IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

KENNETH N. THOMPSON, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) No. 1:12-cv-5020 

 ) 

v. ) 

 ) 

THE VILLAGE OF MONEE, ) 

JOHN CIPKAR, STEPHEN CRESCENTI, ) 

JAMES JONES, and MICHAL DRUMM, ) 

 ) 

Defendants. ) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge: 

 On June 25, 2012, Plaintiff Kenneth N. Thompson filed a lawsuit against Defendants 

Village of Monee, John Cipkar, Stephen Crescenti, James Jones, and Michael Drumm.1

 On 

February 27, 2014, Plaintiff Kenneth N. Thompson, brought a nine-count Fourth Amended 

Complaint against Defendants Village of Monee, individual Monee police officers, and Monee’s 

Chief of Police alleging deprivation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well 

as state law claims. (See R.120, ¶¶ 64-69 (Count III – Excessive Force); id., ¶¶ 70-77 (Count IV 

– Unreasonable Search and Seizure); id., ¶¶ 97-102 (Count VIII – Monell Claim); id., ¶¶ 70-77 

(Count IX – Statutory Indemnification)).2

 On June 17, 2015, the Court granted Defendants’ 

summary judgment on Counts III, IV and VIII, dismissed Count IX (R.210, 211), and entered 

judgment in favor of the Defendants (R.212). Defendants, as the prevailing party, now seek 

 1

 The Court dismissed additional Defendants and claims listed in Plaintiff’s originally filed 

complaint. See e.g., R.166, R.162, R.153, R.113. 

2

 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed with prejudice Counts I, II, V, VI, and VII of the Fourth 

Amended Complaint. (See R.162; R.166.) 
2 

$7,009.95 in costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1). (R.213, Bill.) For the 

reasons below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Rule 54(d)(1) provides that “costs other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the 

prevailing party.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1); see also Goldberg v. 401 N. Wabash Venture 

LLC, No. 09 C 6455, 2013 WL 4506071, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2013.) The list of recoverable 

costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, includes: (1) fees of the clerk and marshal, (2) fees for 

transcripts, (3) witness fees and expenses, (4) fees for copies of papers necessarily obtained for 

use in the case, (5) docket fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1923, and (6) compensation for courtappointed experts and interpreters. See U.S. Neurosurgical, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 572 F.3d 

325, 333 (7th Cir. 2009); Republic Tobacco Co. v. North Atl. Trading Co., Inc., 481 F.3d 442, 

447 (7th Cir. 2007). Rule 54(d)(1) “provides a presumption that the losing party will pay costs 

but grants the court discretion to direct otherwise.” Rivera v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 631, 634 

(7th Cir. 2006); see also U.S. Neurosurgical, 572 F.3d at 333. Taxing costs against the 

non-prevailing party requires two inquiries—whether the cost is recoverable and whether the 

amount assessed is reasonable. See Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 

(7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). District courts have considerable discretion in determining whether 

a particular costs is reasonable and necessary. See U.S. Neurological, 572 F.3d at 333. 

ANALYSIS 

Defendants seek costs for deposition transcripts, subpoena and witness fees, copies of 

state court records, and printing and photocopy costs that totals $7,009.95. (See generally, 

R.214.) Thompson does not provide specific arguments for any of Defendants’ categories of 

alleged incurred costs in regard to their reasonableness or necessity under the law. Instead, 
3 

Thompson makes a general objection to inclusion of five defendants who Thompson voluntarily 

dismissed with prejudice during the litigation. (See generally, R.216.)3

 Specifically, Thompson 

contends that it is error to include costs incurred by his voluntary dismissal of Defendants Chad 

Blake, Brent Cash, John Fowler, Anthony Lazzaroni, and Russel Caruso. (R.216, at 3.) In 

support of his position, Thompson references excerpts from his motions for voluntary dismissal 

stating “each party to bear their own costs and attorneys fees.” (See R.160, Motion for 

Voluntary Dismissal of Defendants Blake, Cash, Fowler, and Lazzaroni; R.162, Motion for 

Voluntary Dismissal of Defendant Caruso.) Thompson then provides a breakdown of 

Defendants’ submitted costs by pro rata shares, subtracting out each of the voluntarily dismissed 

Defendants’ pro rata shares from any expenses incurred after the respective date of dismissal. 

(See R.216-1.) Thompson’s argument for pro rata apportionment fails for at least two reasons. 

