[PUBLISH] 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 12-15164

_____________

D. C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-22293-UU

MELVIN GUALBERTO MEDINA MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CARNIVAL CORPORATION,

a.k.a. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.,

 Defendant-Appellee.

______________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

______________

(February 24, 2014)

Before MARCUS, DUBINA, and WALKER,* Circuit Judges.

DUBINA, Circuit Judge:

 

*

Honorable John Walker, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit Court of 

Appeals, sitting by designation.

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Appellant Melvin Gualberto Medina Martinez (“Martinez”) appeals the 

district court’s order compelling arbitration of his claims pursuant to the 

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 

(“CREFAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208. Martinez argues his claim of Jones Act 

negligence, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, does not fall within his employment contract 

(“Seafarer’s Agreement”) with Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. (“Carnival”) and, 

therefore, is not within the scope of the contract’s arbitration clause. We agree 

with the district court that arbitration is required, and therefore, we affirm the 

district court’s order compelling arbitration.

I.

Martinez is a Honduran citizen who suffered a back injury while employed 

as a mason aboard Carnival’s vessel, the Fascination. Martinez worked ten hours 

per day, seven days a week, and was required to lift and transport boxes of tiles 

and cement and heavy rolls of carpet. During his employment, Martinez 

developed back pain, which he reported to his supervisor. After his condition 

worsened, and he began to feel pain not only in his back but also in his lower 

extremities, Martinez sought further medical care.

 Martinez had back surgery in Panama, performed by Carnival’s selected 

physician, Dr. Avelino Gutierrez. After the surgery, Martinez continued to 

experience serious orthopedic and neurological problems, including numbness in 

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both legs, difficulty urinating, need for a catheter, sexual dysfunction, and 

psychological problems. Carnival sent Martinez to Miami, where he continued to 

receive medical treatment.

The Seafarer’s Agreement, which covered the terms of Martinez’s 

employment, included an arbitration clause stating that, except for wage disputes, 

“any and all disputes arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, including 

any question regarding its existence, validity, or termination, or Seafarer’s service 

on the vessel, shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration.” [R. DE 1-1 

at 6, ¶ 7.] 

After his injury, Martinez filed suit against Carnival in Florida state court, 

asserting claims of Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and failure to provide 

adequate maintenance and cure. In his Jones Act claim, Martinez alleged that the 

physician chosen and paid by Carnival negligently performed his back surgery. 

Carnival removed the case to the federal district court and filed a motion to compel 

arbitration. The district court granted the motion, dismissed as moot all other 

pending motions, and closed the case for administrative purposes. Martinez then 

timely appealed. 

II.

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“We review the district court’s interpretation of [an] arbitration clause 

de novo.” Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 

F.3d 1351, 1366 (11th Cir. 2008).

III.

As we must, we first address our jurisdiction to hear this case. 

Carnival contends that we lack jurisdiction because the district court’s order 

compelling arbitration was a non-appealable interlocutory order, not a final 

appealable decision. We are unpersuaded.

The Federal Arbitration Act provides that a party may appeal “a final 

decision with respect to an arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). A final 

decision “is a decision that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves 

nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Green Tree Fin. 

Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86, 121 S. Ct. 513, 519 (2000) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Yet, a party may not appeal “an 

interlocutory order . . . compelling arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(3).1

 Thus, 

a district court order compelling arbitration and dismissing a plaintiff’s 

claim is a final decision within the meaning of § 16(a)(3). Hill v. Rent-A-

 

1 Though Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which includes 9 U.S.C. § 16, does 

not directly apply to this case, see id. § 1 (“[N]othing herein contained shall apply to contracts of 

employment of seamen . . . .”), the jurisdictional issue is evaluated under the framework of 9 

U.S.C. § 16 because the CREFAA incorporates the provisions of Chapter 1 that do not conflict 

with it. Id. § 208. 

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Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2005). In contrast, a district 

court order compelling arbitration and staying the proceedings before the 

court is an interlocutory order that cannot be appealed. Am. Express Fin. 

Advisors, Inc. v. Makarewicz, 122 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1997). Carnival 

essentially argues that because the district court simply granted the motion to 

compel and closed the case for administrative purposes, but did not dismiss 

the case, its order was more akin to a stay of the proceedings; thus, the 

district court’s decision was an interlocutory order that may not be appealed 

under § 16(b)(3).

The Supreme Court has adopted a functional test for finality, 

examining what the district court has done, and has reiterated that a decision 

is final if it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court 

to do but execute the judgment.” Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension 

Fund of the Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs & Participating Emp’rs, ___ 

U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 773, 779 (2014); Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 86, 121 S. Ct. 

at 519; Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S. Ct. 631, 633 (1945). 

