At nearly the same time, a section of LAV-ATs (Anti-Tank variants), equipped with TOW

missiles, was moving to the south in order to reinforce the engaged security element. The lead

vehicle commanded by Sergeant Brian Siebert, observed a T-72 moving south on the opposite

side of the river. Sergeant Siebert took aim with his thermal sight and destroyed the tank with a

single TOW shot. The tank erupted in a huge fireball that continued to grow as the ammo inside

cooked off. The AT section immediately stowed their turrets and continued south along the road

as they continued to search for enemy across the Diyala. Suddenly, an F- 14 Tomcat appeared

overhead and flew right over the LAV section. First Lieutenant Cameron Albin, the platoon

leader, took notice of the aircraft and inquired if the FiST was controlling CAS. The answer

came back negative, and Major Nash tried desperately to contact the Tomcat's pilot. It appeared

that the aircraft was posturing for an attack on friendly positions, and the jet aircraft roared by

another time. Suddenly a tremendous explosion erupted directly between the two LAy-AT s,

obscuring them from the rest of the company. Luckily, the vehicles had been traveling along a

raised road with a berm off to the right side. The Navy F-14 had dropped a 500-pound bomb

directly in between the vehicles, but on the other side of the berm. The section escaped with

only a minor injury to Sergeant Siebert, who and immediately called back to the company

alerting them of the incident and advising everyone to display their air panels. Major Nash

finally reached a section of Marine F/A-i 8Ds on the TAD net and instructed them to announce

on the emergency 'guard' frequency that a fratricide incident had just occurred between ist LAR

and an F-i4. The Navy Tomcat disappeared and never returned.

Other units in RCT-5 also saw action that day. At first light, the battery advance parties of

2/11, led by the battalion survey section and with a platoon from Charlie Company, i/5, moved

through the "hornet's nest" to prepare PAs near Hatif Haiyawi. The party started to take fire

from a date grove to the west of their positions. Hearing the small arms fire, the platoon from

Charlie Company reoriented and engaged a BMP-2 as well as dismounted infantry threatening

the artillery position areas. The security platoon requested artillery support to engage the Iraqis.

The 2/11 forward CP received the call for fire, and issued a fire order to 5/11 to engage the BMP

and dismounts that were only 800 meters away. Once the artillery started falling, an AT-4 was

used to destroy the BMP and the resistance was quickly mopped up.

As would be the case for the next five days, most units on the east side of the Diyala

received sporadic mortar and artillery fire in and around their positions. The enemy indirect fire

was inaccurate, and Marines quickly assumed a degree of nonchalance on hearing the sound of

explosions. In fact, Marines were more likely to jump at the sound of the Division's own guns,

as 1 ith Marines attacked enemy firing units located by counter-battery radar with a vengeance.

Sometimes, however, the Iraqi cannoneers and mortarmen got lucky:

On 5 April, the Corpsmen in the Field Train were called into action when two mortar rounds

impacted, injuring two Marines. Chief Kelly Richardson was treating Lance Corporal Frederick

Evans for shrapnel wounds to his foot and leg when Lance Corporal Evans began to go into

shock. Chief Richardson maintained his composure and provided some comforting words to the

wounded Marine: "I'll see you at the next Marine Corps Ball. You '11 be easy to spot because

you 'ii have all the ribbons and you '11 be surrounded by all the women." Lance Corporal Evans

and the other wounded Marine were successfully treated and evacuated.

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Preparing to Enter the City

In the southern portion of the zone,

RCT-7 had a number of actions

ongoing. Its main effort was

reconnoitering the two crossing sites

for the fight into Baghdad. Third

Battalion, 4th Marines was in the lead,

and cleared in zone to the southeastern

outskirts of Baghdad. The Fedeyeen

fighters continued to use ambush

techniques against the Marines'

advance. The Battalion continued to

prosecute detected targets with CAS.

The air officer for 3/4 got some 'nonroutine' close air support while calling

Selection of maneuver objectives was made easier because of in on some vehicles across the river. A

the preparatoly planning the Division had done in Kuwait. B-52 had just checked in to support the

advance, and was pushed to the India

Company FAC. The India FAC took control of 'Diecast 32' (the B-52) and set up a Mk-82

string. The total preparation time from check in of aircraft to ready for drop was approximately

17 minutes, and the B-52 dropped 17 Mk-82s on target.

