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56–884 PDF 

" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

111TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

S. PRT. 

2010

111–50 

HAITI: NO LEADERSHIP—NO ELECTIONS 

A REPORT 

TO THE MEMBERS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 10, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 


seneagle
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director 

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v 

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 

Background .............................................................................................................. 2 

Observations ............................................................................................................. 3 

Procedural Actions ............................................................................................ 3 

Political Actions ................................................................................................ 4 

Recommendations .................................................................................................... 4 

In Haiti .............................................................................................................. 5 

Within the International Donor Community ................................................. 5 

Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 5 

Meetings With Individuals in Preparation for or during Visit to Haiti .............. 6 

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC, June 10, 2010. 

DEAR COLLEAGUES: On May 26, 2010, I directed two of my Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff members, Carl 

Meacham and Garrett Johnson, to assess the viability of contesting 

credible Presidential and parliamentary elections slated for this fall 

in Haiti. They consulted with Haitian officials, senior United 

Nations officials, international electoral technicians, and senior 

members of our Embassy in Port-au-Prince. Staff found that even 

under perfect conditions, contesting elections in 2010 will be challenging for Haiti. At a time when leadership is needed, whether 

Haiti will have an elected government to succeed President Pre ́val 

and continue the rebuilding effort is currently uncertain. 

The lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that 

the greatest constraint to rebuilding devastated countries, war-torn 

or otherwise, is the absence of strong and transparent leadership. 

A free and timely election strengthens legitimacy and public support enjoyed by any government, and this is especially important 

in Haiti as it contends with a natural disaster and a long legacy 

of troubled governance. 

Though President Pre ́val has informally announced his commitment to holding elections on November 28 of this year, he has yet 

to issue an official decree authorizing the Provisional Electoral 

Council to begin preparations. This is an important step, as budgetary arrangements and formulation of the electoral calendar cannot move forward without the decree. 

I encourage President Pre ́val to issue the appropriate decree establishing an official date for Presidential and parliamentary elections, without delay. Preparations for elections should begin with 

dispatch because the term of Haiti’s President and the majority of 

its Parliament will have expired by early 2011. The absence of 

democratically elected successors could potentially plunge the country into chaos, adding a political crisis to the death and destruction 

caused by the January 12 earthquake. 

Our Government is sympathetic to the plight of Haitians, as 

demonstrated by the assistance our military, diplomats, and development experts provided in the wake of the disaster. More importantly, the American people, including many Hoosiers like the 

parishioners of St. Luke’s United Methodist Church in Indianapolis 

and the faculty of Notre Dame University, remain committed to 

helping the people of Haiti. But the positive effect of assistance 

programs will be limited if Haiti lacks a responsible, popularly 

elected government. 

(V)

vi 

This report and its recommendations are particularly timely 

given that arrangements for the November elections are stalled. I 

look forward to continuing to work with you on these issues, and 

I welcome any comments you have. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Ranking Member. 

(1) 

1 J.F. Hornbeck, ‘‘The Haitian Economy and the Hope Act,’’ Congressional Research Service, 

May 20, 2010. 2 Ezequil A. Lopez, ‘‘U.N. Rep: Haiti Democracy Depends on Reconstruction,’’ Associated Press, 

June 2, 2010. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/02/ 

AR2010060204271.html. 3 J.F. Hornbeck, ‘‘The Haitian Economy and the Hope Act,’’ Congressional Research Service, 

May 20, 2010. 4 U.S. Department of State, Hill Briefing Notes, published in March 2010. 

5Damien Cave, ‘‘Rubble of a Broken City Strains Haitians’ Patience,’’ New York Times, May 

29, 2010. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/world/americas/30haiti.html?scp=1& 

sq=Pre ́val&st=cse. 

HAITI: NO LEADERSHIP—NO ELECTIONS 

INTRODUCTION

The devastation caused by the earthquake and ongoing aftershocks in Haiti since January 12, 2010, represent one of the worst 

natural disasters to confront the Western Hemisphere. Pre-earthquake, the country was considered the poorest in the region, with 

over 70 percent of the population living on less than $2 per day 

and roughly 50 percent of children having no access to basic education.1 Nearly 3 million people were directly affected by the disaster and casualties exceeded 300,000 according to the Government 

of Haiti. An estimated 1.5 million people are currently living under 

tarps, tents, or transitional houses, which increases the likelihood 

of additional casualties and human suffering during hurricane 

season.2

The earthquake’s damage amounted to 117 percent of Haiti’s 

annual economic output, according to the Inter-American Development Bank and the country’s GDP was reduced by an estimated 50 

percent. Monthly apparel sector exports, which the recently passed 

HELP Act seeks to strengthen because of the sector’s importance 

to the country’s economy, declined 43 percent from $58.2 million in 

February 2009 to $33.1 million in February 2010.3 The loss of a 

significant number of jobs resulting from the disaster, across many 

sectors including apparel, has increased the severity of a chronically high unemployment rate. 

Up to 40 percent of the civil service perished and 28 out of 29 

government ministries collapsed, which has significantly reduced 

Haiti’s already limited capacity to offer basic services.4 Six months 

later, the lack of visible improvements in conditions on the ground 

or official communication regarding reconstruction plans is reported to have exacerbated a lingering crisis of confidence in the 

government among many Haitians. President Pre ́val’s extension of 

his term beyond the constitutionally mandated departure of February 7, 2011, while failing to issue a decree calling for and funding elections, is said to have raised political tensions in the country 

and deepened concerns among the international community.5

2 

6This section is adapted from a January 25, 2008, report prepared by Maureen Taft-Morales 

and Clare Ribando Seelke of the Congressional Research Service entitled ‘‘Haiti: Developments 

and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns.’’ 7 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. ‘‘The 1990 General Elections in 

Haiti,’’ December 16, 1990. Available at http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/electionreports/ 

democracy/FinalReportHaiti1990.pdf. 8The current structure of Haiti’s political system was established under the Constitution of 

Haiti on March 29, 1987. 

BACKGROUND 6

On December 16, 1990, the provisional government of President 

Ertha Pascal-Trouillot held what is believed to be the first free and 

fair elections in Haiti’s history, which saw Jean-Bertrand Aristide 

elected President with 67 percent of the vote.7 In September 1991 

he was overthrown by a military coup and did not return to power 

until October 1994, under the protection of some 20,000 U.S. 

troops. 

Presidential elections of December 1995 saw Aristide succeeded 

by Pre ́val, in the first transfer of power between two democratically 

elected Presidents in Haiti’s history, and a return of Aristide during Presidential elections of December 2000. All of the elections 

held under Aristide and Rene Pre ́val, however, were marred by 

alleged irregularities, low voter turnout, and opposition boycotts. 

On February 29, 2004, Aristide was forced to resign before finishing his Presidential term. After his departure, a ‘‘council of the 

wise’’ was appointed to serve as the interim assembly and they 

chose Mr. Gerard Latortue as Prime Minister. In the absence of an 

elected head of state, the President of Haiti’s Supreme Court was 

named President of Haiti, as delineated in article 149 of the Constitution of Haiti.8

Despite efforts by the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti 

(MINUSTAH), established in April 2004 by the U.N Security Council, conditions remained unstable and natural disasters caused by 

hurricanes inflamed the instability. After several postponements, 

Presidential elections were contested on February 7, 2006, and runoff legislative elections were held in April. Following days of protests in the streets and a controversial calculation process, Pre ́val 

was declared the winner, although he did not initially receive 51 

percent of the vote as required by Haitian electoral law. Because 

the elections were delayed from November 2005 to February 2006, 

Pre ́val was not sworn in on February 7, 2006, as stipulated by the 

Haitian Constitution, but on May 14, 2006. 

President Pre ́val’s term ends, as mandated by the constitution, 

on February 7, 2011. But because of concerns regarding the ability 

of the Haitian Government to organize Presidential and parliamentary elections in the face of the devastation caused by the January 

12 earthquake, Haiti’s National Assembly, before the majority of 

their terms expired on May 8, 2010, granted President Pre ́val an 

extension of his Presidential mandate until May 14, 2011—unless 

a successor is elected and prepared to assume office by February 

7, 2011. 

As was explained to staff by the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, if 

elections are not held before President Pre ́val’s extended mandate 

expires, Haiti may be confronted by a vacuum of power at every 

level of its government. If this occurs, a government of transition 

3 

would need to be established, which would be difficult to form and 

likely lack popular support. 

OBSERVATIONS

During meetings with senior officials from the International 

Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the Government of 

Canada, staff was informed that convening credible elections is feasible in November if key procedural and political decisions are 

made without delay. However, a senior member of Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Council (CEP)—the entity constitutionally empowered to oversee all elections—clearly stated, ‘‘The required schedule 

in order to prepare for elections is not compressible. We have 

already counted that staff must work weekends and holidays to 

meet our deadline.’’ Yet, to date, staff learned that because of procedural and political squabbles, President Pre ́val has neglected to 

take official action and all election-related efforts remain at a 

standstill. 

Procedural Actions 

The baseline procedural action that must be initiated if elections 

are to be held in 2010 is the issue of a Presidential decree by 

Pre ́val, establishing a date and granting the CEP a mandate to 

prepare for Presidential and parliamentary elections. Staff learned 

from senior United Nations officials that Pre ́val’s reluctance to call 

officially for elections is largely motivated by a ‘‘chicken and egg’’ 

scenario. Essentially, the CEP cannot initiate its work without the 

Presidential decree and an estimated $38 million in funding, but 

Pre ́val has stated that donor countries must make firm financial 

commitments before he will set a date. International donors, however, are conditioning their commitments on receiving a detailed 

budget and electoral calendar from the CEP, which they are 

incapable of producing absent a Presidential decree. 

Following the issuance of a Presidential decree, other daunting 

procedural hurdles would then be confronted in the buildup to elections: 

• The electoral list must be updated, to reflect population 

changes since the last time it was revised in 2005, which includes accounting for the nearly 300,000 who perished and 

many more displaced to the hinterlands due to the earthquake. 

This process must begin no later than July, a broad swath of 

electoral experts told staff, if elections are to be held in 2010. 

• National identification cards must be produced for new registrants, as well as for those whose cards were lost or 

destroyed as a result of the earthquake. Haiti’s National Identification Office (ONI), whose capacity has proven to be limited 

during past elections according to senior IFES officials, estimates that it can generate approximately 100,000 cards per 

month. However, the IFES assessment points out that ONI 

only has one machine in all of Haiti and a breakdown or even 

4 

9 International Foundation for Electoral Systems. ‘‘Post-Disaster Assessment on the Feasibility 

of Organizing Free and Fair Elections in Haiti’’ May 13, 2010. 10 Id. 

delay in production could prove catastrophic for the entire 

operation.9

Political Actions 

Staff was told in most meetings that the main challenges to having elections in Haiti were political. The IFES assessment noted 

that the operational arm of the CEP was technically capable of 

organizing elections but argued that ‘‘giving the mandate of organizing the upcoming elections to the current CEP would mean that 

the electoral process will be considered flawed and questionable 

from the beginning.’’ 10

Staff was informed by U.S. Embassy staff that the week before 

our arrival a CEP member was forced to resign after being accused 

by one of his consultants of having taken his salary. Other CEP 

members allegedly wanted to keep the internal conflict concealed 

and asked the member to resign quietly but he refused. The president and director general of the CEP were also recently accused 

publicly by a Haitian senator of awarding a significant contract to 

the relative of a CEP official. Each of these incidents has garnered 

media attention and further undermines the CEP’s credibility. 

Senior members of the CEP consulted while in Haiti agreed that 

their current membership was problematic, but warned that sweeping changes could compromise the ability to contest elections in 

2010. Nonetheless, one member noted, ‘‘Regardless of if the President changes all of the members and the director general or just 

a few of the members, he has to do something.’’ 

