FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 04-30094 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  CR-03-27-M-DWM

DOUGLAS JENSEN,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 8, 2005—San Francisco, California

Filed October 6, 2005

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, M. Margaret McKeown,

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea

13841
COUNSEL

Bryan Charles Tipp, Tipp & Buley, Missoula, Montana, for

the defendant-appellant. 

Joseph E. Thaggard, Assistant United States Attorney, Great

Falls, Montana, for the plaintiff-appellee. 

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge: 

It was an excess of speed that initially brought him to the

attention of authorities, but bad news eventually caught up

with Defendant-Appellant Douglas Jensen (“Jensen”). Jensen

13844 UNITED STATES v. JENSEN
was convicted for possession of methamphetamine with intent

to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). On appeal, Jensen

contends that the district court erred in denying his motion

under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3) to suppress the evidence

seized from his vehicle and residence on the grounds that his

arrest and the seizure of his vehicle were executed without

probable cause and, accordingly, all of the evidence in the

case was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

Jensen also appeals his sentence on the ground that the sentencing scheme under which he was sentenced, 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1), is unconstitutional

insofar as it violates: (1) the constitutional separation of powers and non-delegation doctrines; (2) Jensen’s due process

rights; and (3) the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel

and unusual punishment. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm Jensen’s conviction and sentence. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Report of Jensen’s Reckless Driving 

At approximately 8:00 a.m. on February 19, 2003, a private

citizen saw a black 1987 Ford Taurus station wagon traveling

in excess of 75 miles per hour driving northbound on Highway 93 in Flathead County, Montana. The speed limit in the

area was 25 miles per hour. The citizen called 911 and

reported that the vehicle was traveling at a high rate of speed

and “weaving in and out of traffic” in a reckless manner. He

provided the dispatcher with a description of the car and the

license number of the vehicle. 

Thereafter, the Flathead County Sheriff’s Department

issued an “attempt to locate” dispatch for a reckless, possibly

UNITED STATES v. JENSEN 13845
drunk driver, reported by a concerned citizen, and that dispatch was received by the police department in Kalispell. An

“additional attempt to locate” was later issued and broadcast,

which described the car more specifically as a black 1987

Ford Taurus and provided the license plate number. 

At approximately 8:30 a.m., Sergeant Lonnie Eugene Cook

of the Whitefish Police Department driving south on Highway

93, heard both the original “attempt to locate” dispatch and

the additional “attempt to locate” dispatch. 

B. Arresting Officer’s Information Regarding 

Jensen’s Drug Activities 

Sergeant Cook had served on the Northwest Drug Task

Force (“Task Force”) from September 2000 to January 2003.

During that time, he was also cross-deputized as a Flathead

County Deputy Sheriff. In January 2003, Cook returned to

service as a sergeant on the Whitefish Police Department, and

was replaced on the Task Force by another Whitefish police

officer, Detective Michael Meehan. While on the Task Force,

Cook had received intelligence on Jensen’s drug-running

activities which included a description of Jensen’s car: A

black Ford Taurus station wagon. 

On the basis of knowledge obtained during his time on the

Task Force, Cook suspected that Jensen was the driver of the

vehicle. Cook then called the Flathead County Sheriff’s

Department to confirm his suspicion that Jensen was the

driver of the vehicle. After receiving confirmation from the

Sheriff’s Department that the car was Jensen’s, Cook continued driving south on Highway 93 with the intention of intercepting the speeding vehicle. At that point, Cook heard on his

police radio Flathead County Deputy Tykachk say that the

vehicle was going north at a “high rate of speed” and that

Tykachk “could not get in behind it” or catch up due to the

vehicle’s speed. Cook continued south along Highway 93. 

