[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Reister v. Gardner, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5484.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-5484

REISTER, RECEIVER, APPELLANT, v. GARDNER ET AL, APPELLEES;

CLARKWESTERN DIETRICH BUILDING SYSTEMS, L.L.C., D.B.A.

CLARKDIETRICH, APPELLANT.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Reister v. Gardner, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5484.] 

Corporations—Directors—Breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims—The businessjudgment rule and the litigation privilege are separate concepts—Motions 

for judgment on the pleadings—Complaint was sufficient to state actionable 

claims that should not have been dismissed. 

(No. 2019-1815—Submitted August 5, 2020—Decided December 3, 2020.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, Nos. CA2019-01-010, 

CA2019-01-011, and CA2019-01-020, 2019-Ohio-4720. 

__________________ 

FISCHER, J.

{¶ 1} The law is a large and sometimes complicated field. It is made less 

complicated by the fact that litigants, lawyers, and judges alike may look to 
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 2

precedent for guidance. The Federalist No. 78 at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) 

(Clinton Rossiter Ed.1961). From time to time, however, discrete concepts are 

nonetheless confused, and the clarity provided by prior decisions gets muddied. 

This case involves one such instance of confusion. Because the Twelfth District 

Court of Appeals conflated the litigation privilege with the business-judgment rule 

in its decision affirming the trial court’s decision to grant judgment on the 

pleadings, we clarify the separate nature of these rules, and we reverse the Twelfth 

District’s judgment. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} Appellant, ClarkWestern Dietrich Building Systems, L.L.C., d.b.a. 

ClarkDietrich, previously sued the Certified Steel Stud Association, Inc. (“the 

association”), a Delaware corporation, and its member companies. That lawsuit 

primarily alleged that the association made defamatory statements about the quality 

of ClarkDietrich’s products in a trade publication that the association published and 

disseminated. Appellees, William Gardner and Edward Slish, were members of the 

association’s board of directors at that time. 

{¶ 3} As relevant here, ClarkDietrich’s defamation case proceeded to a 

lengthy jury trial. During that trial, ClarkDietrich settled its claims against each of 

the association’s member companies and offered to dismiss its remaining claims 

against the association with prejudice. The association’s board, however, voted to 

reject that offer, apparently in part due to concerns about related litigation that were 

not addressed by the offer. ClarkDietrich, satisfied that it had been vindicated by 

the settlements it had already reached, then filed a motion with the trial court to 

dismiss the case with prejudice. The association opposed this request and asked 

the trial court to deny the motion. The trial court granted the association’s request, 

denying ClarkDietrich’s motion and allowing the case to proceed. Eventually, in 

what can only be described as a “be careful what you wish for” turn of events, the 

jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of ClarkDietrich along with a $49.5 
January Term, 2020 

3

million judgment. The association was ultimately responsible for $43 million of 

that amount. 

{¶ 4} After the judgment was subsequently affirmed on appeal, 

Clarkwestern Dietrich Bldg. Sys., L.L.C. v. Certified Steel Stud Assn., Inc., 12th 

Dist. Butler No. CA2016-06-113, 2017-Ohio-2713, ClarkDietrich moved the trial 

court to appoint a receiver on behalf of the association so that the association could 

pursue potential breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims against the directors and could 

obtain the funds it needed, in whole or in part, to satisfy the considerable judgment. 

The trial court granted the motion and appellant, John J. Reister, was appointed as 

the receiver. 

{¶ 5} After his appointment as receiver, Reister filed this action against the 

association’s four directors, including Gardner and Slish, and designated 

ClarkDietrich as an interested party. The complaint alleged that the directors 

breached their fiduciary duties by mishandling the ClarkDietrich litigation and 

rejecting multiple opportunities to resolve the case at no cost to the association. 

Arguing that their actions were protected by the litigation privilege, Gardner and 

Slish each moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court agreed with 

Gardner and Slish and granted those motions. 

{¶ 6} On appeal, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 

court’s judgment. According to the Twelfth District, “[t]he actions taken and 

statements made by Gardner and Slish in the underlying matter [were] protected 

and provided immunity under the litigation privilege rule.” 2019-Ohio-4720, 149 

N.E.3d 112, ¶ 27. Like the trial court, the Twelfth District determined that the 

litigation privilege is broad and immunizes “ ‘actions’ as opposed to merely 

‘statements.’ ” Id. at ¶ 25. The Twelfth District accordingly reasoned that the rule 

is applicable to a corporate board of directors’ decision to forgo settling a case. Id.

at ¶ 26. Judge Stephen Powell dissented and observed that the litigation privilege 
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is narrower in scope than either the trial court or the majority had acknowledged. 

Id. at ¶ 37-42 (Powell, J., dissenting). 

