FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAVIER VANEGAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF PASADENA; CITY OF 

PASADENA POLICE DEPARTMENT;

KLOTZ, Individually; in his/her 

capacity as Police Officer for 

Pasadena Police Department; 

ARELLANES, Individually; in his/her 

capacity as Police Officer for 

Pasadena Police Department; STARK, 

Individually; in his/her capacity as 

Police Officer for Pasadena Police 

Department; RIEHL, Individually; in 

his/her capacity as Police Officer for 

Pasadena Police Department; 

MURREN, Individually; in his/her 

capacity as Police Officer for 

Pasadena Police Department; 

LEMOS, Individually; in his/her 

capacity as Police Officer for 

Pasadena Police Department; 

SALAZAR, Individually; in his/her 

capacity as Police Officer for 

Pasadena Police Department; 

BUNDY, Individually; in his/her 

capacity as Police Officer for 

No. 21-55478

D.C. No.

2:20-cv-07845-

SVW-AGR

OPINION
2 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

Pasadena Police Department; DOES, 

1–10, individually, and in their

capacity as Police officers for 

Pasadena Police Department,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 2, 2022

Pasadena, California

Filed August 31, 2022

Before: Daniel A. Bress and Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit 

Judges, and Roger T. Benitez,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bumatay;

Concurrence by Judge Bumatay;

Concurrence by Judge Bress;

Concurrence by Judge Benitez

* The Honorable Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge for 

the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 3

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of the City of Pasadena and Pasadena 

police officers in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 alleging that plaintiff was unlawfully arrested.

At issue was whether police officers had probable cause 

to arrest plaintiff either for reports that he followed and 

harassed an attorney outside a courthouse or for plaintiff’s 

refusal to identify himself during an investigatory stop. 

Defendants asserted that they had probable cause to arrest 

plaintiff on two grounds: (1) disturbing the peace under 

California Penal Code § 415(2); and (2) obstructing an 

officer under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1). 

Plaintiff first argued that, because he was arrested under 

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1), that means it was 

disputed whether probable cause existed under § 415(2). 

The panel disagreed, stating first that it was well-established 

that if the facts support probable cause for one offense, an 

arrest may be lawful even if the officer invoked, as the basis 

for the arrest, a different offense which lacked probable 

cause. Second, by the time of plaintiff’s arrest, the officers 

learned enough facts to believe that plaintiff had violated 

§ 415(2) and therefore had probable cause to make the arrest. 

Having found no violation of the Fourth Amendment, there 

was no need to proceed to the second question of the 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

qualified immunity analysis—whether the unlawfulness of 

the officers’ conduct was not “clearly established.”

Plaintiff next asserted that the officers lacked probable 

cause to arrest him under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) 

because the failure to identify oneself by itself does not 

violate the law. The panel held that no “controlling 

authority” or “robust consensus of cases” prohibited Officer 

Klotz from arresting plaintiff under the facts confronting 

him. Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has said that 

arresting a person for failing to provide an identification 

violates the Constitution. Thus, even if plaintiff’s failure to 

identify himself did not provide probable cause to arrest 

under § 148(a)(1)—a question that the panel did not need to 

decide—Officer Klotz had breathing room to make the 

purported mistake of law and he and the other officers were 

entitled to qualified immunity for plaintiff’s arrest. The 

panel further affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim 

against the City on a failure-to-train theory because plaintiff 

failed to establish a pattern of similar constitutional 

violations by untrained employees. 

Concurring, Judge Bumatay stated that although the 

panel properly affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s falsearrest claim on qualified immunity, he was left wondering 

whether California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) authorizes 

officers to arrest a person based on the refusal to produce 

identification during a police investigation. Judge Bumatay 

found no California court case that categorically holds that 

the failure to identify oneself to an officer during a police 

investigation—without more—furnishes probable cause to 

arrest under § 148(a)(1). So even though the officers must 

receive qualified immunity here, plaintiff might be right that 

officers lacked probable cause to arrest him for violating 

§ 148(a)(1). In rebuttal to Judge Bress’s concurrence, Judge 
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 5

Bumatay stated that his concern is that federal courts may 

have gotten ahead of California courts in interpreting the 

law; it promotes the law to clarify whether the officers made 

a mistake by arresting plaintiff; this question was squarely 

presented in this appeal; and if California law was so clear it 

should have been an easy task to come up with California 

caselaw supporting Judge Bress’s view. 

Concurring, Judge Bress was compelled to write 

separately in this straightforward case only to address Judge 

Bumatay’s separate concurring opinion, which expounds on 

California criminal law and suggests that various federal 

court decisions interpreting California law may be wrongly 

decided. Judge Bress wrote to make clear that, in his 

respectful view, Judge Bumatay’s evaluation of California 

law was both unnecessary to the resolution of this case and 

substantively incorrect, advocating a narrow interpretation 

of California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) that California courts 

have not embraced. Here, plaintiff threatened an attorney 

following a court proceeding. That alone provided probable 

cause for his arrest under California Penal Code § 415(2), as 

the majority opinion correctly held. And so that was 

sufficient to dispose of Vanegas’s § 1983 claim asserting a 

Fourth Amendment violation for allegedly wrongful arrest.

Concurring, Judge Benitez agreed with the court that 

summary judgment was properly granted for the City of 

Pasadena and its police officers. He wrote separately to 

explain that this was an easy case. Although, undoubtedly, 

an arrest for refusing to give one’s name without at least 

reasonable suspicion would be an unreasonable seizure 

under the Fourth Amendment, that was not this case. Here, 

a crime had been reported. Plaintiff’s name was reasonably 

related to the circumstances justifying the stop and central to 

the investigation of a crime, whether the crime was stalking 
6 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

(Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9) or maliciously disturbing another 

by loud noise (Cal. Pen. Code § 415). At that point, the 

detective had probable cause to arrest for either offense and 

he had probable cause to arrest for violating Cal. Pen. Code 

§ 148(a)(1) when plaintiff refused to disclose his name.

COUNSEL

Krista R. Hemming (argued), The Hemming Firm, San 

Pedro, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Arnold F. Lee (argued), Assistant City Attorney; Michele 

Beal Bagneris, City Attorney; Office of the City Attorney, 

Pasadena, California; for Defendants-Appellees.
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 7

OPINION

BUMATAY, Circuit Judge:

At issue in this civil rights lawsuit is whether police 

officers had probable cause to arrest Javier Vanegas either 

for reports that he followed and harassed an attorney outside 

a courthouse or for his refusal to identify himself during an 

investigatory stop. The district court found that officers had 

probable cause for both crimes. We hold that Vanegas’s 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim fails, and we affirm.

I.

Background

This lawsuit stems from events immediately following 

Vanegas’s 2019 divorce proceedings at the Superior 

Courthouse in Pasadena, California. Vanegas appeared at 

the family court hearing, along with his ex-wife, Sandra 

Kerguelen, and her attorney, Karen Suri. According to Suri,

Vanegas raised his voice and yelled at Suri and the judge 

during the hearing. As a result, the judge admonished 

Vanegas to control himself or face sanctions. After the 

hearing, Suri asked a court bailiff to help her and Kerguelen 

leave without Vanegas following them. The bailiff stood in 

front of Vanegas, blocking the way so that Suri and 

Kerguelen could exit.

After Suri and Kerguelen left the courthouse, Vanegas 

followed them. Vanegas started yelling aggressively at Suri. 

Suri and Kerguelen tried to walk away, but Vanegas 

continued to follow while calling Suri a “scumbag” and 

“liar.” Vanegas eventually came within arm’s reach of Suri. 

Feeling threatened, Suri told Vanegas that she would call the 

police. But he still didn’t leave. Suri then dialed 911. Suri 
8 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

told the operator that there was a man following her, yelling 

at her on the street, and that she was afraid and needed help.

At that point, Suri saw a Pasadena Police Department 

Community Service Officer and flagged him down. Suri 

told the officer that Vanegas was following her and that she 

did not feel safe. The officer asked Suri to walk to the police 

station across the street to file a report. Suri and Kerguelen 

did so.

Pasadena Police Officer Philip Klotz was at the 

courthouse on other business. While there, he heard an alert 

over the police radio about a 911 caller being followed 

outside the courthouse. So Officer Klotz exited the 

Courthouse and headed toward the southeast corner of 

Garfield Avenue and Walnut Street. As he walked to the 

intersection, Officer Klotz received an update, advising that 

the suspect, named “Javier Vanegas,” was walking 

northbound on Garfield Avenue. After Officer Klotz 

reached the intersection, he observed only one man, later 

identified as Vanegas, heading north on Garfield Avenue.

