IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

James Williams, (N52706), )

)

Petitioner, )

) 12 C 5345

v. )

) Judge John Z. Lee

Marcus Hardy, Warden, )

Stateville Correctional Center, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

James Williams, a Stateville Correctional Center inmate, brings this habeas corpus petition 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2005 conviction in the Circuit Court of Cook County 

for possession of a controlled substance containing at least 15, but less than 100 grams of cocaine,

with intent to deliver, in violation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2005).

1

 The 

sentencing court found that Petitioner qualified under Illinois’ Habitual Criminal Act, 720 Ill. 

Comp. Stat. 5/33B-1, 2 and imposed a mandatory life sentence. In support of his petition, 

Williams asserts that: (1) the sentencing judge considered impermissible evidence when imposing 

the life sentence in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Shepard v. 

United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005); (2) Illinois’ Habitual Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague;

3

(3) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to tell him about a plea offer and by 

1 Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition pro se; however, he had the assistance of counsel with 

regard to his reply brief.

2 All statutory citations are to the statutes in effect in 2005 when Petitioner was convicted and 

sentenced. The Habitual Criminal Act is now codified at 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-4.5-95 (West 2015). 

3 Petitioner raised Claims One and Two as the same claim in his petition. Because that claim 

presents different issues, however, the Court has addressed it as two separate claims and has renumbered

Petitioner’s claims accordingly. 

 
failing to tell him that, if convicted, he would face a mandatory life sentence; and (4) he was 

wrongfully sentenced under the Habitual Criminal Act.

Procedural Background

Following Petitioner’s conviction, the sentencing court held a hearing regarding the 

application of the Habitual Criminal Act. Illinois v. Williams, No. 1-05-2773 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 

15, 2007), ECF No. 18-8. The trial court found that the Habitual Criminal Act applied after 

determining that Petitioner’s prior convictions qualified him as a habitual criminal as defined by

the Act. Id. The court then sentenced him to life in prison. Id.

On direct appeal to the Illinois appellate court, Petitioner challenged his life sentence on 

the following grounds: (1) the trial court’s findings violated his right to a jury and due process; 

(2) the Habitual Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague; (3) he was not eligible to be sentenced 

under the Act because he committed the first offense more than twenty years before the instant 

conviction; and (4) his attorney provided ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing. Id. 

The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Id. 

Petitioner raised only the first two issues in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois 

Supreme Court. Illinois v. Williams, No. 104269 (Ill.), ECF No. 18-9. The Supreme Court 

denied the petition. Illinois v. Williams, No. 104269, 871 N.E.2d 61 (Ill. May 31, 2007) (Table), 

ECF No. 18-10. 

Next, Petitioner filed a postconviction petition under Illinois’ Post Conviction Hearing 

Act, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/122-1 et seq., arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance when he failed to tell him about a potential plea deal prior to trial and that the trial court 

provided the jury with improper instructions. Illinois v. Williams, No. 1-08-2531 (Ill. Mar. 31, 

2
2011), ECF No. 18-16. The trial court denied the petition, and the appellate court affirmed. Id. 

Petitioner raised only the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his petition for leave to appeal 

to the Supreme Court. Illinois v. Williams, No. 112359 (Ill.), ECF No. 18-17. The Supreme 

Court denied the petition. Illinois v. Williams, No. 112359, 955 N.E.2d 479 (Ill. Sept. 28, 2011), 

ECF No. 18-18. Petitioner then filed the habeas corpus petition. 

Legal Standard

A writ of habeas corpus will be granted only if the Petitioner demonstrates that “he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the 

Court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court’s decision on the merits was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States, or the state court decision is based on an unreasonable 

determination of facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

“A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the ‘contrary to’ clause if the state court 

applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases, or if it 

decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). “An ‘unreasonable 

application’ occurs when a state court ‘identifies the correct legal principle from [the Supreme 

Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of Petitioner’s case.’” 

Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2005) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 

(2003)). 

3
Clearly established federal law is the “‘holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme 

Court’s] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.’” Carey v. Musladin, 549 

U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). The state court is not 

required to cite to, or even be aware of, the controlling Supreme Court standard, as long as the state 

court does not contradict the Supreme Court standard. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

The Court begins with a presumption that state courts both know and follow the law. Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). This presumption is especially strong when the state court is 

considering well-established legal principles that have been routinely applied in criminal cases for 

many years. Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013).

The Court’s analysis is “backward looking.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 

(2011). The Court is limited to reviewing the record before the state court at the time that court 

made its decision. Id. The Court is also limited in considering the Supreme Court’s “precedents 

as of ‘the time the state court renders its decision.’” Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011) 

(quoting Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1399; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003)) (emphasis 

omitted).

“AEDPA’s standard is intentionally ‘difficult for Petitioner to meet.’” Woods v. Donald, 

135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 

(2014); Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1786 (2013)). “As a condition for obtaining 

habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the 

claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). This “highly deferential 

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standard . . . demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford, 537 

U.S. at 24. Habeas corpus is a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice 

systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 

102–03 (quotation marks omitted). “Under § 2254, a habeas court must determine what 

arguments or theories supported, or . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it 

must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories 

are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of th[e] [Supreme] Court.” Id. at 102.

Analysis

I. Claim One: Apprendi/Shepard Challenge

Petitioner argues that the sentencing court erred in considering evidence regarding his

1981 Wisconsin armed robbery conviction in violation of Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, and Shepard, 

544 U.S. at 26, when finding the Wisconsin conviction qualified under Illinois’ Habitual Criminal 

Act.

The rule of Apprendi holds that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to 

the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. This rule incorporates the 

holding of Almendarez-Torres v. United States, which allows a sentencing judge to consider prior 

convictions to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum even though the prior 

convictions were not found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt in the case in which the sentence 

is imposed. 523 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1998); see United States v. Dixon, 790 F.3d 758, 759 (7th Cir. 

2015). Allowing prior convictions under Almendarez-Torres is an exception to Apprendi’s

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general rule that facts increasing the statutory maximum sentence must be found by the jury 

beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Elliott, 703 F.3d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 2012).

The sentencing judge, however, does not have carte blanche when considering the prior 

convictions at sentencing. The judge may consider the prior conviction only when it has “been 

established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial 

guarantees.” Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999). “[T]here is a vast difference 

between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which 

the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard 

of proof.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496.

What is more, “the only facts that the [sentencing] court can be sure the jury [] found 

[beyond a reasonable doubt] are those constituting elements of the offense . . . .” Descamps v. 

United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2288 (2013). The sentencing judge cannot consider 

circumstances surrounding the conviction such as a “disputed” determination as to the theory of

the crime accepted by the jury for the prior conviction. Id. (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 25

(plurality opinion), and Shepard, 544 U.S. at 28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 

judgment)). And the sentencing court cannot rely on its own finding of a fact that is not an 

element of the prior conviction when increasing a sentence beyond the statutory maximum 

sentence. Id. at 2289.

Petitioner was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance containing at least 15,

but less than 100 grams of cocaine, with intent to deliver, in violation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 

6
570/401(a)(2)(A).

4

 ECF No. 18-4 at 163. This resulted in a sentencing range of six to thirty 

years of imprisonment. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 570/401(a)(2)(A). The sentencing judge increased 

the sentence to life in prison under Illinois’ Habitual Criminal Act, 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/33B-1.

The relevant portion of the Habitual Criminal Act requires that “[e]very person who has 

been twice convicted in any state or federal court of an offense that contains the same elements as 

an offense now classified in Illinois as a Class X felony . . . and is thereafter convicted of a Class X 

felony . . . shall be adjudged a habitual criminal.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/33B-1(a).

