III 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. RES. 402 

Calling upon the President to exercise relevant mandatory sanctions authorities under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 

in response to the Government of the Russian Federation’s continued 

aggression in Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea and assault 

on democratic institutions around the world, including through cyber 

attacks. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 12, 2018 

Mr. CARDIN (for himself, Mr. BROWN, and Mr. MENENDEZ) submitted the 

following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

RESOLUTION 

Calling upon the President to exercise relevant mandatory 

sanctions authorities under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in response to the Government of the Russian Federation’s continued aggression in Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea and 

assault on democratic institutions around the world, including through cyber attacks. 

Whereas, on January 6, 2017, an assessment of the United 

States intelligence community entitled, ‘‘Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections’’ 

stated, ‘‘Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential 


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election’’ and warned that ‘‘Moscow will apply lessons 

learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the 

U.S. Presidential election to future influence efforts 

worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election 

processes’’; 

Whereas a report of the minority staff of the Committee on 

Foreign Relations of the Senate released on January 10, 

2018, and entitled ‘‘Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security’’ assessed that the Government of the 

Russian Federation ‘‘employs an asymmetric arsenal that 

includes military invasions, cyber attacks, disinformation, 

support for fringe political groups, and the weaponization 

of energy resources, organized crime and corruption.’’ 

and that the Government of the Russian Federation ‘‘will 

continue to develop and refine its arsenal to use on democracies around the world, including against U.S. elections in 2018 and 2020’’; 

Whereas the Government of the Russian Federation continues to undermine democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine and threatens the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including by its illegal occupation of Crimea and its support for violent separatists in the eastern part of 

Ukraine; 

Whereas the Government of the Russian Federation continues to provide financial, material, and technological 

support to the Government of Syria, which has enabled 

the latter to acquire or develop a range of lethal capacities it has deployed against civilians in its territory, including acts that may constitute war crimes, crimes 


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against humanity or other violations of international 

human rights law; 

Whereas the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 

Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44; 131 Stat. 886) 

passed with overwhelming bipartisan majorities in the 

Senate and the House of Representatives, and title II of 

that Act was developed to respond to the interference of 

the Government of the Russian Federation in the United 

States 2016 election and the aggression of that Government in Ukraine and Syria and to deter such malicious 

activities in the future; 

Whereas the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 

Sanctions Act was signed by the President and enacted 

into law on August 2, 2017, thereby codifying a range of 

mandatory sanctions against the Government of the Russian Federation for its malicious activities against the 

United States democratic process and in Ukraine and 

Syria; 

Whereas, in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation on January 29, 2018, Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Pompeo said he had ‘‘not seen a significant decrease’’ in attempts by the Government of the 

Russian Federation to subvert democracies in Europe 

and the United States and, when asked if that Government would try and interfere in the 2018 United States 

election, he said that he had ‘‘every expectation that they 

will continue to try and do that’’; 

Whereas, on March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama issued 

Executive Order 13360 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to 

blocking property of certain persons contributing to the 

situation in Ukraine), which authorizes the Secretary of 

the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 


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to impose sanctions on persons determined to be undermining democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine 

or threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, 

and territorial integrity of Ukraine; 

Whereas President Obama subsequently issued Executive 

Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking 

property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 

16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons 

contributing to the situation in Ukraine), and Executive 

Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to blocking 

property of certain persons and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to the Crimea region of Ukraine) to 

expand sanctions on certain persons contributing to the 

situation in Ukraine; 

Whereas, on April 1, 2015, President Barack Obama issued 

Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to 

the blocking of property of certain persons engaging in 

significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation 

with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to 

impose sanctions on persons determined to be engaged in 

malicious cyber-hacking; 

Whereas, on December 29, 2016, President Obama issued an 

annex to Executive Order 13694, which authorized sanctions on— 

(1) the Main Intelligence Directorate (also known as 

Glavnoe Razvedyvatel’noe Upravlenie or the GRU) in 

Moscow, Russian Federation; 

