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i 

51–958 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–71] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL 

SECURITY SPACE AND MISSILE 

DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 21, 2009 
(II) 

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

BOB DEGRASSE, Professional Staff Member 

FRANK ROSE, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ZACH STEACY, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, May 21, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request for National Security Space and Missile Defense Programs ..................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, May 21, 2009 .......................................................................................... 41 

THURSDAY, MAY 21, 2009 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California, Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 1 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 3 

WITNESSES 

Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 6 

O’Reilly, Lt. Gen. Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Kehler, Gen. C. Robert ..................................................................................... 45 

O’Reilly, Lt. Gen. Patrick J. ............................................................................ 63 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 119 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 119 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 126 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 125 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, May 21, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:03 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Good afternoon. 

This hearing of the Strategic Forces subcommittee will come to 

order. 

Today the subcommittee will receive testimony on the President’s 

fiscal year (FY) 2010 budget request for national security space and 

missile defense programs. 

Traditionally, this subcommittee would have held separate hearings on both of these topics. After all, unclassified national security 

space programs account for over $11 billion of the President’s request, and the total request for ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs tops $9.3 billion. 

Unfortunately, the timing of the budget submission and the committee’s legislative schedule have made it impossible to hold two 

separate hearings before our markup. That said, the good news is 

that the subcommittee has held four hearings and two briefings on 

specific aspects of these programs already this year. 

Appearing before the committee this afternoon are two wellknown witnesses. Both of them are well equipped to address these 

two major elements of the President’s defense budget. 

First, General Robert Kehler, the Commander of Air Force Space 

Command (AFSPC), will address the national security space aspects of the budget. 

Second, Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly, Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), will discuss the missile defense budget 

request. 

I want to thank both of our distinguished witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today. And I especially want to thank, 

on behalf of the committee, all of the men and women that serve 

with you both in the military and the civilian ranks, and especially 

the people sitting right behind you, who I know have worked very 
2 

hard on this testimony that you have submitted well before the 

deadline, and we very much appreciate how comprehensive it is. 

But you certainly represent the Services that have the most people involved in these programs. They are very excellent people, and 

they are very patriotic Americans. And we want you to please extend to them, on behalf of this committee, our very heartfelt thanks 

for their service. 

Before turning to our witnesses, I would like to briefly identify 

some of the key issues we hope the witnesses will address in the 

course of their testimony today. 

National security space systems provide a wide variety of capabilities to our warfighters by offering global access, unhindered by 

geographic or political boundaries and unrestricted by surface or 

air defenses. While the funding requests for most major space programs remains consistent with past plans, the fiscal year 2010 request contains several significant programmatic shifts. 

First, it recommends terminating the Transformational Communications Satellite System, or TSAT, program. Second, it expands 

funding for other military satellite communications systems. And, 

finally, the request provides a significant increase for Space Situational Awareness (SSA) programs. 

During the past decade, most national security space programs 

have experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays. 

General Kehler, I would ask you to discuss how the budget before us today will help deliver satellite systems in a more timely 

and cost-effective manner. More specifically, what are the Administration’s plans for ensuring that the warfighter will have sufficient, 

protected communication bandwidth in the next decade after the 

termination of the TSAT program, and what will happen with the 

engineering and technical talent who have focused on this problem? 

The subcommittee has also focused significant attention on the 

vulnerability of space-based systems in recent years. In that regard, General Kehler, how will the budget before us address the increasing vulnerability of our satellite system? 

Turning to the issue of missile defense, Secretary Gates has incorporated key decisions into the budget that, in my view, refocus 

the program to its original purpose and to the most pressing 

threats to the security of the United States and our deployed troops 

and allies. 

In 1999, Congress passed, and the President signed, House Resolution (H.R.) 4. That law established the policy of the United States 

to, ‘‘Deploy, as soon as technologically possible, an effective national missile defense system capable of defending the territory of 

the United States against limited ballistic missile attack, whether 

accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate.’’ 

Secretary Gates announced three decisions to refocus the program on their original goals and to address the most pressing 

threats. 

First, he has proposed capping the deployment of long-range missile defense interceptors deployed in Alaska and California at 30, 

arguing that these 30 interceptors would be more than sufficient to 

counter rogue threats or unauthorized launches for the foreseeable 

future. 
3 

Second, he proposed cancelling three programs: the Multiple Kill 

Vehicle (MKV), the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), and the second Airborne Laser (ABL) prototype aircraft. These are programs 

that have been pursued to counter long-range missile threats that 

could develop in the future. Each has experienced technical challenges and some are unlikely to be cost effective if deployed. Finally, the secretary has recommended a $900 million increase 

in funding for theater missile defense programs, such as the Aegis 

Ballistic Missile Defense System and the Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense (THAAD) System. This decision will better protect 

our deployed forces, allies, and friends against the existing shortand medium-range ballistic missile threat, and it is consistent with 

the demands of our combatant commanders for more interceptors 

for theater defense. 

General O’Reilly, in the course of your testimony today, could you 

describe how the Secretary reached these decisions? Were you consulted in the decision-making process? Did the Missile Defense 

Agency recommend these actions? And do you have any reservations about the Secretary’s decision? 

As we dig into the details of the budget, I would also like to hear 

about your new plans for exploring ascent phase intercept technologies to hedge against more complicated threats in the future. 

With that, let me turn to my good friend, the distinguished ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Turner, of Ohio, for any comments he may make. 

Mr. Turner. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate your holding this hearing and, of course, your continued leadership in this. 

And I have been assured by staff that even though we all know 

that you are awaiting confirmation by the State Department that 

that process will continue and you will continue to chair our subcommittee. 

I want to ensure that we get ample time to be able to congratulate you in another hearing just prior to your departure. So, please 

ensure that we get that opportunity, and we know we do not have 

to do it today. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. But thank you for your leadership. 

Well, we have two very thoughtful and accomplished military 

leaders with us today, General Kehler, General O’Reilly. Welcome 

back. Thank you for appearing before the subcommittee. Thank you 

for your leadership. You are both experts in your field, and we 

thank you for your contributions to our national security. 

We have an unusual task before us today. In a single hearing, 

we must cover two broad areas, space and missile defense, that 

under normal circumstances could equally merit their own hearing. 

We also have an unusual budget request to consider this year. 

During last week’s full committee hearing with the Secretary of Defense, we heard of profound changes in the budget that not only occurred outside the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process, but 
4 

were arrived at without what appears to be a commensurate level 

of rigorous analysis. 

As our full committee Ranking Member, Mr. McHugh, said, ‘‘the 

only unifying theme in this year’s budget is that the aggregate fits 

within the top line.’’ This appears to be an apt description of the 

missile defense budget this year. 

During our recent subcommittee hearing on the nuclear security 

budget request, we learned that major program decisions at the 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) would not be 

made until the completion of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). 

Yet, over in the Department of Defense (DOD), sweeping missile 

defense decisions have been made ahead of the QDR and prior to 

the Administration’s completion of its missile defense policy and 

strategy review. By making such decisions now, is the Department 

prejudicing the outcome of these reviews? 

We just observed yesterday a determined Iran test of its 200-kilometer, solid-fuel Sejil-2 ballistic missile that Iran’s president suggested was linked to its ongoing nuclear program. There is a clear 

desire by some actors to emphasize the development of longerrange missiles. How good is our intelligence? 

We know short-range systems well. In many cases, they are 

based on decades-old technology. What concerns me, however, is 

our level of knowledge about rogue nations’ longer-range systems. 

This detailed intelligence information is critical to having effective 

missile defenses. When such uncertainties exist, one usually compensates with increased margins and more diversification, not less. 

Given this growing threat, I am puzzled by the Department’s decision to: stop deployment of ground-based interceptors (GBI) at 30 

rather than 44, reduce the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

(GMD) program by 35 percent, and curb its development. I have 

not seen any analysis or formal force structure requirements to justify this decision, nor have I seen any changes in the Intelligence 

Communities’ (IC) threat assessment that would indicate a decreasing threat. 

Furthermore, what are we to make of the disconnect between 

Secretary Gates’ testimony that the Department will, ‘‘Continue to 

robustly fund research and development’’ of GMD to improve its capability, and MDA’s budget overview, which states, ‘‘We intend to 

. . . curtail additional GMD development’’? 

MDA’s budget overview also calls for rigorous testing, which I 

agree with. But I do not see more GMD flight testing in fiscal year 

2010. I hope today we can address these basic questions. 

We have also been induced to a new concept this year: Ascent 

Phase Intercept. It sounds promising, but it also sounds a lot like 

parts of boost and parts of midcourse. I would like a better understanding of what this entails. It would seem risky to move away 

from ABL, KEI, and MKV for this, as yet, unproven concept. General O’Reilly, I would ask you to address what gives you confidence 

that Ascent Phase Intercept is more technically feasible, effective, 

and affordable? 

During our last missile defense hearing, we reviewed an independent study on MDA’s roles and missions requested by this committee. It recommended that MDA’s mission should be refocused on 

research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), and that 
5 

science and technology (S&T) should receive renewed emphasis and 

increased funding. However, I am hard-pressed to find such emphasis in this year’s budget. How does MDA advance our missile 

defense technologies and foster innovation and ingenuity when net 

reductions are made in future capabilities like ABL, KEI, MKV, 

and the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)? I am unconvinced that a $126 million decrease in Special Programs adequately captures what we lose with the nearly $1 billion cut to future capabilities. 

There is one area in the budget where Congress did see rigorous 

analysis. In previous hearings, we noted a Joint Staff study which 

had recommended increasing the inventory of Aegis and THAAD 

interceptors. The budget request is responsive to these requirements, and I am pleased with that. However, the Joint Staff study 

only looked at these two systems. How do we know the force-structure requirements for other missile defense elements? Also, why 

does an increase in Aegis and THAAD have to come at the expense 

of GMD and European missile defense systems designed to protect 

the U.S. homeland and our allies? 

Looking across the $1.2 billion cut to MDA, I believe that we 

have been presented with a number of false, either-or choices. We 

can do better. 

In contrast, the budget request for space appears relatively balanced. Important acquisition programs, such as Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), Wideband Global Satellite 

(WGS), Global Positioning System (GPS), Space-Based Infrared 

System (SBIRS), and National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) are provided with stable funding. The only substantial change is the TSAT termination. 

The Air Force decided instead to fund two more additional AEHF 

satellites and one WGS satellite, and acknowledged the importance 

of sustaining the industrial base. However, these three satellites 

are not a long-term solution to addressing the military’s increasing 

communications requirements. Without insight into out-year plans 

and funding, I find it difficult to have confidence that the Air Force 

has adequately committed to, and budgeted for, these capabilities. 

The budget requests for Space Situational Awareness, SSA, has 

doubled. It appears a large portion of this increase is allocated to 

the Joint Space Operation Center (JSpOC). 

General Kehler, I would like to better understand the Department’s effort to improve SSA, space protection, and our space intelligence capabilities. Additionally, can you discuss why Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) is on the Air Force Unfunded Priorities List (UPL)? 

Lastly, Air Force Space Command is in a state of transition. Can 

you discuss the status and challenges of divesting your nuclear 

mission and inheriting the cyber mission? 

On a final note, I would like to acknowledge the men and women 

serving in the organizations you lead. These are two worthy fields 

to have a career in, and we are proud of their service and accomplishments. 

Thank you, Madam Chair, for presiding over this important 

hearing. We look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Turner. 
6 

We will begin with General Kehler. 

We have received your prepared statement in advance and it will 

be entered into the record. We welcome your remarks. 

General, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

General KEHLER. Well, Madam Chairwoman and Representative 

Turner, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a real 

honor for me to appear before you today both as an Airman and 

as the Commander of Air Force Space Command. 

Thanks very much for your continued support, not only for the 

United States Air Force, but for the capabilities that we contribute 

to the Joint Force. 

I will certainly take the words that you have given us today 

about your appreciation for the service of the men and women of 

the military across the board, specifically Air Force Space Command. I will take that back. 

And Madam Chairwoman and the rest of the members of the 

subcommittee, I know you know this, but that resonates with them 

and they deeply appreciate that when they hear from the representatives of the American people, the appreciation of the American people. So thank you for those words, and I will definitely take 

those back. 

It is also a great pleasure for me to appear with the Director of 

the Missile Defense Agency. I am very proud to lead 39,000 active 

duty Guard and Reserve Airmen, government civilians, and contractors who contribute to our Nation’s strategic deterrence, and 

who deliver persistent, space-based capabilities to America and its 

warfighting commands around the globe. 

Our mission is to provide an integrated constellation of space and 

cyberspace capabilities at the speed of need. All over the world, as 

we sit here today, in space operations units, in space launch and 

range facilities, in missile alert facilities, in acquisition centers, 

and of course, in our forward-deployed locations around the world, 

the men and women of Air Force Space Command are proud and 

pleased to be answering their Nation’s call. 

Our Airmen are focused on three main areas. 

First and foremost, we operate, secure, and maintain our Nation’s land-based strategic deterrent, with perfection as the standard. Second, we assure access to space, protect our freedom of action in space, and provide joint warfighting capabilities from space. 

And, finally, we are improving cyberspace capabilities by establishing an operational Cyberspace Command, which will be designated 24th Air Force, to meet the demands of the 21st-century 

national security environment. 

