 

had not been harmed under the legal standard. 

I think that that is important to consider. I think that it’s important to note that if they were going to change standing and standards, I think it’s somewhat unfair to put emphasis on the footnote. 

For instance, Footnote 10 of Justice Ginsburg, which said that if 

we are going to change the rules of the game then we should remand the case back to be reviewed. But that wasn’t critical of the 

Second Circuit, in and of—— 

Senator SPECTER. I regret—— 

Mr. MCDANIEL. So I agree with you about your—your emphasis 

or the—on the—— 

Senator SPECTER. I regret that there is so little time. Having 

Mayor Bloomberg and Dean Morgenthau, I’d like to really have a 

chance to cross-examine them. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SPECTER. Except that I agreed with their testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to extend my 

appreciation to each of the witnesses for taking your time to be 

here today. It’s very important. These are—as we need to remind 

ourselves—this is an historic time and appointment, and these are 

very important issues that should not be neglected or overlooked 

because of the press of other activities. 

My own position is that I think, by virtue of her training, her experience and her high achievement, Judge Sotomayor is very well 

qualified, all other things being equal. Unfortunately, because of 

her speeches and other public statements where she said ‘‘there’s 

no such thing as objectivity in the law’’, which the opposite of objectivity is subjectivity. She said there’s ‘‘no neutrality’’. If there’s no 

neutrality, then I guess all that leaves is bias. And it really strikes 

a body blow, I think, to the concept of equal justice under the law. 

Judges are not policymakers and judges should leave that job to 

the elected representatives of the people who reserve the time-honVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00523 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
512 

ored right to throw the rascals out if they don’t like what we’re 

doing as elected members of the legislative branch. 

So, you know, my concern is, what kind of judge would she be, 

if confirmed to the United States Supreme Court, the kind of judge 

that follows her speeches or the kind that follows the law? 

I just want to say to these firefighters what I told them earlier 

today when they were kind enough to come by my office. I think, 

you know, judges make mistakes. They used to say the only lawyer 

that hadn’t lost a case is one that hadn’t tried one. I don’t necessarily hold it so much against Judge Sotomayor that she didn’t 

rule your way in the case. Unfortunately, I think she did not give 

it the proper respect and pay it the sort of attention that she 

should, because there were real claims there that needed to be resolved by a court. 

Every citizen is entitled to that, to have judges pay attention and 

not make mistakes by, you know, trying to sweep it under the rug. 

And thank goodness that Judge Cabranes found the case, because 

it almost slipped through the cracks, and then highlighted it so it 

could get to the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court could address the very important issues that you’ve 

presented here. 

And one of the most important aspects, I think, of this hearing, 

is that it provides an opportunity—and it would not have been provided, I think in large part, unless these firefighters had had the 

courage to do what they’ve done—for us to refocus our attention on 

some of these areas, as Chief Justice Roberts said. He said, ‘‘It’s 

sordid business, this divvying up by race.’’ And looking at people 

not as an individual human being, but as a member of a group or 

because of their sex, or their ethnicity, or their race. You know, it’s 

time for this Nation—I hope we would all agree—to look at everyone as individuals and to reward hard work, sacrifice, and initiative. The kinds of things that I think—particularly you, Frank and 

Ben have demonstrated. Frank is the lead plaintiff—but all the 

firefighters have helped demonstrate the importance of not 

divvying up by race, not using de facto quotas. 

And I think I would have felt a lot better if Judge Sotomayor had 

said, you know what? This is really an important issue and we 

should have addressed it. It slipped through our fingers, but thank 

goodness it was caught and it was ultimately reviewed. But she 

didn’t. I think the idea that the city could throw out a test just because the outcome wasn’t what they wanted is really pretext for racial discrimination. It’s to deny people what they are entitled to because of the color of their skin. 

So I just want to ask, in the short time I have here, Mr. Vargas, 

I read earlier a statement that you had made to the New York 

Times about the reason why you’d gone through these five grueling 

years of litigation and the abuse that you’ve taken from people who 

tried to shame you out of standing on your rights and seeing this 

thing through. 

Could you just tell the Committee what sacrifices you have made, 

what your family has made, and why you felt like those sacrifices 

were so important to vindicate this important right? 

Mr. VARGAS. Well, let alone the financial sacrifice, but, you know, 

it—it starts from the moment you get out of the academy. I mean, 

513 

this was something that I wanted to do. I wanted to advance my 

career as a firefighter right through the ranks. And, you know, the 

books came with me to work every single day, you know, from the 

minute I graduated from the academy right up to when I got promoted to lieutenant, and they kept coming with me right on till I 

took the captain’s exam. And once I get promoted to captain, 

they’re going to continue to come with me until I go right up 

through the ranks, you know. 

It’s—it’s not something that, you know, you can lose sight of. 

You’ve got to continue to work hard and—and I want to instill that 

in my kids. I want them to see that and I want them to know that 

this is what America is all about. You work hard. This is how 

America was built. We’re the greatest country in the world because 

you—you—as I said before, you rise and fall on your own merits. 

Senator CORNYN. Do you hope for a day for your children in 

which, as we mentioned from Martin Luther King’s statement previously, ‘‘they will be judged by the content of their character and 

not the color of their skin’’ ? 

Mr. VARGAS. I think our case goes a long way to help in—in assuring that for them, and they’re going to benefit from this and I 

think we’re going in the right direction now. 

Senator CORNYN. I couldn’t agree more. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Kyl. 

Senator KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome to all of you. One of the things that I think may have 

gotten lost in all of this is why tests are important. I particularly 

wanted to ask the two firefighters here, Mr. Ricci and Mr. Vargas, 

what difference does it make how well you perform on the test, 

whether you pass it or not? What’s the big deal? What do you really have to show in those tests? And when you’re out performing 

your duties, what difference does it make whether you pass the test 

or not? Mr. Ricci, maybe start with you. 

Mr. RICCI. Thank you, Senator. It’s important to realize that over 

100 firefighter die in the line of duty each year, an additional 

80,000 are injured. You need to have a command of the knowledge 

in order to make command decisions. You need to understand the 

rules and regulations. Experience is the best teacher, but only a 

fool learns in that school alone. You have to have a basis to make 

the right decisions, because firefighters operate in all different 

types of environments. I’ve had the proud privilege of training the 

United States Marine Corps Seabird team, and they respond to anthrax attacks in one of these buildings. 

I mean, firefighters have to be prepared for the regular house 

fire, to the car accident, to the hazardous material incident. You go 

to work every day and we’re like an insurance policy for the American public that they hope they never have to use. But when someone calls 911, within four to 5 minutes there’s a fully staffed fire 

company at your door, with no paperwork, and we’re there to answer the call. And when you show up, the officer has to be competent to lead his men and women of this fire service, career and 

volunteer, across the country to make the right decisions. 

Senator KYL. Thank you. That’s a great explanation. 

Lieutenant Vargas. 

514 

Mr. VARGAS. There’s not much I can add to that. 

Senator KYL. That was pretty good. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. VARGAS. That was pretty good, huh? 

Senator KYL. Well, I—I appreciate it, and I know that everybody 

here, regardless of party or position on the nominee or anything 

else, appreciates what you do and what your colleagues do, and 

I’m—I’m sure I speak for all of us in that regard. 

One of the things that I wanted to just say briefly, is that I— 

I am very proud of our—I was a lawyer and I practiced law and 

I—and I won some and I lost some. But I always had confidence 

in our system. And America is not unique, but there aren’t very 

many countries in the world like us where we willingly volunteer 

to put our—our fortunes, our freedom, in the event that we’re accused of a crime, maybe even our life if there could be a death penalty involved, our careers, in the case of the suit that you all were 

involved in. We willing do that. And the way we do it is interesting. You all may not know this. 

The lawyers here certainly know it. When I filed a case in the 

U.S. District Court in Arizona, I didn’t know which judge I was 

going to get. There were about 10. There was one I hoped I didn’t 

get, but I knew the other nine, it didn’t matter. They would all approach—they were Democrats, they were Republicans. But I didn’t 

know because it’s the next one in order and the lawyers don’t know 

the order, so it’s almost by lot. But we had confidence that we could 

put our client’s issue before the court and that justice would be 

done because that’s the way our system works. And over 220 years, 

the rule of law has been established in this country by judges applying the law fairly and impartially. Over time, the precedents 

have been built up. 

And what struck me about what you all had—I’m talking about 

the two of you—to go through, is first of all, you were confronted 

with a judge who, in a very thorough decision, said ‘‘you lose’’. 

Then you appeal to the Second Circuit in a pro curium opinion, and 

you all know now what that is all too well. The court didn’t even 

write about it and said, ‘‘no, you lose again’’. Then the day that you 

got the results from the Supreme Court, just, what’s the difference 

between what you felt at the first situation and when you got the 

news about the Supreme Court, about your confidence in our system? 

Mr. VARGAS. I tried to say earlier that this is exactly how this 

country was built. This is why we’re so great, because, you know, 

you can work hard and you can go after the things that you want 

in this—in this country. And, you know, you’re going to be successful, you know, but you have to apply yourself. And those are the 

things that I tried to instill in—in my kids, and I’ll always put that 

forth. And I’ll speak with my accent so that they can see that it’s 

a great country, you know, and that’s why you need to work hard. 

Mr. RICCI. The price of democracy is vigilance, to be willing to 

participate—and the original feeling was, you know, we always— 

through our attorneys, always went back to that process and said, 

this is America. If we keep going forward, the process will work. 

That, at the end, to be able to look at my son and say, you know, 

I haven’t been there for you, but to look at him and say this is a— 

515 

this is an unbelievable civics lesson—lesson, that if you participate 

in democracy, that’s how it all works. And I thank you, Senator. 

Senator KYL. And I thank you. I hope that all of you will have 

confidence in our legal system in the future. Everybody here, again, 

regardless of position, will really stand in awe at a system which, 

in our country, year in and year out, has proved to be a very, very 

good system for our people. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Senator Kyl, I want to thank you for your 

questions and the responses. I think it was the right way for the 

record to reflect the end of this panel, which has been, I think, 

very, very helpful to us in the record on the confirmation process 

for Judge Sotomayor. 

I want to thank Chairman Leahy for allowing me to chair this 

panel. We’ve had a very distinguished panel, all eight of you, we 

thank you for being here. I particularly want to thank Mayor 

Bloomberg for taking the time to come from New York. I mention 

him because not only—does he do a great job as mayor, but he has 

had an important role at Johns Hopkins University and we very 

much appreciate that. 

And to Mr. Morgenthau, you are the model for the Nation in the 

District Attorney’s Office, and it’s—its a real honor to have you before our Committee and we thank you for your energy and continuation in public service. 

And to Firefighter Ricci and to Lieutenant Vargas, I personally 

want to thank you for being here. You put a face on the issues. 

We—look at cases and we talk about the impact, but it affects real 

people, and real lives, and real families. I think you really have 

added to today’s hearing by your personal stories. Each one of us 

thank you for your public service, and we thank you for your belief 

in our Nation and for the testimony that you have given to this 

Committee. It’s been extremely helpful to each one of us on—the 

Judiciary Committee. 

And with that, we are going to take a 5-minute recess. When we 

return, Senator Klobuchar will be chairing the next panel. 

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the Committee was recessed.] 

After Recess [4:29 p.m.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I think we are going to start our third 

panel here. If everyone could be seated. I will warn those of you 

out there, anyone that has asked David Cone to sign a baseball, 

you must ask all seven of our other panelists as well. 

We are going to start by getting sworn in. Would you please 

stand? Raise your right hand. Do you affirm that the testimony you 

are about to give before the committee will be the truth, the whole 

truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Thank you. 

We are going to start. I will introduce each of you and then you 

will give your 5 minutes of testimony and then we will have questions after that. We are going to start here with Mr. Freeh. Louis 

Freeh is the former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

whose career in the Department of Justice began in 1975 when he 

became a special agent in the FBI. 

Mr. Freeh has a long and distinguished career as a public servant under both Democratic and Republican Presidents. He was appointed by President George H. W. Bush as a Federal District 

516 

Court judge on the Southern District of New York. He was also a 

career Federal prosecutor in the United States Attorney General’s 

Office for the Southern District of New York, serving as Chief of 

the Organized Crime Unit, Deputy United States attorney and Associate United States attorney. 

He graduated from Rutgers Law School and has an LOM degree 

in criminal law from New York University Law School. I look forward to your testimony, Mr. Freeh. 

STATEMENT OF LOUIS FREEH, FORMER DIRECTOR, FEDERAL 

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Mr. FREEH. Thank you very much, Senator. Good afternoon, Senator Sessions, good afternoon to you. It is a great privilege to be 

before the committee, the committee where I have appeared over 

100 times and it is always a pleasure to be here. 

There are many friends on the committee who I have seen over 

the last few days. You have a prepared statement from me. As Senator Sessions knows, I generally don’t read my opening statements 

which has gotten me in trouble with OMB over the years, but I 

thought it might be good just to talk and tell you why I’m here. 

I have had the privilege to work with great judges and a few people who are truly legendary judges. Let me just mention a couple. 

I served on the District Court with Constance Baker Motley who 

before she was a judge had those qualities of fairness and openmindedness and commitment to the rule of law that I think we 

wish to see in our judges. 

The last case I tried as a judge was in the District of Minnesota 

before Judge Devitt. It was a case which by the way, Judge Sessions, Senator Sessions and I worked on together. He was the Attorney General of Alabama, great Attorney General, and I was an 

Assistant U.S. Attorney working on the case. It was the murder of 

a Federal judge. It was one of the few tragic times in our history 

when a Federal judge was murdered and the case was tried before 

Judge Devitt. 

Judge Devitt, who many of his peers said was the judge from 

central casting, was the model of judicial conduct and commitment. 

The jury instruction book, Devitt and Blackmun, was named after 

him. The Devitt Award, which is probably the most prestigious judicial award, is named after him. He was actually one of my mentors when I went on the Southern District bench. 

I was sworn in as FBI Director by Judge Frank Johnson, who as 

someone has mentioned here before, was a legendary judicial hero 

from Winston County, Alabama. He, together with a handful of 

other Republican judges, really changed the tide of history by their 

commitment to the law and to civil rights. Their fearlessness, honesty, and integrity with which they took office—an example to all 

judges. 

So it is my pleasure to recommend to the committee the confirmation of this outstanding judge, Sonia Sotomayor. I want to 

talk a little bit about her judicial experience. I have been here or 

listening to these proceedings for the last few days. I think I may 

be the only lawyer who has actually been with her in a courtroom. 

Since in my view real life experience is the best indicator of what 

517 

a judge will do in the future—how they behaved, conducted, wrote 

and decided matters as a judge. 

As has been mentioned before, this candidate has an enormous 

and rich judicial record, 17 years, thousands of opinions, all the 

things that you want to look for as you make your evaluation. 

The process by which Judge Sotomayor comes here before you is 

quite extensive. You have the President and his reviewers, own investigation, you have the Bar Associations, this committee. You 

have the FBI that conducted now three background investigations. 

I was actually Director when the second one was done. 

You have any and all information that has come from the public, 

from the citizens, Americans. You have reputational evidence from 

other judges, from lawyers who had appeared before her. 

My association with her began in 1992. She was a new judge on 

the Southern District and we had this tradition where the second 

newest judge would mentor the new judge. Some of us didn’t think 

it was the wisest rule to have, since I had about 9 months on the 

bench when she was entrusted to my care, so to speak. 

I actually sat with her in court and sat with her during trials. 

I helped review opinions that she asked me to look at. My law 

clerks were encamped with her law clerks. 

What I want to communicate to you in the very short period remaining is Judge Sotomayor’s enormous judicial integrity and commitment to finding the facts, to being open minded, to being fair. 

She struggled and deliberated in making sure she had all the facts, 

making sure she had the right law, following the law and being the 

kind of judge that I think we would all be proud of. 

Speeches are important and it is great the way you all have considered that so carefully, but when you enter the courtroom and 

you put the judicial robe on, just as you assume the authority when 

you take your committee, it is a whole different set of influences 

and immense power and influence that takes over. 

When Judge Sotomayor has been on the bench, what she has 

written, when she has argued, the way she has conducted herself, 

I think we can very safely predict this is going to be an outstanding 

judge with all the qualities that I know that you would want. So 

I urge you all to support her. Thank you very much. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much. Thank you for your 

testimony. Next we have Chuck Canterbury. Chuck Canterbury is 

the National President of the Fraternal Order of Police, one of the 

nation’s largest and most prominent voices for law enforcement officers. 

Mr. Canterbury has served in numerous capacities in the organization including national Vice President and national Second Vice 

President. He has 25 years of experience in law enforcement where 

he worked as a police officer in Horry County, South Carolina. 

Maybe you know Lindsey Graham, one of our members here. In 

only the best ways, I am sure. 

We look very much forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. 

Canterbury. 

518 

STATEMENT OF CHUCK CANTERBURY, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, 

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE 

Mr. CANTERBURY. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member 

Sessions, Senator Hatch. It is a pleasure to be here today to offer 

the support of 327,000 rank and file police officers, my members in 

the Fraternal Order of Police. 

It is my pleasure to testify in support of the nomination of Judge 

Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court. Speaking as a law enforcement officer, I think it says a lot about the character of a young 

person who graduated from Yale and then accepted her first job as 

a poorly paid prosecutor in the District of Manhattan. Yet that is 

exactly what Judge Sotomayor did, as my members do in every city 

in America. 

She spent 5 years with that office, prosecuted many criminal 

cases, including a triple homicide and she forged an excellent working relationship with the men and women working the beat in 

Manhattan. She earned their respect and a reputation as being 

tough, which in my profession is a compliment. 

As an appellate judge, she has participated in over 3,000 panel 

decisions and authored roughly 400 opinions, handling difficult 

issues of constitutional law, complex procedural matters and lawsuits involving complicated business organizations. 

Some of her critics have pounced on a few of those decisions as 

well as some of the comments made during speaking engagements 

and have engaged in some pretty wild speculation as to what she 

would do as a Supreme Court Justice. 

As a law enforcement officer, I prefer to rely on evidence and fact 

and not speculation to reach those conclusions. 

One such area of speculation is on her feelings toward our right 

to bear arms as guaranteed by the Second Amendment. I want no 

mistake to be made. I take a back seat to no one in my reverence 

for the Second Amendment. In fact, if I thought that Judge 

Sotomayor’s presence on the court posed a threat to my Second 

Amendment rights, I would not be supporting her here today. 

The facts, as some have already pointed out, reflect a brilliant 

and thoughtful jurist respectful of the law and committed to its appropriate enforcement. 

Over the course of her career, she has analyzed each case on its 

merits. To me, that’s evidence of strong commitment to duty and 

to the law, two characteristics that we should expect from all of our 

judges. 

I want to cite a few cases which I’m familiar with because they 

deal with issues that every beat cop in the United States has dealt 

with. In the United States v. Fausto, an offender indicated on 242 

counts relating to child pornography sought to have evidence 

against him thrown out because a search warrant that was sworn 

out lacked probable cause. 

Judge Sotomayor’s ruling held that the error was committed by 

the District Court issuing the warrant, not the officers who executed it. The conviction was upheld. 

In the United States v. Santa, she ruled that law enforcement officers executing a search of a suspect based on an arrest warrant 

they believed to be active and valid should not result in the suppression of evidence even if that warrant had expired. 

519 

In the United States v. Howard, she overturned the District 

Court’s decision to suppress evidence of drug trafficking by finding 

warrantless automobile searches to be constitutional. 

In the United States v. Clark, she held that the law enforcement 

officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by asking to see the 

VIN plate under the hood of a vehicle after discovering that the 

VIN plate on the dashboard was missing. 

All of these rulings show that Judge Sotomayor got at least as 

much of her legal education from her 5 years as a prosecutor as 

she did at Yale Law School. These 5 years in my view reflect the 

same kind of commitment to the law that I have seen in the officers that I represent. 

She has clearly demonstrated that she understands the fine line 

that police officers must walk and in her rulings reflect a working 

knowledge, not a theoretical knowledge, of the everyday realities of 

law enforcement work. 

After reviewing her record, I can say that Judge Sotomayor is a 

jurist in whom any beat cop could have confidence. It is for that 

reason that the National Executive Board of the FOP voted unanimously to support her nomination and we urge you to as well. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Canterbury. 

Next is David Cone. David Cone is a former major league baseball 

pitcher who over an 18-year career played for five teams in both 

the American and National Leagues. 

Mr. Cone won the American League Cy Young Award in 1994 

and pitched a perfect game in 1999 as a member of the New York 

Yankees. He was a member of the Major League Baseball Player’s 

Association throughout his major league career and was an officer 

from 1994 through 2000. Thank you very much for being here, Mr. 

Cone. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID CONE, FORMER MAJOR LEAGUE 

BASEBALL PLAYER 

Mr. CONE. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar, Senator Sessions, Senator Hatch. Nice to see you again. 

On behalf of all major league players both former and current, 

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to acknowledge the unique role 

that Judge Sonia Sotomayer played in preserving America’s 

pasttime. 

As you know, I am not a lawyer, much less a Supreme Court 

scholar. I was a professional baseball player from the time I was 

drafted out of high school in 1981 until the time I retired in 2003. 

I was also a union member and an officer of the Major League 

Baseball Players’ Association. 

As is well known, major league baseball has a long history of acrimonious labor relations. It was not until the 1970’s that players 

first gained the rights of free agency and salary arbitration. This 

meant that for the first time ever, players were able to earn what 

they were worth and have some choice about where they played. 

The next 20 years were quite difficult. There was a lockout or 

strike at the end of every contract. To the players, every dispute 

seemed to center on the owners’ desire to roll back free agency 

rights the players had won. But 1994 was the worst. 

520 

The owners said that they wanted a salary cap and refused a 

promise that they would abide by the rules of the just expired contract after the season ended. We had no choice. The players went 

on strike in August 1994. 

I should note that this was before Congress passed the Curt 

Flood Act authored by Senators Hatch and Leahy which made it 

clear that baseball’s anti-trust exemption could not be used to undermine Federal law. 

In response, the owners canceled the remainder of the season 

which meant that there would be no World Series. Discussions continued through the fall and the early winter but were fruitless. In 

December 1994, the owners unilaterally implemented a salary cap 

and imposed new rules and conditions of employment which would 

have made free agency virtually meaningless. 

They announced they would start the 1995 season with so-called 

replacement players instead of major leaguers. We did not think 

the owners were negotiating in good faith as they were required to 

do under Federal law. We went to the National Labor Relations 

Board. The board agreed with us and went to Federal court to seek 

an injunction against the owners’ unilateral changes. 

The United States district judge who drew the case was Judge 

Sotomayor. The rest is history, or at least baseball history. Judge 

Sotomayor found that the owners had engaged in bad faith bargaining. She issued an injunction. Her decision stopped the owners 

from imposing new work rules, ended our strike and got us all back 

on the field. 

The words she wrote cut right to the heart of the matter, and I 

quote: ‘This strike is about more than just whether the players and 

owners will resolve their differences. It is also about how the principles embodied by Federal law operate. This strike has placed the 

entire concept of collective bargaining on trial. Issuing an injunction by opening day is important to ensure that the symbolic value 

of that day is not tainted by an unfair labor practice and the 

NLRB’s inability to take effective steps against its perpetuation.’ 

Judge Sotomayor grasped not only the complexity of the case, but 

its importance to our sport. Her decision was upheld by a unanimous Court of Appeals panel comprised of judges appointed by different Presidents from different parties with different judicial philosophies. 

On the day he announced her nomination, President Obama observed that some have said Judge Sotomayor saved baseball. Others may think this is an overstatement. But look at it this way. A 

lot of people, both inside and outside of baseball tried to settle the 

dispute. Presidents, special mediators, Secretaries of Labor, Members of Congress all tried to help but were not successful. With one 

decision, Judge Sotomayor changed the entire dispute. 

Her ruling rescued the 1995 baseball season and forced the parties to resume real negotiations. The negotiations were not easy, 

but ultimately were successful which in turn led to an improved relationship between the owners and the players. 

Today, baseball is currently enjoying a run of more than 14 years 

without interruption, a record that would have been inconceivable 

in the 1990’s. 

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I believe all of us who love the game, players, owners and fans, 

are in her debt. If Judge Sotomayor is confirmed, I hope the rest 

of the country will realize as the players did in 1995 that it can 

be a good thing to have a judge or a Justice on the Supreme Court 

who recognizes that the law cannot always be separated from the 

realities involved in the disputes being decided. 

Thank you again and I would be glad to answer any questions 

you may have. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Cone. Our next 

witness is Kate Stith. She is the Lafayette S. Foster Professor of 

Law at Yale Law School where she teaches and writes in the areas 

of criminal law, criminal procedure and constitutional law. 

Previously Professor Stith was an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the 

Southern District of New York where she prosecuted white collar 

and organized crime cases. After graduating from Harvard Law 

School, she clerked for Judge Carl McGowan of the U.S. Court of 

Appeals for the District of Columbia and for Associate Justice 

Byron White on the Supreme Court. Thank you for being here and 

we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF KATE STITH, LAFAYETTE S. FOSTER 

PROFESSOR OF LAW, YALE LAW SCHOOL 

Professor STITH. I thank you, Senators, for the opportunity to 

comment on the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor whom I 

have known since she became a judge in 1992. 

As you noted before, I joined the faculty at Yale Law School in 

1985. I was a Federal prosecutor in New York and I was also a 

Special Assistant at the Department of Justice in Washington. 

While a Federal prosecutor in New York, I had the pleasure of 

working with Louis Freeh. It is my judgment that this is an exceptionally strong nomination. My judgment has nothing to do with 

Judge Sotomayor’s sex, ethnicity or personal story. I am judging 

her on the same criteria that I used when I was asked by the Yale 

Daily News some years ago whether Samuel Alito would be a 

strong nomination to the Supreme Court. I answered yes then and 

I answer yes now. 

Specifically I am confident that Sonia Sotomayor would serve 

this nation with powerful intelligence, vigor, rectitude and an abiding commitment to the Constitution. Moreover, her service as a 

state prosecutor and a District judge will make her unique on the 

court to which she will ascend. 

My views on her are informed by many sources. First, I have 

been unusually involved, at least for a professor, with members of 

the bar and bench within the Second Circuit. 

Among these lawyers and judges who know her best, she is held 

in the highest repute across the board. My views are also based on 

my many conversations with her. Among the most telling are those 

in which she has described the attributes she is looking for in prospective law clerks. 

Through these discussions over more than 15 years, I believe I 

gained insight into her view of the role of a judge. The bottom line 

is this. What she wants in her law clerks are the qualities we all 

want in a judge. 

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She wants to make sure first that they are serious about the law 

and not about politics or professional opportunities after the clerkship. They must be serious about all areas of the law. For Judge 

Sotomayor, there are no favorite areas. 

Which brings me to a third quality she wants in her clerks. The 

prospective clerk must be willing to work his or her fingers to the 

bone if necessary in order to ensure that the opinions Judge 

Sotomayor writes and those she joins do not miss a relevant precedent and do not get a fact wrong. 

There is an overriding fourth quality that the judge considers 

critical. Is the prospective clerk willing to take criticism, work 

harder, and where appropriate rethink her initial assessment or 

his initial assessment of the issues? 

Over the years, the judge’s former clerks have told me time and 

again that they greatly appreciate her devoted commitment to the 

law, as a result of which they were held to higher standards and 

learned more than in any other time of their lives. 

Her conception of the role of a judge is borne out by her judicial 

opinions that I have read in the area of criminal law and procedure. 

On criminal procedure, let me just note that the usual categories 

of left and right do not easily apply. I would say that her decisions 

on the whole reflect more pragmatism and less formalism than 

those of, say, Justice Souter. Sometimes this cuts for the government, sometimes it cuts against it. 

I want to focus in particular on one substantive criminal law 

case, United States v. George decided in 2004. Judge Sotomayor’s 

unanimous 16-page opinion in that case concerns the meaning of 

the mens rea, term willfully in a Federal statute that makes it a 

crime to waillfully falsify a passport application. 

Her opinion makes clear that the role of the courts is not to determine what level of mens rea they think should apply, but what 

Congress intended when it wrote the word willfully. 

The opinion then embarks on an heroic effort to figure out what 

Congress meant in this particular statute. The opinion is so clarifying and insightful that my co-authors and I decided to include a 

long excerpt from it in our forthcoming criminal law case book. 

But the significance of the case isn’t only that it is an excellent 

opinion. It also resulted from the willingness of Judge Sotomayor 

and two colleagues to reconsider their initial decision when additional arguments were brought to their attention, even though this 

meant that a different party would prevail. 

Their aim was neither to affirm the conviction nor to reverse the 

conviction, but to find the best resolution of the complex and conflicting precedents on this mens rea issue. 

In conclusion, I submit that Judge Sotomayor’s opinion in the 

George case reveals four judicial qualities that she clearly possesses. 

First, she cared deeply about the issue at hand, no matter how 

minor or word parsing it may seem even to lawyers. Second, she 

was willing to reassess her initial judgment and dig deeper. 

Third, her legal analysis was exceptionally clear and astute. 

Fourth, she had no agenda other than trying to get the law right, 

523 

and in a society committed to the rule of law, trying to get the law 

right is what it means to be fair and impartial. 

This is a great judge. I urge you to vote in favor of her confirmation. Thank you, Senators. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much. We next have Dr. 

Charmaine Yoest who is the President and CEO of Americans 

United for Life, the first national pro-life organization in the nation 

whose legal strategists have been involved in every pro-life case before the United States Supreme Court since Roe v. Wade. 

Dr. Yoest began her career in the White House during the 

Reagan administration. She has also worked as the Project Director of the Family Gender and Tenure Project at the University of 

Virginia and as a Vice President at the Family Research Council. 

Welcome, Dr. Yoest. We look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DR. CHARMAINE YOEST, AMERICANS UNITED 

FOR LIFE 

Dr. YOEST. Thank you very much, Senator Klobuchar, Ranking 

Member Sessions and members of the committee for inviting me to 

testify before you today. 

As you said, I am here on behalf of Americans United for Life, 

and we are the nation’s oldest pro-life legal organization. Our vision at AUL is a nation where everyone is welcomed in life and 

protected in law. 

We have been committed to defending human life through vigorous judicial legislative and educational efforts since 1971 and we 

have been involved in every abortion related case before the United 

States Supreme Court beginning with Roe v. Wade. 

I am here today because of AUL’s deep concern about the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme 

Court. A vote to confirm Judge Sotomayor to our highest court is 

a vote for unrestricted abortion on demand and a move toward elevating abortion as a fundamental right equal to our freedom of religion and freedom of speech. 

A nominee’s judicial philosophy goes to the heart of his or her 

qualifications to serve on the United States Supreme Court. Based 

on Judge Sotomayor’s record of prior statements combined with her 

over a decade-long service on the board of the Puerto Rican Legal 

Defense and Education Fund, Judge Sotomayor’s judicial philosophy makes her unqualified to serve on the Supreme Court. 

When judges fail to respect their limited role under our Constitution by imposing their personal preferences regarding public policy 

through their decisions, our entire judicial system of equal justice 

under the law is corrupted. 

In a series of speeches as we have heard chronicled here this 

week, Judge Sotomayor has indicated a troubling willingness to celebrate her own personal preferences and characteristics. 

Several references have been made during this hearing to the 

judge’s 2001 wise Latina speech. I would note that in that very 

same speech she stated that ‘personal experiences affect the facts 

that judges choose to see.’ Not just what they do see, but what they 

choose to see. 

524 

Of even greater concern, Judge Sotomayor stated in the same lecture that ‘the aspiration to impartiality is just that. It is an aspiration.’ 

However, impartiality is not merely an aspiration. Impartiality is 

a discipline and its necessity is enshrined in the judicial oath. A 

judge who injects personal experiences into a decision corrupts the 

very foundations of our judicial system. 

Perhaps the clearest example of Judge Sotomayor’s problematic 

philosophy is her April 2009 speech in which she said, ‘Ideas have 

no boundaries. Ideas are what set our creative juices flowing. Ideas 

are ideas and whatever their source, if it persuades you then you 

are going to adopt its reasoning.’ 

We see her here building a case for judicial activism, yet creativity is the approach Americans want least from a judge. A judge 

who approaches the bench seeking to ‘implement ideas’ is an activist judge by definition. 

The laboratories of democracy in our system should remain firmly lodged in the state legislatures, not preempted from the court. 

These troubling speeches did not occur in isolation. Looking at 

the totality of the judge’s record must include her 12 years of service on the board of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education 

Fund. During that time, the organization filed not one, but six amicus briefs in five-abortion related cases before the Supreme Court. 

Given her particular emphasis on personal viewpoint in jurisprudence, we believe these cases become uniquely relevant in providing insight into her judicial philosophy. 

Judge Sotomayor served the fund as a member and vice president of the board of directors and also as chairperson of the Education and Litigation Committees and has been described as an involved and ardent supporter of their various legal efforts. 

What then does her tenure with the organization tell us about 

her judicial philosophy? The Fund briefs consistently argued the 

position that abortion is a fundamental right, expressing hostility 

to any regulation of abortion, including parental notification, informed consent and bans on partial birth abortion. 

For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Fund compared abortion to the First Amendment right to free speech and argued that any burden on the right to abortion was unconstitutional. 

In Ohio v. Akron and Casey, the Fund asked the court to strike 

down parental involvement statutes insisting that minors should 

be ‘protected against parental involvement that might prevent or 

instruct the exercise of their right to choose.’ 

In Williams v. Zbaraz, the Fund argued that failure to publicly 

fund abortions was discriminatory. In Webster v. Reproductive 

Health Services, the Fund argued against, against a requirement 

that physicians personally counsel patients. They even argued in 

Webster that strict scrutiny is required because of the preciousness 

of the fundamental right to abortion, underscoring not just a willingness to engage in creative jurisprudence, but an ideological commitment to advancing an extremist abortion agenda. 

In conclusion, I would like to end on a personal note related to 

the Fund briefs. We have heard quite a bit about settled versus unsettled this week, and the one thing we do know, that as we have 

525 

seen this week, this country is still very unsettled about abortion 

doctrine. 

However, among the American people there are some elements 

of abortion related policy that absolutely do provide common 

ground. Preeminent among these is a core American belief in the 

bonds between parent and child. 

I have five children and the notion that my daughters might be 

taken for a surgical procedure without my knowledge is horrific. 

This common sense commitment to protect our children is overwhelmingly shared among all of those who identify themselves as 

pro-life and pro-choice, and yet it is precisely these kinds of common sense policies like parental notification that are threatened by 

this nomination. 

In the Fund’s brief in Ohio v. Akron, they argued that ‘the court 

would also need to consider whether the state through giving the 

parents confidential information has enhanced these parents’ ability to indoctrinate, control or punish their minor daughters who 

choose abortion.’ 

This is a viewpoint far outside the mainstream of American public opinion and it points to another truth about the Fund arguments in their world view which the evidence indicates Judge 

Sotomayor shares. While arguing to promote abortion to a fundamental right equivalent to the freedom of religion or speech, they 

actually wish to elevate it even further, placing it singularly alone 

among rights beyond the reach of the American public to regulate 

or even debate. Thank you very much. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much. Next we have Sandy 

Froman. Sandy Froman is the Past President of the National Rifle 

Association of America. Ms. Froman is also currently a member of 

the NRA Board of Directors where she has served since 1992 and 

in 2007 was unanimously elected to a lifetime appointment on the 

NRA Council. 

A graduate of Stanford University and Harvard Law School, Ms. 

Froman is a practicing attorney and speaks and writes regularly on 

the Second Amendment. Welcome to the committee, we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF SANDY FROMAN, ESQ., ATTORNEY, GUN 

RIGHTS ADVOCATE, AND FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION 

Ms. FROMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. Chairman Leahy, Ranking Member Sessions, Senator Hatch, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee today to comment on the 

nomination of Sonia Sotomayor as it relates to her views on the 

Second Amendment. 

It is critical that a Supreme Court Justice understand and appreciate the origin and meaning of the right of the people to keep and 

bear arms, a right exercised and valued by almost 90 million American gun owners. 

Yet Judge Sotomayor’s record on the Second Amendment and her 

unwillingness or inability to engage in any meaningful analysis of 

this enumerated right when twice given the opportunity to do so 

suggests either a lack of understanding of Second Amendment jurisprudence or hostility to the right. 

526 

In 2004, Judge Sotomayor and two colleagues in U.S. v. Sanchez 

Villar discussed the Second Amendment claim in a one-sentence 

footnote holding without any analysis that the right to possess a 

gun is clearly not a fundamental right. 

Judge Sotomayor reiterated her view earlier this year as par of 

a panel in Maloney v. Cuomo holding that the Second Amendment 

is not a fundamental right, does not apply to the states and that 

if an object is designed primarily as a weapon, that is a sufficient 

basis for total prohibition even in the home. 

The Maloney court ignored directives and precedent from the Supreme Court in last year’s landmark case, District of Columbia v. 

Heller which held that the Second Amendment guarantees to all 

law abiding, responsible citizens the individual right to arms, particularly for self-defense. 

Although the Supreme Court in Heller warned against applying 

the Supreme Court incorporation cases from the late 1800’s without conducting a proper Fourteenth Amendment inquiry, Judge 

Sotomayor’s panel in Maloney did just that. 

They cited the 1886 case of Presser v. Illinois decided under the 

Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for 

the position that the Second Amendment does not limit the states 

and they ignored the Supreme Court’s 2008 directive to conduct a 

Fourteenth Amendment analysis under the modern doctrine of the 

Due Process Clause to determine if the right is fundamental and 

should be incorporated. 

By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Nordyke v. King when faced 

with the same incorporation question earlier this year did follow 

the Supreme Court’s directive and correctly concluded that the Second Amendment is a fundamental right and does apply to the 

states through the Due Process Clause. 

Our Second Amendment rights are no less deserving of protection against states and local governments than the First, Fourth 

and Fifth Amendments, all of which have been incorporated. 

When faced with the most important question remaining after 

Heller, whether the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental 

and applies to the states, Judge Sotomayor dismissed the issue 

with no substantive analysis. 

She and her colleagues also failed to follow Supreme Court precedent when they held that the New York statute could be upheld 

if the government had a rational basis for the law. They ignored 

that the Supreme Court in Heller rejected the rational basis test 

for Second Amendment claims. 

By failing to conduct a proper Fourteenth Amendment analysis, 

the Maloney court evaded its judicial responsibilities, offered no 

guidance to lower courts and provided no assistance in framing the 

issue for resolution by the Supreme Court. 

Whenever an appellate judge fails to provide supporting analysis 

for their conclusion or address serious constitutional issues presented by the case, it is legitimate to ask whether the judge 

reached that conclusion by application of the Constitution and statutes or based on a political or social agenda. 

Judge Sotomayor’s view robs the Second Amendment of any real 

meaning. Under her view, the city of New Orleans’ door-to-door 

527 

confiscation of firearms from law-abiding peaceable citizens in the 

aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was constitutional. 

Preventing an individual from exercising what the Heller court 

said was the Second Amendment’s core lawful purpose of self-defense is no less dangerous when accomplished by a state law than 

by a Federal law. 

The Second Amendment survives today by a single vote in the 

Supreme Court. Both its application to the states and whether 

there will be a meaningfully strict standard of review remain to be 

decided. 

Judge Sotomayor has already revealed her views and they are 

contrary to the text, history and meaning of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. As a Circuit Court judge, she is constrained 

by precedent. But as a Supreme Court Justice appointed for life, 

she would be making precedent. 

A super majority of Americans believe in an individual personal 

right to arms. They deserve a Justice who will interpret the Second 

Amendment in a fair and impartial manner and write well crafted 

opinions worthy of respect from those of us who must live by their 

decisions. 

The President who nominated Judge Sotomayor has expressed 

support for the city of Chicago’s gun ban which is being challenged 

in NRA v. Chicago, a case headed to the Supreme Court. 