Our court has applied the same test for finality, see, e.g., W.R. Huff Asset 

Mgmt. Co. v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., 566 F.3d 979, 984 (11th Cir. 

2009); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983), 

and looks to the practical effect of the district court’s order, not to its form. 

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See Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 594 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 

2010) (“In making [§ 1291 finality] determinations, ‘we take a functional 

approach, looking not to the form of the district court’s order, but to its 

actual effect.’” (quoting Birmingham Fire Fighters Ass’n 117 v. Jefferson 

Cnty., 280 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2002)). In Young v. Prudential 

Insurance Co. of America, 671 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2012), looking to the 

substance of the district court’s order, we held that it was not final even 

though it dismissed the case on the merits because the order had remanded 

part of the case, but “in substance,” left unresolved whether the plaintiff was 

entitled to relief. Id. at 1215.

The pertinent question we address in this case is not whether the 

district court’s administrative closure is the functional equivalent of a 

dismissal, but rather, whether the district court’s order, on the record before 

us, ended the litigation on the merits and left nothing more for the district 

court to do but execute the judgment. The district court granted Carnival’s 

motion to compel, dismissed as moot all other motions, and administratively 

closed the case. Notably, the district court’s order did not stay the 

proceedings, nor did it contemplate any further action on this case. 

Although the district court did not dismiss the case, the court’s order left all 

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further merits determinations to the arbitrator.2 Thus, the order effectively 

“end[ed] the litigation on the merits and [left] nothing more for the [district] 

court to do but execute the judgment.” Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 86, 89, 121 

S. Ct. at 519, 521 (internal quotation marks omitted) (determining that an 

order of the district court compelling the parties to arbitrate and dismissing 

all the claims before it was a final and appealable decision). 

We acknowledge that administratively closing a case is not the same 

as dismissing a case. See Fla. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Bush, 246 

F.3d 1296, 1298 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (stating that a “closed” case 

does not prevent the district court from reactivating a case). Moreover, an 

administrative closure is not dispositive of finality. However, our focus is 

not on the district court’s label, but rather, on the effect of the district court’s 

order. See Thomas, 594 F.3d at 829. When the district court compels 

arbitration and disposes of all pending motions, it leaves the court with 

nothing more to decide, and it effectively and functionally has issued a 

decision that “ends the litigation on the merits.” Ray Haluch, ___ U.S. at 

___, 134 S. Ct. at 779.

 

2 Indeed, both parties conceded at oral argument that there were no other issues for the 

district court to resolve after it compelled arbitration.

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In a prior case, we addressed the finality of an administratively closed 

case. See Brandon, Jones, Sandall, Zeide, Kohn, Chalal & Musso, P.A. v. 

MedPartners, Inc., 312 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), abrogated 

by Ray Haluch, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 773. In Brandon, we determined 

that the district court order was not final even though it administratively 

closed the case because the district court explicitly retained jurisdiction to 

award attorneys’ fees. Id. at 1355. The district court in Brandon, unlike 

the district court in the present case, acknowledged that it still had other 

matters to resolve. Id. at 1353. Our court even noted that in most cases 

when a district court “rule[s] on all the relief requested,” and “close[s]” the 

case in its order, “that conduct would lead us to conclude that the order was 

final.” Id. at 1354. Thus, even under the analysis utilized in Brandon, the 

district court order in the present case would be final because it disposed of 

all pending motions and did not retain jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration 

award or to award attorneys’ fees associated with the arbitration. See also

Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Bright Metal Specialties, Inc., 251 F.3d 1316, 

1321 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[G]enerally speaking, a decision of the district court 

is final when it disposes of all the issues framed by the litigation and leaves 

nothing for the district court to do but execute the judgment.”).

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The slight distinction between an administratively closed case and a 

dismissed case does not resolve the question of finality. What matters is 

whether the case, in all practicality, is finished. In this case, the district 

court not only administratively closed the case, but it also denied all pending 

motions as moot and compelled arbitration. The district court’s order was a 

functionally final and appealable decision because it left nothing more for 

the court to do but execute the judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that the

order compelling Martinez to arbitrate his claims was “a final decision with 

respect to an arbitration,” and we have appellate jurisdiction. 9 U.S.C. § 

16(a)(3). See also Montero v. Carnival Corp., 523 F. App’x 623, 625 (11th 

Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that the district court order compelling 

arbitration was a final appealable decision even though the order closed 

rather than dismissed the case).

IV.

Martinez argues the district court erred in compelling arbitration 

because the Seafarer’s Agreement terminated before this dispute arose.

