* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-30900

VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA INC Plaintiff - Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. CRESCENT FORD TRUCK SALES INC Defendant - Appellee-Cross-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans

No. 2:02-CV-3398
Before KING, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Plaintiff Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. (“Volvo”) appeals the district court’s judgment entered on the jury’s verdict in f avor of defendant Crescent Ford Truck Sales, Inc. (“Crescent”) on its breach of contract claim. Crescent cross-appeals the jury’s finding, as incorporated into the judgment, that it breached its dealer agreement with Volvo by failing to procure a customer’s signature on the warranty registration. Because we find that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist in this case, however, we VACATE thejudgment and United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D April 10, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 06-30900

2 REMA N D to the district court with instructions to DISMISS the case without prejudice. I. On November 3, 1999, Luciano Refrigerated Transport, Inc. (“Luciano”) initiated an adversary proceeding against Volvo in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District ofLouisiana. On November 15, 2000, Volvo filed a third-party demand against Crescent. However, on January 9, 2000, Volvo entered into an agreement to settle Luciano’s claims. On October 30, 2002, the bankruptcy court dismissed the claims remaining between Volvo and Crescentwithout prejudicefor lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction, concluding that they were not “related to” the Luciano bankruptcy for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Neither Volvo nor Crescent appealed the bankruptcy court’s order.Instead, on November 13, 2002, Volvo filed the instant breach-of-contract
case in district court, alleging 28 U.S.C. § 1332 diversity jurisdiction. The case went to trial, resulting in a jury verdict and final judgment, from which both Volvo and Crescent have appealed. At oral argument, Volvo brought the lack of diversity jurisdiction to the attention of this court and sought to amend the pleadings to cure thisjurisdictional defect, as permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1653, by invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)’sjurisdictional provision for “civil proceedings

. . . related to cases under title 11.” After a close review of the record, however, we conclude that there is no basis for federal jurisdiction in this case. II. A federal court may examine its subject matter jurisdiction at any time during a case. Bass v. Denney (In re Bass), 171 F.3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1999). Whether a federal court has subject matterjurisdiction is a question oflawthat
we reviewde novo. G asch v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2007). This case proceeded in the district court under alleged diversityNo. 06-30900

3 jurisdiction. However, as Volvo suggested at oral argument, diversity jurisdiction is lacking because both parties are incorporated in Delaware. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Volvo now seeks to alter the basis for federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1653, arguing that it is apparent from the face ofits complaint that the federal forum is available in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) because the claims are “related to” Luciano’s bankruptcy proceedings. But the bankruptcy court decided this issue in a final, unappealed order, dismissing Volvo’s thirdparty claim against Crescent without prejudice for lac k of subject matter jurisdiction. In light of the bankruptcy court’s order, principles of col lateral estoppel require the conclusion that there is no related-to-bankruptcyjurisdiction in this
case. In any event, we agree with the bankruptcy court that the claims between Volvoand Crescent are not “related to” the Luciano bankruptcy under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). As the bankruptcy court c orrectly set out, a “proceeding is related to a bankruptcy if the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” In re Bass, 171 F.3d at 1022 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); s ee also Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1995). In other words, an “action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and

. . . in any way impacts upon the handling and administration ofthe bankruptcy estate.” I n reBass, 171 F.3d at 1022 (citationsand internal quotation marksomitted). Further, relatedto-bankruptcy jurisdiction does not exist “over proceedings that have no effect
on the debtor.” Walker v. Cadle (In re Walker), 51 F.3d at 569 (quoting Celotex, 514 U.S. at 308). In In reWalker, we affirmed the district court’sdecision that neither it norNo. 06-30900

4 the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) over a third-party complaint in an adversary proceeding to determine whether the third-party defendant should be required to reimburse the defendant for any money found owing to the debtor. I d. We concluded that the defendant’s claim against the third-party defendant had “no ‘conceivable effect
on the administration of the estate’ nor would the outcome of that claim ‘alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom ofaction.’” I d. We explained that it was “difficult to imagine that whether [the third-party defendant] should be required to reimburse [the defendant] for any money [the defendant] pays to [the debtor] could somehow affect the estate.” Id. In this case, Volvo settled Luciano’s claims against it on January 9, 2000. The bankruptcy court subsequently dismissed Volvo’s third-party complaint because “Volvo Truck’s third-party claim against Crescent will not have any [e]ffect on the [d]ebtor’s estate.” L uciano Refrigerated Transp., Inc. v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc., No. 99-1244, slip op. at 4 (Bankr. E.D. La. Oct. 30, 2002). We agree. As was the case in I n re Walker, we cannot conceive of any way i n which the determination of whether Crescent is liable to Volvo for breach of contract damages could possibly affect Luciano’s bankruptcy estate or alter his “rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action.” Therefore, this case is not “related to” the Luciano bankruptcy f or the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) subject matter jurisdiction. III. CONCLUSION Consequently, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND to the district court with instructions to DISMISS the case without prejudice. Costs shall be borne by Volvo.