Today’s Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen navigate with accuracy, communicate with certainty, strike 

with precision, and see the battlefield more clearly because of 

space-based capabilities. 

It is our job to put those capabilities directly into their hands, 

and we are constantly mindful of those joint team members who 

are in harm’s way. 
7 

We are very proud of our accomplishments. We have a long 

string of successful launches. We are exceeding performance standards in critical operations areas like GPS, satellite communications, weather support, and missile warning. 

But we are very much aware of where we need to improve: We 

need to get better at acquisition; we need to restore the nuclear enterprise; and, we need to deliver new capabilities to the joint team 

on time. We also understand clearly our important role across the 

spectrum of Joint Operations, from routine activities, to irregular 

warfare, to deterring major conflict with regional power. 

The demand for space capabilities is going up. At the same time, 

the threats and challenges in this operational domain are increasing. The fiscal year 2010 budget continues our progress in a number of key investment areas. You have pointed out some of those 

already. 

It continues our assured access to space. It helps improve our situational awareness, and our space protection. And it continues 

modernization of GPS, our satellite communications systems, missile warning, operational responsiveness, and other areas. 

If there is a thought that I could leave you with, it is this one: 

Make no mistake about it, the men and women of Air Force Space 

Command, and the men and women of the United States Air Force 

are in today’s fight every minute of every day. 

We thank you for your past support. We look forward to continuing the discussions that we have been having over the last several months. And I stand ready to answer your questions; happy 

to take them on whenever you are ready, and I was diligent, I 

think, in taking notes, so I am ready to go whenever you are. 

Thanks for having us today. 

[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in the 

Appendix on page 45.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much, General Kehler. 

General O’Reilly, we have received your prepared statement in 

advance and it has been entered into the record. We welcome your 

remarks. 

General O’Reilly, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. PATRICK J. O’REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General O’REILLY. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman, Congressman Turner, other distinguished members of the committee. It is 

an honor to testify before you today on the proposed fiscal year 

2010 budget for the Department of Defense’s missile defense program. 

During fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 to date, the Missile 

Defense Agency has achieved many accomplishments in the development of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), including 

the execution of successful Standard Missile–3 (SM–3) Block IA, 

and Standard Missile–3 Block IV interceptor salvo flight test; the 

delivery of 28 additional SM–3 Block IA interceptors, including deliveries to Japan; a Ground-based Midcourse Defense intercept utilizing the entire sensor and command and control (C2) suite deployed in the Pacific in placement of two other ground-based inter-
8 

ceptors and refurbishment of two other ground-based interceptors 

at Fort Greely, Alaska. 

Deployment of the—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. General O’Reilly, can you pull the mic a little 

closer to you please? 

Thank you. 

General O’REILLY. Deployment of an Army Navy/Transportable 

Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY–2) radar to Israel, the execution of an 

experiment involving the closest data collect to date of a boosting 

missile from a satellite, the safe destruction of a malfunctioning 

U.S. satellite, repeated demonstrations of the Atmospheric Laser 

Beam Compensation during the Airborne Laser flights, delivery of 

the first Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, unit for 

testing, three THAAD intercepts, including the launching of a salvo 

of two THAAD interceptors using the operational firing doctrine. 

Earlier this month, we also successfully placed in orbit the Space 

Tracking and Surveillance System Advanced Technology Risk Reduction (STSS ATRR) satellite to serve as a pathfinder for the next 

generation space-sensor technology. 

However, in addition to our successes, we also faced challenges 

developing the BMDS. During fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 

to date, we experienced nine significant flight test delays, four target failures out of 18 target launches, and one interceptor failure 

in flight. These and other contributing factors have resulted in a 

$264 million cost growth and, further, we have incurred over $252 

million in unplanned costs and 25 weeks of schedule revisions due 

to unplanned operational deployments of our systems under development. 

In response to those challenges, we have worked with our leadership and stakeholders to engage our management oversight, 

strengthen our relationship with the warfighting community, and 

improve BMDS acquisition and test planning. 

We have adopted a series of initiatives to improve acquisition 

and oversight of the contracts we will award over the next 18 

months. I am also signing Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) 

with the Services to institutionalize the Missile Defense Agency 

and Service’s roles and responsibilities for development and 

sustainment and fielding of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. 

In fiscal year 2010, we are proposing approximately $7.8 billion 

for missile defense in response to Secretary Gates’ guidance. As 

Secretary Gates announced on April 6th, this budget was the result 

of a holistic assessment of capabilities, requirements, and risk and 

needs. 

For the purpose of meeting the Secretary’s vision to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities, to enhance the wars we are 

in today, and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years 

ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other 

risks and contingencies. 

The Secretary further said we will restructure the program to 

focus on rogue-state and theater-missile threats. 

Today, there are 5,900 ballistic missiles and hundreds of launchers in countries other than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), China, Russia, or the U.S.; 93 percent, or 5,500 of those 
9 

missiles, are short-range ballistic missiles, with ranges less than 

1,000 kilometers. 

Six percent, or 350, are medium-range ballistic missiles with 

ranges between 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers. And less than one percent are Intermediate, or Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, or 

ICBMs. 

Both Iran and North Korea are showing significant progress in 

developing ICBM technology, but their number of launch complexes 

which exist limits the number of missiles they can simultaneously 

launch. 

I assess the technical risk is low that 30 fully operational 

ground-based interceptors, or GBIs, and silos is a sufficient number 

to counter the simultaneously launched rogue-nation ICBMs over 

the next decade. Additionally, indications are early and prominent 

if the number of rogue-nation ICBM launch complexes increases. 

Although we are proposing to limit the number of GBIs and silos 

to 30, we are storing additional silos, and we are continuing the 

production of the remaining 14 GBIs on contract to maintain the 

ability to produce additional GBIs for testing, refurbishment, future upgrades, and to allow programmatic flexibility to respond to 

the Quadrennial Defense Review, the congressionally mandated 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and other policy direction. 

In contrast to our rogue-nation ICBM defense, I assess the technical risk is considerably higher that the previously planned inventory of theater missile defense interceptors and units can be overwhelmed by the large number of short- and medium-range ballistic 

missiles today. 

Thus, to better protect our forces, allies, and friends from short 

and medium ballistic missile attack, we propose to add $700 million to field more Theater High Altitude Area Defense and Standard Missile–3 interceptors. We also propose to add $200 million 

over three years to fund the conversion of six additional Aegis 

ships to ballistic missile defense capabilities. 

Furthermore, as a hedge against further advanced threats, we 

propose $368 million to leverage our emerging missile defense force 

structure and accelerate the development of capability to destroy 

missiles at all ranges in the highly advantageous early phases of 

flight. 

To more effectively hedge against future threats, we propose to 

cancel the second Airborne Laser, or ABL, prototype aircraft, terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle, or MKV, and Kinetic Interceptor, or 

KEI, programs in lieu of more operationally efficient, alternative 

technology architectures. 

We will continue the research and development effort with the 

existing ABL aircraft, including the first attempted shoot-down of 

a ballistic missile this fall, to address affordability and technology 

issues while addressing the program’s proposed operational role. 

The MKV technology program was established to address complex countermeasures by identifying to destroying all lethal objects 

in a cluster using a single interceptor. The MKV was in the early 

stages of a long development process extending until 2018, and required significant research and development and very immature 

technology. 
10 

We plan to transfer the knowledge gained from MKV to our kill 

vehicle technology base. As stated previously, destroying missiles 

earlier in flight before countermeasures can be deployed is the better hedge against advance future threats than trying to kill all the 

countermeasures after they have been deployed. 

The original KEI mission grew from a boost-phase-only mission 

to a boost and midcourse mission. The development schedule grew 

from 5.5 years to 12–14 years, depending on the spirals. Program 

costs grew from $4.6 billion to $8.9 billion, and the missile average 

unit production cost grew from $25 million to over $50 million per 

interceptor. 

Technology issues delayed the first booster flight test date by 

over a year, and we assess the probability of this flight test occurring this year as very unlikely. 

Additionally, KEI size limits its ability to be operationally deployed without dramatic changes to our military infrastructure and 

significant reduction of our firepower. Affordability and government 

requirements growth, not contractor performance, was the main 

contributor to KEI’s execution problems. 

Given the above facts, and only 15 percent of the $8.9 billion 

worth of contract until 2018 had been accomplished, the Secretary 

of Defense terminated the KEI program. Recently, KEI contractors 

indicated they can complete their flight tests by the end of September 2009, in a manner that accommodates our legal liabilities 

for program termination. I will assess their proposal. 

Like MKV, we will review the KEI products and expertise developed to date to determine follow-on applications to Ascent-Phase 

Intercept mission. The Missile Defense Agency, Joint Staff, combatant commanders, armed services have intensified their collaboration on the development of the missile defense capabilities and 

budgets. 

As announced by Secretary Gates in response to the warfighters’ 

priorities, we are making ballistic missile defense more affordable 

and effective by: one, reshaping our program to enhance protection 

of our deployed forces, allies, and friends against existing threats; 

two, continue to develop and maintain the Ground-based Midcourse 

Defense capability to defeat a limited, long-range, rogue-state attack or accidental launch against the United States; and three, prepare to leverage emerging Ascent-Phase Intercept technologies to 

hedge against the threat growth and realize the greatest potential 

for reducing cost and increasing operational effectiveness of missile 

defense. 

The rationale is based, in part, on a Defense Science Board 

(DSB) study in 2002 which emphasized the benefit of Ascent-Phase 

Intercepts. The study noted that the technological and operational 

challenges of intercepting threat missiles in the ascent phase, the 

phase after powered flight and prior to apogee, is significantly less 

challenging than boost phase. 

Ascent-Phase Intercept would allow us to intercept early in the 

battle space and optimize our ability to execute a shoot-look-shoot 

tactic and defeat the threat before countermeasures are deployed, 

minimal potential impact of debris, and reducing the number of 

interceptors required to defeat a raid of threat missiles. 
11 

With this budget, we will also continue to execute to the fullest 

extent of the law, the upper-tier European capability program to 

counter long-range attacks from Iran. We will execute a rigorous 

test program to build the confidence of the U.S. and allied stakeholders in the BMDS, bolster deterrence against their use, and 

send a powerful message to potential adversaries looking to acquire 

ballistic missiles; thus, testing figures prominently in our proposed 

budget of fiscal year 2010. 

Furthermore, we are collaborating with the service Operational 

Test Agencies (OTAs) and the support of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) to restructure our test program, to improve confidence in the missile defense capabilities 

under development, and ensure the capabilities transferred to the 

warfighter are operationally effective, suitable, and survivable. 

In conclusion, the proposed fiscal year 2010 budget rebalances 

the development of our missile defenses to improve our ability to 

meet the threats we face today and provide a cost- and operationally-effective hedge against future ballistic missile threats facing 

our deployed forces, allies, friends, and our homeland. 

I greatly appreciate your support for the opportunity to testify 

today. I request that I submit the remainder of the statement in 

writing for the record, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

And, ma’am, and, sir, I greatly appreciate, also, your compliments to our workforce that works tirelessly to deliver this capability. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General O’Reilly can be found in the 

Appendix on page 63.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much, General O’Reilly. 

General Kehler, I am going to begin the questioning with my 

first question. 

As you know, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, or NPOESS, program has experienced serious schedule and cost problems. The estimated launch date for 

the first satellite has slipped by over three years to 2014 and the 

total program cost has grown from $6.5 to $13.5 billion. And according to what our staff is hearing, the tri-agency acquisition arrangement between DOD, NASA, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is largely dysfunctional. 

What are your thoughts about how the Nation should proceed in 

the acquisition of new weather satellites? 

General KEHLER. Thanks, Madam Chairwoman. 

First of all, the requirement to provide weather data, both of the 

Earth and the Earth’s atmosphere, and of the space environment 

every day, from a combatant commander perspective, remains very 

high. Very important for our troops to understand the weather for 

all the obvious reasons. Very important for our Airmen to understand the weather, our Sailors, and the list goes on. 

We, right now, have three military weather satellites left on the 

ground. One will launch later this year, and that leaves us with 

two. And we are managing the timeframe of launching those two 

remaining satellites that we have already constructed so that we 
12 

can hedge our bet, basically, here about what might happen with 

NPOESS. 

In terms of the NPOESS program itself, we are not happy either. 

I think that all of us understand there have been some significant 

issues here. There have been issues with the construction of the 

sensors. In some cases, we are stretching in terms of the technology. In other cases, we are stretching—or the program was 

stretching, anyway, in terms of the number of sensors we were trying to integrate on the same platform, et cetera. 

A number of studies have been done about what to do. There is 

one going on now that is about to out-brief within the next week 

or so. I understand they have made some recommendations. I have 

not seen those. We are looking forward to getting that and see 

what their recommendations are, both in terms of program content 

and, as importantly, in terms of program management. 

So I cannot give you a better answer today, Madam Chairwoman, 

than we are waiting to see what this latest review tells us. I know 

some have seen pieces of it. I have not. We are looking forward to 

that. And when we do, I think it is important for us to come back 

and explain to you what we think the right way forward is. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Do you think that you will see that review before 

the mark-up of the bill on June 11th? 

