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55–277 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–96] 

STATUS OF ONGOING U.S. EFFORTS 

IN IRAQ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

ROGER ZAKHEIM, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, September 30, 2009, Status of Ongoing U.S. Efforts in Iraq .......... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, September 30, 2009 ............................................................................ 45 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 

STATUS OF ONGOING U.S. EFFORTS IN IRAQ 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Odierno, Gen. Ray, USA, Commanding General, Multi-National Force—Iraq .. 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Odierno, Gen. Ray ............................................................................................ 49 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Shea-Porter ................................................................................................ 65 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 69 

(1) 

STATUS OF ONGOING U.S. EFFORTS IN IRAQ 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 30, 2009. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

HVC–210, The Capitol, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, today our committee 

meets to receive testimony on the status of ongoing U.S. operations 

in Iraq. Our witnesses today are General Ray Odierno, the Commanding General, Multi-National Force—Iraq (MNF—I); and the 

Honorable Michael Vickers, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. 

We welcome you, gentlemen. 

And, General Odierno, this is the first time I believe that you 

have appeared before this committee as such; is that correct? 

General ODIERNO. It is, Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. We certainly welcome you. 

On February 27, 2009, President Obama laid out a path for 

bringing to a close America’s long war in Iraq that began with the 

invasion of March 20, 2003. America’s men and women in uniform 

have fought heroically to help build a new Iraq, and over 4,300 

Americans have died in that cause. We owe them our deep, deep 

gratitude. 

Right now the United States has about 120,000 to 130,000 combat forces in Iraq and, under the current plan, will end this year 

with 11 combat brigades in Iraq, totally somewhere around 100,000 

personnel. We will maintain that level through the Iraqi elections 

and for a period after the elections through the termination and 

formation of a new government. 

In August 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end, and our 

force presence will consist of 6 advise and assist brigades with 

about 50,000 U.S. military personnel. These brigades and personnel will be slowly withdrawn until December 31, 2011, as required by the U.S.-Iraq status of forces agreement (SOFA). No U.S. 

military personnel will remain in Iraq. 

This readjustment in Iraq will not be an easy one for us and will 

not be easy, I suspect, for the Iraqis. Simply moving so many 

troops and so much equipment out of the country will be a significant logistical challenge. We have not conducted such a large move-
2 

ment over such a distance since Vietnam, and we all know that did 

not go well. 

As part of the drawdown, U.S. military commands will consolidate and begin handing over responsibility for a variety of activities to the Iraqis, the U.S. Embassy or other U.S. agencies. I hope 

our witnesses can address how the planning for this transition is 

going. For their part the Iraqis will have to assume full responsibility for internal security, and there are questions if they will be 

fully capable in that area by the time we leave. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has requested authority to 

transfer some current U.S. military equipment to the Iraqi Security 

Forces (ISF), and I hope our witnesses will address that. Also, if 

they will take a minute to address potential future requests for assisting the Iraqis. 

The Iraqis will also have to come to an agreement on the future 

of the country, and elections in January may be crucial in helping 

them define that. They have not yet determined how the elections 

will be carried out, and it remains to be seen if the elections will 

reinforce sectarian divisions or help create a truly national government. All of us who watched in horror the ethnic violence of 2006 

and 2007 dearly hope for the latter. 

Finally, the U.S. and Iraq will have to determine our future relationship. For many of you, January 1, 2012, is a date when our relations will transform instantly to a normal bilateral relationship. 

In some ways it will likely be true, but in other ways it just may 

not. Iraq will be incapable of providing fully for its external defense. Iraq may well continue to need help developing some aspects 

of its security forces. And we will continue to have interest in ensuring a stable Iraq that doesn’t threaten its neighbors or undermine other regional goals. 

I don’t expect our witnesses here today to have all the answers 

to the questions. The war in Iraq is coming to a close, but my suspicion is that these transitions will take years to work through. 

This is the first time this general has appeared before the House 

Armed Services Committee, but my guess is, General, that you will 

be with us many more times in the days ahead. 

The CHAIRMAN. Now I turn to my good friend, the gentleman 

from California, our Ranking Member Buck McKeon. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to our 

witnesses. 

It is great to have you here, General Odierno. We really appreciate you taking the time to be here today. Please pass on to all 

the men and women in your command how much we are proud of 

their achievements and how much we appreciate their service. 

This is a timely hearing. While the focus in Washington is shifted to Afghanistan, we can’t lose sight of the enormous challenges 

before us in Iraq. We have made remarkable progress in Iraq. Violence continues to stay at a level comparable to 2003. The provincial elections earlier in the year were a success, and the SOFA 

agreement has held together. Most recently, in June, the Iraqi Se-
3 

curity Forces assumed primary security responsibility within Iraqi 

cities, and the U.S. combat forces departed the last remaining cities. 

The issue, therefore, is not whether we have won the war, but 

whether we will win the peace in Iraq. With national elections set 

for January, a referendum on the SOFA on the horizon, as well as 

other significant unresolved political hurdles like the status of 

Kirkuk, there are many unknowns that will determine the prospect 

of enduring domestic peace in Iraq. 

In parallel with Iraq’s demanding political calendar, the President’s February 2009 plan calls for a dramatic reduction to the 

U.S. footprint in Iraq by August 2010. By next summer the President plans to decrease our troop strength by 60 percent, in addition 

to closing bases and moving material out of the theater. 

This leads to some basic questions. First, is it still safe to assume 

that the Iraqi Security Forces will be able to assume security responsibility, and that electoral politics will not trigger sectarian violence? These are the assumptions underpinning the President’s 

plan. This plan arguably made sense in February. Does it still 

make sense today? Many of us here have consistently held the position that scheduling troop withdrawals in Iraq should be based on 

the conditions on the ground. General, we would like to hear from 

you on this subject. Do we have contingency plans in the event the 

security situation demands revisiting the August 2010 timeline? I 

am concerned we may be biting off more than we can chew in Iraq. 

As we begin executing the President’s redeployment plan, we 

also need to keep an eye on the future. What do we want the U.S.- 

Iraqi bilateral relationship to look like? This leads me to concerns 

about the normalization of our relations with Iraq. After all, we 

have invested in Iraq, we should be taking steps to ensure that we 

pursue a robust security relationship with Baghdad. Our increase 

in combat forces was not the only reason the surge was successful; 

rather, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus knew how to leverage our presence to ensure Iraqi leadership made the right 

choices. I am concerned that we may be retreating from this posture too quickly in an effort to normalize our relationship with 

Iraq. We must remember this is an embryonic democracy. 

As much as the situation in Iraq has improved, I think it is fair 

to say the situation is far from normal. So as long as we have a 

force presence in Iraq, our leadership should continue to improve 

itself in Iraqi political—involve itself in Iraqi political affairs to ensure the right decisions are made. Robust engagement seems to be 

the key to a redeployment plan. 

Beyond the strategic and political military concerns, there are a 

host of issues ranging from operational implementation of the advisory and assist brigades to the enormous logistical challenges of 

moving all of our equipment out of Iraq. Accomplishing this all in 

such a narrow window of time is a Herculean task even if we did 

not face what you rightly call drivers of instability. 

I hope we can discuss these issues over the course of the hearing. 

I look forward to a candid discussion on these important issues. 

And again, thank you, General, for being here this morning. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 
4 

I seek unanimous consent that Representative Kilpatrick be allowed to participate in our committee this morning. The gentlelady 

just returned from the Middle East, and we welcome her. Without 

objection. 

Now, as I understand it, Assistant Secretary Vickers has not submitted a written testimony and will not be making an opening 

statement. Is that correct? 

Mr. VICKERS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

So, General Odierno, the floor is yours, and we welcome you and 

congratulate you for the excellent work that you are doing. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. RAY ODIERNO, USA, COMMANDING 

GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE—IRAQ 

General ODIERNO. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon and 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for providing 

me the opportunity today to appear before you to provide my assessment of the current situation, the challenges in Iraq, and how 

our strategy is adapting in order to achieve the President’s vision. 

First, I just want to tell you what a great honor it is to command 

Multi-National Force—Iraq. Having now spent a significant 

amount of time in Iraq, I remain encouraged by the steady and deliberate progress that has been made particularly over the past 21⁄2

years. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as you all know, is now in 

its sixth consecutive year, and it has been a complex and challenging mission in a continuously evolving environment. But the 

one thing that remains constant is the demonstrated courage, compassion, and commitment of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, 

coastguardsmen, and civilians who continue to selflessly serve. I 

am humbled by the opportunity to serve with and privileged to lead 

these great Americans. And I also want to recognize the families 

of our service members who have sacrificed so much, yet continue 

to give their unwavering support in order to allow our service men 

and women the ability to focus on the mission at hand. 

Although challenges remain in Iraq, with the continued support 

of Congress and the American people, I believe we are now in reach 

of our goals. 

As we all know, Iraq is strategically located in the Middle East 

and remains vital to stability in this region. It has always played 

a significant role in regional security dynamics, but too often in the 

past Iraq has been a source of instability rather than stability. 

Today with our help Iraq, is slowly reestablishing diplomatic, economic, and security relationships with all its neighbors. 

As a developing democracy in the heart of the Middle East, Iraq 

has formalized its relationship with the United States. This past 

January our country has implemented two historic bilateral agreements establishing the foundation for a long-term, comprehensive, 

strategic partnership. Together the Security Agreement and the 

Strategic Framework Agreement demonstrate America’s continued 

commitment to Iraq, its people, and stability in the region, and 

they also reflect the maturing relationship and enhanced cooperation between our two nations. 

The Strategic Framework Agreement establishes the foundation 

and mechanisms for an enduring relationship between Iraq and the 
5 

United States through long-term cooperation in a variety of areas, 

including security, technological, educational, and cultural exchanges, just to name a few. The Security Agreement focuses on 

our current military relationship within the context of Iraqi sovereignty by regulating the temporary presence and activities of 

U.S. forces in Iraq and directing the withdrawal of our forces from 

Iraq by December 31, 2011. 

Since implementing the security agreement this past January, 

we have conducted all military operations by, with, and through 

the Iraqi Security Forces operating within the Iraqi rule of law. I 

am extremely proud of how our leaders and service members at all 

levels adapted quickly and quickly adjusting our mind-set and operations in order to maintain operational momentum within the 

framework of the Security Agreement. 

In line with the security agreement on June 30, 2009, the Iraqi 

Security Forces assumed primary responsibilities within the cities, 

and U.S. combat forces departed the last remaining cities. June 

30th was a major milestone for the Government of Iraq, its security 

forces, and the Iraqi people, and a first step in the Iraqi Security 

Forces assuming full control of security in Iraq. 

The positive psychological impact has been profound. The Iraqis 

wanted to be in charge, they wanted the responsibility, and they 

have demonstrated that they are capable. After some initial coordination issues immediately following 30 June, the strong partnerships that we have developed over the last several years in particular have grown even stronger. 

Today, nine months after we began implementing the Security 

Agreement and three months after U.S. combat forces departed the 

cities, we continue to make consistent, deliberate progress in improving the security environment in Iraq. The combined, sustained 

efforts of U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces coupled with the efforts of 

our civilian partners have reduced security incidents and attacks of 

all types to levels on par with the summer of 2003. 

While statistics do not paint the whole picture, they help provide 

some context in understanding the progress made to date. In the 

charts before you, we use six-month increments to specifically highlight the trends in both events and casualties over time. The security incidents chart displayed here clearly shows the improving 

trends across all types of attacks and incidents. Overall attacks 

have decreased 85 percent over the past 2 years, from 4,064 in August of 2007 to 594 in August of 2009, with 565 attacks through 

28 September. In that same time period, U.S. military deaths have 

decreased by 93 percent, Iraqi Security Force deaths have decreased by 79 percent, and ethnosectarian deaths have decreased 

88 percent. In fact, there is another noticeable decrease in 

ethnosectarian incidents, specifically during Ramadan, which has 

always reflected a sharp increase in insurgent and extremist activity. This year there are only 19 ethnosectarian incidents compared 

to 978 in 2006. Additionally, improvised explosive device explosions 

have decreased 74 percent. 

But improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remain the weapons of 

choice of the insurgents and terrorists inside of Iraq. The second 

chart shows high-profile explosions that are specifically intended to 

have a large impact. You can see the steady decrease even after the 
6 

Iraqis assumed responsibility in the cities. But these high-profile 

attacks remain a concern, especially following the two bombings in 

Baghdad on 19 August, which targeted the Ministries of Finance 

and Foreign Affairs. These were horrific attacks claimed and perpetrated by al Qaeda in Iraq and aimed specifically against the 

Government of Iraq’s institutions in order to undermine the 

public’s faith and confidence in the Government of Iraq. 

There was a clear security lapse on 19 August in Baghdad, but 

I do not believe it is the result of any systemic problems, and I remain confident that the Iraqi Security Forces continue to learn, improve, and adjust. After the 19 August attacks, the Government of 

Iraq responded promptly and effectively. They reassessed security 

measures, made adjustments, and increased operations, aggressively enhancing security in the cities, all enabled by U.S. forces, 

and they continue to reassess their security posture. 

The Government of Iraq leaders reinforced national unity, and 

the people responded. To date the extremist efforts to destabilize 

Iraq have failed. The overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people reject extremism. We have seen no indications of a return to the sectarian violence that plagued Iraq in 2006 and 2007. 

Let me now take a little bit of time to discuss the Iraqi Security 

Forces. Overall the professionalism and operational effectiveness of 

the approximately 663,000-strong Iraqi Security Forces, including 

245,000 soldiers and 407,000 police, continue to improve, thus both 

bolstering public confidence and trust in the Iraqi Security Forces. 

