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i 

56–052 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–64] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT OF 

THE NAVY AVIATION PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 19, 2009 
(II) 

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

WILL EBBS, Professional Staff Member 

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member 

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member 

ELIZABETH DRUMMOND, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, May 19, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request for Department of the Navy Aviation Programs .......... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, May 19, 2009 ............................................................................................ 35 

TUESDAY, MAY 19, 2009 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY AVIATION PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, 

Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee .......................................... 10 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Seapower and 

Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee .................................................................. 4 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee ........................................................................... 1 

Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman, Seapower 

and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee ........................................................... 7 

WITNESSES 

Architzel, Vice Adm. David, USN, Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, U.S. 

Navy ...................................................................................................................... 6 

Myers, Rear Adm. Allen G., USN, Director of Naval Warfare Integration, 

U.S. Navy .............................................................................................................. 8 

Trautman, Lt. Gen. George J., III, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Marine 

Corps Aviation Programs, U.S. Marine Corps ................................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd .......................................................................................... 45 

Architzel, Vice Adm. David, joint with Rear Adm. Allen G. Myers and 

Lt. Gen. George J. Trautman, III ................................................................ 51 

Taylor, Hon. Gene ............................................................................................. 39 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT OF 

THE NAVY AVIATION PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Tuesday, May 19, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Courtney presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CONNECTICUT, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. COURTNEY. The hearing will come to order. As some of you 

probably noticed, I am not Congressman Gene Taylor from Mississippi. I am Joe Courtney, who usually sits much further down 

on the dais up here, from Connecticut. Mr. Taylor had a sudden 

call out of the building and asked me just to fill in to get the hearing started, and hopefully he will join us in a short period of time. 

And I am very pleased that the former chairman of the subcommittee, Congressman Bartlett, is here to make sure I don’t do 

anything that will damage the committee’s processes. 

Mr. Taylor has prepared an opening statement which he asked 

me to read into the record. And I am going to do that right now, 

and then we will proceed with Mr. Bartlett’s opening comments. 

Today the subcommittee meets to receive testimony from Navy 

and Marine Corps officials on their aviation programs contained in 

the fiscal year 2010 budget request. Today we have with us Vice 

Admiral Architzel. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Architzel, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Architzel, serving as principal military deputy to 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Stackley of the Navy and Marine 

Corps research, development, and acquisition programs; Lieutenant 

General Trautman, serving as Deputy Commandant for the Marine 

Corps aviation programs; and Rear Admiral Myers, serving as the 

director for integration of all Naval Warfare programs. 

Gentleman, thank you for taking time out of your busy schedules 

to be with us. Much like the Department’s shipbuilding programs, 

aviation programs of the Navy and Marine Corps are not without 

issues. The most apparent issue is the amount of the budget request and the number of aircraft requested. The aviation budget request for this year is $4.6 billion greater 

than last year’s plan for the fiscal year 2010, but the overall quantity of planned aircraft purchases has decreased by 20. Very similar to shipbuilding, the amount of funding requested has steadily 
2 

gone up, but the quantity of aircraft purchased has steadily declined. 

I would like to outline the program and policy issues that, at a 

minimum, I would like our witnesses to address. First, the primary 

policy issue that I would like to address is that of the strike fighter 

inventory of the Navy and Marine Corps. Over the last three years, 

all four congressional Defense committees have had a steady 

stream of Navy and Marine Corps witnesses testify before them 

about an impending strike fighter shortfall. This shortfall is predicted to peak in the middle of the next decade. Right now, current 

analysis puts that peak at 243 aircraft in fiscal year 2018, but if 

you account for the accepted risk that each service has informed 

Congress that they are currently incurring, the peak shortage of 

aircraft climbs to 312 in that same year. 

What is more troubling is that it appears that there is a disconnect between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and 

the Department of the Navy. Officials from OSD have recently 

briefed this committee that there is no strike fighter shortfall, but 

that the totality of strike fighter inventory is a matter of analysis 

in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In other words, OSD 

has already predetermined the answer and now they will use the 

QDR to build the equation. 

I request that the witnesses explain today what the position of 

the Department of Navy is regarding the strike fighter shortfall, 

and if they are aware of any new analysis by the Joint Staff or 

OSD which would contradict what is apparently simple arithmetic; 

because the last time I checked, an aircraft carrier is only worth 

its weight in gold if it has an embarked air wing. In other words, 

90,000 tons of American sovereignty becomes 90,000 tons of American helicopter transportation. 

Next, there are a number of programs, and I know we may not 

have time to discuss all of them today, that are of high interest to 

members of this subcommittee. The first program is the F/A–18 

Super Hornet, which ties directly with the strike fighter inventory 

discussion. What I would like to understand is why the Navy reduced its program request by nine Super Hornets in fiscal year 

2010 over the predicted request in last year’s budget. It is our understanding that the program is executing very well, on cost target, 

and on schedule. 

Yet with the Super Hornet line executing well, the Navy and Marine Corps have opted to increase their fiscal 2010 Joint Strike 

Fighter F–35 aircraft by two, at an estimated cost of $236 million 

each. I know the Department prefers the advantages of stealth, but 

given the high risk and high concurrency regarding the development, testing, and production of the F–35, we need to understand 

at what point that putting combat-proven, rubber-on-the-ramp 

Super Hornets is more advantageous than waiting for an experimental aircraft that is behind its original schedule by more than 

two years, over its original program budget estimate by more than 

$65 billion, and has already reduced its planned inventory quantity 

by more than 400 aircraft. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted in its 

most recent F–35 report to Congress that the program office estimates an additional $2.4 billion is needed to cover cost overruns on 
3 

the air system and engine contracts and to incorporate the one-year 

extension to the development schedule. The prime contractor has 

already extended the manufacturing schedule three times, and due 

to ongoing manufacturing inefficiencies and parts supply problems 

with its subcontractors, has only delivered 3 out of 13 aircraft. 

Nine aircraft should have been delivered by now. 

I would like to understand why the Department wants to accelerate F–35 procurement between 2010 and 2015 by purchasing 28 

additional aircraft above its current program of record. It is my understanding that F–35 contracts are planned as cost reimbursable 

instead of fixed price, and this magnifies the financial risk to the 

government. 

Has the Department learned nothing from the fiascos of the VH– 

71 program and the Littoral Combat Ship program? The F/A–18 

Super Hornet can be purchased for somewhere in the neighborhood 

of $50 million on a fixed-price contract. For the F–35 the cost 

growth per airframe alone is $38.3 million. I think we have a great 

airframe in the F/A–18 Super Hornet. It is affordable, it is multimission, and it is flying off our carriers in combat today. I would 

like our witnesses to explain why this committee should recommend removing funds from a proven program to increase procurement in a developmental program. 

Briefly, I would like to address the VH–71 program. The Navy 

invested over $3.2 billion, received nine test and pilot-production 

aircraft, yet was unable to successfully execute this program that 

ultimately was canceled by Secretary Gates. I would like to understand what the plan is for the current aircraft assets that have already been delivered, what is the plan going forward, and how the 

mistakes of the original program will be prevented from happening 

in the next program. 

I understand the E2–D program may be on the verge of a significant Nunn-McCurdy breach. I would ask the witnesses to comment 

on the health of that program. 

Finally, I understand that although the MV–22 has performed 

extremely well in combat operations in Iraq, the aircraft is having 

sustainment issues and unforeseen additional costs associated with 

maintenance. Are there ongoing efforts at design changes to address some of these maintenance issues? 

I realize that I have outlined a number of issues facing Naval 

aviation. I believe these are fair concerns and deserve an open and 

public accounting of the costs and benefits of these programs. What 

I am not willing to do is sit by as program after program breaks 

the bank on costs. I have seen enough of that in shipbuilding programs. We can no longer afford unaffordable programs. I believe it 

is time to step back and build what we know works, make it better 

if we can, and get the capability to the sailor and marine who need 

it today, not 10 years from now. 

Again I thank the witnesses for joining us today, and now would 

like to recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 
4 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I will read our Ranking 

Member’s opening statement into the record. As you will see from 

my line of questioning later, if it were my opening statement it 

would be a bit different. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our witnesses. We 

meet this afternoon to receive testimony on Navy and Marine 

Corps aviation programs, which is an area with many challenges. 

Naval aviation has been a major component of our mighty military 

might since World War II. Our ability to project power great distances onto shore, from any ocean in the world, has been vital to 

U.S. national security. Our aircraft carriers have become a symbol 

of American diplomatic power and freedom and are the heart of our 

modern Navy. As the saying goes, when a crisis arises, the first 

question on everyone’s lips is, where is the nearest carrier? 

Unfortunately, our Navy faces a significant strike fighter shortfall in the near future. And what good is an aircraft carrier without 

aircraft? Last year the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) testified 

to a fighter shortfall of approximately 125 planes for the Department of the Navy by 2017. This year, based on an updated analysis, the Navy has told Congress that a more realistic estimate is 

a shortfall of over 240 planes. This assumes that the Joint Strike 

Fighter delivers on time and that the Navy will continue to resource its carrier air wings with fewer than is called for in the National Military Strategy. 

If the Joint Strike Fighter program is like most of our programs, 

it will not deliver on time, and so the real shortage will be well 

over 240 planes. Should the Navy resource to its full strike fighter 

requirement, the shortfall would be greater than 300 aircraft. 

What does all this mean? Simple math shows that at least 5 of 

our 11 carriers will be without fighter aircraft, or we would be 

forced to severely limit the number of aircraft per carrier and available for training. In either case, the solution would pose a significant strategic risk. 

I am deeply concerned that this budget actually makes the shortfall worse by cutting the number of Super Hornets the Navy is buying. Facing a gap of at least 243 planes, the Navy is only asking 

for nine Super Hornets. In a few months, the Navy has gone from 

considering another multiyear procurement of Super Hornets to 

cutting the buy of F/A–18s in half. This makes no sense. As I told 

the CNO last week, we either need more planes or fewer carriers. 

I do not think anyone in this room believes that fewer carriers is 

a solution. 

Unfortunately, as Congress has tried to wrestle with this issue, 

the Department of Defense has refused to obey the law and has 

been anything but transparent. The Department of Defense (DOD) 

has not delivered a report on cost and benefits of a multiyear procurement of F/A–18s required by law by March 1, 2009; not delivered the 30-year aviation plan required by law; not delivered a future years Defense program with the budget, as required by section 

221 of Title 10, United States Code; and it has refused to brief Con-
5 

gress on the apparently differing estimates on the size of the fighter shortfall. 

