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S. HRG. 111–441 

OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 16, 2009 

Serial No. J–111–44 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

MATT MINER, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 1 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 87 

Sessions, Hon. Jeff, a U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama .......................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department 

of Justice, Washington, D.C. ............................................................................... 4 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Robert S. Mueller, III to questions submitted by Senators Schumer, Whitehouse, Kaufman, Specter, Franken, Grassley, Kyl, Sessions and 

Coburn ................................................................................................................... 40 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department 

of Justice, Washington, D.C., statement ............................................................ 89 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Kohl, Feinstein, Feingold, Schumer, 

Cardin, Whitehouse, Klobuchar, Kaufman, Specter, Franken, Sessions, Hatch, and Grassley. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Chairman LEAHY. Good morning. I always hate to rush the photographers. If I do this wrong, I hear about it at family gatherings. 

[Laughter.] 

And the photographers understand what I am talking about. 

Today we hold our second hearing this Congress on oversight of 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Of course, we welcome the Director, Robert Mueller, back to the Committee. As Senator Sessions 

and I were saying to Director Mueller just before we started, there 

is a briefing underway on Afghanistan, and that is why a number 

of Senators have to be gone. Others may be delighted to be here. 

I see Senator Grassley, my old friend of decades here. He would 

probably rather be here than Finance these days. 

But I appreciate Director Mueller’s continued dedication to working with Congress to ensure that the FBI can effectively pursue its 

critical missions in law enforcement and national security while 

maintaining the values and freedoms that define us as Americans. 

Last month, Attorney General Holder announced a heightened 

role for the FBI with the formation of a High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group to interrogate the most dangerous and high-value 

terrorist suspects. The group, bringing together experienced professional interrogators, analysts, subject matter experts, and linguists 

from across the intelligence community, the law enforcement community, and the Department of Defense, is going to be housed 

within the FBI. I have talked with Attorney General Holder about 

this. I understand the internal debates that went on on this matter, but the HIG is being created to improve the ability of the 

United States to interrogate dangerous terrorists effectively, and 

doing it in a manner not only consistent with our law but consistent with the values that make America different than other 

2 

countries. And I think it is a welcomed signal the administration 

has chosen to house the HIG within the FBI. The FBI is an agency 

with a long history of proven success in interrogation without resorting to extreme methods that violate our laws and our values 

and fail to make us safer. 

In March, when the Director was before us, I noted his important 

statement last year commemorating the 100th anniversary of the 

FBI. In fact, I got a copy of that and put it in the Congressional 

Record. The Director said, ‘‘It is not enough to stop the terrorist— 

we must stop him while maintaining his civil liberties. It is not 

enough to catch the criminal—we must catch him while respecting 

his civil rights. It is not enough to prevent foreign countries from 

stealing our secrets—we must prevent that from happening while 

still upholding the rule of law. The rule of law, civil liberties, and 

civil rights—these are not our burdens. They are what make us 

better. And they are what have made us better for the past 100 

years.’’ 

I agree with him. 

The Committee is soon going to turn to discussion of the expiring 

provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, what needs to be done in that 

regard. During the past few years, audit provisions included in the 

previous PATRIOT Act statutes brought to light the misuse of certain tools provided by the PATRIOT Act. For example, National Security Letters allow the Government to collect sensitive information, such as personal financial records. As Congress expanded the 

NSL authority in recent years, I raised concerns about how the FBI 

handles the information it collects on Americans. I noted that, with 

no real limits imposed by Congress, the FBI could store this information electronically and use it for large-scale data mining operations. 

We know that the NSL authority was significantly misused. In 

2008, the Department of Justice Inspector General issued a report 

on the FBI’s use of NSLs, revealing serious over collection of information. 

I have also closely tracked the use of Section 215 of the original 

PATRIOT Act, which authorizes an order for business records. I 

have long believed that greater oversight of this section is required, 

including broader access to judicial review of the nondisclosure orders that are so often issued with Section 215 demands for records. 

Finally, I have raised concerns over the misuse of exigent letters 

to obtain phone records and other sensitive records of Americans, 

including reporters—including reporters—without a warrant, without emergency conditions, and without a follow-up legal process. 

Director Mueller has assured us that appropriate steps have been 

taken to prevent a repeat of that abuse. He has helped address 

concerns that records illegally obtained with these letters may have 

been inappropriately retained by the Government. 

So I hope he would agree that as we consider the reauthorization 

of expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act, we should keep in mind 

the proven effectiveness of audits, reviews, and continuing oversight by Congress. 

Our oversight also includes review of the FBI’s traditional, and 

vital, law enforcement role. The FBI has just released the 2008 

crime statistics, and the work of law enforcement and the trend 

3 

lines are to be commended. I hope that the preliminary indications 

for this year show the continuation of these trends despite the economic downturn and financial crisis and that the assistance we 

were able to include in the economic stimulus package to State and 

local law enforcement will help to keep crime down throughout the 

country. 

In May, Congress passed and the President signed into law the 

Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act which gives investigators and 

prosecutors the resources they need to aggressively detect and 

prosecute the mortgage fraud and financial fraud that contributed 

to the massive economic crisis. 

Director Mueller, I want to thank you personally and the Bureau 

for the help you gave us in putting together that important piece 

of legislation. The testimony of your Deputy and others who came 

up here was extremely important to make sure that we wrote a law 

that would actually give law enforcement the tools they need to 

combat this really vicious and malicious form of fraud. 

I think we need a similarly aggressive approach to combating 

health care fraud, another insidious form of fraud that victimizes 

the most vulnerable Americans and drives up the cost of health 

care for all of us. And seeing Senator Grassley here, I might note 

that Senator Grassley was my chief cosponsor on that piece of legislation and helped make sure that we got it voted on the floor, and 

I know it was applauded when it was signed into law by the President. So I applaud the Department for its commitment to reducing 

waste and excess in the health care system. 

I thank Director Mueller for coming here, and once I again I 

thank the hard-working men and women of the FBI, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Senator Sessions, you wished to say something. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF SESSIONS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF ALABAMA 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Director Mueller. Not often enough in our country do we have people 

holding positions for which their background and learning and experience equip them exceptionally well, and I believe you are one 

of the most capable leaders we have in our country. You are utterly 

experienced in the matters that you handle now every day, and I 

thank you and all your agents who work tirelessly to make sure 

that we are not subject to another attack in this country and to 

fight crime and fraud throughout our country. 

And I know a lot of us were dismayed last month when Abdel 

al-Megrahi, the person who was involved in the bombing of Pan 

Am Flight 103 at Lockerbie was released. And thank you for speaking directly on behalf of the feelings of so many of us that this was 

an unconscionable and unacceptable decision to release that murderer, and the political environment that he was released in made 

it even worse. Every now and then a leader like yourself needs to 

speak out on those kinds of issues, and I appreciate that. 

There are a number of issues I would like to talk to you about. 

I am on the Armed Services Committee, and I need to be at this 

briefing on Afghanistan. It is at a critical stage now, so I will not 

4 

be able to stay throughout this hearing. But some of the questions 

I will submit to you in writing and ask a few before I leave. 

Last month, Attorney General Holder announced he was establishing a High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group. The interrogators will operate out of the FBI under the guidelines established by 

the Army Field Manual. According to a Department press release, 

the group would be subject to the National Security Council for 

‘‘policy guidance and oversight.’’ Beyond the Department’s announcement and a few press reports, we know very little about how 

it will operate, either administratively or operationally. We need to 

learn more about that. 

I would just say this: That is an odd mixture. The FBI’s entire 

heritage and background and training is focused on civil law enforcement in America and prosecution of cases in Federal courts, 

primarily, in this country. We have always had military commissions. They are referred to in the Constitution, and we have had 

them before to deal with people who are unlawfully at war with the 

United States. And they are not treated in the same way, and I do 

not understand this at all. It really is an odd mixture to me. It is 

blurring lines that should not be blurred. 

Last week, we had testimony from the National Academy of 

Sciences on strengthening forensics in America, and they questioned whether law enforcement should be involved in any of the 

forensic activities. I think perhaps the greatest technological development in criminal justice history is the FBI fingerprint program 

and its availability to every law enforcement agency in America, 

and it is used hundreds of thousands of times every week. And this 

would be an issue that I think we need to talk about, whether the 

FBI would be required, if that policy were to be effected, to somehow transfer this out of the oversight that you have so ably given 

it for so many years. 

This week, the Committee will consider legislation to shield journalists from being compelled to testify or produce any documents 

in investigations relating to certain protected information. I believe 

this information will do considerable—this legislation as written 

will do damage to our national security. There are reasons, very 

good reasons, that nations have to maintain a certain amount of secrecy, and I think we need to be aware of that, and I hope to ask 

you questions about that. 

So thank you for being here today. I look forward to your testimony, and I will probably submit some written questions to you 

later. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. We will keep the record open for 

any other statements, and, Director Mueller, please feel free to go 

ahead, sir. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, DIRECTOR, 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, and good morning, Chairman Leahy, 

Senator Sessions, and members of the Committee. Thank you for 

having me here today. 

5 

When I was before the Committee back in March, I updated you 

on our national security threats, our strategies to prevent those 

threats from occurring, and ongoing efforts to develop our intelligence capabilities and infrastructure. The statement I have submitted today focuses on criminal threats as well as our other priorities. I might say, in fighting crime the FBI continues to focus on 

areas where our skills and our expertise will have a substantial 

and a lasting impact. 

Today’s FBI is not an intelligence service that collects but does 

not act, nor are we a law enforcement service that acts without 

knowledge. We are a security service fusing the capability to understand the breadth and the scope of threats with the capability 

to dismantle those same threats, whether they be terrorist or criminal. 

On the counterterrorism front, al Qaeda continues to present a 

threat to the homeland. Domestically, through our Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces and overseas through our legal attache ́s and international partners, we work to detect and identify any potential al 

Qaeda operatives who may have access to the United States. We 

are also alert to homegrown or self-radicalized terrorists. And we 

work closely with impacted communities, our law enforcement partners, and the intelligence community to identify and to disrupt 

these threats. 

Closer to home, we are focused not only on terrorist threats but 

also on the threats posed by violent crime and white-collar crime. 

To address these threats, we have moved from a quantitative to a 

qualitative approach. We are using intelligence to identify the 

greatest threats to each of our communities. To be effective, we 

need to collect intelligence that reveals any links between our existing cases and also fills in gaps in our knowledge base. 

Intelligence gathering differs from city to city and State to State, 

just as criminal and terrorist threats differ. And just as partnerships have been key to our efforts against terrorism, partnerships 

are critically important in addressing criminal threats as well. 

Partnerships have enabled us to achieve notable successes in the 

fight against public corruption, our top criminal priority. 

Take as an example our efforts along the southwest border where 

we have focused efforts and concentrated agents. With 120 of the 

700 agents we have fighting corruption assigned to the southwest 

border, we already have over 100 arrests and 130 indictments and 

over 70 convictions in this fiscal year. 

We are seeing success in the fight against violent crime as well. 

Earlier this week, we released the Uniform Crime Report depicting 

crime statistics for 2008. And for the second year in a row, there 

has been a decrease in violent crime. And while the report does not 

give the reasons for that decrease, I do believe that the drop in violent crime says much about the efforts of State and local law enforcement and the efforts of State and local law enforcement with 

the Federal agencies. 

