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i 

45–824 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–133] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE 

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND 

U.S. FORCES KOREA 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 12, 2008 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

MARK E. UDALL, Colorado 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

JULIE UNMACHT, Professional Staff Member 

AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2008 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 12, 2008, Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization Act—Budget Request from the U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces 

Korea ..................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 12, 2008 ................................................................................... 37 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2008 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES 

KOREA 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Bell, Gen. Burwell B. (B.B.), III, USA, Commander, United Nations Command; Commander, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea ....................................................... 7 

Keating, Adm. Timothy J., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command .............. 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bell, Gen. Burwell B. (B.B.), III ...................................................................... 83 

Keating, Adm. Timothy J. ................................................................................ 41 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Cummings .................................................................................................. 127 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 127 

Mrs. Gillibrand ................................................................................................. 127 

Mr. Sestak ......................................................................................................... 127 

Mr. Skelton ....................................................................................................... 127 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Reyes .......................................................................................................... 131 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. PACIFIC 

COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 12, 2008. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:17 p.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the 

committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Today the committee will address the posture of 

the United States Pacific Command, or PACOM, as it is known, 

and one of its major sub-unified commands, U.S. Forces Korea. 

Our witnesses are Admiral Timothy Keating, commander of 

PACOM, and General B.B. Burwell Bell, commander of the United 

States forces in Korea. 

It is great to see both of you. We appreciate your being with us 

and your testimony. 

Admiral Keating, you were recently quoted as saying the readiness of our forces is affected by combat operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. You went on to add, we are at a higher risk state. And, 

Admiral, I suspect you were engaging in an understatement when 

you said that PACOM has only had to adjust its strategic plans a 

little bit since about 30,000 PACOM troops are deployed to the 

Central Command. 

This is just one signal that we are facing increased strategic 

risks due to our commitments in Iraq. There are a number of potential flash points in the world that could be called on to deal 

with, and there are some clear examples in the Asia Pacific region, 

spanning from the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait of 

South and Southeast Asia. 

I would like to point out that in the last 31 years we have had 

12 military engagements involving American forces. And if the future is anything like the past—— 

It appears that our involvement in Iraq has preoccupied us away 

from the Asia Pacific changing strategic landscape at a time when 

we should be proactively engaged on multiple fronts. We must be 

able to pursue opportunities for security cooperation with allies and 

partners in the region, ensure that our force posture will allow us 

to deter or confront any security challenge that might emerge. 

This is concerning when China just announced another doubledigit increase in its military budget. The recent annual report on 
2 

China’s military power details China’s continuing military modernization, including missile buildup across from Taiwan. 

Moreover, there is still much we don’t know regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities. Tensions continue to flare 

across the East China Sea. Indonesia, the Philippines, continue to 

struggle against terrorism, and throughout much of Southeast 

Asia, the threat of terrorism and violence and instability remains 

extraordinarily high. And while we have been preoccupied in the 

Middle East, China and others have been expanding their influence 

in Latin America, Africa, as well as elsewhere around the globe. 

So we must maintain our focus on the Asia Pacific region and ensure that we get our level of strategic risk back within acceptable 

limits. Our own actions may well influence the choices and actions 

of others. I am encouraged by recent Department of Defense agreements involving the U.S.-China defense hotline, research in Chinese archives on Korean War MIAs and POWs, and U.S.-China 

dialogue on nuclear policy and strategy. 

There has also been success in addressing terrorism in the Philippines, and some policy movement over the last year within the 

six-party process of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. 

So I hope you will update us on the good work that you and your 

troops and your personnel are doing in the Asia Pacific area. 

As we begin our testimony, I turn to my friend, the ranking 

member, Duncan Hunter. 

I might point out, we will be having a series of votes as we have 

just finished a series and we undoubtedly will have it. We will do 

our very, very best to get through this as best we can. So let’s proceed. 

Mr. Hunter. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for having 

this hearing today. Very important hearing. 

Today we are going to receive testimony from two gentlemen who 

have traveled long distances to be with us. And Admiral Keating, 

we welcome your appearance before the committee for the first 

time in your current role as commander of the U.S. Pacific Command. 

And I would also like to take this opportunity to commend 

PACOM and the sailors of the USS Lake Erie, USS Decatur and 

USS Russell for last month’s successful intercept of a disabled National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite. Good work. 

And General Bell, welcome back as a commander for U.S. Forces 

Korea. 

Gentlemen, your testimony today on the posture of the U.S. military in your respective areas of responsibility and assessment of 

current and potential security challenges in the Asia Pacific region 

will help inform the national security policy direction and budgetary decisions this committee will make in the coming months. So 

we look forward to your testimony. 

Today’s hearing is important and gives our members an opportunity to pause and consider how new developments and potential 
3 

security challenges in the Asia Pacific region could impact the disposition of America’s forward deployed forces, our strategic partnerships in the region and how the U.S. invests in its military capabilities. 

There are a few developments in your respective areas of responsibility that are important to note. First, the Asia Pacific region 

continues to see strong economic growth, particularly in China, 

Japan and India. Second, 2007 marked a period of political transition in the region with Japan, Australia, South Korea and Thailand 

all electing new leaders. And, lastly, relations among countries in 

the region and with the U.S. continue to evolve. 

Admiral Keating, I am interested in your assessment of these 

economic and geopolitical changes in Asia and the potential impact 

on America’s defense posture in the region. 

And General Bell, I would also appreciate your thoughts regarding any impacts you have observed on the U.S.-South Korea alliance and on the future outlook for U.S. military forces on the peninsula. 

There are several key strategic security issues that require the 

United States to maintain a watchful eye. First, regionally, the rise 

of China. Fueled by its economic engine, it is now a key driver in 

defining the geopolitical and security landscape of Asia. Beyond the 

region, China’s double-digit defense spending increases, which are 

funding a massive military modernization program. We have a continued lack of military transparency regarding China’s intentions 

and capabilities, limited disclosure regarding defense decision-making and unexplained actions, such as the January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test. And all those things continue to concern us. 

So I am interested in learning how PACOM takes into account 

China’s expanding military capabilities in its strategic calculus and 

contingency planning. And specifically, I would like you to address 

China’s anti-access area denial capabilities, very key to American 

planning. 

The continued deployment of advanced cruise missiles, such as 

the supersonic SS–N–27B Sizzler and China’s growing counterspace and cyber-capabilities. These capabilities, if employed, can 

hamper our operational effectiveness. 

Further, the growing size of China’s attack submarine fleet is a 

continuing concern, particularly in light of the fact that only 65 

percent of PACOM’s presence requirements for attack submarines 

are being met with a U.S. force of what is today 52 submarines, 

but which will fall over the long term to only 41 attack submarines. 

And, you know, I looked the other day at the production figures. 

China is outstripping us in production by more than three to one. 

And if you add the boats that they are acquiring, the kilo purchases from Russia, it looks like it is five or six to one in terms 

of building their force as opposed to ours. 

Regional terrorism, particularly in Southeast Asia, continues to 

impact PACOM’s area of responsibility. Anti-American Islamist terrorist groups with ties to al Qa’ida are active in the southern Philippines and have carried out bombings, killings and other destabilizing activities. Additionally, Thailand faces an increasing Muslim insurgency in the south that further complicates the regional 

security situation. 
4 

So I look forward to a discussion on PACOM’s ongoing efforts to 

support our allies in this critical front against terrorism, particularly in terms of counterterrorism assistance and building partner 

nation capacity. 

Also, there is progress toward a denuclearized Korean peninsula 

and ongoing disablement However, much work remains. We can’t 

forget that North Korea has a capacity to produce and test nuclear 

weapons and delivery systems and a track record of proliferating 

ballistic missiles and missile technology. 

Additionally, North Korea retains a significant conventional capability with massed forces near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and 

a potential missile arsenal. 

So General Bell, I am interested in your assessment of the 

progress of the six-party talks and also your concerns about 

threats, particularly missile threats, in your area of responsibility 

(AOR). 

Of course, these evolving developments and challenges to U.S. security are not all inclusive, but they reinforce a need for this committee to be both near- and far-sighted in our deliberations and decision making regarding the Asia Pacific region. 

So, gentlemen, thanks for being with us. And please carry our 

enormous gratitude to all the men and women who wear the uniform under your command. We are very grateful. 

And lastly, General Bell, if you could tell us also about the movement of the American forces in Korea. I am particularly interested 

in how much have we moved out from underneath that artillery 

fan from the north and what the time schedules are for permanent 

establishment in the new bases. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, thanks for this very timely hearing and I look forward to the testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter, thank you very much. 

We have about six minutes now from the end of the vote. 

Admiral Keating, maybe we can squeeze you before that, then 

come back for the general. 

Admiral Keating. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN, 

COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

Admiral KEATING. Thank you, Chairman. 

Congressman Hunter and distinguished members of the committee, two points I would like to make before I begin my remarks, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Number one is to represent the heartfelt appreciation of everyone 

in the United States Pacific Command to general B.B. Bell and his 

wife Katie as they will retire this summer. And I would like to 

make it a matter of record as to how much we appreciate his service for our country over nearly four decades. 

Second, I would like to introduce our senior enlisted leader, Mr. 

Chairman. You have met him before. Chief Master Sergeant Jim 

Roy, who represents all of the wonderful enlisted men and women 

who serve our country in the Pacific. 
5 

I am grateful for the opportunity to testify today and to represent the 350,000 men and women in uniform in the United 

States Pacific Command. 

Our overall impression of our area of responsibility is one of optimism and one of hope. Our region is stable. As we say as often as 

we can, writ large, ‘‘The guns are silent in the Pacific.’’ 

There are areas of tension and of course Burma is an area of turmoil, but overall we find that throughout the region folks are very 

interested in stability and peace and the economic engine that you 

mentioned in churning and it is running on all cylinders. 

Several points that you mentioned and I would like to emphasize. There have been many elections in our area of responsibility. 

Amongst in Japan, South Korea—B.B. will talk to that—Australia 

and Thailand. In each case, I have been able to visit those countries and I am assured that the strategy of the new administrations tends to support that which we would like to see as United 

States Pacific Command, and to speak larger, that of the United 

States of America. 

I think that there is a very interesting mindset developing 

amongst the leaders, military and governmental, throughout the 

region, and that is one of collaboration. We have a broad set of 

strong bilateral relations that have been longstanding in many 

cases and are a matter of formal treaty in five cases. But I think 

that there is a measurable and very beneficial sense of multilateral 

engagement at the military and diplomatic level that is very helpful. 