The ironies abounded in an aged platform built for a

now-defunct strategic mission dropping modern

weapons in support of an infantry company's close

fight. Later that day, 3/4 was able to use the battalion's

Dragon Eye UAV to reconnoiter forward to the two

bridges crossing the Diyala in RCT-7's zone. Both

bridges were, surprisingly, still intact. Lieutenant

Colonel McCoy briefly considered pushing forward to

seize the bridges there and then, but the RCT had been

given a limit of advance short of the canal.

Additionally, Bravo Company, 1st Tanks (attached to

3/4) came upon a compound with many high-tech

machines covered in tarps and sandbags located

outside. Suspicious of having discovered a WMD

sensitive site, the attached infantry platoon cleared the

compound. The research facility was completely

abandoned, but had a large number of computers and

precision machines. The battalion focused on securing

this site, and had its hands full clearing out enemy Marines from f'Platoon, India Company, resistance on the east bank of the river. It was late in 3' Battalion, 4113 Marines clear the town of

the day, and attacking across the Diyala would have to Az Za'Faraniyah in preparation for

be left until the next morning, seizing the southern Diyala bridge.

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Salman Pak

The remainder of RCT-7 continued to conduct operations along Highway 6 to search out and

destroy enemy resistance and ammunition caches. South of Highway 6 was an isolated

peninsula formed by a bend of the Tigris River. The Regime had long used this peninsula, near

the town of Salman Pak, to conduct a variety of activities in an isolated setting. There had been

reports a few days earlier of a large concentration of Saddam Fedeyeen at the Salman Pak

military facility. Lieutenant Colonel Mike Belcher's 3/7 was tasked to conduct a raid on the

facility in order to eliminate the threat to the Division's southern flank. The facility housed a

terrorist training camp, the II Republican Guard Forces Corps (RGFC) Headquarters, and a

presidential palace. The battalion commander's plan called for India Company to secure the

training camp and headquarters, while Lima Company secured the palace. Kilo Company would

provide the reserve and Tanks would provide a blocking position to the north. Two combined

teams of operatives from other US clandestine forces would support the Battalion's attack and

intelligence collection efforts.

Because of the potential to catch a large number of enemy fighters in this cul-de-sac, 3/7's

timeline was accelerated by five hours. The attack that was planned and briefed for 1 800Z now

had to commence no later than 1300Z due to the rapidly developing situation. Major Mike

Samarov, the 3/7 Operations Officer, quickly contacted each of the battalion's elements to adjust

the attack. Departing on the new timetable, Third platoon from Delta Company, 3d LAR

Battalion, encountered a significant enemy ambush by well-entrenched Iraqi paramilitary

soldiers. The Marines defeated the ambush through a combination of suppressive fires and

maneuver. Several LAVs became mired in the muddy Tigris terrain, but were able to extract

themselves while under enemy fire.

By 1430Z, with the battalion poised to

strike, they were informed that the preplanned unguided air strikes were

cancelled. It was decided to strike the

lengthy target list with artillery and

observed CAS only, keeping effects of

unguided fires as far as possible from the

critical sites to be exploited for their

intelligence value. Working feverishly

during a 30-minute artillery preparation

fire, the Battalion Fire Support

Coordinator, Captain Daniel Schmitt, and

the Air Officer, Captain David "Digger"

Kulik, assembled six fixed wing and one Marines detonate an arms cache containing Iraqi

landmines and artillery ammunition. rotary wing section from the available

close air support stack. Briefing desired

munitions points of impact in rapid succession, the FiST addressed all necessary targets to

support the Battalion's scheme of maneuver. Supporting the efforts of the Battalion FiST cell,

Captain Philip "PB" Smith and Major William "Wagon Burner" Dunn, forward air controllers

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for Companies India and Lima respectively, controlled fixed and rotary wing aviation on

additional key targets. Captain Smith recounts:

"After the Hornets dropped their JDAMs, I had them run multiple passes with rockets. Good

thing they came loaded with rocket pods, because it enabled us to hit targets of opportunity

without the collateral damage to the surrounding buildings. It also afforded them a real good

look at what we were about to go into, and I had a veiy comfortable feeling that we had

destroyed everything that moved."