General KEHLER. I have heard one answer that says that they 

are ready to report their results as early as next week. So, I would 

hope that we would have information before you mark. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, I will direct the staff. We are going to be 

back in our districts next week for the Memorial Day recess, but 

we come back on June 2nd. So as soon as you come back, if you 

have been briefed and you can brief us, we will gather the subcommittee and try to accomplish that as soon as we can. 

General KEHLER. Yes, ma’am. 

And it is a actually, it is a larger group that you probably need 

to invite than just me because there are others with equities in this 

decision as well. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. We will do that. 

General KEHLER. But we would be happy to come. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I have a second question. 

Recently, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that 

the Air Force is struggling to build the GPS IIF satellites within 

cost and scheduled goals. I actually was watching one of the cable 

shows this morning, and they had this whole big thing about, you 

know, GPS and, you know, are you going to be able to turn on your 

GPS and get from where you are supposed to go. So I think this 

has hit the major media. The program has overrun its original cost estimate by about $870 

million and its launch of its first satellite has been delayed to later 

this year, probably November of 2009, almost three years late. 

GAO has also raised questions about the Air Force estimate for the 

GPS IIIA schedule and the possibility that delays could result in 

a gap in the GPS constellation in the future. 

Would you describe the current health of the GPS constellation, 

the status of both GPS IIF and IIIA, acquisition programs, and the 

prospect that we might experience a gap in the GPS signal sometime in the future? 
13 

General KEHLER. Well, let me answer the final question first. 

I am highly confident that we will be able to sustain at least, and 

I believe more than, the minimum 24 satellite constellation as far 

as we can see. I am highly confident that we can sustain more than 

24 satellites. 

Let me start with that. Now, let me backtrack. 

GPS is critically important, not just to the U.S. military, not just 

to the citizens of America—by the way, the taxpayers who pay for 

it and offer it free of charge to the rest of the world—but it is important to the entire world. We are responsible for it, and we take 

that responsibility very, very seriously. 

Right now, on orbit, we have the largest and most capable constellation we have ever had. We have 30 active satellites. We have 

another one that we have launched that is still in checkout. Some 

new signals are being checked out. And we have three additional 

that are not right now an active part of the constellation but are 

available. 

We understand the issues that the GAO has raised. In some 

cases, you know, we are not taking exception to them. I would take 

some exception to the fact that I think some of what is being reported is old news. We have been working on these problems for 

quite some time. 

We understand what the issues are. We are about to launch the 

first of the GPS IIF satellites. That will occur late this year. We 

have other launches that have to go in sequence, and so I cannot 

give you a specific such-and-such a date. We have got issues there 

that we are trying to work through. But that is not bad news. That 

is actually good news. 

The GPS III program, at this point, is proceeding very well. It 

is still in development of course. But because of the problems that 

we had with IIF, we have taken more time, in some cases, deliberately, to get IIF right before it goes to orbit. And then we said 

we would buy a finite number of those and get on with GPS III, 

which has been a program we have started with all of the acquisition reform features built in from the start. So I have a lot of confidence in GPS III. I am also confident in the ground system that 

we have put together. 

Why the reporting is going on today, it is because it is based on 

a very, very conservative analysis that is done for planning purposes. That conservative analysis suggests that we might have a 

problem here. But what that does not take into account is the real 

steps that we take to manage the constellation through times like 

this. 

Those steps, when we take those steps, and when we get to the 

next launches, give me the confidence that would say we are going 

to be able to sustain more than 24 satellites on orbit. And all the 

indicators that we have with the on-orbit constellation supports 

what I am telling you here. When you take those measures into account, those real steps that we take to prolong the life of the satellites that are on orbit, when you factor those into the same analysis, it does not show the same kind of problem. 

So, I have high confidence—let me say this again—I have high 

confidence that we are going to be able to sustain greater than 24 

satellites as we continue to upgrade GPS. We are committed to re-
14 

taining that as the gold standard for the world, and we have a commitment to do that, and we understand what our commitment is. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. General, the reason you say 24 is because? 

General KEHLER. That is the minimum requirement to give highaccuracy signals. And, again, as I say, today there are 30 active in 

the constellation, and we expect to be able to sustain 24—greater 

than 24 is what my projection would be. I just cannot tell you how 

many. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I hope your statement today goes a long way to 

giving confidence to people that rely on GPS for many different reasons. 

I have questions, more questions for you, General Kehler. And I 

certainly have some questions for General O’Reilly, but I want to 

give my distinguished colleague, the ranking member from Ohio, 

Mr. Turner, a chance to ask some questions. 

So, I am happy to yield to you, Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General O’Reilly, you have a tough message. And many people, 

in looking at your budget recommendations, are very concerned because they do not see that the world has changed much in the past 

couple months, or that the analysis at DOD has been completed in 

the past couple months that would justify a significant change in 

policy that you are bringing in front of us. 

And I wanted to ask you a couple questions about that. Many 

times when we are faced with issues of guiding a program, you 

complete a strategy and then you undertake a budget. 

As our Ranking Member McHugh said, it looks as if this is a 

budget that its only common theme is it fits under the top line, and 

that you have a budget and under which we are constructing strategy. And that is of a great deal of concern when the issue of missile 

defense is so important and goes right to the issue of our national 

security. 

Every day in the news, the public is more and more aware of 

what the actors of rogue nations and other nations are doing to be 

able to get greater reach and greater precision, greater ability to 

impact the United States and our allies. 

And as you look at the capabilities that we have accomplished, 

that your agency has worked so diligently, and others, to accomplish, it seems as if we are retreating. You and I have had conversations about my concern about the issues of innovation in that, 

you know, when we are advancing in technical areas and then we 

step away from funding, either research or development, we are 

losing the concept of what is the next generation of innovation that 

could be in front of us. 

So many people have questions about how these budget decisions 

are being made and why and whether or not this is prudent. The 

Department appears to be making profound missile defense program and budget decisions prior to the Administration’s completion 

of its missile defense policy and strategy review. 

We do not, as a committee, seem to have any information in front 

of us that would justify the switches that are occurring in each of 

the programs. One such switch is the issue of a switch from longrange missiles focus, and we do not have intelligence or informa-
15 

tion here that would indicate that people are not trying to get 

greater reach to impact our country. 

I have several questions that I want to ask you about specific 

programs that I know that members on this side of the aisle have 

specific questions about them, but could you talk for us a moment 

about the issue of how this budget is put together. Because although you have answers as to, you know, comparatives; why one 

program over another. It appears that an overall strategy is missing as to why we are undertaking the cuts of programs that before, 

just a few months ago, appeared to be pretty important. 

General O’REILLY. Thank you, sir. 

First of all, this budget proposal reflects a process that has been 

developed over the last several years that I believe the most profound impact on the budget was the participatory problem—or 

participatory involvement of senior decision makers, and especially 

the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs, and the Services, in 

order to have the strategy that you refer to today and those analyses, versus the strategy before was based primarily on technical 

judgments by the Missile Defense Agency without the greater involvement. 

So, number one, I do not believe it is so much of a strategy 

change, as a process change. This process has now come to fruition. 

There was more involvement by Combatant Command (COCOM) 

commanders and the warfighters than I have seen before. There 

also was more intense involvement by senior Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD) leadership and the analysts that work to support 

them than has been in the past. 

So, this is a process that was started several years ago, and I believe this is the first budget which was produced from that process 

as the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB), chaired by the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, chaired that board with the full participation of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Director of Operational 

Test and Evaluation, the Service Chiefs, the Joint Chiefs, were 

very involved in this. This was not an isolated decision. In fact, it 

was the most comprehensive that I have ever seen in the missile 

defense area. 

Again, the two aspects: number one is the programs we are referring to are aimed at 1 percent of the threat, whereas we are very 

concerned also about the other 99 percent of the threat that we— 

you are exactly right, sir—we are concerned about the research and 

development that is going in to counter that more deployed, more 

advanced threat, as far as a threat to our deployed forces today. 

This is not done at the expense of the long-range threat. The reduction of the missile silos actually employs a process, then, that 

allows them to be more operationally ready than they are today. 

So, we believe this actually enhances that capability by focusing on 

those 30 and building of refurbishment process, and so forth, for 

the missiles that did not exist before. 

But, primarily, sir, I must say that, yes, the Secretary of Defense 

did give us clear guidance to focus on the rogue threat and the theater threats, but at the same time, there was involvement that I 

had not seen before by senior warfighting commanders, and they 

set the priorities in which I was responding to. 
16 

And then it was approved up through the Secretary. 

Mr. TURNER. And I have a series of questions regarding the 

change from 44 GBIs to 30 GBIs. 

General O’Reilly, do you believe that Mr. Altwegg, your executive 

director, as he does, that, I believe this is his statement, ‘‘the risk 

may go up,’’ by stopping GBI deployment at 30 interceptors. 

So, although you say an analysis has been done, I think, you 

know, the committee members were a little concerned as to how exactly the process was undertaken to go from 45 to 30. I do not 

think we have from you the analysis that would justify or explain 

that. And, as I think you are aware, Mr. Altwegg, in a May 7th 

press conference on the budget, commented that the ‘‘risk may go 

up somewhat, but our intelligence data and the threat at the 

present time permits us to restrict the number of emplaced missiles to 30.’’ 

I am not familiar with that information. Could you comment on 

his statement? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

As the new Director of the Missile Defense Agency, I asked for 

exactly what you are asking for: the analysis to show 44. Why was 

there 44 missiles? I have yet to see that yet. 

We have looked at projections from 2002 of what the threat 

would be today. Those were off by a factor of 10 to 20 in that regard. So, that also underscored, with the warfighter input, senior 

combatant commanders, also the lack of an analysis, as you are 

saying for the 44, put us into a position where there was an operational risk assessment done. 

And the operational risk assessment was deemed to be low for 

the fact that how many simultaneous missiles this system would 

have to engage at any one time now or over the next decade, and 

what would be the intelligence indicators to say that there was a 

surprise growth due to the fact that it takes so long to build one 

of these launch complexes due to the fact that there was not a 

strategy that I had presented, and my agency knows of about, 

again we believe it was a judgment in the past done on a threat. 

But the analysis we have done until now and the assumptions 

in which that original judgment was made on, was off by a factor 

of about 10 to 20. 

Mr. TURNER. And saying that the 44 was arbitrary, I am not 

quite confident that the 30 is—that the reduction that you have 

chosen is not arbitrary also. I look forward to you providing to the 

committee what other information that you have that would justify 

the 44 to 30. 

I understand your position that the 44 was arbitrary. But, again, 

we are seeing increasing threats in this area, not decreasing, and 

yet we are seeing decreasing investment. 

On May 13th, the Secretary of Defense testified that, ‘‘We will 

continue to robustly fund research and development to improve 

GMD.’’ And on page 10 of the DOD budget overview for MDA, it 

clearly states, ‘‘We intend to curtail additional GMD development.’’ 

How should we interpret these two statements that appear to be 

a disconnect? Please—I mean, describe for us any robust R&D efforts for GMD that are going to be continued in this budget request. 
17 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the reference in the overview was in the 

area of the ground system, of curtailing the development or the deployment of the ground system. 

However, at the same time, we are expanding the research and 

development, as I said, for the entire architecture which the GMD 

system benefits. One of the benefits of Ascent-Phase Intercept is if 

you are going to strengthen that, GMD automatically benefits from 

having early sensors, robust command and control, robust communications and secure, which is necessary. 

Besides that, we also have funded a refurbishment program to 

take the oldest interceptors out, replace them with new ones, also 

to upgrade those interceptors with technical risks that we found in 

the original deployment. 

That will be done over the entire fleet over a period of time. We 

also are expanding the test program, which is part of the development, and we are continuing to expand the command and control 

and the algorithms necessary to meet the warfighters’ requirements for better command and control of the system during an attack, and also to plan for it. 

We have others that I can provide for the record of efforts that 

we are continuing on in GMD. But I did not mean to convey that, 

in fact, the 30 missiles that we believe is sufficient for silos is going 

to halt the development of the ground-based interceptors. 

In fact, we will continue on with the two-stage interceptor development, which again brings a new fresh of avionics to the GBIs 

and also their industrial base. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 119.] 

Mr. TURNER. One that continues to be a concern on support for 

the European missile defense. The budget request includes only 

$51 million for a European capability. Does this low funding level 

indicate a change of the Administration’s position, or lack of support, for a European missile defense? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the Quadrennial Defense Review I know 

is going to address that. But in the meantime, the logic behind the 

fiscal year 2010 budget was that I have significant restrictions 

based on the law, the Appropriation, and the Authorization Act of 

last year, on how much I can spend for the construction and the 

development of the missile systems proposed in Europe and the European Midcourse Radar (EMR). 

Due to those restrictions, primarily the need for ratification of 

the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement in the Czech Republic and 

Poland, the $51 million was the most we could see that we could 

expend this year with those restrictions still on us. 

And then there was a second one associated with the production 

of further GBIs for the European midcourse—or the European capability that is limited by the number of flight tests we have to 

occur first for a two-stage GBI, which we are proceeding with. 

But in sum, sir, the limitations from last year’s laws is the reason why we are limited to $51 million. 

Mr. TURNER. So, then, should I interpret your answer to mean 

that there is still sufficient, significant support from the Administration for the European missile defense system (EMDS)? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 
18 

The instructions to me was to continue with that deployment, 

that planning, to the greatest extent possible allowable by law, 

which equated to the $51 million for the development of the sites 

and the planning, and also we are continuing the development of 

the two-stage GBI. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Turner. 