 The termination provision of the Seafarer’s Agreement between 

Martinez and Carnival states, in relevant part:

This Agreement shall automatically terminate without notice 

immediately upon Seafarer’s unscheduled disembarkation of the 

assigned vessel if Seafarer disembarks the vessel for any reason, 

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including but not limited to unscheduled personal leave, illness or 

injury, for more than one full voyage. This Agreement shall also 

terminate without notice immediately upon Seafarer being unfit or 

unable to serve in his or her stated position at the commencement of a 

new voyage.

[R. 4-1 ¶ 2.] Under this language, the Seafarer’s Agreement terminated 

when Martinez disembarked from the cruise ship to seek treatment for his 

back injury which was preventing him from doing his job.

The Seafarer’s Agreement’s arbitration clause does not expressly state 

whether it survives the termination of the Seafarer’s Agreement, but its 

unambiguous language suggests viability. The provision states in relevant 

part:

Except for a wage dispute governed by [Carnival]’s Wage Grievance 

Policy and Procedure, any and all disputes arising out of or in 

connection with this Agreement, including any question regarding its 

existence, validity, or termination, or Seafarer’s service on the vessel, 

shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration . . . .

[R. 4-1 ¶ 7.] Clearly, the parties contemplated some circumstances in which 

the arbitration clause would survive the termination of the Seafarer’s 

Agreement.

“[P]arties can agree to arbitrate ‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’

such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their 

agreement covers a particular controversy.” Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. 

Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, ___, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010). Thus, a court may 

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conclude that the parties agreed to arbitrate the very issue of “arbitrability” 

where “there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so.” Id. at 

___, 130 S. Ct. at 2783 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because parties 

can agree to arbitrate the very question of arbitrabililty, they can also agree 

to arbitrate disputes about contract termination. In this case, the district 

court did not err in refusing to determine whether the Agreement had 

terminated because the question of termination has remained in dispute and 

the “clear and unmistakable” language of the contract indicates that the 

parties intended for just such a dispute to be decided by arbitration and not 

the court. See id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2783.

3

Martinez also argues that even if the arbitration provision survives the 

termination of the agreement, his claim for medical negligence falls outside 

the scope of the arbitration clause in his employment contract because it did 

not arise under the Seafarer’s Agreement. He asserts that the language 

requiring arbitration pursuant to the Agreement does not include claims that 

arise from shoreside medical negligence.

 

3 Martinez also contends Carnival is equitably estopped from enforcing the arbitration 

provision because Carnival took the inconsistent position of treating the Seafarer’s Agreement as 

terminated when it stopped paying his wages but as not terminated for the purpose of arbitrating 

his claim. Martinez is incorrect. Carnival’s assertion that the arbitration provision survives 

termination of the Seafarer’s Agreement is not inconsistent with treating the Seafarer’s 

Agreement as terminated. Thus, equitable estoppel does not apply. See Sea Byte, Inc. v. Hudson 

Marine Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 565 F.3d 1293, 1304 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that equitable estoppel 

applies only when a party adopts a position that is contrary to an earlier position). 

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There is a “federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes.” 

Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, ___, 130 S. Ct. 

2847, 2857 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). When parties agree 

to arbitrate some matters pursuant to an arbitration clause, the “law’s 

permissive policies in respect to arbitration counsel that any doubts 

concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of 

arbitration.” Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2857 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Courts apply the presumption of arbitrability “only where a 

validly formed and enforceable arbitration agreement is ambiguous about 

whether it covers the dispute at hand,” and “where the presumption is not 

rebutted.” Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2858–59. 

In determining whether a dispute arises out of a contract, “the focus is 

on whether the tort or breach in question was an immediate, foreseeable 

result of the performance of contractual duties.” Doe v. Princess Cruise 

Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1218 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In Doe, we held that claims arising under the Jones Act “are 

dependent on [the plaintiff’s] status as a seaman employed by the cruise line 

and the rights that [the plaintiff] derives from that employment status.” Id. at 

1221. See also O’Boyle v. United States, 993 F.2d 211, 213 (11th Cir. 1993) 

(“[I]n order to recover damages under the Jones Act, [a plaintiff] must have 

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the status of a seaman.”). Although the Jones Act dictates Carnival’s duty of 

care, that duty extends to Martinez only because he was employed by 

Carnival as a seaman under the contract. In addition, the terms of the 

Agreement, which specifically reference Carnival’s obligation to provide 

medical treatment aboard the vessel or ashore, contemplated that Carnival 

would provide shoreside medical care for injuries Martinez sustained while 

on the job. Accordingly, we conclude that Martinez’s dispute with Carnival 

clearly arose out of or in connection with the Seafarer’s Agreement and is 

subject to arbitration.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order 

compelling arbitration.

AFFIRMED.

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