5

 

Petitioner’s three felony convictions are: (1) a 1981 Wisconsin armed robbery 

conviction; (2) a 1985 Illinois murder conviction; and (3) the present 2005 Illinois controlled 

substance conviction. Illinois v. Williams, No. 1-05-2773 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 15, 2007) (Rule 23 

order) (direct appeal), ECF No. 18-8 at 2. Petitioner’s present claim challenges only the 

sentencing court’s determination that the Wisconsin conviction contains the same elements as an 

offense classified in Illinois as a Class X felony.

According to Petitioner, the sentencing court violated Apprendi and Shepard because it 

conducted a “broad evidentiary hearing” in making its determination ECF No. 1 at 8. This 

characterization is inaccurate.

The evidence introduced at sentencing regarding the Wisconsin conviction included 

certified records of the conviction, ECF No. 18-4 at 194, and testimony from Wisconsin Assistant 

4 The jury found Petitioner guilty of possession with intent to distribute without making a factual 

finding as to the type or quantity of drug that Petitioner possessed. However, the parties do not dispute that 

Petitioner possessed at least 15, but less than 100 grams, of a substance containing cocaine, with intent 

distribute. Habeas Petition, at 1; Resp’t’s Answer, at 1.

5 Under Illinois law, “[c]ertain serious offenses are designated as Class X felonies. . . . Some offenses 

are designated as Class X offenses in the statute that defines the crime. In other cases, certain felonies are 

raised to the level of a Class X felony under the conditions specified in the applicable statute.” R. Hunter, 

Trial Handbook for Illinois Lawyers, Criminal § 55:1 (9th ed. 2015).

7

 
District Attorney Richard Ginkowski. ECF No. 18-8 at 2–4. Ginkowski testified as to the 

elements of the Wisconsin criminal code in effect in 1981 when Petitioner was convicted of armed 

robbery. Id. at 2. He compared the elements of the Wisconsin and Illinois armed robbery 

statutes, produced a comparison chart, and concluded that they were identical. Id. at 3.

Ginkowski did not discuss the underlying facts of Petitioner’s case during direct 

examination. At one point, he did relate facts from the crime detailed in the criminal complaint, 

but he did so in response to defense counsel’s question regarding Petitioner’s participation in the 

crime.6 Id. at 3–4; see ECF No. 18-4 at 224. The prosecutor’s statement in this regard was 

neither material nor necessary to the sentencing judge’s determination given that the sentencing 

judge needed only the certified record of the Wisconsin conviction and the elements of the 

offenses as set forth in the relevant statutes to determine whether the Illinois’ Habitual Criminal 

Act applied.

A review of the Illinois appellate court’s decision affirming the trial court shows that the 

decision is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Apprendi and Shepard. See 

Illinois v. Williams, No. 1-05-2773 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 15, 2007), ECF No. 18-8; see also Boyd v. 

Boughton, 798 F.3d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 2015) (instructing that the relevant state court decision is 

the last state court decision to address the claim on the merits). The Illinois appellate court

explained as follows:

We find the testimony regarding the sameness of the elements of robbery in Illinois 

and Wisconsin to a fact “of” a prior conviction as opposed to “about” a prior 

6 The only time an underlying fact regarding the conviction was elicited was through cross 

examination by Petitioner’s defense counsel. To the extent that Petitioner complains about this error, he is 

challenging an invited error caused by his counsel. Furthermore, this testimony did not impact the 

sentencing determination. As the state appellate court correctly noted, there is no indication that the 

sentencing judge relied upon any underlying facts from the prior conviction when imposing the life 

sentence.

