[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13432

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TAURIAN JAVON WERTS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 7:21-cr-00053-HL-TQL-1

____________________

Before BRANCH, GRANT, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13432

PER CURIAM:

Taurian Werts appeals his 75-month sentence of

imprisonment for possession of a firearm by a felon. In arriving at 

that sentence, the district court applied a base offense level 

enhancement to Werts’s guidelines range because, in 2017, he was 

convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute

under Georgia law. 

Werts argues that we should vacate his sentence because his 

2017 conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to 

distribute is not a predicate controlled substance offense under the 

sentencing guidelines, for two reasons. First, he contends that the 

Georgia statute was (at the time of the state conviction) and is (at 

the time of federal sentencing) categorically broader than the 

guideline definition of controlled substance offense. Second, he 

asserts that we must apply the “categorical approach” when 

interpreting the guidelines and assume that Werts committed the 

least culpable conduct criminalized by the statute—possession of 

“hemp” with intent to distribute—which was no longer a crime 

under state or federal law at the time of Werts’s federal sentencing. 

Thus, and because the application of the enhancement raised his 

guidelines range, he argues that his sentence was procedurally and 

substantively unreasonable. 

After review, we affirm. Werts’s arguments about the base 

offense level enhancement are foreclosed by our recent opinion in 

United States v. Dubois, No. 22-10829, --- F.4th ----, 2024 WL 927030

(11th Cir. Mar. 5, 2024). And because Werts’s only arguments 

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about the reasonableness of his sentence are based on the 

guidelines issue, the conclusion that Dubois controls here is enough 

to resolve this case. 

I. Background

Werts pleaded guilty in 2022 to possession of a firearm by a 

felon.1 Due in part to his prior drug conviction, the probation 

office assigned Werts a base offense level of 22 under U.S.S.G. § 

2K2.1(a)(3),2 which requires the enhanced base offense level if:

(A) the offense involves a (i) semiautomatic firearm that 

is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine; or (ii) 

firearm that is described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a); and (B) 

the defendant committed any part of the instant 

offense subsequent to sustaining one felony 

conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled 

substance offense[.]

1 Werts was originally charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a 

felon, one count of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and one

count of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. 

After Werts entered a not guilty plea, the government filed a superseding 

information on just the felon-in-possession charge.

2 Werts took the position in his sentencing memorandum that, without the 

enhancement, his base offense level would have been 20, and his total offense 

level would have been 21, giving him a guidelines range of 57 to 71 months 

rather than the 70 to 87 months that the PSI calculated and the court accepted. 

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U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3) (2021) (emphasis added).3 Application Note 

1 of § 2K2.1 defined “controlled substance offense” by reference to 

§ 4B1.2(b)4 which, in turn, defined “controlled substance offense” 

as follows:

The term “controlled substance offense” means an 

offense [1] under federal or state law, [2] punishable 

by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, [3] 

that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, 

distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or 

a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a 

controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with 

intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or 

dispense.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (2021) (emphasis added).5

3 The probation office noted that, as part of the offense conduct, Werts 

possessed a semiautomatic Intratec firearm capable of accepting a “large 

capacity magazine” and that Werts had a 2017 Georgia conviction for 

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, which qualified as a 

“controlled substance offense.” 

4 The Application notes to § 2K2.1 explain that the term “controlled substance

offense” also can be defined by reference to Application Note 1 of the 

Commentary to § 4B1.2 (Definitions of Terms Used in Section 4B1.1). But 

Application Note 1 of § 4B1.2 deals with other definitions that do not apply 

here.

5 Section 4B1.2(b) was amended in 2023 (which was after Werts was 

sentenced), but, because the amendments all deal with maritime drug 

offenses, they are irrelevant. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), November 01, 2023

(Amendment 822).

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Werts objected to the enhancement, arguing that (1) the 

Georgia statute was and is categorically broader than the guideline 

definition of controlled substance offense and (2) the court must 

apply the categorical approach to his 2017 state conviction and 

assume that Werts committed the least culpable conduct 

criminalized by the statute—which, in his case, was no longer a 

crime under state or federal law at the time of his federal 

sentencing. Assuming that his guidelines objections prevailed, 

Werts asked for a sentence at the low end of what he argued was 

the guidelines range. The probation office rejected Werts’s 

objection and submitted the final PSI with a suggested base offense 

level of 22. 

The district court overruled Werts’s objection. Adopting 

the PSI, the district court found a total offense level of 23,6 a 

criminal history category IV, and a guidelines range of 70 to 87 

months. The court sentenced Werts to 75-months’ imprisonment. 