It gives us an opportunity from the United States Pacific Command to lead from within. We do not have to be the only advocate 

for many programs or systems or policies. By encouraging 

multilateralism, countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines can combine to enhance maritime security in their region 

and we can influence that in a more indirect but still very positive 

and beneficial way. I think it leads to quantifiable decreases in the 

threat from Islamic extremism and violent extremism. 

Congressman Hunter, you mentioned this. In the Philippines, we 

have 500 special forces of the United States Army who are deployed in support of the armed forces of the Philippines. It is important for me to emphasize, their role is support, not kinetic military activity. We are training the trainers there in the Philippines. 

And consequently, the armed forces of the Philippines have been 

able to do a very commendable job of reducing the threat of violent 

extremism in central and southern Philippines. 

Progress, too, in Indonesia. In the area of maritime security, in 

the area of information sharing and in the areas of counterterrorism, we have been able to influence Indonesia’s behavior in a 

very important way. This is a nation with 210 million moderate 

Muslims. It is very important that we get our message right in 

working with them. 

Vehicles that we use to pass this message along include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. We have been able to deploy 

the United States Hospital Ship Mercy two years ago. She is going 

again this summer. Last year, we took the USS Peleliu, a gray 

hull, amphibious ship, took most of the marines off, replaced them 

with doctors and dentists and engineers, not all military, a number 
6 

of civilian agencies were also represented, and the Peleliu saw over 

30,000 civilians who were given first-class medical care and dental 

care and over 1,000 major surgeries were performed. 

So these outreach programs of ours are very effective and, we 

think, further reinforce this multilateral approach to the problem, 

the challenges that still exist out there. 

B.B. will address and is more qualified to address the progress 

being made in the six-party talks. That said, we are in fairly frequent dialogue with Ambassador Hill and we are optimistic. Very, 

very cautiously optimistic, but optimistic nonetheless about 

progress that we can make on the six-party talks to lead to a nuclear-free peninsula and, hopefully, peace on the peninsula. 

Challenges remain in our area of responsibility. Political conditions in Burma and Fiji are not optimum. We hope for a return to 

democratic institutions there soon. I was able to visit Thailand recently and saw firsthand the leaders of that country, political and 

military, as a result of their freely elected change in leadership 

there. 

You mentioned, both of you, the People’s Republic of China. I visited twice. I would be happy to—— 

The CHAIRMAN. We need to go vote, Admiral. Excuse me for interrupting. We will take up in just a moment. 

Mr. HUNTER. Admiral, you didn’t quite make it, did you? 

Admiral KEATING. Six minutes. Not quite. 

I will resume on China when you come back, sir. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will resume. 

I might point out that pursuant to the previous announcement, 

we will begin our questioning in this particular hearing in reverse 

order. And those that are of lesser seniority I know will take heed. 

Admiral, proceed. 

Admiral KEATING. A couple of minutes on the People’s Republic 

of China, Mr. Chairman. 

I have been able to visit China twice in the year that we have 

been at Pacific Command. I think I would characterize our relationship as uneven and a cause of some concern, but not worry. 

Congressman Hunter mentioned a couple of areas that I will discuss briefly and then I will certainly of course entertain questions. 

Anti-access and area denial weapons are a cause of concern. We 

have expressed our concern to the Chinese. We asked them to explain to us their intentions, and they choose not to. It gets to the 

difference between transparency and intent. Transparency we don’t 

think is sufficient. It is easy enough to see what they have, the 

weapons they are fielding, the systems that they are building and 

the training that they are conducting. When we ask them the reasons why they would want to develop area denial weapons, that 

seems to us inconsistent with China’s stated goal of a peaceful rise 

and harmonious integration. 

We don’t get much in the way of a discourse. So the saw isn’t 

cutting both ways. Some of those surface-to-surface and surface-toair weapons you mentioned, Congressman Hunter, we are watching 

very carefully. As they field these systems, a number of them are 

being positioned across the Strait of Taiwan. We expressed our concern to the Chinese. They counter with their concern over our po-
7 

tential arms sales to Taiwan. We try to extract ourselves from the 

tactical discussion and just tell them we are interested in peace 

and stability throughout the entire region, including the Strait of 

Taiwan. 

So we advocate continued engagement with the People’s Republic 

of China. We don’t think there is anything to be gained by trying 

to cordon them off or fence them off into a corner. That said, we 

think there has to be more reciprocity and a better understanding 

of their intentions before we are going to make the progress that 

we think is important. 

We want to keep it in as much a non-confrontational basis as we 

can. A small footnote. While I was in China the second time, in 

each of the meetings in which I was fortunate enough in which to 

participate, I asked for a phone number of the guy with whom I 

was speaking. I said, just a simple thing. I see you have a phone 

on your desk. Maybe you can give me your phone number, and that 

way I can call and thank you for the hospitality you have demonstrated. And if there should be some area that doesn’t make 

much sense to us at Pacific Command, I could call you and ask for 

an explanation. I got no phone numbers. 

We are still working on it, but that to me is kind of symptomatic 

of the Chinese reluctance to engage across the spectrum of opportunities that are there, and we are going to continue to push as hard 

as we can to get them to open up and to be more cooperative and 

collaborative partners with us and all other countries in the region. 

I would close, Mr. Chairman, by emphasizing our four priorities 

in the Pacific Command. I am happy to address questions should 

they be of interest to you. That is our warfighting readiness, our 

forward presence and force posture, the importance we attach to regional engagement, and last but most important, the quality of life 

for all of those young men and women who serve our country. For 

that quality of life support that you give us, we are grateful. We 

appreciate your support. 

I would be happy to take any questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Keating can be found in the 

Appendix on page 41.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General Bell, a special word of thanks for your service. This in 

all probability will be your last appearance before the committee. 

You are a superb soldier and a great American. We thank you. 

General Bell. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. BURWELL B. (B.B.) BELL III, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND; COMMANDER, REPUBLIC OF KOREA-UNITED STATES COMBINED FORCES 

COMMAND; AND COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES KOREA 

General BELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. 

Congressman Hunter, distinguished members of the committee, 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. 

Your support for our alliance with South Korea in an area of the 

world which is of vital interest to the United States is indeed greatly appreciated, as is your commitment to our service members who 
8 

are over there serving on the Korean peninsula 8,000 miles from 

here. 

Mr. Chairman, for the record, I would like to submit my posture 

statement. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

General BELL. Thank you, sir. 

On February 25, just last month, Lee Myung-bak was inaugurated as the President of the Republic of Korea, elected in a landslide victory. In his inaugural address before international heads of 

states, diplomats, a bunch of dignitaries, and 45,000 Korean citizens who were gathered outside there with him, he singled out the 

United States and spoke eloquently about us. 

In singling us out, he said, and I would just like to quote quickly, 

in front of all these heads of states, I might add, and he did not 

single them out. He singled out the United States, he said, ‘‘We 

will work to develop and further strengthen traditional friendly relations with the United States into a future-oriented partnership. 

Based on the deep mutual trust that exists between the two peoples, we will also strengthen our strategic alliance with the United 

States.’’ 

Lee Myung-bak spoke of a partnership that he wanted to have 

with us that would be renewed. He said that the Republic of Korea 

is entering into an extremely positive era wherein it is my estimation that the South Koreans strongly desire to reinvigorate the 

alliance that they have with us. In fact, in recent State Department 

public polling done by a very competent outfit, 75 percent of South 

Koreans viewed American military presence on the peninsula to be 

important to their national security and they wanted us to stay 

there. 

In fact, oddly enough, 68 percent of those same people polled, in 

looking at the mutual defense treaty that we have with the Republic of Korea and postulating a resolution of the North Korean issue, 

stated that even if the North Korea issue were resolved, they still 

wanted the United States to stay on the Korean peninsula. 

It is my strongest recommendation that the United States recognize that there has been a sea-change in the focus of the Republic 

of Korea and that we seize the moment and extend a reciprocating 

welcome hand to one of our most steadfast and long-term allies. 

Today the Republic of Korea is a very modern, first-world nation, 

of course rising from third-world stagnation to an economic powerhouse. It is the 11th largest economy in the world today. South 

Korea is bidding to become one of the top 10 economies. In fact, 

that is a policy goal of theirs. 

Korea is strategically located on the East Asian mainland at the 

regional nexus of an economically advancing China, resurgent Russia and an economically powerful Japan. Illustrative of this, Seoul, 

Korea, the capital of Korea, is 100 miles closer to Beijing than it 

is to Tokyo. I cannot overstate the strategic importance of a longterm alliance with the Republic of Korea to help ensure continued 

peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and I think it is of vital interest to us. 

Turning to North Korea real quick, today North Korea remains 

the single most dangerous threat to regional security in East Asia. 

With the fourth largest military in the world, North Korea con-
9 

tinues to train and ready itself for potential war. North Korea employs a military first policy in their economy while depriving its 

citizens of basic sustenance. 

North Korea focuses proportionately enormous energy on developing weapons of mass destruction and it has worked hard to develop a very sophisticated missile capability. Its past record of proliferation coupled with its recent nuclear weapons and missile development activities are a matter of great concern to all of us. 

The six-party talks process is the most viable path to achieve 

denuclearization in North Korea and I remain very hopeful that 

the North Koreans will continue to demonstrate good faith in executing the agreement. Until this full denuclearization is achieved, 

however, progress in lowering the risk to regional and even global 

peace and stability will be a bit problematic. 

Meanwhile, in working with South Korea to modernize and 

transform our alliance, we are on the threshold of transferring 

operational control of South Korean military forces in potential 

wartime from the U.S. Combined Forces Command headquarters, 

which I lead, to the South Korean military itself. This will take 

place in 2012 and this operational control (OPCON) transfer will 

realize the final step in sovereign self-reliance for the government 

of South Korea with the United States remaining, I hope, a trusted 

ally, fully committing to fighting side-by-side should that be necessary in the future. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I will conclude my opening remarks by reiterating that Korea is located at the geographical and geopolitical 

nexus of Northeast Asia. Global economic prosperity, including our 

own, is immensely dependent on continued peace and economic enterprise with our trading partners in that area of the world. 

My strongest recommendation is that the United States approach 

our alliance with South Korea from a long-term strategic perspective. Next month, President Lee Myung-bak will visit the United 

States and Washington, DC. We are indeed the first country that 

he will visit after assuming his presidency. I hope that Congress 

will embrace this very friendly, pro-U.S. and visionary South Korean leader. He is extending a welcoming hand of friendship to us, 

and I think that we best be no less forthcoming and seize this opportunity. 