First, Thompson’s argument presumes that the voluntary dismissal of the Defendants in 

this case warrants a pro rata apportionment of the costs, yet he provides no explanation or 

evidence to support his method of apportionment as applied to this case. Thompson cites 

DeKalb Genetics Corp. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 2002 WL 31109373 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 

2002) (citing In re Air Crash Disaster, 687 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1982)) in alleged support of his 

position. Thompson’s reliance on DeKalb Genetics and In re Air Crash Disaster, however, is 

misplaced. In In re Air Crash Disaster, the Second Circuit stated that “[t]he costs awarded by 

the district court were not limited to allowable expenses incurred solely on behalf of the nonsettling plaintiffs but included expenses incurred on behalf of plaintiffs who agreed that Eastern 

would not be required to pay their costs.” 687 F.2d at 629. This differs from the situation that 

 3

 Thompson’s additional objections to the bill of costs based on his Rule 59(e) motion that 

requested reconsideration of the Court’s summary judgment ruling are considered moot as the Court 

denied Thompson’s Rule 59(e) motion. (See R.219.) 
4 

applies here because Defendants submitted memorandum and supporting exhibits demonstrating 

the costs incurred in litigation and Plaintiffs do not provide any explanation for how the costs 

and fees Defendants submitted relate to the individual Defendants voluntarily dismissed as 

opposed to those that remained in the litigation. See Hutchison v. Amateur Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 

F.3d 1037, 1048 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted) (“Counsel who oppose fees have a 

‘responsibility to state objections with particularity and clarity.’”) Indeed, Thompson’s 

spreadsheet exhibit does not provide any substantive explanation for how each cost relates to 

each Defendant, nor does it voice an objection that Defendants provided explanations are 

insufficient. Thompson’s spreadsheet merely presents the mathematical results from application 

of his pro rata apportionment method across the litigation timeline. Defendants respond that the 

Village incurred the enumerated costs in defense of Plaintiff’s claims, including Plaintiff’s 

Monell claim which was not limited to any particular Defendant. Indeed, as Defendants note, 

they relied on both Caruso and Lazzaronia in their summary judgment motion, despite the fact 

that Plaintiff had, at that time, voluntarily dismissed these two Defendants. This highlights the 

relevancy and necessity of each Defendant to the disputed issues in the case—regardless of 

whether they ultimately remained in the litigation or Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed them. 

Furthermore, Thompson relies on a truncated quotation from the Second Circuit in In re 

Air Crash Disaster, and asserts that the case stands for a proposition that it does not. According 

to Thompson, the district court in DeKalb Genetics explains the Second Circuit case, stating: 

In In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy International Airport on June 24, 

1975, 687 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1982), 36 individual plaintiffs went to trial and 

obtained a jury verdict in their favor against an airline arising out of an airplane 

crash. After the trial, but before the clerk taxed costs, 17 of the 36 plaintiffs 

settled with the airline but stipulated that the settlement was “without costs.” In 

awarding costs to the remaining 19 plaintiffs, the airline asked the district court to 

make a pro rata reduction for those plaintiffs who had settled. The district court 

disagreed and awarded costs to all of the 36 plaintiffs who had gone to trial. On 
5 

appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding it was error for the court to include in 

its award of costs those expenses incurred on behalf of both the non-settling and 

settling plaintiffs. See id. at 629. This makes perfect sense ... 

(R.216, at 2 (citing DeKalb Genetics, 2002 WL 31109373, at *1).) As Thompson presents the 

case, the discussion ends there, however, the DeKalb Genetics court continues: 

“... This makes perfect sense but is beside the point in this case. Here, there is no 

doubt that [the defendant] incurred all of the costs included in its consolidated Bill 

of Costs, and that those costs were reasonable and necessary for the [two cases]. 

To make a pro rata reduction of the costs as [the plaintiff] suggests would deny 

[the defendant] the costs that it undeniably incurred in the [two] cases ... It is 

entitled to the full amount of its costs in those cases.” 

DeKalb Genetics, 2002 WL 31109373, at *1. Defendants argue the same reasoning the DeKalb 

Genetics court used applies here.4

 The Court agrees. Defendants have submitted a supporting 

memorandum with exhibits—billing statements, invoices, and receipts—listing the costs they 

incurred over the course of this litigation and explaining that the inclusion of a Monell claim 

opens up the universe of relevant information beyond any specific Defendant. Plaintiff, on the 

other hand, does not provide any explanation for the reasonable basis of its pro rata 

apportionment and the Court, in its discretion, finds a pro rata share in this case would be 

unreasonable and therefore, denies to reduce Defendants’ costs in that manner. 

