IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 673,

Plaintiff,

v.

OBERWEIS DAIRY, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 12 C 1438

Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary

Judgment. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment is granted and Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is denied. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Teamsters Local 673 (hereinafter, the “Plaintiff” or

“Teamsters”), is a labor union headquartered in West Chicago,

Illinois. Defendant Oberweis, Dairy, Inc. (hereinafter, the

“Defendant” or “Oberweis”) is a family-owned dairy company that

produces and sells traditional dairy products such as milk, cheese,

ice cream, and yogurt. Teamsters represents a bargaining unit for

a portion of Oberweis’ employees. Together, the parties’ have

entered into successive collective bargaining agreements (the

“CBA’s”) since 1991. The most recent CBA became effective on

April 19, 2009 (the “2009 CBA”). This case involves a dispute
regarding the interpretation of the grievance procedures set forth

in the 2009 CBA. 

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Article 4 of the 2009

CBA requires Oberweis to arbitrate grievances involving any

violations of the CBA. Oberweis disagrees. It claims the 2009 CBA

only requires arbitration of claims concerning disciplinary actions

and discharge proceedings. 

The specific grievance at issue here arose on November 22,

2011, when Teamsters alleged Oberweis violated the CBA by granting

employees seniority for the time they were in managerial positions. 

When Oberweis refused to proceed with the arbitration, Teamsters

filed this action seeking to compel arbitration. Currently before

the Court are the parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party “shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [it]

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 

A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence would permit a reasonable

jury to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is material if it could

affect the outcome of the case. Id. If the moving party satisfies

its burden, the non-movant must present facts to show a genuine

dispute exists to avoid summary judgment. See, Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). To establish a genuine issue

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of fact, the non-moving party “must do more than show that there is

some metaphysical doubt as the material facts.” Sarver v. Experian

Info. Sys., 390 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 2004). 

III. ANALYSIS

Both parties have moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff

argues its motion should be granted because the plain language of

Article 4 of 2009 CBA provides that claims concerning any

violations of the CBA are subject to arbitration. Oberweis claims

it is entitled to summary judgment because the language in

Article 4 contains a scrivener’s error which is the result of a

mutual mistake between the parties. Oberweis asks the Court to

reform the 2009 CBA to correct the mistake. 

Prior to addressing the merits of the motions, the Court turns

to the preliminary arguments Oberweis raises in response to

Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. Oberweis first argues that

the case should be dismissed because Teamsters failed to file its

Complaint within the relevant statute of limitations. It then

argues Teamsters failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1 and this

failure requires the Court to exclude a number of Teamsters’

exhibits and deny Teamsters’ motion. The Court will address each

argument in turn. 

A. Statute of Limitations

Oberweis contends Teamsters’ filed its Complaint outside the

applicable statute of limitations. Oberweis argues that the

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Complaint is untimely because Teamsters admitted that it became

aware of Oberweis’ position regarding disputes of this nature on

May 5, 2010, but failed to file this action until February 29,

2012.

Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (the

“LMRA”) governs this case. It provides: 

Suits for violation of contracts between an

employer and a labor organization

representing employees in an industry

affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,

or between any such labor organizations, may

be brought in any district court of the United

States having jurisdiction of the parties,

without respect to the amount in controversy

or without regard to the citizenship of the

parties.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

Teamsters’ Complaint seeks to compel arbitration pursuant to

the 2009 CBA and Section 301(a) of the LMRA. See, Comp. ¶¶ 1, 6. 

Claims brought pursuant to Section 301(a) are subject to a sixmonth statute of limitations period borrowed from Section 10(b) of

the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”). See, 29 U.S.C.

§ 10(b); see also, Chapple v. National Starch and Chemical Co. and

Oil, 178 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 1999). “[A] Section 301 cause of

action accrues from the time a final decision on a plaintiff's

grievance has been made or from the time the plaintiff discovers,

or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered,

that no further action would be taken on his grievance.” Id.

(citations omitted). 

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The Complaint indicates Teamsters filed the grievance it seeks

to arbitrate on November 22, 2011. Compl. ¶ 7. While it is

possible Teamsters learned that Oberweis refused to arbitrate

similar disputes in May 2010, it was not until November 2011 when

Teamsters learned Oberweis refused to engage in arbitration

procedures for this dispute. Id. Teamsters filed its Complaint in

February 2012. See, ECF No. 1. This is within the relevant

limitations period. Thus, the Court rejects Oberweis’ arguments

concerning the timeliness of the Complaint. 