In conclusion, again, it is my best judgment that our alliance 

with U.S. forces stationed in South Korea is of vital importance to 

us and that it should be a centerpiece of our foreign and our security policy throughout the 21st century and beyond, regardless of 

any future resolution of the North Korean issue. 

Thank you, sir, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Bell can be found in the Appendix on page 83.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

It may be a little difficult to call on those in the first and later 

the second row in the correct order, so please bear with me. 

Mr. Sestak. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, one quick question on China. I was curious if any damage assessment has been done after Mr. Bergersen was arrested for 

espionage? He was a specialist in the United States Command, 
10 

Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance 

and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. And whether you have been 

able to see any damage assessment from that, since it was given 

to China? 

Admiral KEATING. I have not seen it, Mr. Congressman. It is underway, but I have seen no results. Nor am I aware, perhaps more 

to the point, of—— 

Mr. SESTAK. But one is being conducted? 

Admiral KEATING. It is my understanding. It is not being done, 

as you will understand, by Pacific Command. 

Mr. SESTAK. Your testimony really goes into the C4ISR area so 

much, I was curious. I didn’t mean to ask that question, but when 

I saw your testimony—— 

General, can I ask you a question, and it goes to you, Admiral, 

also. I am taken with your report that we can meet—we are ready 

to execute our operational plan if called upon out there. And with 

my question, there is not a question we have, in my mind, the best 

military in the world, ever, today. But can it do what is required? 

Can it meet the timelines laid out in 5027, knowing that 60 percent 

of the Army’s equipment is in Iraq, knowing that our troops don’t 

come together as a cohesive unit in America until just before they 

deploy to Iraq, and knowing that there has been no training in 

armor or any artillery for a couple of years? 

I know all about the 600,000. So my question comes, if you are— 

can they meet the timelines? And it would really take some explanation if they could. And that is just a yes or no. And second, if 

you still feel comfortable about it, we used to justify our Army, and 

still do, based upon not just capability but threat scenarios. And 

the Army, as you well know, General, is well-justified upon two 

major regional contingencies. If you don’t need them for that, the 

three or four divisions that has always been required, do we need 

them now, if you are okay? 

General BELL. We cannot meet the timelines, as I currently desire them to be met. 

Mr. SESTAK. Could I ask a question, then, on that one? What is 

the risk to our 27,000 troops there, then? 

General BELL. I would judge the risk to be moderate due to our 

ability to meet the timelines. I have done a lot of work on that, 

Congressman, to come to conclusions. 

I would counter myself by reminding myself that the South Korean army is exceptional. Over 500,000—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Would you accept, then, that we don’t need them in 

the operational plan any longer, those divisions? 

General BELL. Not at all. 

Mr. SESTAK. Why? 

General BELL. What I am saying is that without our force, the 

war-gaming that I have done means that the war will take longer 

to prosecute. We will have the same outcome, success, with American forces engaged to the level which I would prefer. We get the 

job done quicker and more efficiently with less casualties. 

Mr. SESTAK. All right. 

Admiral, you have been over to China and you mentioned about 

the phone. And in 2004, we have a hotline now at the White House 

with China, and in 2004 there was an offer to do one between the 
11 

Department of Defense (DOD) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) 

over there, and I think they have come forward recently, saying 

they would like to. 

What gives you the confidence, though?—a two-part question. 

What did you find out about their intentions? Everybody wants to 

know what is their intentions. And more to the point, what makes 

you think they will pick up the phone when they really didn’t do 

it for the carrier visit, they really didn’t do it for the refueling of 

the minesweepers, and they didn’t do it for the ASAT? 

Admiral KEATING. I don’t know that they will pick up the phone, 

Congressman. And their declaration of intent is one of—extracting 

from them some declaration of intent is one of our primary goals 

is our primary goals in our dealing with the People’s Republic of 

China. 

Mr. SESTAK. Were you able to get anything out there of any intent while you were talking to them? 

Admiral KEATING. Not much, but more than I got the first time, 

Congressman, so in all of two visits, the second was more productive and more candid and slightly more forthcoming. 

Mr. SESTAK. One last question. Last year, I asked I think it was 

Admiral Fallon, sir, our submarines that you put in at Guam, we 

lose half of the time we could use them out there as a ready force 

because they have to come to Hawaii or San Diego to do their 

maintenance, about placing a dry dock there for them. They are 

ready, instead of just having four, you know how it works much 

better than I do. I did not know if there had been any thought of 

that, so that they are there all the time. Because we lose, I understand, as much as 30 to 40 percent of our submarine time out there 

because of the requirement to come back. 

Admiral KEATING. I am unaware of any plan to put a dry dock 

in Guam, Congressman—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Admiral KEATING [continuing]. But I will check. I don’t think we 

do. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 127.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Have you fully answered his question? 

Admiral KEATING. I have, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your service. 

I enjoyed the opportunity—unfortunate as it is that we have to 

break and interrupt these hearings for votes and so forth, it does 

afford some of us an opportunity to chat. I enjoyed very much the 

chat while the vote was going on. 

A couple of questions. Part of that chatting, General Bell, we 

talked very, very briefly about your proposal to make the tours in 

Korea for American forces accompanied tours. I served a little bit 

of time in Korea. My wife served an unaccompanied tour in Korea. 

My son has served an unaccompanied tour in Korea. So on first 

blush, it just seems like a mighty fine idea to me. 

But clearly there are costs and implications. Could you take my 

time, or as much of it as you may need, to just talk about your pro-
12 

posal and how you would see that unfolding and its costs and implications? 

General BELL. Thank you, Congressman. 

I may get gallowed here, because I could go on for hours, but I 

will try to be brief. 

My son was born on the East-West German border, 12 kilometers 

from two Soviet divisions, both armed with nuclear weapons, and 

98 other Warsaw Pact divisions. And my nation aggressively and 

proudly invited my family there to join me, and thus he was born 

there. We had command sponsorship at the height of the Cold War. 

I take that experience to Korea in the year 2008 and I look at 

a modern, first-world country with marvelous infrastructure, one of 

the greatest economies in the world, and I ask myself—and a North 

Korea military which is no match for the Soviet military in the 

Cold War—and I ask myself, why are we contributing to these 

operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo 

(PERSTEMPO) rates by continuing to have 90 percent of my force 

doing 1-year unaccompanied tours only to go back to the States and 

4 or 5 months later deploy back to Iraq or Afghanistan, and then 

turn around and come back to the States after Iraq or Afghanistan. 

And, sure enough, four or five months later go to Korea, when indeed with that kind of policy we are sending a continued message 

to our South Korean ally and regional partners in that area of the 

world of temporary commitment. Because a one-year rotational opportunity speaks to temporary commitment, as though it were a 

war zone. 

And, Congressman, it is not. I mean, I am not lecturing you, sir, 

but it is not a war zone. It hasn’t been for 55 years. This is a modern, first-world country. 

As we move south of Seoul, out of harm’s way, into sanctuary locations, it seems to me in this modern, first-world country of such 

strategic importance to the United States that we need to put a 

stop to this continued PERSTEMPO problem that we are creating. 

We need to send a message to our allies over there of continued 

commitment, and we need to attend to the quality of life of our 

service members by keeping them with their families as long as 

possible. 

So I am a strong proponent of normal family accompanied tours. 

I want a policy decision soon. And I would like to implement it over 

a 10-year period. We can’t do it overnight. It would add about 

17,000 family members to our location over there, which I don’t 

think is a very large number. 

So I am very much a proponent of it. I think it is right for America. It is right for our alliance. It sends the right messages. And 

it is absolutely right for our service members and their families 

and their young children. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, General. 

I can’t imagine there is much resistance from the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines who have served tours in Korea. And I know 

that my son’s family, for example, would have been happier had 

that been an accompanied tour instead of an unaccompanied tour, 

particularly in light, as you pointed out, of the repeated unaccompanied genuine combat tours that have followed. 
13 

Can you share with us where there might be resistance to the 

suggestion that you have gotten? 

General BELL. I think first in any great institution there is always just some resistance to change. I think I can overcome that. 

Sir, there are some fiscal costs here. I think the good news is— 

I mean, it is obviously not without cost. The good news is that our 

Republic of Korea ally gives us a large amount of fiscal support 

each year in what we call special measures agreement burdensharing money. This year I received in the bank $787 million from 

the Republic of Korea to help defer our stationing costs. They pay 

for local national employees exclusively. They pay for our logistics 

and sustainment and maintenance costs. And about one-third of 

that money goes into military construction, which I choose based 

on my priorities. I run it through Congress here for oversight, and 

they pay the bill. 

And so in addition to some fiscal costs that will accrue, I believe 

our ally, South Korea, will help defer some of these costs in a significant way over a 10-year period. 

So there are fiscal ramifications. But again, I am not trying to 

do this in just one year. I want to put it over a long period of time. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gillibrand. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to talk a little bit about cyber-security and cyber-warfare and what the DOD’s communication infrastructure continues 

to be doing to address it, and how PACOM intends whether or not 

to work with the Air Force to tie in their efforts with the new 

cyber-warfare command. 

Admiral KEATING. Yes, ma’am. We do. We intend to. We are in 

fact engaged with, amongst others, United States Air Force, Strategic Command, Department of Homeland Security. All of these organizations have efforts underway to improve the security on the 

unclassified side. 

There have been attacks, to be sure, or intrusions. Some we 

think from China, whether they were state-sponsored or not, I 

don’t know. So we are engaged in upgrading the firewalls and the 

overall system. That is on the unclassified side. We are of course 

paying very close attention to the classified side as well. So we are 

engaged with the Air Force and other agencies. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. And in terms of recruitment, what efforts are 

you undertaking for that, to increase the number of specialists we 

have and those who have the expertise to really not only serve 

throughout the various commands, but also to make our infrastructure in the armed services better? 

Admiral KEATING. I will have to take the specific service efforts 

for the record, if I might. I don’t know if—I would assume that the 

services are, but I don’t have anything to do with that. 

I can tell you at Pacific Command Headquarters, we are continually training our own and bringing in outside, not just military 

but civilian advisers to help us upgrade in force and upgrade our 

security. But I will find out whether the services are conducting a 

special program. I don’t know. 
14 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 127.] 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Okay. Could you—different topic. Can you update me on what our current focus is with the Philippines and 

what we intend to—how we intend to approach that now? 

Admiral KEATING. The Philippines is—yes, ma’am. The longeststanding alliance we have in the Pacific is with the Philippines. I 

have been there twice myself, have visited there many, many times 

as a younger man. 