I am going to recognize members for five minutes by their appearance before the gavel. 

And first we have Mr. Andrews of New Jersey for five minutes. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Thank you, General, Lieutenant General, for your service and for 

excellent testimony today. 

I do not think either of you have made a major change in your 

assessment of the threat that the country faces. I do think you 

have made a major change in the way we assess the evidence in 

these programs, frankly, switching from a faith-based approach to 

these programs to an evidence-based approach, which we agree 

with. 

In looking at the budget sent over, it is interesting, if you look 

at some zeroed-out and significantly-cut programs, BMD intercept, 

Multiple Kill Vehicle, the three European programs, they are reduced by a little over $1.1 billion. And then if you look at what has 

increased, procurement of THAAD, Aegis RDT&E, Aegis procurement, and Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC), they are increased by almost $1.1 billion. So, 

there was a balance between those two approaches. 

And I do think that the evidence supports the balance that you 

have struck. And, Lieutenant General O’Reilly, obviously it was 

more directed at you, although I think the same is true in the 

space-based programs, I wanted to ask you a little bit about the 

evidence of the Multiple Kill Vehicle. 

My understanding is that the emphasis on the mission has 

changed rather substantially when our strategy is what the multiple kill would have done. On page 25, you say we are—instead 

of the initial purpose of the MKV to integrate into midcourse interceptors, we are now assessing the feasibility of destroying threat 

missiles early in flight before countermeasures can be deployed, as 

a hedge against advanced, future threats. 

Is it fair to say that, you know, that the old rationale for the 

Multiple Kill Vehicle does not fit the new strategy? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the mission of the Multiple Kill Vehicle, 

if we are successful with what we are trying to do with this proposed budget, we would not need that mission. 

Mr. ANDREWS. And it is also true on schedule, is it not, that the 

initial schedule for the MKV was 5.5 years. It has now grown to 

somewhere between 12 and 14 years? Is that right? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, that is the Kinetic Interceptor Program. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Okay. 

General O’REILLY. But the MKV program, sir, was on a 2018 

timeframe. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Where is it now? 

General O’REILLY. Well, that is—— 

[Laughter.] 
19 

It is in the very beginning of the program, so that is why—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

And am I correct that the cost has, according to what I have read, gone from $4.6 billion to $8.9 billion? 

General O’REILLY. Again, sir, that is the Kinetic Interceptor Program, yes, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

And the first booster flight test was due in what year? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we re-baselined the program in 2007 for 

the first booster test last year. It had technical—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Did it happen last year? 

General O’REILLY. No, sir. They have had technical problems—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Did you think it is going to happen this year? 

General O’REILLY. No, sir. I do not believe it is going to happen 

this fiscal year. Our schedule assessment was—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand there is some issue about September 

of 2009 possibly happening. 

I want to compare that to the judgment you have made about 

THAAD and Aegis. I note that THAAD procurement is up by $316 

million. Aegis RTD&E is up by $578 million. Procurement for Aegis 

is up by $112 million. 

It was my understanding that the THAAD tests basically batted 

six-for-six. Is that right? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. And it is also my understanding that the system 

has proved so effective there is already a foreign sales component 

with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Could you tell us a little bit 

about that? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

They have made a request for several billion in investment of, 

and procurement of THAAD. 

Mr. ANDREWS. My understanding is, from your testimony, is that 

$6.9 billion is, at least the potential for that? 

General O’REILLY. Million, sir, or billion? 

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes. 

General O’REILLY. I know it is well over $5 billion, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

And Aegis also has a similar record on successful testing. Could 

you tell us a little bit about that? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Well, THAAD has had six-for-six, as you said, sir, but what is 

also important is five of those intercepts were against actual threat 

targets. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

General O’REILLY. In the case of Aegis, they have had a successful string of—out of nine intercept attempts, they have had seven 

intercepts, but one of them, the missile did not launch because 

there was a command and control issue of the configuration by the 

soldiers. 

But for the ones they attempt—they launched, it was eight-forseven. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Within the constraints of the fact that we are in 

a public setting, within those constraints, is it a fair conclusion 

that each of those two systems I just mentioned, properly posi-
20 

tioned, would have a high degree of probability of success against 

the rogue missile threats that you assess exist today? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, against the vast majority, the 99 percent 

I was referring to, yes. Against the longest-range ones, ICBMs, the 

way we are configured today, no, but that is what we are proceeding with on the Ascent-Phase Intercept, to give them that capability so they could handle missiles of all ranges. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. 

My time has expired. Thank you very much. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Andrews. 

I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, five minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Madam Chairman, before we start the questions, 

I have to make an unfortunate announcement. 

Yesterday, the first female Air Force Academy graduate to die in 

combat was killed by an improvised explosive device (IED) near 

Kabul, Afghanistan. So, I would ask, if you could, ask for a moment 

of silence. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I think that is appropriate. 

The committee will have a moment of silence in honor of the lost 

Airman. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Lieutenant Roslyn Schulte. 

[Moment of silence.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. 

General O’Reilly, here is a question about KEI. I am concerned 

with the decision announced on May 7th to cancel KEI, kinetic energy interceptor, in fiscal year 2010, followed by the Missile Defense Agency issuing a stop-work order on the program. 

Likewise, it is troubling that these decisions to immediately halt 

the program and disallow the rest of the 2009 funding, which had 

been approved and directed by Congress, was made without a 

chance for congressional review. 

But would you still consider proceeding with the planned KEI 

missile test this fall in as much as the engine set has been built 

and already delivered to the test site. Over $1 billion in taxpayer 

funds have already been invested in the program, and the completion of such a test would likely yield important scientific data that 

could prove useful in future missile defense R&D efforts. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, first of all, the motivation for the stopwork was we have a legal liability for termination of over $39 million. Since no money was proposed for fiscal year 2010, I have got 

a responsibility to ensure that I can have enough funding in fiscal 

year 2009 to cover the termination agreements I have with Northrop Grumman and the other companies involved. 

So, that was first of all. I have to protect that. And that was not 

sufficient, under the existing plan proposed by the company, in 

order to also pay for the flight test. 

Second of all, there was three tests that were required, as the 

contractor proposed prior to the flight test, again, they have had 

technical difficulties with components and so forth. The program— 

the original schedule proposed a year—two years ago, they are a 

year behind in that. And when we looked at the remaining activities they have, including the additional ground testing, we did not 
21 

see that it was feasible. Our estimate was it would be done, at earliest, if everything was successful, would be December. 

But, I have modified the stop-work order and asked the company 

to propose to me so we can evaluate, is there a proposed way in 

which they believe they could execute the test in the timeframe, 

within the funding, and still cover the legal liabilities that I have. 

Also, I have asked in the stop-work order to have a thorough review of the program. A lot of the technologies developed in KEI are 

directly applicable to what we are referring to in the ascent phase. 

So, we want to ensure we leverage that technology and expertise 

and the follow-on work that then would benefit not just KEI, but 

all the missile systems we are deploying. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. 

What are the Department of Defense’s plans for Ground-based 

Missile Defense, and why should Congress have any confidence 

that MDA can support ‘‘robust R&D,’’ as the Secretary of Defense 

has talked about, to improved Ground-based Missile Defense, including plans for testing years into the future, when budget priorities may shift money away from Ground-based Missile Defense in 

the future? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the limitation we are proposing on GBI is 

the 30 silos, because it was related to the rate at which we need 

to launch interceptors and the number of interceptors we need to 

put in the air to counter any rogue-nation threats that are in the 

air at the same time. 

However, it is dependent on an extensive architecture, the GBI 

program. In all of those other areas, we are upgrading those programs and they will be feeding better discrimination data, command and control data, and so forth, for the interceptors. 

We designed the missile so the basic missile itself had a large capacity for new software. We can upload that software in the missiles in the silos. It was done as forethought ahead of time. 

So, we will continue the lab work of our testing, the command 

and control work, the development of the additional nodes that tie 

into the GMD system, and, for example, our forward-based radars 

and our Sea-Based X–Band (SBX) radar. 

All of those upgrades also directly feed to the GBI’s capability of 

killing a target. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. 

And, lastly, in light of the $1.2 billion decrease in MDA funding, 

can you identify any underfunded programs that would strengthen 

missile defense if you had additional dollars and would put them 

next in the list of priorities? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the part of the missile defense architecture that we can benefit the most from is our ability to see threats 

as early as possible and get an accurate track. So, we are launching two satellites in August on a Delta IV out of Cape Canaveral, 

and we are planning on utilizing them in future intercept tests 

over the next couple of years. 

What we need is a constellation—or would be a significant benefit to the missile defense architecture, if we had a constellation 

that provided persistent surveillance and cold-body tracking of cold 

bodies after they have boosted. 
22 

That is one area. Another area is the development of airborne 

sensors; and we are working very closely with the Predator office 

and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) looking at how can we exploit that capability in order to, again, get early surveillance. 

The interceptor would give us some improvement, but early surveillance and persistent surveillance would give us the greatest leverage. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. 

I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from New 

Mexico, Mr. Heinrich. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General Kehler, General O’Reilly, I want to thank you for joining 

us today. I want to address my first question to General Kehler. 

General, as you know, Operationally Responsive Space’s headquarters is in my district in Albuquerque, as well as the Space Development and Test Wing. And I was very pleased to hear of the 

successful launch of the Tactical Satellite–3 (TacSat–3) on Tuesday 

night, and I certainly congratulate you, Director Wegner, and all 

those involved with that launch, on that successful launch. 

Earlier this week, the Air Force released its Unfunded Priority 

List, which listed ORS as number 3 out of 20. And I wanted to ask 

you if you could explain, specifically, what you think could be accomplished by funding this priority? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. 

We are delighted, as well, with the successful launch of TacSat– 

3. It was another step in what we believe is a very promising way 

forward for smaller satellites with highly capable payloads that 

will be useful for the warfighters. 

What we are doing, now that we have launched TacSat–3, we are 

already on to the construction of the next ORS-like vehicle called 

ORS Satellite Number 1, ORS Sat–1. And the difference is, the 

TacSat series has been developmental, if you will. 

ORS–1 is actually now taking a need from one of the combatant 

commanders and trying to apply operationally responsive principles 

to assembling and launching that. We have given ourselves a fixed 

time to do that in. We have given ourselves a fixed budget to do 

that in. But we have also given ourselves some off-ramps where we 

can make decisions. 

Part of that Unfunded Requirement would be the next increment, if we get to the right decision point, and then decide to go 

forward with this ORS Satellite Number 1, that we can actually 

make it within the kinds of parameters, very aggressive parameters, that we have set up. 

And then assuming that is right, the next piece is for the second 

of those satellites, which would complete the combatant commanders needs in a certain orbit. You cannot cover everything they 

need covered with one satellite. I know you know that. But, we 

would need to put a second one on orbit. That is what this does. 

It completes the first one, goes to the second one. 

Mr. HEINRICH. I actually think you probably answered my second 

question, which related to consulting our combatant commanders 

in terms of what might be included on that ORS Sat–1. 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. 
23 

In fact, this is answering, specifically, a need from Central Command (CENTCOM). They have identified, among a number of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), shortfalls that they 

have that we are addressing; for example, even bigger picture in 

the Air Force with increased Global Hawk, Predator orbit, et 

cetera. 

They have also asked us to do some things that are best done 

from space, and those are infrared (IR) coverage, and that is what 

we will do. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Great. Well, thank you General Kehler. 

I want to ask—sort of move to a different topic for General 

O’Reilly. 

You know, I am a believer in maintaining a multilayered missile 

defense structure, and one of the programs that we have invested 

a lot over the years and, because of my background in directed energy that had a real interest in, is the Airborne Laser, which I 

think presents a lot of value in areas of directed-energy research, 

as well as potential in both the boost and ascent phase. 

I wanted to ask you if you could discuss sort of what the Department’s plan is for applying ABL’s work to other directed-energy efforts, and what plans are in store for the program after the forthcoming tests and shootdown this fall? 

General O’REILLY. Thank you, sir. 

First of all, the achievement of the Airborne Laser last year was 

truly revolutionary. We were able to fire a laser to a target that 

was 80 kilometers or farther away in the Earth’s atmosphere, and 

the system normally shoots upward, so this is more difficult. 

We were able to measure the diffusion of the laser beam over 

this range and receive a return off the target and then compensate 

for that defocusing by the atmosphere, like your glasses, and we actually fired the laser, then, using adaptive optics with a defocused 

laser, and we used the Earth’s atmosphere to focus it. 

So, what happened was we had a very precise laser, we have 

done it 12 times. So we have convinced ourselves that that breakthrough technology is directly applicable for any time a high-powered laser is fired in the atmosphere. And we did it repeatedly. 

That gave us the confidence to move on to take the high-powered 

laser, the 1.3 megawatt-class chemical oxygen iodine laser (COIL), 

we have installed it in the aircraft. The aircraft has flown for several weeks now. It is going through flight checkout, and we are updating the optics on it. But we are convinced that we have solved 

the largest fundamental problem. 

We have also fired that large laser on the ground at Edwards Air 

Force Base over 70 times and at full power. So, it is a matter of 

integrating them onboard the aircraft, and that gives us the confidence for this year. 

However, this is revolutionary technology. We still must prove it. 