An enemy surface to air missile battery fired at the Cobras during one strike on their

objective. The AH-1W helicopters pulled back and the artillery forward observer for Company

L, First Lieutenant Walter Maessen, called in a battalion concentration of artillery. Once again,

the effects of combined arms were devastating to the Iraqi defenders. The efficacy of surface

fires, air fires, and maneuver all working together was repeatedly demonstrated, as the enemy

SAM battery was knocked out and the cobras returned to the fight, unhindered by the anti-air

threat.

The battalion's first elements broke through the compound gates at 1720Z that night.

Mechanical difficulties hindered Lima's advance, but they eventually completed the attack. By

2000Z they secured the presidential palace. Little more than an hour later, the suspected terrorist

training camp and headquarters were secured. Buses, trains, scuba equipment, and even an

airplane mockup confirmed the area as a terrorist training camp. Intelligence exploitation of the

sites was conducted, while the battalion concluded operations to secure remaining objectives.

By 0300Z the next morning, 3/7 reported all objectives secure. Even though the reported enemy

force had disappeared before the attack, the uncovering of the terrorist camp and a significant

amount of Regime documentation marked the operation as a resounding success. Intelligence

exploitation teams used trucks to haul away the voluminous documentation uncovered.

Division Shaping Efforts

Pushing fires across to the west side of the Diyala River, the Division worked to reduce the

risk to RCT-7 in a shaping effort against Regime forces in the Rasheed military complex. The

Rasheed area had been a suspected chemical weapons storage site, and was known to house a

number of Regime helicopters at its airfield. Division Fires and the 11th Marines took it as their

special mission to reduce this pocket of capability, and to eliminate the threat potentially posed

by a Regime helicopter loaded with chemical munitions. From both the Division Forward and

then the Division Main CPs, Division drove B-52, F/A-18, AH-1W, DPICM, and HE artillery

missions against the enemy equipment and facilities observed at the airfield and scattered

throughout the huge Rasheed military complex. The shaping fires were ultimately effective, and

the Rasheed complex offered little resistance when uncovered two days later.

In an economy of force measure, the Division detached 2d LAR Battalion from RCT- 1, and

assigned it the security mission for the critical 150 km stretch of Highway 6 back to An

Numaniyah and the Tigris River crossing. The fact that Barbarian was able to cover such an

extended battlespace was testimony to the agility and flexibility of an LAV mounted unit.

Imposing their will on lingering fighters all along this route, they also built trust and endeared

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themselves to the Iraqi population along the highway. During the accomplishment of this

mission, Barbarian was to reduce the number of Regime holdouts along Highway 6, and

intercept a number of terrorist bombers who had been enroute to southern Iraq.

The Division Main CP

was established along

Highway 6, just to the east

of the Diyala Crossroads.

The personnel of the Main

immediately regretted this

choice of CP locations, as it

was in the middle of a

slaughterhouse-rendering

field. The blowing dust

and dirt were mixed with

animal hair and skin; and

the ground was littered with

animal bones. The

environment motivated the

Marines in the Division CP

to bring swift support to the Murals of Saddam were on nearly every street corner in Baghdad. The attack, as it would get them local Iraqis had defaced most of these prior to the arrival of the Marines.

out of there quickly! The

shaping and counterbattery fires went on for many hours. From the field, the Division watched

the effects of the Division shaping fires first-hand. On those clear nights, the steady glow of the

western horizon showed the way to Baghdad.

On the Division's far eastern flank, the Reconnaissance Battalion maintained a blocking

position near the intersection of Highway 6 and Highway 27 oriented toward Al Kut. Only two

days prior, the Reconnaissance Battalion had blocked the Baghdad Division from the south.

