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i 

51–759 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–23] 

THE STATUS OF U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 17, 2009 
(II) 

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

RUDY BARNES, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ZACH STEACY, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 17, 2009, The Status of U.S. Strategic Forces ........................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 17, 2009 ........................................................................................ 31 

TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 2009 

THE STATUS OF U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California, Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 1 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 2 

WITNESSES 

Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command .............. 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Chilton, Gen. Kevin P. ..................................................................................... 35 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Tauscher ..................................................................................................... 55 

(1) 

THE STATUS OF U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 17, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Good morning. Happy St. Patrick’s Day. And 

happy birthday to General Chilton’s father. 

General CHILTON. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. This is a hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, and the hearing will come to order. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the strategic posture of the United States and the status of our strategic forces, including our nuclear weapons program, missile defense systems, and 

military space programs. 

The Strategic Forces Subcommittee has jurisdiction over each of 

these areas, which track closely with the responsibilities of the U.S. 

Strategic Command, or STRATCOM. 

I want to welcome General Kevin Chilton, Commander of 

STRATCOM. General Chilton has testified before us before. And I 

want to thank you for coming back. 

I want to thank you for the thousands of men and women that 

report to you, and the people behind you, who I know are directly 

responsible for your day-to-day activities. And we work with them 

very closely, as you know, and we very much appreciate their service and, always, their ability to work with us. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. There is plenty for us to discuss today, given the 

many challenges we face with Russia, North Korea and Iran, and 

whether we will rework the Moscow Treaty, and a Comprehensive 

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 

The challenges we face are complicated, and the world we operate in is dangerous, with rogue states and terrorists vying to get 

nuclear weapons. We know that our work here is critical to make 

the world a safer place and to rid the world of these horrible weapons. 

In the debate over nuclear posture, there is an emerging bipartisan consensus. Two years ago, former Defense Secretary Bill 

Perry, former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George 
2 

Shultz, and former Senator Sam Nunn, called for the United States 

to move toward a world free of nuclear weapons. President Obama 

has echoed this call, as well. 

But even as we debate the feasibility of such a policy, we still 

face the ongoing challenge to be good stewards of our nuclear deterrent without undermining critical nonproliferation efforts. 

These challenges highlight the urgent need for a robust discussion of the United States’ strategic posture. 

This subcommittee has acted to enable just such a discussion by 

establishing a bipartisan commission in the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), to examine U.S. strategic posture and recommend a 21st century nuclear weapons policy. 

Under the capable leadership of Bill Perry and former Defense 

Secretary Jim Schlesinger, the commission submitted an excellent 

interim report in December, and they will deliver their final report 

on April 1st. Drs. Perry and Schlesinger will also testify before our 

full committee on April 2nd. 

General Chilton, since your testimony last year, the Congress 

has continued to have a vigorous discussion over the United States’ 

ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and policy. As chair of this 

subcommittee, I have argued that our primary focus should be on 

countering the most imminent, here-and-now threat to our deployed troops and our allies: short- and medium-range missiles. 

This subcommittee also has oversight over our military space 

programs. There is no shortage of challenges here either. A year 

ago, we witnessed the United States’ successful intercept of a failed 

satellite that could have re-entered the atmosphere in an uncontrolled way, threatening populated areas with hydrazine fuel. 

Last month, an Iridium satellite and an old Russian Cosmos satellite collided in outer space. The debris created from the collision 

will be a problem for decades. The collision underscores the urgent 

need for a better Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capability. 

The United States has a host of pressing strategic and policy 

challenges, all of them interconnected. In this hearing, we hope to 

continue a critical discussion, so that we may, together, chart the 

right strategic path forward for the United States. 

Now, let me turn to my distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Turner of Ohio, for any comments he may have. 

Mr. Turner, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I also want to extend a warm welcome to General Chilton, and 

thank you for your vision, leadership, and service to our Nation. 

General, your testimony today on the status of our Nation’s strategic forces provides us with valuable context and insight as we 

begin deliberations in the fiscal year 2010 defense budget. 

Now, General, you and I were just talking a moment ago about, 

these are the hot topics that are facing our Nation and our international scene. And it comes at a time where there are discouraging trends in foreign strategic forces developments, highlighted 
3 

by last month’s Iranian space launch and the impending potential 

North Korean missile launch. 

Some have questioned the relevance and credibility of strategic 

deterrence in today’s complex and uncertain security environment. 

It has also been questioned whether, in these times of global economic crisis and potential tighter defense budgets, we should sustain our current strategic capabilities or invest in their modernization. 

Recently, Mr. McHugh, my colleague and House Armed Services 

Committee Ranking Member, observed, ‘‘Strategic deterrence may 

be exactly what will be required to bolster our allies and friends. 

A weakened global economy is unlikely to lead competitors and adversaries to decrease their strategic capability, as some may hope. 

In fact, it can be argued that the opposite is more plausible. Faced 

with fiscal constraints, will Iran double down on its ballistic missile 

program? The question merits our most careful consideration.’’ 

I am also interested in whether or not you share this view. 

There are a number of significant events this year on the future 

of our nuclear policy and posture. As our chair has noted, the subcommittee looks forward to receiving the U.S. strategic commission’s final report. 

While some have urged the Nation to work toward the global 

elimination of nuclear weapons—an admirable goal—the commission’s bipartisan interim report urged caution. ‘‘It is clear that the 

goal of zero nuclear weapons is extremely difficult to attain, and 

would require a fundamental transformation of the world political 

order.’’ 

The new Administration and Congress may consider treaty ratification and further stockpile reductions. But the commission 

warned that before such decisions are made, ‘‘the DOE and DOD 

should receive from the labs and STRATCOM clear statements describing the future capabilities and flexibility required to minimize 

the risks of maintaining a credible, safe, and reliable nuclear deterrent without nuclear explosive testing.’’ 

What military advice would you give policymakers considering 

such decisions? 

In your testimony, you comment that the U.S. stockpile requires 

the most urgent attention, and that without action, our current 

weapons are not indefinitely sustainable. I do not know that others 

share your same sense of urgency. 

Has the military begun to accept risk as a result of the aging 

stockpile? And how much risk are we willing to accept? 

To address these risks, you supported the Reliable Replacement 

Warhead (RRW) cost and design study last year. Does this concept 

still have merit? 

Later this year, we also expect a new Nuclear Posture Review 

(NPR). I am concerned that unless the NPR makes concrete decisions on nuclear force structure, size and composition, we may be 

further delayed in taking action to address the risks in our current 

stockpile. 

Today, we will ask what key issues you believe the NPR must 

address. 

Missile defense will also be a challenging topic this year, especially if reports of potential budget cuts prove true. We would ben-
4 

efit from your discussion of the missile defense needs and priorities 

from the warfighter’s perspective, particularly if there are potential 

gaps and vulnerabilities in our spectrum of defense. 

Though our committee, in a bipartisan manner, has emphasized 

near-term missile defenses—Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

(GMD), Aegis, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Patriot, and sensors—we also have to figure out a way to preserve investments in future capabilities. I would appreciate your thoughts 

on what future capabilities are most promising. 

Since we will hold a hearing on space security tomorrow, I will 

hold my comments there for that hearing. And, as our current national space policy states, space is vital to our national interests. 

Yet recent events, such as the satellite collision last month and the 

Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2007, serve as stark reminders of the vulnerability of our space assets. 

This committee supports the need for greater Space Situational 

Awareness and protection capabilities. 

We are also interested in how the need for greater survivability 

influences discussions and decisions about our space architecture 

and acquisition programs. What architectural attributes should 

guide our space acquisition investments? And what are your top 

priorities in space? 

Lastly, I want to touch on intelligence and solicit your thoughts. 

Intelligence on foreign nuclear, missile, space, and cyber developments has a great influence on our policy and program decisions. 

Yet, as I observed on this committee, I am always surprised by how 

much we do not know. Our intelligence analysts are tremendously 

talented, but we must ensure that they have the capabilities and 

resources to effectively do their jobs. 

Furthermore, is our military intelligence enterprise adequately 

organized and managed to address our intelligence gaps and shortfalls? 

Though we do not have the details of the President’s budget request, we are fortunate to have your perspective and expertise. 

Today is an excellent opportunity to gain valuable insight from 

you on the military’s requirements, priorities, and key issues. On 

that note, thank you again for being here today, and your willingness to share your assessment of our Nation’s strategic forces. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Turner, thank you for that excellent opening 

statement. I agree with you. Those were excellent questions you 

put forward. 

We have got your written statement, General Chilton which is, 

once again, very comprehensive and thought-provoking. And I am 

looking forward to your shortened testimony. 

General Chilton, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER, 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have just a few 

brief remarks I have asked if I might present to the committee. 

Madam Chair, Ranking Member Turner, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the 

state of the United States Strategic Command. 
5 

And Madam Chair, thank you for recognizing my father on his 

birthday today. James Patrick will be most pleased to know that 

his name was brought forward here in this hearing today. I send 

him my best wishes. 

Since assuming command in October of 2007, I have been honored by your counsel and thoughtful interest in the best ways to 

secure America’s future together. Thank you for your time and for 

your staff’s equally strong interest in visiting and learning about 

the command’s capabilities and requirements. 

Your strong support, especially for the exceptional soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and civil servants, and their families, with 

whom I have the privilege to serve, means a great deal to those 

who already give so much in the defense of their Nation. 

Today, America faces unique national security challenges and 

equally unique leadership opportunities. These challenges include 

global population changes, serious economic difficulties, resource 

competition, bids for regional and global power, the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and an era of 

persistent and often irregular warfare, coupled with an exceptional 

rate of technological change that often outpaces capabilities and 

policies. 

These challenges make 2009 an especially noteworthy year, as 

we look forward to the report of the Congressional Commission on 

the Strategic Posture of the United States, and prepare to conduct 

both the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and a Nuclear Posture Review within the Department. The recommendations made in 

these studies will shape our national security capabilities long into 

the future. 

As the combatant command chartered with the global operational 

perspective, our responsibilities and relationships uniquely position 

STRATCOM to execute global operations, to support other combatant commands and to close potential seams between other combatant commands as well, and provide a clear and consolidated 

warfighter position on future global capability requirements. 

I am pleased to tell you that the United States Strategic Command capably executes deterrence, space and cyberspace operations 

each and every day, and provides a unique global perspective in advocating for missile defense, information operations (IO), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and the 

capabilities that this country needs to combat weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, we are about enabling global security for 

America. 

Today, deterrence remains as central to America’s national security as it was during the Cold War, because, as ever, we would prefer to prevent war rather than to wage it. 

Last year, the Secretary of Defense approved our strategic deterrence plan, a significant first step toward integrating deterrence activities across the U.S. Government. 

Still, credible deterrence rests first on a safe, secure, reliable, 

and sustainable nuclear enterprise, including our stockpile of weapons; including our delivery, command and control (C2) and ISR 

platforms; including our space-based capabilities, and our laboratories and industrial base; and on our most precious resource, our 

people. 
6 

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has substantially reduced our deployed nuclear weapons, dismantled our production capability, and ceased nuclear testing. 

Despite our reductions and lack of modernization of weapons and 

infrastructures, other states still seek nuclear weapons today. 

Additionally, many of our allies rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent umbrella. This reliance must be considered when addressing 

concerns of nuclear proliferation. 

The most urgent concerns for today’s nuclear enterprise lie with 

our aging stockpile, infrastructure, and human capital. 2009 will be 

an important year to act on these issues, to relieve growing uncertainty about the stockpile’s future reliability and sustainability. 

Space-based capabilities provide our Nation and our forces essential, but often unnoticed, abilities to act and operate. The satellite 

constellations that carry these capabilities, however, require more 

careful attention to eliminate delays that can leave us just one 

launch failure away from unacceptable gaps in coverage in the future. 

