NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2008-7099 

GLENDA BROOME, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D., Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Glenda Broome, of Easley, South Carolina, pro se. 

Michael D. Austin, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. With 

him on the brief were Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Jeanne E. 

Davidson, Director; and Harold D. Lester, Jr., Assistant Director. Of counsel on the 

brief were David J. Barrans, Deputy Assistant General Counsel; and Amy M. McAtee, 

Staff Attorney, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Office of the General 

Counsel, of Washington, DC. 

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

Judge Robert N. Davis 
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

 

2008-7099 

GLENDA BROOME, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D., Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

 

 Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 06-1261, Judge 

Robert N. Davis. 

 __________________________ 

DECIDED: September 4, 2008 

 __________________________ 

Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, MAYER, Circuit Judge and STEARNS, District Judge*. 

PER CURIAM. 

Glenda M. Broome appeals a portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board of Veterans’ Appeals decision denying her 

claim for service-connection for the cause of her husband’s death, and therefore her 

claim for dependency and indemnity compensation. Broome v. Peake, No. 06-1261 

 _____________________ 

 * The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, District Judge, United States District Court 

of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
2008-7099 2

 (Vet. App. Mar. 3, 2008). We affirm-in-part and dismiss-in-part. 

The veteran died on June 1, 2001, of intracerebral hemorrhage due to 

spontaneous rupture of a cerebral vessel. Prior to his death, service connection was 

established for degenerative arthritis and multiple sebaceous cysts. He was granted 

total disability based on individual unemployability due to his service-connected 

disabilities effective January 1, 2000. 

Broome’s assertion of clear and unmistakable error (“CUE”) on the board’s failure 

to grant claims by the veteran for 100 percent disability prior to January 1, 2000, is not 

ripe for review because she has yet to file such a claim with the VA regional office 

(“RO”). Each claim of CUE underlying a request for revision of a previous RO decision 

must be presented to and adjudicated by the RO in the first instance. Similarly, her new 

claim of service-connection for Agent Orange exposure first must be presented to the 

RO for adjudication. Because those issues were raised for the first time on appeal, we 

affirm the Veterans Court’s decision not to address them. 

Broome also claims that the board and the Veterans Court erred in concluding 

that the veteran’s intracerebral hemorrhage was not a result of his service-connected 

degenerative arthritis. We see no legal error in the Veterans Court’s conclusion that the 

veteran’s service-connected disabilities were not causally connected to his death. See

38 U.S.C. § 1310; 38 C.F.R. § 3.312. Credibility of expert testimony is a question of 

fact, and it was not inappropriate for the board to weigh the expert medical opinions on 

record for their probative values in determining whether the veteran’s cause of death 

was service-connected. Contrary to Broome’s contention, the board was not required to 

consult with medical experts outside of the Department of Veterans Affairs (“DVA”). 
2008-7099 3

Indeed, it is up to the board’s judgment to decide whether a case is of such medical 

complexity or controversy as to warrant an advisory medical opinion from one or more 

medical experts who are not available within the DVA. 38 U.S.C. § 7109; 38 C.F.R. § 

20.901(d). Even if the board concludes that such an advisory medical opinion is 

warranted, it has some discretion to decide whether to seek one. 38 U.S.C. § 7109(a) 

(stating that, in such a case, “the Board may secure an advisory medical opinion from 

one or more independent medical experts who are not employees of the Department”) 

(emphasis added). 

We have considered Broome’s remaining arguments, and conclude that they 

each (1) challenge a factual conclusion reached by the board or the Veterans Court, 

and (2) fail to raise a constitutional issue. Because we lack authority to review either “a 

challenge to a factual determination” or “a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to 

the facts of a particular case” absent a constitutional issue, 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2), we 

dismiss the remainder of her appeal.