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DEMOCRACY RESTORATION ACT OF 2009 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 

CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON

H.R. 3335 

MARCH 16, 2010 

Serial No. 111–84 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

JUDY CHU, California 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

DANIEL MAFFEI, New York 

[Vacant] 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

PERRY APELBAUM, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

JERROLD NADLER, New York, Chairman 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JUDY CHU, California 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

DAVID LACHMANN, Chief of Staff 

PAUL B. TAYLOR, Minority Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

MARCH 16, 2010 

Page 

THE BILL 

H.R. 3335, the ‘‘Democracy Restoration Act of 2009’’ ........................................... 3 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Virginia, and acting Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties ................................................................ 1 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Wisconsin, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the 

Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties .................................................. 14 

The Honorable Steve Cohen, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Tennessee, and Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil 

Rights, and Civil Liberties .................................................................................. 15 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Hilary O. Shelton, Director, NAACP Washington Bureau, Washington, 

DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 17 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20 

Mr. Roger Clegg, President and General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity, Falls Church, VA 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 23 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 25 

Mr. Burt Neuborne, Inez Milholland Professor of Civil Liberties, New York 

University School of Law, New York, NY 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 37 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 39 

Mr. Hans A. von Spakovsky, Senior Legal Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, 

Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 50 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 52 

Mr. Carl Wicklund, Executive Director, American Probation and Parole Association, Lexington, KY 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 59 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 61 

Mr. Ion Sancho, Supervisor of Elections Leon County, Tallahassee, FL 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 65 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 68 

Mr. Andres Idarraga, Central Falls, RI 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 71 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 74 

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 105 

(1) 

DEMOCRACY RESTORATION ACT OF 2009 

TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2010 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION,

CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Robert C. 

‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, acting Chairman of the Subcommittee presiding. 

Present: Representatives Scott, Conyers, Watt, Cohen, Jackson 

Lee, Chu, Sensenbrenner, and Franks. 

Staff present: (Majority) Keenan Keller, Counsel; David 

Lachman, Subcommittee Chief of Staff; and (Minority) Paul Taylor, 

Minority Counsel. 

Mr. SCOTT. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

Today, the Subcommittee examines one of the cornerstones of our 

democracy, the right to vote in a free and fair election. That right 

is denied an estimated 5.3 million Americans because of felony convictions. As many as four million of these have already completed 

their sentences. 

Chairman Conyers of the full Committee has introduced legislation to deal with that problem. H.R. 3335, the ‘‘Democracy Restoration Act of 2009,’’ of which I am a proud sponsor, would restore the 

franchise of people who have paid their debt to society. 

Disenfranchisement has real consequences. Although this Committee has been in the forefront of efforts to reintegrate ex-offenders into society, these disenfranchisement laws stand as a major 

impediment to that important goal. 

Excluding people who have paid their debts to society from the 

mainstream of our Nation serves no useful purpose, but it does undermine the legitimacy of our elections and runs against our goals 

of returning people to the community and helping them leave behind the wrongdoing of their past. 

In the last Congress, President Bush signed the Second Chance 

Act. It represents a bipartisan recognition that we must do more 

to reintegrate ex-offenders into the community. Voting rights legislation is an important step in that direction. 

This Committee was also the driving force behind the extension 

of the Voting Rights Act, which stands as a crowning achievement 

in this Nation’s march to full participation in our democracy. Unfortunately, we still have work to do. Not only are ex-offenders 

disenfranchised, but efforts to purge ex-offenders from the rolls 

2 

have resulted in thousands of qualified voters losing their right to 

vote. 

Confusion over these laws—for example, whether they apply to 

people on probation or parole, or whether misdemeanors may be involved—and criminal penalties for people who get it wrong intimidates people with every right to vote from exercising that right. 

Disenfranchisement of ex-offenders has a disproportionate impact 

on minority communities. Nationwide, 13 percent of African Americans have lost their right to vote, and that is seven times the national average. In eight States, more than 15 percent of African 

Americans cannot vote due to felony convictions, and in three of 

those States, more than 20 percent of the African American voting 

age population has lost the right to vote. 

These statistics have consequences far beyond the rights of the 

disenfranchised individual. It can marginalize the entire community. In fact, many elections are decided by the margin of who is 

disenfranchised. 

The voice of these communities and our system of self-government are diminished. The entire community is disenfranchised. 

And, in fact, they also prevent those who are disenfranchised from 

having a voice in policies that led to the disenfranchisement. By 

not being able to vote, they have no voice in democracy. 

They have no vote in the appropriations and how we appropriate 

money for education, for example. They have no vote in criminal 

justice laws, and no voice in the selection of the police, prosecutors 

and judges. And in fact, in many areas, there is a political imperative to use disenfranchisement to win elections. 

And so, we need to make sure that everyone has the right to 

vote, so that everyone’s voice is heard. 

States have begun to recognize the injustice of the ex-offender 

disenfranchisement. Since 1997, 19 States have expanded voter eligibility for ex-offenders. 

These reforms have restored the franchise to over 750,000 citizens. Republican governors in Louisiana, Florida and Rhode Island, 

as well as Democratic governors in Iowa, Maryland, North Carolina 

and Washington State have worked to advance the reform of ex-offender franchises. 

Now, we know that, from a Federal point of view, this is a complicated, constitutionally complicated matter, because the Constitution specifically allows States to disenfranchise voters. But under 

the Voting Rights Act, even legal procedures can be proscribed, if 

they are utilized in an intentionally discriminatory way, or in a 

way that has a discriminatory effect. 

So, we are going to see what the options are. Even though this 

may be legal, we may be able to restore some rights. 

So, today, we are joined by a distinguished panel of witnesses, 

and I look forward to their testimony, and now recognize the 

former Chair of the full Committee, the gentleman from Wisconsin, 

Mr. Sensenbrenner. 

[The bill, H.R. 3335, follows:] 

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Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

A core provision of this bill provides the States can only deny felons currently serving their sentences the right to vote, and that exfelons, along with all people who are subject to parole or probation, 

must be allowed to vote, the laws of their States to the contrary 

notwithstanding. 

This legislation would thereby void the laws in 48 out of 50 

States, as well as the District of Columbia, that forbids felons from 

voting in varying degrees. Those States include my own State of 

Wisconsin, where people lose their voting rights if they are incarcerated, or on parole, or on probation. 

As former Judge Henry Friendly said, someone who ‘‘breaks the 

law may fairly be thought to have abandoned the right to participate in making them, and that it scarcely can be deemed unreasonable for a State that the perpetrators of serious crimes shall not 

take part in electing the legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce them and the prosecutors who must try them for 

further violation, or the judges who are to consider their cases.’’ 

When the 11th Circuit, speaking en banc, upheld Florida’s felon 

voting roll, it said that felon disenfranchisement laws are deeply 

rooted in this Nation’s history. Between 1776 and 1821, 11 States 

disenfranchised persons convicted of serious crimes. And by the 

time of the Civil War, more than two dozen out of the then 34 

States had enacted similar laws. 

By the time the 14th Amendment was adopted, 29 States had 

long since established felon disenfranchisement laws. 

This long history clearly refutes any suggestion that those laws 

were racially motivated. As the en banc 11th Circuit observed, at 

that time, the right to vote was not extended to African Americans. 

And therefore, they could not have been the targets of any felon 

disenfranchisement law. 

Indeed, the 14th Amendment itself explicitly permits States to 

adopt such laws. The framers of the Civil War amendment expressly included in Section 1 of the 14th Amendment terms that 

provide for a State’s denial of voting rights ‘‘for participation in rebellion or other crime,’’ and made clear that such laws could not 

serve as the basis for reducing their representation in Congress. 

As the Supreme Court held in Richardson v. Ramirez, Section 2 

is an affirmative sanction by the Constitution of the exclusion of 

felons from the vote, including felons like the plaintiff in that case, 

who had finished their sentences. And a unanimous Warren era 

court decision recognized that a criminal record is one of the factors 

which a State may take into consideration in determining the 

qualifications of voters. 

As the 6th Circuit has said, felons are not disenfranchised because of an immutable characteristic such as race, but rather because of their conscious decision to commit a criminal act for which 

they assume the risks of detention and punishment. 

The majority opinion among the Federal circuits also reject the 

notion that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 can invalidate felon disenfranchisement statutes on the grounds that such laws have a racially disproportionate impact on minorities, while the 9th Circuit—which is the most overturned circuit in the country—held 

15 

that the VRA can cover felon disenfranchisement laws. The en banc 

11th Circuit and the 2nd Circuit have soundly rejected that claim. 

As the 11th Circuit stated, the Voting Rights Act—an entirely 

one-sided legislative history on that point—is supported by subsequent congressional acts. Since 1982, Congress has made it easier 

for States to disenfranchise felons. For example, the National Voter 

Registration Act of 1993, which was signed into law by President 

Clinton, not only provides that a felony conviction may be the basis 

for cancelling a voter’s registration, but it also requires Federal 

prosecutors to notify State election officials of Federal felony convictions. 

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 also instructs State election 

officials to purge disenfranchised felons from their computerized 

voting lists on a regular basis. 

Finally, regardless of the merits of this bill, it is doubtful that 

Congress even has the constitutional authority to enact it, because 

doing so would exceed Congress’ enforcement powers under the 

14th and 15th Amendments. In the 1997 case of City of Boerne v. 

Flores, the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot enact laws in 

support of the constitutional equal protection requirement, unless 

Congress has first developed a legislative record that demonstrates 

a history and pattern of unconstitutional State conduct. 

Not only has that legislative record not been compiled, but for 

the reasons outlined above, it does not appear that it ever could be 

compiled, considering the vast weight of countervailing historical 

evidence. 

Still, I look forward to hearing from all our witnesses today. And 

I think those who are in support of this bill had better answer this. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

And we are joined by the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to make an opening statement, for this has been an issue 

very close to my heart during most of my legislative career. 

In 1986 as a State senator, I passed a bill in Tennessee that 

changed the voting rights in Tennessee, and allowed for people who 

had previously been declared infamous not to have voting rights, 

to get their voting rights restored in a simple process, in a simple 

procedure. And from 1986 to 1996, that law rested on the books, 

and it was known as the ‘‘Cohen period.’’ 

In 1996, because of the Tennessee district attorney generals conference, the law was changed. Over my vote, and maybe one other 

person’s, it was changed. It made me realize at that time that part 

of the impetus, besides the racial implications—which I think are 

clear, de facto, not de jure, necessarily racism—was that the D.A.s 

who put these people in jail did not want to see those people come 

back to vote, because they would not vote for that D.A. 

And that is not right either. It is politically covering your rear. 

And that is what happened when they changed the law in Tennessee. 

And then, in 2006, we changed the law again. And we changed 

it back to a simple procedure similar to what it was in 1986 to 

1996. 

However, an individual from East Tennessee—a Republican in 

the house—put an amendment on, to say that you could not get 

16 

your voting rights restored if you were behind in your child support. Well, spend some time in prison. I think you are going to be 

behind in your child support, because you are not earning any 

money. 

And we know that that was another effort, and that it was challenged. But it was accepted in the house, which is something I wish 

would not have happened, but I was in the senate. The ACLU challenged that action, but I think the courts said that it was not—that 

they were not successful in their court challenge. So, we still have 

that problem in Tennessee. 

The bottom line is, Mr. Chairman, this is a vestige of Jim Crow. 

And I do not care if it is in Wisconsin, if it is in Utah, if it is in 

Alaska. It is a vestige of Jim Crow. And it needs to go. And if the 

Constitution—if there is a problem, we need to find a way to get 

around it. 

And while the distinguished former Chairman of this Committee 

submits that the 9th Circuit is the most overturned circuit, I think 

that is a condemnation of the Supreme Court of the United States, 

not a condemnation of the 9th Circuit, that is more likely on point, 

correct and moving this country forward. So, because it is overturned, that is a badge of honor. 

And the fact is, Mr. Chairman, this is an important hearing. We 

need to make sure that all these type of laws, that in their heart 

and their soul are evil and trying to put a scarlet letter—Hester 

Prynne does not have the A on her chest anymore. We have grown 

since Hester Prynne and ‘‘The Scarlet Letter.’’ 

And this is an eternal scarlet letter put on people, which is contrary to all Christian, Judeo-Christian types of theories, that people can be recovered, can be redeemed, should have an opportunity 

and should be given a stake in society. 

And if people cannot vote, they do not have a stake. And so, they 

are going to stay out of society and they are going to be recidivists. 

It is just wrong. 

And I appreciate Mr. Conyers’ bill, and we need to do all we can 

to pass it. 

Thank you so much. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

We have a distinguished panel with us today. 

The first speaker will be Hilary Shelton, director of the NAACP’s 

Washington bureau, senior vice president for advocacy and policy. 

In this capacity he has advocated on behalf of crucial civil rights 

legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the reauthorization 

of the Voting Rights Act, the Help America Vote Act. He holds degrees in political science, communications and legal studies at 

Howard University, University of Missouri at St. Louis and Northeastern University, respectively. 

Roger Clegg is the president and general counsel for the Center 

for Equal Opportunity. From 1982 to 1993, he held a number of positions with the Department of Justice, including assistant solicitor 

general, and has served in the Civil Rights Division and Environmental Division. He is a graduate of Rice University and Yale Law 

School. 