We have made progress in Space Situational Awareness. But capability gaps remain and require sustained momentum to fill, as 

evidenced by the recent collision between an active communications 

satellite and a dead Russian satellite. 

Cyberspace, another one of our key lines of operations, has 

emerged as a key warfighting domain, and one on which all other 

warfighting domains depend. We remain concerned about growing 

threats in cyberspace, and are pressing changes in the Department’s fundamental network culture, conduct, and capabilities to 

address this mission area. 

We also endeavor to share our best practices with partners 

across the government. Still, the adequate provisioning of the cyber 

mission, especially with manpower, remains our greatest need. 

Finally, the command’s advocacy efforts for missile defense capabilities, ISR management, information operations, and plans to 

combat weapons of mass destruction continue to mature, and positively influence the acquisition process within the Department. And 

STRATCOM is proud of our role in that process, and our ability to 

represent the needs of other combatant commanders in each of 

these areas. 

In this uncertain world, your support is critical to enabling successful execution across the command’s assigned missions and realizing our vision to be leaders in strategic deterrence, and preeminent global warfighters in space and cyberspace. 

Madam Chair, thank you again for this opportunity, for the committee’s providing me this opportunity, and for your support. And 

I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Chilton can be found in the 

Appendix on page 35.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, General Chilton. 

I wanted to elicit a broader response from you about something 

that I saw in your statement that I think we certainly agree on. 

The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission has made it clear 

that the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) has 

been a remarkable success. 
7 

And I think that that has accrued to the American people not 

only fabulous investments in the fastest computers in the world, 

the largest laser in the world—all used to simulate the testing that 

we used to do in the Nevada desert—but, at the same time, we obviously have kept and maintained a large number of hedge weapons. 

In your statement, you say that we mitigate the risk of unanticipated technical challenges—which is a nice way of saying a bad 

piece of information—that the way we do that is only by maintaining more weapons than we would need otherwise. 

And, not to edit your statement, but I think you agree that, fundamentally, the Stockpile Stewardship Program, in and of itself, is 

the real way that we—the science-based program is the real way 

that we mitigate. The secondary way is by keeping the number of 

hedge weapons that we do. 

Can you talk a little bit about your assessment of the sciencebased Stockpile Stewardship Program and its importance? And how 

do we potentially leverage that in the future? 

General CHILTON. Sure. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

A couple of points, though, first on the hedging, just to be clear 

on that, what I mean by that. I think there are two areas that we 

retain the stockpile of non-deployed weapons at the levels that we 

do today. 

One is for a technical challenge that might surprise us. For example, to find out a particular family of weapons has an inherent 

problem that we can anticipate runs throughout the family, and 

that they are no longer available as part of the deterrent. Having 

an excess number of weapons on the shelf that could be rapidly 

uploaded to other platforms to sustain the level of deployed weapons that we would need for today’s policy and strategy is part of 

that hedge. And the reason we need those on the shelf today is because we have no production capacity. 

In the Cold War, we hedged by having a large production capacity in that area. And we also benefited from the ability to test, to 

help resolve problems. Although that was not used all that often, 

it was still a capability. 

The second reason for a hedge would be to be in a position to address strategic uncertainty. So, a sudden change in the geopolitical 

environment of the world, where political leadership in our country 

should determine that there is a need to increase the posture of our 

deployed forces. Again, without a production capacity, the hedge is 

to retain a large inventory on the shelf. 

The Stockpile Stewardship Program has certainly been an important program over the last—was it 17 years now that it has been 

in place—since 1992. It is a program that I think, had we not started, I think we would have lost confidence in some weapons along 

the way. But because of the focus of the team and the support of 

that team, and their ability to delve into issues, discover them 

early and help us work solutions along the way, that has been 

quite helpful. 

So, I am a strong advocate for maintaining robust support for the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program. However, I do not think that is the 

sole solution in front of us. I think we also need to look at modernization of our industrial base. We need to be able to produce the 
8 

key elements and, ultimately, nuclear weapons. And I think if we 

do that, if we have that capability, it will lead to an ability to reduce inventories, which is a desire of all in this business. 

Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Three years ago, we reestablished the ability to 

produce pits, which is certainly part of the production chain. And 

so, it is not completely true that we do not have a production facility. We do not have an end-to-end production facility. 

But clearly, where would you rank—I mean, clearly, we were told 

that, if we could reproduce pits, that we were solving a very big 

question mark in the future as to our sustainability of the current 

stockpile. 

We obviously have a number of opportunities going forward to 

modernize a smaller arsenal, including something called Advanced 

Certification, which could effectively replace what was then—what 

used to be called RRW—in a way that we are, I think, being more 

responsible in the way that we are putting forward what we are 

doing. 

My concern about RRW always was that it led people to believe 

that we were building new weapons. I do not think we want anybody to believe that. But I think we all believe that having a smaller stockpile, that is, where we have extreme confidence and reliability, where we also can do more security and create a sense that 

we had surety and more environmental soundness, is a goal, as 

long as we are reducing the stockpile and eliminating weapons at 

the same time. 

So, can you talk briefly about the production of pits and where 

that fits into this area of production and the value that you consider it to have? 

General CHILTON. Sure. 

A couple points. The ability to produce a nuclear weapon requires 

plutonium production capacity and uranium production capacity. 

So, there are two key elements of the infrastructure that I think 

need to be supported. One is the development or expansion of the 

plutonium and modernization of plutonium capabilities at Los Alamos. And then the uranium capabilities at Oak Ridge. They are 

Cold War—they are not even that—they are World War II era facilities. 

Production—I would not use the word production capability at 

Los Alamos, it is a laboratory. And they can make about 10 to 20 

pits per year. And that is not on the scale of a production capacity, 

in my view. And so, I think that needs to be robusted for both of 

those facilities, for sure. 

I agree with you. We do not need a new nuclear weapon with 

new capabilities. But I do believe we have a great opportunity here 

to develop modern nuclear weapons, modernized, that have 21st 

century requirements put into their design. And the requirements 

of the Cold War era were maximum nuclear yield and minimum 

size. That, because we had small missiles, and we wanted to maximize the number of warheads we could put on top of them vis-a`- 

vis the Russians. We were not worried about the Russians stealing 

our weapons. They had plenty of their own. 

If we look forward to the 21st century, we do worry about terrorists getting their hands on our weapons. And in an environment 
9 

where we have reduced and probably never will grow a production 

capacity anywhere near that we had in the Cold War—we could 

produce close to 3,000 weapons a year. And, the desire that we 

have to step away from testing, that we have unilaterally, or, you 

know, self-imposed, not conducted since 1992—putting those together. 

The number one design requirement, I think, as you look to the 

future, is high reliability. And we have the opportunity to add in 

a modernized weapon, safety and security features that we never 

envisioned that we would have or were a part of the original designs, in some of the weapons during the Cold War. 

So, moving forward with a modern capability not only provides 

those opportunities of high reliability, increased safety and security, which then would immediately relate into a confidence that 

could help you lower the total stockpile. 

They do another important thing and that is, by reenergizing the 

design, science, engineering, and production capability, you reenergize and maintain the human capital element that is also aging. 

And you attract a youth and energy into the programs that will 

make sure that 20 years, 40 years from now, America will still 

have the preeminent knowledge and know-how on how to maintain 

a safe, secure stockpile and provide this deterrent for America. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. General Chilton, you have articulated something 

that I have been interested in for quite a long time. And I think 

the context—I call them ‘‘the fences.’’ 

As long as ‘‘the fences’’ include no testing, no new capabilities for 

the weapons, in the sense that you are not increasing yields, you 

are not making the weapon more robust in the sense that it is now 

a bigger weapon, and that it is all done in the context of ratifying 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and taking down weapons and 

dismantling them, hopefully in a cooperative agreement with the 

Russians and others. 

You know, I think that that is really the kind of policy that can 

be reviewed in a very interesting way over the next few years. I 

think that we have a better sense now for where ‘‘the fences’’ need 

to be, and for what the goals need to be, including, you know, taking down the weapons and making sure that, as we create a weapon that is modern, as you say, that we are also taking away the 

hedge weapons and satisfying ourselves that what we have is modern and sustainable and safer and more secure. 

So I think that those are very good words to use, and I really 

appreciate it. 

Mr. Turner, the floor is yours. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General, the Reliable Replacement Warhead has been mentioned, 

and you have previously been before this committee, where you 

have discussed that proposal. And in reading your testimony that 

you have given us this time, you call for, ‘‘In other words, we need 

a concerted effort to assuage growing uncertainty and ensure a 

more reliable, safer, more secure and sustainable long-term nuclear 

deterrent.’’ And you say, in your opinion, emphasizing what you 

have just said to us, ‘‘a stockpile modernization strategy and nonproliferation efforts should be considered complementary, not mutually exclusive, means to a safer world.’’ ‘‘Modernization could pro-
10 

vide,’’ as you said, ‘‘a unique opportunity to introduce enhanced 

safety and security features that would render our weapons undesirable terrorist targets.’’ 

And, going on, you say, maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent 

is important for nonproliferation. And then you say, ‘‘We should 

also consider using sustainable designs, employing less-exotic and 

better understood materials, restoring a responsive infrastructure, 

and introducing increased weapon reliability and key safety and security measures as ways to further increase our confidence in our 

arsenal over time.’’ 

Now, I am not going to ask you to advocate for the RRW. But 

I am going to ask you, if you would, please provide me with some 

understanding of, what would be the difference from what you are 

asking for and what RRW is? We are looking to a policy focus of— 

if we are not going to go do that, we are going to go do something 

else that responds to these, what really are those differences? 

General CHILTON. Well, sir, last year the program of record on 

the table to address the modernization issues was the RRW program. And there were difficulties with getting that accepted in the 

debate, I think primarily because there was not a, probably a new 

look at our policy. That was the argument. And we needed to first 

look at our nuclear policy before we moved forward in this area. 

So, a couple of things are happening this year. And this is why 

I think 2009 is such a great year. 

One, we have been talking about this issue for the last year-anda-half. And I think that has really been important part of enlightening the debate and bringing this forward, so that we are postured now to go forward as a policy review goes on in the Nuclear 

Policy Review of the new Administration and the Department of 

Defense (DOD). 

Not only that, we will have a Quadrennial Defense Review, 

which those two will be very linked, in my view, because that typically will focus more on the delivery platforms, whereas the Nuclear Policy Review will look more toward the nuclear part of the 

deterrent. 

The fundamental points that I made last year in supporting 

RRW apply to the fundamental points that you still see in my posture statement today. They are describing a capability that we 

need of increased reliability, increased security, and increased safety in a modern weapon, not desiring a new—any new capabilities 

beyond that. 

Does that answer your question? 

Mr. TURNER. Yes. Thank you. 

General, our Chair did an excellent job in asking, and you did 

an excellent job in responding to the issue about the current balance of our stockpiles and our Stockpile Stewardship Program. Recognizing that there are calls for reductions in our stockpiles, what 

do you think, or what would you believe is essential that we have 

to accomplish before we could safely do that? 

General CHILTON. Well, first of all, you start with—I think it all 

starts with a Nuclear Policy Review, and a policy and a strategy. 

Now, because there could be—not necessarily, but there could be— 

changes in policy and strategy that would lead to reduced requirements for weapons. That is one point. 
11 

It could lead to a reduced—or an increased requirements for 

weapons, as well. 

Then on top of that, as we looked—as we looked specifically at 

the hedge weapons that I talked about before, that are both hedging for technical and strategic uncertainty. 