Within our criminal program, our field offices continue to work 

with our law enforcement partners in Safe Streets, OCDETF, Violence Crime Task Forces in order to fight crime in the communities 

that you represent. 

6 

Yet despite the positive trends in this year’s report, violent crime 

continues to plague many communities, especially small- to midsized cities. Gangs are morphing, multiplying, and migrating, entrenching themselves not just in our inner cities but increasingly 

in suburbs and rural areas. 

The FBI focused its efforts on the most violent and criminally active gangs, those that function as criminal enterprises. This model 

enables us to remove the leadership and the most dangerous members of violent gangs and seize their criminally obtained assets. 

Our goal is not just to disrupt their activities, but to dismantle 

their organizations entirely. 

We are also focused on economic crime, primarily mortgage 

fraud, health care fraud. These are not victimless crimes. They impact all Americans by stealing taxpayer dollars and undermining 

the integrity of our financial and health care systems. We currently 

have more than 2,400 pending health care fraud investigations and 

more than 2,600 pending mortgage fraud investigations. 

Our investigations are focused on partnerships, intelligence, and 

information sharing, and through task forces and working groups 

and targeted law enforcement actions, we are having success both 

in generating cases but also successfully committing those responsible for those cases and in general combating fraud. 

In April of this year, 24 individuals were charged as a result of 

a joint FBI-IRS investigation that identified an extensive mortgage 

fraud scheme based in San Diego, California. The scheme involved 

220 properties with a cumulative sale price of more than $100 million. Joint investigations such as this successful investigation and 

prosecution mean that additional resources for identifying perpetrators of fraud and additional prosecutive options for bringing 

them to justice are essential. 

Similarly, in June, I joined the Attorney General and Secretary 

Sebelius in announcing indictments against 53 persons in a combined enforcement effort targeting fraud schemes that threaten 

Medicare. These schemes involve persons who arranged unnecessary or non-existent treatment for straw patients who were willing 

to go along with the scheme for money. Our investigative partnerships, in this instance through the Department of Justice and 

HHS, ensure the prompt resolution of complex health care fraud 

cases and contribute to the prevention of fraud and abuse. 

In closing, I would like to thank the members of the Committee 

for your support of the men and women of the FBI. We continue 

to look forward to working with this Committee on these and other 

threats and challenges facing our country. Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Sessions, and members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today, and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Director. Incidentally, 

there has been some mention of the Lockerbie matter, and as I 

said, several of us, myself included, were at a meeting over a long 

weekend, the 1st of September, and the Labor Day weekend, on the 

meeting of the United States-United Kingdom Interparliamentary 

Group that meets every 2 years. And we raised with our counterVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:22 Jun 04, 2010 Jkt 056529 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56529.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
7 

parts from England the strong and bipartisan displeasure with the 

release of the Lockerbie bomber. I raised the point that it was very 

unusual for you to speak out as you did and that I strongly agreed 

with what you said. 

Now, I said in my opening statement I was pleased to see the 

Obama administration housing the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group in the FBI. You have had a long tradition of conducting 

interrogations that have produced valuable—more than valuable, 

actionable intelligence. Former FBI Agent Ali Soufan testified to 

this Committee about his interrogation of Abu Zubaydah almost 

immediately after he was captured. He used FBI techniques that 

had proven useful time and time again. And he learned that Khalid 

Sheikh Mohammed was the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and he 

discovered Jose Padilla—something that he has had to point out a 

number of times when the record has been misstated. 

What lessons in the long history of FBI interrogations will you 

import to this High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group now that 

it is going to be housed at the FBI? 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me start by saying that the concept is to have 

this combined group administratively housed within the FBI. 

Speaking specifically of the FBI, we have had a tradition of negotiation and interrogation over a period of years that is dependent 

principally on building a rapport. It is one way to go. We believe 

we are successful at it. Many of our agents have spent years on the 

streets as police officers before they come to the Bureau conducting 

interrogations in many environments and in many ways and have 

some expertise. 

There are other substantial capabilities and expertise in terms of 

interrogation elsewhere in the country in other organizations—in 

particular, intelligence organizations. And I believe the concept is 

to bring together this expertise in terms of what techniques work 

legally and are appropriate under the current statutes and regulations, but more particularly put together not only the capabilities 

of an interrogator, but also assure that from each of the agencies 

you have subject matter experts, if it is terrorism or some counterintelligence arena, that you have subject matter expertise as well 

as expertise and background of the person to be integrated so that 

that capability is used to full effect in gaining the information you 

need. 

I will say at the outset that what one wants to do is give the policymaker the options on the table for how you proceed, and to the 

extent possible, if there is the possibility or anticipation of a court 

proceeding in the United States, leave open that option. 

By the same token, I must say that the most important thing for 

us, whether it be the FBI, the CIA, or the intelligence community, 

is to gain that intelligence information that will prevent attacks in 

the first place as opposed to the prosecution of somebody who has 

successfully undertaken that attack. 

Chairman LEAHY. Will you have oversight of the HIG to make 

sure that their methods are legal and effective? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, we will. 

Chairman LEAHY. What about the Army Field Manual? Does 

that give any guidelines? 

8 

Mr. MUELLER. It is, but, you know, the Army Field Manual, 

which is the manual that is being used to conduct investigations 

particularly overseas by the military in places like Afghanistan and 

Iraq, has a set of procedures. There may be other procedures there 

that are not contained within the Army Field Manual that may be 

wholly useful and legal that should be undertaken as well. And 

that is something that has to be explored. 

Chairman LEAHY. But your department will have the oversight 

in that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Our department has, yes, the oversight in terms 

of we are putting it together, but I will tell you it is going to be, 

I hope, FBI leadership with CIA as the deputy. I have had conversations with Leon Panetta. We are agreed that this is a valuable contribution and is going to be a joint effort. 

Chairman LEAHY. Then in that regard—and you have been very 

responsive to this Committee’s jurisdiction for oversight—I assume 

that you will be responsive to oversight requests from the Committee on how this group is working. 

Mr. MUELLER. Absolutely. 

Chairman LEAHY. I realize, of course, in that regard there will 

be areas that will have to be responded to in a classified fashion, 

as well as others that can be done in an open fashion. 

Mr. MUELLER. May I mention two other aspects of it, Mr. Chairman, if I might, and that is, the importance of having uniform 

training and building training curricula that each of the agencies 

contributes to and understands and build the best possible training 

capabilities, but also pulling together the science, the capabilities 

that are known in academia in one place so that we can look at 

it and develop the best possible techniques, legal techniques to proceed. 

Chairman LEAHY. When Congress included in the 2006 PATRIOT Act reauthorization a requirement that the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General conduct audits and reviews of 

the use of National Security Letters authority and Section 215 orders for business records, the Inspector General found some significant abuses, including widespread misuse of NSLs, so-called exigent letters, also claiming emergency circumstances to keep and 

obtain evidence the Government was entitled to. 

You have told the Committee about the important steps—and 

you and I have discussed it privately, too—that the FBI has taken 

in light of these audits to change these procedures. The Justice Department sent a letter to me this week. The oversight provided 

since 2001 and the specific oversight provisions added to the statute in 2006 have helped to ensure the authority is being used as 

intended. 

Would you agree with that, the congressional oversight and the 

audits mandated have been helpful in encouraging the FBI to improve its procedures to make sure these are being used in the way 

they should be? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I will at the outset say that we have for several years now used totally revised procedures that have answered 

and responded to the criticisms of the Inspector General, most particularly in the Office of Integrity and Compliance within the FBI, 

which has now become a model for such offices. 

9 

Whichever mechanism reviews it is of less importance to me than 

there be periodic outside review. My belief is that this could well 

be handled by the annual reviews that are done by the National 

Security Division of the Department of Justice, which has an oversight role in this particular arena. But I do believe that there 

should be some outside review, periodic review. My suggestion 

would be that it be with the—wrapped into, rolled into that review 

which is already undertaken by the National Security Division, Department of Justice. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

With regard to the threat of terrorism and al Qaeda, do we have 

any reason in this country to feel that that threat is less today? Or 

can you tell us if there are any indications that, in fact, the threat 

may be growing? 

Mr. MUELLER. As I think I have repeatedly testified and discussed, the threat is always there, and the concern is that we become complacent. I tend to look at the al Qaeda threat in three 

areas: 

One is arising directly out of Waziristan or the federally administered tribal areas, where you have individuals or any plot that is 

controlled by individuals in that area. 

You then have individuals in other countries, whether it be the 

U.K., the United States or elsewhere, who have been radicalized in 

some way, shape, or form, who may travel to Pakistan to obtain additional training, which is the second level, and I call that a hybrid 

threat, and then come back and pretty much on its own, not controlled necessarily by the al Qaeda hierarchy in Pakistan. That is 

the second level. 

And the third level is self-radicalized, on the Internet or otherwise, individuals who have no contact with al Qaeda in Pakistan, 

but subscribe to the same extremist ideology that present a threat. 

It has continued to present a threat over the last 8 years and presents a threat today. 

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to the media legislation, the 

media shield bill, you and a number of intelligence community colleagues opposed the predecessor of that bill in a letter stating, ‘‘The 

high burden placed on the Government by these bills will make it 

difficult, if not impossible, to investigate harms to the national security and only encourage others to illegally disclose the Nation’s 

sensitive secrets.’’ 

Are you aware of any Nation that has not found it necessary to 

maintain secrets regarding their national security? 

Mr. MUELLER. I cannot purport to be an expert, but I do not 

know of any. 

Senator SESSIONS. Throughout the history of modern nations, 

they all have intelligence agencies and have to operate with some 

degree of secrecy. Isn’t that true? 

Mr. MUELLER. True, but I do believe that we are somewhat 

unique in that there is a First Amendment, which many countries 

do not have as well. 

10 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, are you saying the First Amendment 

prohibits the U.S. Government from maintaining secret investigations of al Qaeda or other things of that nature? 

Mr. MUELLER. That is not at all what I am saying, and the letter 

that I—— 

Senator SESSIONS. I did not think so. 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing.] Participated in writing on January 

23rd, it was my view then and my view now with regard to the legislation. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you for that. I think it is important 

that we get that right, that legislation, and not make a mistake on 

it. 

Would you share with the members of the Committee what kind 

of rules are in place and, for the most part, have been in place for 

many, many years, 20, 30 years, about agents and Assistant 

United States Attorneys, Federal prosecutors, when they make inquiry of media people? Can an agent go out and interview a newspaper person or can an Assistant United States Attorney issue a 

subpoena on their own to a newspaper person? 

Mr. MUELLER. The basic rule, it cannot be done without the approval of the Attorney General. 

Senator SESSIONS. The Attorney General himself or herself. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. This is one of the highest protective standards 

in the Department of Justice, is it not? 

Mr. MUELLER. Excuse me just one second. 

I wanted to make certain that—I know at one point when I was 

at the Department of Justice, I was involved in one of these, and 

I was Acting Deputy, and I wanted to make certain. It was my role 

to advise the Attorney General, because it is the Attorney General’s 

responsibility to sign those. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, the point of which is this is institutionally deep in the culture of the Department of Justice. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. The FBI and the Department of Justice that 

it is a very sensitive matter to inquire of a free news person in 

America, and it should only be done after the most careful review, 

and there are standards set out in the U.S. Attorneys’ manual that 

have to be met, are there not, before such things like—— 

Mr. MUELLER. That is correct. And if you look at the record, and 

I think the—I know in submissions from the Department, the numbers of occasions on which approval has been given is minuscule 

over the years. 

