IG-00-005

AUDIT

REPORT X-38/CREW RETURN VEHICLE PROJECT

MANAGEMENT

February 9, 2000

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR

GENERAL
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______________________________________________________________________________________________________

Acronyms

CRV Crew Return Vehicle

ISS International Space Station

NPG NASA Procedures and Guidelines
W February 9, 2000

TO: A/Administrator

FROM: W/Inspector General

SUBJECT: INFORMATION: Audit of X-38/Crew Return Vehicle Project Management Report

Number IG-00-005

The NASA Office of Inspector General has completed an audit of the X-38/Crew Return Vehicle

(CRV) Project management. We found that X-38/CRV Project management has been generally

effective, but the Project’s strategy entails significant risk in return for a potentially high payoff. The X38/CRV Project is responding to a challenge by the NASA Administrator to demonstrate that humanrated spacecraft can be developed faster and for a fraction of the cost of previous projects. The X38/CRV Project is relying on a high degree of concurrency among design, development, test and

engineering/evaluation activities and a highly optimistic schedule for accomplishing development and

production of the CRV. The Project’s reliance on a high degree of concurrency among design,

development, test, and engineering/evaluation activities warrants a greater emphasis on risk and

performance management than is required by NASA Procedures and Guidelines (NPG) 7120.5A and

warrants the use of performance metrics and criteria for key Project phases.

Background

The United States is committed to providing a crew return capability for the International Space Station

(ISS) in the event of crew injury/illness, ISS failure, or Space Shuttle unavailability. The X-38/CRV is

NASA’s project to meet this commitment. The Johnson Space Center is the lead for the X-38/CRV.

The purpose of this project is to develop an operational CRV for the ISS for a fraction of the cost of

previous human spacecraft projects. This goal is to be achieved through a series of low-cost, rapid

prototype vehicles that are designated X-38. NASA is designing, building, and conducting the initial

flight tests of the X-38 and will use a contractor to build the CRV. As of January 2000, the Project’s

budget was $124.3 million for the X-38 segment and $952 million for the CRV segment.
2

Recommendation

We recommended that NASA management develop and document entry/exit criteria for progressing

through the major Project phases, as required by NPG 7120.5A and as warranted by the high risk and

importance of the X-38/CRV Project.

Management Response and OIG Evaluation

Management concurred with the finding and recommendation. The X-38/CRV Project has developed

criteria for progressing through major Project phases. These criteria will be approved in February 2000

at the ISS Integration Control Board and documented in April 2000 in the X-38/CRV Project Plan

Update.

The actions taken and planned by management are responsive to the recommendation. Developing,

approving, and documenting the entry/exit criteria for progressing through the major Project phases help

assure that technical, schedule, and cost goals will be met.

[Original signed by]

Roberta L. Gross

Enclosure

Final Report on Audit of X-38/Crew Return Vehicle Project Management
FINAL REPORT

AUDIT OF X-38/CREW RETURN VEHICLE

PROJECT MANAGEMENT
W February 9, 2000

TO: M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight

AA/Director, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center

FROM: W/Assistant Inspector General for Auditing

SUBJECT: Final Report on the Audit of X-38/Crew Return Vehicle Project Management

Assignment Number A9900201

Report Number IG-00-005

The subject final report is provided for your information and use. Please refer to the Results in Brief for

the overall results. Our evaluation of your response is incorporated into the body of the report. Your

comments on a draft of this report were responsive to the recommendation. The recommendation will

remain open for reporting purposes until corrective action is completed. Please notify us when action

has been completed on the recommendation.

If you have questions concerning the report, please contact Mr. Dennis E. Coldren, Program Director,

Human Exploration and Development of Space Audits, at (281) 483-4773, or Mr. Len Diamond,

Audit Program Manager, at (321) 867-4531. We appreciate the courtesies extended to the audit staff.

The final report distribution is in Appendix E.