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conviction. We are not concerned with what defendant did in committing the 

convictions themselves. Ginkowski did not testify that a particular act satisfied a 

particular element in either state statute; he only found that the elements were the 

same. Indeed, the only time the facts of the underlying Wisconsin robbery 

conviction came to light was at the end of Ginkowski’s testimony, when defense 

counsel asked whether defendant “merely drove someone to the alleged armed 

robbery,” during the commission of which someone was shot. At no time did 

Ginkowski make any reference as to whether any of those acts satisfied certain

elements, and at no time was the court called upon to make any underlying factual 

determinations. Therefore, to the extent that the trial court considered the 

“extraneous evidence” of Ginkowski’s testimony, it did not err.

ECF No. 18-8 at 7.

The decision is not contrary to federal law because the Illinois appellate court accurately 

cites to Apprendi and Shepard, sets forth their holdings, and discusses the relevant case law. ECF 

No. 18-8 at 4–6. Furthermore, the court did not unreasonably apply Apprendi or Shepard. It 

recognized that the sentencing court was limited to the fact of a prior conviction as determined by 

the statutory elements. There is no statement from the sentencing judge that he considered any 

underlying facts or did anything other than properly consider Petitioner’s Wisconsin conviction 

and the statutory elements of the Wisconsin and Illinois crimes. ECF No. 18-4 at 256. Because a 

court may properly consider these things under Apprendi and Shepard, there was no constitutional 

violation, and the Court denies the petition as to Claim One.

II. Claim Two: Vagueness Challenge to Illinois’ Habitual Criminal Act

Petitioner next argues that Illinois’ Habitual Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague. 

The Habitual Criminal Act counts a federal or state conviction as a prior conviction if it contains 

the “same elements as an offense now classified in Illinois as a Class X felony, criminal sexual 

assault, aggravated kidnapping or first degree murder . . . .” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/33B-1. 

9
Petitioner challenges the word “same” in the statute. He claims there is no definition for the word 

“same,” nor “any self-correcting process built into the statute.” ECF No. 1 at 12. 

“To satisfy due process, ‘a penal statute must define the criminal offense [1] with sufficient 

definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner 

that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” Skilling v. United States, 

561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)). A law 

may be void for vagueness when it “leaves grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed 

by a crime.” Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015). The law must have a 

“‘reasonable degree of clarity’” so that individuals can conform their behavior to the law and 

police are not given “‘virtually complete discretion’” in enforcement. Gresham v. Peterson, 225 

F.3d 899, 907 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358).

The Illinois appellate court rejected this argument on direct appeal, and its holding is 

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The 

decision properly sets forth the constitutional standard for the vagueness challenge. ECF No. 

18-8 at 10. The fact that it cites to an Illinois case, rather than a federal one, for the relevant legal 

standard does not undermine its holding because the state court case cited by the court identifies 

the proper federal standard. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8.

In any event, the Illinois appellate court properly rejected Petitioner’s argument. The 

Habitual Criminal Act mandates a life sentence for a criminal who has committed three qualifying 

offenses, and these offenses are defined under Illinois law. The Act clearly explains that a 

criminal conviction based on federal law or law from another state qualifies only when the

elements of the offense are the same as the elements of a qualifying Illinois crime. There is no 

10
discretion under the Act, and Petitioner does not argue that any underlying state criminal statute is

vague. 

The fact that the Act does not define the word “same” does not make the statute 

unconstitutionally vague. As the Illinois appellate court recognized, the word “same” is a 

commonly understood word. It means identical, and the state law uses the word in this fashion. 

A prior state or federal conviction applies only if the conviction is for a crime that has identical 

elements to one of the qualifying Illinois crimes.

In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court considered a vagueness challenge to the 

Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 135 S. Ct. at 2557. At issue was a 

particular provision of the ACCA that increased sentences for federal criminal defendants if they 

had prior convictions for “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 

another.” Id. at 2555–56 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)). Under the ACCA, courts were

required to “picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves in ‘the ordinary case,’ and to judge 

whether that abstraction presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.” Id. at 2557. The

Johnson Court held that this kind of judicial assessment went beyond simply considering the 

elements of an offense. Id. (stating that the provision of the ACCA “ties the judicial assessment 

of risk to a judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime, not to real-world facts or statutory 

elements”) (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the ACCA provision was void for 

vagueness because the “the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry . . . both denies fair notice 

to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges.” Id.