So we have a shoot-down planned in the fall against a couple of 

targets, and then if we are unsuccessful, this budget supports another attempt later on in the wintertime. If that is unsuccessful, 

a third attempt in the springtime. If that is unsuccessful, I will go 

back to the Secretary of Defense and propose either termination or 

some other decision. 
24 

If it is successful, we will continue to use it as a research and 

development platform. It has given great indications that it can be 

put on military aircraft of a smaller size and be much more 

deployable. 

So those are the type of things we would like to pursue before 

we begin a Tail 2-type development. 

Mr. HEINRICH. You meant when it is successful this fall, right? 

General O’REILLY. Sir? 

Mr. HEINRICH. Sorry. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. [Laughter.] 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

General O’REILLY. We do want to prove it. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Yes. Absolutely. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Heinrich. 

I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Arizona, 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well thank you, Madam Chair. Madam Chair, I 

guess the first thing I would like to do is just to identify with the 

ranking member’s comments in his opening statement, and also 

with Mr. Heinrich’s comments and inquiries related to the Airborne 

Laser. I think that is very insightful. 

Let me thank both of you for being here. I never want to forget 

that while those of us on this panel talk a lot about freedom, it is 

people such as yourselves that give all of your life to it and sometimes, literally, give your life for it. And you are the most noble 

people we have in our society. 

And often times, I think it is probably the most manifest in that 

you take whatever we do, imprudent or not, and you do the very 

best you can to protect this country. And I am very grateful to you. 

I have two new little babies, so I am more grateful than I have 

ever been to what you do, because what you do today certainly affects generations to come. 

One, perhaps, example that I might mention, General O’Reilly, 

in your testimony you talked about some of the legal impediments 

in the law in the last Congress that, perhaps, has impeded progress 

on the European site. 

And I continue to believe that the missile defense, and especially 

related to the European site, could potentially have the ability to 

devalue a nuclear program in Iran and help some of our other ancillary efforts to keep that country from going nuclear, which I feel 

is an imperative of the highest priority and may keep us from facing a, you know, a Jihadist terrorism in our own country. 

So, with that, General O’Reilly, let me direct my first question 

to you, sir. Pretty basic question: Do you believe that the threat 

from long-range missiles has increased or decreased in the last six 

months, as it relates to the homeland here? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I believe it has increased significantly, 

and I base that assumption on the intelligence information. I am 

a customer. I do not develop intelligence, but I use it. And the demonstration of the capability of the Iranian ability to put a satellite 

in orbit, albeit small, shows that they are progressing in that technology. 
25 

Additionally, the Iranians yesterday demonstrated a solid-rocket 

motor test, which is much more feasible to deploy and sustain in 

the field, and that is disconcerting. 

Third, the North Koreans demonstrated, even though their attempt to put a satellite in orbit failed, they had a first and second 

stage that performed fairly well, which, again, shows that they are 

improving in their capacity, and we are very concerned about that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Sure. 

Well, I know that the reports that you mentioned show a difference in the strategic emphasis from 2002 to 2010, and I am hoping, just for the ability to educate the committee, that any reports 

or data that you are able to release to the committee that would 

help us understand, for instance—related to the ground-based midcourse. I think that some of your testimony is very compelling, and 

I would hope that any information or studies that you reference in 

your testimony, would that be possible to give that to the committee? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Thank you. 

Let me shift gears here on you. I think probably related to GBI, 

there has been a lot of questions that I will not repeat. But the 

manufacturing line and industrial base continues to be a great concern in any situation that we face. When does the line go cold for 

the second- and third-tier suppliers, and how will this affect your 

ability to keep options open for the future production of groundbased interceptors? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, for the lower-tier suppliers, the last procurement of the current 44 GBIs was made in 2008 and there was 

some long-lead procurements before that. So, their deliveries are 

occurring this year. 

One area that we are looking at is to upgrade the avionics of the 

missile fleet. And those are the types of initiatives the Secretary 

if referring to as continuing that work so that we have flexibility 

to respond to the decisions of the QDR and others, the Ballistic 

Missile Defense Review. 

So, we have attempted to be as flexible as possible from a programmatic point of view on those ultimate decisions, so that we are 

not prematurely limiting our ability to have an industrial base to 

produce GBIs. 

Also, the refurbishment program does replace a large part of the 

missile avionics system and other components, and so, by having 

a refurbishment program, also keeps the supplier base active to 

supply those components. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, again, I thank you both very much for your 

service to the country. 

And thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Franks. 

I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from South 

Carolina, Mr. Spratt. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thanks very much. 

General, [audio break] talk about the significance and size of this 

program . . . [INAUDIBLE] . . . to bring that money to a current 
26 

value in today’s dollars, we have probably spent $150 billion trying 

to master the threats of missile defense and the threat of other 

missile attacks. And clearly the threat is out there, but there are 

additional threats on top of that. 

Thank you, sir. Shows you my technical expertise. 

Let us cut straight to the BMD, or the GMD. In a way, you diminish that program with faint praise by cutting it from 44 back 

to 30. Is this because you have reassessed the threat posed by 

rogue enemies, or is it because the system itself has limitations 

and there may be better options? 

And if the STSS turns out to be successful and proves that we 

can master the track and also that we can discriminate, is there 

a future for this system that is beyond the size that you have in 

mind right now? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, for the GMD system, sir, we believe that 

the threat continues to grow, but what we are watching is the rate 

at which these missiles can be launched, the raid size, how many 

can be launched at one time. That is critical to us to determine 

what size missile field do we need to respond. That is one. 

Second of all, the STSS program is a pathfinder for what we are 

exploring as a satellite system that is focused on basic functionality 

so that we do not run into the pitfalls we have seen in other satellite programs of cost and schedule overrun, and so forth, and I 

know General Kehler can respond to that better. 

But we are trying to narrow the requirement so that it delivers 

exactly what we need in a manner that uses proven technology for 

that program, so—— 

Mr. SPRATT. We have been following these systems, the SBIRSHigh and the SBIRS-Low and now the STSS for a long time, and 

their potential was always just over the horizon. 

Are you confident that we are about to know whether or not it 

can perform the mission? If not, we may have to look elsewhere for 

something of its—— 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

We are going to launch those satellites, those demonstrators, 

those two, in August, and we have a robust test program for the 

next year-and-a-half to demonstrate all of its capability. And that 

may be its shelf life, but traditionally they last on orbit much 

longer than that, and we are going to take advantage of every possibility we can to test this system and use it in different ways to 

prove out the benefit of a satellite constellation system for ballistic 

missile defense surveillance. 

Mr. SPRATT. General O’Reilly, you testified before that there has 

been an increase of 5,900, I believe, of various missiles, but the 

vast majority of those, 93 percent, I believe, are short-range and 

medium-range missiles. 

Are we putting our money in the right place? Are we developing 

systems like the—adequate systems—like the THAAD and the Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC–3) to counter the threat, or is 

there something else? Should not this be where we are putting substantial resources since this is where the threat primarily resides 

right now? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, our intent is, this is a fiscal year 2010 

budget. But, our intent is to increase the production capacity for 
27 

both those systems so that we can, in our out-years, we are exploring to triple the number that we previously were going to procure 

for the very reason you said, sir. 

So, we have a near-term greater capability against those shorterrange threats to cover our deployed forces and our allies. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

General KEHLER. And, Madam Chairwoman, if I could just add 

a point, Mr. Spratt, sir, just as a point of reference. 

The first two SBIRS payloads are, in fact, flying. Payload number one—— 

Mr. SPRATT. SBIRS-high? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. Well, it is the elliptical orbit, but yes 

sir, it is a part of the SBIRS-high program. The first two are flying. 

The first one is performing exceptionally well—has been handed 

over to the Commander of Strategic Command (STRATCOM) for 

use. 

The second one is also flying and about two-thirds of the way 

through checkout and looks very promising, just as a point of reference. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Spratt. 

I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And, General—start with General Kehler this time. 

With the termination of the TSAT, it leaves open the question of 

the future of protected communications-on-the-move. And the increase from four to six satellites for AEHF, as well as the addition 

of the seventh for advanced procurement for WGS, brings home the 

question whether, you know, whether or not we are going to continue to have what we projected to be a TSAT capability. Is it going 

to migrate to AEHF or WGS, and I am just curious, in terms of 

thinking ahead on this, what the answer to that might be? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. 

The decision on TSAT was really made in the context of all of 

the budget decisions. The requirement to provide for protected communications-on-the-move remains—protected communications 

across the board, really, but the requirement remains. 

But when you have to get to the source of capabilities the TSAT 

was going to bring is really the question. And in the context of the 

other budget decisions, some of the big demand for protected communications-on-the-move has slipped to the right with the other 

budget decisions. 

That has given us an opportunity to continue on a pathway that 

we have just really started. First of all is WGS, which is wideband 

unprotected, but very wideband, highly-capable pipes that we are 

putting up in the sky. 

The first one of those is flying—has been turned over to the combatant commander for use. The second one is on orbit and in checkout, and it looks like that is going to be a highly successful program. 

We then will continue to fly for a little while longer the Milstar 

system until we can put the first of the Advanced EHF satellites 

on orbit. It looks to us like we can—the decisions that Congress 

made last year to go to a fourth AEHF now gives us an opportunity 
28 

to harvest some of the technology out of TSAT, bring that into Advanced EHF, and potentially WGS. 

At the same time, we will be still relying, at some level, on commercial satellite communications. The question for us to come back 

and answer to you is what that mixture looks like and how quickly 

we can pull into the protected piece of this, some of those technologies we have already invested in in TSAT. 

Mr. LARSEN. So, I guess a base, or bottom line on that, or a headline from that is that it may be early to make a decision on whether—on where that potential capability should migrate to, the TSAT 

capability? 

General KEHLER. I think we are—well, what we know is that we 

will infuse some of that technology into Advanced EHF. The question is—and perhaps WGS as well—the question is how, and in 

what kind of blocks. 

What we do not want to do, sir, is make the mistake that we 

have made in the past about having requirements that we cannot 

quite get our arms around at this point. We need to go deliberately. 

We need to use our ‘‘block-build’’ approach, and we need to pull in 

those things that make the most sense. 

Mr. LARSEN. And I suggest to you that we do not want to help 

you make those mistakes, as well. 

General O’Reilly, the MDEB was constituted in this past year 

and I think that, was it January 21st of 2009 is when it first really 

came into—it does not matter—it came into place. 

General O’REILLY. Actually, it was July of the previous year, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. July of 2008. 

Was MDEB involved, then, in this year’s—in the development of 

the fiscal year 2010 missile defense budget? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

They have reviewed the budget and provided the input to it 

twice, and I presented to the Missile Defense Executive Board, that 

was well-attended, the proposals, and then their input went forward to the Secretary of Defense. 

Mr. LARSEN. And was this the first time in the history of the 

agency, the Missile Defense Agency, that the budget was then developed with that additional oversight, as opposed to MDA going 

directly to SecDef and then to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and then to the President, and then to us? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, this was the first time we had the benefit 

of the, not only the process, but also the products that, for example, 

the combatant commanders, STRATCOM is required in this process to provide a Prioritized Capabilities List, which I responded to. 

And then they even evaluated my response and provided a Capability Assessment Report, which had a strong influence on this 

budget of—they rated us red, yellow, green on responding to their 

priorities, and that input was also provided to the MDEB. 

The products and the subcommittees were all working throughout this process. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you very much. 

My time is up. The point I wanted to make is just that there is— 

I know we are having this debate about missile defense and I appreciate it as well. But it is really not just a matter of your debate, 

sorry, your budget showing up to us from the Secretary of Defense. 
29 

It sounds like a more robust review, even before it got to that level, 

than we have seen before. That is what it sounds like to me—the 

internal review within the Department. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. 

I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Rhode 

Island, Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General Kehler, General O’Reilly, thank you for your testimony 

here today. 

I have a couple of questions. First one, more in a broad sense 

and how you make your decisions. How robust is your effort in conducting an analysis of alternatives, as other technologies mature, 

and being able to incorporate them into existing programs? 

You know, we spent a lot of money in Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) developing cutting-edge technologies. I am always skeptical of expensive weapons systems and 

their ability to adapt to new technologies that emerge, you know, 

for example, the ABL using a chemical laser, and if there were to 

be advances in solid-state lasers, could you and would you be able 

to adapt to incorporating that type of technology on ABL, for example, even though you have invested so much time, effort, and 

money into developing a chemical laser. 

So can you talk to me about your robust effort in doing analysis 

of alternatives? How does that process work? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, that is a maturing process that is associated with the establishment of the Missile Defense Executive 

Board run by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. 

The expectation in that board, though, is that the analysis that 

was done to support these decisions is on par with the analysis 

that was done in other milestone decisions. Again, this is a maturing process for the Missile Defense Agency. 

A good example would be we are looking at extending the range 

of the THAAD missile. Before we do that though, we are in a very 

collaborative analysis of alternatives and assessment by the Army, 

the Joint Staff, the Missile Defense Agency, all reporting out to the 

Missile Defense Executive Board. 

So that adds a level of scrutiny at that level that had not existed 

before in a formalized process. Also, I am the acquisition executive 

for the early stages of development, and although we are exempt 

from 5,000, the DOD processes for acquisition, I am reviewing the 

use of a milestone process for my sake, in order to conduct extensive analysis and evaluation of alternatives before we initiate contracts in the way that you are referring to, sir. 