Supported by U.S. forces, the Iraqi Security Forces recently provided safe and secure environments for two mass Shi’a pilgrimages 

in July and August in which millions of pilgrims participated and 

transited throughout Iraq. 

We continue to see signs of normalcy returning to Iraq. Recently 

the first international soccer match was held in Baghdad with over 

50,000 people in attendance. And just last week I witnessed thousands of Iraqis in the parks and streets across Baghdad celebrating 

Eid, which is another indicator of the growing confidence in the 

Iraqi Security Forces, especially following the Baghdad bombings 

just one month prior. You can honestly feel a difference amongst 

the people in Baghdad and around a large majority of Iraq. 

The Iraqi Army and Federal Police continue to improve counterinsurgency implementation, planning, and execution. In some cases 

police primacy has been established in the cities, but this is still 

a work in progress. The NATO Training Mission—Iraq continues to 

focus on institutional training for the Iraqi Security Forces, enhancing the long-term professionalism. Although small, improvement continues in logistics and the sharing and integration of intelligence and operations. The Regional Operation Centers and Provincial Joint Coordination Centers continue to improve. 

The Iraqi Security Forces are now in the lead across the entire 

country with U.S. forces, advising and assisting and enabling operations in the cities, and providing full-spectrum partnership outside of the cities. The Iraqi Security Forces are conducting more 

and more precision intelligence-driven operations, most of which 

are unilateral U.S.-enabled operations relying on U.S. intelligence, 

surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), communications, and some 

aviation and logistical support. We are seeing improved integration 
7 

of Government of Iraq human intelligence and U.S. technical intelligence. Outside the cities Iraqi Security Forces continue a combination of independent, U.S.-enabled and U.S.-partnered full-spectrum operations. 

In addition, we continue to see strides in Government of Iraq 

counterterrorism operations. In May, we began national integrated 

operations with Iraqi Special Operations Forces facilitated by an 

Iraqi Operations Coordination Group, a standing Iraqi interagency 

organization collocated with U.S. counterterrorism forces. Every 

day we conduct jointly planned and executed counterterrorism operations with increasing operational tempo (OPTEMPO) in results. 

I believe that by 2011, the Government of Iraq will have a national counterterrorism force capable of dealing with a variety of 

extremist threats. Just in the last week, we have jointly arrested 

90 high-value individuals, including 52 al Qaeda in Iraq, 23 Shi’a 

extremists, and 15 Sunni insurgents and ex-Baathists. Since 2006, 

we have systematically decreased the number of foreign fighters 

entering Iraq and significantly reduced al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to 

a small ideological core that recruits disenfranchised Iraqis and 

criminals. 

In the north AQI and some remnants of Sunni insurgent groups 

continue in their attempt to reestablish a foothold with the objective of expanding back into Anbar and Baghdad. We are working 

with Iraqi Security Forces to establish a defense in depth across 

Iraq with Iraqi Security Forces in the cities and U.S. forces conducting partner full-spectrum operations in the surrounding belts 

and along the borders to deny extremists safe havens and reduce 

the flow of foreign fighters and lethal aid into Iraq. 

We believe the Iraqi Security Forces will develop the capacity to 

conduct internal and basic external defense over the next 21⁄2 years 

as we continue to draw down our forces. As most of you are aware, 

the Sons of Iraq program succeeded in drawing many out of the insurgency, giving them the opportunity to serve in their communities and earn salaries to support their families. In April, the Government of Iraq assumed full responsibility for the Sons of Iraq 

program. Over 23,000 former Sons of Iraq have transitioned to the 

Iraqi Security Forces and other nonsecurity employment since 

2008, including over 5,500 in Baghdad over the last two months. 

In October, 5,000 more will transition in Baghdad. Despite budget 

cuts across the Government of Iraq, GOI has maintained funding 

for this program, understanding its importance not only to security, 

but also to building greater trust between the Sunni community 

and the government. Sons of Iraq payments through the summer 

are complete, and September pay is ongoing by the Government of 

Iraq. The Government of Iraq’s goal is to integrate all of the Sons 

of Iraq into the ministries by the end of this year. I do not believe 

they will meet this timeline, but I do believe they will continue to 

execute the program in 2010 until it is complete. We will continue 

to monitor the progress of this program very closely. 

In January, Iraqi’s Independent High Electoral Commission orchestrated successful provincial elections in which all Iraqi sects 

and ethnicities participated and voted out also many of the incumbents since they failed to deliver tangible results and rejected those 

who were overtly supportive by Iran. The United Nations Assist-
8 

ance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and international observers deem 

these elections credible and legitimate, and the seating of the provincial government happened peacefully. 

In July, Iraqis experienced another milestone with the Kurdistan 

regional government (KRG) elections, with over 78 percent voter 

turnout of the approximately 2.5 million eligible voters in the 

Kurdistan region. Kurds voted in their first direct and open election for the KRG President. President Masoud Barzani was elected 

with 70 percent of the votes. Voters also signaled a desire for 

change with the success of the Change List, which won 21 percent 

of the KRG Parliament, a moderate loss to the Kurdistan Alliance. 

On 20 August, 2009, the KRG Parliament and President were 

peacefully seated. 

Although security is improving, it is not yet enduring. There still 

remain underlying, unresolved sources of potential conflict. I call 

these drivers of instability. From the beginning security in Iraq has 

been a complex problem that has required nuanced, evolving approaches, and our strategy has reflected this. In this environment, 

we cannot focus on immediate and traditional security threats 

alone, especially as the United States continues to assist Iraq in rebuilding the foundations of the security, civil, political, and economic institutions. 

We continue to assist the Government of Iraq in addressing and 

finding ways to mitigate these root causes of instability. Current 

drivers of instability include communal and factional struggles for 

power and resources, insufficient Government of Iraq capacity, violent extremist groups, and interference from external state and 

nonstate actors. 

Iraq is a nascent democracy emerging from 30 years of authoritarian rule based on ethnosectarian privilege. Its future as a stable 

multiethnic representative state rests upon its ability to deal with 

a myriad of these challenges, and some of these issues will take 

time to resolve. 

The national elections in January of 2010 are critical to determining the path that Iraq will take into the future. The rules of 

the game are being debated in the Council of Representatives 

today. Having just returned yesterday from the Eid holiday, they 

have a condensed timeline to pass an election law and many issues 

to discuss, including Kirkuk, open versus closed lists, and a single 

versus multiple district election. There is a potential to build a 

competent, capable representative government, but there is also 

the potential to exacerbate societal divisions by appointing people 

based on their affiliations rather than their abilities. 

Even as the Iraqi political system continues to mature, there is 

not yet consensus on the exact nature of Iraq’s representative government, one that is accepted across ethnic, sectarian, and regional 

lines. Issues include the role and power of the central Iraqi Government vis-a`-vis the provinces, the integration and balance of ethnic 

and sectarian groups within the government, revenue sharing, and 

long-standing Arab-Kurd issues. 

Iraqi Government institutions continue to evolve, and their ability to provide essential services is improving, yet it will take time 

to develop the institutional process and bureaucratic expertise necessary to sustain programs over time. Also, decades of 
9 

infrastructural neglect require substantial capital investment, and 

a recent decline in the price of oil, the mainstay of the economy, 

has resulted in budget shortfalls negatively impacting the Government of Iraq’s ability to fund its many requirements. 

While endemic corruption and mismanagement persist, the Government of Iraq continues to focus on anticorruption efforts, and 

there has been some progress in developing a culture of accountability for government officials. 

Despite their increased capacity and progress in providing security, the Iraqi Security Forces continue to face shortcomings and 

budget constraints due in part to the declining oil revenues that affect their current and future operational capacity, including 

logistical support across the ministries. We continue to assist and 

advise the Ministries of Defense and Interior as they prioritize the 

minimum essential capabilities for a foundational defense capability, land, sea, and air, before the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 

December of 2011. Critical gaps remain in controlling and protecting Iraqi ground airspace and territorial waters. 

In Iraq, much of the struggles are about power, land, and resources, which is reflective in the Arab-Kurd and Government of 

Iraq-Kurdistan regional government tensions. The key issues include the pending hydrocarbon law, revenue sharing, and the disputed internal boundaries, including areas in Ninawa Province, 

Diyala Province, and Kirkuk Province. We strongly support the 

United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq process promoting political dialogue and resolution of these key issues. 

Violent external groups and external influences take advantage 

of seams within Iraq, such as the Arab-Kurd tensions. Al Qaeda in 

Iraq, Sunni extremist groups, and Shi’a militant groups continue to 

pose threats to stability as they seek to exploit political fissures, 

destabilize the Government of Iraq, and undermine the progress 

made to date. Interference from external actors continues to exacerbate the security situation with Iraq through either tacit or direct support to extremists and proxy groups. Both enhanced security and diplomatic measures are required to secure Iraq’s borders 

with Iran and Syria. 

As outlined by the President on 1 September, 2010, 11 months 

from now our combat mission will end. Our transition force in Iraq 

will then focus on training and advising Iraqi Security Forces; conducting targeted counterterrorism missions by, with and through 

the Iraqis; protecting U.S. forces and others operating around the 

country, while providing support to civil capacity-building missions 

with our interagency partners as well as the United Nations. 

We are reducing our footprint in Iraq by about 60 percent to an 

initial strength of 50,000 boots on the ground by 31 August, 2010. 

Our transition force will consist of three division headquarters and 

six advise and assist brigades, which were specifically tailored to 

support Iraqi civil development. We have already begun deliberately drawing down our forces without sacrificing security. From 

over 143,500 troops and 14 brigade combat teams on the ground in 

January, we have approximately 124,000 troops and 11 brigade 

combat teams (BCTs) operating in Iraq today. By the end of October, I believe we will be down to 120,000 troops in Iraq. As we go 

forward we will thin our lines across Iraq in order to reduce the 
10 

risk and sustain stability through a deliberate transition of responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces. 

We have already reduced our base footprint by over 200 bases so 

far and will continue to close bases deliberately and systematically 

in Iraq. We have also reduced our contractor footprint from 149,000 

in January to just over 115,000 contractors today, saving over $441 

million this year. On 1 January, 2010, we will also combine six 

headquarters elements of Multi-National Force—Iraq into a single 

headquarters called United States Forces—Iraq. This will reduce 

our headquarters force structure by 40 percent, while maintaining 

the overall capacity to command and control the force as we transition more and more responsibility to the Government of Iraq 

through the end of mission in 2011. 

Over the course of this campaign, nonlethal operations have been 

critical to our success. As we change our mission and continue to 

draw down, they will become even more vital. I am referring specifically the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 

and Information Operations, both of which have paid huge dividends so far. 

This past spring, following the seating of the provincial governments, Multi-National Force—Iraq in concert with the State Department-led provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and the newly 

elected Iraqi provincial leaders focused CERP monies on projects 

designed to meet the essential needs of the Iraqi people, sustain security gains, and support provincial governance development. 

CERP remains a critical enabler that we are using judiciously. In June, we returned $247 million of CERP money, and at the end 

of the year we will return another $135 million of CERP money. 

As we begin our responsible drawdown of forces and change of mission in mid- to late-fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2011, we 

expect our need for CERP to reduce; however, CERP will remain 

a critical enabler for stabilization, and our CERP expenditures in 

the future will remain within the 20 approved categories that have 

already been discussed. 

Information Operations has also been a vital component of our 

overall operations in defeating violent extremist groups who themselves use emerging media conduits to recruit, solicit funding, and 

share their ideology. Our Information Operations have complemented our lethal operations and helped save lives, contributed 

to host nation stability, promoted support for democratic processes 

and the rule of law, and reduced the level of violence, yet we are 

engaged with adversaries who continue to exploit the information 

space to try and reverse our gains. So I cannot overstate the importance of Information Operations in achieving our national goals in 

Iraq. 

Over the years, the environment and threat have changed, and 

we have continuously adapted our strategy from focusing on protecting the people in a counterinsurgency fight to concentrating on 

developing Iraqi capacity. Today, given the hard-fought security 

gains, we are transitioning to stability operations, and we will continue to responsibly transfer responsibilities to the Government of 

Iraq, the Iraqi Security Forces, and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. 

Though the focus of our forces is shifting from security to capacity building, our strategic goal remains to foster a long-term part-
11 

nership with a sovereign, stable, self-reliant Iraq. We have a good 

plan that we are executing, and I am confident in our way ahead. 

Iraq is a state and a society under construction, struggling to define its identity and its place in the world after decades of oppression and violence. The way in which we draw down our forces will 

impact not only the relationship between U.S. and Iraq into the future, but also the nature of the new Iraq. Our presence through 

2011 provides psychological and physical support to the Iraqi people, the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces. It provides the opportunity for different groups to build up their constituencies, to participate in politics, to form alliances, and to reach consensus. The level and nature of U.S. engagement with the Iraqis 

will continue to change as the U.S. military draws down. 

Iraq is making steady progress, but has a long way to go. We 

must have strategic patience. Through the Strategic Framework 

Agreement, the United States has a mechanism for supporting Iraq 

to develop its institutional and human capacity. Success will be defined by our ability to support Iraq’s developing institutional capacity, from governance to economics, that will sustain Iraq’s longterm stability. The Iraqi Security Forces have made steady 

progress, and our efforts over the next 21⁄2 years will help solidify 

the foundation of a professional and competent Iraqi Security 

Forces. We must leave Iraq with security forces capable of defending the Iraqi people and protecting their institutions. 

I close as I began, by recognizing the soldiers, sailors, airmen, 

marines, coastguardsmen, and civilians currently serving in Iraq. 

These great patriots and their families have made tremendous sacrifices on behalf of our Nation. They have made a positive difference in the lives of millions of all Americans—excuse me, they 

have made positive differences in the lives of millions, and all 

Americans should take pride in their accomplishments. 

Not long ago Iraq was a society burdened by a seemingly endless 

cycle of violence and destruction. Today it is buoyed by a tremendous sense of hope for a bright and prosperous future as Iraqis prepare for their national elections, elections that will determine the 

future direction of Iraq. Having demonstrated tremendous resiliency, I believe the Iraqi people are determined to make Iraq something very different from what it once was. And we have invested 

an awful lot in Iraq, both from a monetary standpoint and from our 

personal investment of the many lives of those who have been 

killed and injured in Iraq, and I think we have a true opportunity 

to have success. So it is important I think that we continue along 

the line we are. 

So thank you so much for the support that you have given us in 

the past and the support that I expect you will continue to give us 

as we move forward. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you for your very thorough and 

positive report to us, and we welcome your presence here today, 

and thank you for your great contribution. 

[The prepared statement of General Odierno can be found in the 

Appendix on page 49.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General, in your opinion, how fast can we responsibly redeploy our troops from that country? And as you know, 
12 

our military has been greatly stressed over the past several years, 

and we potentially face increased demand for troops in Afghanistan. So what are the risks in speeding up the redeployment of 

troops from Iraq? 

General ODIERNO. Again, as we continue to look at the competing 

demands—first, my responsibility, as you stated, Mr. Chairman, is 

to present to my chain of command what the risks are inside of 

Iraq as we draw down our forces. And as I stated, the important 

part is that we do not want to lose the security progress that has 

been made. The physical and psychological presence of U.S. forces 

help significantly as Iraq continues to move forward. So what we 

don’t want to do is we don’t want to see what I mention as the 

drivers of instability cause a reduction in the confidence of the 

Iraqi people in moving forward with developing their nascent democracy. So we have to ensure that we don’t take enough risk 

where ethnosectarian violence is able to continue, for example, over 

Arab-Kurd tensions, or that we don’t allow al Qaeda and some of 

the outside external influences by Iran and others to cause violence 

inside of Iraq that will cause the Iraqi political system to fall. 

So those are the risks. The plan we have I believe allows us to 

withdraw deliberately and maintain what I believe is an appropriate level of security that the Iraqi Security Forces ultimately 

can sustain and continue to improve. 

That said, we work very carefully—I work very carefully with 

General Petraeus in order to identify any capabilities that we have 

and no longer need that can be used in Afghanistan. We have done 

that over the last several months, and we will continue to do that. 

We will not require—within our plan I have flexibility to speed up 

if I think the situation on the ground allows it or to slow down, and 

I will continue to make those judgments as we move forward. 

As I announced, we will probably be down to about 120,000 

strength by the end of October. That is a bit faster than we originally planned, and that is based on the improvement that we have 

seen out in Anbar Province where we have now replaced two brigades with one brigade out in Anbar. And so we are able to make 

those decisions as we see progress on the ground, and we will continue to do that. So what I have to do is delicately do this without 

losing the gains we have made, while understanding I cannot have 

forces there that are not being used efficiently. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, the country of Iran has been in the 

news a great deal lately. What influence does that country have on 

your efforts in Iraq? 

General ODIERNO. Well, obviously, as a neighbor Iran—all neighboring countries have influences inside of Iraq. What we want overall obviously is an Iran that wants to have positive influence inside 

of Iraq. Unfortunately we still see some malign intent with Iran as 

we continue to see training conducted in Iran of Iranian surrogates 

that now then come back into Iraq. We still continue to uncover 

large caches of rockets, rails to shoot rockets, and some explosively 

formed projectiles that are made in Iran. We continue to see the 

potential interference in the political process inside of Iraq. So 

those obviously are concerns. 

The good part about this is that the Iraqi Security Forces are uncovering many of these elements in southern Iraq. They have con-
13 

tinued to go after these caches and individuals that have been 

trained inside of Iran, so that is a positive aspect. But it is still 

very much a concern that they continue to fund and conduct operations of surrogate elements inside of Iraq. 

The CHAIRMAN. It appears that the future pole star for success 

in Iraq is the upcoming elections. From your vantage point today, 

do you see that in a positive light? 

General ODIERNO. I think these elections are extremely important for the Government of Iraq, and I do believe that they will 

occur in a safe manner as I look at it today. 

The important part about these elections is that this is the first 

election that will be conducted fully by the Iraqis. They will be conducted by the Iraqi High Electoral Commission. And this election 

will be conducted and secured by Iraqis with our just training and 

advice and assistance. We will see, I believe, a turnout among all 

Iraqi elements, all religious groups, all people from all areas of 

Iraq. So I think it will be critical to the future of Iraq. 

We are seeing many coalitions form. The last count, there were 

almost 300 political parties that have registered for these elections. 

I think that is important to show how much these elections mean 

to the Iraqi people and the interest that has been shown. 

And so I believe that these elections will occur. They will occur 

on time. Hopefully the Iraqis will pass an election law here in the 

next several days. We know they are working very hard to do that. 

These elections are important. Those who are elected will set the 

stage for Iraq over the next several years, whether they continue 

to move towards democratic process in an open economy or not. 

And so these will be very important elections for Iraq and the future of Iraq. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you again, General, for your statement. And you know as 

well as anyone the sacrifice our country has made in bringing stability to Iraq. 

Either satisfied with success or anxious to focus elsewhere, many 

in Washington are pushing to move on from Iraq. I am worried 

that that has led some to dismiss the strategic importance of Iraq. 

Please state for the American people what is at stake in Iraq, explain why it is in the national security interest to keep combat 

forces there until September 2010, and why it is necessary to keep 

a residual force in Iraq until the end of 2011 and even beyond. 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Congressman McKeon. 

I would just say as you just look at the geographic location of 

Iraq, you notice the strategic importance of it. It is strategically 

placed within the Middle East. It is centered in between Iran and— 

the Persian Shi’a Iran and the Sunni Arab west and southern partners. And Iraq has always been a country that represents all of the 

Middle East with its population. 

Iraq is moving towards a nascent democracy and wants to move 

towards an open economy, and the ability that it would have to potentially contribute to stability in the Middle East in the long term, 

in my mind, is strategically important to us, and we can’t lose sight 

of that. We have an opportunity here to have a long-term strategic 

partner. 
14 

To the Iraqis the Strategic Framework Agreement, which I discussed in my opening statement, is extremely important to them 

because that will help to develop a long-term relationship with the 

United States, an economic relationship, a security relationship, an 

educational relationship, technological exchanges. That is important to them as they want to move forward as a country that is 

respected, has a democracy, and can continue to develop its own 

economy with the vast resources that it has available to it, but it 

has yet been able to take advantage of. And so I think for those 

factors it is important for us to stay engaged. 

We have spent—as I said earlier, we have spent a lot of money, 

and I know you all know that. We have spent a lot of personal sacrifice inside of Iraq. And security is headed in the right direction. 

We don’t want to lose that. We want to give them the time and the 

space to continue this development. So by leaving our combat 

forces in there until September 1, 2010, allows them to go through 

their elections, allows them to seat their new government. And 

then allowing forces to stay there through 2011 allows them to continue to build their civil capacity so we can take advantage of the 

opportunities that we think Iraq brings to stability in the Middle 

East. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, General. 

Every four years we hold an election to determine our President. 

We do that in November. And we understand that the President 

is sworn in in January, and it seems to be a very—for a couple of 

hundred years we have done that very, very well. Maybe you could 

explain the timeline of how their election works. They have a different system of government. And the election will be held in January, but it will take a while to establish a government. Perhaps you 

could explain that. 

General ODIERNO. Congressman, I will walk through it in general terms. First, again, by the Constitution, the election is supposed to occur no later than the 31st of January. Right now it is 

scheduled for the 16th of January, again pending the passing of the 

election law. Once the election is completed, they take 45 days to 

certify the results of the election. And so what happens is we will 

have hundreds of international observers, maybe thousands. There 

is going to be quite a few international observers, as well as the 

Iraqi High Electoral Commission will certify the results. They will 

take all complaints, and then they will deem the elections to be 

credible, legitimate or not. 

That takes 45 days. Once that happens, you then have 30 days 

to begin the formation of seating the Council of Representatives. 

You then have another 30 days to select the leadership, the Presidency, and then you have another time period to select the Prime 

Minister and then the Speaker. So within that time period, we expect that it will take from January to June or so, maybe July, to 

seat the new government. In 2005, following the elections, the government—the elections were in December, and the government was 

seated in May of 2005. This is the parliamentary system of government, and it just takes time for them to do this. So there is 

timelines on it. They will follow those timelines strictly, but it will 

take time to seat that government. 
15 

Mr. MCKEON. Based on that timeline, then, you are comfortable 

with keeping combat troops in the country until August, and that 

will be sufficient, and you are comfortable with being able to pull 

them out securely at that time? 

General ODIERNO. I do. I look at the first 60 days or so following 

the election as maybe the most critical time if we think there might 

be some sort of violence following the election as the results are 

certified. Our experiences in the past have been if within the 60 

days, that is when you would see some level of violence. So that 

allows us, I think, to make sure that we believe this will be a 

peaceful transition of power, which we expect. But that will allow 

us to ensure this peaceful transition of power, and then allow us 

to draw down as they seat the government—draw down to a level 

of 50,000 by the end of August. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, Mr. Secretary, thank you so much. We appreciate your 

service. 

You know, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has suggested that there is a breakdown between U.S. Transportation 

Command (TRANSCOM) and the Army Central Command 

(CENTCOM) on the movement of equipment out of Iraq. For example, the GAO stated that a thorough inventory of equipment has 

not been completed, nor have any communicated—have they communicated with each other on how they are going to accelerate the 

movement of troops out of Iraq. In your opinion, are you concerned 

that this will increase the time required for all redeployment of 

forces and ultimately impact unit readiness? And do our forces in 

Kuwait have the forces available to support an accelerated redeployment of our troops out of Iraq? And what role, if any, will Turkey play in the redeployment of forces? And maybe you can give 

us a little—— 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Congressman. I can answer some 

of those questions, and I will. 

First off, we have been planning for the redeployment of forces 

and equipment for some time now. In Iraq I have a cell that has 

been established now for about six months that has representatives 

from CENTCOM, from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, that 

we are coordinating the movement of all equipment and personnel 

out of the theater. 

We have done a complete inventory of all the equipment that is 

in Iraq. We understand what we have in Iraq. And that immediately within the cell gets transmitted back to the services and to 

CENTCOM in order for them to decide how this equipment will be 

distributed, whether it comes back to the United States, whether 

it goes somewhere else. 

So I feel confident that we have a good handle on this. We have 

already started moving equipment out that we believe is no longer 

needed based on the withdrawal of some of our forces already, and 

also on the change in mission that we have. And we have already 

sent out over 150,000 pieces of equipment from Iraq. So we continue to do this on a regular basis. 
16 

We plan on in some ways using—we have taken a look at equipment going through Turkey, as well as Jordan, as well as Kuwait. 

And we have actually—we are now actually sending some equipment through Jordan as well as through Kuwait. We coordinate 

very carefully with Army Central Command, who is responsible for 

the logistics support inside of Kuwait. They also are represented in 

the cell that we have established, and we know what their capacity 

is. We have planned this in such a way where our redeployment 

fits within the capacity that is established in Kuwait for both people and equipment. 

Mr. ORTIZ. And I know that for some years back you were utilizing a lot of the National Guard equipment and Reserve equipment because of the damage to some of the regular Army equipment. You still have a lot of equipment that belongs to the National Guard and Reserve in Iraq? 

General ODIERNO. Congressman, I can’t tell you exactly how 

much we have, but over the years, as we have deployed and redeployed units out of Iraq, we continue to rotate equipment through 

Iraq, depending on its usage and its wear, as you pointed out. So 

I don’t know the exact figure, but I am certain there is National 

Guard equipment inside of Iraq. 

So what will happen is, again, we have identified all this equipment that is transmitted back to the services; and most of it is 

Army equipment. So most of it back to the Army, through Army 

Materiel Command, and they then will provide us distribution instructions. 

And, actually, it goes to our—we will ship the equipment to Kuwait or Jordan, and then they will ship it back and send it back 

to the units of its origin or to some other destination if they decide 

that there is another priority. 

That decision will be made back here in the Pentagon between 

the Joint Staff, Secretary of Defense, and the services on where exactly the equipment goes. 

Mr. ORTIZ. My time is now up. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Let me point out, in front of each member is the timeline for 

each questioner, which is a rather new experience for us here, but 

I point that out to the members. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to thank the General for being here. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. 

General, I appreciated so much the briefing I received last month 

with you in Baghdad. I appreciate your leadership. 

In fact, I had two sons serve in Iraq. A reason I felt so comfortable about their service is persons like you, the capable American military leadership. It was really reassuring as a parent. 

And I am so grateful for our troops serving currently, for our veterans. They are making a difference, defeating the terrorists overseas. 

My question, and it is very similar to my good friend Congressman Solomon Ortiz, is relative to equipment. That is, as you execute the redeployment of personnel and equipment from Iraq, to 
17 

what extent is it reasonable to simply move the equipment to Afghanistan? In your opinion, are we fully capitalizing on that opportunity? 

General ODIERNO. Again, we are. I would say again, those decisions are made by others. But let me give you an example of what 

happened, though, recently. 