(2) the Federal Security Service (also known as 

Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or the FSB) in Moscow, Russian Federation; 


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(3) the Special Technology Center (also known as 

STLC, Ltd. Special Technology Center St. Petersburg) 

in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation; 

(4) Zorsecurity (also known as Esage Lab) in Moscow, Russian Federation; 

(5) the autonomous noncommercial organization 

known as the Professional Association of Designers of 

Data Processing Systems (also known as ANO PO KSI) 

in Moscow, Russian Federation; 

(6) Igor Valentinovich Korobov; 

(7) Sergey Aleksandrovich Gizunov; 

(8) Igor Olegovich Kostyukov; and 

(9) Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev; 

Whereas, on December 20, 2017, the Department of the 

Treasury imposed targeted sanctions on 5 nationals of 

the Russian Federation under the Sergei Magnitsky Rule 

of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (title IV of Public 

Law 112–208; 22 U.S.C. 8511 note) and, on December 

21, 2017, the Department imposed targeted sanctions, 

including against one national of the Russian Federation 

for significant corruption, under that Act and a derivative Executive order signed by President Donald Trump; 

Whereas, on January 26, 2018, sanctions maintenance packages were issued by the Department of the Treasury 

under Executive Orders 13660, 13661, 13662, and 

13685, signed by President Barack Obama, and those 

packages targeted individuals and entities in connection 

with the conflict in Ukraine and the illegal occupation of 

Crimea by the Government of the Russian Federation; 

Whereas no sanctions have been imposed pursuant to mandatory provisions enacted under title II of the Countering 


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America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 

9501 et seq.), including— 

(1) section 224 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 9524; relating to sanctions with respect to activities of the Russian 

Federation undermining cybersecurity); 

(2) section 4 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act 

of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923), as amended by section 225 of 

the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions 

Act (relating to sanctions relating to special Russian 

crude oil products); 

(3) section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act 

of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924), as amended by section 226 of 

the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions 

Act (relating to sanctions with respect to Russian and 

other foreign financial institutions); 

(4) section 9 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 

U.S.C. 8908), as amended by section 227 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (relating to sanctions with respect to significant corruption 

in the Russian Federation); 

(5) section 10 of the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 

U.S.C. 8909), as added by section 228 of the Countering 

America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (relating 

to sanctions with respect to certain transactions with foreign sanctions evaders and serious human rights abusers 

in the Russian Federation); 

(6) section 233 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9527; relating 

to sanctions with respect to investment in or facilitation 

of privatization of state-owned assets by the Russian 

Federation); and 


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(7) section 234 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 9528; relating to sanctions with respect to the transfer of arms and 

related materiel to Syria); 

Whereas in testimony on January 30, 2018, to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the 

Senate, Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin said 

‘‘[i]n the near future, you will see additional sanctions’’ 

based on the list of Russian oligarchs or senior political 

figures, presumably against those who had engaged in 

malign activities sanctionable under United States law; 

Whereas a statement on January 29, 2018, from the Department of State asserted that ‘‘several billion dollars’’ in 

defense sector transactions with the Government of the 

Russian Federation or entities affiliated with that Government had been deterred through United States diplomacy and indicated that ‘‘sanctions on specific entities or 

individuals will not need to be imposed because the 

[Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions 

Act] legislation is, in fact, serving as a deterrent,’’; and 

Whereas the deterrent value of sanctions is derived from the 

perception by potential targets that the threat of imposing such sanctions is genuine: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) strongly urges the President— 

3 (A) to examine intelligence information re4 garding the cyber intrusions and attacks of the 

5 Government of the Russian Federation against 

6 democratic elections and systems around the 

7 world; and 


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1 (B) to designate for the imposition of sanc2 tions any persons found to have knowingly en3 gaged in conduct that violates section 224 of 