As I mentioned, we have 500 special operations forces who are 

currently deployed to support the Philippine armed forces in their 

efforts against terrorists and undesirable elements in central and 

southern Philippines. We are making—they, the armed forces of 

the Philippines, are making significant progress in providing peace 

and stability throughout the relatively remote areas of their country. 

Maritime security and maritime domain awareness have improved significantly in the Philippines because of their singular efforts and their cooperation with Malaysia and Indonesia and Singapore. So I think from our perspective, the outlook is optimistic for 

the Republic of the Philippines. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Are there any future requirements for permanent basing? 

Admiral KEATING. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. GILLIBRAND. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conaway, please. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. 

A couple of questions. One easy one for General Bell. I will ask 

them both at the same time, and then you guys filibuster and see 

which one of you gets the most of the mike time. 

General Bell, you mentioned the North Korean army is the 

fourth largest in the world. Would you put that in context of 

lethality and what it means? 

And Admiral Keating, with respect to DOD’s recent analysis of 

China’s modernization and the growth of their military, will you 

talk to us about the implications those have and where they are 

going on that? 

And then one final one, if you have got time, is China’s recent 

denial of port calls to Hong Kong, one of them in a storm relief circumstance, and what that might mean? 

So, those three questions. Thank you. 

General BELL. Thank you, Congressman. 

North Korea has 1.2 million men under arms, active; 5 to 7 million in their reserves. The whole country is only 22 million people. 

That includes children and elderly personnel, so you can see most 

of the military-age citizenry is in the military in one way, shape 

or form. 

The country has a military-first policy economically. All of their 

economic energy goes into their military first, and whatever else is 

left goes to the citizenry. Estimates are that one-third of its gross 

domestic product (GDP) is spent on the military. Ours is about four 

percent. So you can see the magnitude of that. 
15 

They have 13,000 artillery pieces; 250 of them range Seoul, the 

capital of South Korea. So Seoul is constantly under the threat of 

artillery bombardment. They have an 80,000-man special operations force, which is only useful to them in offensive warfare. It 

is the largest special operations force in the world, larger than 

ours. They come first in their military, they are resourced the best. 

Now, this is not an army like the United States, even though it 

is twice the size of our army. They have legacy equipment. And 

when I say legacy, sir, I mean Korean War vintage equipment. 

They have little modern equipment and in terms of stacking up 

against us or the South Korean military, which is very modern 

also, it is not an even match. And so I feel very good in that regard. 

So their numbers come from strength in numbers and their 

equipment is well-maintained but very legacy and no match for 

ours. 

Admiral KEATING. Congressman, the People’s Liberation Army, 

Air Force and Navy are considerable in size. They are getting better at what they do. They have a long, long way to go. I submit 

they will not catch us, to put it in pretty stark language. 

That said, some of their programs are of concern to us. Area denial weapons, anti-access weapons, their growing submarine fleet, 

their expansion into a blue-water capable navy. We are watching 

all those very carefully. I discussed these developments with my 

counterparts in China in seeking intention again, and the response 

I get is we only intend to protect those things that are ours, say 

the Chinese, which is fair enough. 

It could provide challenges for us as demonstrated by their statement to me as they have been—one of their senior admirals said, 

‘‘We are going to start building aircraft carriers. You guys can have 

the east part of the Pacific, Hawaii to the States. We will take the 

west part of the Pacific, from Hawaii to China.’’ I was allowed to 

say we probably would not accept that bargain. 

So we are watching their developments very carefully. We are 

continuing to work with them at all levels at which we are able to 

engage to seek better insight into their intentions. It is not clear 

that they are willing to share much with us, but we are going to 

continue to work on it. 

On the issue of port calls, I visited China shortly after they refused entry of the USS Kitty Hawk as a carrier battle group and 

the two minesweepers a couple of weeks before the Kitty Hawk 

visit. I expressed our concern and our—we were sad, particularly 

about the ships that were seeking safe harbor because they were 

low on fuel and in bad weather. You just don’t do that, as mariners 

and as a nation that seeks to be admitted to the League of Nations. 

There are unwritten rules, and this is one of them. If a ship needs 

help, you provide that help. 

I expressed that concern to them. They accepted my input. Subsequent to our visit, the USS Blue Ridge, the 7th Fleet flagship, 

has been to Hong Kong and we have requests pending for two more 

carrier battle groups to visit. We are cautiously optimistic. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
16 

I just want to follow up on some of the others line of questioning. 

Talking about the military buildup and shipbuilding, you alluded 

briefly to the fact that undersea component is substantial. The New 

York Times had a story a couple of weeks ago where you were 

quoted, in fact, talking about the fact that the size of their fleet, 

in terms of numerical size of their fleet, will exceed ours by the end 

of the decade, which actually is not that far from now. 

And I guess, you know, in terms of trying to decipher intentions, 

I mean, why undersea capability? Why are they building that up? 

And I guess the other question is, what are your thoughts about 

the capability and if this is just the numbers? 

Admiral KEATING. They have about, around 65 submarines 

today, Congressman, the People’s Republic, People’s Liberation 

Army Navy (PLAN), have about 65 submarines. Half a dozen of 

them are nuclear-powered. Of those, two of them are ballistic missile-carrying nuclear submarines. 

So 4 attack boats, 2 nukes, about 58 or so diesel boats. 

They are good and getting better. Again, we spend a modest 

amount of time and treasure, if you will, in tracking them. We 

aren’t bad at that. There are times when there are Chinese submarines underway and I can’t tell you exactly where they are. 

But as you and I discussed earlier, we are not devoting every 

measure we have. We could follow them if we needed to. 

There is a capability when questioned that they, again, to which 

they don’t provide much illumination. We will continue to press 

them for intention. That said, it seems clear to me that their goal 

is beyond simply protecting that which is theirs. They are very reliant, as you would understand and I am sure know, on sea lines of 

communication for energy demands that are increasing dramatically in the People’s Republic of China. So they will want to go out 

and protect those sea lines of communication. And again, that is 

fair enough. But it is hardly anything we will yield exclusive rights 

to them. We will continue to expect and demand and exercise our 

right of free passage in international water and we want to make 

sure they understand that as well. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And I guess, you know, citing the litany of sort 

of unfortunate incidents recently, one of them involved the surfacing of a sub right near the Kitty Hawk, and I guess—what is 

your perspective in terms of how that was handled and how that 

fits in, again, to this question of trying to figure out intentions? 

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir. 

The Song submarine that popped up a couple of miles away from 

Kitty Hawk, it was in international water. They have as much right 

to be there as do we. At that time, the carrier battle group was not 

involved in anti-submarine specific operations. They were doing 

other things. It is a capability that the Navy has. We are reemphasizing the Pacific—our interest in anti-submarine warfare, technology, training and equipment. 

The use of active sonar is obviously a contentious issue these 

days. It is a skill that we emphasize and would seek. We don’t 

want to have that restricted in any way. So the ability to find and 

fix submarines like the Song, it depends on our having available 

the full suite of capabilities and using those capabilities and being 

trained in those capabilities. 
17 

Song got close. No denying it. They are allowed to be there. It 

was a harmless event. The Kitty Hawk and all of our carrier battle 

groups in that part of the world are now taking different measures 

so as to try and preclude recurrence. But they have as much right 

to be there as we do. 

Mr. COURTNEY. At a hearing just a few days ago, Mr. Hunter 

was pointing out the fact that a review of the number of mission 

requests that our submarine fleet is capable in the Pacific to satisfy 

is certainly far less than 100 percent, and I guess the question is, 

do you see that trend worsening because of the fact that you have 

got a new maritime force that is growing? And I guess the question 

is, do we have a fleet size that is adequate to deal with the change 

that is going on there? 

Admiral KEATING. It is adequate to meet need. I could use more 

submarines, and ships for that matter. The Navy intends to give 

us about 60 percent of the fleet, writ large, and it kind of goes back 

to Congress and the question are we ready—are we positioned and 

ready and equipped to meet requirements? We are. 

Risk increases as the number of potential threat vessels increase, 

but today I can satisfy the requirements that have been levied 

upon me by the Secretary of Defense. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Okay, Admiral. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Admiral, General, thank you very much for your service. 

I am the congressional co-chair of the India Caucus and, Admiral 

Keating, I am very interested in the developing relationship, the 

warm relationship and partnership that we have with the Republic 

of India. 

Incredibly, my interest in India developed because my father 

served during World War II in the 14th Air Force in India and also 

in China, and he told me how entrepreneurial the people of India 

are. And it is all coming to fruition in a very positive way. 

Can you tell us about the inter-military cooperation and the various training exercises that have occurred? 

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Things are good with India and getting better. I was a flag lieutenant to the then Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, Admiral 

Crowell, and he visited India. I was fortunate enough to sit behind 

him in some of those meetings. The reception he got was, I would 

characterize as chilly. 

I went in August. The reception was warm and engaging and accommodating and gracious. The Indian military, all branches, are 

eager to engage with the United States. They are anxious to have 

their officers and noncommissioned officers attend our war colleges 

and service schools. We participated with India in exercise Malabar 

in the Bay of Bengal. Two U.S. aircraft carriers, the Indian aircraft 

carrier and ships from Singapore, Japan and Australia. So five nations represented in navy and some air forces. 

They were able to communicate on a secure circuit, 24 hours a 

day, for the duration of the exercise. It was a very sophisticated 
18 

and demanding exercise. It wasn’t just positioning of ships. Unprecedented in our experience. 

So our relations are warm, they are open, they are candid and 

they are advancing with the Indian military. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

And indeed, General, I share your positive view of the deepening 

relationship we have with the Republic of Korea. It is really exciting, and I appreciate your hospitality to have visited there and 

seen our troops and how inspiring they are. 

I am very pleased that Congress Members Ed Royce and Ellen 

Tauscher have introduced legislation, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)+3, in regard to military sales. 

How do you feel this would effect the relationship between our 

great ally, Korea, and the United States? 

General BELL. Congressman, thank you. 

It is a great question, and I would like to answer it straight up. 

South Korea has a foreign military sales status with us called 

major non-NATO ally. That is a step below this thing called 

NATO+3. Interestingly enough, in this era, in the NATO+3 countries are five former Warsaw Pact countries and three former Soviet states who now enjoy a higher foreign military sales (FMS) 

status than does our most reliable ally, South Korea, who, I might 

add, is our largest customer every year, year in and year out. 