And that is for the initial milestones. A full-scale development, 

I am soliciting the participation of the service acquisition executives that I am going to—that is ultimately going to receive this capability, so that together we are reviewing these programs before 

we execute large contracts. 

We do work with DARPA and we have had exchanges with them 

and we are investing in solid-state laser on the side as a technology 

program. 
30 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you for your answer, General. 

General O’Reilly, I know that some of these things you have 

talked about in your opening statement and some members have 

touched on them, but just again for my comfort level, the budget 

request increases funding for the Aegis BMD and THAAD programs by $900 million, while terminating the Multiple Kill Vehicle, 

Kinetic Energy Interceptor, and adding the approaches of the second Airborne Laser prototype. 

Can you talk a little more about the Department’s rationale for 

the significant increase in funding in these two programs and cutting back on the other three? And also why were these decisions 

made prior to the completion of the Administration’s missile defense policy and strategy review? And finally, does this reflect a 

shift in focus from long-range threats to more short- and mediumrange threats? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the Missile Defense Executive Board process allowed the warfighter a strong voice on what priorities of capabilities they need and what risk assessments are out there. The 

Joint Staff, or the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), 

over a year ago, approved a study that showed that we were deficient in the number of Aegis and THAAD missile systems. 

And so that was an endorsed study from the previous two years 

ago, and so therefore with the scrutiny that that study has had, 

and the endorsement it has had, we move forward with those procurements because the threat to those forces exists today, and we 

wanted to, as quickly as possible, respond to both those requirements that were endorsed by the Vice Chiefs of the Services and 

meet the threat that we saw out there. 

The other shift, though, is primarily, we—part of the Missile Defense Executive Board is it does review the threat. And it does review the intelligence and so forth. And we are aiming the research 

and development, along with the deployment of the most mature 

systems we have, to respond to the large preponderance of the 

threat which is in the short and medium ranges. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And the issue of waiting for the completion of the 

Administration’s missile defense policy and strategy review? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, there is a lot of decisions that we did not 

make, such as to keep the GBI line—to terminate that line. We did 

not. And there is an example of we are maintaining programmatic 

flexibility awaiting for those decisions, those policy decisions, to be 

made later this year and announced through the QDR and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. 

So we wanted to be as responsive as we could, as quick as we 

could, to the combatant commanders’ request for missile defense 

capability—at the same time, allow programmatic flexibility for 

those policy decisions that will be made later on this year. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General. 

I yield back. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

I think we will go into a second round of questions. 

General O’Reilly, the United States and Israel are jointly developing an upper-tier missile defense system to engage potential ballistic missile threats to Israel at longer ranges. Israel’s preferred 

alternative is to develop a new missile, the Arrow–3. However, I 
31 

understand that successful development of the Arrow–3 system is 

considered a high risk. 

What are the key risk areas? Are we exploring alternative ways 

of assisting Israel to meet its upper-tier requirement? And how 

likely is it that Arrow–3 will be able to meet the schedule of deploying in initial capability by 2014? 

General O’REILLY. Ma’am, the design for the Arrow–3 missile 

system shows it will be an extremely capable missile. It is very advanced. It is a more advanced design than we have ever attempted 

in the United States with our programs. That is due to the way 

that the seeker has great flexibility, and it has other propulsion 

systems. It will be an extremely capable system. 

However, associated with that advanced development is the 

schedule that goes along with that and the timelines in which we 

saw, we are not in a position to say they cannot achieve those technical accomplishments. And we hope they do, and we are very supportive of that process. 

But we saw particularly the schedules in which they were proposing, I had deemed, and I had had independent studies deem, as 

very high-risk for a missile development program. 

So, our assessment is that it is unlikely that they can meet the 

schedule, which they had laid out to accomplish all of these technical achievements, at this time. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

It was our understanding that Mr. Rogers from Alabama was 

going to have an opportunity to speak after the first round, but 

since we are going to wait for the second—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. No one consulted with me on that. If they had 

consulted me, I would have said that having two—— 

Mr. TURNER. That is fine. 

Ms. TAUSCHER [continuing]. Two different hearings at once would 

have made it difficult to do that. 

Mr. TURNER. That is absolutely fine. It was really a staff communication to us. So we understand, Madam Chairman, that that was 

not your call. But in order to facilitate his schedule, I am going to 

yield to him a portion of my time. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the ranking member. 

Generals, thank you both for being here, and thank you for your 

service. 

General O’Reilly, I want to pick up on our conversation from last 

week about these GBIs. Well, first of all, when you were talking 

to Mr. Langevin, I thought you said you were delaying the decision 

on the GBIs until later—the termination of that. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, that is the production line. We have not 

proposed that we would stop the production line or any potential 

for future buys of GBI. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is—— 

General O’REILLY. What we had stopped was the going beyond 

30 missile silos. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. So then as far as tests are concerned, I know 

that of the 44 you are going to use 10 for testing. So you are not— 
32 

at least on this date—you are not planning to discontinue production so that you will have some future interceptors for tests? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

We are, in fact, in parallel to this effort, going through a test review with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the 

service Operational Test Agencies. And we are identifying quite a 

number of tests that we are going to need in the future that will 

require GBI participations, including salvos of GBIs. 

So that—we are completing that work now and that will be another indicator of the number of ultimate GBIs we would need for 

the purpose of testing. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

You talked earlier when the ranking member was asking you 

about the logic for 30 as opposed to 44 being deployed, and you basically said you looked for somebody to tell you why we had 44, and 

you never had been able to get an answer. 

General O’REILLY. Well, sir, it was the best I can tell. I have not 

seen an analysis, but the best I can tell, it was a judgment based 

on where the threat would be today driven by how many rogue-nation intercontinental ballistic-type missiles could be launched at 

one time in this timeframe. And, of course, it was very hard to 

judge risk or the threat, and that was a judgment done many years 

ago. But that was the best understanding I have today of how the 

number got to be 40, at that time. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I understand your interest in the AscentPhase Interceptor, and I like that idea. I just do not understand 

why we would diminish a level or a layer of our current capability 

while we are waiting on that, I think exciting, technology to mature. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, in the GBI assessment or analysis, we did 

go back and look at what we know today and what the Intelligence 

Community can identify as the ability for the threat to launch multiple. 

We need a GBI capability. We realize that. And we need to have 

one that is sustained for decades. 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. 

General O’REILLY. We realize that, and we have not shut the 

door to that at all. 

In the area of the execution of those other programs, which we 

terminated, their execution was delivering very late, it was very 

high-risk. We want that capability, but although boost-phase capability would be ideal, our assessment of the risk of achieving that 

is very high. 

Yet, very close to boost-phase is ascent-phase, and we thought it 

was much more achievable, and we want to have enough interceptors so that we can respond in volume with a large number of 

interceptors responding back to those threats. 

And so we are trying to explore, and we are pursuing ways, to 

take our given force structure today and make it more powerful 

and more of a deterrence to these type of launches. 

Mr. ROGERS. How much money is in the budget for that ascentphase technology development? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, if look at what we are strictly going to be 

investing in, it is focused at about $368 million this year. But it 
33 

leverages the interceptor work and over $1.5 billion that is going 

on in the development of the rest of the system that the ascentphase adds that first layer of defense. 

So, it is going to be working with—it is going to be developed in 

consonance with that other $1.5 billion. So I did not advertise $1.8 

billion in that area because I believe that is not a fair assessment. 

But there is $368 million that is directly going to give us this 

type of capability to use the rest of the system this way. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate that. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Larsen, do you have any second-round questions for five minutes? 

Mr. LARSEN. Not at this time, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Lamborn for five minutes? 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

General Kehler, how does the $136.4 million increase in Space 

Situational Awareness funding in the fiscal year 2010 budget reduce the vulnerability of our space assets, and will the increase enable the DOD to share SSA data to prevent accidents like the Iridium collision in February? 

General KEHLER. Sir, with the increased importance of space 

comes some interesting issues, one of which is an increased need 

for us to have better situational awareness of what is there. 

Space becomes more crowded all the time. We look at over 19,000 

objects that we actively track on orbit. There are hundreds, certainly, thousands, perhaps even more that are there that we do not 

see—nuts, bolts, washers, screws, things that have been part of the 

cost of doing business on orbit. And so it is important for us to increase our situational awareness. 

In the 2010 budget, the increases that we have asked for for situational awareness are not because of program overruns. They are 

not because of difficulties that we are having. We are looking to 

target that fiscal year 2010 investment at being able to use our existing sensors better. And that means being able to understand the 

data, collect more data from the existing sensors, put it together 

better, and put it to better use. 

In the meantime, as we are working our way down this road, we 

are increasing our computing capability today, as well as the number of human beings who are analysts who can look at the data 

and decide when a collision might occur. 

That money is actually being spent right now, today. It is not, 

by budget standards, it is not a huge amount of money. We expect 

to have much better capability to predict potential collisions by the 

end of this year. 

We are better today than we were when the collision occurred 

back in February. We will be better tomorrow than we are today. 

But that is at using the data that we already have and being able 

to use it better. 

As we go into 2010, we will begin to pull more sensors into that 

mixture, and I think we will be able to do better sooner not by worrying about new sensors, although there is some of that in that 

budget. We will put a new sensor on orbit here later this year that 

will allow us to observe objects on orbit better. 
34 

But by and large, this near-term investment is to make our operations center better. They can process the data better, display it 

better, and give human beings some better understanding of what 

they need to do, and how they need to go about it. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. 

General O’Reilly, the budget request includes only $51 million for 

a European capability. Does this low funding level indicate a 

change of Administration position or lack of support for European 

missile defense? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, it does not. It reflects the legal restraints 

I have from last year’s Authorization and Appropriation Act. Fiftyone million is about the extent I can execute this year without the 

ratification of the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements of the 

Czech Republic and Poland. 

We are continuing the two-stage GBI development, which also is 

part of the European capability and the development and deployment of forward-based radars, which are also part of that architecture. 

But I am limited to that amount; that was my estimate as how 

much I could do without these other constraints being met. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. 

On Tuesday, a Washington Post article referenced a study by the 

EastWest Institute, an independent think tank based in Moscow, 

New York, and Belgium, that concluded the proposed European 

missile defense system is ‘‘ineffective against the kind of missiles 

Iran is likely to deploy.’’ 

General O’Reilly, you do not agree with that assessment, do you? 

General O’REILLY. No, sir, I do not. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And why not? [Laughter.] 

General O’REILLY. Sir, a lot of the assumptions they use in these 

type of assessments are not accurate and they do not reflect our 

true capability—our specifications, what we have demonstrated, 

also what we know of the threat, for what I have access to in intelligence, it does not correlate to the basic assumptions that they use 

in that study and others I have seen like that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Madam Chairman, I yield back. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. Langevin, from Rhode island, for five minutes? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General O’Reilly, it has come to my attention that MDA has set 

aside money for THAAD batteries but not radars. I was concerned 

that the goal of the Administration appealed more to THAAD systems and may be hampered by a limit in the X–band radars and 

production to accompany the batteries. 

What is MDA’s plan for dealing with the gap in deployable radars to the new THAAD systems, and when does MDA begin the 

procurement of the radar to meet the Administration’s goals? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we do not have a gap in the radar between the radars and the batteries. This radar is a multifunction 

radar. It can operate with the THAAD unit for tactical defense, and 

it can also operate standalone as a forward-based radar for strategic-type threats, long-range, IRBM, ICBM, on its own. 
35 

So, what we have procured is enough for the THAAD units 

today, and additional radars to also produce in that same function, 

we are developing the software so that these radars can operate in 

one function or the other, and they are interchangeable. 

So, this concern may be the concern that they do not see a radar 

matched to a particular battery. We did that on purpose so that we 

have a pool of radars and any of them can support that battery. 

But we have the seventh radar being delivered this year and we 

have four THAAD units previously. With this budget, we are proposing additional THAAD units, two more, and with those THAAD 

units come radars. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General. 

That was all I had, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. Franks for five minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General O’Reilly, earlier you had just mentioned briefly the complexity of the Arrow–3, and this was not really one going to be one 

of my questions, but I was somewhat fascinated that, potentially, 

it has the potential to have some paradigm shifts in missile defense 

capability. 

And I understand that there is at least an effort to make sure 

that that process stays alive to see if they make their knowledge 

points and it is because the Israelis, as you know, certainly have 

shown the ability to shock the world, many times. 

And I am hoping that we can make sure that if that is to happen 

again, it can be good for the United States and for Israel. So I am 

glad to see that there is still an effort there to see how they do with 

the Arrow–3. 

The committee—in fact, you cited the Joint Staff’s joint capability, the Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM) study conclusion that twice 

the number of Aegis and THAAD interceptors are required, and to 

the budgets, in my judgment, they did that, and I think that is a 

credit to those who did. 

What studies have been done to identify the force-structure requirements for the rest of the missile defense architecture, like for 

example, you know, GMD or Patriot or radars and other sensors. 

Have there been other studies that, you know, to identify the force 

requirements? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, over the past year, we have also had great 

success in establishing Memorandums of Agreements with the 

Services. And in the case of the Army, I signed one with the Secretary of the Army in January. 