Officer Klotz asked Vanegas whether his name was 

“Javier.” Vanegas responded by asking Officer Klotz who 

he was. Officer Klotz identified himself as a law 

enforcement officer and asked Vanegas for his 

identification. Despite at least three requests for 

identification, Vanegas did not comply and instead took out 

his cell phone to record the interaction. Officer Klotz then 

gave Vanegas the option of either producing his 

identification or being placed in handcuffs. Vanegas still 

refused to identify himself.

After several other officers arrived, Officer Klotz placed 

Vanegas in handcuffs for officer safety. Afterward, Officer 

Klotz received a radio call that Vanegas violated California 
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 9

Penal Code § 415—a disturbing-the-peace ordinance. 

Officer Klotz asked other officers to have Suri identify 

Vanegas. Officer Klotz received confirmation over the radio 

that Suri positively identified Vanegas as the person who 

was following her.

While other officers remained with Vanegas, Officer 

Klotz walked across the street to speak with Suri. Officer 

Klotz saw Suri almost crying and visibly shaking. Suri 

relayed that Vanegas began following her and Kerguelen 

after the family court hearing. After interviewing Suri, 

Officer Klotz walked back to Vanegas and advised him that 

he was under arrest. The officers then took Vanegas to the 

Pasadena police station for booking. Vanegas was 

eventually released with a citation for violating California 

Penal Code § 148(a)(1), which punishes obstructing a peace 

officer. The Office of the City Attorney for Pasadena 

declined to pursue charges and Vanegas was never convicted 

of any offense stemming from his arrest.

A few months later, Vanegas sued the police officers 

involved and the City of Pasadena alleging, among other 

claims, violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The officers and the City 

moved for summary judgment. In granting summary 

judgment, the district court ruled that probable cause existed 

to arrest Vanegas under California Penal Code §§ 148(a)(1) 

and 415(2) and so there was no Fourth Amendment 

violation. The court also held that Vanegas did not establish 

Monell liability against the City. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

Vanegas appeals the dismissal of his § 1983 claim. We 

review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Branch 

Banking & Tr. Co. v. D.M.S.I., LLC, 871 F.3d 751, 759 (9th 

Cir. 2017). We first address Vanegas’s claim against the 
10 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

officers and then turn to his claim against the City. As to 

both claims, we affirm.

II.

§ 1983 Claim Against the Officers

To prevail under § 1983, Vanegas must show that 

(1) Pasadena police officers “violated a federal statutory or 

constitutional right” and (2) “the unlawfulness of their 

conduct was clearly established at the time.” District of 

Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (simplified). 

So the inquiry is two-fold. Did the officers violate 

Vanegas’s constitutional rights? And if so, were those rights 

clearly established at the time?

On the first question, Vanegas’s challenge implicates the 

Fourth Amendment since he claims he was unlawfully 

“seized.” In the context of a § 1983 action, a Fourth 

Amendment violation occurs when a person is arrested 

“without probable cause or other justification.” Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 

(simplified). Probable cause to arrest exists when there is a 

“fair probability or substantial chance of criminal activity” 

by the arrestee based on the totality of the circumstances 

known to the officers at the time of arrest. Id. (simplified). 

This “is not a high bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 

320, 338 (2014).

On the second question, even with a constitutional 

violation, officers may still receive qualified immunity if the 

unlawfulness of their conduct was not “clearly established” 

at the time of arrest. By “clearly established,” we mean that 

the “contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 

violates that right.” Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d 
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 11

800, 824 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (simplified). In other 

words, “existing law must have placed the constitutionality 

of the officer’s conduct beyond debate.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 

at 589 (simplified). And we only look to “controlling 

authority” or “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive 

authority” to determine settled law. Id. at 589–90 

(simplified).

While Vanegas asserts he was unlawfully arrested, the 

officers maintain that they had probable cause to arrest him 

on two grounds: (1) disturbing the peace under California 

Penal Code § 415(2); and (2) obstructing an officer under 

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1). And even if no probable 

cause existed under state law, they contend they are still 

entitled to qualified immunity given there was no violation 

of clearly established law. We look at each basis for arrest 

in turn.

A.