So it is, from my perspective, bizarre and strange that we would 

give a higher level of foreign military sales status to anyone other 

than the Republic of Korea. I believe we should go to NATO+4, and 

that fourth would be the Republic of Korea. 

Now, just briefly, we generally provide them with what they 

need, and I don’t think they have been overly restricted. But it 

sends the wrong message to our ally that somehow their status in 

our eyes is below former Warsaw Pact countries. And I just don’t 

think that is right. 

Republic of Korea fought with us in Vietnam, sent troops to 

Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring 

Freedom (OEF), and now has 350 soldiers in southern Lebanon, 

and I don’t know that all those other countries have that same battle record. 

Thank you, Congressman, I appreciate it. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you so much for citing their—I have actually visited with their troops in Kabul and Baghdad. I had the 

opportunity to visit a provincial reconstruction team led by our Korean allies. And so I look forward to working with Congresswoman 

Tauscher and Congressman Royce. 

Thank you very much. I yield the balance of my time. 

General BELL. Thank you, Congressman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Larsen, I think we can get you before we break for what 

could possibly be three votes. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. I think a lot of us would be happy to go to the floor 

if there were actually three whole votes being taken instead of just 

one. I will look forward to that. 

First question is for Admiral Keating. When we were in Japan 

in January, we discussed with some of the U.S. Forces Japan folks 
19 

about the command and control issues with regard to ballistic missile defense between the U.S. and Japan, and there was some discussion about the progress being made on those discussions with 

the command and control working group out of PACOM. Can you 

briefly give us an update on where that command and control (C2) 

discussion is? 

Admiral KEATING. The study is not concluded. It is still underway, as you probably know, Congressman. 

That said, there are no obstacles that have come to my attention. 

As you know, the Japanese launched a surface-to-air missile and 

hit the intended target in the Pacific missile range facility around 

Thanksgiving, and that command and control structure was exercised in a very demanding real-world scenario. 

So I am satisfied that progress is being made, and I don’t see any 

insurmountable obstacles. 

Mr. LARSEN. Look forward to hearing more about that. 

On page 11 of your testimony, you said you welcome new resources for persistent surveillance, pages 11 and 12. Can you identify which resources, which assets, would be best for you? 

Admiral KEATING. I would rather take that and give it back to 

you in a classified response, if I could. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. LARSEN. I will look forward to that, then, as well. 

General Bell, you mentioned the infrastructure investment in 

normalization. I needed to let you know that when my spouse was 

in Korea with me, that morning we spent with you, there out with 

the spouses and probably your best advocates are the spouses of 

the folks who are stationed there, there were a few of them there. 

In fact, my spouse had her finger shaking in my face, saying, 

‘‘When are you going to take care of this problem.’’ Not soon 

enough for her, I guess. 

So you talked about normalization. You talked about the foreign 

military sales status changes. But there are some other issues that 

you discussed with us there. 

I recall that you said that the incoming president, now president 

of Korea, said he—I think your impression was that he wasn’t 

against continuing forward on the op con transfer. There was some 

discussion about it in the election. Can you give us a more firm 

view on the new president’s view on op con transfer? 

General BELL. Congressman, I can. He and his subordinates, the 

minister of national defense, the national security adviser, et 

cetera, have all said in front of their own committees and to me 

that they, one, support op con transfer, that they are absolutely 

committed to accomplishing it by 17 April 2012. We have agreed 

to a timeline and we have signed those timelines. 

All they have asked for at this point is a good review process to 

see how we are doing against those timelines. I am very confident 

we will meet all the objectives of the timelines. I don’t see any obstacles at all. 

I am very confident that we will do what is right for this alliance. We will take down the lightning rod for periodic anti-American sentiment, which can be a foreign officer commanding your 

military in wartime, me, and it will be healthy for our alliance. 
20 

And I am very optimistic about it. We are in good shape and this 

government is supportive. 

Mr. LARSEN. So the review is not over whether or not to do the 

transfer? It is just to have some auditing, that timelines are getting 

met to move to the transfer? 

General BELL. That is correct, Congressman. 

Mr. LARSEN. Great. Thanks. 

Another issue you discussed, and I don’t know if you want to discuss it here, but I will bring it up. Between op con transfer, normalization, foreign military status change, it is starting to get to 

look like a, you know, how we ought to approach the Republic of 

Korea (ROK)-U.S. alliance well into the future. A lot of steps. 

One thing you mentioned to us was the idea of what you called 

a strategic pause in the ROK drawdown of U.S. forces. Can you 

chat a little bit with us about that and what the implications of 

that might be? 

General BELL. Well, we have drawn down our force to approximately 28,500 right now from a high of 37,000 just a couple of 

years ago. So about 9,000 troops have come off the peninsula in the 

last four years. 

If we complete our drawdown, that would require us to take 

down another 3,000, leaving us at 25,000. I believe the Republic of 

Korea is going to ask us, and perhaps when President Lee Myungbak visits here, if we will have a pause in that to study the future 

requirements. 

If he does ask for that pause, I think it would be prudent for the 

United States to agree to sit down and discuss the issue and then 

potentially execute a pause based on those discussions. 

And that is really all I know right now. We will have to wait and 

see what they ask for. 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. Appreciate that very much. 

Thank you, General. Thank you, Admiral. 

General BELL. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

I think we honestly ought to break, and I understand we have 

three to five votes. So, gentlemen, have patience. 

[Recess.] 

Dr. SNYDER [presiding]. We are going to go ahead and get started. I think Chairman Skelton is going to be 10 or 15 minutes before he gets back. 

Where are we at? 

Mr. Franks for five minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, I always try to express my appreciation to the people 

from the armed forces that appear before this committee, because 

we just want to always remind ourselves here that apart from your 

courage and your commitment and sacrifice, none of us could be 

here. And the idea of a free republic would just simply be a fantasy 

in the world. So thank you so very much. 

Admiral Keating, I, to just say a word further, I think you personify everything the sailors would like to be when they grow up. 

I am just grateful for your example and for—— 

Admiral KEATING. I hope my wife and kids are watching. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I hope they are, too. 
21 

But last year, you signed a letter in support of space radar. And 

you advocated it, you know, as a combatant commander, that your 

need for the capabilities that the system would provide, that would 

include open ocean surveillance and moving target indications from 

territory that would be denied to aircraft. 

And as you probably know—just for the record, space radar is 

not built in my district. As you may know, space radar program 

has been effectively cancelled, in a sense, unless it emerges in some 

other form, in some other area. 

And so I guess my question to you is, does the U.S. Pacific Command still require these capabilities? It is a pretty heavy question. 

Admiral KEATING. Thank you, Congressman. 

In Pacific Command the requirement does exist. That has not diminished in any way. In fact, it is at least as pressing, if not a 

more pressing requirement, today than it was when I signed the 

letter. 

It goes to Congressman Larsen’s question. Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance are an abiding concern of ours for the entire AOR. There is, of course, a large maritime aspect to that. 

So open ocean surveillance and denied area surveillance is a significant requirement of ours, and the platform that satisfies the requirement is of less interest in its specifics than is the overarching 

requirement. The requirement still exists. 

Mr. FRANKS. I understand. 

Space radar is a tough one to replace with just one capability, 

as you know. But thank you, sir. 

General Bell, I had the wonderful privilege of coming over to 

South Korea and visiting you, along with Mr. Akin and Mr. Larsen 

and Ms. Tauscher, and what an enlightening trip that was. And I 

want you to know I appreciate you and I think that we are very 

fortunate to have your service there. 

I understand that you have recommended that the U.S. set a cooperative policy to maintain a meaningful troop presence on the 

Korean peninsula, even if there is a peace treaty signed with North 

Korea. And I wonder if you could expand on that a little. 

General BELL. Thank you, Congressman. 

I am of a mind that that region of the world is of vital national 

interest to the United States. Twenty-five percent of the world’s 

trade today flows through that area, and that is growing. 

South Korea itself is our seventh largest trading partner. And of 

course, right next to us, China, one of our big trading partners, obviously, as is Japan. And of course, that area of the world is an 

area over history that has been fraught with any number of clashes 

and wars and confrontations that have destabilized the region and, 

indeed, the world. 

And my sense is that U.S. presence on the Asian mainland, in 

the Republic of Korea, is a stabilizing influence, and that irrespective of the resolution of the North Korea issue, that it is in our interest, because of our trading partnership and our desire for stability and security in that area of the world, it is in our interest 

to have a long-term relationship, not unlike we have today in Europe. 

So I am advocating that we recast the alliance as something beyond simply a confrontational alliance to prevent aggression 
22 

against South Korea by North Korea and recognize that the treaty 

we signed in 1953 doesn’t even mention North Korea. It talks about 

mutual defense against any aggression in the Pacific region on either partner. And I think the way the treaty is written is exactly 

right and we ought to cast it in that light. And I think it is in our 

interest to do that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, sir. 

You also, in appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, you projected a need for South Korean military and private 

facilities to be protected from the North Korean missile capability 

and that South Korea should set up a missile shield against potentially incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles or just whatever 

it might be, and adding that it should be compatible with the U.S. 

system. 

And I wonder if you could expand on that a little bit. It seemed 

very important to me when we were there. 

General BELL. Thank you, Congressman. 

North Korea has a wide variety of legacy and modern missiles, 

and we project that there are about 800 of them operational now. 

Most of them, theater ballistic missiles. Relatively short-range, but 

they range the entirety of the Korean peninsula. 

I have got Patriot batteries over there right now protecting sensitive U.S. sites, mostly aviation sites, et cetera. 

The Republic of Korea does not have a complementary system 

fielded right now. I think it is in their interest that they do that. 

They have begun to approach this properly, I think. They are going 

to purchase German Pat-2 Patriots. That is a start. And they are, 

of course, fielding Aegis destroyers now, not equipped with theater 

ballistic missile (TBM) capability, but they do have the radars onboard, which are very important. 

And so I think it is in their interest to look more directly at the 

anti-theater ballistic missile capacity, partner better with us and 

fully integrate with our capacity, so that they can provide a more 

protective envelope for their nation. And there is even opportunity 

to go beyond that into the region. 

And so I think it is in their interest, and I am arguing strongly 

for it. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Cummings for five minutes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Keating, I just have a few questions about China. 

DOD’s recently-released annual report on China’s military power 

notes that China has recently agreed to begin submitting an annual report to the United Nations on its military expenditures. 

How significant is this development in terms of increasing China’s 

transparency? 

Admiral KEATING. Any indication by the Chinese of their strategy, of their intention, we welcome. I would be surprised if this 

were a terribly illuminating document they send the United Nations, Congressman. 