4 the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 

5 Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9524; relating to 

6 sanctions with respect to activities of the Rus7 sian Federation undermining cybersecurity); 

8 (2) urges the Secretary of the Treasury and the 

9 Secretary of State to fully implement section 9 of 

10 the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Eco11 nomic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 

12 8908), as amended by section 227 of the Countering 

13 America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (relat14 ing to sanctions with respect to significant corrup15 tion in the Russian Federation), taking into account 

16 information provided in the report mandated under 

17 section 241 of the Countering America’s Adversaries 

18 Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44; 131 

19 Stat. 922) and other credible information available 

20 as a basis for potential additional sanction designa21 tions; 

22 (3) calls on the President to immediately exer23 cise sanctions authorities provided for under the 

24 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanc25 tions Act to impose sanctions on relevant Russian 


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1 individuals and entities found to have knowingly en2 gaged in sanctionable conduct, including under— 

3 (A) section 4 of the Ukraine Freedom Sup4 port Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923), as amended 

5 by section 225 of the Countering America’s Ad6 versaries Through Sanctions Act (relating to 

7 sanctions relating to special Russian crude oil 

8 products); 

9 (B) section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom 

10 Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924), as 

11 amended by section 226 of the Countering 

12 America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 

13 (relating to sanctions with respect to Russian 

14 and other foreign financial institutions); 

15 (C) section 10 of the Sovereignty, Integ16 rity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of 

17 Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8909), as 

18 added by section 228 of the Countering Amer19 ica’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (relat20 ing to sanctions with respect to certain trans21 actions with foreign sanctions evaders and seri22 ous human rights abusers in the Russian Fed23 eration); 

24 (D) section 233 of the Countering Amer25 ica’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 


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1 U.S.C. 9527; relating to sanctions with respect 

2 to investment in or facilitation of privatization 

3 of state-owned assets by the Russian Federa4 tion); and 

5 (E) section 234 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 

6 9528; relating to sanctions with respect to the 

7 transfer of arms and related materiel to Syria); 

8 (4) urges the President— 

9 (A) to publicly acknowledge the ongoing 

10 threat posed by the Government of the Russian 

11 Federation to democratic values and processes 

12 in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere; 

13 (B) to prioritize the development of a co14 ordinated, whole-of-government response to that 

15 urgent threat; and 

16 (C) to work with Congress to provide for 

17 the funding and implementation of that re18 sponse as soon as possible before the 2018 elec19 tions; 

20 (5) urges the President— 

21 (A) to vigorously implement section 231 of 

22 the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 

23 Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9525; relating to 

24 sanctions with respect to persons engaging in 

25 transactions with the intelligence or defense 


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1 sectors of the Government of the Russian Fed2 eration); 

3 (B) to continue to work diplomatically to 

4 encourage substantial reductions in significant 

5 transactions with the intelligence and defense 

6 sectors of the Government of the Russian Fed7 eration; and 

8 (C) to ensure that sanctions are imposed 

9 under such section 231 in the event that a sig10 nificant transaction with a person that is part 

11 of, or operates for or on behalf of, the intel12 ligence or defense sectors of the Government of 

13 the Russian Federation, as defined in guidance 

14 issued by the Department of State, takes place; 

15 (6) supports efforts to expose and publicize 

16 threats posed by the malign influence and 

17 disinformation efforts of the Government of the Rus18 sian Federation, as the United States intelligence 

19 community did in January 2017, including through 

20 efforts by social media platforms, independent 

21 media, State and local governments primarily re22 sponsible for elections management and oversight, 

23 and other governmental and civil society actors; and 

24 (7) calls on the President to take specific meas25 ures to ensure the protection of United States demoVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:55 Feb 12, 2018 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\SR402.IS SR402

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1 cratic institutions in advance of the 2018 elections, 

2 including the provision of cyber security defensive 

3 measures to election administrators at the State and 

4 local level that request assistance and to political 

5 parties and candidates. 

Æ 


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