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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43194

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CODY PORTER RADFORD,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 512

Filed: April 29, 2016

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. Richard S. Christensen, District Judge. 

Order denying motion to suppress, affirmed; judgment of conviction and sentence 

of three and one-half years, with a minimum period of confinement of one year, 

for felony reckless driving, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Maya P. Waldron, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GUTIERREZ, Judge

Cody Porter Radford appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to 

suppress evidence found after a traffic stop. Radford also challenges his sentence. We affirm. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

While driving on the interstate, a witness observed a black Kia SUV traveling in the same 

direction, swerving in and out of traffic lanes. After the SUV nearly hit the cement median 

several times, the witness dialed 911 from his cell phone. As he was driving, the witness

continued watching the SUV and relayed his observations to the dispatcher over the phone. 

Based on the information provided by the witness to the dispatcher, Officer Johnson was able to 

spot the black SUV on the interstate. He observed the car “kicking up a lot of dust,” and he 
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advised dispatch of the vehicle’s location. Based on the witness’s and officer’s observations, 

Corporal Branch was able to locate the black Kia SUV and initiate a traffic stop. 

Once Corporal Branch made contact with Radford, the driver of the SUV, Corporal 

Branch noticed Radford’s eyes were red and watery. Suspecting that Radford’s driving might be 

impaired, Corporal Branch performed field sobriety tests on Radford, which he passed. Corporal 

Branch then spoke on the phone with the witness regarding his observations of the vehicle. 

Corporal Branch then arrested Radford for reckless driving. While performing an inventory 

search, Corporal Branch found marijuana and a metal container with two needles inside. The 

State charged Radford with trafficking in marijuana, Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(1); possession 

of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37-2734A(1); possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-

2734A(1); and reckless driving, I.C. § 49-1401(1). Radford filed a motion to suppress, asserting 

that the traffic stop and arrest were unlawful. The district court denied the motion. Radford 

entered a conditional guilty plea to an amended charge of possession of marijuana with intent to 

deliver, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The state dismissed 

the remaining charges. The district court sentenced Radford to a unified three and one-half-year 

sentence, with one year determinate. Radford timely appeals.

II.

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Suppress

Radford first contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to 

suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by 

substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 

as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a 

suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 

weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 

127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 

659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 

In his motion to suppress, Radford first contended that the stop was unlawful because it 

was not supported by reasonable suspicion. A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of 

the vehicle’s occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
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searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Atkinson, 128 Idaho at

561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to 

investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the 

vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 

(1981); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). The 

reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the 

time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). The 

reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation 

or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the 

facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer’s experience 

and law enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. 

App. 1988). 

Officers may rely on a 911 caller’s report of dangerous driving in evaluating whether 

there is reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle. See Navarette v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 

S. Ct. 1683 (2014). In Navarette, an anonymous 911 caller reported that another driver had run 

her off the road and provided the dispatcher with the location of the incident as well as the 

vehicle’s description and license plate number. Id. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 1686-87. Shortly 

thereafter, an officer located the described vehicle near the location of the incident. Id. at ___, 

134 S. Ct. at 1689. The Supreme Court held that the contemporaneous eyewitness account by

the 911 caller, which was corroborated by the officer’s ability to locate the vehicle, established

reasonable suspicion of drunk driving when viewed objectively from the perspective of a 

reasonable police officer. Id.

Here, the 911 caller was contemporaneously informing the dispatcher about his 

observations of the vehicle as he witnessed it being driven. He described the vehicle as 

repeatedly swerving outside the lanes of traffic, nearly hitting the cement median wall on several 

occasions. Officers were then able to locate the vehicle based upon the caller’s description of the 

vehicle and its location. Just as the Court in Navarette held that the contemporaneous eyewitness 

account of dangerous driving, combined with police corroboration in locating the vehicle, was 

enough to establish reasonable suspicion of drunk driving to justify a traffic stop, the eyewitness 

account and corroboration by Officer Johnson and Corporal Branch was enough to establish 

reasonable suspicion of Radford’s unlawful driving to justify a traffic stop of Radford. Thus, the 
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district court did not err in finding the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion based upon 

the totality of the circumstances.

In his motion to suppress, Radford also asserted that the warrantless arrest was not 

supported by probable cause. A warrantless arrest is lawful if the arresting officer has probable 

cause to believe the arrestee has committed a public offense in his presence or has committed a 

felony not in his presence. I.C. § 19-603. Additionally, “[t]he authority to make an arrest is the 

same as upon an arrest for a felony when any person is charged with . . . [r]eckless driving.” I.C. 

§ 49-1405(1)(f). Reckless driving is defined as operating a vehicle “carelessly and heedlessly or 

without due caution and circumspection, and at a speed or in a manner as to endanger or be 

likely to endanger any person or property. . . .” I.C. § 49-1401(1). Probable cause requires the

officer to possess information that would lead a person of “ordinary care and prudence to believe 

or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that such person is guilty.” State v. Alger, 100 Idaho 

675, 677, 603 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1979). 

Here, the officer did not see Radford’s erratic driving. However, the 911 caller’s 

description of witnessed events to the dispatcher was sufficient to establish an honest and strong 

suspicion that Radford was guilty of driving recklessly. Radford’s conduct of swerving outside 

of traffic lanes and nearly hitting the cement median wall was likely to endanger himself, other 

individuals, or property. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding the officer had 

probable cause that Radford committed the crime of reckless driving to justify a warrantless 

arrest. Thus, because the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop and probable 

cause to justify the arrest, the district court did not err in denying Radford’s motion to suppress.

B. Sentence

Radford next contends that his sentence is excessive in light of the mitigating evidence. 

An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Burdett, 

134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 2000). Where a sentence is not illegal, the 

appellant has the burden to show that it is unreasonable and, thus, a clear abuse of discretion. 

State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992). A sentence may represent such 

an abuse of discretion if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 

103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it 

appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is necessary to accomplish the primary 

objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, 
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rehabilitation, or retribution applicable to a given case. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 

P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). Where an appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed 

an excessively harsh sentence, we conduct an independent review of the record, having regard 

for the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 

interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). When 

reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 

144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 

Here, when sentencing Radford, the district court considered the Toohill factors, finding 

that Radford displayed an “incredible disrespect for the law.” The court also considered 

Radford’s previous criminal history, acknowledging that Radford had been granted numerous 

chances to show respect for the law. The court imposed a unified sentence of three and one-half 

years, with one year determinate. Upon review of the record in this case, including the 

mitigating factors, we cannot say that Radford’s sentence is unreasonable. Therefore, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion. 

III.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not err in denying Radford’s motion to suppress. Corporal Branch 

had reasonable suspicion to justify stopping Radford’s vehicle based on the corroborated 911 

witness testimony and to justify the arrest based upon the witness’s observation that Radford was 

driving recklessly. Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 

sentence. Accordingly, we affirm both the order denying the motion to suppress and the 

judgment of conviction and sentence. 

Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.