IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DARNELL COOPER,

Plaintiff,

v.

KARYN MORGAN et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 12-cv-5625

Judge Edmond E. Chang

Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim

PLAINTIFF DARNELL COOPER’S 

OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS’

LOCAL RULE 56.1(a)(3) STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff Darnell Cooper (“Plaintiff”) hereby answers, objects, and otherwise responds to 

Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement of Facts as follows:

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 1:

Darnell Cooper, Inmate No. N71947, is an inmate at Stateville Correctional 

Center and has been since May 26, 2011, serving a 35 year sentence given in 2010. Exhibit “A,” 

Deposition of Darnell Cooper, p. 6-8.

RESPONSE NO. 1: 

Undisputed. 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 2:

Darnell Cooper is not trained as a certified medical technician, a nurse or a 

physician. Ex. A, pp. 13-14.

RESPONSE NO. 2: Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 2 as unsupported by the cited record. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). Otherwise, undisputed. 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 1 of 34 PageID #:1720
2

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 3:

Mr. Cooper is on several medications that affect his memory related to his 

diagnosis of depression schizophrenia. Ex. A, p. 129, 132.

RESPONSE NO. 3: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 3 as unsupported by the cited 

record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). The portions of Plaintiff’s testimony 

cited in Paragraph 3 indicate only that Plaintiff is currently on medications, and that he 

had been diagnosed with depression and schizophrenia. Plaintiff later testified that he 

thinks one of these medications may affect his memory, but that he is not sure. (Cooper 

Dep.1 130:2-8.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 4:

Mr. Cooper would defer to the healthcare providers as to whether his burn was 

healing or getting better. Ex. A, pp. 58-62, 100.

RESPONSE NO. 4: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 4 as unsupported by the cited 

record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). With respect to the facts stated in 

Paragraph 4, the portions of the record cited in Paragraph 4 indicate only that Plaintiff 

could not tell whether the burn on his back was healing during the period between his 

encounter with Nurse Headlee on June 22, 2011 and June 30, 2011, and would therefore 

defer to a medical provider to make that specific determination. (Cooper Dep. 60:19-62:4.) 

Plaintiff’s testimony on page 100 of the record cited in Paragraph 4 addressed whether he 

knew the state of his burn as of the date of his deposition, and includes no reference to a 

health care provider. (Cooper Dep. 100:12-24.)

 1 “Cooper Dep.” refers to the transcript of the July 15, 2015 deposition of Plaintiff Darnell Cooper, located at 

Docket No. 169. 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 2 of 34 PageID #:1720
3

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 5:

Mr. Cooper did not know how to treat a burn in June or July 2011. Ex. A, pp. 

141-42.

RESPONSE NO. 5: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 5 as unsupported by the cited 

record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). The portion of Plaintiff’s testimony 

cited in Paragraph 5 indicates that he knew that the proper treatment of a burn included 

the provision of pain medication and consultation with a doctor, but did not know 

specifically what additional treatment the doctor would provide for the burn. (Cooper 

Dep. 142:5-8 (“Q. You didn’t know how to treat a burn at all as of June and July of 2011, 

correct? A. I knew I needed pain medication to remedy the pain and to see the doctor.”).)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 6:

Mr. Cooper never went to try to go to the commissary to get Ibuprofen or Tylenol 

for the pain. Ex. A, p. 120.

RESPONSE NO. 6: Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 6 as unsupported by the cited record. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). The portion of Plaintiff’s testimony cited in 

Paragraph 6 does not reference whether plaintiff tried or did not try to go to the 

commissary. (Cooper Dep. 120:1-24.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 7:

Mr. Cooper had no other contact with the defendants after July 2, 2011. Ex. A, p. 

72.

RESPONSE NO. 7: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 7 as unsupported by the cited 

record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). The portion of Plaintiff’s testimony 

cited in Paragraph 7 indicates only that he does not remember whether he had any 

interactions with any of the Defendants related to his burns or this lawsuit, but that he may

have interacted with them at some point after July 2, 2011. (Cooper Dep. 72:4-23.)

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 3 of 34 PageID #:1720
4

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 8:

Nurse Morgan was employed as a licensed registered nurse by Wexford, working 

at Stateville, from March 2011 to March 2012. Ex. B, Transcript from Karyn Morgan, RN’s 

discovery deposition, pp. 12, 17-18.

RESPONSE NO. 8: Undisputed. 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 9:

Nurse Morgan does not have any handwritten progress notes in Mr. Cooper’s 

chart, other than one time Mr. Cooper refused medication pass on January 2, 2012 and one 

administration of Risperdal on July 1, 2011. Ex. B, p. 91, Ex. G, Darnell Cooper’s Medical 

Records, pp. 26, 74.

RESPONSE NO. 9: Undisputed.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 10:

Nurse Morgan was trained in the treatment of burns including making 

assessments of burns and pain caused from burns. Ex. B, pp. 40-42.

RESPONSE NO. 10: Undisputed, but add that in the portion of testimony cited in 

Paragraph 10, Morgan stated that she was taught that when encountering a patient with a 

burn, she was supposed to “assess it and to have the doctor look at it” and that her 

assessment should include “looking at it, assessing the skin area, seeing if it was reddened, 

blistering, [or if there was] any kind of charred skin,” and also speaking with the patient 

about how he was burned, whether he was in pain, and how he would rate the pain. 

(Morgan Dep. 2 40:14-42:12.) Then, Morgan was supposed to “take care of it accordingly.” 

(Morgan Dep. 42:10-13.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 11:

Nurse Matuzas is a licensed practical nurse at Stateville for Wexford from July 

2010 through November 2011. Ex. C, Angela Matuzas discovery deposition, pp. 10, 16, 17.

 2 “Morgan Dep.” refers to the transcript of the June 3, 2015 deposition of Defendant Karyn Morgan, located at 

Docket No 169-1. 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 4 of 34 PageID #:1720
5

RESPONSE NO. 11: Undisputed that Matuzas was a licensed practical nurse at Stateville, 

employed by Wexford, from July 2010 through November 2011. 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 12:

Nurse Matuzas saw plaintiff on one occasion, June 21, 2011 and she gave him 

ointment and changed his bandages. Ex. A, p. 128, Ex. G, p. 8.

RESPONSE NO. 12: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 12 as mischaracterizing the 

evidence. Matuzas saw Cooper at least two times, once on June 20, 2011, and once on June 

21, 2011. (Cooper Dep. 127:23-128:1.) The portion of Plaintiff’s testimony cited in 

Paragraph 12 does not indicate whether or not Matuzas saw Plaintiff on other occasions. 

Undisputed that when Matuzas saw Plaintiff on June 21, 2011, she applied silvadine to his 

burn and changed his bandages. 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 13:

Ms. Matuzas complied with the applicable standard of care in treating Mr. 

Cooper. Ex. C, pp. 83-84.

RESPONSE NO. 13: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 13 as unsupported by the 

cited record, inadmissible as a legal conclusion, and improper lay opinion testimony. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). In the portion of the testimony cited in Paragraph 

13, Matuzas stated only that she believed she complied with the applicable standard of care

during her interactions with Plaintiff. (Matuzas Dep. 3 83:25-84:3.) Matuzas 

acknowledged that her belief that she complied with the applicable standard of care was 

based solely on her assumption that whatever treatment she provided to Plaintiff must 

have been specifically called for by a doctor’s order, which she does not recall ever seeing. 

