The Tripoli CG held another meeting with local tribal leaders in order to facilitate the

restoration of local security and the resumption of services. These meetings were to continue on

a daily basis to both highlight Tripoli's requests for assistance in establishing a local

government, and to build rapport with the leaders. There were a large number of tribal leaders,

and the Task Force assembled lists of the names, cross-checking them with the list of wanted

Iraqi war criminals. Several rival tribal leaders accused each other of having intelligence

contacts in the old Regime or of hiding Regime officials, and the HET teams aggressively

worked to exploit this internal friction to gain information on the whereabouts of Regime figures

who remained at large. The CG established a Tribal Council, assisted by the local professionals

who had come forward to offer assistance in restoring electricity and water services to the city.

One of the first orders of

business was the disestablishment of

vigilante checkpoints. The Sheikhs

had returned from the meeting the

day before, and had instructed their

people to set up independent

checkpoints outside and out of sight

of the Marine checkpoints. The

stated intent of these checkpoints

was to keep non-locals from looting

the homes of local residents, but

these unauthorized checkpoints took

on a more sinister form. That

morning, while traveling south along

Highway 1, HET 11, under Warrant

Officer Shawn Dunn, discovered

four hasty checkpoints, each manned A Marine Human Exploitation Team disbands a vigilante

by approximately 40 individuals. A checkpoint.

zigzag pattern of broken furniture

and garbage was set at each point, and the men manning the point were armed with clubs, metal

rods, and specially constructed batons with rubber tips designed for body beatings. At one

checkpoint, a burned out car was located fifty feet from the zigzag and the men were in the

process of smashing the windshield of a car stopped in the center. An elderly couple was

cowering in the car. Without hesitation, the five members of the HET waded into the much

larger crowd. The HET team stopped the attack, seized the weapons, and interrogated the

attackers. At this checkpoint, and at each subsequent point, the ringleaders were former

policemen claiming that they had received orders to establish the points by the tribal leaders at

the behest of the Americans (this order was never given). Local vigilantes stated they had

established these checkpoints for local security against looters and to prevent people coming

from out of town to steal from their homes. Despite vigorous denials to the contrary, the thugs

manning the checkpoints appeared to be stealing goods from the cars that passed through. The

checkpoints were broken apart and the men were ordered to disperse.

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These vigilante checkpoints were indicative of the lawlessness and fear that characterized

much of Iraq in the interval between the end of the Baath regime and the restoration of law and

order. In the period immediately following the liberation of Tikrit, the city police force had

ceased to function, as officers changed into civilian clothes and fled into the countryside. The

Task Force received numerous reports of reprisal killings and beatings from local citizens.

Difficulties in re-starting the electrical plant left the area in darkness, facilitating looting and the

activities of former regime paramilitary forces. Responding to the general lawlessness,

Lieutenant Colonel White, CO of 1st LAR Battalion, began the creation of a civilian police

organization to help restore order. Because many former police officers had committed human

rights violations during the previous regime, 1st LAR set up a careful screening process for new

police recruits. Within 24 hours of the initial meeting, the first traffic police recruits were on the

streets, standing at checkpoints alongside the Marines. Expanding this small force into a larger,

better-trained organization would fall to the relieving force once Tripoli departed.

While patrolling and escorting tribal

leaders on the east side of the Tigris River,

members of the Task Force command

element were approached by agitated

locals who stated that "Kurds" had

murdered someone just up the road. When

the patrol element reached the incident

site, they discovered a small sedan taxi

with numerous bullet holes in the

windshield. The passenger was dead with

wet blood on his face, and the driver was

bleeding from glass fragment wounds.