B. Local Rule 56.1

Next, Oberweis argues that Plaintiff’s Motion fails because

Teamsters failed to adhere to Local Rule 56.1. Oberweis contends

that this failure mandates the exclusion of a number of exhibits

and denial of Teamsters’ Motion. 

Rule 56.1 governs motions for summary judgment. Its purpose

is to “make it relatively simple for the court to determine whether

there are bona fide issues of fact requiring a trial.” Widmar v.

Sun Chemical, No. 11-C-1818, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148684 at *1

(N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2012). It requires the party moving for

summary judgment to put forth a statement of “material facts” which

consists of “short numbered paragraphs” that include specific

references to “affidavits” or “other parts of the record” that

support the facts set forth. L.R. 56.1(a).

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Pursuant to Rule 56.1, the party opposing summary judgment

must give “a concise response” to each of the movant’s statements. 

L.R. 56.1(b). If the opposing party denies a fact as true, the

Rule requires the opposing party to provide “specific reference to

affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials”

that support denial. Id. 

Teamsters failed to submit a 56.1 Statement of Material Facts

and failed to respond to Oberweis’ Statements of Material Fact. 

Its failure to respond results in deeming admitted those

uncontroverted statements in Oberweis’ Local Rule 56.1 submission. 

See, Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006). 

However, its failure does not amount to an automatic judgment in

favor of Oberweis. Id. Instead, the ultimate burden of persuasion

remains with Oberweis to show that it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Id. 

Oberweis also claims that Teamsters’ Motion for Summary

Judgment should be denied because a number of its supporting

exhibits are inadmissible. While the Court does not find an

automatic denial of the Motion appropriate, the Court disregards

all of Teamsters’ unauthenticated exhibits. See, Rosemary B. on

Behalf of Michael B. v. Bd. of Educ. of Community High Sch. Dist.

No. 155, 52 F.3d 156, 159 (7th Cir. 1995) (a party must provide a

proper foundation to authenticate documents or other exhibits which

the party claims entitles them to judgment as a matter of law). 

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The Court also strikes those exhibits that contain inadmissible

hearsay. See, Hong v. Children's Memorial Hosp., 993 F.2d 1257,

1264–65 (7th Cir. 1993). As a result, the only exhibits that the

Court will consider from Teamsters are those exhibits which

Oberweis has also submitted and authenticated to support its

motion. This includes Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 35, 39, 41,

43, and 50. All of Teamsters’ remaining exhibits are disregarded

for the purposes of these motions. 

C. Merits of Summary Judgment Motions

The Court now turns to the merits of the parties’ Motions for

Summary Judgment. Teamsters contends it is entitled to judgment

because the plain language of the CBA supports a finding that any

violations of the CBA are subject to arbitration. Oberweis claims

it is entitled to summary judgment because the 2009 CBA contains a

“scrivener’s error” which amounts to a mutual mistake. 

Determining whether a collective bargaining agreement creates

a duty to arbitrate is a contractual question. John Wiley & Sons,

Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546–47 (1964). Thus, it is the

Court’s duty to interpret the CBA to determine whether the parties

intended to arbitrate grievances such as the one at issue here. 

AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 651

(1986). In making this determination, the Court is cognizant of

the “liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration agreements.” 

Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 21 v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,

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491 F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has

held that there is a presumption of arbitrability unless there is

no possible interpretation that the arbitration clause covers the

asserted dispute. Id. at 687–88.

In examining the language of the CBA in this case the Court

notes the following. Article 4 is entitled “Grievance Procedure[:]

Discipline and Discharge or any Violations of the Agreement.” 

Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 5. Under subheading “A,” Article 4 states “[a]ll

grievances relating solely to the discharge or discipline of an

employee shall be processed as follows . . . ” Id. (emphasis

added). It then outlines the necessary steps for an employee to

undertake if the employee was discharged or disciplined and the

grievance remained unsettled. See, id. Article 4 concludes by

stating “[i]f the grievance is not satisfactorily settled, either

party may request arbitration within ten (10) days from the

Employer’s denial of the grievance . . . [and that] [i]n the event

a grievance is referred to arbitration . . . [t]he arbitrator shall

decide only the grievance submitted by applying the express

language in this Agreement . . . ” Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 6, ECF No. 20,

PageID #95. Importantly, Article 4 is void of any language which

provides instructions on the grievance procedures for “any [other]

violations” of the CBA. Id. 