Calls for President Pre ́val to exercise his executive powers and 

reform the CEP have been ongoing since controversial decisions 

made by the CEP to ban candidates representing Fanmi Lavalas 

(FL) from participating in the senatorial elections of 2009. FL is 

the political party of Aristide who continues to exert control even 

while exiled in South Africa. The CEP barred FL from standing for 

election, according to senior officials from the United Nations, on 

the grounds that FL’s list of candidates lacked Aristide’s signature. 

Appeals by the United Nations, the Organization of American 

States, and other international partners for the CEP to reverse its 

decision—in order to buttress the legitimacy of the elections—went 

unheeded. Consequentially, many allegedly pro-Pre ́val candidates 

prevailed in an election that saw less than 20 percent of eligible 

voters participate, according to senior U.S. Embassy staff. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Strong leadership is required by the Government of Haiti if elections are to be contested in 2010. The current stalemate may prove 

to be a significant obstacle to the reconstruction effort and Haiti’s 

struggle to institutionalize essential democratic traditions. The 

path toward elections in Haiti contains many formidable procedural and political obstacles. The following recommendations constitute critical steps that, if taken without delay, will increase the 

country’s chances of realizing economic and political development. 

5 

Staff strongly encourages appropriate officials at the Department of 

State to ask, 

In Haiti 

• President Pre ́val to issue a decree in earnest establishing a 

date for Presidential and parliamentary elections. This will 

empower the technical arm of the CEP with the mandate and 

funding to initiate preparation of electoral lists and identifications cards, as well as voter education campaigns in anticipation of elections. • President Pre ́val to undertake the appropriate restructuring of 

CEP’s membership, in consultation with international partners, in a way that causes minimal interruption to procedural 

preparations, but demonstrates a clear political commitment to 

contesting credible elections. 

Within the International Donor Community 

• The international donor community to seek an agreement with 

the CEP and all political parties, including the factions of 

Famni Lavalas, to ensure that the parties meet the CEP’s legal 

requirements and are not excluded from the elections because 

of perceived technicalities. • The international donor community, immediately upon issue of 

the decree by President Pre ́val, to make a portion of election 

funds available so that the daunting task of updating electoral 

lists, generating identification cards, and reallocating displaced 

persons to the appropriate polling center can begin before July 

2010. 

CONCLUSION

The people of Haiti are confronted with a unique opportunity to 

fundamentally alter the trajectory of their economic, social, and 

political future. Rebuilding the country is already proving to be a 

slow and daunting challenge, which will demand extraordinary 

leadership and unity of purpose if it is to be successful. The United 

States and the international community have demonstrated their 

desire to support the people of Haiti as they attempt to realize this 

objective. But this commitment should not be taken for granted. 

President Pre ́val and his administration should view the elections of 2010 as a moment to signal clearly their commitment to 

a democratic framework and good governance, which then must be 

visible in day-to-day actions. The outpouring of goodwill and 

resources by the United States and the international community 

should be leveraged by Haiti’s leaders to catalyze compromises on 

contentious issues so that all sides can go forward and rebuild 

Haiti together. 

6 

MEETINGS WITH INDIVIDUALS IN PREPARATION FOR OR DURING

VISIT TO HAITI

U.S. Diplomats 

Kenneth Merten, Ambassador to Haiti 

David Lindwall, Deputy Chief of Mission 

Kara McDonald, Political Counselor 

Greg Groth, Economic Counselor 

Haitian Government Officials 

Gaillot Dorsinvil, Provisional Electoral Council, President 

Jacques Belzin, Provisional Electoral Council, Treasurer 

Pierre-Louis Opont, Provisional Electoral Council, Director General 

United Nations Officials 

Kevin Kennedy, United Nations, Special Representative of the Secretary General 

David Le Notre, United Nations, OIC Electoral Assistance Section 

Organization of American States Official 

Albert Ramdin, Organization of American States, Assistant Secretary General 

International Elections Experts 

Sophie Lagueny, International Foundation for Electoral System, 

Chief of Party 

Rachna Mishra, Embassy of Canada, Political Counselor 

Æ