Nonetheless, any—as I say any disclosure that they make, any 

document that they sign, would be of benefit. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And so you have little confidence that they will 

release anything very meaningful? Is that what you are saying? 
23 

Admiral KEATING. My personal experience would recommend 

they would not be very forthcoming, Congressman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Roughly how many PACOM military personnel 

speak the Mandarin Chinese language? Do you know? 

Admiral KEATING. I don’t. I will take that one and get back to 

you, Congressman. I do not know. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 127.] 

Mr. CUMMINGS. How important are language skills to U.S.-China 

security cooperation? How important is that? Do we have programs 

in place to strengthen those skills? 

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir. We do have programs in place. And 

it gives us an appreciation, a better appreciation than those who 

don’t speak Mandarin or any of the Chinese languages, for their 

culture and their way of thinking. And that is proving to be somewhat problematic for us. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And section 1201 of the fiscal year 2000 National 

Defense Authorization Act restricts inappropriate exposure of the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to certain operational areas and requires annual reports to Congress on all contacts with the PLA. Is 

the provision still relevant or necessary given the progress on the 

United States-China military engagement over recent years? 

Admiral KEATING. I think it is relevant, Congressman. It does 

not restrict us. You will notice, if I understand the language right, 

it doesn’t require our permission to engage. It just requires us to 

notify once the contact has been made. And in any case, we are increasing the engagement opportunities and their participation, albeit limited in exercises. So that language does not restrict us, Congressman. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Finally, on February 29, 2008, the United States 

and China signed that agreement establishing the defense hotline 

between the two defense establishments. It is China’s only such defense hotline with another country at the defense ministerial level. 

Installation of equipment is scheduled to begin in a few weeks. 

What is the potential of this hotline to enhance communication 

and avoid miscalculations between the United States and China? 

Admiral KEATING. Congressman, I think the installation of the 

hotline is a significant step. It is not the end-game. It is not where 

we want to end up with the Chinese Ministry of Defense or the 

Liberation Army officials, but it is a significant first step. 

And as Congressman Sestak mentioned earlier, there is no guarantee the Chinese will answer the phone. And that is a little glib, 

but our dealings with the Chinese officials have been characterized 

by that exact event occuring. In the case of the EP–3 that went 

down, there were hours that went by when we kept trying to get 

someone to answer the phone. Literally, they did not. 

So installation of the hotline, a significant step forward. It is 

progress, but it is not end-state. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman, for five minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
24 

Admiral Keating, thank you for being here today in this hearing. 

This is my first as a member of this great committee and I am 

humbled to be part of these proceedings. 

Recently I visited Dahlgren Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, 

Virginia. In fact, it was the day after the successful targeting and 

destruction of our imagery satellite last month. 

Can you tell me what your assessment is of China’s and Russia’s 

response to this operation? Do you expect that China will continue 

to demonstrate their own anti-satellite capabilities? 

Admiral KEATING. Congressman, the shortest answer is, I am not 

sure how China and Russia are reacting. China’s initial reaction 

was muted, as was to the best of my understanding Russia’s, which 

is interesting to us. 

I think it is indicative of our transparency and our stated intentions from all levels of the federal government. We told the world 

what we were going to do. We told them about when we were going 

to do it, about where. And it turns out that we ‘‘hit what we were 

aiming at.’’ 

As opposed to the Chinese, who didn’t tell anybody they were 

going to, outside of—and there were many in their own government 

who didn’t know they were going to attempt and they succeeded in 

hitting one of their weather satellites. 

So their response has been muted. I think that is a favorable reaction, if you will. There was not a significant outcry. I have not 

been to China since our shoot down. I am looking forward to the 

opportunity to engage with them on that, because we were very 

critical of their—the lack of transparency that they demonstrated 

in their shoot down. So I look forward to the conversation. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance of 

my time. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Taylor, for five minutes. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Keating and General, thank you very much for being 

here. 

Admiral Keating, on page 18 of your testimony, I am quoting, 

‘‘The Army downloaded APS force stock equipment to support the 

Iraq-bound Army units.’’ 

It is my understanding that the typical National Guard and Reserve unit is operating at about 60 percent of their equipment assignments. If you were to have a running start, although unlikely, 

but a running start conflict with the North Koreans today, what 

equipment do you have? What is your equipment percentages on 

the Korean peninsula? 

Admiral KEATING. Would you like—B.B. knows more about it 

than I do, Congressman. 

General BELL. I will take the first part of that. 

Our Army prepositioned stock (APS) force stock on the Korean 

mainland, which I control, run by the Army Materiel Command, is 

in top-notch condition. I have tested it. I have brought Army troops 

over from the continental United States, drawn a sampling of that 

equipment, taken it to the range and shot it, interviewed the troops 

myself at your encouragement, and I was very, very pleased. 

So on the peninsula, we are in good shape. Our issue, of 

course—— 
25 

Mr. TAYLOR. General, what does good shape translate to percentage wise? 

General BELL. We have 100 percent of our combat equipment. 

We have 96 percent of all the equipment authorized. And it is at 

97 percent operational readiness rate. 

Mr. TAYLOR. In the entire Pacific Command, given, again, hopefully, a very unlikely scenario, the Chinese move on Taiwan, how 

would you rate your equipment stocks, Admiral? 

Admiral KEATING. The Navy and Air Force equipment stocks are 

at 100 percent, and with commensurate readiness levels for that 

equipment. The Marine Corps has used one of their two afloat preposition ships and are replenishing that as we speak. So Air Force 

and Navy are at 100 percent and Marine Corps is at 50 percent 

and climbing. 

Mr. TAYLOR. If you were in a position to request assets and you 

were offered either two DD1000s or five DDG51s with enhanced radars, and you were given one or the other package to take for your 

command, what would you prefer to have? 

Admiral KEATING. Five over two. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Is there anything in particular about the 51—I am 

sorry, about the 1000, that is of particular interest to the Pacific 

Command? Or to take it a step further, in your opinion, should you 

and I be fortunate enough to have this job for another 10 years, 

would you rather have the 1000 or a nuclear-powered cruiser? I realize this is not something that is going to happen overnight, but 

it is something that your successor—— 

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir. I would recommend the 1000. I have 

had the benefit of deploying on nuclear-powered aircraft carriers 

and have enjoyed the advantages attendant to that nuclear power 

plant, Congressman. But for a cruiser with the logistic capabilities 

that are resident in the Navy today, I do not think that nuclear 

power for a cruiser is as important as the other capabilities that 

might be resident in the E1000. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Can I remind you of your earlier statement, about 

the need for the fleet to pull into port because it was low on fuel? 

Would that happen with a nuclear cruiser? 

Admiral KEATING. It is less likely to happen with a nuclear cruiser. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Would Admiral Houser have sailed into the typhoon 

off of the Philippines at Christmastime of 1944 if his destroyers 

were full of fuel? 

Admiral KEATING. It would not as likely have happened with nuclear power. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. 

Thank you very much. Thank both of you for your service. And 

if there is—and again, I am concerned. There are obviously the 

known costs of this war. Kids lying up at Walter Reed, Bethesda, 

kids at Arlington. I am concerned of the unknown costs of this war, 

as far as equipment being worn out and not replaced. And I would 

hope that in your leadership capacities, you would make us aware 

of what needs to get done. 

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
26 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes, for five minutes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, thank you for being here. And General. 

Admiral, I have two questions for you, both of them relating to 

China. The first one that has been a concern of our committee is, 

obviously, our flagships are sending our carriers anywhere around 

the world, and the carrier groups that are there. We are sending 

one of the most expensive assets we have any time we have a conflict. And we are loading it with thousands of the best men and 

women we have and some of the most expensive airplanes. 

One of the threats to those carriers are the threat-d missiles, 

particularly the Sizzler. And we know that China has armed their 

submarines with those missiles now. We also know the Russians 

are trying to sell them on the world scene, perhaps even to countries like Iran, even though we don’t know that for certain. 

The question I would have for you related to that particular mis- sile is, are we confident now that we can stop it? We put a $10 million add in the budget last year to make sure we could develop the 

defense, and as I understand it we won’t have that defense ready 

until 2014. Is there anything we can do from this committee in 

terms of either scheduling or funding that could help ratchet that 

time period up? That is the first question I have. 

And the second one relates to the March 22nd referendum that 

is going to take place in Taiwan. You and I have talked about this 

before, but, you know, everything we have heard from our Taiwanese contacts, be they political or military or academic, is that 

they may take some kind of action, depending on how that referendum might come out. Can you just give us your assessment of 

what that looks like and what that particular action could be if 

China were to react? 

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir. 

On the first question, Congressman, I recently appeared before 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to express Pacific Command’s concern for 

our electronic warfare, electronic countermeasures status. It is of 

concern to us in the Pacific Command, principally because of People’s Liberation Army, Navy and Air Force developments. 

We talk about area denial weapons and anti-access weapons. Included in that arsenal are the weapons that you are discussing. 

The Department chooses where to spend its money, of course. 

Any and all emphasis we can get from you to improve the status 

of electronic warfare, research and development would be appreciated. The missile you described in a very sophisticated piece of 

hardware and we are currently not as capable of defending against 

that missile as I would like. 

On the Taiwan referendum, which is in two weeks, I guess, on 

the 22nd, the indications we get, Congressman, are the referendum 

will fail. We hope it does, frankly. If it passes, China will likely 

take some to significant umbrage at the passage and their response 

is unpredictable. 

We are prepared for various alternatives at the Pacific Command, military options. We have forces that are positioned in anticipation of potential activity. I do not foresee it happening, but 

the Chinese have made it clear to us that they view this ref-
27 

erendum with some concern. Should it pass, their response is unpredictable and it could potentially include a military option. 

Mr. FORBES. One follow-up question to that, back on the Sizzler. The $10 million that we put in the budget that we did direct toward developing a defense for that, is that adequate in terms of 

dollars? What is it that is delaying us until 2014? Some of us are 

a little bit uncomfortable going from now to 2014 not having a defense that we feel comfortable with on that missile. 

Is there something we can do in terms of increased funding that 

would assist that, directed at that defense? Or is there something 

we can do to help in the scheduling that might ratchet that up 

from 2014 to a closer time period? 

Admiral KEATING. Congressman, let me take that one and get 

you a specific response. Beyond my—we could use anything we can 

get as soon as we get it, which is not satisfactory. It happens to 

be the truth. But let me get you a detailed response as to what activity—what action your committee could take that would be helpful in terms of funding and priorities and timelines. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 127.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you Admiral. 

