2021 IL App (2d) 200383-U 

No. 2-20-0383 

Order filed November 1, 2021

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent 

except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS, ) of Winnebago County. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 18-CF-2526 

) 

MARK A. STOWE, ) Honorable 

) Brendan A. Maher, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Bridges and Justice Schostok concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Admission of defendant’s prior conviction for impeachment purposes under Illinois 

Rule of Evidence Rule 609 was proper where the date defendant was released from 

confinement for the conviction was calculable from the date defendant was 

discharged from mandatory supervised release.

¶ 2 Defendant, Mark A. Stowe, argues that it was plain error for the State to impeach him at 

his jury trial with his prior conviction of criminal damage to property, admitted under Illinois Rule 

of Evidence 609 (eff. July 1, 2011) (codifying People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971)). 

Defendant claims that the State did not establish that the conviction fell within the 10-year limit 

of Rule 609. We disagree. The State provided the date defendant was discharged from mandatory 
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supervised release (MSR) for the prior conviction, and the trial court could easily ascertain from 

that discharge date that defendant’s release from confinement for the prior conviction fell within 

the 10-year limit. Accordingly, there was no error, and we affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In September 2018, defendant had his dogs outside in his backyard while his neighbor, 

who was having a cookout in his backyard, had his dog outside. The parties’ backyards abutted, 

and a common fence ran along the property lines. The dogs were barking and creating a ruckus. 

Defendant began arguing with his neighbor and other people at the party about the dogs. The 

conflict escalated when defendant retrieved an airsoft gun and threatened to shoot the neighbor. 

The police were called, and defendant ran from them when they arrived. As the police subdued 

defendant with a taser, a glass he was carrying fell and shattered. An officer was cut by the glass 

as he kneeled by defendant and struggled to handcuff him. Based on what transpired, defendant 

was charged with one count each of resisting a peace officer (720 ILC 5/31-1(a-7) (West 2018))

and aggravated assault (id. § 12-2(a)(1)) and two counts of disorderly conduct (id. § 26-2(a)(1)).

¶ 5 In July 2019, the State filed a motion in limine to introduce, for impeachment under Rule 

609, defendant’s October 29, 2007, conviction of criminal damage to property (see 720 ILCS 5/21-

1(d) (West 2006)) in case No. 200-CF-3039.1

 Defendant filed a motion in limine to bar the 

conviction. Defendant asserted that the age of the conviction made it more prejudicial than 

probative. Defendant did not argue that the conviction was inadmissible because it did not meet 

1 Defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSI) reflects that defendant pled guilty to 

the offense on October 17, 2006. He received a sentence of probation. On October 29, 2007, 

defendant pled guilty to violating his probation. He was sentenced to prison. 
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Rule 609’s 10-year limit. See Ill. R. Evid. 609(b) (eff. July 1, 2011) (“Evidence of a conviction 

under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of 

conviction or of the release of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date.”)

¶ 6 On July 22, 2019, before jury selection, the court held a hearing on the motions in limine. 

At the hearing, the State offered to tender to the trial court a certified copy of defendant’s October 

2007 conviction and his criminal history from the Department of Corrections (DOC). The DOC 

records are not contained in the record on appeal, but they were tendered to defense counsel below, 

who did not take issue with their accuracy. The State represented at the hearing that defendant 

was sentenced to imprisonment for the October 2007 conviction, served a term of MSR upon 

release, and was discharged from MSR on September 25, 2010. The State argued that, based on 

the MSR discharge date and “simple math,” it was clear that the October 2007 conviction fell 

within the 10-year limit. The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine over defendant’s 

objection. 

¶ 7 In his testimony at trial, defendant admitted that he had a prior conviction of criminal 

damage to property. The jury, which was admonished that it could consider defendant’s prior 

conviction only in assessing his credibility, found defendant guilty of obstructing a peace officer

and disorderly conduct (both counts) but not guilty of aggravated assault. After defendant’s 

posttrial motions were denied, he was sentenced to 24 months of probation. This timely appeal 

followed. 