Now, they had the same mission, only oriented a different direction, ensuring no threat to the

Division's rear along Highway 6. The 200-km jaunt in-between was already receding into

memory. By now, the Marines of the Reconnaissance Battalion had their fill of Al Kut, and were

eager to get back to the fight at the front of the Division. Their efforts as an economy of force

mission here, however, permitted the Division's flow of combat power forward. Having bought

time for the Division to close Baghdad with its main assault elements, the battalion sent Alpha

and Bravo companies west to link up with the Division Main CP near the Diyala River in

anticipation of additional tasking.

The Division's push up Highway 6 continued to stress extended LOCs. The Hantush

Highway Airstrip was the nearest KC- 130 capable strip and the transfer point for much-needed

supplies. The Hantush FARP was workable but required a 150 km round trip that included two

crossings of the Tigris to support the Division movement into the suburbs of Baghdad. I MEF

was busy establishing An Numaniyah Airfield as a logistics node but it was not yet fully

operational. The Division had outraced the supporting logistics effort, and as a result, CSSG-1 1

had to reach back to 'pull' support forward. In one instance, 1 1th Marines downloaded their own

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logistics trains and made the drive south to retrieve critically needed artillery ammunition when

it could not be pushed to them. In another instance, CSSG-1 1 searched unsuccessfully for

MREs, ammunition, and repair parts. The G-4 made repeated requests to forego establishment

of intermediate support nodes in order to push support as far forward as possible, but the support

plan continued on its established timetable unaltered. The Division continued to live on 'pulllogistics.'

Assessing the situation, both CSSG- 11 and 3d MAW responded magnificently to support the

Division. On 4 April, CSSG-1 1 established a hasty Rapid Refueling Point near Sarabadi Airfield

to provide fuel, food, and ammunition. Located along the Division's route of march on Highway

6, it provided easy access and ample storage space for the CSSG. For their part, the MAW

evaluated the landing strips at both Sarabadi and Salman Pak East — an airstrip 10 km closer to

Baghdad. The Wing chose to use Salman Pak East Airfield as their FARP site, and the MWSG

rapidly closed in and expanded the field's capabilities in short order. These two sites satisfied the

differing needs of elements of the MAGTF, and together greatly increased the support to the

Division.

6 April

To the Banks of the Diyala

RCT-1 arrived along the Diyala eastern corridor and conducted a RIP with RCT-5 at the

'Dead General's Crossroads'. RCT-1 had made its original 200 km march from Highway 7 to

An Numaniyah in 24 hours. They had made a second arduous march of 120 km from An

Numaniyah to the Diyala crossroads. After covering all that distance, RCT-1 was eager to get

back into the fight, and began planning for its own assault crossing of the Diyala. The RCT took

its new battlespace south of RCT-5, and assumed responsibility for the cordon along the eastern

side of the Diyala River, north of RCT-7. This move set the Division up for its planned course

of action in Baghdad. RCT-7 and RCT-1 were poised to attack into Baghdad from the south and

east, while RCT-5 had been relieved of its battlespace in the east so it could force a crossing

further north and enter the city from the northeast. The entire Division was now in position for

the coordinated attack into Baghdad.

As the Division worked to establish its cordon around the city, the Marines continued to

provide extensive counterbattery fires against Iraqi artillery firing from within the open areas of

the city (stadiums, racetracks, roadways, military complexes) often co-located near

noncombatants. In order to minimize collateral damage to noncombatants and civilian

infrastructure, many of the radar-acquired targets were passed exclusively to aviation for

engagement with precision munitions using the 'quickfire' procedures the Division had practiced

back in Camp Pendleton. All targets were vetted with high-resolution imagery to check for

potential collateral damage prior to conducting counterfire missions. Artillery targets became

fewer and fewer as the Marines gained fires dominance over any would-be Iraqi indirect fire

capability, and infantry units overran enemy firing positions.

