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THE SCIENCE OF SECURITY,

PARTS I AND II

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND 

OVERSIGHT 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 25, 2009

AND 

NOVEMBER 17, 2009

Serial No. 111–38

and 

Serial No. 111–63

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio 

KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

HON. BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, Chair 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio 

KATHY DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

DAN PEARSON Subcommittee Staff Director 

EDITH HOLLEMAN Subcommittee Counsel 

JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member 

DOUGLAS S. PASTERNAK Democratic Professional Staff Member 

KEN JACOBSON Democratic Professional Staff Member 

ALEX MATTHEWS Research Assistant 

TOM HAMMOND Republican Professional Staff Member 

JANE WISE Research Assistant 

(III)

C O N T E N T S

The Science of Security, Part I: Lessons Learned in Developing, Testing and Operating Advanced Radiation Monitors 

June 25, 2009

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House 

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 8

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 9

Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and 

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................... 10

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 11

Panel I:

Mr. Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 12

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14

Biography .......................................................................................................... 22

Dr. Micah D. Lowenthal, Director, Nuclear Security and Nuclear Facility 

Safety Program, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, National Research 

Council, The National Academies 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 22

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 24

Biography .......................................................................................................... 28

Discussion 

Prioritizing Security Needs ................................................................................. 29

Decision-making: Processes and Timelines ........................................................ 30

ASP in Context: The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture ........................... 31

Management of ASP Testing and Deployment .................................................. 32

Justifying the Cost of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program ................ 33

Panel II:

Dr. William K. Hagan, Acting Deputy Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office, Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 35

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 37

Biography .......................................................................................................... 40

Mr. Todd C. Owen, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field 

Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland 

Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 41

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 42

Page

IV

Mr. Todd C. Owen, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field 

Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland 

Security—Continued

Biography .......................................................................................................... 46

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 47

Appendix: Additional Material for the Record

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show Limits of 

the New Technology, Report to Congressional Requesters, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, GAO–09–655, May 2009 ................................................. 54

Prepublication Copy, Evaluating Testing, Costs, and Benefits of Advanced 

Spectroscopic Portals for Screening Cargo at Ports of Entry, Interim Report 

(Abbreviated Version), Committee on Advanced Spectroscopic Portals, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, Division of Earth and Life Studies, 

National Research Council of the National Academies .................................... 86

The Science of Security, Part II: Technical Problems 

Continue to Hinder Advanced Radiation Monitors 

November 17, 2009

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 178

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 179

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House 

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 184

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 185

Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and 

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................... 186

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 187

Witnesses:

Mr. Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 193

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 195

Biography .......................................................................................................... 199

Dr. Timothy M. Persons, Chief Scientist, U.S. Government Accountability 

Office (GAO) 

Biography .......................................................................................................... 200

Mr. Todd C. Owen, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field 

Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland 

Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 200

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 202

Biography .......................................................................................................... 206

Dr. William K. Hagan, Acting Deputy Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office, Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 207

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 208

Biography .......................................................................................................... 211

Discussion 

CBP Procedures After a Primary Alarm and the Effect of False Positives .... 212

Steps Taken to Reduce False Positives and Negatives ..................................... 213

Page

V

Mission Critical Failure ....................................................................................... 215

Energy Windowing to Improve PVT Performance ............................................. 216

The CBP Inspection System ................................................................................ 217

The Helium-3 Shortage and Potential Alternative Materials .......................... 218

In What Circumstances Should ASPs Be Deployed? ........................................ 219

Expectations of a Cost-benefit Analysis on ASPs .............................................. 220

Metrics and Timelines for Making Decisions About ASPs ............................... 222

Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Dr. William K. Hagan, Acting Deputy Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office, Department of Homeland Security; and Mr. Todd C. Owen, Acting 

Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security .............................. 230

Mr. Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO); Mr. Todd C. Owen, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, Department of Homeland Security; and Dr. William K. Hagan, 

Acting Deputy Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department 

of Homeland Security .......................................................................................... 235

(1)

THE SCIENCE OF SECURITY, PART I: LESSONS LEARNED IN DEVELOPING, TESTING, 

AND OPERATING ADVANCED RADIATION 

MONITORS 

THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Miller 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

2


50324a.eps
3

HEARING CHARTER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

The Science of Security, Part I: Lessons

Learned in Developing, Testing, and

Operating Advanced Radiation Monitors 

THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 2009

10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose 

The Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight meets on June 25, 2009 to examine problems with the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to acquire its next generation radiation monitors known as Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASPs). The ASP program has been under scrutiny since 2006 for failing to 

have clear-cut program requirements, an adequate test plan, sufficient timelines 

and development milestones or a transparent and comprehensive cost benefit analysis. Since the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), a DHS component, was 

created in 2005, they have been responsible for researching, developing, testing and 

managing the program. 

The hearing will examine two new independent reports—one by the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) and the other by the National Academy of Sciences—

that identify ongoing and systematic problems in the testing and development of the 

ASP program. With an estimated program cost of $2-to-$3 billion the Subcommittee 

will evaluate the rigor of the overall test program, the technical abilities of the ASPs 

compared to existing radiation portal monitors and search for lessons from the ASP 

program that can be applied to future DHS acquisitions.

Background 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, protecting the Nation from a 

nuclear or radiological attack has been a top national security priority. In 2002, to 

help address this potential threat, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

agency began deploying radiation monitors at U.S. border sites and ports of entry 

so its officers could screen the more than 23 million containers of cargo that enter 

the country every year for radiological and nuclear materials. 

The equipment used to screen this cargo both then and now are polyvinyl toluene 

(PVT) or ‘‘plastic’’ portal monitors able to detect the presence of radioactive sources, 

but unable to identify the type of radiation present. The PVT monitors, while relatively inexpensive, robust and highly reliable, are unable to distinguish between 

radioactive sources that might be used to construct a nuclear bomb, such as Highly 

Enriched Uranium (HEU), and non-threatening naturally occurring radiological materials (NORM) contained in ceramic tiles, zirconium sand or kitty liter, for instance. As a result, any time a PVT monitor detects a radioactive source the cargo 

is sent to ‘‘secondary’’ screening where CBP agents verify the detection of the radioactive source with a second PVT monitor and use hand-held Radioactive Isotope 

Identification Devices called RIIDs to help identify the source of radiation. 

This method of operation leads to many ‘‘secondary’’ inspections for naturally occurring radioactive material or radioactive material intended for benign purposes, 

such as radioactive medical isotopes. At the Los Angeles/Long Beach port of entry, 

for instance, PVT monitors routinely send up to 600 conveyances of cargo to secondary inspection each day. The RIIDs, used in secondary inspections however, are 

limited in their abilities to locate and identify potential threat material in large 

cargo containers. As a result, CBP officers can consult with scientists in CBP’s Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS) unit who can often help them enhance the 

ability to correctly identify the radioactive material of concern. As a last resort, CBP 

officers may physically search a cargo container by emptying its contents and closely 

scrutinizing it for potentially dangerous radioactive material. 

4

If terrorists were to try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials in containerized cargo—and there are ample other pathways for such smuggling—they would 

likely try to shield or ‘‘mask’’ those materials in an attempt to make it more difficult 

to detect, identify and locate the material of concern. Shielding requires that lead 

or steal or other types of metal enclose the radioisotopes to hide its radioactive signature. Potential terrorists may also attempt to ‘‘mask’’ threatening radioactive material by placing it together with or alongside other non-threatening material that 

has a natural radioactive signature, such as ceramic material, kitty litter or even 

bananas. Most nuclear security experts believe smuggled radioactive or nuclear material would be both shielded and masked in order to conceal it from being located 

and properly identified. Obviously, these efforts would make it harder to detect. 

In order to help both improve the flow of commerce by eliminating many of the 

false alarms that send cargo for secondary screening and to more accurately identify 

radioactive or nuclear material, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began 

developing Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASPs) in 2004. The ASPs were intended 

to both detect and identify radioactive material. In April 2005, the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office was created by National Security Presidential Directive–43/Homeland Security Presidential Directive–14 to, among other things, research, develop, 

test and acquire radiation detection equipment to be used by CBP and other federal 

agencies. The office was not formally established until October 2006 under the 

SAFE Port Act.

From the very start of the ASP program, DNDO seemed to push for acquisition 

decisions well before the technology had demonstrated that it could live up to its 

promise. On July 14, 2006, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff and 

the Director of DNDO, Vayl Oxford, announced contract awards to three companies 

worth an estimated $1.2 billion to develop the ASPs, including the Raytheon Company, from Massachusetts, the Thermo Electron Company from Santa Fe, New Mexico and Canberra Industries from Connecticut. Both Chertoff and Oxford held a 

press conference to announce the billion dollar contract awards just a few months 

after highly critical reviews of the ASPs’ abilities by the GAO and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 

In March 2006, GAO said: ‘‘it is not clear that the benefits of the new portals 

would be worth any increased cost to the program.’’ In June 2006, NIST submitted 

a report to DHS on results of side-by-side testing the previous year at the Nevada 

Test Site of both ASP and PVT systems. The DNDO had assumed that the ASPs 

would correctly identify HEU 95 percent of the time for both bare or unmasked 

HEU and HEU masked in a container with more benign radiological material. Yet, 

NIST found that the three best ASP systems tested identified HEU only 70 to 88 

percent of the time. Their ability to identify ‘‘masked’’ HEU was much worse. The 

three ASP manufacturers did this only 53 percent of the time (Raytheon), 45 percent 

of the time (Thermo) and 17 percent of the time (Canberra). ‘‘Despite these results,’’ 

the GAO found, ‘‘DNDO did not use the information from these tests in its cost-benefit analysis.’’ DNDO claimed that they assumed they would meet the 95 percent 

performance level at some point in the future but provided no data on why they 

reached this conclusion, said GAO. 

At the Chertoff-Oxford press conference in July 2006, then Secretary of Homeland 

Security, Michael Chertoff, said one of the key reasons for developing the ASPs and 

replacing the existing radiation monitors was to ‘‘have fewer false positives.’’ In September 2007, Vayl Oxford, the Director of DNDO reiterated that point in testimony 

to Congress where he emphasized that the ASPs would reduce the number of false 

alarms from the nearly 600 experienced each day by the PVTs at the port of Long 

Beach in California, for instance, to 20 to 25 per day with the new ASP monitors. 

That was the hope, anyway. One of the criteria for ASP primary screening prior 

to certification of the new radiation monitors by the Secretary of Homeland Security, which is required by the appropriations committees, is that the ASPs must 

refer at least 80 percent fewer conveyances for further inspection than the PVTs. 

But in ‘‘field validation tests’’ earlier this year, by one of the two remaining contractors, the ASPs being tested sent more innocent radioactive shipments to secondary 

screening than the older PVT monitors. The cause of the high false positives was 

apparently due to a software glitch. This was a serious concern to the Customs and 

Border Protection personnel who will have to operate and maintain the ASPs if and 

when they are certified and deployed. The contractor has reportedly corrected the 

software issue and intends to return the ASPs to field validation testing next 

month. 

Last fall, ‘‘integration’’ testing of the ASPs by the second remaining contractor 

was halted because of different technical troubles with its own software. The contractor corrected the problem and its ASP machines re-entered integration testing 

late last year. The contractor hopes to finish integration testing and begin field valiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
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dation testing in early August. Still, both contractors are now many months behind 

schedule because technical issues have forced delays. 

Virtually any high-technology research and development program experiences 

bumps in the road, technical troubles and occasional set-backs. However, well managed programs have clear technical requirements and strategic goals. They ensure 

that the new technology being developed is thoroughly tested and adequately integrated into the operational plans and procedures of those who must operate them 

in the field. When these vital components are short changed, when the test plan is 

insufficient and the program’s research, development and testing methods are 

marred by scanty scientific rigor, the technical tools being developed are bound to 

suffer as a result. Cutting critical corners in the development process serves no one’s 

interests. Yet, from the start many of the leaders of the ASP program at DHS 

seemed more interested in fielding this technology then in vigilantly validating its 

performance and effectiveness. At the July 2006 press conference unveiling the contractors on the ASP program, for instance, Vayl Oxford said: ‘‘the priority for the 

first year . . . is to get units out immediately.’’ Three years later, none of these 

units have yet cleared field validation tests. 

The policy governing the ASP program and the disproportionate focus on getting 

the ASP units into the field quickly never matched the multiple independent technical assessments of the technology being developed and tested. Over the past three 

years the Government Accountability Office has issued six reports on the ASP program and testified before Congress multiple times on this matter. Last year the 

Homeland Security Institute, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center 

for DHS, issued a report on the ASPs that also criticized the ASP test program, saying it provided insufficient data. The National Academy’s of Science, which will release an interim report on the ASPs that they have just concluded this week, will 

provide testimony at the Subcommittee hearing that echoes many of the concerns 

raised by GAO over the years.

History of Problems 

In 2006, the GAO issued a harsh critique of the DNDO’s cost-benefit-analysis 

(CBA) of the ASPs. The DNDO analysis omitted critical test data that identified 

major technical problems with the ASPs and they drastically increased the procurement costs of the PVTs. In short, the GAO found DNDO’s cost-benefit analysis was 

‘‘incomplete,’’ based on ‘‘unreliable’’ data and used ‘‘inflated cost estimates for PVT 

equipment.’’

In 2007, GAO concluded that tests of the ASPs conducted by DNDO were ‘‘biased’’ 

and ‘‘were not an objective and rigorous assessment of the ASPs’ capabilities.’’ The 

tests, for instance, used insufficient amounts of materials likely to mask or shield 

radioactive threat sources that terrorists might attempt to smuggle into the country. 

The tests, said GAO, did not attempt to test the limitations of the ASPs and ‘‘did 

not objectively test the performance’’ of currently used hand-held radiation detectors 

or RIIDs. 

Last year, in their own independent cost estimate of the ASP program, GAO 

found that the ASPs could cost about $3.1 billion, $1 billion more than the DNDO’s 

estimate. The GAO also found that the DNDO had often changed its deployment 

strategy, eliminating plans to develop ASP portals for rail, airport and seaport cargo 

screening terminals, for instance. As a result, GAO estimated the newest scaled 

back plan reduced the potential costs of the program to about $2 billion from 2008 

to 2017. The only documentation that DNDO provided to GAO for this major change 

in the ASP program was a one-page spread-sheet and DNDO has still not released 

an updated cost-benefit analysis of the program. 

In addition, GAO criticized DNDO’s decision not to complete computerized simulations or ‘‘injection studies’’ of the ASPs prior to certification by the Secretary of 

Homeland Security. The National Academy of Sciences has also found that computer 

modeling is critically important to the ASP program since running every potential 

radioactive smuggling scenario in live tests is unrealistic. Computer simulations 

would help provide a clearer assessment of the potential performance of the ASPs 

in actual smuggling incidents and effectiveness at identifying threatening radioactive material. DNDO, however, does not plan to complete the studies prior to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision on certification, which DNDO expects to 

occur in October.

Problems Remain 

While DNDO’s past tests have been characterized as being unsound, incomplete 

and limited in scope, the GAO’s most recent work on the ASP program does point 

6

to some improvements in the integrity of the latest round of tests. However, they 

also pinpointed significant technical limitations which have not yet been resolved. 

The ASP portals did prove more effective than the PVTs in detecting HEU materials concealed by ‘‘light shielding.’’ However, differences between the ASPs and 

PVTs became less notable when shielding was slightly increased or decreased. In 

past tests there was virtually no difference in the performance of the two machines 

with regard to detecting other kinds of radioactive isotopes, such as those used for 

medical or industrial purposes, according to the GAO, except in one case where the 

ASPs performed worse than the PVTs. Whether these other forms of radioactive 

sources are sensed by a PVT or ASP machine they all require secondary inspection 

to determine why a payload contains radioactive material. In detecting HEU, the 

ASPs performed better only in one narrowly defined scenario, which many experts 

see as an unrealistic portrayal of a true attempted nuclear smuggling incident. None 

of the tests run by DNDO, for instance, included scenarios that utilized both ‘‘shielding’’ and ‘‘masking’’ as a means of attempting to smuggle radioactive or nuclear material. 

In addition, GAO and others have faulted DNDO for not focusing enough on attempting to improve the current radiation portal monitor program. Instead, DNDO 

has been nearly single-mindedly focused on developing Advanced Spectroscopic Portals at the expense of other far simpler alternatives. Surprisingly, for instance, 

DNDO has not completed efforts to improve the performance of PVTs by a method 

called Energy Windowing that could provide them with some limited, but enhanced, 

performance. Energy Windowing efforts are controversial and are believed to only 

provide modest enhancements to the performance of PVTs. But both GAO and CBP 

has been pushing DNDO to do more on this front for years. In addition, DNDO has 

not made efforts to upgrade the software in the hand-held radiation detection units 

known as RIIDs that could also provide a far less expensive alternative to enhancing the operational effectiveness of radiation monitors. 

Because both remaining ASP contractors suffered from serious technical problems 

in their last round of testing, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency personnel fear that if the ASPs are certified, procured and deployed that they will encounter many problems in the field that will negatively impact their day-to-day operations and perhaps the technical effectiveness of the current radiation monitoring 

program to actually detect illicit nuclear or radiological material coming into the 

country. The GAO, National Academy of Sciences and others have also criticized 

DNDO for not seeking input from CBP officials on the ASP program from the start. 

The relationship has improved and DNDO does attempt to include CBP in critical 

decisions regarding the ASP program today. But many critics say perhaps one of 

DNDO’s biggest failures was the fact that they did not do this from the beginning, 

seeking input from the operational users of the technology that DNDO was tasked 

to research, test and develop. 

As a result of all of these issues, the ASPs continue to suffer from key questions 

about their ability to provide significant improved performance over existing radiation detection equipment currently fielded at U.S. ports. The Department of Homeland Security has already spent more than $235 million on the ASP program. But 

if the Secretary of Homeland Security certifies that the ASP monitors are worth investing in this fall—just three to four months from now—then $2 billion more may 

be invested to procure ASP radiation monitors. Yet, given the continued criticism 

of the narrowly focused and inadequate ASP test program, the limited technical improvements they may offer over current radiation monitors and significant increased 

costs to maintain and operate the ASPs compared to the PVTs, the success of the 

program remains in doubt.

Key Issues

• Go Slow. Uncovering and resolving technical problems once newly developed 

radiation monitors are fielded may hinder the ability to detect and identify 

radioactive or nuclear material that poses a potential threat. It could disrupt 

operations at U.S. borders and ports of entry curtailing the flow of commerce 

and it will cost more to rectify these problems in the field, rather than in the 

laboratory or at the test range. Yet, rather than carefully testing and validating the performance and effectiveness of the ASP monitors before a major 

procurement decision is made DHS has continually sought to get the ASPs 

into the field in spite of critical technical flaws identified during testing.

• Cost Benefit Analysis. Even if the technical abilities of the ASPs are proven, their relative technical capabilities and increased costs must be carefully 

weighed in comparison to the existing radiation monitoring system in place 

today. Replacing a proven, less-costly system that has the confidence of its opVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
7

erators, must be given careful consideration. The DNDO has not yet provided 

an updated cost-benefit-analysis that would validate a decision to procure the 

multi-billion dollar ASP equipment.

• Judging Performance. As the House Committee on Appropriations has said 

in the past, procurement of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitors 

should not proceed until they are deemed to add a ‘‘significant increase in 

operational effectiveness’’ over the current PVT system already in place. Last 

July, CBP, DNDO and the DHS management directorate jointly issued criteria for determining this increase in effectiveness in both ‘‘primary’’ and ‘‘secondary’’ screening. In primary screening the criteria requires ASPs to detect 

potential threats as well as or better than PVTs, show improved detection of 

Highly Enriched Uranium and reduce innocent alarms. In secondary screening the criteria requires ASPs to reduce the probability of misidentifying special nuclear material (HEU or plutonium) and reduce the average time to conduct secondary screenings. The Secretary of Homeland Security must certify 

to Congress that the ASPs have met these criteria before funding for fullscale procurement of the ASPs goes forward. However, the criteria to measure 

this improvement are weak and rather vague.

• Lessons Learned. The Department of Homeland Security must make greater efforts to avoid rushing to acquisition decisions when the R&D is incomplete. With ASPs, the research and development program itself has been hindered by a lack of rigorous scientific evaluations, and undemanding testing 

protocols. Moving to acquire systems plagued by such problems may endanger 

security and significantly increase the costs of the program. A review of 

DHS’s major programs by GAO last November found that 45 of 48 major programs did not adhere to the agency’s own investment review process that 

helps provide appropriate oversight to address cost, schedule and performance 

problems. In FY 2008, the review found, DHS spent $147.5 million on the 

ASP program despite the fact it did not have a mission needs statement. The 

program also lacked operational requirements documents and an acquisition 

program baseline.

Witnesses 

Panel I:

Mr. Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Office

Dr. Micah Lowenthal, Division on Earth and Life Studies, Nuclear and Radiation 

Studies Board, National Research Council, The National Academy of Sciences

Panel II:

Dr. William Hagan, Acting Deputy Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

(DNDO), Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Mr. Todd C. Owen, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs & Border Protection (CBP), Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS).

8

Chairman MILLER. The hearing will now come to order. Good 

morning. Welcome to today’s hearing, The Science of Security: Lessons Learned in Developing, Testing, and Operating Advanced Radiation Monitors.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, preventing the detonation of a nuclear or radiologic device—a ‘dirty 

bomb’—in the United States has become a top national security objective. We have invested billions of dollars since 9/11 to develop 

the means to prevent, detect and respond to any attack by weapons 

of mass destruction. We developed radiation monitors at our port 

and border crossings to screen millions of cargo containers entering 

the United States every year, hunting for radiological material that 

could be used for terrorist purposes. Since 2004, the Department of 

Homeland Security has spent more than $230 million on a program 

to develop a new radiation detection system called an Advanced 

Spectroscopic Portal, or ASP, that can both detect and identify nuclear material. 

Congress expects that the funding federal agencies receive will 

be well spent. When it comes to scientifically challenging or technically demanding programs, it pays to have well-prepared program requirements, demanding testing protocols and an independent and comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Those vital steps, 

those vital program components help managers make informed decisions about whether to move forward with a technology development program or to replace a proven technology with a new technology. Unfortunately, despite recent progress, the ASP program 

has suffered because it lacked all the preparatory steps of a wellmanaged program. We will hear about some of those problems 

today from the Government Accountability Office and the National 

Academies of Science. 

Over the years, the GAO has released six reports on the ASP 

program. The GAO found that some of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s tests were biased and did not provide a rigorous assessment of ASP’s capabilities. The Agency relied on incomplete 

and unreliable data in their cost-benefit analysis, omitting critical 

test data, inflating the cost of current radiation detectors and underestimating the cost of ASP monitors. The Department failed to 

produce a requirements document or adequate documentation regarding major changes to the planned ASP deployment strategy. 

DNDO never considered the option of investigating improvements 

of the existing radiation portal monitoring program, both the PVT 

monitors and the hand-held detectors that Customs and Border 

Protection agents rely upon. 

The National Academy of Science’s interim report on the ASP 

program, released yesterday, reflects many of the same concerns. 

The Academy calls for significant restructuring of DHS testing procedures for the ASP program. They question the criteria being used 

to judge the ASPs’ performance and they recommend that DHS not 

proceed with further ASP procurement until they address all the 

findings and recommendations in their report. 

GAO’s reports have provided a regular accounting of how the 

ASP program was going wrong. The Academy report provides a 

roadmap to how the program can be put back on track, assuming 

9

that the Department determines that it is worth the cost and effort. 

Radioactive materials have become a normal part of commerce. 

They are used for medical procedures and industrial applications. 

Bananas have radiation. Technology can help us detect and identify radioactive sources in cargo containers but no technology can 

sort out good radioactive material intended for legitimate purposes 

from the bad radioactive materials intended to do us harm. As a 

result, human operators will still need to make important decisions 

often informed by intelligence efforts to keep the Nation secure. 

Well-trained, well-equipped people, law enforcement officers and 

Customs and Border Protection inspectors will always be critical to 

the equation. 

This hearing addresses our responsibility to the technological 

part of that equation. Before we move forward with a $2 billion or 

$3 billion program, we must ensure that we get our money’s worth 

from the new technology. Put another way, if we have $2 billion 

or $3 billion to spend to enhance our security, is this technology 

really how we should spend it? 

I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today. 

And now I recognize Dr. Broun, the Ranking Member from Georgia, for an opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BRAD MILLER

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, preventing the detonation of a nuclear or radiological device in the U.S. has become a top national security objective. 

We have invested billions of dollars since 9/11 to develop the means to prevent, 

detect and respond to any attack by weapons of mass destruction. We have deployed 

radiation monitors at our ports and border crossings to screen millions of cargo containers entering the U.S. every year, hunting for radiological material that could be 

used for terrorist purposes. Since 2004, the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) has spent more than $230 million on a program to develop a new radiation 

detection system called an Advanced Spectroscopic Portal or ASP that can both detect and identify nuclear material. 

Congress expects that the funding federal agencies receive will be well spent. 

When it comes to scientifically challenging or technically demanding programs, 

studies have shown that it pays to have well-prepared program requirements, demanding testing protocols and an independent and comprehensive cost benefit analysis. These vital program components help managers make informed decisions about 

whether to move forward with a technology development program, or to replace a 

proven technology with a new technology. Unfortunately, despite some recent 

progress, the ASP program has suffered because it lacked all the preparatory steps 

of a well managed program. We will hear about some of those problems today from 

both Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the National Academies of 

Science. 

Over the past three years the GAO has released six reports on the ASP program. 

The GAO found that some of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO) tests 

were ‘‘biased’’ and did not provide a rigorous assessment of the ASP’s capabilities. 

The agency relied on ‘‘incomplete’’ and ‘‘unreliable’’ data in their cost-benefit analysis—omitting critical test data, inflating the costs of the current radiation detectors, and underestimating the costs of ASP monitors. The Department failed to 

produce a requirements document or adequate documentation regarding major 

changes to their planned ASP deployment strategy. DNDO never considered the option of investing in improvements to the existing radiation portal monitoring program—both the current polyvinyl toluene (PVT) monitors and the hand-held detectors Customs and Border Protection agents rely upon. 

The National Academy of Sciences’ interim report on the ASP program, released 

yesterday, reflects many of the same concerns. The Academy calls for a significant 

restructuring of DHS testing procedures for the ASP program, they question the criVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
10

teria being used to judge the ASP’s performance and they recommend that DHS not 

proceed with further ASP procurement until they address all of the findings and 

recommendations in their report. 

GAO’s reports have provided a regular accounting of how the ASP program was 

going wrong; the Academy’s report provides a roadmap to how the program could 

be put back on track—assuming that the Department determines that is worth the 

cost and effort. 

Radioactive materials have become a normal part of commerce. They are used for 

medical procedures and industrial applications. Technology can help us detect and 

identify radioactive sources in cargo containers, but no technology can sort out 

‘‘good’’ radioactive material intended for legitimate purposes from the ‘‘bad’’ radioactive material intended to do us harm. As a result, human operators will need to 

make important decisions, often informed by intelligence efforts, to keep the Nation 

secure. Well trained, well equipped people—law enforcement officers and customs 

and border protection inspectors—will always be critical to the equation. 

This hearing addresses our responsibility to the technological part of that equation. Before we move forward with a two to three billion dollar program we must 

ensure that we get our money’s worth from the new technology. Put another way, 

if we have two or three billion dollars to spend to enhance our security, is this technology really how we should spend it? 

I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today.

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our 

witnesses here today and to thank you for participating in this important hearing on the Department of Homeland Security’s Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program. I know it is hard to say, particularly for the non-scientist, but I am a scientist—I am a physician. 

Yesterday the House took up consideration of the DHS appropriations bill, and later today the Science Committee’s Technology 

and Innovation Subcommittee, which I am also a Member of, will 

hold a hearing on cyber security. I also sit on the Homeland Security Committee’s Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cyber Security, Science and Technology as well. Needless to say, DHS has 

kept me busy this week. 

This morning we will look into the status of the Department’s ongoing development of the next-generation radiation portal monitors, 

get an update from GAO on their continued work, and receive a report from the National Research Council. It goes without saying 

that this program has been followed closely for some time now and 

thankfully many of the testing issues that GAO has brought up in 

previous reports seem to have been mitigated, at least somewhat. 

However, this program is far from out of the woods. In their most 

recent analysis, GAO and the Academy raised new issues relating 

to the rigor of the testing and the certification process and offer 

paths forward for potential acquisition in the future. I hope DHS 

takes these recommendations seriously, and I look forward to ensuring that they are not summarily dismissed for the sake of arbitrary timetables. We see that frequently here in government. 

Looking forward, DHS should conduct a rigorous cost-benefit 

analysis that takes into account updated threat assessments, a review of all variations of concepts of operations, potential upgrades 

to existing technologies and independent cost estimates. It also 

needs to weigh the pros and cons not just of ASP versus Polyvinyl 

Toluene (PVT) and Radio-Isotope Identification Devices (RIID), but 

also whether the additional capability gained outweighs the needs 

of other aspects of the global nuclear detection architecture. Unfortunately, this may be hard to do at this point considering GAO indicated earlier this year that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

11

had, to quote GAO, ‘‘not developed an overarching strategic plan to 

guide its development of a more comprehensive global strategy for 

nuclear detection.’’

All of these factors need to be taken into consideration as DHS 

moves toward an acquisition. Even then I will remain cautious, 

given the Department’s track record with past acquisitions. Many 

of the issues we are dealing with today could have been prevented 

by engaging the end-users early on in the process and also by clearly defining the requirements and simply following existing Department acquisition processes. 

Last week this subcommittee held a hearing on issues plaguing 

NPOESS. The AST program exhibits eerie similarities to that program in that it attempted to link research and development activities with the acquisition of an operational system and had unclear 

architectural priorities. Let us hope other federal programs can 

learn from these lessons and protect taxpayers from future inefficiencies and waste. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time and I look 

forward to our witnesses’ testimony. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE PAUL C. BROUN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome the witnesses here today, and 

thank them for participating in this important hearing on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program. 

Yesterday the House took up consideration of the DHS Appropriation bill, and 

later today the Science Committee’s Technology and Innovation Subcommittee, 

which I also sit on, will hold a hearing on cyber security. I also sit on the Homeland 

Security Committee’s Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cyber Security, Science 

and Technology, as well. Needless to say, DHS has kept me busy this week. 

This morning we will look into the status of the Department’s ongoing development of next-generation Radiation Portal Monitors, get an update from General Accountability Office (GAO) on their continuing work, and receive a report from the 

National Academy of Sciences. It goes without saying that this program has been 

followed closely for some time now, and thankfully many of the testing issues that 

GAO brought up in previous reports seem to be mitigated. However, this program 

is far from ‘‘out of the woods.’’ In their most recent analysis, GAO and the Academy 

raise new issues relating to the rigor of the testing and certification process, and 

offer paths forward for a potential acquisition in the future. I hope DHS takes these 

recommendations seriously, and I look forward to ensuring that they are not summarily dismissed for the sake of arbitrary timetables. 

Looking forward, DHS should conduct a rigorous Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) that 

takes into account updated threat assessments, a review of all variations of Concepts of Operations (CONOPS), potential upgrades for existing technologies, and 

independent cost estimates. It also needs to weigh the pros and cons of not just ASP 

versus Polyvinyl Toluene (PVT) and Radio-isotope Identification Devices (RIID), but 

also whether the additional capability gained outweighs the needs of other aspects 

of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. Unfortunately, this may be hard to 

do at this point considering GAO indicated earlier this year that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) had ‘‘not developed an overarching strategic plan to 

guide its development of a more comprehensive global strategy for nuclear detection.’’

All of these factors need to be taken into consideration as DHS moves toward an 

acquisition. Even then, I will remain cautious given the Department’s track record 

with past acquisitions. Many of the issues we are dealing with today could have 

been prevented by engaging the end-users early in the process, clearly defining requirements, and simply following existing Department acquisition processes. 

Last week this subcommittee held a hearing on issues plaguing the National 

Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). The ASP program exhibits eerie similarities to that program in that it attempted to link research and development activities with the acquisition of an operational system, and had unclear arVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
12

chitectural priorities. Let’s hope other federal programs can learn from these lessons 

and protect taxpayers from future inefficiencies and waste. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Thank you.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Broun. 

Panel I: 

Chairman MILLER. I am now pleased to introduce our panel of 

witnesses. Mr. Gene Aloise is the Director of Natural Resources 

and Environment at the Government Accountability Office, GAO, 

and Dr. Micah Lowenthal is the Director of the Nuclear Security 

and Nuclear Facility Safety Program in the Nuclear and Radiation 

Studies Board at the National Research Council of the National 

Academy of Sciences. Is that how you describe your job at a cocktail party? 

As our witnesses should know, you each have five minutes for 

your spoken testimony. Your written testimony will be included in 

the record for the hearing. When you have all completed your spoken testimony, we will begin with questions and each Member will 

have five minutes to question the panel. It is the practice of this 

subcommittee to receive testimony under oath. Do either of you 

have any objection to taking an oath? Okay. You also have the 

right to be represented by counsel. Do either of you have counsel 

here? If you would please stand and raise your right hand? Do you 

swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth? 

The record will reflect that both Mr. Aloise and Dr. Lowenthal 

took the oath. Mr. Aloise, you may begin. 

STATEMENT OF MR. GENE ALOISE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) 

Mr. ALOISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased 

to be here today to discuss DHS’s plans to develop and test advanced portal monitors for use at the Nation’s borders to prevent 

nuclear materials from being smuggled into the United States. According to DHS, the current system of radiation detection equipment is effective and does not impede the flow of commerce. However, DHS wants to improve the capabilities of the existing equipment with new equipment. 

One of the major drawbacks of the new equipment is the substantially higher cost compared to the existing equipment. We estimated in September 2008 that the life cycle cost of each standard 

cargo version of the ASP to be about $823,000 compared to about 

$308,000 for the PVT standard cargo portal and that the total program cost for the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO) latest deployment plan would be about $2 billion. 

Since 2006, we have issued six reports, and including today, four 

testimonies, and have made 19 recommendations for improving 

DNDO’s efforts to develop and test portal monitors. Our concerns 

have focused on the need for realistic and objective testing of ASPs, 

full disclosure and reporting of testing limitations, development of 

cost estimates that consider the full cost to deploy the new equipVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
13

ment, and development of a sound cost-benefit analysis which determines whether the marginal increase in security from the ASPs 

is worth its very high cost. 

My testimony today is based on our recent report, which assessed 

the most recent round of ASP testing. I will also discuss the lessons 

learned from ASP testing. Our work on the latest round of ASP 

testing found that DHS increased the rigor in comparison with previous tests, and thereby added credibility to the test results. However, we still question whether the benefits of the ASP justify the 

high cost. In particular, DHS’s criteria for significant increase in 

operational effectiveness require only marginal improvement in the 

detection of certain weapons-usable nuclear material. The marginal 

improvement required of ASPs is particularly notable given that 

DNDO has not completed efforts to enhance the performance of the 

current generation of equipment. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) officials have told us that they have repeatedly urged DNDO 

to investigate improving the performance of the equipment through 

what is known as energy windowing. DNDO has collected the data 

necessary to do this, but has not yet completed efforts to analyze 

the data and further improve the technique. 

Our analysis of the new test results shows that ASPs detected 

certain nuclear materials better than PVTs when shielding approximated DOE threat guidance, which is based on light shielding. However, differences between the two systems were hard to 

recognize when shielding was slightly increased or decreased. Both 

systems had difficulty in detecting nuclear materials when shielding was somewhat greater than threat guidance, which is set to 

match the extent of the detection limits of the PVTs. Importantly, 

the threat guidance is not a realistic approximation of how a terrorist might shield nuclear material to successfully smuggle it undetected through a border crossing. 

In addition, DNDO underestimated the time needed for ASP testing, which was originally supposed to be finished by September 

2008. DHS’s most recent schedule anticipated ASP certification 

around May 2009, but testing has been delayed even further, and 

DHS has not updated its schedule. As far as we know, certification 

is scheduled for some time this fall. 

Of concern to us is the fact that DNDO does not plan to complete 

simulations that could provide additional insights into ASP capabilities and limitations prior to certification. On this point, DNDO 

does not seem to have learned from past mistakes. A rush to deploy 

ASPs before all testing is complete leads to shortcuts in testing and 

raises questions among stakeholders about the equipment’s effectiveness and reliability. Furthermore, DNDO has not yet updated 

its cost-benefit analysis, which might show that DNDO’s plan to replace existing equipment is not justified. 

One of the primary lessons to be learned from our work is to 

avoid the pitfalls in testing that stem from a rush to procure new 

technologies. In the case of the ASP, a push to rush to replace existing equipment led to a testing program which lacked scientific 

rigor. Even for the new round of testing, DNDO consistently underestimated the time necessary to conduct tests and resolve problems, and testing is still not completed. 

14

1DNDO was established within DHS in 2005; its mission includes developing, testing, acquiring, and supporting the deployment of radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry. CBP 

began deploying portal monitors in 2002, prior to DNDO’s creation, under the radiation portal 

monitor project. 2GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Program to Procure and Deploy Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the Department’s Previous Cost Estimates, 

GAO–08–1108R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2008). 3 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2069 (2007); 

Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. 

No. 110–329, 121 Stat. 3574, 3679 (2008). 