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1. Oberweis’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Oberweis contends that the absence of any language outlining

the procedures for grievances other than discharge and discipline

proceedings is indicative of a mutual mistake. Indeed, it avers

that it is unaware how the “or any violations of the agreement”

even appeared in the 2009 CBA. See Def.’s L.R. 56.1 Statement of

Material Fact ¶ 27. As a result, Oberweis requests that Court

reform the contract to reflect the true intent of the parties. 

“The contract law doctrine of scrivener’s error, or mutual

mistake, allows a court of equity to reform a contract where a

written agreement does not reflect the clear intent of the parties

due to a drafting error.” Young v. Verizon's Bell Atl. Cash

Balance Plan, 667 F.Supp.2d 850, 894 (N.D. Ill. 2009) aff'd, 615

F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2010). The party seeking reformation bears the

burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence that “a mistake

has occurred and that mistake does not reflect the intent of the

parties.” Id. 

Oberweis submits that the plain language of the 2009 CBA

reflects the mutual mistake between the parties. It also points to

the lack of evidence during the parties’ negotiations of previous

CBA’s as support for the fact that a mutual mistake occurred. 

However, Oberweis admits that the phrase “any violations of the

agreement” appeared in Article 4 as early as 1998 when the parties

negotiated its 1998-2003 CBA. Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. at

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4. While Oberweis claims that the notes from these negotiations do

not reflect an expansion of Article 4 and what disputes were or

were not subject to arbitration, it fails to explain why the

language remained in the 2009 CBA. This is particularly perplexing

given Oberweis’ assertions that the individuals involved in the

negotiations were “experienced labor relations professionals.” Id.

at 9. Assuming this is true, the Court finds it odd that the

negotiators would not have corrected the alleged “scriveners error”

when the time came to renegotiate the CBA in 2009. Thus, the Court

does not find the plain language of the 2009 CBA nor the absence of

any notes convincing to establish a scrivener’s error. 

The Court finds Oberweis’ arguments regarding the parties’

course of dealing equally unavailing. Oberweis claims that it has

never arbitrated a grievance that did not relate to disciplinary or

discharge proceeding. It states this is evidence that supports

finding a mutual mistake occurred. 

If this were actually the case, the Court might agree;

however, Oberweis admits that on November 4, 2010, it responded to

a grievance that related to the payment of delivery charges – a

grievance unrelated discharge or discipline. See, Def.’s L.R. 56.1

Statement of Fact ¶¶ 37-39. While Oberweis explains that

ultimately the grievance was never arbitrated and avers that it

responded only because of its “general obligation to bargain with

the Union . . . [,]” the fact remains this was a grievance relating

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to a violation of the 2009 CBA that did not relate to discipline or

discharge. Id. ¶ 39. Similarly, Oberweis acknowledges that in

2010 it responded to two separate unfair labor practice charges the

Teamsters filed. Id. ¶¶ 40-41. Oberweis states it responded to

these grievances because of “pressure from the labor board,” and

not because it agreed Article 4 of the CBA required the

arbitration. Id. ¶ 41. 

Regardless of the reasons why Oberweis responded to and

arbitrated the aforementioned grievances, it is undisputed that

these non-discharge, non-disciplinary grievances were addressed. 

Thus, the Court does not find the parties’ prior course of dealing

convincing to establish that the parties did not intend issues

relating to violations of the 2009 CBA to be arbitrated.

Furthermore, Oberweis’ reliance on Young v. Verizon Bell

Atlantic Cash Balance Plan, 615 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2010) is

misplaced. There, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s

decision to reform a pension plan under the Employment Retirement

Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Id. at 824. It reasoned that

because the employer presented objective, convincing evidence that

there “was a scrivener’s error inconsistent with [the]

participants’ expected benefits,” reformation was appropriate. Id.

at 820. It distinguished Young from prior cases finding

reformation inappropriate by noting that unlike the previous cases,

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in Young a “windfall” would result without the correction. Id. at

819. 