(Matuzas Dep. 84:9-85:9.) Matuzas does not know who Plaintiff is and does not recall 

 3 “Matuzas Dep.” refers to the transcript of the July 13, 2015 deposition of Defendant Angelique Matuzas, located at 

Docket No. 169-2.

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 5 of 34 PageID #:1720
6

whether she ever spoke with Plaintiff. (Matuzas Dep. 60:5-11.) Wexford’s treatment 

protocols require Wexford nurses to, among other things, provide pain medication to and 

arrange for a doctor to see inmates with even minor burns. (Exhibit 74, pgs. 5-6.) On both 

June 20, 2011 and June 21, 2011, when Plaintiff showed Matuzas his burns, requested pain 

medication, and asked to see a doctor, Matuzas refused. (Cooper Dep. 50:13-51:10; 56:6-

57:14.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 14:

Kent Ocupe was a licensed practical nurse hired by Wexford at the time of the 

allegations, and is now a registered nurse. Ex. D, Deposition Transcript of Kent Ocupe, RN, pp. 

8, 12-13, 25

RESPONSE NO. 14: Undisputed.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 15:

Nurse Ocupe had training as to treatment of burns including determining the type 

of burn, severity of the burn and treatment for different burns. Ex. D, pp. 85-86.

RESPONSE NO. 15: Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 15 as vague, ambiguous, and 

unsupported by the cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). Undisputed 

that, at an unknown time prior to his deposition on June 12, 2015, Ocupe received training 

as to the treatment of burns, including determining the type of burn, severity of the burn, 

and treatment for different kinds of burns. In the portion of the testimony cited in 

Paragraph 15, Ocupe testified only about the training that he received when he went to 

school to be a Registered Nurse. (Ocupe Dep. 5 85:10-86:16.) Defendants offer no evidence 

regarding when Ocupe received this training, and Ocupe did not obtain his license as a 

 4 The numbered exhibits referenced throughout this response are the Exhibits to Plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) 

Statement of Facts, filed contemporaneously with this response.

5 “Ocupe Dep.” refers to the transcript of the July 12, 2015 deposition of Defendant Kent Ocupe, located at Docket 

No. 169-3.

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 6 of 34 PageID #:1720
7

Registered Nurse until the week before his deposition was taken in this matter. (Ocupe 

Dep. 25:15-20.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 16:

Nurse Headlee was a registered nurse working at Wexford at the time of the 

allegations in the complaint. Ex. E, Deposition transcript of Stacey Headlee, RN, p. 24.

RESPONSE NO. 16: Undisputed.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 17:

Nurse Headlee was taught and trained in the treatment of burns. Ex. E p. 64.

RESPONSE NO. 17: Undisputed.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 18:

The care provided by Nurse Headlee was reasonable and appropriate. Ex. E, p. 

170.

RESPONSE NO. 18: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 18 as unsupported by the 

cited record, inadmissible as a legal conclusion, and improper lay opinion testimony. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). In the portion of testimony cited in Paragraph 18, 

Headlee testified only that it was her opinion that the treatment she provided was 

reasonable and appropriate. (Headlee Dep. 6 170:7-17.) Wexford’s treatment protocols 

require Wexford nurses to, among other things, provide pain medication to and arrange 

for a doctor to see inmates with even minor burns. (Exhibit 7, pgs. 5-6.) On June 22, 2011, 

Plaintiff requested, among other things, that Headlee provide him with pain medication 

 6 “Headlee Dep.” refers to the transcript of the June 9, 2015 deposition of Defendant Stacey Headlee, located at 

Docket No. 169-4.

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 7 of 34 PageID #:1720
8

and allow him to see a doctor. (Cooper Dep. 59:14-60:5; Exhibit 17 ¶ 2.) Headlee refused 

both of these requests without explanation. (Cooper Dep. 59:21-60:5.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 19:

Ms. Headlee saw plaintiff on two occasions, June 21, 2011 and July 20, 2011. Ex. 

E, pp. 95-97, 104-08, Ex. A, p. 129, Ex. G, pp. 5, 6

RESPONSE NO. 19: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 19 as not supported by the 

cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). Headlee saw Plaintiff on June 

22, 2011, not June 21, 2011. (Exhibit 1 ¶ 2.) At that time, Plaintiff requested, among other 

things, that Headlee provide him with pain medication and allow him to see a doctor. 

(Cooper Dep. 59:14-60:5; Exhibit 1 ¶ 2.) Headlee refused both of these requests without 

explanation. (Cooper Dep. 59:21-60:5.) In the portions of Headlee’s testimony cited in 

Paragraph 19, Headlee testified that she did “not remember the exact date” that she spoke 

with Mr. Cooper, but that according to her status note, “it looks like” it was on June 21, 

2011. (Headlee Dep. 96:10-22; 104:3-13.) Headlee also testified that she wrote a progress 

note that she dated July 20, 2011, but the written record did not refresh her recollection of 

the date of her second interaction with Plaintiff, because “you know, my heritage, we don’t 

really – dates, times, it’s not – it’s irrelevant to us.” (Headlee Dep. 107:11-108:2.) Headlee 

acknowledged that she had reason to doubt the accuracy of the date that she wrote on the 

progress note. (Headlee Dep. 108:9-18 (“Q. And is there anything on this document that 

indicates the date on which you saw Mr. Cooper? A. It says I saw him on the 20th of July. 

Q. Do you have any reason to doubt that that was the date that you saw him? A. Well, 

 7 Exhibit 1 is a declaration executed by Plaintiff Darnell Cooper on October 30, 2015. Before signing the 

declaration, Plaintiff made minor corrections by striking through certain words and replacing them with words that 

he highlighted in yellow. Upon learning of these corrections, Plaintiff’s counsel incorporated them into, and mailed 

to Plaintiff, a revised declaration. Plaintiff signed the revised declaration and placed it in IDOC mail on November 

3, 2015 but due to delays affecting outbound mail at Stateville, Plaintiff’s counsel has not yet received the clean 

declaration.

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 8 of 34 PageID #:1720
9

knowing me and time, yeah. Q. So it’s possible that you had seen him on a different date? 

A. It’s possible.”).) Headlee testified that neither her progress notes nor her recollection 

were reliable indicators of time. (Headlee Dep. 8:10-12 (“Q. And for how long did you 

meet with them? A. Time is not relevant in my background so I have no idea.”); 10:4-8 

(“Q. And when did you start working at Sam’s Club? A. Again, time and dates are not 

relevant so I have no idea.”); 107:11-108:2; 108:9-18; 148:21-23 (“Q. When was that? A. 

Again, I’m sorry; time is not relevant to me.”).)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 20:

On December 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed a civil rights lawsuit naming various IDOC 

and Wexford employees alleging deprivation of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§1983. Docket #7. On May 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming Karyn 

Morgan, Angelique Matuzas, Kent Ocupe and Stacey Headlee, hereinafter referred to as 

“Wexford defendants” alleging deprivation of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§1983. Docket #69.