In closing, we believe that given the importance of this new 

equipment to our national security, that Congress and the American taxpayer still need to know three things: does the equipment 

work, how much will it cost; and does the marginal increase in security justify its very high cost. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks and I would be happy 

to respond to any questions you and the Ranking Member may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENE ALOISE

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons

Learned From DHS Testing of Advanced

Radiation Detection Portal Monitors

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s work on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) testing of advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) radiation detection monitors. As you are aware, the national security mission of U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP), an agency within DHS, includes screening for smuggled 

nuclear or radiological material that could be used in a nuclear weapon or radiological dispersal device (a ‘‘dirty bomb’’). To screen cargo at ports of entry, CBP conducts primary inspections with radiation detection equipment called portal monitors—large stationary detectors through which cargo containers and vehicles pass 

as they enter the United States. When radiation is detected, CBP conducts secondary inspections using a second portal monitor to confirm the original alarm and 

a hand-held radioactive isotope identification device to identify the radiation’s 

source and determine whether it constitutes a threat. 

The polyvinyl toluene (PVT) portal monitors currently in use can detect radiation 

but cannot identify the type of material causing an alarm. As a result, the monitors’ 

radiation alarms can be set off even by benign, naturally occurring radioactive material. One way to reduce the rate of such innocent alarms—and thereby minimize unnecessary secondary inspections and enhance the flow of commerce—is to adjust the 

operational thresholds (i.e., operate the PVTs at a reduced level of sensitivity). However, reducing the sensitivity may make it more difficult to detect certain nuclear 

materials. 

To address the limitations of current-generation portal monitors, DHS’s Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) in 2005 began to develop and test ASPs, which 

are designed to both detect radiation and identify the source.1 DNDO hopes to use 

the new portal monitors to replace at least some PVTs currently used for primary 

screening, as well as PVTs and hand-held identification devices currently used for 

secondary screening. However, in September 2008, we estimated the life cycle cost 

of each standard cargo version of the ASP (including deployment costs) to be about 

$822,000, compared with about $308,000 for the PVT standard cargo portal, and the 

total program cost for DNDO’s latest plan for deploying radiation portal monitors—

which relies on a combination of ASPs and PVTs and does not deploy radiation portal monitors at all border crossings—to be about $2 billion.2

Concerned about the performance and cost of the ASP monitors, Congress required the Secretary of Homeland Security to certify that the monitors will provide 

a ‘‘significant increase in operational effectiveness’’ before DNDO obligates funds for 

full-scale ASP procurement.3 The Secretary must submit separate certifications for 

15

4GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show Limits of the New Technology, GAO–09–655 

(Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2009).

primary and secondary inspection. In response, CBP, DNDO, and the DHS management directorate jointly issued criteria in July 2008 for determining whether the 

new technology provides a significant increase in operational effectiveness. The primary screening criteria require that the new portal monitors detect potential 

threats as well as or better than PVTs, show improved performance in detection of 

highly enriched uranium (HEU), and reduce innocent alarms. To meet the secondary screening criteria, the new portal monitors must reduce the probability of 

misidentifying special nuclear material (e.g., HEU and plutonium) and the average 

time to conduct secondary screenings. 

DNDO designed and coordinated a new series of tests, originally scheduled to run 

from April 2008 through September 2008, to determine whether the new portal 

monitors meet the certification criteria for primary and secondary screening and are 

ready for deployment. Key phases of this testing program include concurrent testing 

led by DNDO of the new and current equipment’s ability to detect and identify 

threats and of ASPs’ readiness to be integrated into operations for both primary and 

secondary screening at ports of entry; field validation led by CBP at four northern 

and southern border crossings and two seaports; and an independent evaluation, led 

by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate at one of the seaports, of the new 

portal monitors’ effectiveness and suitability. 

Since 2006, we have issued six reports and four testimonies on development of 

radiation detection portal monitors, including today’s testimony, and have made 19 

recommendations for improving DNDO’s efforts to develop and test portal monitors. 

Our concerns have focused on key areas in which DNDO’s efforts have lacked the 

necessary rigor given ASPs’ high cost and the importance of the radiation portal 

monitor project to our national security. These areas include objective and realistic 

testing of ASPs’ performance in comparison with the performance of current-generation equipment; full disclosure and reporting of the limitations of tests used to support a decision by the Secretary of Homeland Security on ASP certification; development of a cost estimate that considers the full costs of the plan for deploying radiation detection portal monitors; and development of a cost-benefit analysis based on 

ASPs’ demonstrated performance and a complete accounting of the portal monitor 

project’s costs. (App. I presents a summary of our key findings and recommendations related to ASPs.) As I will discuss today, DNDO has improved the rigor of testing but has not yet updated the cost-benefit analysis that is critical to a decision 

on whether to replace radiation detection equipment already deployed at ports of 

entry with the significantly more expensive ASPs. 

Specifically, my testimony discusses (1) our key findings on the most recent round 

of ASP testing and (2) lessons from ASP testing that can be applied to other DHS 

technology investments. These findings are based on our report released this week 

and other related GAO reports.4 We conducted this performance audit work in June 

2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to produce a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our statement today. 

The Latest Round of Testing Highlights the Limitations of ASPs 

Our report on the latest round of ASP testing found that DHS increased the rigor 

of ASP testing in comparison with previous tests and that a particular area of improvement was in the performance testing at the Nevada Test Site, where DNDO 

compared the capability of ASP and current-generation equipment to detect and 

identify nuclear and radiological materials. For example, unlike in prior tests, the 

plan for the 2008 performance test stipulated that there would be no system contractor involvement in test execution. Such improvements addressed concerns we 

previously raised about the potential for bias and provided credibility to the results. 

Nevertheless, based on the following factors, we continue to question whether the 

benefits of the new portal monitors justify the high cost:

• The DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness. Our 

chief concern with the criteria is that they require a marginal improvement 

over current-generation portal monitors in the detection of certain weaponsusable nuclear materials when ASPs are deployed for primary screening. 

DNDO considers detection of such materials to be a key limitation of currentgeneration portal monitors. We are particularly concerned about the marginal 

16

improvement required of ASPs because the detection threshold for the current-generation portal monitors does not specify a level of radiation shielding 

that smugglers could realistically use. DOE and national laboratory officials 

told us that DOE’s threat guidance used to set the current detection threshold 

is based not on an analysis of the capabilities of potential smugglers to take 

effective shielding measures but rather on the limited sensitivity of PVTs to 

detect anything more than certain lightly shielded nuclear materials. DNDO 

officials acknowledge that both the new and current-generation portal monitors are capable of detecting certain nuclear materials only when unshielded 

or lightly shielded. The marginal improvement in detection of such materials 

required of ASPs is particularly notable given that DNDO has not completed 

efforts to fine-tune PVTs’ software and thereby improve sensitivity to nuclear 

materials. DNDO officials expect they can achieve small improvements in 

sensitivity, but DNDO has not yet funded efforts to fine-tune PVTs’ software. 

In contrast to the marginal improvement required in detection of certain nuclear materials, the primary screening requirement to reduce the rate of innocent alarms could result in hundreds of fewer secondary screenings per day, 

thereby reducing CBP’s workload and delays to commerce. In addition, the 

secondary screening criteria, which require ASPs to reduce the probability of 

misidentifying special nuclear material by one-half, address the inability of 

relatively small hand-held devices to consistently locate and identify potential 

threats in large cargo containers.

• Preliminary results of performance testing and field validation. The preliminary results presented to us by DNDO are mixed, particularly in the capability of ASPs used for primary screening to detect certain shielded nuclear 

materials. Preliminary results show that the new portal monitors detected 

certain nuclear materials better than PVTs when shielding approximated 

DOE threat guidance, which is based on light shielding. In contrast, differences in system performance were less notable when shielding was slightly 

increased or decreased: Both the PVTs and ASPs were frequently able to detect certain nuclear materials when shielding was below threat guidance, and 

both systems had difficulty detecting such materials when shielding was 

somewhat greater than threat guidance. With regard to secondary screening, 

ASPs performed better than hand-held devices in identification of threats 

when masked by naturally occurring radioactive material. However, differences in the ability to identify certain shielded nuclear materials depended 

on the level of shielding, with increasing levels appearing to reduce any ASP 

advantages over the hand-held identification devices. Other phases of testing 

uncovered multiple problems in meeting requirements for successfully integrating the new technology into operations at ports of entry. Of the two ASP 

vendors participating in the 2008 round of testing, one has fallen behind due 

to severe problems encountered during testing of ASPs’ readiness to be integrated into operations at ports of entry (‘‘integration testing’’); the problems 

may require that the vendor redo previous test phases to be considered for 

certification. The other vendor’s system completed integration testing, but 

CBP suspended field validation after two weeks because of serious performance problems resulting in an overall increase in the number of referrals for 

secondary screening compared with existing equipment.

• DNDO’s plans for computer simulations. DNDO does not plan to complete injection studies—computer simulations for testing the response of ASPs and 

PVTs to simulated threat objects concealed in cargo containers—prior to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision on certification even though delays 

to the ASP test schedule have allowed more time to conduct the studies. According to DNDO officials, injection studies address the inability of performance testing to replicate the wide variety of cargo coming into the United 

States and the inability to place special nuclear material and other threat objects in cargo during field validation. DNDO had earlier indicated that injection studies could provide information comparing the performance of the two 

systems as part of the certification process for both primary and secondary 

screening. However, DNDO subsequently decided that performance testing 

would provide sufficient information to support a decision on ASP certification. DNDO officials said they would instead use injection studies to support effective deployment of the new portal monitors.

• Lack of an updated cost-benefit analysis. DNDO has not yet updated its costbenefit analysis to take into account the results of the latest round of ASP 

testing. An updated analysis that takes into account the results from the latest round of testing, including injection studies, might show that DNDO’s 

17

5GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major Programs Lack Appropriate Oversight, GAO–09–29 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 18, 2008). 6GAO, Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD–00–199 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2000).

plan to replace existing equipment with ASPs is not justified, particularly 

given the marginal improvement in detection of certain nuclear materials required of ASPs and the potential to improve the current-generation portal 

monitors’ sensitivity to nuclear materials, most likely at a lower cost. DNDO 

officials said they are currently updating the ASP cost-benefit analysis and 

plan to complete it prior to a decision on certification by the Secretary of 

Homeland Security.

Our report recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct DNDO 

to (1) assess whether ASPs meet the criteria for a significant increase in operational 

effectiveness based on a valid comparison with PVTs’ full performance potential and 

(2) revise the schedule for ASP testing and certification to allow sufficient time for 

review and analysis of results from the final phases of testing and completion of all 

tests, including injection studies. We further recommended that, if ASPs are certified, the Secretary direct DNDO to develop an initial deployment plan that allows 

CBP to uncover and resolve any additional problems not identified through testing 

before proceeding to full-scale deployment. DHS agreed to a phased deployment that 

should allow time to uncover ASP problems but disagreed with GAO’s other recommendations, which we continue to believe remain valid.

Procurement Decisions for New Technologies Require Rigorous Testing 

and Thorough Analysis of Results 

The challenges DNDO has faced in developing and testing ASPs illustrate the importance of following existing DHS policies as well as best practices for investments 

in complex homeland security acquisitions and for testing of new technologies. The 

DHS investment review process calls for executive decision-making at key points in 

an investment’s life cycle and includes many acquisition best practices that, if applied consistently, could help increase the chances for successful outcomes. However, 

we reported in November 2008 that, for the period from fiscal year 2004 through 

the second quarter of fiscal year 2008, DHS had not effectively implemented or adhered to its investment review process due to a lack of senior management officials’ 

involvement as well as limited monitoring and resources.5 In particular, of DHS’s 

48 major investments requiring milestone and annual reviews under the Department’s investment review policy, 45 were not assessed in accordance with this policy. In addition, many major investments, including DNDO’s ASP program, had not 

met the Department’s requirements for basic acquisition documents necessary to inform the investment review process. As a result, DHS had not consistently provided 

the oversight needed to identify and address cost, schedule, and performance problems in its major investments. Among other things, our November 2008 report recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct component heads, such 

as the Director of DNDO, to ensure that the components have established processes 

to manage major investments consistent with departmental policies. DHS generally 

concurred with our recommendations, and we noted that DHS had begun several 

efforts to address shortcomings in the investment review process identified in our 

report, including issuing an interim directive requiring DHS components to align 

their internal policies and procedures by the end of the third quarter of fiscal year 

2009. In January 2009, DHS issued a memorandum instructing component heads 

to create acquisition executives in their organizations to be responsible for management and oversight of component acquisition processes. If fully implemented, these 

steps should help ensure that DHS components have established processes to manage major investments. 

Based on our body of work on ASP testing, one of the primary lessons to be 

learned is to avoid the pitfalls in testing that stem from a rush to procure new technologies. GAO has previously reported on the negative consequences of pressures 

imposed by closely linking testing and development programs with decisions to procure and deploy new technologies, including the creation of incentives to postpone 

difficult tests and limit open communication about test results.6 We found that testing programs designed to validate a product’s performance against increasing standards for different stages in product development are a best practice for acquisition 

strategies for new technologies. In the case of ASPs, the push to replace existing 

equipment with the new portal monitors led to a testing program that until recently 

lacked the necessary rigor. Even for the most recent round of testing, DNDO’s 

schedule consistently underestimated the time required to conduct tests, resolve 

18

problems uncovered during testing, and complete key documents, including final 

test reports. In addition, DNDO’s original working schedule did not anticipate the 

time required to update its cost-benefit analysis to take into account the latest test 

results. The schedule anticipated completion of testing in mid-September 2008 and 

the DHS Secretary’s decision on ASP certification between September and November 2008. However, testing is still not completed, and DNDO took months longer 

than anticipated to complete the final report on performance testing. 

As previously mentioned, a number of aspects of the latest round of ASP testing 

increased the rigor in comparison with earlier rounds and, if properly implemented, 

could improve the rigor in DHS’s testing of other advanced technologies. Key aspects 

included the following:

• Criteria for ensuring test requirements are met. The test and evaluation master plan established criteria requiring that the ASPs meet certain requirements before starting or completing any test phase. For example, the plan required that ASPs have no critical or severe issues rendering them completely 

unusable or impairing their function. The criteria provided a formal means 

to ensure that ASPs met certain basic requirements prior to the start of each 

phase of testing. DNDO and CBP adhered to the criteria even though doing 

so resulted in integration testing taking longer than anticipated and delaying 

the start of field validation.

• Participation of the technology end-user. The participation of CBP (the enduser of the new portal monitors) provided an independent check, within DHS, 

of DNDO’s efforts to develop and test the new portal monitors. For example, 

CBP added a final requirement to integration testing before proceeding to 

field validation to demonstrate ASPs’ ability to operate for 40 hours without 

additional problems and thereby provide for a productive field validation. In 

addition, the participation of CBP officers in the 2008 round of performance 

testing allowed DNDO to adhere more closely than in previous tests to CBP’s 

standard operating procedure for conducting a secondary inspection using the 

hand-held identification devices, thereby providing for an objective test.

• Participation of an independent test authority. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate, which is responsible for developing and implementing the 

Department’s test and evaluation policies and standards, will have the lead 

role in the final phase of ASP testing and thereby provide an additional independent check on testing efforts. The Science and Technology Directorate 

identified two critical questions, related to ASPs’ operational effectiveness 

(i.e., detection and identification of threats) and suitability (e.g., reliability, 

maintainability, and supportability), and drafted its own test plan to address 

those questions.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have 

at this time.

GAO Staff Acknowledgments 

Ned Woodward (Assistant Director), Joseph Cook, and Kevin Tarmann made key 

contributions to this testimony. Dr. Timothy Persons (Chief Scientist), James Ashley, Steve Caldwell, John Hutton, Omari Norman, Alison O’Neill, Amelia Shachoy, 

and Rebecca Shea also made important contributions.

19

Appendix I: 

Key Findings and Recommendations from

Related GAO Products on Testing

and Development of ASPs 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, But Concerns Remain. GAO–06–389. 

Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006.

• Key findings. Prototypes of advanced spectroscopic portals (ASP) were expected to be significantly more expensive than current-generation portal monitors but had not been shown to be more effective. For example, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) officials’ preliminary analysis of 10 ASPs tested at the Nevada Test Site found that the new portal monitors outperformed 

current-generation equipment in detecting numerous small, medium-size, and 

threat-like radioactive objects and were able to identify and dismiss most naturally occurring radioactive material. However, the detection capabilities of 

both types of portal monitors converged as the amount of source material decreased.

• Recommendations. We recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security 

work with the Director of DNDO to analyze the benefits and costs of deploying ASPs before any of the new equipment is purchased to determine whether 

any additional detection capability is worth the additional cost. We also recommended that the total program cost estimate for the radiation portal monitor project be revised after completion of the cost-benefit analysis.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the Purchase 

of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the Monitors’ Costs and Benefits. 

GAO–07–133R. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2006.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Decision to Procure and Deploy the Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not Supported by Its Cost-Benefit 

Analysis. GAO–07–581T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2007.

• Key findings. DNDO’s cost-benefit analysis issued in response to our March 

2006 recommendation did not provide a sound analytical basis for DNDO’s decision to purchase and deploy ASPs. We identified a number of problems with 

the analysis of both the performance of the new portal monitors and the costs. 

With regard to performance, DNDO did not use the results of its own tests 

and instead relied on assumptions of the new technology’s anticipated performance level. In addition, the analysis focused on identifying highly enriched uranium (HEU) and did not consider how well the new portal monitors 

can correctly detect or identify other dangerous radiological or nuclear materials. With regard to costs, DNDO did not follow the DHS guidelines for performing cost-benefit analyses and used questionable assumptions about the 

procurement costs of portal monitor technology.

• Recommendations. We recommended that DHS and DNDO conduct a new 

cost-benefit analysis using sound analytical methods, including actual performance data and a complete accounting of all major costs and benefits as 

required by DHS guidelines, and that DNDO conduct realistic testing for both 

ASPs and current-generation portal monitors.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the National 

Laboratories’ Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in Support of DNDO’s 

Testing and Development Program. GAO–07–347R. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 

2007.

• Key findings. DNDO had not collected a comprehensive inventory of testing 

information on current-generation portal monitors. Such information, if collected and used, could improve DNDO’s understanding of how well portal 

monitors detect different radiological and nuclear materials under varying 

conditions. In turn, this understanding would assist DNDO’s future testing, 

development, deployment, and purchases of portal monitors.

• Recommendations. We recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the Director of DNDO, collect reports concerning all of the 

testing of current-generation portal monitors and review the test reports in 

20

order to develop an information database on how the portal monitors perform 

in both laboratory and field tests on a variety of indicators, such as their ability to detect specific radiological and nuclear materials.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO–07–1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.

• Key findings. We found that tests conducted by DNDO in early 2007 were not 

an objective and rigorous assessment of the ASPs’ capabilities. Specifically, 

we raised concerns about DNDO using biased test methods that enhanced the 

apparent performance of ASPs; not testing the limitations of ASPs’ detection 

capabilities-for example, by not using a sufficient amount of the type of materials that would mask or hide dangerous sources and that ASPs would likely 

encounter at ports of entry; and not using a critical Customs and Border Protection (CBP) standard operating procedure that is fundamental to the performance of hand-held radiation detectors in the field.

• Recommendations. We recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security 

delay Secretarial certification and full-scale production decisions on ASPs 

until all relevant tests and studies had been completed and limitations to 

tests and studies had been identified and addressed. We further recommended that DHS determine the need for additional testing in cooperation 

with CBP and other stakeholders and, if additional testing was needed, that 

the Secretary of DHS appoint an independent group within DHS to conduct 

objective, comprehensive, and transparent testing that realistically demonstrates the capabilities and limitations of ASPs.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Program to Procure and Deploy Advanced 

Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the Department’s Previous Cost Estimates. GAO–08–1108R. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2008.

• Key findings. Our independent cost estimate suggested that from 2007 

through 2017 the total cost of DNDO’s 2006 project execution plan (the most 

recent official documentation of the program to equip U.S. ports of entry with 

radiation detection equipment) would likely be about $3.1 billion but could 

range from $2.6 billion to $3.8 billion. In contrast, we found that DNDO’s cost 

estimate of $2.1 billion was unreliable because it omitted major project costs, 

such as elements of the ASPs’ life cycle, and relied on a flawed methodology. 

DNDO officials told us that the agency was no longer following the 2006 

project execution plan and that the scope of the agency’s ASP deployment 

strategy had been reduced to only the standard cargo portal monitor. Our 

analysis of DNDO’s summary information outlining its scaled-back plan indicated the total cost to deploy standard cargo portals over the period 2008 

through 2017 would be about $2 billion but could range from $1.7 billion to 

$2.3 billion. Agency officials acknowledged the program requirements that 

would have been fulfilled by the discontinued ASPs remained valid, including 

screening rail cars and airport cargo, but the agency had no plans for how 

such screening would be accomplished.

• Recommendations. We recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security 

direct the Director of DNDO to work with CBP to update the projection execution plan to guide the entire radiation detection program at U.S. ports of 

entry, revise the estimate of the program’s cost and ensure that the estimate 

considers all of the costs associated with its project execution plan, and communicate the revised estimate to Congress so that it is fully apprised of the 

program’s scope and funding requirements.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Needs to Consider the Full Costs and Complete 

All Tests Prior to Making a Decision on Whether to Purchase Advanced Portal 

Monitors. GAO–08–1178T. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2008.

• Key findings. In preliminary observations of the 2008 round of ASP testing, 

we found that DNDO had made progress in addressing a number of problems 

we identified in previous rounds of ASP testing. However, the DHS criteria 

for significant increase in operational effectiveness appeared to set a low bar 

for improvement—for example, by requiring ASPs to perform at least as well 

as current-generation equipment when nuclear material is present in cargo 

but not specifying an actual improvement. In addition, the ASP certification 

schedule did not allow for completion of computer simulations that could provide useful data on ASP capabilities prior to the Secretary’s decision on certification. Finally, we questioned the replacement of current-generation equipVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
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1This testimony also summarized our September 2008 report on the life cycle cost estimate 

to deploy ASPs (GAO–08–1108R).

ment with ASPs until DNDO demonstrates that any additional increase in security would be worth the ASPs’ much higher cost.1

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Phase 3 Test Report on Advanced Portal 

Monitors Does Not Fully Disclose the Limitations of the Test Results. GAO–08–

979. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2008.

• Key findings. DNDO’s report on the second group of ASP tests in 2007 (the 

Phase 3 tests) did not appropriately state test limitations. As a result, the report did not accurately depict the results and could potentially be misleading. 

The purpose of the Phase 3 tests was to conduct a limited number of test runs 

in order to identify areas in which the ASP software needed improvement. 

While aspects of the Phase 3 report addressed this purpose, the preponderance of the report went beyond the test’s original purpose and made comparisons of the performance of the ASPs with one another or with currently deployed portal monitors. We found that it would not be appropriate to use the 

Phase 3 test report in determining whether the ASPs represent a significant 

improvement over currently deployed radiation equipment because the limited number of test runs did not support many of the comparisons of ASP performance made in the report.

• Recommendations. We recommended that the Secretary of DHS use the results of the Phase 3 tests solely for the purposes for which they were intended—to identify areas needing improvement—and not as a justification for 

certifying whether the ASPs warrant full-scale production. If the Secretary intends to consider the results of the Phase 3 tests in making a certification 

decision regarding ASPs, we further recommended that the Secretary direct 

the Director of DNDO to revise and clarify the Phase 3 test report to more 

fully disclose and articulate the limitations present in the Phase 3 tests and 

clearly state which insights from the Phase 3 report are factored into any decision regarding the certification that ASPs demonstrate a significant increase 

in operational effectiveness. Finally, we recommended that the Secretary direct the Director of DNDO to take steps to ensure that any limitations associated with the 2008 round of testing are properly disclosed when the results 

are reported.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show Limits of the New Technology. GAO–09–655. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2009.

• Key findings. We reported that the DHS criteria for a significant increase in 

operational effectiveness require a large reduction in innocent alarms but a 

marginal improvement in the detection of certain weapons—usable nuclear 

materials. In addition, the criteria do not take the current-generation portal 

monitors’ full potential into account because DNDO has not completed efforts 

to improve their performance. With regard to ASP testing, we found that 

DHS increased the rigor in comparison with previous tests, thereby adding 

credibility to the test results, but that preliminary results were mixed. The 

results showed that the new portal monitors performed better than currentgeneration portal monitors in detection of certain nuclear materials concealed 

by light shielding approximating the threat guidance for setting detection 

thresholds, but differences in sensitivity were less notable when shielding was 

slightly below or above that level. Testing also uncovered multiple problems 

in ASPs meeting the requirements for successful integration into operations 

at ports of entry. Finally, we found that DNDO did not plan to complete computer simulations that could provide additional insight into ASP capabilities 

and limitations prior to certification even though delays to testing allowed 

more time to conduct the simulations.

• Recommendations. We recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security 

direct the Director of DNDO to assess whether ASPs meet the criteria for a 

significant increase in operational effectiveness based on a valid comparison 

with current-generation portal monitors’ full performance potential and revise 

the schedule for ASP testing and certification to allow sufficient time for review and analysis of results from the final phases of testing and completion 

of all tests, including computer simulations. If ASPs are certified, we further 

recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of 

DNDO to develop an initial deployment plan that allows CBP to uncover and 

22

resolve any additional problems not identified through testing before proceeding to full-scale deployment.

BIOGRAPHY FOR GENE ALOISE

Gene Aloise is a Director in the Natural Resources and Environment team at 

GAO. He is GAO’s recognized expert in international nuclear nonproliferation and 

safety issues and completed training on these subjects at the University of Virginia 

and Princeton University. His work for GAO has taken him to some of Russia’s 

closed nuclear cities and the Chernobyl reactor in Ukraine as well as numerous nuclear facilities around the world and in the United States. Mr. Aloise has had years 

of experience developing, leading, and managing GAO domestic and international 

engagements. His diverse experience includes assignments with congressional committees as well as various offices within GAO. He has received numerous awards 

for his leadership and expertise including GAO’s Meritorious Service Award. Mr. 

Aloise received his Bachelor’s degree in political science/economics from Rowan University and holds a Master of Public Administration from Temple University. Mr. 

Aloise is also a graduate of the Senior Executive Fellows Program, John F. Kennedy 

School of Government, Harvard University.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Aloise. 

Dr. Lowenthal. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICAH D. LOWENTHAL, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR SECURITY AND NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY PROGRAM, NUCLEAR AND RADIATION STUDIES BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES 

Dr. LOWENTHAL. Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, Members of the Committee. My name 

is Micah Lowenthal. As you said, I am the Director of the Nuclear 

Security and Nuclear Facility Safety Program at the National Research Council’s Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board. I am here 

to describe a recently issued interim report from a Congressionally 

mandated National Research Council study on Advanced 

Spectroscopic Portals. 

I am the study director supporting the authoring committee of 

that report, and I will begin by providing background on the request for this study and then I will summarize the main messages 

of the report. 

The Department of Homeland Security, or DHS, wants to deploy 

new radiation detector systems called Advanced Spectroscopic Portals, or ASPs, to improve scrutiny of containerized cargo for nuclear 

and radiological material. The ASPs are intended to replace some 

or all of the radiation portal monitors (RPMs) and hand-held radioisotope identifiers (RIIDs) currently used at ports and border crossings across the United States. Congress required that the Secretary 

of Homeland Security certify that the ASPs provide a significant 

increase in operational effectiveness over the old systems. Congress 

also directed DHS to ask the National Research Council to advise 

the Secretary on testing, analysis, costs and benefits of the ASPs 

before the certification decision. 

I want to point out that the appropriations committees who made 

these requirements said they appreciate that certification will be 

difficult. The study committee agrees with that, that these are hard 

problems, both for the testing and the cost-benefit analysis, so it 

is not surprising that DHS’s work has been challenging. 

Here are the main findings and recommendations from the interim report. The study committee found that the ASP performance 

23

tests prior to 2008 had serious flaws. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, acknowledged problems with the tests and addressed a number of those flaws in later testing. The 2008 performance tests were indeed improved, but shortcomings remain. 

DNDO’s current approach to performance testing involves physically testing detector performance against a small number of configurations of threat objects and cargo in one environment. The set 

of possible combinations of threats, cargo and environments is so 

large and multidimensional that DNDO needs an analytical basis 

for understanding the performance of its detector systems, not just 

an empirical basis. Our study committee recommended that DHS 

use a more rigorous approach in which scientists use computer 

models to simulate configurations and detector performance, use 

physical tests to validate and refine the models and use the models 

to select key new physical tests that advance our understanding of 

the detector systems. This iterative modeling and testing approach 

is standard in the development of some high-technology equipment 

and is essential for building scientific confidence in detector performance. 

The idea of an iterative approach also extends to deployment. 

The study committee recommends a process for incremental deployment and continuous improvement of the ASPs with experience in 

the field leading to refinement in both the technologies and the operations for the next deployment. As a first step in this process, 

DHS should deploy the unused ASPs it already has, to assess the 

ASPs’ performance in multiple environments without investing in 

a much larger acquisition at the outset. 

The ASP cost-benefit analysis was not complete when our interim report was written. Preliminary estimates by DNDO indicate 

that the cost increases from replacing the currently deployed systems with ASPs outweigh the cost reduction or savings from operational efficiencies. Therefore, a careful cost-benefit analysis will 

need to reveal the security advantages, if any, of the ASPs over the 

current systems and possible alternatives. Such a cost-benefit analysis should include three key elements: a clear statement of the objectives of the program, an assessment of meaningful alternatives; 

and a comprehensive, credible and transparent analysis of benefits 

and costs. 

DHS should consider tradeoffs among different options for allocating its efforts and funds, looking at the overall system for ways 

to improve defense against nuclear smuggling. The study committee recommended that DHS not proceed with further procurement of ASPs until it has addressed the findings and recommendations from the report, and the ASP has been shown to be a favored 

option in the cost-benefit analysis. 

Now, those are the main messages from the report. For this 

hearing I was also asked to comment on any lessons learned regarding processes by which the ASPs have been researched, developed and tested to date. Although the study committee only examined the testing of ASPs, not a broader portfolio, I think there are 

three lessons to be learned based on the study. First, the process 

of modeling and testing iteratively can be applied more broadly to 

other complex technology development programs. Second, incremental deployment with continuous improvement is a good stratVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
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1The National Research Council is the operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences, 

the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, 

chartered by Congress in 1863 to advise the government on matters of science and technology. 

The Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board is responsible for oversight of National Research 

Council studies on safety and security of nuclear materials and waste. 2Dr. Robert Dynes, a physicist at the University of California, member of the National Academy of Sciences, and former President of the University of California, chaired this study. 3The report is titled Evaluating Testing, Costs, and Benefits of Advanced Spectroscopic Portals 

for Screening Cargo at Ports of Entry: Interim Report. The abbreviated version of the report is 

available online at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record¥id=XXXX

egy for deployments of systems that have not fully matured, especially if they are envisioned to have an ongoing mission. And third, 

the systems-level approach that is examining how to optimize 

choices within the overall system, rather than focusing narrowly on 

one tradeoff decision, is applicable to almost every use of equipment in security applications. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be glad to 

elaborate my testimony in response to questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lowenthal follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICAH D. LOWENTHAL

Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and Members of the 

Committee. My name is Micah Lowenthal and I am the Director of the program on 

Nuclear Security and Nuclear Facility Safety in the National Research Council’s 

Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board.1 I am here to describe the recently issued interim report from a congressionally mandated National Research Council study on 

advanced spectroscopic portals (ASPs). I am the study director supporting the authoring committee of that report.2 The full report is classified, but an abbreviated 

version was also produced for unrestricted public release.3 My testimony is based 

on the abbreviated version. I will begin by providing background on the request for 

this study. I will then summarize the main messages of the report and discuss some 

of the points most relevant to this hearing. 

BACKGROUND ON THE REQUEST FOR THE STUDY 

Containerized cargo entering the United States at sea ports and land-border 

crossings for trucks is currently screened for radiation using detectors, called radiation portal monitors (RPMs), in conjunction with hand-held radioisotope identifiers 

(RIIDs). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is seeking to deploy new radiation detectors, called advanced spectroscopic portals (ASPs), to replace the current RPM and RIID combination, which has known deficiencies. The ASPs consist 

of new detector equipment and new software, including algorithms for isotope identification. 

Following some controversy over the testing and evaluation of the new ASPs, Congress required in Title IV of Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 

(Public Law 110–161) that the Secretary of Homeland Security submit to Congress 

a report certifying that ASPs would provide a ‘‘significant increase in operational 

effectiveness’’ over continued use of existing screening devices. This certification is 

a precondition for proceeding with full-scale procurement of ASPs. Congress also directed DHS to request that the National Academies advise the Secretary on the certification decision by helping to validate testing completed to date, providing support 

for future testing, assessing the costs and benefits of this technology, and bringing 

robustness and scientific rigor to the procurement process. Due to delays in the test 

and evaluation program, the Academies and DHS agreed that the study committee 

would issue an interim report that provides (1) the committee’s evaluation of testing 

plans and execution it has seen, and (2) advice on how the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) can complete and make more rigorous its ASP evaluation for 

the Secretary and the Nation. 

This interim report is based on testing done before 2008 (referred to as past tests), 

plans for and preliminary results from performance tests carried out in 2008, and 

the agency’s draft cost-benefit analysis as of October 2008. The committee received 

briefings on the performance test results and analysis and on the cost-benefit analysis but it did not receive any written reports on those topics by February 2009, 

when the interim report entered the Academies peer review process. 

I will now discuss each element of the study task below.

25

SUMMARY OF THE MAIN MESSAGES OF THE REPORT 

First, I want to note that the committee focused much of its attention on performance testing. This is not because the other tests are unimportant—the portals will 

be of little use if they are incompatible with CBP’s computer systems, for example—

but the design, execution, and evaluation of these tests are comparatively routine, 

even if solutions to problems revealed by the tests are not. The design, execution, 

and evaluation of performance tests for the ASPs is more challenging and involves 

more of the science and engineering principles on which the committee has advice 

to offer.

Past Performance Testing 

Performance tests prior to 2008 had serious flaws that were identified by the Government Accountability Office and the Secretary’s ASP Independent Review Team. 

All truck-conveyed containers at ports and border crossings currently pass through 

primary screening, which is conducted with a radiation portal monitor (RPM). Containers that trigger an alarm are sent to secondary screening, which is conducted 

with an RPM and a RIID. The tests prior to 2008 did not adequately assess the capabilities of the ASP systems in primary and secondary screening compared with 

the currently deployed RPM and RIID screening systems, nor whether the ASP systems met performance criteria for procurement. 

There were serious flaws in the testing protocol. Notably, DNDO utilized the same 

radiation sources in performance testing that were used to set up and calibrate this 

testing. Device setup and any calibration must use separate radiation sources from 

those used for testing. Also, standard operating procedures for the use of RlIDs in 

secondary screening were not followed in the performance tests, which disadvantaged the RIIDs in comparisons with ASPs.

2008 Performance Testing 

DNDO staff acknowledged several pre-2008 deficiencies and designed its 2008 test 

plan to correct them. The study committee examined the revised test plan, observed 

tests, and questioned test personnel, and the committee concluded that DNDO did 

address those problems. 

Because of the ASP configurations and the size of their detectors, ASPs would be 

expected to improve isotope identification, provide greater consistency and coverage 

in screening, , and increase speed of screening compared to the current RPM–RIID 

combination when used in secondary screening. Consequently, DNDO’s 2008 performance tests of ASPs in secondary screening focused on confirming and quantifying that advantage for several threat objects, cargoes, and configurations. 

When used for primary screening, an ASP system must be compared to the existing RPM–RIID combination for primary and secondary screening. This is because 

ASPs perform an isotope identification function in primary screening. Isotope identification is only possible in secondary screening with the current RPM–RIID system. 

DNDO’s preliminary analysis did account for this difference. 

The study committee found that the 2008 performance tests were an improvement 

over previous tests. They enabled DNDO to identify and physically test some of the 

performance limits of ASP systems. However, the committee identified several 

shortcomings of these tests: (1) The selected test configurations were too limited to 

assess the performance of ASP systems against the range of threat objects, cargoes, 

and configurations that could be encountered during cargo screening operations at 

ports without modeling to complement the physical experiments; (2) the sample 

sizes (the number of test runs of each case) are small and limit the confidence that 

can be placed in comparing ASP and RPM–RIID performance; and (3) in its analysis, some of the performance metrics are not the correct ones for comparing operational performance of cargo screening systems. These shortcomings are described 

in greater detail in our report. In the committee’s judgment, DHS cannot determine 

whether ASPs can consistently outperform current RPM–RlID systems in routine 

practice until these shortcomings are addressed. Better physical measurement and 

characterization of the performance of the systems are a necessary first step but 

may not be sufficient to enable DHS to conclude that the ASPs meet the criteria 

it has defined for achieving a ‘‘significant increase in operational effectiveness.’’

The committee recommends modifications to the testing procedures that are being 

used by DHS. These modifications would influence subsequent procurement steps, 

as described in the recommendations for the procurement process.

Recommended Approach for Testing and Evaluation 

To make the testing and evaluation more scientifically rigorous, the committee 

recommends an iterative approach involving modeling and physical testing. The 

26

threat space that is, the set of possible threat objects, configurations, surrounding 

cargoes, and conditions of transport—is so large and multi-dimensional that DNDO 

needs an analytical basis for understanding the capabilities of ASP detectors for 

screening cargo. DNDO’s current approach is to physically test small portions of the 

threat space and to use other experimental data to interpolate and extrapolate to 

other important parts of the threat space to test the identification algorithms in 

ASP systems. 