Werts appealed. 

6 This offense level includes the enhanced base offense level of 22, a four-point 

enhancement based on the specific offense characteristics (possession of a 

firearm in connection with a drug crime), a two-point reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility, and a one-point reduction for entering a timely 

guilty plea. 

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II. Standard of Review

This Court “review[s] de novo the interpretation and 

application of the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Dupree, 

57 F.4th 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). 

III. Discussion

Werts argues that the district court misapplied the base 

offense level enhancement, and therefore imposed a procedurally 

and substantively unreasonable sentence. 

In broad strokes, Werts advances this argument on two 

fronts. “First, Georgia’s marijuana offense” is “categorically 

overbroad from [sic] the federal definition at the time of Mr. 

Werts’[s] prior state arrest.”7 “Second, by the time of his 

underlying federal offense . . . both the federal and Georgia 

marijuana statutes had changed since his prior arrest” such that the 

least culpable conduct for which he could have been convicted in 

2017 was no longer a crime at the time of his federal sentencing.

7 In particular, Werts points to four alleged categorical “mismatches” between 

Georgia law and federal law:

(1) what parts of the cannabis plant count as a controlled 

substance; 

(2) what species of cannabis count as a controlled substance; 

(3) what conduct counts as distribution of marijuana (e.g., does 

“social-sharing” count or must there be a commercial 

transaction); and

(4) what mental state is required for conviction.

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For those reasons, he contends that, under the categorical 

approach, Georgia’s statute is not a “controlled substance offense” 

for purposes of the guidelines. 

While this case was pending, however, a panel of this court 

issued its decision in Dubois, 2024 WL 927030.8 In Dubois, we

considered, among other things, whether the appellant’s “Georgia 

marijuana conviction [was] a ‘controlled substance offense’ under” 

§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) of the sentencing guidelines.9 Id. at *1. Dubois, 

like Werts, was sentenced in 2022 under the 2021 version of the 

guidelines. Id. at *1, *3. Dubois, also like Werts, was assigned a 

higher base offense level than he would have had otherwise 

because of an enhancement for having sustained a “felony 

conviction of . . . a controlled substance offense.” Id. at *10 (alteration 

in original) (emphasis added) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)); 

see also U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). And Dubois, like Werts, “objected 

to the probation officer’s application of [the] enhanced base offense 

level” on the grounds that “his Georgia marijuana conviction d[id]

not qualify as a categorical controlled substance offense under the 

guidelines.” Id. at *2.

8 We ordered briefing to address the effect of Dubois on this case. 

9 At the time Dubois was sentenced, § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) provided for an enhanced

base offense level of 20 if “(A) the defendant committed any part of the instant 

offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either a crime of 

violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (2021). 

While Werts’s base offense level was enhanced under § 2K2.1(a)(3), both 

provisions defined “controlled substance offense” by reference to § 4B1.2(b), 

so the same interpretive conclusions apply.

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In particular, and again like Werts, Dubois argued “that we 

should vacate his sentence because his 2013 conviction for 

possession with intent to distribute marijuana is not a predicate 

‘controlled substance offense’ under the Sentencing Guidelines” 

because the Georgia statute is “categorically broader than the 

guideline definition of ‘controlled substance offense.’” Id. at *7. 

Under the categorical approach, Dubois pointed out, the court was 

required to assume that he had committed the least culpable 

conduct criminalized by the statute of conviction. Id. Dubois 

“explain[ed] that[,] at the time of his conviction in 2013, both 

Georgia and federal law defined ‘marijuana’ to include hemp.” Id. 

(citing O.C.G.A. § 16-13-21(16) (2011); 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2009)). 

“But by the time he was sentenced for his federal offenses in 2022, 

both definitions had been amended to exclude hemp.” Id. (citing 

O.C.G.A § 16-13-21(16) (2019); 21 U.S.C. § 802(16)(B)(i) (2018)).

Thus, “[b]ecause the law at the time of his state conviction was 

broader than the law at the time of his federal sentencing, [Dubois] 

maintain[ed] that the state conviction is not a controlled substance 

offense.” Id.

Analyzing the text of the guidelines, the panel concluded 

that “[a] drug regulated by state law is a ‘controlled substance’ for 

state predicate offenses, even if federal law does not regulate that 

drug.” Id. at *8; see also id. (“More precisely, state law defines which 

drugs qualify as a ‘controlled substance’ if the prior conviction was 

under state law, and federal law defines which drugs qualify as a 

‘controlled substance’ if the prior conviction was under federal 

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law.”).10 Thus, “[b]ecause Dubois’s underlying conviction was 

under Georgia law,” the panel concluded that it was required to 

“consult Georgia law to determine whether the substance that he 

trafficked [was] a ‘controlled substance’ under the guidelines.” Id.

at *9.

And finally, the panel held that courts must look to state law 

at the time of conviction “even if [the substance the defendant was 

convicted of possessing] is no longer regulated when the defendant 

is sentenced for the federal . . . offense.” Id. at *10.

In sum, Dubois held “that a ‘controlled substance’ under § 

4B1.2(b)’s definition of ‘controlled substance offense’ is, for prior 

state offenses, a drug regulated by state law at the time of the 

conviction.” Id. at *11. The panel emphasized that this conclusion 

holds “even if [the substance] is not federally regulated, and even if 

it is no longer regulated by the state at the time of federal 

sentencing.” Id. Thus, “[b]ecause Georgia law regulated 

marijuana—including hemp—at the time of Dubois’s 2013 

conviction,” the panel concluded that “the district court did not err 

10 The panel also “reject[ed] the parties’ suggestion that [it] need not decide 

which sovereign’s law controls to decide [Dubois’s] appeal” because “our 

answer to this ‘whose law’ question informs our answer to the ‘what time’ 

question that follow[ed].” Dubois, 2024 WL 927030, at *9; see also id. at *11 

(explaining that the only circuits to conclude that courts must look to the law 

at the time of federal sentencing, rather than the law at the time of the 

predicate conviction, did so on the theory that substances had to be controlled 

by federal law to be captured by the guidelines—and “th[at] distinction is absent 

here”).

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by enhancing Dubois’s base-offense level under section 

2K2.1(a)(4)(A).” Id.

Under the prior panel precedent rule, we are bound by 

holdings in prior published decisions that have not been overruled 

by the Supreme Court or this Court en banc. United States v. RomoVillalobos, 674 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Birge, 

830 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the rule 

“applies only to holdings, not dicta”). “The holding of a case 

comprises both the result of the case and those portions of the 

opinion necessary to that result.” United States v. CaraballoMartinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Once we have decided that a statement is a 

holding, not dicta, “[t]he prior panel precedent rule applies 

regardless of whether the later panel believes the prior panel’s 

opinion to be correct, and there is no exception to the rule where 

the prior panel failed to consider arguments raised before a later 

panel.” United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019).

Dubois controls this case for three reasons. First, Dubois’s 

interpretation of “controlled substance offense”—on both the 

question of which law applies, and the question of when in time the 

law is to be assessed—is plainly a holding, because it was necessary 

to the judgment: affirming Dubois’s sentence. Dubois, 2024 WL 

927030, at *11, 13.

Second, the issues Dubois resolves foreclose Werts’s 

arguments. The four categorical mismatches Werts points to are 

premised on comparing how state and federal law define marijuana 

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and how they define the crime of possessing it with the intent to 

distribute it.11 And his point that hemp is no longer criminalized 

turns on comparing the definitions of marijuana—both state and 

federal—in 2017 versus 2022. Given that the predicate conviction 

is an offense against state law, all of Werts’s arguments fail both 

because Dubois directs us to state law, not federal law, and because 

Dubois directs us to the time of the state conviction, not the present. 

Id. at *7, 11. 

Third, Werts’s arguments about the reasonableness of his 

sentence depend entirely on his argument that his guidelines range 

was improperly calculated. Since his guidelines argument fails, so 

too does his argument about the reasonableness of his sentence. 

IV. Conclusion

In sum, Werts’s arguments that the district court improperly 

applied § 2K2.1(a)(3) to raise his base offense level, and thus that his 

11 Werts suggests in a supplemental brief that Dubois does not foreclose all of 

his arguments because Dubois “addresses only the overbreadth concerns raised 

as a result of the changes in Georgia and federal law legalizing hemp products” 

and “does not consider all of the grounds [he] raise[s].” See Footnote 7 (detailing purported categorical mismatches). We disagree. Regardless, “there is no 

exception to the [the prior panel precedent] rule where the prior panel failed 

to consider arguments raised before a later panel.” Gillis, 938 F.3d at 1198.

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sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable, are 

foreclosed by Dubois. We therefore affirm his sentence. 

AFFIRMED.12

12 This appeal was originally scheduled for oral argument, but the panel 

unanimously agreed to remove it from the oral argument calendar under 11th 

Cir. R. 34-3(f).

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