RCT-5 continued its exhaustive reconnaissance along the banks of the Diyala north of the

existing bridges, but found no viable alternatives, except for the Highway Bridge at Baqubah, 50

km to the north. Even the promising site found the previous day by 1st LAR Battalion proved

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unsupportable. The difficulty was not the river itself, but the miserable terrain on both sides of

it. The area along the Diyala River was very muddy, and was crossed with drainage ditches,

canals, and muddy fields. Individual small vehicles in small numbers could make their way to

the river's edge using the network of muddy canal roads, but any larger vehicles would not make

it. The bridging could be done, but building a road to service the bridge on both sides of the

river would eliminate it as a timely option. The maneuver elements might get across, but the

RCT commander did not want to get stranded on the far side of the river with no combat trains or

logistics support in what could be a logistically intensive fight. Using the existing bridge in

Baqubah would require a round trip distance detour of over 100 km, and would depend on

securing the bridge intact. It appeared as if RCT-5 would have to use one of the bridges in the

south to get across the Diyala.

The Division began to focus intently on the two southern bridges over the Diyala, as these

appeared to offer the only intact crossing points into the city. Both bridges were in RCT-7's

zone, and 3/4 continued their reconnaissance in force along the eastern banks of the river. The

resistance in the suburban area on the nearside approaches to both bridges would prove

significant.

Scoping the Diyala Bridges

The town of Az Zafaraniyah was the scene of intensive small arms and RPG fire against the

advancing Marines of 3/4. Initially the movement was clear, as CAAT 1 and Kilo Company

moved along the road on the southwestern side of the town. With Kilo in place to provide

After the Fedeyeen defenders were driven out, Iraqi citizens welcome the Marines.

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overwatch, India Company moved up, dismounted, and began a limited clearing operation in the

urban area. It was then that the paramilitary forces in the town initiated their ambush. Numerous

RPGs flew at the Marines, but no one suffered a direct hit. The intense exchange of fire lasted

for some time, until a well-aimed tank main gun round into the building sheltering the enemy

fighters turned the tide. By pushing into the town approximately three blocks on the flanks of the

route, India established a buffer zone between urban threats and the road.

As the battalion secured the east side of the canal just short of the bridge, enemy infantry and

mortars were sighted across the river, and gunfire was exchanged across the canal. The

battalion's Dragon Eye UAV was used to confirm an intelligence report of possible damage to

the southern bridge, allowing the battalion's Obstacle Clearing Detachment (OCD) to conduct a

more detailed assessment. They found that both of the Diyala bridges had been damaged

overnight. The Iraqis had taken advantage of the brief respite, attempting to destroy the two

existing bridges, successfully damaging both. The Division would now have to conduct an

amphibious assault across the river and build its own bridges for follow-on forces.

The Dragon Eye UA Vprovided a view of the damaged Southern Bridge over the Diyala River.

As Marines assessed the damage sustained at the southernmost Diyala Bridge, Lieutenant

Colonel McCoy decided to move to the river and view the bridge himself He needed to assess if

the gap created by the Iraqi's demolition attempts was narrow enough to support the use of an

Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB) attached to Bravo Company. Throughout the day,

the battalion had received intense but inaccurate AK-47 and RPG fire from across the river.

Advancing alone towards the bank of the river, Lieutenant Colonel McCoy quickly began his

assessment of the gap and ran through the capabilities he had to address the problem. As he

waited in the prone he was surprised to look towards the river to find a French photographer in

bright civilian clothes right next to him taking his picture. Initially perturbed about having

visitors in civilian clothes drawing fire towards his position, he revised his assessment when he

realized that the photographer was between him and the incoming fires. After that, the

photographer's bright clothes were a welcome addition to the Diyala River landscape as the

commander conducted his leader's reconnaissance.

Later that afternoon, the Division engineer was sent forward to assess the supportability of a

Division crossing. The Iraqis had made an attempt to destroy both of the bridges crossing the

Diyala Canal. The engineers discovered that the southern bridge had an entire span blown out.

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The bridge was damaged beyond repair, and the damage was too wide to span with an AVLB.

At the northern site, the Iraqis had blown a hole in the far span of the bridge, and the entire

western end of the bridge was sagging. It would require a detailed engineer assessment, but

neither crossing looked good. With the engineer reconnaissance that RCT-5 had conducted also

coming up empty, the Division had gone from three planned crossings to zero in 24 hours. The

Division had crossed oceans and deserts to get to Iraq, had come nearly 500 km into fraq over

two 'big name' rivers, and was now challenged by a ribbon of water that most barely knew the

name of.