Second, Thompson relies, not on the Court’s order dismissing the certain Defendants, but 

on the language in his motion’s request for relief. (See R.216, at 3 (citing R.160, R.164).) 

Indeed, neither of the Court’s orders upon which Thompson relies echo the language of 

Thompson’s motions. (See R.162; R.166.) The Court’s orders state: “Defendants Chad Blake, 

Brent Cash, John Fowler and Anthony Lazzaroni and Counts five, six and seven are dismissed 

with prejudice” (R.162) and “Defendant Russell Caruso ... [is] dismissed with prejudice” 

 4

 Defendant mentions in a footnote that DeKalb Genetics declined to follow In re Air Crash 

Disaster “for reasons not relevant here”, but does not provide any explanation or analysis as to what those 

reasons are and how they are not relevant. (See R.216, at 2, n. 1.) 
6 

(R.166). Thompson submitted the second motion as an “Agreed Voluntary Dismissal of 

Defendant Russell Caruso.” (R.164.) To categorically deny the costs that “shall be allowed as 

of course to the prevailing party unless the district court otherwise directs”, based on the 

language in Thompson’s motions alone would be improper. Indeed, Rule 54(d), creates a 

presumption that prevailing parties will recover their costs. Migon v. Thorek Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 

No. 86 C 5280, 1991 WL 10679, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 1991) (Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August,

450 U.S. 346, 351 (1981); Congregation of the Holy Passion of Touche, Ross & Co, 854 F.2d 

219, 221–22 (7th Cir. 1988)). The Court’s order dismissed the certain Defendants with prejudice 

and the Seventh Circuit has found that under such circumstances, a prevailing party is entitled to 

costs. See Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1076–77 (7th Cir. 1987) 

(holding that after voluntary dismissed, defendants were the prevailing party for purpose of Rule 

54(d)); see also First Commodity Traders, Inc. v. Heinold Commodities, 766 F.2d 1007, 1015 

(7th Cir. 1985) (following voluntary dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim without prejudice, 

defendant was prevailing party entitled to costs). See also, Migon, 1991 WL 10679, at *1 

(“[p]laintiffs’ dismissal of their claim with prejudice, does not preclude an award of costs to the 

defendants”). The situation is different, however, for the agreed voluntary dismissal of 

Defendant Caruso. Defendants do not respond to Thompson’s assertion that the language of the 

motion reflects an intention to forgo all costs and fees related to the voluntarily dismissed 

Defendant and instead focus on the inapplicability of the pro rata apportionment. Indeed, of all 

the Defendants voluntarily dismissed from the case, Caruso is the only one for which Defendants 

have a separate cost listed—list of deponents showing “Russel Caruso” deposed on “11.24.14.” 

(R.214, at 3.) No categorical charges are listed for the remaining voluntarily dismissed 

Defendants, and even if they were, the parties—namely Defendants—did not agree to the motion 
7 

and its requested relief. Based on the parties’ agreement in voluntary dismissal of Caruso “with 

each party to bear their own costs and attorneys fees”, the Court reduces Defendants’ deponent 

cost by $172.50—the amount for Mr. Caruso’s deposition. (See R.214, at 3.) 

Because Plaintiff does not provide any additional arguments or objections to any of the 

specific categories of expenses or associated costs beyond his general objection to inclusion of 

costs for the dismissed Defendants addressed above, the Court treats the remaining categories 

and expenses as unchallenged. See Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 864 

(7th Cir. 2005) (“There is a presumption that the prevailing party will recover costs, and the 

losing party bears the burden of an affirmative showing that taxed costs are not appropriate”); 

see also Kurgan v. Chiro One Wellness Ctrs. LLC, No. 10-CV-1899, 2015 WL 1850599, at *4 

(N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2015) (finding that where no objection to reasonableness is made, a court is 

justified in adopting rates as requested). Accordingly, the Court awards Defendants all requested 

fees—minus the cost of the Caruso deposition, totaling $6,837.45. 

CONCLUSION

 For the forgoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion 

and awards costs in the amount of $6,837.45 to Defendants. 

 

DATED: January 12, 2016 ENTERED 

 _________________________________ 

 AMY J. ST. EVE 

 United States District Court Judge