RESPONSE NO. 20: Undisputed.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 21:

On April 29, 2014, Plaintiff was able to reach a settlement agreement with the 

IDOC defendants only and the case was dismissed as to those defendants. The case remained as 

to the Wexford defendants. Docket #67, Ex. A, p. 24.

RESPONSE NO. 21: Undisputed.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 22:

Plaintiff alleges that on June 16, 2011 and June 30, 2011, he suffered objectively 

serious injuries in the form of burns to his right shoulder, upper middle back and head caused by 

excessively hot shower water in the F-House showers. Docket 69, para 34-35. Plaintiff alleges 

that despite specific knowledge of the Plaintiff’s injuries the Wexford defendants denied him 

access to adequate medical care by refusing Plaintiff’s request to see a doctor, refusing Plaintiff’s 

request for burn cream, refusing Plaintiff’s requests for pain medication, and/or ignoring or 

denying plaintiff’s formal grievances resulting in damages in the form of severe pain, suffering, 

and permanent scarring and discoloration of skin. Docket 69, para 37, 39

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 9 of 34 PageID #:1720
10

RESPONSE NO. 22: Plaintiff objects to the term “alleges” as argument. The remainder of 

Paragraph 22 is undisputed, with the clarification that Plaintiff made multiple requests for 

defendants to let him see a doctor. (Exhibit 1 ¶¶ 1-2; Cooper Dep. 51:1-10; 56:6-22; 59:14-

60:5; 68:5-11; 70:7-21.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 23:

Mr. Cooper was aware of several avenues in order to see a medical technician, 

nurse, nurse practitioner or doctor, including filling out a sick call request form. Ex. B, pp. 89-

90. Ex. A, pp. 12, 15,19

RESPONSE NO. 23: Undisputed.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 24:

After a sick call request is made at Stateville, the medical technician (CMT), an 

Illinois Department of Corrections employee, would be the first line of triage for a sick inmate 

and would see the inmate first at their cells and determine whether they could treat the inmate’s 

condition or whether the inmate needed to be seen by a nurse, physician assistant or doctor. Ex. 

D, pp. 14, 32, Ex. B, pp. 90-91, Ex. C, p. 59, Ex. F, Deposition transcript of Arthur Funk, MD, p. 

211.

RESPONSE NO. 24: Disputed. Any patient with a burn must be referred to a physician, 

physician’s assistant, or nurse practitioner. (Exhibit 7, pg. 5 §C-D.) Wexford nurses who 

encounter inmates who complain of burns are supposed to perform an assessment of that 

patient. (Funk Dep. 8 169:8-21; Exhibit 7, pg. 5.) Wexford nurses are required to apply 

silver sulfadine to minor burns and must provide pain medication to patients with any 

minor or superficial burn. (Exhibit 7, pg. 6 §E(1).) Nurses are supposed to contact a 

physician whenever a patient presents with a burn. (Matuzas Dep. 37:3-10; 38:2-8; 85:10-

22.)

 8 “Funk Dep.” refers to the transcript of the June 4, 2015 30(b)(6) deposition of Wexford Health Sources through its

designated representative Arthur Funk, M.D., located at Docket No. 169-5.

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 10 of 34 PageID #:1720
11

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 25:

Nurses at Stateville have no duty to assess or provide treatment to inmates in their 

cells at the time they are passing medication as they have to provide medication to 100-150 

inmates, thus carrying hundreds of pills. Ex. B, pp. 26, 34-35, 84-85, 87-88, Ex.D, pp. 35-36, Ex. 

E, p. 86.

RESPONSE NO. 25: Disputed. A nurse’s job duties while passing medication include 

conducting assessments of patients with medical conditions and obtaining appropriate 

treatment, including by alerting a correctional officer or placing an inmate on sick call to 

see a doctor. (Headlee Dep. 34:14-35:15; Ocupe Dep. 37:6-38:4; 59:18-60:2; Funk Dep. 

169:8-21.) It would be “totally inappropriate” for a Wexford nurse distributing medication 

to ignore an inmate’s request to be placed on sick call or see a doctor for pain medication

as a result of a burn. (Funk Dep. 170:2-12; 197:13-198:3.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 26:

If a nurse was passing medications, they can order that the inmate be sent to the 

healthcare unit or request that a medical technician see the patient. Ex. D, pp. 18, 38. Ex. F, p. 

210.

RESPONSE NO. 26: Undisputed.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 27:

If a patient is to receive treatment like dressing changes the inmate will be 

brought down to the healthcare unit and treated by the nurses. It would never be done in the cells. 

Ex. E, pp. 39-40, 43-44

RESPONSE NO. 27: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 27 as vague, ambiguous, 

conclusory, and unsupported by the cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 

56.1(a). In the testimony cited in Paragraph 27, Headlee testified about sick call and 

separately testified that she personally did not administer creams or ointments to a patient 

“in their housing situation;” she offers no testimony regarding whether or not she or any 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 11 of 34 PageID #:1720
12

other nurse could, or was supposed to, provide any treatment in any patient’s cell. 

(Headlee Dep. 39:1-40:24; 43:1-44:24.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 28:

A nurse can make the independent determination as to whether an inmate’s 

condition warrants seeing a physician or physician assistant. Ex. E, p. 76, Ex. F, p. 221.

RESPONSE NO. 28: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 28 as unsupported by the 

cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). Wexford’s treatment protocol 

for burns requires nurses to refer any inmate with any burn to a physician, physician’s 

assistant, or nurse practitioner. (Exhibit 7, pg. 5 §C-D.) None of the testimony cited in 

Paragraph 28 relates to physician assistants. 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 29:

Inmates have access to pain medication from the prison commissary. Ex. F, pp. 

123-24, 223 Ex. C, p. 82, Ex. A, p. 48.

RESPONSE NO. 29: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 29 as vague, ambiguous,

and unsupported by the cited testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). The 

cited testimony does not state whether pain medication was available at the time of 

Plaintiff’s injuries. During 2011, Plaintiff did not have access to Ibuprofen or Tylenol 

through the commissary. (Cooper Dep. 48:16-18.) None of the Defendants ever said to 

Plaintiff that he could purchase pain medication in the commissary to treat his burns. 

(Cooper Dep. 138:5-9.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 30:

If nurse provides treatment or medication to an inmate, the nurse would document 

it contemporaneously. Ex. D, p. 91, Ex. E, p. 166.

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 12 of 34 PageID #:1720
13

RESPONSE NO. 30: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 30 as unsupported by the 

cited record, speculation, conclusory, argument, and improper lay opinion. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). On July 1st or 2nd of 2011, Ocupe gave Plaintiff 

dibucaine ointment, but he did not document that fact. (Cooper Dep. 70:7-21.) In the 

portion of Ocupe’s testimony cited in Paragraph 30, Ocupe testified that when he was 

trained as a nurse, he was trained that if he provided medication to an inmate, he should 

document it; he did not testify that any other nurse received this training, or that he or any 

other nurse actually adhered to it. (Ocupe Dep. 90:17-91:6.) In the portion of Headlee’s 

testimony cited in Paragraph 30, Headlee testified that her practice would be to document 

an encounter at or about the time that she saw the inmate; she did not testify that she 

always did so, nor did she offer any testimony about any other nurse’s practices. (Headlee 

Dep. 166:18-167:4.) The cited testimony does not state whether any other nurse would 

document contemporaneously each time that they provide treatment or medication to an 

inmate. 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 31:

Had plaintiff requested pain medication at any time, it would have been 

documented. Ex. C, p. 82.

