UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

XADRIAN McCRAVEN, 

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF ILLINOIS and ILLINOIS

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN &

FAMILY SERVICES, 

Defendants.

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Case No. 12-cv-4451

Judge John W. Darrah

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Plaintiff Xadrian McCraven filed a lawsuit against the State of Illinois and the

Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”), alleging three separate

counts: (I) denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 

U.S. Constitution; (II) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Illinois

Constitution; and (III) breach of contract. Defendants move to dismiss McCraven’s

Complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). This Motion has been fully

briefed and is ripe for ruling. 

BACKGROUND

McCraven, a resident of Cook County, Illinois, filed suit against the 

State of Illinois and DCFS on June 7, 2012. (Compl. ¶ 4.) McCraven was hired as a

Public Service Administrator by DCFS in June 2007. (Id. ¶ 7.) McCraven joined the

American Federation of State, County, and Muncipal Employees, AFL-CIO (“the

Federation”) in December 2008, and his position as Public Service Administrator was

part of the professional bargaining unit under the Federation’s Master Contract. (Id. ¶ 8.) 
The State of Illinois and the Federation regularly negotiate collective bargaining

agreements for the bargaining units of employees. (Id. ¶ 9.) The agreements cover

employee wages, base rates of pay and pay increases, and promotions. (Id. ¶ 10.) 

McCraven was covered by the Master Contract in his role as Public Service

Administrator. (Id. ¶ 11.) On February 28, 2012, McCraven was placed on

administrative leave, while DCFS investigated allegations of his misconduct; and, on

March 5, 2012, McCraven was terminated. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) 

McCraven alleges in the Complaint that the State of Illinois and DCFS failed to

comply with the grievance and discipline procedures provided for in the Master Contract

when terminating him. In Count I of the Complaint, McCraven alleges that his

Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection was violated when Defendants failed to

apply the discipline procedure set forth in the Master Contract to him, while applying the

procedure to other employees, and seeks relief conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶¶

16-18.) Count II of the Complaint alleges a similar violation under the Equal Protection

Clause of the Illinois Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 19-21.) Finally, McCraven contends in Count

III of the Complaint that the State of Illinois breached the Master Contract between it and

the Federation when it applied different procedures to McCraven as compared to other

similarly situated employees. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) McCraven moved for a temporary

restraining order, seeking a court order requiring Defendants to place McCraven on

administrative leave with pay during the pendency of any administrative hearings and

litigation; this motion was denied on June 13, 2012.

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Defendants move to dismiss all three counts, arguing there is a lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) or, alternatively, that McCraven failed

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).1 

LEGAL STANDARD

To properly assert a claim in a complaint, the plaintiff must present “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand

for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (Iqbal) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (Twombly)). While a court is to accept all allegations

contained in a complaint as true, this principle does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949. 

A defendant may file a motion to dismiss a claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To defeat a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual matter to state a claim for

relief that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

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 Defendants also move to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), which

provides that an action must be dismissed without prejudice if a defendant is not served

within 120 days. The rule further provides that the court “must extend the time for

service for an appropriate period” if the plaintiff demonstrates good cause for missing the

deadline to serve a defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). McCraven represents in his

response that he moved orally to extend the time to serve Defendants on November 13,

2012, which was granted at a hearing before the Court. (Resp. at 3-4.) Hence,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the Rule 4(m) basis is denied.

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misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 

However, “[w]here the well-settled pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not

‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. For a claim

to be plausible, the plaintiff must put forth enough “facts to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting the plaintiff’s allegations. 

Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

At issue in a 12(b)(6) motion is “not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail” but

whether the plaintiff is entitled to present evidence to support the claims alleged. 

AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation and

citation omitted).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to raise as a defense, by

motion, a federal court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. “When reviewing a

dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . the district court must accept as true

all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff.” St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999)). 

However, when a defendant challenges subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561

(1992).

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ANALYSIS

Suing Entities Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Defendants first attack Count I of the Complaint by arguing that neither DCFS

nor the State of Illinois can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is well established that

“Congress did not abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity from suit under section 1983,

as it could have done.” Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012) (Thomas)

(citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-70 (1989) (Will)). 