Seating a Justice on the Supreme Court who does not treat the 

Second Amendment as a fundamental right deserving of protection 

against cities and states could do far more damage to the right to 

keep and bear arms than any legislation passed by Congress. 

Thank you. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much for your testimony, 

Ms. Froman. 

Our next witness is David Kopel. He is currently the Research 

Director of the Independence Institute in Golden, Colorado and an 

Associate Policy Analyst at the CATO Institute. 

He is also a contributor to the National Review Magazine. He 

graduated from the University of Michigan Law School. Thank you 

very much for being here. We look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID KOPEL, ESQ., INDEPENDENCE 

INSTITUTE 

Mr. KOPEL. The case of Sonia Sotomayor v. the Second Amendment is not yet found in the record of Supreme Court decisions. Yet 

if Judge Sotomayor is confirmed to the Supreme Court, the opinions of the newest Justice may soon begin to tell the story of a Justice with disregard for the exercise of constitutional rights by tens 

of millions of Americans. 

New York state is the only state in the union which completely 

prohibits the peaceful possession of nunchaku, a xenophobic ban 

enacted after the opening to China in the early 1970s after the 

growth of interest in martial arts. 

In a colloquy with Senator Hatch on July 14, Judge Sotomayor 

said that there was a rational basis for the ban because nunchaku 

could injure or kill someone. The same point could just as accurately be made about bows and arrows, swords or guns. All of them 

528 

are weapons and all of them can be used for sporting purposes or 

for legitimate self-defense. 

Judge Sotomayor’s approach would allow states to ban archery 

equipment with no more basis than declaring the obvious, that 

bows are weapons. Even if there were no issue of fundamental 

rights in this case, Judge Sotomayor’s application of the rational 

basis test was shallow and insufficiently reasoned and it was contrary to Supreme Court precedent showing that the rational basis 

test is supposed to involve a genuine inquiry, not a mere repetition 

of a few statements made by prejudice people who impose the law. 

The plaintiff in Maloney had argued that even putting aside the 

Second Amendment, the New York prohibition violated his rights 

under the Fourteenth Amendment. There was no controlling precedent on whether Mr. Maloney’s activity involved an unenumerated 

right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Accordingly, Judge Sotomayor and her fellow Maloney panelists 

should have provided a reasoned decision on the issue. Yet Judge 

Sotomayor simply presumed with no legal reasoning that Mr. 

Maloney’s use of arms in his own home was not part of the exercise 

of a fundamental right. 

Testifying before this committee on July 14, Judge Sotomayor 

provided further examples of her troubling attitude to the right to 

arms. She told Senator Hatch that the Heller decision had authorized gun control laws which could pass the rational basis test. 

To the contrary, the Heller decision had explicitly rejected the 

weak standard of review which Justice had argued for in his dissent. 

Both Judge Sotomayor and some of her advocates have pointed 

to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in NRA v. Chicago as retrospectively validating her actions in Maloney. The argument is 

unpersuasive. Both the Maloney and the NRA courts cited 19th 

century precedents which had said that the Fourteenth Amendment’s ‘‘privileges or immunities’’ clause did not make the Second 

Amendment enforceable against the States. 

However, as the Heller decision itself had pointed out, those 

cases ‘‘did not engage in the sort of 14th Amendment inquiry required by our later cases.’’ 

In particular, the later cases require an analysis under a separate provision of the 14th Amendment, the Due Process clause. Notably, the Seventh Circuit addressed this very issue and provided 

a detailed argument for why the existence of modern incorporation 

under the Due Process clause would not change the result in the 

case at bar. In contrast, Judge Sotomayor’s per curiam opinion in 

Maloney did not even acknowledge the existence of the issue. 

Various advocates have made the argument that since Maloney 

and NRA reached the same result, and since two of the judges in 

NRA v. Chicago were Republican appointees who were often called 

‘‘conservatives,’’ then the Maloney opinion must be all right. This 

argument is valid only if one presumes that conservatives and/or 

Republican appointees always meet the standard of strong protectiveness for constitutional rights which should be required for any 

Supreme Court nominee. 

In the case of the NRA v. Chicago judges, that standard was 

plainly not met. The Seventh Circuit judges actually made the polVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00540 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
529 

icy argument that the Second Amendment should not be incorporated because incorporation would prevent states from outlawing 

self-defense by people who are attacked in their own homes. 

A wise judge demonstrates and builds respect for the rule of law 

by writing opinions which carefully examine the relevant legal 

issues, and which provide careful written explanations for the 

judge’s decisions on those issues. Judge Sotomayor’s record on arms 

rights cases has been the opposite. Her glib and dismissive attitude 

toward the right is manifest in her decisions and has been further 

demonstrated by her testimony before this Committee. In Sonia 

Sotomayor’s America, the peaceful citizens who possess firearms, 

bows, or martial arts instruments have no rights which a State is 

bound to respect, and those citizens are not even worthy of a serious explanation as to why. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kopel appear as a submission for 

the record.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much. And did I say your 

name correctly? Oh, well, that was good. Thank you. 

Next we have Ilya Somin, and Professor Somin is an assistant 

professor at George Mason University School of Law. His research 

focuses on constitutional law, property law, and the study of popular political participation and its implications for constitutional 

democracy. He currently serves as co-editor of the Supreme Court 

Economic Review, one of the country’s top-rated law and economic 

journals. After receiving his M.A. in Political Science from Harvard 

University and his law degree from Yale Law School, Professor 

Somin clerked for Judge Jerry E. Smith of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 

I look forward to your testimony, Mr. Somin. Thank you for being 

here. 

STATEMENT OF ILYA SOMIN, PROFESSOR, GEORGE MASON 

UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 

Mr. SOMIN. Thank you very much. I would like to thank the 

Committee for the opportunity to testify and, even more importantly, for your interest in the issue of constitutional property 

rights that I will be speaking about. For the Founding Fathers, the 

protection of private property was one of the most important reasons for the establishment of the Constitution in the first place. 

As President Barack Obama has written, ‘‘Our Constitution 

places the ownership of private property at the very heart of our 

system of liberty.’’ 

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court and other Federal courts have 

often given private property rights short shrift and have denied 

them the sort of protection that is routinely extended to other constitutional rights. I hope the Committee’s interest in this issue will 

over time help begin to change that. 

In my oral testimony today, I will consider Judge Sotomayor’s 

best property rights decision, Didden v. Village of Port Chester. In 

my written testimony, which I hope will be entered into the record, 

I also discuss her decision in Krimstock v. Kelly. 

The important background to the Didden decision is the Supreme 

Court’s 2005 decision in the case of Kelo v. city of New London, 

530 

which addressed the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that private 

property can only be taken by the Government for a public use. 

Unfortunately, a closely divided 5–4 Supreme Court ruled in Kelo 

that it is permissible to take property from one private individual 

and give it to another solely for purposes of promoting economic development, even if there is not any evidence that the promised development will actually occur. 

This licensed numerous abusive takings in many parts of the 

country. Indeed, since World War II, economic development and 

other similar takings have displaced hundreds of thousands of people, many of them poor or ethnic minorities. But as broad as the 

Kelo decision was in upholding a wide range of abusive takings, 

Judge Sotomayor’s decision in the Didden case went even further 

than Kelo in doing so. 

The facts of Didden are as follows: In 1999, the village of Port 

Chester in New York declared a redevelopment area in part of its 

territory where, therefore, property could be taken by eminent domain in order to promote development. And they also appointed a 

person named Gregg Wasser, a powerful developer, as the main developer for the area. 

In 2003, Bart Didden and Dominick Bologna, two property owners in the area, approached the village for permission to build a 

CVS on their property, and they were directed by Mr. Wasser— 

they were directed to Mr. Wasser, who told them that they must 

either pay him $800,000 or give him a 50-percent stake in their 

business. Otherwise, he threatened he would have the village condemn their property. When they refused his demands, the property 

was condemned almost immediately after that. 

Now, in her decision with two other members of the Second Circuit, the panel that Judge Sotomayor was on upheld this condemnation in a very short, cursory summary order that included 

almost no analysis. And though it is true that they cited the Kelo 

decision, they made no mention of the fact that Kelo actually stated 

that pretextual takings are still forbidden under the Constitution— 

pretextual takings being defined as takings where the official rationale for the condemnation was merely a pretext for a plan to 

benefit a powerful private party of some sort. 

There is some controversy over what counts as a pretextual taking and what does not. But if anything does count as a pretextual 

taking, it is surely a case like Didden, where essentially the property would not have been condemned but for the owner’s refusal to 

pay a private party $800,000. Surely, if anything is a pretextual 

taking, it is a case where property is condemned as part of a 

scheme for leverage to enable a private individual to extort money 

from the owners. 

In her oral testimony before this Committee, Judge Sotomayor 

said that her decision was based in part on a belief that the property owners had filed their case too late. I think the important 

thing to remember about this statement is that in her own decision, she actually specifically wrote that she would have ruled the 

same way ‘‘even if the appellant’s claims were not time-barred.’’ So 

she claimed that even regardless of when they filed their case, she 

would have come out the same way. 

531 

Moreover, as I discuss in my written testimony, her statute of 

limitations holding was entirely dependent on the substantive 

property rights holding as well, and I can discuss that further in 

questions if the Senators are interested. 

I think the bottom line about this case is its extreme nature. If 

one is not willing to strike down a condemnation in a situation like 

this; if one is not willing to say that this is not a public use, it is 

not clear that there are any limits whatsoever on the Government’s 

ability to take private property for the benefit of politically powerful individuals. 

And on that note, I am happy to conclude, and I thank you very 

much for the opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Somin appear as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

We are not going to have each Senator ask 5 minutes of questions, and I will start with Director Freeh. You are the only panelist who has had the opportunity to sit with Judge Sotomayor as 

a fellow judge. What did you learn about her and her approach to 

judging that led you to endorse her? 

Mr. FREEH. You know, I think all the qualities that we have 

heard in this hearing as the optimal qualities—mainstream, fairmindedness, preparedness, integrity, knowledge and intellect, patience, part of being a good judge is listening and making sure that 

the parties are all heard, and really, you know, her sense of commitment to getting all the facts and then applying the law. 

As you said, Senator, I not only served with her but actually was 

with her in court, as I mentioned in my opening statement. As we 

say, I ‘‘second-sat’’ her in a number of her first trials where I actually observed her entire conduct of the trial, preparation, motion 

practice, instruction to juries, how she treated witnesses. And I 

think of all the things I observed over a 6-month period was really, 

you know, how detailed she was in preparing a written opinion. 

So this was never a judge that had a predisposition or a pre-notion or a personal agenda, but struggled and committed a lot of 

time and effort to getting the facts and applying the law. And I 

think she did that as a brand-new judge. She has done it for 17 

years. And I think we can be assured she will do it as a Justice. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. As someone who was appointed by President George H.W. Bush, do you have any reservations about her 

ability to be a Supreme Court Justice without activism or an ideological agenda? 

Mr. FREEH. No, I am totally confident that this would be an outstanding judge, and whether it was President Obama or someone 

else, as you mentioned, Judge Sotomayor was first appointed by 

George Bush, the first George Bush. I was also. You know, I think 

she has all of the mainstream, moderate, restrained adherence to 

the law qualities that we want, and I think we are going to be very 

proud of her. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. 

Mr. Canterbury, you spent more than 25 years as an active-duty 

police officer in South Carolina. I know what a difficult job you 

had. From my previous job, I have been able to see it firsthand. 

Are you confident that, if confirmed, Judge Sotomayor has the 

532 

background and judicial record to be a Justice who will be mindful 

of the need for law enforcement to protect our Nation and have a 

pragmatic view of law enforcement issues? 

Mr. CANTERBURY. We are very confident of that. Based on the 

over 450 criminal cases that we reviewed, we felt that her judgment was fair, tough, and balanced. Throughout all of the cases 

that we reviewed, and looking at the totality of her career, we feel 

very comfortable that she will make a fine judge. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much. 

Just as I said Mr. Freeh was the only one on the panel that 

served with Judge Sotomayor, Mr. Cone, you are the only one on 

the panel that has pitched a perfect game, as far as I know. Did 

you believe her to be fair when she ended the baseball strike? I 

have to tell you that I thought your testimony—people have for 4 

days now talked about each specific case and questioned a lot on 

different cases and were very thorough in their questioning and 

their understanding. But I thought you so succinctly described the 

effect that her ruling had on many, many people across this country. 

And what do you think that this decision says a little more 

broadly about her approach to law in general and the impact of her 

judicial philosophy on the lives of individual Americans? 

Mr. CONE. Well, thank you, Senator. You know, from my perspective, as I said in my statement, a lot of people tried to end that 

dispute, including President Clinton—we were called to the White 

House—special mediators, Members of Congress. I spent weeks on 

end here in Washington lobbying Congress on trying to get a partial repeal of the antitrust exemption, which did happen, and Senator Hatch and Senator Leahy certainly sponsored that bill, the 

Curt Flood Act, which I think had an enormous impact as well. But 

Judge Sotomayor is the one who made the tough, courageous call 

that put the baseball players back on the field. You know, from my 

perspective as a union member, we felt that we were in trouble, 

that the game was in trouble. It was to the point of almost being 

irreparably damaged. And she made the courageous decision to put 

the game back on the field and get the two parties back to the bargaining table and negotiating in good faith. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is good to be 

with you, and we are glad you are on this Committee. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Cone, I was reading a story about statistical stuff the other day. It came to me that, you know, if you throw 

a coin, it can land five times in a row on heads. And so I wonder 

about that a little bit in an effort to have racial harmony on test 

taking, because sometimes it is just statistically so, which makes 

me think there is no way the American League could have won— 

what? –12 out of the last 13 All-Star Games. 

Mr. CONE. It makes you wonder, yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. Two or three is about all they are worth, 

right? Thank you for your testimony. We have enjoyed it. 

Judge Freeh, nice to see you. I value your testimony, always do, 

and I appreciate it very much. 

533 

I would note, I think you would agree with me, but former President Bush, former former President Bush nominated Judge 

Sotomayor as Senator Moynihan’s pick. In other words, they had 

a little deal that President Bush would appoint three judges, I 

think, and Senator Moynihan would get to pick one, and he nominated the recommendation of Senator Moynihan. Is that the way 

you remember it? 

Mr. FREEH. I think that is correct, but I also think he is supporting this nomination now. 

Senator SESSIONS. Okay. That is a good comment. You did good. 

Ms. Stith, thank you for your very insightful comments. I appreciated that very much, and it is valuable to us. 

Dr. Yoest, I was thinking about this organization, Puerto Rican 

Legal Defense and Education Fund, PRLDEF, and do board members of your organization know what lawsuits you are pursuing and 

generally what the issues are? 

Ms. YOEST. Thank you for that question, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. Push your button. 

Ms. YOEST. I was asked that question, actually, right after Judge 

Sotomayor was nominated, and it was the day before my board 

came to town for one of our annual meetings. And as I have listened to the discussion of her relationship with the fund as a board 

member, I have found the connection between her association with 

the cases and her description to really strain credulity. 

The fact of the matter is you don’t have to have read an individual case or reviewed a particular point as a board member to 

be intimately associated with it. The point of being a board member for all of us who have dedicated our lives to the nonprofit realm 

is to have oversight and to have accountability and responsibility 

for the organization. And so I think it is—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think that is probably—most boards 

should operate that way, at least. 

Ms. Froman, is it correct to say that Judge Sotomayor’s opinion 

in Maloney, which said the Second Amendment does not apply to 

the States, if it is not overruled and if it is followed by the United 

States Supreme Court, then basically the Second Amendment 

rights are eviscerated, with regard to cities and States they could 

eliminate firearms? 

Ms. FROMAN. That is correct, Senator. The problem is the Heller 

case did not have to deal with the incorporation issue because it 

took place in Washington, D.C., which is a Federal enclave and 

Federal law applies directly. But if the Second Circuit decision or 

the Seventh Circuit decision remains law, is approved by the Supreme Court, goes up the Supreme Court and is affirmed, then, 

yes, cities and States can ban guns. 

Senator SESSIONS. Does it worry you that the judge who has already ruled on the case one way, and it was a 5:4 case before, now 

could be deciding—being the deciding vote on how that might turn 

out? 

Ms. FROMAN. It is of great concern to me, Senator, and that is 

why I am here today to testify. And it is of particular concern to 

me today because she did not give any reason, she did not explain 

what the basis was for her holding. It is kind of like when I was 

in math class, it was not enough to get the right answer. You had 

534 

to show your work so that the professor knew that you actually 

worked the problem and you did not cheat. 

So, you know, without any explanation of how she reached her 

conclusions, we cannot tell whether that was a legitimate application of the Constitution and the statute. 

Senator SESSIONS. I know your organization officially—I see 

today they said they wanted to see how the hearings went and 

what the nominee said. After that, has the National Rifle Association now made an announcement today, and what is it? 

Ms. FROMAN. Well, I, of course, have been here today, and I am 

not here to speak on behalf of the NRA. I am here to speak on my 

own behalf and, of course, on behalf of other American gun owners. 

The NRA is the oldest and largest civil rights organization in the 

history of this country. They are dedicated to preserving and protecting the Second Amendment. And I think they have been out 

every day talking about the concerns that the NRA has over Judge 

Sotomayor’s record. 

Senator SESSIONS. Are you aware that—I was just given a document here that said that, ‘‘Therefore, the National Rifle Association 

opposes the confirmation of Judge Sotomayor.’’ Were you aware 

that that had happened? 

Ms. FROMAN. I was told about that while I was here, Senator, 

yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. Okay. 

Ms. FROMAN. And so I am sure that they have given a full explanation of that position, and I am glad to see that. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Somin, thank you for your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Kopel, for yours. And I frankly feel now obligated 

to look more closely at the Didden case. You raised more serious 

concerns than I realized. In fact, I guess I was thinking this is 

worse than I thought after hearing your testimony. I do think that 

it does impact the property rights of great importance, and thank 

you for sharing that. 

If you want to make a brief comment, my time is—— 

Mr. SOMIN. Yes, thank you, Senator. I agree with you it raises 

very important concerns and that these sorts of takings affect thousands of people around the country, particularly the poor and minorities, as the NAACP pointed out in their amicus brief in the 

Kelo case where they indicated that the poor and politically vulnerable and ethnic minorities tend to be targeted for these sorts of 

condemnations. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much. 

Senator Kyl. 

Senator KYL. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

First of all, let me acknowledge those on the panel who I know, 

but I thank all of you for being here. Louis Freeh, it is great to see 

you again. I respect your opinions greatly. I want you to know that. 

I also respected the way David Cone played baseball very, very 

much. And I used to root for you, as a matter of fact. I should not 

say that as an Arizona Diamondbacks fan, but I had another team 

in the other league. 

Senator SESSIONS. Senator Bunning’s record, was his perfect 

game the last one when you did it? 

535 

Mr. CONE. No. His was done back in the 1960’s, but there are 

only, I think, 17 perfect games in the history of the game. I am 

lucky enough to be one of them. 

Senator KYL. And, of course, Dr. Yoest; and Sandy Froman is a 

person with whom I have consulted over many, many years, long 

before she was the National President of the NRA, but also on legal 

matters. And I appreciate her because of her distinguished law career, the judgment that she gives on this. 

I wish I could ask all of you a question, but let me just ask a 

couple here. 

First of all, Sandy, the question that Senator Sessions asked I 

think gets right to the heart of the matter, and I wonder if you 

could just put a little bit of a legal spin to it. The question is: What 

would it mean to the gun owners of America if Judge Sotomayor’s 

opinion were to be the controlling law in this country from now on? 

She acknowledged under my questioning that it would be more 

difficult—I do not have her exact quotation here, but it would be 

more difficult for gun owners to challenge the regulations of states 

or cities, but it was unclear exactly how much more. 

Could you describe the test that would be used in such a situation and, in your opinion, how much more difficult it would be for 

gun owners to sustain their rights as against States and localities? 