Burt Neuborne is a professor of civil liberties at New York University School of Law. He has served as the legal director of the 

17 

Brennan Center for Justice at NYU since its founding in 1995. In 

addition to his work at the Brennan Center, he served on the New 

York City Human Rights Commission from 1988 to 1992, and as 

the national legal director of the ACLU from 1981 to 1986. 

Hans Spakovsky is a senior legal scholar at the Center for Legal 

and Judicial Studies at the Heritage Foundation. He served in the 

Department of Justice as counsel to the assistant attorney general 

for civil rights from 2002 to 2005, and as a commissioner of the 

Federal Elections Commission in 2006 and 2007. He is a graduate 

of Vanderbilt University School of Law and received his B.S. from 

MIT. 

Carl Wicklund is the executive director of the American Probation and Parole Association. He has over 37 years of experience in 

justice and human service fields that includes corrections program 

development and management. At the APPA he has been a member of the National Program Committee, chaired the Juvenile Justice Committee and served on the board of directors. He holds a 

B.A. in psychology from Gustavus Adolphus College. 

Ion Sancho is a supervisor of elections for Leon County, Florida, 

serving since January 1989. He has been re-elected to five additional terms. He is one of only three out of 67 supervisors of elections in Florida without a party affiliation. He has devoted special 

attention to studying voting technology as an increasing participation in our electoral system. He received a J.D. from Florida State 

University Law School and B.A. from Stetson University. 

Andres Idarraga is a native of Rhode Island. He was convicted 

of a felony when he was 20 and spent 6.5 years in prison. Since 

his release in June of 2004, he has worked hard to overcome his 

past, becoming a full-time student at Brown University while 

maintaining full-time employment and advocating on behalf of 

those disenfranchised due to felony conviction. 

He is currently in his second year at Yale Law School, and I have 

learned that he is going to be joining the office of the full Judiciary 

Committee as an intern later this year. 

I am pleased to welcome all of you. Your written statements in 

their entirety will be made part of the record, and I ask each of 

you to summarize your testimony in 5 minutes or less. 

To help you stay within that time, there is a timing device at the 

table that is right behind the water pitcher. So, that would help 

you stay within the time. The light will start green, switch to yellow when there is 1 minute remaining, and will turn red when 5 

minutes are up. 

It is customary in this Subcommittee to swear in the witnesses, 

but we are going to skip that this time and just go with—starting 

with Mr. Shelton. 

TESTIMONY OF HILARY O. SHELTON, DIRECTOR, 

NAACP WASHINGTON BUREAU, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. SHELTON. Thank you very much. And good afternoon, Chairman Scott, Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, 

Congressman Cohen and esteemed Members of this Subcommittee. 

Thank you so much for calling this important hearing and for 

asking me here today to share with you the NAACP’s position on 

this crucial piece of legislation. 

18 

The NAACP strongly supports H.R. 3335, the ‘‘Democracy Restoration Act of 2009,’’ and urges its immediate enactment. At the 

heart of this debate, Mr. Chairman, is a question of rehabilitation, 

democracy and basic fairness. Currently, an estimated 5.3 million 

Americans across our Nation are denied the right to vote because 

of the laws that prohibit or restrict voting by people with felony 

convictions. 

Three-fourths of these Americans are no longer in jail. The Democracy Restoration Act would permit men and women to register 

and vote in Federal elections once they have been released from 

prison. 

The question as to whether or not these people should be allowed 

to vote is not a partisan question. Since 1997, 19 States that are 

considered both blue and red have amended felony disenfranchisement policies in an effort to restore voter eligibility. 

Felony disenfranchisement laws have had a racially and ethnically disparate effect on minority Americans in general, and on 

African Americans quite specifically. Nationwide, an estimated 13 

percent, or one out of every eight African American men cannot 

vote, because of a prior felony conviction. This is seven times the 

national average. 

And while the majority of those Americans who are 

disenfranchised because of prior felony convictions are Caucasian, 

African Americans, who make up about 13 percent of the U.S. national population, constitute about one-third, or 33 percent, of those 

disenfranchised. 

Furthermore, given the current rates of incarceration, three in 10 

of the next generation of African American men can expect to lose 

their right to vote at some point in their lifetime. In States that 

disenfranchise ex-offenders, as many as 40 percent of African 

American men may effectively and permanently lose their right to 

vote. 

One question that is frequently asked is, how many of these men 

and women would vote if they had an opportunity? It is, frankly, 

difficult to say. 

However, in 2006, voters in Rhode Island changed the law so 

that once a felon was released from prison, he or she was able to 

register to vote. Since probation or parole terms can run a decade 

or more, an estimated 15,000 people in that State were prevented 

from voting. After passage of the amendment, about 6,000 of these 

people registered to vote in the 2008 election. 

Felony disenfranchisement also has an impact at the community 

level. Voting is one way that people take responsibility for their 

lives and show a sense of ownership, or become a stakeholder in 

our great Nation. By prohibiting an individual from participating 

in an electoral process, we are decreasing the stake he or she may 

have in his or her own community. 

Furthermore, election laws—even those governing Federal elections—are determined by individual States, and so, disenfranchisement laws may vary significantly across the country. On one hand, 

some States allow individuals to vote while they are incarcerated. 

On the other hand, 11 States currently do not allow people to vote 

once they are convicted of a felony offense, even after they have 

fully completed their sentences. 

19 

This leads to confusion and disparities. A perfect example of the 

vast disparities is right here in our own backyard. 

In Virginia, a felony conviction automatically results in a permanent disenfranchisement, yet just over the State line in West Virginia, a person is allowed to register and vote once he or she leaves 

prison. As a result, less than 1 percent of the total population of 

West Virginia is disenfranchised, and all but 3.4 percent of African 

American populations of voting age are able to vote. 

In Virginia, almost 7 percent of the entire voting age population 

is disenfranchised due to a past felony conviction, and almost 20 

percent of the State’s African American population is locked out of 

the voting booth. 

Felony voting restrictions are the last vestige of voting prohibition. When the U.S. was founded, only wealthy men were allowed 

to vote. Women, racial and ethnic minorities, illiterates and the 

poor were excluded. Most of these restrictions have all been eliminated over time, often with much debate, rancor and challenges. 

People who have served their time and been released from prison 

are the last Americans to be denied their highly cherished, basic 

right to vote. Furthermore, the fact that the States which disenfranchise the most African Americans tend to be in the South, 

makes these laws all the more suspect. 

In fact, in some States with more restrictive ex-felony disenfranchisement laws, we have had African Americans report that their 

personal history—and, therefore, their voting eligibility—is questioned, simply because of the color of their skin. 

Because the right to vote is such an important element of the 

democratic process, it is simply wrong to predicate it upon a system 

rife with racial disparities. 

And with the voting such an integral part of becoming a productive member of American society, the way forward for our Nation 

should be a new paradigm in which we encourage ex-felons to vote, 

not prohibit them. 

Chairman, I would like to again thank the Committee for the opportunity to speak, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shelton follows:] 

20 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HILARY O. SHELTON


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Mr. SCOTT. Exactly 5 minutes. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Shelton. 

Mr. Clegg? 

TESTIMONY OF ROGER CLEGG, PRESIDENT AND GENERAL 

COUNSEL, CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, FALLS 

CHURCH, VA 

Mr. CLEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today. 

My name is Roger Clegg, and I am the president and general 

counsel of the Center for Equal Opportunity. I work there with 

Linda Chavez on a variety of issues. We are best described as a 

conservative think tank. 


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I appreciate the opportunity to testify today, because I feel very 

strongly about this bill. I am sorry to say that what I have to say 

is that this Committee, this Congress, does not have the authority 

to pass it, and that even if you did have the authority to pass it, 

it would be a bad idea. And I do not view either one of those as 

being particularly close calls. 

The authority that is asserted for passing this bill appears principally to be Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. That is not 

what Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution says. 

It is about Congress regulating the ‘‘Times, Places and Manner’’ 

of elections. That is not determining who votes in an election. That 

is explicitly the subject of other, different parts of the Constitution. 

That is what Alexander Hamilton thought. That is what James 

Madison thought. That is what the words of the Constitution mean. 

There is no Supreme Court authority to the contrary. 

The case that most squarely presented this issue succeeded in 

getting the vote of exactly one Supreme Court justice. The other 

eight justices not only did not join him, but explicitly, to one degree 

or another, rejected Article I, Section 4 as authority. So, what you 

have to rely on instead, I guess, is authority under the 14th or 15th 

Amendment. 

Mr. Chairman, in your introduction you said that you can rely 

on those provisions if there is a racially disproportionate intent or 

effect—there is racial intent or effect. 

I must respectfully disagree. The case law is quite clear that 

there must be discriminatory intent, there must be disparate treatment. And the history is quite clear that there is no systematic use 

of or intent behind these felon disenfranchisement laws to disenfranchise people on the basis of race. 

The opposing side’s own historical research bears that out. The 

idea that, if you commit a crime, you are not allowed to vote, has 

roots in ancient Greece and ancient Rome. It came over to the colonies from England. It was passed in all kinds of States that did not 

have any—did not even allow African Americans to vote, and so, 

could not have been intended to keep them from voting. They were 

passed in a huge majority of States, long before the Civil War. 

It is true that there were five southern States in the period from 

1890 to 1910 that tweaked those laws to further disenfranchise African Americans. But those were five States—those laws are no 

longer on the books. All the other States that passed these laws did 

not have that intent. 

The historical record is overwhelming that that is the case. And 

as has already been acknowledged, 48 of the 50 States in the 

United States, to one degree or another, disenfranchise felons. The 

historical record simply is not there. 

And the record that is being relied on here is nonexistent. The 

Supreme Court’s decision, the Supreme Court’s handling of the 

Northwest Austin case last year, made clear that they were very 

interested in Congress being able to point to some kind of authority. 

And I must say, Mr. Chairman, that as skeptical as the Supreme 

Court was in the Northwest Austin case, the case for congressional 

authority there was robust compared to what we have here. There 

is simply no authority for Congress to pass this bill. And as my 

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written testimony elaborates, it would be a bad idea for them to do 

so, even if they did have that authority. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Clegg follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER CLEGG


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Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Neuborne? 

TESTIMONY OF BURT NEUBORNE, INEZ MILHOLLAND PROFESSOR OF CIVIL LIBERTIES, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 

SCHOOL OF LAW, NEW YORK, NY 

Mr. NEUBORNE. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon. 

It is a great tribute to the both scholarly and intellectual force 

in this Nation that I can disagree so vehemently with Professor 

Clegg over the Committee’s authority. 

I don’t think there is any doubt about the Committee’s authority. 

One can argue about the merits of this, and other people will do 

that much better than I can. But as far as the power of Congress 

to sever the last link between a history of using devices to prevent 

the members of racial minorities to vote, I think is, without question, that you have this power. 

This is the last link. Literacy tests are gone. The durational residence requirements are gone. The property qualifications are gone. 

The intimidation has finally been stopped. The violence has been 

stopped—the last link to the racist past of the felony disenfranchisement laws. 

Felony disenfranchisement, or disenfranchisement for conviction, 

did indeed predate the Civil War. They had it in Greece. But once 

the Civil War was fought, and once the 14th and 15th Amendments 

were put on the books, this was an extraordinarily convenient device for racists in both the North and the South to seize upon as 

a way to make sure that the newly freed slaves and the newly 

freed Black Americans would be unable to vote. 

And it is true that five States in 1890 began to tweak it, but the 

southern States and many of the northern States in the period 

from 1868 to 1890 used felony disenfranchisement laws outrageously and discriminatorily in a way to discriminate against 

Blacks. 

Now, I noticed on the train on the way down—and I hope you 

will forgive this personal aside—that this is the 45th anniversary 

of my first testimony before Congress. I testified in 1965 on the 

Voting Rights Act of 1965. And my topic, the task I had that day, 

was to talk to Congress about its power to abolish literacy tests— 

nationwide, in every State in the union, whether or not those 

States were currently engaged in racial discrimination. 

And I argued to the Committee then—and I argue now, because 

it is the same argument—that under Section 2 of the 15th Amendment, Congress possesses power to act when three things come together: one, an impediment to voting that has been historically 

used to discriminate against members of racial minority; two, a 

showing that that impediment continues today to have the effect of 

discriminating against racial minorities; and three, the possibility 

and potential that the current effect is intended, because, as we all 

know, proof of intent is very, very difficult. 

And the most important power this Committee possesses under 

Section 2 of the 15th Amendment is the power to act prophylactically to stop techniques that have been historically used in a racially discriminatory way, that are still having racial impact, and 

38 

where it is impossible to prove on a case-by-case basis that the intent exists. The purpose of Section 2 of the 15th Amendment is to 

give you the power to act prophylactically on a wholesale basis, 

where litigation on a retail basis would be inappropriate and impossible to prove. 

Now, when this issue came before the Supreme Court in Oregon 

v. Mitchell—the case that Professor Clegg mentioned—all nine 

members of the Supreme Court—nine-nothing, not a single dissent—all nine members said that you had the power to eliminate 

literacy tests in every State in the country, because of three things: 

because literacy tests had been used in a discriminatory way to 

prevent Black people from voting; because they were still being 

used in a way that had a disproportionate impact on Black people; 

and because it was impossible on a case-by-case basis to differentiate when it was intentional and when it was not. 