RESPONSE NO. 31: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 31 as vague, ambiguous, 

speculation, conclusory, argument, improper lay opinion, and unsupported by the cited 

record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). The portion of Matuzas’s testimony 

cited as the sole support for Paragraph 31 makes no reference to whether Plaintiff’s 

requests for pain medication to other nurses would have been documented. (Matuzas Dep. 

81:21-82:4.) Notably, Matuzas has no recollection of Plaintiff, whether she ever spoke to 

Plaintiff, or whether Plaintiff ever said anything to her about the pain he was experiencing 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 13 of 34 PageID #:1720
14

as a result of burns. (Matuzas Dep. 60:2-63:20; Exhibit 3 ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff requested pain 

medication from Morgan on June 18, 2011 and July 1, 2011, Matuzas on June 20, 2011 and 

June 21, 2011, Headlee on June 22, 2011, and Ocupe on July 1st or 2nd of 2011. (Exhibit 1

¶¶ 2-3; Cooper Dep. 51:1-10; 56:6-22; 68:5-11; 70:7-21.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 32:

First degree burns require no treatment. Ex. D, p. 86. Ex. F, pp. 234-235.

RESPONSE NO. 32: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 32 as conclusory, argument, 

improper lay opinion testimony, and as directly contradicted by the cited record. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). Defendants did not designate any expert witness, and 

the deadline for doing so has passed. The proper treatment for a first-degree burn is a 

topic requiring scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. The testimony cited in 

Paragraph 32 on this issue is from lay witnesses, and is therefore inadmissible. See Fed. R. 

Evid. 701. Moreover, Dr. Funk testified in the portion of his testimony cited in Paragraph 

32 that the proper treatment for first degree burns includes “avoidance of irritation of the 

skin . . . [a]nalgesics if the patient requests it,” and sometimes dressing changes. (Funk 

Dep. 234:6-17.) Further, the nursing treatment protocols adopted by Wexford and in effect 

during 2011 specify that even superficial burns are painful and that the proper treatment 

of even minor and superficial burns includes pain medication and referral to a doctor, 

physician’s assistant, or nurse practitioner. (Exhibit 7, pgs. 5-6.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 33:

First degree burns would not leave a scar. Ex. F, p. 201.

RESPONSE NO. 33: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 33 as conclusory, argument, 

and improper lay opinion testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 14 of 34 PageID #:1720
15

Defendants did not designate any expert witness, and the deadline for doing so has passed. 

Whether a first-degree burn can leave a scar is a topic requiring scientific, technical, or 

other specialized knowledge. Because Dr. Funk testified only as a lay witness, his testimony 

on this issue is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 701. 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 34:

Nurses at Stateville can treat inmates’ complaints of burns and pain per protocol 

and/or doctor’s orders including application of saturated gauze, dressing changes, and 

application of certain creams. Ex. B, pp. 21, 26, 29. Ex. D, p. 54, Ex. E, pp. 43-44, 69, 156.

RESPONSE NO. 34: Undisputed, but add that the nursing treatment protocols adopted by 

Wexford and in effect during 2011 specify that even minor or superficial burns require 

pain medication and that all burns require referral to a doctor, physician’s assistant, or 

nurse practitioner. (Exhibit 7, pgs. 5-6.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 35:

A&D ointment does not treat burns, protect burnt skin or prevent scarring from 

burns. Ex. F, p. 201.

RESPONSE NO. 35: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 35 as conclusory, argument, 

and improper lay opinion testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). 

Defendants did not designate any expert witness, and the deadline for doing so has passed. 

Whether A&D ointment treats burns, protects burnt skin, or prevents scarring from burns

is a topic requiring scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Because Dr. Funk 

testified only as a lay witness, his testimony on this issue is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 

701.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 36:

The risk of infection in a first degree burn is very slight. Ex. F, p. 235.

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 15 of 34 PageID #:1720
16

RESPONSE NO. 36: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 36 as conclusory, argument, 

and improper lay opinion testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). 

Defendants did not designate any expert witness, and the deadline for doing so has passed. 

The risk of infection resulting from a first-degree burn is a topic requiring scientific, 

technical, or other specialized knowledge. Because Dr. Funk testified only as a lay witness, 

his testimony on this issue is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 701.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 37:

A first degree burn would cause discomfort for the first 24 hours, the next 24-48 

hours would have discomfort limited to skin contact in that area and after three days they have 

no discomfort at all. Ex. F, p. 235.

RESPONSE NO. 37: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 37 as conclusory, argument, 

and improper lay opinion testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). 

Defendants did not designate any expert witness, and the deadline for doing so has passed. 

The pain or discomfort resulting from a first-degree burn is a topic requiring scientific, 

technical, or other specialized knowledge. Because Dr. Funk testified only as a lay witness, 

his testimony on this issue is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 701. Plaintiff was in pain for 

multiple days after suffering both of his burns. (Cooper Dep. 47:20-22; 50:13-51:10; 52:9-

11; 56:6-22; 68:5-11; 69:2-16; 70:7-21; Exhibit 1 ¶ 2.) Moreover, the nursing treatment 

protocols adopted by Wexford and in effect during 2011 specify that even superficial burns 

are painful and that the proper treatment even minor and superficial burns includes pain 

medication for at least three days and that all burns require referral to a doctor, 

physician’s assistant, or nurse practitioner. (Exhibit 7, pgs. 5-6.) 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 16 of 34 PageID #:1720
17

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 38:

On June 16, 2011, Mr. Cooper jumped out of the shower after the allegedly hot 

water hit his back, right side of his body and part of his neck. Ex. A, pp. 29, 34-35.

RESPONSE NO. 38: Undisputed.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 39:

Mr. Cooper did not tell any guards or any medical personnel of the alleged burn 

from the shower on June 16, 2011. Ex. A, pp. 37, 39.

RESPONSE NO. 39: Plaintiff objects to the term “alleged” as argument. The remainder 

of Paragraph 39 is undisputed, but add that the shower during which Plaintiff suffered the 

burn took place during the evening. (Cooper Dep. 137:16-18.) Plaintiff did not see any 

medical personnel on June 16, 2011 after he was burned by the shower water. (Cooper 

Dep. 137:19-22.) Defendants offer no evidence indicating that Plaintiff encountered a 

guard on June 16, 2011 after he was burned by the shower water. 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 40:

The first time that plaintiff noticed that he had any burn was on June 17, 2011. 

Docket 69, Para 16, Ex. A, pp. 39.

RESPONSE NO. 40: Disputed. Undisputed that plaintiff did not see the actual burns on 

his skin until he woke up on June 17, 2011, the morning after the evening shower during

which he was burned. However, Plaintiff suffered pain from his burns immediately after 

they occurred on June 16, 2011. (Cooper Dep. 138:10-18.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 41:

Plaintiff did not tell any medical personnel of his burn on June 17, 2011. Ex. A, 

pp. 42-43

RESPONSE NO. 41: Undisputed, but add that Defendants offer no evidence that Plaintiff 

encountered any medical personnel on June 17, 2011.