The distraught driver stated that four

Kurds in a white pickup truck had attacked

The international media was everywhere in Tikrit. them. The Task Force Command element

conducted a high-speed pursuit of the

reported vehicle, but was unable to catch up to it. As the patrol moved past another intersection,

another dead body was observed on the side of the road to the northeast. It was clear that to the

east of the Tigris, the breakdown of law and order was having a chaotic effect. The Task Force

continued to find examples of lawlessness throughout the countryside. Despite the local practice

of blaming any disruptive activity on 'Kurds', most of the violence appeared to be perpetrated by

the locals themselves. The breakdown of law in the countryside made it possible for locals to

engage in the revenge killings, tribal disputes, and vendettas that were much a part of the local

culture. Local civilians with pickup trucks were observed raiding a food warehouse and a grain

storage facility. Although the local leaders continued to vehemently blame this behavior on

outsiders and 'Kurds', this did not appear to be the case. A few of the more trustworthy tribal

leaders accompanying the patrol confirmed this assessment. Restoring law and order to the

Iraqis was going to be a challenge.

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Second LAR continued with its operations on the northern side of town. One of the

Battalion's primary objectives was the massive Al Sahra air base on the northwest side of Tikrit.

When 'Barbarian' moved to clear

this compound, they discovered

vast revetment fields full of

abandoned equipment. After

scattering the ineffectual

resistance in the area, they also

discovered large warehouses

containing everything from intact

new (2002) French Roland

missiles, to new Russian-made

aerial cluster bombs. The

Battalion reported the equipment,

destroyed what they could, and

documented the rest. Full

clearing of this compound would

require weeks of effort. Al Sabra

was one of the facilities passed

The excesses of Saddam palaces shocked many Marines, down to the relieving force when

they arrived.

17 April

The Shadow Regime

There was never a dull moment on security in Tikrit. The locals responded well to the

confident but non-aggressive posture of the Marines:

The Marines of Platoon (Red Platoon), Company A (Apache Company) had the

responsibility of establishing and operating an entry control point (ECP) on the northern

main service road leading into Tikrit. Sergeant Timothy L. Williams, Mojave Valley, Arizona

(Fort Mojave Indian Tribe) was the man on the scene. "The first few vehicles through the

ECP were kind of hostile," recalled the sergeant, "but once they got used to us they were all

pretty friendly." As the Marines conducted vehicle searches, Sergeant Williams noted that the

occupants of the vehicles began to help them by teaching his Marines the Iraqi translations

for trunk, hood, door, and other terms that would help his Marines in their mission. "The

locals hospitality flowed the longer we were there." "They brought us pita bread, fresh eggs,

and veggies." The Iraqis became so comfortable with Sergeant Williams and his Marines that

when asked if they had weapons, would lift up their 'man dresses' and show the blushing

Marines that they were not in fact armed.

More disturbing than the overt violence and lawlessness were the unambiguous signs

gathered by the Task Force indicating the presence of a 'Shadow Regime' in the greater Tikrit

area. The old power elite remained active in the areas that Marines were not physically present.

The Shadow Regime no longer had governance over the population, but clearly still retained the

levers of power in the countryside. Thirty years of brutal dictatorship had left the Iraqi people

incapable of independent actions in the absence of specific government direction and approval,

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and they retained a viscera! fear of the former Regime. Organized anti-US/Coalition meetings

were being held in outlying areas and secluded parts of the city. At these meetings, the former

Regime members and Baathists organized a campaign to threaten the local populace with death if

they cooperated with the efforts of the Marines. The 'Shadow Regime' was not a monolithic and

centrally controlled opposition force, but instead was a loosely organized threat from former

regime power brokers, coordinated primarily by a similar desire to return to their days in power.

These men still wielded significant control over the local populace through fear and intimidation,

and operated at the fringes of the areas under the Marine's control.

The Shadow Regime recognized its own inability to exercise military power against US

forces, and had adjusted its tactics to work against the populace behind the scenes. By doing so,

it sought to quietly undermine US efforts without provoking a military response. The Shadow

Regime posed a direct and present threat to the stability and the success of any future

government. The actions and tactics observed by Task Force Tripoli would prove a reliable

forecast of the actions of the last Regime holdouts, and a large number of other parties vying for

power in the post-Saddam government.