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 Defendant argues that his convictions should be reversed and his case remanded for a new 

trial because his credibility was improperly impeached with the October 2007 conviction of 

criminal damage to property. Defendant claims that the State’s proof of when he was discharged 
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from MSR was insufficient to establish that no more than 10 years had elapsed from the date of 

his release from confinement for the prior conviction until the date of his trial in this case. 

¶ 10 In making this argument, defendant acknowledges that he forfeited the issue by failing to 

raise it in his posttrial motions.2 See People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 611-12 (2010) (“To 

preserve a claim for review, a defendant must both object at trial and include the alleged error in a 

written posttrial motion.”). Nevertheless, he urges us to consider his claim under the plain-error 

rule (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967)). The plain-error rule bypasses forfeiture and 

permits a reviewing court to consider an unpreserved error when: 

“(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error 

alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the 

seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious 

that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the 

judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 

Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). 

Under either prong of the plain-error rule, the burden of persuasion remains on the defendant. 

People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2009). 

¶ 11 “The first step of plain-error review is to determine whether any error occurred.” Id.; see 

also People v. Wilson, 404 Ill. App. 3d 244, 247 (2010) (“There can be no plain error if there was 

no error at all.”). This requires “a substantive look” at the issue raised. People v. Johnson, 208 

Ill. 2d 53, 64 (2003). Thus, we first determine whether admitting the prior conviction was error 

2 The State argues that, in addition, defendant never raised this precise issue in his motion 

in limine. 
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because the State failed to establish that no more than 10 years had elapsed from the date of 

defendant’s release from confinement on the prior conviction until the date of his trial here. 

¶ 12 In Montgomery, our supreme court adopted a federal rule on the use of prior convictions 

to impeach a witness’s credibility. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516. 

“[T]he Montgomery rule provide[s] that, for the purpose of attacking a witness’ credibility, 

evidence of a prior conviction is admissible only if (1) the crime was punishable by death 

or imprisonment in excess of one year; or (2) the crime involved dishonesty or false 

statement regardless of the punishment. In either case, however, the evidence is 

inadmissible if the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime 

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [Citation.] In addition, 

evidence of a conviction under this rule is inadmissible if a period of more than 10 years 

has elapsed since the date of conviction or release of the witness from confinement, 

whichever is later.” People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 81 (1996) (citing Montgomery, 47 

Ill. 2d at 516).

Subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 609 codify the Montgomery rule. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 609(a), (b) (eff. 

July 1, 2011). 

¶ 13 The 10-year limit is calculated by (1) taking the latter of (a) the date of the witness’s prior 

conviction or (b) the date the witness was released from confinement for the prior conviction and 

then (2) counting the number of days between the later of the foregoing dates and (3) the date of 

the defendant’s trial. See People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 598-99 (2008). Under the rule, a

witness is considered released from confinement when he is released from prison, not when he is 

discharged from MSR. People v. Sanchez, 404 Ill. App. 3d 15, 18 (2010). The party seeking to 

introduce the prior conviction is responsible for presenting evidence of a release date, and absent 
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such evidence, the date of conviction is used to calculate the 10-year limit. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d at 

597. 

¶ 14 Here, the State presented evidence that defendant was convicted of criminal damage to 

property on October 29, 2007. Criminal damage to property is a Class 4 felony subject to 

imprisonment of one to three years (see 720 ILCS 5/21-1(d) (West 2006); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(6) 

(West 2006) (recodified as 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-45(a) (West 2018)). The State also presented 

evidence that defendant was discharged from MSR on September 25, 2010. MSR is a mandatory 

term that a defendant must serve after he is released from prison. People ex rel. Berlin v. Bakalis, 

2018 IL 122435, ¶ 18. When defendant was sentenced for criminal damage to property, he was 

subject to a one-year term of MSR. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(3) (West 2006) (“for a Class 3 felony 

or a Class 4 felony, [the MSR term is] 1 year”). Although, as the State notes in its brief, defendant 

may have served a shorter term of MSR (see id. § 3-3-8(b)), no authority provides that a term of

MSR may be lengthened. This is pivotal here. If the longest term of MSR defendant could have 

served was one year, he had to be released from prison no earlier than September 25, 2009. 