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 17 of 34 PageID #:1720
18

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 42:

On June 18, 2011, when plaintiff alleges he told Karen Morgan of his burns, 

Nurse Morgan was distributing medication in F-house. Ex. A, pp. 45, 127

RESPONSE NO. 42: Plaintiff objects to the characterization “alleges” as argument. The 

remainder of Paragraph 42 is undisputed.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 43:

On June 18, 2011, plaintiff was taken to urgent care and a CMT examined Mr. 

Cooper’s back and neck and noted no blisters present with some peeling. Docket 69, para 19, Ex. 

A, p. 47; Ex. G, p. 6. Ex. F, pp. 136-38, 211

RESPONSE NO. 43: Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 43 as vague, ambiguous, and 

unsupported by the cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). Undisputed 

that on June 18, 2011, Plaintiff was taken to urgent care and that a CMT examined him. 

To the extent that the term “noted” in Paragraph 43 means “documented in the progress 

note,” the remainder of Paragraph 43 is undisputed. To the extent that the term “noted” 

means “observed,” the remainder of Paragraph 43 is unsupported by the cited evidence, 

none of which includes testimony offered by individuals with personal knowledge of the 

nurse or CMT’s observations. 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 44:

On June 18, 2011, the CMT cleansed the wounds, applied Sulfadyne and 

bandages to the right shoulder and back of neck, and noted a plan for daily dressing changes and 

to monitor for infection. Docket 69, para 19, Ex. A, p. 47; Ex. G, p. 6. Ex. F, pp. 136, 138, 209, 

211, 213.

RESPONSE NO. 44: Undisputed. 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 45:

On June 19, 2011, plaintiff did not tell any of the Wexford defendants about his 

alleged burns. Ex. A, p. 50.

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 18 of 34 PageID #:1720
19

RESPONSE NO. 45: Plaintiff objects to the term “alleged” as argument. The remainder 

of Paragraph 45 is undisputed, but add that Defendants offer no evidence that Plaintiff 

encountered any of the Defendants on June 19, 2011. 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 46:

On June 21, 2011 at approximately 10:15 a.m., plaintiff was taken to the health 

care unit where defendant, Angela Matuzas changed plaintiff’s bandages, cleansed the area with 

saline solution and applied Silvadene cream. Ex. A, pp. 49-50, 56-57. Ex. C, p. 66-67 Docket 69, 

para 23, Ex. G, p. 8. Ex. F, p. 213

RESPONSE NO. 46: Undisputed, but add that during this encounter, Plaintiff told 

Matuzas he was in pain, asked her for pain medication, and requested that she allow him to 

see a doctor for his burns. (Cooper Dep. 56:6-22.) Matuzas refused Cooper’s requests and 

told a security officer that Cooper was “making trouble.” (Cooper Dep. 56:6-57:14.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 47:

On June 21, 2011, Nurse Matuzas noted that Mr. Cooper had a minor burn that 

was healing well on the back of his neck and right shoulder. Ex. C, p. 64, Ex. G, p. 8

RESPONSE NO. 47: Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 47 as vague, ambiguous, and 

unsupported by the cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). To the 

extent that the term “noted” in Paragraph 47 means “documented in the progress note,” 

Paragraph 47 is undisputed. To the extent that the term “noted” means “observed,” 

Paragraph 47 is disputed and unsupported by the cited evidence; Matuzas does not 

remember any of her interactions with Plaintiff. (Matuzas Dep. 60:2-63:20.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 48:

On June 21, 2011, Nurse Matuzas noted that Mr. Cooper reported that the burn 

was feeling better and although he complained of minor discomfort, Mr. Cooper showed no signs 

of distress. Ex. C, p. 68. Ex. G, p. 8, Ex. A, pp. 57-58.

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 19 of 34 PageID #:1720
20

RESPONSE NO. 48: Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 48 as vague, ambiguous, argument, 

and unsupported by the cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). 

Undisputed that on June 21, 2011, Matuzas documented in a progress note that Plaintiff

said “it’s feeling a bit better,” that he complained of discomfort, and that despite this 

complaint Matuzas documented that Plaintiff showed no sign of distress. Plaintiff told 

Matuzas that the burn felt a bit better only after she applied burn cream to the wound; he 

meant that the burn felt cooler after she applied the burn cream, but the pain remained. 

(Cooper 139:2-14.) To the extent that “noted” means “observed,” the remainder of 

Paragraph 48 is disputed and unsupported by the cited evidence; Matuzas does not 

remember any of her interactions with Plaintiff. (Matuzas Dep. 60:2-63:20.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 49:

On June 21, 2011, at 1240 pm, plaintiff was again taken down to the health care 

unit and saw defendant, Nurse Headlee. Ex. A, pp. 58-59, Ex. G, p. 5, Docket 69, para 25. Ex. E, 

p. 104

RESPONSE NO. 49: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 49 as unsupported by the 

cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). Plaintiff was taken to the health 

care unit and saw Headlee on June 22, 2011, not June 21, 2011. (Cooper Dep. 58:17-59:17.) 

Headlee testified that neither her progress notes nor her recollection were reliable 

indicators of time. (Headlee Dep. 8:10-12 (“Q. And for how long did you meet with them? 

A. Time is not relevant in my background so I have no idea.”); 10:4-8 (“Q. And when did 

you start working at Sam’s Club? A. Again, time and dates are not relevant so I have no 

idea.”); 107:11-108:2; 108:9-18; 148:21-23 (“Q. When was that? A. Again, I’m sorry; time 

is not relevant to me.”); see also Plaintiff’s Response to ¶ 19.)

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 20 of 34 PageID #:1720
21

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 50:

On June 21, 2011, Nurse Headlee changed Mr. Cooper’s dressing and noted that 

the wound was healing and the skin was intact with no redness or blisters observed. Ex. A, p. 59, 

Ex. G, p. 5, Ex. E, pp. 97-99, 154-55

RESPONSE NO. 50: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 50 as unsupported by the 

cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). Plaintiff was taken to the health 

care unit and saw Headlee on June 22, 2011, not June 21, 2011. (Cooper Dep. 58:17-59:17.) 

Headlee testified that neither her progress notes nor her recollection were reliable 

indicators of time. (Headlee Dep. 8:10-12; 10:4-8; 107:11-108:2; 108:9-18; 148:21-23; see 

also Plaintiff’s Response to ¶ 19.) Headlee did not change Plaintiff’s dressings during that 

visit and refused to apply any gauze or burn cream to his burns. (Cooper Dep. 59:21-60:2.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 51:

On June 21, 2011, Nurse Headlee did not note any complaints of pain, requests

for medication, or requests to see a physician by Mr. Cooper. Ex. G, p. 5,

RESPONSE NO. 51: Disputed. Headlee did not see Plaintiff on June 21, 2011; she saw 

him on June 22, 2011. (Cooper Dep. 58:17-59:17.) During Plaintiff’s June 22, 2011 

encounter with Headlee, he complained to her about the pain he was experiencing from his 

burns, requested pain medication, and asked for her to arrange for him to see a doctor. 