13846 UNITED STATES v. JENSEN
C. Traffic Stop

At approximately 9:00 a.m., Cook caught up with Jensen as

Jensen’s vehicle made a westbound turn onto Blanchard Lake

Road. Sergeant Cook stopped Jensen’s car, asked to see Jensen’s driver’s license, and proceeded to question Jensen. A

short time later, Deputy Tykachk and Flathead County Corporal Phil Meredith arrived. 

Corporal Meredith began to conduct an investigation and

field sobriety test. Based on the information he obtained, Corporal Meredith concluded that Jensen was not intoxicated but

indicated he would cite Jensen for careless driving. 

D. Arrest and Impoundment of Jensen’s Vehicle

From his three years of experience as a member of the Task

Force, Cook knew that the Task Force had been interested in

Jensen. Cook called Task Force Detective Michael Meehan

and informed Meehan that Jensen was the subject of a traffic

stop. Cook then asked whether the Task Force “ha[d] any

ongoing investigations” or was “looking at [Jensen] for anything” to which Detective Meehan responded, “Oh, I didn’t

know he was back from Mexico.” Shortly thereafter, Meehan

arrived at the scene of the traffic stop. 

Cook called Officer Zimmerman, a senior officer on duty

at the Kalispell Police Department, and inquired whether the

Kalispell Police Department wished to cite Jensen for careless

driving or take him into custody. Officer Zimmerman gave

Cook clearance to arrest Jensen. Cook arrested Jensen and

ordered Jensen’s vehicle impounded. Cook then took Jensen

to the impound lot, where they met Detective Meehan. After

Jensen refused to consent to a search of his automobile, a

police department K-9 unit drug-sniffing dog was used to

check the vehicle. The dog alerted police to the presence of

narcotics. Cook then transferred Jensen to the custody of the

Kalispell Police Department. 

UNITED STATES v. JENSEN 13847
As a result of the dog’s indicating the presence of narcotics

in Jensen’s vehicle, Detective Meehan applied to a district

court judge for a search warrant to search Jensen’s vehicle for

evidence related to the criminal possession of illegal drugs. In

addition to describing the results of the canine alert, the sworn

application included the statement that Jensen “is known to

Meehan and other members of the [Northwest Drug Task

Force] of being involved in the sale and trafficking of

methamphetamine.” The application also stated:

Meehan has received recent information on or about

January 21, 2003 from an informant who has been

proven reliable by the NWDTF. The informant

advised that Jensen was currently making a trip to

the Nevada California [sic] area to pick up a large

quantity of methamphetamine. The informant

advised that Jensen was using his black Ford station

wagon to haul methamphetamine back to Montana.

The same informant advised that he knew Jensen to

package methamphetamine in coffee to mask the

odor. The packages were hidden inside and under the

station wagon and on one occasion, the informant

helped Jensen unpack a large load of methamphetamine. 

In the application, Meehan also reported on information

received by another member of the Task Force, Detective

McCarvel. According to the application, Detective McCarvel

was told in December 2002 by a citizen source “very familiar

with Jensen and Jensen’s drug activity” that Jensen distributed

methamphetamine, and regularly traveled to California to

acquire methamphetamine, on one occasion in the company

of the citizen source. The citizen source told McCarvel that

“Jensen had previously been arrested in another state, when

he was transporting drugs on one of these trips,” “frequently

concealed large quantities of methamphetamine in . . . a tool

box in the bed of a pickup or a lockbox underneath the seat

of the vehicle,” and “commonly stored the methamphetamine

13848 UNITED STATES v. JENSEN
in plastic containers and used cayenne pepper to help mask

the odor of methamphetamine.” 

The search warrant application also contained information

regarding McCarvel’s work with another confidential informant in January of 2003. The confidential informant was reliable, according to the application, because the informant had

“provided accurate, reliable information that was corroborated

. . . made statements against their [sic] self interest and performed two successful controlled drug transactions.” The confidential informant also claimed familiarity with Jensen’s

drug activities, had purchased methamphetamine from Jensen,

and knew Jensen was traveling to southern California to purchase large quantities of methamphetamine for sale in Montana’s Flathead Valley. 