Defendant’s trial date of July 22, 2019, arrived 9 years, 9 months, and 27 days—less than 10 

years—after September 25, 2009. Because a shorter term of MSR would mean that even less time 

elapsed between the date defendant was released from prison and his July 22, 2019, trial date, 

admission of his prior conviction for impeachment purposes was proper.

¶ 15 Moreover, we note that defendant never argued in the trial court that the State presented 

insufficient evidence of when defendant was released from confinement for his prior conviction. 

Because he made no such challenge (and assuming the certified copy of defendant’s conviction 

and the DOC records did not clarify when defendant was released from prison), the State was 

denied the opportunity to provide the more specific evidence that defendant now claims was 
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required. Given the circumstances, defendant simply cannot challenge the State’s evidence now. 

See People v. Robinson, 299 Ill. App. 3d 426, 436-37 (1998) (claims are procedurally defaulted

when a defendant fails to object to errors arising at trial that could be corrected).

¶ 16 Defendant argues that the State ran afoul of Naylor by relying on a presumption that 

defendant was released from prison no earlier than one year before September 25, 2010, rather 

than on actual proof. Defendant misreads Naylor and unfairly downplays the quality of the 

evidence the State presented.

¶ 17 Defendant relies on the court’s remarks in Naylor that “the proponent of the prior 

conviction has the responsibility of presenting evidence of a subsequent release date,” and that, 

“[a]bsent such evidence, a trial court must not resort to any presumptions regarding a release date 

and must employ the date of conviction.” Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d at 597. However, the court in Naylor

did not expound on what constitutes a “presumption[ ] regarding a release date.” Id. The court 

had no occasion to do so, because the State in Naylor “concede[d] that it did not present evidence 

of a release date” and, thus, that “defendant’s date of conviction [was] the operative date for 

purposes of Montgomery.” Id. at 598. The issue in Naylor was whether the endpoint of the 10-

year limit was the date the defendant allegedly committed the currently charged offenses or the 

date of trial on the current offenses. Id.

¶ 18 Here, putting aside the fact that the certified copy of defendant’s conviction and/or the 

DOC records may have indicated exactly when defendant was released from prison, and that any 

doubt created from the absence of these documents must be resolved against defendant (see Foutch 

v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984)), the issue raised here is not the same issue raised in 

Naylor. Moreover, the State here, unlike in Naylor, neither conceded that the date of conviction 

controlled nor failed to present any evidence of defendant’s release date. While the date defendant 
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was discharged from MSR may not be the best evidence of when defendant was released from 

confinement, it was nonetheless significant evidence on that point. With that evidence, the court, 

as indicated above, easily ascertained that defendant was released from confinement within the 10-

year limit. People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62, 73 (2009) (in recognizing that courts should determine 

before a defendant testifies whether a prior conviction can be used for impeachment purposes, our 

supreme court noted that trial courts “can readily ascertain whether less than 10 years has elapsed 

since the date of conviction of the prior crime or release of the [defendant] from confinement”). 

As the State observes, the trial court is presumed to know the law and apply it properly. People v. 

Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 32 (1997). That presumption is rebutted only when the record contains 

strong affirmative evidence to the contrary. Id. Here, the record does not contain strong 

affirmative evidence indicating that the trial court did not understand the law on the admission of 

prior convictions for impeachment purposes.

¶ 19 Notably, to the extent that defendant claims that evidence of the prior conviction was more 

prejudicial than probative, we observe that he forfeited review of that issue by failing to raise it in 

a posttrial motion and that he has not invoked plain-error review on that issue.

¶ 20 Given that defendant’s prior conviction of criminal damage to property fell within the 10-

year limit, the trial court did not err in admitting the conviction at trial. Without error, defendant 

cannot establish plain error, and the forfeiture stands. 

¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 22 For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago 

County. 

¶ 23 Affirmed.