The committee recommends that DNDO use computer models of threat objects, 

radiation transport, and detector response to simulate ASP performance. Then 

DNDO can use physical experiments to validate these computer models, which 

would allow a critique of the models’ fidelity to reality and show where model refinements were needed. Physical testing and model refinement would proceed iteratively 

until the model provided an acceptably accurate depiction of reality. With validated 

models, DNDO could evaluate the performance of ASP systems over a larger, more 

meaningful range of the threat space than is feasible with physical tests alone. 

This kind of interaction between computer models and physical tests is standard 

in the development and deployment of some high-technology equipment and is essential for building scientific confidence in technology performance. The performance 

tests conducted in 2008, and even prior to 2008, can be used to help refine and validate models. The committee also notes the skills required to proceed exist in the 

National Laboratories.

Recommended Approach for the Procurement Process 

The idea of an iterative approach also extends to deployment of ASP systems at 

ports of entry. The committee noted that DHS’ testing philosophy is oriented toward 

a one-time certification decision in the near future. However, the mandate for passive radiation screening of cargo at ports of entry is expected to continue indefinitely. Rather than focusing on a one-time decision about the deployment of ASPs, 

the committee suggests that current testing be viewed as a first step in a continuous 

process of system improvement and adaptation to changes in the threat environment, composition of container cargo, technological and analytical capabilities, and 

the nature of commerce at ports of entry. These factors have changed significantly 

over the last decade and can be expected to evolve—in both predictable and unpredictable ways—in the future. The committee recommends that DHS should develop 

a process for incremental deployment and continuous improvement, with experience 

leading to refinements in both technologies and operations over time, rather than 

a single product purchase to replace current screening technologies. The ASP deployment process should be developed to address and exploit changes. This would 

enable DNDO to adapt and continually update its screening systems so that they 

do not become outdated as they would after a one-time deployment. 

As the first step in this process, the committee recommends that DHS deploy its 

currently unused low-rate initial production ASPs for primary and secondary inspection at various sites under a program of extended operational testing. Such deployment, even on a limited scale, would provide valuable data concerning ASP operation, reliability, and performance, and would allow DHS to better assess ASP capabilities in multiple environments without investing in a much larger acquisition at 

the outset. 

The development of the hardware for radiation detection and the software for analyzing detector signals is separable. The current DHS procurement process is a competition among vendors to provide the combined systems, which has been useful. 

However, as DHS moves forward, the committee recommends that it match the best 

hardware to the best software (particularly the algorithms), drawing on tools developed by the competing companies and others, such as the national laboratories. 

The deployment of ASPs will not eliminate the need for hand-held detectors with 

spectroscopic capabilities. Because some of the improvement in isotope identification 

offered by the ASPs over the RIIDs is a result of software improvements, the committee recommends that these improvements be incorporated into hand-held detectors. Improved software might significantly improve RIID performance and expand 

the range of deployment options available to Customs and Border Protection for 

cargo screening. 

By separating the hardware and software elements of the system and engaging 

the broader science and engineering community, DHS would have increased confidence in its procurement of the best product available with current technology, and 

simultaneously could advance the state-of-the-art.

27

Recommended Approach for Cost-Benefit Analysis 

The preliminary analysis presented to the committee suggests that benefits of deploying the ASPs may not be clearly greater than the costs. Because DNDO’s preliminary estimates indicate that the cost increases from replacing the RPM–RIID 

combination with ASPs exceed the cost reductions from operational efficiencies, it 

is important to consider carefully the conditions under which the benefits of deploying ASPs justify the program costs. A cost-benefit analysis (CBA) can provide a 

structure for evaluating whether a proposed program (such as the ASP program) is 

reasonable and justified. 

The Secretary’s decision on ASP certification is based, at least in part, on whether 

the ASPs meet the objectives in DHS’ definition of ‘‘significant increase in operational effectiveness’’ (SlOE); however, other factors relating to the costs and benefits of the proposed ASP program will also need to be taken into account. DHS’ definition of SlOE is a modest set of goals: As noted above, the increases in operational 

efficiency do not by themselves appear to outweigh the cost increases from replacing 

the RPM/RIID combination with ASPs, based on DNDO’s preliminary estimates, 

and the criteria do not require a significantly improved ability to detect special nuclear material (an ingredient of a nuclear weapon) in primary screening. If the ASPs 

meet the defined goals and are able to detect the minimum quantities of nuclear 

threat material recommended by the ‘‘DOE guidance,’’ DHS still will not know 

whether the benefits of the ASPs outweigh the additional costs associated with 

them, or whether the funds are more effectively spent on other elements of the 

Global Architecture. 

A CBA can provide insight about alternative choices—for example, whether the 

benefits of a given program exceed its costs, and which choices are most cost-effective. To be effective, the CBA must include three key elements: (1) a clear statement 

of the objectives of the screening program; (2) an assessment of meaningful alternatives to deploying ASPs; and (3) a comprehensive, credible and transparent analysis of in-scope benefits and costs. 

The CBA should begin with a clear statement of what operational problem the 

ASPs are intended to address. This statement will define the role that the system 

plays in providing a layer in the defense against the importation of nuclear or radiological materials. The CBA should also include a narrative that clarifies how improving detection for containers at ports of entry to the United States fits into a 

larger effort to improve detection capabilities, in recognition of the many ways that 

materials could be brought into the United States through ports of entry that are 

not already screened, or across uncontrolled stretches of border. Furthermore, to be 

useful in a procurement decision, a CBA must address whether funds are better 

spent to replace the currently deployed equipment rather than to expand coverage 

for other material pathways that currently have no radiation screening. DHS should 

consider tradeoffs among different options for allocating efforts and funds, looking 

at the overall system for ways to improve defenses against nuclear smuggling. Such 

an analysis is needed in the CBA for ASP systems because it is not evident that 

it has been provided elsewhere. 

The CBA also needs to account for meaningful alternatives (including non-ASP 

systems) to reveal the scale of the benefits of ASPs for radiation screening and determine whether these benefits outweigh the additional costs for procurement and 

deployment. The complexity of the container screening task suggests that there 

could be many different options worthy of consideration. These options include variations on ASP deployment configurations and operational processes, and application 

of technologies beyond the current RPM–RIID and ASP systems such as deploying 

hand-held passive detectors with state-of-the-art software and advanced methods for 

detecting nuclear materials. Considerations should include active interrogation, improved imaging systems, and integration of these existing technologies. These alternatives need to be compared to a baseline that reflects as realistically as possible 

the screening capability that DHS currently has in place. This baseline should reflect the number and placement of current RPM and RIID detectors, sensitivity of 

these detectors based on how they are operated at each port, and performance of 

existing hand-held detectors in the manner they are used in the field. The CBA 

must indicate what capability an investment in ASPs will provide beyond the existing systems as they are currently deployed and operated, or beyond alternative radiation detection technologies that could be developed and deployed at ports of entry. 

In comparing alternatives, it is important that the CBA treat benefits and costs 

in a comprehensive, credible, and transparent manner. The benefit assessment 

should show how the ASP system would contribute to improving security with respect to prevention of the detonation of a nuclear device or radiological weapon in 

the United States. Because this is the primary objective of the ASP program, a CBA 

that is silent on this subject would be incomplete. Such an assessment is difficult 

28

and no assessment of such benefits will be definitive or unassailable. The cost assessment should cover all phases of the acquisition life cycle in a manner that is 

independent of contractor or program office biases, and it should also assess the risk 

of cost escalation associated with the estimate. 

The committee recommends that DHS not proceed with further procurement until 

it has addressed the findings and recommendations in this report, and then only if 

the ASP is shown to be a favored option in the CBA.

‘‘Lessons Learned’’

For this hearing I was also asked to comment on ‘‘lessons learned’’ regarding the 

processes by which the ASPs have been researched, developed, and tested. Although 

the study committee only examined the testing of ASPs, my personal view is that 

three lessons that could be learned:

First, the process of iterative modeling and testing can be applied more broadly 

to other complex technology development programs. Modeling coupled to validating 

experiments is a necessity for some technology applications because of the complex 

conditions in which these technologies must operate. 

Second, incremental deployment with continuous improvement is a good strategy 

for deploying systems that have not fully matured, especially if they are envisioned 

to have an ongoing mission. 

Third, a systems-level approach—that is, examining how to optimize choices within the overall system rather than narrowly focusing on one tradeoff decision—is applicable to almost every use of equipment in security applications. 

This concludes my testimony to the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to 

testify on this important topic. I would be happy to elaborate on any of my comments during the question and answer period.

BIOGRAPHY FOR MICAH D. LOWENTHAL

Micah Lowenthal is the Director of the Nuclear Security and Nuclear Facility 

Safety Program in the Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board at the National Research Council of the National Academies. At the Academies, he has directed domestic and international studies on nuclear and radiological safety and security, nuclear 

nonproliferation, nuclear fuel cycles, radioactive waste, and management of contaminated environments. Before joining the National Academies’ staff in 2001, Dr. 

Lowenthal was a researcher and lecturer at the University of California at Berkeley. 

In 1996 he was an American Association for the Advancement of Science Environmental Science and Engineering Fellow. Dr. Lowenthal received an A.B. degree in 

physics and a Ph.D. degree in nuclear engineering, both from the U.C.–Berkeley.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Lowenthal. Unfortunately, 

you all probably know that our days here are somewhat scattered, 

and I need to go to the Floor. We have tried to arrange another 

Member of the Majority who is a Member of the Subcommittee to 

preside in my absence. Ms. Dahlkemper has been an especially conscientious Member and she may arrive between now and 11:00, 

which is when I expect to come back, and if that is the case, we 

will come out of recess and she will preside or any other Member 

of the Majority who is a Member of the Subcommittee. 

Mr. BROUN. Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to preside if you 

would like me to. 

Chairman MILLER. Well, I thank Dr. Broun for that generous 

offer but I think we will do it the way that every other committee 

and subcommittee in Congress does it. So with that, we will need 

to stand in recess. I apologize again for the inconvenience. Believe 

me, it is more inconvenient for me than it is for you, and we will 

be back in session but I appreciate your being here and I thank you 

for your indulgence. 

[Recess.] 

29

DISCUSSION

Chairman MILLER. We are now out of recess. Floor colloquies are 

undoubtedly one of the most peculiar stylized aspects of Congressional service. I have heard of political campaigns that 80 percent 

of all the effort is wasted, the problem is, no one knows what the 

20 percent is that is not. I suspect that there is at least that ratio 

of wasted effort in Congressional service and I very much suspect 

Floor colloquies are in the wasted effort category. But it was something I had to do. 

Mr. BROUN. Floor debate, isn’t it? 

Chairman MILLER. I will resist temptation to point out other aspects of Congressional service that may be wasted efforts. If we 

may now begin our rounds of questioning, Mr. Aloise, Dr. 

Lowenthal, Dr. Broun, I now recognize myself for five minutes. 

PRIORITIZING SECURITY NEEDS

Dr. Broun raised the point that there are other priorities that we 

have to decide between, priorities even within security, so it is not 

security versus other things government does. In October of 2007, 

this committee held a hearing on an exercise on a scenario of a terrorist attack assuming that a dirty bomb was detonated in two 

American cities, and what we found was that we were probably 

better prepared, certainly better prepared for Katrina than we 

were for dirty-bomb attacks, despite the fact that if there is one 

punch that has obviously been telegraphed by terrorists, by alQaeda in particular, it is a dirty-bomb attack. We did not have the 

capacity to conduct the test to see what the level of contamination 

was, to let our people know that they can go back into offices, office 

buildings—that we might shut down, indefinitely, 10, 15, 20 square 

blocks of an American city, the midtown of an American city or perhaps two—that would probably take six years to complete the necessary environmental tests for an attack in one city, nor testing on 

individuals to see if they had been exposed to radiation. That might 

take a couple years. We would have to tell parents that we could 

not test their children to see if they had been exposed to radiation 

for a couple years. But, you know, if the child’s hair started falling 

out, call us and maybe we can move them up in line. And the failing there seemed to be simply one of funding. We are not prepared 

to respond to a radiological attack, and here we see we are spending $2 or $3 billion to develop a technology that those who will use 

it really question whether it does much if any good at all, certainly 

not enough to justify $2 or $3 billion. DNDO expects the Secretary 

of Homeland Security to make a decision this October, four months 

from now, about whether to certify that it is worth investing the 

$2 billion in the ASPs. Do either of you believe that there will be 

enough information available this fall for DHS to make that decision, and how confident are you that the costs of the ASPs justify 

the investment? Mr. Aloise. 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, that is the question. In our view, until integration testing is done, field validation is done, operational testing is 

done, the injection studies are complete, an analysis of energy 

windowing versus the ASPs is done, until all the testing is done 

and we know whether or not this marginal increase in security is 

30

justified through a sound, independent cost-benefit analysis, it is 

our belief that we shouldn’t spend any money on this program or 

go forward with it. 

Chairman MILLER. And do you think there is any realistic chance 

those preconditions may be satisfied between now and October? 

Mr. ALOISE. At this point it does not look that way. 

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Lowenthal. 

Dr. LOWENTHAL. We agree that these are the preconditions for 

going ahead with certification, that there is a great deal of information that is needed. I am not really in a position to tell you how 

much time it will take them to get that information together. There 

is some information that they presumably have already put together, some analysis that they have already done that we haven’t 

seen. We will be happy to look at it when they provide it. But in 

terms of timelines, we would not be inclined to guess when they 

will be ready. 

DECISION-MAKING: PROCESSES AND TIMELINES

Chairman MILLER. Both of you appear to disagree with DHS’s 

view that they will be able to obtain the data they need from field 

evaluation tests that are to begin next month. Why do you not believe that those tests will be good enough for DHS to base a decision on? Mr. Aloise. 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, that is only part of, as I just said, what they 

need to base their decision on. You know, field validation testing 

has not gone well so far. They suspended it after two weeks because they were actually sending more—the ASPs were actually 

sending more to secondary than the PVTs so they had to work out 

a number of those problems and I am assuming they have. It has 

been a while since the initial testing. We just have to see how it 

goes, and we are going to be looking to CBP for a lot of the answers 

because they are the agency that has to live with this equipment, 

and I—we feel fairly confident that they are not going to go forward until they are satisfied that the testing has gone right at this 

point. 

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Lowenthal. 

Dr. LOWENTHAL. The testing that they are going to do for field 

validation is going to tell them something that they need to know 

but it won’t tell them everything that they need to know, and the 

committee—the study committee’s recommendations were to enhance what they are going to be able to learn from these sorts of 

tests with modeling and simulations. The range of environments 

that they are going to be operating in is very limited. They are only 

doing field validation testing in four different sites, and there are 

a lot of other conditions, a lot of other kinds of cargo and so on that 

are worth learning about. Some of that can be done with simulation and some of it can be done with the deployment that the committee recommended. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Dr. Broun for five minutes. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Chairman. 

31

ASP IN CONTEXT: THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION

ARCHITECTURE

How would y’all—‘‘y’all’’ is a southern word. How would you all 

prioritize the upgrade from the PVT RIID system to the ASP system within the entire global nuclear detection architecture? Let us 

start with Dr. Lowenthal. 

Dr. LOWENTHAL. I should point out that the committee really 

only looked at the testing of the ASPs and talked about what kinds 

of information a decision-maker would want to have; and so the 

committee recommended that they (DHS) consider these other components of the global architecture—and there are gaps that are 

known and have been pointed out by others within that architecture—but the committee did not study that question, itself. What 

the committee did say is that if you look at this from the perspective of an adversary who is trying to sneak something into the 

United States, if you can—if you reinforce the places where you already are screening but you leave other avenues totally open, you 

may not be gaining much improvement in security. 

Mr. BROUN. Mr. Aloise. 

Mr. ALOISE. We agree. As I mentioned to Dr. Lowenthal a 

minute ago, we are spending a lot of money upgrading locks on the 

front door but the windows and the back door are wide open. Does 

that make sense to do with limited resources, so——

Mr. BROUN. I agree wholeheartedly. Are there other areas that 

would benefit greater from the same level of investment, Mr. 

Aloise? 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, there are a lot of vulnerabilities that need to 

be looked at that have not been properly addressed in the architecture. The border crossing is really not the greatest threat, so I 

would—we believe that we should be looking equally hard at all 

the other vulnerabilities in the architecture because as it was just 

said, that is probably not where they are going to come through. 

If they have taken the time and trouble to get this material, it is 

unlikely they are going to stick it in a cargo container and drive 

it across through a portal monitor. 

Mr. BROUN. And with open borders, they can just carry it in 

wherever they want to carry it. 

Dr. Lowenthal, particular—and let me ask you to answer your 

question in view of comments you made in your testimony about 

that we have ASPs sitting there now, if you would include that discussion? 

Dr. LOWENTHAL. Well, given the scope of our study, I wouldn’t 

be comfortable to try to identify what the most promising area is. 

What the committee recommended is that DHS do that analysis, 

look at the entire system. We have some concerns that that hasn’t 

been done, and—I will separate this into two parts. One is that the 

committee recommended that DHS look at that whole system in 

addition to just the tradeoff between the ASPs and the PVTs, because as a decision-maker, the people in the Administration and in 

Congress will want to know whether the money is well spent. The 

analysis does not appear to have been done elsewhere and so the 

committee recommends that it be included in this ASP decision. 

Now, the other component of that is the deployment of the ones 

32

that they already own. That is more for a learning exercise. This 

is something where they can learn more about the performance of 

the systems in the field and improve them as they go forward. I 

think these are directed at slightly different points. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you. My time disappeared, so I guess I am 

out of time. I am not sure where we stand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER. Well, you will have time for a second round 

because I was planning to ask at least one more question. I now 

recognize myself for a second round of questions. 

MANAGEMENT OF ASP TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT

Your criticism, for both of you, the criticism appears to be as 

much that the problems with the ASPs was not the technical challenges but that the whole program was just poorly managed. This 

is a recurring theme for this committee, you know, how could management—how could programs be managed better. But if you think 

the whole testing program has been troubled from the start, and 

that the management more than anything else is a problem, what 

lessons should we learn? How should this program be managed differently? How can it be managed differently in the future, this and 

other similar programs? 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, I will take a shot at that. Back in 2006 when 

we issued our first report on the deployment of PVTs, we learned 

about the ASPs and we knew then that there would only be a marginal improvement in security. That is why we called for a costbenefit analysis before anything went further; is it worth the marginal increase in security you are going to get from the ASPs? Do 

that first, then go talk to the Congress and the decision-makers can 

decide whether it is worth it or not, and we know the story. It was 

poorly done, and it was based on assumptions and not data, and 

that leads us to where we are today. It was a rush to push technology through that was immature, and that has got to be the true 

lesson of this, is that without proper and scientifically rigorous 

testing, without a technology that is mature, it should not be generally rushed to deployment—especially when you have a system 

already there that is working. 

Chairman MILLER. Right. Dr. Lowenthal. 

Dr. LOWENTHAL. I should point out that our study committee was 

silent on the matter of whether this was managed well or not, but 

I think that the report highlights many of the points that you made 

in your opening remarks about what should be done in the future. 

I think you hit on all of those—a well-planned-out testing program 

with criteria established in advance and an idea as you go in for 

what you are going to learn from each stage of this, making sure 

that it matches up with what the customer is looking for, as Mr. 

Aloise mentioned. All of those components lead to having a testing 

and evaluation program that will lead to procurement that gives 

the customer what he needs and the Nation what it needs. 

Chairman MILLER. Would it be a fair summary to say that the 

problem is that we began with the conclusion and then found the 

analysis to support it, rather than beginning with the analysis, and 

then finding what conclusions would come from the analysis? 

33

Mr. ALOISE. I think so, Mr. Chairman. I think we had a solution 

in search of a problem. 

Chairman MILLER. There is a problem but there may have been 

another solution. Our clock is not working, so each Member needs 

to show self-restraint. I will now go to Dr. Broun for a second 

round. Ms. Dahlkemper has arrived and I think is now collecting 

herself. 

Dr. Broun for five minutes, however that might be measured. 

Five minutes based on the honor system. 

Mr. BROUN. I hope Ms. Dahlkemper can collect herself. I trust 

that she can. She is very good at doing that. 

I am very interested to hear Dr. Lowenthal’s comments about 

whether we can take the ASP units that are available now, put 

them in a parallel screening process out there in the field, as the 

appropriators evidently are preventing us from doing. Would you 

recommend that we do so, and is that something that you could put 

in your report to us, so that we can look at that possibility and 

maybe even make that recommendation? 

Dr. LOWENTHAL. Yes. Our study committee recommended that 

they take the—they procured a number of these low rate initial 

production [units] so that they can test and evaluate them. They 

have a number of them that have been sitting moth-balled. I understand that some of them have been cannibalized for parts for 

other ones, and we don’t have an exact number of how many they 

have, but they have some number of them that they already own 

that they could deploy in the field. Our study committee’s recommendation, explicitly in the report, is that these should be deployed at selected sites, and the experience gained from those will 

contribute to both their understanding of how they perform, but 

also how they might be able to modify the operations at the sites, 

and also the technology, what improvements they might want to 

put in there. So that is explicitly in the report. 

Mr. BROUN. Mr. Aloise, any comments? 

Mr. ALOISE. Just that we would agree with that. We think that 

is a smart idea. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you. I hope that the CBP people can be consulted because I think the end-user has not been consulted enough 

in this process, and with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. You may or may not have had 

time to yield back. You probably did. 

Ms. Dahlkemper for more or less five minutes. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you very much, and I apologize for 

being late. I had a markup in another committee, but I appreciate 

the opportunity to ask a question of both of you if you could just 

address this. 

JUSTIFYING THE COST OF THE ADVANCED SPECTROSCOPIC

PORTAL PROGRAM

Can either of you provide some insight into whether improving 

portal radiation detection is worth $2 billion to $3 billion? Assuming that ASPs prove to be robust enough to use, and they deliver 

real improvement in detection in commercial flow, would that still 

be enough to justify deploying them, given all the other needs out 

there and our limited resources? 

34

Mr. ALOISE. I have to go back to, and I know I sound like a broken record on this, a cost-benefit analysis that we have been calling 

for a couple years, although those factors that you mentioned need 

to be in there so that the decision-makers can look at and see 

whether the marginal improvement is worth it, considering all the 

vulnerabilities we have in the architecture already that we need to 

address. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Dr. Lowenthal. 

Dr. LOWENTHAL. We agree entirely that a cost-benefit analysis 

will be needed to show that. We are not in a position to judge 

whether they are going to be worth it, partly because our study 

didn’t examine the results of their tests for this interim report. It 

looked at the approach. Once they have the results and they can 

factor those into their cost-benefit analysis, then a judgment can be 

made as to whether they are worth it. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Mr. Aloise, the GAO has done a lot of work 

on how agencies should do a cost-benefit analysis. Can you lay out 

some principles that should be guiding DHS as they begin their 

own cost-benefit analysis on whether to acquire ASPs or not? 

Mr. ALOISE. Yes. In fact, we just developed this about a year ago 

on how to develop a cost-benefit analysis. It was based on working 

with 90 representatives from all the federal agencies including 

DHS and it lays out exactly what the best practices are. But some 

of the things must be based on fact, must be fact based, based on 

data, not assumptions, must have proper documentation all along 

the way, and those are the kinds of things that we are missing 

from the ones we looked at for DNDO. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Anything specific to this particular——

Mr. ALOISE. In particular, test results, what do the test results 

show. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. All right. Dr. Lowenthal, do you want to comment on that? 

Dr. LOWENTHAL. If I can just add one point, we give some advice 

on how to complete the cost-benefit analysis but one of the things 

that is pointed out in our report is that no cost-benefit analysis at 

the end that deals with security matters is going to be totally unassailable. They are going to have to produce something that they 

can defend, but you are always going to be able to pick at some 

part of it. This is a difficult problem. This is not an easy issue to 

work through. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Ms. Dahlkemper. You still had 

five minutes. 

That concludes the questioning of this first panel. Again, we 

thank both Mr. Aloise and Dr. Lowenthal, and we will stand at 

ease for a second while this panel can step down and the next 

panel can come up. 

Panel II: 

At this time I would like to introduce our second panel. Dr. William Hagan is the Acting Deputy Director of the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office at the Department of Homeland Security. That is 

also a mouthful of a title. Mr. Todd C. Owen is the Acting Deputy 

35

Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Field Operations at the 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security. You each have five minutes for your spoken testimony. Your 

written testimony will be included in the record. When we have 

completed your spoken testimony, we will begin with questions. 

Each Member will have five minutes to question the panel. It is the 

practice of this subcommittee to receive testimony under oath. Do 

either of you have any objection to taking an oath? Both witnesses 

indicated that they do not. If not, you also have the right to be represented by counsel. Do either of you have counsel here? And both 

indicated they do not have counsel present. Please stand and raise 

your right hand. Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but 

the truth? 

The record should reflect that both witnesses took the oath. We 

will begin with Dr. Hagan. 

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM K. HAGAN, ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Dr. HAGAN. Good morning, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member 

Broun and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. As Acting 

Deputy Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, 

at the Department of Homeland Security, I am honored to be here 

with my colleague from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 

Mr. Todd Owen. I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to share lessons learned and progress to date on our Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program. I would also like to thank 

the Committee for its support of DNDO’s mission to reduce the risk 

of radiological and nuclear terrorism to the Nation. 

Over the past three years, we have made substantial investments in the development of the next generation of radiation portal 

monitor known as the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal, or ASP. The 

goal of the ASP program is to advance passive detection for cargo 

inspection. ASP is expected to automatically discriminate threat 

from non-threat materials for unshielded to lightly shielded threats 

in primary inspection while improving identification capability in 

secondary inspection. To ensure that ASP systems achieve the necessary technical and operational performance, we are in the midst 

of putting them through a rigorous test campaign. ASP has already 

advanced through several rounds of performance testing, and will 

face field validation at ports of entry, as well as independent operational testing and evaluation conducted by the DHS Science and 

Technology Directorate’s operational test authority. The successful 

completion of these tests, along with other analyses in consultation 

with the National Academy of Sciences, will then inform the Secretary’s certification decisions for ASP this fall. 

In addition, during the execution of our test campaigns, we have 

cooperated with the Government Accountability Office and the National Academy of Sciences to provide both groups with information 

and visibility into our testing and analysis processes. The resulting 

review as issued by the GAO and the NAS provide a valuable external assessment of the ASP program. 

The 2008–2009 set of ongoing tests reflect a number of steps 

DNDO has taken to reform test processes. For example, one of our 

36

most fundamental improvements has been to standardize test 

event planning. We now utilize detailed instructions with a sixmilestone process to ensure that test planning is done openly, that 

partner inputs are included, and that test events are designed to 

provide the data required to meet the objectives of the test and to 

help make programmatic decisions. Additionally, some improvements in the ASP program have been the result of DHS-wide enhancements to program management. The changes put in place 

within DHS further ensure that any eventual certification or acquisition decisions are consistent with DHS priorities and made with 

a strong acquisition management foundation. 

Specifically, we are implementing DHS’s new management directive 102–01 for large acquisition programs which requires a complete set of analysis, testing and documentation as input for an acquisition decision. This set includes, for example, analysis of alternatives, concept of operations, operational requirements, mission 

need statements, cost-benefit analysis and others. We are acutely 

aware that we must integrate end-user requirements and conduct 

tests and evaluation campaigns. We recognize that the development and deployment of new systems can be expensive and the 

cost to taxpayers must be justified by the increased capabilities of 

the equipment. We feel that the plans and procedures now in place 

for the ASP program provide a sound foundation for future certification and acquisition decisions. ASP systems have been under review and evaluation for over three years, and further improvements will always be possible, but I believe that after the plan testing and analysis is complete and the requirements of MD 102–01 

have been fulfilled, DHS will be in a position to make an informed 

decision. 

As a final note, I would like to emphasize that while we are diligently working to characterize and evaluate the performance of 

ASP to ensure that operators receive appropriate equipment for 

their mission, the ASP program is only one piece of the multi-layered solution we call the global nuclear detection architecture 

through which we seek to integrate efforts across the government 

into an overarching strategy to improve the Nation’s nuclear detection capabilities. Accordingly, we plan to continue deployments of 

detection systems at our official ports of entry while also dedicating 

increased time and effort to a wider range of pathways. In addition, 

we have been working to strengthen the architecture by filling 

gaps, improving technologies, building necessary infrastructure and 

raising awareness about radiological and nuclear threats and the 

role of detection systems. 

I look forward to continuing to work with our partners within 

DHS, other federal departments and State and local agencies and 

the Members of this subcommittee and the Congress to help keep 

the Nation safe from radiological and nuclear terrorism. 

This concludes my statement. I thank you for your attention. I 

am happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hagan follows:]

37

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM K. HAGAN

Introduction: 

Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. As Acting Deputy Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), I would like 

to thank the Committee for the opportunity to share lessons learned and progress 

to date on our Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program. I would also like to 

thank the Committee for its support of DNDO’s mission to reduce the risk of radiological and nuclear terrorism to the Nation. 

DNDO was established to improve the Nation’s capability to detect and report attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation, and to further enhance this capability over time. 

To that end, our work is guided by our development of a global nuclear detection 

architecture (GNDA). DNDO has developed a time-phased, multi-layered, defensein-depth GNDA that is predicated on the understanding that no single layer of defense can detect all radiological or and nuclear (rad/nuc) threats. For this reason, 

the GNDA provides multiple detection and interdiction opportunities overseas, at 

our borders, and within the United States to effectively increase the overall probability of system success. DNDO has worked with intra- and interagency partners 

to develop time-phased strategies and plans for improving the probability of detecting and interdicting nuclear threats. DNDO will continue to enhance the GNDA 

over time by developing better detection technologies, working with our operational 

partners to improve concepts of operations (CONOPs), enabling real-time reporting 

of detection events, and supporting effective response to real threats. 

My testimony today will include a status update and lessons learned in DNDO’s 

efforts to address one aspect of the GNDA—scanning cargo containers at ports of 

entry. Specifically, I will focus on the ASP program—a program to improve the detectors used to perform this task.

Role of Container Scanning and ASP in the GNDA: 

The United States border is the first layer within the GNDA where the United 

States has full control over detection and interdiction. As such, considerable effort 

and resources have been placed at this layer to provide comprehensive radiological 

and nuclear detection capabilities, particularly at ports of entry (POEs). After 9/11, 

considerable concern was raised about the possibility that terrorists could use the 

enormous volume of cargo flowing into the United States as a pathway for bringing 

in nuclear material or a nuclear weapon. By far, the largest mode for incoming 

cargo is maritime shipping containers, with approximately 11 million containers 

coming into the country every year. Additionally, in the Security and Accountability 

for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006, Congress mandated that all containers coming 

in through the top 22 ports, by volume, be scanned for radiation by the end of 2007. 

A key consideration in rad/nuc detection is the ability to effectively detect threats 

without impeding the flow of legitimate trade and travel across the border. United 

States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) currently scans cargo entering at our 

nation’s POEs using polyvinyl toluene (PVT)-based radiation portal monitors 

(RPMs) that can detect radiation, but cannot distinguish between threat materials 

and naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM), such as kitty litter and ceramic tiles. Narrowing down alarms to just those for dangerous materials is especially important for POEs that have a high volume of containers, or those that see 

a high rate of NORM. To address this limitation, DNDO is developing next-generation technology—the ASP program. The ASPs have shown significantly improved capability to distinguish rad/nuc threats from non-threats over the hand-held instruments currently used in secondary screening. Thus, the introduction of ASP systems 

is expected to not only reduce the number of unnecessary referrals and false 

positives in primary but increase the probability of detecting dangerous materials 

in secondary. 

As you know, DNDO initiated the ASP program in 2006, building on previous 

work within CBP and the Science and Technology Directorate. ASP systems are the 

next generation of radiation portal monitors. ASP units are now being developed by 

two separate vendors. These units have been subjected to rigorous tests and both 

systems will complete several rounds of performance testing and field validation at 

POEs. Following these performance tests, both systems will complete independent 

operational testing and evaluation conducted by the DHS Science and Technology 

Directorate’s Operational Testing Authority. Test data will be analyzed and provided in support of the Secretary’s Certification decision. DNDO is also engaged 

with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to allow them to review ASP testing 

and inform the certification process, as required in the FY 2008 and 2009 Homeland 

38

Security Appropriations bills. Indeed, in its most recent report on ASP testing, the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) acknowledged the many enhancements and 

lessons that DNDO has incorporated into its testing programs.

Reviews to date and lessons learned: 

Since 2006, the ASP program has undergone extensive review from outside agencies, including the GAO, an Independent Review Team (IRT) established by the previous DHS Secretary, and, most recently, the National Academy of Sciences. We 

have taken each review seriously, valued the recommendations that have been provided, and, where we felt appropriate, we have incorporated their recommendations 

into the next stages of the program. 

The first reviews conducted by the GAO of the ASP program focused on testing 

conducted in 2005 as part of the original ASP vendor selection and the initial costbenefit analysis used to evaluate potential deployment options for ASP systems. In 

its report, released in September 2006, GAO questioned the methods used by DNDO 

to quantify performance capabilities of new systems, and insisted that ASP performance be evaluated against system requirements prior to full scale deployment. 

DNDO concurred with the need for additional testing prior to full scale deployments, which were underway prior to the release of GAO’s report. These tests were 

conducted throughout 2007 and focused specifically on evaluating the performance 

of ASP systems in a number of testing environments. 

In September 2007, GAO recommended that DHS establish an independent body 

to conduct additional testing of ASP systems, which DNDO agreed to, launching the 

ASP-Independent Review Team (IRT), a team of independent experts, drawn from 

a wide range of institutions and backgrounds. The ASP–IRT Report, delivered in 

February 2008, provides a valuable independent assessment of the ASP program, 

and served as an important source of information, albeit based on the data that was 

available at the time. 

In addition to the reviews of 2007 testing, at the conclusion of initial ‘‘field validation’’ testing in 2007, CBP identified a number of functional improvements, unrelated to detector performance, that required modifications to ASP systems prior to 

deployment. DNDO postponed efforts to seek certification at that time, initiated new 

efforts to develop these requested changes , and conducted a new series of tests in 

2008 and early 2009 to ensure that these changes did not detract from detector performance. 

The 2008–2009 test campaign transitions the program from developmental to 

functionality and performance testing, culminating in full operational tests. This 

testing includes:

1. System Qualification Testing, designed to demonstrate that ASP units are 

manufactured in accordance with processes and controls that meet the specified design requirements;

2. Performance Testing at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), designed to evaluate 

ASP, PVT, and radioisotope identification devices (RIID) detection and identification performance against controlled, realistic threat materials, shielding 

and masking scenarios;

3. Integration Testing, designed to determine whether the ASP systems are capable of operating and interfacing with the other equipment found in operational settings;

4. Field Validation Testing, designed to exercise the ASP in a stream of commerce environment at POEs;

5. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), designed to measure the operational effectiveness and suitability of ASP. The OT&E will be independently 

conducted by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T).

Recently, the GAO released its latest report, focusing on the testing conducted in 

2008 and 2009. GAO acknowledged improvements in ASP testing, but raised some 

concerns. DNDO agrees that analysis and review of test data is necessary. DNDO 

plans to continue study the results of testing as the ASP program progresses. However, DNDO believes that the data analysis performed to date and the anticipated 

data from ongoing testing will be sufficient to inform an ASP certification decision 

in the future. 

In addition to the GAO’s reviews, DNDO and CBP have provided NAS with regular testing updates. Recently, the NAS delivered an interim report to the Department and the Appropriations Committees. Like the NAS, DNDO sees the intrinsic 

value of continued testing and incremental deployment of ASP systems. However, 

DNDO must balance the need to better understand a complex system like ASP and 

the need to further reduce the risk of certain significant vulnerabilities and operVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
39

ational burdens. DNDO believes that the criteria outlined for certification are a sufficient threshold for determining when we have reached the point where deployment 

should begin. 

Ultimately, these reviews provide for a valuable external assessment of the ASP 

program. It is only through initial deployments that we will continue to learn more 

about the performance of these systems, and most rapidly bring about the improvements that are needed to address current limitations. ASP systems have been under 

review and evaluation for over three years now, and, while further improvements 

will always be possible, we should not delay the implementation of substantially improved capabilities.

Acquisition lessons learned and changes made in response: 

DNDO has taken a number of steps to reform processes to ensure the success of 

ASP, as well as other development and acquisition programs. At the same time, 

these reforms are accompanied by a number of similar improvements to DHS-wide 

program management processes. 

With regard to testing, DNDO has taken a number of steps to improve internal 

procedures based on lessons learned from earlier tests. 

One of our most fundamental improvements has been through the standardized 

implementation of DNDO Operating Instruction 1, ‘‘Test Event Planning.’’ This detailed instruction lays out a six-milestone process that ensures that test planning 

is done openly, that partner inputs are included, and that test events are designed 

to provide the data required to meet the objectives of the test, and ultimately to 

help make programmatic decisions. 

We have also taken considerable steps to ensure that any ASP testing is responsive not just to DNDO requirements and objectives, but to all DHS partners. Prior 

to the 2008–2009 testing, DHS created a test planning working group that included 

DNDO, CBP, the DHS Operational Testing Authority (OTA), the Office of the Under 

Secretary for Management (USM), and the National Laboratories. Collectively, this 

group laid out the test campaign and assigned responsibilities for each test event 

to respective components. 