Ms. FROMAN. Yes, thank you, Senator Kyl. Well, I believe I heard 

you questioning one of the panels earlier. You raised that issue 

yourself, which is she said the rational basis test would be sufficient to sustain any gun ban that the Government wanted to impose, whether it was a city or a state. And the rational basis test 

is the lowest threshold that the Government has to meet to sustain 

a ban. They can articulate any reason, pretty much, and it will be 

sufficient to get past that review. 

Now, the Supreme Court in Heller made it clear that the rational 

basis test is not allowed when you are interpreting an enumerated 

right like the Second Amendment. But she ignored that in the 

Maloney case and talked about rational basis anyway. So that is 

of great concern to me and I think to the almost 90 million American gun owners that, yes, it is fine to say in Heller that we have 

a right that is protected against infringement by the Federal Government. But that doesn’t mean—the Heller case doesn’t mean that 

cities and states cannot ban guns, cannot issue whatever regulations they want, as long as they can articulate what will meet this 

rational basis test. It is a very, very low threshold. 

And as a matter of fact, that is why the District of Columbia had 

their gun ban. That is why the city of Chicago basically has a gun 

ban that prevents people from having firearms even in their home 

for self-defense. 

So that is what we are concerned about as gun owners in America. 

Senator KYL. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Yoest, in the questions by Senator Coburn of the nominee, 

he asked about advances in technology, and as I recall Judge 

Sotomayor’s testimony, she did not want to acknowledge the impact 

of advances in technology as it relates to the Supreme Court’s evaluation of restrictions on abortion. 

536 

Do you believe that advances in technology are important to the 

viability trimester framework that the Court articulated in Roe, 

and why? 

Ms. YOEST. Well, I would reference back to the confirmation 

hearings of the Chief Justice in which he went through one of the 

elements that we look at when we reconsider factual—how things 

relate to a case, and there has definitely been tremendous advances 

on the scientific realm as it relates to human life. 

So I think it is important to see her, whether or not she is willing to consider that kind of thing, and it also goes to—Americans 

United for Life works very focused on pro-life legislation at the 

State level, and part of the challenge that we face is this question 

of how much the American people are going to be allowed to interact with their duly elected representatives at the State level in restricting abortion in a common-sense way that they would like to 

see. 

Senator KYL. Thank you. Just to be clear, I have recalled her testimony slightly incorrectly. She actually did not say or would not 

say how she viewed it. She said it would depend upon the case that 

came before her. So I do not want to mischaracterize her testimony, 

but your point is that it would be very important for a court in 

evaluating a restriction imposed by a State. 

Ms. YOEST. Yes, sir. 

Senator KYL. Okay. Thank you. Again, I wish I had more time 

to—but we have, I think, one or two panels left here, so we should 

probably move on. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Senator, we have two panels left. 

Senator KYL. Yes, but we thank you very much. This is an important event in our country’s history. You have contributed to it, 

and we thank you, all of you, for it. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Canterbury. I appreciate the 

FOP’s—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Yes, I want to thank all of you, and you 

just did a marvelous job in stating your opinions. I think it was 

helpful for everyone, and thank you very much. Have a very good 

afternoon. It was one of our shortest panels. You are lucky. You 

can go home and have dinner. 

We are going to take a 5-minute break, and then we will have 

the next panel join us. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 5:36 p.m., the Committee was recessed.] 

After Recess [5:46 p.m.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR [presiding].—We are going to get started 

with our next panel, if you could stand to be sworn in and raise 

your right hands. Do you affirm that the testimony you are about 

to give the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. We are joined here by Senator 

Sessions. I know Senator Kyl may be joining us and has been with 

us today, and whoever else stops by. But we want to thank you for 

coming. We have had a good afternoon. 

What I am going to do is introduce each of you individually and 

then you will give your 5 minutes of testimony. I know one of our 

537 

witnesses is a little late. So we are going to start here with you, 

Ms. Romero. 

Ramona Romero is the current national president of the Hispanic 

National Bar Association and the corporate counsel for logistics 

and energy at DuPont. She is also a cofounder and former board 

member of the Dominican-American National Roundtable. She is a 

graduate of Harvard Law School. 

Ms. Romero, we are honored to have you here. Thank you. We 

look forward to your testimony. You can give your testimony, because our other witness got a little delayed coming over from the 

House. So thank you. 

STATEMENT OF RAMONA ROMERO, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, 

HISPANIC BAR ASSOCIATION 

Ms. ROMERO. Good afternoon. As Madam Chair said, my name 

is Ramona Romero and I am the national president of the Hispanic 

National Bar Association, which is known as the HNBA. We are 

grateful to Chairman Leahy, to you, Ranking Member Sessions, 

and to all of the members of the Committee for affording the 

HNBA the opportunity and honor of testifying at this hearing. 

This is the fifth time that we have appeared before this Committee in support of the confirmation of a Supreme Court justice. 

We take great pleasure in endorsing Judge Sotomayor. Her support 

is based, first and foremost, on the merits of her stellar credentials. 

The HNBA was founded in 1972. One of its primary goals is to 

promote equal justice for all Americans by advancing the participation of Hispanics in the legal profession. It is a nonprofit, voluntary 

bar association. We have 37 affiliates in 22 states. The HNBA is 

nonpartisan and it does not represent a particular ideology. 

Today, I am accompanied by nine former HNBA national presidents and vice president-elect. Like many Americans, we were 

proud when President Obama announced the nomination of Judge 

Sotomayor. As many members of this Committee know, for decades, the HNBA has worked to promote a fair, independent and, 

yes, diverse judiciary, one that reflects the rich mosaic of the American people. 

There are over 45 million Hispanics in the United States. We 

represent over 15 percent of the population. We are the largest, 

fastest growing and youngest segment of the population. Yet, Hispanics are under-represented among lawyers and judges. 

The appointment of the first Hispanic to the Supreme Court is 

an important—an important symbolic milestone for our country, 

just like Justice Marshall was with respect to African-Americans 

and Justice O’Connor was with respect to women. 

The HNBA often reviews the qualifications of judicial candidates, 

regardless of background of politics. We consider a number of factors: exceptional professional competence, intellect, character, integrity, temperament, commitment to equal justice, and service to 

the American people and, also, to Hispanics, the community we 

serve. 

Judge Sotomayor more, more than satisfies all of these criteria. 

Before her nomination, we were already familiar with Judge 

Sotomayor’s impressive background. We had endorsed her for both 

of her prior judicial appointments. 

538 

In 2005, the HNBA also named the judge on a bipartisan 

shortlist of eight potential Supreme Court nominees, prepared by 

a Supreme Court committee, after substantial due diligence. The 

HNBA’s Supreme Court committee, again, performed due diligence 

on her record after this nomination. 

As a result, we are confident that Judge Sotomayor is extraordinarily well qualified to serve as a justice for the Supreme Court. 

Some have suggested that, if confirmed, the judge will render decisions based on her personal bias. They could not be more wrong. 

Her extensive judicial record shows that her background and her 

experiences do not detract from her ability to adhere to the rule of 

law. On the contrary, they are a positive. 

Her story resonates with all Americans. She is proof that in our 

country, in our country, there is no limit, even for those of us from 

the most humble of backgrounds. Her confirmation will mark another key step in our journey as one nation, indivisible. 

We are grateful to President Obama for making a wise decision 

in nominating Judge Sotomayor. Our thanks to all Americans for 

their interest in one of our country’s shining stars. 

The HNBA thanks this Committee and urges the Senate to confirm Judge Sotomayor. Thank you for listening. 

[The prepared testimony of Ms. Romero appear as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, Ms. Romero. Also, 

welcome to all of the many past presidents that are there, that is 

quite a number, as well as vice presidents. 

We have now been joined by the honorable Nydia Vela ́zquez, who 

is the Congresswoman here. I know she is incredibly busy and has 

joined us, and Senator Sessions and I have both agreed that you 

would not have to stay for questions. 

She is currently serving her ninth term as representative for 

New York’s 12 Congressional District. She was the first Puerto 

Rican woman elected to the U.S. House of Representatives and currently serves as the Chairwoman of the Congressional Hispanic 

Caucus, Chair of the House Small Business Committee, and a senior member of the Financial Services Committee. 

Because you missed the swearing in, we will do that now. This 

is the Senate Judiciary Committee, so welcome. Could you raise 

your right hand? Do you affirm that the testimony that you are 

about to give before the Committee is the truth, the whole truth 

and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Representative VELA ́ ZQUEZ. I do. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. You have 5 minutes, Congresswoman, and we are honored to have you here. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LYDIA VELA ́ ZQUEZ, CHAIR, 

CONGRESSIONAL HISPANIC CAUCUS 

Representative VELA ́ ZQUEZ. Thank you. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member, and the members of the Committee, I have known 

Sonia Sotomayor for over 20 years. 

In fact, when I was first elected to Congress in 1993, I asked her 

to administer my oath of office. I can tell you personally that she 

is a grounded and professional individual. And over the last 3.5 

539 

days, all of us have been able to see her considerable legal ability 

impressively displayed. 

Hispanics everywhere are proud that such a distinguished legal 

talent hails from our community. We have all been energized by 

her nomination. But, of course, that is not the reason why she 

should be confirmed. The case for Judge Sotomayor’s confirmation 

is built on her vast experience, keen intellect, and tremendous 

qualifications. 

It is not that Judge Sotomayor does not have a compelling life 

history. She does. As so many have already pointed out, hers is a 

uniquely American story, one that begins in the Bronx projects and 

ultimately reaches the highest echelons of our legal system. 

This background instilled within her the belief that hard work is 

rewarded and the knowledge that with the right combination of talent and effort, anything is possible in America. 

These core values propelled Sonia Sotomayor to remarkable 

heights. As her career progressed, she managed to reach nearly 

every level of the legal system. With each new step, she excelled 

not only as a prosecutor and a litigator, but also as an appellate 

judge. 

Yet, throughout that process of achievement, she never once lost 

touch with her roots or her Bronx neighborhood. Instead, she augmented her vast legal experience with common sense understanding of working class America. That appreciation will add a 

valuable perspective to the Supreme Court. 

Make no mistake. The stakes are high for Hispanic-Americans. 

The Supreme Court will rule on many matters that are critical to 

our community, from housing policy to voting rights. These are 

delicate issues. 

With many of these matters, passion runs deep on both sides. Resolving them fairly will require objectivity, impartiality, and an unwavering commitment to the rule of law. 

Judge Sotomayor’s record demonstrates these qualities. She has 

a reputation as a non-ideological jurist, someone who chooses not 

to spar with those who think differently, but to instead find common ground. When working with Republican appointees, colleagues, Sotomayor’s record will show that 95 percent of the time, 

she managed to forge consensus. 

She was able to do this because she commands a sophisticated 

grasp of legal argument and has a keen awareness of the law’s effect on every American. 

When the Congressional Hispanic Caucus reviewed a broad 

range of qualified Supreme Court candidates, these were the traits 

we were looking for. We were looking for individuals who upheld 

constitutional values, exhibited a record of integrity, and had a profound, profound respect for our Constitution. 

It is our overwhelming belief that Judge Sotomayor meets these 

criteria. That is why we enthusiastically and unanimously endorse 

her nomination. 

Senators, the decision before the Committee today is one of your 

greatest responsibilities. I know this is something none of you on 

either side of the aisle take lightly. But I believe Judge Sotomayor’s 

record of judicial integrity, impartiality and, as she puts it, fidelity 

to the law, is one we can all admire regardless of party or ideology. 

540 

If confirmed, Judge Sotomayor’s service on the court will bring 

great pride to the Hispanic community. That goes without saying. 

But more importantly, it will add another objective disciplined 

legal talent to that august body. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to 

answering any questions. You can send it to my office, but we are 

going right now, and I really, really appreciate the opportunity that 

you have given me on behalf of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. 

[The prepared testimony of Representative Vela ́zquez appear as 

a submission for the record.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you so much, Congresswoman 

Vela ́zquez. That was an eloquent and personal statement. It means 

a lot to us, and you have contributed much to the hearing. 

Representative VELA ́ ZQUEZ. Thank you. I know her well. I know 

her heart, her soul, her intellect, but, most importantly, her temperament and integrity. Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you so much, Congresswoman 

Vela ́zquez. We know you have to vote and there are many things 

going on over in the House. So we appreciate and understand that. 

Thank you very much. 

Next, we have Theodore M. Shaw. Mr. Shaw is a professor at Columbia Law School and former director-counsel and president of 

the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. He began his legal career in the 

Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice. 

He is a graduate of Wesleyan University and the Columbia University School of Law. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Shaw. We look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THEODORE M. SHAW, PROFESSOR, COLUMBIA 

LAW SCHOOL 

Mr. SHAW. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Senator Sessions, and, in his absence, of course, Chairman Leahy. 

I have known Sonia Sotomayor for over 4 years. We first met in 

1968 as freshmen at Cardinal Spellman High School in the Bronx. 

We were among a modest number of black and Latino students, 

perhaps 10 percent of that school’s population, in what was one of 

the most academically challenging high schools in New York City. 

It was a time of great change, great challenge. 1968 was the year 

that Dr. King was assassinated; also, Robert Kennedy; the year of 

the Chicago Democratic National Convention; and, there was much 

unrest. 

Many of the minority students at Spellman, including Sonia and 

I, came from the public housing projects of Harlem or the Bronx 

or the tenement houses that surrounded them. We were shaped by 

these extraordinary times and by the communities from which we 

came, for better or worse. 

During that time, the light of opportunity began to shine into 

corners of society that were long neglected for reasons of race and 

poverty. Many of us are beneficiaries of what has come to be known 

as affirmative action; that is, the conscious effort to open opportunities to individuals and groups that had been historically discriminated against and excluded from mainstream America. 

541 

Some people will immediately seize upon that description to talk 

about ‘‘unqualified’’ individuals. Affirmative action, properly structured and implemented, lifts qualified individuals from obscurity 

rooted in unearned inequality. 

In spite of her brilliance, there was a time when someone like 

Judge Sotomayor would have been routinely left out of the mainstream of opportunities we have come to associate with somebody 

of her capabilities and accomplishments. 

Sonia was at the top of our class at Cardinal Spellman High 

School. Everyone, white, black, Latino, Asian, ranked behind her. 

She was studious, independent-minded, mature beyond her years, 

thoughtful. She wasn’t easily influenced by what was going on 

around her. She walked her own path. 

To be sure, Sonia was comfortable in her own skin and proud of 

her community and her heritage. She did not run from who or 

what she was and is. Still, Sonia was not one to be easily swayed 

by peer pressure, fads, or the politics of others around her. 

She approached any issue from the standpoint of fierce intellectual curiosity and integrity. In fact, she was an intellectual powerhouse. Sonia was a leader among students at Cardinal Spellman 

High School. She set the pace at which others wanted to run. 

Sonia did not live a life of privilege. She lost her father at a very 

young age. She had been diagnosed with diabetes even before she 

came to high school. It was not something I remember her talking 

about. She simply carried herself with an air of dignity, seriousness 

of purpose, and a sense that she was going somewhere. 

In my 4 years of high school, I never saw Sonia interact with 

anyone in a disrespectful or contentious or antagonistic manner. 

Her temperament was even then judicious. 

In short, although I never told her then and although she did not 

know it, I envied her intellectual capacity, her discipline, her unquestionable integrity. I admired her. 

After graduating from Cardinal Spellman at the top of our class 

and as valedictorian, she was off to Princeton and, somewhat further down in the rankings, I was off to Wesleyan. I did not stay 

in touch with her over many of the ensuing years, but we did meet 

up again some years later. 

I followed her as one does a star from one’s high school orbit. 

Eventually, of course, she went on to Yale Law School after Princeton. She excelled in everything she did. 

Her qualifications for the Supreme Court would ordinarily be a 

no-brainer but for the politics of judicial nomination. I have faith 

that the Senate and this Committee will not let those politics get 

in the way. 

My career has been as a civil rights lawyer. I have been in the 

midst of ideological warfare on contentious issues. I have been unabashed about my point of view. I am conscious of the fact that as 

I testify about Sonia, there may be some who project my thoughts 

and beliefs on to her. 

Some have already tried to label her as an activist outside of the 

political mainstream. To be sure, I consider those who work for racial justice and other civil rights to be a vital part of mainstream 

America. But Sonia’s life has not been lived on the battlefield of 

542 

ideology or partisanship, where many of us who are labeled or who 

label ourselves as liberal or conservative have locked horns. 

Indeed, her record defies simplistic label. She began her legal career as a prosecutor, not ordinarily a job thought of as a bastion 

of liberal activism. Her service on the board of the Puerto Rican 

Legal Defense Fund both speaks to the strength of that organization and the range of her interests from prosecution to civil rights. 

Her service was commendable. In fact, this range of experience 

and commitment places Judge Sotomayor in the mainstream of 

middle America, where surely Americans are both interested in the 

prosecution and punishment of those who engage in criminal activities, as well as the protection of civil rights and elimination of invidious discrimination. 

I have much more to say, but it is in my written testimony and 

I see my time is expiring. I would like to refer you to my comments 

on this whole notion of experience and what that brings to the 

bench. 

But to conclude, I want to say that she has served our nation for 

17 years as a Federal district court judge and then as an appellate 

judge with great distinction. Now, she is being considered for an 

appointment as associate justice to the United States Supreme 

Court. 

Candor compels me to admit that I swell with pride when I contemplate the possibility that my high school classmate may ascend 

to the highest court in the land. 

But quite aside from this petty and undeserved pride on the part 

of one who was merely a high school classmate, there are millions 

of Americans who see for the first time the possibility that someone 

who looks like them or who comes from a background like theirs 

may serve on the United States Supreme Court, someone who is 

supremely qualified, by any measure. 

It is a great honor for Judge Sotomayor that President Obama 

has nominated her to the United States Supreme Court. It will be 

even a greater honor for our nation if she were to be confirmed and 

were to serve. Thank you. 

[The prepared testimony of Mr. Shaw appear as a submission for 

the record.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much. Appreciate it, Mr. 

Shaw. Our next witness is Tim Jeffries. Tim Jeffries is the founder 

of P7 Enterprises, a management consulting practice located in 

Scottsdale, Arizona. Mr. Jeffries serves on the board of directors of 

several corporations and nonprofit organizations, including the National Organization for Victims Assistance and the Arizona Voice 

for Crime Victims. 

I don’t know if you want to add anything, Senator Kyl. 

Senator KYL. Well, Madam Chairman, thank you for that opportunity. I think you will see, when he testifies, the basis for his 

knowledge and passion about the protection of victims’ rights and 

I think that will speak for itself and I am anxious to follow-up with 

the questions, as well. But I thank you very much. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much. Welcome to the 

Committee, Mr. Jeffries. We look forward to your testimony. 

543 

STATEMENT OF TIM JEFFRIES, FOUNDER, P7 ENTERPRISES 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Senator Sessions, 

Senator Kyl. I appreciate the humbling invitation to provide my 

personal testimony in opposition to the honorable Judge 

Sotomayor’s appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court. The views 

that I express here today are my own and not the views of any organization I may reference. 

As my bio shows, I come from a blue collar family. My father’s 

grandfather served in the Union Army during the Civil War and 

rode for the Pony Express. My mother’s grandparents emigrated 

from Portugal to America in the 1900s with no money in their 

pocket and no English in their vocabularies. 

Similar to thousands of other simple, hardworking Americans, 

my involvement in the crime victims support movement was borne 

from unimaginable tragedy. On November 3, 1981, my beloved 

older brother, Michael, was kidnaped, beaten, tortured and murdered by a transient gang of street criminals in Colorado Springs, 

Colorado. 

The two murderers stabbed my dear, defenseless brother 65 

times and ultimately killed Michael by slashing his throat and 

crushing his skull with the heel of a remorseless, blood-soaked 

boot. 

Based on Federal crime statistics, 17,000 people are murdered in 

our country every year. On average, someone is murdered every 31 

minutes. On average, every 10 weeks, more people are murdered 

in our country than passed on that brutal, horrible day of September 11. 