Senator SESSIONS. That is correct. It just almost is not done unless it has to be done for some very significant reason. I am not 

sure that is always wise, but I think to err has been on the side 

of protecting the media if there has been any error in recent years 

for the most part. 

Let me ask you about this entire—the high-value detainees and 

whether or not they will be mirandized. The President said of 

course we are not going to give Miranda to people we arrest who 

are combatants against the United States, at war against us. But 

it appears to me that is exactly where we are heading if this commission or group that was formed within the administration to 

11 

study it, they have required and opined that most prosecutions 

would be in Federal courts and not in military commissions, or the 

presumption is that they would be in Federal courts and not military commissions. 

And isn’t there—just yes or no—a big difference, a significant difference between the evidentiary standards of a military tribunal 

and a Federal court prosecution? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, it may well be, but I do believe there is a 

great deal of confusion about this. We have been working over in 

Iraq and Afghanistan—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Wait a minute. It may well be. There is a difference between a military commission with regard to Miranda 

warning and a trial in a United States district court—— 

Mr. MUELLER. There may be. 

Senator SESSIONS. Yes or no? 

Mr. MUELLER. There may be. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think there is. All right. Now, if you are 

going to try a case in a Federal district court, Director Mueller, 

aren’t you required to comply with the rules of evidence that are 

in force in that court? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. And if you are going to bring a witness in who 

has confessed to a military interrogation and try to try them in a 

Federal court and they have not been mirandized and they confessed, can’t the defense lawyer likely prevail in suppressing the 

confession? 

Mr. MUELLER. He would certainly try and likely prevail. 

Senator SESSIONS. And doesn’t that mean then if a presumption 

is in place that these cases are going to be tried in Federal court 

that we need to be mirandizing everybody arrested in the war on 

terror—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not believe that follows. I do not believe that 

follows. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, who would we not mirandize? 

Mr. MUELLER. Most of the individuals that are picked up in Afghanistan and Iraq have not been mirandized, although we have 

been a participant in interrogations for the last 5, 6 years. There 

are occasions, and a very few occasions, where the determination 

has been made to mirandize somebody for a reason principally to 

hold out the option of being able to try that person in another 

court. 

Senator SESSIONS. Oh, to hold out the option. So if you are going 

to try them in Federal court, they should be mirandized. Right? 

Mr. MUELLER. If you want the statement, a particular statement 

at a particular time admissible in a Federal court, generally that 

has to be mirandized. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think that is correct. 

Mr. MUELLER. I agree. 

Senator SESSIONS. And so if you have got a presumption that 

these cases are going to be tried in Federal court, why wouldn’t the 

rule be pretty normal in the field by military interrogators and others to give Miranda warnings? Wouldn’t it be making a mistake not 

to? And isn’t that likely to reduce the amount of intelligence they 

gather? 

12 

Mr. MUELLER. I think you could make—sit and look at it and determine what kind of information the person has, regardless of 

what court the person—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Who is going to look at it, Director Mueller? 

Mr. MUELLER. Who is going to look at it? 

Senator SESSIONS. Who is going to be making—— 

Mr. MUELLER. The National Security Council in terms of is the 

intelligence more important than holding out an option in Federal 

court. And sitting and looking at that, you would want that option 

available, if it could be available, and not to the detriment of gaining the intelligence you need to prevent terrorist attacks. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think it creates quite a bit of pressure to 

give Miranda warnings on many, many, many cases if the presumption is those cases are going to be tried in Federal court and 

not a military commission, that this is going to reduce the amount 

of intelligence obtained on the battlefield that we have never given 

Miranda warnings before in the history of this country of those who 

are at war against us, and it represents a significant problem. And 

I do not agree with you on that, and you can minimize it, and we 

will ask some written questions. But I feel strongly about it. This 

is an alteration of military effort, war, through a civilian prosecution, and it is a dangerous trend, in my opinion. 

Chairman LEAHY. Director Mueller, isn’t it a fact—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, why ask—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, you have gone way over your time, but 

I just want to cut to the chase here. If soldiers are on the field, 

they have been in battle, they have captured some people, they do 

not give the Miranda warning to them when they capture them, do 

they? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Chairman LEAHY. Of course not. And I wanted that clear because 

I have actually had letters from people who have listened to some 

of this hoopla that goes that say, ‘‘How can you capture somebody 

and you have to give them a Miranda warning? ’’ Nobody does. My 

son was in the marines. You were in the military. Of course we do 

not do that. 

Senator Kohl. 

Senator SESSIONS. I would just say the presumption came into 

place on July 20th of this year that these cases would be tried in 

Federal courts, and that inevitably requires a far more—a far larger increase in Miranda warnings than ever has been done in the 

history of this Republic, or any other nation, to my knowledge. 

Chairman LEAHY. I might note that we have an awful lot of people captured on the battlefield that are never going to see a Federal 

court and are never going to be held anywhere else. And when you 

win a battle and you capture somebody, you do not give a Miranda 

warning. 

Senator Kohl. 

Mr. MUELLER. And I do believe, sir, if you ask the commanders 

in the field—in Afghanistan or Iraq—to determine whether or 

not—the issue of whether or not you give Miranda warnings has 

ever interfered with their ability to do their job, I think they would 

say no, and it is important to have the FBI there and the FBI’s expertise there. 

13 

Senator SESSIONS. You think the FBI needs to be involved in interrogations in Iraq now? 

Mr. MUELLER. In some, yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. In some? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. Are you going to pick and choose? 

Mr. MUELLER. We do it with—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Let’s hold that for the next round. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think this is an important issue. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well—— 

Senator SESSIONS. We have muddled entirely the classical distinction between war and criminal prosecution. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Sessions, I have allowed you to have 

twice as much time even as I took in questions, and I want to make 

sure, though—we have a number of Senators who also want to go 

to this briefing. I want them to have a chance. 

We will go to Senator Kohl. 

Senator SESSIONS. I will excuse myself to go see what we can do 

help win this war in Afghanistan. 

Chairman LEAHY. Then we will go next to Senator Grassley, and 

then we will go next to Senator Feinstein, and then we will go next 

to Senator Hatch. 

Senator KOHL. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I would like to thank the FBI for your assistance, with the 

serial murder string in Milwaukee that spanned over 20 years. The 

FBI was instrumental to this investigation, resulting in a major arrest, as I am sure you are aware. On behalf of our chief, our mayor, 

victims’ families, and the entire city, we would like to thank you 

and the FBI. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. Thank you, sir. It was a joint effort, 

and I appreciate Ed Flynn’s comments in that regard. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you so much. 

As you said in your remarks at the outset, major crime across 

the country is showing some decrease, but it seems to be centered 

in the largest cities across our country. We in Wisconsin have experienced the same kind of a decrease in Milwaukee. It has been 

major and recognized and very much appreciated. But in cities of 

medium and smaller size around our State, we also have experienced significant increases in major violent crime. 

For example, in Racine, the number of violent crimes went from 

391 in 2005 to 542 in 2008. And in Madison, the number went from 

839 violent crimes in 2005 to 891 in 2008. And in other cities, like 

LaCrosse, we have had similar significant increases in violent 

crime from 2005 to 2008. 

As you indicated, this also seems to be a pattern around the 

country. To what do you attribute it? And what are some of the 

thoughts you have about addressing this serious issue? 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me just say maybe three things. 

The first is that the quality of policing in cities makes a substantial difference. 

Second, I do believe the spread of gangs can have a huge impact 

in the rise of crime in particular cities, the MS–13, the Latin 

14 

Kings, you name those, and to the extent that they gain a foothold 

in a community and you see crime rising. 

And, last, although the violent crime statistics have gone down 

over the last couple of years, I do believe that we will face some 

resurgence in the future. You have a number of persons being released from prison, in some cases because of the shortage of prison 

space. You have a number of persons who have spent substantial 

periods of time, having been arrested 10, 15, 20 years ago, coming 

out and coming out to an economy that is very difficult to find a 

job. And, consequently, I do believe we have to watch this closely. 

To that end, we are working closely with our State and local 

counterparts. My belief is always that we do a better job working 

in task forces and combining the capabilities and the skills of the 

local police departments and sheriffs’ offices with the FBI, ATF, 

and DEA. And that maximizes our capabilities of addressing a particular violent crime program in a particular city. 

Senator KOHL. I appreciate that, but what would explain the difference between the decrease in violent crime in the major cities 

around our country, including Wisconsin, and smaller to mediumsized communities? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not sure anybody can put their finger on it, 

and I am not certain that one answer fits all. As I go back, it may 

be the quality of policing; it may be the impact of taking out a particularly violent gang in a particular city; it may be a combination 

of utilizing social services along with the efforts of the Federal and 

State and local law enforcement authorities. I do not think there 

is one answer. 

We tend to look at crime and say, Okay, what is the fix for crime 

generally in our cities, and too often it is individualized. And I do 

recognize the pattern in our larger cities has gone down more substantially than others, and to a certain extent, I think the argument can be made that it is the quality of policing in those particular cities. 

Senator KOHL. Director Mueller, in your testimony you emphasize the importance of the FBI’s coordination with local law enforcement by maintaining regular contact with the officers who are 

on the street day in and day out and to work, as you indicated, 

shoulder to shoulder with them. 

I think we all agree that FBI coordination with State and local 

law enforcement is a critical component of fighting and preventing 

crime. For example, FBI agents are currently working with the 

Racine Police Department and sheriff’s office to target violent 

street gangs and drug-trafficking organizations operating within 

that area in Racine. Their presence in the community is also important to further principles of community policing that have been 

successful. 

What are some of the specific programs that the FBI has a been 

working on to achieve this shoulder-to-shoulder coordination? Are 

there any new programs or efforts on the horizon to improve the 

ones you are using now? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, as I said, the critical programs for us relate 

to working on task forces. Let me just do a count, if I could. We 

have almost 200 violent crime, violent gang task forces around the 

country. We have almost 2,100 agents working gangs and criminal 

15 

enterprises, which is a very substantial number for us. We have 17 

Safe Trails task forces that have been set up to address violent 

crime in Indian country. We have 34 child prostitution task forces 

or working groups, and we have eight major theft task forces. And 

to the extent that persons are willing to sit down shoulder to shoulder with us and share experience and expertise in task forces directed at either a specific threat, like an individual gang, or a more 

generalized threat, we are always open to do that. 

I believe we are most effective when we work closely together 

and share the expertise and capabilities in addressing these crimes. 

Senator KOHL. Director Mueller, the FBI has a broad jurisdiction 

and a critical role to play in crime investigations and law enforcement in ways that impact every American. We count on the FBI 

to combat mortgage and corporate fraud, health care fraud, international and domestic terrorism, violent crime, crimes against children, and border violence, just to name a few. 

In these tough economic times, we are all cautious about spending our money wisely and stretching each dollar as far as we can. 

The FBI’s budget has increased slightly from year to year, but your 

needs and activities seem to grow considerably every year. 

What has the FBI done to try to stretch the limited dollars that 

you have so that American taxpayers get the most for their dollar? 