{¶ 7} Following the Twelfth District’s split decision, Reister and 

ClarkDietrich separately appealed here and we accepted their appeals. See 158 

Ohio St.3d 1434, 2020-Ohio-877, 141 N.E.3d 242. 

II. ANALYSIS

{¶ 8} The central issue in this appeal is the proper scope of the litigation 

privilege in Ohio. The litigation privilege provides absolute immunity to parties, 

witnesses, lawyers, and judges from future lawsuits for statements made during and 

relevant to judicial proceedings. Erie Cty. Farmers’ Ins. Co. v. Crecelius, 122 Ohio 

St. 210, 171 N.E. 97 (1930), syllabus; Willitzer v. McCloud, 6 Ohio St.3d 447, 448-

449, 453 N.E.2d 693 (1983); Surace v. Wuliger, 25 Ohio St.3d 229, 495 N.E.2d 

939 (1986), syllabus; Hecht v. Levin, 66 Ohio St.3d 458, 460, 613 N.E.2d 585 

(1993). To be clear, it still does that. 

{¶ 9} Contrary to 90 years of precedent, however, the court of appeals 

applied the litigation privilege to actions rather than statements when it held that 

the litigation privilege shielded the business decisions of the corporate directors in 

this case. The court justified this departure from our precedent by looking to 

Florida law, see Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. 

United States Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606, 608 (Fla.1994), and importing concepts 

borrowed from the business-judgment rule. Specifically, the Twelfth District stated 

that it was “contrary to the purposes of the litigation privilege rule to second-guess 

the litigation strategy employed by the directors and the Association’s counsel” and 

that “[c]onsistent with the purposes of the litigation privilege rule, directors Slish 

and Gardner should be free to use their best judgment in defending the underlying 

lawsuit without fear of having to defend their action in a subsequent civil action for 

those decision[s].” 2019-Ohio-4720, 149 N.E.3d 112, at ¶ 29. 
January Term, 2020 

5

{¶ 10} We respectfully reject the determination by the court of appeals and 

clarify that in this case, Ohio law, not Florida law, controls and defines the contours 

of the litigation privilege. In doing so, we reaffirm our long-established rule that 

the litigation privilege provides absolute immunity from civil suits for defamatory 

statements made during and relevant to judicial proceedings. Willitzer at 448-449; 

Crecelius at syllabus. We further clarify that the business-judgment rule and the 

litigation privilege are, in fact, discrete concepts. 

{¶ 11} Because this case involves a Delaware corporation and litigation that 

took place in Ohio, we apply Ohio law to define the litigation privilege and we look 

to Delaware law to define the directors’ fiduciary duties and the business-judgment 

rule, see Gries Sports Ents., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., Inc., 26 Ohio 

St.3d 15, 20, 496 N.E.2d 959 (1986). Reviewing the pleadings in this case under 

the guiding principles established by the applicable law, we hold that judgment on 

the pleadings was improper. 

A. Distinguishing Between the Litigation Privilege 

and the Business-Judgment Rule

{¶ 12} The business-judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a 

business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 

faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 

company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.1984), overruled on other 

grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del.2000). It is a recognition that 

judges, with the benefit of hindsight, should not second-guess the numerous and 

difficult real-time choices that corporate officers and directors are faced with,

Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.1971), unless, of course, the 

presumption that the officers and directors acted in accordance with their fiduciary 

duties is rebutted, Aronson at 812. 

{¶ 13} The business-judgment rule is not unique to specific transactions and 

applies to any decision made pursuant to the directors’ authority under Delaware 
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 6

law. Zapata Corp. v. Moldanado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del.1981). Accordingly, the 

business-judgment rule may apply to the decisions that directors make in 

connection with litigation involving the corporation they serve. Id. (“managerial 

decision making power * * * encompasses decisions whether to initiate, or refrain 

from entering, litigation”). This necessarily means that the business-judgment rule 

may apply to decisions regarding the settlement of a lawsuit. See, e.g., White v. 

Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 552 (Del.2001) (“The decision to approve the settlement of a 

suit against the corporation is entitled to the same presumption of good faith as 

other business decisions taken by a disinterested, independent board”). 

{¶ 14} The litigation privilege, by contrast, is designed to protect “the 

integrity of the judicial process” by affording participants in litigation with 

immunity from future lawsuits over relevant statements made during judicial 

proceedings. Willitzer, 6 Ohio St.3d at 449, 453 N.E.2d 693. By removing the fear 

of future consequences, the litigation privilege facilitates the disclosure of 

“pertinent information” and helps to “ascertain the truth.” Id. The litigation 

privilege is therefore applicable to statements that bear “some reasonable relation 

to the judicial proceeding in which” they appear. Surace, 25 Ohio St.3d 229, 495 

N.E.2d 939, at syllabus. It is not applicable, however, to conduct that is simply 

connected in some way to litigation. Willitzer at 449-450 (concluding that the 

litigation privilege shielded a physician from liability arising from his testimony in 

judicial proceedings but not from claims arising from the manner in which he 

conducted examinations). Consequently, the litigation privilege has nothing to do 

with the decisions that corporate directors make during litigation.