After being in a heightened chemical defensive posture since before crossing the LD three

weeks prior, the Division directed all elements to transition to MOPP Level 0 on 6 April. For the

first time in three weeks, Marines would be able to wear something other than their now filthy

MOPP suits.

Lieutenant Colonel Chris

Conlin's 1/7 moved into a

suspected sensitive site about 8 km

southeast of Baghdad, the

Tuwaitha nuclear facility. It was

completely unoccupied and had

been partially looted, but was

obviously extremely important to

the Regime. The facility was

encircled by sixty-foot high berms,

with bunkers evenly spaced,

surrounding the facility. Tuwaitha

was the site of the Iraqi atomic

energy facility. UN weapons

inspectors had recently inspected

the site and there was some An abandoned Iraqi T-72 hidden under the palm trees near the

residual concern about exposure to Diyala River.

chemical agents and radiation. The

battalion's NBC officer, Chief Warrant Officer Carl Hinson, ran a series of tests to determine

that all levels were normal. Elements of 1/7 stayed in the facility overnight waiting for the order

to move north. The battalion was relieved of the facility in the morning by Marines from the

Combat Engineer Battalion.

A Nighttime Assessment of the Diyala Footbridge

In the dark, 3/4 tasked Kilo Company with clearing and supporting the southern bridge

approaches. Luckily, there was a damaged footbridge next to the main bridge, that the engineers

of Charlie Company, ls Combat Engineer Battalion decided could be used with some

improvisation. Second Lieutenant Daniel Francis and Sergeant Mauricio Guevaracano led the

engineer platoon attached to 3/4. As the Marines approached the river, the enemy began fiercely

defending the bridges with a high volume of machine gun, RPG, mortar, and artillery fires.

Sergeant Guevaracano's squad was one of the first units at the bridge, and they immediately

285
established fighting positions and returned fire. Upon securing the near bank, Sergeant

Guevaracano organized a small bridge reconnaissance team and moved out onto the footbridge

to conduct a night reconnaissance. With no cover and being highlighted by flares, he carefully

gathered as much information as possible on the bridges before returning to his defensive

position. He discovered that the 20-foot gap in the footbridge could be covered with improvised

materials from the riverbank. This would allow dismounted infantry to cross the river at the

southern bridge site.

Abandoned Iraqi surface-to-air-missiles were found throughout the battlespace. The poor

condition of most of these weapons made them unusable.

Crossing dismounted infantry was one thing, but the RCT staff huddled to plan how to

project the rest of the RCT's combat capability across the Diyala. RCT-7 had been reinforced

with two Bridge Companies, and the engineers assisted in developing a plan that would get the

most combat power across the river quickly. It was decided that 1st Tanks would conduct a feint

at the northern bridge site, located seven km up-river from the southern bridge. Engineers would

conduct an explosive breach of a mine field that lay at the base of the bridge, and the Tank

Battalion would drive an AVLB forward to span the damaged section. Meanwhile, 3/4 would

continue to flow dismounted forces across the southern footbridge, while the engineers

constructed a ribbon bridge a few hundred meters to the north. Once armor crossed the ribbon

bridge to reinforce the dismounted Marines, a more permanent Medium Girder Bridge (MGB)

would be built over the southern bridge's damaged span. To enable the emplacement of the

MGB, 3/4 would conduct an amphibious assault crossing to seize the far bank. LD was set for

0300Z, 7 April. RCT-7 would be conducting the first combat assault crossing operation in this

fight.

Intelligence from multiple sources indicated the enemy was trying to concentrate

reinforcements and indirect fire assets opposite RCT-Ts planned crossing points. To support

Colonel Hummer's attack, Colonel John Toolan of RCT-1 proposed a supporting attack that

included an assault crossing of the Diyala on RCT-7's northern flank. Newly arrived, short on

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food, but full of motivation, RCT- 1 would use their AAV's to swim across. They would thrust

into the city on the northern flank and draw pressure off the Division's main effort, RCT-7. The

Division CG quickly approved the plan.

