Filed 5/31/16 P. v. Wettig CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CLAYTON WETTIG,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B266655

(Super. Ct. No. 2012007990)

(Ventura County)

Clayton Wettig was subject to postrelease community supervision (PRCS) 

when he was arrested. (Pen. Code, § 3451.) He had an informal probable cause hearing 

before a probation officer. Subsequently, the trial court found him in violation of PRCS. 

He contends, among other things, that the trial court erred because the PRCS revocation 

process violates his right to due process. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2012, Wettig pled guilty to unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. 

Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), felony evading an officer (id., § 2800.2, subd. (a)), and resisting 

or obstructing an officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). He was sentenced to three years 

in state prison. 

In 2013, Wettig was released on PRCS. 

Wettig repeatedly violated his PRCS conditions. He had served two "flash 

incarcerations" and had five prior "revocations" of PRCS. On June 23, 2015, Wettig was 

arrested again for violating his PRCS conditions. 
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On June 25, 2015, a probable cause hearing was held before Probation Officer 

Venessa Meza. Meza found probable cause for finding that Wettig violated his PRCS 

conditions. 

In the probation officer's written report for revocation of PRCS, the probation 

agency stated that Wettig was advised of his right to counsel, denied the violation, "declined 

to accept" a "proposed sanction," and requested a court hearing. 

On July 1, 2015, the Ventura County Probation Agency filed a petition to 

revoke PRCS and scheduled a hearing date for July 9, 2015. 

On July 9, 2015, Wettig's counsel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. 

Wettig claimed the revocation process violated his due process rights, and cited Williams v. 

Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 636 (Williams). On July 9, 2015, the trial court 

held a hearing on that motion. The court denied the motion. On that same day, Wettig 

appeared in court with his public defender and admitted the PRCS violations. The court 

ordered him to serve 90 days in county jail with a total credit of 32 days. 

The trial court found that 1) Meza conducted a probable cause hearing that 

was compliant with Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 472 (Morrissey); 2) the parole 

procedures set forth in Williams, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th 636 do not apply to PRCS; and 3) 

there "has been no violation of [Wettig's] due process rights." 

DISCUSSION

Wettig contends, among other things, that 1) the process used to revoke his 

PRCS violated his right to due process, 2) he did not have a probable cause hearing that 

complied with Morrissey standards, 3) Meza used a procedure that was "nothing more than 

an ex parte early disposition conference," 3) he was not given an adequate opportunity to 

present evidence at the probable cause hearing, and 4) he was entitled to the procedures 

provided to parolees mentioned in Williams and the procedural rights parolees receive under 

Proposition 9.

The PRCS procedures here do not violate Wettig's equal protection or due 

process rights. (People v. Gutierrez (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 393, 402-404.) After his arrest 

for violating PRCS conditions, Wettig received a prompt probable cause hearing. (Id. at 
3

p. 402.) The PRCS hearing officers who decide probable cause are neutral decision makers. 

(Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 485 ["someone not directly involved in the case"]; 

Gutierrez, at p. 402.) PRCS procedures and Proposition 9 parole procedures are not 

required to be identical. (Gutierrez, at pp. 403-404.) There are valid justifications for the 

different procedures. (Ibid.) Wettig did not present evidence in the trial court to support his 

factual assertions about how the probable cause hearing was conducted. He did not present 

evidence to show that the hearing officers are not neutral, that their findings are incorrect or 

unreliable, that the procedure was unfair, or that he was not afforded a prompt probable 

cause hearing after his arrest. He consequently is not in a position to challenge the trial 

court finding that the hearings comply with Morrissey standards. 

Moreover, the denial of a Morrissey-compliant probable cause hearing does 

not warrant reversal unless it results in prejudice at the revocation hearing. (In re La Croix

(1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154-155.) Wettig makes no showing that a due process defect 

prejudiced him or affected the outcome of the PRCS revocation hearing. (In re Moore

(1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 285, 294; see also In re Winn (1975) 13 Cal.3d 694, 698 [defendant

has the burden of showing prejudice].) He admitted the PRCS violations and served the 

custodial sanction. "[T]here is nothing for us to remedy . . . ." (Spencer v. Kemna (1998) 

523 U.S. 1, 18.) We have reviewed his remaining contentions and conclude he has not 

shown grounds for reversal. 

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

PERREN, J.
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Donald D. Coleman, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. 

Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy 

Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.