Remember, the way we hedged for strategic uncertainty in the 

past was having a production capability. That could be part of the 

solution, to reduce inventories. 

The other way we could hedge for reduction in technical surprise 

is to have more robust design and, again, a production capability. 

So, these things are kind of linked in my mind, as we looked at 

our—what we retain on the shelf, independent of our deployed 

forces. And so, that is why I think it is really important that we 

address the industrial base issues and the modernizations issues 

for the stockpile, as well as the stewardship program. 

And if I could just add one point. It is kind of on what you mentioned in your first question about nonproliferation. I see there is 

a linkage here in two ways. One, if some measure U.S. seriousness 

in nonproliferation by the total inventory of our weapons. And so, 

following a strategy of improving the industrial base and modernizing the weapons, that would allow you to reduce the amount of 

hedge weapons you have. It could be in line with that, and supporting of that position. 

Additionally, when we think about the reliability of our weapons 

in our inventory, there is a key linkage, I believe, to our allies, 

friends and allies, who rely on the nuclear umbrella provided by 

the United States of America. And their trust and confidence in the 

reliability of that umbrella, certainly, I think, links—has a linkage 

into—proliferation or nonproliferation concerns in the debate. And 

that needs to be considered as we look at this in the policy reviews 

this year. 

Mr. TURNER. And then, for my last question, turning to missile 

defense. There is going to be a significant amount of budgetary 

pressures as we move forward. What are some of the priorities that 

you would like us to emphasize as we look to missile defense? 

And then also, if you could comment on testing. As you view testing that has occurred to-date, and future testing that the Missile 

Defense Agency (MDA) plans, what are your thoughts and views 

there? 

General CHILTON. First on priorities. I think where we come 

down in STRATCOM is that there needs to be a balance in priorities. I mean, we developed the missile defense system for really 

two fundamental reasons. One was for protection of the United 

States of America. And the other was for protection of our deployed 

forces forward. 

And so, when we look at how we balance the investments in this 

area, or look at the capability gaps in these areas, we always 

have—it cannot be an either/or in my view, but there has to be a 

balance as we go forward. 

And I think the discussions we have had internally with regard 

to how we prioritize, the way MDA has laid out their five-block approach to fielding, I think has been very instructional to us as we 

look to shift, or not shift, funding in various areas to support those 

priorities. 
12 

So, it is important that we continue to focus on both, in my view. 

With regard to testing, looking in the rearview mirror, I would 

say, I do not know of a better way, or how we could have done a 

better job of fielding, as quickly as we did, the missile defense systems that we have in place today. 

When you look at any other acquisition program in the history— 

recent history, and that would not even go back 20 or 30 years— 

it is hard to envision getting a new, a single new airplane on the 

ramp in less than 11 years from the start of a program. And yet, 

in the missile defense area, if you look at the advances we have 

made, both for the theater defenses and Standard Missile–3 (SM– 

3), and Aegis, and THAAD and in the defense of the homeland with 

the ground based interceptor (GBI) system, global Ballistic Missile 

Defense System (BMDS), it really has been impressive in the fielding of these systems. 

But there has been some risk taken on in that, and some—to be 

fast. And that has been certainly in the testing area. 

Now, as we look forward, I have reviewed and met with General 

O’Reilly about where he wants to take the Missile Defense Agency 

in the future with regard to testing. And I think he is on the right 

path for increasing our confidence in these systems as we go forward. I think the path will help improve the models that are important to MDA. 

I think they will find budgetary savings in the approach he is 

going to take from a holistic perspective for acquiring targets, for 

example, and centralizing a little bit of the testing more in the Missile Defense Agency. 

So, I am very optimistic of the path that he is charting right 

now. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Turner. 

The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Sanchez, is recognized for 

five minutes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I thank the chairwoman. 

General, first of all, thank you again for being before us. 

My question has to do with the Warfighter Involvement Program 

(WIP), and the Priorities Capabilities List (PCL). 

It is my understanding that the WIP and the PCL were developed to take warfighter views into account during the missile defense development process, and to identify the warfighters’ longer 

term missile defense developmental priorities. So, my question is, 

how does STRATCOM identify, prioritize, and address combatant 

command priorities? And has it developed an assessment tool that 

can effectively identify the most urgent priorities? 

General CHILTON. Thank you, ma’am. 

We have a process that we use, not only for missile defense, but 

for all of our other areas that we are asked to advocate for, for all 

of the regional combatant commanders around the world. We call 

it our Senior Warfighter Forum, SWARF. 

And my deputy commander, Vice Admiral Mauney, chairs the 

SWARFs for these areas. And what we try to do in these areas is 

collect from the regional combatant commanders their requirements. And one would be in the missile defense area for sure. And 
13 

so, this is a way that we inject those requirements into discussions 

that are then had when budgetary decisions are made later on. 

Part of the requirements’ development and prioritization efforts 

is the PCL, the Prioritized Capabilities List. And there is a dialogue that goes on after we have developed a Prioritized Capabilities List through conversations with the regionals—to include 

Northern Command (NORTHCOM), of course, who is a regional, 

but in defense of the homeland—to present the Prioritized Capabilities List to the Missile Defense Agency, who then returns back 

to us what they think is technically achievable within technology, 

and also budgetary constraints. 

So there is that, I think a healthy dialogue of unconstrained 

wants with fiscal and technical realities that merge and then are 

presented, and decisions are made forward on which way to go forward in the program. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Is this a continuous process? Or is it done once a 

year? Or how do you—— 

General CHILTON. Well, we stay in continuous dialogue. But the 

SWARFs do happen on a scheduled basis, so they are periodic. 

And ultimately, what you are working toward, of course, is in 

synch with the budget cycle—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Right. 

General CHILTON [continuing]. In support of the program objective memorandum (POM) process. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. And then my second question. Not only do 

I sit on this committee, but I also sit on the Homeland Committee. 

And one of the subcommittees would be the Cyber Security Subcommittee, which, of course, is—we are placing a lot more attention 

on, because it is a big gap. 

And my question would be, what do you think is the greatest 

cyber security threat facing the United States? Do you think—do 

you think we are more vulnerable to cyber attacks on commercial 

or public infrastructure, or attacks on military cyber assets? What 

type of action is STRATCOM taking to deter? Whatever you can 

talk about here in an open forum. 

And what were the lessons learned from 2008, when computer 

hackers from China hacked in to penetrate the information systems 

of the U.S.? And what do you need to better protect our country’s 

information systems from these types of hackers? 

General CHILTON. Your first question on the threat, ma’am, I am 

worried about all the threats. 

And the threats, when we think about them, they kind of span 

from what I will call the bored teenager, which was, really, kind 

of maybe the first threats we started seeing in the hacker world, 

back in the 1990s, through, obviously, much more sophisticated 

threats that we are seeing criminal activity out there, all the way 

up to threats that could be sponsored by high-end and even nationstates that could potentially threaten not only our military networks, but also our critical national networks. 

Are we vulnerable today across the spectrum? I would say ‘‘yes.’’ 

And does more work need to be done in defending our networks? 

I would say ‘‘yes,’’ as well. 

Of course, at U.S. Strategic Command, what we have been asked 

to do by the President through the Unified Command Plan (UCP), 
14 

is to operate and defend in the military networks only, and be prepared to attack in cyberspace when directed. 

But, day in and day out, our focus is on operating and defending 

our networks. And that takes a close relationship with the Intelligence Community. 

We rely tremendously on support from the Intelligence Community writ large and, particularly, on the National Security Agency 

(NSA), because they can give us a lot of threat warning. They have 

an information assurance role and mission. And that marriage and 

the support that we receive from them has been instrumental in 

our efforts to operate and, particularly, to defend our networks. 

We learn every day through various attempts to penetrate our 

networks—some which are successful, and many, many, many 

more which are unsuccessful—but we do learn from those and roll 

those lessons back in to. 

What we need in this area, I believe, for U.S. Strategic Command 

is—well, and let me talk about the military, writ large. 

Three things have been our focus area. 

A changing culture, first of all. We need to start thinking about 

cyberspace and our utility of it, not so much as a convenience, but 

as a military necessity, because every domain, whether it is air, 

land, or sea, depends on cyberspace for their operations. 

And I am not sure we have made that mental shift yet from 

these systems that really just grew up on our desks and are conveniences to us, to something that we need to protect. So, changing 

that culture is really important and, perhaps, the hardest thing to 

do. 

The next thing we need to do, I believe, is change our conduct. 

And our conduct—by that I mean, defense and operation of our 

military networks is commanders’ business. It is not some computer assistant’s business. The security and the awareness of the 

security is our commanders’ business. And commanders need to 

hold their—to train their people on security. And then they need 

to hold them accountable. They need to have robust inspection programs in cyberspace systems. 

So when an inspection team arrives at my base to inspect my 

fighter wing, they not only look at my fighters and my maintenance, but they look at my cyber systems. And, if I put all the defenses in that STRATCOM has told me to put in, are they operating properly? Am I positioned and worried about the defense of 

that network? That is a change in our conduct today. 

And then, lastly, we need to improve our capabilities. And that 

is in two particular areas, I would say. First, people; we have not 

resourced this mission area, in my view, correctly from a manpower 

perspective. We have made improvements in our schoolhouses, and 

the Secretary of Defense has given great support to increasing the 

throughput in our educational programs through our cyber schoolhouses. But we have not realized that increase in people capability. 

And the second part is in technology. Too much today, we rely 

on still picking up the phone and passing information. And I think 

we can do better in some machine-to-machine capability, so that we 

can start anticipating and reacting to threats at network speed, as 

opposed to at human speed. 
15 

And so, some key investments in technologies are going to be 

very important to us, I think, as we try to advance the ball here 

in the military defense of our networks. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And I would just like to say that I do not believe that this subcommittee has really maybe had a classified hearing on this particular area. It is a big area of concern and interest for me. And 

I might ask that we might do that at some point. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I am happy to do that. We have shared responsibility with the Terrorism Subcommittee for this very widening area 

of cyber security. And our plan is to have a joint hearing with ourselves and Congressman Smith’s subcommittee. And we will do 

that as soon as we can get it on the calendar. 

Thank you, Ms. Sanchez. 

Now, I am happy to recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 

Franks, for five minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. 

And, General, thank you for being here. 

I am fully aware that the Air Force does not casually pin four 

stars on just anyone. But I want you to know I am glad they chose 

you to head STRATCOM. I think my own little babies have a better hope for walking in freedom, because they did that. And I am 

grateful for all that you do, and for all the sacrifice you have made 

for human freedom. 

I also have noticed that most of the time when we—preceding 

some of the questions here—we quote your testimony. I think 

sometimes, generals get more of their own words spoken back to 

them, more than politicians, even. 

So, I am going to begin by quoting your testimony. 

You said in your testimony that, related to missile defenses, that 

they ‘‘provide a critical deterrent against certain existing and potential threats, increase the cost of adversaries’ already expensive 

technologies and reduce the value of their investments.’’ 

And I believe, General, that that is a critically important point. 

Oftentimes, when we speak of missile defense, we think just of defending ourselves against missiles, rather than devaluing entire 

programs, to the extent that, hopefully, rogue states will not be 

able to gain technology that they can pass along to terrorists, 

which remains a great concern to me. And I think it is more short 

term than we realize. 

But the committee has been working through this issue, and I 

wonder if you could help us understand, or just explain it to us, 

how missile defense systems deter potential threats and devalue 

our adversaries’ offensive investments. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Congressman. 

I think they do it in two ways. And I will even step back further 

and look at strategic—or deterrence in a broader sense. And going 

back to the Cold War, we felt—I think the United States felt—we 

had a pretty good handle on what it took to deter the Soviet Union. 