And Congress, under those circumstances under Section 2 of the 

15th Amendment, has the power to exercise the enormously important reform of saying, where there is smoke, you do not have to 

prove fire every time, if it is too hard to do. And we will step in 

and eliminate the practice entirely in order to sever the possibility 

that it is still linked to a racially discriminatory past. 

In fact, when Professor Clegg and, I assume, my colleague on my 

left are going to argue to you that the Committee has no power to 

do this, what they are really telling you is that the Committee had 

no power to eliminate literacy tests nationwide in 1970, and that 

the Supreme Court was wrong when it voted nine-nothing in Oregon v. Mitchell to uphold that power. Each of these devices—literacy tests on one hand, felony disenfranchisement on another. 

First, the legislation would operate only in Federal elections, 

leaving States to do what they will. 

Second, they both have long and ugly histories of racially discriminatory animus in their genesis and in their use after the Civil 

War. 

Three, they both today operate with disproportionate impact and 

prevent large numbers of poor people and racial minorities from 

voting. 

And fourth, it is difficult and—as a litigator who spent a lifetime 

doing this—virtually impossible to prove a racial animus in a sophisticated world where people know that they are not supposed to 

admit it. And so, it becomes impossible to prove it. 

But when you put those four things together, you have a prescription, I believe, for congressional action. And I urge you to follow that prescription. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Neuborne follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF BURT NEUBORNE


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Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. von Spakovsky? 


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TESTIMONY OF HANS A. von SPAKOVSKY, SENIOR LEGAL 

FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to testify today. 

I am Hans von Spakovsky of the Heritage Foundation. 

Various consequences attach to a criminal felony conviction. 

First, there are prison or jail sentences. Second, there may be fines, 

court costs, restitution and possible probation and parole requirements. Finally, there are various disabilities such as the inability 

to own a gun, to work as a police officer, to serve in certain elected 

offices, or to serve on a jury. 

Time in prison is not, and has never been, the only way a felon 

pays his debt for breaking the law and endangering his fellow citizens and the public. 

I have to say with all due respect to Professor Neuborne, I pulled 

out my copy of the Constitution. He must be looking at a different 

version of it than I have, because this bill is an unconstitutional 

intrusion into the rights of the States. Congress does not have the 

power to do this. 

Professor Neuborne keeps talking about literacy tests, and that 

we would say that Congress did not have the power to do anything 

about that. That, of course, is wrong. The 15th Amendment made 

discriminating on the basis of race illegal. Literacy tests were used 

for that purpose. So, obviously, with the Voting Rights Act, which 

was passed under the power of the 15th Amendment, Congress had 

the power to do that. 

But the 14th Amendment specifically states that States may 

abridge the right to vote because of rebellion or other crime. And 

as it was said in the, I think, Ramirez case, which looked at a felon 

disenfranchisement law in California, Congress cannot be seen to— 

the Founders and the passers of that amendment could not be seen 

to be taking away with one section of the 14th Amendment what 

they are granting the States specifically with the other. 

As has been said, criminals lose their right to vote, not because 

of their race, but because of their conscious actions. There is no 

power in Article I for Congress to do anything that is contrary to 

this provision in the 14th Amendment. 

Section 2 of Article I and the 17th Amendment provide that voters for Members of Congress shall have the same qualifications as 

voters for members of State legislatures. This explicitly places in 

the hands of the States the ability to determine the qualifications 

of voters. 

Congress is given the authority to alter the times, places and 

manner of elections for Congress. But the qualification of a felon 

to vote cannot be remotely compared to a regulation governing the 

time, place or manner of an election. 

And I would point out that in the ACORN v. Edgar case, which 

upheld the National Voter Registration Act, the court specifically 

said that the reason that those provisions regarding voter registration were within the power of Congress was because voter registration is within the manner of holding an election. And in fact, the 

court said that, if the law had been designed to make it impossible 

for the State of Illinois to enforce its voter qualifications, that 

would have been an entirely different case. 

51 

There are also sound public policy reasons why this should not 

be done. The loss of civil rights is part of the sanction that our society has determined should be applied to criminals. States are entitled to ensure that those who injure or murder their fellow citizens, 

who steal, or who damage our democracy by committing crimes, 

have paid their debt to society, and even more importantly, have 

shown that they can be trusted to exercise all the rights of full citizenship. 

This bill would force States to immediately restore the right of 

convicted felons the moment they are out of prison, even if they are 

on parole in a halfway house, or have not paid restitution or fine. 

While most States automatically restore this right when felons 

have completed their sentences, other States have a more individualized procedure. Virginia, for example, has set up an application 

process that allows an individual review. 

A felon cannot apply until he has been released from supervised 

probation for 3 or 5 years, depending upon the crime. This is perfectly reasonable, given that a majority of felons were re-arrested 

and re-incarcerated within a short time after they were released 

from prison. 

The felon also has to show he has paid all of the court costs, fines 

and restitution. This bill would completely override this process at 

the expense of victims who are still owed restitution, and grant relief on a wholesale basis without considering whether someone is 

really entitled to restoration of those rights. 

The findings claim that this legislation will ‘‘reintegrate offenders into free society, helping to enhance public safety.’’ And it also 

says that felon voting laws serve no compelling State interest. 

If that is correct, then why does this legislation not also restore 

the other civil rights a convicted criminal may lose, such as the 

right to public employment? 

Federal law also prohibits felons from owning a gun. If public 

safety will be enhanced by providing felons with the ability to vote, 

why doesn’t this bill amend Federal law to allow them to own a 

gun? 

Are we to believe they can be trusted to vote, but not to own a 

gun? 

Are we to believe that a convicted child molester can be trusted 

to vote, but not to be a teacher in a public school? Are we to believe 

a convicted drug dealer can be trusted to vote, but not to be a police officer? 

Won’t that help integrate such criminals back into society, as 

claimed by the bill? 

The supporters of this bill apparently trust felons enough to require the automatic restoration of their right to vote. But they do 

not trust them enough to automatically restore the right to own a 

gun, or to restore all of the other civil rights that are taken away 

when they are convicted of murder, robbery, rape or bribery. 

The American people and their State representatives make these 

decisions. The Constitution specifically gives them that right. If 

Congress wants to change it, you have to do it through a constitutional amendment. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. von Spakovsky follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF HANS A. VON SPAKOVSKY


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Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Wicklund? 

TESTIMONY OF CARL WICKLUND, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

AMERICAN PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION, LEXINGTON, KY 

Mr. WICKLUND. Good afternoon, Chairman, Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today in support of 

H.R. 3335. 

I am not a constitutional scholar, but I do think that this legislation will restore the right to vote in Federal elections to nearly four 

million of our fellow citizens who have a criminal conviction in 

their past, but who are out of prison and living in the community. 

Because I believe that voting plays in integral role in a successful reentry of people coming out of prison, I urge you to pass the 

Democracy Restoration Act. 

I happen to live in Kentucky, one of the last two States in the 

country to permanently disenfranchise everyone with a felony conviction unless they receive individual, discretionary, executive 

clemency. This archaic law disenfranchises over 180,000 Kentuckians, more than a quarter of whom are African American. 

I have been the executive director of the American Probation and 

Parole Association since 1996, and I have over 37 years of experience in the corrections and human services field, including serving 

as the director of probation and parole for the county community 

corrections department and have developed and managed several 

community-based and private sector programs for offenders and atrisk youth in Minnesota. 

Among the many other professional associations I sit on, the FBI 

Criminal Justice Information Services Advisory Policy Board and 

the National Governors Association Intergovernmental Justice 

Working Group. I have been awarded the Florida Association of 

Community Corrections Lifetime Achievement Award, the Congressional Crime Victims’ Rights Caucus Allied Professional Award and 

the Justice Leadership Award. 

APPA, or the American Probation and Parole Association, represents over 35,000 individuals in the field of probation, parole and 

community corrections. We have members in every State, as well 

as a number of different countries. APPA members supervise more 

than five million adults across the United States. 

Our vision is to have a fair, just and safe society where community partnerships restore hope by creating a balance of prevention, 

intervention and advocacy. Restoring the right to vote—the most 

basic of all rights—to people who are living and working in the 

community is central to this core mission. 

For this reason, APPA has been part of national efforts to restore 

voting rights to people with criminal convictions. In 2007, we 

passed a resolution calling for the restoration of voting rights. I 

currently sit on the Brennan Center for Justice Law Enforcement 

and Criminal Justice Advisory Council, comprised of police chiefs, 

corrections officials and prosecutors who have come together to 

support voting rights restoration. 

Our members have encouraged voting rights legislation in a 

number of States, including Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, New 

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York, Washington and Wisconsin. We believe that civic participation is integral to successful rehabilitation and reintegration. 

One of the core missions of parole and probation supervision is 

to support successful transition from prison to the community. 

Civic participation is an integral part of this transition, because it 

helps transform one’s identity from deviant to law-abiding citizen. 

For this reason, the Democracy Restoration Act is indispensible; 

it is an indispensible part of the reentry process. 

The combination of the sheer number of people being released 

from prison every day and the revolving door created by staggering 

recidivism rates have forced those who work in community supervision to look carefully at the process of reentry and find innovative 

ways to ease this reintegration, with the ultimate goal of preventing future crime and protecting public safety. 

Civic participation and successful rehabilitation are intuitively 

linked. One of the greatest challenges facing those who are coming 

out of prison or jail is the transition from focus on one’s self as an 

individual that is central to the incarceration experience, to a focus 

on one’s self as a member of community that is the reality of life 

in our democratic society. 

Civic participation has also been linked to reducing recidivism. 

One study tracking the relationship between voting and recidivism 

found that former offenders who voted were half as likely to be arrested than those who did not. This study reaffirms that a package 

of pro-social behaviors that are linked to desistance from crime and 

participatory life. 

There are four generally accepted purposes of criminal penalties: 

prevention against committing new crimes, deterrence, retribution 

and rehabilitation. Losing the right to vote does not address any 

of those. 

And we are not alone in our support for restoring the voting 

rights. Other national criminal justice and law enforcement agencies, including the National Black Police Association and the Association of Paroling Authorities International, have passed resolutions in favor of voting rights restoration. 

Even the current director of the Office of National Drug Control 

Policy wrote, when he was chief of police in Seattle, ‘‘voting is an 

important way to connect people to their communities.—We want 

those who leave prison to become productive and law-abiding citizens. Voting puts them on that path.’’ 

I thank you for the opportunity to present today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wicklund follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARL WICKLUND


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Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

We have been joined by the Chairman of the full Committee, Mr. 

Conyers, the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt, and the 

gentlelady from California, Ms. Chu. 

Mr. Sancho? 

TESTIMONY OF ION SANCHO, SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS 

LEON COUNTY, TALLAHASSEE, FL 

Mr. SANCHO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, honorable Members of the Committee. My name is Ion Sancho, and I have been 


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an election official in the State of Florida for, now, 21 years. And 

I can tell you that Florida is probably the poster child for the dramatic case for reform that we need in this Nation. 

Of the five million Americans that are estimated to be barred 

from voting as a result of committing crimes, almost one out of five 

of these people reside today in the State of Florida. And the genesis 

of our current statute did begin following the American Civil War 

with the Constitution of 1868, the first evidence of a bar to felon 

voting in our history. 

No one here can forget the Florida election of 2000, perhaps the 

most infamous election in our country’s history. While most Americans can recall problems with butterfly ballots or pregnant chad, 

less well-known, but of more significance, is the role played by the 

flawed felons list distributed to the 67 Florida supervisors of elections in the spring of 2000 by Florida state officials. 

Pursuant to a consent decree entered into with the NAACP, and 

then-Florida Secretary of State Kathryn Harris, in 2002, 20,000 

legal Florida voters were required to be added back to our rolls, because these were the numbers that the State admitted had been illegally identified as felons, and thus, not allowed to vote on November 7, 2000, in a contest that was decided by a mere 537 votes. 

Again, in 2004, we were given flawed lists, which fortunately, 

this time, the media sued to gain access. And once the flaws were 

known, Governor Jeb Bush was forced to withdraw those lists for 

our use to declare citizens as ineligible. 

Even as I am talking to you now, Florida’s current efforts to reform the process of civil rights restoration is not working. Republican Governor Charlie Crist and the Florida cabinet, based upon 

the need for fundamental fairness in our process, initiated reforms 

in 2007, allowing for the restoration of voting rights for all non-violent offenders. 

The Florida legislature, when told that 42 new employees would 

have to be dealt with to deal with the work load necessary, not 

only did not provide the 42 workers, they cut the clemency board’s 

existing work staff. And today, the backlog is between 1 to 3 years 

for individuals that the State has said should be brought back into 

the process of voting, and they cannot, because of the partisan interference at the Florida legislative level. 

It is time we adopted national and rational standards for Federal 

elections and to stop the partisan game playing which has become 

the hallmark of American politics today—not just in Florida, but 

across the Nation. 

And I can tell you that in my tenure as an election administrator 

in Florida, nothing has helped our voting process more than the 

two major pieces of Federal legislation that this Congress enacted: 

the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, which finally established voter registration procedures fairly across our State; and the 

Help America Vote Act, which established properly the statewide 

databases which we now can properly identify and process voters 

in a fair and opportune manner. 

