Illinois Official Reports 

Supreme Court

Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Interstate Warehousing, Inc., 2017 IL 121281

Caption in Supreme

Court:

ASPEN AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, v. 

INTERSTATE WAREHOUSING, INC., Appellant.

Docket No. 121281

Filed September 21, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that 

court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. John 

P. Callahan, Jr., Judge, presiding.

Judgment Appellate court judgment reversed.

Circuit court judgment reversed.

Cause remanded with directions.

Counsel on

Appeal

Kimberly A. Jansen, of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, of Chicago, for 

appellant.

Timothy S. McGovern and Daniel G. Wills, of Swanson, Martin & 

Bell, LLP, of Chicago, for appellee.

Craig H. Zimmerman and Michael W. Weaver, of McDermott Will & 

Emery LLP, Michele Odorizzi, Richard F. Bulger, and Gary A. Isaac, 

of Mayer Brown LLP, and Tobin J. Taylor, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker 

& Allen, P.C., all of Chicago, for amici curiae Certainteed 

Corporation et al.
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Leslie J. Rosen, of Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, of Chicago, and 

Jeffrey White, of American Association for Justice, of Washington, 

D.C., amicus curiae.

Justices JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, 

Garman, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION 

¶ 1 The plaintiff, Aspen American Insurance Company, filed a complaint in the circuit court of 

Cook County in which it alleged that the roof of a Michigan warehouse owned by the 

defendant, Interstate Warehousing, Inc., had collapsed, causing the destruction of goods 

owned by plaintiff’s insured, Eastern Fish Company. Defendant, an Indiana corporation, 

moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Daimler AG v. 

Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). The circuit court denied the motion, and a 

divided appellate court affirmed. 2016 IL App (1st) 151876. For the reasons that follow, we 

reverse the judgments of the lower courts.

¶ 2 Background 

¶ 3 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the following. Eastern Fish Company (Eastern) is a New 

Jersey-based corporation that sources and imports fish products. In 2013, Eastern contracted 

with defendant to store some of its fish products in a refrigerated warehouse near Grand 

Rapids, Michigan. On March 8, 2014, part of the warehouse’s roof collapsed, causing ruptured 

gas lines and an ammonia leak. The leak contaminated the fish products that were stored in the 

warehouse, rendering them unfit for human consumption. Plaintiff, which insures Eastern, 

paid Eastern’s claim for the loss and, in exchange, received subrogation rights. 

¶ 4 On July 14, 2014, plaintiff filed this subrogation action against defendant in the circuit 

court of Cook County. Plaintiff’s complaint sets forth various causes of action, including 

breach of contract and negligence, and asserts that defendant is responsible for the loss of 

Eastern’s fish products. The complaint also alleges that defendant “maintain[s] a facility in or 

near Chicago.” 

¶ 5 Attached to plaintiff’s complaint are several documents: a series of letters between 

defendant and Eastern’s attorneys in which the roof collapse is discussed, a copy of the 

warehousing contract between defendant and Eastern, and a printout of the masthead from 

defendant’s website. The letterhead of defendant’s correspondence and the warehousing 

contract both state that defendant’s corporate office is located in Fort Wayne, Indiana. In 

addition, the letterhead, contract, and website masthead all contain a list of eight warehouses 

operated by defendant throughout the country. These include the Michigan warehouse that is at 

issue in this case; a warehouse in Joliet, Illinois; two warehouses in Indiana; and other 

warehouses in Colorado, Ohio, Tennessee, and Virginia. 
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¶ 6 Defendant filed a motion to quash service and dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of

personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 2-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 

5/2-301 (West 2012)). In the motion, defendant did not dispute that it was doing business in 

Illinois through the warehouse located in Joliet. However, defendant asserted that this was 

insufficient to subject it to general personal jurisdiction in Illinois. Rather, according to 

defendant, under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 

U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), plaintiff was required to show that defendant is domiciled or 

“at home” in Illinois in order to establish jurisdiction. Defendant maintained that plaintiff had 

not met this standard. 

¶ 7 Attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss were an affidavit from Jeff Hastings, 

defendant’s chief financial officer, and Ryan Shaffer, the general manager of the Joliet 

warehouse. In his affidavit, Hastings states that defendant is an Indiana corporation with its 

principal place of business in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Hastings further states that defendant is “a 

75% member of” Interstate Warehousing of Illinois, LLC, a limited liability company 

organized under Indiana law, which also maintains its principal place of business in Fort 

Wayne, Indiana. According to Hastings’s affidavit, Interstate Warehousing of Illinois 

“operates” the Joliet warehouse, while Ryan Shaffer, an employee of defendant, is the general 

manager. In his affidavit, Ryan Shaffer confirms that he is the general manager of the Joliet 

warehouse, is responsible for its day-to-day operations, and is employed by defendant. 

¶ 8 Plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s motion to dismiss in which it argued that, because 

defendant was doing business in Illinois through the Joliet warehouse, it was subject to general 

personal jurisdiction in this state. According to plaintiff, defendant could, therefore, be sued on 

causes of action unrelated to its activities in Illinois. Included with plaintiff’s response was a 

printout of a “corporation file detail report” from the Illinois Secretary of State’s website. The 

report indicates that defendant is an Indiana corporation that has been registered to do business 

in Illinois since 1988. Plaintiff submitted no further filings in the circuit court and made no 

discovery requests.1

 

¶ 9 Following a hearing at which no testimony was taken, the circuit court denied defendant’s 

motion to dismiss. The appellate court affirmed. 2016 IL App (1st) 151876. The appellate 

court concluded that plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of general personal jurisdiction 

and that defendant had failed to overcome this showing with contrary evidence. Justice 

Lampkin dissented, finding that, in light of Daimler, plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie

showing of jurisdiction. Id. ¶¶ 64-72 (Lampkin, J., dissenting). 

¶ 10 We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Mar. 5, 

2016). In addition, we allowed the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association and the American 

Association for Justice to file a joint amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiff, and we allowed 

Certainteed Corporation, Honeywell International, Inc., and Union Carbide Corporation to file 

a joint amicus curiae brief in support of defendant. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). 

 

1Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(l) (eff. July 1, 2014), the parties have the right to discovery 

on the issue of personal jurisdiction. Jurisdictional discovery is warranted only when it is shown that the 

requested discovery is “relevant to the subject matter” (Ill. S. Ct. R. 201(b)(1) (eff. July 1, 2014)) of 

personal jurisdiction. 
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¶ 11 Analysis 

¶ 12 The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie basis to exercise personal 

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Russell v. SNFA, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 28 (citing 

Wiggen v. Wiggen, 2011 IL App (2d) 100982, ¶ 20). Where, as here, the circuit court has 

determined that the plaintiff has met its burden based solely on documentary evidence, our 

review is de novo. Id. On review, any conflicts in the pleadings and supporting affidavits will 

be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, but uncontradicted evidence offered by the defendant may 

defeat jurisdiction. Id. 

¶ 13 In Illinois, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is authorized 

under the “long-arm” statute found in section 2-209 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 

5/2-209 (West 2012)). Plaintiff contends that subsection (c) of the statute supports a finding of 

jurisdiction here. That provision states that a court may exercise jurisdiction on any “basis now 

or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.” 

735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West 2012). Thus, to determine whether jurisdiction is appropriate 

under subsection (c), we must consider the constitutional limits placed on a state’s authority to 

exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Because defendant in this case does not 

argue that the Illinois Constitution imposes any greater restraints on the exercise of jurisdiction 

than the federal constitution, we consider only federal constitutional principles. Russell, 2013 

IL 113909, ¶ 33. 

¶ 14 The United States Supreme Court has held that the federal due process clause permits a 

state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when the 

defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit 

does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe 

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 

(1940)). Two types of personal jurisdiction are subject to the due process analysis: specific and 

general. Specific jurisdiction is case-specific. That is, specific jurisdiction exists when the 

plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum 

state. Russell, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 40 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 

472 (1985)). In contrast, general jurisdiction is all-purpose. Where general jurisdiction exists, 

the plaintiff may pursue a claim against the defendant even if the conduct of the defendant that 

is being challenged occurred entirely outside the forum state. Id. ¶ 36 (citing Goodyear Dunlop 

Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)). In this case, plaintiff does not 

complain of any conduct committed by defendant in Illinois. Thus, only general jurisdiction is 

at issue here. 

¶ 15 Plaintiff maintains that, “consistent with U.S. Supreme Court decisions” interpreting the 

federal due process clause, a state may exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant “where 

the defendant has continuous and systematic general business contacts with the forum state.” 

Therefore, according to plaintiff, to establish a prima facie case of general jurisdiction under 

subsection (c) of the long-arm statute, a plaintiff need only “show a defendant’s continuous 

and substantial business activity in Illinois.” Plaintiff emphasizes that, in this case, defendant’s 

“Illinois contacts are not tenuous or random, but have been continuous and systematic for over 

twenty-five years.” For this reason, plaintiff asserts that defendant may be subjected to general 

personal jurisdiction in this state. We disagree. 
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¶ 16 In Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), the United States Supreme 

Court held that the due process analysis for general personal jurisdiction does not rest simply 

on “whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense 

‘continuous and systematic.’ ” Id. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 

919). Such a standard, the Court explained, is “unacceptably grasping.” Id. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 

760. Instead, the Court held that, under the federal due process clause, “ ‘[a] court may assert 

general jurisdiction over [a] foreign *** corporation[ ] to hear any and all claims against [it] 

when [its] affiliations with the State are so “continuous and systematic” as to render [it] 

essentially at home in the forum State.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 754 

(quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919); see also, e.g., BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. ___, 

___, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017); Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 626-27 (2d 

Cir. 2016); Kipp v. Ski Enterprise Corp. of Wisconsin, Inc., 783 F.3d 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2015) 

(Daimler “raised the bar” for general jurisdiction); Sonera Holding B.V. v. Çukurova Holding 

A.Ş., 750 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2014) (Daimler makes “clear that even a company’s 

‘engage[ment] in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business’ is alone 

insufficient to render it at home in a forum” (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 

761)); State ex rel. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41, 51 n.6 (Mo. 2017) 

(noting Daimler’s “rejection of doing business as a basis for jurisdiction”); Barrett v. Union 

Pacific R.R. Co., 390 P.3d 1031, 1040 (Or. 2017) (same); ClearOne, Inc. v. Revolabs, Inc., 

2016 UT 16, ¶ 42, 369 P.3d 1269 (same). 

¶ 17 The Supreme Court went on to explain in Daimler that the “paradigm” forums in which a 

corporate defendant is “essentially at home” are the corporation’s place of incorporation and 

its principal place of business. Daimler, 571 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 760. The Court further 

noted that, in an “exceptional case,” a corporate defendant’s activities in a forum outside its 

place of incorporation or principal place of business “may be so substantial and of such a 

nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Id. at ___ n.19, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19. 

To illustrate what it meant by an “exceptional case,” the Supreme Court pointed to Perkins v. 

Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). Daimler, 571 U.S. at ___ n.19, 134 S. 

Ct. at 761 n. 19. In that case, the defendant corporation was forced to relocate temporarily from 

the Philippines to Ohio because of World War II. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48. Ohio was thus 

“the center of the corporation’s wartime activities” and, effectively, a “ ‘surrogate for the place 

of incorporation or head office.’ ” Daimler, 571 U.S. at ___ n.8, 134 S. Ct. at 756 n.8 (quoting 

Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 

Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1144 (1966)). As such, the defendant corporation was subject 

to general jurisdiction in that state. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448. 

¶ 18 Accordingly, in this case, to comport with the federal due process standards laid out in 

Daimler and, in doing so, comply with subsection (c) of the long-arm statute, plaintiff must 

make a prima facie showing that defendant is essentially at home in Illinois. This means that 

plaintiff must show that defendant is incorporated or has its principal place of business in 

Illinois or that defendant’s contacts with Illinois are so substantial as to render this an 

exceptional case. Plaintiff has failed to make this showing. 

¶ 19 Plaintiff does not dispute that defendant is incorporated in Indiana and Hastings’s 

uncontradicted affidavit establishes that defendant’s principal place of business is in Indiana. 

Further, plaintiff’s complaint does not allege, and there is nothing in the record to suggest, that 

this is an exceptional case on the order of Perkins. To be sure, plaintiff has established that 
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defendant does business in Illinois through the warehouse in Joliet. But this fact falls far short 

of showing that Illinois is a surrogate home for defendant. Indeed, if the operation of the 

warehouse was sufficient, in itself, to establish general jurisdiction, then defendant would also 

be at home in all the other states where its warehouses are located. The Supreme Court has 

expressly rejected this reasoning. Daimler, 571 U.S. at ___ n.20, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20 (“[a] 

corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them”); see 

also, e.g., Brown, 814 F.3d at 629 (the plaintiff failed to establish an exceptional case under 

Daimler where the defendant’s contacts in the forum state did not establish a “ ‘surrogate 

principal place of business’ ”); Kipp, 783 F.3d at 698 (noting Daimler’s “stringent criteria” for 

establishing general jurisdiction); Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 

2014) (“Daimler makes clear the demanding nature of the standard for general personal 

jurisdiction over a corporation”); Monkton Insurance Services, Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 

432 (5th Cir. 2014) (under Daimler, it is “incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction 

in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal place of business”). 

¶ 20 Plaintiff has failed to show that defendant’s contacts with Illinois render it at home in this 

state. To subject defendant to general personal jurisdiction would therefore deny it due process 

of law. Accordingly, jurisdiction is not authorized under subsection (c) of the long-arm statute. 