(Cooper Dep. 59:14-60:5; Exhibit 1 ¶ 2.) She refused these requests without explanation. 

(Cooper Dep. 59:21-60:5; Exhibit 1 ¶ 2.) Undisputed that when Headlee saw Plaintiff on 

June 22, 2011, she did not record in the progress note that he complained of pain, 

requested medication, or requested to see a physician. 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 21 of 34 PageID #:1720
22

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 52:

Since Nurse Headlee did not note such complaints or requests, Mr. Cooper did not 

make such complaints or requests, as it would have been Nurse Headlee’s custom and practice to 

document such information. Ex. G, p. 5, Ex. E, p. 99, 154, 156-57.

RESPONSE NO. 52: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 52 as vague and ambiguous 

with respect to the phrase “such complaints” and as conclusory, argument, and 

unsupported by the cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). When 

Plaintiff saw Headlee on June 22, 2011, he requested that she clean the area of his burns, 

apply burn cream and gauze, and provide him with pain medication. (Exhibit 1 ¶ 2.) 

When Headlee refused, he requested that she allow him to see a doctor. (Exhibit 1 ¶ 2.) 

Headlee denied that request as well. (Exhibit 1 ¶ 2.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 53:

On June 21, 2011, Nurse Headlee would have educated Mr. Cooper on keeping 

the burn moist with water from faucet in his cell. Ex. E, p. 103.

RESPONSE NO. 53: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 53 as argument, conclusory, 

speculation, and not supported by admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local 

Rule 56.1(a). Headlee did not see Plaintiff on June 21, 2011; she saw him on June 22, 2011. 

(Cooper Dep. 58:17-59:17.) What Headlee “would have” done is speculation. In the cited 

testimony, Headlee testified that she “usually educate[s] everybody” so she “most likely” 

did so with respect to Plaintiff. (Headlee Dep. 103:5-8.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 54:

By June 21, 2011, Mr. Cooper did not need to be seen by a physician because his 

burn was healing. Ex. E, p. 158.

RESPONSE NO. 54: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 54 as conclusory, argument, 

improper lay opinion testimony, and not supported by the cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 22 of 34 PageID #:1720
23

56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). Defendants did not designate any expert witness, and the 

deadline for doing so has passed. Whether Plaintiff needed to see a physician, and whether 

his burn was healing as of June 21, 2011, are topics requiring scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge. Because Dr. Funk testified only as a lay witness, his testimony on 

this issue is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 701. Notably, Headlee did not see Plaintiff on 

June 21, 2011; she saw him on June 22, 2011. (Cooper Dep. 58:17-59:17.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 55:

By June 21, 2011, Mr. Cooper did not require any pain medication for his burn as 

the healing stage does not cause any pain. Ex. E, p. 159.

RESPONSE NO. 55: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 55 as conclusory, argument, 

improper lay opinion testimony, and not supported by the cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). Defendants did not designate any expert witness, and the 

deadline for doing so has passed. Whether Plaintiff required pain medication, and whether 

his burn was healing, as of June 21, 2011, are topics requiring scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge. Because Dr. Funk testified only as a lay witness, his testimony on 

this issue is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 701. Notably, Headlee did not see Plaintiff on 

June 21, 2011; she saw him on June 22, 2011. (Cooper Dep. 58:17-59:17.) Cooper suffered

pain from the burns on both June 21, 2011 and June 22, 2011. (Cooper Dep. 56:6-22; 

Exhibit 1 ¶ 2.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 56:

From June 22, 2011 to June 30, 2011, Mr. Cooper did not request any medical 

care for his neck and back. Ex. A, p. 61.

RESPONSE NO. 56: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 56 as unsupported by the 

cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). When Plaintiff saw Headlee on 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 23 of 34 PageID #:1720
24

June 22, 2011, he requested that she clean the area of his burns, apply burn cream and 

gauze, and provide him with pain medication. (Exhibit 1 ¶ 2.) When Headlee refused, he 

requested that she allow him to see a doctor. (Exhibit 1 ¶ 2.) Headlee denied that request 

as well. (Exhibit 1 ¶ 2.) In the cited portion of Plaintiff’s testimony, Plaintiff testified that 

he did not believe that he requested medical attention during the time period starting after 

that visit and ending on June 30, 2011. (Cooper Dep. 60:20-61:3.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 57:

On June 30, 2011, the date of the second alleged shower burn, plaintiff did not 

believe that he had a burn on his head. Ex. A, pp. 62, 65.

RESPONSE NO. 57: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 57 as directly contradicted 

by the cited record, and to the term “alleged” as argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local 

Rule 56.1(a). In the portion of Plaintiff’s testimony cited in Paragraph 57, Plaintiff testified 

that after being burned in the shower that day, he “felt the burn . . . but I didn’t notice the 

severity of the burn.” (Cooper Dep. 65:13-21.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 58:

The first time plaintiff told someone about the burn on his head was when he 

noticed the skin on his head peeling on July 1, 2011. Ex. A, pp. 65-66.

RESPONSE NO. 58: Undisputed.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 59:

On July 1, 2011, when plaintiff alleges that he told Nurse Morgan of his alleged 

head burn, Nurse Morgan was passing medications in the cell house. Para 27, Ex. A, pp. 66, 68.

RESPONSE NO. 59: Plaintiff objects to the terms “alleges” and “alleged” as argument. 

The remainder of Paragraph 59 is undisputed.

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 24 of 34 PageID #:1720
25

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 60:

Plaintiff admits that he received care for his burn on June 30, 2011, July 1 and 

July 2 by Nurse Ocupe. Ex. A, pp. 70-71, 86.

RESPONSE NO. 60: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 60 as mischaracterizing the 

cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). In the portion of Plaintiff’s 

testimony cited in Paragraph 60, Plaintiff testified about only one interaction with Ocupe, 

which took place on either July 1st or July 2nd of 2011, who provided him with ointment. 

(Cooper Dep. 86:19-22.) Plaintiff requested during that visit that Ocupe provide him with 

some pain medication or allow him to see a doctor. (Cooper Dep. 70:10-21.) Ocupe 

walked away without responding to Plaintiff’s requests. (Cooper Dep. 70:10-21.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 61:

On July 2, 2011, when plaintiff alleges he told Nurse Ocupe of the burns on his 

head, Nurse Ocupe was passing medications in the cell house. Ex. A, p. 128

RESPONSE NO. 61: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 61 as vague, ambiguous, 

and mischaracterizing the cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). 

Plaintiff objects to the term “alleges” as argument. The cited testimony indicates that 

Plaintiff saw Ocupe on either July 1st or July 2nd, 2011. (Cooper Dep. 128:7-18.) The 

cited testimony does not reference whether or not Ocupe was passing medication when 

Plaintiff saw him on those dates. (Cooper Dep. 128:1-24.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 62:

Plaintiff did not show Nurse Ocupe the burns on his shoulder or tell him about 

them on July 2, 2011. Ex. A, p. 71.

RESPONSE NO. 62: Undisputed, but add that Plaintiff showed the burns on his head to 

Ocupe when he saw him on July 1 or July 2, 2011. (Cooper Dep. 70:7-21.)