But even today, even though we have what I consider one of the 

best databases in the country in terms of voter registration, costing 

$23 million, which was completely funded through Federal dollars, 

and an ongoing cost of $2.5 million a year to operate, there is one 

67 

central flaw in the State design of that database. No supervisor of 

elections can look up and identify which Florida citizens have been 

given the right to have their voting rights restored. 

And in a study that was released last March by the Florida 

ACLU, numerous Florida election officials could not properly identify what Florida’s current votes were—what the law for individuals seeking to vote were. An individual who was turned away 

from registering to vote in Hillsborough County had to come to 

Leon County, where that individual was properly registered and 

placed back on the rolls where they should have been. 

Again, the constitutional arguments here that the manner of an 

election does not include the right and how one may register or 

cast a ballot, I think is a specious argument. The same argument 

was used against the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. In 

fact, you can determine what is right and what proper manner individuals may vote in Federal elections. 

And it is time we ended the partisan process that is all too often 

appurtenant to this process, and have a rational standard, so that 

all election officials all across the country, and all citizens who 

want to participate in this process do not have to come up to me, 

as citizens do when I am in the outside in my community and seeking to register individuals. And I see the look in people’s eyes who 

want to register to vote, but they cannot. They cannot register to 

vote, and I can see that. And they are ashamed. 

They wear the scarlet letter on their forehead that Congressman 

Cohen talked about. And there is nothing I can do to assist them, 

because that is the process in Florida, and I am charged with carrying out those rules. 

But I think we do need reform. I think that our association has 

been on record for, in our own State, for adopting a procedure 

much as this congressional act. As soon as an individual has served 

his time, that individual should be allowed to register and vote. 

And in conclusion I would like to cite Republican Governor Charlie Crist, who in trying to convince the Florida Cabinet—which he 

successfully did—that we needed to make reforms, wrote, justice 

cries out for us to do what is right. Dignity, justice, honor. And at 

what point do the punished have the right to do a simple chance 

to come back to society? 

Those whose lives we discuss today have served a sentence, as 

they should have. But what right do we here have to add to that 

sentence? 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sancho follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF ION SANCHO


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Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Idarraga? 

TESTIMONY OF ANDRES IDARRAGA, CENTRAL FALLS, RI 

Mr. IDARRAGA. Chairman Conyers, Chairman Scott, Representatives Chu, Watt and Members of this honorable Committee, thank 

you for this opportunity to testify at this hearing in support of this 

bill. 

My name is Andres Idarraga, and I am here to discuss the merits of this bill from an extremely personal perspective, for myself 

and for the communities I grew up in and worked. 

Almost 6 years ago, I was released from prison after serving 61⁄2

years. Like most other newly released persons, my priorities were 

securing housing and employment. I also dearly wanted to get an 

education. 

Voting was neither at the top nor near the top of my list at that 

time. However, it was something I thought about very much. 

Half-way through my prison term, I discovered the prison library, and ironically, it was there where I discovered what being 

a citizen of this great country means. 

When I grew up, neither of my parents had formal education. My 

father did not make it past elementary school in his native country. 

My mother did not get an education, either. 

I had very few reference points of what getting an education 

meant. And it was in that library where a small group of prisoners 

would discuss various topics ranging from economics, law, literature, math, philosophy, where I finally found what it meant to 

be a citizen. 

The latter was mainly due to two great, influential books. One 

was the autobiography of Nelson Mandela, and the other was a biography of Thurgood Marshall. Both men understood the self-correcting mechanisms and the deep humanity of their societies. For 

them, there were no enemies, only potential allies, for both men 

understood that we all had to live with the results that society creates together. 

Today, we have created a society that excludes some five million 

people from the ballot. This exclusion is at the end of a complicated 

chain that often begins with poverty and a lack of education, involves the criminal justice system and penal institutions, and often 

ends in isolation, bitterness and disfranchisement. 

I have personally travelled this complicated chain from beginning 

to end, like I stated. 

After serving 61⁄2 years in prison, during that time I realized 

what I had thrown away and became determined to turn things 

around for myself, my family and my community. After I was released, I attended the University of Rhode Island, graduated from 

Brown University, and am now in my second year at Yale Law 

School. 

My education and my experiences provide me with the foundation to believe, like my role models, that our constitutional laws 

call for correcting the injustice of felon disfranchisement. 

In summer of 2004, shortly after my release, I approached my 

parole officer about voting. She answered that she was not sure 

whether I could or not, because I was a convicted felon. Her reVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:37 Jun 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\031610\55480.000 HJUD1 PsN: 55480
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sponse is emblematic of our national patchwork of laws on this 

issue, which create confusion, even for those who should know 

what the answer is. 

Therefore, I had to find out for myself. 

At that time, I was living with an aunt, had a job, was a month 

away from beginning my freshman year at the university. I felt extremely fortunate. During my time in prison, I worked relentlessly 

to prepare myself for my second chance, and my efforts were beginning to pay off. Now that I had taken care of my most pressing concerns, I could begin thinking about larger issues. 

One of those larger issues was, what was my role as a citizen 

who had been recently released from prison, and who aspired to 

make a difference in the lives of similarly situated men and 

women? At least, I thought, I should be able to exercise the fundamental role the citizen plays in our society, which is voting. 

Ironically, I have also talked to many individuals who have gone 

for the citizenship test. And one of the questions it states is, it 

says, what is the most important right you get upon becoming a 

U.S. citizen? And the answer is, voting. 

My question to my parole officer at the time was the first step 

in the direction to vote. However, I later learned that I was barred 

from voting due to my felon conviction. I was disappointed and perplexed. 

Later, I soon joined the Rhode Island Right to Vote coalition that 

was working to change laws on this issue. In my home State of 

Rhode Island, which was referenced, there was—there is parts of 

the State where close to 25 percent of young men are disfranchised. 

About 10 to 15 percent are Latinos. And while it does disproportionately affect minorities, in the aggregate, it is still our felon 

White citizens who are mostly affected by these laws. 

Denying the formerly incarcerated the right to vote serves no 

purpose as far as I can see. On the front end, disfranchisement 

does not function as an effective deterrent to crime, nor does it further any compelling government interest in public safety upon release. In fact, the opposite is true. 

Studies have shown that voting by those who have been arrested 

is associated with lower rates of recidivism. 

In November 2006, my fellow Rhode Islanders were the first in 

the Nation to go to the polls and approve a ballot referendum to 

restore voter rights to people as soon as they were released from 

prison. 

After this ballot was approved, I recall going in to vote for the 

very first time, and driving my 8-year-old nephew to the voting 

booth with me. We engaged in a back-and-forth conversation of 

who was I voting for, and why. And he was extremely interested. 

And I was able to impart in him for the very first time the model 

and behaviors that I try to impart on my community, and which 

I did not grow up in. I hope that he takes the lesson to heart. 

This year, I founded a group that organizes law students to teach 

constitutional law in local high schools. And the beginning of the 

year, we asked students what their conception of the law is. For 

most of them, they viewed the law negatively. They see it as a 

blunt instrument with little give. 

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I believe, and I have come to view the law very different. I see 

its redemptive qualities. And I hope to impart that in those communities. 

During my travels, I have received many e-mails, many letters 

from people that have been affected, thanking me, and telling me 

about the first time they went to vote, because of some of our efforts. This bill will further citizenship and the rule of law in communities that sorely need it. 

I only hope that those communities become as actively engaged 

in our society as my fellow classmates at Yale Law School are. 

Thank you for this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Idarraga follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANDRES IDARRAGA


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Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

We will now question the witnesses under the 5-minute rule, and 

I will begin. 

Mr. Clegg and Mr. Neuborne, Article I, Section 2 says that the 

electorates in each State shall have the qualifications requisite of 

the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature. 


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That is where the States get to pick who can vote in a Federal election. Is that right? 

Mr. NEUBORNE. That is the source of the States’ power to set ballot—qualifications for their own elections, and at least presumptively for State—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. And the 14th Amendment says that you essentially cannot deny someone the right to vote, but then says, except 

for participation in rebellion or other crimes. That is the authority 

to disenfranchise people who have committed felonies. Is that 

right? 

Mr. CLEGG. No. 

Mr. SCOTT. No? Mr. Clegg? 

Mr. CLEGG. I do not think that the States need affirmative Federal authority. I do not think that the States need affirmative— 

thank you. 

I do not think that the States need affirmative Federal authority 

to decide what the qualifications for voting in their States are. 

I think, though, that the provision that you read—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, it says—wait, wait, wait. 

Mr. CLEGG [continuing]. It says that the people who wrote the 

14th Amendment saw that there would typically be non-racial reasons for disenfranchising criminals. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, it says that—essentially, it says, when the right 

to vote in any election is denied to any male inhabitant of such 

State, being 21 years of age—now, we have taken out the male 

with the subsequent—and it has gone to 18 subsequently. 

But it suggested you cannot discriminate. Anybody that is otherwise qualified, male inhabitant over 21, you have got to let them 

vote, except for participation in a crime. That would give them the 

right to discriminate against those people. If they have committed 

a crime, you would be able to discriminate against them for having 

committed a felony. 

Mr. CLEGG. No, I do not think that that is—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Then where else can you discriminate against them 

on any basis? 

Mr. CLEGG. Well, for instance, there are all kinds of people who 

are not allowed to vote in the United States. I mean, we sort of 

think that everybody can vote, but actually, that is not true. Of 

course, we do not let children vote. We do not let people who are 

mentally incompetent vote. 

Mr. SCOTT. No, wait a minute. We have 21 years of age—— 

Mr. CLEGG. That does not—— 

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. Inhabitant. 

Mr. CLEGG [continuing]. Mental competence. We do not let noncitizens vote. 

There are certain minimum, objective standards of responsibility 

and trustworthiness and loyalty that we require of people, if they 

are going to participate in the sacred enterprise of self-government. 

And people who have committed serious crimes against their fellow 

citizens do not meet those minimum standards. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Then you get the 15th Amendment that says 

that the right to vote shall not be denied or infringed by the United 

States or any State on account of race, color, previous condition of 

servitude. If you can show for any reason, for any scheme that you 

82 

are denying the right to vote on account of race, color, that can be 

prohibited. 

Mr. CLEGG. Absolutely. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

Mr. CLEGG. But I do not think that that is what is going on with 

the vast majority of felon disenfranchisement—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Well, if you could show in a particular State 

that the scheme of disenfranchisement was enacted for the—with 

the intent to diminish the African American vote, would it be illegal? Could you proscribe it? 

Mr. CLEGG. You could proscribe it. And you could have it—even 

without a Federal law, you could bring a lawsuit—and have it 

struck down as unconstitutional. And indeed, the Supreme Court 

has done that in at least one case. 

Mr. SCOTT. Which case? Could you describe the case? 

Mr. CLEGG. The case was Hunter v. Underwood. And it involved 

an Alabama misdemeanor, an Alabama statute that 

disenfranchised people who had committed certain misdemeanors, 

not even felonies. And it was shown that that law was passed in 

the post-Reconstruction era, explicitly to disenfranchise African 

Americans. 

And Chief Justice Rehnquist in, I believe, a unanimous opinion 

for the Court, struck it down was unconstitutional. 

Mr. SCOTT. And so, without regard to the bill as it is written, in 

those targeted situations where you can show that it has discriminatory, in that case, intent, then the Federal Government would 

have the right to proscribe that disenfranchisement. 

Mr. CLEGG. That is correct. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now, if it is intent. What about discriminatory impact? 

Mr. CLEGG. No. The Court has made quite clear that laws that 

have a simple disproportionate impact on the basis of race or ethnicity are not unconstitutional. It said that on several occasions 

with respect to the 14th Amendment. A plurality has said that 

with respect to the 15th Amendment. And of course there is no reason to think that two Reconstruction era statutes would have a different standard in that regard. 

Mr. SCOTT. But it you tried to start a disenfranchisement, and 

you are in a covered State under Section 5, and you could show a 

discriminatory impact, could you prohibit it under the Voting 

Rights Act today? 

Mr. CLEGG. That is one reason why I think the Voting Rights Act 

today is unconstitutional in that respect. 

Mr. SCOTT. To the extent that the Voting Rights Act is constitutional, you could, in fact, proscribe the use of felony disenfranchisement with a disparate impact, if you tried to pull it off today in 

a covered State. 

Mr. CLEGG. I think what would happen then, Mr. Chairman, is 

that arguendo you would be able to make out a prima facie case 

under Section 5, or under Section 2, for that matter, if you could 

show a disproportionate impact. 

However, the State would be able to come back and rebut that 

prima facie case by showing that it had a strong and legitimate 

reason for the challenged practice. 

83 

And in my view not allowing people who have committed crimes, 

who are not willing to follow the law, to make the law for the rest 

of us is a good reason. And a case—a prima facie case could be rebutted by a State simply saying that, look, the overwhelming majority of States in the United States do not, and have not, allowed 

felons the vote. That is what we do. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, wait a minute. 

Mr. CLEGG. And it could rebut the prima facie case that way. 

Mr. SCOTT. A racially neutral, good faith purpose does not override the discriminatory impact under Section 5. 

Mr. CLEGG. No, I disagree with that. It is just like in the employment context, Mr. Chairman. If an employer has a selection device 

that has a disparate impact, a prima facie case can be made 

against him. But the employer can then come back and show a 

business necessity for the practice and win that way. 