And likewise, the Soviet Union felt they had a good handle on what 

it took to deter the United States of America. 

Today, in the 21st century, besides the complexities that we have 

talked about already, it is a much more complex geopolitical environment that we live in. And there is not this bipolar threat. We 
16 

are not just worrying about deterring one other nation-state. There 

are other threats to the United States of America that we need to 

consider deterring. 

And some of these potential adversaries may not be as deterred 

by the nuclear might that we have, and, in fact, may not be looking 

at us from a nuclear exchange perspective, but more from a blackmail perspective or a dissuasion perspective, where, if we were not 

otherwise postured, might put—potentially put—the United States 

in a position of thinking more than twice about whether or not to 

engage in a conventional conflict in a region, because the risk 

would be a potential nuclear attack on the United States of America. 

And so, having a missile defense system that could essentially 

neuter that threat, or counter that threat, has become an important element of the broader deterrence landscape, which looks beyond just a bipolar world, but to a multi-polar world, and to various actors who have maybe different values, different fears and 

different objectives in mind that they would like to achieve. 

There is a dissuasion objective as well, by having a credible deterrent, a credible defense that might cause them to look at their 

investments in this area and realize that they can never outgun 

that capability, and make decisions to steer away from investments 

in things like long-range ballistic missiles and a nuclear weapons 

program, and steer those funds to other needs their country may 

have that are less threatening to the United States of America. 

So, there is a deterrent aspect and then, hopefully, an aspect, if 

we demonstrate our capability and it is understood by the potential 

adversary, a decision calculus that we would hope they would make 

to turn away. And that is part of the dissuasion piece. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, sir. 

General, in a February 27, 2009, press release—press conference, 

excuse me—in response to a question regarding our nuclear missiles being on ‘‘hair-trigger alert,’’ which I believe was probably an 

unfair or unfortunate characterization, you said, ‘‘The alert postures that we are in today are appropriate, given our strategy, 

guidance and policy.’’ 

Can you discuss our current alert posture and its appropriateness? 

And if I do not get to it—it looks like this will be my last question—thank you again for being here. 

General CHILTON. Oh, thank you, sir. 

Well, you know, you actually quoted back in the correct context. 

The context of my comments were, in today’s policy and strategy, 

we have our forces, I believe, on the appropriate alert profile. 

Mr. FRANKS. Would you characterize that as ‘‘hair-trigger alert’’? 

General CHILTON. I would not. I think that is a bad characterization, because I just think it evokes a vision in the minds, at least 

of my generation of Americans, who grew up with cowboy Western 

shows, that hair-trigger envisions a gun pulled, a finger on the 

trigger, and better not sneeze. And our current alert posture is 

nothing like that at all. 

In fact, our current posture in our nuclear weapons are absolutely secure and safe, and not at risk from inadvertent use. And 

they are not at risk from not being used when so ordered by the 
17 

President of the United States, who has control over those nuclear 

weapons. 

And so, my context of my comments were exactly as you put it, 

in today’s current policy and strategy. It is not to say that, in the 

Nuclear Posture Review, as we review, that we as a nation may decide to look for a different policy and a different approach to doing 

things. 

But we need to do that in a deliberative fashion, work from policy to strategy to posturing of forces, and not in reverse, in my 

view. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, sir. 

And thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General, welcome, and thank you for your testimony here today. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I apologize for having to step out. I had to speak 

on the floor. And so, if this has been covered already, you can let 

me know. 

General CHILTON. I will be happy to readdress. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I have a particular interest and concern about 

cyber security, so I would like to turn our focus there. 

I have been involved in a number of things that have tried to address our Nation’s cyber security efforts including, just recently, 

one of four co-chairs of the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies’ Commission on Cyber Security for the 44th Presidency, 

and had the opportunity to chair the Subcommittee on Homeland 

Security on Emerging Threats in Cyber Security last year. 

It is obviously an ever-present threat, a growing threat, and an 

ever-changing nature of the threat is very hard to stay ahead of it. 

My question is, listening to your remarks and reading the testimony on the role of STRATCOM in cyber security, I am certainly 

pleased to hear that the Department of Defense has a good understanding of the immense strategic global threats that our Nation 

faces. And I have had the opportunity to speak with General Cartwright on these issues a number of times, as well. 

As you mentioned, however, these threats spread across government as well as private domains. 

So my question is, can you please elaborate more on what you 

believe DOD’s role should be in a government-wide approach to 

cyber security? 

General CHILTON. I am sorry, sir. DOD’s role? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. DOD’s role in a government-wide approach to 

cyber security. And I will stop there and—— 

General CHILTON. Sure. 

Mr. LANGEVIN [continuing]. See if I can get in a second question. 

General CHILTON. Today, Congressman, as you know, 

STRATCOM is chartered to defend, operate and defend, our military networks only. And so, we worry about the dot-military networks. We are not asked today to defend the .edu, the .com, the 

.gov. The consideration for defense of vulnerabilities in that area 

falls to the Department of Homeland Security. 

That said, we are directed to be prepared to support the Department of Homeland Security, and have already begun those efforts 

by not only sharing office space with them at our—in one of my 
18 

component commands, the Joint Task Force for Global Network 

Operations (JTF–GNO). 

By sharing lessons learned that we have learned over the last 

several years in trying to get our arms around defending just the 

military networks, we have established linkages between their centers, their Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), and our 

command and control centers, so that we can share information, 

should we see a new threat vector coming into the military networks, that we make sure that they are aware of that, and vice 

versa. So today, we have begun to build a support linkage in that 

area. 

I think the broader question of who should best do this for the 

other parts of America, where we worry about defending our power 

grids, our financial institutions, our telecommunications, our transportation networks, the networks that support them, I think that 

is going to be a key outcome of the 60-day study that the President 

has chartered, and probably findings beyond that study. 

But I think that is the intent, is to take a good, hard look at 

what are the appropriate roles and responsibilities to go forward in 

that regard? And we at STRATCOM will be prepared to support in 

whichever way that we are directed to go forward. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Let me go to another one. 

STRATCOM recently reorganized its structure—I think you alluded to this in your testimony—reorganized its structure for 

cyberspace operations, placing the Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations under the direct command of the Joint Functional 

Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC–NW), who also 

acts as the director for the National Security Agency. 

How effective do you believe that this reorganization has been? 

And, as a follow up, does this put too much military authority 

under our Intelligence Community? And as a follow-on to that, 

where does the Department of Homeland Security’s mission to protect critical infrastructure fit under this new command? 

General CHILTON. On the first point, what we have done is, the 

command authority still runs from the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, so these organizations still report to STRATCOM. 

And that is important, I think, because we have a Unified Command Plan that gives us authorities and responsibility, and a command chain that runs down. 

In the past, I had two components working the cyber problem for 

me, one prepared for attack and attack as directed, and the other 

for operate and defend. 

And what we have done is, I have delegated operational control 

of the operate and defend to my network warfare commander, General Alexander. 

Now, the advantages of this, and the reason we did this, is because we firmly believed you cannot look at operate, defend, prepare to attack, attack and exploit, in stovepipes. You need to be 

able to look at them holistically, because they are so interconnected. 

One can inform you of an impending attack, and allow you to 

posture. As you consider offensive operations, you want to make 

sure your defenses are up. When you are under attack, of course, 
19 

a way to respond is stronger defenses, but also attack. Offense is 

also sometimes the best defense. 

So, finding a way to bring these two organizations together and 

more closely aligned is the intent. 

We have already begun to see fruits from that, from that work, 

and better cooperation between the organizations. But we still have 

a lot of work to go. 

General Alexander is just bringing forward to me now, and we 

are starting to assess, a plan that would show how he would implement, in detail, that organizational construct, which will require 

for him to grow some capabilities to oversee that entire staff, if you 

will, to oversee that entire group now. 

An important point though. When General Alexander is working 

in this particular position, as the commander of JFCC–Network 

Warfare, he is wearing a STRATCOM badge, and he is reporting 

to the STRATCOM commander. We take great advantage of his 

linkages when he wears his other hat as the director of NSA, to 

build the bridges and linkages that we need for intelligence support 

to do the work that we do for operating and defending a gig every 

day. 

So, the marriage and the close relationship there between the 

NSA when he wears that hat, and when he is wearing his network 

warfare hat and working for me, is really important when we think 

about how best to operate, defend and then, potentially, if directed, 

attack through cyberspace. 

And then, sir, if you could repeat the last part of your question. 

I am sorry, I did not—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The last one is, where does the Department of 

Homeland Security’s mission to protect critical infrastructure fit 

under this new command? 

General CHILTON. Where does it fit. 

Actually, again, I think the 60-day study might inform us on 

that. But it does not fit at all today. This command organization 

is aligned directly to support the commander of U.S. Strategic 

Command and the Unified Command Plan missions we have been 

given, which do not include defense of the homeland for those other 

networks, but are solely restricted to operating and defending the 

military networks. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I know you have a great challenge on your hands 

in protecting us in cyberspace, and I offer my support and whatever I can do to make your job easier. 

And I thank the Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

And I am happy to recognize the gentleman from Washington, 

Mr. Larsen, for five minutes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General Chilton, just to continue on the theme of cyber command, there are renewed discussions about establishing a new unified command for cyberspace operation. 

In your assessment, what would be the impact of that, both for 

it and against it, of moving organizations such as the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare and the Joint 

Task Force, out from under Strategic Command? 
20 

General CHILTON. Well, Congressman, first of all, we have a 

cyber command today, would be my first comment. And that is U.S. 

Strategic Command, because we have that mission today. And it is 

a mission we take very seriously, and a mission I think we have 

successfully advanced quite well in the operation and defense of the 

military networks. 

There is another advantage to the mission set that have been 

given to U.S. Strategic Command. You will notice they are global 

in nature. They really are agnostic to lines drawn on a map, or 

even continents and oceans—mission sets of deterrence, the mission sets of space, and the mission sets of cyberspace. 

One of the great strengths of having those under one organization is our ability to, when given a problem—and ultimately, a 

problem will resolve around a country that the United States has 

a problem with—we have the unique oversight and insight into 

these global domains, and can find synergies and opportunities to 

present integrated capabilities to the regional combatant commanders as we support their operations. 

And so, I think there is a good synergy today for these three 

global mission sets in U.S. Strategic Command. 

The other side of the argument is for standing up a single, focused command, you would gain the advantage of single focus in 

this area. And recall, we once had a single-focused U.S. Space Command. So, it would not be without precedent. 

The challenge—there are some advantages to that in a singular 

focus, of course. But the challenge would be how to make sure you 

bring that integrated in, in an integrated fashion, to a set of capabilities that it would support, might make that a little more difficult. 

And so, I think those would be just the broad balance comments 

I would have on that. But, rest assured, we have a cyber command 

today, sir. It is U.S. Strategic Command. 

Mr. LARSEN. I get your drift on what your thoughts are on that. 

I wanted to talk a little bit about the personnel side, the people 

side, because you did note that the schools are there. They are putting people out, producing folks. 

But you still, I think in your verbal testimony, or your answer 

to a question, it sounded to me like you expressed some level of 

concern about, maybe it was a curriculum you had concern with. 

I am not sure. You talked about—you used the word ‘‘correctly,’’ to 

try to be sure we structured these schools ‘‘correctly.’’ 

So, I guess I am hearing a bit of a disconnect in your thoughts 

about the schooling and—— 

General CHILTON. No, I may have misspoken there, sir. I do not 

have any issues that have been brought to my attention, or that 

I have with regard to our schoolhouses. 

What we are doing is increasing the number of people we are 

putting through the schoolhouses, in an effort to increase the corpus of expertise we have in this particular area. And I think that 

is a good thing. 

