This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 GLADYS L. CORLISS, 7 Plaintiff-Appellant, 8

v. NO. 29,152 9 EASTERN PLAINS HOUSING 10 DEVELOPMENT CORP., et al., 11 Defendants-Appellees. 12 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF QUAY COUNTY 13 Albert Mitchell, District Judge 14 Gladys L. Corliss 15 Tucumcari, NM 16 Pro Se Appellant 17 Wade L. Jackson 18 Albuquerque, NM 19 for Appellees 20 MEMORANDUM OPINION 21 KENNEDY, Judge. 22 Gladys L. Corliss (Plaintiff) appeals from thirty-three orders issued by the 232 district court. [RP 2427] This Court’ s calendar notice proposed summary affirmance. 1 Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition [M IO] and a separate motion to amend the 2 docketing statement. After consideration, this Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to 3 amend the docketing statement, but allowed Plaintiff to file an amended memorandum 4 in opposition in order to more fully discuss th e issues raised in the original docketing 5 statement and mentioned but not discusse d in the original memorandum in opposition. 6 [Id.] Plaintiff has now filed the amende d memorandum in opposition. [AMIO] After 7 reviewing the memorandum in opposition and the amended memorandum, we remain 8 persuaded that Plaintiff’s claims and her contentions were given due, careful, and 9 correct consideration at every point by the di strict court. Accordingly, we affirm. 10 DISCUSSION 11 Plaintiff’s memorandum and the ame nded memorandum name and discuss as 12 issues Plaintiff’s contentions that “this case is just part and parcel of a movement in 13 this State to smear, damage, defame, discre dit, retaliate and humiliate [Plaintiff] for 14 seeking the truth, speaking the truth, and s eeking to expose violations of the law, and 15 those parties violating the law.” [AMIO 2] Plaintiff further indicates that “[j]ust a 16 portion of the facts pertaining to this matter are contained within this case, but spread 17 over more than a twelve[-] year period, and that is why it was not originally included 18 in [t]he Docketing Statement. ” [AMIO 2-3] Plaintiff th en proceeds to provide this 193 Court with a “synopsis” of facts relevant to the alleged movement to smear and 1 defame Plaintiff since 1996, including how various district court judges have abused 2 their discretion and violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment, and Due Process rights. 3 [AMIO 15] In addition, Plaintiff objects to this Court’s application of res judicata and 4 collateral estoppel to bar Plaintiff’s claims pertaining to the termination of a lease 5 agreement even though that dispute was fully litigated in magistrate court, decided 6 against Plaintiff, and Plaintiff did not appeal from that judgment. [AMIO 25] 7 Further, Plaintiff contends that many of her issues were not raised in the docketing 8 statement because she was c onfused about the appeals process. [AMIO 28] In 9 addition Plaintiff contends that many of her issues were not preserved below because 10 she claims the district court denied Plain tiff access to the courts, denied her the right 11 to be heard, allowed motions to pile up without prompt rulings, denied her equal 12 protection of the law, and abused its disc retion and power. [AMIO 29] Plaintiff 13 further contends that the district court judge was biased and prejudiced against her. 14 [AMIO 32-34] Plaintiff continues to ar gue that summary judgment was improperly 15 granted against her. [AMIO 36] She alsocontends that the district court judge 16 violated the code of judicial conduct in his rulings against her. [AMIO 45] 17 As we discussed in the calendar notice, pro se litigants are required to comply 18 with all rules and orders of the courts. See Bruce v. Lester , 1999-NMCA-051, ¶ 4, 127 194 N.M. 301, 980 P.2d 84. Moreover, based on the extensive record before us, we 1 remain persuaded that (1) the district court’s orders are supported by substantial 2 evidence; (2) the district court correctly applied the applicab le law to the facts; (3) the 3 district court properly exercised its role in resolving the conflicts in the evidence, 4 determinating the credibility of the witne sses, and weighing the evidence presented; 5 and (4) throughout the intensely litigated, extensive proceedings, Plaintiff was 6 afforded due process of law. The me morandum and the amended memorandum do 7 not bring to light additional facts or legal authorities that persuade us otherwise. 8 1. Substantial Evidence 9 To the extent Plaintiff continues to conte nd that entry of any or all of the orders 10 is not supported by the circumstances, facts, or evidence presented by the parties or 11 before the district court judge, we affirm . “Substantial evidence is such relevant 12 evidence that a reasonable mind would fi nd adequate to support a conclusion.” 13 Landavazo v. Sanchez , 111 N.M. 137, 138, 802 P.2d 1283, 1284 (1990) (citation 14 omitted). “On appeal this Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to 15 the [prevailing parties] to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support 16 the trial court’s ultimate finding of fact.” Wisznia v. Human Servs. Dep't , 17 1998-NMSC-011, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 140, 958 P.2d 98. The appellate court presumes 18 that the trial court is correct and the burden is on the appellant, here Plaintiff, to 195 clearly demonstrate that the trial court erred. Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. and 1 Fabricating, Inc. , 111 N.M. 6, 8, 800 P.2d 1063, 1065 (1990). In this case, however, 2 while claiming that the district court erre d in entering the orders, Plaintiff did not 3 summarize the evidence that supports the district court’s rulings in a situation where 4 Defendants presented evidence and a position on Plaintiff’s claims that conflicted with 5 Plaintiff’s evidence and Plaintiff’s position. See, e.g. , Thornton v. Gamble , 101 N.M. 6 764, 769, 688 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Ct. App. 1984) (stating that c ounsel must set out all 7 relevant facts in the docketing statement) . We are not persuaded, moreover, that 8 Plaintiff was denied access to the courts or denied full opportunity to present her 9 claims. The extensive record proper s hows otherwise. Thus, in reviewing a 10 substantial evidence claim, “[t]he question is not whether substantial evidence exists 11 to support the opposite result, but rather whether such eviden ce supports the result 12 reached.” Las Cruces Prof’l Fire Fighters v. City of Las Cruces , 1997-NMCA-044, 13 ¶ 12, 123 N.M. 329, 940 P.2d 177