Finally, in the 2008–2009 ASP test campaign, based on lessons learned in the 

2007 test campaign series, we instituted strict entrance and exit criteria for each 

of the test events. These criteria were developed long before testing began, and were 

developed jointly with our operational partner, CBP. This has given us confidence 

that as the ASP systems have continued through this series of test events, requirements are met prior to completion. 

DNDO has also made a number of program management changes based on lessons learned throughout the program. In late 2008, DHS decided against exercising 

the next contract option for one of three ASP vendors. This decision reduced costs 

for carrying forward multiple, parallel development efforts. 

Finally, DNDO and the ASP program have benefited from a number of DHS-wide 

improvements to program management. DNDO has adopted Management Directive 

(MD) 102–01, which outlines the acquisition management process for DHS programs. ASP program plans have been adapted to be consistent with the rigorous 

process outlined in the directive. This will further ensure that any eventual certification and acquisition decisions are consistent with DHS priorities and made with 

a strong acquisition management foundation. 

There is an important distinction between two key milestones for the ASP program—Secretarial certification and the MD 102–01 milestone decision for purchase 

and deployment of ASP. The former is a rather loosely defined milestone, which we 

have clarified by defining a ‘‘significant increase in operational effectiveness,’’ requiring that the Secretary formally state that she believes the ASP system is ‘‘better 

than’’ the current system. The latter is a very well defined milestone that was developed for all large programs within the Department of Homeland Security. Items 

such as mission needs, operational requirements, analysis of alternatives, etc., are 

part of the MD 102–01 process. No ASP production units can be purchased and deployed without successfully navigating the MD 102–01 process. The Secretarial certification requirement is in addition to and in advance of the MD 102–01 deployment decision. 

Together, the lessons learned in testing and program management, along with the 

introduction and adherence to MD 102–01 have significantly improved the ASP program. At the same time, it is important to note that these lessons learned have not 

only benefited the ASP program; they are being applied across DHS.

40

ASP Path Forward: 

The plans and procedures in place for the ASP program provide a sound path forward for ASP certification and future acquisition decisions. The current path to certification includes testing, accompanied by the analysis of results, to ensure that 

Secretary Napolitano has sufficient information for ASP certification. ASP systems 

have been under review and evaluation for over three years now, and, while further 

improvements will always be possible, a certification decision will determine whether or not the systems address increase the probability of detecting dangerous materials while minimizing the operational burdens. 

ASP was designed to improve capabilities in both primary and secondary inspections. For primary applications, we have defined a ‘‘significant increase in operational effectiveness’’ as being a quantified reduction in unwanted referrals to secondary inspection, while maintaining similar or better sensitivity in detecting materials of concern. Ultimately, the degree to which ASP systems meet this objective 

is driven by sensitivity thresholds at which the systems will be operated, similar 

to the threshold used for current PVT systems. Therefore, the advantage in primary 

can be viewed as an improvement in efficiency of operations (less unwanted referrals), while maintaining the same or better detection efficiency. The relative degree 

to which we realize these benefits with respect to the current systems will vary by 

port, depending on the operational thresholds at which the current PVT systems are 

set. 

The evaluation of ASP systems in secondary inspection is more direct. The ability 

of ASP systems to identify and resolve the source of radiation is directly compared 

to the ability of current capabilities to perform the same functions. In this instance, 

a ‘‘significant increase in operational effectiveness’’ is defined as a quantified improvement in the ability to identify materials of concern. 

Both of these definitions were developed through coordination between DNDO, 

CBP, and USM. This definition has been approved by DHS senior leaders and has 

served as the guide for developing test campaigns to meet these test objectives. 

Again, because of the rigor that has gone in to developing and quantifying these improvements, we are seeking to remove ambiguity in the evaluation process, and ensure that any certification and acquisition decisions are made consistent with DHS 

priorities and objectives.

Conclusion: 

DNDO will continue to work with CBP and other partners within and beyond 

DHS to improve the Nation’s ability to detect radiological and nuclear threats at our 

ports and borders. DHS is facing a challenge at our ports and borders as the Department balances facilitating the flow of goods and commerce with the need to sufficiently scan cargo for radiological or nuclear threats as it enters our nation. As 

both the President and Secretary have said, the Nation will need more technology 

to meet its security challenges and the technologies that DNDO is pursuing, of 

which ASP is but one example, are a critical component in addressing that challenge. 

Our efforts to develop and evaluate ASP systems are sound. Current test results 

are capturing the benefits of ASP systems, and the reviews to date have provided 

a valuable assessment of the program and identified a number of key lessons 

learned. 

I welcome and appreciate the Committee’s active engagement with this program, 

and look forward to continuing our cooperation as we move forward together. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and Members of the Subcommittee, I thank 

you for your attention and will be happy to answer any questions that you may 

have.

BIOGRAPHY FOR WILLIAM K. HAGAN

Dr. William Hagan serves as Acting Deputy Director of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). Prior to that, he 

was Assistant Director for the Transformational Research and Development (R&D) 

Directorate at DNDO. In that role Dr. Hagan was responsible for long-term R&D 

seeking technologies that can make a significant or dramatic positive impact on the 

performance, cost, or operational burden of detection components and systems. 

Prior to DNDO, he was a Senior Vice President at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Business areas included nuclear technology (analysis, 

detection, and applications), telecommunications, optics, transportation, system integration, and technology assessments during his thirty years at SAIC. 

41

Dr. Hagan earned a Bachelor of Science in Engineering Physics in 1974, Master 

of Science in Physics in 1975, and Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering in 1977 

from the University of Illinois at Urbana. He received his Ph.D. in Physics from the 

University of California–San Diego in 1986. He holds three patents. Dr. Hagan was 

appointed to Senior Executive Service in 2006.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Hagan. 

Mr. Owen for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. TODD C. OWEN, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. 

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. OWEN. Good morning, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member 

Broun, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. As the Acting 

Deputy Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations 

with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, I am honored to be here 

this morning alongside Dr. Hagan to discuss the detection of radioactive and nuclear material in cargo containers and the future role 

that Advanced Spectroscopic Portal technology will have on CBP 

operations. 

I would also like to express my gratitude to the Congress for its 

continued support of CBP initiatives. Among the numerous priorities that were recognized in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Congress provided CBP with $100 million worth of stimulus funding towards non-intrusive inspection equipment. This 

funding will allow CBP to upgrade and expand its successful NonIntrusive Inspection (NII) program and more efficiently inspect 

containers and vehicles crossing the border, allowing them to enter 

our country and its commerce in a safe and prompt manner. 

CBP has made tremendous progress in ensuring that supply 

chains importing goods into the United States are more secure 

against potential exploitation by terrorist groups aiming to deliver 

weapons of mass effect. CBP uses a multi-layered approach to ensure the integrity of supply chains from point of stuffing through 

the arrival in the U.S. ports of entry. This multi-layered defense 

is built upon interrelated initiatives, which include the 24-hour 

rule in the Trade Act of 2002, the automated targeting system, the 

use of Non-Intrusive Inspection equipment and radiation portal 

monitors, our container security initiative and the Customs Trade 

Partnership Against Terrorism program. These complementary layers enhance security and protect our nation. 

Prior to 9/11, not a single radiation portal monitor and only 64 

large-scale non-intrusive inspection systems were deployed to our 

nation’s borders. By October of 2002, CBP had deployed the first 

RPM at the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit. Today CBP has well 

over 1,200 RPMs and 227 large-scale NII technology systems deployed nationwide. NII technology allows the officers to detect possible anomalies, anomalies which may indicate the presence of a 

weapon of mass effect or some other contraband, and to date in fiscal year 2009, CBP NII systems have conducted over 3.1 million 

exams resulting in over 7,800 narcotic seizures with a total weight 

of over 2.6 million pounds as well as $6.2 million in currency 

seized. 

In addition to the significant strides made in the area of NII 

equipment, CBP also continues to deploy first-generation radiation 

42

portal monitors to our ports of entry. Currently, 97 percent of the 

trucks and 93 percent of the personally owned vehicles arriving 

from Canada, 100 percent of the trucks and vehicles from Mexico 

and 98 percent of the arriving sea containers are scanned by our 

current radiation detection technologies. In total, CBP scans 98 

percent of all cargo arriving into the United States by land and sea 

using radiation portal monitors. In addition, CBP officers scan 100 

percent of general aviation aircraft arriving to the United States 

from foreign destinations using hand-held radiation identification 

devices. 

Since the first RPM was deployed in 2002, CBP officers have 

scanned over 368 million conveyances for the presence of radiation, 

and we have resolved 2.1 million radiological alarms successfully 

with minimal or no impact to the flow of legitimate trade and travel. CBP continues to closely coordinate with key stakeholders to ensure the impact of this activity causes minimal disruption to port 

operations. The first-generation RPM systems, although very sensitive, do have limitations. While they alert CBP officers to the 

presence of radiation, a secondary exam is necessary to positively 

identify the specific isotope causing the alert. In the event that a 

CBP officer is unable to positively resolve the alert, scientific reachback is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. 

The ASP is expected to enhance our detection capability while 

significantly reducing the number of secondary examinations. This 

is due to its ability to distinguish between actual threats and natural or medical radiation sources that are not security threats. 

CBP has worked closely with the DNDO in the development and 

operational testing of ASP, has provided DNDO with functional requirements and has been actively engaged in every step of the evaluation process. CBP’s focus for operational testing is to evaluate 

the effectiveness for systems deployed in our operational environments. We will continue to work with DNDO and the DHS Science 

and Technology Directorate towards secretarial certification, and 

we are also working within DHS to ensure that any future ASP acquisitions and deployment decisions are consistent with DHS priorities. The decision to purchase and deploy ASPs in the operational 

arena will be based on CBP’s mission needs, operational requirements, comprehensive cost-benefit analysis to include the full understanding of maintenance and operation costs, and analysis alternatives and other considerations. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, today I have addressed CBP’s commitment to invest in new technologies and 

emerging technology aimed at enhancing cargo security. We must 

continue to maintain our tactical edge by integrating new technology into our ports of entry. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here this morning and 

I would be happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Owen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TODD C. OWEN

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, esteemed Members of the Subcommittee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss the 

work of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), particularly the detection of radioactive and nuclear material in cargo containers and the future role that the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program will have on our operations. CBP strives 

43

to continually improve the security of cargo entering our borders and facilitate the 

flow of legitimate trade and travel. Included in this process, over 98 percent of all 

arriving maritime containerized cargo is presently scanned for radiation through radiation portal monitors. 

I want to begin by expressing my continuing gratitude to Congress for its continued support for the mission and people of CBP. It is clear that the Congress is committed to providing CBP the resources we need in order to increase and maintain 

the security of our borders. We appreciate your efforts and assistance. 

CBP is the largest uniformed, federal law enforcement agency in the country. We 

station over 20,000 CBP officers at access points around the Nation, including at 

air, land, and sea ports. As of mid-May, we have deployed over 19,000 Border Patrol 

agents between the ports of entry. These forces are supplemented with 1,058 Air 

and Marine agents, 2,318 agricultural specialists, and other professionals. These 

personnel are key players in the implementation of Secretary Napolitano’s Southwest Border Security Initiative. 

CBP continues to execute all of its responsibilities, which include stemming the 

illegal flow of drugs, contraband and people, protecting our agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases, protecting American businesses 

from theft of their intellectual property, enforcing textile agreements, tracking import safety violations, regulating and facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, facilitating legitimate travel, and enforcing United States trade laws. 

CBP facilitates lawful immigration, welcoming visitors and new immigrants, while 

making certain those entering this country are indeed admissible and taking appropriate action when an individual fears being persecuted or tortured if returned to 

their home country. At the same time, our employees maintain a vigilant watch for 

terrorist threats. In FY 2008, CBP processed more than 396 million pedestrians and 

passengers, 122 million conveyances, 29 million trade entries, examined 5.6 million 

sea, rail, and truck containers, performed over 25 million agriculture inspections, 

apprehended over 720 thousand illegal aliens between our ports of entry, encountered over 220 thousand inadmissible aliens at the ports of entry, and seized more 

than 2.8 million pounds of illegal drugs. 

We must perform our important security and trade enforcement work without stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel that is so important to our nation’s 

economy. These are our twin goals: border security and facilitation of legitimate 

trade and travel.

CBP OVERVIEW 

I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee today to highlight key accomplishments related to container security, particularly those related to new and 

emerging technology. CBP has made tremendous progress in securing the supply 

chains bringing goods into the United States from around the world to prevent their 

potential use by terrorist groups that seek to deliver weapons of mass effect. The 

use of cutting-edge technology has greatly increased the ability of front line CBP 

Officers to successfully detect and interdict illicit importations of nuclear and radiological materials. CBP uses a multi-layered approach to ensure the integrity of the 

supply chain from the point of stuffing through arrival at a U.S. port of entry. This 

multi-layered approach includes:

• Advanced Information

Æ 24-Hour Rule

Æ Automated Targeting Systems

Æ Importer Security Filing

• The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism

• The Container Security Initiative

• The Secure Freight Initiative

• Use of Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology and Mandatory Exams for All 

High-Risk Shipments

I will discuss each one of these layers in greater detail with particular focus on 

our radiation and nuclear detection capabilities.

ADVANCE INFORMATION 

CBP requires advanced electronic cargo information as mandated in the Trade Act 

of 2002 (including the 24-hour rule for maritime cargo). Advanced cargo information 

on all inbound shipments for all modes of transportation is effectively evaluated 

using the Automated Targeting System (ATS) before arrival in the United States. 

44

ATS provides decision support functionality for CBP officers working in Advanced 

Targeting Units (ATUs) at our ports of entry and CSI ports. The system provides 

uniform review of cargo shipments for identification of the highest threat shipments, 

and presents data in a comprehensive, flexible format to address specific intelligence 

threats and trends. ATS uses a rules-based program to highlight potential risk, patterns, and targets. Through rules, the ATS alerts the user to data that meets or 

exceeds certain pre-defined criteria. National targeting rule sets have been implemented in ATS to provide threshold targeting for national security risks for all 

modes: sea, truck, rail, and air. 

The Importer Security Filing interim final rule, also known as ‘‘10 + 2,’’ went into 

effect earlier this year and has already yielded some promising results. This program will provide CBP timely information about cargo shipments that will enhance 

our ability to detect and interdict high risk shipments. Comments on aspects of this 

rule were accepted until June 1, 2009, and implementation using informed compliance will continue until January of next year. Shipments determined by CBP to be 

high-risk are examined either overseas as part of our Container Security Initiative 

or upon arrival at a U.S. port.

Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 

The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C–TPAT) is an integral part 

of the CBP multi-layered strategy, in that CBP works in partnership with the trade 

community to better secure goods moving through the international supply chain. 

C–TPAT has enabled CBP to leverage supply chain security throughout international locations where CBP has no regulatory reach. In 2009, CBP will continue 

to expand and strengthen the C–TPAT program and ensure that certified member 

companies are fulfilling their commitment to the program by securing their goods 

moving across the international supply chain to the United States. To carry-out this 

critical tenet of C–TPAT in 2009, teams of Supply Chain Security Specialists (SCSS) 

will conduct validations and revalidations of C–TPAT members’ supply chains to ensure security protocols are reliable, accurate, and effective. 

As C–TPAT has evolved, we have steadily added to the rigor of the program. CBP 

has strengthened the C–TPAT program by clearly defining the minimum-security 

requirements for all categories of participants wishing to participate in the program 

and thereby gain trade facilitation benefits. As of June 18, 2009, there are 9,286 

companies certified into the C–TPAT program. CBP’s goal is to validate all partners 

within one year of certification, revalidate all companies not less than once every 

three years and revalidate all U.S./Mexico highway carriers on an annual basis, 

based on the risk associated with the Southern Border Highway Carrier sector of 

C–TPAT.

Container Security Initiative 

To prevent terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States, CBP has 

also partnered with other countries through our Container Security Initiative (CSI). 

In FY 2008 CBP Officers stationed at CSI ports reviewed over 11 million bills of 

lading and conducted over 74,000 exams in conjunctions with their host country 

counterparts. Because of the sheer volume of sea container traffic, containerized 

shipping is uniquely vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. Under CSI, which is the 

first program of its kind, we are partnering with foreign governments to identify 

and inspect high-risk cargo containers at foreign ports before they are shipped to 

our seaports and pose a threat to the United States and to global trade. 

CBP Officers stationed at foreign CSI ports review 100 percent of the manifests 

originating and/or transiting those foreign ports for containers that are destined for 

the United States. In locations where the tremendous volume of bills prevents the 

CSI team at the port itself from performing 100 percent review, or during port shutdowns, CSI targeters at the National Targeting Center provide additional support 

to ensure that 100 percent review is accomplished. Utilizing the overseas CSI team 

and the CSI targeters at our National Targeting Center, CBP is able to achieve 100 

percent manifest review for the CSI program. 

Today, CSI is operational in 58 ports covering 86 percent of the maritime containerized cargo shipped to the United States.

Secure Freight Initiative 

The Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) is an unprecedented effort to build upon existing port security measures by enhancing the United States Government’s ability to 

scan containers for nuclear and radiological materials in seaports worldwide and to 

better assess the risk of inbound containers. Secure Freight will provide carriers of 

maritime containerized cargo with greater confidence in the security of the shipment 

45

they are transporting, and it will increase the likelihood of an uninterrupted and 

secure flow of commerce. This initiative is the culmination of our work with other 

government agencies, foreign governments, the trade community, and vendors of 

leading edge technology. 

Moving forward, CBP will prioritize future deployments of scanning systems to locations of strategic importance by identifying seaports where non-intrusive imaging 

and radiation detection data would be most practical and effective in deterring the 

movement of weapons of mass destruction via containerized cargo. Under this strategy, the additional scan data provided by SFI will enhance DHS’ risk-based and layered approach to securing maritime containerized cargo. We will continue to work 

with Congress to enhance the safety of our nation’s ports and the security of incoming cargo.

Non-Intrusive Inspection/Radiation Detection Technology 

Today I will specifically address large-scale X-ray and gamma imaging systems 

and radiation detection devices; technologies that play a critical role in our layered 

enforcement strategy. 

The deployment of imaging systems and radiation detection equipment has contributed to CBP’s tremendous progress in ensuring that supply chains bringing 

goods into the United States from around the world are secure against exploitation 

by terrorist groups that seek to deliver weapons of mass effect. 

Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology serves as a force multiplier that allows 

officers to detect possible anomalies between the contents of the container and the 

manifest. CBP relies heavily on the use of NII as it allows us to work smarter and 

more efficiently in recognizing potential threats. 

Prior to 9/11, not a single Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM), and only 64 large-scale 

NII systems, were deployed to our nation’s borders. By October of 2002, CBP had 

deployed the first RPM at the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit. Today, CBP has deployed 1,250 operational RPMs at seaports, land border ports, and mail facilities, 

227 large-scale gamma ray or x-ray imaging systems and 3,000 small scale NII systems nationwide. Additionally, CBP has deployed over 1,382 Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices (RIID) and over 17,542 Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD). These devices allow CBP to inspect 100 percent of all identified high-risk cargo. 

Currently, 97 percent of trucks and 93 percent of personally owned vehicles arriving through northern border ports, 100 percent of vehicles arriving through southern border ports, and 98 percent of arriving sea containers are scanned by our radiation detection technologies. CBP uses RPMs to scan 98 percent of all cargo arriving 

in the U.S. by land and sea. In addition, CBP officers now use hand-held radiation 

identification devices to scan 100 percent of private aircraft arriving in the U.S. 

from foreign destinations. As of May 2009, CBP officers scanned over 368 million 

conveyances and successfully adjudicated 2.1 million radiological alarms. 

It is important to distinguish these deployments from the 100 percent mandate. 

These deployments refer to CBP’s domestic RPM deployments, which perform radiation detection (not imaging) of containers that are scanned in the U.S. but prior 

to release into the commerce. The 100 percent mandate requires scanning in a foreign port and both imaging and radiation detection. 

The first generation RPM systems, although very sensitive, do have limitations. 

While they alert CBP officers to the presence of radiation, a secondary exam is necessary to positively identify the location and specific isotope causing the alert. In 

the event that a CBP officer is unable to positively resolve the alert, scientific reach 

back is available on a 24/7 basis through the National Targeting Center and CBP’s 

Laboratory & Scientific Services Division located in the northern Virginia area. 

Understanding these limitations and the need for more precise radiological detection architecture, the DNDO was chartered to develop new technologies that will 

improve CBP’s radiation and nuclear detection capabilities. One of these new technologies is the next generation RPM, or the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP). 

The ASP is able to distinguish between actual threats and natural or medical radiation sources that are not security threats. In doing so, the ASP is expected to 

enhance our detection capability, while significantly reducing the burden of responding to the numerous benign, nuisance alarms that are mostly generated by everyday 

products. This will allow CBP to focus our staffing and resources on high-risk shipments and other border security initiatives.

CBP COORDINATION WITH THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE (DNDO) 

In the course of our collaboration with DNDO, CBP brings knowledge of how our 

ports work, of the support needs of our front-line officers, and of the operational reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
46

quirements for new technologies that must work consistently in a broad array of environments. Additionally, we must remain attuned to critical factors such as 

throughput and capacity as we seek to maintain an appropriate balance between security and the facilitation of cross-border travel and trade. 

CBP has worked closely with DNDO in the developmental and operational testing 

of the ASP. A complete independent operational testing and evaluation will be conducted by the DHS S&T Director, T&E and Standards Director, Operational T&E, 

when the system is ready. CBP’s objective for operational testing is ensuring that 

systems are operationally acceptable and effective and can be deployed in our operational environments. Specifically, CBP provided DNDO with functional requirements for the ASP and has been actively engaged in every step of testing, including 

performance testing at the Nevada Test Site and Integration testing currently ongoing at a mock port of entry at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. 

During integration testing, CBP works closely with DNDO to assess each system’s 

performance as an integrated unit, including reach back capability and ancillary 

equipment such as traffic lights and automated gate arms that are essential to 

maintain positive control of vehicles at our congested ports of entry. In addition, 

CBP works with DNDO to assess and categorize each system’s defects to ascertain 

their technological impact on performance and their operational impact on front-line 

CBP officers—the users of the system. 

CBP will continue to work with DNDO towards Certification by the Secretary, 

which is dependent on demonstrating a ‘‘significant increase in operational effectiveness’’ over existing first generation radiation detection systems. Only after this Certification has been reach can the discussion then turn to potential acquisition and 

deployments of the ASP systems. The decisions to purchase and deploy ASPs in the 

operational arena will be based on mission needs, operational requirements, and a 

full understanding of maintenance and operational costs, to include a comprehensive 

cost benefit analysis, an analysis of alternatives, etc.

CONCLUSION 

In conclusion, I would like to say that technology plays an enormous role in securing the supply chain. Security technology is continuously evolving, not only in terms 

of capability but also in terms of compatibility, standardization, and integration 

with information systems. It is important to note that there is no single technological solution to improving supply chain security. As technology matures, it must 

be evaluated, and adjustments to operational plans must be made. Priority should 

be given to effective security solutions that complement and improve the business 

processes already in place, and which build a foundation for secure 21st century 

global trade. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, today I have addressed CBP’s commitment to investing its efforts in the areas of new and emerging detection technology, 

as well as some of the steps we have taken towards enhancing cargo security. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I will be happy to answer any of 

your questions.

BIOGRAPHY FOR TODD C. OWEN

Todd C. Owen is the Executive Director of the Cargo and Conveyance Security 

Office within U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Field Operations. As 

the Executive Director for the Cargo and Conveyance Security (CCS) Office since 

May 2006, Mr. Owen is directly responsible for all cargo security programs and policies for CBP, including the ‘‘100 percent scanning initiative’’ announced in October, 

2007. Included within Mr. Owen’s responsibilities are the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program (C–TPAT) 

Office, all non-intrusive inspection technology and radiation portal monitor deployments, the National Canine Enforcement Program, and the National Targeting Center, Cargo. 

Mr. Owen also coordinates CBP’s maritime cargo enforcement policies and activities with the U.S. Coast Guard, and all air cargo efforts with the Transportation 

Security Administration. 

Previously, Mr. Owen was the Director of the C–TPAT program from January 

2005 through May 2006. During his tenure as C–TPAT Director, this 9,000 member 

strong industry partnership program was strengthened by more clearly defining the 

security measures which must be adopted for a member to be eligible to receive the 

trade facilitation benefits afforded by CBP. Strong management controls were implemented and hiring was increased, allowing for a significant increase in the level of 

foreign site assessments performed worldwide under this program. 

47

Prior to arriving in Washington in January 2005, Mr. Owen was the CBP Area 

Port Director in New Orleans. As the Area Port Director, Mr. Owen was directly 

responsible for all CBP operations in New Orleans and throughout Louisiana. Two 

hundred forty officers are stationed in the seven Louisiana CBP port offices managed by the Area Director. 

Mr. Owen began his career as an Import Specialist in Cleveland, Ohio in 1990, 

and transferred to Miami in 1992. Through his eight years in South Florida, Mr. 

Owen held various trade related positions within Field Operations and the Office 

of Strategic Trade, before being selected for the New Orleans Area Port Director position in 2000. 

Mr. Owen, a career member of the Senior Executive Service, is a graduate of John 

Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio, and was a senior executive fellow at Harvard 

University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. Mr. Owen also holds a Master’s degree in Public Administration from St. Thomas University in Miami, Florida.

DISCUSSION

Chairman MILLER. I now recognize myself for five minutes. Dr. 

Hagan, you have heard a lot of criticisms of this program this 

morning, that is the Maginot Line of terrorism. It is pretty unlikely 

that terrorists will actually try to go through this system when it 

would be relatively easy to go around it, that a lot of the testing 

seems to be an afterthought to justify a conclusion that was already reached. The end-user, the Customs and Border Patrol, think 

that they are doing perfectly well and that their existing technology could be improved upon relatively cheaply compared to the 

investment that would be required, the spending that would be required for ASP. And both of the previous witnesses very much 

questioned the validity, the thoroughness of the testing that was 

being used to justify the decision to deploy ASP. What is the urgency? In view of all of that, what is the urgency about putting a 

certification decision before the DHS Secretary in October? 

Dr. HAGAN. I guess there is a couple things I would like to say. 

First is that there is a sense of urgency regarding some of the limitations of the current system. We can’t talk about these in open 

session, but we would be happy to do that at a later time. But having said that, I don’t believe that today that there is a rush to deployment nor is there a ‘do it by October or something bad happens.’ So what we are doing though is pushing forward as aggressively as we can to get to the decision point about deployment. In 

other words, we are not saying we have got to deploy these right 

now. We are saying we have got to get, as soon as possible, to the 

point where we make that decision, and as was said by the earlier 

witnesses, the information that is required to make that decision, 

as I mentioned in my oral statement, there is a lot of information, 

a lot of data, a lot of test results that have yet to be analyzed and 

brought together and integrated in this cost-benefit analysis, and 

that would be an important part of the decision that will be made 

in October. So, I guess I would disagree that we are rushing to deployment. I would say that we are rushing more towards getting 

all the information as fast as we can but doing it in a thoughtful, 

deliberate, disciplined way and through this MD 102–01 process 

that I mentioned, to get to that decision point. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Owen, we heard again from GAO and the 

National Academies of Science that the work to this point did not 

really instill confidence in them that this new system would perform as reliably, as effectively as we would like or even as the exVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
48

isting technology works. They seem not concerned about a delay. 

They in fact encouraged a delay. Do you agree with their recommendation to stick with what we have got and not rush either 

to deploy or to certify or to decide to deploy? 

Mr. OWEN. Sir, as the operator, the end-user of the systems, we, 

as front-line officers, need technology that will not only reduce the 

possibility of a missed threat but as well as reduce the rate of innocent alarms that our officers are spending their time on. In the 

port of Long Beach, for example, we have between 400 and 600 radiation alarms every single day. We have a team of about 100 officers over the three shifts that work on just resolving these innocent 

alarms throughout the course of their workday. So having a new 

piece of technology or an enhancement to technology that will allow 

us to not only identify any missed potential threats, but reduce the 

number of innocent alarms, is something that we do support. But 

as I mentioned in our hearing, our testimony, we have been doing 

this for some time with the existing PVTs. We have been able to 

resolve those 2.1 million alarms without a negative throughput 

with the flow of commerce in our ports of entry. So the technology 

that we have is effective but again, as we have matured the technology, we are looking for that technology which will give us an 

edge, if you will, a step up from what we have, particularly in 

terms of missing any threats that the PVTs may not capture right 

now. 

Chairman MILLER. With respect to the existing technologies, the 

PVTs with the follow-up searches, are there enhancements, improvements in that technology that seem available, achievable, and 

have those improvements, are those being pursued? 

Mr. OWEN. Our current system with the PVT which will alert—

the container will then go in a secondary where we will perform 

the analysis with the radiation isotope identifier and we push that 

information back to our laboratory and scientific folks—it is a process that we have crafted and we feel comfortable with. What we 

have seen in the operational area, in terms of the energy 

windowing that you heard from the first panel, is we have seen 

operational benefits to being able to make adjustments to the existing PVTs to account for the recurring, burdensome, naturally occurring radioactive shipments that come through in legitimate 

cargo. So we have seen the benefits from energy windowing in the 

operational environment. 

Now, as to have we pushed those benefits as far as we can 

through energy windowing, we really need to defer to the scientists, to DNDO and our partners at Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratories to tell us if we have gone as far as we can with energy 

windowing. But again, as the operator of these systems, we have 

seen benefits in the ports of entry where we have deployed energy 

windowing. Have we maximized that? I would really defer to the 

scientists to give us that answer. 

Chairman MILLER. I understand the principal problem with the 

current technology is as you have pointed out, not so much that it 

would miss—it is less a concern for missing radiation than the 

large number of false positives. Perhaps not false in the sense that 

it is not radiation, but it is not radiation that is a problem. How—

I understand that the PVT system has been tested for that as well. 

49

How did it fare compared to the existing—I am sorry. The ASP system, how did it fare compared to the PVT system in false positives? 

Dr. HAGAN. I will take that. The actual test data is classified, but 

I can answer in a qualitative way, that in—there are two places 

in which the ASP is being tested and considered. One is in primary 

inspection and the other is secondary inspection. Do you want me 

to explain what I mean by that? 

Chairman MILLER. Well, for the record at least, sure. 

Dr. HAGAN. Okay. 

Chairman MILLER. Briefly. 

Dr. HAGAN. So a conveyance comes in and goes through primary 

inspection or screening, and goes through an RPM or radiation portal monitor of some sort. If that monitor alarms, then that conveyance is referred to secondary inspection where it is further examined either with another monitor, a radiation portal monitor or a 

hand-held RIID. And ASP is being considered for deployments to 

both of those, both primary inspection and secondary inspection. In 

the primary application, the ASP is a—has the ability to identify 

the type of—the source of the radiation. The PVT is not able to do 

that. So PVT simply says there is radiation, better go to secondary 

and off it goes. In the case of ASP, because of the spectroscopic nature of the system, it can discriminate between a threat material 

and non-threat material, or if it can’t discriminate, then it sends 

it to secondary as well. So it can dismiss and reduce the number 

of referrals to secondary. In the secondary application, if you have 

ASP there, then you are comparing essentially the performance of 

a large spectroscopic portal which is very, very large compared to 

a very small hand-held detector in which case the—again, I can’t 

talk about the specifics of the results but the ASP is far superior 

to the hand-held detector in terms of its ability to, in real time, 

identify the source of the radiation and dismiss it as appropriate. 

Chairman MILLER. Is it classified to say which did better, the 

PVT or the ASP? 

Dr. HAGAN. No. I am sorry. I should have said, yes. So the ASP 

does far better in the secondary application of being able to identify——

Chairman MILLER. Well, which—I am sorry. Which system produced more false positives, ASP or PVT? 

Dr. HAGAN. In the most recent——

Chairman MILLER. February. 

Dr. HAGAN. Okay. In the most recent—you are talking about 

field validation testing, I think. 

Chairman MILLER. Yes. 

Dr. HAGAN. In field validation tests, the ASP system sent more—

had more referrals to secondary than the PVT did. However, we 

have now—it is actually not surprising. It was the first time that 

ASP had been able to operate in a real operating environment, and 

so just as with PVT, adjustments were made to what are called 

thresholds in the ASP. So we are not making software changes, we 

are simply tuning the system as you do with the PVT, and then 

we have done a lot of analysis and simulation, as was mentioned 

earlier, to verify that these changes will in fact improve the performance and give us the expected performance. 

50

Chairman MILLER. Okay. It appears that my time has really and 

truly expired. 

Dr. Broun for five minutes. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t watch the clock 

very closely, as you very well know, and I will always give you—

almost always give you a lot of leeway unless there is some particular reason not to. 

But Dr. Hagan, what you are saying, it is my understanding that 

the ASPs—you just made a statement that they are better. It is my 

understanding that that is only with the lightly shielded radiation. 

Isn’t it true that with heavily shielded or moderately shielded radiation, that there is not much difference between the two programs? 

And isn’t it also true that if anybody is going to bring radiationtype special nuclear materials in any shipment, aren’t they going 

to be shielded and very highly so? 

Dr. HAGAN. The answer to the second part first. One might speculate that that would be the case but you can’t really know for 

sure, and so yes, it is probably likely that someone would shield it, 

but a knowledgeable adversary might not do that for other reasons 

which I will talk about later. But going back to the first part of 

your question, yes, the two systems, both PVT monitors and ASP 

monitors are what are called passive detection systems. They both 

suffer from the limitation that if a nuclear material or a weapon 

is shielded enough, then there just is no signal for either detector 

to detect. Now, so what we are—the long-range plan for this, and 

it is already being implemented in part, is to say that if a—by having these passive detectors, we are forcing the adversary, knowledgeable adversary, anyway, to heavily shield the object. Well, that 

heavily shielded object, then, is a very—well, I shouldn’t say very 

but is an easy target or an easy image or easy thing to identify in 

a radiographic image or non-intrusive inspection system which Mr. 

Owen talked about. So by having complementary, in the sense, orthogonal type of systems, one that is passive system that will detect lightly shielded or unshielded material, and another system 

that will detect shielded material, then you have covered—you 

have done a good job of covering the complete spectrum of possibilities. Any system, of course, can be defeated by a knowledgeable adversary, but by having those two systems combined, then you really 

do a much better job of dealing with that problem. That being said, 

the amount of shielding that is needed, the effectiveness of PVT 

versus ASP for lightly or moderately shielded materials is—it depends on what it is you are shielding, and we would have to go into 

particulars and specifics about different types of objects, which we 

can’t do here. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Hagan. My time is about up. I will 

yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Ms. Dahlkemper for five minutes. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I live on Lake Erie and so I go back and forth to Canada a fair 

amount and actually I felt much safer a few years ago when were 

pulled over. My father had had a stress test two weeks prior so I 

do actually have some personal experience with those innocent 

alarms. I didn’t understand what was going on at the time. It was 

the first time I had ever been pulled over. 

51

Mr. OWEN. I hope we didn’t cause too much stress. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. No, no, we were fine, but I actually felt much 

better coming back home and telling people who had no idea that 

this was actually being detected as we all would drive back home 

from Canada. But DHS has spent almost half a million—a billion 

dollars deploying PVT monitors at border crossings and ports 

across the country, including the one I came across, obviously. 

Does, Mr. Owen, the Customs and Border Protection believe that 

the current system, using PVTs and doing the secondary inspection 

with hand-held detectors and other means, is working well in 

terms of keeping us safe and moving commerce along? And I guess 

I am wondering what is the cost of manpower versus what is the 

cost of ASP? You know, I am looking at the dollars spent here, 

knowing we have limited resources and where are we best spending our money. 

Mr. OWEN. And I would just respond, ma’am, that again two 

parts to that equation is, is the PVT finding all of the threats or 

are there threats that could be slipping through just because of the 

physics involved, and that is where ASP can help us in that regard. 

The second piece of that would be, can we respond to the number 

of secondaries that are caused by the existing PVT systems, and 

the answer is yes, we demonstrate that. There is a resource impact 

on this. Again, we would look at Los Angeles, we look at what we 

do up in the Peace Bridge there in Buffalo where you probably 

came through. It is a timely process. The officers do have to go 

through each secondary exam and treat it as if it is a real threat. 

We cannot let our guard down and just assume it was your fatherin-law, that he had medical testing, let you go down. We have to 

take you out of the vehicle, we have to go through that whole process. So having a system that reduces the number of innocent 

alarms that are sent into secondary will help us do that. As to is 

the cost of the manpower savings offset by the ASP, I think that 

is some of the work that the DNDO is doing with their overall costbenefit analysis. It will take into consideration those variables. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. I wanted to ask you too about the maintenance and operation costs of the ASPs and they are estimated to 

be anywhere from five to twelve times more expensive than the 

costs of running the PVTs, and so in the worst case ASPs will cost 

about $100,000 a year to run as compared to $8,000 a year for the 

PVTs. Does Customs have the budget to support this kind of system if it were deployed nationally, and have you thought about 

what you would have to give up in terms of personnel or other, you 

know, equipment to run this? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, and that is a very good question. That is a concern that we do have now. The ASP systems, depending on how the 

final outcome of the cost-benefit and the cost of the systems, I 

think it is well accepted that it is going to cost more than what we 

have with the PVTs. Currently we have about 1,250 PVTs deployed 

nationwide. We continue to expand along the northern border. We 

are going to get—up to 100 percent of the cargo coming in from 

Canada this year will be covered by PVTs. We will end up with 

about 1,500 PVTs by the end of this calendar year. There is an extensive operation and maintenance tail that comes with that. I 

think any deployment decisions going forward with ASPs needs to 

52

be cognizant of the impact that will have on the operator. There 

is much talk about the initial acquisition cost and the deployment 

cost to buy it, put it in the ground, but I don’t think we can forget 

about the operation and maintenance tail that comes along with 

this, that will then fall on the backs of the operator, in this case 

CBP. So it is something that we are concerned with. It is something that again is going into the overall cost adjustments for what 

we can expect with the ASP systems. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Do you have any thoughts on what this would 

do in terms of personnel? Would it free up great numbers for other 

purposes? 