Where we are short of people, if you were to take a look at my 

Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations and our Joint 

Task Force for Network Warfare, and we have done a lot of studies 
21 

over the last year-and-a-half on what levels they should be manned 

at. 

The manning is just not there. We have not been able to get either the positions I feel we need, or the belly buttons, if you will, 

to fill those positions appropriately. 

And so, there is a challenge here. And it is not one that you 

would not anticipate in the development of a new mission set in a 

new domain. And that is, understanding requirements, what it 

takes to operate and do the missions you have been given in that 

area. And I think we have worked that really hard. 

And then, growing and fielding the people, and organizing, training, and equipping the people to do that. The services know well 

today how to organize, train, and equip people for air, land, and 

sea operations, and space operations. 

And now the challenge is to make sure we understand how to organize, train, and equip people for cyberspace operations, and adequately man the force that is chartered to provide the security the 

Nation needs. 

Mr. LARSEN. So, are the services still trying to catch up with the 

specific needs of what that new community—that community 

needs? 

General CHILTON. Right. And we have worked very closely with 

the services to help define and understand what those requirements might be for the future, by kind of looking back on past operations, by doing exercises, tabletop exercises and discussions. We 

have done quite a bit of work with the services over the past year, 

year-and-a-half, in this area. 

So, at U.S. Strategic Command, we feel like we have a good idea 

on what the needs are. And now we are in the process of articulating them. And as we look forward, we will look for additional 

support from the services to not only send the people to the schools, 

which they are doing, but to think about how they organize, train, 

and equip to support these mission sets. 

Mr. LARSEN. Madam Chair, are we doing a second round of questions? 

Great. I will yield back then. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What are the most important steps the U.S. 

needs to take to improve our Space Situational Awareness capabilities, and what capabilities are the services, and the combatant 

commanders, and the Intelligence Community telling you they need 

from future space systems? And how do you see STRATCOM facilitating the efforts needed to meet those needs? 

General CHILTON. From the Space Situational Awareness perspective, it is kind of a multi-pronged approach that is required. 

And you start, basically, with your ability to sense the domain, or 

to scan and surveil the domain. 

And so, improvements in this area are important. And so, it is 

both in ground-based systems, some of which we continue to sustain from Cold War developments, developed systems. But also, we 

need to look for opportunities to expand our surveillance architecture beyond even just the borders, the traditional borders of the 

United States and where we have them today, because in this area, 

geography does matter. Where you are located on the Earth matters. 
22 

And so, we need to look at opportunities to expand our surveillance, both with ground-based radars and electro-optical capabilities in space. And there are opportunities here, I believe, to work 

with our friends and allies, to team with them in this particular 

area. 

Next, we could do a better job today, and we are working this 

problem hard, with taking the data we receive from these sensors, 

and the data we could receive in the future, and bring them into 

our Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg Air 

Force Base, in a fashion, in a machine-like fashion, where we can 

bring them in in an integrated fashion to look at. 

Today, my commander for space, General Larry James, out 

there, oftentimes finds himself having to integrate all these different piece parts of the domain of space that he has charted to 

surveil on PowerPoint charts, as opposed to a holistic wave, or we 

would look at in the air domain, a common operating picture type 

display, where you could take one look on the big wall and see who 

the good guys are, who the bad guys are, who the neutrals are, and 

what they are doing in that domain. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Would that be like a fusion cell or—— 

General CHILTON. A fusion technology capability. 

Ms. TAUSCHER [continuing]. Technology capability. 

General CHILTON. But it requires—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Would you have to develop that yourself? 

General CHILTON. No, you know, we have—services need to do 

that for us. And so, we are the demanding customer. And then we 

look to, in this case, the Air Force is working this problem for us 

through their acquisition arm at both the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) in Los Angeles, and the Electronic Systems 

Center (ESC) back at Hanscom. 

So, getting common data, getting more data in, getting common 

data formats in, into a fusion-type machine is important. Calculation capability, or computer processing capability, is an important 

element, too, that is resident at the Joint Space Operation Center 

in the first space control element there, where you need to be able 

to—you know, we are tracking 18,000 pieces or objects in space 

today. More than that. Some is debris. Some are active satellites. 

And you worry about them running into each other, as was evidenced lately. 

The computational capability to do that can be increased. Today, 

we only do what is referred to as conjunction analysis, better said 

collision, potential collision analysis, for our highest priority satellites. And the highest, of course, being our manned systems, the 

International Space Station and the space shuttle. 

But it is a small subset of all the active satellites up there. And 

I believe we can look at opportunities to improve that capability, 

because I think where we need to go is to not only worry about 

those few high priorities that we have there, but all satellites that 

the U.S. military, at least, relies on for military operations. And 

that oftentimes includes civilian satellites, which we lease. And we 

are not able to do that today. 

So, better sensors and more of them, common data, fusion element, computational capabilities, I think are areas that we can improve on. And I would add one more point. 
23 

I am really excited about the Space Based Space Surveillance 

(SBSS) system, which will be launched, either at the end of this 

year or early next, which will be the operationalizing of an experiment, called the Midcourse Space Experiment/Space Based Visible 

(MSX/SBV), where we discovered there was actually value in being 

in space in observing space, particularly in the geosynchronous 

belt. 

And this capability, when we get up there, I am excited to see 

the improvements that will make in our situational awareness, 

particularly at the geosynchronous altitudes. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. General, are you the first astronaut to be 

STRATCOM commander? 

General CHILTON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. That is pretty cool, is it not? 

General CHILTON. Being an astronaut was pretty cool. [Laughter.] 

I was very blessed to be a part of the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA) for a part of my career. And what a 

great organization to be a part of. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, you bring a very distinct pedigree to the 

job. So, I am sure that that will inform us and make us even better 

than we have ever been. 

General CHILTON. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I am going to reserve any further questions I 

have and turn to Mr. Turner from Ohio. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General, earlier this year, the Administration requested a review 

by DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE) to include the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to, ‘‘assess the cost 

and benefits of transferring budget and management of NNSA or 

its components to DOD and elsewhere.’’ 

What are STRATCOM’s or your views on this, on the Administration’s idea, and that review? 

General CHILTON. I guess I do not have any particular views one 

way or the other on that. I think it is a valid question to ask. I 

think it is a good question for the Administration to take on, and 

I am glad they are looking at it. 

But I think it is not just a question for the Administration. It is 

a question for the Congress, as well, because, I mean, they are 

interlinked there in the oversight role, as well. 

And so, I look forward to the results of the Administration’s look 

at this here when that is published. 

Mr. TURNER. One of the issues that you and I have discussed 

that I just want to put a footnote to this hearing, and not to discuss 

in an exchange here, is the issue of the security for our nuclear 

weapons, our labs, our nuclear installations that certainly, any 

such study would be a part of. 

And I would continue to look to you, to your thoughts as to ways 

that we can enhance that, having a concern as to what our 

vulnerabilities might be, both within NNSA, DOE, and DOD. So, 

I would appreciate your continued thoughts in that area. 

General CHILTON. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Turning then to space, as our Chair was discussing, 

there is certainly the—this is an evolving time. You and I were, as 
24 

we were just talking in the opening, and there is so much that is 

happening in what we are seeing other actors doing in space. 

If you could talk for a moment, what is our posture, our plans 

or our policies, if we should be attacked? If someone should attack 

our space assets, how is it at this point that we proceed? 

General CHILTON. Well, the United States always maintains the 

inherent right of self-defense. And our policy has been that an attack on one of our space assets would be considered a serious attack on the United States. 

So, in our view, those are sovereign assets up there, the U.S. satellites that are up there. And it is one that we would take very seriously. 

From a STRATCOM perspective, who is chartered to operate and 

defend our space systems, our military space systems, we have to 

always remind ourselves to look at it from a holistic perspective. 

There is a deterrence part of this, and there is an asymmetric part 

of this, as well. 

It is easy to get too wrapped up in the physical defense, if you 

will, of a satellite, and not pay attention to the fact that that satellite cannot do its mission without an electronic connection to the 

ground. And that electronic connection, both for the maintenance 

of the health of the satellite and for directing its mission, is not 

only essential, but also a vulnerability. 

And that electronic signal comes back to a ground station, which 

is fixed. So, in itself, that is a vulnerability. And then, it is probably plugged into the cyberspace to take direction, as well. 

And so, when we at STRATCOM think about defense of space assets and we bring in both the cyber perspective, the electronic warfare perspective, the physical security perspective, when we think 

about that, and then also, what can be done with regard to our onorbit satellites in both enhancing their awareness and our awareness of what is going on around them, or from the ground, being 

directed toward them—all as an integral part of the equation when 

we think about this. 

Mr. TURNER. And that was the next area that I was going to, is 

this issue of deterrence. We have so many actors that are gaining 

in their capabilities, who are dedicating significant resources to 

their space assets and their ability to disable or diminish our assets. 

On the nuclear side, on the missile defense side, we talk about 

deterrence frequently. What are some of the things that we can be 

doing more, or that we should focus on more in looking to the area 

of deterrence in space? 

General CHILTON. Well, deterrence in any area involves a couple 

of things. One, a position needs to be taken on—a policy position, 

if you will. 

So, you have to be able to look somebody in the eye and say, ‘‘If 

you do this, then—’’ and then, whatever the ‘‘then’’ is, has to be 

credible. Both credible internally, but most important, credible in 

the individual’s eye who you are trying to deter. 

It is not necessarily linked that, if there is a cyber threat, that 

you have to have a capability in cyberspace to deter somebody. Or 

if there is a space problem, that it has to be a space capability that 

deters them, or conventional, either. 
25 

I mean, you can go across domain and across areas and draw the 

lines in different areas. It could be an economic deterrent. If you 

do this, then you will suffer these economic or diplomatic penalties. 

That can be part of a deterrent strategy, as well. So, there are lots 

of elements that you can bring to bear in the quiver here. 

And again, we have got to be cautious that we do not just get 

overly focused and say, because it is a space capability or space 

issue, we need a space capability to deter that. 

We may have an adequate suite of other capabilities to deter that 

particular adversary. But we have got to have a—we also need to 

have a policy statement that puts the will behind the deterrent capability to make it effective. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Happy to recognize the gentleman from Washington for five minutes, Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

General, last year I was briefed on STRATCOM’s electronic warfare (EW) capabilities assessment—capabilities-based assessment, 

which identified gaps in our military EW capabilities. I understand 

you are now working to finish the Functional Solutions Analysis 

(FSA)—— 

General CHILTON. Right. 

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. The FSA, which will include recommendations for how to address these deficiencies. 

Could you let us know a little bit more about the role 

STRATCOM is going to play in implementing the solutions for EW 

gaps? Does STRATCOM just hand the FSA, the Functional Solutions Analysis, to the services? If not, what role will you play to 

make sure the recommendations—the appropriate ones—are implemented? 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Congressman. 

The FSA recommendations, as well as every other area that 

STRATCOM is chartered by the UCP to advocate in, whether it is 

missile defense, ISR, or, in this case, information operations or, 

combating weapons of mass destruction. These are areas where we 

have no forces or capabilities assigned to us, but we are ordered 

to get the warfighter input and advocate. 

And so, what we will do with the FSA when it goes forward, of 

course it will be shared with the services. But the intent of doing 

this whole work, including the capabilities based assessment (CBA) 

and now the FSA, was to bring those forward in a fashion, to inform the fiscal year 2011 POM deliberations that will come this 

summer and fall. 

And STRATCOM has a chair at the table, in particular portfolios 

of the POM deliberations. And most importantly, my J–8 staff, and 

that team gets embedded in the issue teams that address the trade 

space and the issues to be brought up to senior level decision-makers. 