The facts here are readily distinguishable. First, Teamsters

will not receive a “windfall” of benefits if the Court refuses to

reform the 2009 CBA. Instead, the parties will proceed to

arbitration and the arbitrator will determine whether Teamsters

grievance has merit and how it should be resolved. Next, Oberweis

failed to present objective evidence of mutual mistake. While it

has provided affidavits and declarations from its officers and

legal representatives stating those individuals’ intent and

interpretations, the Court does not find such evidence objective. 

The same is true with respect to the parties’ prior dealings and

the way in which Oberweis handled previous grievances unrelated to

disciplinary proceedings or discharge. Accordingly, the Court

rejects Oberweis’ arguments concerning mutual mistake and denies

its motion for summary judgment. 

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff contends it is entitled to summary judgment because

Article 4 of the 2009 CBA states that “any violations of the

agreement” are subject to the grievance procedures set forth in

Article 4. See Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 5. It relies upon United

Steelworkers v. Warrior Golf Company, 363 U.S. 574 (1960) as

support. 

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In Warrior Golf Company, the Supreme Court held arbitration

should be compelled in collective bargaining disputes “unless it

may be said that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an

interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” Id. at 582-83. 

Indeed, Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Warrior Golf

reinforce its holding. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communc'ns

Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (finding that if an

arbitration clause is broad, there is a presumption in favor of

arbitrability). As further support, the Seventh Circuit adheres to

the principle that “[a]ny ambiguities as to the scope of the

arbitration clause are resolved in favor of arbitration.” United

Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. &

Serv. Workers Int'l Union v. TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d 531, 536 (7th

Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 

Applying these principles to the case at bar, the Court finds

arbitration appropriate. Teamsters contends Oberweis has violated

Article 8 of the 2009 CBA. Article 8 is entitled, “Seniority.” 

Id. at 6. The Complaint states Oberweis violated Article 8 by

“granting employee’s seniority for time they were in managerial

positions.” Compl. ¶ 8. Teamsters claims this is a violation of

the CBA and is subject to the procedures outlined in Article 4. 

While the Court concedes the obvious inconsistency between

Article 4’s heading which purports to provide a grievance procedure

for “any violations of the agreement” and subheading “A” which

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states that the procedures described relate “solely to the

discharge or discipline of an employee,” it is undeniable that

Teamsters’ grievance here concerns a “violation” of the CBA. 

Accordingly, the Court finds the arbitration procedures within

Article 4 “susceptible to an interpretation that covers this

dispute. Nothing more is required to establish the arbitrability

. . . ” TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d at 536. 

The Court is cognizant of the fact that Oberweis could rebut

the presumption of arbitrability. However, it can only do so if it

produces “the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the

claim from arbitration.” AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 650. The Court

finds Oberweis fails to meet this burden and finds its evidence

insufficient as a matter of law. 

For example, Oberweis submitted a letter addressed to the

National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) from its former attorney

Anthony Crement as support for its summary judgment motion. See,

Def.’s Ex. A-12, ECF No. 26-2. The letter is in response to the

NLRB’s request for additional information concerning a grievance

that related to the “method of calculating commissions from sales

. . . [,]” – a grievance unrelated to discipline or discharge. Id.

at PageID #680. In explaining the reasons for Oberweis’ position,

the letter states, “[s]ince there is no procedure for handling

language related grievances in Article 4 the parties applied the

procedure in that Article for disciplinary grievances. To that

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end, the parties submitted the grievance to the labor management

committee provided for in Article 4 A.3. . . . ” Id. at

PageID #683. The letter is dated February 8, 2011 and concerns a

2010 grievance unrelated to discharge or disciplinary proceedings. 

Yet, Oberweis chose to follow the grievance procedure outlined in

Article 4. As such, the Court does not find this evidence

“forceful” enough to rebut the presumption that the parties’

intended violations of the 2009 CBA to be arbitrated. AT&T Techs.,

475 U.S. at 650. 

In sum, the Court finds Oberweis cannot overcome the

presumption of arbitrability. The dispute is arbitrable under the

plain language in Article 4’s heading and any ambiguities or

inconsistencies within Article 4 are resolved in favor of

arbitration. TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d at 536. Accordingly,

Teamsters’ motion for summary judgment is granted. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [ECF No. 25] is denied. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [ECF No. 18] is granted. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge

United States District Court

Date: August 22, 2013

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