{¶ 15} So, while the business-judgment rule may apply to the decisions that 

directors make during the course of litigation involving the corporation they serve 

(and there may even be additional statutory protections for those directors when 

their decisions are informed by the advice of counsel, see Del.Code Ann., Title 8, 

141(e)), the litigation privilege is entirely distinct. Again, the litigation privilege 
January Term, 2020 

7

protects participants in litigation from future suits over statements made during the 

litigation. The business-judgment rule, on the other hand, is a standard of review 

that affords deference to the decisions that informed and conflict-free directors 

make while managing the affairs of a corporation, including decisions regarding 

litigation. 

B. Judgment on the Pleadings Was Improper

{¶ 16} Having clarified that the litigation privilege protects statements, not 

actions, and is a concept separate from the business-judgment rule, we turn to the 

pleadings in this case and consider whether the decision to grant judgment on the 

pleadings was proper. 

{¶ 17} Our review of a judgment on the pleadings is de novo. New Riegel 

Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer Group Architecture & Eng., Inc.,157 

Ohio St.3d 164, 2019-Ohio-2851, 133 N.E.3d 482, ¶ 8. Dismissal is appropriate 

under Civ.R. 12(C) when (1) the court construes as true, and in favor of the 

nonmoving party, the material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from those allegations and (2) it appears beyond doubt that 

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief. State 

ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 

(1996). 

{¶ 18} The complaint in this case alleges that the directors owed the 

association certain fiduciary duties, that the directors breached those duties as a 

result of their handling of the litigation involving the association, and that the 

alleged breach of those duties damaged the association. The complaint specifically 

alleges that the directors were conflicted due to their positions as employees of 

other corporations that were competitors of ClarkDietrich and that the decisions 

that the directors made here were, as a result, irrational and not in the best interest 

of the association. In light of those alleged facts and others, the complaint goes on 

to allege that these decisions were not a valid exercise of business judgment. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

 8

{¶ 19} Considering the applicable standard of review and the fact that a 

litigant need only include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

party is entitled to relief,” Civ.R. 8(A), the complaint here was sufficient to state 

actionable claims against Gardner and Slish that should not have been dismissed. 

The litigation privilege does not change this, and, based on the pleadings, it is 

premature to say whether the business-judgment rule will apply here. Accordingly, 

judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate. 

C. Remand

{¶ 20} Given our resolution of the issues presented here, remand to the trial 

court is necessary. In light of the confusion below, we note that our decision is 

specific only to this stage of the proceedings. While we have clarified that the 

litigation privilege and the business-judgment rule are separate concepts and that 

judgment on the pleadings was improper at the time it was entered, nothing in our 

decision should be construed as passing judgment on the merits of this case or on 

whether the business-judgment rule will apply at later stages of these proceedings. 

That issue, the application of the business-judgment rule at those later stages, and 

the outcome of this case should be decided on remand. 

III. Conclusion

{¶ 21} For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the court 

of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, DEWINE, and DONNELLY, JJ., 

concur. 

STEWART, J., concurs in judgment only. 

_________________ 
January Term, 2020 

9

 Helmer, Martins, Rice & Popham Co., L.P.A., James B. Helmer Jr., Robert 

M. Rice, Jennifer L. Lambert, and B. Nathaniel Garrett; and Millikin & Fitton Law 

Firm, Steven A. Tooman, and Heather Sanderson Lewis, for appellant John J. 

Reister. 

 Frost Brown Todd, L.L.C., and Mathew C. Blickensderfer; and Cohen & 

Grigsby, P.C., Anthony M. Cillo, and Fridrikh V. Shrayber, for appellant 

ClarkWestern Dietrich Building Systems, L.L.C. 

 Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Brian S. Sullivan, Peter J. Georgiton, and Justin 

M. Burns; and Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams & Aughtry, Scott M. 

Ratchick, and John C. Guin, for appellee Edward R. Slish. 

 Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Daniel R. Warncke, and Aaron M. 

Herzig; and Fox Rothschild, L.L.P., Jeffrey M. Pollock, and Robert J. Rohrberger, 

for appellee William A. Gardner. 

 Squire Patton Boggs, L.L.P, Lauren S. Kuley, and Benjamin Beaton; and 

Kevin D. Shrimp, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Chamber of 

Commerce. 

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