Is this the transparency that President Obama promised? Does 

the Department of Defense consider itself above the law? Let us be 

clear. The mere existence of a Quadrennial Defense Review does 

not exempt the Department from fulfilling its legal obligations. 

While I understand that the witnesses this afternoon are not responsible for these decisions to violate the law, let me say at the 

outset that the Department cannot expect to use the QDR as a getout-of-jail-free card. Our witnesses should understand that this 

committee expects and deserves answers, not evasive maneuvers. 

Before closing, let me briefly mention a few other concerns that 

I hope the witnesses will address. First, the development and testing of the Joint Strike Fighter remains uncertain. The fact that we 

are already spending billions of dollars to buy these planes when 

we have only completed a fraction of the testing deeply concerns 

me. I believe that we will continue to see costs and schedules slips, 

and am concerned that in a constrained fiscal environment we will 

continue to see growth in this expensive program. The Joint Strike 

Fighter may be a great weapons system, but it seems to be the 99 

percent solution that Secretary Gates said we should avoid. 

I would also like the witnesses to comment on where we stand 

in terms of electronic warfare capabilities today. Are we meeting 

the needs of the combatant commanders? What are the Marines 

doing about electronic warfare? Will the Navy continue to provide 

expeditionary electronic warfare capability on behalf of the Air 

Force? 

There is much work to be done in the area of Naval aviation. Let 

me again thank the witnesses for being here today, for the work 

they are doing for our Nation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. I yield back. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

Mr. COURTNEY. We have been joined by Mr. Coffman. Do you 

have an opening statement? 

Mr. COFFMAN. No, I don’t, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. Buzzers are going off. There are 

votes. The good news is these are the final votes of the day and 

there are only three. 

Admiral, why don’t you submit your remarks and then we can 

take a brief recess for the members to go vote. And we will come 

back, and we should have the rest of the afternoon clear. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And again you can have your statements entered 

for the record. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Sure. Chairman Courtney and Congressman, Ranking Members, distinguished committee members, it is 

my honor to appear before you today to discuss the Department of 

the Navy’s aviation procurement program. I would like to have my 

written statement submitted for the report. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Without objection. 
6 

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. DAVID ARCHITZEL, USN, PRINCIPAL MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. As the Department of Navy’s acquisition 

lead, we develop and test and acquire our country’s Naval aviation 

weapons systems by balancing performance, schedule, and cost-effectiveness. The fiscal year 2010 budget supports the Navy and Marine Corps’ joint forces, capable of meeting the wide spectrum of 

threats to our Nation both today and in the future. 

The Department continues the development and low rate initial 

procurement of the F–35 Lightning II and the E–2D Advanced 

Hawkeye, CH–53 Heavy Lift Replacement Helicopter, the P–8A Poseidon, unmanned aviation, and new strike weapons capabilities. 

We will procure our first full rate production EA–18 Growler aircraft this year, and continue procurement of the F/A–18 Super Hornet, the V–22, the T–6B Joint Primary Aircraft Training System 

(JPATS), UH–1 and AH–1 Zulu helicopters, the 60 Romeo and Sierra helicopters. In total, Navy and Marine Corps Aviation will procure 98 tactical and fixed-wing aircraft, 100 rotary-wing aircraft, 

and five BT UAVs, for a total of 203 aircraft with the fiscal year 

2010 funding. 

The Navy’s acquisition professional workforce, dedicated men 

and women of civilian and military career fields, are working to 

bring the most capable and affordable weapons systems to the fleet. 

By developing new technologies, testing, and integration of systems, and the procurement of equipment and support of these 

weapons systems, they execute the funds and policies of this budget request. I am proud to represent them before this committee. 

The Navy is committed to funding and fielding the Joint Strike 

Fighter as a highly capable fifth generation multi-mission Strike 

Fighter. JSF is in the eighth year of its design, development, and 

test program. Three SDD aircraft are in ground and flight tests. All 

F–35 variants are projected to meet their respective key performance parameters, or KPPs. The F–135 engine has completed 

11,300-plus test hours on 16 engines through mid-April 2009. Systems integration testing continues on plan via flight tests, flying 

lab, and over 150,000 hours of ground laboratory testing. A fully 

integrated mission-system jet flies in 2009. 

I would like to note the good news of the P–8A Poseidon acquisition program. We are leveraging the efficiencies of the commercial 

production bulk product Boeing 737 to realize the technologically 

advanced product in a shortened acquisition timeline. This aircraft 

will be delivered only nine years after program initiation, and will 

be both extremely capable and affordable. 

In fiscal year 2010, we will procure six Low Rate Initial Procurement (LRIP) Lot I aircraft. The program will commence flight tests 

later this year in IOC and fiscal year 2013. 

Another good news story, EA–18 Growler has completed its operational tests and is preparing to go before the Defense Acquisition 

Board for product decision later this summer for reproduction. We 

have delivered 16 aircraft to Whidbey Island, and are on track for 

Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in September of this year. 
7 

In fiscal year 2010, we will procure 22 production aircraft. The 

E–2D Advanced Hawkeye has completed over 92 percent of its System Design and Development (SDD) program and operational assessment, and currently has two aircraft in flight tests that have 

flown more than 1,000 flight hours. The aircraft has already demonstrated that its advanced radar delivers three times the range of 

legacy radar, and provides the detection required against the advanced threats of today and tomorrow. The program we presented 

to the Defense Acquisition Board for Milestone C decision by the 

end of this month. We need to award a contract for two LRIP Lot 

I aircraft by June 5th to keep this vital program on track. 

We are continuing the vision to meld manned and unmanned air 

systems, or UAS, in the future of tactical air aviation by exploring 

an Unmanned Combat Air System, or N–UCAS, technologies and 

capabilities. Our current demonstration efforts include maturing 

technologies for actual aircraft carrier catapult launches and arrested landings, as well as carrier-controlled airspace integration, 

including aerial refueling through a hybrid Navy or Air Force refueling system. 

I would like to thank the committee for your continued support 

of the Navy and Marine Corps Aviation, and the opportunity to testify before the committee. I welcome your questions regarding the 

Department of the Navy’s acquisition programs. 

Mr. COURTNEY. All right. Thank you, Admiral. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Architzel, General 

Trautman, and Admiral Myers can be found in the Appendix on 

page 51.] 

Mr. COURTNEY. And if the other witnesses have statements, we 

will take them up when we reconvene after the recess. The committee stands in brief recess. 

[Recess.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. TAYLOR [presiding]. The subcommittee will come back to 

order. We are now going to hear from Lieutenant General George 

Trautman. Sir. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. GEORGE J. TRAUTMAN, III, USMC, 

DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR MARINE CORPS AVIATION PROGRAMS, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General TRAUTMAN. Good afternoon, sir. Chairman Taylor, Congressman Akin, distinguished members, it is a privilege for me, as 

the leader of Marine Corps Aviation, to appear before you today to 

discuss the President’s 2010 budget submission. Sir, in the interests of time I will truncate my remarks and just, if it is all right 

with you, submit them for the record. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Without objection, your statement will be submitted 

for the record. 

General TRAUTMAN. In both the Chairman’s opening statement 

and the Ranking’s opening statement, mention was made of the V– 

22 and Joint Strike Fighter. If I could, I will just read that part 

of my statement for you. 
8 

First, the MV–22 Osprey. We have just finished the three highly 

successful combat rotations to Iraq. And just last week a fourth Osprey squadron sailed toward the fight with the Marine Expeditionary Unit that will be deployed for the next six or seven months. 

The Osprey has transformed the way we are fighting in a manner 

akin to the introduction of the helicopter in the middle of the last 

century. We can now project combat-loaded Marines, soldiers, and 

special operators from a sea base or any forward site deep into the 

battle space at the speed of a KC–130. And we can do it at altitudes above the ground threat that has claimed so many helicopters in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Then we can land the 

payload anywhere it is needed, just like a helicopter. With its 

speed, range, and survivability, the MV–22 is truly a game changer. 

Another game changer for us will be the F–35B Short Takeoff 

and Vertical Landing variant of the Joint Strike Fighter. In the fall 

of 2012, when the Marine Corps stands up its first operational 

squadron, the VMFA–332, this fifth generation stealth aircraft, will 

begin replacing our F/A–18s, AV–8s, and EA–6Bs with a single 

platform that far exceeds the operational capabilities of any of the 

tactical aircraft being flown today. The Joint Strike Fighter gives 

us the operational agility we need to support the Joint Force in the 

hybrid battles that loom on our Nation’s bow. 

Most importantly, we intend to leverage the unprecedented sensor capability this machine offers for the benefit of the entire Marine Air-Ground Task Force, allowing us to accelerate the decision 

cycle and fight smarter than we ever have before. Just three short 

years from now, our operational commanders will be able to combine the effects of these two machines, the MV–22 Osprey and the 

F–35 Lightning II, from a sea or land base to unleash a tempo, 

agility, and speed of action that has never been possible in the 

past. 

Regardless of the future threats we will face, our unvarying mission remains to be the Marine Corps’ aviation force in readiness 

across the full spectrum of combat operations. My pride in the accomplishments of our Marines, past and present, and the staying 

power of our military families is only exceeded by my confidence 

that we are properly poised to meet our future challenges. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today, and I 

look forward to answering your questions, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much, General. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Trautman, Admiral 

Architzel, and Admiral Myers can be found in the Appendix on 

page 51.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair now recognizes Rear Admiral Allen 

Myers. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. ALLEN G. MYERS, USN, DIRECTOR 

OF NAVAL WARFARE INTEGRATION, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral MYERS. Good afternoon, sir. Mr. Chairman, Representative Akin, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss Navy Aviation. I would like to submit my written statement for the record. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Without objection, sir. 
9 

Admiral MYERS. I am delighted to share this time with my colleagues from the Navy and Marine Corps to convey the contributions of Navy aircraft in our Armed Forces. Our aviation community, comprised of aircraft, ships and weapons systems, has proved 

to be a stabilizing force, with the capacity to span the globe. 

If we could take a look back to the days following 9/11, just three 

weeks after the attack, two carriers, the Enterprise and the Carl 

Vinson, were in theater ready to provide continuous strikes and 

close air support. In fact, the Enterprise reversed course while 

steaming out of theater for home port. No need to refuel, no need 

for immediate replenishment. That strike group commander, with 

the best trained crews in the world, was ready to respond. Navy 

carrier-based F/A–18s provided the first tactical air strikes in country. Our response in support of 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom, 

continues today. In fact, as recently as a few days ago, our Chief 

of Naval Operations cited a statistic that I would like to mention, 

because I believe it bears repeating, on the value of our carrier 

fleet. 

He said a single Navy aircraft carrier provides 46 percent of the 

fixed-wing aircraft sorties in Afghanistan; that one carrier provides 

close air support, airborne reconnaissance, and airborne electronic 

attack to our troops in contact with the enemy. By the way, the response time to those troops in contact with the enemy is often less 

than 10 minutes. 

Augmenting the carrier’s support for our troops ashore, the Navy 

deploys land-based airborne electronic attack via the EA–6B. These 

aircraft conduct critical missions that protect U.S. forces and support offensive operations. Is it really any wonder that in a moment 

of crisis we hear the phrase ‘‘Where are the carriers?’’ Often the 

first to arrive in response to a crisis, a carrier strike group provides 

credible capability and assured access with the speed, agility, persistence, all that is needed without the reliance on shore infrastructure. 

Seapower projects persistent combat capability ashore while facilitating the building of partnerships, as we have seen in our combined task forces at sea, including the Horn of Africa. Seapower is 

disrupting insurgents on land as well as disrupting smuggling and 

piracy at sea. 

Our fixed- and rotary-wing Navy assets have been engaged in 

counterpiracy operations around the Horn of Africa. Last month, 

during the Maersk Alabama incident, the first U.S. military asset 

on scene was a Navy P3. And our helicopters have been integral 

in the apprehension of a number of pirates by providing necessary 

surveillance to locate, track, and intercept vessels on behalf of the 

visit, board, search and seizure teams. 

Our carriers and ships remain on station around the world, providing presence in other places as well: the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Pacific, the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and 

the Red Sea. Our forces provide the effects ashore, at sea, and 

strengthening relationships and building regional stability throughout the area. 

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget maintains our ability to 

meet our wartime needs today and contend with future security 

challenges. The aircraft that are fighting today’s war are being re-
10 

capitalized or sustained to ensure relevancy across the spectrum of 

threats. We are thankful to our predecessors for investing in programs that we are benefiting from today and those that will meet 

future security challenges tomorrow. 

Our budget continues the development of the F–35, the E–2D, 

the P–8, unmanned systems, as well as new strike weapons capabilities. The Department of Navy will produce 98 additional tactical 

and fixed-wing aircraft, 100 rotary-wing aircraft, and five Vertical 

Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

(VTUAVs), for a total of 203 aircraft. 

I would like to offer my appreciation to this committee. Without 

the committee’s tireless devotion and significant contributions, the 

great successes of our force would not be possible. We are truly 

grateful, and thank for the opportunity to appear before you. And 

thank you for your support for what you do for us today and what 

we will do tomorrow. And I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much, Admiral. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Myers, Admiral 

Architzel, and General Trautman can be found in the Appendix on 

page 51.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate your all 

being here today. There have been a number of themes that we 

have heard throughout a series of hearings on where we are. And 

it probably wouldn’t surprise you that we would pick up on one of 

those, and that is the situation with the lack of aircraft, particularly because of the planes having to be retired with over 8,000 

hours on them. I understand that the 10,000 hours doesn’t really 

work, that it costs too much to try to take care of changing the different parts that would be stressed. So that resulted this year in 

an estimate of, instead of 120-some aircraft shortfall on our aircraft 

carriers, to about 240-some. 

I guess my question is, and everybody is saying, and I guess really what they are saying is, give us more time to figure this out. But 

what they are saying is we have got to do this quadrennial review. 

Well, it isn’t like this is too complicated. We say we are going to 

have 11 aircraft carriers. For a certain brief window we are going 

to be down to 10. You got 44 aircraft on an aircraft carrier. If you 

are 240-some aircraft short, you have got five aircraft carriers with 

no planes on them. 

So my question is, one, first of all, how does that affect the number of missions that you have to fly just to practice? Because I was 

watching night landings on these things, and it looked to me like 

that was a pretty tricky business, and I would think you would 

want to have plenty of practice for your pilots. And if you have got 

fewer planes, then I would think it would affect your training 

schedule. That is the first question. 
11 

Second question would be, let’s say that you can’t have 44 aircraft on an aircraft carrier. Is an aircraft carrier just about as good 

if you have got 20 aircraft so you can split the aircraft half and 

half? If that is not the case—so let’s just answer those two first 

questions. 

Admiral MYERS. Representative Akin, I would like to take the 

first stab at that. First of all, to go back to your numbers, last year 

in PB 09, I briefed that we were forecasting in the later teens, 

starting in 2016 through 2018, a strike fighter shortfall for the U.S. 

Navy of 69 aircraft, and the Department of Navy, 125. That was 

assuming that all of our legacy F/A–18s, the A through D, could get 

to 10,000 hours. So that was sort of a bookend. The other bookend 

was if none of those aircraft got past 8,600 hours, that it would be 

a 125 and 243 shortfall. 

Now, that was last year. And what I would like to do is talk to 

you for a few minutes and outline what has changed. 

Mr. AKIN. It has got to be pretty short, so just a minute or so 

on it. Just get to the number that—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, I want to remind the Ranking Member that 

as the Ranking Member you have all the time you want. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay, I appreciate that. Okay. We will proceed then. 

Admiral MYERS. Okay. Those were the bookends. And what we 

have discovered since then is that doing the analysis for the service 

life extension has informed us that there are a number of areas 

that we want to be focused on when we open these aircraft up, 

when they go to the depot. So to cut to the end, we are not sure 

exactly what number of aircraft that we are going to be able to get 

through. And the reason we are not sure—— 

Mr. AKIN. Between about 125 and 240; it is somewhere between 

there would be your guess? 

Admiral MYERS. We are not sure right now, Representative Akin. 

And the reason is because we are still discovering a lot by looking 

at these aircraft when they go to the depot. We have had 39 aircraft that have gone to the depot to date. We thought there were 

about 159 focus areas or areas of interest on the airplane. We have 

got about nine that have come through the depot. And what we 

found is there were 50 additional areas. Each airplane is going to 

be a little bit different. But as we go through a three-phase process 

to determine what the limits are on service life extension, we are 

going to be able to refine the technical baseline and understand 

more. 

Now, currently today, the Navy has—currently has the aircraft 

necessary to fulfill the missions that the Combatant Commands 

(COCOMs) have laid upon us. So we have the aircraft that we need 

today. So the focus is how do we get through the next summer? 

What are the levers that we need to look at to understand not only 

what the strike fighter shortfall is, but how to mitigate it. And 

there are four ways to mitigate it. One is to maintain our continued 

unwavering support for the Joint Strike Fighter. Second is to maintain our buys of F/A–18 E/Fs. Third is to maintain the funding in 

terms of logistics for our current legacy aircraft, our strike fighters. 

And fourth is to understand how many of these F/A–18 A through 

Ds we can get through the SLAP process. And it is going to take 

time. 
12 

Now, you had another question about the number 44 on our carriers; 44 is the requirement for the Navy for strike fighters on our 

aircraft carriers; 44 represents the number that the combatant 

commanders are expecting when those carriers show up overseas to 

provide the necessary effects for everything from contingency ops 

to major combat operations. And it also represents the most effective use of a Nimitz class-size flight deck. So 44 is the number that 

is required for our aircraft carriers, and that is what we intend to 

do. 

Mr. AKIN. So then following up, you are saying you would not deploy a carrier that had significantly number less than 44 planes on 

it? You would want to keep that number pretty close if you have 

a carrier that is out. Is that what you are saying? 

Admiral MYERS. Congressman, what I am saying is 44 is the requirement, and that is what we are basing—from the Navy staff 

and from a programming perspective, that is what we program towards. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. But if you had a shortfall, then you are saying 

you would rather have some aircraft carrier left behind than to 

have one with half the planes on it or something. You wouldn’t consider that probably. Or are you saying you just don’t know or—— 

Admiral MYERS. That is a fleet commander decision on exactly 

how he loads out a carrier air wing. We understand the requirement. We understand the way that we are deploying ships in our 

aircraft carriers and their air wings today. But how that would be 

done in the future would depend on the needs of the combatant 

commander and the fleet commander. But currently the requirement is for 44, and that is what we are doing right now. 

Mr. AKIN. Right. What I heard you say, though, you gave me a 

lot of detail, but what I heard you say was still the shortfall is 

probably going to be between the 125 number and the 243 number, 

because 243 was worst case. That is assuming you can’t get any 

more than 8,600 hours. And the 125 was assuming that you could 

get 10,000 hours. And you are saying until you actually look at the 

planes, you won’t know exactly how many of them fit into which 

category, but it is going to fall in that number; is that correct? 

Admiral MYERS. There is the possibility that some of them could 

fall outside that number. And that is part of the analysis, the second phase of the analysis that is ongoing right now that Naval Air 

Systems Command (NAVAIR) is doing and working with their depots to understand exactly the extent of whether or not it is going 

to be exactly in that—— 

Mr. AKIN. In that bracket, even. 

Admiral MYERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. So you are not even sure of that bracket is what you 

are saying. 

Admiral MYERS. The bracket is the best information that we 

have at this moment, but we have still got work to do, Congressman. 

Mr. AKIN. Now, what would it cost—let’s say that you find some 

aircraft that are 8,600 hours and they are going to need some repairs. Do we have any idea of what that would cost? My understanding was it was prohibitive to do that; that it would be cheaper 

just to get some new ones. Is that true or not necessarily or—— 
13 

Admiral MYERS. It is not necessarily true. What we know is that 

a center barrel costs about 5 million. And a center barrel is going 

to be required on the earlier lot aircraft, meaning Lot 16 and earlier. What we know is that the inner wing could cost as much as 

4- or 5 million. What we know is that the inner wing is a focus 

area of the aircraft that have gone through the depot in terms of 

the additional hot spots or focus. But what we don’t know is whether or not all of the aircraft that go through are going to need all 

of those repairs. So it could be expensive and it might not. And 

right now that is what the second phase—— 

Mr. AKIN. We don’t have a current cost estimate of what it would 

take if we wanted to extend the service life on them. We don’t really know what that number is is what you are saying. It depends 

on the individual plane. Is that what you are basically saying? 

Admiral MYERS. Yes, sir. It depends on the plane. We have programmed some moneys because we do know about the center barrel replacements. And the analysis that will go on through the 

summer and is expected to finish in the March 2010 time frame is 

set to be a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 12 issue. And 

that is the way that we have set up the analysis, to feed into POM 

12. And that would give us enough time to buy the equipment and 

make sure that we programmed and placed everything we need in 

the depots for the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). 

Mr. AKIN. I think the Navy has completed its analysis of the benefits of the multiyear procurement of the F/A–18As. What is the 

minimum number of aircraft required to be purchased over the contract period that would result in a savings of at least 10 percent 

as required by law? Is there some particular number that you have 

got to get? Because we saved, what, a billion dollars on that before 

on the multiyear two? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Sir, if I could take that question. You are 

correct on the multiyears for the Hornets. There have been two. 

The first multiyear was for 210 aircraft. It resulted in about a $710 

million savings. That was a five-year program. We followed that 

with a multiyear two, which just ended in 2009. That saved about 

1.1 billion over the same five-year period. To make a multiyear 

value, we need economic quota quantities, which means we have to 

have volume. We have also got to have a length of period of time. 

It wouldn’t do us any good to give volume and put it in one or two 

or three years. We have to have some length of time to make that, 

to get that return on investment. 

Sir, to answer your question, if we looked at multiyear one, we 

had a seven-and-a-half- or six-percent savings that equates to. 

Multiyear two, about 11-percent savings. If you have those kind of 

savings, we need to go five years and get economic quota quantity 

buy. We want to have a significant savings, which is on the order 

of 10 percent, or $500 million, would be those kind of the ‘‘bookends’’ if we are using that term here, that we would seek to get 

in a multiyear procurement, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. Well, I didn’t hear the answer to my question. I guess 

the question is, what number do you have? Let’s say we are starting 2010 right now. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Yes, sir. 
14 

Mr. AKIN. And let’s see, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is scheduled to be ready to go at, what, 2015? Are we sure that is going 

to happen on time? That gives you five years, right? 2010 to 2015. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. Let’s assume JSF is actually there at 2015, so you do 

have the five years. So what would the number be to get to the 10 

percent? Have you figured that? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Sir, let me—fiscal year 2010 is a single-year 

buy of Hornets. As you know, the Growler we put into the 

multiyear for multiyear two. And we were able to take advantage 

of that. With a single year buy, we don’t have the economic quota 

quantity to do it. So 2010 is in the books. We don’t have that ability to incorporate that into a multiyear now. 

Mr. AKIN. So we are talking 2011 then. 2011 to 2015? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. Are you sure that we are going to have JSF in 2015? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. I know that I can speak to the IOCs we 

have today, which is for the Marine Corps and the Navy, and say 

that on plan we have today we will, sir. I mean we are developing 

those programs to go forward on those timelines. But I also will say 

we will have to wait to find out what the Department’s direction 

is on aircraft. We need to know the numbers so we can get the economic quantity and time frame involved before we can enter into 

a multiyear. But if we were to—the multiyear is certainly something we do aggressively go after when we can on multiple programs, as you are aware. The V–22 is an example, the 60 Romeos, 

60 Sierras. So we do definitely want to get multiyears when we 

have them there. 

Mr. AKIN. Man, I am having a hard time getting anything. I feel 

like I am trying to nail JELL–O to a wall, gentlemen. I am asking 

about a time for a multiyear, and you are saying, no, we really 

don’t know what the requirements are. I am talking about the requirements, I thought we were looking at 125 and then 243. And 

now you are saying, yeah, but it could be this other way. Somewhere along the line we have got to make a plan as to what we 

are going to do. I mean maybe JSF is going to be there in 2015, 

and that is obviously something that is very important. 

I know the Marine Corps has a keen interest in the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) version, because you are kind of 

putting all your eggs in that basket, where the Harriers, I guess, 

are getting older and older. But somewhere along the line, we have 

got to be able to do some planning. And it seems like no matter 

how you look at the numbers, you are coming out short on fighter 

planes. So I guess that is the reason we are having a hearing is, 

where are we? 

Admiral MYERS. Yes, sir. And Congressman, for the record, I just 

want to correct—the correct number that we should be referring to 

is 69 to 129 for the U.S. Navy. And that is what I briefed last year. 

Those were the bookends of 10,000 hours for 300 aircraft and 8,600 

hours, no aircraft SLEP. So that gives you about a 70-aircraft 

shortfall. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. Let’s start with 70. If you had 70 additional aircraft over a 5-year period, would you get 10 percent then? 
15 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Sir, I am not trying to be anything but direct. As much as I can, from an acquisition standpoint, if we were 

to get to a few things, we need to have an economic quota quantity. 

We need to have an economic rate of production, which would—the 

minimum sustained rate is about 24 aircraft to go through. The 

economic requirement is somewhere between 30 and 36, depending 

on the numbers we have. So if you could generate on the order of 

30 per year for 5 years, you would be able to enter a multiyear that 

would produce 10 percent savings. But, sir, that—— 

Mr. AKIN. You are saying 30 per year. So that would be 150 

then? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. If a scenario of a multiyear, that is what 

would happen, sir. Regardless of what aircraft we are dealing with, 

when you can get those type of quantities and be able to produce 

them to allow economic quota quantity buys over a five-year period 

or some significant period of time, then you will definitely get savings in a multiyear. That is the only reason we are allowed to enter 

a multiyear is if we can assure significant savings. 

Mr. AKIN. Right. So are you saying the minimum you would have 

to buy would be about 150, over 5 years total, in order to get that 

10 percent? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Sir, under the scenario you presented me, 

yes, sir; that would be what we would have to do. I would say that. 

But again, I don’t set the requirements. This is from an acquisition 

standpoint. You asked me to give you the numbers as they apply 

to a multiyear, and that is what I have done, sir. 

Admiral MYERS. Yes, sir. And to reinforce Admiral Architzel, the 

requirement is 44 strike fighters on our carrier wings. And based 

upon the President’s Budget (PB) 09 data, the shortfall for USN is 

still about 70 aircraft, best case right now. But we still have some 

discovery to do this summer as we go through Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP), and we still have some levers to pull. 

Mr. AKIN. The number was higher because you had Marine 

Corps F/A–18s that you were including also. Is that correct? 

Admiral MYERS. What I gave you was an inclusive Department 

of Navy and U.S. Navy number before. The 69–129 is a U.S. Navy 

number. And the 125–243 was a Department of Navy number that 

includes Navy and Marine Corps. And that is what was briefed last 

year. Yes, sir. 

General TRAUTMAN. Sir, if I may comment, maybe help with the 

variables that are involved here. First of all, the PB 09 numbers 

are no longer relevant to this discussion in my opinion. For example, if the program purchases more Joint Strike Fighters than we 

did in PB 09, which it does, the strike fighter shortfall would come 

down by a commensurate number of F–35s, both B and C models. 

Secondly, this issue of the Service Life Assessment Program and 

the Service Life Extension Program is very much filled with variability at this point. We are partway through phase B of a threephase process of examining these airplanes to decide how many of 

the 623 existing A through D Hornets can be extended. Talking to 

NAVAIR as recently as Friday, there are approximately 330 A 

through Ds which they identify as prime candidates to be extended. 

And so we will extend, bureau number by bureau number, making 
16 

wise business case decisions associated with the choices that will 

have to be made to extend those aircraft going forward. 

Mr. AKIN. So you say you have identified 130 A through D? 

General TRAUTMAN. Three hundred thirty of the 623 existing are 

prime candidates for extension. There are no technical impediments to extension at this point. 

Mr. AKIN. Sir, are you saying—does that mean you wouldn’t have 

to put more money in them, or they would be prime candidates to 

put more money into to get them to 10,000? 

General TRAUTMAN. You said it right, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. The second time? 

General TRAUTMAN. Yes, sir. Put more money into them on a 

case-by-case basis to decide how much would need to be extended. 

But even that has variability. For example, the majority of the interest areas are in the center barrel. That is the majority of the interest areas. We already have $1.14 billion in the budget to pay for 

417 center barrels to be replaced. 

The second most are in the wings. There are options with regard 

to the wings. One is repair. Two is to remove and replace. And the 

Admiral gave you the cost of a new wing. But the third is to take 

wings out of Aircraft Maintenance and Regeneration Center 

(AMARC), which we are doing right now, and replace those wings 

with wings that are essentially free. And then the third large area 

that we are concerned about as we go through the assessment program is in the aft end of the A through Ds. That is probably where 

most of the uncertainty lies right now with regard to the cost. 

Mr. AKIN. Well, I appreciate the Chairman’s patience. And I will 

go ahead and wrap up with that. Thank you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman. And if need be, 

there will be a second round. You have had a great line of questioning. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, 

Mr. Massa. 

Mr. MASSA. Mr. Massa has no questions at this time. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair then recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In Mr. Taylor’s opening statement he sort of walked through a number of issues that 

I think he was asking for some responses from the witnesses. I 

think the last item was on the Presidential helicopter. He referenced the fact, obviously, that Secretary Gates on Friday announced the cancellation of the program. And I was just following 

on his comments. I don’t know which witness would be appropriate 

to respond. But you know, what do you sort of see as the next steps 

and the way forward? Obviously, we need a new helicopter. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Yes, sir, Congressman Courtney, let me 

start, and I will turn it over to anyone else. You are correct; Secretary Gates did announce, recommend cancellation. And his basis 

for that was the original $6 billion program which had headed towards 13 billion, 6 years overdue, does not meet the requirements 

of the White House. And increment one, in fact, is a long way to 

meet that requirement. 

So this has been a very extremely challenging requirement in 

this program, complicated and exacerbated by us trying to bring 

this program to meet a need earlier when we weren’t really defined 
17 

what we had to do. There were mistakes that were made. We drove 

significant developmental efforts forward at a time when we 

weren’t certain of what those impacts would be. And we grossly underestimated the cost and schedule required to deliver this. 

As a result of that, Under Secretary of Defense Carter directed 

the cancellation of the program to Mr. Stackley. We are taking 

those initiatives now to cancel that program and bring it to resolution. The path forward is within 30 days we will come forward with 

a high-level plan of how will we anticipate going forward in the future. 

That is not all the details that go with every facet of the program 

to understand, but it is a high-level, if you will, plan of action how 

we are going to go forward to meet the direction. Also to have a 

program developed so we can do the Presidential replacement helicopter program. So in this case I believe what we need to do now 

is we need to meet the requirements, we need to understand what 

those requirements are going to be, understand the impacts of 

those requirements, begin with the requirements, take them 

through to the impacts of that, and do the de rigueur we need to 

do to make an executable program, sir. And I will turn it over to 

other comments. 

General TRAUTMAN. Let me add then, sir, two things come to my 

mind. First is, are the legacy VH–3s and VH–60s preserved and remain safe for carrying our President? And the answer to that is 

yes. And this budget includes the requested dollars to make that 

a reality. 

The second is these airplanes are going to need to be replaced. 

The VH–3 is 40 years old. By 2017, even with the Service Life Extension Programs that we are assessing now, they are near the end 

of their life. So I am very anxious to get back into the requirements 

generation process, work with the White House Military Office to 

decide what requirements they will lay out, and then help move 

those requirements up to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and into the acquisition community so that we can get started 

on a new replacement for the VH–3 and VH–60. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. And I realize you said 30 days from now 

you will come out with, I guess, a new position or new plan. And 

I don’t want to get ahead of that, but one argument that has been 

out there, The New York Times had a column about it the other 

day that we shouldn’t cancel because there is so much sunk costs 

already into the VH–71. 

And I guess I was wondering, thinking that through, the Navy 

is not going to just sort of walk away from the research and the 

development and the investment that has already taken place. I 

mean there are some ways to recoup some of what has already 

been paid for. Is that a safe assumption to make, so that the taxpayers won’t feel like it was just completely thrown away? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Congressman Courtney, if I could, let me 

begin and then I will offer it for my colleagues to comment. But, 

again, first off, what I mentioned to you was a high-level comeback, 

if you will, or plan to go forward. And simultaneously with that, 

we have another course of action we have to follow, which is following the cancellation of the program, we have to bring about 

what we do with this program and how we bring it to closure. 
18 

So the first thing that was done was, for example, stop work to 

allow the contracting officer to issue actions that then would result 

in us to be able to bring, as I mentioned, bring it to closure. That 

involves understanding all that we have invested, and where we 

are, and be able to close out the books; be able to make sure we 

understand where we are in funding, be it 2009 or 2010 funding, 

et cetera, to what we need to do to follow through once the contracting officer takes actions on a termination, as it be. 

So understanding what we want to do in the future, obviously we 

will take advantage of anything we can from a technology standpoint that would go into future helicopter programs or other programs of similar nature. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Again, as we start back in this program we 

have to understand the requirements. We have to begin with the 

requirements, understand what they mean, and what we have to 

do to meet those missions that is set in front of us. And that was 

fundamental to it. 

But to your point, the investments that were made and the understanding the technology investments that were ongoing certainly we will take advantage of that to go forward. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

You know, you would think from the discussion we have been 

having that we hadn’t spent $3.2 billion and a number of years 

building the 71. In the original requirements document for the VH– 

71 program, the Navy gave a litany of reasons why the legacy fleet 

was in urgent need of replacement. So urgent that we were working around some of the usual procedures to get a plane more quickly so the President could have it. The planes the Navy said was 

overweight. They lack all-weather capability. They have extremely 

limited range speed and payload. And I quote from the document. 

The legacy aircraft is no longer capable of implementing upgrades 

for mission requirements. 

And now, we are told that the current fleet is okay; that it can 

indeed be upgraded; that the cost of doing so will likely might be 

enormous. We have already spent $3.2 billion to produce the nine 

Increment 1 helicopters. They meet or exceed their performance requirements. They were always intended to fly the Presidents. Why 

isn’t it reasonable that Congress would expect the Navy to field 

these aircraft to meet the highly urgent need we have been briefed 

on for years? But instead, Congress has been given a list of reasons 

why flying the 35-year-old legacy fleet for another decade is preferable to fielding the modern VH–71 helicopters we have already 

paid to produce. 

For instance, we are told that Increment 1 only has a five-year 

service life, even though the committee knows that it was designed 

for a minimum of 30 years and that the Navy has not even performed a basic air frame fatigue testing to make a sound determination. We need real answers as we consider the budget request. 

Frankly, Congress has been ignored for too long on this critical 

program, and I am concerned that in the stop work order we are 

now being ignored. 
19 

The Navy said that we needed a new aircraft to fly the President. We bought that. We asked the Navy to build that aircraft. 

And now, without coming back to the Congress for consultation, the 

Navy has issued a stop work order. 

This very limits our options, because there will be cost involved 

with the stop work order if we decide that we really ought to continue building these planes, and there is additional costs involved 

in making the line hot again. 

First, what is the estimated cost of extending and maintaining 

the current legacy fleet if VH–71 is terminated? How much will it 

cost to provide service life extension for the current fleet? And, 

what kind of new improvements will be made and at what costs? 

We were previously told that we really couldn’t make the necessary 

improvements, which is why we needed a plane so urgently that we 

were bypassing some of the usual procurement procedures. 

And, second, are you telling this committee that the Increment 

1 helicopters did not in fact provide a better overall capability than 

the current VH–3? 

General Trautman, you have flown the VH–71. Would you not 

agree that, on its own, it represents a more capable, modern, and 

safer aircraft? 

General TRAUTMAN. Yes, sir. Let me start. I have flown both the 

VH–3 and the VH–71 Increment 1 aircraft recently, and there is 

no doubt that the VH–71 Increment 3—Increment 1 aircraft is a 

better aircraft than the VH–3. 

The challenge has been, sir, that the VH–71 Increment 1 aircraft 

does not meet the requirements that were passed to us by the 

White House Military Office. And—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. General, if you would let me interrupt for just a 

moment. We know that. We know that the Increment 1 was designed to provide what we were told was essential transportation 

for the President while Increment 2 is being developed. We know 

that Increment 1 is deficient in—of little deficient in payload capability, in speed, and in how far it can go in range. But the essential 

reason we were told for moving away from the current fleet was 

to have better communication capacity we understand VH–71 provides the Increment 1. 

Mr. Chairman, in just a moment, I would like to go through some 

numbers that I think are absolutely compelling that we ought to 

continue. We have now invested $3.2 billion. If we now shut down, 

it is going to cost about half a billion in the industry to shut down. 

It is going to cost about a tenth of a billion in the Navy to shut 

down. And for another $1.3 billion, we could make ready five of the 

nine planes so that the President could use them. And I am told 

by the manufacturer that, for roughly $100 million each, which 

comes well under the original figure of $6.8 billion, that they will 

enter into a firm fixed price contract to deliver another 14, which 

means we would have a total fleet then of 19 planes. 

The additional cost to provide 19 planes is small compared to the 

investment we have already made. Why isn’t it in the taxpayers’ 

and the President’s best interest to go ahead and provide these 

extra planes? We will have essentially nothing if we simply terminate and shut down. 

Mr. TAYLOR. If the gentleman would answer the question, please. 
20 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Congressman Bartlett, if I could. Part of 

your what your discussion is on the Increment 1, as I mentioned 

before, this VH–71’s extremely challenging requirement shows significant development efforts that were grossly underestimated. 

And, on top of that, we went to a two-increment approach in an effort to deliver near-term as well as long-term solutions. 

Sir, we are not delivering on the capability of the Increment 1. 

The program does not meet the requirements. And that was what 

the recommendation for cancellation was for. 

Mr. BARTLETT. But, sir, if I might interrupt for just a moment. 

It was going to be sufficiently superior to the present fleet that it 

was deemed desirable to spend the money to produce it and to use 

it for five years while we produced Increment 2. Why isn’t that 

analysis still valid? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Sir, you are referring to numbers in terms 

of operational use. And, quite frankly, the VH–71 Increment 1, the 

additional weight, as well as has to do with the aircraft itself would 

be a different aircraft than the one you are talking to when you are 

talking 30 years of aircraft life. That is another factor in the Increment 1, in terms of its not being able to make more than approximately, estimates now, 1,500 hour life. 

But the overarching consideration was not making the requirements needed for the helicopter and the decision to cancel Increment 1 and 2 from Secretary Gates. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that the original five-year life was not what the plane was expected could do. It 

was just they only needed it for five years until they had Increment 

2s. But nobody doubts that this plane is built as well as other helicopters, and it should have the usual 30- , 35- , 40-year life. Should 

it not? 

General TRAUTMAN. My understanding is the systems command 

would have to inspect the airplane and go through a rigorous service life extension program, seeking hot spots in areas of interest in 

some order of discussion we had previously about the F/A–18 A 

through D. That work has not been done yet. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. We are trying to be generous with the time. But I would hope that we will keep in mind 

we do have a pretty good crowd today, and let’s try to give everyone a chance to ask their questions. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Washington state, 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first, let me apologize and prepare everyone, I am bound to—I am ready to ask some 

fairly noncontroversial questions. So I want to send a warning to 

everybody about that. 

But it does have to do with the shortfall. But it has to do with 

the shortfall in the electronic warfare expeditionary wing. And 

right now, we do not yet have an—I do not yet have an idea from 

you all what we plan to do in 2012 to fulfill the expeditionary gap. 

And I would like to have an understanding if yet a decision has 

been made to have the Growler fill that gap; or, if—with additional—or, if a decision hasn’t been made, what kind of timeline 

are we on to make a decision so we can get there, so that by the 
21 

time the gap is there, we have made a decision ahead of time to 

fill that gap? Who would be the best one to answer that? 

Admiral MYERS. I will take the first shot, Congressman. 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. 

Admiral MYERS. The EA–6B for the Navy is currently planning 

to sunset or sundown their expeditionary capability starting in 

2010 and ending in 2012. So from the period from 2012 to about 

2016 to 2018 the Marine Corps will have the only expeditionary 

ALQ–99 capability out there. 

There is a gap in that the Next Gen Jammer, the follow-on, we 

do not anticipate the initial operating capability on the Joint Strike 

Fighter or an F/A–18G type of aircraft until the 2018 timeframe. 

So right now there is an acknowledged gap in terms of expeditionary capability that could—or, depending on what happens with 

the sundown of the Marine EA–6s. 

In terms of what are our opportunities to mitigate this gap, we 

still have a hot production line with F/A–18s, and that is a hot production line that goes through the next few years. I know that 

there is dialogue, and this is a discussion topic in the building. But 

for the time being, there is no plan to recapitalize the Navy EA– 

18 Growlers in an expeditionary role. 

Mr. LARSEN. So, and that gets to the point. At what point does 

it change from a discussion item to an action item? 

Admiral MYERS. What I can tell you is that it is an item that 

I know that the Department of Navy is discussing with the other 

services, and I can’t answer about the question about exactly when 

there is going to be the next step or when there is going to be a 

dialogue that would lead to a decision either to recapitalize or not. 

Currently, there is no decision to recapitalize. 

Mr. LARSEN. General Chapman with regards to the EA–6Bs flying for the Marine Corps, as I understand, again, you are planning 

to keep those until about 2018, and then one of your 35 variants 

will take over the airborne electronic attack. Do I have that about 

right? 

General TRAUTMAN. You are close, sir. If I may. Our plan is to 

keep our EA–6Bs going for another decade and sundown the last 

of ours in 2019. We believe that is the prudent course to take as 

we bring F–35 on line. Now, we won’t stand up an electronic warfare version of the F–35. What we will do is we will take advantage 

of the inherent capabilities resident in all F–35 variants across the 

board. We have also taken steps to ensure that next generation 

jammer is not just a replacement pod for the ALQ–99 on the Prowler and Growler, but is also going to be a threshold capability on 

the F–35. 

So by 2019, you should be in a situation where you could fly in 

F–35s in a very low observable mode; or, if called for, you could fly 

F–35s not very low observable with next generation jammer pods 

on them. 

Now, we are also looking at opportunities to not even have it be 

a podded capability, but somehow using conformal antennas ideas 

that are resonant in the analysis of alternates going on right now, 

maybe even make it a very low observable capability with that. 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. And I am looking forward to seeing results of 

that. Can you talk a little bit, a very short time, but can you dem-
22 

onstrate to me now or to the committee now that you are confident 

that the fleet of Prowlers that you have will be flying up until 

2019? And, second, General Trautman—I am sorry, I can’t see from 

here. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Admiral Architzel. 

Mr. LARSEN. Can you talk a little bit about whether or not the 

timeline on the next generation jammer is going to meet at that 

time line, or when you want to put it on the F–35 and when it is 

ready for being put on the Growlers? 

General TRAUTMAN. Yes, sir. First, with regard to the Marine 

Corps’ sundown plan a decade from now, the answer is yes. And 

principally because we would be able to take advantage of the 

Navy’s sundowning EA–6Bs. So there is a population somewhere 

above 100 to outfit our 32 Prowlers that we want to keep flying 

until 2019. 

In addition, we have funded and will take some of the Navy’s improved capabilities Sets III, which will improve our ability to provide Prowler support to the Joint Force Commander for the next 

decade. So we are very confident that we will be all right, despite 

the fact that our Prowlers are flying at the 1–1 dwell right now. 

They are one of the most popular capabilities in the expeditionary 

environment that we have. 

With regard to next generation jammer timeline, I think that remains to be seen how quickly that program can come to the floor. 

But about a decade from now I think we should be able to do it. 

The ideas are picking up more and more energy and steam in recent months. I am surprised but gratified that they are. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Sir, again to the Growler. As we go forward, 

we have a very successful program meeting all performances. It is 

out of test now, finished from its op eval. We will get results coming forward from that in near term. 

The F–12 aircraft, out. We are getting ready to actually go forward on first deployment IOC in the aircraft this year. 

As you go forward into the next generation jammer, that is an 

analysis of alternative that is funded. And we will go back. And I 

don’t think we should—we can’t, that is not what an analysis of alternative does. In other words, to predicate what the result of that 

is. There will be alternatives put on the table about how to take 

everyone electronic attack forward. And from that analysis of alternatives it will come back to the requirements folks to say which 

way we want to head. And then we will proceed with that. 

The timeline in your question is in supporting of the Prowler, 

and that would be somewhere around 2018 timeframe, 2019 timeframe. I would offer comments from Admiral Myers as well. 

Admiral MYERS. Well, the analysis of alternatives for the Next 

Gen Jammer, as Admiral Architzel said, is ongoing. There is 128 

million in that program, originally designed to deliver in 2016, and 

it slid to about 2018 right now. So it is moving in the wrong direction in terms of the delivery in time for the sunset of the EA–6, 

to your point, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and would remind 

him that we are going to try to have a second round should the 

need arise. 
23 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is a question I guess for both the Navy and the Marine 

Corps. What is the status of the CH–46 right now? And what is the 

time line for that? 

General TRAUTMAN. Let me start, sir, since the CH–46 is principally a Marine Corps aircraft. It is better than you would imagine. I mean, we have done some very wise things with the CH–46 

over the past decade and a half. We have improved the engines 

through the engine reliability improvement program about a decade ago. We have changed out the cockpit, we have changed out 

the drive train. We have spent our dollars wisely in the CH–46 and 

it remains a workhorse today. We have CH–46s deployed on our 

Marine Expeditionary Units around the globe. We have them forward deployed in the Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) 

in Japan and we have them operating in Iraq today. Thank goodness the venerable ‘‘Phrog’’ is continuing to perform just as we had 

hoped that it would. 

As far as its sundown, as long as we can keep the V–22 Osprey 

on track, we hope to be out of the CH–46 business by the end of 

the next decade, and we are on track to do that. 

What we have been able to do, similar to my answer on the EA– 

6B previous, we have been able to take best of breed. As the V– 

22s arrive, now at 30 per year, we have been able to use best of 

breed on the 46 and sundown and put the ones in the boneyard 

that no longer need to be used, so we actually had a pretty solid 

fleet of CH–46s at this time. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Sir, if I could. It is interesting that the 

Phrog, as we are talking about here, the Navy is out of the CH– 

46 business but I would just share with you all that when I was 

executive officer of the great ship Dwight D Eisenhower back in the 

early 1990s, on a Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP) evolution, 

which I was up on the bridge and counting the carriers that were 

doing it, the first lift of the day was from an H–46 bringing a missile load over from the Suribachi alongside. That Helo was a year 

number older than the ship we were on. And the first lift had engine stall, lost engine, lost lift impaled itself in the back end of the 

Suribachi. That ended the Underway Replenishment (UNREP). So 

we had to cancel the missile offload. We came back and did that 

later. 

The reason I am telling you that story is that I came back to be 

the Commanding Officer (CO) of the USS Guam in OPH–9 three 

years later. Made two deployments with it. On my second deployment, the SAR Helo of it came out to be on my detachment was 

that same bureau number that had impaled itself on the back end 

of the Suribachi. 

So I am advocate for keeping things around, but the Phrog’s time 

had come and gone, and today we have the—it has been a venerable airplane, but it is long past its service life as we go forward. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Admiral, I think you mentioned a new variant for 

the 53. Can both of you tell me where we are with the CH–53? 
24 

General TRAUTMAN. I can start, sir. The CH–53 Kilo is what you 

are referring to. This is an airplane, it is a heavy lifter that will 

replace our existing CH–53 Echos. 

The requirement that we laid out for this airplane was to carry 

27,000 pounds 110 miles round-trip in a Navy, high, hot day. That 

is about three times what the CH–53 Echo can carry today. 

The need for this is because, unfortunately, the Marine air 

ground task force is getting heavier. Gun Laying and Positioning 

System (GLPS) and some other things have caused us a degree of 

concern. But this 53 Kilo will be the load-carrying machine that we 

need. 

The program has resolved, to my knowledge, all of the technical 

risks associated with bulking up and becoming this heavy lifter 

that I described. It got off to a slow start, about a year late on preliminary design review. That is going to make them late for critical 

design review. We are in the process now of assessing with the program manager and the contractor what impact that may have on 

cost and schedule. Our desire is to have initial operation capability 

of the 53 Kilo in around 2016, and we will see if we can hold that 

as we get to more fact-based analysis on the program in the coming 

two or three months. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the rest of my time. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. It is still Rhode Island, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I apologize. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony today. I just want to turn for a minute to Signals Intelligence 

(SIGINT). The EP–3 is the Navy’s only land-based signals reconnaissance aircraft, and the EP–3 have been heavy engaged in support of operations in Bosnia, Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan. And, 

clearly, the planes are wearing out right now. The President’s 

budget contains $12 million for the EP–3 replacement program, 

EP(X). 

My question is, what is your plan for replacing these critical assets? And where does the EP(X) stand today? 

Admiral MYERS. Thank you for your question, sir. The EP–3, currently we have 18, and they will be in our inventory through the 

2020, 2021 timeframe. 

Currently, we are undergoing an analysis of alternatives to determine whether or not a follow-on EP(X) would be a manned replacement platform or an unmanned or distributed platform or series, a family of platforms. So that analysis is ongoing, and that is 

an issue for fiscal year 2011 and POM 12 to make sure that we 

understand and are focused on and funded, so if it is a follow-on 

platform, then we can program for it and make sure that it is mature enough before we sunset the EP–3. And if the decision is to 

re-man the EP–3 and keep it in the same manned platform, then 

we need to make a decision by POM 14 to take advantage of some 

of the zone 5 kits, Statistical Sampling Inventory Method (SSIM) 

[AR 310–50], and the outer wing work that we have been doing for 

the P–3. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. This morning, sir, if I could. I participated 

in an acquisition governance meeting, which was on the follow-on 
25 

EP(X), what we would do. And it is at the very early stages, as 

mentioned. This is the early setting of where we go from the program and setting requirements up front. 

Part of what we have learned over the past years is understanding exactly what it is we want to procure and what are the 

challenges before we go to any kind of procurement program. 

So this set the stage for what Admiral Myers said about entering 

into an analysis of alternatives. This is a decision to go forward to 

that, to set in place that motion. So we are working closely on the 

acquisition side with the requirements and with the Office of the 

Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), the entire OPNAV staff to go 

forward and the programs to go forward, sir, just from an acquisition standpoint. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So EP(X) is still at the very, very early stages of 

evaluation? 

Admiral MYERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Turning my attention to another issue. I 

have been off the subcommittee for two years while I was serving 

on Intel. And just for my own knowledge, the V–22 program had 

an initial bad start and we lost a number of good soldiers in crashes. Can you give me an update on the safety record right now of 

the V–22, and what the reasons were? I assume those were from 

a lot of human error in the flying of those birds. Can you give me 

just an update of the safety record right now and how we are 

doing? 

General TRAUTMAN. Sir, if I may take that. Those two mishaps 

you referred to occurred nine years ago, one in April nine years ago 

and the other December not quite nine years ago. Those were tragic mishaps. We learned a lot from those mishaps. We dug into the 

airplane, put the airplane through the most intensive engineering 

scrutiny I think of any airplane in the Department’s history. And 

thank goodness we did, because the proof has been in the way the 

airplane has performed since then. 55,000 hours on V–22s in the 

fleet, to include the last 20 months of combat operations in Iraq flying in the most austere, hostile environments that you can imagine. V–22s have performed miraculously. 

Last Friday, we launched a squadron of V–22s out on a Marine 

Expeditionary Unit sailing towards fight from Carolina, and by the 

fall we will have a squadron of V–22s in Afghanistan. 

Since then, thank goodness, the safety record has been superb. 

We have had a couple of minor challenges on the deck that we 

have resolved and we know the causes of those. But, beyond that, 

the safety record has been absolutely superb for the last nine 

years. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Sir, if I could just to add. Although not perhaps as current you want, but you went back and talked about the 

history of the program. And I happened to have been the commander of OPTEV for—operational test and evaluation force for 

the retesting of the V–22 as it came back into its op eval. And I 

can tell you that the rigor put in from NAVAIR on the tactical side 

as well as from the Marines in training and bringing it in forward 

was nothing short of impressive as we got that through its op eval, 

and now as you can see the results of that in its performance. 
26 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank you for your answers and the reassurance 

that the program is working well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair thanks the gentleman from Rhode Island. 

Now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I just have a really 

quick question. When it comes to the golden hour in Afghanistan, 

are we good to go now on that? 

General TRAUTMAN. Well, the Marine Corps is good to go. As you 

know, sir, the Marine Corps is expert at task organizing to provide 

the right capabilities to the Marine Air Ground task force commander that he needs. And as we grow the force in Afghanistan 

from its previous 2,000 up above 10,000, we made quite sure that 

we had the right number of assault support platforms in theater 

to ensure that we can provide the support that we need for the Marines. 

Mr. HUNTER. So we have met that standard now? 

General TRAUTMAN. Well, I believe we will meet that standard 

inside the contiguous battle space that the Marine Corps has been 

given with the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade. I am not 

sure and I am not up to speed on the rest of the Afghanistan at 

this point. 

Mr. HUNTER. But for RC South? I am just asking about the Marine Corps. 

General TRAUTMAN. For the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade, my understanding is that we can and will meet that standard 

with the assets that we have. 

Mr. HUNTER. When we have the Marine Corps surge? 

General TRAUTMAN. When the surge is complete. When we finish 

this month’s rotation. 

Mr. HUNTER. Does that coincide with the V–22 getting there? 

General TRAUTMAN. The V–22 will arrive in the fall. Right now 

we have CH–53 Deltas, CH–53 Echos, and UH–1Ns in the battle 

space, and they will provide the capability that we need. We are 

also, as I said, sending a squadron on Marine Expeditionary Unit 

and they are sailing towards the Central Command area of operation. So it would be up to the combatant commander whether he 

wanted to employ them in that environment or not. 

Mr. HUNTER. Are they going to be using the V–22 for medical 

evacuation (MEDEVAC) or casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)? 

General TRAUTMAN. From the Marine Expeditionary Unit? 

Mr. HUNTER. No. In the fall. 

General TRAUTMAN. In the fall? Absolutely. That is one of the 

main reasons that we lean forward. And as soon as we have 

enough range and depth in the V–22 community, we want to get 

two squadrons. 

Mr. HUNTER. What I am trying to set clear is the golden hour 

is going to sink and coincide with the V–22s getting to Afghanistan 

and being used for CASEVAC and MEDEVAC? 

General TRAUTMAN. No. That is not true, sir. The golden hour inside the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s battle space will 

be met with the existing assault support platforms that we are putting into theater, is my understanding. 
27 

Mr. HUNTER. In the fall? 

General TRAUTMAN. No. Now. 

Mr. HUNTER. Now. 

General TRAUTMAN. Now. 

Mr. HUNTER. So it is being met. 

General TRAUTMAN. As we grow to 10,000 and more, yes. 

Mr. HUNTER. I am not trying to mince words. I am saying, you 

are saying that it will be met. And I am asking, do we have the— 

is the golden hour standard being met now with the Marines that 

we have there now? 

General TRAUTMAN. I believe it is met now. Let me take a comeback to make sure I am right. I believe it is met now. We do not 

have all of the assault support forces there yet. I think we have six 

more CH–53 Echos to deploy. But the 53 Deltas that are in that 

battle space are quite capable of supporting the golden hour inside 

the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s battle space. Let me 

have a take-away to go confirm that I am right about that, but I 

think I am. 

Mr. HUNTER. Along those lines, are you happy with the way that 

the infrastructure is being built for air at Camp Bastion in 

Kandahar? Is it going to be able to support you? Because you 

weren’t building it. Right? The Air Force is building it and you will 

be using some of it. Right? 

General TRAUTMAN. That is right. 

Mr. HUNTER. So is it going according to plan to support you? 

General TRAUTMAN. We will be bedding down our aircraft a combination of Kandahar and Bastion. We are working side by side in 

Bastion with the Air Force. 

Mr. HUNTER. You are now? 

General TRAUTMAN. We are. And we shipped 6 million square 

feet of AM–2 matting to Afghanistan. 

Mr. HUNTER. That makes good border fence, by the way. 

General TRAUTMAN. I hope it is not being used for that. We need 

to lay it down to create Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), Forward 

Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs), and airfields, and I think 

we are. I know we are. 

We also provided the subject matter expertise for our marine 

wing support squadrons that actually showed both the Army and 

the Air Force how to expeditiously lay down that matting. So that 

progress is being made as best it can be. There have been times 

in the last two months that one of my principal concerns was the 

pace at which this was being done. But as I sit here today, I am 

satisfied that we are on track. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Gentlemen, as you can tell by some of the questions, 

we are facing an affordability problem in the very near future. 

For the record, I would like to ask each of your personal opinions 

as to how many aircraft around the world would you rate as superior to the F/A–18E/F? If you would name them, name the country 

of origin, and whether they exist, and a ballpark figure of how 

many of them would exist in each of those countries. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. So, to answer your question I am an S–3 

aviator, but I will tell you that I do not know today of an air-
28 

plane—the F/A–18 is certainly a superior fighter. There is no question about it. So I really don’t have the—I can’t give you a number 

comparison, but I will tell you that F/A–18E/F particularly is a 

standout fighter among fighters today. But it is also not a fifth generation fighter. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I understand, sir. Admiral Myers, would you like to 

address that? 

Admiral MYERS. Yes, sir. And I will say that of all the aircraft 

that are in production from four nations, that I would much rather 

be in the cockpit of an F/A–18E/F than any one of those other aircraft. 

Mr. TAYLOR. General, would you like to offer an opinion? 

General TRAUTMAN. Well, I think it is difficult to parse among 

all of the fourth generation airplanes that exist in the world. The 

F/A–18E/F is certainly tied with them. It doesn’t stand a chance 

against an F–22 or an F–35, though. And I think that is the key 

reason the Marine Corps is—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Hopefully we will not be shooting at each other any 

time soon. Again, the question was, nations other than our own. 

And I am asking your professional opinion. 

General TRAUTMAN. I think there are airplanes out there that 

our return ratio would not be what we would want for our young 

men and women if we had to go against them. Now, hopefully we 

won’t have to go against them. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Is there any of them that you would care to mention 

at this point? 

General TRAUTMAN. MiG–29, for example. 

Mr. TAYLOR. And are they being produced in any sort of significant numbers by any country? 

General TRAUTMAN. I don’t think so, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. And, again, I am—with that, I am going to yield to 

the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Akin. 

Mr. AKIN. Just a couple more questions. General Trautman, my 

understanding is that the Marine Corps currently has four F/A–18 

fighter squadrons that are supposed to have 40 aircraft allocated 

to them but actually have no aircraft allocated to them. And the 

Marine Corps does not apparently include those in the shortfall. 

And, if so, why did you not include them in the shortfall? 

General TRAUTMAN. Sir, about three years ago we made a 

proactive decision to cadre two active and two reserve fighter attack squadrons. We did this in anticipation of the arrival of Joint 

Strike Fighter. We learned when we transitioned to the V–22 from 

our large medium lift population of CH–46s that one thing you 

need to do when you have a large population changing, as our tactical aircraft are going to change beginning in 2012, is to create a 

manpower pool from which you can draw, because particularly 

when you are changing from a 46 to a V–22 or from a legacy Hornet to a Joint Strike Fighter, it is not a light switch; it is a rheostat 

and you have to have time to train and prepare both air crew and 

maintainers. 

So we set aside those cadre personnel, and now thank goodness 

we did because over the last few months we picked the squadron 

commander for our first fleet readiness squadron VMF–AP 501, 

which will stand up beginning this summer. We picked the first six 
29 

aviators that will go into that squadron. We are detailing the maintainers that will go into that squadron. And beginning in 2012 and 

2013, we will bring back those two active cadre squadrons as Joint 

Strike Fighter Squadrons, and that has been our plan. 

With regard to the two reserve cadre squadrons, we will bring 

them back three or four, five years into the Joint Strike Fighter 

transition about the time that reserve aviators and maintainers are 

looking for a place to go if they decide to remain engaged in the 

Marine Corps via the Reserves. 

So we think we have got this laid out right, and that is why we 

did what we did. 

Mr. AKIN. So, in a sense, your strategic decision of three years 

ago was why you started with four squadrons, you are going to go 

down to two. So, in the transition, you have got just less aircraft 

available to you, so you realized that you were at a lesser strength. 

And you accept that risk because you are transitioning from one 

aircraft to another? That is what I think I am hearing you say. 

General TRAUTMAN. That is exactly right, sir. These transitions 

are challenging. And that is why we take the decision that we took 

to set aside that manpower pool. 

Mr. AKIN. As long as the other plane comes on line, you are saying we can live with being at half strength, or some, a few years 

to make that transition. If they are not on line in time, then that 

becomes increasingly problematic, I suppose? 

General TRAUTMAN. It does. We are meeting our current obligations with the force structure that we have. The challenge is, of 

course, that Marine Tac-Air is at a higher op tempo than either the 

Navy or the Air Force Tac-Air. So in some ways, we are playing 

out the risk on the backs of our Marines. And we don’t like to do 

that, but we think it is a proactive step that was worth taking in 

order to get to the Joint Strike Fighter in 2012 and 2013. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. So those 40 are not counted in the shortfall then 

that we were talking about before? 

General TRAUTMAN. Well, they are not really a shortfall, sir. For 

example, if we decided to have those squadrons up and we didn’t 

want to take the manpower, we could take the 30 Lot 10 and 11 

F/A–18Cs that we are putting into preservation and we could have 

those round up those squadrons in the near term if we chose to do 

so. I think that would not be a very wise decision, though. I prefer 

the decision we made. 

Mr. AKIN. You are saying there are aircraft around, but they are 

just old? 

General TRAUTMAN. Lot 10 and 11. That is right. 

Mr. AKIN. You also mentioned the idea of reworking some of the 

F/A–18s. You are saying that is a possibility, depending on the 

analysis of what those look like. The numbers we are seeing on 

that is, is you are looking at about $15 million if you have got to 

put that rework in, and that gets you whatever it is, 1,500 hours 

or something. It seems like, to me, that is almost costing you twice 

the cost per hour and a lot less capability than if you just got a 

new F/A–18. Would you ever look at doing that? 

General TRAUTMAN. I was advised that putting any kind of number on the cost of extending a Hornet from 8,000 to 10,000 at this 

point would be premature. As I said, we are only halfway through 
30 

phase B of a three-phase process. And until we get through that 

process, there are too many variables associated to put a number 

on it. I haven’t heard a number as high as 15 million. That is a 

new one to me. I have heard lower numbers. 

Mr. AKIN. What is the engine? About 5? Is it 10? What was the 

engine, the central component? 

General TRAUTMAN. The center barrel? Yes, sir. We already have $1.1 billion in the budget that is already paid for to do 417 center 

barrels. So the good news is that is a risk mitigator against the 

challenge we face in order to do the service life extensions. And as 

I said, most of the areas of interest are in the center barrel area. 

Mr. AKIN. It still costs money, though. 

General TRAUTMAN. No doubt, sir. You are exactly right. And we 

will have to make wise, case-by-case, bureau-by-bureau number assessments and then decisions about how to expend our—— 

Mr. AKIN. If you had to do the center barrel and you had to do 

the wing sections, what are you talking, actual dollars, to do that 

on a plane? 

General TRAUTMAN. Well, for example, if we already have the 

center barrel budgeted. If we went to AMARC as we are doing this 

year to get 24 wings out, we could do both of those for no additional 

dollars. If we had to buy a center wheel wing, I am not sure what 

the current cost of that is. I would have to defer to Admiral 

Architzel or Admiral Myers. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Sir, I will give it to Admiral Myers in a second or two. But what you have to do with the center barrel, that 

is Lot 17 and prior. If you did a center barrel replacement—which 

we funded. And let’s take about 6,000 hours. For those numbers of 

Hornets, and I think the number is somewhere around 400 plus 

numbers we have there, that is funded in our budget, and we go 

forward. That runs at about center barrel two-and-a-half billion— 

two-and-a-half million. Excuse me. So if you then add in—— 

Mr. AKIN. Two-and-a-half million for a center barrel. And then 

you have got the functional interoperability architecture (FIA) to do 

the wings. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. The number I have is two-and-a-half, and so 

we will have to get back to you. They are being quoted four-anda-half here. 

So the center—if you get the wing section and the center fill barrel, it is about 5 million for those. Now, as General Trautman says, 

if you take wings off an existing aircraft with—you still have to rework those wings. So you are going to have some costs involved. 

You are absolutely right, sir. 

If you want to look at where we go to get above to the 8,600 

hours and you want to go past that into 10, we have a high flying 

hour inspection. That inspection alone is running around about 

$475 million. That is to get to the point where you can open and 

inspect and look at the airplanes to see what you have. And I agree 

with General Trautman, we don’t know what we will have in those 

airplanes. Probably in those, where we designed into the center 

barrel on that Lot 18 and on, we should not expect to replace center barrel. But in those areas that are fatigued, hot points in the 

aircraft, we have to do—we have to extend some work or maybe— 

depending on what we have. 
31 

So fatigue, stress, cracking, or issues on the empanage, or tail. 

And then on top of that you also have to do system work on the 

airplane. So that is I think where the quandary comes in, is what 

is the exact cost of each aircraft. You won’t know until you open 

them up and find out what you have, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. You basically, I think you made it clear to me today 

that you don’t really know what the fighter aircraft shortfall is. 

You are saying it is somewhere—and I thought it was variable between two numbers. You said that you can’t even count on that. 

When will you know for sure what your shortfall is? When will you 

actually have a number? 

Admiral MYERS. The shortfall right now is about 70 aircraft. And 

that is based on the analysis that I brought to you—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. AKIN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. 70 aircraft when, Admiral? Give me a year. 

Admiral MYERS. It peaks in the 2016 to 2017 time. 

Mr. TAYLOR. When does your shortfall kick in? What year? 

Admiral MYERS. The shortfall starts to develop in mid to later 

2013 timeframe. Now, that is—Chairman and Congressman, that 

is based on the analysis that was brought last year. What is ongoing right now is, as General Trautman mentioned, we are in the 

second phase of a three-step process and we are refining the technical baseline and cost estimates to see exactly what we want to 

SLEP and what is in the realm of the possible. 

What we knew last year was conceptually what the cost would 

be and a preliminary estimate on what it would take. And that is 

why we gave bookends. What we are starting to do now is better 

understand. Last year, when we came to you the 8,600 and 10,000 

numbers, the 69 and 129 was based on 295 aircraft being able to 

be SLAP’d. Right now the number is about 330 aircraft that we 

think might be candidates or are targeted to be SLEP’d. But 

through the summer we are going to have a lot more information. 

And the second phase is set to complete next March. 

We have got lots of work to do, and I want to make sure that 

everybody understands that it is not just the SLAP’ing of the aircraft that is our focus on mitigating the shortfall. It also means 

that we maintain our buy of the JSF. It means we maintain the 

logistics support of the current fleet. And it also means that we 

maintain the current buy of our F/A–18E/Fs. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I appreciate the gentleman yielding. Please continue. 

Mr. AKIN. That—I mean, I have got a chart here that shows the 

number you are talking about, 69 it says here for 17. I think that 

was the Navy. 

Admiral MYERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. The total number is 125. And then I think the chart 

also says what happens if you can’t get to the 10,000 hours. And 

then that jumps it to 129 and 243. 

Admiral MYERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. Have you seen this? 

Admiral MYERS. Yes, sir, I have. 

Mr. AKIN. That is what I was pulling my numbers off of, was this 

chart. 
32 

Admiral MYERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. Are these numbers still the best we know for the moment? 

Admiral MYERS. Those numbers have not been officially changed 

and updated. We are currently doing analysis and looking at assumptions that might impact those numbers, and that is also ongoing. We are taking a look at—— 

Mr. AKIN. So the answer to when we will know pretty sure is 

going to be a year or next March. Would we have a pretty good 

handle on it at that point? 

Admiral MYERS. We will no a lot more through the summer, sir. 

And through the summer we will also be able to better understand 

what the assumptions are that go into that model in terms of our 

productive ratio or the efficiencies that we use on the air wings 

that are not deployed. There is a lot of things that go into the 

model besides just 44 and the Marine Corps requirement, and that 

is one of the things that the Marines and the U.S. Navy are currently undergoing is some an understanding of ways that we can 

more efficiently get aircraft out to the warfighter. 

General TRAUTMAN. Congressman, if I could add to Admiral 

Myers’ excellent answer about the variability. That chart that you 

held up last year is no longer relevant. It is not an accurate depiction at this point. And I can just give you the simplest example I 

can is if we have decided to buy additional F–35s Bs and Cs compared to last year, which we have done, that changes all of those 

equations, just for an example. 

Mr. AKIN. But you could picture yourself in our shoes. We got 

this information from you in March, and I am hearing you say that 

it is increasingly irrelevant right now. It is hard for us to get a 

number. I am just saying, when are we going to have something 

that we can understand what we are planning? 

Admiral MYERS. We owe you better and more current information. And in March, sir, that was the best that we had. And we owe 

you the benefit of understanding what we think the future is going 

to hold in terms of F–35 production and in terms of the ongoing 

SLAP and SLEP analysis. 

Mr. AKIN. So are you saying then the end of this summer you 

think we are going to have some pretty reliable numbers? Or is it 

going to be March of next year? I mean, where are we going to be 

within plus or minus 10 percent of the number? 

Admiral MYERS. I will have to get back to you, sir, and take that 

back to our leadership, not only in the fleet, but also in the systems 

command to make sure that we get you a good time frame. 

Mr. AKIN. We have got to have something to work with. Thank 

you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HUNTER. Will the gentleman yield really quick? I just have 

a quick question listening to this. Wouldn’t the numbers have already been put together for the internal DOD budget with this? 

Isn’t there a number? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Both very fair questions. I would remind both gentlemen that we tend to go through this at the beginning of every 

new administration; that it is my memory that the Bush administration did not submit a DOD budget until July of 2001. And so 

although this is taking longer than anyone wished it had, there is 
33 

still a little bit ahead of that mark which was eight years ago right 

now. 

With that, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, relevant to your question about 

competitive aircraft around the world, it is my understanding that 

the only aircraft we have that might be competitive with the latest 

Russian SU fighter aircraft is the 22. Is that also your understanding? 

Admiral MYERS. I am not an F–22 pilot, so—and I am not read 

in on a lot of the F–22 programs, sir. So my perspective comes from 

the Navy and what I know of the F/A–18 and for—not meant for 

an open hearing but a more private discussion, that is the aircraft 

I would prefer to be in. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I think, Mr. Chairman, it is not a certainty anymore that we will always have the best fighter aircraft in the 

world. I think most people now feel that the latest SU Russian 

fighter is probably as good as or maybe better than our best plane. 

And they are selling them. India has bought them. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sure. The Chair thanks the gentleman. And for the 

record, since that was Mr. Bartlett’s observation, I would appreciate you gentlemen getting back to us within two weeks, if possible, with how many of those aircraft have been produced and how 

many are around the world. I think is that a fair request, gentlemen? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Sure. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. No more questions. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Akin. 

Mr. AKIN. No. Thank you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Gentlemen, I think it has been a very, very productive hearing. I very much appreciate your time. We apologize for 

the delay at the beginning because of votes. But I think you have 

made your case very, very well, and we know we have a lot of work 

to do. Thank you very much for being with us. The subcommittee 

is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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MAY 19, 2009 

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