[Original signed by]

Russell A. Rau

Enclosure

cc:

B/Chief Financial Officer

B/Comptroller

BF/Director, Financial Management Division

G/General Counsel

JM/Director, Management Assessment Division
bcc:

AIGA, IG, Reading Chrons

W/D. Coldren

L. Diamond

JSC/BD5/Audit Liaison Representative

Douglas_A_Comstock@OMB.eop
NASA Office of Inspector General

IG-00-005

 A9900201 February 9, 2000

X-38/Crew Return Vehicle Project Management

Introduction

The NASA Office of Inspector General performed this audit during an early part of the X-38/Crew

Return Vehicle (CRV) Project (the Project), specifically, during the X-381 phase and before the CRV

phase. Critical parts of each phase of the Project are being accomplished concurrently. Johnson Space

Center (Johnson) is the lead center for the Project. As of January 2000, the Project’s budget was

$124.3 million for the X-38 segment and $952 million for the CRV segment.2

Our overall objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of Project management (see Appendix A). We

have issued a report on the need for planning an operational test of the CRV.3

Results in Brief

X-38/CRV Project management has been generally effective, but the Project’s rapid prototyping

strategy entails significant risk in return for a potentially high payoff as compared to the traditional

approach of sequential design, development, test, and engineering/evaluation. To reduce risk and

increase assurance of meeting the crew return capability commitment, Johnson should develop criteria

by which to measure readiness to progress through major Project phases. The criteria should include

performance metrics and alternative actions or strategies. Absent such criteria, the Project risks not

achieving the maturity necessary to move to subsequent Project phases. Management concurred with

the recommendation. The X-38/CRV Project Office developed entry/exit criteria for progressing

through the major Project phases. The ISS Program Manager will approve the criteria at the Space

Station Integration Control Board and document it in the X-38/CRV Project Plan Update.

Our overall audit results related to specific subobjectives are summarized in Appendix B.

 

1

The X-38 is NASA’s in-house activity to develop an experimental CRV using a lifting body spacecraft.

2

The X-38 is funded by the Space Flight Advanced Projects appropriation ($92.3 million) and the International Space Station

(ISS) appropriation ($32 million). The CRV is funded by the Space Flight Advanced Projects appropriation ($6 million) and the

ISS appropriation ($946 million). This budget represents an increase of $26 million for the X-38 and a decrease of $189 million

for the CRV compared to the August 1999 budget referenced in our draft audit report. This budget also represents a reduction of

$94 million from the Project’s fiscal year 2000 budget request of $148 million, additional X-38 work to be performed, and

spending limitations by the Office of Management and Budget. On December 23, 1999, NASA reported to the Committee on

Science that the spending limitations may result in delays to CRV Phase 1 contract awards and delivery of the CRV to the ISS and

that additional steps may be taken to alleviate the delays.

3Report Number IG-99-036, “X-38/Crew Return Vehicle-Operational Testing,” September 20, 1999.
2

Background

The United States is committed to providing a crew return capability as part of the international

memorandum of understanding for the International Space Station (ISS). The crew return capability is

to be used in the event of crew injury/illness, ISS failure, or Space Shuttle unavailability. The X38/CRV is NASA’s project to meet the commitment using a lifting body concept. The concept includes

a reusable deorbit module for atmospheric entry to 23,000 feet and a parafoil for the final descent and

landing of up to seven crew members. NASA is designing, building, and conducting the initial flight tests

of the X-38 and will use a contractor to build the CRV. Two significant vehicle changes have taken

place. Specifically, the vehicle capacity has been increased to accommodate seven rather than four

crew members, and the vehicle height has been reduced to allow for possible modification to a crew

transfer vehicle4 or an orbital transfer vehicle.5

Johnson’s X-38/CRV lead Center responsibility is supported by NASA’s Ames Research Center,

Dryden Flight Research Center, Glenn Research Center, Goddard Space Flight Center, Kennedy

Space Center, Langley Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center for testing, launch,

components, analysis, and consultation. The Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force,

Department of Energy, European Space Agency, and German National Space Agency are providing

test support, simulation access, consulting, components, software, and structural parts. The X-38/CRV

funding covers the acquisition of four X-38 vehicles, four CRV’s, two berthing/docking modules, and

one set of spare parts; the funding does not include the costs of Space Shuttle launches or logistics.

Project Management and Risk

Finding. The X-38/CRV Project strategy, known as “rapid prototyping,”6 responds to a challenge by

the NASA Administrator to demonstrate that human-rated spacecraft can be developed faster and for a

fraction of the cost of previous projects.7 As a result, the X-38/CRV Project is relying on a high degree

of concurrency among design, development, test, and engineering/evaluation activities and a highly

optimistic schedule to accomplish development and production of the CRV. While this Project

approach offers potential high payoff, the approach negatively affects the ability to accurately adhere to

project cost and schedule. Therefore, Johnson needs to focus additional attention on risk and

performance management including the use of performance metrics and criteria needed for key Project

decision points.8 The Project’s high concurrency warrants more risk management than current NASA

policy requires.