Mr. MUELLER. Actually, one of the more innovative and useful 

programs we have had is for several years now we bring in graduates of the various business schools around the country. We bring 

them in as interns, and then we bring them in for the FBI. They 

come out of business school with a desire to make a difference and 

with expertise in areas such as finance, procurement, and the like. 

And we set them to particular issues. 

For instance, we had millions of dollars of savings in terms of 

utilizing rental cars in our rental fleet attributable to the fact that 

we had a group of individuals that took that particular problem 

and looked at a better way to do it that would save millions of dollars. And we have replicated that in a variety of areas throughout 

the Bureau. 

We have to look at our facilities because we have 56 field offices 

around the country, more than 400 resident agencies, and we 

looked at savings in terms of we need the spread, we need to cover 

the country, but we also have to look at savings there. 

I call it savings. Unfortunately, those who look at the Federal 

budget call it ‘‘cost avoidance’’ as opposed to ‘‘savings,’’ but we are 

continuously driving to save money and be able to utilize those 

funds in the areas that they may be better spent. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Grassley. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Director. It would be nice if I had the Department of Justice here with 

you because I think there are a lot of questions that they ought to 

be answering as well as you answering. But I have the opportunity 

to ask you so I will start out with where we were a year ago now. 

I asked you a question about highlighting problems with cooperation between the FBI and ATF. You gave what I would have to conVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:22 Jun 04, 2010 Jkt 056529 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56529.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
16 

sider a legitimate answer: ‘‘DOJ requested the opportunity to provide consolidated responses on behalf of all involved DOJ components. The FBI has provided its input to DOJ for preparation of a 

consolidated response.’’ The only thing is the Department of Justice 

has not responded. 

So in this morning’s paper, in regard to the same issue of cooperation between ATF and FBI, we find the Department of Justice, Inspector General Glenn Fine saying that there are repeated 

squabbles, and feuding over bomb investigations. 

So it brings me to my first question with you about the article 

or about questions of the past. I have been asking about FBI-ATF 

relationships for over 2 years, and my last question was submitted, 

as I said, September 2008. I never received a response. It is completely unacceptable that I get more information from a newspaper 

article than directly from the Department of Justice. 

I am particularly concerned about this latest news report because 

Committee staff received a briefing from your agency and the ATF 

last year in which they were told, this Committee staff was told, 

that the agencies understood the jurisdictional problems and that 

these conflicts had been resolved, hence raising questions about the 

Inspector General’s report seemingly refuting statements that we 

had in staff briefings. 

So I want to know what the real story is. Could you tell me, 

please, what is the true state of cooperation between the FBI and 

ATF? Specifically, have the jurisdictional problems been resolved? 

And I suppose in connection with answering that specific question 

about jurisdictional problems, have they been resolved, can the current memorandum of understanding be improved in any way? 

Mr. MUELLER. First of all, they have not all been resolved, as the 

IG points out. There are still issues. A year ago, we had just entered into an MOU which addressed a number of the issues in 

terms of responsibility when one gets to a scene. 

As I think you are aware, inasmuch as we have responsibility for 

terrorism, it is important for us. And I do believe it is tremendously important for us to be on the scene and utilizing our capabilities, both domestically and perhaps internationally, when there 

is a possibility of a terrorist event. 

If it does not turn out to be a terrorist event and falls within the 

purview of ATF, then it is appropriate that ATF have it. 

When we last talked a year or so ago, it was our expectation that 

the MOU would satisfy that. As the IG is pointing out, it does not 

satisfy it because two sides of it are interpreting it different ways, 

and it has to be resolved. 

I will tell you that at our level and the top levels, I think the 

cooperation is excellent, is good, has been for a year or two. When 

you get down to the field, there are pockets where it is not so good. 

And I generally think that it is not institutional but more individual, and each of our agencies has persons that perhaps live 

more in the past than they should, and so there is still work to be 

done, as the IG has pointed out. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, for the taxpayers’ benefit, I think that 

they would expect agencies within the same Federal Government 

working for the same American population would get along to get 

done what needs to be done and not waste time that way. 

17 

Let me go on to another—— 

Mr. MUELLER. Can I just mention one thing, if I could? If you 

look at the cooperation we have had, we have jointly investigated 

any number of places and done it exceptionally well, whether it be 

Oklahoma City or the 1993 bombings in New York. The ability not 

to get along is the exception in my mind and not necessarily the 

rule. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, if it gets the Inspector General’s attention, it seems to be still quite a problem. Let me go on to another 

one. 

In February, I cosponsored S. 372, the Whistleblower Protection 

Enhancement Act, legislation updating whistleblower protection for 

all Government employees. It addresses a number of hurdles that 

good-faith whistleblowers face when bringing complaints alleging 

retaliation for protected whistle-blowing. The legislation was 

marked up in the Homeland Security Committee where a compromise substitute was adopted. 

As an original cosponsor, I am deeply concerned by a provision 

that was included at the very 11th of hours which strikes the current whistleblower protection for FBI employees. That law was 

passed in 1978 and was not effective until 1997 when President 

Clinton issued a memorandum directing the Attorney General to 

establish whistleblower protections for FBI. 

Those procedures have provided some basic level for protection 

for FBI employees now over the years and, while not perfect, are 

greater than if the Homeland Security Committee substitute became law. I am very concerned with this provision striking the existing provisions and have been working to determine who authored it. In chasing down where this came from, I have heard a 

number of different things. Some have said the provision came 

from the White House, others said the intelligence community, and 

others have directly stated it was done at the request of the FBI. 

I understand that the Committee members and the White House 

have said this provision will be removed, but I still want to know 

where and why it came to be. 

So, Director Mueller, I am going to ask five questions, but they 

can be answered shortly. You have repeatedly stated your view 

that whistleblowers should not face retaliation. First question: Do 

you believe that current whistleblower protections under Section 

2303 should be repealed? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not that familiar with the particular statutory numbers. I would have to get back to you on that. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, do you have any idea where the provision for repeal came from? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Did any individual of the FBI have anything 

to do with drafting the provision? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not know. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Would you get back to me on that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Has the FBI provided any comment to the 

Department of Justice, White House, or other executive agencies 

regarding repealing the existing FBI whistleblower protections? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not know. 

18 

Senator GRASSLEY. Get back to me, please. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Lastly, will you make—I hope you will make 

a commitment to me and this Committee that the FBI will not advocate to repeal the existing whistleblower protections outlined in 

Section 2303 as part of whistleblower reforms. 

Mr. MUELLER. I cannot do that now. I would have to look at it. 

I am not really familiar with the issue. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, you have kept telling me for a long period of time, ever since you have been in office, and predecessors 

to you, that you thought whistleblower protection was important 

for—— 

Mr. MUELLER. I do. 

Senator GRASSLEY [continuing.] FBI people. 

Mr. MUELLER. I would reiterate that I think whistleblower protection is important, and as we have discussed, every year I send 

out an e-mail to persons saying I will not abide, tolerate retribution. Any time I get a claim of whistleblower status, I send it immediately to the Inspector General so that there is no conflict of 

interest, and I think as I have indicated to you, and I think as has 

been proven over the years, I would not put up with retaliation 

against whistleblowers. 

Senator GRASSLEY. On that last point, would you get back whether or not you would support any modification of 2303? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRASSLEY. As well as the other two. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRASSLEY. And does that have to go through the Department of Justice for you to answer my question on those points? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, will they get back to me? You probably 

do not know, because they have not gotten back to me over the 

year on the other one. 

Chairman LEAHY. I will join with the distinguished Senator from 

Iowa to help get those answers because—— 

Senator GRASSLEY. Well, thank you. And I knew you would. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Because the Senator from Iowa has been as 

much a leader on these whistleblower matters as any Senator of either party, and I will work with you on that. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Director Mueller, we have—there are sometimes so many jurisdictions that you have to appear before. I know one is, of course, 

the Intelligence Committee. We are fortunate that we have members of this Committee who, by tradition, also serve on the Intelligence Committee. And we are, of course, twice as fortunate to 

have the Chair of the Intelligence Committee here, and I will yield 

to her now. 

Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And 

welcome, Director. It is good to see you again. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

19 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me begin by using my capacity for a 

minute as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee to thank you. 

I have mentioned to you, I think on three prior occasions, about intelligence-related reports from the FBI not reaching the Committee 

in a timely way, and I want to tell you they are now reaching the 

Committee in a timely way. So thank you very much for achieving 

that. 

Mr. MUELLER. And thanks also goes to the Department of Justice 

for that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, maybe that is a precedent that material can flow more quickly. So I thank the Department of Justice. 

Second, the FBI gang assessment indicated that violent gangs 

are moving from large cities to smaller cities. Senator Hatch and 

I have been working on a gang bill for 10 years now, which has 

stalled because of an objection from the House of Representatives 

to the fact that it has got an enforcement portion to it. 

Could the drop in crime—in large cities be related in any way 

to the movement of gangs to smaller communities? 

Mr. MUELLER. I have not looked at that, and will. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Would you? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, I will. I have not looked at that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. From an intelligence 

point of view on the subject that Senator Sessions raised about Miranda warnings, it is my understanding that the FBI just wants to 

keep the possibility of Miranda warnings on the table so that if you 

have been involved in an arrest of somebody that is likely to be 

tried in a Federal court, that warning can be given; but that soldiers are not giving Miranda warnings nor is there any request for 

them to do so. Is that correct? 

Mr. MUELLER. That is true. And, in fact, we have been, as I say, 

operating with the military in Iraq and Afghanistan for a number 

of years. The military welcomes us and our expertise, and rare is 

the occasion that we will give Miranda warnings when we are participating in an interrogation in that environment. 

On the other hand, you may pick up an individual who has been 

indicted someplace and you have the possibility of bringing that 

person back to the United States to face that indictment for a terrorist act that occurred some time before, and at least it ought to 

be put on the table as to whether or not you wish to mirandize that 

individual before you talk to him, both for—well, certainly to make 

a statement admissible in court in the United States, but that does 

not necessarily exclude that the person will be interviewed for intelligence purposes as opposed to the admissibility of a statement 

in a court in the United States. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. I am pleased we cleared that up. 

I think that is helpful. 

In August, during the break, I had the opportunity to meet with 

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in Los 

Angeles and found it very interesting, and then later during that 

period of time, I saw this quote from Dewey Webb, the chief of the 

ATF office in Houston, saying that at least a dozen women in the 

past 2 years have surfaced in Federal gun-trafficking cases as suspects or cooperating witnesses in Houston and South Texas, essentially women with no criminal history, he asserted, were being used 

20 

to be straw buyers of high-powered weapons and then giving those 

weapons to relatives or to smugglers to bring them into Mexico. 

What do you know about this? And what is being done about it? 

Mr. MUELLER. It is principally the purview, as you point out, of 

ATF, but over the years a person who wants straw buyers will use 

women or others without any criminal background and often—it is 

not something new. It has been there for any number of years. 

Often, whether it be a woman or a man who is a straw buyer, it 

is the avenue you have to breaking down the ring and getting the 

cooperation you need to investigate successfully and to incarcerate 

the individuals who are responsible. So it is a phenomenon that 

has been there for a period of time. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, perhaps we can discuss that more fully 

another time. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. But, you know, the Mexican Government is 

very concerned about the massive importation of guns from the 

United States into Mexico. Big guns, too. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. And we have to find a way to stop that, so 

I would like to talk with you. But I would like to turn now to a 

FISA matter. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. The three sunsetting provisions of the PATRIOT Act: lone wolf, the business records, and roving wiretaps. 

This is an issue where two committees have jurisdiction, both the 

Judiciary Committee and the Intelligence Committee. I spoke to 

Senator Leahy yesterday and indicated that we would like to work 

together, if possible, so we do not get into battles of sequential referrals and that kind of thing. 

It was my thinking simply to extend those three provisions until 

the PATRIOT Act is up for reauthorization, which is 3 years hence. 

I believe Senator Leahy will submit a bill that does some other 

things as well. 

I have just received a copy of a letter—written to me and the 

Vice Chairman of Intelligence dated September 14th by the Justice 

Department saying that they are in full support of reauthorization 

of all three provisions, and that if there were ideas for some 

changes, they would be happy to discuss them. The letter is signed 

by Ron Weich, and it is a rather forceful case for continuation. 

I would like to ask you if you would discuss your use of those 

three provisions and their relevance today in the continuing concerns about terrorists infiltrating our country. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, let me start by saying I hope you reinforce 

each other to, again, pass these three provisions. 

Chairman LEAHY. We will work it out. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Right. 

Mr. MUELLER. First of all, the business records, 215. Between 

2004 and 2009, we have used that more than 250 times. I make 

the point that that provision is used with the approval of the FISA 

Court. The business records that are sought there relate almost— 

not all the time, but almost solely to terrorist investigations in 

which the records that are received are absolutely essential to identifying other persons who may be involved in terrorist activities. 

21 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Involving a foreign terrorist. 

Mr. MUELLER. Involving someone who is a foreign terrorist. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So you are prepared to say that there is no 

domestic exclusivity, but that this relates to a foreign terrorist? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, it relates to an agent of a foreign power. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Exactly. 

Mr. MUELLER. As it says in the FISA statute. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. So each one would. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. My understanding is that 215 relates to—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. It does—— 

Mr. MUELLER.—any investigation relating to—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN [continuing.] And I see that it has been used 

that way. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Okay. 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me just check and make sure. Yes. 

Chairman LEAHY. Do you want to answer that question? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. If he could just finish quickly on the lone 

wolf provision and the roving wiretap provision. 

Mr. MUELLER. Roving wiretaps were used approximately 140 

times over those same years, and it is tremendously important. 

With the new technology, it is nothing to buy four or five cell 

phones at the same time and use them serially to avoid coverage. 

And the roving wiretaps are used in those circumstances where we 

make a case that that is going to happen and we get approval for 

it. It is essential given the technology and the growth of technology 

that we have had. 

As to the lone wolf, that has not been used yet, but my belief is 

it needs to be there where we have an individual, such as 

Moussaoui, whom we need to go up and get a FISA warrant, either 

for a search or an interception, and cannot identify specifically, 

with specificity, a particular foreign power, that is, a particularized 

terrorist organization that he belongs to, but we need to, as they 

say in this lone-wolf context, go to the FISA Court and say, Okay, 

this is a lone wolf, we cannot put the tie to this particular terrorist 

group, but here are the reasons why we need to go up on this individual. 

So my belief is each of these three provisions are important to 

our work. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing him 

to answer. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Hatch. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 

you, Director Mueller, for the great service you have given this 

country over all these years. We have been together a lot of times, 

and all I can say is that you are one of the heroes in this country, 

and so are all of those FBI personnel people who really protect us 

throughout all these years. I just want to tell you I sure appreciate 

you. 

But I was relieved when the Census Bureau independently chose 

to terminate its relationship with the Association of Community 

Organizations for Reform Now, commonly known as ACORN. I am 

deeply troubled by the most recent controversy concerning that orVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:22 Jun 04, 2010 Jkt 056529 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56529.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
22 

ganization, and many other controversies, too. The disturbing behavior of ACORN employees was captured on video at ACORN offices in Brooklyn, New York, Baltimore, Maryland, Washington, 

D.C., and San Bernardino, California, giving guidance on criminal 

activity. 

A documentary film maker posing as a prostitution ring leader 

entered these ACORN offices and received advice on how to maintain his enterprise and receive tax credits for doing so. I was basically shocked when this advice included, among other things, how 

to launder profits from an alleged prostitution ring that was going 

to involve under-age girls. 

Now, during a meeting, ACORN representatives were informed 

that the girls were smuggled into the United States from a foreign 

country for the purposes of sex trafficking. ACORN employees were 

told by the film maker that the reason for obtaining the residence 

was to establish a brothel that would house these under-age girls. 

Consistent amongst all three ACORN offices was the advice to lie 

to law enforcement, conceal the profits, and ensure that any of the 

under-age girls involved in the prostitution ring do not talk to law 

enforcement. One ACORN employee in Baltimore told the alleged 

prostitution ring leader that, ‘‘Girls under 16 don’t exist’’ and 

‘‘Make sure they keep their mouths shut.’’ 

Now, this heinous conspiratorial criminal activity is usually carried out by organized crime families. However, it appears that 

ACORN, which has offices in 41 cities nationwide, has decided to 

engage in offering expert advice on how to get caught running a 

sex slavery ring, money laundering, and even mortgage fraud. 

Now, this was not random, and the consistency of the advice indicates that this system is systematic and widespread within 

ACORN. The complicit behavior of ACORN employees in multiple 

offices offering to assist persons engaging in sex trafficking is egregious behavior. 

Now, can you tell me if you have been made aware of all these 

issues and if the FBI field offices in Washington, Baltimore, and 

New York are examining these incidents? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think the first time I heard of this incident to 

which you refer was last evening, and beyond that, I do not know 

where we are. Clearly, given what you have said, it is something, 

in consultation with the Department of Justice, that we would look 

at. 

Senator HATCH. This is what I have been led to believe, and I 

would sure appreciate it if you would look at it and do something 

about it. 

Now, last month, the White House and the Attorney General announced the formation of a new working group comprised of Federal law enforcement and intelligence personnel for the sole purpose of interrogating high-value detainees. This has been referred 

to as the HIG. You are familiar with that. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator HATCH. Okay. According to both the White House and 

the Attorney General, the HIG will be housed inside the FBI, and 

a senior FBI official will be in charge of the HIG. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

23 

Senator HATCH. However, the administration has stressed that 

the HIG will not be a sub-unit of the FBI or DOJ. Now, that point 

by the administration does not shed light on who the HIG will report to, either the FBI or the National Security Council. 

Now, if the only goal of the administration is to prosecute highvalue detainees in Article III courts, the development of evidence 

will be key to the Government’s case. 

What I have reservations about is evidence that was developed 

by the intelligence community. For instance, in some cases the 

Government may not be willing or able to produce the source of the 

evidence in court. 

Furthermore, the evidence may be the fruit of information obtained from foreign intelligence or foreign investigations. This information could lead investigators down a line of questioning during an interrogation that they will have to explain in court. 

If trying these cases in Federal criminal courts is the ultimate 

goal, what solution does the FBI propose to address hearsay evidence exclusions? And just one follow-up question: Will the FBI implement a policy on the HIG to begin each intelligence interrogation with a Miranda warning? Is the FBI currently mirandizing detainees in Afghanistan? I think you have approached that. But if 

you could answer those three questions. 

Mr. MUELLER. I think the heart of the issue is prosecution is not 

the ultimate goal of every interrogation. It may well be intelligence 

gathering. But by the same token, you should not avoid the possibility that you may be able to obtain evidence that would result in 

a prosecution. And, consequently, the effort is to look at an individual, determine what is the evidence you have on them. Is the 

evidence admissible into a courtroom? Does it come from intelligence sources where it is problematic given the reasons that you 

said, it may have come from a source or method that would be disclosed or may have come from a foreign country? 

But tie that together and say, What do we have on this individual? Firstly, how does it tie together to maximize our ability to 

interrogate that individual? And the information that you need to 

effectively interrogate an individual may well come from law enforcement sources or it may well come from intelligence sources. 

But the persons who are doing the interrogation should have that 

information in front of them, and in unique cases—this is highvalue targets, and as I said before, maybe somebody has been indicted before—at least have the option of giving Miranda warnings 

in certain circumstances where it is appropriate that would help 

the prosecution, not to the detriment of gathering intelligence. 

And so the group, the HIG units are a combination of intelligence 

and law enforcement, FBI, but intelligence in terms of CIA, in 

terms of DIA, with the combined expertise so we can more effectively do it and make certain we have the intelligence on the table. 

The other thing that we have in this country that many countries 

do not have is the Classified Information Procedures Act, which enables us, as happened with Moussaoui and other cases, to successfully try individuals while still protecting sources and methods, 

while still protecting information that may have come from overseas. 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you. 

24 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up, and I will submit the 

rest of my questions. Thank you, Mr. Director. 

Chairman LEAHY. We are going to be having votes on the floor 

soon. What I am going to try to do is keep this going during that 

time and have people take turns going over there. 

Next is Senator Feingold, of course, and then it will be Senator 

Kaufman and Senator Franken. I have the rest of the list here. 

Senator Feingold, Senator Franken, Senator Whitehouse, Senator 

Klobuchar, Senator Schumer, and Senator Cardin. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me begin, Director, good to see you again. I would like to 

first associate myself with Senator Kohl’s comments about violent 

crime in Wisconsin. The overall trend of violent crime decreasing 

is, of course, heartening, but I urge you to continue to work closely 

with State and local law enforcement on these issues. 

Director, as to the PATRIOT Act, three provisions of the PATRIOT Act expire, as we know, at the end of the year, and yet critical information about their implementation has not been made 

public—information that I think would have a significant impact 

on the debate. 

During the debate on the Protect America Act and the FISA 

Amendments Act in 2007 and 2008, I felt that critical legal and factual information remained unknown to the public and to most 

Members of Congress. This is information that was certainly relevant to the debate and might even have made a difference in the 

way some people voted. 

During the last PATRIOT Act reauthorization debate in 2005 a 

great deal of implementation information remained classified. This 

time around I think we have got to try to find a way to have an 

open and honest debate about the nature of these Government 

powers while, of course, protecting national security secrets. 

I have raised this repeatedly, as you know, with administration 

officials over the past couple of years. I did so most recently in 

June in a classified letter also signed by Senators Leahy, Durbin, 

Wyden, and Whitehouse. 

I appreciate that the Justice Department letter this week made 

public for the first time that the lone-wolf authority has never been 

used, as you just confirmed. That is a good start since this is a key 

fact as we consider extending that power. But there is also information about the use of Section 215 orders that I believe Congress 

and the American people deserve to know. 

I realize that you are not the sole person to make this decision, 

but I am asking you today for your commitment to advocate for 

finding a way to allow some limited information to become public 

so we can have a real debate about this. Will you make that commitment? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not think I can because there is inevitable 

tension between, particularly when it comes to national security, 

keeping the information classified because not to do so would harm 

national security. On the other hand, I understand what you are 

saying in terms of what you learn on the Intelligence Committee 

would be useful in the debate on the floor, and there is a tension. 

But I do believe that the information that is provided to the IntelVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:22 Jun 04, 2010 Jkt 056529 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56529.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
25 

ligence Committee in a classified setting is appropriately provided 

to the Intelligence Committee in a classified setting, and while 

there is that tension there, I can not give you the commitment that 

I would advocate for releasing more information than we have in 

the past. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I hope you will reconsider that. The fact 

is you have made public that the lone-wolf provision has never 

been used. That is something that perhaps other people would like 

to know. But you have chosen to do that, so obviously you are not 

applying this as an across-the-board rule. And I know that the 

number of times Section 215 orders have been issued is something, 

but it does not come close to providing the kind of information 

about the use of the authority that I think is needed for meaningful 

public debate. 

Mr. MUELLER. And that may be where we disagree. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And I just want to say that I feel as strongly 

as anybody in this body and in this country about keeping things 

secret that have to be kept secret. And my feeling and understanding about that has increased greatly as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee for the past 4 years. But I really do believe there is a way to do this, and I hope you will work with us 

and consider appropriate disclosure that is not harmful to our 

country but allows us to have a real debate. 

Mr. MUELLER. I would do that in terms of particular pieces of information, yes. 

Senator FEINGOLD. In December, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit found that the gag order provisions of the National Security Letter statute violate the First Amendment. Has 

the FBI changed its procedures for NSL gag orders to address the 

constitutional problems identified by this decision? And if so, has 

it made these changes nationwide, or are they just changed in the 

States that are in the Second Circuit? 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me check one thing, if I might. 

[Pause.] 

Mr. MUELLER. We made the change across the country. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Okay, good. While the court’s decision was 

specific to NSLs, it has implications for the gag orders associated 

with the Section 215 orders as well. Has the FBI made any 

changes to these procedures as a result of the Second Circuit’s decision? 

Mr. MUELLER. Not in that venue. We disagree with the application of the Second Circuit opinion to these other procedures. 

Senator FEINGOLD. All right. We will take that up in the future 

then, but I appreciate the answer. 

As Senator Leahy already mentioned, last year the DOJ Inspector General issued a second set of reports on the FBI’s use of the 

National Security Letters and Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. In 

light of the upcoming reauthorization process, I want to follow up 

on a particularly troubling incident discussed in one of these reports. 

The IG said that the FBI had issued NSLs to obtain financial 

records in an investigation after the FISA Court had twice refused 

to approve Section 215 orders in the same investigation because of 

First Amendment problems. This obviously leaves me very conVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:22 Jun 04, 2010 Jkt 056529 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56529.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
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cerned about how seriously the FBI takes First Amendment issues 

in the course of its investigations. 

Do you think it was appropriate for the FBI to seek information 

using NSLs, an investigative tool that does not require judicial approvals, to get around the FISA Court’s refusal to approve a Section 215 order? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am not familiar with this incident. Quite clearly, 

in the way you have characterized it in terms of judge shopping or 

process shopping, I am not certain that is appropriate. But I am 

not familiar with the incident, and I will have to get back to you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, the report was issued a year and a half 

ago. Has the FBI taken any action to ensure that this does not 

happen again? 

Mr. MUELLER. There are a number of issues we looked at in the 

wake of the two to three IG reports, and on this one I cannot give 

you a specific answer at this time. We would have to get back to 

you. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I look forward to hearing from you, and 

you have been responsive to my requests in the past, so I look forward to hearing from you as soon as possible. 

I would like to ask you finally about roving FISA wiretaps, one 

of the provisions of the PATRIOT Act that is due to sunset. I never 

objected to granting this authority to the FBI. My concern as with 

a lot of the PATRIOT Act provisions, was that adequate safeguards 

were not included. 

For example, in the criminal roving wiretap statute, there is a 

requirement that before a new phone or computer can be wiretapped that has not explicitly been approved in advance by a judge, 

there must be reason to presume that the target of the surveillance 

is nearby. This is sometimes referred to as the ascertainment requirement. It helps ensure that the FBI does not tap the wrong 

phone or computer being used by an entirely innocent American. 

Why not include a similar requirement for the FISA roving taps? 

Mr. MUELLER. It is my understanding—and, again, I have not 

looked at it in a while—that we are required to show that there 

is a likelihood that the individual will be using many phones in 

order to get the approval for that particular provision. It seems to 

me that that satisfies the due process, the constitutional requirements, and is adequate. To prove more would mean that we would 

be going back to the judges day in and day out in this day where 

cell phones are throwaway cell phones. Given the technology now, 

in many places, as we have seen in the debate on FISA, the statutes do not keep up with the technology. 

In drafting and adding another requirement, it will inhibit our 

ability to swiftly track those individuals who are seeking to avoid 

surveillance, counter-surveillance, and—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Is that the consequence in the criminal roving wiretap statute? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, criminal rule is much—I think is—ask my 

opinion, it is too restrictive. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Okay. 

Mr. MUELLER. It is too restrictive. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Fair answer. 

27 

Mr. MUELLER. And we would be far more effective on criminals 

if we went back to looking at Title III given the new technology. 

Title III has been on the books for a number of years. Technology 

has changed dramatically. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you Director Mueller. 

Chairman LEAHY. Senator Franken. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Mr. Director. 

First of all, Director Mueller, I want to thank you for providing 

me with briefings on Somali individuals from Minnesota who returned to Somalia to join Islamic extremists. After those briefings, 

I am satisfied that the FBI is doing a very good job on the ground 

in the Twin Cities. Obviously, these individuals are a rare exception within the Somali community in Minnesota, which is a patriotic and hard-working and important part of our State. 

One of the many things that makes this country special is that 

we are a melting pot, and we have people with the cultural background and language skills that we need for these investigations. 

How is the FBI doing on this front? Do we have enough Arabicspeaking translators, for example, for terror investigations? 

Mr. MUELLER. I cannot say we are doing as well as I would like. 

We have almost doubled our capability since September 11th, but 

that was a small capability to begin with. 

When it comes to Somali speakers or Pashtu or others where 

there are various clan dialects and the like, it becomes even more 

problematic. We have had substantial outreach programs since 

September 11th in trying to attract those who have those capabilities, both in terms of providing translating capabilities but also as 

agents to be able to operate. 

We are not where we want to be. It is tremendously difficult, but 

we have done everything we possibly can to encourage, recruit, and 

bring in persons from diverse backgrounds. 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay. Thank you. The task force has been discussed today. I am concerned about rendition, and I can see from 

a release on the task force from the Department of Justice on August 24th that actually we are going to—you are calling it transfers 

or it was called transfers in this, but that is rendition, isn’t it? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, there are renditions, somebody can be rendered from another country pursuant to an extradition treaty. I 

mean, that is also called rendition. Somebody can be transferred 

from another country as a result of the other country putting the 

person on the plane to the United States. That is a rendition, albeit 

without any extradition paper. There are other issues—— 

Senator FRANKEN. My question is: Are we going to continue the 

policy of rendition where we send folks, prisoners, to other countries? And will the FBI be handing folks over to the CIA for rendition? 

Mr. MUELLER. We have not done that in the past. We will not 

do it in the future. I gave a brief description of that because, yes, 

we have been involved in renditions, but not the renditions I think 

you are asking about. 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay. I just want to make sure that there are 

no transfers of people to other countries for torture, and—— 

28 

Mr. MUELLER. We certainly would not do that. When we transfer 

somebody to another country—actually, generally it is the Marshals Service, and it is pursuant to paper, extradition—— 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay, and you do not hand them over to the 

CIA? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. Have not, will not. 

Senator FRANKEN. Okay. The FBI has a human-trafficking initiative that investigates and arrests traffickers. In Minnesota, there 

is a serious problem with trafficking in Native American communities. People are trafficking Native American women. In fact, the 

Minnesota Indian Women’s Resource Center recently found that 27 

percent of its clients, Native American women, were victims of 

human trafficking as defined by Minnesota law. 

I want to know if human trafficking is a priority at the FBI. And 

how many full-time employees investigate human trafficking at the 

FBI? And how many man-hours are spent investigating human 

trafficking at the FBI? 

Mr. MUELLER. I had not been aware, prior to the mention by 

your staff, that this question might be coming up about human 

trafficking of Native American women. It is something I have to 

look into. I do not believe that—— 

Senator FRANKEN. Please. 

Mr. MUELLER. We will. I can tell you that we have over 100 

agents at work in Indian country. We have maintained that since 

September 11th despite the other priorities. But I would have to 

get back to you as well as to the number of agents and others we 

have that are working on human trafficking in general, and I will 

do that. 

Senator FRANKEN. Please get back to me on that and on how 

many of your investigations have centered on trafficking of Native 

American women. 

The FBI gathers crime statistics from around the country, but in 

Minnesota, Indian tribes actually do not participate in our State’s 

crime-reporting program. State laws says actually that they cannot. 

This means that crimes on Indian reservations are underreported 

in national statistics and that Indian tribes themselves have difficulty tracking and analyzing crime, and this is a big problem. 

Do you know how many Indian tribes and reservations participate in the Uniform Crime Reporting Program? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not. I might be able to get back to you, but 

it is a voluntary reporting structure. 

Senator FRANKEN. I have about a little bit over a minute left, so 

I am just going to—you know, we hear a lot about cyber terrorism, 

but I think a lot of folks do not have a clear idea what it is and 

how it can actually harm people in the country and just how fighting it is crucial in our war on terror. 

Can you tell me what cyber terrorism is and how it can actually 

result in the loss of lives? Or do that for our people watching. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, if you have an attack, if you have a denialof-service attack or a worm or a virus, quite often you do not know 

who is responsible for that. Is it a state actor? Is it a country someplace? Is it a terrorist or a terrorist group? Or is it an individual? 

Whatever the activity is, you have to trace it back and attribute 

it to one of the three. Generally, with terrorists, it could be disVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:22 Jun 04, 2010 Jkt 056529 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56529.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
29 

rupting a communications network. The possibilities are shutting 

down an electrical grid, shutting down a stock exchange. In other 

words, any activity that would bring attention to the terrorists that 

would disrupt our capabilities would probably be called a terrorist 

activity. 

Senator FRANKEN. Can they do stuff with satellites? Can they do 

stuff with air traffic control? 

Mr. MUELLER. Air traffic control is one that we would be concerned about, but it generally is off the Internet and utilizing the 

Internet as the vehicle as opposed to statutes. You also have the 

more recent example of the Russians disrupting the Georgian command-and-control capabilities before the invasion of Georgia by 

Russia. 

It is that kind of activity, either state-sponsored or terroristsponsored, that can shut down various networks of the military or 

in the private arena as well. 

Senator FRANKEN. And presumably we have really smart people 

working on this. I remember the FBI several years ago did not 

have the best—this is before you took office—did not have the best 

computer system. 

Mr. MUELLER. Luckily, we do have very smart people. I really 

rely on them. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MUELLER. As do other agencies. 

Senator FRANKEN. I am very reassured. Thank you. Thank you, 

Mr. Director. 

Mr. MUELLER. If I may make one other point on that. 

Senator FRANKEN. Sure. 

Mr. MUELLER. This is the wave of the future, though. For the 

FBI, it is absolutely essential that we attract, we bring in these 

people, because the battlefields of the future are going to be in the 

cyber arena, and we have to grow in the same way that NSA and 

the intelligence community and the military have to grow to address those threats of the future. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE [presiding.] Director, Chairman Leahy has 

gone to the vote. He will be back shortly, but in the meantime, it 

is both my turn and my temporary chairmanship, so I guess I call 

on myself. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MUELLER. Do I call you ‘‘Mr. Chairman’’ ? 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Better not do that. 