Mr. OWEN. Well, my view on this is, when you look at the way 

the layouts are in the seaports, you have to have still an officer 

man those exit gates where you have the radiation portal monitors. 

So whether it is manned with two officers or one officer because the 

alarms are less frequent, there will still be a cost figure associated 

with the manpower. There may be some operational adjustments 

that we can make in the secondary areas but I think the cost savings are something that we still need to measure once we are confident that the ASPs are delivering as we hope they will do. So 

there will be some savings from that. Will that offset the increase 

in operation maintenance costs associated with the ASP? That is 

something that we have to take very careful consideration of. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you. My time is up. I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Ms. Dahlkemper. That will be the 

last round of questions. Dr. Hagan, I trust that when DHS has 

completed its cost-benefit analysis, that we will get a copy that is 

still warm from the printer. 

Dr. HAGAN. Okay. 

Chairman MILLER. So under the rules—before we bring the hearing to a close, I do want to thank all of our witnesses for testifying 

before the Subcommittee today. Under the rules of the Committee, 

the record will remain open for two weeks for additional statements from the Members and for answers to any follow-up questions any Member of the Committee may have for witnesses, and 

I understand that Dr. Broun does have questions. The witnesses 

are excused and the hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(53)

Appendix: 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

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(177)

HEARING ON THE SCIENCE OF SECURITY, 

PART II: TECHNICAL PROBLEMS CONTINUE 

TO HINDER ADVANCED RADIATION MONITORS 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in Room 

2310 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Miller 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

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HEARING CHARTER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

The Science of Security, Part II:

Technical Problems Continue to

Hinder Advanced Radiation Monitors 

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2009

1:00 P.M.–3:00 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose 

The Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight meets on November 17, 2009, 

to examine continuing problems with the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

efforts to acquire its next generation radiation monitors known as Advanced 

Spectroscopic Portals (ASPs). This is a follow-up to the hearing the Subcommittee 

held on June 25, 2009, titled: The Science of Security: Lessons Learned in Developing, Testing and Operating Advanced Radiation Monitors. Since the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), a DHS component, was created in 2005 they have 

been responsible for researching, developing, testing and managing the program. 

The ASP program is estimated to cost $2-to-$3 billion and has been under scrutiny since 2006 for failing to have clear-cut requirements, an adequate test plan, 

sufficient timelines, development milestones or a transparent and comprehensive 

cost benefit analysis. These problems have been identified by the Government Accountability Office, National Academy of Sciences, the Homeland Security Institute, 

a Federally Funded Research and Development Center for DHS, and the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology. 

In July, one month after the Subcommittee’s last hearing, the ASPs went through 

a second round of Field Validation Tests. During the tests the ASPs exhibited several ‘‘false positive’’ alarms for special nuclear material that did not exist. In another disturbing incident during the tests, one ASP monitor stopped working altogether yet the system operator remained unaware of this malfunction. Two dozen 

cargo trucks were permitted to go through the non-functioning portal monitor in 

order to be screened for potential radioactive and nuclear material until the problem 

became apparent. DNDO considered this a ‘‘Mission Critical Failure.’’ No new plans 

have yet been scheduled to re-test the ASPs for the third time. The Subcommittee 

will examine the results from the most recent tests, continuing technical problems 

with the ASPs, supply shortages of a key component for radiation monitors that 

may hinder the eventual deployment of the ASPs and further drive up its potential 

cost, and potential enhancements to the current fleet of radiation monitors in use 

today.

Background 

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, protecting the Nation from a nuclear or radiological attack has been a top national security priority. In 2002, to help 

address this threat, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency began 

deploying radiation monitors at U.S. border sites and ports of entry to screen the 

more than 23 million cargo containers that enter the country every year for radiological and nuclear materials. 

Polyvinyl toluene (PVT) radiation portal monitors have been used to screen this 

cargo since then. They are able to detect the presence of radioactive sources, but unable to identify the type of radiation present. The PVT monitors, while relatively 

inexpensive, robust and highly reliable, are unable to distinguish between radioactive sources that might be used to construct a nuclear bomb, such as Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), and non-threatening naturally occurring radiological materials (NORM) contained in ceramic tiles, zirconium sand or kitty liter, for instance. 

As a result, any time a PVT detects a radioactive source the cargo is sent to ‘‘secondary’’ screening where CBP agents verify the detection of the source with a secVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00185 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
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ond PVT monitor and use hand-held Radioactive Isotope Identification Devices 

called RIIDs to help identify the source of radiation. 

This method of operation leads to many ‘‘secondary’’ inspections for naturally occurring radioactive material or radioactive material intended for benign purposes, 

such as radioactive medical isotopes. At the Los Angeles/Long Beach port of entry, 

for instance, PVT monitors routinely send up to 600 conveyances of cargo to secondary inspection each day. In addition, the RIIDs used in secondary inspections are 

limited in their abilities to locate and identify potential radioactive material in large 

cargo containers. 

In order to help improve the flow of commerce by eliminating many of the unnecessary alarms that send cargo for secondary screening and to more accurately identify radioactive or nuclear material, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

began developing Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASPs) in 2004. The ASPs were 

intended to both detect and identify radioactive material. In April 2005, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was created by National Security Presidential Directive43/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-14 to, among other things, research, 

develop, test and acquire radiation detection equipment to be used by CBP and 

other federal agencies. 

In July 2006, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff and the 

former Director of DNDO, Vayl Oxford, announced contract awards to three companies worth an estimated $1.2 billion to develop the ASPs, including the Raytheon 

Company and the Thermo Electron Company (now called Thermo Fisher Scientific 

Inc.) both headquartered in Waltham, Massachusetts and Canberra Industries from 

Connecticut. Canberra is no longer a contractor on the DNDO program.

ASP Requirements/Criteria 

One of the key reasons for replacing the existing radiation monitors with newly 

developed ASPs in the first place, as articulated by Secretary of Homeland Security, 

Michael Chertoff in July 2006 was to ‘‘have fewer false positives.’’ In September 

2007, Vayl Oxford, then the director of DNDO reiterated that point in testimony to 

Congress where he emphasized that the ASPs would reduce the number of false 

alarms from the nearly 600 experienced each day by the PVTs at the port of Long 

Beach in California, for instance, to 20-to-25 per day with the new ASP monitors. 

That was the hope, but it has not been the reality during testing of the ASPs and 

other serious security questions about the performance reliability of the ASPs have 

emerged in the most recent round of tests. 

As the House Committee on Appropriations has said in the past, procurement of 

the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitors should not proceed until they are 

deemed to add a ‘‘significant increase in operational effectiveness’’ over the current 

PVT system already in place. In July 2008, CBP, DNDO and the DHS management 

directorate jointly issued criteria for determining this increase in effectiveness in 

both ‘‘primary’’ and ‘‘secondary’’ screening. In primary screening the criteria requires ASPs to detect potential threats as well as or better than PVTs, show improved detection of Highly Enriched Uranium and reduce innocent alarms. In secondary screening the criteria requires ASPs to reduce the probability of 

misidentifying special nuclear material (HEU or plutonium) and reduce the average 

time to conduct secondary screenings. The Secretary of Homeland Security must certify to Congress that the ASPs have met these criteria before funding for full-scale 

procurement of the ASPs goes forward. The criteria to measure this improvement, 

however, are weak and rather vague.

Testing Regime 

Significant hurdles remain before ASPs can be certified and fully deployed. Both 

contractors have passed ‘‘integration testing.’’ They must now successfully make it 

through Field Validation Tests where they operate at ports of entry in tandem with 

PVT units. So far, only one of the two ASP vendors has made it to this stage. The 

one vendor that has made it to this stage will need to make its third attempt to 

successfully pass the Field Validation Tests before it can move forward. If and when 

they successfully pass this stage of testing they will then go to ‘‘Solo Operations,’’ 

where they will be tested at a port-of-entry operating independently of the PVTs. 

If they pass those two critical tests, then the DHS Directorate of Science & Technology which has been mandated the Operational Testing Authority (OTA) of the 

ASPs will put them through a separate series of tests to ensure they meet the specified requirements, do not suffer from technical glitches and operate efficiently. Once 

that testing is completed and the S&T Directorate signs off on the performance and 

reliability of the ASPs then the DHS Secretary must make a determination about 

whether the costs of the ASPs and the capabilities they provide justifies a decision 

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to invest in their full scale deployment. Along the way DNDO is supposed to provide 

a final cost-benefit-analysis of the ASP program to help inform the Secretary’s decision. This document has been promised many times but not yet completed.

Masking & Shielding 

If terrorists were to try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the U.S. 

via containerized cargo they would likely try to shield and/or mask those materials 

in an attempt to make it more difficult to detect, identify and locate the material 

of concern. Shielding requires that lead or other types of metal enclose the 

radioisotopes to hide its radioactive signature. Potential terrorists may also attempt 

to ‘‘mask’’ threatening radioactive material by placing it together with or alongside 

other non-threatening material that has a natural radioactive signature, such as ceramic material, kitty liter or even bananas. Most nuclear security experts believe 

smuggled radioactive or nuclear material would be both shielded and masked in 

order to conceal it from being located and properly identified. These efforts would 

make it harder to detect. 

Many of DNDO’s previous tests of the ASPs have been criticized for being less 

than realistic. In one series of tests the ASP portals did prove more effective than 

the PVTs in detecting HEU materials concealed by ‘‘light shielding.’’ However, differences between the ASPs and PVTs became less notable when shielding was 

slightly increased or decreased. In other tests there was virtually no difference in 

the performance of the two machines with regard to detecting other kinds of radioactive isotopes, such as those used for medical or industrial purposes, according to 

the GAO, except in one case where the ASPs performed worse than the PVTs. In 

the most recent round of tests in July DNDO says the ASPs detected one radioactive 

source that the PVTs missed. 

In previous attempts to detect HEU during tests, the ASPs performed better only 

in one narrowly defined scenario, which many experts see as an unrealistic portrayal of a true attempted nuclear smuggling incident. None of the tests run by 

DNDO, for instance, included scenarios that utilized both ‘‘shielding’’ and ‘‘masking’’ 

as a means of attempting to smuggle radioactive or nuclear material. In addition, 

only one of the vendors has made it to field validation testing. But as the contractor 

has attempted to fix problems that occurred during previous tests new, more serious 

technical issues have emerged.

Field Validation Tests 

The Raytheon ASPs went through their first round of field tests last February, 

but technical issues hampered their performance. They had a large number of false 

alarms on several radioactive isotopes. Overall, in fact, the ASPs sent more cargo 

for secondary inspection than the currently operating PVTs did. Adjustments were 

made to prepare them for another round of field tests. Since the Subcommittee’s last 

hearing on the ASP program in June, the ASPs have gone through a second Field 

Validation Test at four U.S. ports of entry in L.A. Long Beach, California; the New 

York Container Terminal in Newark, New Jersey; Port Huron, Michigan; and Laredo, Texas. 

On average, the PVTs refer one out of every 40 cargo containers to secondary inspection placing a large a burden on the staffing resources of CBP. The ASPs are 

required to send only one out of every 1,000 inspections to secondary inspection in 

order to help lessen that logistical burden. This is one of the key requirements that 

must be met in order for the Secretary of Homeland Security to permit full scale 

production of the ASPs to proceed. During the Field Validation Testing last February, however, the ASPs sent more than five times that number of cargo conveyances to secondary inspection based on false alarms. During the most recent Field 

Validation Tests in July the ASPs reportedly reduced the number of false alarms 

compared to the PVTs by 69 percent bringing them much closer to the 80 percent 

reduction in false alarms that they are required to meet. But new, more serious 

problems also emerged during the field validation tests in July. 

During this second round of field tests the ASPs again failed to perform as expected. This time they falsely identified several cargo conveyances as having special 

nuclear material, when they actually had none. This is a critical issue, since the actual smuggling of special nuclear material presents a serious threat. If it is detected 

at a port-of-entry Customs and Border Protection officers have extensive response 

requirements they must implement. DNDO and the contractor are still unclear why 

the ASPs falsely identified special nuclear material during these tests. Their intended fix to this problem has been to decrease the sensitivity of the ASP monitors 

to specific radioactive isotopes. The hope is that this will correct the problem, reduce 

the number of false alarms and still ensure that the ASPs are able to detect these 

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isotopes. It is a delicate and difficult balance. It also decreases the ostensible advantage of having the ASPs replace the PVTs in the first place. 

Most unsettling, in one instance during the July tests one ASP monitor stopped 

working altogether yet the system operator remained unaware of this malfunction. 

Two dozen cargo trucks were permitted to go through the ASP in order to be 

screened for potential radioactive and nuclear material while it was not operating. 

DNDO considered this a ‘‘Mission Critical Failure.’’ Fortunately, during these tests 

all trucks that went through the ASP also went through a PVT monitor. If this had 

occurred during ‘‘solo’’ testing of the ASPs or during actual deployment of the ASPs, 

cargo carrying radiological or nuclear threat material could have sailed past port security and into the United States unchecked. The cause of this problem has reportedly been rectified by the contractor.

Energy Windowing 

Many experts believe significant improvements can be made to the existing fleet 

of PVT radiation monitors without investing billions of dollars into new ASPs. Energy windowing is a mathematical algorithm that can help improve the sensitivity 

of PVT radiation monitors, enhancing their ability to detect radioactive sources resulting in improved operations and capabilities. The technology is currently used in 

some radiation monitors. Both GAO and CBP believe that DNDO should much more 

aggressively invest in this research to improve the performance of the currently operating radiation detection monitors. Although energy windowing may only lead to 

modest enhancements in the performance of PVTs, that improvement could be significant in terms of improving their performance to be more on par with what ASPs 

are supposed to be capable of and at a far less financial cost. Reducing the sensitivity of the ASPs to certain types of special nuclear material, which was done to 

resolve the problems that emerged during the July tests, should not prevent them 

from alarming for isotopes that were not there in the first place. The only result 

would be to reduce the odds that the ASPs will identify those isotopes when they 

are actually present.

A Dwindling Supply of Helium-3 (He-3) 

The future deployment of both PVT and ASP monitors is dependent on the supply 

of Helium-3 (He-3), a non-radioactive gas that is a byproduct of tritium decay. Tritium is a critical component in nuclear weapons used to boost the yield of nuclear 

warheads. Helium-3 gas is used in neutron detector tubes, a component of both PVT 

and ASP radiation portal monitors used to help identify plutonium. He-3 is also 

used in medical imaging, such as MRI machines, the oil and gas industry and for 

high energy research. During the cold war the U.S. had a steady supply of He-3 as 

a result of its nuclear weapons production operations. With the end of the cold war 

the production of nuclear weapons ceased and this supply diminished. At the same 

time, since 9/11 the demand for radiation monitors skyrocketed and demand for He3 soon out-paced the supply. 

There are no readily available alternatives to He-3. In addition, no other technology matches the stability, sensitivity, and ability to detect neutron radiation that 

He-3 neutron tubes currently offers. DNDO has estimated that the anticipated supply-to-demand ratio of Helium-3 in coming years is expected to be 1-to-10. Costs for 

the rare isotope have already begun to rise. By one estimate, a few years ago the 

cost of He-3 was around $100 per liter. Today, He-3 is estimated to cost as much 

as $2,000 per liter. According to a recent Department of Energy report, new ASP 

radiation monitors will use nearly three times more He-3 as current PVT monitors 

do, about 132 liters compared to 44 liters. These facts should be carefully considered 

by the Secretary of DHS when making cost-benefit decisions about whether or not 

to proceed with producing the ASPs.

Cost Benefit Analysis 

Even if the technical abilities of the ASPs are proven, their relative technical capabilities and increased costs must be carefully weighed in comparison to the existing radiation monitoring system in place today. Replacing a proven, less-costly system that has the confidence of its operators, must be given careful consideration. 

The DNDO has not yet provided an updated cost-benefit-analysis that would validate a decision to procure the multi-billion dollar ASP equipment. 

Virtually any high-technology research and development program experiences 

bumps in the road, technical troubles and occasional set-backs. However, well managed programs have clear technical requirements and strategic goals. They ensure 

that the new technology being developed is thoroughly tested and adequately integrated into the operational plans and procedures of those who must operate them 

183

in the field. When these vital components are short changed, when the test plan is 

insufficient and the program’s research, development and testing methods are 

marred by scanty scientific rigor then the technical tools being developed are bound 

to suffer as a result. Cutting critical corners in the development process serves no 

one’s interests. Yet, at the start of the ASP program many of the DNDO leaders 

seemed more interested in fielding this technology then in effectively validating its 

performance and effectiveness. At the July 2006 press conference unveiling the contractors on the ASP program, Vayl Oxford then the Director of DNDO said: ‘‘the priority for the first year . . . is to get units out immediately.’’ Three years later, none 

of the ASPs have yet cleared field validation tests.

Witnesses:

Mr. Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Dr. Timothy M. Persons, Chief Scientist, Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Mr. Todd Owen, Executive Director for Cargo and Conveyance Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Dr. William Hagan, Acting Deputy Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

(DNDO), Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

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Chairman MILLER. Welcome to today’s hearing entitled The 

Science of Security, Part II: Technical Problems Continue to Hinder 

Advanced Radiation Monitors.

Soon after the September 11 attacks, Customs and Border Protection, CBP, began operating radiation portal monitors to screen 

cargo entering the United States for radiological and nuclear material. They have purchased approximately 1,500 polyvinyl toluene 

monitors and deployed them at ports and border crossings throughout the United States. Mercifully, polyvinyl toluene monitors are 

generally referred to as PVTs. 

PVTs indicate the presence of a radiation source, but they cannot 

identify the nature of the source. As a result, any cargo container 

that provokes a warning from a PVT is then sent to a secondary 

inspection where customs officers use other technology and information to determine what sort of material is in the container. 

There are plenty of innocent sources of radiation: kitty litter, medical isotopes, ceramics, bananas, and many of these secondary inspections can be handled quickly. However, some secondary inspections require that the container be opened, and even emptied, in 

the search for a source. That is time consuming, but the PVT 

seems to be working well to meet customs’ dual mission to keep us 

safe while maintaining a steady flow of commerce. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been developing a new radiation portal monitor, championed by the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, that advocates believe should replace the PVTs. The new monitor, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitor, or ASP, would detect the presence of radiation in 

cargo, but it would also identify the type of radiation. That would 

allow more harmless cargo to pass unimpeded through the port and 

require far fewer secondary referrals. If it worked as advertised, 

the ASPs would be more likely to identify highly enriched uranium 

or other materials of concern and enhance the flow of commerce 

while freeing up customs officers to tend to other duties besides 

secondary inspections. 

Despite a $230 million investment of taxpayer dollars thus far 

for development, the ASPs haven’t performed as expected, and the 

results from recent tests are still worrisome. Last June we learned 

of problems in the first field test in February 2009. At our June 

hearing we heard that those issues had been fixed and that the 

July field test would allow the department to move forward towards a cost-benefit analysis and certification decision for the Secretary. So far, we have seen neither. 

The July test highlighted yet another problem with the ASPs. 

The devices detected nuclear materials when none were present. 

The ASPs had numerous false positive hits for special nuclear 

material in July, each one of which would have resulted in the implementation of mandated security responses by Customs, potentially shutting down port operations. Fortunately, Customs was 

also running the PVTs which saw no radiation presence, and there 

was none, and cleared up the issue in secondary fairly quickly. 

DNDO has told our staff that they intend to fix this new problem 

by changing the sensitivity of the ASPs to detect uranium, but it 

isn’t clear why that should be reassuring, changing the sensitivity 

setting. If we lower the sensitivity setting to the very materials the 

185

ASP is supposed to be better at monitoring or detecting, would the 

ASP still be better than PVTs at detecting those materials? And 

would we have to go back to the Nevada Test Site to prove that 

you can still detect levels of special nuclear material more accurately than the PVTs can? 

Second, if the machines detect special nuclear material when 

there is none there, how does changing the sensitivity make any 

difference at all? Detecting ghost isotopes is a problem with the operating system, not with the sensitivity level, it would appear anyway. Since the taxpayers have spent $200,000 for each of the 1,500 

PVTs that are deployed now, the case for ASPs, which will run 

about $800,000 per unit, a total cost of $2 to $3 billion, needs to 

be clear both in terms of better detection performance and better 

support for Customs operations. Add to that greater acquisition 

cost, an annual operating expense of ASPs that is at least five 

times more expensive per unit than PVTs, and the need for a convincing case is even greater. As it stands, it is hard to see why 

ASPs should be more than a secondary inspection tool. 

In fact, that is the role they play in the Department of Energy’s 

Megaport program. The DOE already runs a program that inspects 

cargo leaving 27 major foreign ports for destinations anywhere in 

the world. DOE, which developed portal radiation detection technology, uses PVTs for primary inspection and then uses the ASPs 

for secondary inspection to help identify the type of isotope to 

which the PVT responded in the first place. The Department of Energy’s approach to identifying radiation should be instructive to 

DHS. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for appearing today. I particularly want to thank GAO for continuing their work on this matter and for their continued assistance to this committee and Congress, and the Appropriations Committee as well. It is very helpful 

for the Appropriations Committee to be asking the right questions, 

and you have helped them and helped us ask the right questions. 

I suspect that this will not be the last time that we gather on this 

subject—we do seem to come back to the same subjects again and 

again—nor the last time we hear from witnesses that we still face 

a long list of tests and validations before we can think about replacing the PVTs with the ASPs. 

I would now recognize the Ranking Member, Dr. Broun, for his 

opening comment. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BRAD MILLER

Soon after the September 11 attacks, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) began 

operating radiation portal monitors to screen cargo entering the United States for 

radiological or nuclear material. They have purchased approximately 1,500 polyvinyl 

toluene (PVT) monitors and deployed them at ports and border crossings throughout 

the United States. 

PVTs indicate the presence of a radiation source, but they cannot identify the nature of the source. As a result, any cargo container that provokes a warning from 

a PVT is then sent to a ‘‘secondary’’ inspection where Customs officers use other 

technology and information to determine what sort of material is in the container. 

There are plenty of innocent sources of radiation—from kitty litter to medical isotopes—and many of these secondary inspections can be handled quickly. However, 

some secondary inspections require that the container be opened, and even emptied, 

in the search for a source. While this is time consuming, the PVT seems to be workVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00191 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
186

ing well to meet Customs’ dual mission to keep us safe while maintaining a steady 

flow of commerce. 

The Department of Homeland Security has been developing a new radiation portal monitor, championed by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), that advocates believe should replace the PVTs. This new monitor—the Advanced 

Spectroscopic Portal monitor or ASP—would detect the presence of radiation in 

cargo, but it would also identify the type of radiation. This would allow more harmless cargo to pass unimpeded through the port and require far-fewer secondary referrals. If it worked as advertised, the ASPs would be more likely to identify highly 

enriched uranium and other materials of concern and enhance the flow of commerce 

while freeing up Customs officers to tend to other duties besides secondary inspections. 

Despite a $230 million investment of taxpayer dollars for development, the ASPs 

haven’t performed as expected, and the results from recent field tests are worrisome. Last June we learned of problems in the first field test of February 2009. At 

our June hearing we heard that those issues had been fixed and that the July field 

test would allow the Department to move towards a cost-benefit analysis and certification decision for the Secretary. To date, we have seen neither. 

The July field test highlighted yet another problem with the ASPs: the devices detected nuclear materials when none were present.

The ASPs had numerous false positive hits for special nuclear material in July—

each one of which would have resulted in the implementation of mandated security 

responses by Customs, potentially shutting down port operations. Fortunately, Customs was also running the PVTs (which properly saw no radiation present) and 

cleared up the issue in secondary. 

DNDO has told our staff that they intend to fix this new problem by changing 

the sensitivity of the ASPs to detecting uranium, but it isn’t clear that should be 

reassuring. If you lower the sensitivity to the very materials the ASP was supposed 

to be better at detecting, why would the ASP will still be better than PVTs at detecting those materials? Would you have to go back to the Nevada Test Site to prove 

that you can still detect levels of special nuclear material more accurately than the 

PVTs can? 

Second, if the machines detect special nuclear material where it doesn’t exist, why 

should changing the sensitivity make any difference at all? Detecting ghost isotopes 

is a problem with the operating system itself, not with the sensitivity level for a 

particular isotope. 

Since the taxpayers have spent $200,000 for each of the 1,500 PVTs already deployed, the case for ASPs, which will run approximately $800,000 per unit—for a 

total cost of $2–3 billion—needs to be clear both in terms of better detection performance and better support for Customs operations. Add to this greater acquisition 

cost, an annual operating expense of ASPs that is at least five times more expensive 

per unit than PVTs, and the need for a convincing case is even greater. As it stands, 

it is hard to see why ASPs should be more than a secondary inspection tool. 

In fact, that is the role they play in the Department of Energy’s Megaport program. DOE already runs a program that inspects cargo leaving 27 major foreign 

ports for destinations anywhere in the world. DOE, which developed portal radiation 

detection technology, uses PVTs for primary inspection and reserves ASPs for secondary inspections to help identify the type of isotope to which the PVT responded. 

The Department of Energy’s approach to identifying radiation should be instructive 

to DHS. 

I want to thank our witnesses for attending today. I particularly want to thank 

GAO for their continuing work on this matter and for their continuing assistance 

to this committee and Congress. I suspect that this will not be the last time we 

gather on this subject, nor the last time we hear from witnesses that we still face 

a long list of tests and validations before we can even speak sensibly about replacing 

PVTs with ASPs.

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome the 

witnesses here today and thank you all for participating in our follow-up hearing on the Department of Homeland Security’s Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program. It is hard for a Southerner 

to say quickly. 

This afternoon we will be brought up to date on the Department’s ongoing development of the next generation radiation portal 

monitors and get an update from the GAO on their continuing 

work. As I said in our earlier hearing this past summer, this proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00192 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
187

gram is certainly not out of the woods. The latest field validation 

tests reveal additional problems that will have to be overcome before moving forward. I hope DNDO will be able to give us some insight today on what we can expect from this program in terms of 

the future paths forward. With considerable taxpayer money on the 

line, questionable improvements over current capabilities and outstanding cost benefit analysis and a confusing acquisitions history 

that unfortunately has morphed the R&D with procurement, this 

program is rapidly approaching a point where the Federal Government has to decide whether it wants to fish or cut bait. I am concerned with the fact that considerable public funding has been expended on developing a technology that the private sector was developing in parallel on its own dime. DHS as a whole, and DNDO, 

CBP, DHS, S&T individually, should be focusing on long-term, 

high-risk, high-reward technology, not providing seed money for 

commercial, off-the-shelf equipment. That being said, I realize that 

DHS’s mission is vastly different from DOE’s, the Department of 

Defense’s and that they have additional requirements that demand 

a more robust system. GAO and the Academy made several recommendations over the past few years. I trust that DNDO and 

CBP will be able to update this committee on how they are responding to those recommendations and where they plan to go from 

here. The Nation expects a lot from the Department, and I hope 

that we aren’t developing tunnel vision by focusing too much on 

one method of conveyance and not seeing the forest for the trees. 

The Department has an enormous task of securing our borders and 

not just at points of entry but all along our borders. Spending billions of dollars to secure the front door of our house doesn’t seem 

very rational if we are just going to leave the back door open and 

all the windows and have a gaping hole in the walls, too. That is 

not to say that we should do nothing at all, but rather, everything 

we do should be put in context of a well-thought-out global nuclear 

detection architecture. 

As I said earlier this summer, many of these issues we are dealing with today could have been prevented by engaging the endusers earlier in the process. Clearly defining the requirements, developing clear architectural priorities and simply following a clear 

acquisition process. This Committee is no stranger to programs 

that have set aside these best practices for working in expediency’s 

sake. 

I look forward to working with the Department and the Majority 

to make sure any decision that is made is in the best interest of 

our nation’s security, the taxpayer and our economy. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time and I thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE PAUL C. BROUN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome the witnesses here today, and 

thank them for participating in our follow-up hearing on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program. This afternoon 

we will be brought up to date on the Department’s ongoing development of next generation Radiation Portal Monitors and get an update from the General Accountability Office (GAO) on their continuing work. 

As I said at our earlier hearing this past summer, this program is certainly not 

out of the woods. The latest Field Validation Test revealed additional problems that 

will have to be overcome before moving forward. I hope DNDO will be able to give 

188

us some insight today on what we can expect from this program in terms of future 

paths forward. With considerable. taxpayer money on the line, questionable improvements over current capabilities, an outstanding cost-benefit analysis, and a 

confusing acquisitions history that unfortunately has morphed Research and Development (R&D) with procurement, this program is rapidly approaching a point where 

the Federal Government has to decide to ‘‘fish or cut bait.’’

I’m also concerned with the fact that considerable public funding has been expended on developing a technology that the private sector was developing in parallel 

on its own dime. DHS as a whole (and DNDO, CBP, and DHS S&T individually) 

should be focusing on long-term high-risk high-reward technology, not providing 

seed money for Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) equipment. That being said, I realize that DHS’ mission is vastly different from the Department of Energy’s (DOE) 

and the Department of Defense’s (DOD), and that they have additional requirements that demand a more robust system. 

GAO and the Academy made several recommendations over the last few years. 

I trust that DNDO and CBP will be able to update this committee on how they are 

responding to those recommendations, and where they plan to go from here. The 

Nation expects a lot from the Department, and I hope that we. aren’t developing 

tunnel vision by focusing too much on one method of conveyance and not seeing the 

forest through the trees. The Department has an enormous task of securing our borders, not just at points of entry, but all along our borders. Spending billions of dollars to secure the front door or our house, doesn’t seem very rational if we are just 

going to leave the back door open: That is not to say we should do nothing at all, 

but rather everything we do should be put in the context of a well thought out Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. 

As I said earlier this summer, many of the issues we are dealing with today could 

have been prevented by engaging the end-users earlier in the process, clearly defining requirements, developing clear architectural priorities, and simply following a 

clear acquisition process. This committee is no stranger to programs that have set 

aside these best practices for expediency’s sake. I look forward to working with the 

Department and the majority to make sure any decision made is in the best interest 

of our nation’s security, the taxpayer, and our economy. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Thank you.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Broun. I ask unanimous consent that all additional opening statements submitted by Members 

be included in the record. Without objection, it is so ordered. Also, 

there has been an e-mail exchange between our staff and the staff 

of DNDO, Kimberly Koeppel, and without objection, I move that 

the printed versions of the e-mailed questions and answers also be 

entered into the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:]

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Chairman MILLER. It is my pleasure to introduce our witnesses 

at this time. Mr. Gene Aloise is the Director of Natural Resources 

and Environment at the Government Accountability Office, GAO. 

He is an expert in international nuclear proliferation and safety 

issues and holds degrees in political science, economics and public 

administration. Mr. Aloise is a recipient of GAO’s Meritorious Service and Distinguished Services Awards and has served several Congressional committees and offices within GAO. This is not the first 

time he has appeared before us on this topic. 

With Mr. Aloise is Dr. Timothy Persons, GAO’s Chief Scientist. 

Before entering GAO, before joining GAO, Dr. Persons was the 

Technical Director of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects 

Activity, I–ARPA, and previously served as a technical director at 


50324x5.eps
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the National Security Agency. Mr. Persons, if people ask you at a 

cocktail party what you did for a living, did you just say you 

worked for the government? He holds degrees in nuclear physics, 

computer science and biomedical engineering and has been involved in evaluations of many high-tech U.S. Government programs and projects, including GAO’s work on the Advanced 

Spectroscopic Portals, ASP monitors. We look forward to hearing 

his testimony today as well. 

Mr. Todd C. Owen is the Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner 

of the Office of Field Operations for the U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, Department of Homeland Security. Also a mouthful. He 

also served as the Executive Director of the Cargo and Conveyance 

Security Office, Office of Field Operations, since May of 2006. Mr. 

Owen began his career with the Customs and Border Protection in 

1990 and has previously held the positions of Area Port Director 

in New Orleans and Director of the Customs Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism, C–TPAT Program. 

And then finally, Dr. William Hagan is the Acting Deputy Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at the Department of 

Homeland Security. Dr. Hagan holds degrees in physics and nuclear engineering as well as three patents. He spent 30 years with 

the Science Applications International Corporation before coming 

to DNDO and serving as the Assistant Director of the Transformational Research and Development Directorate. 

I think all of our witnesses would need to use small print for 

their business cards. 

As our witnesses should know, you will each have five minutes 

for your spoken testimony. Your written testimony will be included 

in the record for the hearing. When you all have completed your 

spoken testimony, we will begin with questions. Each Member will 

have five minutes to question the panel. It is the practice of this 

subcommittee to receive testimony under oath. This is an Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee. Do any of you have an objection to taking an oath? Let the record reflect that none of the 

witnesses had any objection. You also have the right to be represented by counsel. Do any of you have counsel here? Let the 

record reflect that all of the witnesses said no. We ask you these 

questions to put you at ease. 

Would you all now please stand and raise your right hand? 

Mr. BROUN. And we are not going to water board them. 

Chairman MILLER. Well, that would be the next hearing. Please 

stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear to tell the truth and 

nothing but the truth? Let the record reflect that each of the witnesses did take the oath. 

We will begin with Mr. Gene Aloise. Mr. Aloise, please begin. 

STATEMENT OF MR. GENE ALOISE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) 

Mr. ALOISE. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss DHS’s plans to develop 

and test advanced portal monitors, known as ASPs, for use at the 

Nation’s borders to prevent nuclear materials from being smuggled 

into the United States. My testimony today focuses on the results 

194

of DNDO’s testing of the ASPs, including the July 2009 field testing. 

According to DHS, the current system of radiation detection 

equipment, the PVTs, is effective and does not impede the flow of 

commerce. However, DHS wants to improve the capabilities of the 

existing equipment with ASPs. One of the major drawbacks of the 

ASP, as you know, is a substantially higher cost compared to the 

existing equipment. We estimated that the life cycle cost of each 

standard cargo version of the ASP to be about $822,000 compared 

to about $308,000 for the PVT standard cargo portal and that the 

total program cost would be about $2 billion. 

Earlier this year I testified before this subcommittee on DNDO’s 

2008 round of ASP performance testing at the Nevada Test Site. 

That testing showed that the ASPs performed better than the PVTs 

in detecting certain nuclear materials and met DOE’s threat guidance. However, the ASP’s performance rapidly deteriorated once 

shielding was slightly increased. These test results showed what 

we reported in 2006, that any increase in detection of certain nuclear materials would be marginal. 

While the ASP may have met DOE’s threat guidance for shielded 

nuclear material, the threat guidance is not a realistic approximation of how a terrorist might shield nuclear material to successfully 

smuggle it undetected across our borders. 

The latest round of field testing conducted in July revealed two 

critical performance problems with ASPs that the Chairman mentioned. First, the ASPs had an unacceptably high number of false 

positives for the detection of high-risk nuclear material. In other 

words, the ASP was seeing nuclear material that wasn’t there and 

alarming. CBP officials told us that any alarm for this type of nuclear material is very disruptive to a port or border crossing and 

could effectively shut down operations until the source of the alarm 

is found. Furthermore, repeated false alarms for nuclear materials 

could have the undesired effect of causing CBP officers to doubt the 

reliability of the ASPs and be skeptical about the credibility of future alarms. 

The second critical failure of the ASPs noted in the July testing 

stemmed from a problem with the key component of the equipment 

which led an ASP to in essence shut down. Of great concern was 

the fact that the ASP did not alert the CBP official that it had shut 

down and was not scanning cargo. If this were not a controlled test, 

the CBP officer would have allowed the cargo to enter the United 

States thinking it had been scanned when it had not. 

DNDO’s proposed solutions to these critical failures raise questions about whether the ASPs will provide any meaningful increase 

in the ability to detect certain nuclear materials. Specifically, to address the problem of false positives, DNDO is modifying the ASP 

to make it less sensitive to certain nuclear materials. While this 

may fix the problem of false alarms, it diminishes even further the 

ASP’s ability to detect the nuclear material we are most concerned 

about. 

To address the second failure, DNDO plans to, among other 

things, install an indicator light on the ASP that will alert CBP officials that the ASP has a mission-critical failure. In our view, an 

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1DNDO was established within DHS in 2005; its mission includes developing, testing, acquiring, and supporting the deployment of radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry. CBP 

began deploying portal monitors in 2002, prior to DNDO’s creation, under the radiation portal 

monitor project. 2 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of 

Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO–07–1247T, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 

2007). 

indicator light is not the solution. The ASP must be stable and secure enough to avoid these shut-downs. 

Furthermore, DNDO has not completed efforts to improve the 

PVTs to detect high-risk material through energy windowing. CBP 

has repeatedly urged the completion of this research, because an 

improved PVT could be the more cost-effective way to improve detecting certain nuclear materials and have a similar performance 

to a working ASP. 