However, a state and state agencies are not “persons” able to be sued under Section 1983,

“thus providing a statutory as distinct from a constitutional defense to section 1983 suits

against states and their agencies.” Thomas, 697 F.3d at 613 (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 70-

71). A court must address a statutory defense before the constitutional defense in order

to avoid “unnecessary constitutional decision making.” Thomas, 697 F.3d at 613

(citations omitted).

“The DCFS is a state agency; it was established by state statute and is funded by

the state.” Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 908 (7th Cir. 1986). Therefore, McCraven

is precluded from suing either Defendant under Section 1983. Count I of McCraven’s

Complaint is dismissed on this basis. 

Sovereign Immunity

Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment provides that each state is a sovereign entity

and therefore immune from suit without its consent. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13

(1890). However, “Congress has waived sovereign immunity for most forms of

prospective relief . . . .” Blagojevich v. Gates, 519 F.3d 370, 371 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 5

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U.S.C. § 702). A plaintiff can avoid a sovereign immunity bar under the Ex parte Young

doctrine by seeking prospective, equitable relief. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-

60 (1908). Because in Count I McCraven seeks a declaratory judgment that his

termination violated the Equal Protection Clause, and further seeks to enjoin Defendants

from further violations of the Equal Protection Clause, this claim would not necessarily

be barred by the sovereign immunity doctrine. 

However, to the extent Counts II and III of the Complaint seek to enjoin a state

actor to comport with state law, these claims are barred, as “[i]t is well established that

the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal court from ordering state officials to

conform their conduct to state law.” Komyatti v. Bayh, 96 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 1996)

(further noting that the doctrine of sovereign immunity relates to jurisdiction, but does

not “function as a true jurisdictional bar”). 

Failure to State a Claim

Regardless of the application of sovereign immunity to McCraven’s claims,

Count I of McCraven’s Complaint must also be dismissed for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. 

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action

that discriminates on the basis of membership in a protected class or irrationally targets

an individual for discriminatory treatment as a so-called ‘class of one.’” Reget v. City of

La Crosse, 595 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553

U.S. 591 (2008) (Engquist)). “To state a suspect class or class-of-one equal protection

claim, a plaintiff must allege that a state actor intentionally treated him differently than

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others similarly situated.” Glenwood Halsted LLC v. Village Glenwood, 866 F.Supp.2d

942, 947 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (citing Harvey v. Town of Merrillville, 649 F.3d 526, 531 (7th

Cir. 2011). Here, it does not appear McCraven alleges he was part of a protected class,

so his claim is treated as a so-called “class-of-one” claim. 

The Seventh Circuit has acknowledged it is difficult to succeed on a class-of-one

claim, as it requires “(1) the plaintiff [to] allege[] that he has been intentionally treated

differently from others similarly situated and (2) that there is no rational basis for the

difference in treatment or the cause of the differential treatment is a ‘totally illegitimate

animus’ toward the plaintiff by the defendant.” McDonald v. Village of Winnetka, 371

F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). However, the Seventh Circuit, citing the Supreme Court

in Engquist, has held that “class-of-one claims cannot be based on the highly

discretionary and individualized sorts of decisions that public employers must make

about their employees.” Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 938-39 (7th Cir. 2010)

(Abcarian). The Seventh Circuit further held that subjective, discretionary decisions

made by the government, like those relating to employment, are immune from class-ofone claims. Id. at 939. “[T]he class-of-one theory of equal protection is a ‘poor fit’ with

employment decisions, which are themselves ‘often subjective and individualized, resting

on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify’ . . . ‘a class-of-one

theory of equal protection has no place in the public employment context.” Abcarian,

617 F.3d at 939 (quoting Engquist, 553 U.S. at 594, 603-605). Therefore, McCraven

cannot state a claim upon which relief may be granted in Count I, which seeks to assert a

class-of-one claim on the basis of his termination from public employment.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted. Count

I of the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),

and Counts II and III of the Complaint, McCraven’s pendent state law claims, are

dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,

726 (1966). McCraven may file an amended complaint within twenty-one days of the

date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, consistent with the requirements of Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11. If McCraven does not file an amended complaint within that time period, this

case will be dismissed with prejudice.

Date: March 27, 2013 ______________________________

JOHN W. DARRAH

United States District Court Judge

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