IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-10562

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

WELLIE ELISHA WOODSON,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:08-CR-100-1

Before WIENER, STEWART, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

After Defendant-Appellant Wellie Elisha Woodson admitted violating

conditions of his supervised release, the district court sentenced Woodson to two

consecutive 18-month terms of imprisonment, for a total of 36 months, to be

followed by two concurrent 24-month terms of supervised release. Woodson

claims that his above-guidelines revocation sentence is substantively

unreasonable because it represents a clear error of judgment in balancing the

sentencing factors.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 24, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 11-10562

To preserve the issue, Woodson asserts that revocation sentences should

be reviewed for “reasonableness.” In fact, we review revocation sentences under

18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4)’s “plainly unreasonable” standard. United States v.

Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 496 (2011). Under

this standard, we first consider “whether the district court procedurally erred

before we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed

under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In

reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we “take into account the totality of

the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines

range . . . but must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the [18

U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall,

552 U.S. at 51.

Woodson asserts that he was sentenced to three years in prison for twice

using marijuana, making an insufficient effort to find a job, falling behind on

restitution, missing four counseling sessions, and skipping one urine test.

Woodson claims that his three year sentence is (1) considerably higher than the

terms of imprisonment imposed for his original, more serious crimes of

conviction, bank robbery and using a firearm during that crime; (2) considerably

higher than the advisory guidelines range for his violations of supervised

release; and (3) the type of sentence a person in criminal history category I could

have received at original sentencing for offenses such as, inter alia, involuntary

manslaughter, aggravated assault involving the discharge of a firearm and

bodily injury, and distribution of 80 kilograms of marijuana. He also contends

thatthis sentence ignores important mitigating information, such ashis “success

on supervised release for more than a year before his last revocation, a fact that

surely predicts a higher chance of successful reintegration to society,” and “his

serious efforts to find employment, even well below his experience level, before

his revocation.”

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No. 11-10562

These arguments ignore that Woodson admitted that he violated the

conditions of his second chance at supervised release by twice testing positive for

the use of marijuana, skipping drug testing and treatment sessions, quitting his

job and failing to submit job search logs as instructed by his probation officer,

failing to make restitution payments, and failing to contact his probation officer

as instructed after failing his drug test. The district court considered that this

was Woodson’s second failed attempt at supervised release and that his 18

months in prison following his first revocation did not serve as a “wake-up call”

to Woodson. Because Woodson’s conduct violated specific conditions of his

release for a second time under supervision, the severity of his conduct compared

to that of others not in his position is of no moment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). 

Similarly, his comparison of his second revocation sentence to original sentences

for other crimes is misplaced. See Miller, 634 F.3d at 843. The district court

considered the advisory guidelines range suggested by the relevant policy

statements, which it rejected because it did not believe that the range

adequately addressed the § 3553(a) factors it should consider under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e)(3).

None of Woodson’s arguments shows that the district court abused its 

discretion in its consideration of the relevant sentencing factors. In light of all

of the circumstances and the due deference owed to the district court, we hold

that the sentence imposed is not substantively unreasonable. See Gall, 552 U.S.

at 51. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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