In fact, since September 11, 115,000 people have been murdered 

in America. This gut-wrenching level of violence in our country exceeds the approximate population of Santa Clara, California or 

Gresham, Oregon or Peoria, Illinois or Allentown, Pennsylvania. 

Further compounding this epic national crisis, other violent 

crimes in our country are committed at an appalling rate. Based 

on the crime clock produced by the Office for Victims of Crime in 

the Department of Justice, someone is raped in our county every 

1.9 minutes. Someone is assaulted in our country every 36.9 seconds. An instance of child abuse or neglect is reported every 34.9 

seconds. 

Making matters worse, this breathtaking spectrum of heinous violence in our country does not receive the consistent political action 

it warrants and the constant media focus it deserves. 

Prior to my testimony, my wife sent me a text and she asked, 

‘‘Where are all the Senators? ’’ And perhaps that is a metaphor for 

what vexes and undermines the crime victims support movement. 

The true horror in verifiable existence of evil in our country are 

often minimized, if not trivialized, with well intentioned, yet sadly 

misguided equivocations about the troubled lives of guilty criminals 

and their various personal circumstances. 

Unfortunately, based on public statements, Judge Sotomayor has 

repeatedly offered misplaced sympathy for criminals, despite the 

fact that justice exists to protect the innocent and to punish the 

guilty. Forgiveness and mercy are one thing. Punishment and accountability are another. 

544 

In four situations, four different events that are noted in my testimony, Judge Sotomayor sympathy and perhaps empathy for 

criminals that may be well intentioned, but I feel is tragically misplaced. 

At a Columbia Law School public service dinner, she stated, ‘‘It 

is all too easy as a prosecutor to feel the pain and suffering of victims and to forget that defendants, despite whatever illegal act 

they have committed, however despicable their acts may have been, 

the defendants are human being.’’ 

In January 1995, in receiving the Hogan-Morganthau Award, 

Judge Sotomayor stated, ‘‘The end result of a legal process is to 

find a winner. However, for every winner, there is a loser, and the 

loser is himself or herself a victim,’’ forgetting for the fact that 

when meeting justice, it’s not to find a winner, it’s to find justice. 

On July 12, 1993, in a Federal sentencing hearing that she presided over, over a cocaine dealer, Judge Sotomayor apologized to 

the cocaine dealer for having to send him to Federal prison. 

She stated the mandatory 5-year sentence was a ‘‘great tragedy 

for our country.’’ She also stated she hoped the cocaine dealer ‘‘will 

appreciate that we all understand that you were a victim of the 

economic necessities of our society.’’ Then she added, ‘‘But unfortunately, there are laws I must impose.’’ 

Having viewed the autopsy photos of my massacred brother and 

heard the heartbreaking stories of thousands of victims and survivors of violent crimes in America, I believe Judge Sotomayor’s 

sympathy for criminals at the expense of the burdens carried by 

crime victims is unworthy of our nation’s highest court, where public safety and protection of the innocent should be paramount. 

Whereas Judge Sotomayor’s biography is admirable and compelling, it is a great American story of which, as an American, I am 

proud. I am deeply troubled that she has regularly offered well intentioned, yet misguided sympathy to criminals without notable 

deference to the pain and suffering of the victim. 

These are the very people who need government’s protection. Statistics show that the most egregious crime in our country disproportionately impacts the poor, the disadvantaged, the downtrodden, the defenseless. These are the very people that the justices in our highest court must have sympathy for, must have empathy for. 

Madam Chairman, I appreciate your patience with my testimony 

that has extended beyond its time. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. That is fine, Mr. Jeffries. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And I would be happy to answer any questions at 

the appropriate time. 

[The prepared testimony of Mr. Jeffries appear as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. That is fine, and thank you for sharing that 

tragic story. It must have been very difficult. 

Neomi Rao is our next witness. Neomi Rao is a professor of law 

at George Mason University. Previously, she served as associate 

counsel and special assistant to President George W. Bush and 

served as a counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee. She is a 

graduate of the University of Chicago Law School, that is something we have in common. 

545 

Professor Rao clerked for Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas and Fourth Circuit Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson. I look forward 

to your testimony. Thank you for being here. 

STATEMENT OF NEOMI RAO, PROFESSOR, GEORGE MASON 

UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL 

Ms. RAO. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, Senator Sessions and other distinguished members of this Committee. It is an 

honor to testify at these historic hearings, which have provided the 

opportunity to have a respectful public dialog about the important 

work of the Supreme Court and the judicial philosophy of an accomplished nominee. 

I have submitted more detailed written testimony and I should 

state at the outset that I take no position on the ultimate question 

of the confirmation of Judge Sotomayor. 

In my opening remarks, I would like to highlight some points 

about the judicial role. During these hearings, Judge Sotomayor 

has expressed broad principles about fidelity to the law with which 

we can all agree. But fidelity to the law can mean very different 

things to different judges. 

Although in her testimony she has distanced herself from some 

of her earlier remarks, her speeches and writings might still be 

helpful in understanding her view of the judicial process. 

First, Judge Sotomayor has explicitly rejected the idea that there 

can be an objective stance in judging. She has explained that every 

case has a series of perspectives and thus requires an individual 

choice by the judge. 

This goes beyond recognizing the need to exercise judgment in 

hard cases or the idea that reasonable judges may at times disagree. If there is no objective view, one can question whether there 

is any law at all apart from the judge’s personal choices. 

Second, there is the related issue of the role of personal experiences in judicial decision-making. It would be hard to deny that 

judges are human and made up of their unique life journeys. Many 

judges recognize this and explain how they strive to remain impartial by putting aside their personal preferences. 

Judge Sotomayor’s position, however, has suggested that her personal background, her race, gender and life experiences, should affect judicial decisions. 

Throughout her testimony, Judge Sotomayor has reaffirmed that 

she decides cases by applying the law to facts and that she does 

not follow what is in her heart. Of course, all nominees to the Supreme Court honestly state their fidelity to the law. 

Nonetheless, this leaves open the question of how a judge chooses 

to be faithful to the law. Judges go about this task in different 

ways. Following the law could mean, as formalists believe, that the 

judicial role and the privilege of political independence require 

judges to stick closely to the actual words of statutes and the Constitution. The basic idea is that by focusing on the written law, 

judges act as fair and impartial arbiters. 

Other judges consider that they are following the law when they 

interpret it to conform to what is rational or coherent or just. They 

believe that following the law means trying to bring about what 

they consider to be the best outcome, all things considered. These 

546 

judges may be ruled by pragmatism or personal values, such as 

empathy. 

Even with a sincere purpose of following the law, judges use very 

different methods for finding what the law requires. For example, 

some judges are far more likely to determine that the law is ambiguous and, therefore, requires the judge to fill in the gaps. 

If the judge finds the law indeterminate, he or she may look to 

outside sources, such as international law, or to personal values 

about what is fair or rational. Pragmatic, flexible interpretation of 

the law allows significant room for individual assessments of what 

the law requires, as each judge will have his or her own conceptions about what is best. 

If the law is really a series of perspectives, this suggests a very 

thin conception of law. Fidelity to law as a series of perspectives 

is something very different from fidelity to law as binding written 

commands of the legislature and Constitution. If law is simply 

one’s own perspective, then fidelity to law is little more than fidelity to one’s own views. 

The Supreme Court gets a final word with regard to constitutional interpretation. A nominee’s judicial philosophy is important, 

because on the Supreme Court, the only real restraint is self-restraint. 

Our constitutional structure does not give judges political power. 

It gives them the judicial power to decide particular cases through 

an evenhanded application of the law; to fairly interpret statutes 

and the Constitution for all that they contain, not more, not less. 

In our courts, the rule of law should prevail over the rule of what 

the judge thinks is best. Thank you for giving me the chance to testify today. 

[The prepared testimony of Ms. Rao appear as a submission for 

the record.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, Ms. Rao, for your 

testimony. Next, we have John McGinnis. John McGinnis is a professor of law at Northwestern University. Previously, he was a deputy assistant attorney general in the Department of Justice’s Office 

of Legal Policy; a graduate of Harvard Law School, where he was 

the editor of the Harvard Law Review, something he has in common with President Obama. That is not true? 

Mr. McGinnis. He was president of the Harvard Law Review. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. You were editor. Well, we could just pretend for today. Professor McGinnis also clerked on the U.S. Court 

of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 

Thank you for being here, Professor McGinnis. We look forward 

to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN MCGINNIS, PROFESSOR, 

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 

Mr. MCGINNIS. Thank you so much, Chairman Klobuchar, Ranking Member Sessions, for the opportunity to address you. At the 

outset, I want to make clear that, like my colleague, I am not taking any position on Judge Sotomayor’s nomination, although I will 

say she has my respect and good wishes. 

547 

What this hearing affords is one of the rare opportunities for a 

constitutional conversation with the American people and where 

the correct constitutional principles can be identified. 

Ultimately, the Constitution rests on the people’s confidence in 

the Constitution and their fidelity to the principles. Only once the 

correct constitutional principles are identified can the Nation measure a nominee’s adherence to those principles and so determine 

whether he or she should be confirmed. 

My subject, the use of international and foreign law, is an issue 

of substantial importance, not least because the Supreme Court 

has come to rely on such material. For instance, in Lawrence v. 

Texas, the Supreme Court recently relied on the European Court 

of Human Rights as part of its decision to strike down a statute 

of one of our states. 

In my view, such reliance distorts the meaning of our Constitution. It undermines domestic democracy and it threatens to alienate Americans from a document that is their common bond. 

So what are the correct principles? I think they can be simply 

stated. They are that judges should avoid giving any weight to contemporary foreign or international law unless the language of the 

Constitution calls for it, and the language of the Constitution generally does not. 

If the Constitution, as I believe, should be interpreted according 

to the meaning it had at the time it was ratified, it follows directly 

that the use of contemporary foreign or international law is not 

proper. 

The problem with this use, in fact, is that it’s contemporary, not 

simply the fact that it’s foreign or international, because the meaning of the Constitution was fixed at the time it was ratified. 

But even if one is a self-styled pragmatist about constitutional 

theory, the use of contemporary foreign or international law in constitutional jurisprudence is still objectionable. 

Pragmatists believe the Constitution should only invalidate our 

laws if they have bad consequences. But a conflict between our law 

and foreign law is not appropriately used to create any doubt about 

the beneficence of our own law. 

Foreign law is formulated to be good for that foreign nation, not 

for ours. Indeed, a proposition of foreign law is really only the tip 

of an iceberg of some complex set of social norms in other nations. 

But since the United Nations doesn’t share all those norms, importing that single legal proposition into our nation can have very 

bad consequences for us. International law differs from foreign law, 

because international at least purports to have some kind of universality, which foreign law does not. 

But raw international law also lacks any democratic pedigree 

and can cast doubt on our democratically made law. Indeed, international law has multiple democratic defects. Totalitarian nations 

have participated in its fabrication. Very unrepresentative groups, 

like law professors, still shape its form. 

It’s also hardly transparent. American citizens have enough trouble trying to figure out what goes on in hearings like this one, let 

alone in diplomatic meetings in Geneva. 

As I read Judge Sotomayor’s speech on this issue, her position 

depends on propositions that seem, to me, in some tension. Judge 

548 

Sotomayor stated that justices should not use foreign or international law, but they should consider the ideas they find in such 

materials in their decision-making. 

I understand, at this hearing, Judge Sotomayor disavowed the 

use of such materials to have any influence on jurisprudence, and 

I welcome that disavowal. What she left unexplained, to my satisfaction at least, however, is her view in the speech that such materials can help us decide our issues; her praise for the use of such 

law in Lawrence v. Texas, which expressly relied on that European 

human rights decision; and, perhaps most puzzling of all, her endorsement and her praise for Justice Ginsberg’s view when it’s well 

known that Justice Ginsberg, in contrast with, say, Justice Scalia, 

believes that such materials are relevant to decision-making. 

Indeed, Justice Ginsberg says that they’re nothing less than the 

basic denominators of fairness between the Governors and the governed. 

Foreign and international law may well contain good ideas, as 

Justice Sotomayor suggested, but so many other sources that have 

no weight and should not, I think, routinely be cited as authority. 

To put the question in perspective, undoubtedly, the Bible and 

the Quran have many legal ideas that many people think are good, 

but we would be rightly concerned if judges used them as guidance 

for interpreting the Constitution or even routinely cited them. 

Depending on what text the judge cited and what she omitted, 

we might think she was biased in favor of one tradition at the expense of others. 

In my view, the rule of law itself ultimately is founded on the 

proposition that only material that is formally relevant should have 

weight in a judge’s decision, and the way a judge can demonstrate 

adherence to the rule of law in this context is extremely simple— 

simply refrain from appealing to the authority of foreign of international law in her opinion. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared testimony of Mr. McGinnis appear as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, Professor McGinnis. 

Last, but not least, we have Professor Rosenkranz. Nicholas Quinn 

Rosenkranz is an associate professor at Georgetown University 

Law Center. After graduating from Yale Law School, he clerked for 

Judge Frank Easterbrook on the U.S. court of appeals for the seventh circuit and for Justice Anthony Kennedy on the U.S. Supreme 

Court. He then served as an attorney advisor at the Office of Legal 

Counsel in the United States Department of Justice. 

You should know, Mr. Rosenkranz, that Judge Easterbrook was 

my professor at law school and I know that must have been kind 

of a tough clerkship. I am sure you had to work very hard. So we 

look forward to hearing your testimony. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS QUINN ROSENKRANZ, PROFESSOR, 

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 

Mr. ROSENKRANZ. Madam Chair, thank you. Ranking Member 

Sessions, members of the Committee, I thank you all for the opportunity to testify at this momentous hearing. 

549 

I, too, have been asked to comment on the use of contemporary 

foreign legal materials in the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. I agree entirely with Professor McGinnis’s analysis. 

In my remarks, I’ll try to explain why this sort of reliance on foreign law is in tention with fundamental notions of democratic selfgovernance. I should emphasize that I, too, take no position on the 

ultimate question of whether Judge Sotomayor should be confirmed, and I offer my comments with the greatest respect. But I 

am concerned that her recent speech on this issue may betray a 

misconception about how to interpret the United States Constitution. 

In this room, and at the Supreme Court, and in law schools, and 

throughout the nation, we speak of our Constitution in almost 

metaphysical terms. In the United States, we revere our Constitution. And well we should; it is the single greatest charter of government in history. But it is worth remembering exactly what it is 

that we revere. The Constitution is a text. It is comprised of words 

on parchment. A copy fits comfortably in an inside pocket, but copies don’t quite do it justice. The original is just down the street at 

the National Archives, and it is something to see. It is sealed in 

a titanium case filled with argon gas, and at night it is kept in an 

underground vault. But during the day, anyone can go and see it 

and read it, and everyone should. The parchment is in remarkably 

good condition. And the words are still clearly visible. 

The most important job of a Supreme Court justice is to discern 

what the words on that piece of parchment mean. The job is not 

to instill the text with meaning. The job is not to declare what the 

text should mean. It is to discern, using standard tools of legal interpretation, the meaning of the words on that piece of parchment. 

Now, sometimes the meaning of the text is not obvious. One 

might need to turn to other sources to help understand the meaning of the words. One might, for example, turn to the Federalist 

Papers or to early Supreme Court cases to see what other wise lawyers thought that those words meant. 

But what the Supreme Court has done in two recent and controversial cases is to rely on contemporary foreign law in determining the meaning of the United States Constitution. And this is 

the practice that Judge Sotomayor seemed to endorse in her recent 

speech. But when one is trying to figure out the meaning of the 

document down the street at the Archives, it is mysterious why one 

would need to study other legal documents, written in other languages, for other purposes, in other political circumstances, hundreds of years later and thousands of miles away. To put the point 

most simply, as a general matter, it is unfathomable how the law 

of, say, France, in 2009, could help one discern the original public 

meaning of the United States Constitution. 

Those who would rely on such sources must be engaged in a different project. They must be trying to update the Constitution to 

bring it in line with world opinion. To put the point most starkly, 

this sort of reliance on contemporary foreign law must be, in essence, a mechanism of constitutional change. 

Foreign law changes all the time, and it has changed continuously since the Founding. If modern foreign law is relevant to conVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00561 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
550 

stitutional interpretation, it follows that a change in foreign law 

can alter the meaning of the United States Constitution. 

And that is why this issue is so important. The notion of the 

court ‘‘updating’’ the Constitution to reflect its own evolving view 

of good government is troubling enough. But the notion that this 

evolution may be brought about by changes in foreign law violates 

basic premises of democratic self-governance. When the Supreme 

Court declares that the Constitution evolves—and it declares further that foreign law may affect its evolution—it is declaring nothing less than the power of foreign governments to change the 

meaning of the United States Constitution. 

And even if the court purports to seek a foreign ‘‘consensus,’’ a 

single foreign country might tip the scales. Indeed, foreign governments might even attempt this deliberately. France, for example, 

has declared that one of its priorities is the abolition of capital punishment in the United States. Yet surely the American people 

would rebel at the thought of the French Parliament deciding 

whether to abolish the death penalty—not just in France, but also 

thereby, in America. 

After all, foreign control over American law was a primary grievance of the Declaration of Independence. It, too, may be found at 

the National Archives, and its most resonant protest was that King 

George III had ‘‘subject[ed] us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution.’’ 

This is exactly what is at stake here—foreign government control 

over the meaning of our Constitution. Any such control, even at the 

margin, is inconsistent with our basic founding principles of democracy and self-governance. 

I hope that the Committee will continue to explore Judge 

Sotomayor’s views on this important issue. Thank you. 

[The prepared testimony of Mr. Rosenkranz appear as a submission for the record.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, to all of you. Just to 

clarify, Mr. Rosenkranz, the one case that Judge Sotomayor considered on the death penalty, she actually sustained it. She rejected 

a claim that it did not apply and I do not think she used foreign 

law at all to say that it did not apply. She actually sustained the 

death penalty. Are you aware of that case, the Heatley case? 

Mr. ROSENKRANZ. Yes, I am aware of it. I am referring primarily 

to the speech that she gave on this topic. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Okay. Well, I would say that her opinion 

probably rules, if you look at how she actually ruled on this. She 

did not say that you could not have the death penalty because of 

French law. Thank you. 

Ms. Romero, I had some questions about your testimony. You 

talked about the fact that Ms. Sotomayor’s opinions are characterized by a diligent application of the law, reasoned judgment, and 

an unwavering commitment to upholding the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent. 

Do you want to talk to me about how you reached that conclusion? 

Ms. ROMERO. We have a Supreme Court committee, as I mentioned, and the committee conducted a thorough review of her 

background. In addition to reviewing about 100 of her cases, we 

551 

commissioned a review by a group of law professors who reviewed 

about 100 of her cases. 

We reviewed many of her speeches and articles and, also, spoke 

to dozens of colleagues and people who know her. So we conducted 

a fairly extensive due diligence. So our conclusion is based primarily on our review of her cases, which I think is what really 

should prevail here. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. You also noted in your remarks that the 

judge’s opinions can’t be readily associated with a particular political persuasion or judicial philosophy, and I think that may be reflected in the fact that she has been endorsed—in our last panel, 

Louis Freeh, who had been appointed by George H.W. Bush and, 

also, served as the FBI director. 

We had the Fraternal Order of Police, the largest police organization in the country. We have had the National District Attorneys 

Association that supports her and, in fact, a review of her sentences shows that she is right in the mainstream. 

I questioned her yesterday about some of her white collar sentences were actually quite lengthier than some of her colleagues. 

Do you want to talk about what you mean by that her opinions 

cannot be readily associated with a particular political persuasion 

or judicial philosophy? 

Ms. ROMERO. Well, there is no pattern that emerges of an activist judge here. It is quite apparent that her opinions are highly 

driven in that she relies extensively on the application of the law 

to the facts that face her. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. Mr. Shaw, do you want to comment a bit about what she was like in high school? You said she 

was judicious and I was trying to imagine if I was judicious in high 

school. 

But you did know her from Cardinal Spellman High School. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. SHAW. Cardinal Spellman High School in the Bronx and her 

temperament was even-keeled, calm. She was very thoughtful, fairminded. She treated all individuals equally. She exhibited many of 

the qualities that she exhibits now. 