The confidential informant reportedly told McCarvel that

“Jensen frequently concealed the methamphetamine in body

panels or in hidden compartments, on the vehicle that he

drove to California . . . frequently attempted to mask the

methamphetamine with either coffee or pepper . . . [and] usually made these trips to California approximately once every

four weeks.” According to McCarvel’s informant, “Jensen

was getting ready to leave to California (approximately the

second week of January 2003), and that Jensen would be taking a 1987 Ford Taurus station wagon, black in color.” 

Later that same day, the county court issued a search warrant authorizing the search of the vehicle. 

Detective Meehan searched the vehicle and found three

Tupperware containers wrapped in black tape inside the frame

under the vehicle. The containers had magnets glued to the

inside and contained a crystalline substance mixed with pepper. In one container was 156.5 grams of a mixture of

methamphetamine and cayenne pepper. In the second container was 206.1 grams of pure methamphetamine (and an

additional 106.2 grams of powder). In the third container was

UNITED STATES v. JENSEN 13849
419.7 grams of powder, 54.66 grams of which was pure

methamphetamine. 

E. Search of Jensen’s Residence

Upon finding the methamphetamine in Jensen’s vehicle, on

February 20, 2003, Detective Meehan applied to the Flathead

County district court for a search warrant for Jensen’s residence. The warrant contained substantially the same information contained in Meehan’s application for a warrant to search

Jensen’s car, as well as a description of what that search had

produced. The state court issued the search warrant, which

was executed by officers the next day. In Jensen’s home, officers located a briefcase, a Tupperware container, a digital

scale, and bags with crystal-like substance and a small amount

of marijuana. Inside a desk found in the residence, officers

found a large number of sandwich bags, a scale and a marijuana pipe. 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Motion to Suppress 

After Jensen was indicted, he moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle and residence on the grounds

that his arrest for reckless driving, and the seizure of his vehicle were all conducted without probable cause and, accordingly, the evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. 

The district court denied Jensen’s motion to suppress. 

B. Bench Trial and Verdict

Having waived his right to a jury trial, Jensen was tried in

a bench trial. That same day, the district court judge found

Jensen guilty of possession of methamphetamine with intent

to distribute 50 grams. 

13850 UNITED STATES v. JENSEN
C. Sentencing Hearing and Sentence

At the sentencing hearing, the district court judge adopted

the recommendation of the Presentence Report. He found that,

under the Sentencing Guidelines, Jensen’s base offense level

was 34. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3), (c)(3) (providing that

possession of between 150 but less than 500 grams of

methamphetamine warrants a base offense level of 34). Jensen’s sentencing guideline range with a 34 base offense level

would have been 210-260 months’ imprisonment. 

Here, however, Jensen had two prior felony convictions.

Following the statute, the district court sentenced Jensen to

life imprisonment and ten years supervised release under 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). 

III. PROBABLE CAUSE 

Jensen argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle and residence.1

 We review de novo a district court’s denial of a

motion to suppress as to issues of law. United States v. Jones,

286 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002). We review the district

court’s findings of fact in denying a motion to suppress for

clear error. Id.

[1] The Fourth Amendment requires that a law enforcement

officer have “probable cause” to arrest an individual without

a warrant. See United States v. Hoyos, 892 F.2d 1387, 1392

(9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by United States

v. Ruiz, 257 F.3d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 2001). The test for

whether probable cause exists is whether “at the moment of

arrest the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the

1We agree with the district court that the law enforcement officers had

“reasonable suspicion” for the initial traffic stop. See Alabama v. White,

496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990) (requiring “reasonable suspicion” of criminal

wrongdoing before conducting an investigatory traffic stop). 