The contribution of the Task Force's two HET teams continued to be a significant force

multiplier. These Marines were seemingly everywhere, exploiting sources on the bridge,

breaking up vigilante roadblocks, investigating local authority figures, and tracking down former

Regime members who were part of the Shadow Regime that was working at cross purposes with

the Task Force. The HET teams of Lieutenant Nathan Boaz and Warrant Officer Shawn Dunn

were among the most important elements of the task force. These Marines worked tirelessly,

often in dangerous situations, to serve as a go-between for the Task Force CG and the locals.

Locals help identify areas where the Shadow Regime remained in controL

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367
18 April

The 'Attack' to Bayji

General Kelly congratulates the newly appointed Police Chief in BayjL

Shadow Regime members not withstanding, the situation in Tikrit increasingly became more

stable. Capitalizing on the developing relationship with Fahran Al-Sudaid, a sheikh whose tribe

included the areas north of Tikrit, Brigadier General Kelly coordinated a meeting with the tribal

leaders of Bayji, a town approximately 40 km north of Tikrit. The arrangement, coordinated

with Captain Connable's assistance, would help return the greater Tikrit area to a state of relative

normalcy. There had been, as yet, no US forces entering the Bayji urban area. Demonstrating

extreme trust in the relationship he had established with Fahran Al-Sudaid, the CG dictated that

only a single LAR company accompany him, his staff, and Mr. Al-Sudaid to the center of Bayji.

The 'diplomatic' mission to Bayji was successful in all regards. No contact with hostile

forces occurred (although a roadside arms bazaar was broken up by the Tripoli staff along the

way) and a broad range of local leaders and citizenry attended the town meeting held in the

center of the city. After delivering a liberation speech with the assistance of Al-Sudaid and

Gunnery Sergeant Camille Hamadani from HET 11, Brigadier General Kelly approved the

establishment of a locally elected council and police chief The Task Force staff set

communications and contact procedures with the council. Bayji was liberated with smiles and

handshakes instead of with preparatory fires and tank main gun fire.

In addition to bringing Bayji under Task Force control, significant steps were taken to reduce

former Regime presence in Tikrit and restore services to the populace. From the second day in

Tikrit, the Marines of CSSC-Tripoli were purifying 20,000 gallons of sweet water from the

Tigris River daily, and distributing it at five locations in the city. Major Estepp (CAG) continued

368
to work closely with tribal leaders to coordinate the restoration of electrical power, moving two

large cranes into the city from an outlying Kurdish area to assist in the repair of downed lines.

After the local leadership had failed to do so, the Task Force CG ordered all images of Saddam

Hussein in the town destroyed. Before initiating this action, however, he insisted that the local

leadership request assistance in destroying the images. The local leadership had hesitated to take

the initiative upon themselves out of fear that Saddam or his remaining local henchmen would

return and deal

harshly with them.

They had come to

trust the Marines,

however, and now

asked for their help.

To keep this from

becoming a mad

exercise in vandalism,

the CG assigned the

task specifically to 1st

LAR Battalion, who

began what would

become an ongoing

and labor-intensive

task with the

assistance of EOD,

CSSC, and HET

Marines. Marines conducted a turnover with the US Army, introducing the local

leadership to the Army officers.

19-21 April

Relief in Tikrit

Task Force Tripoli was soon to be relieved by elements of the US Army's 4th Infantry

Division. The lead elements of this Division began to arrive in Tikrit on the 19th, and were given

a thorough orientation to the peaceful situation in town, and the continuing exercise in selfgovernance being worked with local leaders. This advance party gained an appreciation for the

peaceful situation, and was pleased to take the word to their higher headquarters. The follow-on

staff of the US 4' Infantry Division had a different perspective on the situation. The US 4th ID

had missed the combat phase of OIF, and were determined to have a share in the 'fighting'.