We had 19 sets of route clearance equipment that was excess, 

that we once needed that we no longer needed, and we expedited 

the movement of that equipment to Afghanistan. So we identify 

those key pieces that are no longer needed in Iraq, they are needed 

in Afghanistan, and those are moved very quickly. That is completely coordinated through Central Command with General 

Petraeus and his team as we move equipment back and forth. 

So, absolutely, we identify the critical pieces of equipment that 

are needed. We have moved some engineer and aviation equipment 

as well from Iraq to Afghanistan as our need for it has reduced, 

and we will continue to do this as we move forward. 

Mr. WILSON. And I am particularly interested in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), so I hope each one that could be moved would 

be moved. It just gives such protection to our troops and allies. 

General, I understand that the relationship between the MultiNational Force—Iraq and Iraqi Security Forces is actually far more 

positive than the media portrays. In fact, on our tour, we were at 

Tallil, where my son Alan served for a year, and we visited with 

your personnel and the Iraqi security personnel in the same room 

working together. It was just startling to me. 

Then we had the opportunity to see the new Iraqi Special Forces, 

and they have the latest, most modern equipment in the world. 

I also noticed they have M249 crew-served weapons, which are 

made by FN Manufacturing of Richland County, South Carolina, 

my constituents. They are very proud to make those for our troops 

and for our Iraqi allies. 

What is your assessment of the relationship and what measures 

can be taken to further improve communication and cooperation? 

General ODIERNO. First, I will say over the last three years specifically, during and following the surge of forces, the partnerships 

that have been developed and the relationships that have been developed have been extremely strong with the Iraqi Security Forces, 

from private up to the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior. 

In every operational command, in every Joint Provision Coordination Center, which are the ones that collect all the information, we 

have joint commands operating in every one of those. 

There are always some anecdotal stories that will tell you maybe 

there are not good relationships, but I will tell you that the 

strength of the relationships between our leaders and their leaders 

continues today as we continue to support them as they move forward, and the large majority of Iraqi leaders are appreciative of 

that support that we continue to give as we move forward here and 

as they take more and more responsibility for security. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, it was extraordinary as we were there that 

Congressman Patrick Murphy was on the congressional delegation 

(CODEL), and he had served in Iraq, and it looked like he just 

couldn’t wait to join the Iraqi Special Forces. 
18 

Mr. Secretary, as our military forces draw down in number and 

transition fully to an advise and assist role in Iraq, what support 

do you expect from the State Department? In your opinion, are the 

Department of Defense and State Department roles clearly defined? 

Mr. VICKERS. The National Security Council (NSC) currently has 

a process under way to manage the transition of certain responsibilities from the Department of Defense to the Department of 

State. One of these will be assistance to Iraqi police forces over 

time, and I believe that process is well under way. 

Mr. WILSON. And a final story, I was with Congressman Henry 

Cuellar one time seeing the training of the Iraqi police. He was 

right in the middle of them. I thought maybe it was dangerous. No, 

they all were practicing English. So it is just a great experience. 

Thank you, and I appreciate your testimony today. 

General ODIERNO. Congressman, if I could just add a little bit to 

the last comment. We are in the process of redeveloping a joint 

campaign plan between the U.S. Embassy and Multi-National 

Force—Iraq which is focused entirely on transitioning responsibilities to the Embassy as well as the Government of Iraq as we withdraw our forces in 2010 and ’11, and we plan on publishing this 

document sometime around the first of the year. That will identify 

the deliverables and specifically what we transition to the U.S. Embassy, who has responsibility for it, and what transitions to the 

Government of Iraq. Because this is really important for the continued success post-2011 as well. 

Mr. WILSON. And I am grateful to have a nephew stationed at 

the Embassy. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, once again, Mr. Secretary, General, once again, for being before us, and thank you for the work that you do for our country. 

And you are right. Our troops are just doing a great job. In fact, 

I get a lot of e-mails and a lot of information and a lot of calls from 

them about what is going on on the ground. 

I know, General, you and I usually have a disagreement about 

what is really happening out there in Iraq, and I think usually I 

am closer to what is really going on than you. But let me just put 

for the record that I do believe we are getting out. We are getting 

out of Dodge, and we are going to get it done sooner rather than 

later, and that means that we really are looking at our State Department and other departments to get that other work done as we 

withdraw our troops. 

General and Mr. Secretary, I would like both of you to answer 

this question: General, at the end of July, you and Secretary Gates 

visited with Kurdish leaders in Irbil; and you were widely quoted 

saying that the Arab-Kurd tensions over disputed internal boundaries and national petroleum policy were the biggest problem facing Iraq. In fact, you said Arab-Kurd tensions are the number one 

driver of insecurity. Yet, this morning when you began and you 

talked about the drivers, you didn’t mention this. 

So my questions are, do you still believe that the number one 

driver is insecurity, or do you still think it is up there? And what 
19 

measures have been taken to manage and to reduce the tensions 

that are going on? 

And, of course, Article 140 of the constitution of Iraq provides for 

a phased process of normalization, census, and referendum to determine the final boundaries of the Kurdish region within a democratic process. But some have said to me that they think the U.S. 

has to be more active in getting this 140 Article issue done, this 

process done. In fact, when I asked Secretary Gates in front of this 

committee, he said that the U.S. fully supports Article 140. 

So my question is, how involved are we in that? What are we 

doing to push these sides to get to a resolution under the constitution? And if in fact we are going to have a responsible withdrawal, 

don’t you think that getting that Article 140 process done is almost 

a precondition for us to be able to remove troops and make sure 

that these ethnic issues are taken care of? And why is 140 stalled 

and what are we doing to move it in the right direction? 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

I still believe that Arab-Kurd tensions is the number one driver 

of instability inside of Iraq. I mentioned it. I might not have said 

it was number one, but I did mention it. And this is long-standing 

problems over land and resources and the distribution of those in 

these key areas that have been going on for hundreds of years inside of Iraq between the Kurds and the Arab population. 

The Article 140 process back in December 2007, actually did not 

get finished by December of ’07, which was the date in the Iraqi 

constitution it was supposed to be finished. And when that happened, what happened was we formed a United Nations (U.N.)— 

the U.N. took over trying to renegotiate and get the sides together. 

So we have a U.N. commission now that is working very hard between the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government to try to come to some agreement with these very difficult 

issues regarding disputed areas in terms of boundaries as well as 

a sharing of hydrocarbon and resources. 

So what we are doing is we are fully in support of that effort. 

We support the U.N. We engage with both the Government of Iraq 

and the KRG on these issues to make sure they continue to participate in this process, and this process ultimately will follow hopefully and cause the implementation of the 140, Article 140, and the 

resolution of these issues. 

In addition, we are attempting to work with the Government of 

Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government to reduce tensions in 

the areas. Over the last year or so, on several cases, it is the U.S. 

forces who have helped to reduce tensions between these groups. 

We now have them in discussion, and they are trying to come up 

with some sort of an architecture, security architecture, that will 

reduce tensions between the Arabs and Kurds. So we will be at 

such a level that everybody understands that they will solve this 

problem through the political processes of the U.N. 

This is something that Iraq has to solve. This is an Iraq problem 

that the Iraqis have to solve. We have to be engaged at all levels, 

and we will continue to be engaged at all levels. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Franks. 
20 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and General 

Odierno. Thank you for being here, Mr. Secretary. 

You know, General, I remember not so long ago flying across 

Iraq in pitch darkness in a Blackhawk helicopter just about 150 

feet off the ground, and my memory is very clear that I was much 

more disconcerted about that than you were. 

I just appreciate what a great soldier of freedom you are. I am 

convinced when that day comes and we do get out of Dodge, that 

those streets of Dodge will be much safer because you passed that 

way. 

No one knows the future. No one knows what will happen in 

Iraq. I suppose there are two people who try to predict the future, 

those who don’t know and those who don’t know they don’t know. 

But, that said, I think you have given Iraq a chance to live in 

freedom, and you may have brought a beachhead of freedom to the 

Middle East that potentially could help the whole of humanity turn 

in a better direction. And whatever happens beyond that, I certainly salute you for your noble and gallant service. 

I suppose my first question is to some degree along Chairman 

Skelton’s question, but it has to do with power vacuums. I know 

it has been said that U.S. presence, if it disappears, that there will 

be a power vacuum that could occur. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad himself has been quoted saying, ‘‘The political power of the occupiers 

is collapsing rapidly. Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the 

region. Of course, we are prepared to fill the gap with the help of 

our neighbors and the regional friends like Saudi Arabia and with 

the help of the Iraqi nation.’’ 

Now, I know that Iran has been implicated very clearly in making the explosively formed penetrators that are one of the great 

dangers to our troops there. So I guess, taking into account the potential regional influence Iran may have, how close a relationship 

do you envision Iraq and Iran to have in the future, and how great 

a concern should that be when we are discussing the amount and 

type of U.S. forces that should remain in Iraq for ongoing stability? 

General ODIERNO. First, I think we must always realize that 

Iran and Iraq are neighbors and they are going to have a relationship. The one thing, though, over time that I have learned spending in Iraq is the Iraqis are nationalists. They really don’t want 

anyone interfering in their internal politics. They want Iraq to be 

for Iraq. And I think it is important to remember that as we move 

forward. 

Again, I think the important part is about the key term that the 

President used in his strategy and the strategy we are doing is ‘‘responsible drawdown.’’ And that is why it is so important to do it 

slowly, deliberately, so we are able to draw down in such a way 

where the Iraqi Security Forces continue to grow, all the other civil 

capacity builders continue to grow, and that allows Iraq to stand 

up as a country who can resist some of these outside forces who 

might attempt to have undue influence. That is also why it is so 

important for us to have a long-term relationship with Iraq. 

So I think those are the keys as we move forward. 

Mr. FRANKS. I suppose, you know, again, it is the obvious followup. You said in the close of your testimony that, ‘‘We must leave 
21 

Iraq with the security force capable of defending the Iraqi people 

and protecting the Government of Iraq institutions.’’ 

Obviously, that is the long-term goal that we all want, very, very 

cogent remarks. What in the final analysis is your biggest concern 

with achieving this goal? What can we do to make sure that happens? What can the Congress do? I think you have carried Congress on your back this whole time. So I just want to make sure 

you can give us some perspective. 

General ODIERNO. I would just say is that it is about strategic 

patience, and even after we leave in 2011, we can’t just say, okay, 

Iraq is finished. We are going to need some additional support between now and 2011 to help build some of the capacities. We will 

identify what we need to you. 

We will also need to continue to support them in some way beyond 2011, not by having troops in Iraq but by helping them to 

continue to develop their institutions, and we can have an influence on that. 

So we have to make sure that we allow them to do that, and we 

keep that in mind as we move forward. Ultimately, I believe that 

will contribute to our own security and stability in the region. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, General. My time is gone, but I 

thank you again for your commitment to human freedom. My two 

little babies I think will live in a brighter place in life because of 

people like you, and I appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General, Mr. Secretary, for being here and for your 

outstanding work. I know, General, you certainly are being credited 

for helping to turn this situation around, and we appreciate that. 

I wanted to ask you, the Wall Street Journal reported yesterday 

that the Iraqis are having difficulty with their budget crunch and 

oil prices decreasing and purchasing equipment that they had already requested from the U.S. Government, and there are a number of issues combined with that. How difficult and how high a priority is it for us to get this straight, and are there policies that we 

in fact should be looking at right now that would allow them to 

purchase more of those in advance? 

General ODIERNO. I think it is very important. We have been 

working this for quite some time. 

First, the Iraqi budget, I know because of the price of oil, their 

budget has decreased quite significantly. Their combined Ministry 

of Defense–Ministry of the Interior (MOD–MOI) budget is about 

$10 billion a year. About 85 percent of that is fixed, non-discretionary, and it has to do mainly with salaries and other things. So 

that leaves a very small piece left to invest in modernization. They 

have already purchased several things such as patrol boats and 

many other Army and some Air Force equipment that they have 

to still pay for. So almost all of their even discretionary income is 

taken up. 

So what I want to be able to do is assist them in some small 

ways by using stay-behind equipment, potentially leaving for them, 

as well as improving their ability to not have to pay all costs up 
22 

front for foreign military sales (FMS), where they can spread it 

over a longer time period. 

Mrs. DAVIS. As I understand it, they don’t meet a number of the 

criteria that we have. 

General ODIERNO. That is exactly right. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) bank has to certify them. And, of course, they are 

trying to get through that certification by having enough reserves 

so they get certified. So it is a very complex problem, and we have 

things competing against each other. So we are trying to come up 

with many different ways to help them to get the equipment we 

think is necessary for them to have a foundational capability by 

2011. 

Part of that might be is we might have to—what we believe is 

there is, in fiscal year ’10 and ’11, we think we have a requirement 

of about $3.5 billion that we need to help them in order to finish 

getting the foundational capacity that they need in order to be able 

to have security by 2011. Then we will have to continue some sort 

of a foreign military financing (FMF) program through the State 

Department after 2011. If we are able to do that, that will allow 

them to slowly build up and have the security capability necessary 

to protect themselves. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

One of the things that must be frustrating is that violence does 

continue to flare from time to time. I noticed that one of the highranking Iraqi Army generals was recently killed as well. I guess 

that was reported yesterday. 

What effect does that have in terms of the government, the 

army? Or have we gotten so numb to that now in a sense that it 

doesn’t have the kind of impact? 