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 25 of 34 PageID #:1720
26

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 63:

Plaintiff first filled out a medical request form to the officers on July 20, 2011 

regarding burns he received on June 16, 2011. Ex. A, p. 73. This first request does not mention 

the burn from June 30, 2011. Id. Plaintiff did not know what the result of this request was. Ex. A, 

p. 75.

RESPONSE NO. 63: Undisputed that Plaintiff filed an offender request form on July 20, 

2011 requesting to see a doctor and receive pain medication for his burns, and that Plaintiff 

does not know the results of that specific request. Disputed that this was the first medical 

request form Plaintiff submitted regarding his burns. Plaintiff submitted a medical 

treatment grievance on June 20, 2011 in which he complained about the lack of medical 

treatment that he had received for the burns that he suffered on June 16, 2011. (Exhibit 2.) 

On July 5, 2011, Plaintiff filed a medical treatment grievance in which he complained about 

the lack of medical treatment that he had received for the burns that he suffered on June 

16, 2011 and June 30, 2011. (Exhibit 8.) In that grievance, Plaintiff complained that 

despite several encounters with medical personnel, he had still not received any pain 

medication for his burns. (Exhibit 8.) Plaintiff also orally requested medical treatment 

from the defendants on several occasions (Cooper Dep. 47:20-22; 50:13-51:10; 52:9-11; 

53:15-24; 56:6-22; 68:5-11; 69:2-16; 70:7-21; Exhibit 1 ¶ 2.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 64:

On July 20, 2011, plaintiff was sent to the healthcare unit and saw Nurse Headlee. 

Ex. A, pp. 75, 79-80, Ex. G, p. 6, Ex. F, p. 214

RESPONSE NO. 64: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 64 as directly contradicted 

by the cited evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). In the cited testimony, 

Plaintiff stated that he had no reason to doubt “if there is documentation” that he visited

“a nurse” on July 21, 2011. (Cooper Dep. 75:15-18.) Plaintiff saw a nurse on July 20, 2011, 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 26 of 34 PageID #:1720
27

but the nurse was not Headlee. (Cooper Dep. 79:24-80:3; 80:19-23 (“Q. Is it possible that 

that was Ms. Headlee? A. On July 20th? Q. Correct. A. No.”)). Headlee testified that 

neither her progress notes nor her recollection were reliable indicators of time. (Headlee 

Dep. 8:10-12 (“Q. And for how long did you meet with them? A. Time is not relevant in 

my background so I have no idea.”); 10:4-8 (“Q. And when did you start working at Sam’s 

Club? A. Again, time and dates are not relevant so I have no idea.”); 107:11-108:2; 108:9-

18; 148:21-23 (“Q. When was that? A. Again, I’m sorry; time is not relevant to me.”); see 

also Plaintiff’s Response to ¶ 19.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 65:

On July 20, 2011, Nurse Headlee noted no complaints by Mr. Cooper, examined 

the skin on the back of his head, neck and back and provided no treatment for the burn because it 

was healed. Ex. E, pp. 162-65, Ex. G, p. 6, Ex. A, pp. 121-122, Ex. F, pp. 214-215.

RESPONSE NO. 65: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to the phrase “because it was healed” as 

conclusory, speculation, and argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). 

Plaintiff objects to the remainder of Paragraph 65 as unsupported by the cited record. Id. 

Plaintiff’s only visit with Headlee regarding his burns took place on June 22, 2011. 

(Cooper Dep. 59:5-17; 70:7-72:8.) Plaintiff did not see Headlee on July 20, 2011. (Cooper 

Dep. 79:24-80:3; 80:19-23 (“Q. Is it possible that that was Ms. Headlee? A. On July 20th? 

Q. Correct. A. No.”)). Headlee testified that neither her progress notes nor her 

recollection were reliable indicators of time. (Headlee Dep. 8:10-12 (“Q. And for how long 

did you meet with them? A. Time is not relevant in my background so I have no idea.”); 

10:4-8 (“Q. And when did you start working at Sam’s Club? A. Again, time and dates are 

not relevant so I have no idea.”); 107:11-108:2; 108:9-18; 148:21-23 (“Q. When was that? 

A. Again, I’m sorry; time is not relevant to me.”); see also Plaintiff’s Response to ¶ 19.)

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 27 of 34 PageID #:1720
28

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 66:

On July 30, 2011 and November 9, 2011, Mr. Cooper was seen in the 

hypertension clinic with no complaints related to his burns. Ex. G, pp. 12, 20.

RESPONSE NO. 66: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 66 as unsupported by the 

cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). Undisputed that the cited 

documents indicate that Plaintiff was seen by someone on July 20, 2011 and November 9, 

2011. Neither of the cited records indicate whether or not Plaintiff complained of burns 

during those encounters. 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 67:

On August 1, 2011, and October 17, 2011, Mr. Cooper had teeth extracted by Dr. 

Mitchell. Ex. G, pp. 46, 138, 141.

RESPONSE NO. 67: Undisputed. 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 68:

On August 9, 2001, Mr. Cooper refused a blood draw ordered by Dr. Carter 

because he was fasting for Ramadan. Ex. G, p. 140.

RESPONSE NO. 68: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to the term “August 9, 2001” as 

unsupported by the cited record. The cited record reflects that the interaction described in 

Paragraph 68 took place on August 1, 2011. The remainder of Paragraph 68 is undisputed. 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 69:

In June, July and August, plaintiff saw his psychiatrist, Dr. Kelly and he never 

complained to him about the pain from his burns. Ex. A, p. 132.

RESPONSE NO. 69: Disputed. Plaintiff attempted to tell Dr. Kelly about the pain he was 

experiencing from his burns, but Dr. Kelly refused to address Plaintiff’s pain because the 

purpose of the visit was psychological treatment. (Cooper Dep. 133:8-16.)

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 28 of 34 PageID #:1720
29

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 70:

On October 5, 2011, Mr. Cooper sent letter to CMT regarding complaints of 

numbness on his left side and he was seen at nursing sick call on October 6, 2011. Mr. Cooper 

did not make any complaints related to his burns. Ex. G, p. 17.

RESPONSE NO. 70: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 70 as unsupported by the 

cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). The cited evidence does not 

indicate whether or not Plaintiff made any complaints related to his burns during the 

October 6, 2011 visit. (Defendants’ Ex. G, pg. 17.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 71:

On December 20, 2011, plaintiff wrote PA Williams requesting cream that would 

get the tone back on his back skin. Ex. A, p. 106.

RESPONSE NO. 71: Undisputed.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 72:

On January 2, 2012, Karen Morgan, RN noted that Mr. Cooper refused the 

morning medication pass. Mr. Cooper had no complaints at this time. Ex. G, p. 26.

RESPONSE NO. 72: Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 72 as vague and ambiguous with 

respect to the term “noted,” and as unsupported by the cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). To the extent that the term “noted” in Paragraph 72 means 

“documented in the progress note,” the remainder of Paragraph 72 is undisputed. To the 

extent that the term “noted” means “observed,” the remainder of Paragraph 72 is 

unsupported by the cited evidence, none of which includes testimony offered by individuals 

with personal knowledge of the nurse or CMT’s observations.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 73:

On January 10, 2012, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Carter for complaints of a non 

healing burn on left shoulder and numbness on top of left foot, but no complaints of pain related 

to a burn. Par 32. Ex. A, pp. 107, 125-126, Ex. F, p. 215, Ex. G, p. 26.