Some of the testimony I have heard here is delivered by people 

who don’t know her and, frankly, who won’t let the facts get in the 

way. It has nothing to do with who she is. But I understand part 

of what goes on at these hearings. 

Her career is one that has been very extensive as a judge and 

I cannot tell you that she would rule in the way that I would want 

her to rule in every case if she were confirmed to the Supreme 

Court. She hasn’t done that in her career so far. 

But I don’t think that’s the standard. I think that all any of us 

can expect and hope for and want is that she is fair, open-minded, 

and that she applies the law to the facts, and, clearly, her record 

has done that. Her speeches are not how she should be judged. It’s 

her 17-year record on the bench. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. In fact, I imagine you might not 

have agreed with some of the decisions. I think we found out that 

of the discrimination claims that are brought before her, she rejected 81 percent of them and, of course, had found for some of 

them. 

552 

So I think it is a tribute, Mr. Shaw, that you would still be here 

knowing that you may not have agreed with her on every single decision that she made. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SHAW. Thank you. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. I want to recognize Senator Kyl and let him 

have my time now. But I would just note Senator Kyl is a superb 

lawyer, senior member of this Committee, involved in the leadership of the Senate. So I know that is why he has had to get back 

over right now, because a lot of things are happening. 

He also has argued three cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, 

which very few lawyers in this country can have the honor of ever 

arguing one. 

Senator KYL. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, Senator 

Sessions. Just to give you one idea about what it is like to be in 

leadership, we are trying to figure out right now, and the reason 

I have been consulting my Blackberry, while listening out of both 

ears to your testimony, and I thank all of you for being here, is we 

are trying to figure out if we are going to come back here and vote 

at 1 a.m. tomorrow morning or we are going to try to have three 

different votes here yet this evening and not come back at 1 a.m., 

the kinds of things Senators consider all the time. 

Again, let me thank all of you. First, with regard to the last two 

panelists, I very much appreciate your discussion of foreign law. It 

is a subject that I think this Committee needs to pay a lot more 

attention to. 

Judge Sotomayor has said two contradictory things and it will be 

up for us to try to square which will, in fact, govern her decisions 

on the Supreme Court, should she be confirmed. 

She said, on the one hand, on numerous occasions, that she 

thinks that foreign law should be considered and that she agreed 

with Justice Ginsberg and disagreed with Thomas and Scalia. I 

think, Mr. Rosenkranz, you pointed out what that means in terms 

of the use of foreign law. 

Yet, she has said here, even, I think, this morning, that she does 

not think foreign law should be used in interpreting the Constitution or statutes. So we are left to wonder and I guess we will just 

have to try to figure that out. 

I also wanted to specifically ask Tim Jeffries a question. I know 

Tim Jeffries and I know of his considerable work on behalf of victims of crime, and that is why I think you are a good person to answer this question, Tim. 

To me, there is one place where empathy does play a role in a 

judge’s decisions and I can think of only this one situation, and it 

is at the time of sentencing, when at least some states and the Federal Government now allows persons who are not parties before the 

court to make statements before the court at the time of sentencing. 

That is a time where, to the extent there is discretion with respect to sentencing, a judge can take into account what people tell 

him about the victim, about the defendant, about other matters, 

and empathy cannot help but play a role in that. 

Could you just remind us, from your perspective of having 

worked for victims’ rights now, why it is important for judges to 

553 

consider the point of view of victims, in this particular situation, 

in sentencing statements or in the other situations in which it is 

appropriate for a victim or a victim’s advocate to make an appearance in a given case? 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Senator Kyl. As 

you know, in the U.S. Constitution, there are over 20 references to 

defendants’ rights. There are no references to victims’ rights. 

Currently, under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, which is Federal 

law, there are statutory protections for victims of Federal crimes, 

which those protections provide the right to be informed, to be 

present, to be heard. But that is just for Federal crimes. 

If you look at the states in our great union, it is a patchwork 

quilt of victims’ protections and in upwards to 15 states, there are 

no victims’ protections whatsoever. It is challenging enough that 

incomprehensible crime is committed in our country. Fifty people 

will be murdered today, 760 people will be raped today, over 3,000 

people will be assaulted, and over 4,000 children will be abused. 

It’s incomprehensible and as if that is not tough enough, when 

people enter the justice system, which should exist to do just 

things, revictimization often takes place. 

Judge Sotomayor is a great American story, valedictorian of her 

grade school, valedictorian of her high school, the Pyne Prize at 

Princeton, summa cum laude, phi beta kappa, editor of the Yale 

Law Journal. She has written 380 opinions. She has given over 180 

speeches. Even today, she said, ‘‘It’s important to use simple 

words,’’ and I quote. 

So I can assure everyone here that when a victim, a victim’s family is in a courtroom, above and beyond the fact that they’re looking 

for justice that the system should mete, they’re looking for the 

kindness that a just system should provide. 

And whereas I continue to be very impressed with the honorable 

Judge Sotomayor’s story and her record of accomplishment and all 

the incredible witnesses that have come to support her, I’m extremely concerned that a jurist who understands how important 

words are, through several decades of speeches, could be so cavalier 

as it pertains to victims’ feelings. 

And as I stated in my prepared remarks, forgiveness and mercy 

are one thing. Justice and accountability are another thing. And so 

I am just hopeful, I am prayerful that if Judge Sotomayor is confirmed to our nation’s highest court, that she will never lose sight 

of what I’m sure were some very hard days she spent as a prosecutor. 

And with all due respect to the troubled lives of guilty criminals, 

we should be focused on victims. 

Senator KYL. Thank you. Thank you, all panelists. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much. Senator Kaufman. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I just have a few questions. Ms. Romero, can 

you tell us what Judge Sotomayor’s confirmation would mean to 

your organization, the long struggle for greater diversity on the 

Federal bench? 

Ms. ROMERO. It’s not only about our organization. I think it’s 

about all Americans. It’s about all Americans seeing themselves reflected at the highest levels of our profession. 

554 

It’s about public trust in the integrity of the judicial system. It’s 

about public faith and public understanding about the law. On the 

day that Justice Souter announced his retirement, I was in New 

Mexico speaking to a group of high school students, 600 high school 

students, primarily Hispanic, in an underserved area of New Mexico, of Albuquerque, and I told them, ‘‘I’m going to speak with you 

for about 5 minutes, give me 5 minutes, and if you want to, afterwards, I will answer any questions you want.’’ 

I spoke to them for 5 minutes. Then they asked me questions for 

40 minutes. So I was very proud of the fact that they were enormously interested in the law. But some of the questions were a little bit more than troubling in the sense that they reflected some 

distrust in their interactions with the judicial system and on how 

the community interacts with the judicial system. 

So one of our missions as a bar association is to try to educate 

youngsters about the fact that the law really is fair and is just and 

that it reflects them and that it is accessible to them. So it’s about 

that, it’s about access. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Professor Shaw, can you tell us, just from 

your vast background, just a little bit about the function of legal 

defense funds and how they serve society? 

Mr. SHAW. Sure. I worked for almost 26 years for the NAACP 

Legal Defense Fund, ending up being director, counsel and president. The Legal Defense Fund is the organization that was borne 

out of the NAACP, which I consider to be and I think most historians would consider to be the oldest civil rights organization in 

this country, even though another claim has been made here today. 

But the Legal Defense Fund litigated Brown v. Board of Education and many of the major civil rights cases on behalf of African-Americans, but also others. PRLDEF was modeled after the 

Legal Defense Fund, as were many other legal defense funds, including some of the conservative legal defense funds that now exist 

in other institutions in other parts of the world. 

One of the things I would underscore, because I listened with 

great interest to some of the things that some of the witnesses said 

about Judge Sotomayor’s role as a board member, I know that as 

deputy director of the Legal Defense Fund and then director-counsel, we made sure that the board understood its role and the staff 

understood its role. 

The board was not responsible for the selection of cases or responsible for legal strategy. In fact, I worked very hard to make 

sure that those lines remain drawn. That’s not to say that the 

board didn’t get engaged in policy, but the staff and the lawyers 

and the leadership of the organization have responsibility for legal 

strategy and, also, for deciding what cases would be filed. 

And I think that’s pretty much the way most legal defense funds, 

including PRLDEF, operated. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you very much. I want to thank the 

entire panel for being here today. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Thank all of you. This is another 

good panel and I think it is enriching our discussion. These will all 

be part of the record. It is reflective of a commitment that the SenVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00566 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
555 

ate should make and must make to make sure this process is handled correctly. So thank you all. 

I think the foreign law matter is a big deal to me. Some people 

make out like it is nothing to this, this is just talk. But it is baffling to me how a person of discipline would think that foreign 

opinions or foreign statutes or U.N. resolution could influence the 

interpretation of an American statute, some of which may be 1970, 

1776. 

I think you mentioned, Mr. Rosenkranz, that Americans revere 

the Constitution. I remember at a judicial conference, 11th circuit, 

Professor Van Alstine said that if you respect the Constitution, if 

you clearly respect it, you will enforce it as it is written, whether 

you like it or not; if you don’t do that, then you disrespect it and 

you weaken it. 

And the next judge, someday further down the line, will be even 

more likely to weaken it further and just because you may like the 

direction somebody bent the Constitution this year in this case does 

not mean you are going to like it in the future, and our liberties 

then become greater at risk. 

Would you agree with that? 

Mr. ROSENKRANZ. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. Ms. Rao, you discussed of these philosophies. 

How do you feel about that? Ms. Rao, I am not a legal philosopher 

and one of the level thoughts I have had in the back of my mind, 

I think Judge Sotomayor would have been better served to stay 

away from legal philosophers. It may be the way her momma 

raised her and so forth. But legal philosophies are another thing. 

But she expressed some affirmation of legal realism. Is that not 

a more cynical approach to the law in which the theory is somewhat to the effect that, well, it is not realistic to be idealistic about 

words having definite meanings and we all know judges do differently. 

Is that a fairly decent summary of that and the danger of that 

philosophy? 

Ms. RAO. I think that is one of the dangers of legal realism. I 

think that there are two parts of legal realism. There is one part 

that is largely descriptive, which is that legal realism means that 

often a judge’s viewpoint is going to influence their judging, and I 

think that everyone recognizes that’s a possibility. 

But I think many people go a step beyond that to say, well, a 

judge’s individual views should shape their judging, and I think 

that is a big step. 

Senator SESSIONS. So in this law review article, you have read 

that. Did you read the law review article she wrote? I am not sure 

it is an explicit endorsement, but it is certainly an affirmation of 

that philosophy in many ways in her references to it. Would you 

agree? 

Ms. RAO. It seemed that way to me, as well. And I think it’s also 

supported by her other statements in which she has said that there 

is no objective stance in judging. I think that is all part of the same 

general idea. 

Senator SESSIONS. And there were only perspectives, was that 

the language? Do you remember those words? 

Ms. RAO. Only a series of perspectives. 

556 

Senator SESSIONS. That does not mean much to me. I am not 

sure I am comfortable with a judge who thinks things are just a 

series of perspectives. 

Have any of you been familiar with the French judicial philosophy that involves single decisions? I am told it is a technique that 

the French courts utilize to have—my time has—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. You can keep going. Just speak in French 

from now on. 

Senator SESSIONS. I studied it for 2 years. My understanding is 

that the French courts frequently use very short, unsigned opinions, without dissents and without discussion. So it is very difficult 

to understand the principle behind their approach to law. 

So I just wonder about that. Are you familiar? I didn’t see any. 

Thank you all for your comments and thoughts. We appreciate it 

very much. This is an important issue and we value your insight. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions. 

And I wanted to thank all of you, as well. Actually, Mr. 

Rosenkranz, I did appreciate your testimony. I think it is a valued 

issue to discuss. But I just wanted to make it clear, when I asked 

you that question about the case, in fact, Judge Sotomayor has 

written or joined more than 3,000 opinions in her 17 years as a 

judge and she has never used foreign law to interpret the Constitution or statutes, and including the case I mentioned. That does not 

mean that it is not a valid point to discuss. 

Mr. ROSENKRANZ. She has never used foreign law to interpret the 

Constitution. I think she may have used it to interpret a Federal 

statute. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. The point of the issue is that when you 

brought up the death penalty in the French system, is that she had 

not used foreign law. In fact, she sustained the death penalty in 

that case. Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. There is a national debate. Just Ginsberg favored that in her speech. She endorsed the Ginsberg model and 

criticized the Scalia model. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And then one last thing that I wanted to 

put on the record, a July 9 New York Times article entitled 

‘‘Sotomayor Meted Out Stiff Prison Terms, Report Indicates,’’ in 

which it states that, ‘‘Most striking was the finding that across the 

board, Judge Sotomayor was more likely to send a person to prison 

than her colleagues. This was true whether the offender was a 

drug dealer or had been convicted of a white collar crime.’’ 

[The article appear as a submission for the record.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, on that subject, I would point out that 

the Washington Post study found that her criminal justice decisions were on the left side of the Democratic judges. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. You know what, Senator Sessions. We will 

put both articles in the record. Very good. 

Senator SESSIONS. Good deal. Mine is already in the record. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Great. I just want to thank all of you. I 

know all of your thoughts were heartfelt and well researched. Especially, thank you, Mr. Jeffries, for coming with a difficult situation. I am so sorry about what happened to your brother. 

557 

We are going to break for 5 minutes and then Senator Kaufman 

is going to be taking over this next panel, our last panel. Thank 

you very much. 

Senator SESSIONS. I would note for the record it is highly unlikely that I would be a ranking member and that Senator Kaufman would be chairing this Committee. What a remarkable development that is. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Exactly. Just for everyone’s knowledge, 

Senator Kaufman was Senator Biden’s chief of staff for many, 

many years and took over his seat, and so now he is going to be 

chairing this Committee hearing. 

Ms. ROMERO. Madam Chair, if I may? 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. This is just a free-for-all. Ms. Romero, 

please comment. 

Ms. ROMERO. No, I’m not commenting. I was just going to ask to 

ensure that the longer statement can be submitted and inserted 

into the record. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Certainly. Everyone’s longer statements 

will be included in this record for all of the panels. So thank you 

very much. We will recess for 5 minutes and we will return. 

[Whereupon, at 6:57 p.m., the Committee was recessed.] 

After Recess [7:07 p.m.] 

Senator KAUFMAN. We will now call our final panel, saving the 

best for last, consisting of Patricia Hynes, Dean JoAnne Epps, Mr. 

David Rivkin, and Dr. Stephen Halbrook. 

Before we start, Michael J. Garcia was supposed to be here today 

but—be here for the hearing, but he thought it was going to be tomorrow. We all thought it was going to be tomorrow. Welcome to 

the Senate. You never know when things are going to happen. 

Without objection, what I would like to do is put his statement in 

the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Garcia appear as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator KAUFMAN. Also, Congressman Serrano is going to try to 

make it, but why don’t we do first—you know, as with in all the 

prior panels, all witnesses, as you know, are limited to 5 minutes 

for their opening statements. Your full written statement will be 

put in the record. Senators will then have 5 minutes to ask questions of each panel. 

I would now like to ask the witnesses to stand and be sworn. Do 

you swear that the testimony you are about to give before the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you God? 

Ms. HYNES. I do. 

Ms. EPPS. I do. 

Mr. RIVKIN. I do. 

Mr. HALBROOK. I do. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. 

Our first witness is Ms. Patricia Hynes. Patricia Hynes is president of the New York City Bar Association, a former Chair of the 

American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary. She is also a senior counsel of Allen & Overy, LLP. She 

was Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York 

and clerked for Judge Joseph Zavatt in the U.S. District Court for 

558 

the Eastern District of New York. She is a graduate of Fordham 

Law School. 

Ms. Hynes, I look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF PATRICIA HYNES, PRESIDENT, NEW YORK 

CITY BAR ASSOCIATION 

Ms. HYNES. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Kaufman, Ranking Member Sessions, and Senator Whitehouse. I am the president, 

current president of the Association of the Bar of the city of New 

York, and I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you this evening 

regarding the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to be an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. 

I am joined this evening by Lynn Neuner, who is sitting right behind me, who chaired the Subcommittee of our Executive Committee that conducted the evaluation of Judge Sonia Sotomayor. 

As this Committee is aware, the Association of the Bar of the city 

of New York is one of the oldest bar associations in the country, 

and since its founding in 1870 has given priority to the evaluations 

of candidates for judicial office. As far back as 1874, the association 

has reviewed and commented on the qualifications of candidates for 

the U.S. Supreme Court. 

It is a particular honor for me to participate in this confirmation 

process for this particular nominee. 

In May 1987, our association adopted a policy that directs the 

Executive Committee, our governing body, to evaluate all candidates for appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Executive 

Committee has developed an extensive procedure for evaluating 

Supreme Court nominees, including a process for conducting research, seeking views of persons with knowledge of the candidate, 

and of our membership of more than 23,000 members of the New 

York Bar and other bars. We evaluate the information we receive 

and express a judgment on the qualification of a person nominated 

to the U.S. Supreme Court. 

In 2007, the Executive Committee of the association moved to a 

three-tier evaluation system by including a rating of ‘‘Highly Qualified.’’ This is the first time the association has used the three-tier 

rating for a nominee to the Supreme Court. 

In evaluating Judge Sotomayor’s qualifications, the association 

reviewed and analyzed information from a variety of sources. We 

reviewed more than 700 opinions written by Judge Sotomayor over 

her 17 years on both the circuit court and the district court. We 

reviewed her speeches, articles, her prior confirmation testimony, 

comments received from members of the association and its committees, press reports, blogs, commentaries, and we conducted 

more than 50 interviews with judicial colleagues, former law clerks, 

numerous practitioners, as well as an interview with Judge 

Sotomayor herself. 

The Executive Committee, on evaluating the qualifications of 

Judge Sotomayor, passed a resolution at its meeting on June 30th 

finding Judge Sotomayor highly qualified to be a Justice of the Supreme Court based upon the committee’s affirmative finding that 

Judge Sotomayor possesses to an exceptionally high degree all of 

the qualifications enumerated in the association’s guidelines for 

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559 

lines are: exceptional legal ability, extensive experience and knowledge of the law, outstanding intellectual and analytical talents, maturity of judgment, unquestionable integrity and independence, a 

temperament reflecting a willingness to search for a fair resolution 

of each case before the court, a sympathetic understanding of the 

court’s role under the Constitution in the protection of personal 

rights of individuals, and an appreciation of the meaning of the 

United States Constitution, including a sensitivity to the respective 

powers and reciprocal responsibility of Congress and the executive 

branch. 

These guidelines establish a very high standard which, in our 

opinion, Judge Sotomayor clearly meets. Specifically, the association found that Judge Sotomayor demonstrates a formidable intellect; a diligent and careful approach to legal decision-making; exhibiting a firm respect for the doctrine of judicial restraint, separation of powers, and stare decisis; a commitment to unbiased, 

thoughtful administration of justice; a deep commitment to our judicial system and the counsel and litigants who appear before the 

court; and an abiding respect for the powers of the legislative and 

executive branches of our Government. 

We believe Judge Sotomayor will be an outstanding Justice of 

the United States Supreme Court, and I am very grateful to this 

Committee for giving me the opportunity to express the views of 

the Association of the Bar. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hynes appear as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Ms. Hynes. 

Our next witness is Dean JoAnne A. Epps. JoAnne Epps is the 

dean of the Beasley School of Law at Temple University, and she 

has taught at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. She 

is here today to speak on behalf of the National Association of 

Women Lawyers, where she serves as the Co-Chair of the Supreme 

Court. Dean Epps, I attended Temple for one course. I am sorry I 

did not graduate. But I have enjoyed Temple basketball for over 50 

years, so I am looking forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF JOANNE A. EPPS, DEAN, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY 

BEASLEY SCHOOL OF LAW, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN LAWYERS 

Ms. EPPS. Thank you very much, Mr. Senator. Senator Kaufman, 

Senator Sessions, Senator Whitehouse, I am really honored to be 

here this evening on behalf of the National Association of Women 

Lawyers, whose president, Lisa Horowitz, is seated behind me as 

I speak. And we are here today to urge your vote in support of the 

confirmation of Judge Sotomayor to be an Associate Justice of the 

Supreme Court. 