General ODIERNO. I think for the Iraqis—first of all, it was a brigade commander that was killed yesterday up in Mosul. No, it does 

have an impact. The Iraqi Security Forces, like our forces, understand what their duty is and what their mission is, and they are 

very dedicated to providing security to their people. And I have 

seen many acts of bravery by Iraqi leaders and their soldiers, and 

in a lot of ways they are no different from our soldiers when it 

comes to that. 

So they see that as their mission, and they are trying to root out 

these last remnants of al Qaeda and other insurgents in some of 

these very difficult areas. 

The sad part, Congresswoman, is that we continue to see these 

attacks against innocent civilians. They absolutely mean nothing to 

the outcome, and all it does is kill innocent people. It is frustrating 

to us, and it is frustrating to the Iraqis. That is what we are trying 

to stop inside of Iraq now, these mass bombings that occur. Although much less frequently than before, they still occur and kill 

many innocent people. Those are the kinds of incidents we are trying to stop. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Are our civilians able to move freely, go down and 

have a cup of tea, to engage in an informal fashion yet at this 

point? 

General ODIERNO. They can, in order to meet with Iraqi officials. 

I would say you can, but it is still a little bit difficult to move freely. They are targets, is part of the problem. 
23 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you for being here this morning, and Secretary 

Vickers, thank you. I will have a question in a second. 

General, the hash marks on your right sleeve I think indicate deployments away from family and the comforts of this country. I 

can’t count them from here. But as a representative of all the men 

and women sitting behind you who have earned those stripes and, 

more importantly, their families who endured during those deployments, thank you very much. We sincerely appreciate your great 

service to this country. Please pass that on from us to the folks 

who you lead. I know you are very proud to lead them. 

Following up a little bit on what Susan just asked, the Department of Defense has asked for $750 million of legislative authority 

to give equipment to the Iraqis. Much of that will be excess equipment that it might be cheaper to leave it than bring it home. And 

this may be a better question for the Secretary. Much of it is going 

to be non-excess equipment, equipment that we may need or do 

need, judge that we need in other places. How do we reimburse the 

services that give that equipment up? How do they replace it? Is 

that going to be a supplemental? Where do we find the money to 

replace that equipment that otherwise would be needed for some 

of the other forces? 

General ODIERNO. I will let the Secretary answer that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. He has been very quiet all morning. 

General ODIERNO. I will say just one thing. We divide it into several groups. There is excess equipment that is truly excess to all 

of our requirements, so that is not required. But there is some 

equipment that might not be completely excess but what we have 

determined is it actually costs us more money to send it back than 

it would to leave it there. So that is the decision process we go 

through on this equipment. 

Now, in terms of the authority and reimbursing, I leave that to 

the Secretary. 

Mr. VICKERS. Our J–4, our logistics director to the Joint Staff, is 

leading a process right now looking at this issue with the services 

about, as General Odierno said, what amount of the inventory is 

excess that we could leave in Iraq, what costs too much to bring 

back, how we reimburse the services, but also what we would ship 

elsewhere, for example, for other needs, and that process is still 

under way. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Sure. I understand that. But how do we get the 

services reimbursed for that equipment that is considered non-essential? I have great confidence in your ability to decide which is 

which and to figure out it costs more to ship it home. But how do 

repay? Is it going to be a supplemental, an additional budget request? Where are you guys coming up for the money for the services? Out of hide, or what are you going to do? 

Mr. VICKERS. I think that is being worked in the 2011 budget 

process, sir, is my understanding; and it will be resolved before 

then. But I am sorry I don’t have a better answer for you right 

now. 
24 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay, if you don’t mind getting back with us on 

the record on that. 

Mr. VICKERS. I will, sir. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. CONAWAY. General, as you have lived with the Strategic 

Framework and the Status of Forces Agreement for several months 

now, are there anything about those agreements that need be to 

adjusted or tweaked that you need help with from a legislative 

standpoint in terms of filling out the rest of these two or three 

years we are involved that would make it easier or better, from 

your perspective? 

General ODIERNO. Well, I think I will be honest with you. I have 

been pleased. Frankly, it has turned out better than I probably 

originally thought it would as we walked into this. But I think— 

and it is because, again, I go back to the relationships. The relationship we will have built with the Government of Iraq has allowed us to execute this agreement in a very fair, appropriate manner. 

I think we have the authorities we need inside of the Security 

Agreement to execute what we need to do. It also, importantly, 

puts the Iraqis out front. Although we are still conducting combat 

operations, we do everything through the Iraqis. I think that is 

where we want to be today, because we want to slowly give them 

more and more responsibility. So I feel comfortable so far with the 

agreement as it is written. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. One last question as it relates to the 

risks that the elections won’t come off in January. Other than them 

not being put into the form of election laws, what other risk do you 

see that those elections won’t come off appropriately? 

General ODIERNO. As I look at it today, if we get the election law 

passed, I believe unless there is some unforeseen event that would 

happen—and I have trouble getting my arms around what that 

might be—I really believe the elections will occur on time, unless 

there is something that caused a large amount of sectarian violence 

to break out between now and the election. But I just don’t see it, 

because the Iraqi people don’t want to go there. They are tired of 

that, and they want to move forward. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Again, General, thank you for your long service, 

and please convey to the folks you lead how much we appreciate 

it, but especially their families, because I think a lot of times the 

families don’t get bragged on enough, what they do to allow you 

and your team to do what it does. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

General, welcome, and, Mr. Secretary, welcome to you, too. 

Thank you both for your service and, General, particularly your 

great leadership of our forces in Iraq. I hope you also pass on our 

deep appreciation for all of those that you lead who wear the Nation’s uniform of how grateful we are for their sacrifice and their 

service. 
25 

General, when you and I had the opportunity to meet when I was 

there to visit in Iraq over the Memorial Day recess, it was just 

prior to the beginning of the drawdown of troops; and the particular area that you still had concern about was in Mosul in particular, the presence there still of al Qaeda in Iraq. Can you give 

me an update on the current situation there, the strength of insurgent forces there, and what you have seen as we have started to 

withdraw? 

Also, on a broader sense, as we get closer to 2011 and once we 

have completed withdrawal of all of our forces, can you give us an 

assessment of what the intelligence sources suggest, what does 

your personal assessment conclude, is the strength of those that 

might be waiting for us to leave and their ability to carry out attacks to undo everything that we have achieved to this point? 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Congressman. 

First, with Mosul, Mosul continues to be probably the most difficult area. Nineveh Province, Mosul is part of Nineveh Province, 

is probably still the most difficult area. However, we are still making progress. Incidents have come down a little bit. 

What we have been able to do is, with the Iraqi Security Forces 

taking responsibility inside of the cities, that has allowed us to 

move outside in the belts around Mosul and also move towards the 

border with Syria, which has made it much more difficult for foreign fighters and other groups to transit. So I think, because of 

that, we are starting to see a reduction in some of the capacity up 

there. 

But the current concern goes back to their attempt to exploit 

some of the political fissures, Arab-Kurd tensions being one of 

them, in Nineveh Province, where you have some of the groups 

such as al Qaeda trying to ignite some sort of conflict between 

Arabs and Kurds and potentially some Shi’a minority groups and 

Kurdish minority groups. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Is al Qaeda still the main problem? 

General ODIERNO. It is. Again, its capabilities are degraded, but 

they are still a bit resilient, and they are still able to conduct operations. We have been able to cut into their finance network a bit, 

but they are like a Mafia organization. They extort money from 

many small businesses in order to fund their operations. We realize 

that, and we are going after that, working with the Iraqis. We believe if we can really go after their funding it will significantly 

limit what they can do. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. On the broader question of those who would be 

waiting for us to leave and the assessment of their strengths and 

ability? 

General ODIERNO. Yes. I think the important part is if we can 

get the Iraqi Security Forces, as I stated earlier, to a level, they 

are on the right track. If we continue to progress over the next twoand-a-half years, if we continue to fund some of the things they 

need, I believe that they will be ready and they will be able to handle the groups that are remaining. 

The development of the Iraqi special operations forces and their 

ability to do counterterrorism operations improves every day. The 

improvement of the conventional forces to do counterinsurgency operations is getting better. Police primacy is probably the one area 
26 

that will probably need continued support following 2011. I think 

we will have police primacy in many parts of Iraq but not in all 

parts. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. On the advise and assist brigades that you developed, can you can give a little more clarity of each of the troop levels for the advise and assist brigades? I know it is 35,000 overall, 

but give us just a breakdown on that. 

Again, I understand that the role of those will be to continue to 

train and equip and support the Iraqi Security Forces. What specifically would the advise and assist brigades accomplish that is not 

being done already today? 

General ODIERNO. First of all, what we have done is we used to 

have—there is about 4,000 people in the advise and assist brigades. 

What they do, what they will be able to do they have not done before is we used to have external advisory teams that we took from 

all over, the Army and Marine Corps mainly, and put them into 

Iraq and they were independent entities. What we have now done 

is we have embedded all of these inside of these brigades so it gives 

us unity of command and unity of effort. These brigades control all 

of this training and assist. They will be able to develop at all levels. 

So it will be much more organized, controlled, and I believe we will 

get better results from it. 

In addition, they will be able to continue to provide security for 

the provincial reconstruction teams and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and U.N. individuals who want to still work in 

building Iraqi civil capacity. So that will be what they do. And also 

always provide protection for our force. But that will be what they 

do. 

So what we have done is we have better organized them to do 

that mission. We do some of that today, but really we are organized 

more for combat operations and not for training and assistance. So 

what we have done is we still have the ability to defend ourselves, 

but they are better organized to do this type of mission. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR [presiding]. Mr. Coffman for five minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Odierno, I was in Iraq in 2005–2006 with the United 

States Marine Corps working with Sunni Arabs in a civil affairs capacity. And one thing I noticed from the population is that they repeatedly expressed a concern to me that the army—that the Iraqi 

Army at that time working in the area was predominantly Shi’a, 

with very few Sunnis in the Iraqi Army, and they really saw that 

as an occupation force and not as a force of their own. Is there better integration in the military today? 

General ODIERNO. The army and the police force itself is representative of the population, so I believe there has been more done 

to integrate both Sunni and Shi’a. You don’t hear that much anymore. 

The Sons of Iraq and integrating some of them in the security 

forces, out in Anbar specifically, which we did in 2007 has helped 

specifically out in Anbar and some of the other areas. But we have 

Sunni leaders, we have Shi’a leaders, we have Kurd leaders. So I 

think the army for the most part reflects a good cross-section. 
27 

I still think some Iraqis will tell you they are concerned that 

leaders have not yet been, by constitution, approved by the Council 

of Representatives and are solely selected by the Prime Minister, 

so we have to work our way through that. I think that is one issue 

that continues to raise its head as we continue to move forward, 

and we continue to work that with them. It is about the Council 

of Representatives enforcing their will based on the constitution. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, General. 

Another question, when we look at the insurgency today—again, 

when I was there in 2005–2006, the foreign fighters were a large 

part of the insurgency at that time and certainly were al Qaedalinked. How would you describe the insurgency inside of Iraq 

today? 

General ODIERNO. It is much different than it was. 

First, the numbers and size of it is significantly less than it was. 

Foreign fighters are coming in at a rate of 90 percent less than 

what it was back then. There is very few that come across every 

month, and once they get into the country, they have difficulty maneuvering. But there are still some that are coming in. 

We are seeing a smaller and smaller group, and, in some cases, 

I would argue it is moving more to criminality than it is an insurgency. But it is hard sometimes to determine the difference, whether it is criminal activity or insurgent activity. But some of those 

have combined. 

Because of the many insurgents either reconciling, coming back 

to the Government of Iraq, or over time have been killed or captured, many criminals are now being used in order to attempt to 

try to conduct some of these activities. So it is a different understanding of those elements. 

Overall, I would just continue to emphasize that the security 

around most of the country is fairly normal. In only a few places 

do we have serious incidents, and in many instances life has really 

returned to normal inside of Iraq. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General, how do you see the combat service support elements of the Iraqi military today? Are they still largely dependent on the United States, or are they increasingly independent? 

General ODIERNO. They are better, but they are still not where 

they need to be to be completely independent. They still need our 

support. 

Part of the area that is hurting the Iraqi Security Force combat 

service support (CSS) is that they put a freeze on hiring based on 

their budget constraints; and in ’09, ’10, and ’11 is when they are 

supposed to really build the CSS. And if they continue to have this 

freeze they won’t have the individuals to fill the positions. That is 

part of the problem. We are working with them now to ensure that 

happens. 

But, overall, we have seen improvement, but it is not yet where 

we believe they can be completely independent of providing their 

CSS. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General, how much is corruption a factor today? 

Obviously, in 2005–2006, it was a significant factor in the Iraqi 

Government. How would you evaluate it today? 
28 

General ODIERNO. Corruption is still problematic. It is still endemic inside of Iraqi society and in the ministries. However, we are 

starting to see—I know specifically in the Ministry of Interior and 

Ministry of Defense, they are taking specific steps in order to 

counter corruption. We have seen the arrest of two ministers involved in corruption. We have seen the firing of some generals involved in corruption. So they are starting to understand the importance of government officials being accountable for their actions 

and the fact that corruption will not be accepted. 

I still think we will have years in order for them to solve this 

problem, but they are beginning to move on the right path. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, General. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Courtney for five minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you General and Secretary for being with us today. 

I was with Mr. Lynch in July, as you may recall, visiting. You 

had pretty much just passed at least the 40-month mark, at least, 

when we were visiting you. I think when they write the history 

books of this whole conflict your service is going to just stand out 

in terms of your dogged persistence. And I think, again, the fact 

that there are so many empty seats in this room is the ultimate 

statement on how successful you have been. Two years ago, this 

topic, you couldn’t move in a committee hearing room, and, again, 

I think that by itself says a lot. 

One of the other things that, two years ago, when General 

Petraeus testified, he was joined by Ambassador Crocker to sort of 

report in from Iraq, and, obviously, some things have changed. The 

Green Zone has now been disbursed in terms of the new U.S. Embassy, and you are in a new physical location. As Congresswoman 

Sanchez indicated, the political challenges facing Iraq are still as 

much a part of the end game here as it was two years ago. How 

is the relationship between your office and the ambassador? How 

often do you interact, and what efforts are still being made by us 

to keep moving forward on the political end? 

General ODIERNO. Thank you so much for the question. 

First of all, we interact every single day. We probably meet personally three or four times a week. I have an office in the Embassy 

that I man. But I also have about 300 people within MNF—I that 

are actually in the Embassy that are in support of economic, police, 

training, and other agencies, planning, that are there every single 

day working with the Embassy. So we are completely integrated at 

every level. We continue to be completely integrated. 

We are updating this joint campaign plan, which is a joint plan 

between Ambassador Hill and myself. We are working this very 

hard, very closely together. It is very important, because it really 

is going to set what the deliverables are as we transition to civilian 

capacity building once the military completes civilian capacity 

building. 

The way I put it to all of my people is, in 2003, we had a chance 

to do this. We didn’t do it quite right. We have a chance now. We 

have got to make sure we have the planning and the deliverables 

necessary to make sure this works as we reduce our presence. We 

are hand in hand doing a joint process with the Embassy, and I 

feel very comfortable with this. 
29 

So I believe we have a real good system in place. Every meeting 

that I hold, we have a member of the Embassy at the meeting. So 

our relationship is good. Ambassador Hill and I work very closely 

together on a daily basis. As I tell him, the only thing Ambassador 

Hill and I disagree with every day is that he is a Red Sox fan and 

I am a Yankees fan. So, besides that, we do pretty well. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, I have to side with the State Department 

on that issue. 

Just to follow up on Congressman Conaway’s question about 

SOFA, there was a lot of time spent in terms of trying to balance 

the jurisdictional issues in terms of if there was disputes and how 

to resolve disputes. And I think, again, you were talking in July 

when we were over there about the fact that it was still kind of 

new to people, but we were trying to get it done at the street level 

rather than have it go up above. Do you find that you have to kind 

of referee or at least the systems requires refereeing? 

General ODIERNO. I think we are all honest brokers, is how I put 

it, in some of these issues. Sometimes we become the honest 

broker. They know we will work for both sides trying to come up 

with the right solution. Those times are coming less and less, but 

we still are, on many issues, the honest broker. So what we try to 

do is play a role that allows the Iraqis to solve it, with us facilitating the process for them to solve these problems. 

That is a change in mindset that we have to have. It is not that 

we have less leverage. It is that our leverage is different today 

than what it was, and it needs to be different because of the security agreement, because we recognize their sovereignty. We want 

them to build the capacity to solve these problems themselves. So 

it is our responsibility to make sure we help them to solve those 

problems themselves in any way we can. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And, real quick, you mentioned that the CERP 

money, a substantial amount of money was returned. I mean, why 

is that happening? It is just the need isn’t there? Were we overbudgeted? 

General ODIERNO. A couple of things. First, some of the money 

was actually used to pay the Sons of Iraq, and that was the first 

$240 million we returned. The Iraqis took over the payments of the 

Sons of Iraq. Since that is why we said we needed this, we turned 

it over. 

The other thing is we also had $270 million of Iraqi CERP money 

that they gave us. So we used their money before using our money. 

So both of those combinations allowed us to turn back some money. 

The other thing is, obviously, now we are very careful that we 

will not do projects that we know we cannot track and make sure 

they are successfully completed. So sometimes we don’t have the 

capacity to ensure that these projects are done and done properly 

and they are finished properly. So I think that all of those contributed to us turning the money back in. 

But I do want to emphasize it is still a very important program. 

We still need some CERP money in the next few years to do this. 

But it will be a request that is, obviously, less than it was in the 

past. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Shuster for five minutes. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
30 

And, General, thank you for being here today. I appreciate your 

service. I just want to echo what my colleague from Connecticut 

said. When they write the story about Iraq, your name will be 

prominent in that story. Because in my several trips over there, I 

can’t remember a time when I haven’t met with you in Iraq. This 

is the first time I think I have seen you out of Iraq in the last several years. So, again, I appreciate that service. 

Secretary Vickers, I am glad that you are still over at the Defense Department, especially with what is going on in Afghanistan. 

We know you are an old hand at Afghanistan. So thanks for being 

here today. 

General, you said to us in my last trip there in June that November, December, January and February will be the key months—two 

months before the election, two months after the election—as to 

whether we will be able to continue the drawdown. 

I think you mentioned here today that you don’t foresee that 

happening, but violence will be—that will be one of those things 

that we look at. Is that the only thing, a spike in violence, that 

could possibly cause you to say to the President, let’s slow down or 

stop the drawdown, a spike in violence? 

General ODIERNO. Again, I think unless we had some sort of not 

only violence but if we saw a collapse for some reason in the government itself, which I don’t foresee. But it is what we look at, is 

what are those potential points of instability that could cause us 

to have concern about the seating of the government and the successful seating of this government and will they be able to continue 

peacefully as they move forward. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The last election, as I recall, it took months before 

they were every able to form a coalition. Would that be something, 

if they haven’t formed a government in February? 

General ODIERNO. I think what we would have to decide is if we 

think it will not happen peacefully, and I think I will know that 

by the first 60 days following the elections. So even if they are having trouble forming coalitions, as long as they are doing it peacefully, I think we can continue. We will still have 50,000 people. 

That is still quite a bit of individuals, that we can still have some 

impact if we need to. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. 

The next question, we talked about the loss of oil revenue. How 

diversified is the Iraqi economy and what have we been doing or 

what have they been doing to diversify it? 

General ODIERNO. It is not diversified. About 90 percent of their 

revenue comes out of the oil industry right now. 

One of the things they are doing, in October, there will be an investment conference held here—I think it is the 20th and 21st— 

where we will have many of the Iraqi leadership coming over to 

meet with U.S. businessmen. They have done the same thing in 

London already. These are the kinds of things we have to do to attempt to diversify the economy. 

They still have some work to do in investment laws that they 

have to pass. They are working those now, and I am hopeful that 

maybe before the October meeting they will have passed one of 

these investment laws. There is some indication they might be able 

to do that, but we will have to wait and see. 
31 

So it is important that they start to develop an atmosphere 

where businesses—there is lots of opportunity in Iraq for investment, but it is about does it have the environment for investors to 

go in. That is what we have to continue to help them to focus on. 

I think I also believe getting a new government in will help. I 

think you will see the Iraqi Government continue to mature. I 

think the next government will be more mature than the last government. They will understand the process more, they will understand their roles, and I think that will help them to also work some 

of these key issues that have to be worked in order to diversify the 

economy. 

Mr. SHUSTER. When you are in the economy diversifying it, education has got to play a key role, as well as building a representative democracy. What has been happening as far the education? 

Have you been building that up? 

General ODIERNO. First of all, a week ago, they reported that 6.6 

million children will go to school in Iraq. Their school year will 

start here at the end of September, the beginning of October. That 

is the highest number that they have had in a very, very long time, 

in fact, maybe the highest number on record. I know the highest 

number since 2003, and I think it is actually the highest number 

even before that. So that is a positive sign, that they will have 6.6 

million children that will go to school. 

Their universities are now developing relationships with U.S. 

universities. We know that some of the land grant universities 

around the U.S. have visited and are conducting regular engagements with them and exchanges. 

The Government of Iraq also approved $4.5 million in grants for 

Iraqi students, Fulbright scholarships for Iraqi students to study 

around the world, mostly in the United States and Western Europe. So I think these are all positive steps that are starting to be 

taken that will allow them to continue to educate their population. 

The Iraqis have always been a fairly educated population, but 

there has been some problem with that based on what has happened here in the aftermath of 2003. But we see that starting to 

regenerate itself, and we are encouraged, but there is still quite a 

bit of work to do. 

In the Strategic Framework Agreement, this is one of the strong 

parts of this agreement, is the education piece. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General. 

General, I just have two questions. One is just a tactical issue. 

You have mentioned that we have withdrawn 150,000 pieces of 

equipment already from Iraq. GAO says there is 31 million pieces 

of equipment in Iraq. Do you really believe that we can be totally 

out of there by the end of 2011, in view of that number and all the 

other numbers attendant to that? And do you plan per the Army 

requirements to close up the bases even with the environmental requirements? 

As you know, in Korea, they have been closing them up, but they 

put a stop to them because they haven’t followed the correct procedures, nor have we funded for it. 
32 

Are you planning to help expedite this to turn over more of those 

pieces of equipment? Because is a large difference between 150,000 

and 31 million. 

General ODIERNO. First, Congressman, if I could, I believe it is 

3.1 million is the number we have, 3.1 million pieces of equipment. 

Still, 150,000 is a small piece of 3.1 million as well. 

First off, I do believe we can get that equipment out by then. 

When we say 3.1 million, of course, that goes from the smallest 

piece of equipment up to a tank. So there are several different 

kinds. 

As we close our bases, we have a very sophisticated process that 

we go through that includes environmental assessment based on a 

security arrangement which we signed with the Government of 

Iraq which addresses this issue; and they have to go through very 

specific points in order to determine this. So I feel confident we are 

following what we agreed to in the security agreement with the 

Government of Iraq on how we turn over these bases. 

In some cases, it takes nine to ten months to do this. So the important part is we are able to identify this ahead of time in order 

to have the time to do the things necessary. 

In addition, many of these bases will actually be turned over— 

they won’t be closed. They will be turned over to the Government 

of Iraq, especially the big bases. 

Mr. SESTAK. You do this in a non-permissive environment? That 

is the plan? 

General ODIERNO. We have closed 200 bases so far. So we have 

already done it, in some cases, in a non-permissive environment. 

Mr. SESTAK. My second question is, Iran consistently comes 

through this committee and almost any security briefing in the 

general area of southwest Asia or the Middle East, whether it is 

Afghanistan or tomorrow’s hearing on ballistic missile defense 

(BMD). And you spoke a lot of Iran, but over the last couple of 

years, I was struck by several comments that had been made. 

One was by the intelligence agency when they sat before the 

committee and said, if we are not there bleeding, Iran will work for 

stability in Iraq. 

The second one was made by General Eikenberry as he departed 

Afghanistan as a General. And when asked if Iran works towards 

our same objectives in Afghanistan, as we do, he replied, yes, they 

do. They want stability there, and they don’t like al Qaeda because 

they are Sunni. 

The third one was the national intelligence estimate (NIE) that 

came out about 2007, and in testimony here the intelligence community again testified that, with regard to foreign policy and security decisions, Iran takes a cost-benefit approach, rather than a 

headlong rush to a decision irregardless of cost or benefits to its 

diplomatic, political, and other goals. 

You have worked—and you can’t miss it, particularly in this 

job—and you have brought up Iran a number of times. What perspective can you provide us? 

Because Iran will continue to be brought up in almost any security briefing, and you can provide us, rather than ‘‘they cause mischief.’’ Got it. North Vietnam caused mischief. But what can you 

take away to give us of how to deal with this nation, in view of 
33 

those three statements that say, you know, maybe this nation overall, much like other nations we have had to deal with, has similar 

goals but comes about it from a different way? 

General ODIERNO. I would just say, first, if we weren’t there to 

bleed that they wouldn’t conduct attacks, it is hard to say. What 

I would tell you is I know right now that on a daily basis they conduct attacks against Iraqi Security Forces with no U.S. forces 

around. So I am not sure that quite tracks with that statement. 

But what I would say is, again, I think Iran needs to have a relationship with Iraq, but it has to be the right kind of relationship, 

defining what is best for Iraq, what is best for Iran. I think they 

should have free trade. I think they should have a relationship that 

helps with religious activities, et cetera. 

But, again, I think they have objectives that aren’t clear to us. 

Iraq is important to them because of the potential Sunni-Shi’a 

issues that are in the Middle East, and Iraq falls in the middle of 

that. So I think there are other reasons why they want to be in 

Iraq besides just having normal relationships. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. SESTAK. So could the Secretary just answer, if you don’t 

mind? The Secretary is just going to make a comment, sir. 

Mr. VICKERS. Just one comment on Afghanistan. Their meddling 

there is somewhat less than they have done in Iraq, but they do 

support Sunni groups. Strange alliances, but they do, in fact. 

The CHAIRMAN. I didn’t catch that, so thank you very much. 

Mr. Hunter, please? 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, Mr. Vickers, I know you through reputation. Just thanks 

for your work as the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) when it 

comes to counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) and 

the doctrine that is being reinvented right now for Afghanistan. 

And, General, you have been praised eloquently here. I will just 

back that up by saying thanks for letting us walk up to the men 

and women who have served in Iraq and say thanks for winning 

this. I think that is important. 

The first question is, if you could both put your heads together 

and say—I think we have been through two-and-a-half, maybe 

three generals—McKiernan, McNeil, and now McChrystal in Afghanistan—during the time that you have been in charge of Iraq, 

what lessons learned would you like to see brought over to Afghanistan from Iraq that you haven’t seen? 

General ODIERNO. Well, I would just say, first, I have been—as 

you said, I have spent a large majority of the last several years in 

Iraq, so I don’t pretend to understand the environment in Afghanistan in order to understand what could be applicable inside of Afghanistan versus Iraq. 