Unlike the ACCA, the Habitual Criminal Act provides fair notice because it expressly 

limits the conduct covered under the Act to that giving rise to a federal or state offense whose 

11
elements are identical to specific qualifying Illinois crimes. Furthermore, in contrast to the 

ACCA , the Habitual Criminal Act does not invite a wide-ranging inquiry and is strictly tied to 

statutory elements. Courts need only conduct a side-by-side comparison of the elements of two 

pertinent criminal statutes to determine the Act’s applicability. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot 

demonstrate that the Illinois appellate court’s rejection of his vagueness challenge was contrary to, 

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Count Two is thus rejected. 

III. Claim Three: Counsel’s Performance Regarding Lesser Sentence

Petitioner’s third claim asserts ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to warn him 

that he faced a mandatory life sentence if he went to trial and for rejecting a plea offer that would 

have avoided a life sentence. ECF No. 18-11 at 31–32. Petitioner claims he would have 

accepted the offer for a lesser sentence had he known he faced a mandatory life sentence if 

convicted at trial. Id.

Although Petitioner raised this ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his postconviction 

petition, Respondent argues that the claim is nonetheless procedurally barred because the Illinois 

appellate court rejected this claim on an independent and adequate state law ground. Specifically, 

Respondent argues that the state court rejected this argument because Petitioner had failed to 

provide the necessary affidavit in support. This is incorrect.

To result in procedural default, a state court must clearly and expressly rely upon an 

independent and adequate state law ground for its decision. Johnson v. Thurmer, 624 F.3d 786, 

789 (7th Cir. 2010). A state court does not meet this requirement when the procedural rule 

invoked by the court is interwoven with an adjudication of the claim on the merits. Sanders v. 

12
Cotton, 398 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Page v. Frank, 343 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 

2005)).

While the state court noted that the Petitioner failed to attach his affidavit in support of his 

postconviction petition, citing 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/122-2, the court did so within the discussion 

of the claim’s merits. See ECF No. 18-16 at 4–5. At no point did the state court hold that its 

ruling was based on a procedural bar. See id. Rather, the court addressed the merits of the claim 

by ruling that Petitioner failed to present any evidence, or an explanation for the absence of 

evidence, to show that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. See id.

Additionally, it is clear that the appellate court understood how to base its ruling on an 

independent and adequate state law ground because it did so with regard to a different issue. 

Petitioner raised a different ineffective assistance of counsel argument, an argument that is not 

raised in the present habeas corpus petition, regarding an improper jury instruction. ECF No. 

18-16 at 5. The state argued the issue was forfeited because there was no timely objection at trial 

and because the issue was not raised on direct appeal. Id. The appellate court agreed and held 

that the issue was barred under “principles of waiver and forfeiture.” Id. The appellate court’s 

ruling on this other issue stands in stark contrast to its ruling with regard to his attorney’s purported 

failure to advise him of the plea offer.

Turning to the merits, the starting point for Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 

Strickland established the general rule that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a 

showing of deficient performance and prejudice, 466 U.S. at 687, and Hill applied Strickland in the 

context of plea agreements, Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

13
In Missouri v. Frye,

7 the Supreme Court held that “as a general rule, defense counsel has 

the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and 

conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012). The Court 

emphasized that even in such cases, Strickland’s prejudice requirement demands that the 

defendant establish that “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 1410.

“To establish prejudice,[] it is necessary to show a reasonable probability that the end result of the 

criminal process would have been more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a 

sentence of less prison time.” Id. at 1409. 

Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the state court ruling was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, Strickland and its progeny. In rejecting Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, the state appellate court explained, “even if a plea was tendered for a 

lesser sentence, the trial court did not have authority to impose it because defendant was subject to 

the mandatory sentence of natural life under the Habitual Criminal Act.” ECF No. 18-16 at 4 

(citations omitted). This ruling by an Illinois court interpreting an Illinois statute undercuts

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on 

state law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). That is because “federal 

habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 

(1990). “In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction 

7 Although Frye was decided in 2012, after the date of the relevant state court decision, the Court 

may still consider Frye in its analysis because the Frye Court stated that it was merely applying the 

principles of Strickland and Hill, rather than announcing a new standard. 132 S. Ct. at 1409 (“This 

application of Strickland to the instances of an uncommunicated, lapsed plea does nothing to alter the 

standard laid out in Hill.”); see also Hare v. United States, 688 F.3d 878, 878 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing 

that Frye did not break new ground but rather, applied the established Strickland and Hill standards). 

14

 
violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68; see Shaw 

v. Wilson, 721 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that a federal court must defer to a state 

court’s ruling on state law when that ruling is part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); 

Thompson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a habeas claim that an 

Illinois court misapplied an Illinois statute raises a non-cognizable state-law issue).

The state court interpreted the Illinois Habitual Criminal Act and determined, as a matter of 

state law, that Petitioner faced a mandatory life sentence regardless of any plea offer. Thus, as a 

matter of Illinois law, Petitioner faced a mandatory life sentence regardless of whether he had 

pleaded guilty to a lesser offense. Because this Court cannot reexamine state court 

determinations on state law questions, and because the state court determined that Petitioner had

suffered no prejudice from any purported deficiency of his trial counsel, Petitioner cannot 

demonstrate a Strickland claim. The state court’s rejection of the claim was neither contrary to, 

nor an unreasonable application of federal law. Accordingly, the Court denies the habeas petition 

with regard to Claim Three.

IV. Claim Four: Misapplication of the Habitual Criminal Act

Petitioner’s final argument is that the state court misapplied Illinois’ Habitual Criminal 

Act. The Act requires that the third conviction qualifying for the life sentence must occur within 

twenty years of the first qualifying conviction. Petitioner argues that sixteen years that he spent 

serving his second conviction is counted towards the twenty years based on the language in the 

Act. If this argument is correct, Petitioner’s third conviction would have occurred more than 

twenty years after his first conviction. This would mean he could not have qualified for a life 

sentence. The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s interpretation of the Act and held that he 

15
qualified for a life sentence. ECF No. 18-8 at 12–14. 

The Court too must reject Petitioner’s claim. Petitioner argues that an Illinois court 

misinterpreted an Illinois statute, and the Court cannot grant habeas relief based on a state court’s 

purported misapplication of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (per curiam); 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67; Dellinger v. Bowen, 301 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the 

Court is bound to follow an Illinois court’s interpretation of Illinois law. Shaw, 721 F.3d at 914. 

Because the Court has no authority to reject a state court’s interpretation of a state law, the Court 

denies the petition as to Claim Four. 

V. Certificate of Appealability

The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability under Rule 11 of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Petitioner cannot make a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right or that reasonable jurists would debate, 

much less disagree, with this Court’s resolution of this case. Resendez v. Knight, 653 F.3d 445, 

446–47 (7th Cir. 2011); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition on the 

merits. The Clerk is instructed to enter a judgment in favor of Respondent and against Petitioner. 

Petitioner is advised that this is a final decision ending his case in this Court. If Petitioner wishes 

to appeal, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within thirty days of the entry of 

judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). On the Court’s own motion, Respondent Marcus Hardy 

is terminated. Petitioner’s present custodian, Nicholas Lamb, the Acting Warden of Stateville 

Correctional Center, is added as Respondent. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 

16
U.S. 426, 435 (2004). The Clerk shall alter the case caption to Williams v. Lamb. 

SO ORDERED. ENTERED: 3/30/16

____________________________________

John Z. Lee

United States District Judge

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