Part of that created a board of directors in which would review 

those exact studies so that we have Army input, we participate 

with the Army, and we make joint decisions. The programs you 

mentioned are all Army programs, and that is how we have worked 

through the Army force development process of their Army staff to 

determine what are the force structure requirements for the Army. 

Mr. FRANKS. And, again, without pressing you too hard here, are 

there copies that would be available to the committee that would 

give us some clarification as to what the rationale was in many of 

those case? 
36 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I will have to go back and look at that, 

but I will go back to the Army and make that request. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 119.] 

Mr. FRANKS. I would appreciate it, General. Sure would. 

Let me then shift gears again. You know, there have been at 

least one study that has examined alternatives to the proposed 

missile defense system in Europe, and the independent assessment 

conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), which was 

required by the fiscal 2008 budget. 

Have you seen any alternatives to the current proposal that are 

more cost-effective in providing defense of Europe and the U.S. 

than the existing plan? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we are going through that cost-estimating 

process right now. There are several alternatives that it, again, it 

is driven by the assumptions, 30-year life, those type of assumptions. 

But the current proposal for an upper-tier defense, which is what 

was proposed—upper-tier against long-range threats. We have not 

seen a proposal that is less costly than that. 

But we are also evaluating, and the Department is evaluating, 

the protection of all of NATO, and that is more costly when you 

bring in other units because you need shorter-range units to protect the southern tier from Iran, which is the focus of this. 

But for the upper tier, for the lowest cost of protecting for the 

upper tier would be the program of record, at this time. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, one of the alternatives that I have seen, you 

know, would provide protection for Europe, but it would not provide protection for the homeland. And I just want to make sure, 

you know, that the protection of the United States is still a necessary criteria for the Administration’s plans for the European site. 

Is that still your understanding? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. And there are analyses going on and 

assessments by the Department as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review that have not been complete yet. But, from that point 

of view, the requirement I have had, the guidance I have had, is 

for the protection of the United States and Europe. 

Mr. FRANKS. General, I hope you are successful. Thank you, sir. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Obviously, a lot of the questions that you are receiving today concern the reduction of the 44 GBIs to 30—is a concern of not only 

the level of protection that we have but also looking forward and 

our capabilities to support our industrial base. 

There is concern in second- and third-tier suppliers where reports indicate could be without work at the end of this year, which 

results in the issues of loss of capability and cost for restarting 

versus cost for maintaining. 

You had indicated before the 44, perhaps, was arbitrary. You believe that you have some basis for looking at 30. But one of the 

issues that has been raised in the numbers that you are going to 

be reducing the ground-based interceptors to is the issue of sustaining flight testing. 
37 

According to the budget request, 10 of the remaining 14 GBIs not 

deployed will be used for test assets. Assuming two flights per 

year, and perhaps the salvo test, the expectation is that you would 

run out of test GBIs before the end of the Future Years Defense 

Program (FYDP). Once these 10 GBIs are used up, do you see the 

need for further GMD flight testing? And then the context in which 

this information has been highlighted is the issue that, currently, 

for our ICBMs and our Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles 

(SLBMs), you say they are two to three times—there are flight 

tests. 

My understanding is that, General Kehler has indicated that before the Senate Armed Service Committee—that you would like to 

go from three flight tests to four flight tests. The concern is, obviously, is that with the reduction, you are going to run out of the 

ability to conduct tests of something that, perhaps, if you look at 

other programs, we will need a continuous sustainment, not just 

for determining whether or not it operates but whether or not there 

are upgrades and other types of testing to ensure that it is operational. 

If you are going to run out of these, it does seem that there, perhaps, should be an effort to sustain our industrial base, both the 

second- and third-tier suppliers, so we do not incur a huge cost as 

we go forward with testing. Have you taken that issue into consideration, and what are your thoughts? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, if I can, first is I do not believe I have 

said the 44 was arbitrary, it was just I have not seen the substantiating data that was used for that. It appears to me to have been 

a judgment on risk and on an intel assessment of how many threat 

missiles would be available today, or we would be threatened by, 

for simultaneous launch. 

But, so it was a judgment made on data. It is just that that data 

is still under assessment, and I know what they said and it is not 

the case here—— 

Mr. TURNER. Okay, I guess that is where I accept your correction, however, I guess the concern that everyone has is, well, what 

is the change? Is the data on which it was based lost to you? I 

mean, you say you have not seen it. Because what we would like 

to see is what has changed. 

Everyone’s understanding of the changes of the environment we 

are in is an increasing threat, not a decreasing threat. And so that 

is why everyone is so concerned about your now proposing a decrease. So, in the issue of picking that number, people have concern 

about what data was used. So, if you do have an ability to look 

back at that and give us some comparative, we would appreciate 

it. But your thoughts on the issue of testing, I would appreciate. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

This budget was developed without the benefit of the current test 

review, which is ongoing, that we have testified to before; Dr. 

McQueary, myself, and General Nadeau. We are completing that 

review now. It has an increase in testing over what was previously 

assumed for the purpose of this budget. Those results will go to the 

Missile Defense Executive Board, and we will brief that out for 

judgments made by them in order to inform our proposed budget, 

2011, for the next year. 
38 

In the meantime, my concern has been, as you have stated, to 

focus and ensure that we are addressing the obsolescence process— 

or problems that do occur with any electronic system over time, 

and we are in a position in which to activate the production lines 

if they do go cold or extend those production lines for those suppliers through a refurbishment process. 

What this budget proposed which did not exist before was a formal process where you have additional missiles, spares, intentional. And you recycle them through fleet as a way of measuring 

their performance and understanding their aging. 

These are also fairly extensively tested missiles in their silos 

themselves. They were designed that way up front using the latest 

technology at the time, which was just a few years ago, which is 

much beyond the type of fleets at which we are compared to often, 

the older missile systems that do not have the level of built-in tests 

and they are not monitored in the same way in their environment. 

But even with that, we have an annual maintenance program. 

We have a quarterly program that goes out and looks and measures the performance of each missile. In the past, we have pulled 

missiles and refurbished them because of the instrumentation 

which we have in these silos. 

So, when we put that together, that is also going to be considered 

into the ultimate number of GBIs that we need to procure. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. So I do not mischaracterize what you have 

said, and see if I can get this right, you do believe that there could 

be increased flight testing requirements in looking at sustainment 

of the program. You are evaluating that. You are going to be making recommendations as to what that would be, and it might result 

in a shift in the number of ground-based interceptors that you are 

going to recommend, which could, in turn, then assist sustaining 

the industrial base. 

General O’REILLY. That is correct, sir, as we finish this review 

of what is necessary in order to fully characterize the GMD system. 

Mr. TURNER. And, excuse me if you said, because I did not catch 

it, what is your timeframe for that? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we had testified before we would be complete by now. It is a very complex review involving STRATCOM— 

was added to the process, so we have a warfighter input. We 

thought that was important. 

But our timeframe is June, sir. Next month. 

Mr. TURNER. So, you think that the number of ground-based 

interceptors that—you may have a different number as we move 

forward with this bill, then, for us. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we will propose it to the Missile Defense 

Executive Board as the total results that come out of this testing 

program. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Turner. 

I am about to close the hearing, but I just wanted to make one 

clarification, General O’Reilly, because I think that there is clearly 

some confusion. Do we not already have a defense against some of 

the Iranian long-term threat in the Alaska system? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, ma’am, we do—— 
39 

Ms. TAUSCHER. So the idea that we would have no threat, no deterrent, no defense, unless the European site was built is really 

leading people astray? 

General O’REILLY. Ma’am, the European site is focused on protection of what we do not have in Europe today and redundant coverage of the United States, but it is redundant coverage of what 

we already have. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Well, General Kehler and General O’Reilly, thank you very much 

for being here, once again. We extend our best wishes to people in 

your command, both the civilian and the Guard and the Reserve 

and the folks that are working on active duty, and we appreciate 

your being here. 

You have informed us very well on the number of issues that we 

have a lot of jurisdiction over, so we thank you very much. And the 

hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MAY 21, 2009 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MAY 21, 2009 

(119) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

General O’REILLY. In FY 2010, we will maintain the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) long-range defense capability with missile fields at Fort Greely, AK 

(FGA), and Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), CA, where we will emplace 26 and 

4 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), respectively. While the number of missile silos 

will remain at 26 at FGA, we will transition to newer silos to improve operational 

readiness. Thirty highly ready, operational GBIs will provide the United States with 

a sufficient number of operational interceptors, considering the limited number of 

ICBM launch complexes in North Korea and Iran and the long development time 

required for construction of additional ones. Additional GBIs, beyond the 30 emplaced in silos, will be necessary for maintaining and refreshing an operational fleet 

of GBIs through testing, upgrades and refurbishment. In FY 2010, we also propose 

to fund enhancements to GMD models and simulations, upgrades to increase the 

robustness and reliability of GMD communications; upgrades to command and 

launch systems; and security, infrastructure, and sustainment operations at FGA 

and VAFB. 

In addition to the budget request for GMD, there are other significant midcourse 

defense development activities in our proposed FY 2010 budget intended to enhance 

GMD’s contribution to the BMDS. Approximately $650M beyond the BMD Midcourse Defense program element will benefit and enhance the operation of our longrange defenses, namely, test planning and execution and target development ($160.6 

million); development and operation of the Sea-Based X–Band radar ($174.6 million); software development, system engineering, and External Sensors Lab work for 

the AN/TPY–2 X–Band radar ($201 million); operation of the Upgraded Early Warning Radars ($28 million); modeling and simulations ($51.3 million); and work on the 

Single Simulation Framework ($36 million). 

Continued research and development will improve the capability we already have 

to defend against long-range rogue missile threats. We will also continue rigorous 

ground testing as well as the development and testing of two-stage GBIs to expand 

the defensive battle space, better protect the United States, and potentially develop 

a European Capability. 

While the emerging results of the MDA test restructure study will influence the 

final number of GBIs procured, the FY 2010 budget conveys a commitment to complete the procurement of 44 GBIs already on contract, some of which will go to the 

replacement and refurbishment of the 14 oldest interceptors in order to improve 

operational readiness of the fleet and extend GBI production capability. Completion 

of this procurement allows us to retain an active production capability which could 

be used to meet potential requirements for the European Capability, respond to test 

results, and implement future policy and fleet lifecycle management decisions. 

Moreover, similar to Air Force and Navy practices for Minuteman and Trident missiles, we intend to propose procurement of additional GBIs beyond the 44 already 

delivered or on contract for long-term follow-on operational test and evaluation. 

Although we will limit the number of operational silos to those required to support the 26 interceptors at Fort Greely, we are reviewing the construction of Missile 

Field #2 to determine the most cost-effective approach to maintaining the highest 

level of missile silo reliability for future decades of GBI operations. 

Additionally, we are upgrading the security infrastructure and completing the 

construction of a new power plant and power distribution system at Fort Greely. 

Once operational GBIs are emplaced in all 30 silos, we will begin replacing the oldest emplaced GBIs with the newest interceptors from the total produced to maintain 

a high state of operational readiness in their latest configuration. [See page 17.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

General O’REILLY. The Services develop force structure requirements in partnership with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). MDA provides the technical and analytical information on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems to the Services so 

that they may determine the BMD force structure required to meet their operational 

demands. Once developed, the Services pass requirements to USSTRATCOM for 
120 

prioritization and then to MDA/Service Boards of Directors (BoD) and the Missile 

Defense Executive Board, in turn, for adjudication. 

MDA has assisted the Army, as Lead Service, in the development of force structure requirements for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, 

the AN/TPY–2 Radar (Forward-Based Mode), Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

(GMD) interceptors and fire control, and most recently, European BMD capability. 

European Capability 

Army and MDA have conducted numerous site visits in Poland. MDA and the 

Army have developed plans for the construction of European Interceptor Site facilities and the Army has developed force structure estimates required to operate and 

maintain those facilities. The European Operational Concept, published by MDA in 

April 2009, describes the operation of the European component within the Ballistic 

Missile Defense System. The Army will leverage this document when developing the 

Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership Personnel and Facilities required for 

BMD capability. European Capability force structure planning is on-going. However, 

force structure resourcing will only occur pending ratification of agreements with 

Poland and when directed to execute the program. 

AN/TPY–2 

The initial deployment of AN/TPY–2 (Forward-Based Mode) radar at Shariki, 

Japan in Jul 2006 under national emergency underscored the need to resource AN/ 

TPY–2 units. MDA has provided Space and Missile Defense Command with AN/ 

TPY–2 concepts, operational description, functions, and tasks to support detailed 

analysis for the design and development of force structure required for AN/TPY–2 

units. The Army has conducted a force design update and resourced Table of Organization and Equipment for four AN/TPY–2 Radars. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviews ballistic missile radar capabilities and placement options to 

provide improved surveillance and impact point prediction support in support of 

Combatant Command (COCOM) requirements. Decisions for radar deployment follow COCOM procedures and the Joint Staff’s Global Force Management Process. 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 21-inch Business Case Analysis 

MDA, in collaboration with the Army, is developing a Business Case Analysis 

(BCA) analysis for the development of a 21-inch interceptor. The Army is working 

on a companion study which examines the impact of an enhanced, improved capability of a 21-inch interceptor on currently planned Army force structure. Both studies are expected to be presented at the next MDA/Army BoD for PB12 consideration. 