The Supreme Court has recognized in the—— 

Mr. SCOTT. But if they cannot—— 

Mr. CLEGG [continuing]. In a voting rights case involving—— 

Mr. SCOTT. If they cannot show a business necessity, although 

they had racially neutral intent, but it had a disparate impact, and 

cannot show a business—I mean, there is just the Griggs case. 

Mr. CLEGG. That is right. But you are able to come back and 

rebut it. And the Supreme Court has recognized the same kind of 

rebuttal opportunity under the Voting Rights Act. 

Mr. NEUBORNE. Mr. Chairman, could I comment a bit on the 

question, as well? Because I think I disagree quite strongly with 

Professor Clegg on this. 

He is, of course, completely correct in describing Hunter v. 

Underwood to you, which is the case where the Supreme Court 

struck down the Alabama felon disenfranchisement law on the 

ground of showing that it was part of this post-Reconstruction effort to disenfranchise Blacks throughout the South. And Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion has a splendid history of the use of the 

felon disenfranchisement laws during that period as a racist way 

to prevent people from voting. 

Now, how do we take that forward into the modern era under 

Section 2 of the 15th Amendment? 

And Professor Clegg’s description of the complexities of litigating 

a case one by one to try to prove the continuing racial animus is 

exactly why Congress has power under Section 2 of the 15th 

Amendment to act when there is a history of racial animus, where 

there is a continuing racial impact—a disproportionate racial effect, 

as you point out—and where Congress finds that it is extraordinarily difficult to determine on a case-by-case basis which voter 

is being turned away because of race, and which voter is being 

turned away for some other reason. 

Congress has the power under those circumstances to act prophylactically to sweep away the remnants of a racist past, precisely because it is impossible to do it on a case-by-case basis to try to prove 

intent in a world in which politicians now have a sophisticated 

knowledge that they are not supposed to admit that that is what 

they are doing. 

Mr. CLEGG. I do not agree, by the way, that it is that difficult 

to show discriminatory intent. 

84 

When I was at the Justice Department, we brought disparate 

treatment cases, and won disparate treatment cases, all the time. 

Mr. NEUBORNE. Did you ever lose one? 

Mr. CLEGG. And we used—— 

Mr. NEUBORNE. Did you ever lose one? 

Mr. SCOTT. Wait a minute. Wait a minute. 

Mr. CLEGG. Probably should have. 

Mr. SCOTT. Let me just follow through, Mr. Neuborne. 

Mr. Neuborne, under your analysis, and under the constitutional 

requirement that we have to narrowly tailor any remedy, could you 

globally proscribe felony disenfranchisement laws everywhere, even 

where it is clearly in States where there are virtually no African 

Americans, and you cannot possibly show that it was done with 

that intent? 

Or would you have to do it on a targeted basis showing, as we 

did with the Voting Rights Act, that it has a discriminatory intent 

and impact in a particular State, and do it on a case-by-case—not 

an individual voter-by-voter, but state-by-state basis where it 

would be illegal? 

Mr. NEUBORNE. Well, that is a great question, congressman. And 

fortunately for me, at least, there is a good answer for it. And that 

is that the literacy test experience is exactly that experience. 

What happened was that literacy tests were obviously used 

throughout the South in a much more aggressive way to disenfranchise Blacks than throughout the North. But they were used everywhere in a racially discriminatory way in one way or another at 

one point in the Nation’s history. 

And then, in 1970, when Congress was considering what to do 

with literacy tests, they asked exactly your question. They said, 

should we sweep away literacy tests only in the States that fall 

under the Voting Rights Act? Or should we sweep literacy tests nationwide, regardless of whether or not there is a history in the 

past? 

And they chose to do it nationwide, because they realized that 

even in States without a comprehensive history, there were, nevertheless, the opportunity for racially discriminatory behavior. And 

indeed, there was a case by New Hampshire, ironically, argued by 

David Souter when he was an attorney general of New Hampshire, 

in which he attempted to distinguish New Hampshire from the rest 

of the country on literacy tests, and he lost. 

And he should have lost, because Congress wanted to take it out 

all over the country as part of their prophylactic power to eliminate 

the vestiges of racial discrimination in voting—— 

Mr. CLEGG. But, you know, at the other extreme, I think that if 

you had one instance in one State of discrimination, for the Congress to use that as an excuse to enact a nationwide law would 

clearly be unconstitutional. 

And there was testimony—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, Mr. Clegg, is the—— 

Mr. CLEGG.—11 years ago—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Is the prohibition against literacy tests—how is that 

done? 

85 

Mr. CLEGG. No. I think that that is much closer to the opposite 

extreme, where it was being used systematically in large parts of 

the country in order to disenfranchise—— 

Mr. SCOTT. In New Hampshire? 

Mr. CLEGG. I am sorry? 

Mr. SCOTT. In New Hampshire? 

Mr. CLEGG. I do not know. 

But the point is, it was being used in lots of places, not just one 

isolated incident. 

Here, on the other hand, we have laws that have been passed all 

over the country with every State except for two, had a history of 

clearly being used for non-racial reasons for hundreds and thousands of years. 

And for Congress seize upon the disparate impact that it has in 

some instances as an excuse to invalidate all these laws, I think 

would clearly be unconstitutional. 

Mr. SCOTT. My time has more than expired. 

Mr. CLEGG. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question? 

I just want to compliment you on your scrupulousness in wanting 

to get the right answer on this constitutionally, which I think is 

very important. And I do not know—I mean, I am a little reluctant 

to bring this up, particularly because he is not here. 

But I thought that I heard Representative Cohen say that he is, 

you know, very much in favor of this law, and if there is a constitutional problem, that this Committee will just have to find some 

way around it. 

I do not know if that is what—if you heard that or not. But I 

just want to go on record saying that that is—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, if we pass a law, we will do everything we can 

to make sure that it is constitutional. 

The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks? 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I guess I would direct my first question to Professor Clegg. 

I think I saw you shaking your head when the comparison was 

made between felony disenfranchisement and the literacy laws test. 

And could you expand on that? Tell me what was on your mind 

there. I am fascinated. 

Mr. CLEGG. Well, I thank you for the question, but I have been 

trying to do that, actually. I think that two really cannot be equated. The history of literacy tests as a deliberate device that was 

used to disenfranchise people on the basis of race and ethnicity, 

that that was being stubbornly adhered to and abused for decades, 

is one historical incident. 

The felony disenfranchisement laws present a completely different historical incident. And I just think that the two cannot be 

equated. 

It is true, as I said in my testimony, that there were five southern States that tweaked their laws in the period from 1890 to 1910 

deliberately to keep African Americans from voting. And that was 

unconstitutional. That was wrong. But those laws are no longer on 

the books. 

86 

And the 48 States that have felony disenfranchisement laws now, 

it is just ridiculous to assert that those laws, as a general matter, 

have racial roots. That is simply not true. 

Now, I have great affection for Professor Neuborne, but, you 

know, the parts of his testimony, you know, where he says, you 

know, to the contrary, that, for instance—the one instance he says 

that ‘‘many, probably most, and possibly all’’ criminal disenfranchisement laws have been implemented and enforced in a discriminatory manner—and another instance where he says ‘‘most felony 

disenfranchisement statutes have their genesis in an effort to disenfranchise racial minorities’’—you believe that? 

Mr. NEUBORNE. I will stand by it. 

Mr. CLEGG. ‘‘Most felony disenfranchisement statutes?’’ 

You are talking about 48 States—most of those have their genesis in an effort to disenfranchise racial minorities? 

Mr. NEUBORNE. I will stand by that. It came into being after— 

now, if I have a moment to explain, felony disenfranchisement in 

this country has two periods, the period before the Civil War and 

the period after the Civil War. 

The period before the Civil War, there were literacy tests. There 

were felon disenfranchisement statutes. There were property qualifications. They probably did not have much of a racial impact, because most Blacks could not vote, especially after Dred Scott. There 

simply was not a serious racial problem with voting. 

But once the 14th and 15th Amendments got passed, all of a sudden, these old standards—which of course date back to Greece and 

Rome—were recycled by racists. They were recycled by racists all 

over the country as convenient rocks to throw at newly enfranchised Blacks. And they threw them everywhere. They threw them 

in New York. They threw them in Florida. 

To say that you only want to look at the period from 1890, when 

five States tweaked their laws—obviously to target Blacks—overlooks entirely the period from 1868 to 1890, when State after State 

adopted these rules, or made them harsher, or made them harder 

to administer. There is no way to separate the ugly racial past that 

seeps into our felony disenfranchisement laws from the legitimate, 

which is exactly why Section—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Neuborne, if I could—— 

Mr. NEUBORNE [continuing]. Of the 15th Amendment is so important. 

Mr. FRANKS.—I would like to have Professor Clegg have a chance 

to respond. 

Mr. NEUBORNE. I am sorry. I am sorry. I overstated, I am afraid. 

Mr. CLEGG. No, no, no. 

Professor Neuborne and I, before the hearings began, were talking about how we both enjoyed Alexander Keyssar’s book, ‘‘The 

Right to Vote.’’ And Keyssar said that outside the South, the disenfranchisement laws ‘‘lacked socially distinct targets and generally were passed in a matter-of-fact fashion.’’ Even for the postwar, post-Civil War South, Keyssar has more recently written, in 

some States ‘‘felon disenfranchisement provisions were first enacted by Republican government that supported Black voting 

rights.’’ 

87 

I just do not think that you are going—you know, try as hard as 

you might, Professor Neuborne—I do not think that you are going 

to be able to get a majority, let alone ‘‘all’’ of the 48 States in the 

category of having racist intent—— 

Mr. FRANKS. I would be interested in knowing what, Mr. 

Neuborne, what States you would suggest did that. 

Mr. NEUBORNE. What State? 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes, what States? 

Mr. NEUBORNE. Alabama. We know that, because the Supreme 

Court certified it. In Hunter v. Underwood, they struck it down as 

unconstitutional. 

Mr. FRANKS. You are suggesting all States—— 

Mr. NEUBORNE. We know that there were—Florida, in 1868, 

when it enacted its constitution, and for the first time put in a 

criminal disenfranchisement to prevent newly freed Blacks. 

The constitutions of many of the States that were being readmitted to the Nation, for the first time begin to put in felon disenfranchisement, because they recognized that it is a very, very 

easy way to be able to minimize the ability of Blacks to vote. 

Mr. CLEGG. No, no—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Professor Clegg, I am out of time here, but I would 

like to have you respond. 

Mr. CLEGG. Well, I would just say that none of those laws are 

on the books anymore. 

Mr. NEUBORNE. Yes, but their ancestors are on the books. 

The question is, what was the genesis—what we are talking 

about here is, was there a past in which it was clear that felon disenfranchisement was intentionally imposed to prevent Blacks from 

voting? And the answer is, of course there was such a past. 

Now the question is, is there a present in which the current incarnation of those laws is having a disproportional racial impact? 

And of course, the answer is yes. 

And then third is, is there power in Congress, once that happens, 

to say, given the racist past, given the racist impact, we can take 

this thing out once and for all, all over the country, just like we 

took out literacy tests. Because believe me, there were many States 

that did not have a history of racial discrimination with literacy 

tests. 

Mr. FRANKS. Professor Clegg, I will give you the final word. 

Mr. CLEGG. Well, I will just say that Chief Justice Rehnquist in 

his Hunter v. Underwood opinion made it clear that a very different case would be presented if Alabama were to re-pass the law 

without discriminatory intent. These laws are not on the books 

anymore. And I do not think that in most States they ever had discriminatory intent. 

And to say that, well, once you had a felon disenfranchisement 

law that might have had discriminatory intent, you are therefore 

forever barred from ever having—from ever saying that a criminal 

should not be able to vote—is not good constitutional law. 

Mr. NEUBORNE. And that is not what I am saying. I am simply 

saying that once you—— 

Mr. CLEGG. And I think, if it is not unconstitutional, then Congress is not going to have—does not have the authority to go in on 

a wholesale basis and cite that as evidence for why there has to 

88 

be a national, one-size-fits-all standard superseding constitutional 

authority that is expressly given to the States. 

Mr. NEUBORNE. Well, I will just ask one last question, and I will 

ask Professor Clegg, why—— 

Mr. FRANKS. I thought we were asking the questions up here, 

Mr. Neuborne. 

Mr. NEUBORNE [continuing]. Is the literacy test different? Why is 

the literacy test case different? That is all. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Neuborne, I am going to—to the Chairman, I 

am going to yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Michigan, Chairman of the full Committee, 

Mr. Conyers? 

Mr. CONYERS. Is there credit being given in constitutional law for 

this course, Professor Scott? [Laughter.] 

This is a fascinating discussion. 

And I would like to continue it, because I think this hearing is 

very important. We have in the audience attorney Marc Mauer of 

the Sentencing Project, Charles Sullivan of CURE, not to mention 

all the distinguished witnesses you have called. And there are 

probably others in the audience that makes this hearing extremely 

important. 

There may be a requirement for us to have another hearing on 

this, because this is very fundamental. And I would like the discussion to keep going on, except that I just have to—I have been informed, Mr. Clegg, that you feel that the Voter Rights Act was and 

is unconstitutional? 