After careful evaluation of Judge Sotomayor’s background and 

qualifications, the National Association of Women Lawyers, NAWL, 

has concluded that Judge Sotomayor is highly qualified for this position. She has the intellectual capacity, the appropriate judicial 

temperament, and respect for established law and process needed 

to be an effective Justice of the Supreme Court. She is mindful of 

a range of perspectives that appropriately should be considered in 

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560 

onstrate that highly qualified women have a rightful place at the 

highest levels of our profession. We, therefore, encourage your vote 

in favor of her confirmation. 

Founded over 100 years ago, and with thousands of members 

from all 50 States, NAWL is committed to supporting and advancing the interests of women lawyers and women’s legal rights. We 

campaigned in the 1900’s for women’s voting rights and the right 

of women to serve on juries, and we supported most recently this 

year the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. 

In all of the intervening years, NAWL has been a supporter of 

the interests of women. As such, NAWL cares deeply about the 

composition of the Supreme Court and ensuring that it includes the 

perspectives of all Americans, especially those of women, not just 

because most of our members are women, but because all of our 

members care about issues that affect women. 

NAWL’s recommendation today is based on the work of NAWL’s 

Committee for the Evaluation of Supreme Court Nominees. In evaluating the qualifications of Judge Sotomayor to serve as an Associate Justice, special emphasis was placed on matters regarding 

women’s rights or that have a special impact on women. Eighteen 

committee members were appointed by the president of NAWL and 

include law professors and a law dean, appellate practitioners, and 

lawyers concentrating in litigation. I co-chaired this committee together with Trish Refo, a partner at Snell & Wilmer in Phoenix, 

Arizona. 

We divided our committee work into two categories. Like others 

who testified here today, we read a large selection of Judge 

Sotomayor’s opinions, and we interviewed more than 50 people who 

know her in a variety of capacities. Those who were interviewed 

described Judge Sotomayor as open-minded but respectful of precedent, which is consistent with what we found in her judicial opinions. She is courteous and respectful to those with whom she has 

professional interactions, including those who do not occupy positions of status or influence. She has treated litigants, attorneys, 

and court personnel—and, in particular, for our committee’s review, women in the courts—with the utmost respect and professionalism both in and out of the courtroom. Those who have 

interacted with Judge Sotomayor in other capacity, both before and 

after she was appointed, describe her as a good colleague, a team 

player, and supportive of institutional goals. 

Our review of Judge Sotomayor’s writing included her majority 

opinions, concurrences, dissents, and opinions that she wrote or 

joined in that were reviewed by the Supreme Court. And from that 

review, we have concluded that Judge Sotomayor has consistently 

displayed a superior intellectual capacity, a comprehensive understanding of issues with which she was presented, and a thorough 

and firm grasp of the legal issues that have come before her. 

Looking at the clock, I would like to move to the final point that 

we would like to say. NAWL supports the confirmation of Judge 

Sotomayor for the important message that it conveys. NAWL does 

not believe that Judge Sotomayor should be confirmed solely because she is a woman or a Latina, but the fact is that Judge 

Sotomayor is, as ultimately we all are, a product of her experiences. And for her, those experiences include life as a woman and 

561 

as a Latina. Both perspectives will be welcome additions to this 

Court’s deliberations. 

As a Nation, we have come a long way, but we still have much 

to do. Women are nearly half of this Nation, but a mere one-ninth 

of the Supreme Court. The disparity in representation is not trivial 

in effect. In the legal profession, although women have comprised 

50 percent or more of graduating law school classes for more than 

two decades, they continue to be markedly underrepresented in 

leadership roles in the profession. As of last year, women were only 

16 percent of equity partners in the country’s largest law firms; 99 

percent of the law firms in this country reported that their highest 

paid lawyer was a man. Just 23 percent of Federal district and circuit court judges were women. Just 1.9 percent of all law firm partners were women of color. And 19 percent of the Nation’s law firms 

have not one lawyer of color. 

Your confirmation of Judge Sotomayor will, therefore, send a 

strong message to law firms, corporations, Government, and academia that we must and can eliminate the persistent barriers to 

the advancement of women attorneys. It will reinforce what should 

be a standard expectation: that women of diverse ethnic backgrounds should, of course, occupy positions of parity with men. 

As others have said this week, I long for the day when it would 

not even occur to anyone to mention Judge Sotomayor’s gender or 

ethnicity, those matters having become non-noteworthy. But that 

time is not yet here. With this vote, you will send a message, most 

especially to the wonderful women and girls in your life, telling 

them not just that they matter but that issues of concern to them 

matter. 

In summary, NAWL, the National Association of Women Lawyers, found Judge Sotomayor eminently qualified for this position, 

but not simply because she is a woman. She has the intellectual 

capacity, the appropriate judicial temperament, and respect for established law and process to be an outstanding Supreme Court Justice. She is mindful of the human component of law and symbolizes 

the triumph of intelligence, hard work, and compassion. Accordingly, NAWL strongly supports her confirmation and urges you to 

vote in favor of her. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Epps appear as a submission for 

the record.] 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Dean Epps. 

Our next witness is the Honorable Jose ́ E. Serrano. Congressman 

Serrano, will you please stand and be sworn? Do you swear that 

the testimony you are about to give before the Committee will be 

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 

God? 

Mr. Serrano. I do. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. 

Representative Jose ́ Serrano represents the 16th Congressional 

District of New York in the Bronx. He is an active member of the 

Congressional Hispanic Caucus and now is the most senior member 

of the Congress of Puerto Rican descent. Previously, Representative 

Serrano served in the 172nd Support Battalion of the U.S. Army 

Medical Corps and was a member of the New York State Assembly. 

562 

Congressman Serrano, I look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, A REPRESENTATIVE 

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

Representative SERRANO. Thank you. And before you start the 

clock running, sorry I am late. I am Chairman of the Financial 

Services Appropriations Subcommittee. My counterpart is Senator 

Durbin, and we just passed our bill with 17 amendments, a motion 

to recommit, and a lot of issues that had nothing to do with my 

bill being discussed. 

Senator KAUFMAN. No one starts a clock on a member of the Appropriations Committee prematurely. 

[Laughter.] 

Representative SERRANO. You are well taken care of, Senator. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. 

Representative SERRANO. Senator Kaufman, thank you, Senator 

Whitehouse, thank you, Senator Sessions. Thank you so much for 

the honor you have given me by inviting me to testify on behalf of 

Judge Sonia Sotomayor. 

Today I represent the proudest neighborhood in the Nation—the 

Bronx, New York. I cannot begin to describe the pride and excitement that my community feels to know that one of our own stands 

on the verge of a historic confirmation to the Supreme Court. Like 

you, I am often greeted by constituents on streets, at diners, after 

church services, where I cut my hair, at the local bodega or my favorite cuchifrito stand. Usually, we talk about a personal or congressional issue or simply a friendly greeting. Now they just talk 

about Sonia. 

They speak about her as if she was a member of their own personal family, about their pride in her accomplishments. They show 

a profound understanding of just how significant this nomination 

is and how it proves that in our country everything is possible. 

One of the best examples of the significance of this nomination 

is the number of people who are watching these hearings. In the 

Bronx, and in many communities around the Nation, folks have 

come together to share this moment. That is a clear sign of the 

pride and joy that they feel. Back home, believe me, it is a celebration. 

Like the nominee, my family moved from Puerto Rico to New 

York. Like her, I grew up in a public housing project in the Bronx. 

Like her family, we also struggled in our new surroundings. It was 

tough in the Bronx, but we had dignity and our eye on a better future. 

One of the proudest moments of my life came when I was first 

elected to the New York State Assembly with my classmate, Senator Chuck Schumer. As we were being sworn in, a friend said to 

my father, ‘‘Don Pepe, you are a lucky man. You have two children. 

One son is a school teacher, and the other is an Assemblyman.’’ My 

Pop, with that wonderful accented English, looked at him and replied, ‘‘I busted my back to get lucky.’’ 

I am sure that Judge Sotomayor and her mother have had many 

similar moments. We are living our parents’ dreams, enabled by 

their sacrifices and years of hard work. But our story is not unique 

to the community we come from. All around our great Nation there 

563 

are people working day and night, saving, doing without, all in 

order that their children could live the life that they want for them. 

Sonia represents the best of American culture. She comes directly from the strand of our national character that says, ‘‘You can 

be anything you want.’’ It says, ‘‘Through hard work, you can reach 

the top in this country.’’ She is living proof that our dreams for our 

children are never impossible. 

When you invited me to speak, I wondered if my role here today 

was to tell you about her legal qualifications. Coming before you 

are many people who will speak to her work and the legal profession. We know that she is highly regarded and that she has a deep 

understanding of the law and profound respect for the Constitution. She comes before you with more Federal court experience 

than any other nominee in the last 100 years. You know, I quickly 

came to the conclusion that my role is to tell you about where she 

comes from, how she got to this point, and what this means for our 

country. 

We come from rough neighborhoods. We were surrounded by people making do on little. Sometimes there was desperation and despair. Around us were many distractions that could have taken us 

down a totally different road, but there was also ambition and people determined to make something of themselves. We came from a 

place where family comes first, where the core values are hard 

work and looking out for one another. 

As I moved out into the wider world, first through the Army and 

then in my political career, I learned that these were not liberal 

or New York or Puerto Rican or Latino values. They are American 

values. 

Bronx neighborhoods may not seem as similar to middle America, but the values that we hold dear—family, freedom, looking out 

for the neighbors—are the same. Everyone watching this nomination this week should know that based upon her background and 

ideals, they are in good hands with Judge Sotomayor. 

When I walk into the Capitol to work every day, I often stop and 

think how fortunate I am as a kid from a Bronx project to make 

it here. It is an incredible story that I have lived, but since she was 

nominated by President Obama, I have had to remember that my 

story pales in comparison to hers. 

In conclusion, this proud woman from the Bronx is perhaps the 

best and the brightest we have. She has risen to the top through 

her incredible intellect and hard, hard work. I know that her values are your values and those of people around this country. Her 

story is my story. But her story is your story or that of your parents’ or your grandparents’. She will be a brilliant member of the 

Court, and I urge you to vote for her nomination, and I thank you 

for allowing me to show up late and for giving me this honor, which 

is one of the greatest I have ever had, to testify on behalf of this 

great woman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Serrano appear as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Congressman. It is our honor having you here. 

Senator SESSIONS. Congressman, thank you. That was a beautiful statement. 

564 

Representative SERRANO. Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. We appreciate it very much. 

Representative SERRANO. And with your permission—I do not 

know if it is allowed—I have some statements I have made about 

her in the past in 1998 and 1999 that I would like to submit for 

the record. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Without objection. 

Representative SERRANO. Thank you. 

[The statements appear as a submission for the record.] 

Senator KAUFMAN. Our next witness is Mr. David Rivkin. David 

Rivkin is a partner in the law firm of Baker Hostetler. Previously, 

he was Associate Executive Director and Counsel to the President’s 

Council on Competitiveness at the White House He also worked in 

both the Department of Justice and the Department of Energy. 

Mr. Rivkin, I look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID RIVKIN, ESQ., PARTNER, BAKER 

HOSTETLER, LLP, AND CO-CHAIRMAN, CENTER FOR LAW 

AND COUNTERTERRORISM, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF 

DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. RIVKIN. Chairman Kaufman, Ranking Member Sessions, I 

want to thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. Indeed, 

I am honored to be here. Let me begin, though, by noting briefly 

that I am appearing here on my own account and do not represent 

the views of my law firm, its clients, or any other entity or organization with which I am affiliated. I am also not expressing a view 

as to how you should discharge ultimately your advise-and-consent 

function. 

Without a doubt, Judge Sotomayor is both an accomplished jurist 

and an experienced lawyer. It is, nevertheless, critical that the 

Senate weigh her understanding of the judiciary’s proper role in 

our constitutional system before consenting to her appointment. 

In my view, it is particularly essential that the Senate probe her 

views on the proper judicial handling of national security cases. 

This is the case for two distinct reasons. 

First, the United States remains engaged in a protracted global 

war against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Winning this war is essential to our country, and its conduct has presented novel legal challenges rarely seen in previous conflicts. 

Second, despite Judge Sotomayor’s long and distinguished service 

on the Federal bench, she has not had the occasion to consider 

many cases in the national security area. Therefore, the central 

topic of the Committee’s inquiry should be Judge Sotomayor’s understanding of the proper role of Article III courts vis-a-vis the executive and legislative branches in the area of national defense. To 

the extent that these hearings in your judgment have not produced 

sufficient information regarding her views in this area, I would 

urge the Committee to pose written questions to her. 

As you know, Congress and the President have traditionally been 

accorded near plenary authority in the national defense and foreign 

policy arenas, particularly when the conduct of armed conflict is involved. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has dramatically expanded its role in these areas. In my view, this has significant implications for our Government’s ability to prevent another 

565 

devastating attack on the United States and be able to win this 

war. 

Indeed, there can be little doubt that the principles the Supreme 

Court has developed since Hamdi v. Rumsfeld was decided in 2004 

make it far more difficult for the United States to defeat any 

enemy that resorts to unconventional warfare. 

For example, the Supreme Court has imposed what has proven 

to be an unworkable habeas corpus regime with regard to the detainees now held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 

Meanwhile, the lower courts have begun the process of extending 

this habeas regime to individuals captured and held by the United 

States in other parts of the world, particularly at the Bagram Air 

Force Base in Afghanistan. This development threatens our ability 

to wage war in the Afghan theater in general and presents problems for operations of our special forces in particular. 

I want to emphasize that this judicial activism was not prompted 

by, nor even exclusively directed at, the previous administration’s 

allegedly exaggerated view of executive power. To begin with, the 

Bush administration’s use of Presidential powers, in my view, was 

far more modest than that of any previous wartime American 

President. 

Second, in striking the key parts of the Military Commissions 

Act of 2006 in the 2008 Boumediene case, the Supreme Court invaded the constitutional prerogatives of both political branches. 

The Court’s majority did not seem to be particularly troubled by 

the fact that Congress and the President worked in concert at the 

very height of their respective Article I and Article II constitutional 

prerogatives as identified in Justice Jackson’s seminal Youngstown 

Sheet & Tube analysis. 

The substance of these cases aside, I am also troubled by some 

of the stated assumptions that seem to undergird this ongoing 

wave of judicial activism in the national security area. These assumptions basically are that the courts are the best guardians of 

civil liberties and that the extension of judicial jurisdiction over all 

national security issues would produce a superior overall policy for 

our Nation. This view is both a historical and profoundly at odds 

with our constitutional fabric. When Article III courts extend jurisdiction over matters that are not properly subject to judicial jurisdiction, they act extra-constitutionally. Such an action by the 

courts, even if cloaked in the high-minded language of individual 

liberty, is no better than any extra-constitutional exertion of authority by congressional or executive branch. 

As we address these issues today, I note that these concerns are 

now shared by both sides of the aisle. Despite criticizing President 

Bush’s wartime policies during last year’s campaign, President 

Obama has continued virtually all of them. His administration’s 

litigation strategy on all of the pending key national security issues 

is identical to that of his predecessor. This is especially true with 

regard to the detention of captured enemy combatants without trial 

outside of the United States. 

His policies will continue to be challenged in the courts, and the 

Supreme Court is certain to play a central part in determining 

what those policies should be. If Judge Sotomayor is confirmed, her 

rulings will have immense consequences for our country’s safety 

566 

and security. I believe the Senate owes it to the American people 

to engage her on these issues fully and openly. 

I thank you for the opportunity to share my views with the Committee, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rivkin appear as a submission 

for the record.] 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rivkin. 

Our final witness in this panel is Dr. Stephen Halbrook. Dr. Stephen Halbrook has practiced law for over 30 years and has authored or edited seven books and numerous articles on the Second 

Amendment. Most recently, he drafted the amicus brief for the Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller, which was signed 

by Vice President Cheney, 55 Senators, and 250 Members of the 

House of Representatives. He is a graduate of Georgetown University Law Center. 

Mr. Halbrook, I look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN HALBROOK, ATTORNEY 

Mr. HALBROOK. Thank you, Chairman Kaufman, Ranking Member Sessions, Senator Whitehouse. We’ve learned that Judge 

Sotomayor ended the great baseball strike and we’ve learned that 

she was and she is a fan of the New York Yankees. 

However, in her decision in Maloney v. Cuomo, had the State of 

New York decided to ban baseball bats, it would be upheld under 

the rational basis test. Al Capone proved that you could bash out 

the brains of two colleagues with a baseball bat. 

Instead of banning one big piece of wood called a baseball bat, 

New York State banned two little pieces of wood connected by a 

cord called a nunchaku, and that’s what the court upheld in the 

Maloney case. 

But for our purposes, the issue is the decision in Maloney that 

the Second Amendment does not apply against the states through 

the 14th Amendment. The court relied—the only Supreme Court 

case relied on by Maloney was Presser v. Illinois, which simply held 

that the First and Second Amendments do not apply directly to 

state action. It was never raised whether the 14th Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment through the due process clause. 

Presser relied on Cruikshank. Cruikshank relied on pre-14th 

Amendment cases deciding that the Bill of Rights did not apply directly against the states. But we find out in Heller, the Heller decision, footnote 23, that Cruikshank does not apply because it did not 

engage in the kind of modern 14th Amendment analysis that’s required by the Supreme Court’s cases decided primarily in the 20th 

century that Bill of Rights guarantees, especially substantive guarantees, apply to the states through the due process clause of the 

14th Amendment. 

Despite that admonition in the Heller case, decided a year ago, 

the panel in the Maloney case did not say anything about the modern incorporation analysis. Now, Judge Sotomayor did say yesterday that under Supreme Court precedent, the Second Amendment 

does not apply against the states through the 14th Amendment. 

That’s an inaccurate statement. The Supreme Court has never decided that issue. 

567 

Now, there are pending before the Supreme Court two cert. petitions on that issue, NRA v. Chicago, which arose out of the Seventh Circuit, upholding the Chicago handgun ban, held that incorporation had to be decided by the Supreme Court. That court was 

not able to do it. 

And Mr. Maloney has filed his own cert. petition and, in fact, he’s 

asked that. if cert. is granted in NRA v. Chicago, that his case be 

consolidated with the NRA case. 

Now, in her questionnaire, in response to this Committee’s questions, Judge Sotomayor stated that ‘‘conflict of interest would arise 

from any appeal arising from a decision issued by a panel of the 

Second Circuit that included me as a member,’’ and she stated that 

she would recuse herself in that case. 

She has decided the issue now pending before the Supreme Court 

and, therefore, we would expect and we would hope that she would 

recuse herself if she is, in fact, confirmed. 

Now, another per curiam case that she participated in deciding, 

Sanchez-Villar, has disturbing concerns involving both Second and 

Fourth Amendment rights. That case held that the mere possession 

of a firearm gave rise to probable cause to search, seize and arrest 

the person in possession thereof. 

Apparently, under New York law, it’s a crime to possess a firearm and it’s only an affirmative defense that you have a license for 

it. In that case, the court stated that the right to possess a gun is 

clearly not a fundamental right. 

That was totally unnecessary to the decision. It upheld a conviction of an illegal alien for possession of a firearm. And the correct 

decision would be to say that illegal aliens don’t have Second 

Amendment rights, and, in fact, the court disregarded a Supreme 

Court decision in Verdugo-Urquidez, decided in 1990, which explicitly stated that the people that the term ‘‘the people’’ in the First, 

Second and Fourth Amendments refers to are the members of our 

national community and not to aliens and not to illegal aliens. 

A third case I want to mention briefly, United States v. Cavera, 

an en banc decision by the Second Circuit, upheld a Gun Control 

Act prosecution and the sentencing under it. Judge Sotomayor 

wrote a dissenting opinion that I think is commendable. 