One of the lessons I learned is you have got to understand the 

environment, and you have to understand what are the social, economic, political, military issues that underpin the reason why violence is occurring. 

So, the one thing—and from what I have seen, General 

McChrystal is doing exactly this. He is outlining what are the underlying factors that are causing the instability inside of Afghani-
34 

stan, and you have to take a whole government approach to solve 

those problems. 

So I can’t tell you specific because I don’t understand the environment enough in Afghanistan. But I can tell you that, from everything I have read, that he understands that completely and understands the fact that it is a complete approach that has to be 

taken to solve the problem there, just like we needed to do that in 

order to solve the problem in Iraq and will continue to need to do 

that until we leave at the end of 2011. 

Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask a quick follow-up before Mr. Vickers answers that. 

Do you think you would have seen the success in Iraq that you 

have seen now if you did not have the surge? 

General ODIERNO. Well, again, I would say, obviously, the surge 

of forces in Iraq helped us to create the security environment that 

we have now, along with many others things. 

The one thing I tell everyone with the surge in Iraq, it was just 

not about the surge of forces. It was about the change in our tactics, procedures, the techniques, and procedures. It was about a 

surge of the State Department people as well in order to create embedded provincial reconstruction teams with the brigades. It was 

about an outreach program to the Sunni insurgents that allowed 

them to begin to reconcile and form the Sons of Iraq. It was about 

understanding what was causing the underlying impacts and that 

we tried to go after these using a combination of CERP, military 

capacity, and others. So that is what I learned in terms of the 

surge. 

Mr. HUNTER. So a lot of things happened, but you wouldn’t have 

been able to do it without that increased security to allow all of 

those things to take place. 

General ODIERNO. Well, again, the surge of forces clearly had an 

impact on our ability to improve the security inside of Iraq. 

Mr. HUNTER. Got you. Thank you. 

Mr. Vickers, first question: Lessons learned, without being critical of anything that is going on, possibly lessons learned. I know 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are different in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, different people, different kind of violence, different 

area. The actual terrain is different. But if you could take something from Iraq and put it in Afghanistan, maybe systems of lessons learned, the ways that we did things there that we are not 

doing in Afghanistan, what would that be? 

Mr. VICKERS. Well, first, the difference is the insurgency is more 

rural-based. It is less based on ethno-sectarian conflict in Afghanistan. It is more a Pashtun-based insurgency in the south and the 

east. And then there is the critical importance of the sanctuary 

that Afghan insurgent groups enjoy in Pakistan. They also receive 

more funding from external sources than I believe Iraqi insurgents 

did, getting more internally. 

That said, there are common principles in good counterinsurgency that can be transported; and I think General McChrystal is 

doing some of that now. The focus on protecting the population is 

a core mission for forces, and the integration of all elements of 

power, the whole of government approach, as General Odierno 

talked about. But also things like counterterrorism and counter-
35 

narcotics to make sure they support our overall COIN effort, as 

was done very, very well in Iraq. 

Mr. VICKERS. As you know, we have a major review going on 

right now at the White House of our Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, and so that is probably about as much as I would like to say 

now. 

Mr. HUNTER. I am out of time. Thank you both for your service. 

And thanks for winning once again, General. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

We have Dr. Snyder, Mr. Taylor and Ms. Giffords in that order. 

Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

I was unable to be here earlier, General Odierno, and you may 

have answered some of these questions, but in your written statement on page seven, you talk about nonlethal operations, a force 

multiplier, and in specific you talk about CERP and the Information Operations. There is very little mention of the provincial reconstruction teams. Have they not been as much a force multiplier 

as you have desired, or do you not consider them in that category? 

Is there a reason why you did not discuss them more? 

General ODIERNO. No. I did because it is the House Armed Services Committee, but they are absolutely critical to what we do. The 

provincial reconstruction teams, as I just stated earlier, were a key 

piece in the surge of allowing us to get out and reach and build 

civil capacity, and it continues to be very important. 

Dr. SNYDER. How is that working as you have transitioned? You 

mentioned the number of bases that you have closed, and PRTs can 

only operate in a secure environment. Have they had to pull back, 

or are they using Iraqi forces to provide security? 

General ODIERNO. Well, the plan we have, we have 27 locations. 

Some are satellite locations now. We provide the security for them 

in all those areas. When we plan our drawdown, one of the considerations we take into place is the breach of the provincial reconstruction teams, and we have coordinated with the State Department how we will do this. So they will be able to maintain a fairly 

significant number, 16 is the number we are looking at, throughout 

the country and will be able to continue. One of the main missions 

of the advisory and assistance will be to provide security for the 

provincial reconstruction teams to make sure that they have the 

access necessary. 

Dr. SNYDER. You don’t foresee that that will be—at some point 

the PRTs will have Iraqi troop security—only Iraqi troops for security? 

General ODIERNO. I think we will slowly turn that over to them 

so when we get to post-2011, that they would be able to do that. 

That will be part of the process. 

Dr. SNYDER. As you had mentioned earlier in discussion, I think, 

from Mr. Shuster about economic investment coming from abroad, 

what is the current status, if you know, in terms of the Iraqi, I 

would use the word ‘‘diaspora,’’ Iraqis who left the country to Jordan and other countries? Are they returning, are they not returning? 
36 

General ODIERNO. They are returning, but in very small numbers. 

Dr. SNYDER. Do the ones that are outside the borders, do they 

participate in the elections? 

General ODIERNO. In 2005, they participated in the election. As 

part of the election law, it will be—they will develop what countries 

they will provide the opportunity for those not in Iraq to vote, and 

that will be part of the election law as they approve it. 

Dr. SNYDER. We focus a lot here in the Congress, and the American people do, too, on troop strengths, I think probably sometimes 

to our detriment; that we should focus on an Afghanistan discussion, for example, and a whole lot of other things. But I wanted to 

ask, are there any limits or considerations with regard to U.S. Government civilian numbers? I assume those numbers are relatively 

small. I don’t see them—you mentioned civilian contractors have 

come down substantially, but I think we have a whole lot smaller 

numbers of U.S. civilian personnel there. Is that a number that you 

are following, and, if so, which way is that going? 

General ODIERNO. Obviously I work—the Ambassador is obviously the one who tracks the civilians that work in the State Department side. As part of our contracts, we have some American 

citizens who work as part of the contractors, and I do track that. 

But in terms of the State Department side, we do watch that. 

They are—what they are trying to determine is part of our joint 

campaign plan. They are to determine the number that is needed 

as we transition, and I think that number will not go down. I think 

it will stay about what it is now, and, in fact, some cases have to 

come up. For example, if they take over the police training, they 

will need more civilians than they do now. 

Dr. SNYDER. And it is not just State Department, it could be Justice Department, Ag. 

General ODIERNO. Exactly. Justice Department, Agriculture Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), et cetera. 

Dr. SNYDER. Are you satisfied with the morale of our troops? 

General ODIERNO. As I go around, I am very satisfied. And one 

of the things we always check—I talk to them all the time. Reenlistments are over 100 percent in Iraq. In fact, in June we finished reenlistment, and they have met all of the goals. So, I mean, 

I think that is also a sign of morale. They are proud of what they 

have accomplished in Iraq and are starting to see some of the 

progress that has been part of their sacrifice. 

Dr. SNYDER. As you have closed bases and pulled back U.S. 

troops, are you satisfied with the ability to do medical evacuations 

of wounded troops? 

General ODIERNO. About once every two weeks, I get updated on 

our ability to conduct medical evacuation. I am absolutely confident 

that we can provide medical evacuation for all of our soldiers, sailors, and marines that are currently stationed there. 

Dr. SNYDER. Does Iraq have any helicopters and helicopter pilots 

that they do their own medical evacuations? 

General ODIERNO. They do have the capacity to do that, but it 

is small. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General. Thank you for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 
37 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from Arkansas. 

The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. General, like everyone else in this room, on behalf 

of the people in south Mississippi, we are very grateful for what 

you have done and continue to do over there in the many years of 

your life that you have devoted to this effort in Iraq. 

I have always been impressed by the brilliance of whoever discovered the Sons of Iraq policy, and literally found out that for a 

fairly small amount of money, we can take people who were shooting at us to become our defenders. Since that has been such a successful program, you did touch on it for about a paragraph in your 

testimony, what steps are being taken to see to it that those people 

who are now on our side remain on the side of the Government of 

Iraq? Do they recognize the significance of what has happened? 

What steps are they taking to work those people, to either keep 

them on the payroll in their present capacity or find some other job 

within the Iraqi Government for them? 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Congressman. The Government of 

Iraq does understand the importance they play. It is very interesting. They have a plan in place to move all of them—they actually showed us a list of all the names of the Sons of Iraq. And they 

showed us the list, that some will go to this ministry, some will go 

to this ministry, some will go to the local governmental ministry. 

And they laid it all out and said, we are going to begin to execute 

this, and they started to execute that in August. So that is a positive sign. 

But what is interesting is after the bombings on 19 August in 

Baghdad, the Commander of the Baghdad Operational Command 

came back and said, I want to slow down the movement of the Sons 

of Iraq into the other nonsecurity ministries, I want to keep them 

on longer because of what they do for us in order to help us in the 

security. So they made a decision to keep them on a bit longer. I 

think that shows first the recognition of the senior commanders of 

how important the Sons of Iraq are to the security, and, secondly, 

that they, I believe, will transition them and take care of them. In 

2009, when they had all the budget cuts, the only line that was not 

cut was the Sons of Iraq, and they continue to have that fully funded. So I think those are all positive signs. 

What I have to make sure happens is since they will not get 

them all transitioned to the ministries by the end of 2009, we have 

to make sure that that will be taken care of in 2010. And we will 

work very hard with the Reconciliation Committee of the Government of Iraq in order to do that. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I didn’t see it in your prepared remarks, but obviously one sign of things getting back to normal would be electricity 

to the average Iraqi. And I know—have we gotten to the point 

where we have reached or they have reached prewar levels of electricity to the average citizen? 

General ODIERNO. Actually they are above the prewar levels. 

They are producing I think it is an average of 155,000 megawatts. 

What that means basically is about a 20 percent increase from last 

year. And even more importantly is they have less units now going 

off line. So what they are able to do is maintain a more stable grid. 
38 

That said, although they are producing more electricity, they still 

have some problems with distribution. And so they have some 

problems in some areas of distributing electricity to all the people. 

So my guess is you would run into some Iraqis who have yet to see 

an increase. 

The other problem, of course, is demand has increased fivefold 

since 2003, which is a sign of freedom and other things, but also 

obviously puts more pressure on the Government of Iraq to provide 

more and more electricity. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I guess lastly I am going to ask you to look out into 

the future. It is my impression from several thousand miles away 

that we have replaced a strong, brutal thug with more of a distribution of the powers amongst the sheikhs. And if you had to say, 

it would look more like the Magna Carta than the Declaration of 

Independence or the United States Constitution. I was just curious, 

in your opinion, do you think it remains for the foreseeable future 

some sort of a power-sharing agreement amongst the sheikhs, or is 

power being consolidated in Baghdad? How do you see their political system going forward? 

General ODIERNO. I think it is still to be determined. But what 

I would say is what we are seeing is following the provincial elections of this year; people want to see more of a nationalistic government. And I think as we see the new alliances form for this election, you are seeing that they are reaching it. They are just not a 

Shi’a alliance. There will be a Shi’a plus some Sunnis and some 

others. Maliki’s—Prime Minister Maliki’s alliance will be a nationalistic alliance that has many different groups in it. So I see that 

as extremely positive that they have recognized the fact that to be 

successful you have to be able to have more than one representative or one area of the people inside of Iraq. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thanks again for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Ms. Giffords. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Odierno, it is good to see you again. Thank you for your 

time to come here and for your service to our Nation. Unfortunately because of a conflict I wasn’t here for most of the hearing, 

but I did have a chance to read your testimony. And, of course, it 

impresses me that within your second paragraph you talk about 

military families, and you talk about their unwavering service and 

their sacrifice. 

I know a lot of strategic questions have been asked already, but 

I would like to talk about the families. As a military spouse myself, 

and as someone with Fort Huachuca and Davis-Monthan, I have a 

lot of military interest in southern Arizona. I have a chance to 

meet with military families and really learn about the unspoken 

heroes, the real stories of hardship that have happened behind the 

scenes. And I still remember quite succinctly the first time we met 

in Iraq and you talked about your wife, and you talked about if we 

lose the families, we will lose the soldiers, the sailors, the airmen 

and the marines. So could you talk about our efforts to draw down 

the changing stresses on the service members and their families as 

well? 
39 

General ODIERNO. I think what we are trying to do obviously is 

reduce the time between deployment—I mean, increase the time 

between deployments, because we all know—and all of us and all 

the people sitting behind me in uniform, they have all been on several deployments. And although we tend to play off what that really means, we know that there is an impact on every single person 

who deploys, and you need a time to recover from that deployment. 

And if you are not given enough time, it can have an impact not 

only on the soldier, but the family. 

So number one is we got to try to increase the amount of time 

between deployments, where they can enjoy their families, get settled again, understand and build those relationships, and then 

allow time for them to recoup and recover with their families. And 

we also have to realize the impact that these deployments have on 

a single parent because you become a single parent for a very long 

time, and I think sometimes that is the part we miss is we think 

about the soldiers and the help they need, and we forget about the 

impact of our wives or husbands who become single parents for 

very long periods of time, sometimes during very difficult times for 

their children as they are growing up. 