In for a Penny

The Division expanded its planning for the operation in Baghdad. If there was to be an

assault river crossing operation into the City, then there no longer appeared to be a severable line

between establishing a cordon and maneuvering forces into the city. The CG tasked the G-2

with coming up with the objectives for a Division attack into the city, and the G-2 produced a list

of 27 Regime targets, gleaned from the lists of SSE sites, Regime strongpoints, government

offices, media centers, and recent intelligence reporting. Securing each of these sites would

demonstrate the Coalition's intent to disarm the Regime and liberate the populace. In

preparation for the attack, map packages on these 27 targets were printed and disseminated. If

the Division was going into the city, it would at least be going in with a sense of what it needed

to accomplish. A large number of these objectives were located in the Rasheed military complex

just over the river from RCT-7. As a 'middle ground' between establishing the cordon and

actually securing eastern Baghdad, seizing the Rasheed complex could be considered part of an

outer cordon that offered a superb launch platform for continued attacks or raids into the city.

The Division established objectives in the Rasheed complex for the initial attack by RCT-7 in the

south, and defined the perimeter road around the complex as a limit of advance. Forcing the

door open a crack at Rasheed would allow the rest of the Division to flow through and complete

the cordon. The Division effected boundary adjustments to afford all 3 RCTs battlespace east of

the Diyala so that they could effectively employ indirect fires in the coming assault.

The Division's flanks were secured by the LAR battalions, with 3d LAR Battalion screening

the northeastern flank of the Division battlespace to protect against counterattacks by remnants

of the Al Nida Division. Third LAR conducted a RIP with RCT- 1, enabling the RCT to continue

the attack into Baghdad with all of its combat power. The Wolfpack zone now extended for

nearly 30 km, as it established its screen to the east. The Battalion continued to screen to the east

until ordered to join Task Force Tripoli on 12 April. Second LAR Battalion continued to provide

LOC security from An Numaniyah to the Diyala crossroads, aggressively keeping the MSR open

for transportation of critically needed supplies.

Far to the south and east, members of the Division were fighting another battle against the

terrain. On 3 April, four M1A1 tanks and one M88 tank retriever had become mired in the muck

on the south bank of the Tigris across from Al Aziziyah. Two tanks had pulled into what they

thought was an open field to set in for the night. When they went to move the next morning,

they found themselves mired in mud, completely unable to move. The M88 retriever sent in to

pull them out suffered the same fate. A third M1A1 was a mobility kill due to enemy fire and

the last inoperable due to transmission failure. RCT-5 had evacuated the crews, passed grids for

recovery to CSSC-115, and moved up Highway 6 to continue to press the enemy. Major Greg

Frich, the Division Ordnance Readiness Officer, led a recovery team and security force to the

site on 6 April. By the time they arrived, the tanks and retriever that were stuck in the field had

slowly sunk to the level of their turrets, and the mobility kill tank had been pushed off the road

into the Tigris. Master Sergeant Mike Hamlett, Staff Sergeant Shane Perry, and Staff Sergeant

Kevin Jones drew on years of experience to solve the problem. Trees felled from the

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surrounding area were laid across the field to support the CSSB-1O retrievers. Sergeant Michael

Zutz and Corporal Jesse Pogodzinski used excavators to clear away dirt and build earthen ramps

for additional support. The light enemy activity in the northwest tree line was quickly resolved

with some medium machinegun fire. The first retriever attached a cable to the tank while the

second retriever attached a cable to the first in daisy chain fashion. As the first retriever began to

sink pulling out the tank, the second pulled it out. At the end of the first day, the first M1A1 was

successfully extracted. Using tow bars on the South River Road, the team returned to the

security of Captain Erich Krumrei's 8th ESB perimeter near the Pearl 3 crossing at An

Numaniyah. The second and third days would see the same operation — starting well before first

light, continuing through the day, and returning 45 miles to the secure perimeter at night — under

the watchful eyes of the security team led by Sergeant William Roper from CSSB-1O's MP

detachment. In five days, the 16-Marine team salvaged all four M1A1s and the M88 that had

been reported as unrecoverable. Even the Mesopotamian marshes that had denied attacking

armies for millennia could not stand up to the resourcefulness and stubbornness of the United

States Marines.

Recovering these M-88 and M1A1s from the unforgiving Iraqi muck

south of the Tigris proved a tremendous challenge.

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