UNITED STATES v. JENSEN 13851
arresting officers and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in

believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing

an offense.” United States v. Bernard, 623 F.2d 551, 559

(1980) (internal quotation and citations omitted). A determination as to whether probable cause exists requires a “practical, common-sense” decision based on the totality of the

circumstances, including the veracity, basis of knowledge and

reliability of the information provided by informants. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983). 

A. Drug Activity 

We conclude that Cook had probable cause to arrest Jensen

on suspicion of illegal drug activity. Sergeant Cook testified

that, while a member of the Task Force, he had received intelligence regarding Jensen’s activities. Jensen argues that

Cook’s failure precisely to specify what intelligence he had

received renders his testimony ineffective to support a finding

of probable cause. We disagree. 

1. Collective Knowledge Doctrine

[2] Sergeant Cook’s testimony that he had received intelligence regarding Jensen was sufficient for the purpose of

establishing probable cause under the so-called “collective

knowledge doctrine.” The accepted practice of modern law

enforcement is that an officer often makes arrests at the direction of another law enforcement officer even though the

arresting officer himself lacks actual, personal knowledge of

the facts supporting probable cause. United States v. Butler,

74 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 1996); see also United States v.

Hensely, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (police officers entitled to rely

on radio bulletins based on reasonable suspicion of other officers). In such situations, a probable cause determination is

based on the collective knowledge of the law enforcement

personnel. 

13852 UNITED STATES v. JENSEN
“[W]here law enforcement authorities are cooperating in an

investigation [ ], the knowledge of one is presumed shared by

all.” Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772 n.5 (1983). “The

rule exists because, in light of the complexity of modern

police work, the arresting officer cannot always be aware of

every aspect of an investigation; sometimes his authority to

arrest a suspect is based on facts known only to his superior

or associates.” United States v. Valez, 796 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir.

1986). 

We elaborated on this doctrine in United States v. Bernard,

623 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1980). There, the defendants were

charged with conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1) and 846. Id. at 560.

The district court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress,

and the government appealed. Id. at 560. We reversed, holding that the collective knowledge of all of the agents involved

in the investigation and surveillance manufacturing methamphetamine was sufficient to constitute probable cause. Id. at

560 (internal citation omitted). “In effect all of them participated in the decision to make the arrests . . . [One officer] was

entitled to rely on the observations and knowledge of [the others], even though some of the critical information had not

been communicated to him.” Id. at 560-61. 

Similarly, in Hoyos, 892 F.2d at 1387, this court again held

that “the arresting officer need not have personal knowledge

of the facts sufficient to constitute probable cause” and “need

not be aware of all the facts and circumstances known to the

other officers participating in the arrest.” Id. at 1392. Rather

“probable cause may be based on the collective knowledge of

all the officers involved in the investigation and all of the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Id.

y3Under Bernard and Hoyos, then, “when there has been

communication among agents, probable cause can rest upon

the investigating agents’ ‘collective knowledge.’ ” United

States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

UNITED STATES v. JENSEN 13853
Bernard)); see also United States v. Sandoval-Venegas, 292

F.3d 1101, 1105-1106 (9th Cir. 2002).

2. Information Known By Individual Agents Here

Here, considering all of the circumstances, we conclude

that the record clearly establishes that Sergeant Cook and

members of the Task Force had extensive and specific knowledge of Jensen’s drug-related activities. 

a. Information Known By Detective Meehan

Detective Meehan became involved in the stop of Jensen

when Sergeant Cook called him and asked whether the Task

Force was “looking at [Jensen] for anything.” Meehan then

drove to the scene of the stop to consult with Cook and was

present at the time of Jensen’s arrest. The record indicates

that, prior to the time of the arrest, Meehan had been told by

an informant on or around January 21, 2003 that “Jensen was

currently making a trip to the Nevada California area to pick

up a large quantity of methamphetamine.” 