 

4A crew transfer vehicle would transfer a replacement crew member(s) from Earth to a vehicle in space and/or return a retiring

crew member(s) from a vehicle in space to Earth.

5An orbital transfer vehicle would transfer a crew member(s) from one vehicle in space to another vehicle in space.

6Rapid prototyping allows project maturation through fault detection and analysis during system development rather than after

system development.

7

The Administrator termed this approach “faster, better, cheaper.”

8

The documented support needed to exit from and enter each Project phase.
3

Faster, Better, Cheaper Projects' Failure Rates. In August 1999, the Aerospace Corporation9

issued a technical paper that analyzed the faster, better, cheaper approach compared to the traditional

project approach in the area of small satellites. The technical paper stated that the faster, better,

cheaper projects were more effective in terms of time, total cost, flight rate, and cost-effectiveness as

compared to the traditional projects. However, the faster, better, cheaper

projects had higher full and partial failure rates of 28 percent and 44 percent, respectively, in

comparison to full and partial failure rates of 10 percent and 30 percent, respectively, for traditional

projects.10

Assessment Office Review of the X-38/CRV. NASA’s Independent Program Assessment Office

(the Assessment Office)11 determined that the X-38/CRV Project rapid prototyping approach offers

great promise to save up to $1 billion12 over the traditional approach. The Assessment Office identified

five rapid prototype projects13 it characterized as failures and attributed the failures to a lack of project

maturity. The Assessment Office review of the X-38/CRV Project identified 102 risk items of which 51

were characterized as high-risk items. The Assessment Office characterized the Project schedule as

high risk but achievable and concluded that the high-risk items raise concern that achieving the maturity

needed to enter production would not be achieved within the Project schedule. The Project Office is

addressing the risk items. On March 15, 1999, the Assessment Office recommended the commercial

practice of establishing a maturity gate14 prior to Phase 1 – contract awards. The Associate

Administrator for Space Flight and the Project Manager are ensuring that the risk items are resolved or

scheduled for resolution prior to Phase 1 contract awards.

Evaluation Requirement. NASA Procedures and Guidelines (NPG) 7120.5A, “NASA Program

and Project Management Processes and Requirements,” April 3, 1998, addresses the evaluation

subprocess. The evaluation subprocess supports the initial approval and continues to provide project

progress assessment by the customer, experts, and stakeholders. The evaluation subprocess is an

assessment of the project’s ability to meet commitments and recommendations for proceeding with,

modifying, or terminating the project. The evaluation subprocess is to occur throughout the life cycle of

the project to ensure the successful completion of each phase.

NASA Team Assessing Need for Guidance. The NASA Administrator has established a team15 to

study the nontraditional faster, better, cheaper approaches such as rapid prototyping for programs and

 

9

The Aerospace Corporation is a private, nonprofit corporation that is exclusively scientific and provides research, development,

and advisory services to the Space and Missile Systems Center of the Air Force Materiel Command and other agencies,

international organizations, and governments in the national interest.

10NASA was not required to and did not comment on or respond to the Aerospace Corporation technical paper.

11At the direction of the NASA Chief Engineer, the Assessment Office at Langley Research Center performs objective,

nonadvocate reviews of NASA programs and projects.

12The amount is based on the Assessment Office-developed cost using its estimating model.

13The projects were Advanced Research and Global Observation Satellite, Space Technology Experiment Program, Miniature

Sensor Technology Integration, Commercial Global Phone, and Pegasus.

14A “gate” is a term the Assessment Office uses to indicate an action that must be completed before proceeding to the next step

(for example, contract award).

15The team includes NASA, industry, and university representatives.
4

projects. The team is studying the programs and projects that worked and those that did not in order to

establish guidance that the Agency can institutionalize. The guidance would include recommended

action for necessary changes to NPG 7120.5A to fulfill the Administrator’s concept of doing business

faster, better, and cheaper. The team’s report is due to NASA Headquarters mid-February 2000.