And that is where we have our best effect, I believe. Just having 

a seat at the table and being in the debate, making sure it is an 

informed debate, and bringing that perspective to not only the Department of Defense at the Program Analysis and Evaluation 

(PAE) level, the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) level, but also 
26 

at the services. And we found great success in sharing our input 

at that level, and coming to accommodations, even before the OSD 

review of the program. 

But that is how we influence it, is by having a chair at the table. 

And I have a chair at the table at certain elements of the discussions that has proven very valuable. 

Mr. LARSEN. Well, it has been an issue I have been tracking 

quite closely. The Navy’s EW community, the electronic aircraft 

community, is in my district. I kind of got rolling on this with the 

Prowler squadrons, ended up working on the ground with our Marines and Army folks in Iraq and Afghanistan. And then, the Army 

is standing up a cadre of EW technicians, 1,600 by 2013 or so. And 

trying to be sure that we do not create just another set of stovepipe 

EW functions within the services, but looking at a more broad, defense-wide EW approach, I think it is real important. 

And my understanding of the CBA was this was 1 of 10 lines I 

think, capabilities-based assessments that were being done over 

the last couple of years. The one related to EW is—the idea is to 

look at a more broad-based approach, and a more integrated approach within the Pentagon. 

General CHILTON. Well, I think that is important. It was brought 

to the attention of the broader community about—a little over a 

year ago, that maybe we had lost attention, focus on the electronic 

warfare area, and it was an area we paid a lot of attention to, I 

know, in the past. I remember, growing up in the Air Force we certainly did. 

And it was heightened not only by shortfalls perhaps in the air 

domain, but it was the need for increased focus in a land domain 

was amplified by the improvised explosive device (IED) problem 

that we faced over in Iraq and now face in Afghanistan, as well, 

and the electronic—you know, the remote ignition of those devices. 

And so, I think you are exactly right, Congressman. We have an 

opportunity here, I think. I am excited to see the results of the FSA 

and how that moves forward, and an opportunity to look at EW 

again in the appropriate light and focus area, and look at it broadly. 

Mr. LARSEN. Just another question. Thank you very much for 

that and expanding on that for me. 

There is an interesting comment in your written testimony that 

you did not cover in your opening testimony. And there is a lot in 

there. Of course, we give you five minutes, so I did not expect you 

to cover everything. 

But then you should expect us to read what you wrote. So, on 

export controls. Near the end you talk about unnecessary constraints by export control legislation and regulation and the need 

for appropriate flexibility to permit relevant technology transfer to 

allies or to decontrol—the decontrol of some technology in a timely 

fashion when commercial availability renders their control no 

longer necessary, mainly to help our friends and allies. 

It is not new to me to hear that from folks. It is maybe new to 

me to hear that from STRATCOM or anyone in the military. 

Can you talk about some of the discussion taking place within 

STRATCOM about export control legislation, regulation, and why 

you see the need for some changes? 
27 

General CHILTON. Yes, I guess it would be unfair for me to say 

that there is a lot of discussion within STRATCOM. And—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Well, let me put it this way. 

General CHILTON. But I will—— 

Mr. LARSEN. You are the four-star general in charge of 

STRATCOM. 

General CHILTON. Sure. 

Mr. LARSEN. It is in your testimony. So, that tells me there is 

enough discussion in STRATCOM—— 

General CHILTON. Well, observation, perhaps, is a better way for 

me to say it. 

And in working with the Space Partnership Council, we work 

very closely with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the 

Joint Staff, NASA, the Air Force. I have listened closely, in particular to some of the past NASA administrator’s concerns about 

America’s ability to compete internationally. I have heard comments from foreign—other folks from the European Space Agency, 

for example, saying the best thing that happened to their commercial space enterprise was International Traffic in Arms Regulations 

(ITAR). I mean, I do not know the veracity of that or not. But the 

comment was made. 

So, I just went down to French Guiana at the invitation of the 

French government, to observe an Ariane 5 space launch and tour 

their facilities. And it was very enlightening to me, and I much appreciated that. 

I think they launched four satellites on top of that Ariane. None 

of them were U.S.-made. I think there was a U.S. company participating in one of the satellites. 

But just data points, if you will, for me. And as I knit that together in my mind and think about what is required to sustain the 

industrial base of the United States of America for our critical communications satellites, our early warning satellites, weather satellites, Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites for the future, et 

cetera, I am concerned from inputs that I am receiving from others 

within our government outside of STRATCOM and the DOD, from 

observations I have made, that perhaps we need to take a look at 

this. 

I understand clearly that we have to protect critical components 

that are sensitive in some sense, a military nature or scientific nature, that we might not want to share for national security reasons. 

But our industrial base is a part of our national security infrastructure, as well. 

And so, all I am suggesting is that I think it would be fair to 

take a look at this and see is it—ask and try to answer the question—are our current regulations and policies putting at risk our 

industrial base for our national security requirements of the future, 

or not? Which could include our ability to compete commercially, 

but, you know, that is certainly out of my lane. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you very much. That was a very informative 

answer. I appreciate it. 

Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for five 

minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. 
28 

General, you know, I do not want to place you in the crossfire 

of any policy decision that this committee may have to deal with. 

So I guess the best way to do that is to be very candid with you 

as to my own policy concern about an issue that has been in the 

news lately, and that I think that there is a growing concern, at 

least on my part, and that is related to the European site. 

I will be very direct with you and members of this committee. I 

believe that that site is in danger of being scaled back, delayed or 

even potentially canceled. And I also believe that there are some 

windows of opportunity that we may have to devalue the Iranian 

nuclear program to the extent that perhaps, you know, the hope is 

that we can prevent that from ever coming into full being. 

And again, an oft-stated concern of mine is that that program 

may eventually lead to giving technology to terrorists that would 

change our concept of freedom forever in our country. 

With the growing, at least incontrovertible, issue of long-range 

missile capability, without even addressing the nuclear component, 

but with the growing, long-range missile capability of Iran—and I 

will ask you, if I can, outside the policy considerations, to just—if 

you could address the advantages, both strategically and tactically, 

that a fixed missile defense site has, like the one that we have 

heretofore planned in Europe, over some of the other sites in terms 

of its defense capability and deterrent capability. 

I hope I have said that right, General. Does that give you enough 

to go on? 

The main advantage I am looking for here is just from a military 

perspective. What is the advantage to having a fixed missile defense site in Europe to deal with potentially Middle Eastern missiles coming either toward the European allies or forward deployed 

troops, or, most importantly, our homeland? 

General CHILTON. Okay. I think I can answer that from a—it is 

really, I think, more of a physics problem than anything. And that 

is, if you envision a threat from Iran in the future, of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), and even at a long-range, Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) threat, a credible threat of 

that being developed, that would hold at risk the United States of 

America, and Europe. 

Then, if you look at just the geometry of that, if your intention 

is to field a system that can defend both of those, or add to the defense of both Europe and the United States of America, then you 

would probably logically look to something on the European continent, in that vicinity. 

If you were just concerned about defense of the United States of 

America, you would not necessarily need to do that. And so, therein 

lies—you know, it is really just a geometry problem and physics 

problem, in my view, but linked closely to our policies and our 

agreements, and also linked closely to the threat and how that 

might develop. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I really hope that this year’s Nuclear Posture 

Review will embrace your own position, so that we can appropriately—and I am switching gears on you—appropriately support 

a nuclear posture that is based on reality, and not academics or 

just abstract theories. 
29 

You mentioned that decreasing the level of readiness for the nuclear stockpile would be like—to use your words—taking the now, 

or sort of the now-holstered gun apart, and mailing pieces of it to 

various parts of the country, and then when you are in a crisis, deciding to reassemble it. 

Now, I think that is a very apt description. But I wonder if you 

could expand on the risk of decreasing the level of readiness for our 

nuclear stockpile. 

General CHILTON. Okay. Again, I made the comments in the context of our current policy and strategy. And I do not take off the 

table the absolute necessity to relook at that as part of a policy or 

strategy review. 

I perhaps overstated, or stated, I think the analogy is still valid. 

But you could also say the analogy could be like taking the gun 

apart and just dispersing it around this room, as opposed to mailing it around the country. So I maybe used one where you envisioned having to rely on FedEx to pull this back together, as opposed to self-assembly. 

But the point is that that is essentially what you are talking 

about doing, is you are delaying the ability, the responsiveness. 

You are eliminating the responsiveness of the system. 

One thing that I think needs to be discussed broadly in the Nuclear Posture Review, and in any policy or strategy discussion with 

regard to our posture, is this concept of stability, strategic stability. 

It was really important in the Cold War, and it was important 

to the Russians and important to us, as well. And there was even 

dialogue between us and the Russians—the Soviets, I should say 

then—on strategic stability. 

And what this refers to in the theory, which I think is, in practice, a real concern, is you want to make sure you have taken away 

any incentive for an adversary to feel the need to strike first—or 

be tempted to strike first, because they felt like they could win. 

And so, how you put your forces on alert can add to—what levels 

of alert and how you posture them—can add to or detract from 

strategic stability. And so, that needs to be considered if we take 

this question up as we go forward. 

How does changing the alert posture of our forces, whether they 

be the ICBMs or the submarines—we clearly did for the bombers 

already—how does that address the calculus of stability in the deterrence equation? 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, General. I certainly wish you the 

best. 

And thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. You are welcome, Mr. Turner. 

Does any member have a further question? 

General Chilton, thank you for being before us today. Thank you 

for your hard work and your leadership of STRATCOM. And the 

thousands of enlisted people, men and women, and the civilian 

force that works with you, thank you very much for their service. 

Please thank them for us. 

This hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee is adjourned. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, ma’am. 

[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 17, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 17, 2009 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 17, 2009 

(55) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER 

Ms. TAUSCHER. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the 

United States, which was established by the FY 2008 defense authorization bill, will 

deliver its final report in two weeks. One of the key issues they have been examining is whether the concept of strategic deterrence changed since the end of the 

Cold War? Do you believe it has? If so, how? 

• What implications might such changes have for the size and composition of the 

U.S. nuclear deterrent force? 

• What implications might such changes have for the non-nuclear elements of 

U.S. strategic posture? 

General CHILTON. The concept of strategic deterrence has evolved since the end 

of the Cold War. Deterrence must be effective across a spectrum of potential adversaries from nation states to individuals as a function of the adversary’s decision 

maker, security environment, U.S. objectives, and other factors. Strategic deterrence 

must address the desire of states and non-state actors to acquire and use weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD) against the U.S. and our allies. Nuclear weapon and 

ballistic missile proliferation remain critical concerns with respect to non-state actors and rogue nation states. In addition to these broader strategic deterrence requirements, our extended deterrence capabilities must assure our allies and encourage non-proliferation, reaffirming the continuing need for a credible, reliable, safe, 

and secure nuclear deterrent. 

The end of the Cold War has had a profound impact on the size and composition 

of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The Nation has reduced our stockpile from over ten 

thousand warheads to just over two thousand operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW). It may be possible to further reduce these numbers, but 

reductions must be done in concert with synchronized revisions to our national nuclear strategy, arms control agreements, and nuclear stockpile modernization efforts. It is anticipated that the NPR will explore and develop the force structure for 

the nuclear forces that will be needed for the next 5–10 years. The Nuclear Posture 

Review (NPR) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on negotiations 

are underway this year and USSTRATCOM will fully support both of those efforts. 

Additionally, future credibility of our nuclear deterrent will depend on stockpile 

modernization. A modern warhead coupled with a responsive nuclear infrastructure 

would retain our ability to hedge against technological or geopolitical uncertainty 

with fewer numbers of warheads in the stockpile. 