In addition, Meehan learned from the informant that Jensen

was using his black Ford station wagon, the car he was driving when he was stopped by Officer Cook. Meehan’s informant told of assisting Jensen in procuring a large quantity of

methamphetamine, related in detail Jensen’s method for packaging the drug to avoid detection, and described where Jensen

secreted containers of methamphetamine in the station wagon.

b. Information Known By Detective McCarvel

At the time of Jensen’s arrest, another member of the Task

Force, Detective McCarvel, possessed extensive information

regarding Jensen’s activities, information he had shared with

Detective Meehan. The record reflects that McCarvel had

learned from a citizen source that Jensen regularly went to

13854 UNITED STATES v. JENSEN
California to purchase methamphetamine, “frequently conceal[ing] large quantities of methamphetamine in his vehicle.”

c. Information Known By Sergeant Cook

During the suppression hearing, Cook testified that while

working on the Task Force, he had received intelligence on

Jensen. In particular, Cook testified that: “I had prior intelligence from the Northwest — working on the Northwest Drug

Task Force that Mr. Jensen may be involved in some other

things.” Cook and Meehan—his replacement on the Task

Force—worked in close contact during the arrest. Cook called

Meehan after Jensen had been stopped. After stating, “I didn’t

know he was back from Mexico,” Meehan immediately proceeded to the scene of the traffic stop. 

[4] It is clear that the facts and circumstances within the

knowledge of Sergeant Cook and Detective Meehan, and of

which they had reasonably trustworthy information, were sufficient to support a belief that Jensen had committed a narcotics offense. The record indicates that the totality of the

circumstances at the time Cook arrested Jensen included intelligence gathered by Cook during his service on the Task

Force, as well as the information contained in the sworn warrant application submitted by Meehan. Accordingly, Jensen’s

arrest was supported by probable cause. See Butler, 74 F.3d

at 921. 

B. Impoundment of Jensen’s Vehicle

[5] Based on the evidence supporting Jensen’s arrest, as

well as the results of the canine sniff test,2 impoundment of

Jensen’s vehicle was proper under the Fourth Amendment,

because Cook had probable cause to believe the vehicle con2We also note that such use of a narcotics-detection dog does not itself

constitute a search so as to implicate Fourth Amendment concerns. See

Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S.Ct. 834, 838 (2005). 

UNITED STATES v. JENSEN 13855
tained illegal drugs. See United States v. Ibarra, 345 F.3d

711, 715 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Cook also had the authority to impound Jensen’s vehicle

under the “community caretaker doctrine.” Once the arrest

was made, the doctrine allowed law enforcement officers to

seize and remove any vehicle which may impede traffic,

threaten public safety, or be subject to vandalism. See Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1477 n. 4 (9th

Cir. 1992); see also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441

(1973). 

The district court specifically found that Jensen’s vehicle

was parked in the road “such that it was reasonable for Sgt.

Cook to impound it to remove the obstruction to traffic.”

Moreover, the district court found that “Sgt. Cook’s concerns

about vandalism were reasonable.” The district court did not

clearly err in making these findings. 

[6] Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to

deny Jensen’s motion to suppress. 

IV. SENTENCING

Jensen also argues that the sentencing penalty provided

under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) is

unconstitutional in that it: (1) violates the separation of powers and non-delegation doctrines; (2) violates Jensen’s due

process rights; and (3) subjects Jensen to cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We

review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. See United

States v. Stokes, 292 F.3d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 2002), and we

affirm. 

The statutory scheme at issue here, Section 841(b)(1)(A),

provides for the possibility of life imprisonment for any person who violates the statute where such person has two prior

convictions for a felony drug offense. See 21 U.S.C.

13856 UNITED STATES v. JENSEN
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Under Section 851, increases in sentence

based upon prior felony drug convictions may not be imposed

unless the United States Attorney first files a written information stating the prior convictions to be relied upon. See 21

U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). A defendant may challenge the use of any

of the prior convictions that occurred within the last five

years. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(b)-(c) & (e). Once the Government files the information, the sentencing court is then

required to impose the enhanced sentence “if the court determines, after hearing, that the person is subject to increased

punishment by reason of two prior convictions.” 21 U.S.C.