Mr. CLEGG. I am sorry. The what act? 

Mr. CONYERS. I said, I have been informed that you believe the 

Voters Rights Act was, and is, unconstitutional? 

Mr. CLEGG. Yes, I think I told you that before you passed it. Unfortunately, you did not listen to me. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, I did not ask for any explanation. I just 

wanted to make sure that you had said that. I was not here. 

Mr. CLEGG. Section 5 and Section 203, I believe—— 

Mr. CONYERS. You do not have to go any further. [Laughter.] 

Thank you. 

Mr. CLEGG. I do not think that it is all unconstitutional. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, sir. I am trying to ask you the questions, and not you give me the lecture when I do not need it. 

Okay. 

Now, I wanted to spend some attention with Mr. von Spakovsky, 

because it is your view, I take it, that no one convicted of a felony 

should ever be allowed to vote again. Is that correct? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. That is incorrect, sir. 

Mr. CONYERS. Oh. 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. I think it is up to the States to decide that 

issue. 

Mr. CONYERS. I see. 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. If Congress wants to change the 14th 

Amendment, then I think they have to do it through a constitutional amendment. 

Mr. CONYERS. All right. Then, is it your view that no felon, once 

convicted, should ever be allowed to vote? 

89 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. No, no. I—— 

Mr. CONYERS. I said, is that your view? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. No. I think they should get their vote back 

under certain circumstances. 

Mr. CONYERS. Oh, okay. That is what I am trying to find out. 

But you are in a State that does have lifetime felony preclusion 

of anyone from voting. Is that right? Virginia? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. There is an application process—— 

Mr. CONYERS. Is that right? Yes or no. 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. The answer is no. If you apply and meet the 

standards, you can get your right to vote back. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, I am getting help from my colleague—— 

Mr. SCOTT. If the gentleman would yield? 

Mr. CONYERS. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. In practice, and that is what happens, but it is totally 

discretionary with the governor. 

These governors have set some standards, and have said that 

they will follow, if you go with these good guidelines in so many 

years. But it is totally discretionary with the governor. And some 

governors have been much more liberal with their process, and others have been fairly stingy. 

Mr. CONYERS. So, some governors have at some time granted 

someone the right to vote, even though they were formerly a felon. 

Is that right? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. I am sorry. In Virginia? 

Mr. CONYERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. Yes. 

Mr. CONYERS. Okay, but not very many. 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. I do not know what the numbers are. 

Mr. CONYERS. You mean, you think there could be a lot of them 

could have gotten the right to vote back? 

Now, you are not really coming here as—are you a member of 

the Virginia Board of Elections? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. I am not a member of the Virginia Board 

of Elections. 

Mr. CONYERS. Fairfax County. 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. I was sworn in as a member, yes. 

Mr. CONYERS. Oh, okay. So, maybe you would not know whether 

there were few or many. Okay. 

This is a great panel here. [Laughter.] 

I am going to implore that you and the Chairman see if we can 

continue this discussion, because it is, I think, very important. And 

I think the Subcommittee is doing a great service by having all of 

them here, including you. And I yield to you. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I am glad to see that. If Professor 

Clegg and Mr. von—I always have a tough time with his name— 

Spakovsky could get equal time on that, that would just tickle me 

to death. 

Mr. CONYERS. Oh, that is great. 

What about Neuborne? [Laughter.] 

Mr. FRANKS. No, I would have to take the Fifth on that. [Laughter.] 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, then, let me yield to him now, since you may 

not be able to get the equal time that some of the others would. 

90 

Mr. NEUBORNE. As long as I can still vote. 

Mr. CONYERS. Yes, we do not have any power to prevent anybody 

from voting. We wish we could encourage more people to vote, as 

a matter of fact. But sometimes I think we do not have much 

power to do that, Mr. Shelton. 

Please, where can we—can we reach any form of agreement 

among the seven of you here this afternoon in terms of the subject 

matter, which is presumably my legislation on this subject? 

Mr. NEUBORNE. If I may, congressman? 

I mean, one of the prerequisites of a law professor is to assign 

research to other people. And it seems to me that, from the disagreement that has emerged on the panel, one, I think, very important thing would be to assemble a definitive history of the use of 

felon disenfranchisement laws to prevent Black people from voting, 

because if that history does not exist, I agree with Professor Clegg, 

then, that it is much harder to find power to deal with it. 

It still might exist under the elections clause and under Section 

5 of the 14th Amendment. But surely, the easiest place to look is 

Section 2 of the Fifteenth. And that requires the history of racial 

animus. And it seems to me that it is not beyond the power of experts to provide the Committee with an excellent history. 

And once that history exists, then I think it is logically, absolutely impossible to distinguish felon disenfranchisement from literacy tests. And then there is a unanimous decision of the Supreme 

Court in Oregon v. Mitchell, saying that you have the power to act. 

Mr. CONYERS. Now, before I yield—and I see that Judy Chu is 

waiting patiently, and now we have been joined by Sheila Jackson 

Lee, so I am going to wrap this up. 

But could I ask a leader in the civil rights movement, Hilary 

Shelton, for any impressions that you could leave with us to help 

guide us as we move through this legal, historical, constitutional 

thicket, which most of us up here find totally fascinating—most of 

you there, as well. I would like to hear your views. 

And I will yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHELTON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with you 

that it is a fascinating conversation as we talk about many of the 

theories in our legal system. 

But the biggest concerns, of course, to organizations like the 

NAACP is the actual effect, what happens in practice. And quite 

frankly, what we have seen happen in practice is—I am happy to 

see my colleague from Florida sitting here—is something very, very 

different. 

We have, in effect, African Americans and many other racial and 

ethnic minorities locked out of the process, because of an assumption that indeed they are a felony offender—an assumption that 

very well they should be screened out unlike any others. 

As you talked about that 2000 election in Florida, what the 

NAACP experienced, quite frankly, when we went into Florida, was 

every African American male being asked at some polling sites 

whether indeed they had felony offenses on their record, but no one 

else being asked that question. 

And very well what that attitude is actually a form of discrimination that actually intimidated many of the African American and 

91 

other Black voters, for that matter, that went into the polls to participate. 

The effect, again, is the disenfranchisement in large pockets in 

the most heavily concentrated African American cities in the country, where they are disenfranchised to a point there is no involvement, there is no political capital along those lines. And much, 

much of the very spirit of our democracy is then prohibited from 

being able to be implemented. 

So, indeed, it is a great conversation. But in many ways, as we 

look at what it means to everyday people, what it means to the 

very core of our democracy itself, raises major concerns. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Chu? 

Ms. CHU. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I was interested in Mr. Clegg’s testimony. And I wanted to give 

a chance for the others to respond to the rationale that was posed 

by your testimony, Mr. Clegg. And they had to do with the policy 

rationale for being against felony voting. 

First was the rationale that we should not let felons vote, just 

as we deny other groups the right to vote. So, we also, as you state, 

we also deny the vote to citizens and non-citizens and the mentally 

incompetent, because they, like felons, fail to meet the objective 

minimal standards of responsibility, trustworthiness and loyalty we 

require of those who participate in government. 

And so, Mr. Neuborne, or Mr. Wicklund, or any others that may 

want to respond, how are felons different from children citizens, 

non-citizens and the mentally incompetent? 

Mr. NEUBORNE. With respect, congresswoman, on the merits, the 

rest of the panel is so much better qualified than I am to talk 

about why it is so important to re-enfranchise convicted felons. 

I will say that the notion that somehow you would equate them 

with children or with mental incompetents, I mean, there, the reason you do not let them vote is because they lack the capacity to 

make the choices that goes to voting. But nobody suggests that 

when someone comes out of prison they lack the capacity for choice. 

So, of course, those are not helpful analogies. 

But the actual merits, I would ask my colleagues who know 

much more about it to respond. 

Mr. CLEGG. Of course, I am not suggesting that they are, you 

know, incompetent or lack the facilities in the same way. Again, 

though, there are, these—as I said, we have these minimum standards of responsibility, loyalty and trustworthiness. And I think 

that—you know, I have nothing against children. I have children. 

But they are not as responsible as adults. 

And likewise I think that people who have committed serious 

crimes against their fellow citizens have shown that they, too, lack 

a sense of responsibility. And that this minimum level of responsibility is something that we demand of people if they are going to 

participate in the sacred enterprise of self-government and making 

laws that they and everyone else are going to have to follow. 

Ms. CHU. Well, Mr. Wicklund or Mr. Sancho, do you have any 

response? Should felons be put in the same category as children, 

non-citizens and the mentally incompetent? 

92 

Mr. IDARRAGA. Representative Chu, to respond briefly, I would 

say there is absolutely, actually no difference between ex-felons 

and normal citizens when it comes to voting. The analog between 

abridgement of voting rights, I do not think, is the gun rights or 

other type of—for example, myself, I will be up before the Bar committee one day of character and fitness, and they should rightly 

take into account my past. 

The analog is more the abridgement of a fundamental, core right, 

although voting is not a Bill of Rights right. But it is more—the 

analog is closer to abridging freedom of speech because you are an 

ex-felon, or any other of the freedom of religion, or what have you, 

because you are an ex-felon. 

It is fundamentally different than small children or the mentally 

incompetent, because of the reasons Professor Neuborne stated. 

But I think, if anything, the rationale should swing the other way. 

We would want people invested in their communities, reintegrated 

into communities, and have them become stakeholders in their 

communities. 

This—is at the end of a very troublesome chain. And that begins 

with problems in the criminal justice system too far for this Committee to handle, to take up in this instance. 

And another thing I want to point out is, Professor Clegg spoke 

that we do not want violent offenders making laws for other people. 

The fact is, I believe, in Rhode Island it was close to 80 percent 

of people disenfranchised were non-violent offenders, low-level drug 

offenses. 

We are disenfranchising people because of the over-criminalization on the front end of things, which has a very disparate impact 

and troublesome impact on the back end of things. 

Mr. CLEGG. I do not think I drew a distinction between violent 

and non-violent offenders. 

Ms. CHU. Well, actually, though, I see this in your testimony 

right here, because I am reading right from it. But because—you 

say that there should not be a Federal law allowing felons to vote, 

because, ‘‘Some crimes are worse than others, some felons have 

committed more crimes than others, and some crimes are recent 

while others are long past.’’ 

That is a quote, actually, from your testimony. 

So, then, my question would be to the rest of the panel, should 

there be a differentiation allowing a felon the right to vote, based 

on the degree of the crime? And if not, why not? 

Mr. SANCHO. In Florida, I would like to point out that we had 

an explosion in individuals’ loss of the right to vote when the Florida legislature decided to make writing a bad check a felony. And 

it raises the issue of, is this the serious crime that had been identified, for example, with rebellion that was part of the constitutional 

framework that has been previously mentioned. 

And I seriously think it is not, but these kinds of felony laws 

have the same pernicious effect. And in fact, in Leon County had 

the effect of removing individuals that had worked for years as 

election workers. 

And one personal case that I am aware of, a young mother who, 

in fact, wrote a bad check to a grocery store to feed her son, could 

no longer work. 

93 

And this kind of—in Florida, they have tagged these economic 

elements, so that once you are a felon, you no longer can do basic 

kinds of non-professional work, such as you cannot be a barber, you 

cannot be a roofer, you cannot be a contractor, you cannot be a cosmetologist. 

Well, these are whole categories of non-professional workers, 

which now, the loss of your right to vote and your civil right has 

now removed you from being able to economically serve the purpose that, in my opinion, we established this great Nation, was to 

pursue happiness to the highest and best degree that we can. And 

this right to vote has been kind of a hammer that has now put the 

Nation in a Catch-22 posture, where, is this the kind of crime we 

are talking about? 

Yet we are now preventing the individual, as in Tennessee, who 

they are going to be in prison, they are going to fall behind in their 

ability to make the child payment. They are going to now permanently be in this Catch-22 where they will not be able to get their 

right to vote restored. And we have done that in Florida. We have 

done that across the States. 

And I think we need to rationalize this process and remove what 

is clearly now, in my own opinion as a humble Florida election official, a partisan tool to attempt to reduce the other side’s troops and 

votes. And I think that is not where we want to be, and we have 

got to reverse that posture in this Nation today. 

Mr. CLEGG. I agree that there are all kinds of contexts where 

drawing distinctions between different kinds of crimes can make 

sense, and including in the re-enfranchisement of felons. But that 

is exactly what this statute does not do. And I think it would be 

very difficult for Congress at the Federal level to engage in that 

kind of fine-tuning. 

This is another policy reason—wholly apart from the constitutional reasons—this is another policy reason why I think it is a 

mistake for Congress to leap in here and try to write a one-sizefits-all statute that is going to apply to all States—states which are 

constantly changing what is a felony, what is not a felony, constantly changing the—you know, passing new laws and rescinding 

old laws. It is simply unworkable for the Federal Government to 

engage in the kind of fine-tuning that is being urged here. 

Mr. SANCHO. But I actually believe it is just the opposite, sir, because what we have done by these crazy patchwork of laws is make 

it impossible for election administrators to properly determine who 

is properly ineligible or eligible. And, in fact, as the report that I 

have presented from Florida from last March, many Florida election officials actually illegally barred individuals from registering. 

And I think this problem is occurring in the election administration 

area all across the country. 