We face threats today that cannot be deterred with nuclear weapons alone. We 

have been the victim of cyberspace intrusions and have seen other nations develop 

capabilities to hold our space assets at risk. The strategic deterrence challenge for 

the non-nuclear elements of U.S. strategic posture is to hold at risk what our enemies value most, to counter ideology, WMD acquisition, ensure survivability of our 

networks and space assets, and protect against a WMD attack. Along, and in coordination with the NPR, the Quadrennial Defense Review is anticipated to explore and 

develop recommendations for non-nuclear forces that will also consider their value 

in deterring adversaries along these lines. Our non-nuclear capabilities must continue to advance in technology and quantities to address the broad range of adversaries in a balanced way. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is expected to be completed 

by the end of 2009. What key issues should the NPR address? 

General CHILTON. As we seek to balance capabilities and resources for our complex strategic environment, the NPR should address the following: 

1. Role of nuclear forces in U.S. national security strategy, planning, and programming. 

2. Policy requirements and objectives for the U.S. to maintain a reliable, safe, secure, and credible nuclear deterrence posture. 

3. The relationship between U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, targeting strategy, 

and arms control objectives. 
56 

4. The role missile defense capabilities and conventional forces play in determining the role and size of nuclear forces. 

5. The levels and composition of the nuclear delivery systems required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any plans 

for replacing or modifying existing systems. 

6. The nuclear weapons complex necessary to sustain a credible, reliable, and safe 

nuclear deterrent and remain flexible to respond to geopolitical and technological change. 

7. The active and inactive nuclear weapons stockpile required to support U.S. national and military strategy, including any plans for replacing or modifying 

warheads. 

8. Recognition of the need to assure allies as well as deter potential adversaries. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What do you believe are the security threats with the greatest implications for our strategic posture and policies? In view of such threats, are we 

making the right investments in strategic systems? 

General CHILTON. The security threats with the greatest implications to our strategic posture and policies are regional and non-state actors who seek to develop, acquire, proliferate, or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Over the last decade, 

states have expanded both nuclear weapon production capabilities and delivery system testing; further increasing the risk of proliferation to non-state actors seeking 

to harm the U.S. and our allies. 

USSTRATCOM supports an interagency approach which synchronizes government-wide deterrence activities to ensure our national leadership has credible capabilities to meet today’s broad security challenges to combat the spread, transfer, or 

use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. We must continue to credibly deter 

through a broad strategy that includes a complementary approach to the 

sustainment, modernization and security of our strategic systems as well as a clear 

focus on nonproliferation activities. We must continue making critical investments 

to sustain, modernize and recapitalize our strategic forces to maintain a credible deterrent into the foreseeable future. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What is your assessment of other countries’ nuclear and strategic 

forces programs and intentions? How should they influence U.S. strategic forces policy and programs? 

General CHILTON. The U.S. is the only nuclear weapon state party to the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty that is not in the process of modernizing its nuclear arsenal. Other countries are exercising the full weapons development cycle (design, develop, produce and assess) and have committed to modernization of their delivery 

systems, stockpiles and associated infrastructures. To maintain a credible deterrent, 

assure allies, and ensure a safe, reliable, secure nuclear stockpile the U.S. must 

maintain the capability to fully exercise this process. The U.S. nuclear enterprise 

infrastructure has atrophied during the past two decades and requires a near term 

commitment to recapitalize key production capabilities needed to sustain the deterrent. The nation has sustained its nuclear deterrent by extending the lives of aging 

Cold War strategic forces and relying on a large hedge of non-deployed legacy warheads to manage risk. While today’s U.S. stockpile remains reliable, safe, and secure, concerns exist about long-term confidence in our aging weapons. We must explore options to increase the long-term confidence in our stockpile while also recapitalizing the infrastructure and reducing the large hedge of non-deployed weapons. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Do you see any risks to the U.S. moving lower than the Moscow 

Treaty’s specified range of 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed warheads? What 

specific military conditions might make further stockpile reductions acceptable? 

General CHILTON. Today’s stockpile adequately addresses current policy and strategy goals, but we will incur additional risk if operationally deployed warheads are 

reduced below levels needed to address these goals. Without a production capability, 

we currently mitigate technological and geopolitical risk by maintaining a large 

hedge of non-deployed weapons. This year’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), will provide the national policy and strategy 

basis for defining future nuclear force structure, stockpile, and infrastructure requirements, and will consider current and potential future military conditions in 

their decisions. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Would a decrease in operationally deployed warheads to a range 

of 1,000 to 1,200 substantially change the investment required to maintain our nuclear arsenal? 

General CHILTON. The nuclear posture review will examine this type of questions. 

However, because a significant portion of the infrastructure cost associated with 

maintaining the arsenal is fixed, an action to reduce operationally deployed war-
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heads by itself would not significantly change the investment required. While a 

smaller stockpile and reduction in warhead types can reduce long-term operating 

and sustainment costs, investment is still required to retain core human capital and 

manufacturing capabilities inherent in a credible nuclear deterrent. In the shortterm, deployed stockpile reductions may increase costs for warhead storage, transportation and dismantlement. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What impact, if any, would such a reduction in deployed warheads 

have on STRATCOM? 

General CHILTON. It is anticipated that reduction in the number of nuclear weapons would be accompanied by a new strategy and guidance for optimizing the strategic deterrent forces to meet the U.S. national security requirements. As a result, 

USSTRATCOM would be tasked to develop and ultimately implement operational 

direction to the nuclear forces in coordination with force providers. 

USSTRATCOM will continue its advocacy efforts to ensure delivery systems and 

warheads are highly reliable, leaving no doubt of their effectiveness or our ability 

to use them if directed by the President. As the number of weapons is reduced, the 

reliability of those that remain must be assured, and if possible, enhanced. 

USSTRATCOM will continue to place great effort into ensuring the warheads are 

safe and secure, both to prevent accidents and to prevent unauthorized use. No matter the number of deployed warheads, nuclear surety will remain one of the central 

tenants of the nuclear enterprise. 

USSTRATCOM must ensure that U.S. nuclear forces are ready, sufficiently diverse, and operationally flexible to provide the president with the necessary range 

of options for their use and as a hedge against the technological failure of any particular delivery system or warhead design. 

Thus, as the number of deployed weapons decreases, USSTRATCOM will be a 

leading advocate to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the remaining 

stockpile. A strong stockpile stewardship program, coupled with a reinvigorated, albeit smaller, nuclear infrastructure, as well as sufficient weapon and platform diversity, will ensure the continued viability of the nuclear force to meet national requirements. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Please describe the process involved in setting requirements for 

the future nuclear force structure. What is STRATCOM’s role? What obstacles or 

challenges might be impeding a more specific definition of military requirements for 

the future nuclear force structure? 

General CHILTON. Setting future nuclear force structure requirements starts with 

the President’s National Security Strategy. From this general guidance, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs develop the national military 

objectives for the Armed Forces. USSTRATCOM roles in this process include: advising as required during policy and strategy development, analyzing proposed force 

structures for military sufficiency and operational suitability, advocating for future 

capabilities that support national objectives, and developing operational plans from 

which force readiness requirements flow. 

USSTRATCOM is one of several organizations who are responsible for ensuring 

a reliable, safe, and secure deterrent capability for the nation. To accomplish this, 

clear articulation of policy and strategy are needed. Without the creation of a responsive infrastructure and investments to sustain the human capital necessary to 

maintain long-term confidence in our nuclear deterrent, military requirements will 

need to consider the technical risk and geopolitical change associated with an aging 

stockpile. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Several alternatives have been proposed to sustain and/or modernize our nuclear weapons; these range from remanufacturing aging components 

to their original specifications to the reliable replacement warhead, as well as life 

extension programs and reuse concepts. From a military perspective, what are the 

benefits, challenges, and risks of these various alternatives? 

General CHILTON. We must have long-term confidence in the reliability, safety 

and security of our stockpile. Warhead life-extension programs (LEPs) provide limited opportunity to improve reliability, safety or security, due to design constraints 

associated with our legacy warheads. There are materials used in legacy weapons 

that pose production challenges, and we are a number of years from an adequate 

capability to re-produce many components needed to sustain our stockpile. Reuse 

concepts that use components from the existing stockpile in different combinations 

may provide options for greater improvements in reliability, safety, and security but 

require additional study to fully explore designs, benefits and production requirements. Replacement warhead designs offer the opportunity to introduce the most 

significant improvements in reliability, safety, security and sustainability, but require a plutonium pit manufacturing capability in the near-term. LEP and reuse options will also require some level of pit manufacturing capability in the mid-to-long- 
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term as existing pits reach end-of-life. Regardless of the selected sustainment strategy, recapitalization of both uranium and plutonium research and manufacturing facilities and manpower are critical to the long-term stockpile sustainment of the deterrent. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. In the wake of the Minot-Barksdale unauthorized transfer in 2007 

and the nosecone misshipment to Taiwan in 2006, several reviews of the DOD nuclear enterprise were conducted. What is your assessment of the corrective actions 

taken to date? What would be your top priorities among recommendations that have 

not yet been implemented? 

General CHILTON. USSTRATCOM has aggressively implemented corrective actions to address issues identified by various reviews of the DOD nuclear enterprise. 

In response to the recommendation that ‘‘The Commander, USSTRATCOM should 

assume responsibility for directing the operational effectiveness of U.S. nuclear 

forces and ensure the command is actively involved in monitoring the readiness of 

nuclear forces, including the synchronization of corrective action for deficiencies and 

improvements,’’ CDR USSTRATCOM has established a Flag/General Officer position 

dedicated to directing day-to-day oversight of nuclear force operations and the command and control system. This officer is responsible to the Commander for managing nuclear readiness and assessment reporting, as well as oversight of the war 

planning system modernization. He is the lead for all nuclear functions across 

USSTRATCOM. 

USSTRATCOM has established a Nuclear Enterprise Council, chaired by the Deputy Commander, which brings together USSTRATCOM’s component and nuclear 

task force Commanders to identify, assess and monitor emerging issues with potential to impact the nuclear mission and to make recommendations on nuclear matters 

to the Commander, USSTRATCOM. 

The USSTRATCOM Nuclear Enterprise Board is a working body dedicated to supporting the USSTRATCOM nuclear mission and advocacy roles. Specifically, this 

forum reviews assessments that judge compliance with U.S. nuclear weapons command and control, safety, and security directives, and oversees training and readiness assessments of Headquarters, USSTRATCOM; service components; task forces 

and Joint Functional Component Commands to support the USSTRATCOM mission 

and provides recommendations to the Nuclear Enterprise Council. 

USSTRATCOM has also taken action to observe all nuclear-related inspections, 

and taken steps to increase the rigor of command-level exercises. To that end, it 

would be beneficial for USSTRATCOM to partner with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate a series 

of senior seminar wargames to enhance understanding of nuclear deterrence and to 

revalidate current strategies or develop new strategies and operational concepts regarding the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What are the military’s requirements for mid-term and long-term 

PGS capabilities? 

General CHILTON. USSTRATCOM requires a capability to deliver prompt, precise, 

conventional kinetic effects at intercontinental ranges against strategic, high-value, 

time-sensitive targets. A prompt global strike capability will provide greater flexibility for National leadership and is most appropriate when there is a serious threat 

to national security and time to position other forces is not available. We are focused 

on maturing technologies to field a system and close the capability gap as soon as 

possible, leveraging technology developments in the PGS Defense-wide account to 

reach a full operational capability. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Can you comment on potential scenarios where a PGS capability 

would be used? 

General CHILTON. Prompt global strike will be useful in any scenario where a 

rapid, non-nuclear kinetic response is either the most appropriate and/or most 

tactically feasible option to strike a target and conventional forces are unavailable 

or cannot quickly respond to the situation. In that capacity, a prompt global strike 

capability will provide greater flexibility to National leadership facing serious 

threats to national security when conventional forces are unavailable or cannot 

quickly respond to the situation. 

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 2008 report on conventional prompt 

global strike developed several credible scenarios based on material provided by Department of Defense officials, historical experience with actual or seriously contemplated strikes, and intelligence projections. The scenarios include the need to 

strike a ballistic missile launcher poised to launch a weapon of mass destruction 

(WMD) at the U.S. or allies; an opportunity to strike a gathering of terrorist leaders 

or a shipment of WMD during a brief period of vulnerability; and the need to disable 

an adversary’s command-and-control capability as the leading edge of a broader 
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combat operation. The NAS report is comprehensive and validates the conventional 

prompt global strike capability gap. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Are current joint space programs with the intelligence community 

adequately supporting warfighter intelligence requirements? How might you change 

the investment strategy to better support the warfighter in theater? 

General CHILTON. Today’s warfighter intelligence requirements are a function of 

the fast-moving, quickly-evolving operations on the ground, which challenge the 

ability of our current joint space programs to respond in real-time to changing situations requiring immediate, concise, and comprehensive updates. Our existing ability 

to collect data is unsurpassed, yet we lack sufficient automated analysis and processing capabilities to push fused information within tactically relevant timeframes 

to the warfighter. 

Our strategy must focus on processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) 

through machine-to-machine interface that provides combatant commanders direct 

access to fused intelligence information. This may address future warfighter intelligence support needs. To accomplish this strategy, we seek to improve support to 

the warfighter in theater through our advocacy role for space capabilities and Combatant Commander level Senior Warfighter Forum (SWARF) review and validation 

of intelligence requirements. Additionally, we participate in forums that include the 

intelligence community in balancing capability requirements. Today, requirements 

are being met to the best of our existing abilities and capabilities. However, the ability to meet future warfighter needs could be adversely impacted by procurement and 

acquisition challenges. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Please describe the potential operational concepts and value that 

you see ‘‘operationally responsive’’ space (ORS) solutions providing. What is your assessment of the ORS program office implementation and its responsiveness to 

warfighter needs? 

General CHILTON. Potential operational concepts from ORS solutions involve augmentation and first-response reconstitution of the most critical products and services provided by our space capabilities today. In response to stated COCOM needs, 

particular emphasis within ORS is on rapid reconstitution and augmentation in the 

space mission areas of ISR and communications. 

The value of ORS solutions lies in providing a third supporting and responsive 

element to our National Security Space portfolio. ORS solutions will be designed to 

be complementary to the existing and planned space systems and to the use of purchased commercial space products and services that will together meet the bulk of 

our national military space needs. ORS has a mix of attributes—responsiveness, 

flexibility, affordability, and assuredness—that are unique relative to these other 

two approaches (USG systems and commercial space). 

USSTRATCOM has been actively engaged with the ORS Office for the past 18 

months in providing Joint Force Commander urgent needs for space effects. In that 

time, we have requested ORS assessment of three different needs—UHF communications augmentation, Space Situational Awareness (SSA) of the geosynchronous 

belt, and a specific type of ISR product in support of USCENTCOM. In each case, 

we have been satisfied with the effectiveness and responsiveness of the ORS process 

and with the breadth of solution options. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What is our national and military policy if our space assets are 

attacked? Do we have clear ‘‘red lines’’ or thresholds for attacks against our space 

assets? What are the merits of a declaratory policy that signals our intent and lays 

out consequences? 

General CHILTON. The United States views the proliferation of anti-satellite weapon systems with grave concern for several reasons: the implied threat to free use 

of space for peaceful use by nations, the collateral effects of employment of such capabilities on the safety of human space flight and on satellite operations. 

Regarding ‘‘red lines,’’ the National Space Policy provides general guidance. The 

United States considers space capabilities—including ground and space segments 

and the links between them—vital to its national interests. The United States considers its and other states’ space systems to have the rights of unhindered passage 

through, and operations in, space without interference. Any purposeful interference 

with these assets will be interpreted as an infringement of our rights and considered 

an escalation in any conflict or crisis. The United States reserves the right to defend 

and protect its space systems with a wide range of options. 

We do not favor a black and white declaratory policy. There is no sure declaration 

that would cover the ‘‘whole of Government’’ scenario responses and we would risk 

our credibility if we failed to respond as formally stated. Historically, the U.S. has 

maintained a declaratory policy to allow senior leadership flexibility in their response to infringements on our stated vital interests. 
60 

Ms. TAUSCHER. What are the merits of ‘‘rules of the road’’ and/or codes of conduct 

in space? 

General CHILTON. Given the increasing use of space, frequent calls have been 

made for ‘‘Rules of the Road,’’ a ‘‘Code of Conduct,’’ or ‘‘Best Practices Guidelines’’ 

for conducting space operations. The U.S. Department of State’s naming convention 

recommends we refer to any proposed guidelines as ‘‘Best Practice Guidelines.’’ Proposals of this type may be described as providing ‘‘a common understanding of acceptable or unacceptable behavior within a medium shared by all nations.’’ The U.S. 

received a third draft ‘‘EU Code of Conduct’’ following approval by EU ministers 

2008 and the Department of Defense is leading the U.S. Government. The United 

States will play a leading role in advancing transparency and confidence building 

measures (TCBMs) relating to space activities. Such TCBMs can help increase 

transparency regarding governmental space policies, strategies and potentially hazardous activities. This can help to reduce uncertainty over intentions and decrease 

the risk of misinterpretation of miscalculation. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. The head of Army SMDC has said that within three years, China 

may be able to challenge the U.S. at a ‘‘near-peer level’’ in space. What are 

STRATCOM and DOD doing to ensure that the U.S. military will maintain its access to space, to defend U.S. interests in space, and to engage in mutual threat reduction measures? 

General CHILTON. As clearly articulated in the National Space Policy, the United 

States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for 

peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity. While other nations expand 

their access to space and space services, we must actively maintain our own access 

to space and we must defend our interests in space. We continue to advocate for 

an improved Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capability as a key enabler to support access to space. In defense of our space capability, space protection efforts by 

USSTRATCOM, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC)-National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Space Protection Program, and others are being broadened to ensure 

adequate protection of the military, civil and commercial space sectors that support 

U.S. national security and ensure continued access to and freedom of action in 

space. We are also developing Operationally Responsive Space concepts and technologies that can be employed to rapidly supplement or reconstitute space forces. 

USSTRATCOM and DOD continue to advocate for spaceflight safety and minimization of space debris to reduce the threat to our on orbit assets. As 

USSTRATCOM assumes responsibility for space surveillance information sharing as 

currently executed under the Air Force’s Pilot Program for Commercial and Foreign 

Entities (CFE), USSTRATCOM will share Space Situational Awareness information, 

as appropriate, and encourage responsible activities in space to mitigate risk 

through a cooperative arrangement. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Is the national security space community adequately organized 

and managed to address the challenges ahead in space security and space acquisition? 

General CHILTON. The recent report to Congress entitled ‘‘Report to Congress of 

the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of National Security Space’’ (Young Panel) provided an assessment on this issue. 

As the single point of contact for military space, USSTRATCOM is responsible for 

planning and conducting space operations and advocating for space capabilities. We 

provide military representation to U.S. national agencies, commercial entities and 

international agencies for matters related to military operations and manned space 

flight. Additionally, our diverse security cooperation, space situational awareness, 

and warning and attack assessment activities necessitate a whole-of-government approach that highlights the need for strong leadership and synchronized actions both 

in acquisition and in operations governmentwide. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Can you provide us an update on the new global missile defense 

concept of operations that STRATCOM is developing in conjunction with the other 

COCOMs? 

• What are the key elements of the new CONOPS? 

• Does it change any of STRATCOM’s existing authorities with regard to missile 

defense? 

General CHILTON. STRATCOM JFCC IMD is completing a final review of the 

Global Missile Defense CONOPS across DOD, prior to submission to the CJCS and 

SECDEF for review and approval. A collaborative planning process is designed in 

to address specified ballistic missile threats. The CONOPS will additionally serve 

as a framework for developing Geographic Combatant Commander MD plans and 

for integrating allied and coalition partner capabilities into the U.S. Missile Defense 

architecture. The CONOPs includes methods for responding to the dynamic situa-
61 

tion of theater campaigns with recommendations for the allocation of capabilities; 

as well as the integration of tracking and defensive operations support. The Global 

Missile Defense CONOPS does not change any of USSTRATCOM’s existing authorities which are set by the UCP. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. In 2006, the Joint Staff completed a study identifying the force 

structure needs for upper tier missile defense systems, i.e., Aegis BMD and THAAD. 

What are the force structure needs for other missile defense systems, such as Patriot, Ground-based Midcourse Defense, and sensors? 

General CHILTON. Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization 

(JIAMDO) completed a Joint Capability Mix Study that identified upper-tier missile 

defense needs. A review of the process for determining force structure and inventory 

needs will take place within the larger strategy and policy review directed by Section 234 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 

2009. This effort will occur over the next year. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Last year, Congress directed the Department of Defense to develop an overarching plan for setting missile defense force structure and inventory 

requirements, which is due by April 15, 2009. 

• Can you provide the committee an update on the status of that report? 

• What role will STRATCOM and other COCOMs play in this process? 

General CHILTON. OSD (AT&L) was assigned responsibility for this action and 

STRATCOM and the other combatant commands have been fully involved in the 

plan development. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. In 2004, STRATCOM conducted a Military Utility Assessment 

(MUA) of the initial set of Ground-based Missile Defense (GMD) capabilities deployed in California and Alaska to determine their militarily effectiveness. 

• How confident are you in current GMD system capabilities? 

• Do you have any plans to conduct another MUA of the GMD system? 

• If so, when do you expect to have the MUA completed? 

General CHILTON. We continue to have confidence in Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) capability. This confidence is based on experience in day-to-day operations, operability demonstrations, and numerous flight and ground tests including 

the Dec 08 successful intercept of a threat class target with a ground-based interceptor launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. 

USSTRATCOM conducts BMDS Military Utility Assessments (MUAs) annually. 

The most recent, dated 31 Mar 08, reflects system status as of 31 Dec 07. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Please update us on missile defense international cooperation efforts. Where do you see as the greatest opportunities for international collaboration 

and integration? 

General CHILTON. We are currently cooperating with international partners, both 

in real-world operations, as well as in future wargames and experimentation. 

Consultations and collaborations were conducted with several nations during the 

recent launch by North Korea of a TD-2 class missile. We have been supporting the 

USEUCOM deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar to Israel and preparations for JUNIPER COBRA 09 exercise, and have provided supporting expertise in planning for 

potential deployments of European interceptors and midcourse radar. 

USSTRATCOM’s component, JFCC IMD, is leading an eight nation future missile 

defense policy war-game called NIMBLE TITAN 2010, in which we have been exploring higher-level policy issues and ramifications for coalition missile defense in 

discrete steps. We recently completed a Limited Objective Experiment in March 09, 

which was a Policy workshop with State and Foreign Affairs treaty and legal experts from all eight player nations, as well as NATO’s International Military Staff. 

The wargame is scheduled for April 2010. We have also been involved in Joint 

Project OPTIC WINDMILL (JPOW), which is a Dutch-German-led exercise that integrates operations of missile defense units, such as European PATRIOTs with higher level C2 systems. JPOW continues to be an excellent mechanism to explore possible NATO integration with U.S. BMD capabilities at the tactical and operational 

level. These two wargames, as well as exercises with our Pacific allies, continue to 

be our most significant venues for international warfighter cooperation. 

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