Joint Capability Mix Study 

The Joint Capability Mix (JCM) II study was conducted by the Joint Staff J8 

JIAMDO in collaboration with MDA and the Services. The JCM II has recommended the acquisition of additional inventory for THAAD, Aegis, AN/TPY–2 

Radar and European Mid-course Radar. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

has endorsed the recommendation. The Missile Defense Executive Board and the 

Deputy’s Advisory Working Group have approved resources for the acquisition of 

these components. 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review 

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review, currently being conducted by the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, is analyzing key aspects of missile defense policy, force structure, sufficiency, and funding. The review is scheduled for 

completion in January 2010. 

Upgraded Early Warning Radars 

Air Force is the Lead Service for the Upgraded Early Warning Radars. Force 

structure (manpower and funding) requirements for those components are found in 

the Transition and Transfer Annexes, co-authored by Air Force and MDA and approved by the MDA/Air Force BoD. 

Aegis BMD 

In addition to the Joint Capability Mix II requirements that call out SM–3 quantities, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) has documented formal requirements 

from several Combatant Commanders that call for Aegis BMD ship presence in various regions. The requirement exceeds what can be supported by the number of 

planned Aegis BMD ships. These requirements are being addressed in PR11. 

Additional Studies 

The Missile Defense Executive Board Operational Forces Standing Committee has 

directed review of other technology initiatives with force structure implications. 

These studies are listed below. If technology is proven, these capabilities would become the basis for future Service force structure reviews. 
121 

• Land-Based SM–3 Architecture 

• Early Intercept 

• Air-Launched Hit-to-Kill Initiative [See page 36.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MAY 21, 2009 

(125) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. The FY 2010 budget request includes a total of $9.3 billion in missile defense funding, approximately $1.5 billion below the FY 2009 funded level. A significant number of programs were eliminated such as MKV and KEI; some were significantly reduced such as GMD. Can you provide the committee with the analysis 

data the Department used to recommend these total programmatic changes? 

General O’REILLY. In direct response to the warfighter’s expressed needs, we are 

reshaping our program of work to bolster transportable regional defense capabilities 

to provide more robust protection of our deployed forces, allies and friends against 

existing threats. 

In accordance with Unified Command Plan 08, United States Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM) is responsible for synchronizing planning for missile defense. In coordination with the other combatant commands and the Services, USSTRATCOM 

uses its Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) to develop and produce a biannual 

list of desired ballistic missile defense capabilities, the Prioritized Capability List 

(PCL). MDA responds to the PCL with an assessment, called the Achievable Capabilities List (ACL), of the technical and schedule risks and programmatic feasibility 

of delivering the requested capabilities in the timeframe specified. As a member of 

MDA’s program control board which manages the configuration of MDA’s programmatic and operational baselines, USSTRATCOM assesses the degree to which 

the ACL satisfies the PCL. This assessment is called the Capability Assessment Report (CAR). The CAR provides the foundation, justification, and rationale for MDA’s 

annual budget submission. Although the PCL is produced every two years, the 

Operational Forces Standing Committee (OFSC) and the Missile Defense Executive 

Board (MDEB) review BMDS development priorities and progress on a bimonthly 

basis. These programmatic changes are in concert with expressed warfighter ballistic missile defense capability needs. 

More specifically, the Department chose to terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle 

(MKV) program because it was not considered affordable at this time given its technical challenges, our need to re-look at requirements, and our need to re-allocate 

resources to accommodate an increased focus on theater capabilities. The MKV technology program was established for integration on to midcourse interceptors to address complex countermeasures by identifying and destroying all lethal objects in 

a cluster using a single interceptor. Because this technology is still in the early 

stages of development and considerable questions remain about its feasibility, we 

decided to focus resources instead on technologies that are designed to defeat advanced countermeasures of launched missiles in their ascent phase—after the boost 

phase and before the threat missile reaches its apogee. 

The Department terminated the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) program because it is incompatible with the Department’s direction to counter rogue nation and 

theater threats and it is not the most cost or operationally effective hedge to countering future ballistic missile threats. KEI’s boost phase intercept mission was ideal 

for countering long-range, advanced, strategic threats, but current and emerging 

medium- and intermediate-range threats over the next decade will be more effectively countered early in their flight (during a threat missile’s ascent phase) by utilizing near-term interceptors and leveraging the Missile Defense Agency’s emerging 

BMDS sensor and command and control network. The deployment of other interceptor systems will be much sooner than KEI’s planned deployment. The deployment of other interceptor systems also avoids the significant operational and platform integration issues associated with deploying a new, large KEI class interceptor 

on mobile platforms. KEI was not deemed affordable due to the cost growth of program and a program delay from the original five years to today’s fourteen-year development schedule. In addition, delays due to technical problems indicated a lack 

of technology maturity of the KEI interceptor. 

Regarding the Ground-Based Missile Defense (GMD) Program, the GMD planned 

program for FY10 has a balanced program for sustainment of the current operational capability while continuing development for future capability. The GMD program plans include funding for key element goals in advancing the GMD system to 

stay well ahead of the threat capabilities of rogue nations. Specifically, verifying ca-
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pability and improving confidence in the fielded system, continued ground/flight 

testing and fielding of thirty operational GBIs. Thirty highly ready, operational 

GBIs will provide the United States with a sufficient number of operational interceptors, considering the limited number of ICBM launch complexes in North Korea 

and Iran and the long development time required for construction of additional ones. 

While the emerging results of the MDA test restructure study will influence the 

final number of GBIs procured, the FY 2010 budget conveys a commitment to complete the procurement of 44 GBIs already on contract, some of which will go to the 

replacement and refurbishment of the 14 oldest interceptors in order to improve 

operational readiness of the fleet and extend GBI production capability. Completion 

of this procurement allows us to retain an active production capability which could 

be used to meet potential requirements for the European Capability, respond to test 

results, and implement future policy and fleet lifecycle management decisions. 

Moreover, similar to Air Force and Navy practices for Minuteman and Trident missiles, we intend to propose procurement of additional GBIs beyond the 44 already 

delivered or on contract for long-term follow-on operational test and evaluation. 

Mr. TURNER. Your Department made significant programmatic decisions regarding U.S.- and European-based missile defense programs prior to the completion of 

the Administration’s QDR. Can you please explain why? Did the applicable combatant commanders including NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, and EUCOM play a role in 

this decision-making process? 

General O’REILLY. The original schedule for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in 

Europe projected a 2013 capability; however, delays in obtaining Host Nation Ratification and restrictions imposed by Section 233 of the FY09 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) have resulted in revisions to the program schedule and 

funding obligation plans. The European Component program reflects compliance 

with FY09 NDAA requirements and continues to focus on two-stage interceptor development and test, pending the outcome of the QDR, in order to maintain the European Component of the BMDS as a viable missile defense option. 

USSTRATCOM and the Joint Staff represent the warfighter community within 

the Operational Forces Standing Committee and the Missile Defense Executive 

Board in reviewing BMDS development priorities and progress on a bimonthly 

basis. These stated programmatic changes are in concert with expressed warfighter 

ballistic missile defense capability needs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. In a memo to the Commander of Strategic Command in February 

you wrote, ‘‘Space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems 

today provide many advantages to U.S. forces in combat. However, these systems 

were not designed specifically to support battlefield operations as their primary mission, yet their services have become essential to warfighting capabilities.’’ Further, 

you noted that we need the capability to deliver an effects-based, tactically focused, 

ISR capability that is responsive to the warfighter. You specifically cite the need to 

determine how we can provide combatant commanders the ability to directly task 

space-based assets and downlink data in theater. These capabilities would provide 

commanders the ability to plan and direct space-based sensors with confidence and 

flexibility. In addition, receiving, processing, and disseminating quality data in operationally relevant timeframes would greatly enhance combat decision-making. 

Are you aware that commercial satellite data providers can immediately bolster 

the combatant commanders’ access to high-quality imagery and products through direct tasking and downlink and other rapid tactical access methods? 

General KEHLER. Yes, we are definitely aware of the many forward-leaning advances and capabilities offered by the commercial space sector. One of the key drivers for today’s active use of commercial satellites was the operational demand for 

digital imagery during DESERT STORM. As a result, current Eagle Vision (EV) 

commercial systems have responded to the U.S. military’s need for rapid, tactical 

access to broad area and multispectral overhead imagery. From a military perspective, our partnership with commercial space is a key element in the way-ahead vision for maintaining information superiority across the broad spectrum of military 

operations. 

Mr. LAMBORN. In a memo to the Commander of Strategic Command in February 

you wrote, ‘‘Space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems 

today provide many advantages to U.S. forces in combat. However, these systems 

were not designed specifically to support battlefield operations as their primary mission, yet their services have become essential to warfighting capabilities.’’ Further, 

you noted that we need the capability to deliver an effects-based, tactically focused, 
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ISR capability that is responsive to the warfighter. You specifically cite the need to 

determine how we can provide combatant commanders the ability to directly task 

space-based assets and downlink data in theater. These capabilities would provide 

commanders the ability to plan and direct space-based sensors with confidence and 

flexibility. In addition, receiving, processing, and disseminating quality data in operationally relevant timeframes would greatly enhance combat decision-making. 

Do you plan to leverage this critical capability that is currently available and if 

so, please provide details? 

General KEHLER. We continue to explore a variety of commercial satellite options 

and are presently leveraging this important supporting capability. For example, the 

Eagle Vision system is a commercial architecture designed to provide theater commanders and combat units with rapid imagery products for mission planning. It is 

currently deployed and is both tasking and receiving commercial space imagery from 

a variety of platforms. Also of note, in the recent Schriever V Wargame in March 

2009, we explored more effective ways for the United States to operate with commercial providers and coalition partners to assure space and information superiority. As a part of this evaluation, we organized an Industry Cell to operate in conjunction with the other government groups to more effectively integrate commercial 

products. While certain legal and foreign affiliation issues must still be considered, 

we continue to evaluate the feasibility of these private sector capabilities and, 

through currently fielded systems and future exercises, better understand the important contribution that commercial imagery plays in today’s fight. 

Mr. LAMBORN. General Kehler, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) is responsible 

for the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) tasked with monitoring approximately 

15,000 objects in the orbital threat environment. These objects are compounded by 

additional breakups, and the entire debris field must be tracked to prevent catastrophic collisions in space. In addition, the Haystack antenna at Millstone Hill is 

being deactivated for hardware upgrade, which degrades our SSN capability. Would 

AFSPC realize enhanced Space Situational Awareness by leveraging the existing 

network of MDA sensors through multi-mission sensor utilization? 

General KEHLER. AFSPC recognizes the potential contributions of the MDA sensors network and continues to assess the value they could bring to Space Situational 

Awareness (SSA). Within the Command, we have a strategic approach toward 

achieving our Nation’s SSA objectives which includes, as our number one priority, 

to ‘‘integrate and leverage information from a variety of existing assets and 

sources—use current information in new ways.’’ In fact a number of our sensors already perform important roles for missile warning, missile defense or space surveillance depending on the scenario. Back in July 2008, when we completed our National Interim SSA Architecture, we identified SSA capabilities that MDA sensors 

could contribute toward and included them in the architecture. Since that time, we 

have been involved in activities to find the best approach for data exchange between 

the two communities through a net-centric, service-oriented architecture. Finally, we 

are working with our mission partners to analyze the individual sensors’ and networks’ capabilities and their specific value to the mission along with any necessary 

agreements that would have to be put into place, funding sources, and concepts of 

operations changes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. General O’Reilly, I understand that the sensors deployed in the 

Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) collect information on orbital space objects. This information must be assessed for possible threat, and upon resolution, 

discarded as non-threatening. Assuming that the necessary modifications are implemented with no degradation of the primary Ballistic Missile Defense mission, would 

the MDA support enhanced information sharing with the space community through 

multi-mission sensor utilization? 

General O’REILLY. While these activities demonstrate the inherent capabilities of 

the X–Band radars to support the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) mission, full 

integration of these radars into the SSA mission will require development and testing of real-time software and connectivity into the Space Surveillance Network 

(SSN). Additionally, such use would need to be coordinated with the respective Combatant Commanders and appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures developed. 

SSA is a difficult problem requiring a network of sensors worldwide. The Cobra 

Dane Upgrade (CDU) and the Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) are currently connected to the SSN, provide multi-mission capability, and have been contributing to the SSA mission for over 20 years. Additional MDA ground and seabased radars can potentially support the SSA mission from their operational and 

test locations, supporting launch characterization, reducing track coverage gaps, and 

increasing capacity. Several of the X–Band radars have demonstrated their ability 

to support the mission in the past: 
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• The AN/TPY–2 radar has participated in the USSTRATCOM-sponsored Extended Space Sensors Architecture (ESSA) Advanced Capability Technology 

Demonstration (ACTD) 

Æ As part of this demonstration, the AN/TPY–2 radar at the Pacific Missile 

Range Facility supported characterization of the TACSAT–3 launch on May 

19, 2009 

• The Ground-Based Radar Prototype (GBR–P) has demonstrated an offline capability to perform long-range satellite tracking and imaging and orbital debris 

tracking 

• During Operation Burnt Frost, multiple AN/TPY–2 radars and the SBX all provided tracks of the USA 193 satellite as well as high-resolution data of its destruction. Also, the CDU and the UEWRs provided pre-event characterization 

and post-intercept debris tracking. 

Æ