CLD-079 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 16-4107

___________ ALEX LEROY LOVEJOY

v. RICHARD A. LEWIS; MICHAEL L. ROZMAN; EDWARD M. MARSICO, JR.; JOSEPH P. CARDINALE, JR. Alex L. Lovejoy, Appellant

___________________ _________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle Distri ct of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 3-15-cv-02495) District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani

___________________ _________________ Submitted for Possible Dismi ssal Pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 December 21, 2016 Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and BARRY, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: January 6, 2017)

_________ OPINION *

_________ PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an op inion of the full Court and pu rsuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 Alex Leroy Lovejoy appeals from the Distri ct Court’s dismissal of his complaint. We will summarily affirm. In December 2015, Lovejoy, an inmate c onfined at SCI-Graterford, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of his Fift h, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fo urteenth Amendment rights. Lovejoy contended that on Ma rch 22, 2001, President Judge Richard A. Lewis of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas instru cted Lovejoy “to never come back to the State of Pennsylvania” and that if Lovejoy did, Judge Lewis would “make an example out of him.” In October 2002, a jury found Lovejoy guilty of third-degree murder. Lovejoy claimed that Judge Lewis ma de good on his promise to “m ake an example” of him by improperly disregarding a juror’s ambiguous response during the post-verdict juror polling in front of Lovejoy at the conclusion of the trial, 1 and sentencing him to twentyto-forty years’ incarceration fo r third-degree murder as if the jury had reached a unanimous verdict. In additio n to the claims asserted agai nst Judge Lewis, Lovejoy also named Dauphin County District Attorney Ed ward M. Marsico, J r., Dauphin County Deputy District Attorn ey Joseph P. Cardinale, Jr., and Dauphin County Assistant District Attorney Michael L. Rozman for failing to intervene or co rrect the alleged injustice.

1 Lovejoy alleges that when the jurors were polled for their verdict for the charge of murder in the third degree, one juror, who ha d previously voted “N ot guilty” for murder in the first degree, responded “As I wrote.” Lovejoy claims that th is response indicates a “not guilty” verdict, which would have resulted in “h anging the jury.”3 In June 2016, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) a nd 1915A(a), the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing Lovejoy’s compla int with prejudice as his claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and expl ained that amendment wo uld be futile as the statute of limitations had lapsed eleven y ears prior. Over Lovejoy’s objections, the District Court, by order entered on Octobe r 31, 2016, adopted the recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. Lovejoy appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S.C. § 1291. Becaus e Lovejoy has been granted in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we review this appeal for possible dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We exercise plenary review of the District Court's order dism issing Lovejoy’s complaint. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We agree with the District Court that Lo vejoy’s complaint is barred by the statute of limitations for the reasons given by th e Magistrate Judge in her Report and Recommendations. Moreover, we ag ree with the District Court that even if the complaint were timely, it is also barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court unequivocally held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or im prisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conv iction or sentence invalid,” a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 action must prove that his co nviction or sentence has been reversed on appeal, expunged, or called into question. Id. at 486-87. Be cause Lovejoy’s allegations — that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous verdict, see United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 815 (3 d Cir. 1996), and was4 therefore erroneously sentenced — necessarily challenge th e legality of his conviction and sentence, he must demonstrate that his conviction has been invalidated to proceed with this suit. He has failed to do so. Th us, the District Court properly dismissed his complaint under Heck. 2 Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.

2 Lovejoy’s complaint, which sought dama ges from both the presiding judge and the prosecutors involved in his case, is also barred under the doctrines of judicial and prosecutorial immunity. See Pierson v. Ra y, 386 U.S. 547, 55 3-54 (1967) (holding judges are immune “from liab ility for damages for acts comm itted within their judicial jurisdiction” even wh en “accused of acting maliciously a nd corruptly”); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (hol ding “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceed ings or for trial, a nd which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the St ate, are entitled to the pr otections of absolute immunity”).