In closing, the concerns raised by the results of the July 2009 

field testing provide even greater reason for DNDO to implement 

our recommendations from our May 2009 report. In particular, our 

recommendation that DNDO assess whether the ASPs meet the 

criteria for significant increase in operational effectiveness based 

on a valid comparison with the PVT’s full performance. This is especially relevant given that ASPs seemingly will no longer be as effective in detecting certain nuclear materials. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. Dr. Persons and I 

would be happy to respond to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENE ALOISE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s work on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) testing of advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) radiation detection monitors. One mission of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an agency 

within DHS, includes screening cargo and vehicles coming into this country for 

smuggled nuclear or radiological material that could be used in an improvised nuclear device or radiological dispersal device (a ‘‘dirty bomb’’). To screen cargo at 

ports of entry, CBP conducts primary inspections with radiation detection equipment called portal monitors—large stationary detectors through which cargo containers and vehicles pass as they enter the United States. When radiation is detected, CBP conducts secondary inspections using a second portal monitor to confirm 

the original alarm and a hand-held radioactive isotope identification device to identify the radiation’s source and determine whether it constitutes a threat. 

The polyvinyl toluene (PVT) portal monitors CBP currently uses for this screening 

can detect radiation but cannot identify the type of material causing an alarm. As 

a result, the monitors’ radiation alarms can be set off even by shipments of bananas, 

kitty litter, or granite tile because these materials contain small amounts of benign, 

naturally occurring radioactive material. To address the limitations of current-generation portal monitors, DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) in 2005 

began to develop and test ASPs, which are designed to both detect radiation and 

identify the source.1 DNDO hopes to use the new portal monitors to replace at least 

some PVTs currently used for primary screening, as well as PVTs and hand-held 

identification devices currently used for secondary screening. 

Since 2006, we have been reporting on issues associated with the cost and performance of the ASPs and the lack of rigor in testing this equipment. For example, 

we found that tests DNDO conducted in early 2007 used biased test methods that 

enhanced the apparent performance of ASPs and did not use critical CBP operating 

procedures that are fundamental to the performance of current hand-held radiation 

detectors.2 In addition, in 2008 we estimated the life cycle cost of each standard 

cargo version of the ASP (including deployment costs) to be about $822,000, compared with about $308,000 for the PVT standard cargo portal, and the total program 

cost for DNDO’s latest plan for deploying radiation portal monitors—which relies on 

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3 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Program to Procure and Deploy Advanced Radiation 

Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the Department’s Previous Cost Estimates. GAO–

08–1108R, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2008). 4 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2069 (2007); 

Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. 

No. 110–329, 121 Stat. 3574, 3679 (2008); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 

2010, Pub. L. No. 111–83, 123 Stat. 2142, 2167 (2009). 5 Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show Limits of the New Technology, GAO–09–655 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2009).

a combination of ASPs and PVTs and does not deploy radiation portal monitors at 

all border crossings—to be about $2 billion.3

Concerned about the performance and cost of the ASP monitors, Congress required the Secretary of Homeland Security to certify that the monitors will provide 

a ‘‘significant increase in operational effectiveness’’ before DNDO obligates funds for 

full-scale ASP procurement.4 In response, CBP, DNDO, and the DHS management 

directorate jointly issued criteria for determining whether the new technology provides a significant increase in operational effectiveness. The primary screening criteria require that the new portal monitors detect potential threats as well as or better than PVTs, show improved performance in detection of highly enriched uranium 

(HEU), and reduce by 80 percent the number of innocent alarms that are sent to 

secondary inspection. To meet the secondary screening criteria, the new portal monitors must reduce the probability of misidentifying special nuclear material (e.g., 

HEU and plutonium) and the average time to conduct secondary screenings. 

DNDO designed and coordinated a new series of tests, originally scheduled to run 

from April 2008 through September 2008, to determine whether the new portal 

monitors meet the certification criteria and are ready for deployment. Key phases 

of this round of testing include concurrent testing led by DNDO of the new and current equipment’s ability to detect and identify threats and of ASPs’ readiness to be 

integrated into operations for both primary and secondary screening at ports of 

entry; field validation testing led by CBP at four northern and southern border 

crossings and two seaports; and an independent evaluation, led by the DHS Science 

and Technology Directorate at one of the seaports, of the new portal monitors’ effectiveness and suitability. 

In May 2009, we reported on the results of the then-current round of ASP testing.5 The findings from that report were based on completed tests and preliminary 

results available at the time. Testing on ASPs has continued since that report was 

issued. Today my testimony will (1) discuss the principal findings and recommendations from our May report and (2) update those findings based on the results of 

DNDO’s July 2009 ASP field validation testing. The findings we are presenting 

today are based on our previous ASP reports and updated with information collected 

during interviews with DNDO and CBP officials. We also reviewed testing results 

in a report on the July 2009 tests from the ASP Field Validation Advisory Panel, 

a panel made up of officials from CBP, DNDO, and a national laboratory established 

to examine testing results and provide recommendations. On November 12, 2009, 

we briefed DHS, CBP, and DNDO officials on the findings of our updated work. 

During the briefing, CBP and DNDO officials provided oral comments and offered 

additional information and clarifications we included in this testimony as appropriate. Both our prior work and our updated work were conducted in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require 

that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

produce a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

statement today. 

Improved Testing Rigor Discussed in Our May 2009 Report Demonstrates 

Limitations of ASPs 

Our May 2009 report on the then-current round of ASP testing found that DHS 

increased the rigor of ASP testing over that of previous tests, and that a particular 

area of improvement was in the performance testing at the Nevada Test Site, where 

DNDO compared the capability of ASP and current-generation equipment to detect 

and identify nuclear and radiological materials. For example, unlike in prior tests, 

the plan for the 2008 performance test stipulated that the contractors who developed the equipment would not be involved in test execution. This improvement addressed concerns we previously raised about the potential for bias and provided increased credibility to the results. Nevertheless, based on the following factors, in our 

197

report we questioned whether the benefits of the new portal monitors justify the 

high cost:

• The DHS criteria for a significant increase in operational effectiveness. Our 

chief concern with the criteria is that they require only a marginal improvement over current-generation portal monitors in the detection of certain 

weapons-usable nuclear materials during primary screening. DNDO considers 

detection of such materials to be a key limitation of current-generation portal 

monitors. The marginal improvement required of ASPs to meet the DHS criteria is problematic because the detection threshold for the current-generation 

portal monitors does not specify a level of radiation shielding that smugglers 

could realistically use. Officials from the Department of Energy (DOE), which 

designed the threat guidance DHS used to set the detection threshold, and 

national laboratory officials told us that the current threshold is based not on 

an analysis of the capabilities of potential smugglers to take effective shielding measures but rather on the limited sensitivity of PVTs to detect anything 

more than certain lightly shielded nuclear materials. DNDO officials acknowledge that both the new and current-generation portal monitors are capable 

of detecting certain nuclear materials only when unshielded or lightly shielded. The marginal improvement in detection of such materials required of 

ASPs is particularly notable given that DNDO has not completed efforts to 

fine-tune PVTs’ software using a technique called ‘‘energy windowing’’ that 

could improve the PVTs’ sensitivity to nuclear materials. DNDO officials expect they can achieve small improvements in sensitivity through energy 

windowing, but DNDO has not yet completed efforts to fine-tune the PVTs’ 

software. In contrast to the marginal improvement required in detection of 

certain nuclear materials, the primary screening requirement to reduce the 

rate of innocent alarms by 80 percent could result in hundreds of fewer secondary screenings per day, thereby reducing CBP’s workload. In addition, the 

secondary screening criteria, which require ASPs to reduce the probability of 

misidentifying special nuclear material by one-half, address the limitations of 

relatively small hand-held devices in consistently locating and identifying potential threats in large cargo containers.

• Results of performance testing and field validation. The results of performance 

tests that DNDO presented to us were mixed, particularly in the ASPs’ capability to detect certain shielded nuclear materials during primary screening. 

The results of performance testing at the Nevada Test Site showed that the 

new portal monitors detected certain nuclear materials better than PVTs 

when shielding approximated DOE threat guidance, which is based on light 

shielding. In contrast, differences in system performance were less notable 

when shielding was slightly increased or decreased: both the PVTs and ASPs 

were frequently able to detect certain nuclear materials when shielding was 

below threat guidance, and both systems had difficulty detecting such materials when shielding was somewhat greater than threat guidance. With regard to secondary screening, ASPs performed better than hand-held devices 

in identification of threats when masked by naturally occurring radioactive 

material. However, the differences in the ability to identify certain shielded 

nuclear materials depended on the level of shielding, with increasing levels 

appearing to reduce any ASP advantages over the hand-held identification devices. Other phases of testing uncovered multiple problems in meeting requirements for successfully integrating the new technology into operations at 

ports of entry. Of the two ASP contractors participating in the current round 

of testing, one has fallen behind due to severe problems encountered during 

testing of ASPs’ readiness to be integrated into operations at ports of entry 

(‘‘integration testing’’); the problems may require that the vendor redo previous test phases to be considered for certification. The other vendor’s system 

completed integration testing, but CBP suspended field validation testing in 

January 2009 after two weeks because of serious performance problems resulting in an overall increase in the number of referrals for secondary screening compared with existing equipment.

• DNDO’s plans for computer simulations. As of May 2009, DNDO did not plan 

to complete injection studies—computer simulations for testing the response 

of ASPs and PVTs to simulated threat objects concealed in cargo containers—

prior to the Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision on certification even 

though delays to the ASP test schedule have allowed more time to conduct 

the studies. According to DNDO officials, injection studies address the inability of performance testing to replicate the wide variety of cargo coming into 

the United States and the inability to place special nuclear material and 

198

other threat objects in cargo during field validation. DNDO had earlier indicated that injection studies could provide information comparing the performance of the two systems as part of the certification process for both primary 

and secondary screening. However, DNDO subsequently decided that performance testing would provide sufficient information to support a decision on 

ASP certification. DNDO officials said they would instead use injection studies to support effective deployment of the new portal monitors.

• Lack of an updated cost-benefit analysis. DNDO had not updated its cost-benefit analysis to take into account the results of ASP testing. An updated analysis that takes into account the testing results, including injection studies, 

might show that DNDO’s plan to replace existing equipment with ASPs is not 

justified, particularly given the marginal improvement in detection of certain 

nuclear materials required of ASPs and the potential to improve the currentgeneration portal monitors’ sensitivity to nuclear materials, most likely at a 

lower cost. DNDO officials said they were updating the ASP cost-benefit analysis and planned to complete it prior to a decision on certification by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

Our May report recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct 

DNDO to (1) assess whether ASPs meet the criteria for a significant increase in 

operational effectiveness based on a valid comparison with PVTs’ full performance 

potential and (2) revise the schedule for ASP testing and certification to allow sufficient time for review and analysis of results from the final phases of testing and 

completion of all tests, including injection studies. We further recommended that, 

if ASPs are certified, the Secretary direct DNDO to develop an initial deployment 

plan that allows CBP to uncover and resolve any additional problems not identified 

through testing before proceeding to full-scale deployment. DHS agreed to a phased 

deployment that should allow time to uncover ASP problems but disagreed with 

GAO’s other recommendations, which we continue to believe remain valid.

Results from July 2009 Testing Raise Continuing Issues 

The results of DNDO’s most recent round of field validation testing, which it undertook in July 2009, after our May report was released, raise new issues. In July 

2009, DNDO resumed the field testing of ASPs at four CBP ports of entry that it 

initiated in January 2009 but suspended because of serious performance problems. 

However, the July tests also revealed ASP performance problems, including two critical performance deficiencies. First, the ASP monitors had an unacceptably high 

number of false positive alarms for the detection of certain high-risk nuclear materials. According to CBP officials, these false alarms are very disruptive in a port environment in that any alarm for this type of nuclear material would cause CBP to 

take enhanced security precautions because such materials (1) could be used in producing an improvised nuclear device and (2) are rarely part of legitimate or routine 

cargo. Furthermore, once receiving an alarm for this type of nuclear material, CBP 

officers are required to conduct a thorough secondary inspection to assure themselves that no nuclear materials are present before permitting the cargo to enter 

the country. Repeated false alarms for nuclear materials are also causes for concern 

because such alarms could eventually have the effect of causing CBP officers to 

doubt the reliability of the ASP and be skeptical about the credibility of future 

alarms. 

Secondly, during the July testing the ASP experienced a ‘‘critical failure,’’ which 

stemmed from a problem with a key component of the ASP and caused the ASP to 

shut down. Importantly, during this critical failure, the ASP did not alert the CBP 

officer that it had shut down and was no longer scanning cargo. As a result, were 

this not in a controlled testing environment, the CBP officer would have permitted 

the cargo to enter the country thinking the cargo had been scanned, when it had 

not. According to CBP officials, resolving this issue is important in order to assure 

the stability and security of the ASP. 

In addition to these key performance problems, the ASP was not able to reduce 

referrals to secondary inspection by 80 percent as required by the DHS criteria for 

a significant increase in operational effectiveness. According to the report from the 

ASP Field Validation Advisory Panel, a panel made up of officials from CBP, DNDO, 

and a national laboratory, the ASP was able to reduce referrals to secondary inspection by about 69 percent rather than the 80 percent as required by the DHS criteria. 

While the performance of the ASP during the July field validation testing raises 

issues about its potential readiness for deployment, DNDO’s proposed solutions to 

address these performance problems raise additional questions about whether this 

equipment will provide any meaningful increase in the ability to detect certain nuclear materials. Specifically, to address the problem of false positive alarms indiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00204 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
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cating the presence of certain nuclear materials, according to DNDO officials, DNDO 

has modified the ASP to make this equipment less sensitive to these nuclear materials. While this may address the issue of false positive alarms, it will also diminish 

the ASP capability of detecting a key high-risk nuclear material. Since the ASP 

modification, DNDO conducted computer simulations using a vendor-provided system called a ‘‘replay tool’’ to examine the effect of the modification on the ASP’s performance. According to DNDO officials, the replay tool demonstrated that the modified ASP will still be able to detect certain nuclear materials better than the PVT. 

However, at this point, DNDO does not plan to retest the ASP at the Nevada Test 

Site where it can examine the effects of these modifications using actual nuclear 

materials. As we reported earlier this year, the results of the testing at the Nevada 

Test Site demonstrated that the ASPs represented a marginal improvement in detecting certain nuclear materials. By reducing the sensitivity to these materials and 

not retesting the modified ASPs against actual nuclear materials, it is uncertain exactly what improvement in detecting certain nuclear materials these costly portal 

monitors are providing. 

While DNDO is reducing the sensitivity of ASPs to certain nuclear materials, it 

has yet to complete efforts to improve the PVT’s ability to detect these same materials through energy windowing. For several years, CBP officials have repeatedly 

urged DNDO officials to complete this research. However, it was not apparent from 

our discussions with DNDO officials if this effort is making meaningful progress 

with the development of energy windowing or when it will be completed. Furthermore, CBP officials stated that, depending on the outcome of this research, energy 

windowing could be the more cost effective way to improve detection of certain nuclear materials. In our view, ASPs being modified to diminish their capabilities to 

detect certain nuclear materials raises questions about whether energy windowing 

might be able to achieve a similar level of performance against these same materials 

from the PVTs that are already in place. 

Beyond reducing the sensitivity of ASPs to certain nuclear materials, DNDO also 

plans to address the issue of critical failures by, among other things, installing an 

indicator light on the ASP that will alert CBP officers that the ASP has experienced 

a mission-critical failure and is no longer scanning cargo. While this should address 

the issue of CBP officers not knowing that the ASP has suffered a critical failure, 

CBP officials stressed to us the need for the ASP to be stable and secure enough 

to avoid these shutdowns. 

In closing, the issues raised by the results of the July 2009 field validation tests 

provide even greater reason for DNDO to address recommendations from our May 

2009 report. In particular, we reiterate the importance of our prior recommendation 

for DNDO to assess whether ASPs meet the criteria for a significant increase in 

operational effectiveness based on a valid comparison with PVTs’ full performance 

potential, given that the ASPs will no longer be as effective in detecting certain nuclear materials. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have 

at this time.

Staff Acknowledgments 

Dr. Timothy Persons (Chief Scientist), Ned Woodward (Assistant Director), Joseph 

Cook, and Kevin Tarmann made key contributions to this testimony. Kendall 

Childers, Karen Keegan, Carol Kolarik, Jonathan Kucskar, Omari Norman, Alison 

O’Neill, and Rebecca Shea also made important contributions.

BIOGRAPHY FOR GENE ALOISE

Gene Aloise is a Director in the Natural Resources and Environment team at 

GAO. He is GAO’s recognized expert in international nuclear nonproliferation and 

safety issues and completed training on these subjects at the University of Virginia 

and Princeton University. His work for GAO has taken him to some of Russia’s 

closed nuclear cities and the Chernobyl reactor in Ukraine as well as numerous nuclear facilities around the world and in the United States. Mr. Aloise has had years 

of experience developing, leading, and managing GAO domestic and international 

engagements. His diverse experience includes assignments with congressional committees as well as various offices within GAO. He has received numerous awards 

for his leadership and expertise including GAO’s Meritorious Service and Distinguished Service Awards. Mr. Aloise received his Bachelor’s degree in political 

science/economics from Rowan University and holds a Master of Public AdministraVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00205 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
200

tion from Temple University. Mr. Aloise is also a graduate of the Senior Executive 

Fellows Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

STATEMENT OF DR. TIMOTHY M. PERSONS, CHIEF SCIENTIST, 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Aloise. Dr. Persons. I think 

I said Parsons earlier. Persons. You are here to answer questions 

but the testimony of Mr. Aloise is your testimony as well? 

Dr. PERSONS. That is correct.

BIOGRAPHY FOR TIMOTHY M. PERSONS

Dr. Timothy M. Persons was appointed the Chief Scientist of the United States 

Government Accountability Office (GAO—the investigative arm of the U.S. Congress) in July of 2008. In this role he is an expert advisor and chief consultant to 

the GAO, Congress, and other federal agencies and government programs on cutting-edge science and technology (S&T), key highly-specialized national and international systems, engineering policies, best practices, and original research studies 

in the fields of engineering, computer, and the physical and biological sciences to 

ensure efficient, effective, and economical use of science and technology in government programs. The Chief Scientist also works with GAO’s Chief Technologist to 

lead the production of Technology Assessments for the U.S. Congress. 

Prior to joining GAO, Dr. Persons was the Technical Director of the Intelligence 

Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) from November 2002 to July 2008. 

IARPA’s mission is to invest in high-risk/high-payoff research with potential to revolutionize the business of intelligence collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination. From July 2001 to November of 2002, he served as the Technical Director for 

the National Security Agency’s (NSA) Human Interface Security Group which researches, designs, and tests next-generation biometric identification and authentication systems. He has also served as a radiation physicist with the University of 

North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 

Dr. Persons is a 2007 Director of National Intelligence S&T Fellow whose research focuses on computational imaging systems. He was also selected as the 

James Madison University (JMU) Physics Alumnus of 2007. He received his B.Sc. 

(Physics) from JMU, a M.Sc. (Nuclear Physics) from Emory University, and a M.Sc. 

(Computer Science) and Ph.D. (Biomedical Engineering) degrees from Wake Forest 

University. He is a senior member of the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Association for Computing Machinery, and the Sigma Xi research honor society and has authored an array of journal, conference, and technical articles. He 

is also a Ruling Elder in the Presbyterian Church in America and lives happily in 

Maryland with his wife Gena and their two children.

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Mr. Owen. 

STATEMENT OF MR. TODD C. OWEN, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. 

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. OWEN. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to be here 

this afternoon to provide an update on the role that U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection plays in protecting our nation from the illicit 

introduction of radiological or nuclear materials in cargo containers, and on the future role that Advanced Spectroscopic Portal 

technology would have on CBP operations. 

I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to Congress for 

its continued support toward CBP initiatives. Among the numerous 

priorities that were recognized in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Congress provided CBP with $100 million of 

stimulus funding toward upgrading and adding non-intrusive inspection equipment. This funding will allow CBP to upgrade and 

201

expand its successful NII program and more effectively inspect containers and vehicles crossing our border, allowing them to enter 

our country and its commerce in a safe and prompt manner. 

Everyday over 57,000 maritime containers, truck trailers and rail 

cars cross our border. CBP uses a multi-layered approach to ensure 

the integrity of supply chains from points of stuffing through arrival at U.S. ports of entry. This multi-layer defense is built upon 

interrelated initiatives which include the 24-Hour Rule and the 

Trade Act of 2002, the Automated Targeting System, Non-Intrusive 

Inspection (NII) equipment and radiation portal monitors, the Container Security Initiative and the Customs Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism, C–TPAT program. These complementary layers 

enhance security and protect our nation. 

Prior to 9–11, not a single radiation portal monitor and only 64 

large-scale NII systems were deployed to our nation’s borders. By 

October of 2002, CBP had deployed the first RPM to the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit, and today CBP has just under 1,400 RPMs 

and 232 large-scale NII systems deployed nationwide, and that is 

an increase of almost 200 more RPMs and five additional largescale NII systems since I last testified before this subcommittee in 

June. 

NII technology allows the officers to detect possible anomalies, 

anomalies which may indicate the presence of weapons of mass effect or some other contraband. In Fiscal Year 2009, CBP conducted 

over 5.2 million examinations using NII technology, allowing CBP 

to meet our twin goals of enhance security and trade facilitation. 

In addition to the significant strides made in the area of NII 

equipment, the CBP also continues to deploy first-generation radiation portal monitors to our nation’s ports of entry. Since last testifying before this subcommittee, CBP and DNDO have now completed deployments of RPMs along the northern border and now 

scan 100 percent of trucks and passenger vehicles arriving from 

Canada, 100 percent arriving from Mexico and 98 percent of arriving sea containers for the presence of nuclear radiological materials. Since the first RPM was deployed in 2002, CBP officers have 

scanned over 404 million conveyances for the presence of radiation 

and 2.2 million radiological alarms have been successfully adjudicated with minimal or no impact on the flow of legitimate trade 

and travel. CBP continues to closely coordinate with key stakeholders to ensure the impacts of this activity causes minimal disruption on port operations. 

The first generation RPM systems, although very sensitive, do 

have limitations. While they alert the CBP officers to the presence 

of radiation, a secondary exam is necessary to positively identify 

the specific isotope causing the alert. In the event that a CBP officer is unable to positively resolve the alarm, scientific reach-back 

is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. 

The ASP is expected to enhance our detection capability while 

significantly reducing the number or secondary examinations. This 

is due to its ability to distinguish between actual threats and natural or medical radiation sources that are not security threats. 

CBP has worked closely with the DNDO in the development and 

operational testing of ASP, has provided DNDO with functional requirements and has been actively engaged in every step of systems 

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evaluation. CBP will continue to work with DNDO, and with the 

DHS Science and Technology Directorate, S&T, toward Secretarial 

Certification, and is also working with DHS to ensure that any future acquisition and deployment decisions are consistent with DHS 

priorities. The decision to purchase and deploy ASPs in the operational arena will be based on CBPs mission needs and operational 

requirements, a comprehensive cost benefit analysis to include a 

full understanding of the maintenance and operational cost and 

analysis of alternatives and other considerations. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, today I have 

addressed CBP’s commitment to investing in new and emerging detection technology aimed at enhancing cargo security. We must 

continue to maintain our tactical edge by integrating new technology into our ports of entry. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy 

to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Owen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TODD C. OWEN

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, esteemed Members of the Subcommittee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss the 

work of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), particularly the detection of radioactive and nuclear material in cargo containers and the potential future role that 

the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program will have on our operations. CBP 

is responsible for ensuring the security of cargo entering the United States at our 

borders and facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. As part of this process, over 98 percent of all arriving maritime containerized cargo is currently 

scanned for radiation through radiation portal monitors. 

I want to begin by expressing my gratitude to Congress for its continued support 

for the mission and people of CBP. It is clear that Congress is committed to providing CBP the resources we need in order to increase and maintain the security 

of our borders. We appreciate your efforts and assistance. 

CBP is the largest uniformed federal law enforcement agency in the country. We 

station over 21,000 CBP officers at access points around the Nation, including air, 

land, and sea ports. We have deployed over 20,000 Border Patrol agents between 

the ports of entry. These forces are supplemented with 1,266 Air and Marine agents, 

2,392 agricultural specialists, and other professionals. 

CBP’s responsibilities include stemming the illegal flow of drugs, contraband and 

people, protecting our agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests and 

diseases, protecting American businesses from theft of their intellectual property, 

enforcing textile agreements, tracking import safety violations, regulating and facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, facilitating legitimate travel, 

and enforcing U.S. trade laws. CBP facilitates lawful immigration, welcoming visitors and new immigrants, while making certain those entering this country are indeed admissible and taking appropriate action when an individual fears being persecuted or tortured if returned to their home country. At the same time, our employees maintain a vigilant watch for terrorist threats. In FY 2009, CBP processed more 

than 361 million pedestrians and passengers, 109 million conveyances, 25.8 million 

trade entry summaries, examined 5.2 million sea, rail, and truck containers, performed over 26.8 million agriculture inspections, apprehended over 732,000 illegal 

aliens between our ports of entry, encountered over 224,000 inadmissible aliens at 

the ports of entry, and seized more than 2.8 million pounds of illegal drugs. 

We must perform our important security and trade enforcement work without stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel that is so important to our nation’s 

economy. These are our twin goals: border security and facilitation of legitimate 

trade and travel.

CBP OVERVIEW 

I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee today to highlight the continued 

progress on radiation detection technology. I would also like to take this opportunity 

to bring attention to CBP’s holistic cargo security programs that are applied to all 

environments. CBP has made tremendous progress toward securing the supply 

chains that bring goods into the United States from around the world, and preVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00208 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
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venting their potential use by terrorist groups, by: using cutting-edge technology to 

increase the ability of front-line CBP Officers to successfully detect and interdict illicit importations of nuclear and radiological materials; moving resources where 

they are most needed; integrating all CBP offices; sharing information, including actionable intelligence, across all aspects of CBP; and utilizing a multi-layered approach to ensure the integrity of the supply chain from the point of stuffing, through 

arrival at a U.S. port of entry. This multi-layered approach includes the following 

comprehensive cargo security programs that are applied to all modes of transportation:

• Advance Information

Æ 24-Hour Rule

Æ Automated Targeting Systems

Æ Importer Security Filing (commonly known as ‘‘10+2’’)

• The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C–TPAT) and Free and 

Secure Trade (FAST)

• Container Security Initiative (CSI)

• Secure Freight Initiative

• Use of non-intrusive inspection technology and mandatory exams for all high 

risk shipments.

I will discuss each one of these layers in greater detail with particular focus on 

our radiation and nuclear detection capabilities.

ADVANCE INFORMATION 

CBP requires advanced electronic cargo information, as mandated in the Trade 

Act of 2002, for all inbound shipments in all modes of transportation. This advanced 

cargo information is evaluated using the Automated Targeting System (ATS) before 

the cargo arrives in the United States. 

ATS provides decision support functionality for CBP officers working in Advanced 

Targeting Units at our ports of entry and Container Security Initiative ports abroad. 

The system provides uniform review of cargo shipments for identification of the 

highest threat shipments, and presents data in a comprehensive, flexible format to 

address specific intelligence threats and trends. Through rules, the ATS alerts the 

user to data that meets or exceeds certain pre-defined criteria. National targeting 

rule sets have been implemented in ATS to provide threshold targeting for national 

security risks for all modes of transportation: sea, truck, rail, and air. The DHS 

Science and Technology Directorate is exploring additional methodologies for conducting risk assessment. 

The Importer Security Filing interim final rule, also more commonly known as 

‘‘10+2,’’ went into effect earlier this year and has already yielded promising results. 

This program will increasingly provide CBP timely information about cargo shipments that will enhance our ability to detect and interdict high risk shipments. 

Comments on aspects of this rule were accepted until June 1, 2009, and implementation using informed compliance will continue until January of next year. Shipments determined by CBP to be high-risk are examined either overseas as part of 

our Container Security Initiative, or upon arrival at a U.S. port.

CUSTOMS TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM (C–TPAT) 

CBP works with the trade community through the Customs Trade Partnership 

Against Terrorism (C–TPAT) to better secure goods moving through the international supply chain. C–TPAT has enabled CBP to leverage supply chain security 

throughout international locations where CBP has no regulatory reach. Under the 

C–TPAT program, a prospective member submits basic company information and a 

security profile via an Internet-based portal system. CBP conducts records checks 

on the company in its law enforcement and trade databases and evaluates the security profile, ensuring the company meets the security criteria for its particular business sector. Members who pass initial vetting are certified into the program. Using 

a risk-based approach, CBP Supply Chain Security Specialists conduct on-site visits 

of foreign and domestic facilities to confirm that the security practices are in place 

and operational. 

C–TPAT is a voluntary public-private partnership program wherein CBP works 

with the trade community in adopting tighter security measures throughout their 

international supply chain. In return for making these enhancements members are 

afforded benefits to include reduced exams, dedicated cargo lanes (FAST), Stratified 

Exam, an assigned Supply Chain Security Specialist (SCSS). Potential members iniVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00209 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
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tially complete an online application. The SCSS then conducts internal record 

checks and evaluates the security profile provided. Upon completion of vetting the 

company then becomes a Certified member who will then be physically validated 

within a year of certification. 

In 2009, CBP continued to expand and strengthen the C–TPAT program and ensure that certified member companies are securing their goods moving through the 

international supply chain to the United States. Teams of Supply Chain Security 

Specialists conducted validations and re-validations of C–TPAT members’ supply 

chains to ensure that security protocols are reliable, accurate, and effective. 

As C–TPAT has evolved, we have steadily increased both the rigor of the program 

and program membership. CBP has strengthened the C–TPAT program by clearly 

defining the minimum security requirements for all categories of participants wishing to take part in the program. As of Nov. 6, 2009, there were 9,509 companies 

certified into the C–TPAT program. CBP’s goal is to validate all partners within one 

year of certification, re-validate all companies not less than once every three years, 

and re-validate all U.S./Mexico highway carriers on an annual basis, due to the 

risks of compromise of trailers associated with the Southern Border Highway Carrier sector of C–TPAT. 

C–TPAT’s 9,509 Certified Partners include 4,330 importers, 2,583 carriers, 821 

brokers, 784 consolidators/third party logistic providers, 56 Marine Port Authority 

and Terminal Operators and 935 foreign manufacturers. C–TPAT has conducted 

13,246 on-site validations of manufacturing and logistics facilities in 90 countries. 

301 C–TPAT importer partners have been designated Tier 3, meaning they have exceeded the minimum security criteria and have been granted the highest level of 

program benefits.

CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE 

Because of the sheer volume of sea container traffic, containerized shipping is 

uniquely vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. To prevent terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States, CBP has also partnered with foreign governments through our Container Security Initiative (CSI). CSI, which is the first program of its kind, was announced in January 2002 and is currently operational in 

58 foreign seaports—covering more than 80 percent of the maritime containerized 

cargo shipped to the United States. The program enables CBP to identify and inspect high-risk cargo containers at foreign ports before they are shipped to our seaports and pose a threat to the United States and to global trade. CSI stations multidisciplinary teams of CBP officers to work with host country counterparts to identify 

and examine containers that are determined to pose the highest risk for terrorist 

activity. 

CBP officers stationed at foreign CSI ports review 100 percent of the manifests 

originating and/or transiting those foreign ports for containers that are destined for 

the United States. In locations where the tremendous volume of bills prevents the 

CSI team at the port itself from performing 100 percent review, or during port shutdowns, CSI targeters at the National Targeting Center provide additional support 

to ensure that 100 percent review is accomplished. Utilizing the overseas CSI team 

and the CSI targeters at our National Targeting Center, CBP is able to achieve 100 

percent manifest review for the CSI program. In FY 2009, CBP officers stationed 

at CSI ports reviewed over nine million bills of lading and conducted over 56,000 

exams in conjunction with their host country counterparts.

SECURE FREIGHT INITIATIVE 

The Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) is an effort to build upon existing port security 

measures by enhancing the U.S. Government’s ability to scan containers for nuclear 

and radiological materials in seaports worldwide and to better assess the risk of inbound containers. SFI provides carriers of maritime containerized cargo greater confidence in the security of the shipment they are transporting, and increases the likelihood of an uninterrupted and secure flow of commerce. This initiative is the culmination of our work with other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments, 

the trade community, and vendors of leading-edge technology. 

CBP will prioritize future deployments of scanning systems to locations of strategic importance by identifying seaports where non-intrusive imaging and radiation 

detection data would be most practical and effective in deterring the movement of 

weapons of mass destruction via containerized cargo. The additional scan data provided by SFI will enhance DHS’ risk-based and layered approach to securing maritime containerized cargo. We will continue to work with Congress to enhance the 

safety of our nation’s ports and the security of incoming cargo.

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NON INTRUSIVE INSPECTION/RADIATION DETECTION TECHNOLOGY 

The deployment of imaging systems and radiation detection equipment has contributed tremendously to CBP’s progress in ensuring that supply chains bringing 

goods into the United States from around the world are secure against exploitation 

by terrorist groups. Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology serves as a force multiplier that allows officers to detect possible anomalies between the contents of a 

container and the manifest. CBP relies heavily on the use of NII, as it allows us 

to work smarter and more efficiently in recognizing potential threats. 

Prior to 9/11, not a single Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM), and only 64 large-scale 

NII systems were deployed to our nation’s borders. By October 2002, CBP had deployed the first RPM at the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit. Today, CBP uses RPMs 

to scan 99 percent of all cargo arriving in the U.S. by land and sea. CBP, in partnership with the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), has deployed 473 RPMs at northern border land 

ports of entry; 385 RPMs at southern border land ports of entry; 433 RPMs at seaports; and 55 RPMs at mail facilities. Currently, CBP has 232 large-scale NII systems deployed and 5,816 small-scale NII units. Additionally, CBP has deployed 

1,515 Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices (RIIDs) and 19,365 Personal Radiation 

Detectors (PRDs). These devices allow CBP to examine 100 percent of all identified 

high-risk cargo. To date, CBP has used the deployed systems to conduct over 38 million examinations, resulting in over 8,300 narcotic seizures, with a total weight of 

over 2.6 million pounds, and over $28.6 million in undeclared currency seizures. 

Since RPM program inception in 2002, CBP has scanned over 404 million conveyances for radiological contraband resulting in over 2.2 million alarms. CBP’s Laboratories and Scientific Services spectroscopy group at the National Targeting Center 

has responded to some 21,599 requests from the field for technical assistance in resolving alarms. To date 100 percent of all alarms have been successfully adjudicated 

as innocent. 

CBP is pleased to report that the final installation of RPMs along our shared 

northern border was commissioned on Oct. 29 at the Trout River, N.Y., port of 

entry. This milestone represents another critical step in the Department’s efforts to 

strengthen the interconnected U.S. border security network by deploying technology 

and personnel to key border locations to meet modern-day security needs. This recent milestone provides CBP with the ability to utilize radiation detection technologies to scan 100 percent of trucks and personally owned vehicles arriving 

through both northern and southern border ports, and 98 percent of arriving sea 

containers. In addition, CBP officers now use hand-held radiation identification devices to scan 100 percent of private aircraft arriving in the U.S. from foreign destinations. 

The first generation RPM systems, although very sensitive, do have limitations. 

While they alert CBP officers to the presence of radiation, a secondary exam is necessary to identify the location and specific isotope causing the alert. In the event 

that a CBP officer is unable to positively resolve the alert, scientific reach back is 

available on a 24/7 basis through the National Targeting Center and CBP’s Laboratory & Scientific Services Division located in the northern Virginia area. 

Understanding these limitations and the need for more precise radiological detection architecture, DNDO was created in 2005 to focus on radiological and nuclear 

threats and develop new technologies that will improve the Nation’s ability to detect 

and identify radiological and nuclear weapons and material. One of these new technologies is the next generation RPM, or the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP). 

The ASP is able to distinguish between actual threats and natural or medical radiation sources that are not security threats. In doing so, the ASP would enhance 

our detection capability, while significantly reducing the burden of responding to the 

numerous benign alarms that are mostly generated by everyday products. This 

would allow CBP to focus our staffing and resources on high-risk shipments and 

other border security initiatives.

CBP COORDINATION WITH DNDO 

In our collaboration with DNDO, CBP brings knowledge of how our ports work, 

of the needs of our front-line officers, and of the operational requirements for new 

technologies that must work consistently in a broad array of environments. Additionally, CBP is attuned to critical factors such as throughput and capacity as we 

seek to maintain an appropriate balance between security and the facilitation of 

cross-border travel and trade. 

CBP has worked closely with DNDO in the developmental and operational testing 

of the ASP. A complete, independent operational testing and evaluation will be conducted by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate’s Test and Evaluation and 

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Standards Division, along with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, 

when the system completes the current course of testing. CBP’s objective for operational testing is to ensure that systems are suitable and effective in our operational 

environments. CBP provided DNDO with functional requirements for the ASP and 

has been actively engaged in every step of testing, including performance testing at 

the Nevada Test Site and integration testing currently ongoing at a mock port of 

entry at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. 

During CBP-led field validation and integration testing, CBP has been working 

closely with DNDO to assess each ASP system’s performance as an integrated unit, 

including reach back capability and ancillary equipment such as traffic lights and 

automated gate arms that are essential to maintaining positive control of vehicles 

at our ports of entry. In addition, CBP works with DNDO to assess and categorize 

each system’s issues to ascertain their technological impact on performance and 

their operational impact on front-line CBP officers—the users of the system. 

CBP will continue to work with DNDO toward certification by the Secretary, 

which is dependent on demonstrating a ‘‘significant increase in operational effectiveness’’ over existing first-generation radiation detection systems. At such time, the 

discussion could then turn to potential acquisition and deployment of ASP systems. 