. “Additionally we will not reweigh the evidence 14 nor substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder.” Id. 15 We hold that substantial evidence was presented in support of the district 16 court’s orders. 17 2. Application of the Law to the Facts of the Case 18 To the extent Plaintiff continues to contend that the trial court incorrectly 196 applied the applicable law to th e facts of this case, we disagree. As the district court 1 recognized, Plaintiff and Defendant Eastern have already litigated in magistrate court 2 the underlying dispute between them, which involved a residential lease agreement. 3 In that case, it was established that Plaintiff entered into a residential lease agreement 4 with Defendant Eastern. [RP 905] The l ease provided that, after the initial term, the 5 lease would continue on a month-to-month ba sis unless either party gave thirty (30) 6 days written notice of termination to the other as provided in the lease agreement. [RP 7 905-06] The initial term of the lease ende d on February 1, 2002. [RP 906] Defendant 8 gave Plaintiff thirty (30) days notice of termination of the lease agreement on 9 February 5, 2003. [Id.] Plaintiff refused to vacate the premises on March 31, 2003. 10 [Id.] Defendant Eastern brought suit agai nst Plaintiff in Curry County Magistrate 11 Court in 2003. [Id.] The Curry County Magi strate Court issued a writ of restitution 12 to Defendant Eastern, restoring possession of the premises and terminating the rental 13 agreement. [Id.] Finally, we understand th at although Plaintiff is appearing in this 14 case pro se, Plaintiff was represented by counsel in the magistrate court trial. [RP 15 923] Defendant Eastern prev ailed in the magistrate c ourt case, and Plaintiff was 16 legally ousted from the premises pursuant to a valid termination of the lease 17 agreement. [RP 924] 18 Plaintiff did not appeal from the magistrate court judgment against her. The 197 facts and the legal and equ itable conclusions made therein under the Owner-Resident 1 Relations Act are final matters, not open to re litigation in the district court nor are they 2 reviewable in this appeal. As such, the di strict court correctly determined that the 3 facts, and the legal and equ itable conclusions arising out of the parties’ dispute under 4 the lease agreement were before the magi strate court, and resulted in a judgment 5 against Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not appeal from the magistrate judgment, which 6 established that Defendants di d not violate Plaintiff’s c ontractual or other legal or 7 equitable legal rights under the lease agreement and pursuant to the Owner-Resident 8 Relations Act. [RP 925-26] In fact, after trial at which Plaintiff was represented by 9 counsel, the magistrate court determined that Plaintiff herself had violated her 10 obligations under the lease agreement to l eave the premises upon the valid termination 11 of the lease. [Id.] As the district c ourt recognized in the present case, the well12 established doctrines of finality, issue precl usion, collateral estoppel, law of the case, 13 and res judicata preclude relitigation, reconsider ation, or review in this appeal of the 14 matters litigated in the magistrate court case. [ See, e.g. , RP 924-926] As the district 15 court recognized, application of these doctrin es to Plaintiff’s causes of action requires 16 the dismissal of many of them. [Id.] 17 As the district court further correctly determined, Plaintiff’s numerous criminal 18 causes of action are not claims upon which re lief may be granted in this civil case. 198 [RP 926] 1 Finally, resolution of Plaintiff’s remaining claims, including for Defendants’ 2 alleged fraud, bad faith, tric kery, collusion, and lying, involved the fact finder in 3 determining the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to begiven their testimony 4 and the other evidence. As discussed below, we do not review these matters on 5 appeal. In this case, moreover, Plainti ff failed to identify to the district court 6 particular acts of deceit or collusion engage d in by the individual Defendants, and she 7 provided no evidence that any such acts o ccurred with regard to any of them. See, 8

