IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL WHITTED, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 12 C 2461

)

COOK COUNTY SHERIFF THOMAS )

DART, and the COUNTY OF COOK, )

)

Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:

On September 16, 2013, Plaintiff Michael Whitted filed a three-count Fourth Amended

Complaint alleging a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim (Count II) and a

claim pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56

L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (Count III), against Defendants Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart and the

County of Cook.1

 Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendants’

summary judgment motion.

BACKGROUND

I. Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1

Local Rule 56.1 “is designed, in part, to aid the district court, ‘which does not have the

advantage of the parties’ familiarity with the record and often cannot afford to spend the time

combing the record to locate the relevant information,’ in determining whether a trial is

1

 In his response brief, Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his Fourth Amendment claim as

alleged in Count I of the Fourth Amended Complaint. 
necessary.” Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Local

Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the moving party to provide “a statement of material facts as to which

the moving party contends there is no genuine issue.” Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625,

632 (7th Cir. 2009). “The opposing party is required to file ‘a response to each numbered

paragraph in the moving party’s statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific

references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” Id.

(citing N.D. Ill. R. 56.1(b)(3)(B)). Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) requires the nonmoving party to

present a separate statement of additional facts that requires the denial of summary judgment. 

See Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2008). 

In general, the purpose of Local Rule 56.1 statements and responses is to identify the

relevant admissible evidence supporting the material facts, not to make factual or legal

arguments. See Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006) (“statement of material

facts did [] not comply with Rule 56.1 as it failed to adequately cite the record and was filled

with irrelevant information, legal arguments, and conjecture”). “When a responding party’s

statement fails to dispute the facts set forth in the moving party’s statement in the manner

dictated by the rule, those facts are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion.” Cracco, 559

F.3d at 632; see also Frey Corp. v. City of Peoria, Ill., 735 F.3d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 2013).

In sum, “[f]or litigants appearing in the Northern District of Illinois, the Rule 56.1

statement is a critical, and required, component of a litigant’s response to a motion for summary

judgment. The purpose of the local rule is to make the summary judgment process less

burdensome on district courts, by requiring the parties to nail down the relevant facts and the

way they propose to support them.” Sojka v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 686 F.3d 394, 398 (7th Cir.

2
2012). With these standards in mind, the Court turns to the relevant facts of this case.

II. Relevant Facts

On May 20, 2008, a Circuit Court of Cook County judge arraigned Plaintiff as an adult

with armed robbery in the Circuit Court of Cook County Sixth Municipal District Courthouse

located in Markham, Illinois. (R. 95, Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. Facts ¶ 4.) During the May 20,

2008 court appearance, a record was made in open court that Plaintiff was 16-years-old. (Id. ¶

6.) Also during the May 20, 2008 court appearance, the Circuit Court judge held a bond hearing

and set bond in Plaintiff’s case. (Id. ¶ 7.) The Clerk of the Court then filled out a mittimus that

did not indicate which detention facility (adult or juvenile) the Sheriff’s officers were to

transport Plaintiff.2

 (R. 102, Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Stmt. Add’l Facts ¶ 5, Ex. D.) 

After his court appearance, a Sheriff’s deputy took Plaintiff into a holding area with his

co-defendant, who was an adult, where they remained for approximately 30 minutes. (Defs.’

Stmt. Facts ¶ 9; Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 4.) Thereafter, the Sheriff’s deputy took Plaintiff to another

holding cell with approximately seven to eight adult arrestees. (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶ 10; Pl.’s

Stmt. Facts ¶¶ 7, 9.) After four hours in the second holding cell, two Sheriff’s officers

transported Plaintiff and the other arrestees to the Cook County Department of Corrections

(“CCDOC”). (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶ 11; Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 10.) Plaintiff asked both transport

officers when they were going to take him to the Juvenile Temporary Detention Center

(“JTDC”). (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶ 12.) The officers told him that they would first transport him to

the CCDOC with the adult arrestees and then transport him to the JTDC. (Id.; Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶

2

 Defendants’ arguments based on the boilerplate language found on the Clerk of the

Circuit Court of Cook County’s form number CCCR N707-75M-10/8/04 (43350124) are

unavailing. (R. 95-4, Ex. D, R. 95-5, Ex. E.) 

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11.) 

Upon arriving at the CCDOC, the arrestees — including Plaintiff — exited the bus, after

which Sheriff’s officers strip-searched them. (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶ 14; Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 12; R.

95-2, Ex. B, Pl.’s Dep., at 26-28.) The officers then placed Plaintiff in a holding cell with adult

arrestees. (Id.) During his initial intake, Plaintiff spoke to an unnamed Sheriff’s officer and told

the officer that he was 16-years-old and that he was not supposed to be at the CCDOC. (Defs.’

Stmt. Facts ¶¶ 15, 16; Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶¶ 1, 13; Pl.’s Dep., at 31-32.) The officer then accused

Plaintiff of lying about his age. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 14.) After completing the initial intake,

Plaintiff talked to a mental health professional as part of the overall intake process. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

At that time, Plaintiff told the mental health care provider the date of his birth. (Id.)

After completing the intake procedure, a Sheriff’s deputy transferred Plaintiff to Division

11 of the CCDOC. (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶ 18.) Plaintiff was housed in cell 23 with an adult

detainee. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 19.) Once in Division 11, Plaintiff told a Sheriff’s deputy that he

was in the wrong place because of his age. (Id. ¶ 20; Pl.’s Dep., at 57-58.) During his transport,

intake, and detention at the CCDOC, Plaintiff told at least five Sheriff’s office employees that he

was a minor. (Defs.’ Stmt. Fact ¶ 38.) 

At some point on the evening of May 21, 2008, Plaintiff called a friend and asked him to

notify his mother that he was in adult detention and that his mother needed to bring proof of his

age so he could be transferred to the JTDC. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 24; Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 21.) Plaintiff then

went to the shower area at which time two adult detainees hit him on the back of the head, threw

a blanket over his head, and pushed him to the ground. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 23.) While naked

and lying face down on the shower floor, the adult detainees held Plaintiff with a choke-hold and

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anally raped him. (Id. ¶ 25; Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶ 26.) Immediately after the rape, the adult

detainees told Plaintiff that they would kill him if he told anyone. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 26.) 

The next morning on May 22, 2008, a correctional officer told Plaintiff to pack up

because he was leaving Division 11. (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶ 29.) Sheriff’s officers then

transported Plaintiff to Division 9 and placed him in protective custody. (Id. ¶ 31; Pl.’s Stmt.

Facts ¶ 27.) Plaintiff remained in Division 9 until the afternoon of May 23, 2008, when Sheriff’s

officers transported him to the JTDC. (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶ 33.) 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.

56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). In determining summary judgment

motions, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there

is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167

L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After “a properly supported motion for summary

judgment is made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (quotation omitted).

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ANALYSIS

Plaintiff brings his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim based on the

state-created danger/special relationship exceptions to DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of

Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). See Buchanan-Moore v.

County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009). Because Plaintiff brought this action

against Sheriff Dart in his official capacity and did not identify the John Doe Defendants within

the statute of limitations, the Court must examine Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim

within the framework provided by Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98

S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). See Snyder v. King, 745 F.3d 242, 246 (7th Cir. 2014);

Belbachir v. County of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975, 982 (7th Cir. 2013). To clarify, “[a] government

entity violates the Due Process Clause only if it maintains a policy or custom that infringes upon

the rights protected by that clause.” Hamilton v. County of Madison, Ill., 746 F.3d 766, 780 (7th

Cir. 2014). To establish liability against Sheriff Dart, Plaintiff “must show the existence of an

‘official policy’ or other governmental custom that not only causes but is the ‘moving force’

behind the deprivation of constitutional rights.” Teesdale v. City of Chicago, 690 F.3d 829, 833

(7th Cir. 2012). 

Here, Plaintiff asserts that Sheriff Dart’s failure to train Sheriff’s deputies and officers on

the basic means by which to ensure that juvenile detainees are not housed with adult detainees

was the moving force behind the deprivation of his substantive due process rights. “In limited

circumstances, a local government’s decision not to train certain employees about their legal

duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an official government policy for

purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thompson, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L.Ed.2d

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417 (2011). Under this standard, a local government’s failure to train must amount to the

deliberate indifference of the rights of the citizens whom the officers encounter. See id. (citing

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)). “Deliberate

indifference” is a term used in both Eighth Amendment claims and constitutional actions against

municipalities. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811

(1994). Specifically, “deliberate indifference serves under the Eighth Amendment to ensure that

only inflictions of punishment carry liability.” Id. On the other hand, the “term was used in the

Canton case for the quite different purpose of identifying the threshold for holding a city

responsible for the constitutional torts committed by its inadequately trained agents.” Id.

(citation omitted). Proof of deliberate indifference in the context of a failure to train case “can

take the form of either (1) failure to provide adequate training in light of foreseeable

consequences; or (2) failure to act in response to repeated complaints of constitutional violations

by its officers.” Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 2006). 

In his brief, Plaintiff focuses on the first method of proof explaining that “[a]lthough

often the best way to prove that the municipality was deliberately indifferent is to show many

instances of constitutional violations that show a pattern that was ignored by the municipality, []

that is not the only means.” (R. 107, Resp. Brief, at 18.) Indeed, usually “[a] pattern of similar

constitutional violations by untrained employees” is necessary “to demonstrate deliberate

indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1360. Nonetheless, the first

method of proof as discussed in Sornberger, also known as the “single-incident” method as

hypothesized by Canton, is an alternative to establishing deliberate indifference in a failure to

train case. See Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1360-61. As the Connick Court explained:

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In Canton, the Court left open the possibility that, “in a narrow range of

circumstances,” a pattern of similar violations might not be necessary to show

deliberate indifference. The Court posed the hypothetical example of a city that

arms its police force with firearms and deploys the armed officers into the public

to capture fleeing felons without training the officers in the constitutional

limitation on the use of deadly force. Given the known frequency with which

police attempt to arrest fleeing felons and the “predictability that an officer

lacking specific tools to handle that situation will violate citizens’ rights,” the

Court theorized that a city’s decision not to train the officers about constitutional

limits on the use of deadly force could reflect the city’s deliberate indifference to

the “highly predictable consequence,” namely, violations of constitutional rights. 

The Court sought not to foreclose the possibility, however rare, that the

unconstitutional consequences of failing to train could be so patently obvious that

a city could be liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of

violations.

Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, under Canton and Connick, single-incident liability is

available in rare circumstances where the need for more or different training is so obvious that a

plaintiff’s injury is a “highly predictable consequence” of any such deficient training. See

Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1361; Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. Liability under this theory depends on the

“likelihood that the situation will recur and the predictability that an officer lacking specific tools

to handle that situation will violate citizens’ rights.” Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan

County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409-10, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).

Viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, he presents the

following evidence to support his failure to train claim. First, it is undisputed that the entire

Cook County Department of Corrections falls under the purview of Cook County Sheriff

Thomas Dart, including the 11 divisions at the Cook County Jail, the transportation of detainees

to the CCDOC and JTDC, and the various lockups and holding cells at all of the Cook County

Courthouses. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 28.) It is further undisputed that the CCDOC is required to

follow Illinois law and keep juvenile detainees separate from adult detainees as a matter of

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policy. (Id. ¶ 29.) 

At his deposition, CCDOC Assistant Executive Director Michael Charles Holmes

testified that there was a policy in May 2008 that people under the age of 17 could not be housed

in the adult Cook County Correctional System, but he was unsure how that policy was enforced

or how Sheriff’s deputies were made aware of this policy. (Id. ¶ 30, R. 95-6, Ex. F, Holmes

Dep., at 90-91.) Holmes further testified that in May 2008 there was a policy in place that

Sheriff’s officers would transport juvenile detainees on a separate bus than adult detainees,

although, again, he was unsure how Sheriff’s officers were trained on this policy. (Id. ¶ 36,

Holmes Dep., at 24-27, 31-33.) In addition, Holmes stated that if a detainee claimed to be under

the age of 17 during the intake process, the Sheriff’s officer would immediately notify a

supervisor and the supervisor would then generate the necessary paperwork to determine the

detainee’s classification. (Id. ¶ 37, Holmes Dep., at 44-45.) Holmes stated that he believed this

policy was in the CCDOC’s rules and regulations. (Id., Holmes Dep., at 49.) 

The Chief of the Civil Division, Kelly Jackson, who was in charge of all the courtroom

Sheriff’s deputies in May 2008, testified at her deposition that a state statute dictates the policy

that children under the age of 17 cannot be housed in the adult Cook County Correctional

System and that Sheriff’s officers are trained in juvenile law when they are at the academy. (Id.

¶¶ 30, 33, R. 95-7, Ex. G, Jackson Dep., at 43-45.) Jackson further testified that although the

policy for juvenile arrestees is to separate them from the adult arrestees while in court, as a

matter of practice, keeping juveniles separate from the adult arrestees is not always possible. 

(Id., Ex. G, Jackson Dep., at 13-14.) Also, Jackson stated that there was a policy that juvenile

detainees cannot be held in the same holding cells as adult detainees. (Id. at 20.) Nevertheless,

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the sergeant in charge of the Markham Courthouse lockup, Eugene Matthews, testified at his

deposition that the training for courtroom deputies did not include training on how to deal with

juvenile arrestees. (Id. ¶ 32, R. 102-25, Mathews Dep., at 20-21.)

Moreover, at her deposition, Jackson admitted that the screening sheet and information

reports generated by the Sheriff’s deputies indicate a detainee’s date of birth. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts 

¶ 34; see also Pl.’s Exs. 19, 20.) Other evidence in the record, however, suggests that there is no

policy or procedure requiring a Sheriff’s officer to calculate the age of a detainee based on his

birth date. (Id. ¶ 35, Ex. F, Holmes Dep., at 94.) 

Based on these facts, Plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence creating a triable issue of

fact that the Cook County Sheriff’s employees responsible for separating, transporting, and

guarding juvenile and adult detainees do not receive adequate training and that it was highly

predictable that placing a juvenile detainee in the general adult population at the Cook County

Jail would result in a constitutional violation, in this case, the rape of the juvenile detainee by

adult detainees, as discussed in detail below. In other words, based on this evidence, a

reasonable jury could conclude that due to the violent and volatile nature of the Cook County

Jail, it is highly predictable that the lack of adequate training in separating juvenile and adult

detainees — as dictated by state law — would result in the violation of juvenile detainees’

constitutional rights. See Taylor v. O’Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1196 (7th Cir. 1989) (“As one of

the largest and most populous county jail facilities in the country,” the “Cook County Jail houses

criminals charged with a variety of crimes, from misdemeanors to murder and many of the

prisoners may be violent.”).

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In particular, construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor,

evidence in the record reveals that although there was a policy in place in May 2008 that

children under the age of 17 could not be housed in the adult Cook County Correctional System,

how and if the Sheriff’s office actually trained officers and deputies as to this policy is unclear. 

Further, although there was a policy in place, there is evidence that it was not always possible to

keep juvenile and adult detainees separated. It also appears that there is a protocol for when a

detainee claims to be under the age of 17 during the intake process, yet in this matter, the

Sheriff’s officer did not notify a supervisor or double-check the necessary paperwork, but instead

accused Plaintiff of lying. In addition, although the screening sheet and information reports

generated by the Sheriff’s deputies and officers indicate a detainee’s date of birth, either there is

no system in place for Sheriff’s officers to calculate a detainee’s age or the officers are not

trained to look at the date of birth information when transporting, processing, and incarcerating

pre-trial detainees. 

Under the circumstances, the Sheriff’s officers’ deliberate indifference led directly to the

predictable consequence that the adult detainees physically harmed and raped Plaintiff. See

Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 409-10. As the Canton Court posits — “Would the injury have been

avoided had the employee been trained under a program that was not deficient in the identified

respect?” Canton, 489 U.S. at 391. Here, the answer is yes, especially because Plaintiff

informed Sheriff’s personnel at least five times that he was under the age of 17. Therefore, the

Court denies Defendants’ summary judgment motion regarding Plaintiff’s Monell claim.

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The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants violated his substantive due

process rights under state-created danger/special relationship exceptions to DeShaney.

3

 As the

DeShaney Court explained, the purpose of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

is “to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] them from each

other.” Id. at 195. Accordingly, “[t]here is no federal constitutional right to be protected by the

government against private violence in which the government is not complicit.” Sandage v.

Board of Comm’rs of Vanderburgh County, 548 F.3d 595, 596 (7th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless,

“while there’s no federal constitutional duty to protect or to rescue from a peril that the

government did not create, there is a duty not to harm.” Id. at 597 (internal parenthesis omitted).

Also, “when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the

Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety

and general well-being.” DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200; T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 589-90

(7th Cir. 2010) (“An exception to [DeShaney’s] general rule exists when the state has a ‘special

relationship’ with the citizen, such as when it takes the person into custody or otherwise imposes

3

 Plaintiff also argues that the officers’ conduct violated his due process right to his

liberty interest in “unjustified intrusions on personal security.” See Ingraham v. Wright, 430

U.S. 651, 673, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 383 (7th

Cir. 1979). This argument is based on cases decided before the Supreme Court’s 1989 DeShaney

decision and dovetails with Plaintiff’s state-created danger/special relationship argument. See

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200 (“when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him

there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some

responsibility for his safety and general well-being”). In fact, the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly

cited White in reference to the state-created danger/special relationship theories. See, e.g., Paine

v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2012); Jackson v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 204, 653 F.3d

647, 655 (7th Cir. 2011).

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limitations on the person’s ‘freedom to act on his own behalf.’”).4

To establish his substantive due process claim, Plaintiff must present evidence showing

that: (1) Defendants created or increased a danger that he faced while he was in custody; (2)

Defendants’ failure to protect him from the danger was the proximate cause of his injuries; and

(3) Defendants’ failure to protect Plaintiff “shocks the conscience.” Jackson v. Indian Prairie

Sch. Dist. 204, 653 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2011). “The Supreme Court has held that state action

that shocks the conscience is conduct which may be deemed ‘arbitrary in the constitutional

sense.’” Id. (citation omitted); see also Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir. 2007)

(substantive due process “affords protection of the individual against arbitrary action of

government”). “Only ‘the most egregious official conduct’ will satisfy this stringent inquiry,”

such that “[m]aking a bad decision, or even acting negligently, does not suffice to establish the

type of conscience-shocking behavior that results in a constitutional violation.” Jackson, 653

F.3d at 654-55 (citation omitted). 

Viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, he has clearly

fulfilled the first two elements of his substantive due process claim, namely, Defendants created

and increased the danger that he faced while he was in custody at the Cook County Jail by

placing him with adult detainees and it was foreseeable that Defendants’ failure to protect him

from this danger while he was a juvenile pre-trial detainee caused his injuries. See Paine v.

4

 Instead of categorizing the DeShaney exceptions as the “special relationship exception”

and “state-created danger exception,” the Seventh Circuit has recently stated that “[s]tate actors

who needlessly create risks of harm violate the due process clause by depriving persons of life,

liberty, or property without process.” Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2012); see

also Sandage v. Board of Comm’rs of Vanderburgh County, 548 F.3d 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2008)

(“in both classes of case the victim is safe before the state intervenes and unsafe afterward.”).

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Cason, 678 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2012) (“state actors who, without justification, increase a

person’s risk of harm violate the Constitution.”); see also Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1127

(7th Cir. 1993). The Court thus turns to the third requirement, namely, whether Defendants’

failure to protect Plaintiff “shocks the conscience.” 

The “shocks the conscience” standard lacks precision, but “when the circumstances

permit public officials the opportunity for reasoned deliberation in their decisions, [courts] shall

find the official’s conduct conscience shocking when it evinces a deliberate indifference to the

rights of the individual.” King v. East St. Louis Sch. Dist., 189, 496 F.3d 812, 819 (7th Cir.

2007). That is the case here — the Sheriff’s failure to adequately train deputies and officers to

keep juvenile detainees separate from adult detainees does not involve a situation in which the

Sheriff’s officers had to make split-second decisions under pressure or in haste. See County of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). Instead, the

Sheriff has had ample opportunity to implement adequate training of the officers and deputies to

protect juvenile detainees prior to May 2008 when Sheriff’s officers placed Plaintiff in a position

of significant danger causing Plaintiff’s physical injury. Indeed, as the Supreme Court teaches:

[L]iability for deliberate indifference to inmate welfare rests upon the luxury

enjoyed by prison officials of having time to make unhurried judgments, upon the

chance for repeated reflection, largely uncomplicated by the pulls of competing

obligations. When such extended opportunities to do better are teamed with

protracted failure even to care, indifference is truly shocking. 

Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853. Although the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a

guarantee against bad decisions, Defendants’ conduct evidences deliberate indifference because,

under the circumstances, the Sheriff had the opportunity to prevent the foreseeable, dangerous

consequences of placing a juvenile in custody with adults by implementing sufficient training of

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his officers and deputies. See Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 576 (7th Cir. 1998) (the

Supreme Court has “endorsed the use of the deliberately indifferent standard for cases in which

the defendants have the luxury of forethought.”). Therefore, the Court denies Defendants’

summary judgment motion in regard to Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim.

On a final note, the Court has already rejected Defendant Cook County’s attempt at

dismissal from this lawsuit because there is no employer/employee relationship between the

county and its sheriff. (R. 21, 8/27/12, Mem., Op., & Order, at 6-7.) As discussed in the Court’s

August 27, 2012 Memorandum, Opinion, and Order, Plaintiff conceded that Cook County cannot

be held liable under the theory of respondeat superior under the circumstances. Nevertheless,

Cook County is an indispensable party to this lawsuit because state law requires the County to

pay judgments entered against the Sheriff’s Office in its official capacity. See Askew v. Sheriff of

Cook County, 568 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2009); Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 324 F.3d

947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003); 55 ILCS 5/5-1002. 

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ summary judgment motion brought

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a).

Dated: June 23, 2014

ENTERED

______________________________

AMY J. ST. EVE

United States District Court Judge

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