So I still think there is some work we have to do along those 

lines. I know the Army and the Marine Corps and the Air Force 

and Navy are looking at this, and they constantly look at it. But, 

you know, the strength of our families, you can only rely on that 

so much without giving them the assistance necessary. And so I 

think it is something that we absolutely have to keep our eye on 

as we continue to move forward with supposedly increased requirements now in Afghanistan. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. General, obviously we would look forward to any 

of your suggestions. We were able to implement through the 

Wounded Warriors Assistance Act a couple of years ago some help 

for soldiers that were getting out of the military. But I think when 

I last saw you, there was a—I don’t want to say epidemic, but a 

real strong spike in the number of suicides, particularly in the 

Army. And I know that you talked about implementing some programs there in Iraq, but can you talk about whether or not those 

were successful, and have we seen the numbers decrease? 

General ODIERNO. We have actually—although we hadn’t had a 

suicide in about 60 days, which is the longest period we have gone, 

but I think we may have had one last night, so unfortunately that 

might have ended. But I think we have started to see some of these 

programs take hold, the fact that we have more counselors, the fact 

that we continue to have more awareness. It is really about leadership awareness and leadership down the chain of command to recognize when an individual has problems. 

So I am seeing some progress, at least in Iraq itself. I can’t speak 

for the Army as a whole, but I can speak for in Iraq itself. But we 

still have too many, so we still have more to do. And again, what 

is always disappointing to me is it is not because people don’t care, 

but when you break down a suicide, you always find that there are 

three or four places if somebody had intervened, we could have 

stopped the act from happening. And so what we got to do is understand where those intervention points are and then do it so we 

save a life. And that is what we have to continue to work on. 
40 

Ms. GIFFORDS. General, Mr. Chairman, there is incredibly strong 

bipartisan support for our service members and the families, but 

oftentimes we look to you, those commanding generals and officers 

in the field, to let us know what is working and what is not working. So having that feedback is very important. 

And just in closing I just have to thank you for your willingness 

to reach out to The Colbert Show. This is a population that 

wouldn’t necessarily be paying attention to day-to-day operations in 

Iraq, but you are able to put, I mean, a real face on how hard it 

is and what the service members go through. I mean, of course it 

was a comedy, but it was very well done. I just thank you for your 

willingness to reach out and engage on that level. 

General ODIERNO. Thank you. And I think he is due for another 

haircut. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. I think so, too. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will make judicial notice of the fact. 

I have Ms. Shea-Porter, and Mr. Coffman wishes a second round. 

So Ms. Shea-Porter. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. And as a former military spouse, 

I would like to associate myself with the remarks of Congresswoman Giffords, and thank you for the attention you are giving to 

these military men and women, who, as you know, have carried the 

burden for so long for the rest of us. So thank you. 

I wanted to talk to you about a conversation I had with General 

Petraeus earlier this year when I was talking about the electrocution deaths of some of our soldiers. And I was told there was Operation Task Force Safe Actions for Fire and Electricity (SAFE), and 

that they were going to be doing the investigation. And I believe 

that the investigation was supposed to end right about now, but 

again comes some horrible news about a former military man who 

came as a contractor to Iraq, Mr. Hermanson, and he was recently 

electrocuted. And so I had a couple of questions for you, General. 

First of all, was his facility inspected, or were you only inspecting 

the facilities that soldiers occupied? 

General ODIERNO. It was not inspected. What happens is as a 

contractor it is the responsibility of the contractor to ensure they 

have adequate facilities, so we were not inspecting those facilities. 

However, since that incident we have sent Task Force SAFE over 

to first outline to all the contractors what is expected of them in 

terms of proper safety requirements. And we have also offered 

them any assistance that they might need with Task Force SAFE 

to go look at all of their facilities to ensure they are in line with 

what we believe to be safe structures. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Since we knew that we were having trouble 

with the contractors who were supposed to be doing the safe wiring, why was the decision made not to inspect the contractors’ facilities? 

General ODIERNO. I am not sure we made a conscious decision 

not to inspect them. I think what we focused on was the Department of Defense personnel. And I think as we continue to expand 

this, we will look. But there are some contractual issues that we 

have to work through. So we asked the lawyers to take a look at 

this to see what we can and can’t do because of the fact they are 

contractors, so we are working our way through this now. 
41 

This obviously highlighted a problem that we all didn’t understand at the time, and so we continue to work it. And what I am 

telling you is we are working this problem now, but we have to go 

through some legal reviews and other things. We have offered some 

initial assistance just to make sure we don’t have any repeated offenses in that specific contractor. But there are many other contractors that have facilities that in some cases aren’t even under 

the Department of Defense. And I don’t remember, but I think this 

one wasn’t even under the Department of Defense either. I think 

it was under a Department of State contract as well. So that 

throws in a whole other issue of how we do this. 

So we are working through this because we want to get rid of 

the bureaucracy so we save the lives of the people who are going 

there to work, and that is important to us. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. These men and women serve this country as 

well, and I really don’t understand it because I know that many 

of them had access to the medical care that the military was providing, and so clearly there was some crossing over there that they 

felt comfortable not even reimbursing, as you recall, I am sure. So 

I just can’t understand what happened there. 

Were there any other services provided for the people in those 

buildings? 

General ODIERNO. I will have to get back with you on that. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. If you could do that, I would appreciate that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 65.] 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I have one last question. Can you comment on 

whether the Department of Defense has declined to investigate the 

apparent electrocution of the American Department of Defense contractor? 

General ODIERNO. Again, I have to go ahead and take a look at 

that and see exactly what happened, okay? I will get you an answer back on that. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I would appreciate that General, because I 

feel very certain that when that family sent their loved one over 

to serve this country, they expected that we would do what we 

could to protect all of them, whether they were in uniform or 

whether they were serving as civilians. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 65.] 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you, and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Coffman, second round. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, Mr. Secretary, could you discuss Kurdish aspirations, 

because I think that there certainly was some concern when some 

of the Kurdish provinces were engaging in their own negotiations 

in terms of oil exploration and development. Given the fact that the 

central government relies on those oil revenues, what are Kurdish 

aspirations, and how does the oil issue enter the equation? 

General ODIERNO. I can’t speak for Kurdish aspirations, but 

what I can speak to is the two oil fields that are producing oil inside of Kurdistan are actually oils fed to the central government, 

and they are getting all of the revenue from those oil fields. 
42 

Mr. COFFMAN. There have been reports that some new—not the 

existing oil fields, but there are some new exploration. 

General ODIERNO. Yeah. The issue has to do, Congressman, with 

there is some new exploration that has been done since 2003. 

Those are pumping oil, those are going to the central government. 

There are also—there might be some additional exploration going 

on. That is the issue. Who pays for the exploration? The central 

government could be doing it. Does the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) have the authority to issue these contracts? And that 

is what is yet to be resolved and has to be resolved through the 

hydrocarbon legislation. 

Mr. COFFMAN. De-Baathification clearly went too far in the aftermath of the invasion, post-invasion of Iraq. Where is that now, because it certainly led to a lot of resentment among Sunni Arabs? 

General ODIERNO. They have what they call the accountability 

and justice law, which was passed a couple of years ago, which also 

has had some significant problems in implementation. So what it 

is going to require, I believe, is for them to go back and pass some 

more legislation that will adequately address this issue, and that 

is something that I think they have to do internally. 

But the accountability and justice law has been something that 

has been very difficult to implement because it in some cases had 

not appeared to make sense based on some of the individuals that 

would no longer be allowed to work who had been serving honorably for several years already within the system. So the Government of Iraq knows that they have to readdress this problem, but 

it is still one that has to be addressed. 

Mr. COFFMAN. The problems with the Shi’a militias, how would 

you evaluate the Shi’a militias of today. And to what extent are 

they aligned with Iran? 

General ODIERNO. The number of Shi’a militias has declined significantly, and the number of Shi’a militias in Iraq have declined 

significantly since the March–April 2008 operation done by the 

Government of Iraq in both Basra and Iraq. I think there are— 

what you don’t see any more is large movement of Shi’a militias 

who control areas, but what you have now is some militant groups 

that don’t control areas, but conduct attacks for several different 

reasons. And I think we have seen the militia element move in 

their ability—in what they do and their abilities. So although they 

continue to be a threat because they do conduct attacks against 

both U.S. forces and Iraqi Security Forces and others, their influence has been significantly reduced to what it was in 2007 and the 

beginning of 2008. 

Mr. COFFMAN. To what extent is Iran—I think you mentioned 

briefly Iran providing them training. To what extent is—and I 

think you also mentioned Iran providing them munitions and 

weapons. 

General ODIERNO. Yeah. 

Mr. COFFMAN. What is the trend line on that now? 

General ODIERNO. I think it is less than what it was, but what 

they have done is they appear to target it a little more to certain 

organizations, small organizations that continue to train inside of 

Iraq—train inside of Iran, and who come across with increased capabilities to conduct operations and attacks inside of Iraq. And 
43 

they are still provided munitions such as rockets and explosiveform projectiles. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Many of the Sunnis in Iraq, at least when I was 

there, would speak of the Shi’a and say the question is at the end 

of the day are they Arabs first, or are they Shi’a first? And they 

would speak of this in reference to the influence of Iran over a 

Shi’a-dominated Iraqi Government. How do you see that at this 

time? 

General ODIERNO. You know, the people I deal with—again, I 

don’t—what I would say is the people I deal with, I believe, are 

Iraqis first, I will put it that way. And I think that Iraq is first 

and foremost in their mind. There are, of course, many who are 

trying to influence. I think Iran is trying to influence some. I think 

there is others, Syria and others, trying to influence as well. That 

is what makes Iraq so important, I think, in the long run. 

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly thank the gentleman. 

General Odierno, we thank you for your appearance, for your excellent testimony. We thank you for the service that you are rendering. You are making history in your leadership in Iraq for our 

country, and we thank you for that. 

I may also mention that all of us in this committee feel that the 

young men and young women in your command are making history 

as well. And when the final chapter of Iraq is written in our efforts 

there, I know full well that your name will be very, very prominent 

as well as all those young men and young women who have worked 

so hard and so professionally, and the families that we support, 

and we just can’t thank them enough. 

So, General, thank you very much. 

Mr. Vickers, thank you for being with us. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER 

General ODIERNO. Throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operations contractor camps 

exist where provision of life support for employees is the responsibility of the contractor. However, every contract has differing provisions and levels of Government 

support for their personnel. All of our contracts require that every contractor will 

uphold both U.S. and local laws and require that the contractor complies with the 

CENTCOM and MNF—I regulations and living standards (as applicable). 

With regards to the contractor and specific contract in question, the U.S. Government provided: office space, dining facilities and water, medical care (contractor personnel shall be authorized medical care in emergencies to prevent loss of life, limb, 

or eyesight of any personnel/employee), MWR/PX/Fitness Center, electrical power, 

badges, ammunition storage, fuel (the Government will provide fuel access to all 

contract vehicles/generators that are used in direct support of the contract). [See 

page 41.] 

General ODIERNO. At the direction of the Multi-National Force—Iraq Commander 

and in coordination with the DOS, Task Force SAFE conducted an on-site investigation of Camp Olympia from September 3-7, 2009. The investigation found that improper bonding and grounding of electrical systems in Mr. Hermanson’s billet combined with a faulty water heater element caused the metal pipes in the shower to 

be energized. Task Force SAFE found many of Camp Olympia’s electrical facilities 

to be improperly bonded or ungrounded, and identified 1,031 immediate Life, 

Health, and Safety defects which were reported to Triple Canopy, and the Department of State Regional Security Office for immediate correction. Triple Canopy was 

issued a Cure Notice on September 4, 2009, from Joint Contracting Command IraqAfghanistan directing them to take actions to repair the shortcomings identified by 

Task Force SAFE within 10 days. In response, Triple Canopy hired an electrical 

team comprised of local national and U.S. electricians led by a U.S. Master Electrician to make the necessary repairs. [See page 41.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 30, 2009 

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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. On January 10, 2007, President Bush ordered a ‘‘surge’’ of 20,000 

additional soldiers, increasing the number to nearly 160,000 U.S. forces in Iraq. 

During this time the Democrat leadership brought many resolutions and bills to the 

floor disapproving of the President’s decision to increase the number of troops and 

demanding an immediate withdrawal from Iraq. On February 16, 2007, the House 

passed H.Con.Res. 63 opposing this mission and on March 23, 2007, the House 

voted on H.R. 1591 to remove all U.S. forces in Iraq by August 2008. According to 

the ‘‘Security Incidents’’ chart provided in your written testimony, the number of potential and executed attacks decreased from approximately 40,000 to approximately 

25,000 during the end of 2006 through the end of 2007 coinciding with the ‘‘surge’’ 

of American troops. General Odierno, was the ‘‘surge’’ successful in combating the 

insurgents and decreasing the security threats in the region? 

General ODIERNO. Yes. The ‘‘surge’’ of forces in Iraq helped us to create the security environment that we have now, along with many other things. The ‘‘surge’’ was 

more than a surge of U.S. forces; it was a surge of ideas and represented a change 

in our tactics, techniques and procedures. It also consisted of integrating support led 

by the State Department which included embedded provincial reconstruction teams 

with our brigades. It was about an outreach program to the Sunni insurgents that 

allowed them to begin to reconcile and form the Sons of Iraq. 

It was about understanding what was causing the underlying impacts and using 

a combination of increase in troops, partnership with the State Department and engagement with former insurgents to enable security so the people and government 

of Iraq could build their capacities and develop a stable, democratic government. 

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