Thank you General. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Ortiz for five minutes. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you so much for joining us today. Good to see both of you. 

Admiral Keating, with the Global War on Terror focused on the 

Central Command area of responsibility, and I know it is a huge, 

huge area, but we do have efforts to defeat the war on terrorism. 

And I know that fortunately this area of responsibility includes the 

Philippines and Indonesia and other areas now. 

How do we do to defeat this huge problem that we have? And are 

you happy with the tools that you have? 

Admiral KEATING. It is our number one challenge, Mr. Congressman, the struggle against violent extremists in the Asia Pacific region. 

I am more concerned with that than I am with, let’s say, North 

Korea or the People’s Republic of China or any—it is my number 

one concern, our number one concern. 

The progress we are making, I think, is significant. There is, of 

course, much yet to do. We are undertaking as broad an effort as 

I think we can. It is not just military only. It is an interagency, 

interdisciplinary, inter-governmental approach. And we are also 

emphasizing this to our commercial partners. 

A simple example is the Container Security Initiative. The more 

secure each of these systems is and the more interlocked those systems are, the greater the chance that the terrorists will be unable 

to prosecute their attacks, the tougher it is for them to move 

around, and the more demanding it is for their suppliers to get 

them money and logistical support. 

So it is hardly a United States military initiative only, though we 

are as often as we can taking the lead. Examples include the 500 

special forces we have in the Philippines. Examples include the 

support we are giving to Indonesia and Malaysia and Singapore for 
28 

counterterrorism efforts in their country, the support that we are 

providing countries who aren’t quite so prominent on the radar 

scope, like Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In each of those cases, we 

are providing training, we are providing information and, in some 

cases, sanitized intelligence, all intended to make it tougher for terrorists to move around, tougher for terrorists to seek sanctuary and 

to find sanctuary, and tougher for their supporters to get them the 

supplies that they need. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Is your budget adequate to address those issues that 

you just mentioned? 

Admiral KEATING. Congressman, it is. 

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, one of the things that I worry about is that 

if we have to respond to those areas, one of the concerns that I 

have is sustainability. Are you satisfied with what we have, to be 

able to sustain those troops in case there is an emergency there, 

in case a conflict arises? Because I know in that area, you know, 

fuel has become a very precious commodity, especially at over almost four dollars a gallon. 

So do you think you will be able to sustain your troops if the 

need came to that? 

Admiral KEATING. We do, Congressman. We assess and reassess 

and reassess constantly, on a daily basis, in our headquarters. And 

I report my evaluation to the Secretary of Defense on a monthly 

basis. Our assessment today reflects the state of affairs since I 

have been in command, and that is we are adequately resourced to 

meet the requirements that are levied upon us. 

To be sure, and as we mentioned earlier, we would have to make 

adjustments to the execution of some of our plans, and we would 

take a little bit longer in the achievement of success—as we 

achieve success. On the sustainment piece, we have been able to 

reinforce the stocks ashore and afloat and, as referenced in Congressman Taylor’s question, and we are—for example, we have two 

carrier battle groups forward-deployed today. We have six B–52s in 

Guam. There are three B–2s remaining there. We have an SSGN, 

one of the new Tomahawk-shooting ballistic submarine boats, 

former ballistic missile boats. 

So we are adequately resourced to be able to provide the 

sustainment that the troops need. 

Mr. ORTIZ. My time is about up now, but I want to thank both 

of you for your service to our country and thank you for the great 

job that you all do. 

Thank you, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin for five minutes. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you very much. 

You are all very patient. I think we have had a few interruptions. 

But just to get to the point and maybe give you about the third 

kick at the cat, General Bell, but we had a fantastic congressional 

delegation (CODEL) looking at missile defense and also a visit to 

South Korea. And you made the points there, and you have made 

them here this afternoon, the geopolitical importance of what is 

going on. 

And it seems to me that what you are saying is, if you could use 

South Korea the way the basing is set up so that people could take 
29 

their wives and kids and all, it solves a number of different problems. What are, first of all, the immediate benefits for doing something like that? 

General BELL. Well, the immediate benefits of having our families with us, of course, it makes us a happier military. Nothing 

makes a service member less happy than being separated from his 

or her family. 

Clearly, with the combat rotations that we have now and the fact 

that we are a volunteer force, these rotations are very complex for 

all of our service members. So the immediate benefit would be to 

slow that process down. 

Mr. AKIN. So it helps in the operational tempo thing, which is 

a problem all across the board for us, right? 

General BELL. Operationally, it would help me because if I have 

a service member there, like in Europe or Japan, for three years 

instead of one year, not only do I have stability in the ranks, but 

I have got an experienced service member who doesn’t have to relearn everything once a year after an exercise. So operationally, it 

is of great import. 

So just from a force readiness and a compassion perspective, having your families with you is a very important matter overseas. 

I think it also sends a very powerful message of commitment to 

our allies and to our friends and partners in the region. If we are 

willing to have our families with us, then we must be committed. 

And we are committed. By not having our families there and having one-year short rotations, it argues that we are waiting for 

something to be over and then we will be done with it and leave 

because of the kind of rotations that we currently have. 

So I would like to end that process and establish some kind of 

permanent approach to our garrisoning over there. And I think we 

will all win from it. I know we will. There will be a fiscal cost, but 

it is moderate at worst, and I think with host nation resourcing 

that it can be mitigated very well over about a 10-year period, and 

that is what I am advocating. A 10-year transition period, not 

something next Thursday. 

Mr. AKIN. So if you did have a 10-year transition period, as you 

are talking about, would it be possible then to start increasing the 

number of families who have wives and kids? In other words, you 

build some facilities, you could bring some in—— 

General BELL. Absolutely. 

Mr. AKIN [continuing]. And as you build more—and I think you 

said that the South Koreans have already partnered with us. They 

have got some real estate that they have got laid out. They are 

going to help with it. So it is a matter of us just finishing our commitment to that project. Is that correct? 

General BELL. Yes, sir. They are aggressively pursuing their end 

of the bargain already. They have spent about $2 billion cash. They 

are committed and the commitment is not against dollars. It is 

against projects. But it is about $7 billion to $8 billion total that 

they are helping us in our move. 

Mr. AKIN. What do we need, just to sort of cut to the chase here, 

what specific thing should we look for in the budget to see—or do 

we need to put in the budget—what authorities do you need? First 
30 

of all, you need some TRICARE, so you have got some kind of a 

medical plan over there. Is that correct? 

General BELL. The first thing I need, Congressman, is a policy 

decision in the Department of Defense, and I am working with 

DOD, because there are a lot of ramifications for this. And as of 

this moment, that policy decision has not been completed. So I am 

arguing for it, but without the correct policy with regard to stationing, then certainly I am limited in what I can do. 

But I can do some things myself, and I have. For example, I can 

increase command sponsorships for those service members who are 

currently authorized over there and allow some additional families 

as far as the facilities that I can procure. So I need more child development centers. I need more DOD school systems. I need more 

medical facilities, certainly, to do this. And I would put that in 

place over a period of 10 years. 

And I think as we ramped up with our families, about 17,000 additional family members, potentially, I am not sure that many 

would actually show up, but that many possibly, over a 10-year period, is about 700 or 800 a year, and we can easily absorb that in 

our maintenance and building programs, in my view. And after 10 

years from now, we will have a fully functioning, three-year command sponsorship tour over there. 

Mr. AKIN. And that would certainly show a good commitment to 

the Koreans that have been with us—— 

General BELL. It would. 

Mr. AKIN [continuing]. Ever since Vietnam and every other place. 

They have been a good ally, as you have mentioned, and it does 

send a message to the entire region. 

I just hope that you know you have got some good support for 

that from members of the committee here. Certainly Congresswoman Tauscher, who led the CODEL, I think is very much onboard, and a number of others. So we want to try to see that. It 

seems like a good, logical investment overall. 

General BELL. Thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. AKIN. And, again, I want to just thank everybody here for 

your service and your good work and all. So thank you for the 

afternoon. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Akin. 

I am going to take my five minutes now. 

Admiral Keating, during the last vote, several series of votes, I 

happened to run through the cloakroom over there, and once again 

there was more cable news discussion of Admiral Fallon’s resignation. 

You know, I didn’t know him well, personally. We always enjoyed 

the exchanges with him here. And so I have two emotions. One of 

them is sadness, because I have such great respect for this very 

small number of people that occupy the niche. I guess, what, five? 

Are there five of you combatant commanders? 

I mean, since the time I got here, I remember having a discussion with Ron Dellums, you know, the big Oakland radical who 

came out here, Oakland radical self-described. 

And after I had been here a few months, you know, I grabbed 

him after one of these hearings and I said, ‘‘These guys, these combatant commanders, who are these guys?’’ And Ron said, ‘‘I go back 
31 

home and talk to all my friends and I say these guys are the pinnacle of what America has to offer.’’ And I still believe that, and 

I include you in that group. 

Admiral KEATING. Thank you. 

Dr. SNYDER. So it is with great sadness that I see that Admiral 

Fallon left. 

And the other emotion—and maybe it was completely appropriate for him to leave. I don’t understand. I can’t see through the 

dark glass. But from this perspective, we get apprehensive about 

what does this potentially mean when we have a fellow that we did 

have great respect for, still have great respect for, who we valued 

his candor, both in private and publicly. 

So my question for you is, recognizing it is a delicate question for 

me to ask you, but what kind of apprehensions or concerns does it 

create for you as a combatant commander in terms of, as you look 

at what you are supposed to say either here at this hearing or as 

the press grab you walking out of this room or the kinds of lengthy 

interviews that apparently led to the magazine article? Any comment you want to make or not make, I would appreciate. 

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Fallon is a good friend. I worked for him and with him 

for decades and, like you, I am sad that he is leaving the service, 

period. 

I feel no apprehension, Congressman, in my current position, as 

to my ability or my responsibility to express opinions dissenting or 

supporting for administration policy or departmental policy. I 

promise you, I come in here without any muzzle, either implicitly 

or explicitly applied by any of my superiors. 

I have had the good fortune of spending some time with the 

President and at the National Security Council, in the Department 

of Defense with all manner of officials, and never once has there 

ever been an intimation of any desire to restrict my ability to express my personal and professional opinion. So I have no apprehension at all, sir. 

Dr. SNYDER. I appreciate your comments. 

I want to shift and ask a specific question which, coincidentally, 

is related to Admiral Fallon’s testimony here within the last week. 

He testified in response to some questions, first from Congresswoman Sanchez and then I think from Mr. Thornberry, that he felt 

that right now, today, in addition to the 3,400 or 3,500 Marines 

that are coming onboard in Afghanistan, that he needed 2,000 additional Marines. 