She made a statement that ‘‘Arbitrary and subjective considerations, such as a judge’s feelings about a particular type of crime, 

should not form the basis of the sentence,’’ and she explained in 

great detail the reason for that. That’s exactly the way the law 

should be interpreted and constitutional rights should be interpreted, as well. I think she made the correct decision in that case. 

The question now is whether she will also take Second Amendment rights seriously, and that’s the big unanswered question. 

Thank you. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Halbrook. Congressman 

Serrano, you talked about your district and how people feel. How 

are young people growing up going to be affected by Judge 

Sotomayor being on the Supreme Court? 

Representative SERRANO. It’s amazing that you ask that question. And I assure the rest of the panel I did not give him that 

question. But I was talking to my chief of staff this morning, who 

568 

was telling me how many watching parties were taking place in my 

district this week. 

Watching parties, people come together with covered plates, they 

bring food and they watch. And the question that seems to be rising out of the young people is, ‘‘What do I do to go to law school? ’’ 

Now, I don’t know if this country needs more lawyers, because 

you know the jokes about that, and I better stop, because I’m not 

a lawyer. But I believe that what it has done more than anything 

else—and it’s not just her being on the Supreme Court, but the exchanges between this panel and the judge—is that people are becoming more aware of law cases, of law issues. 

And so No. 1, I think it will invite young people to consider a 

legal profession. Second, the issue of pride is so important in your 

own life. 

When I was a young man, there weren’t many Puerto Ricans for 

me to look to in New York as successes. So I always looked to Roberto Clemente, the baseball player, who was such a dignified man 

and who insisted on being called Roberto and not Bob, and then 

later on said Bob was Okay. And I saw that growth and then his 

death was part of that dignity of that man. 

But now, it’s a different story. Now, there are some people who 

look to me. There are people who look to artists. There are people 

who look to other people. 

But in closing, let me just say this. Nothing that you can accomplish in this country looks bigger than the presidency or the Supreme Court. So, obviously, it’s going to inspire people to say, ‘‘I 

can do it.’’ 

And, in fact, she told you here, while she was answering some 

tough questions, that, in many cases, she was telling people, ‘‘You 

can make it. You can make it.’’ And there’s nothing more pro-American than to say to somebody, ‘‘You can make it.’’ 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. Ms. Hynes, how did Judge 

Sotomayor’s experience as a prosecutor and a commercial litigator 

affect your ruling on her qualifications? 

Ms. HYNES. Well, it just shows how well rounded she is. I was 

a prosecutor. Indeed, Bob Morganthau appointed me in 1967 and 

in those days, I was the one woman in that office of 100—I have 

a great picture of a sea of 100 men and I sit behind Bob, who was 

the boss. Right? And he started my career as he did Judge 

Sotomayor’s. I’ve had a wonderful career, but he gave me that opportunity. 

And I spent 15 years in the prosecutor’s office and I went up 

through the ranks and became executive assistant. But when I left 

the prosecutor’s office and went out into practice on the defense 

side, you really get the appreciation that there are two sides to an 

issue. You really have to measure and judge. 

So I think it makes her more well rounded, that she’s seen the 

prosecution side, those issues, the tensions, you heard the representative of the police association. You have Louis Freeh, who we 

all worked with in that same office. 

So she has the appreciation of those tensions, but she also understands the defense side and she combines that with the commercial 

litigator, a prosecutor, a trial judge, and an appellate judge. She is 

569 

the total package. She is the total package and she has done it in 

the best possible way. 

And when I listen, as I’ve tried to do to all of the testimony, I 

think you just have to look at what her background is and her 

record. And after that, your question should be answered, because 

she has been a terrific example of someone who has very, very 

carefully applied the law and done what she thought was right. 

We are all proud of her. When I say I’m particularly proud to be 

here tonight for this candidate, it’s because in New York, we know 

the quality of the judging that we have gotten from Judge 

Sotomayor. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you very much. Dean Epps, based on 

your analysis of your organization of her record, how would you 

speak about Judge Sotomayor’s judicial temperament? 

Ms. EPPS. Thank you very much, Senator. We asked a lot of people who had the opportunity to appear before Judge Sotomayor, to 

appear as opposing counsel, to work with her as co-counsel, to be 

litigants before her, and we found universally that people thought 

she had an extraordinarily appropriate judicial temperament. 

That doesn’t mean that she’s not passionate, which we believe 

that she is. But in all responses, people described her as respectful, 

considerate and kind. And so on that particular issue, we were 

thoroughly satisfied that she has the temperament to be an appropriate associate justice of the Supreme Court. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you. Ranking Member Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Congressman, thank you for your 

eloquence. I just appreciate that very much. Ms. Hynes, your professionalism and approach is worthy of the New York Bar Association. I agree with you, from the beginning, that her experience is 

really the rich kind of experience, almost an ideal experience for 

any Federal appellate judge. 

We have wrestled with a lot of issues that are controversial in 

the legal system today and a lot of us care deeply about those 

things. We are worried about some of the things we see in the 

courts. So that affects how you approach a nominee. But her background and her integrity is exceptional and I appreciate that. 

Ms. Epps, thank you for your testimony. Mr. Rivkin, I just want 

to take a minute, because I guess Senator Lindsey Graham asked 

some questions about national security issues. 

You know that Congress and the President have traditionally 

been accorded near plenary authority in national defense areas. 

That is, I think, consistent with the heritage of our country, up 

until very recent years, post 9/11 years. 

I call your attention to a case before the second circuit, Doe v. 

Mukasey, last year, and that is Attorney General Mukasey, former 

judge from New York, Mukasey, in which a three-judge panel that 

included Judge Sotomayor ruled, in part, that certain provisions of 

the Patriot Act were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 

Specifically, the panel found unconstitutional the provisions of 

the Patriot Act allowing senior government officials to certify that 

the release of certain documents would endanger national security. 

The panel stated, ‘‘The fiat of a government official, though senior in rank and doubtless honorable, cannot displace the judicial 

obligation to enforce constitutional requirements.’’ 

570 

Does that give insight into Judge Sotomayor’s approach to law? 

The opinion went on to state, ‘‘Under no circumstances should the 

judiciary become the handmaiden of the executive.’’ 

Mr. RIVKIN. I think it’s a troubling opinion, Senator Sessions. It 

may strike some people as a technical case. The panel was concerned with the fact that the certifications by senior government officials had to be treated by the courts as conclusive expressed absent a showing of bad faith, and this view that the scheme unduly 

displaces judicial power, that it makes judiciary a rubber stamp. 

And I find that surprising in a couple of ways. First of all, I don’t 

see how you can read the statutory language as establishing a rubber stamp in the context of a bad faith inquiry, let’s say, by the 

director of FBI in making the certification as to the national security consequences of the disclosure of this information. 

You can ask the director, ‘‘How did you make the decision? What 

facts did you look at? Was that something you did generically? Did 

you drill down on it? How often have you rejected such requests in 

the past? ’’ 

So it is a meaningful scrutiny—it’s a deferential inquiry, but it’s 

a meaningful inquiry. So I don’t understand, especially in a facial 

challenge, why would you dismiss it as unconstitutional in a few 

short sentences. 

Second, there is nothing unique about treating certifications by 

government officials as conclusive. There are numerous other criminal justice contexts, including, for example, immunity orders arising in the context of grand jury proceedings, or requests, for pen 

register information, where such certifications have been treated 

with enormous deference by the court. 

What’s interesting, from my perspective, Senator Sessions, is 

that, ironically enough, more deference has been shown over the 

years to these types of certifications in pure criminal justice cases 

(drug cases, health fraud cases), than in national security cases, 

even though, to me, the public safety concerns are far more palpable in a terrorism case and justify greater judicial deference to 

the executive. 

Senator SESSIONS. I have seen some of that in our Committee. 

Could you briefly give me this answer and see if I am correct? We 

have got a lot of people that contend that captured enemy combatants are entitled to habeas corpus. 

Even in our Committee, Senators have contended we denied habeas corpus. We have repealed habeas corpus. It is in the Constitution. Why would you deny it to these captives? 

But is it not true that when the Constitution was written, it 

made provision for the habeas corpus, that it would never interpret 

it as applying to enemy combatants that were captured on the battlefield? 

Mr. RIVKIN. And held overseas. That is absolutely right. That 

was the teaching of the post-World War II, Eisentrager case. That 

was something that never happened throughout 200 years of American history. Yet the Supreme Court, in the space of four short 

years, has changed this and imposed a habeas regime to test the 

Executive’s military detention decisions. 

571 

Senator SESSIONS. President Bush actually relied on the historic 

interpretation. He was criticized because the Supreme Court basically changed the law later. Is that correct? 

Mr. RIVKIN. That’s correct. And the Bush administration merely 

followed the well established legal architecture, Senator Sessions. 

For anybody who has seriously looked at the case law, their legal 

positions were entirely reasonable and solidly anchored in binding 

precedent. 

It is Supreme Court that went away from it own opion decisions. 

What’s even more regretable, from my perspective, is that lower 

courts are now expanding this further. The biggest problem now is 

that the lower courts are then extending constitutional habeas to 

Bagram. 

Senator SESSIONS. And reading Miranda warnings, it appears. 

Mr. RIVKIN. Miranda warnings are now being roughly read when 

captering enemy combatants on foreign battlefields. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Halbrook, you wrote the brief on behalf 

of 55 Senators in the Heller case and your view, I guess, was accepted. 

Is it true that the decision, the Maloney decision, that Judge 

Sotomayor was a member of the panel that ruled on it, and you 

have expressed concerns about it, is it not true that that case will 

need to be reversed or the Second Amendment does not apply to 

the states in any city in the country and state government could 

completely deny people the right to keep and bear arms? 

Mr. HALBROOK. Senator Sessions, the basic issue was, first of all, 

the meaning of the Second Amendment. In Heller, the court said 

it protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, including 

possession of a handgun in your home. 

And Judge Sotomayor’s answers to questions about that decision, 

by the way, this week, have been very noncommittal as to whether 

she agrees with the decision. She does recognize that it’s precedent, 

of course. 

And then the next issue is whether the Second Amendment applies to the states through the 14th Amendment due process 

clause, like virtually every other Bill of Rights freedom, assembly, 

petition, free speech, press, unreasonable search and seizure, the 

right to counsel, the whole works. 

And it’s only logical, once it has conceded, it has held that it’s 

an individual right, that it would be considered an explicitly guaranteed right in the Constitution. Being explicitly guaranteed normally means it’s a fundamental right and the test of—instead of 

rational relation, the compelling state interest test would apply, 

like other fundamental rights. 

So that’s the issue that’s before the Supreme Court right now. 

Senator SESSIONS. Regardless of whether or not the precedent 

justified the decision in Maloney, and I think we can argue about 

that, but the point is that decision would eviscerate effectively the 

protection, the constitutional protection to keep and bear arms, if 

it became the Supreme Court opinion. 

Mr. HALBROOK. That would be correct. 

Senator SESSIONS. The Supreme Court affirmed that approach. It 

is going to need to reverse that approach or the Second AmendVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00583 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
572 

ment is severely weakened and really eviscerated. Is that right fundamentally? Am I exaggerating? 

Mr. HALBROOK. Well, most of the firearms laws—that’s correct. 

There’s 20,000 firearm laws on the books and most of them are at 

the state and local level, not Federal law. 

The Federal Gun Control Act has expanded greatly in the past 

years, but most firearms possession issues involve state and local 

law. And the ruling in the seventh circuit case in NRA v. Chicago 

and the ruling in Maloney is that the Second Amendment has no 

application to states and localities. 

So you could ban firearms. You could ban anything you wanted 

to ban. Anything that would be an arm, the Second Amendment 

just doesn’t apply. It would be a curious doctrine that here you 

have the fundamental right, protected in the Bill of Rights, to say 

that it only applies to the Federal Government. 

The 14th Amendment’s framers desired and intended that the 

bill of rights guarantees apply to the states through the 14th 

Amendment. And one of the big issues of protection was the right 

of freed slaves to keep and bear arms, because they were violated 

by the Black Codes that were enacted by the southern states after 

the Civil War. 

And to get rid of that kind of discrimination, to allow freedmen 

to keep and bear arms, to have free speech and to have all the 

other rights that are set forth in the Bill of Rights, that was the 

intent of the 14th Amendment and that’s the issue before the Supreme Court now and that’s the issue that Maloney decided adversely. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You are very kind. 

Senator KAUFMAN. Senator Whitehouse. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Chairman. Here we are with 

the last panel, last witness, last question or last questioner anyway. I do not want to cause undue trouble, but I would like to react 

to Dr. Halbrook’s testimony, which, first of all, I think was fine. 

You are very learned. You are outside counsel for the National 

Rifle Association. You are knowledgeable about their issues. You 

have won these cases in court before. Your advocacy was ardent, 

but also very polite and cordial. 

So I have no problem with what your testimony said. My concern 

is this, and I mention this in front of the ranking member, because 

he has been energetic on this point. There have been an array of 

witnesses who have made similar points and there has been an 

array of questioning, really almost nonstop questioning on Heller 

and Maloney. 

As I understand the history of this, for 220 years, the United 

States Supreme Court never recognized any individual right to 

bear arms. Just last year, a new conservative majority, by the 

barest of majorities, discerned, for the first time, a new constitutional right, individual right, to bear arms, which is fine. That is 

now the law of the land. 

But it applied only in D.C. So it applied only to Federal law. So 

the case itself never reached the question of the application of the 

individual right that Heller announced in its application to the 

states or, for that matter, to municipalities. 

573 

And that is against a background tradition of fairly extensive 

regulation of firearms by states and municipalities, restrictions on 

felons in possession, regulation of permits to carry concealed weapons, sentencing enhancement for armed crime, prohibitions against 

unauthorized discharge of firearms in city limits and so forth, all 

of which are well established. 

Now, it could well be that when the Supreme Court is presented 

with an opportunity to discuss Heller and to evaluate whether it 

should be extended to apply against states and municipalities, that 

it may choose to do that. But it strikes me that that is presently 

an undecided question by the Supreme Court. 

And as you yourself said a moment ago, the question of the application of precedent in Maloney is one we can argue about. What I 

would hate to have happen here would be to create an atmosphere 

in which a Supreme Court candidate feels that he or she is going 

to walk into a volley of fire if he or she will not announce in advance or signal in advance an intention to expand Heller beyond 

where it now is, where the law has never gone before. 

Maybe it should go there, maybe it will go there, but the point 

of fact is that at this point in time, it has not gone there. I believe 

there is a point at which it verges on unseemly lobbying of the 

nominee to send signals as to where she will vote when the inevitable petition to expand Heller gets brought before the court. 

I do not think it is appropriate for her to decide that matter. I 

do not think her decision in Maloney is outside of the bounds of 

normal judicial precedent, particularly in light of the unique circumstances of the Heller decision, the 220 years of having never 

discovered the right before, the limitation to Federal law by virtue 

of being a D.C. case, and the long history of state and municipal 

regulation of firearms without constitutional objection. 

So it seems to me that a cautious judge, small ‘‘C’’ conservative 

judge, would be inclined not to expand Heller at that point, but to 

make her decision within what she perceived the law to be at the 

time and then if the court wanted to further expand this new constitutional right, that would be the job of the court. 

But I hope that we have not, in the course of this hearing, begun 

to trespass into a point in which the message is being sent to Justice Sotomayor or to subsequent nominees that they need to signal 

how they will rule on a case that the Supreme Court has not yet 

decided in order to achieve confirmation, because I think, again, 

that crosses a boundary between testing the credentials of a candidate in a proper advise-and-consent and what is, I think, unseemly and improper for the advice and consent process, which is 

to seek commitments in future cases or to lobby as to outcomes in 

future cases. 

I know that the ranking member feels very strongly about that 

this right should be extended and we will all have the opportunity 

in due course to make our views known. But I just want to point 

out that I think in this advise and consent process, there is a point 

at which making one’s point about something does trespass on unseemly lobbying. 

I am not sure we have reached that point yet, but I think we are 

in that neighborhood anyway and I would hope that my colleagues, 

as they evaluate Justice Sotomayor, would take that into considerVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00585 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
574 

ation and evaluate her based on her talents, her abilities, and not 

on her failure to give what I think would be an improper advanced 

signal as to how she might rule as a Supreme Court justice in Heller 2, whatever the case will be named. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, you are a good lawyer and you make a 

good point. I would say two things. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. We were both U.S. attorneys, so we argue 

with each other all the time. 

Senator SESSIONS. He is my chairman of the Courts Subcommittee. But two things I would say about it. Number one, it has 

been appropriate to ask nominees about cases they decided, and 

she has decided this case. 

And I think Senator Kyl made a good point. If her case were the 

one that goes up to the Supreme Court, certainly, she would recuse 

herself, would have to, I think, under the rules, and maybe even 

if another one with the very same issue comes up, maybe she 

should consider it. 

Number two, let me tell you what the average American thinks. 

Just reading the words in the Constitution, it says ‘‘Congress shall 

make no law respecting the establishment of religion or free 

speech.’’ It says Congress. That means the U.S. Congress. But that 

applies to the states. That has been incorporated. 

The Second Amendment says, well regulated militia, ‘‘the right 

of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.’’ So that 

one, all that stuff, it just seems to apply to the people. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I think the ranking member is a very good 

lawyer and he makes a very good argument. My only point is that 

the—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Maybe we ought to have the experts on that. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE.—Supreme Court has not accepted that argument yet and until it does, it is an unanswered question. Again, 

I do not want to say that we have trespassed that point at this 

stage, but I do think that it is worth demarcating as we go through 

this advice and consent process. 

But there does come a point where it begins to look like we are 

pressuring candidates to reach a particular outcome and to make 

pledges about a particular outcome rather than simply evaluating 

the merit of their decisions. 

But your argument is very well made and it may very well prevail when that case comes before the Supreme Court. 

Senator KAUFMAN. I thank the panel. I have no further questions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, it has been great to serve 

under your leadership. 

Senator KAUFMAN. This has been great. This is a great panel. 

Senator SESSIONS. Who needs Pat Leahy? Don’t you tell him I 

said that. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KAUFMAN. I need Pat Leahy. All I need is Pat Leahy and 

a member of the Appropriations Committee. I want to thank the 

panel and, frankly, I want to thank all the panels. 

This is an incredible process. The ranking member said, when he 

first started, that this is an educational experience for the AmerVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:18 Jun 24, 2010 Jkt 056940 PO 00000 Frm 00586 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56940.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
575 

ican people. I have been dealing with this process for a long time 

and I really think that is true. 

People get to stop for a minute, look at our Constitution, look at 

the way our process works, and this is a wonderful week in which 

people came, they argued, they fought, just this last exchange. 

Everyone can say what they think. We had not just the members 

of the Senate, but Members of Congress, from the public. I just 

think it is a wonderful example of what a great country this is and 

how our Constitution works. 

I would also like to thank Chairman Leahy and Ranking Member 

Sessions for doing a very thorough hearing, being very open to letting people go where they go and, yet, still getting this whole thing 

done in record time. 

This is an incredibly important process. I believe, as a student 

of the Congress, outside of the decision to go to war, the decision 

of who is going to be on the Supreme Court is the single most important decision that you make as a United States Senator, because when you pick a member for the Supreme Court, you are 

picking someone who serves for life. 

If Judge Sotomayor is confirmed and serves in the court, she will 

probably be here long after this panel of Senators is gone, except 

for Senator Whitehouse. But anyway, I just want to thank everybody for doing that. The Chairman has left the record open until 

5 p.m. 

Senator Sessions, anything you would like to say? This hearing 

is hereby adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 8:04 p.m., the meeting was concluded.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.] 

[Additional material is being retained in the Committee files, see 

Contents.] 

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1170 


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1173 


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56940.788
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56940.789
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1194 


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1195 


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1196 


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1197 


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1198 


56940.797
1199 


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1200 


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1202 


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1227 


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1234 


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1235 


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1236 


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1269 


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1300 


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1332 


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1366 


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1368 


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1370 


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1371 


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1372 


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1373 


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1374 


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1394 


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1396 

Æ 


56940.995