First of all, I welcome you here and thank you for your continued 

leadership of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is an organization that Americans are very proud of. You have been given a 

significant new responsibility with respect to the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group, and very recently. It was, I think, the 

end of August when this was announced. 

I am wondering what your administrative benchmarks are for 

the next couple of months to keep that process moving forward and 

to discharge the obligations that you have received. What do you 

see as your next steps? When do you think the group will be fully 

operational? What are the key benchmarks on the way there? 

30 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me start by saying we are in the midst right 

now of following up with protocols for this group, but as important 

as anything else is the leadership, both the leadership from the Bureau and the leadership from the intelligence community. And we 

are exploring names and options for that. 

The third area that we are—there is outreach to other persons 

who have done research in this area to try to bring in early the 

lessons learned and research from Phil Heymann at Harvard, Defense Intelligence Committee, other areas who have been looking at 

this over the last 3 years. So we start with some accumulated 

knowledge upon which we will build. 

But in my mind, the two critical issues are bringing together our 

organizations to work closely together and understand and have 

consensus on the goal of this structure and, second, the leadership 

of it that should be supported by all participants. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And could you put that into some kind of 

a time horizon for me? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would say by the first of the year, but I tend to 

be impatient. I will give you a longer—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. That is an admirable quality. 

Mr. MUELLER.—time horizon than I would like. I can tell you 

that just about every other day I am looking at one or another 

piece of it. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Very good. I should take this opportunity 

to congratulate you for the success that the FBI has had in its role 

in these high-value interrogations. The very identity of Khalid 

Sheikh Mohammed as the architect of the 9/11 horrors was something that was achieved by an FBI-led interrogation. It was a joint 

effort. There were CIA and FBI interrogators present. But I wanted 

to take this opportunity to congratulate you because you played an 

effective role. 

Mr. MUELLER. Can I just—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Yes. 

Mr. MUELLER. Can I just insert something? 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Please. 

Mr. MUELLER. That is, we have participated in interrogations 

with the Agency and the military. There have been successes 

across the board. And in my mind, we are not where we are today 

without the activities and capabilities of the Agency in terms of addressing the war on terror and the military. And while I appreciate 

the congratulations, I must say that we do spend a lot of time in 

attributing successes to particular areas given the policy debate, 

but the fact of the matter is the Agency has been absolutely instrumental in bringing the safety to the extent that we have it today. 

And I did want to make that point as—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. That is a very good point, and I think you 

are wise and administratively generous and prudent to make it— 

and accurate, I believe, also. But I also think that the FBI’s role 

has been undersung, and I want to take this opportunity to express 

my appreciation for your agency’s efforts. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. As we look toward bringing people from 

Guantanamo to the United States for further detention, for prosecution as criminals, for incarceration, presumably, after a convicVerDate Nov 24 2008 09:22 Jun 04, 2010 Jkt 056529 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\56529.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
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tion, what is the FBI’s assessment of the security risks that that 

process presents? Do you believe that the Federal Bureau of Prisons, for instance, has any—how big of a hazard would the detention of these folks in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons 

be to the United States? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think it depends on the circumstances, depending on where the Bureau of Prisons puts a person. Quite obviously, 

you have been out to Colorado and seen Florence, I think, and 

there is very, very little risk there. In most Federal prisons, there 

is very, very little risk. 

County jails are somewhat different. My expectation is that when 

you are bringing persons from overseas who are involved in terrorism, they will be given top priority in terms of assuring that not 

only are they incarcerated, cannot escape, but also that they do not 

affect or infect other prisoners or have the capability of affecting 

events outside the prison system. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Assuming appropriate prioritization for 

these individuals, do you have any doubts about the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ ability to keep them secure? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. You do not have any doubts or you do 

have doubts? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I know, I think the Bureau of Prisons—I do 

not—I do not know the circumstances. My expectation is the Bureau of Prisons along with the Marshals Service will provide adequate and appropriate security. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Very good. 

Senator Klobuchar. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, Senator Whitehouse. 

Good to see you again, Director Mueller. 

I just wanted to talk with you a little bit about the white-collar 

area. I know you devoted some of your testimony to that, and while 

I see the prosecution of violent crimes and the investigation of violent crimes as well as terrorism to be priorities of your work, I also 

have always believed that it has been very difficult for local law enforcement to handle some of these complex cases coming from that 

angle that my previous job before I came to the U.S. Senate. 

One of the things we have talked about at previous hearings is 

the potential for fraud with the TARP money and the stimulus 

money, and I wondered if there were—without revealing specific 

cases, if the FBI is prepared for that type of fraud that we might 

see. 

Mr. MUELLER. I think in the out-years we are going to need additional resources. We have been given some resources. We requested 

additional resources in the 2010 budget, and our expectation is we 

will ask for more in the 2011 budget. And there is no doubt in my 

mind that with the monies that are flowing freely, relatively freely 

through the Federal Government, we have to work closely with the 

IGs to identify where those monies are flowing and who is going 

to take a piece of it—whether it be through fraud or public corruption. 

But with those amounts out there, there is no doubt that there 

will be a number of people who seek to obtain those amounts illegally, and it will take us as well as the Inspector Generals as well 

32 

as new ways of identifying and maintaining data that will enable 

us to get to the heart of a scheme relatively early, and through manipulating that data or pulling in that data, be able to make a 

prosecutable case that much quicker. And we are working on that 

at this point in time. 

There is no doubt in my mind, whether it be from the TARP or 

the stimulus package and the like, that there is going to be fraud, 

abuse, betrayal of the public trust. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And you also have testified about the 

health care fraud and the work that is being done there, and as 

we deal with cost savings for health care and looking for those savings, one of the things I was most startled by were some of the estimates that the health care fraud costs taxpayers $60 billion a year, 

it potentially is 20 percent of total Medicare spending. I know when 

I was a prosecutor, we had a number of cases involving this that 

were quite shocking, and some of it is technology because people 

are able to get into hospital systems and start ripping things off 

or getting identity numbers and things like that. And then some 

of it is just providers, which is actually the scariest part, people 

putting patients at risk or doing multiple billings, multiple surgeries. 

So could you address what the FBI is doing in that regard? And 

I also have a bill on this to require direct depositing or electronic 

funds transfer for the Medicare payments because the regulations 

have not been uniformly enforced, and to me that is a simple nobrainer that we would have direct depositing so that would also 

help us to prohibit some of this fraud. 

Mr. MUELLER. I can tell you at this point we have almost 2,500 

cases. This year alone, we have had 490 convictions in health care 

fraud cases. We have ten task forces around the country, and we 

have about almost 800 persons working on health care fraud in 

which 460 are special agents. 

That is not enough to address the problem, and as the health 

care debate goes on and if, indeed, there is a health care bill, we 

would hope that there would be provisions in there that would address this particular issue. Perhaps the one that you just suggested 

would be one. And our people I know are looking at what might 

come out and how we can at the outset put into place the records 

and the capability of access to those records so that we can identify 

the fraud schemes without waiting for somebody to walk in the 

door. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Exactly, and I would think your input from 

the agency would be very important as we go forward. I believe 

this has got to be part of any kind of health care reform bill when 

we are looking at those kinds of numbers and we are trying to save 

money. And like I said, some of these schemes can be really easy. 

We had someone that just collected Social Security numbers at a 

hospital because they happened to be in a drawer in a little stack 

in a rubber band. Obviously, they have changed their procedures 

since then. That was just a straight identity theft scheme using the 

Social Security numbers. But there are much more complex 

schemes, as you know. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, on a number of occasions, the Attorney General and Secretary Sebelius have spoken out about this and are 

33 

concerned about it and have taken the opportunity to make the 

point in press conferences relating to health care fraud where there 

have been successful conclusions to investigations. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Exactly. And I know, again, how high-cost 

these investigations can be, but it is my hope, when you look at 

that Madoff case—which, of course, was SEC; it was not your issue. 

But to have all of those whistleblowers that have called and tried 

to report that and $65 billion stolen, the costs of these investigations may be high, but the cost of not doing anything is so much 

higher. So thank you on that. 

The last thing I wanted to ask you about was we recently had 

a hearing on the National Academy of Science report on forensic 

science, and as you know, they released a report in February on 

some of the changes they would like to see, some recommendations 

in the forensic science area. We had a very interesting hearing 

with police chiefs and prosecutors and people from the Innocence 

Project there, and we actually found some general agreement. 

There were clearly disputes about some of the language in the reports that the prosecutors did not like, but there was some general 

consensus on accrediting some of these forensic science labs and 

some certification and also funding for more training in this area 

and also taking care of some of the backlog that we have seen 

across the country. 

Could you comment on the FBI’s view on that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I think our view is that we absolutely believe that accreditation is tremendously important. We have sought 

it and received it. But I think that that is absolutely essential to 

raising the capabilities of laboratories around the country. Training, quite obviously, always contributes to that. The one area in 

which there was some discussion, and that is, separating the 

forensics laboratory from the—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. The police. 

Mr. MUELLER. The police. In our case, I think it would have a 

substantially detrimental effect. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Right. I agree. 

Mr. MUELLER. And you as a prosecutor—— 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I totally get that part of it. That is why I 

am trying to find the consensus pieces, and there was a consensus 

on the accreditation, funding, training, backlog, and then just some 

of these certification issues. 

Mr. MUELLER. We are on that train. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Okay. Good. Very good. Thank you very 

much, Director. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I think we await the return of the Chairman from the vote. It should be very shortly. If you do not mind, 

I will take an extra moment and follow up with you, until he gets 

here, on the questions for the record that I asked when you appeared before the Committee on March 25th having to do with 

issues surrounding the security clearance, background checks, the 

hiring process for the individuals that the FBI needs to bring on 

board as it takes more and more of a national security-oriented 

role, people with foreign experience, people with foreign language 

capability, people who have more national security backgrounds 

and so forth. 

34 

You have a very considerable security clearance process, and I 

gather from the response that I have been given that you have 

been able to manage quite effectively to keep the security clearance 

process within the 90-day timeframe that is suggested for trying to 

bring people on board, and that in driving it to that standard, you 

feel you have also been able to meet national security and clearance security requirements. 

Could you comment a little bit more about what it took to get 

there? Was that an easy step? And did it sort of fall within ordinary chains? Or did you have to really press matters to get that 

accomplished? 

Mr. MUELLER. It has impact in two areas. One is our ability to 

hire any given year. We get a 1-year budget, and often we do not 

get our budget because there is a continuing resolution, and so we 

have a much truncated time in which to bring those persons on 

board. 

Our Human Resources Division is completely revamping its procedures, and while we will not get everybody on board or will not 

by September 30th, we will be by the first of the year. Certainly 

with agents and analysts, we actually are above our numbers in 

hiring there, and we are just a bit down on the professional staff. 

We also have looked in the context of the overarching review that 

has been done by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

as to how to restructure our security checks for our people and 

have done that, and then working—I am not certain where we are 

in terms of the 90-day timeframe. I would have to get back to you 

on that. But I do believe that we are working with the ODNI and 

the rest of the intelligence community to fix this problem. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I appreciate that. The Chairman has returned. 

Chairman LEAHY [presiding.] Thank you. Thank you, Senator 

Whitehouse, for filling in. 