Any decision to purchase and deploy ASPs in the operational arena will be based 

on mission needs, operational requirements, and a full understanding of maintenance and operational costs, to include a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis and 

an analysis of alternatives.

CONCLUSION 

Technology plays an enormous role in securing the supply chain. Security technology is continuously evolving, not only in terms of capability but also in terms of 

compatibility, standardization, and integration with information systems. It is important to note that there is no single technological solution to supply chain security. As technology matures, it must be evaluated, and adjustments to operational 

plans must be made. Priority should be given to effective security solutions that 

complement and improve the business processes already in place, and which build 

a foundation for secure 21st century global trade. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you again for this opportunity to testify about CBP’s commitment to investing in new and emerging detection technology, as well as some of the steps we have taken toward enhancing cargo 

security. I will be happy to answer any of your questions.

BIOGRAPHY FOR TODD C. OWENS

Mr. Todd C. Owen was appointed to Executive Director of the Cargo and Conveyance Security office, Office of Field Operations (OFO), in May 2006. Mr. Owen is 

responsible for all cargo security programs and policies for CBP, including the Container Security Initiative, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program (C–TPAT) office, all non-intrusive inspection technology and radiation portal 

monitor deployments, the national canine enforcement program, the National Targeting Center-Cargo, and the 100 percent scanning initiative. Mr. Owen also coordinates U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) maritime cargo enforcement policies and activities with the U.S. Coast Guard and all air cargo efforts with the 

Transportation Security Administration. 

Mr. Owen previously served as the Director of the C–TPAT program from January 

2005 until May 2006. As Director, he strengthened management control and increased hiring, allowing for a significant enhancement in the level of foreign site assessments performed worldwide under this 9,000 member partnership program. 

Before arriving in Washington, D.C., Mr. Owen was the Area Port Director in 

New Orleans, where he was directly responsible for all CBP operations throughout 

Louisiana, managing 240 officers at seven port offices. Before being selected as Area 

Port Director, Mr. Owen spent eight years in South Florida where he held various 

trade related positions within OFO and the Office of Strategic Trade. 

Mr. Owen began his career with U.S. Customs Service in 1990 as an Import Specialist in Cleveland, Ohio. 

Mr. Owen is a career member of the Senior Executive Service and was a senior 

executive fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. 

He is a graduate of John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio, and holds a Master’s degree in Public Administration from St. Thomas University in Miami, Florida.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Owen. Dr. Hagan for five 

minutes. 

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STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM K. HAGAN, ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Dr. HAGAN. I am sorry. I am losing my voice. Good afternoon 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun and the distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee. As Acting Deputy Director of the 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, at the Department of 

Homeland Security, I am honored to be here with the U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection Executive Director for Cargo and Conveyance Security, Mr. Todd Owen. 

I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to provide this update on our Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program, or 

ASP. Since our last hearing, ASP systems have undergone another 

round of field validation conducted by CBP. The purpose of field 

validation is to produce information about the operational characteristics of the system and correct any issues that must be resolved 

before moving onto the last test event for the system, the Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E). 

The July field validation identified several issues. We worked 

with CBP to classify the severity of these operational and technical 

issues and DNDO has since addressed all the issues initially identified. Because the systems are configuration controlled, adjustments were checked and validated through use of a replay tool and 

regression testing to ensure that sensitivity to threats was not decreased below guidance. Although a few issues remain to be resolved, we are optimistic that field validation can be restarted in 

the near future. 

After CBP completes field validation, OT&E will be conducted by 

the DHS Science and Technology Directorate’s operational testing 

authority. The current path to certification includes field validation 

and OT&E, as well as preparation of all the departmental acquisition program requirements, including presentation of the program 

before the DHS Acquisition Review Board, or ARB, for a production 

decision. We are committed to following the Department’s Management Directive 102–01. As such, we cannot speculate about the outcome of the ARB decision. The Secretary’s decision regarding certification will follow the ARB. 

Beyond testing of the ASP systems, deployment of our current, 

low-rate initial production ASP units is now being considered. The 

fiscal year 2010 appropriations bill signed three weeks ago contains 

specific language encouraging incremental deployments of ASP, as 

did the report from the National Academy of Sciences, and we are 

planning discussions with CBP regarding the best way to deploy 

these units once OT&E is completed. 

However, one new obstacle has emerged that will greatly impact 

the path forward. The United States is facing a severe helium-3 

shortage. Helium-3 is a gas that is used for neutron detection within both current and next-generation RPMs. Because this decreased 

supply affects multiple agencies within the Federal Government 

and beyond, the White House has convened an Interagency Policy 

Committee, including DHS, to discuss the issue and possible solutions. This group decided in September that no more helium-3 will 

be allocated to RPMs for the time being. We are currently leading 

interagency efforts to identify alternative neutron detectors, and we 

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are working to assess the impact this will have on our deployment 

strategy and path forward. For now, we plan to continue field validation and operational testing evaluation in exploring our options 

for the path forward beyond that. 

Additionally, I have also been asked to address the status of improvements to the currently deployed RPM systems, the PVT systems. Some have asked if software or algorithm improvements including improvements to the energy windowing algorithms that are 

currently deployed could provide enhanced capabilities for PVT systems. We are currently funding work at Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory to improve energy windowing and conduct related research 

to determine what kinds of PVT improvements may be possible. 

This research is still ongoing. That being said, it is important to 

note that any improvements to PVT detectors will only improve 

primary inspection capabilities or detection. Current performance 

limitations, and secondary inspection where CBP officers require 

the ability to identify radiological sources, are not addressed by improvements to PVT technology. Better energy windowing algorithms will not change this fact. 

As a final note, I would like to emphasize that the ASP program 

is only one piece of the multi-layered solution we have termed the 

global nuclear detection architecture. This strategy calls for the use 

of multiple preventive actions at our ports as well as security 

measures along all potential pathways beyond, at and within the 

Nation’s borders. 

We will continue to work with our partners within DHS, other 

federal departments, State and local agencies and the Members of 

this subcommittee and the Congress to keep the Nation safe from 

radiological and nuclear terrorism. 

This concludes my statement. I thank you for your attention, and 

I will do my best to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hagan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM K. HAGAN

Introduction: 

Good afternoon Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee. As Acting Deputy Director of the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office (DNDO) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), I would 

like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to provide a status update on the 

Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program. I would also like to thank the Committee for its support of DNDO’s mission to reduce the risk of radiological and nuclear terrorism to the Nation. 

In late June of this year, I provided testimony about our next-generation radiation 

portal monitors (RPMs), including where RPMs are deployed and how DHS’ U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operates this technology at our ports of entry 

(POEs). My testimony today will include a status update and the path forward for 

the ASP program. I will also describe operations during field validation and improvements for poly-vinyl toluene (PVT) systems.

Energy Windowing for PVT Systems: 

Before I get into an update on the ASP Program, I have been asked to address 

the status of improvements to PVT systems. For some time, there have been various 

questions about the possibility of exploring energy windowing improvements to the 

currently deployed PVT systems. Energy windowing is an algorithmic alarm method 

that can be applied to plastic scintillator-based RPM systems to improve operational 

sensitivity to certain threat sources while reducing the alarm rates from naturally 

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ments could provide enhanced capabilities for PVT systems that would achieve performance similar to that of the ASP systems. Algorithms that provide energy 

windowing for PVT systems were introduced into the currently deployed systems in 

2007, and DNDO is currently funding work both at the Johns Hopkins University 

Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) and at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

(PNNL) to determine if further gains can be made through additional energy 

windowing techniques. We have also asked that, wherever possible, the labs work 

cooperatively on these efforts. Funding for the work at PNNL is approximately $1.6 

million of Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 appropriations, and investments in APL for studies 

related to energy windowing are approximately $90,000 of FY 2009 appropriations. 

Scientists are thus far uncertain whether additional gains in operational performance can be coaxed from PVT RPMs by using more energy windowing, because the 

limits of passive detection with plastic-based detectors are coupled with a need to 

keep false alarms at a minimum. As new techniques are studied and evaluated, it 

is important to note that the scintillation properties of PVT detectors are fundamentally different than the ASP technology and we continue to evaluate the operational 

effectiveness of next-generation systems concurrently.

Current Status of the ASP Program: 

DNDO continues to enhance the capability to detect and report attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use 

against the Nation. Part of our work involves working with DHS partners to provide 

the equipment and systems they need to perform their missions, including scanning 

cargo for possible radiological or nuclear threats. After 9/11, considerable concern 

was raised about the possibility that terrorists could use the enormous volume of 

cargo flowing into the United States as a means to bring in nuclear material or a 

nuclear weapon. By far, the largest mode for incoming cargo is maritime shipping 

containers, with approximately 11 million containers coming into the country every 

year. Additionally, in the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 

2006, Congress mandated that all containers coming in through the 22 top volume 

ports be scanned for radiation by the end of 2007. Thus, considerable effort and resources have been devoted to this mode of transportation to provide comprehensive 

radiological and nuclear detection capabilities, particularly at POEs. 

CBP currently scans cargo entering at our nation’s POEs using PVT-based radiation portal monitors (RPMs) that can detect radiation, but cannot distinguish between threat materials and naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM), such 

as kitty litter and ceramic tiles. Narrowing down alarms to just those for dangerous 

materials is especially important for POEs that have a high volume of containers, 

or those that see a high rate of NORM. 

Building on previous work within CBP and the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), DNDO initiated the ASP program in 2006 to develop next-generation technology that can both detect radiological material and distinguish between 

threat and non-threat materials. ASP systems have shown significantly improved 

capability to distinguish radiological threats from non-threats over the hand-held instruments currently used in secondary screening. Thus, the introduction of ASP systems is expected to not only reduce the number of unnecessary referrals and false 

positives in primary scanning but increase the probability of detecting dangerous 

materials in secondary. I want to be clear here that ASP cannot and will not be 

acquired and deployed until an Acquisition Review Board (ARB) has been conducted 

and the Secretary of Homeland Security has certified that the technology provides 

a significant improvement in operational effectiveness over current systems. Although we are getting closer to these decision points, testing and evaluation still remains so that all the data required to make informed decisions has been accumulated, analyzed, and documented. 

To date, two ASP vendors have developed systems that have completed the following 2008–2009 tests: System Qualification Testing, designed to demonstrate that 

ASP units are manufactured in accordance with processes and controls that meet 

the specified design requirements; and Performance Testing at the Nevada Test Site 

(NTS), designed to evaluate ASP, PVT, and radioisotope identification devices 

(RIID) detection and identification performance against controlled, realistic threat 

materials, shielding, and masking scenarios. One vendor has also completed Integration Testing, designed to determine whether the ASP systems are capable of operating and interfacing with the other equipment found in operational settings. This 

vendor has now begun field validation testing, designed to exercise ASP systems in 

a stream of commerce environment at POEs. 

The second vendor has experienced technical and accounting issues that have 

caused its testing schedule to lag behind. DNDO is in the process of determining 

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the best path forward with this vendor. The remainder of my testimony will focus 

solely on the first vendor.

Field Validation: 

Since our last hearing, CBP conducted an additional round of field validation at 

operational POEs. You may recall that CBP operated the ASP systems at four field 

validation sites in January and February of 2009 for a period of two weeks. During 

this time, the systems were run in tandem with the PVT systems to scan incoming 

cargo conveyances, and were able to collect data in an operational port environment 

with real flow-of-commerce. During these operations, the ASP systems showed higher than expected alarm rates for three industrial sources. 

Following this first round of field validation, the ASP thresholds were adjusted 

to more effectively eliminate alarms on benign sources and were retested to ensure 

that the sensitivity for detection of special nuclear material and threats did not fall 

below guidance requirements. Utilizing a computer-based replay tool, we were able 

to determine that the adjustments solved the problem without decreasing the probability that the system will detect and identify threats. Additionally, the systems 

were put through regression testing to determine if the problem had been appropriately addressed. 

After the threshold adjustments were fine-tuned for the three specific isotopes 

that were problematic in the winter, CBP restarted field validation in July. This 

testing identified two additional issues. First, there was a single mission-critical 

fault at one field validation site in which the software database system failed to 

scan multiple conveyances, and did not immediately notify the CBP Officer of the 

problem. There was no security threat at this port because ASP systems were operating in parallel with the current generation systems. A technical representative 

from the vendor was summoned and the issue was rectified. The cause of the problem has since been identified and fixed. To assure that the fix did not create any 

unintended problems, the software has been successfully regression tested. 

The second technical issue identified during July field validations was a higher 

than expected rate of false alarms for certain special nuclear material (SNM) 

threats. Since ending this second round of testing, the ASP thresholds were adjusted 

to eliminate this problem, and the systems were retested to ensure that the sensitivity for detection of special nuclear material and threats was not reduced below 

guidance requirements. Use of the replay tool and regression testing validated that 

the false alarm rate will be reduced below guidance requirements, and it is anticipated that another round of tandem operation field validation will verify the effectiveness of the settings. In this case, the threshold adjustments resulted in an acceptable reduction in the sensitivity of the system, while remaining more sensitive 

than required by the original specifications. 

The fact that the SNM false alarms did not occur at the same rate in the first 

round of field validation as seen in the second round is a good example of the need 

for robust, multi-stage testing, since it may have revealed a sensitivity to seasonal 

changes and cargo contents that was not expected. Such oddities are typical when 

a new system transitions from the lab to the real world, and we will continue to 

learn and improve as testing progresses. At present, DNDO and CBP are in discussions to establish the ground rules for starting the next period of tandem field validation evaluations. Following the completion of tandem operations, ASP systems 

will undergo solo field validation evaluations.

Path Forward: 

Once all the phases of field validation are completed to the satisfaction of both 

DNDO and CBP, ASP systems will complete independent operational testing and 

evaluation (OT&E) conducted by the S&T Operational Testing Authority. Test data 

will be analyzed and provided to inform the Secretary’s certification decision. DNDO 

is also engaged with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to perform an additional review of ASP testing and inform the certification process, as required in the 

FY 2008, 2009, and 2010 Homeland Security Appropriations bills. 

Additionally, DNDO is working to develop a cost-benefit analysis that will analyze 

the cost effectiveness of deploying ASP systems in several different configurations. 

This cost-benefit analysis methodology is still being processed with the available 

data and requires additional data from the remaining tests before it can undergo 

review within the Department and be finalized. 

The current path to certification includes testing as described above, accompanied 

by the analysis of results, to ensure that Secretary Napolitano has sufficient information and all the Departmental acquisition program requirements are met. ASP 

systems have been under review and evaluation for over three years now, but we 

211

are focused on informing a decision to go forward with acquisition and deployment 

with the appropriate processes. Such a decision will be made only when it has been 

determined that ASP will increase the probability of detecting dangerous materials 

while minimizing operational burdens, rather than based on a pre-determined 

timeline. 

The changes and continued diligence that DNDO exercises in conjunction with the 

ASP program will ensure that any eventual certification and acquisition decisions 

are consistent with DHS priorities and made with a documented acquisition management foundation. The ASP program will also be presented to the DHS ARB for 

an MD 102–01 milestone decision for purchase and deployment of ASP. This is a 

very well-defined milestone that was developed for all large programs within the 

Department of Homeland Security. Items such as mission needs, operational requirements, analysis of alternatives, etc., are part of the MD 102–01 process—no 

production units can be purchased and deployed without successfully navigating the 

process. To be clear, the Secretarial certification requirement is in addition to the 

MD 102–01 deployment decision. DNDO intends to present both the Secretary and 

the ARB with all the necessary information to make decisions about the operational 

effectiveness and potential optimal deployment of ASP systems.

Conclusion: 

DNDO will continue to work with CBP and other partners within and beyond 

DHS to improve the Nation’s ability to detect radiological and nuclear threats at our 

ports and borders. DHS is facing a challenge; we must balance facilitating the flow 

of commerce at our ports and borders with the need to sufficiently scan cargo for 

radiological or nuclear threats before it enters our Nation. As both the President 

and Secretary have said, the Nation needs more technology to meet its security 

challenges and the technologies that DNDO is pursuing, of which ASP is but one 

example, are a critical component in addressing that challenge. 

Our efforts to develop and evaluate ASP systems are based on sound, proven testing and evaluation processes used with proven success across government and academia. Current test results are capturing the benefits of ASP systems, and the reviews to date have provided a valuable assessment of the program and identified 

a number of key lessons learned. As we collect more operational data for the ASP 

systems, we are better able to determine the optimized settings for detecting and 

identifying threats, while facilitating the flow of legitimate commerce. 

I welcome and appreciate the Committee’s active engagement with this program, 

and look forward to continuing our cooperation as we move forward together. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, and Members of the Subcommittee, I thank 

you for your attention and will be happy to answer any questions that you may 

have.

BIOGRAPHY FOR WILLIAM K. HAGAN

Dr. William Hagan serves as the Acting Deputy Director for the Department of 

Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). Prior to 

January 2009, Dr. Hagan served as the Assistant Director of the Transformational 

Research and Development (R&D) within DNDO. Dr. Hagan was responsible for 

long-term R&D, seeking technologies that can make a significant or dramatic positive impact on the performance, cost, or operational burden of detection components 

and systems. 

Before his work with DNDO, he was a Deputy Business Unit Manager at Science 

Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Business areas included nuclear 

technology (analysis, detection, and applications), telecommunications, optics, transportation, system integration, and technology assessments during his thirty years 

at SAIC. 

Dr. Hagan earned a Bachelor of Science in Engineering Physics in 1974, Master 

of Science in Physics in 1975, and Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering in 1977 

from the University of Illinois at Urbana. He received his Ph.D. in Physics from the 

University of California–San Diego in 1986. He holds three patents. Dr. Hagan was 

appointed to Senior Executive Service in 2006.

DISCUSSION

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Hagan. I now recognize myself for five minutes. 

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CBP PROCEDURES AFTER A PRIMARY ALARM AND THE

EFFECT OF FALSE POSITIVES

Mr. Owen, I hope that CBP’s procedure is, if you identify nuclear 

materials, the kind of nuclear material that would be used in a nuclear weapon or for a dirty bomb, that your procedures would require that you act like your hair was on fire, that you act with 

great urgency. Without getting into anything that is classified in 

this setting, could you describe what your procedures are? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. Whenever we have any alarm of a PVT on 

primary, the cargo or the passenger vehicle is then sent into secondary because again, the PVTs at this point only detect radiation, 

they do not identify what it is. 

In the secondary, we use the hand-held Radiation Isotope Identification Device. If that determination is that we have special nuclear materials, we then implement what we call SIN procedures: 

secure, isolate, notify. We secure the area, we isolate the conveyance, and then we begin our notifications back to our Laboratory 

and Scientific Services folks at our National Targeting Center for 

cargo here in Northern Virginia. The CBP officers would transmit 

the radiation spectra to the Laboratory and Scientific Services people to make a determination as to what exactly what we have 

there. So as this is going on, again, we are in secondary. It is a 

more controlled arena. Depending on the footprint of the port, depending on the layout, the time of day, the traffic, will impact how 

much of a disruption it will be to some port operations. But clearly, 

whenever we have a higher level threat such as the special nuclear 

materials, we do act accordingly. There is some disruption to the 

port operations until we resolve that alarm. 

Chairman MILLER. You said secure, secure and identify, secure 

the area. How big an area do you secure? 

Mr. OWEN. Mostly it is just in the secondary area with what we 

have. We will create a perimeter of secure area if you will. It will 

not require an automatic shutdown of neighboring activities or anything like that. As we do the initial readings, send it back to our 

Laboratory and Scientific Services folks—clearly, if the issue has 

escalated, if it is of grave concern to us, your exclusion zone would 

expand and the level of activity would increase. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Do you have any idea how many hours 

ports like New York, New Jersey, Los Angeles, Long Beach, would 

be closed or how they would be affected by false positives for special nuclear materials? 

Mr. OWEN. I don’t have any data as to how many times this has 

happened or was shut down, but those are the procedure. And really again, based on the layout of the port, if it is a large seaport, 

you can have just one terminal affected by an alert of special nuclear materials through one of our detection devices. If it is a 

smaller land border crossing, you could theoretically have a much 

greater impact on that type of operation. So there is an impact depending on the different variables as to how much of an impact, 

but clearly there is an impact whenever we have an alert of a special nuclear material. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Well, obviously one of the most immediate problems with false positives is disruption of commerce, disVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00218 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
213

ruption of ports and borders. But I remember from college that the 

first time the fire alarm went off in the dorm, everyone rolled right 

out of bed and went outside, but by the time it happened three or 

four times because of a prank, all anyone did was just put a pillow 

over their head to make the noise—so they could sleep through the 

noise. I don’t ever want it to become routine if we have an alert 

that there is a special nuclear material. Obviously, if there is a real 

fire, the fire alarm would have done no good at all. 

Mr. Aloise, the July round of field validation tests, there were, 

you said, false positives. The machinery, the device, ASPs detected 

materials that were not there at all. Can you give us the details 

of how many false positives or was it one or two machines, was it 

all the machines? What happened? 

Mr. ALOISE. Yes, I believe, and CBP can confirm this, there was 

four per thousand at the smaller ports and eight per thousand, 

eight false positives per thousand conveyances at the larger ports 

during the testing in July. 

Chairman MILLER. And was that across all machines or was that 

just one or two machines that seemed not to be quite right? 

Mr. ALOISE. I believe it was across all machines, yes. 

Chairman MILLER. So it was a problem with technology generally 

not with a problem with a specific——

Mr. ALOISE. With any one machine. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. My time has almost expired, so I will 

recognize Dr. Broun for five minutes. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Chairman. I still am going to be very 

generous with time. You have been very generous with me, and I 

will continue to be generous with you at any point. I want to make 

the Chairman——

Chairman MILLER. After serving for two years with Dana Rohrabacher as a Member of the Subcommittee, it is really not a problem. 

STEPS TAKEN TO REDUCE FALSE POSITIVES AND NEGATIVES

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Some of the field validation tests reveal high levels of false positives for the special nuclear 

materials. This is a serious problem because any identification of 

any special nuclear materials requires a robust response from CBP 

officers. What is DNDO doing to address this issue? And you might 

also—I am concerned not only about false positives but false negatives. And I really haven’t heard anything about that so if you 

could deal with that, too? 

Dr. HAGAN. Regarding what we are doing about the false 

positives, the field validation showed a large number or unacceptably high number of calls for SNM (Special Nuclear Material). We 

have adjusted the threshold levels for the ASP and run a replay 

tool to demonstrate that in fact the number of false alarms, if these 

threshold settings had been used instead of what was used in July, 

that almost all of those false alarms would have been eliminated. 

The number would have dropped from about, according to my data 

here, from about 49 to seven. Now, no system is flawless or perfect. 

And so it is not likely that we will ever build a system that will 

produce no false alarms in primary. But the levels that we are opVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:19 Mar 17, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00219 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Z:\DOCS\50324.TXT SCIENCE1 PsN: COMSCI
214

erating now according to the replay tool are within the acceptability range. 

Regarding false negatives, in the flow of real commerce in the 

field validation activity, there is really no way to know if you have 

dismissed something that you shouldn’t have. Now, we have testing 

at another place, the Nevada Test Site, where we tested that, and 

I don’t recall what the false negative rate was, but it was quite low. 

Mr. BROUN. As a physician, I am concerned about, and in 

science, as you know, talk about specificity and sensitivity. Several 

independent sources have already indicated that ASP only marginally increases our ability to detect lightly shielded special nuclear 

materials. If we manipulate those thresholds, won’t this decrease 

that margin even more, and if this is the case, how would that affect any future cost benefit analysis? 

Dr. HAGAN. The change in—when the threshold settings were 

changed, again using the replay tool, we were able to calculate 

what the difference or see what the difference was in the sensitivity. It is a reduced sensitivity as with any detector. When you 

make your system—when you reduce, make changes to reduce the 

false alarm rate, the sensitivity is usually affected. So this is true 

of this detector as well. But when we compare the sensitivity of the 

system before the threshold settings were made to that after, while 

it was reduced, the reduction was rather slight and the performance of the system is still within the specification and the guidance. 

Mr. BROUN. In order to verify and validate the threshold changes 

made to ASP systems, a replay tool was developed. Has this tool 

been validated by an independent party? 

Dr. HAGAN. Yes, it has. 

Mr. BROUN. Okay. And who is that party? 

Dr. HAGAN. The Johns Hopkins APL, Applied Physics Lab. 

Mr. BROUN. And what was the results of that? 

Dr. HAGAN. Okay. Well, maybe the best way to convey that is to 

comment or to give you some of the results from the replay tool validation exercise. So when we say a replay tool, we mean we want 

a tool that when given the same input data as the real system, it 

produces the same results as the real system. And so the replay 

tool was given the real data for 11,000 occupancies, and the results 

were compared to what actually came out of the system. The results were identical for all 11,000 except for eight. Those eight that 

were found, the reason that the differences were slightly different, 

the results were slightly different, is that the codes were run on 

two different computers, and there was a slight round-off error difference between the two computers. And because of that, there 

were eight occupancies that yielded slightly different results. Other 

than that, the results were identical. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you. Mr. Aloise or Dr. Persons, do you all 

have a response to that? 

Mr. ALOISE. We would say this and then I will let Dr. Persons 

answer as well. As you recall in June when we testified, we said 

there was a marginal improvement in the Nevada testing over 

what the PVTs were, and that marginal improvement, because of 

this reducing of the thresholds has now gotten smaller. So when 

they do the cost benefit analysis, all this has to be factored into 

215

that cost benefit analysis because now the ASP seemingly does not 

have the performance that it initially did when we testified here 

earlier this year. So that is one point. 

The other point is we have not looked at the replay tool. We have 

not talked to Johns Hopkins, so we can’t really comment on the replay tool. Dr. Persons, would you like to——

Dr. PERSONS. Well, just to confirm what Mr. Aloise was saying, 

we have not been able to look at that, but one of our key points 

on this is just the idea of an independent verification or validation 

of such a tool to do that. And in interviews with CBP officials, for 

example, there was a concern about perhaps having an institution 

such as the American National Standards Institute, or ANSI, do 

something more standardized oriented body to do that. There is 

also of course when you are dealing with software development 

issues which are implied in these systems with this level of complication, then you would look at of course the software models, the 

software standards, how those were constructed, how they execute 

the algorithms and perform under test. 

Mr. BROUN. Dr. Hagan, I would like for you to, if you would, submit that report for the record for us——

Dr. HAGAN. Sure, in the form of a letter. 

Mr. BROUN.—and a discussion about it. Okay. Good. Thank you, 

sir. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Dr. Broun. The Chair joins Dr. 

Broun in that request. 

Ms. Dahlkemper for five minutes. 

MISSION CRITICAL FAILURE

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all 

those here testifying today. I want to go to one of the most basic 

problems and I guess one of the most alarming was the mission 

critical failure when two dozen cargo trucks were permitted to go 

through the ASP in order to be screened and actually were not operating at that time. And supposedly this has been rectified by the 

contractor with an indicator light. Is that correct? 

Dr. HAGAN. No. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Nothing has been rectified? 

Dr. HAGAN. It has been rectified but not with an indicator light. 

There is a message that gets shown to the operator on screen that 

says that the system is in mission critical failure and should not 

be operated. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. So prior to this there was no way to detect if 

there was——

Dr. HAGAN. There was a message but it was confusing and not 

clear, and so that is what led to the incident. By the way, I should 

comment that this only happened one time in one system in all the 

testing in validation runs that have been going on for approximately for a year. So we don’t think it is going to happen again, 

but we modified the software to properly notify the operator. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. I can buy a $15 smoke detector for my house 

and it will tell me when it is beginning to not work, and when it 

doesn’t work, it will beep so I have to get up in the middle of the 

night and take the battery out. But anyway, I just wanted to make 

sure that that problem is rectified at this point. 

216

Dr. HAGAN. It has been rectified, it has been regression tested, 

and we are confident that the message will be properly displayed. 

We are struggling a bit with this one error or issue that has come 

up because it has only happened once. So we don’t think it will 

happen again. But that is the point of field validation, is to shake 

out some of the issues and problems before you move on to the actual operational test. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. How may of these are in operation in this field 

testing? How many? 

Dr. HAGAN. Six. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Six? And how many of the PVTs do we have 

currently? 

Mr. OWEN. Just under 1,400 deployed nationwide at the land 

borders and seaports and some mail facilities. 

ENERGY WINDOWING TO IMPROVE PVT PERFORMANCE

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Okay. One of the things I wanted to ask, Mr. 

Owen, is on the GAO’s previous work on the ASPs, they found that 

the ASPs provide a marginal improvement of the PVTs to attack 

the certain types of radioactive sources under a handful of very 

specific scenarios. But the GAO has also recommended that DNDO 

invest in ways to increase performance of the existing radiation 

monitors known as PVTs by a software improvement process called 

energy windowing. Do you believe that more efforts should be made 

to investigate the benefits of the energy windowing? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, our position remains that we need to fully maximize what the detection capabilities of the existing technology of 

the PVTs is. So we believe there are gains that have already been 

made with energy windowing, and we would rely on our scientific 

partners to tell us if we have reached the edge of that envelope as 

to how much they can do, either with the existing algorithms or 

with advanced algorithms that may be there. So as the operator 

and end-user of the equipment, yes, we would like to etch out as 

much detection capabilities as we can from the PVTs, recognizing 

that even with energy windowing, there will still not be an identification device, just a detection device. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Mr. Aloise, how much has been spent on energy windowing work by DNDO or DHS in the last few years compared to how much has been spent on developing ASPs? 

Mr. ALOISE. I don’t have that information, but I do know that we 

have been told that further research has sort of been slow-balled, 

and we would have liked to have seen them a lot further by now 

in where the energy windowing is with the PVTs. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Could I get that information? Could that information be found, Mr. Owen, in terms of how much work has been 

done? 

Dr. HAGAN. Yeah, I can give you the numbers right now. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Okay. 

Dr. HAGAN. For energy windowing, we have funded a total of 

about $1.9 million again to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. And how does that compare to how much has 

been spent on ASPs? 

217

Dr. HAGAN. It is a lot less. I don’t know the exact ratios or anything. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. What is the total? You don’t know what the 

total has been spent? 

Dr. HAGAN. Well, I think the number that was quoted I wouldn’t 

argue with. I think it was $230 million over the last——

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. It is $1.9 million over the last how many 

years? 

Dr. HAGAN. Which——

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Last few years. When did we start? I am new 

to Congress so when did we start working on ASPs. 

Dr. HAGAN. Oh, ASPs? 2004 or 2005. I actually don’t know. I 

wasn’t here then. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. So we have spent $230 million in that time period on that? 

Dr. HAGAN. Right. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. And the energy windowing, you started working on that? 

Dr. HAGAN. That was in fiscal year 2009. I think the actual work 

started in July of ’09 at PNNL. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. So since just this past July we spent $1.9 million? 

Dr. HAGAN. Oh, we haven’t spent it. We have obligated it. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Obligated it? 

Dr. HAGAN. I don’t think it has been actually expended yet, but 

the work is ongoing. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Okay. And that just started this year, in July? 

Dr. HAGAN. Yes, in July, right. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. My time is expired. I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you, Ms. Dahlkemper. Mr. Bilbray for 

five minutes. 

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being 

late, and so if my questions have already been answered, you can 

remind me my tardiness was inappropriate. 

THE CBP INSPECTION SYSTEM

Mr. Owen, the issue of inspection, do we have a formal, multitier inspection system and when we talk about the inspection is 

there any pre-entrance inspection before they get to the port facilities? 

Mr. OWEN. We do not pre-inspect cargo. What we do have is part 

of our layered cargo security strategy. We receive advanced information on all cargo and all modes before it arrives in the United 

States, different timelines, whether it is coming by air, by truck, 

by rail or maritime. With that advanced information, we make an 

initial assessment if the cargo poses a risk. In our maritime environment through our container security initiative, we have officers 

deployed in 32 countries at 58 seaports that can then conduct an 

inspection on the highest risk maritime cargo before it is put on a 

vessel coming to the United States. We do not have a similar program in air or in land. So even though we have that advanced information before the truck or the train or the airplane arrives in 

the United States, we can identify the highest risk, but then it 

218

would be looked at at the port of arrival. So we do not have preinspection overseas for cargo. 

Mr. BILBRAY. Okay. So we do have it for the maritime. Do we 

have any structure at all that if there was the ability to basically 

modify the arrival system, in other words hold them offshore until 

we could board the craft and be able to inspect it? 

Mr. OWEN. Yes, sir. Absolutely. We work very closely with the 

Coast Guard. If there are any threats on a vessel, we will keep the 

vessel out at sea to address those threats or concerns with the crew 

or whatever the case may be. Likewise with the air cargo, we receive the information four hours before the plane lands, so in most 

cases if we have a concern that aircraft can be diverted to have address that threat, yes, sir. 

Mr. BILBRAY. And I am glad to hear that because, let us face it, 

the port facilities tend to be much more centrally located in high 

population areas than either the port of entries for vehicles or with 

the aircraft, so thats preemptive. 

THE HELIUM-3 SHORTAGE AND POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE

MATERIALS

The issue of helium-3, as we are fighting to try to make what we 

have stretch, any discussion of the crisis and what we would need 

to do to crank up the breeder so we can produce more and make 

it available for you? 

Dr. HAGAN. There has been a lot of discussion. This issue has 

really risen quickly to the top of a lot of people’s lists, including the 

White House. They have formed an Interagency Policy Committee 

to address this that involves not only DHS but of course the White 

House folks, DOE, DOD and so forth. The problem is rather severe. 

The demand will probably outstrip the supply by a factor of ten. 

There is just not very much. And there are other uses for this material, for helium-3 that involve medical uses and so forth that 

frankly will probably end up having higher priority, although I 

can’t say that for sure. 

Mr. BILBRAY. So the fact that this is a strategic supply problem 

that we need to address as a nation? 

Dr. HAGAN. Yes. I believe that is the case. Now, there are—so for 

some applications, like low-temperature physics research, helium3 is pretty much the only—you are almost researching the material 

itself, so it can’t be replaced. 

For our applications in neutron detection, there are other potential alternatives which we are, DNDO, is taking the lead for the 

interagency group to explore. We have been funding research in 

this area for several years already. So we are looking at alternative 

means of detecting neutrons. But because we don’t know what 

those means are today, there are several, as I say, potential alternatives. But it can still take a year or two probably to sort of test 

those, evaluate them and make sure that the designs work. So it 

is a real problem for us. That is why it has thrown a real glitch 

into our planning process. 

Mr. BILBRAY. Are there any other jurisdictions or agencies 

around the world that are specifically looking at developing this capability? 

Dr. HAGAN. To make helium-3? 

219

Mr. BILBRAY. Yeah. 

Dr. HAGAN. Well, there are places——

Mr. BILBRAY. We don’t have any others domestically. Is there 

anybody domestically looking at it? 

Dr. HAGAN. There is some thought to perhaps going into natural 

gas wells and separating some of the helium from that and then 

distilling that, pulling out the helium-3 from that. There is a possibility of a source in—well, several sources in other countries. I 

probably shouldn’t say much more than that. 

Mr. BILBRAY. Okay, Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired 

but in all fairness, there are a whole lot of issues that the Federal 

Government gets involved with that states, counties, cities, international bodies could work on or whatever. Here is one where this 

really is in our lap. I just can’t perceive a state or a county or a 

coalition of states being able to address this issue, and here is one 

that I would sure like to see the Federal Government make some 

priority decisions and say this is one that only the Federal Government can do so the Federal Government has to be more aggressive 

on this. And I will remind all of us as we talk about other issues 

that could be handled by other agencies that we keep forgetting 

about the ones that only we can handle. And maybe we need to 

focus on these items that other people can’t handle. So I appreciate 

your testimony and yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. Mr. Rothman was here and I 

think will be back shortly. I will recognize him out of turn if he 

returns for a first round rather than for a second round. 

IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD ASPS BE DEPLOYED? 

The Chair of the Appropriations Subcommittee for Homeland Security is my colleague from North Carolina, David Price. His district adjoins mine. In fact, they kind of wrap around each other like 

a couple playing Twister. If he should ask me in what circumstances the new technology of the ASP should be deployed, 

what should I tell him? What are the markers for when it is reliable enough to replace the PVTs? Should it never replace the 

PVTs? Should it always be used unless there is some breakthrough 

that we haven’t seen yet, some improvement in the technology? 

Should it always be used for secondary screening after a PVT has 

identified something to be concerned about? Or is this worth it at 

all? If the PVTs seem to be working, there is some disruption of 

having a truck pull over to the side and going over it by hand or 

cargo. But is this worth it? Mr. Aloise. 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, our position has consistently been that nothing 

should be acquired in large scale until all the testing is complete, 

all the results are in, we know whether the system works or not, 

a cost benefit analysis has been done, and we can see whether it 

is worth it given all the other demands we have in our architecture, all the gaps in that architecture. After that cost benefit analysis is done, we will have a better answer to know whether it is 

worth to pursue with the ASPs versus the PVTs. Then the question 

is where? Does it make sense more in secondary? Does it make 

sense in other places? 

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So our position, again, we need to get the testing done, all of it 

done, we need to do the cost benefit analysis. And until then we 

really don’t have enough information to make this decision on. 

Chairman MILLER. Well, the original idea was to replace PVTs 

with the ASPs. Given what we know, even assuming that the testing improves, we figure out what all the problems are so that it 

doesn’t sort of go off without—it doesn’t become non-functional 

without us noticing it until after a lot of trucks have gone through 

or it doesn’t produce an amount of false positives that is going to 

shut down major ports for a significant period of time. After we 

have worked out those kinks, does it still make sense at all for it 

to be a primary detection device instead of the PVTs? 

Mr. ALOISE. We have our doubts. 

Chairman MILLER. Mr. Owen. 

Mr. OWEN. Well, again, from our perspective, assuming it meets 

all of the technical and scientific endeavors and the machines work, 

then we have a serious concern about the operation and maintenance costs, the tail that will come with each one of these devices. 

As you mentioned in your opening statement, we are looking at 

perhaps as much as five times or more what it costs to currently 

operate it. So we also are waiting anxiously to see the cost benefit 

analysis as well as the life cycle costs to see if we can even as an 

agency afford these devices should they continue to develop and 

mature and be proven scientifically to work. 

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Hagan. 

Dr. HAGAN. I agree with the GAO on this. Until we get the cost 

benefit analysis and a lot of other data, by the way, that goes into 

what we call an Acquisition Review Board, it is really not prudent 

to try to presuppose the result of that. We absolutely adhere to the 

notion that doing the testing and doing the validation, doing the 

cost benefit analysis, life cycle cost estimates, all that has to be 

done and fed into this process. We have a very rigorous process 

within the department to do that. I wouldn’t want to speculate 

about whether it is going to make sense in primary or secondary, 

either or both. But we at DNDO at least are indifferent to that. 

The point is it has to be driven by, you know, real data and analysis. 

Chairman MILLER. Three years ago, Vayl Oxford, who was then 

Director of DNDO, said the priority for the first year is to get units 

out immediately. That seems like not the best idea right now. Does 

anyone disagree with that? Does anyone agree still with what Vayl 

Oxford said then, three years ago? Not a priority to get this in 

place immediately? Okay. 

When do we expect we will get the cost benefit analysis? 

EXPECTATIONS OF A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS ON ASPS

Dr. HAGAN. The cost benefit analysis is—we are actually struggling with this right now because of the helium-3 shortage and the 

impact of that. The cost benefit analysis of course depends on what 

the cost of the system is. We will have to most likely replace to helium-3 neutron detectors with some alternative. At this point, we 

don’t know what that alternative is. As I said before, we have several potential candidates for that. But until we know what that is, 

it is going to be difficult to generate a cost benefit analysis because 

221

we won’t know what the cost of the systems is. It may be possible 

to work around that, but frankly we don’t know that yet. We are 

still looking at all the various options. We can try to get to a CBA, 

cost benefit analysis, but without that information and of course 

without the results from the operational test, we can’t do that. 

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Persons, actually, most of my questions I 

have directed initially to Mr. Aloise and he used the first person 

plural, and then you nodded. So I didn’t direct an additional question at you, but you have worked with many new technologies. Are 

there best practices? Are there lessons to be learned for how to develop new practices, how to develop and deploy new technologies 

and have those lessons, have those best practices been applied with 

respect to this technology? 

Dr. PERSONS. Yes, sir. I worked with—coming out of an environment where, if you are familiar with the Defense Advance Research 

Projects Agency, it is the idea about rapid technology development, 

in the absence of requirements that is normally for a very high-risk 

type, high-reward research and development paradigm. And this 

particular case, as you mentioned earlier, there is sort of some relatively mature technologies, it was just relatively immature, the 

concept of operations it was going to be asked to be placed under, 

in other words, a port operation with high volume and so on. 

And so I think some of the lessons learned from this is what you 

put your finger on just a moment ago, was what I would call the 

mistake of scheduling invention, in other words, setting artificial 

deadlines. We want to get these out and then we will worry about 

sort of the technology development later on. GAO best practices for 

many years on this topic have shown that that is a mistake to do 

that. You want to risk mitigate the way you develop your programs 

by investing and particularly empowering your science and technology folks to do that and do that outside a procurement operation. Even though there needs to be close ties there, it still needs 

to be this idea that the science and tech folks can do the technology 

and development, and the procurement folks can worry about how 

to do the procurement 

And so keeping that sort of balance of power, doing that, the requirements definitions is hugely important. I think in this case, the 

customer ultimately was CBP and what were they going to be comfortable with in an operational paradigm? Was the con-op really 

going to be an ASP and primary alone in solo mode, or is there 

going to be a reduction in their manpower requirements and so on. 

or was it an SNM detection paradigm alone? Those are some issues 

that drive requirements through CBP out to the end of the program. 

And then thirdly, of course, the independent testing and evaluation, we have had a lot of discussion on that. Again, the key thing 

is there is the independence of that and how that is done. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. 

Dr. PERSONS. And so we have been pleased to see DNDO talking 

about interacting with DHS’s OT&E office and so on——

Chairman MILLER. Okay. 

Dr. PERSONS.—at this phase. 

Chairman MILLER. One of the lessons learned is that, at some 

point, you look for an off-ramp that if a technology seemed like a 

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good idea but just didn’t work, that you determine is not a matter 

of just working out kinks, but this was not as good idea as it 

seemed. Are there measures for when you should look for an offramp? 

Dr. PERSONS. Right. Well, GAO best practices recommend the 

use of readiness levels, technology readiness levels and so on. I 

think one of the things here that I think could perhaps be used is 

the idea of software readiness levels and so on because software an 

algorithms are such a critical part. I think that has manifested 

itself in the recent conclusion of the field validation tests and so 

on. 

So you have these metrics for doing that, and I think organizationally as I believe DHS likely has is some idea about what is an 

acceptable risk of this technology or this system for deployment. 

And there are ways to measure that and just give your managers 

informed decisions so that they can determine the risk of something, whether or not it needs to move forward and—mode. 

Chairman MILLER. Well that is not quite a Dana Rohrabacher 

five minutes, but I am over the traditional five minutes. And with 

that I recognize Dr. Broun for five minutes or more. 

METRICS AND TIMELINES FOR MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT

ASPS

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Chairman, and I am going to dovetail 

back into what the Chairman was asking. I would like to know the 

metrics. It seems to me that we keep fooling around here and have 

excuses of not implementing a technology, and not only a valid 

technology that is not only useful but may be preferable over our 

current technology, but there are other things that CBP is already 

doing. And going back to the Chairman, you are talking about an 

off-ramp, it seems to me we are getting to the point of fishing or 

cutting bait or one of the two. I mean, we have got to do something. 

If you all would give us some metrics about when we can expect 

the decision-making process, if you can help us to understand at 

what point do we need to pull the plug on the ASP program or implement something else or what have you with all of you, and I 

would like to—because I don’t have a good feeling about this, 

frankly. I don’t know about other Members but I would appreciate 

it if you all would give us some metrics or if you have them, please 

tell me right now. Mr. Aloise? 

Mr. ALOISE. Well, you know, DHS came up with their ‘‘significant 

increase in operational effectiveness’’ as their metric for going forward with this new equipment, and we from the beginning thought 

it was a pretty low bar. I mean, I will go back to what I said. You 

know, even if this ASP works, it is a marginal increase. Now, with 

the adjustments and thresholds, that margin has gotten more narrow. So what GAO’s role is here to evaluate what DHS is doing and 

provide this information to the Congress, of course, and we have 

made recommendations all along to make improvements in the 

testing, in the reporting, but the bottom line, I have to go back to 

what I have said, once the testing is done, we need to do that cost 

benefit analysis and decide whether or not it is worth to go ahead 

with this. 

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Now, it has taken longer. You know, you mentioned in 2007 they 

were ready to deploy, but the Congress who has oversight and getting GAO involved has got us to where we are today. Now, where 

do we go from here? I assume a third round of field validation testing. The first round, they made adjustments. The second round, we 

may be seeing the results of those adjustments, and we don’t know 

what is going to happen in the third round. The question is, is this 

equipment worth it? And that is a decision that DHS has to make. 

And I mean, we have got a lot of information right now, and somebody can make a decision or they can put this back into what we 

belong—where it should have been for a long while, and that is 

R&D, in development, and see where—what is the most you can 

get out of this promising piece of equipment. But when you know, 

we started down the path or just started down the path of acquisition, deployment and spiral development, they have called it, and 

it has got us to where we are today, where the equipment has a 

lot of problems, it doesn’t work very well right now. And to take 

a risk and replace the equipment we have got now on the borders 

that we know works with equipment we don’t know works, you are 

always going to have GAO saying, whoa, step back. We need to 

look at this again. 

So I don’t know. It is kind of a long-winded answer to your question, but we need more information before we could come to a conclusion, and that has to be the cost benefit analysis. 

Mr. BROUN. Another question with cost benefit analysis, how can 

you do one without first knowing whether the ASP was used as a 

primary screening tool or as a secondary screening tool? I think 

that needs to be determined, too, just doing that cost benefit analysis because otherwise you are just shooting in the dark. 

Frankly, I see the private sector developing screening methods 

without the taxpayer being on the hook for them, and we have this, 

we have spent a bunch of money and a lot of it is sitting in a warehouse and not being deployed and we are testing. Mr. Chairman, 

I think it might be time to have that offer out from everything that 

I can see, but I don’t know. 

And I would just like to ask Mr. Owen, would you possibly agree 

with me that it is time to maybe look at other technologies? 

Mr. OWEN. Well, again, as you mentioned, the PVTs do meet our 

needs right now. They are effective. We can handle the level of 

alarms that we have got there. Hopefully, with any advances 

through the energy windowing, they give us a little bit greater 

technology detection capabilities than we have right now. Whether 

we can say we should pull the plug or not, I think again from the 

CBP standpoint, the jury is still out. We need that cost benefit 

analysis. We need to see how much better these in fact perform 

over the technology that we have before we could even make a decision as to should they just be in secondary or should they be primary and secondary. 

But I would like to just close by saying again, through all of our 

testing, we have kept the PVTs up and running. So we have always 

had that safety net, that effective equipment that we know has 

worked so that those 27 trucks did not get through when the machine went down. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

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Chairman MILLER. Thank you. 

Dr. HAGAN. Could I respond to any of this? 

Chairman MILLER. Yes. Dr. Hagan. 

Dr. HAGAN. Thank you. First of all, I wanted to comment that 

the cost benefit analysis addresses both primary and secondary 

screening, so we are not pre-determining that outcome. Second, the 

ASP, what we have been talking about here primarily is about ASP 

and PVT in primary, and you know, the debate will rage on. As I 

said before, I agree that the CBA is the way to determine that, you 

know, whether that is effective or not and worth the money. 

The ASP operating in secondary is another matter. The limitations of the current system—CBP officers are using the current 

equipment as well as they possibly can. There is no question about 

that. But there are limitations to those systems in both primary 

and secondary, and let me just focus on secondary. In secondary, 

there are limitations which improvements to PVT cannot address. 

Only ASP can do that. I can’t talk about the limitations or the 

changes or improvements of ASP compared to hand-helds in an 

open session. But the differences are dramatic. And so I think this 

talk of an off-ramp would be very premature and perhaps a closed 

session would be the way to deal with that. But I would urge you 

to consider the fact that ASP has considerable application and benefit in secondary. 

Chairman MILLER. It is not really my turn, but I do hold the 

gavel. Mr. Aloise, Dr. Persons, do you all have security clearances? 

Do you have that top secret security, the top? Are you familiar with 

all of the analyses of the comparative benefits of PVT and ASP and 

primary and secondary versus hand-held? Are you familiar with all 

of that as part of the work you have done? 

Mr. ALOISE. We are familiar with everything we have been 

shown, yes. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Have you asked for everything? 

Mr. ALOISE. Yes, we have. 

Chairman MILLER. If there is something you haven’t been shown, 

you have asked for it and not been shown it? 

Mr. ALOISE. Right, and we don’t know that that is the case 

but——

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Right. And you do understand that 

GAO is part of Congress and when they ask, we are asking and we 

need for you to give them anything they have asked for. 

Mr. ALOISE. Absolutely. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Assuming that you have seen everything, is there anything—if you know all the tippy-top secret stuff, 

is it really different? Is analysis a lot different in the way that Dr. 

Hagan suggests? 

Mr. ALOISE. I would say this. I think you pretty much know the 

story as I have testified and GAO has reported on. 

Now, in regards to secondary, just in discussions among ourselves, the ASP is bigger in radiation detection size matters. So it 

is a bigger instrument than the hand-held. So just for that—you 

have longer dwell times in secondary. So there might be uses. 

There might be a possibility where it make sense to put it into secondary, but we still don’t have all that information. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. What is a dwell time? I am sorry. 

225

Mr. ALOISE. You know, the container can sit a little bit longer 

in a secondary inspection, so you have a better account. 

Chairman MILLER. I see. You are not trying to move things 

through. 

Mr. ALOISE. You are not driving through. 

Chairman MILLER. All right. I now recognize Ms. Dahlkemper. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Staying on this line of questioning, if it was 

used in the secondary manner, how many units would we need? 

Mr. OWEN. Yeah, I don’t have the date available as to how many 

secondary locations we have in all of the ports of entry, but it is 

far fewer than what we have in primary obviously. But even with 

that, the volume through secondary is relatively low. I mean, we 

have about a one percent alarm rate on the land border and about 

2.5, 2.6 percent in seaports. So we would have to again look at the 

life cycle costs, the cost benefits as to how much better does it offset what it is costing us to buy this equipment versus the time savings or the fewer officers to address the secondaries. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Would anyone else like to address that? I don’t 

know if anyone else can give you a better—more answer on that? 

Dr. HAGAN. I can give you sort of a range. Like Mr. Owen, I don’t 

have the numbers in front of me, but I believe the number of secondary sites is on the order of 400 to 500. Not clear that one would 

put an ASP at every one of those by any means. But as Mr. Owen 

says, it is far fewer than the number of primary screening locations. So the——

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. I am certain there would be certain points 

that would be much more crucial. Maybe some of the borders—I 

mean, I live near the Canadian border. Some of those ports of entry 

are much more crucial than others. 

Dr. HAGAN. Right. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. I did want to ask, though, I did want to kind 

of go back to this helium-3 issue because I think this is a crucial 

issue even beyond this hearing today. Who is in charge of the interagency task force on this? 

Dr. HAGAN. It is the White House. I can’t remember the name 

of the organization. I can give you the name of the person. That 

is about all I could do. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Who is that? 

Dr. HAGAN. Her name is Julie Bentz, B-e-n-t-z. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Okay. My understanding is the ASP need 

three times the helium-3 as the PVTs? 

Dr. HAGAN. The way it was designed was to have even more sensitivity for neutrons than the PVT systems did. So we put helium3 tubes in the ASP design. But if we wanted to maintain the same 

level of sensitivity as the PVT for neutrons, it would require the 

same amount of helium-3. There is nothing that links the neutron 

detection technology to whether it is an ASP or a PVT. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. As it is currently designed? 

Dr. HAGAN. It was designed to have more sensitivity to neutrons 

than the PVT system because more sensitivity is better. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. So how much more helium-3 is being utilized 

in an ASP than a PVT? 

Dr. HAGAN. About three times more. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. About three times? 

226

Dr. HAGAN. What I am saying though is if we want to go back 

to the same level of sensitivity as we currently have with the PVT, 

then the amount of helium-3 that would be required for an ASP 

unit would be the same as for a PVT unit. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Well, then why would we have to change the 

unit if the sensitivity wasn’t increased? 

Dr. HAGAN. Because this is for neutron detection only. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Okay. 

Dr. HAGAN. There is another part of the system that detects 

gamma rays, and that is the part that is different. So maybe I 

should say that the difference between an ASP and a PVT is the 

gamma ray detection part. In one case, with the PVT, it is a big 

block of plastic, and in the case of an ASP it is chunks of sodium 

iodide. But in both cases, the neutron detection part is done with 

tubes of helium-3 gas. And that part is essentially the same with 

both systems. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. So you could redesign it so it would use the 

same amount of helium-3 and not really jeopardize the security? 

Dr. HAGAN. Right. You wouldn’t even have to redesign it. You 

could just take the tubes out, cut the number of tubes down by 

pulling them out. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Okay. 

Dr. HAGAN. It would be simple to do that. 

Ms. DAHLKEMPER. Okay. That answers my question. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. I thought there was a Steve Rothman sighting, but that was perhaps a false positive. I think we now 

had sufficient questions for now at least. We may have an additional hearing. On this, you know, we do have—all Members have 

top-secret clearance. We have in this building and in the Cannon 

Building we have—leaded walls and Members go in and have to 

drop off their Blackberries and their cell phones before they go in, 

and they bring down a cone of silence and we hear all the top-secret stuff. And if we need to do that, we will, but if we go through 

that exercise and don’t hear anything, it is going to be pretty irritating. So let us not do that right away, but before we close the 

hearing out, Dr. Hagan, can you tell us exactly where you think we 

will be on April 1? Will we have completed successful field tests, 

will there be a cost benefit analysis, where will we be on April 1? 

Three years ago the then-head of your unit said let us get this stuff 

deployed right now. Where will we be in April? 

Dr. HAGAN. Because of the helium-3 issue, I cannot give you an 

answer about the cost benefit analysis. We know how important it 

is, and we may be able to do something, but without knowing how 

much the helium-3, or the neutron detection part of the system will 

cost, it makes that difficult. But we are looking at ways to try to 

get around that. Going back to field validation—well, maybe I 

should let Mr. Owen respond about the schedule. But by April, we 

will be, I suspect, in some phase of field validation or operational 

test. 

Mr. OWEN. In terms of the field validation, we have those two 

critical areas that we have been discussing. We feel those have 

been addressed by DNDO. There are a few other minor issues that 

we are working through. Our objective is to restart field validation 

227

in the first quarter of calendar year 2010. So within the next 

month, we should restart field validation for a third round and go 

forward from there. 

Chairman MILLER. Okay. Before we bring this hearing to a close, 

I want to thank our witnesses for testifying, and I guess it is a little early to say I look forward to seeing you the next time. Under 

the rules of the Committee, the record will remain open for two 

weeks for additional statements from the Members and for any answers to any follow-up questions the Committee may have for the 

witnesses. The witnesses are excused and the hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:27 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(229)

Appendix: 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

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Responses by William K. Hagan, Acting Deputy Director, Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security; 

and Todd C. Owen, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 

Department of Homeland Security

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

Questions for Dr. Hagan, and Mr. Owen:

Q1. Do you believe computer modeling through replay tools, injection studies, or regression tools are enough for certification, or do you believe real-world field testing is required?

A1. Certification requires that the ASP system be both effective and suitable for the 

operation it is designed to perform and that it meets the significant increase in 

operational effectiveness (SIOE) criteria. Each of the elements listed in the question 

play a part.

Real-world testing is vital. During the ASP program the systems 

have undergone or will undergo real-world and near-real world 

testing during controlled performance tests at the Nevada Test Site 

(NTS, real-world targets of interest), Integration testing (real-world 

interface and interoperability testing), and both Field Validation 

activities and Operational Testing (real-world stream of commerce 

and Customs Officer involvement), as well as any initial deployments. Real-world events allow the system to be exposed to a variety of traffic, cargo and radiological conditions that cannot be duplicated in any other way. Because real-world data is so important, 

it is vital that the data relating to traffic, cargo and radiological 

conditions be collected so that the impact of certain system changes 

can be evaluated without having to re-experience all real-world environments. For ASP systems all of this data is collected in what 

is known as ICD–1 files. 

Replay tools provide the developer with an opportunity to re-create the real-world sensor data from previous data collection events 

(ICD–1 files), and to explore how changes in systems parameters 

would have impacted the results from those events. Replay tools 

are not computer modeling. These types of tools are used extensively for many types of systems, especially when data collection/

real-world testing is expensive, dangerous, or time consuming. In 

this case, Replay tools can determine the performance of the detector system for a previous data collection event under various system parameter changes, such as threshold settings. In another example, Replay tools are used to determine if the system can continue to perform if one or more of its elements are faulty. Since 

ICD–1 data files are organized by detector type, the replay tools 

can be used on modified ICD–1 files that have had this data removed. These sorts of regression analysis are extremely useful and 

can be used to provide information toward a certification decision. 

Injection studies are a way of extending the types and amounts of 

threat sources into stream of commerce data (i.e., ICD–1 files) so 

that system response to a broad spectrum of sources can be estimated. Injection studies are a type of computer modeling, and 

should therefore be checked against real, controlled experiments to 

validate that the injection tools closely match the output of real 

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systems given the same input. Injection tools are useful to point toward potential improvements in systems performance, and should 

be used during continuous improvement planning—For certification, the best approach to confidently understanding system performance for threat sources is to perform measurements that span 

the threat space as much as practicably possible.

Q2. Has other ASP equipment been developed outside of this process by the private 

sector?

A2. DNDO is aware of other vendors, outside the ASP program, that have continued to develop spectroscopic portals.

Q3. How much money has DNDO spent on ASP R and D to date?

A3. $181M.

Q4. What is the proper role for DNDO in this process? 

Should DNDO be simply testing moderate changes to Commercial Off The Shelf Technology, or should it be focusing on next generation technology?

A4. The Congressional and Executive guidance establishing DNDO, specifically the 

SAFE Port Act of 2006, the National Security Presidential Directive 43, and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14, charge DNDO with maturing ‘‘transformational technologies’’ as well as to ‘‘develop . . . and enhance national nuclear 

and radiological capabilities.’’

Q5. Who should be testing COTS, CBP or DNDO?

A5. Three entities within DHS cooperate in the testing of COTS (and GOTS) systems: DNDO, the end-user (in the case of ASP this would be CBP), and S&T. CBP 

must ensure that the testing of systems incorporates realistic operational scenario, 

DNDO must ensure that the testing properly addresses the detection and identification requirements of the system within the GNDA and also must ensure that any 

developmental testing has been completed prior to Operational Testing. S&T is the 

DHS Operational Testing Authority and as such must assess the suitability and effectiveness of the final system configuration in real operational environments.

Q6. In addressing previous problems indentified in Field Validation Testing, has the 

agency changed the underlying algorithms that were tested at the Nevada Test 

Site (NTS)?

A6. No.

Q7. Will simply changing isotope thresholds be enough to fix these problems, or will 

algorithms need to be changed?

A7. As demonstrated by replay and regression testing, we are convinced that 

threshold adjustments, while reducing sensitivity, will reduce the false alarm rate 

while maintaining adherence to the ASP specification.

Q8. If algorithms are changed, will the equipment have to go back to the NTS?

A8. If the Department determines that changes, if they are to occur, warrant a return, to NTS, then such testing will be conducted.

Q9. If so, how much will this cost and how long will it take? 

Is the Department only changing threshold levels (and not 

changing algorithms) simply because it does not want to go back 

to NTS?

A9. The cost and schedule of such tests, if needed, would be dictated by the type 

of testing required. ASP thresholds were changed because the algorithm is performing well, and because no reasons to make changes to the algorithm have been 

identified. The thresholds were changed because real-world field validation showed 

that they were not previously set in the best configuration. The Department has not 

intentionally avoided making any necessary changes to the algorithm to avoid returning to NTS.

Q10. At our previous hearing, we discussed the possibility of deploying the Low Rate 

Production (LRP) ASPs that are currently in storage in tandem with PVTs in 

order to get more data. 

232

Does the Department currently have the authority to do this?

A10. The FY 2010 Appropriations Bill, and accompanying Conference Report, addresses low rate initial production ASP systems. Specifically, H.Rept. 111–298 states 

that, ‘‘the conferees encourage DNDO to undertake deployment of low rate initial 

production ASP systems, as appropriate, and use data from such deployments to inform future portal monitor decisions.’’

Q11. Has the Department made any progress on this front?

A11. The Department is working through the logistics of completing operational 

testing to get to Secretarial certification before making an LRIP deployment decision.

Q12. How much would this cost and how long would it take?

A12. There are eight (8) LRIP systems available for deployment. Approximately $3 

million would be needed for installing and maintaining the systems for 1 year. Installation of the 8 systems would take place over a six (6) month window. Data collection and data analysis would take approximately 6–12 months and would cost 

$100K–$200K per system. Total for all activities would be less than $5 million.

Q13. CBP issued a RFI for ASPs several years ago only to have it rescinded by 

UNDO after the office was formed.

In retrospect, do you believe the Request For Information (RFI) 

should have gone forward, with an eventual Request for Proposal 

(RFP) after that?

A13. Given the urgency to address perceived limitations in fielded systems at the 

time, DHS still believes that those decisions were appropriate. It is difficult to gauge 

what may have come from an RFI/RFP process from 2003. CBP believes that the 

success of any research and development program, leading to possible deployments 

of next generation equipment, must begin with requirements defined by the end 

user/operator, and robust field evaluations/development.

Q14. Do you believe the requirements developed by DNDO will create a system that 

can stand up to a cost-benefit analysis?

A14. An initial cost-benefit analysis, based on performance assumptions and systems requirements developed by DHS, warranted a decision to proceed with the program. Performance testing has shown potential benefits for ASP systems over current systems, particularly in secondary screening. However, the Department will not 

make any predictions as to the results of a final cost-benefit analysis, based on performance data, until such all testing and analysis is complete

Q15. Should the cost-benefit analysis consider upgrades in current Radioisotope 

Identification Device (RIID) technology and Polyvinyl Toluene (PVT) ‘‘energy 

windowing’’ as options?

A15. No. The CBA will assess the cost and benefits of the ASP vs. the current system (which currently utilizes energy windowing). Should the ‘‘current system’’ 

change before the CBA is complete, the CBA would be adjusted accordingly.

Q16. How is the Department responding to the recommendations of GAO and the 

National Academy of Sciences?

A16. DNDO has appropriately incorporated or responded to the recommendations 

of both organizations as follows.

a. Responding to the GAO

Recommendation regarding significant improvement to 

operational effectiveness (SIOE): The GAO Recommended 

DNDO assess whether ASPs meet SIOE criteria based on valid 

comparison with PVT’s full performance potential, including use of 

energy windowing to increase sensitivity to threats. DNDO has 

structured ASP testing to validate that ASP meets SIOE criteria. 

The SIOE criteria require that the comparison be made against the 

‘‘current system.’’ DNDO will and should follow this path. We 

stress that the current PVT based system contains energy 

windowing algorithms that were updated in 2007. DNDO has also 

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funded additional research at both Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory 

to further investigate the potential to improve performance of PVT 

systems based upon algorithm enhancements, including new approaches to energy windowing. On a side note, energy windowing 

techniques may also be applied to spectroscopic systems like the 

ASP, which may enhance performance there as well. 

Recommendation to revise ASP testing and Certification 

schedules: The GAO recommended altering schedules to allow sufficient time for review and analysis of results from final testing including injection studies. The ASP program schedule incorporates 

time following completion of Field Validation and Operational Testing of 

ASP, before presenting ASP to the DHS Acquisition Review 

Board for approval and then to the DHS Secretary for certification. 

This time interval prior to a decision allows all stake holders to 

thoroughly review test results and for proper consideration of the 

ASP cost-benefit analysis.

b. Responding to the NAS

Recommended approach for testing and evaluation: The 

NAS recommended an ‘‘iterative approach with modeling and physical testing complimenting each other.’’ In this approach, ‘‘theory 

and models of threat objects, radiation transport, and detector response’’ should be used to ‘‘simulate performance and predict outcome,’’ using ‘‘physical experiments to validate the predictions and 

allow critique of the models.’’ We believe that the ASP program, 

through development activities carried out by vendors, to test programs executed by the government, to replay tools and injection 

tools used for analysis, has followed the spirit of this recommendation. The performance of the ASP systems in controlled performance tests has mirrored predictions extremely well. The issue that 

remains for ASP is one of threshold settings against real-world 

cargo which must be determined through empirical evidence. 

Recommended Approach of the Procurement Process: The 

NAS recommended that DNDO employ an ‘‘iterative’’ approach for 

the procurement process. Rather than a ‘‘onetime certification decision in the near future,’’ the NAS recommended a continuous process of improvement and adaptation of the system, beginning with 

the deployment of LRIP systems. We agree with the NAS in principle and are evaluating this approach. This approach is consistent 

with the ASP Acquisition Plan and will be reflected in actual deployments when they begin. 

Recommended Approach for Cost-Benefit Analysis: The 

NAS Committee recommended that DHS not proceed with further 

procurement until ‘‘ASP is shown to be a favored option in the costbenefit analysis.’’ This recommendation is incorporated into the 

governance structure of the ASP program. Additionally the NAS 

made recommendations about the nature of the CBA itself, stating 

that it ‘‘needs to include three key elements: (1) a clear statement 

of the objectives of the screening program: (2) an assessment of 

meaningful alternatives to deploying ASPs; and (3) a comprehensive, credible and transparent analysis of in-scope benefits and 

costs.’’ We continue to agree with the NAS that a complete CBA is 

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necessary before any decisions are made and the elements suggested by NAS are factored into the CBA.

Q17. Setting aside the increased costs of ASPs over the current PVT/RIDD combination, how much more money will ASP Operations and Maintenance (0 and M) 

cost CBP?

A17. Current PVT RPM units cost approximately $12,000 per year to operate and 

maintain. While CBP has not seen the final ASP maintenance cost estimate, this 

figure is expected to range from $65–100k each year per unit.

Q18. Given dwindling budget estimates, how will these increased O&M costs affect 

overall security?

A18. If no increase in O&M funds accompanies the deployment of ASPs, CBP would 

have to secure funding from other programs or staff positions.

Q19. Will CBP even be able to operate ASPs in the current budget environment if 

they are certified?

A19. CBP anticipates that the appropriate O&M funding would be included should 

the ASPs be deployed.

Q20. If the ASP systems are certified and deployed, will the Department be able to 

find cost savings?

A20. The deployment of ASPs will result in an overall increase in life cycle costs.

Q21. Does the ASP system require less CBP personnel to operate?

A21. There is no appreciable savings in required personnel over the entire deployed 

architecture. In primary scanning operations, for example, land border crossings 

would not see a staff reduction. In secondary, the ASPs may require less physical 

labor and less time to operate; however, a CBP Officer will still be required to operate the ASPs. It should be noted that the ASP will not eliminate the need for RIIDs 

which will be used for more detailed inspections and alarm adjudication. 

Only very limited reductions likewise would be seen in seaport 

deployments.

Q22. Does the ASP system allow for greater flow of commerce, or would other factors 

at ports and border crossings still impede commerce?

A22. No appreciable gains to the flow of commerce would be realized over the entire 

deployed architecture. At land border crossings, impediments to the flow of commerce are due to non-radiation scanning processes (i.e.—passport control and antismuggling inspections). At seaports, the flow of commerce is mostly determined by 

individual terminal procedures.

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1Without tests at NTS we will not have True Positive or False Negative data with the new 

software.

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO); Todd C. Owen, Acting Deputy Assistant 

Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 

Department of Homeland Security; and William K. Hagan, Acting Deputy Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security

Questions submitted by Representative Paul C. Broun

Questions for Mr. Aloise, Dr. Hagan, and Mr. Owen:

Q1. Do you believe computer modeling through replay tools, injection studies, or regression tools is enough for certification, or do you believe real world field testing is required?

A1. The current campaign of ASP testing, which started in early 2008, involved several different types of testing each for its own purpose. The August 2008 testing at 

the Nevada Test Site (NTS) was designed to test sensitivity of the ASPs (and PVTs) 

against actual physical sources of special nuclear materials (e.g., uranium and plutonium). For the current campaign of testing, the NTS phase of testing was particularly important given that the ASPs were expected to have an improved capability 

of detecting special nuclear materials, and, for security reasons, NTS was the only 

place where DNDO could fully physically test the ASPs capability of detecting these 

very dangerous materials. 

To this point, the field validation tests have shown an unacceptable level of false 

alarms for the presence of certain nuclear materials. To resolve this, DNDO officials 

told us that they have made changes to the thresholds of the ASP, but not to the 

underlying algorithms (or software) that allows these machines to detect radiation. 

As we testified, this change makes the ASP less capable of detecting certain nuclear 

materials, raising questions about whether the ASPs represent a significant improvement in operational effectiveness over the PVTs in detecting certain nuclear 

materials. 

While DNDO officials told us that they were not making changes to the ASP algorithms, the report of the Field Validation Advisory Panel stated that ‘‘correcting algorithm issues will change ASP referral rate’’ suggesting that there will be future 

changes to the ASP algorithms. So, there is some confusion about exactly what 

changes will need to be made in order to successfully complete field validation testing. This represents a subtle, but important distinction—we regard ‘‘algorithm corrections’’ as algorithm changes and not simple threshold adjustment. 

In our view, prior to any certification decision to move forward with procurement 

of ASPs, there should be additional testing at NTS against actual physical sources 

of special nuclear materials in order to (1) understand exactly how the modified 

ASPs performance compares against the performance of PVTs in detecting certain 

nuclear materials, and (2) assure that there are not any unintended consequences 

in detection capabilities resulting from the modifications made to the ASPs since the 

August 2008 testing at NTS.1 This is to say, at this stage in the development of 

the ASP, major systems acquisition best practices require performance testing with 

actual special nuclear material because of the expected corrections to the software 

(beyond simple threshold adjustment). 

Q2a. Has other ASP equipment been developed outside of this process by the private 

sector?

A2a. Based on the number of proposals submitted to DNDO’s initial RFP for the 

ASP, it is quite possible that spectroscopic radiation detection systems have been 

developed outside of DNDO sponsorship. The issue here is determining the extent 

to which those COTS vendors have focused development on spectroscopic radiation 

detection systems that could operate in a high-impact port environment (large format and high traffic throughput) in support of CBP’s mission. Moreover, only 

DNDO’s two developers have been afforded the ability to test their systems with actual special nuclear material at the NTS.

Q2b. How much money has DNDO spent on ASP R&D to date?

A2b. DNDO would be the best source for this information.

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Q2c. What is the proper role for DNDO in this process? Should DNDO be simply 

testing moderate changes to Commercial off the Shelf Technology or should it 

be focusing on next generation technology?

A2c. We believe the Secretary of DHS should determine whether DNDO should be 

a technology development or a major systems acquisition organization. If she chooses to keep both functions within the organization, then the Secretary should establish a strong separation and independent operational construct between the technology development and major systems acquisition missions. Ultimately, DNDO’s 

goal should be toward addressing the mission needs of the end-user (CBP in the 

case of the ASP program). Organizational best practices hold that DNDO should 

regularly assess the extent to which these needs may be met with existing commercial-off-the-shelf technologies, as well as the nature and extent of development necessary for emerging or next-generation technologies. In the case of ASPs, the mission need has become less clear based upon the lessening of the criteria for a ‘‘significant increase in operational effectiveness.’’ This is to say, the primary mission 

need DNDO put forward was to better detect certain special nuclear materials, and 

the expectation was established that ASPs would vastly outperform PVTs in this 

area as manifested by a dramatic reduction of referrals to secondary screening due 

to NORM. However, recent testing has raised questions about both the ASPs capabilities to reliably and efficiently detect these materials as well as the exact significance of the increase in operational effectiveness of these next generation systems 

that are 2.5 times more expensive per unit than the current generation of technology. Moreover, it is not clear that the PVT technology has reached its limit of 

performance based upon energy windowing algorithms or other advances in materials science for nuclear detection.

Q2d. Who should be testing COTS, DNDO, or CBP?

A2d. GAO sees three parts of a testing regime for these systems: (1) software development testing, (2) physical performance testing at NTS (supported by follow-up 

modeling and simulation work), and (3) field validation testing. In our view, the first 

is managed by DNDO and its contractors with independent testing and evaluation 

done by a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC), university 

affiliated research center (UARC), or the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The second is also managed by DNDO in partnership with the National Nuclear Security Administration’s staff at NTS as well as the OT&E group 

of DHS and/or NIST (simulation work can be supported by national labs or UARCs). 

The third should be managed by CBP with support from DHS OT&E as the enduser since they are responsible for screening operations at a working port of entry.

Questions for Mr. Aloise and Dr. Hagan:

Q3a. In addressing previous problems identified in Field Validation Testing, has the 

agency changed underlying algorithms that were tested at the Nevada Test Site 

(NTS)?

A3a. As discussed above, while DNDO officials told us that they were not making 

changes to the ASP algorithms, the report of the Field Validation Advisory Panel 

stated that ‘‘correcting algorithm issues will change ASP referral rate’’ suggesting 

that there will be future changes to the ASP algorithms. So, there is some confusion 

about exactly what changes will need to be made in order to successfully complete 

field validation testing.

Q3b. Will simply changing isotope thresholds be enough to fix these problems, or will 

algorithms need to be changed?

A3b. Only additional testing can answer this. However, once the problem with false 

alarms is fixed, the ability of the ASPs to detect certain nuclear materials will be 

diminished. Understanding whether the ASP can detected certain nuclear materials 

better than the PVTs will be an important part of deciding whether to move forward 

with procurement of the ASPs.

Q3c. If algorithms are changed, will the equipment have to go back to the NTS?

A3c. In our view, prior to any decision to move forward with procurement of ASPs, 

there should be additional testing at NTS against actual physical sources of special 

nuclear materials in order to (1) understand exactly how the modified ASPs performance compares against the performance of PVTs in detecting certain nuclear 

materials, and (2) assure that there are not any unintended consequences in detection capabilities resulting from the modifications made to the ASPs since the August 

2008 testing at NTS.

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Q3d. If so, how much will this cost and how long will it take?

A3d. DNDO would be the best source for this information. However, we were previously told by DNDO that NTS testing costs about $500,000 per week. In our view, 

this testing, while expensive, would be worthwhile prior to DNDO committing billions of dollars toward procurement of the ASPs.

Q3e. Is the Department only changing threshold levels (and not changing the algorithms) simply because it does not want to go back to NTS?

A3e. DHS would be the best source for this information.