¶ 21 Plaintiff also notes, however, that subsection (b)(4) of the long-arm statute authorizes a 

court to exercise jurisdiction in any action arising within or without Illinois against any 

defendant “doing business within this State.” 735 ILCS 5/2-209(b)(4) (West 2012). Plaintiff 

asserts that jurisdiction in this case is authorized under this provision. We reject this 

contention. In light of Daimler, subsection (b)(4) cannot constitutionally be applied to 

establish general jurisdiction where, as here, there is no evidence that defendant’s contacts 

with Illinois have rendered it “essentially at home” in this state.

¶ 22 Finally, plaintiff argues that, because defendant has registered to do business in Illinois 

under the Business Corporation Act of 1983 (Act) (805 ILCS 5/1.01 et seq. (West 2012)), and 

because defendant has a registered agent in Illinois for service of process, it has “subjected 

itself to the jurisdiction and laws of Illinois.” That is, plaintiff maintains that, by registering to 

do business in Illinois, defendant has effectively consented to the exercise of general 

jurisdiction in this state and thereby obviated any due process concerns. Again, we disagree. 

¶ 23 Section 13.05 of the Act states that “a foreign corporation organized for profit, before it 

transacts business in this State, shall procure authority so to do from the Secretary of State.” 

805 ILCS 5/13.05 (West 2012). Section 13.15 of the Act (805 ILCS 5/13.15 (West 2012)) lists 

the requirements that must be met and information that must be provided before authorization 

is approved. The Act also requires, under section 5.05 (805 ILCS 5/5.05 (West 2012)), that 

each foreign (and domestic) corporation having authority to transact business in Illinois 

maintain a registered office and registered agent in this state. In addition, section 5.25 of the 

Act (805 ILCS 5/5.25 (West 2012)) states that a foreign corporation having authority to 

transact business in Illinois may be served with process either upon the registered agent 

appointed by the corporation or upon the Secretary of State. 

¶ 24 None of the foregoing provisions require foreign corporations to consent to general 

jurisdiction as a condition of doing business in Illinois, nor do they indicate that, by registering 

in Illinois or appointing a registered agent, a corporation waives any due process limitations on 

this state’s exercise of general jurisdiction. Indeed, the Act makes no mention of personal 
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jurisdiction at all. Accord Surita v. AM General LLC, No. 15 C 7164, 2015 WL 12826471, at 

*3 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (the Act “does not contain a provision with jurisdictional consent language” 

(emphasis in original)). 

¶ 25 Further, section 5.25(a) of the Act states that service on the registered agent of a foreign 

corporation is for that process, notice or demand that is “required or permitted by law.” 805 

ILCS 5/5.25(a) (West 2012). This phrase indicates “some limitation in accordance with law.” 

Brown, 814 F.3d at 636. There is no basis for excluding constitutional due process limitations 

from an inquiry into what is “permitted by law.” Id. at 636-37. 

¶ 26 Plaintiff points to section 13.10 of the Act (805 ILCS 5/13.10 (West 2016)). This provision 

states that a foreign corporation “shall be subject to the same duties, restrictions, penalties, and 

liabilities now or hereafter imposed upon a domestic corporation of like character.” Id.

Plaintiff suggests that this provision supports a finding of jurisdiction. However, as defendant 

observes, a duty is a “legal obligation that is owed or due to another.” Black’s Law Dictionary 

615 (10th ed. 2014). Personal jurisdiction is not a duty but, instead, “refers to the court’s power 

‘ “to bring a person into its adjudicative process.” ’ ” People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, 

¶ 12 (quoting Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334 

(2002), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 870 (8th ed. 2004)). Thus, the fact that a foreign 

corporation registered to do business in Illinois is subject to the same duties as a domestic one 

in no way suggests that the foreign corporation has consented to general jurisdiction. 

¶ 27 Under the Act, a foreign corporation must register with the Secretary of State and appoint 

an agent to accept service of process in order to conduct business in Illinois. We hold, 

however, that in the absence of any language to the contrary, the fact that a foreign corporation 

has registered to do business under the Act does not mean that the corporation has thereby 

consented to general jurisdiction over all causes of action, including those that are completely 

unrelated to the corporation’s activities in Illinois. Notably, other courts have reached similar 

conclusions. See, e.g., Perez v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., No. 3:16-CV-00842-NJR-DGW, 

2016 WL 7049153, at *6-9 (S.D. Ill. 2016) (interpreting the Act); Brown 814 F.3d at 641 

(interpreting Connecticut law); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123 (Del. 2016) 

(Delaware law). 

¶ 28 Conclusion 

¶ 29 For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are reversed. 

The cause is remanded to the circuit court to enter judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint.

¶ 30 Appellate court judgment reversed. 

¶ 31 Circuit court judgment reversed. 

¶ 32 Cause remanded with directions.