UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ JAMES RUDNICK, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. RICK RAEMISCH; JOHN CHAPDELAINE; JENNIFER ANDERSON; NICOLE WILSON; ERIC HOFFMAN; SAMORA; BROWN; DAVID CUSTER; DARREN COREY; WILLIAM SHERWOOD, Defendants - Appellees. No. 17-1262 (D.C. No. 1:16-CV -02071-RM-KLM) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before MORITZ , McKAY , and KELLY , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ James Rudnick, a Colorado prisoner pro ceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a tem porary restraining order or preliminary injunction. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 10, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 I. Background Mr. Rudnick sued various prison offi cials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by placing restrictions on his access to the prison’s law library and on his printing of legal materials; by vi ewing, sharing, and threatening to delete his le gal files; and by confiscating his personal eyeglasses and replacing them with state- issued eyeglasses. Mr. Ru dnick relied on the same essential allegations to support his moti on for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. A magistrate judge issued a report and recommended denying the motion because Mr. Rudnick failed to show he w ould suffer irreparable harm if the motion was not granted. Mr. Rudnick objected to the magistrate j udge’s recommendation, but the district court overruled the objec tion and adopted the magistrate judge’s report in its entirety, stating, “Plaintiff’s objection is long with detailed recitations of the law and restatements as to the merits of hi s claims [but] at no poi nt does he cite to any specific errors in [the magistrate judge’s] factual fi ndings or legal analysis.” R., Vol. 3 at 137. II. Analysis We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s deni al of a request for a preliminary injunction. Little v. Jones , 607 F.3d 1245, 1250 ( 10th Cir. 2010). We liberally construe Mr. Rudnick’s pro se pleadings. See Childs v. Miller , 713 F.3d 1262, 1264 (10t h Cir. 2013).3 To prevail on his motion, Mr. Rudnick needed to show “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2 ) a likelihood that [he] will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief ; (3) that the balance of e quities tips in [his] favor; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest.” Little , 607 F.3d at 1251 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Because a pr eliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.” Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers , 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (1 0th Cir. 2003). Further, because the purpose of prelimin ary injunctions is to preserve the relative positions of the partie s until trial, they are specifica lly disfavored if they alter the status quo, are mandatory (as opposed to prohibitory), or afford the movant all the relief that could be recove red after a full trial. See Schrier v. Univ. of Colo. , 427 F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (10t h Cir. 2005). “Such disfavored in junctions must be more closely scrutinized to assure that the exigencies of the case support the granting of a remedy that is extraordinary even in the normal course.” Id. at 1259 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, “prison o fficials’ exercises of discretion should generally be respected, as federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state offi cials trying to manage a volatile environment.” Wilson v.
Jones , 430 F.3d 1113, 1123 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quot ation marks omitted). A. Legal Access As noted by the magistrate judge, Mr. Ru dnick did not allege that he was being denied all access to the prison’s law library a nd his legal files. Ra ther, he was merely seeking improved access to both. For exam ple, Mr. Rudnick sought access to his4 legal files at least three times per week and unfettered access to photocopy and print documents. The magistrate judge determined that such allegati ons were inadequate to show irreparable injury supporting injunctive relief on this claim, and we agree. “[T]he constitutional obligation to provi de inmates access to courts does not require states to give inmates unlimited access to a law libra ry, and inmates do not have the right to select the met hod by which access will be provided.” Penrod v.
Zavaras , 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Mr. Rudnick has not challenged the magist rate judge’s finding that he has some access to the law library’s resources, nor has he shown an irrepara ble injury resulting from prison regulations limiting pr isoners’ computer access to one two-and-a-half-hour session per week and requiring them to pay for photocopies and printouts. His ample filings in the district court belie a ny argument that he is being denied meaningful access to the courts. Moreover, Mr. Rudnick has not shown that “the denial of legal resour ces hindered [his] efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim,” id. , in part because he has not identified or described the legal action he seeks to
pursue. Mr. Rudnick also wants to be able to use the prison’s legal access program without having to accept the prison’s terms and conditions, which he contends are unconscionable because they allow prison offici als to view prisoners’ files to monitor compliance with the terms and conditions. He further cont ends that prison officials have shared the contents of his files with other indivi duals, including prisoners and the state attorney general, a nd threatened to delete those files. But the record does5 not support the conclusion that he is likely to succeed on the merits on these issues. Even “when a prison regula tion impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legiti mate penological interests.” Turner v. Safely , 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Mr. Rudni ck has not shown that the terms and conditions are not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, such as ensuring all prisoners have access to the prison’s limited resour ces while protecting against the misuse of those re sources. And his allegations that his files were shared and could be deleted “contai n insufficient factual inform ation to conclude that a constitutional violation is plausi ble, rather than possible.” Gee v. Pacheco , 627 F.3d 1178, 1192 (10t h Cir. 2010). Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Mr. Rudnick had not met hi s burden to show a clear and unequivocal right to relief on his legal-access claim. B. Eyeglasses The magistrate judge acknowledged that Mr. Rudnick’s allegations about his state-issued eyeglasses may rise to the level of seri ous or substantial harm. Nonetheless, she concluded that he ha d not shown that the alleged harm was irreparable. The magistrate judge found that Mr. Rudnick had been issued glasses that matched his prescription and was eligib le for an optometry appointment within two months of the court’s order. Thus, he was not being denied eyeglasses entirely. He did not support his conten tion that the state-issued gl asses were inadequate with any evidence other than his own self-servi ng statements. And his contention that6 future prescriptions and lens types provide d would be inadequate was speculative. Again, the magistrate judge cited the doc ket as evidence that Mr. Rudnick had not been significantly hindered in his ability to prepare and submit numerous filings despite the limitations he complained of bo th with respect to hi s eyeglasses and his access to the prison’s legal services. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Mr. Rudnick’s allegations do not satisf y the demanding standard required for a preliminary injunction on this claim. III. Conclusion We affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Rudnick’s motion for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunc tion. We grant Mr. Rudnick’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and remind hi m of his obligation to continue making partial payments until his fili ng fee has been paid in full.

Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge