IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

KIRSHA BROWN-YOUNGER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 1979

)

LULU, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This copyright infringement action was originally brought

pro se by Kirsha Brown-Younger (“Brown-Younger”) against a number

of defendants. This Court appointed Charles Leuin (“Leuin”), the

next in line among the members of the trial bar obligated to take

pro bono appointments, to represent Brown-Younger, only to learn

through Leuin’s motion to be relieved from representation that he

had a total conflict of interest (at least three of the

defendants named by Brown-Younger are currently clients of

Leuin’s law firm).

Immediately upon receipt of Leuin’s notice of motion, this

Court sought the name of another trial bar member to replace him

as Brown-Younger’s lawyer. But because the staff person in

charge of such matters was out of the office at that time, the

request for appointment will be granted either on or immediately

after her scheduled return to her office on May 16. In the

meantime, Brown-Younger did not choose to appear at the time of

presentment of Leuin’s motion--but later in the same day this
Court received no fewer than four self-prepared documents from

Brown-Younger:

1. her Motion for Appointment of Counsel due to

attorney Leuin’s withdrawal, a matter as to which what has

been said earlier indicates that this Court was ahead of

her; 

2. a request that defendant Barnes & Noble be

defaulted for failure to file a timely responsive pleading;

3. a typewritten document (which like the lastmentioned item had been delivered to this Court’s chambers

on May 14, but which this Court did not see until the

following day) bearing this caption:

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS ANSWER

MOTION TO STRIKE

DEMURRER

4. another typewritten document, delivered to this

Court’s chambers on May 15 and bearing this caption:

MOTION REQUESTING RE-SCHEDULING OF

DISCOVERY CONFERENCE

First of all, Brown-Younger must understand that she cannot

have it both ways: Appointment of counsel to represent her means

that she can no longer act pro se--and that means she cannot file

court documents on her own. Moreover, the nature of her filings

confirms the good sense of that rule:

1. With this Court having appointed counsel to

represent her, she should have realized that the first2
listed filing was unnecessary--certainly not when counsel’s

withdrawal had nothing to do with any problem that she had

created.

2. As for the Barnes & Noble matter, Dkt. 18 is the

United States Marshals Service form of Process Receipt and

Return showing an April 20 date of service, so that BrownYounger’s May 14 filing was indeed three days beyond the

Barnes & Noble responsive pleading date (assuming that the

service of process complied with the rules). Under the

circumstances this Court will await the prompt attention to

the matter by Brown-Younger’s new counsel.

3. Brown-Younger’s third-listed document is itself

stricken. First, it reflects a misapprehension of the

common understanding that a motion to dismiss filed by one

of several defendants to a lawsuit seeks only the dismissal

of that defendant (unless, of course, the flaw identified in

the motion is fatal to the lawsuit itself). And second, as

stated earlier, any substantive arguments must be advanced

by counsel and not by Brown-Younger herself.

4. Just where Brown-Younger gets the idea to “move[s]

the court for an order compelling a settlement conference,

pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 16,” is a mystery. This Court of

course always encourages parties to consider settlement, but

Brown-Younger’s strong-arm notion is both unwarranted and

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impractical. Hence the motion is denied.

________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: May 15, 2012

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