A bright line, a simple test to ensure that citizens may vote in 

Federal elections is exactly what we have to do, if we want to pursue, I believe, fundamental—— 

Mr. CLEGG. Well, the bright line that you have is one—it is a 

bright line all right, and it makes no distinction between espionage, 

treason, murder, writing bad checks—right, whatever. They are all 

in the same category. That is a bright line. 

Ms. CHU. I see my time has long since expired. So, I yield back. 

94 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen? 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Scott. And I want to thank you for 

holding this hearing. And indeed, I have already thanked Mr. Conyers for presenting the bill. 

I understand that part of my opening statement was either confused or misunderstood. And when I said that the argument that 

this was possibly not constitutional, that we should find a way to 

make it constitutional—or what exactly the verbiage I used, I am 

not sure—was basically saying what Mr. Neuborne said. Mr. 

Neuborne believes it is totally constitutional and totally proper. 

But, you know, after Plessy v. Ferguson, there were a lot of people that said that was the law of the land. And it went on for 58 

more years until Thurgood Marshall had the good sense and the 

courage to bring a case to the Supreme Court and say, no, separate 

was not equal. And Brown v. Board of Education changed all that. 

And sometimes you can take a position that something is the 

law, and that there is not standing, or that there is not venue, but 

the courts can find it. 

Now, the words ‘‘manner of election’’ in Florida, who was allowed 

to vote determined who was President of the United States. And 

that affected people in all 49 States. And there should be a basis 

where, in an election for President of the United States, if you vote 

in Florida, or you cannot vote in Florida but you could vote in 

Michigan, it is not fair. 

People should be able to have the same standards by which they 

vote to elect the President of the United States—in my opinion. 

And in my opinion, we ought to find arguments and make arguments that hopefully a court will accept. I have little faith in this 

Court that we have right now to accept those arguments—or any 

arguments. 

But we need to make progress in this country. And this is 2010. 

You know, there were citings—and I understand the citings, you 

hear them on the floor, and I use them, too—Founding Fathers, 

what Alexander Hamilton thought. Alexander Hamilton did not 

think women should vote, and he did not think African Americans 

should be free. And he did not think, if you did not own property 

or could not pass some literacy test, that you should be able to 

vote, either. 

And Thomas Jefferson said, constitutions should not be seen as 

sacrosanct. But like children who outgrow their clothing, they 

should be able to adjust as they grow and fit new clothes, and fit 

new ideas. 

And the idea that we should be trapped in a mentality that denies people a chance to vote, that because they committed a wrong 

at one time means they are perpetually wrong and never have an 

opportunity, is, I think, antithetical to the basis of the founding of 

this Nation and what this Nation is supposed to stand for. 

Now, I know the organization Mr. Clegg represents, Center for 

Equal Opportunity, it is a confusing name. Because usually when 

you see Center for Equal Opportunity, you think of something else. 

You know, I know in George Orwell, he wrote about the Department of Peace that waged war, the Department of Education that 

burned books. 

95 

So, I guess it is all right, because of that great literary classic, 

to have something called the Center for Equal Opportunity. But I 

would submit to you, what you are talking about is not equal opportunity. It is saying that one time burned, forever scorched. 

And as I mentioned—and I think somebody here referenced Hester Prynne, I think it was Mr. Sancho—you should not have a perpetual scarlet letter. The idea that people can become good citizens—and the fact is, in most elections, not more than 25 percent 

of those in a good election year take the opportunity to vote and 

exercise their freedoms and their franchise. 

So, if you take these people who were supposed to be the bottom 

of the barrel, and give them the opportunity, they have got a 

chance by their proof, to show by going to the polls that they are 

better than 75 percent of the country that neglects their opportunity to vote. 

But give them a chance. And if they want to vote, obviously, they 

are better citizens than you think. 

But I would submit to you that this legislation is appropriate. 

I appreciate Mr. Neuborne’s well-reasoned argument, that just 

like the literacy test in 1965, the people came up here and said, 

oh, that is not the law, and you cannot do it, just like people said, 

civil rights is not the law and you cannot do it, that America needs 

to bring its resources together and its best legal talent to formulate 

arguments to present to a court that hopefully will accept them, 

and move this country out of where it is in certain of these laws, 

which are vestiges of Jim Crow. 

Now, Mr. Clegg, I would like to ask you a question. Do you think 

that Jim Crow laws still have an effect on society today, that people have been affected by those laws, and that they are 

disenfranchised and/or disadvantaged because of the long history of 

Jim Crow laws in this Nation? 

Mr. CLEGG. Yes, I do. 

Mr. COHEN. You do? Well, where under equal opportunity do 

they get some extra opportunity, because of the fact that they are 

starting with a weight around their ankle? 

Mr. CLEGG. Well, I think that there are—the playing field is not 

level in many different ways. But I think that there are people of 

all colors at both ends of the playing field. And I think that where 

you and I may differ is that I do not think that you should use skin 

color as a proxy for whether somebody is poor or not, or whether 

somebody is disadvantaged or not. 

If you want to have programs—and we may be able to agree on 

some programs—that help people who come from disadvantaged 

backgrounds, who are poor, who live in poverty. 

Mr. COHEN. Let me ask you this. Mr. Clegg, the question I asked 

was about Jim Crow. Jim Crow was targeted at African Americans. 

Tell me where you agree that Jim Crow laws that targeted African 

Americans still affect African Americans today. And how can we 

remedy that? 

Mr. CLEGG. I think that—well, I would have to give you an example. You could probably without too much difficulty show that 

an individual living in poverty can trace that poverty to the fact 

that his father was not able to get a good education because of Jim 

Crow laws. You can do that. 

96 

However, there are—I do not think that you should say, okay, 

well, therefore, we are going to make a program available to you. 

This other person over here, he is poor, but the reason he is poor 

is because he just immigrated from Mexico. 

Mr. COHEN. But the government of the United States—— 

Mr. CLEGG. And the person here is poor—— 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Clegg—— 

Mr. CLEGG [continuing]. Because he just came over—— 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Clegg—— 

Mr. CLEGG [continuing]. On a boat from Southeast Asia. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Clegg—— 

Mr. CLEGG. But you do not hear about them. 

Mr. COHEN. Look at me, and let me give you something. But 

question is, with Jim Crow laws, the States of this government, 

under the permission of the United States government, passed laws 

to keep those people as second-class citizens. Nobody passed any 

laws saying that people came over in boats, like my great-grandfather did, had to be second class. There were no laws on the 

books. 

This government passed laws and said, you cannot go to water 

fountains. You cannot go to theaters. You cannot have jobs. You 

cannot have contracts. And that happened. 

So, how do you rectify the lingering consequences of Jim Crow? 

Mr. CLEGG. My point is that the poverty and so forth, the disadvantages that people suffer because of Jim Crow, can be remedied. But there is no reason to—— 

Mr. COHEN. How do you do it? Tell me how you do it. 

Mr. CLEGG [continuing]. And deny people opportunity—— 

Mr. COHEN. Tell me how you do it. Don’t tell me how you—these 

other people, don’t put them on the same boat. How do we help 

these people that this government, this life, liberty and pursuit of 

happiness, that enslaved people, and then did it through laws 

passed by legislatures and Congresses, how do you help those people? 

Mr. CLEGG. If you have somebody who is in poverty, you can 

have programs that provide, you know, better educational opportunities, that provide, you know, a Head Start program, or something 

like that, scholarships, special mentoring programs. There are all 

kinds of programs—— 

Mr. COHEN. And if I go to your Web site, will I see those types 

of—— 

Mr. CLEGG. My point is that—— 

Mr. COHEN. If I go to your Web site, will I find your Web site 

showing programs like that that you espouse and advocate? 

Mr. CLEGG. Yes. And you will find it made very clear that we 

have no objection at all to programs that improve the opportunities 

for disadvantaged people, without regard to race or ethnicity. 

And that is why—I mean, you know, you were criticizing as misleading the name of my organization. The reason that we are the 

Center for Equal Opportunity is to draw a distinction between 

those who believe in equal opportunity, which we do, and those 

who believe in racially mandated equal results, which is something 

that we reject. 

97 

We do not like quotas. We believe in e pluribus unum. We do not 

think that statutes and laws that give preference on the basis of 

race and ethnicity are constitutional or good policy. 

And let me just say, Congressman Cohen, you know, my notes 

show that when you were giving your opening statement, you used 

the phrase ‘‘get around it,’’ referring to the Constitution. I do not 

think—— 

Mr. COHEN. You cannot get around the Constitution. You have 

got to make a good argument. And that is what I was submitting. 

When I say ‘‘get around,’’ I mean get around the mentality that you 

have got, that it is set in stone, and that you do not have jurisdiction. 

I am submitting that Mr. Neuborne is right, and that you can 

make an argument that there is jurisdiction, and there is, in my 

opinion—and Mr. Neuborne made it. And that is what I mean. I 

meant get around your mentality that says there is not, and therefore, do not try to make progress. 

My time has expired, and I thank Mr. Scott for the hearing. 

Mr. NEUBORNE. Can I—— 

Mr. CLEGG [continuing]. To get around the Constitution. And 

with all respect, I think that that is a very troubling attitude for 

somebody who has taken an oath to the Constitution to have. 

Mr. NEUBORNE. Can I congratulate you, Representative Cohen, 

on putting into my mind an argument that I should have thought 

of, but did not? But it is another very powerful reason why you 

have authority to pass it. 

It is astonishing to me that somebody, that a felon, or somebody 

who has been convicted of passing a bad check in Florida cannot 

vote, but somebody who is convicted of passing a bad check in 

Georgia can vote. 

Now, that is the kind of irrational discrimination on the ability 

to vote that should trigger the 14th Amendment’s power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. 

The passage of uniform criteria that would sand down irrational 

differences State to State on whether you can vote for President of 

the United States, seems to me clearly within this Committee’s 

power without the necessity of going to the 15th Amendment. It is 

a 14th Amendment argument. And I did not think of it until you 

were making your point. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Mr. Neuborne. I also 

want to let Mr. Clegg know that congress people get the last word. 

And after I closed, and you questioned my taking my oath of office, which I take seriously, let me submit to you that Dr. King said 

so appropriately, that sometimes when the laws are wrong, it is all 

right to resist them, because they are inherently wrong and morally wrong. 

And what I am submitting is, arguments can be made, not to 

subvert the Constitution, but to change the Constitution, to change 

the law of this land. Because you change it through arguments. 

And words have meaning, and you put flesh on them. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. SCOTT. The gentlelady from Texas? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

98 

Mr. Neuborne, you have gotten us just at that burst of thought 

and analysis to where we need to be with this particular legislation 

and why this legislation should move as expeditiously as it can. As 

we have listened to all of the testimony, I think we have come to 

a point to recognize there is discrimination. 

For example, in the State of Maine and Vermont, we have Members of Congress who are here. The State of Maine has no disenfranchisement for people with criminal convictions. Except for 

their philosophy and the representation of their State, I see no difference in the Members of Congress from the States of Maine and 

Vermont. 

They do not act erratically. They do not seem to espouse unconstitutional or unpatriotic statements. They do not seem to be perpetrating criminal acts or supporting freeing all criminals across 

America. 

But yet, felons, apparently, in Maine and Vermont can vote. So 

you make a very valid point. 

And as I look at the whole list, and I see some States with some 

forms of release or opportunity to vote, and some were not, we have 

a constitutional question of whether or not it is a discriminatory 

practice across the Nation, because there is inconsistency. 

And I may steal or have a bounced check in Texas—which, by 

the way, for the first time in this Judiciary Committee, I can actually say a kind word on the criminal justice system about Texas. 

At least they have a compromise, and that is attributable to State 

Representative Harold Dutton and others, who have worked so 

without ceasing on this issue. 

But it seems to me, if I have a bounced check in Texas, and I 

go to another place, am I a felon there and cannot vote? I was able 

to vote in Texas, but I have to go to another State, because I am 

being relocated because of my spouse. Can I vote? 

That is a patently discriminatory practice, and I think that it 

cries out for relief. 

I hope that the court reporters captured your analysis there, because we need to rush right immediately, even in an amendment 

form, to make sure we attributed the framework of this bill to, I 

believe you said the 14th Amendment and Section 5 under that, to 

be able to deal with it. 

But let me ask Mr. Spakovsky. Could he tell me when slavery 

ended in Virginia? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. Well, it ended at the end of the Civil War. 

But after Reconstruction, as many people know, many of the southern States, including Virginia, implemented Jim Crow laws to suppress the rights of Black citizens. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And during that time, slavery, and then, as 

you indicated, Reconstruction and Jim Crowism, could Black citizens vote? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. Only if you look at the percentages of registration and turnout. It varied over time. It was a very small 

amount—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. No, let me go back—— 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY [continuing]. Depending on what period you 

were looking at. 