We have checked with whether Senators Schumer, Cardin, or 

Specter are coming back. The votes, as I think they probably told 

you, Director, is a whole series of votes. But you have been here 

before. You know how that sometimes works. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEAHY. I would state, however, that we have had—on 

our side of the aisle, we have had 11 Senators who have taken part 

in this, 11 Democratic Senators. We have also had the distinguished Ranking Member, Senator Sessions, and two senior, very 

senior members of the Republican Party take part-–14 of us. It 

shows how serious we take this. I would note that you take the 

question of oversight seriously. You and I talk not just here, but 

we talk during the weeks and the months as we go along. 

I would note that in the spring the National Academy of Sciences 

issued a comprehensive report on the need to improve forensic 

sciences in the United States. The Judiciary Committee has held 

two hearings on this already. I have been disturbed by some of the 

things I have heard. 

When I was a prosecutor, I used forensic evidence all the time. 

We did not have DNA then, but we used everything else. I know 

how valuable it can be both to the prosecution and the defense, but 

it is valuable only if it is accurate and reliable and if it reflects 

35 

state-of-the-art and technique. I think we have to have total confidence. 

As you know and I know, there are some cases that have no forensic evidence. But when it is there, for the interest of justice, it 

has to be accurate. It has to be something both sides can agree on. 

In the 1990’s, I recall the FBI faced some similar problems. We 

learned the FBI laboratory was not living up to the highest standards. Ultimately, the FBI worked with the Congress, and we built 

an entirely new FBI laboratory. A massive undertaking. I think it 

was about $100 million, years. 

Now the FBI is at the forefront of forensic science. In fact, one 

area that we see now that people agree as being solidly reliable, 

DNA, actually the standards were developed by the FBI. 

What do we do with forensic programs around the country? Some 

argue that we should have one national lab. Others say that State 

labs can be good. And as you know, some States have very good 

labs; some States do not. How do we establish standards so, if you 

are trying a case in Vermont or California or Ohio and forensic 

science is used, that there is some touchstone standard, like the 

National Academy of Sciences said, that we can look at and say, 

Okay, we know this is good? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do believe that accreditation is tremendously important, and driving persons to upgrade laboratories and shaming 

them into seeking accreditation. And it is going to require the support not just of the laboratories themselves, but it costs money to 

upgrade a lab. It takes money to train the various technicians you 

need. 

Chairman LEAHY. Money and time. 

Mr. MUELLER. Money and time, and you need everybody to be 

pushing it. Particularly, in this case, it should be the judges, it 

should be the prosecutors, it should be defense counsel, it should 

be the technicians themselves. And as you have pointed out, the 

guilt or innocence of somebody is often dependent on the quality of 

that forensic evidence, even before DNA. 

The other aspect of it is, as everything else, we need to work together. You indicate that we established the standards with regard 

to DNA. Well, we did it with a working group of individuals from 

around the country, from a variety of laboratories, so that it was 

not the FBI dictating; it was law enforcement within the United 

States coming together with an appropriate solution and standards. 

The same thing can be said for CJIS, the Criminal Justice Information Services, where we have a board which is made up mostly of 

State and local law enforcement that we basically are the administrator, and that works exceptionally well. 

So having the money, having the push, having the accreditation, 

and then having the input of a board from State and local law enforcement are, I would say, the key components. 

Chairman LEAHY. And this is something really that affects everybody in the criminal justice system. It affects the judges, defense 

attorneys, prosecutors. We have talked about this before. A prosecutor wants to make sure they have got the right person. The 

worst thing is you convict the wrong person because it means whoever committed the crime is still out there going free, plus the obvious violation of convicting the wrong person. 

36 

You have what I call the ‘‘CSI factor.’’ You go into court and everybody says, ‘‘Well, where is the DNA? ’’ Well, a lot of cases do not 

have DNA. Or, ‘‘Where are the fingerprints? ’’ A lot of cases do not 

have fingerprints. ‘‘Where is the ballistics? ’’ A lot of cases do not 

have it. 

But when it is there, it ought to be something where—the argument is we all agree on—I mean, agree on the finding; otherwise, 

I think we are going to be in for some real difficulty, especially 

with some of the court cases that come down about requiring the 

testimony of the person who actually did it. That could be almost 

impossible, and I know your laboratory helps local law enforcement 

all around the country, and that could create a real problem. 

Let me ask you another thing while the staff is checking if there 

are others coming back. We saw the murder of Marcello Lucero, an 

Ecuadorian immigrant, brutally killed in Long Island, and we have 

seen other such crimes against Latinos and immigrants. The 

Southern Poverty Law Center showed that FBI statistics suggest 

a 40-percent rise in anti-Latino hate crimes across the Nation between 2000 and 2007. 

What is happening here, and what steps are being taken? I think 

both of us abhor hate crimes of any sort, whether they are against 

Latinos, blacks, people because of their gender or sexual identification. But is there an increase in Latino immigrant hate crimes? 

Mr. MUELLER. I had not been aware of that. I will have to go and 

check on that. But whenever we get allegations in that regard, in 

consultation and in conjunction with the Department of Justice to 

determine the applicability of our jurisdiction, we thoroughly investigate and try and convict. I will have to get back to you on that 

increase. I had not recognized that. I know we have a problem with 

reporting of hate crimes because some believe it is a somewhat 

nebulous category. Some are unwilling to put it into that category, 

and our statistics, as I say, are dependent on State and local law 

enforcement providing that information. 

We have in the last couple of years, when we have our meetings 

with regard to the information that is provided to CJIS, focused on 

that particular issue in order to encourage State and local law enforcement to spend more time and enable us to have accurate statistics in that regard. 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, the late Senator Kennedy had espoused 

hate crime legislation, and I am proud to follow his lead in doing 

that. We have legislation pending that would increase the tools for 

Federal investigators, but also to State and local law enforcement 

to deal with hate crimes. We know this happens. We saw the murder of a guard at the Holocaust Museum, and your Department 

was involved, something that all of us found as shocking, I think, 

as you might see. Do you think if we pass a bill we might be able 

to help law enforcement curb the trend of crimes on ethnicity or 

race or sexual orientation or bias? Would that help us? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to take a look at it, but it might 

well. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

I see Senator Schumer here. I yield to Senator Schumer. You 

voted, I take it. 

37 

Senator SCHUMER. I did. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me 

thank you. I know you asked many more questions than you 

thought you would, and you are a good friend, a great leader, and 

a wonderful Chairman, so thank you for doing that. And I hope the 

questions, Mr. Director, were not too difficult that I caused to be 

asked. 

Anyway, I have a bunch of questions. The first relates, of course, 

to what happened in New York a few days ago. We marked the 

eighth anniversary of our terrorist attacks, the 9/11 attacks, last 

Friday in solemn ceremonies, seeing the families still wearing the 

pictures of the people they lost. And we marked this day with remembrance, but also rededication to the country’s national security. 

As I have said publicly, I think the FBI does a very good job and 

is light years better than they were on 9/10/2001. And a lot of that 

is to your credit, Mr. Director, and the men and women who work 

for you, the thousands and thousands who do it. In New York, we 

have a very good task force. 

Now, my question is just, you know, this recent report put New 

Yorkers on edge. It came at a time right after 9/11. There are all 

sorts of rumors flying around, so I just want to ask you a question, 

and I know that this is an ongoing investigation. Not much can be 

said of it in public, nor should it, so that the investigation is not 

compromised. 

However, here is the one question I have. Could you assure New 

Yorkers and the American public that the situation is under sufficient control and there is no imminent danger to their safety? 

Mr. MUELLER. I can say that I do not believe there is imminent 

danger from that particular investigation, from what I know of that 

particular investigation. 

Senator SCHUMER. Okay. I think we will leave it at that. I want 

to urge you to continue the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, a very 

successful enterprise, and I would urge continued cooperation. I intend to visit it shortly. They invited me to come, and I will be 

there. 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me also put in and say without any reservation that our relationships with NYPD in this and other investigations could not be better, and that New Yorkers are well benefited 

by the work of NYPD and Ray Kelly in making the city safe. And 

in situations where there are investigations being conducted, we 

have a very good working relationship and will continue that relationship. 

Senator SCHUMER. Good. Glad to hear it. I know it to be the case, 

and thank you for saying it. 

The next question relates to the terror alerts. As you know, Tom 

Ridge, the former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, recently wrote a book. It was entitled ‘‘The Test of our Times.’’ 

The book reveals how some, including former Attorney General 

Ashcroft, former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, he said, pressured 

him to elevate the national security threat just days before the 

2004 election in what he suspected was an effort to influence the 

election. That is his characterization, not mine. Furthermore, he 

stated you were on his side against raising the terrorist level. 

38 

Could you please provide us with what you know happened then? 

Is it true that you were against raising the alert level? 

Mr. MUELLER. I cannot speak to the particular incident that is 

recounted in Tom Ridge’s book. What I can say is I do believe 

throughout the years that we have been dealing with terrorist attacks that any person sitting at the table was interested in doing 

the right thing, not for political reasons. Each one sitting at the 

table when these decisions were made understands the decision 

may well relate to whether a person lives or dies as a result of a 

terrorist attack. And I did not see political considerations in those 

discussions. 

Senator SCHUMER. Those specific discussions. 

Mr. MUELLER. Throughout. 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you. The next question relates to the 

security of FBI data bases and cyber security experts. The administration released a new National Intelligence Strategy yesterday, 

and it designated cyber security as a new top priority for the intelligence community. That makes a great deal of sense. You told the 

Committee this morning how important this area is and how important it is to hire appropriate experts. 

A report issued by a private consulting firm, Booz Allen, this 

summer highlighted numerous continuing problems our Government has in hiring enough capable cyber security experts, and you 

cannot do this work without highly qualified personnel. 

So, first question: Does the FBI have sufficient experts to meet 

the Nation’s growing cyber security needs? And, similarly, is the 

FBI expanding its efforts to recruit and retain such experts? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, in the wake of September 11th, we changed 

the definition of our hiring needs, and cyber capabilities was one 

of those areas that we immediately focused on. And since then, we 

have brought in any number of persons who were program analysts, software developers, all range of cyber expertise in that particular category, are still recruiting for that category. It is a—what 

do I want to say? It is one of the categories that we understand 

is absolutely essential to get the right people in it and one that is 

going to expand. 

The other aspect that I do believe that is tremendously important is we have a cyber task force that is relatively large. That includes personnel from any number of agencies so that we tap in not 

only to the expertise of the FBI, but also the expertise of the intelligence community, the military, and others. 

Senator SCHUMER. Are you having, though, some difficulties in 

finding enough cyber security experts? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Senator SCHUMER. No? 

Mr. MUELLER. No. 

Senator SCHUMER. Good. I am going to ask the GAO to conduct 

a report on the hiring of cyber security experts, not just in the FBI 

but in other parts of the Government as well, so we can comprehensively identify any systemic deficiencies and work together 

to keep our intelligence agencies fully and appropriately staffed. 

Chairman LEAHY. Is that it? 

Senator SCHUMER. That is it. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

39 

Director, we are now several minutes into a 10-minute roll call 

vote. I will recess the hearing now, again with thanks to you. I appreciate, as I said before, that you have always been available 

when I have had questions, and I appreciate your testimony here 

today. We share a common interest in law enforcement—look forward that we can be proud of. Again, I compliment you for your 

speech on the anniversary, on the FBI’s anniversary. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. We stand in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submission follow.] 

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