§ 851(d)(1). 

A. Separation of Powers

First, Jensen contends that the sentencing scheme violates

the separation of powers doctrine under Article I of the Constitution insofar as the Sentencing Guidelines “no longer

apply” once a Section 851(a)(1) information is filed, and thus

any discretion with respect to sentence is vested in the

executive—rather than judicial—branch. According to Jensen, this impermissibly infringes on the ability of the district

court to impose a sentence of less than life imprisonment. 

[7] This argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s

decision in United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997).

There, the Court rejected an argument that prosecutorial discretion under Section 851 resulted in unconstitutional disparity in sentencing, observing that the discretion available to

prosecutors under Section 851 is “similar to the discretion a

prosecutor exercises when he decides what, if any, charges to

bring against a criminal suspect,” and holding that such discretion is constitutional. Id. at 762. 

[8] Jensen also argues that Section 851 violates the nondelegation doctrine inasmuch as it delegates to the executive

branch the legislative power and discretion to sentence defendants under the sentencing provisions of Section 841. JenUNITED STATES v. JENSEN 13857
sen’s argument is unavailing. Under the Supreme Court’s

decision in United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 371

(1989), delegation is permissible so long as there are “intelligible principles” by which to exercise the delegated authority.

[9] While this court has not directly addressed the question

whether the sentencing scheme at issue here violates the

non-delegation doctrine, two circuits have concluded that the

sentencing scheme does not impermissibly delegate legislative authority to the executive. See, e.g., United States v.

Crayton, 357 F.3d 560, 571-72 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that

21 U.S.C. § 851 does not violate the non-delegation doctrine);

United States v. Cespedes, 151 F.3d 1329, 1333 n.1 (11th Cir.

1999) (holding that Section 851 does not constitute a delegation of legislative power and concluding that “even if the sentence enhancement provisions of § 851 were characterized as

a delegation of legislative power, we would find that Congress had provided altogether intelligible principles to render

the delegation constitutional”). We find this reasoning persuasive and similarly reject Jensen’s separation of powers claim.

B. Due Process 

[10] Jensen argues that the sentencing scheme violates his

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment insofar

as it vests all discretion in the Attorney General and the

United States Attorney and confers no discretion on the sentencing judge. This argument is foreclosed by our decision in

United States v. Van Winrow, 951 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1991),

where we rejected the argument that the imposition of a life

sentence for three prior drug convictions under 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A) violates due process by depriving the trial

judge of discretion to impose sentence. We held that such sentences are “individualized according to quantity and variety of

narcotic possession” and “according to the number of prior

felony drug convictions,” and thereby comport with due process. Id. at 1071. 

13858 UNITED STATES v. JENSEN
C. Eighth Amendment

[11] Finally, Jensen argues that the sentencing scheme

imposed a sentence that was not “proportional” to the crime,

thereby subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. This argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (affirming Michigan court’s

imposition of a life sentence for a first time conviction for

drug possession holding that such sentence does not violate

the Eighth Amendment); see also United States v. Van Winrow, 951 F.2d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the imposition of a life sentence for three

prior drug convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) was

cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment). 

V. CONCLUSION

We conclude that Sergeant Cook had probable cause to

arrest Jensen for suspicion of drug trafficking under the collective knowledge doctrine. We therefore affirm the district

court’s denial of Jensen’s motion to suppress the evidence

seized from his vehicle and residence. 

Moreover, we reject Jensen’s arguments regarding the constitutionality of the statutory scheme under which he was sentenced, 21 U.S.C. § 841 and 21 U.S.C. § 851. Accordingly,

we affirm the district court’s sentence of life imprisonment

without parole. 

AFFIRMED.

UNITED STATES v. JENSEN 13859