Risk Management and Performance Management. NPG 7120.5A addresses the importance of

executing projects “faster, better, cheaper” and correlates the use of special techniques with the

Government's streamlined, new ways of doing business. The NPG requires program and project

managers to identify, analyze, prioritize, mitigate, control, and assure communication of risks to all levels

of a program/project. The NPG also requires program and project managers to establish effective

mechanisms for tracking and maintaining successful performance, to include performance assessment,

schedule management, and process metrics. The NPG does not currently differentiate between risk and

performance management applicable to traditional programs and projects as compared to “faster,

better, cheaper” ones. However, the higher full and partial failure rates of “faster, better, cheaper”

programs and projects warrant a greater emphasis on risk and performance management than is

generally required by the NPG so as to assure program and project success.

Major Project Decision Points. The Project Manager identified the following major or key decision

points in the X-38/CRV Project life cycle:

• Award to the Phase 1 contractors.

• Certification of Flight Readiness of X-38 Vehicle 201 for the space flight test.

• Award to the Phase 2 contractor.

• Certification of Flight Readiness of the CRV for delivery to the ISS.

Development of criteria to support exit from and entry to each of these phases will facilitate the

evaluation subprocess relative to the decision for proceeding with, modifying, or terminating the

Project.

Management Action Necessary to Strengthen Evaluation Subprocess. The major project

decision points constitute exit from and entry into particular project phases and are similar to the

maturity gates referred to by the Assessment Office. To mitigate the Project risks, to track and

maintain successful performance, and to support the evaluation subprocess, the Project Office should

develop and document the major characteristics, criteria, and strategies relative to moving through the

Project phases.
5

Recommendation, Management’s Response, and Evaluation of Response

The Director, Johnson Space Center, should develop and document the major characteristics,

criteria, and strategies for progressing through major Project phases, as required by

NPG 7120.5A and as warranted by the high risk and importance of the X-38/CRV Project.

Management’s Response. Concur. The X-38/CRV Project Office has developed specific criteria

for progressing through the Project phases. These criteria will be approved in February 2000 at the

Space Station Integration Control Board and will be documented in the April 2000 X-38/CRV Project

Plan Update.

Evaluation of Management’s Response. The actions planned by management are responsive to the

recommendation. The recommendation is resolved but will remain undispositioned and open for

reporting purposes until corrective action is completed. The complete text of management’s comments

is in Appendix D.
6

Appendix A. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Objectives

Our overall objective was to audit management effectiveness of the X-38/CRV Project. Specifically,

we evaluated project approval, project plan feasibility, project plan scheduling, project testing and flight

testing, project inclusion of program requirements, project consideration of the CRV for use as a crew

transfer vehicle; and technology information export controls.16 Details on our audit results for these

areas are in Appendix B.

Scope and Methodology

Our audit included visits to Johnson X-38/CRV facilities, attendance at a Flight Readiness Review, and

observance of a free-flight17 test of an X-38 at Dryden Flight Research Center. We examined project

records and documentation, dated August 1998 through October 1999, to evaluate whether plans and

actions were reasonable. Specifically, we:

• Reviewed NASA policies and procedures, ISS program requirements, the Federal Acquisition

Regulation, and Draft Requests for Proposal.

• Interviewed Project Office and various review team personnel.18

• Examined the review team's reports on the X-38/CRV Project and the ISS Program.

Management Controls Reviewed

We reviewed management controls relative to the Project. Specifically, we reviewed the controls

established in NPG 7120.5A relative to project approval and the evaluation subprocess. Those

management controls were effective except that the control related to the evaluation subprocess requires

management attention and is addressed in this report.

Audit Field Work

We performed audit field work for this report from August through October 1999. We performed the

audit work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

 

16We did not evaluate project-manifesting plans because it was too early for any substantive actions to have begun.

17 Free-flight refers to an unpowered glide of an X-38 after it is carried and dropped from a B-52 aircraft.

18The personnel of the NASA Advisory Council/Cost Assessment and Validation Task Force, Independent Program Assessment

Office, and Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.
7

Appendix B. Audit Subobjectives Results

Project Approval. NPG 7120.5A provides guidance for the structure of the project plan. The X38/CRV Project began in 1995 and because of its high visibility, was later made subject to review by

the NASA Program Management Council19 and the requirements of NPG 7120.5A. We reviewed the

X-38/CRV Project Plan, which was approved in August 1998, and concluded it fulfilled the

requirements of NPG 7120.5A with two exceptions, which had been noted by the Assessment Office.

During March 1999, the Assessment Office identified a need for updating the current project status to

begin September 1999 and for development of a Risk Management Plan to be completed by

September 1999. Therefore, we are not making additional recommendations in this area.

Project Plan Feasibility. The X-38/CRV project approach contains risk in that it deviates from the

traditional design, development, test, and engineering/evaluation approach. The traditional approach is a

long, sequential process with flight testing being primarily performed on the operational vehicle. The X38/CRV Project approach responds to a NASA Administrator challenge to demonstrate that human

spacecraft could be developed for less cost than previous projects. Other reasons for the approach

were ISS annual funding ceilings, receipt of Office of Management and Budget CRV Project approval

and funding, and the required CRV delivery date to the ISS. The Project approach uses: (1) the

proven characteristics of U.S. Air Force X-23/X-24A lifting body;20 and (2) rapid prototyping, with

testing and revisions in later prototypes. Project approaches and elapsed times are contained in the

draft requests for proposals. Aerospace companies have reviewed the Phases 1 and 2 draft requests

for proposals and have not questioned the Project approaches or elapsed time. We concluded that the

approaches and projected elapsed times are reasonable and feasible.

Project Plan Schedule. As of June 1999, CRV #1 was scheduled for delivery to the ISS in May

2004. The Project schedule was proceeding on the following milestones:

• October 1999 – Award Phase 1 contracts to two or more contractors to assess X-38 capability

and CRV design requirements, participate in development of ground tests, and develop cost

proposals for Phase 2.

• September 2001 – Conduct X-38 space flight test from the Space Shuttle.

• January 2002 – Award Phase 2 contract to one contractor to design, develop, fabricate, test, and

certify four CRV’s, berthing/docking adapters, and one set of spare parts.

• January 2004 – Deliver first CRV to Kennedy Space Center.

• May 2004 – Launch CRV #1 aboard Space Shuttle and deliver to ISS.

 

19The NASA Program Management Council is NASA’s Senior Management group, chaired by the Deputy Administrator, and is

responsible for reviewing and recommending approval of proposed programs and for overseeing their implementation according to

Agency commitments, priorities, and policies.

20The U.S. Air Force developed the lifting body concept in the 1960’s and 1970’s during its X-23 and X-24 Programs.
8

Appendix B

As of October 22, 1999, the latest budget actions would extend the referenced milestones by 8, 5, 9,

12, and 14 months, respectively.

Project Testing and Flight Testing. Testing has included captive-carry21 and free-flight tests of

scaled-down versions of the X-38 flown under the wing of a B-52 airplane and parafoil deployment

testing. Testing disclosures of high Project importance have included vibrations, delaminating,22 laser

pyrotechnic23 ineffectiveness, and parafoil operation. Project Office reports showed that testing was

producing desired results in terms of proof of concept and identification of characteristics requiring study

and revision. During this audit, we reported24 a condition identified by three review teams that pertains

directly to ISS crew safety and the lack of planning or provision for an operational CRV flight test.

Project Inclusion of Program Requirements. Space Station Program CRV Requirements

Document 50306 identifies 16 CRV top-level requirements. See Appendix C for details. The Project

addresses all 16 requirements. Fourteen of the requirements will be validated in both the X-38 and

CRV project portions. The remaining two, all-attitude separation25 and separation within 3 minutes, will

be validated only in the CRV project portion.

Project Consideration of the CRV for use as a Crew Transfer Vehicle. The Project Office is

developing the X-38/CRV to strictly meet the crew return requirements as opposed to any additional

function, such as crew transfer. This best serves the Program and the Project success by not increasing

complexity, schedule, and cost beyond what is necessary to meet the U.S. commitment and the ISS

defined requirement. The Project Office has modified the X-38 design, including a reduction of vehicle

height, so that consistent with the U.S. and European Space Agency agreement, the vehicle, with

modification, can be attached to and launched on an expendable launch vehicle. A crew transfer vehicle

or an orbital transfer vehicle may ultimately be derived from the X-38/CRV investment and technology

but not in a manner that adversely affects the Program or the Project.