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 29 of 34 PageID #:1720
30

RESPONSE NO. 73: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 72 as mischaracterizing the 

cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). Undisputed that on January 10, 

2012, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Carter regarding complaints related to his burns and 

numbness on his left foot. The cited record reflects that Dr. Carter documented the 

presence of a scar above Plaintiff’s right scapula. (Defendants’ Ex. G, 26.) That scar was 

caused by Plaintiff’s burns. (Cooper Dep. 108:24-109:5.) Plaintiff also complained to Dr. 

Carter regarding the burns on his back and his head during the visit. (Cooper Dep. 

107:10-20.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 74:

Dr. Carter assessed Mr. Cooper as having a healed superficial burn on his right 

shoulder. Ex. G, p. 26, Ex. F, p. 217

RESPONSE NO. 74: Undisputed.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 75:

Mr. Cooper’s burn as presented to the CMT on June 18, 2011 was a first degree 

burn. Ex. F, pp. 212, 231.

RESPONSE NO. 75: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 75 as conclusory, argument, 

speculation, improper lay opinion, and mischaracterizing the cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). Defendants did not designate any expert witness, and the 

deadline for doing so has passed. The proper diagnosis of Plaintiff’s burns is topic 

requiring scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Because Dr. Funk testified 

only as a lay witness, his testimony on this issue is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 701. Dr. 

Funk does not recall whether he ever treated Plaintiff, and he did not speak to any 

individuals who treated Plaintiff. (Funk Dep. 9:21-12:2; 23:2-24:12.) Dr. Funk did not 

review Plaintiff’s medical record prior to his 30(b)(6) deposition. (Funk Dep. 25:14-17. 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 30 of 34 PageID #:1720
31

(“Q. You didn’t review any medical records in preparation for your 30(b)(6) testimony 

today, is that correct? A. That is correct.”); 24:15-22; 25:7-13; 128:22-129:4.) Dr. Funk 

testified only as to “what likely would have occurred.” (Funk Dep. 231:2-16.) Further,

Plaintiff did suffer blusters from his burn. (Cooper Dep. 41:9-14; 120:11-15.) 

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 76:

Plaintiff currently does not have any pain on his head or back or peeling or 

blisters on his skin. Ex. A, pp. 118, 125.

RESPONSE NO. 76: Undisputed that Plaintiff did not have any pain on his head or back 

or peeling or blisters on his skin as of the date of his deposition in this matter.

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 77:

Mr. Cooper did not suffer a permanent scar from the alleged burn he suffered in 

June 2011. Ex. F, pp. 217-18, Ex. A, pp. 109, 10-11.

RESPONSE NO. 77: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to the term “alleged” as argument. 

Plaintiff has a scar from the burns in the area of his right shoulder blade and collarbone. 

(Cooper Dep. 108:24-109:5 (“Q. Do you have a scar in your – generally in your right 

shoulder blade up to your collarbone area?. A. Yes. Q. And what is that from? A. The 

burns.”).)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 78:

It would be reasonable that a patient would not seek consultation with a physician 

for a burn like Mr. Cooper suffered. Ex. F, pp. 234-35.

RESPONSE NO. 78: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 78 as conclusory, argument, 

speculation, improper lay opinion, and unsupported by the cited record. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c); Local Rule 56.1(a). Defendants did not designate any expert witness, and the 

deadline for doing so has passed. The proper diagnosis of Plaintiff’s burns is topic 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 31 of 34 PageID #:1720
32

requiring scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Because Dr. Funk testified 

only as a lay witness, his testimony on this issue is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 701. 

Whether it would be “reasonable” for a patient to not seek consultation with a physician 

for burns like those Plaintiff suffered is an issue for a jury. Moreover, in the cited 

testimony, Dr. Funk relies on the disputed assumption that Plaintiff’s burns were first 

degree (see response to ¶ 75, supra) and does not specify whether the hypothetical conduct 

described in Paragraph 78 would be “reasonable.” (Funk Dep. 234:1-235:14.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 79:

Mr. Cooper did not name any of the Wexford defendants in any grievance that he 

filed. Ex. A, pp. 86, 126.

RESPONSE NO. 79: Undisputed. Plaintiff did not know the names of any of the Wexford 

Defendants when he filed the grievances related to their failure to adequately treat his 

burns. (Cooper Dep. 140:5-12.) He learned their names during the litigation of this case. 

(Cooper Dep. 140:13-15.)

STATEMENT OF FACT NO. 80:

The relief requested in all four grievances by plaintiff was that he wanted the F 

house water to be turned down. Ex. A, p. 87.

RESPONSE NO. 80: Disputed. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 80 as unsupported by the 

cited evidence. In the portion of testimony cited in Paragraph 80, Plaintiff stated that, 

among other things, the grievances he filed were about Defendants’ failure to provide him 

with pain medication. (Cooper Dep. 86:23-87:2 (“Q. Okay. So what you’re complaining of 

from a medical standpoint in this grievance is that you did not receive pain medication? A. 

Correct.”) Cooper Dep. 87:21-24 (“Q. Okay. And again, you are receiving -- requesting 

medical care in terms of pain medication, true? A. Yes.”).) In his June 20, 2011 grievance, 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 32 of 34 PageID #:1720
33

Plaintiff requested that each individual who denied him medical attention be suspended 

and pay to him monetary damages. (Exhibit 2.) In his July 5, 2011 grievance, which 

incorporated by reference his June 20, 2011 grievance, Plaintiff stated “I have yet to 

receive any medication for my burns.” (Exhibit 8.) In his September 1, 2011 grievance, 

which incorporated by reference his June 20 and July 5, 2011 grievances, Plaintiff stated “I 

never received any paid medication for my burns.” (Exhibit 9.)

Dated: November 10, 2015 Respectfully submitted,

 /s/ Alex J. Maturi

Jon A. Geier

Christopher F. Allen

Alex Maturi

Paul Hastings LLP

71 South Wacker Drive

45th Floor

Chicago, IL 60606

Telephone: (312) 499-6000

Facsimile: (312) 499-6100

Email: alexmaturi@paulhastings.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF DARNELL

COOPER

 

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 33 of 34 PageID #:1720
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 10th day of November, 2015, I served true and correct copies 

of Plaintiff Darnell Cooper’s Objections and Responses to Wexford Defendants’ Local Rule 

56.1(a)(3) Statement of Facts via Electronic Mail, upon the following counsel of record for 

Defendants: 

Peter James Strauss

Cunningham, Meyer & Vedrine

One East Wacker Drive

Suite 2200

Chicago, IL 60601

(312) 578-0319

pstrauss@cmvlaw.com

/s/ Alex J. Maturi

Alex J. Maturi

Attorney for Plaintiff Darnell Cooper

Case: 1:12-cv-05625 Document #: 176 Filed: 11/10/15 Page 34 of 34 PageID #:1720