e.g. , Campos Enterp., Inc. v. Williams and Co. , 1998-NMCA-131, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 9 691, 964 P.2d 855 (stating that an appellate court reviews only matters that were 10 presented to the trial court). In addition, as the districtcourt correctly determined, 11 Plaintiff’s claims relating to alleged misrepresentations with regard to the lease 12 addendum were litigated in the magistrate court action and determined against her. 13 [RP 2364] We hold that Defendants werecorrectly granted summary judgment on 14 these remaining claims. [RP 1965, 1968, 1992, 2320, 2358, 2360, 2362, 2365, 2367, 15 2400, 2402] 16 Finally, we affirm the district court’ s subsequent orders denying Plaintiff’s 17 motion to alter or amend the judgment si nce the issues raised in these motions 18 presented no new facts or law that would provide a reason to relitigate, or otherwise 199 alter or amend, the final judgments against Plaintiff in this case. [RP 2369, 2400, 1 2402, 2423] Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 2 Plaintiff’s motion. See, e.g. , Parsons v. Keil , 106 N.M. 91, 739 P.2d 505 (1987) 3 (discussing that the standard of review fo r determining whether the trial court erred 4 in granting or denying a motion to vacate judgment is whether trial court’s ruling 5 constituted an abuse of discretion). 6 We note that the order dismissing De fendants Danessa Lands and Josie Mills 7 from this case was filed on August 1, 2008. [RP 2358] This order was a final, 8 appealable order on that date, pursuant to Rule 1-054(B)(2) NMRA (“When multiple 9 parties are involved, judgment may be entered adjudicating all issues as to one or 10 more, but fewer than all parties. Such j udgment shall be a final one unless the court, 11 in its discretion, expressly provides otherwise.”). As such , in order for this Court to 12 have jurisdiction to review th at order with regard to the dismissal of those Defendants 13 from this case, Plaintiff was required to file a notice of appeal within thirty (30) days 14 of August 1, 2008, which she did not do. See Rules 12-201(A) and 12-202(A) 15 NMRA; see also Govich v. North Am. Sys., Inc. , 112 N.M. 226, 230, 814 P.2d 94, 98 16 (1991) (explaining that time and place of filing a notice of appeal are mandatory 17 preconditions to appellate jurisdiction); cf. Trujillo v. Serrano , 117 N.M. 273, 277, 18 871 P.2d 369, 373 (1994) (holding that an untimely appeal may be permitted if the 1910 delay was for unusual circumstances such as judicial error). Regardless of other 1 considerations, this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the merits of that order 2 regarding the dismissal of those Defendants. 3 3. Resolution of Conflicts in the Evid ence; Determining the Credibility of the 4 Witnesses; and Weighing the Evidence 5 To the extent Plaintiff continues to argue that the district court incorrectly 6 disagreed with her rendition of the facts or events, this Court defers to the district 7 court’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence, its determination of the credibility of 8 the witnesses, and its decisions on the we ight to be given the evidence presented. 9 Buckingham v. Ryan , 1998-NMCA-012, ¶ 10, 124 N.M. 498, 953 P.2d 33; see also 10 Wisznia , 1998-NMSC-011, ¶ 10. We “indulge ev ery reasonable inference to support 11 the trial court’s findings, ignoring conflic ts in the evidence unfavorable to the 12 [Defendants].” Id. Plaintiff’s contentions on appeal consistently raise matters of 13 conflicts in the evidence pres ented, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to 14 be given the evidence. We defer to the district court and affirm on all of these matters. 15 16 4. Due Process 17 Finally, in reviewing the circumstances of this case, we conclude that Plaintiff’s 18 due process rights were not violated. To the extent Plaintiff continues to claim 19 otherwise, we affirm. Due process require s only that notice be reasonably calculated, 2011 under all the circumstances, to inform partie s of the pendency of the action and afford 1 them the opportunity to present their objections. See Marinchek v. Paige , 108 N.M. 2 349, 351-52, 772 P.2d 879, 881-82 (1989). Due pr ocess does not require that a party 3 agree with the outcome or prevail on the merits of his or her claims. 4 In this case, the record proper indicates that Plaintiff fully participated in the 5 proceedings and the hearings. Her claims and objections were carefully considered 6 in extensive and exhaustive pleadings, hearings as applicable, and in written orders 7 of the district court. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s claims were rejected in 8 accordance with applicable law. See, e.g. , State v. Case, 100 N.M. 714, 717, 676 P.2d 9 241, 244 (1984) (stating personal bias cannot be inferred from an adverse ruling) ; see 10 also, e.g. , Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Branch, 89 N.M. 325, 327-28, 552 P.2d 227, 229-30 11 (stating “that trial courts have supervis ory control over their dockets and inherent 12 power to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious 13 disposition of cases”). 14 Therefore, we cannot say that Plainti ff did not receive due process of law. 15 Further, because the record indicates thatthe district court judge fully considered 16 Plaintiff’s claims and gave her full and equal opportunity to present her claims, 17 Plaintiff has not persuaded us that the district court was biased or prejudiced against 18 her. Our review of the record indicates to us that the district court judge applied the 1912 applicable law to the facts of this case and ruled against Plaintiff on the merits in 1 accordance therewith. Thus, we affirm the district court in this regard. 2 CONCLUSION 3 Under the circumstances of this case, we affirm the district court’s orders 4 granting judgment to Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

___________________________________ 7 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 8 WE CONCUR : 9

_________________________________ 10 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 11

_________________________________ 12 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge 13