99 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. The slaves that were enslaved, could 

they vote in Virginia? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. I am sorry. When they were—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. At the time that slavery was—— 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. No, of course, no. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. In place, they could not vote. 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. No. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. During Jim Crow, could Africans, negroes or 

colored people vote in Virginia? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. A small percentage could, depending on 

where you were and in what years you are looking at. But the percentages were very small, because of the efforts made to suppress 

their registration and voting. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you think that was a good thing? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. I am sorry. What? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you think that was a good thing? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. Well, of course not. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. In the instance of your State—and I think you 

are on the elections law, and it seems as if you have a complete 

bar with individuals of felony convictions, which I imagine are an 

array of different acts, except for government approval of their individual rights, which I imagine there is some process—you do not 

see that as a restoration of slavery? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. I do not. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Because I do. 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. No. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. To completely bar a person who has served 

their time and seeks to restore their contributions to society, that 

you would bar them, are they not enslaved to the extent that their 

constitutional rights, or rights to express themselves, is then denied? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. I do not agree. The State of Virginia has an 

application process, so people can apply after a certain period of 

time to get that right back—and the other rights that are taken 

away—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And how many do you think—— 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY [continuing]. Such as not the right—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. How many do you think apply? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY [continuing]. To serve on a jury or to serve 

in elected office. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. How many do you think apply to this process? 

Do you have any percentages? 

Mr. VON SPAKOVSKY. I do not have the numbers or percentages 

on—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Leon, I think—no, you are from the state 

of Leon, excuse me. You are from—Mr. Sancho, let me thank you 

for having a bright light on this concept. And I think you have 

made a very important point. 

You recall the election of 2000, when the database came from the 

State of Texas, and represented that there were many more felons 

in your State than there actually were. 

What kind of crisis did that pose for you? It seems like you were 

in—I know this was particularly around Florida A&M, when individuals were trying to vote. There were allegations that Black men 

100 

were arrested walking toward the poll. Obviously, a lot of that was 

investigated. 

But what does that do to the election process? 

Mr. SANCHO. It destroys the people’s faith that, in fact, elections 

have any validity at all. That is what it does. 

And I will tell you that today, that there are portions of the State 

of Florida around Duval County, where there are large populations 

of African Americans in South Florida, where, in fact, people do believe that, in fact, there is no right to vote because of that experience. And it is going to take a long, long time to reestablish in their 

minds that this is, in fact, a Nation of laws and justice. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You made another point, and I would like to 

ask Mr. Andres, so I need to get the pronunciation of his last name. 

I will call on you in just a moment. But you made a very valid 

point that ties into this whole issue. 

Mr. Spakovsky did not want to acknowledge that the oppression 

of a person who has finished their time, and has to be subjected 

to an application process, is like slavery. As far as I am concerned, 

it is like slavery. 

And although Virginia may have ended the formal slavery of African Americans, or colored people, negroes, at a period of time 

past Jim Crowism, there are people who are presently enslaved 

with the complete denial of any right to be re-enfranchised, except 

for an application process. 

But you expanded your point, and that was the point that people 

cannot be barbers, or cannot be beauticians. And I think some of 

that spills over into our other States. This is not a case for that 

right now. 

But what it says is that we have a completely oppressive system 

that has people in third class citizenship. Is that what I am hearing from you, Mr. Sancho, in the voting sense? 

Mr. SANCHO. Well, it does. These individuals have become a permanent underclass in the State of Florida. And it is a drag on 

every element of our social institutions—education, social welfare 

programs—and it impacts on the right to vote. 

We are a jurisdiction in Leon County that believes in access. 

Leon County, in fact, is the southern-most extension of the Old 

South plantation. There is only about a 12 percent population of 

African Americans in the State of Florida. 

But in the panhandle, that average is much higher. We are near 

35 percent. My neighboring county, Gadsden, is the only majority 

minority county in the State of Florida. 

And you can see the economic destruction that our own lack of 

restoring the ability to people to integrate themselves into society 

has left. It is a terrible legacy. 

We tried to overcome that in Leon County. We have a lot of great 

educational institutions at Florida State and Florida A&M. And in 

our jurisdiction, our jurisdiction is the highest-voting jurisdiction in 

the State of Florida. We had an 86 percent turnout in the last general election. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But this bill would help you, if this was to be 

passed. This bill would help if this was to be passed, to give more 

empowerment to individuals. 

101 

Mr. SANCHO. I believe it would. I believe that people would no 

longer have to avert their eyes when I am doing voter registration 

drives, because I challenge people to register to vote. I encourage 

them. 

And you can see the individuals who have this permanent shame 

that has scarred their soul. They will not even look me in the eye. 

They cannot even answer. They just shake their heads and—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have seen that, too. 

Mr. SANCHO [continuing]. Just cannot register to vote. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me, just 

to get this last question to—is it Mr. Aradarra? 

Mr. IDARRAGA. Idarraga. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Idarraga, thank you so very much. You are a 

living example. Six years incarcerated, if I am correct? 

Mr. IDARRAGA. Yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And presently at Yale Law School. What State 

would you call your residence at this point, sir? 

Mr. IDARRAGA. I would say I am a permanent resident of Rhode 

island, and a temporary resident of Connecticut. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. And I have to find Rhode Island 

here, but the point is, you are redeeming, in essence, you are restoring your life. You are being rehabilitated. 

What is your response to what seems to be the enslavement of 

individuals who have previously been incarcerated? It seems to be 

a constant state of slavery, because they are not allowed to exert 

their constitutional rights or the right to vote. What is your perception of that? 

Mr. IDARRAGA. I would say, at the very least, when you are in 

a distressed community, and you see the law basically working 

against you at many steps of the way, and that is all you know, 

that is all you see, it just creates a natural antagonism to the law 

and to the legitimacy of the law. 

I think when we embrace individuals that—we give them the 

rights that are fundamental at the core of citizenship, it at least 

tells them that the law will not work unequally. It invests them in 

the democratic process. 

I think it is nonsensical to restrict the right to vote for ex-felons, 

just like it is nonsensical—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. There is a representation that you are not 

competent, that you would be incompetent, and that you are not 

worthy. What do you say to that? 

Mr. IDARRAGA. Tremendously. Even as a student at Yale Law 

School, I may go through an interview process and then have to 

bring up my past. And in that context, people take a step back, and 

that scarlet branding is very evident, even for myself. 

For a person that does not even have that credential, I could just 

only imagine the obstacles they have to face. They are living under 

permanent second, third class citizenship with a tremendous scarlet branding that they have to walk around with—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But do you think they are incompetent, that 

they should not be able to vote, because they are incompetent? 

Mr. IDARRAGA. Absolutely not. Absolutely not. 

In Rhode Island, out of the 15,000 that were re-enfranchised, 

6,000 registered to vote. And many, many people that I knew perVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:37 Jun 09, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\031610\55480.000 HJUD1 PsN: 55480
102 

sonally, because the place where I grew up was a small place, 

called me, told me about some of the things they were thinking 

through, thanked me, went to the polls with their children. 

They are absolutely not incompetent, and they are much smarter 

than we give them credit for. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would just—I am sorry, if I could yield to Mr. Wicklund? Yes, 

sir. 

Mr. WICKLUND. I just wanted to add that there are so many collateral consequences that go with a felony conviction. 

There are many collateral consequences that go with felony convictions, and some make sense. For instance, there are some restrictions. You do not want a pedophile driving a school bus. But 

at the same time, you know, should a burglar never get to be a barber? 

And there are also collateral consequences, such as your criminal 

history never goes away. I mean, just ask any of these mining and 

harvesting of information companies that are buying criminal justice information and selling it to employers and apartment renters, 

et cetera. However, even the ones that make sense are there because the felon, the past felon, creates some sort of risk to the community. 

There is no risk in having someone vote. How does that hurt 

anybody? And in fact, they can then vote to eliminate some of these 

barriers that are in their way of actually becoming participatory 

citizens. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. 

I was at a meeting, Mr. Chairman, I will just put on the record, 

with what I would think informed persons. And we were talking 

about Federal funding. An informed government official said to me, 

well, I believe that if it is Federal funding, ex-felons cannot get a 

job. 

This is about voting. I understand that. But I believe it is also 

about lifting the burden of slavery on ex-felons. That what it is, 

plain and simple—enslaved. 

So, the constitutional rights, the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendment, has just been voided, whether they are White, Hispanic, African American or Asian. How many people can we keep enslaved in 

the United States of America in the 21st century? 

I would argue that this legislation is long overdue, and would 

hope that we could move it forward as quickly as possible. I yield 

back to the Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

And I want to thank all of our witnesses. This has been very informative. 

There seems to be a fairly universal consensus that we may be 

able to do something. There is not a consensus on the bill yet. But 

certainly, if we can show intent, and target it to those where we 

can show that intent, there seems no question. There seems to be 

a question about what we can do if we cannot show the intent, but 

we can show impact. 

But we want to thank all of our witnesses for helping us out 

today. 

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Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit to the Chair additional written questions for the witnesses, 

which we will forward, and ask the witnesses to respond to as 

promptly as they can, so the answers may be made part of the 

record. 

Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit any additional materials for inclusion into the record. 

And with that, without objection, the Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(105) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN CONYERS, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND

CIVIL LIBERTIES

Last Congress, President Bush signed the Second Chance Act into law, signaling 

a greater awareness of the need to implement policies that assist in the reintegration of ex-offenders into their communities. I believe that the Democracy Restoration 

Act is the next logical step for restoring ex-offenders to their fullest participation 

in civic life and merits our support. 

When this Subcommittee last held a hearing on ex-offender disenfranchisement 

legislation in October, 1999, the news was somewhat discouraging, as millions of 

citizens across the nation were permanantly barred from the polls. Since that time, 

I can report that bipartisan reform efforts like this legislation have gained traction 

at the state level. Democrat and Republican governors alike—including then-governor George Bush of Texas—have seen that this issue is not about who wins elections, but about constitutional principles. 

The Sentencing Project reports that, since 1997, 19 states have amended felony 

disenfranchisement policies in an effort to reduce their restrictiveness and expand 

voter eligibility. These reforms have resulted in more than 760,00 citizens regaining 

their voting rights. Yet, despite these reforms, more than 5 million American citizens were ineligible to vote in 2008’s historic Presidential election because they have 

a felony conviction. Almost 4 million of these people—many of whom work every day 

and pay their taxes—reside in the 35 states that still prohibit ex-offenders who have 

completed their sentences, or who are on probation or parole, from voting. 

As a matter of principle, I believe that such prohibitions on the right to vote undermine both our voting system and the fundamental rights of people with felony 

convictions. Disenfranchisement laws isolate and alienate ex-offenders, and serve as 

one more obstacle in their attempt to successfully put the past behind them by fully 

reintegrating into society. But that is only half the story. 

There are three grave discrepancies in State laws regarding felony convictions that lead to unfairness in Federal elections. First, there is no uniform 

standard for voting in Federal elections, which leads to an egregious disparity and 

unequal participation in Federal elections based solely on where a person lives. 

Second, laws governing the restoration of voting rights after a felony conviction 

are unequal throughout the country and persons in some States can easily regain 

their voting rights while in other States persons effectively lose their right to vote 

permanently. 

Third, State disenfranchisement laws disproportionately impact ethnic minorities, 

thus adversely infringing upon citizens of these communities constitutional right to 

vote. 

These concerns about ex-offender disenfranchisement are not rhetorical. Laws 

that continue to disenfranchise people after release from prison create the opportunity for erroneous purges of eligible citizens from the voting rolls, are difficult to 

administer, and generate needless confusion among election officials and the public. 

For example, although people with misdemeanor convictions never lose the right 

to vote in Ohio, in 2008 30% of election officials in the state responded incorrectly 

or expressed uncertainty about whether individuals with misdemeanor convictions 

could vote. This kind of confusion has resulted in barriers to legal voter registration 

and flawed voter purges that have deprived legitimate voters of their rights. Only 

federal law can conclusively resolve the ambiguities in this area plaguing our voting 

system. 

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This legislation is a narrowly crafted effort to expand voting rights for people with 

felony convictions, while protecting state prerogatives to generally establish voting 

qualifications. The legislation would only apply to persons who are not in prison, 

and it would only apply to federal elections. As such, our bill is fully consistent with 

constitutional requirements established by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions upholding federal voting rights laws. 

In past Congresses, voting restoration legislation has been supported by a broad 

coalition of groups interested in voting and civil rights, including the NAACP, 

ACLU, the National Council of Churches (National and Washington Office), the National Urban League, the Human Rights Watch, The Brennan Center for Justice 

and the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, among many others. 

This coalition has expanded to include many law enforcement groups including 

the American Probation and Parole Association, the Association of Paroling Authorities International and the National Black Police Association, among others, who recognize that allowing people to vote after release from prison helps rebuild ties to 

the community that motivate law-abiding behavior. 

The practice of many states denying voting rights to ex-offenders represents a vestige from a time when suffrage was denied to whole classes of our population based 

on race, gender, religion, national origin and property. Even today, Courts have 

made a similar link and found that ex-offender disenfranchisement statutes can be 

racially discriminatory—violating the Voting Rights Act. Just like poll taxes and literacy tests prevented an entire class of citizens, namely African Americans, from 

integrating into society after centuries of slavery, ex-felon disenfranchisement laws 

prevent people from reintegrating into society after they have served their time in 

prison. 

Ultimately, I believe that our nation fails not only people with felony convictions 

by denying them the right to vote, but the rest of out society as well. America has 

struggled throughout its history to ensure that its citizenry be part of legitimate and 

inclusive elections. It is long overdue that these restrictions be relegated to 

unenlightened history. I look forward to hearing from today’s witnesses as we build 

the record in support of passing this critical civil rights legislation. 

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