They characterized their recent road march to Tikrit (in trace of the Marines) as an 'attack', and

remained convinced that the situation in Tikrit required a very stern military enforcement

posture. The dichotomy between the two peacekeeping strategies was unsettling for the Marines,

and many winced when Army Apache attack helicopters swooped in to the Division battlespace

without coordination, and began to strafe seemingly indiscriminately on abandoned enemy armor

directly between, and in close proximity to, 2d and 3d LAR's positions. Fortunately, they missed

the LAVs. The Marine foot patrols, without flak vests and in soft covers, were replaced with

menacing and physically destructive M1A2's and Bradley fighting vehicles on the streets. Stores

369
that had reopened quickly closed back up as the people once again evacuated the streets,

adjusting to the new security tactics. A budding cooperative environment between the citizens

and American forces was quickly snuffed out. The new adversarial relationship would become a

major source of trouble in the coming months.

On 19 April, Brigadier

General Kelly and members of

his staff conducted a final

meeting with Fahran Al-Sudaid

in order to further the ongoing

working relationship and attempt

a turnover with incoming 4th

Infantry Division officers. At the

invitation of Mr. Al-Sudaid,

Kurdish and Arab tribal leaders

from north of Bayji to the border

areas with Syria and Turkey

attended the combination

meeting and traditional feast in

order to initiate diplomatic

contact with the Coalition. The

design was to use this

The MEF Commander addressed the Marines in Tikrit and informs opportunity to pass down

them of the end offull-scale combat operations, relationships based on trust and

mutual respect for each other's

agendas that had begun to

blossom between tribal leaders and the Marines. Here was a tremendous opportunity to secure

the peaceful cooperation of the northern Iraqi tribes. The meeting was successfully concluded,

with plans for future contact with the northern tribes established. The meeting might have been

even more productive had senior officers from 4th Infantry Division been willing to attend.

Third LAR had already been relieved of its battlespace in Tikrit, and sent back down to

Samarra on 17 April. Wolfpack had relieved RCT 5 in Samarra, allowing the RCT to return to

assume stabilization missions to the south in Ad Diwaniyah and As Samawah. Wolfpack

resumed their former zone and watched as the peaceful Samarra countryside returned to normal.

The peace was shattered on 19 April, as the US 4th Infantry Division attacked past their positions

and deep into Tripoli's battle space. Wolfpack hunkered down at the sound of chain guns and

.50 caliber machineguns, trying to avoid becoming friendly fire casualties. Apache attack

helicopters were roving up and down the highway destroying military equipment, reopening

military actions in an area that had been peacefully secured. Citizens who had been rejoicing in

their new-found freedom were sent back, cowering in fear at this unexplained change in

American tactics.

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On this day, the Division CG's intentions message recorded the following lessons learned:

A critical lesson emerging in our handoff with V Corps is the mission essential

requirement for dismounted infantry in civil-military ops. As we hand off our portion of

Baghdad as well as the city of Tikrit, the lack ofArmy dismounts is creating a void in personal

contact and public perception of our civil-military ops. Our forces need to project confidence

in the security environment we have created. That is best exemplIed in light, mobile force in

contact with the local citizenry, sans helmets and flak jackets where appropriate, and without

armored vehicles. If we cannot engender friendship and confidence in the local security

environment, we cannot set the conditions for good order integral to a return to civil control.

Future force structure analysis groups must recognize this imperative prior to cutting infantry

from our Table of Organization. Mattis sends.

These words would prove prophetic, as later incidents in other parts of Iraq would

demonstrate that a standoffish, overbearing occupation force would serve to alienate rather than

endear the local populace. The individual discipline and overall numbers of dismounted Marine

infantry proved well suited to the duties of both controlling and supporting a newly liberated

people. Throughout Blue Diamond's zone, tanks and AAVs were rapidly withdrawn from use as

firm and friendly Marines shifted to truck-borne and dismounted patrols.

Despite some misgivings about the danger posed to the peaceful civilians by the differing

philosophies of the two American units, Task Force Tripoli carried out the relief in place with

the US Army 4th Infantry Division from 19-21 April. The Task Force elements began to move

south by echelon on 19 April as the Division Main CP displaced from Baghdad to Ad

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