Technology Information Export Controls. NASA signed Memorandums of Understanding with

German Aerospace Center and the European Space Agency for the X-38/CRV Project during

February and July 1999, respectively. NASA staffed the requirements in the

 

21Captive-carry refers to a test in which the X-38 test vehicle is attached to a NASA B-52 aircraft for the entire flight test.

22Disengaging of layers that had been affixed to each other.

23Actuation by laser firing.

24Report Number IG-99-036, “X-38/Crew Return Vehicle-Operational Testing,” September 20, 1999.

25CRV ability to separate from the ISS irrespective of the ISS position.
9

Appendix B

memorandums with the State Department and other Federal agencies. The memorandums require that

notifications must accompany the transfer of technical data that are proprietary or subject to export

controls and must specify the entities authorized to receive that data. The X-38/CRV Project and

aspects that involve cooperation with other Government partners lend to the potential for technology

gains to foreign partners. An X-38 Project Review Board Report, May 1998, states that the

partnership is reducing near-term cost of the X-38 and CRV to NASA and the U.S. taxpayer. The

report further states that with this gained knowledge and after human-rating26 of the Ariane 5,

27 the

Europeans would have an important crew transfer capability they have desired for years. NASA has

implemented the requirement to protect technology information with respect to entities outside the

cooperative agreement, while the parties to the agreement can yield significant technological gains with

respect to a vehicle that will provide human access to space.

 

26A term used for a space system that incorporates design features, operational procedures, and requirements necessary to

accommodate human participants.

27The Ariane 5 is a French expendable launch vehicle.
10

Appendix C. X-38/CRV Top-Level Requirements

Requirement

X-38

and

CRV

CRV

Only

Minimum of Single Fault Tolerant1 at the end of 3-year, on-orbit duration X --

Minimum Mission Reliability of .99 X --

System Availability of 95 percent over 3-year, on-orbit mission X --

Capable of autonomous flight operations and landing X --

Dry Land Touchdown X --

Shirtsleeve Operation2 X --

All Attitude Separation3-- X

Separation within 3 minutes -- X

Supports medical mission timeline X --

Operated in the English language X --

Supports 7 crew members of 95th percentile American male4 X --

Peak sustained gravity forces of less than +/-4 gravity forces X --

Two-way communication with the ground X --

Minimum on-orbit life of 3 years X --

Landing accuracy of 5 nautical miles radius circular error probability X --

Launch aboard Space Shuttle X --

 

1Critical systems designed so that no single failure shall cause loss of the crew.

2Not requiring special, protective clothing.

3CRV ability to separate from the ISS irrespective of the ISS position.

4Able to accommodate seven persons of a size and weight up to that of 95 percent of the American male population.
11

Appendix D. Management’s Response
12

Appendix D
13

Appendix D
14

Appendix D
15

Appendix E. Report Distribution

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Headquarters

A/Administrator

AI/Associate Deputy Administrator

B/Chief Financial Officer

B/Comptroller

G/General Counsel

H/Associate Administrator for Procurement

HK/Director, Contract Management Division

HS/Director, Program Operations Division

J/Associate Administrator for Management Systems

JM/Director, Management Assessment Division

L/Associate Administrator for Legislative Affairs

M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight

NASA Advisory Officials

Chair, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Chair, NASA Advisory Council

Chair, Advisory Committee on the International Space Station

Chair, Aeronautics and Space Transportation Technology Advisory Committee

NASA Centers

Director, Dryden Flight Research Center

Director, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center

Director, John F. Kennedy Space Center

 Chief Counsel, John F. Kennedy Space Center

Non-NASA Federal Organizations and Individuals

Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Policy

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division, Office of Management and Budget

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch, Energy and Science Division, Office

 Management and Budget

Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs Division, Defense Acquisitions

 Issues, General Accounting Office

Professional Assistant, Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space
16

Appendix E

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member - Congressional Committees and Subcommittees

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Senate Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs

House Committee on Appropriations

House Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies

House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology

House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations

House Committee on Science

House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science

Congressional Member

Honorable Pete Sessions, U.S. House of Representatives
NASA Assistant Inspector General for Auditing

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Major Contributors to this Report

Dennis E. Coldren, Program Director, Human Exploration and Development of Space Audits

Len Diamond, Audit Program Manager

Dennis Clay, Auditor

Kenneth Sidney, Auditor

June C. Glisan, Program Assistant

Nancy C. Cipolla, Report Process Manager