The following day, I think it was the following day, the commandant of the Marine Corps was sitting where General Bell is, 

and I asked him, ‘‘Do you have the ability to provide 2,000 additional Marines?’’ And he said he did not. 

You were quoted not all that long ago in a ‘‘Boston Globe’’ article 

saying, I will just read your quote as they quoted you, ‘‘We have 

had to adjust our strategic plans a little bit because of the 30-some 

thousand Marines and soldiers who ordinarily are in our area but 

are not.’’ That was your quote, ‘‘who are ordinarily in our area but 

are not.’’ 

My question is, I assume if somebody called you up and said, 

‘‘We need 2,000 more Marines from your area,’’ that that would 
32 

put—I mean, you have some apprehension about the troops that already are not there, that that would not be a very favorable thing 

or request for you to hear. Is that accurate? 

Admiral KEATING. As far as it goes, Congressman. 

I certainly don’t mean to be coy, but I have got 2,000 Marines. 

I have got 280,000 in the Pacific Command bag, if you will. So if 

we had a crisis, running start or no, and X number of forces were 

required, I am confident I would either have them in the Pacific 

Command or be able to get them, depending on the nature of the 

crisis. 

If it were a significant peninsula issue, we would certainly anticipate a running start for it. But if there were a no-notice attack 

anywhere in the AOR, I have resources at my disposal immediately 

that I think are sufficient to immediate need. Two thousand Marines, I could get them today in the case of a crisis. 

Dr. SNYDER. You know, that is interesting, in case of a crisis, because this—I think sometimes—well, let me put it another way. To 

have Admiral Fallon, you know—we talk a lot about we want to 

hear from the guys on the ground, who are close to the ground, and 

you are the leadership as close to the guys on the ground—and to 

have him say, ‘‘I need 2,000 more.’’ He said, ‘‘I don’t need more 

than that, but it would be very helpful to have 2,000 more troops.’’ 

Now you are sitting here a week later saying you could come up 

with 2,000 Marines if you had to. You know, I don’t want to get 

anybody in a box here, but it is concerning to hear that—it was different. The phrasing was not, ‘‘Well, we could always use more.’’ It 

was, ‘‘I need 2,000 more troops.’’ 

Maybe we will leave it there for today, Admiral Keating. 

Admiral KEATING. Okay. 

Dr. SNYDER. General Bell, I wanted to ask on the issue that Mr. 

Akin was talking about, and others, with regard to going to the 

families. I think that is a great direction to move. I think you will 

find a lot of support for that. 

I wanted to go a bit the opposite way. I have wondered, too, if 

given that these were unaccompanied tours, which do put strains 

on families, that almost all those troops, I think, are active component forces. Is that correct? 

General BELL. That is correct. 

Dr. SNYDER. I wondered if it wouldn’t be—if there wouldn’t be 

some advantage to go the other way, which is if you are going to 

have unaccompanied tours, maybe the way to handle that would be 

to use our Reserve component forces in those positions, where a 

four-month rotation or a five-month rotation or a three-month rotation or a six-month rotation, where they could come over there, be 

mobilized. They would not be separated so long from their jobs and 

families as a Reserve component force. 

But obviously you are not moving in that direction. Is that potentially a problem? Is an issue of training part of the consideration? 

General BELL. Well, Congressman, you know, we do have a lot 

of Reserve components committed to our op plan and they train 

with us frequently. We just concluded a major exercise and had 

hundreds and hundreds of our Reserve component personnel over 

there, and they are a key part of our operation. 
33 

However, the garrisoning of troops overseas, whether it is for a 

one-year short tour or a three-year permanent tour or four or five 

months, while we do that, clearly, in Kosovo today, and we certainly did it in Bosnia and those troops responded magnificently— 

they were under my command when I was the United States Army 

Europe commander and a NATO commander. 

I believe we are beyond that in the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea is not in my view a theater that responds well to 

short-tour combat-focused rotation today, although we have a 

threat there, I admit that, not unlike we had in the Cold War with 

the Soviet Union. 

But I think it is in a position now, with the quality of the military, the Republic of Korea, the partnering that we do with them, 

the regional focus that we have, hopefully, and in the future will 

have, that it lends itself to the kind of stationing like we enjoy in 

Japan and like we enjoy in Europe. 

And so while I love our Reserve component troops big time, and 

I have great relationships with them and they are operational 

forces now, as you well know, they are no longer a strategic reserve, I believe we are best served in Korea with active component, 

normal three-year rotational forces. That is my assessment after 

looking at it over there. 

I would certainly love to have Reserve components rotate over 

there any time anybody wants to send them to me, because they 

are terrific soldiers and sailors and airmen and Marines. 

Dr. SNYDER. I understand. 

Thank you all for your time today. We apologize for the delay 

with the votes. We have all been through that before. 

General Bell, if we don’t see you again, best wishes. 

General BELL. Thank you, Congressman. 

Dr. SNYDER. I am sorry. I didn’t realize Mr. Skelton was here. 

So you are not off the hook yet. 

General BELL. Congressman, the chairman never lets us off the 

hook, whether we are here or not. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Snyder, I appreciate you being able to take over and chair 

the meeting while I had some very, very pressing obligations. 

Admiral, you could come up with 2,000 Marines, right? 

Admiral KEATING. Correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. Could you come up with 2,000 soldiers? 

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Three? Three thousand? 

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. How high do I get to go? 

Admiral KEATING. Well, I have 280,000 folks in uniform in the 

Pacific, Mr. Chairman. I certainly don’t mean to be glib, but if push 

comes to shove, depending on how bad the situation is, I can get 

all of them. 

Let me clarify that. It is not so much that I have to go get them. 

I have got them today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can we talk about China for a minute? You have 

noticed a distinct warmth with the way you have been treated and 

accepted. Am I correct? 

Admiral KEATING. That is correct, sir. 
34 

The CHAIRMAN. China recently, I don’t know whether it is in theory or whether there is a requirement, but China recently gave a 

list of its military increases over the year, purchases over the year, 

to the United Nations. Am I correct? 

Admiral KEATING. That is my—yes, sir. I think you are. 

The CHAIRMAN. But this has not been the case before. 

Admiral KEATING. That is my understanding, yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can you read anything or very much into that? 

Admiral KEATING. I do not think we should read too much into 

it. We will see what the Chinese give us. But I don’t—I do not 

think that this will be a revolutionary revelation, Mr. Chairman. 

I don’t think it will amount to much. I hope it does, but I don’t 

think it will. 

The CHAIRMAN. We have requested something similar, is that 

correct, from them? To your knowledge? 

Admiral KEATING. I don’t know that we have asked for anything 

of a formal manner from the Chinese. The Department may have, 

of which I am unaware. But I have asked for that sort of information frequently—well, in two visits and in other opportunities to 

meet with them, Chairman, but I will find out if the Department 

has asked for an official declaration by the Chinese. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 127.] 

Admiral KEATING. Now, they issue a white paper. They have 

done at least two, the People’s Liberation Army, they are relatively 

small documents. That doesn’t make them invaluable, but they are 

not particularly informative or persuasive. 

The CHAIRMAN. Looking to the future with China, do you have 

future plans on meeting with them, discussing with them, as we 

speak? 

Admiral KEATING. Chairman, we do. As an example, we have the 

Marine Consultative Committee, which just met last week. Our J5 

Major General Conant was our representative there, in Shanghai. 

The meetings were not a waste of time, but there was little in 

terms of product that was delivered by the Chinese. And it can be 

something as simple as the agreement to undertake an incident at 

sea study. They chose to be not very cooperative on the several 

issues that we proposed. 

I intend to get back there after the Olympics, some time in the 

fall to early winter, for what will be my third visit. We have exchanges at various levels. Our senior enlisted leader, as I mentioned earlier, Jim Roy, will go to China in the, I think, near future. 

But to answer your question, Mr. Chairman, yes, sir, we do have 

engagement opportunities that are scheduled. We will pursue those 

vigorously at the Pacific Command. Our various component leaders, commanders, and their forces will visit China and engage with 

Chinese colleagues as frequently as the Chinese will allow us. 

The CHAIRMAN. Have you asked to visit with the second artillery 

group? 

Admiral KEATING. I have. And I was—I did not get permission. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is interesting, because our congressional 

delegation did—— 

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir. 
35 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. This past August. 

Admiral KEATING. I should go with you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Sir? 

Admiral KEATING. I should go with you next time, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. You are invited. 

Admiral KEATING. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone else have any questions for the Admiral or the General? 

Well, we can’t thank you enough for being with us and for your 

invaluable service. 

Admiral, we look forward to seeing you again. 

General Bell, Godspeed. 

[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 12, 2008 

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MARCH 12, 2008 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 12, 2008 

(127) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON 

Admiral KEATING. DOD and USPACOM have not asked the Chinese military to 

present a budget report to the United Nations. However, both DOD and USPACOM 

have consistently encouraged China to increase the transparency of its defense 

budget, to include process, scope of funding, and intent. [See page 34.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Admiral KEATING. The Navy has two fully-funded programs of record to deal with 

this specific threat, with Initial Operational Capability (IOC) between 2011 and 

2014. USPACOM supports these programs and timelines. We have not requested accelerated IOC. 

Should increased funding become available, the Navy would be best able to determine if an earlier IOC is possible. [See page 27.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. GILLIBRAND 

Admiral KEATING. USPACOM influences cyberspace specialist recruitments only 

indirectly. USPACOM defines the skill sets required for cyberspace operations to 

U.S. Strategic Command. The Services have the lead for recruiting. [See page 14.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SESTAK 

Admiral KEATING. There are no plans to build dry dock capability in Guam for 

submarine maintenance. [See page 11.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CUMMINGS 

Admiral KEATING. Within the USPACOM area of responsibility, 156 assigned personnel speak Mandarin Chinese, at various levels of proficiency. [See page 23.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 12, 2008 

(131) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES 

Mr. REYES. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems will provide the capability to counter the threat from short-, medium-, and intermediaterange ballistic missiles. The first THAAD fire unit is scheduled to enter service in 

2009. 

What level of importance does PACOM attach to the timely deployment of 

THAAD into its theater? 

To what extent will THAAD and other BMD systems (e.g., PAC–3, SM–3) enable 

PACOM to successfully execute its warplanes? 

Is it true that PACOM would like to forward-deploy one of the four planned 

THAAD fire units to Guam? 

Admiral KEATING. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

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