California Penal Code § 415(2)

California Penal Code § 415(2) punishes “[a]ny person

who maliciously and willfully disturbs another person by 

loud and unreasonable noise.” “Maliciously” means a wish 

to “vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a 

wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of 

law.” Cal. Penal Code § 7(4). “Willfully” means “a purpose 

or willingness to commit the act.” Id. § 7(1). To comply 

with the First Amendment, California courts have construed 

§ 415(2) to prohibit loud noises in only two circumstances: 

(1) “where there is a clear and present danger of imminent 

violence,” or (2) “where the purported communication is 

used as a guise to disrupt lawful endeavors.” In re Brown, 

510 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Cal. 1973). So the ordinance only 
12 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

criminalizes loud noise “designed to disrupt rather than 

communicate.” Id. at 1022.

Under California law, “making loud noises, shouting 

obscenities, and making threats” constitute a violation of 

§ 415(2). In re Curtis S., 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703, 763–64 (Cal. 

Ct. App. 2013). In that case, a defendant shouted and used 

obscene language at the victim, told her to “get back, you 

better get back,” called her a “bitch,” and swung his fist at 

her. Id. at 760. The defendant’s speech caused the victim to 

back away in fear. Id. The court upheld the charge under 

§ 415(2) because the defendant’s speech “presented a clear 

and present danger of imminent violence and was designed 

to disrupt a lawful endeavor.” Id. at 763.

Vanegas argues that, because he was arrested under 

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1), that means it’s disputed 

whether probable cause existed under § 415(2). We 

disagree.

First, it does not matter that Officer Klotz stated that the 

basis of Vanegas’s arrest was under § 148(a)(1). It is wellestablished that “[i]f the facts support probable cause . . . for 

one offense,” an arrest may be lawful “even if the officer 

invoked, as the basis for the arrest, a different offense” which 

lacks probable cause. United States v. Magallon-Lopez, 

817 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Edgerly v. City 

& Cnty. of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“[P]robable cause supports an arrest so long as the arresting 

officers had probable cause to arrest the suspect for any 

criminal offense, regardless of their stated reason for the 

arrest.”).

Second, by the time of Vanegas’s arrest, the officers 

learned of enough facts to believe that Vanegas had violated 

§ 415(2). Suri called 911 and reported that a man was 
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 13

following her, yelling at her on the street, and that she was 

afraid and needed help. She then told a Pasadena 

Community Service Officer that she feared Vanegas because 

he was following her and shouting at her. Suri also 

positively identified Vanegas to officers as the person who 

followed her. Finally, when Officer Klotz walked over to 

Suri, he saw she was visibly shaking. Based on the 

collective knowledge of the officers, there was a fair 

probability that Vanegas’s noises constituted “a clear and 

present danger of imminent violence” and a “disrupt[ion of] 

lawful endeavors.” In re Brown, 510 P.2d at 1023.

There is one wrinkle. Violation of § 415(2) is a 

misdemeanor. See Cal. Penal Code § 17(b). Under 

California law, an officer may only make a warrantless arrest 

for a misdemeanor if he has probable cause to believe that 

the person committed the offense in the officer’s presence. 

Cal. Penal Code § 836(a)(1). So if Vanegas’s arrest was 

based on § 415(2), then the officers may have violated 

California law because his conduct was not in Officer 

Klotz’s presence. But that does not change the result. That’s 

because “[t]he requirement that a misdemeanor must have 

occurred in the officer’s presence to justify a warrantless 

arrest is not grounded in the Fourth Amendment.” Barry v. 

Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1990). So to establish a 

violation of the Fourth Amendment, it does not matter if 

Officer Klotz was present when Vanegas committed the 

misdemeanor. Rather, the “crucial inquiry” is whether 

Officer Klotz had probable cause to make the arrest. Id. at 

773. Here, we hold that he did.

Having found no violation of the Fourth Amendment, we 

need not proceed to the second question of whether the 

officers violated a “clearly established” right for Vanegas’s 
14 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

offense under § 415(2). So on this basis alone, Officer Klotz 

lawfully arrested Vanegas.

B.

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1)

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) punishes “[e]very

person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public 

officer [or] peace officer, . . . in the discharge or attempt to 

discharge any duty of his or her office or employment.” The 

officers contend that Vanegas’s actions fall within its 

prohibition since his refusal to identify himself obstructed 

Officer Klotz’s investigation of a potential stalking case. In 

response, Vanegas argues that California law does not 

require a person to identify himself to police officers. He 

contends that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him 

under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) because the failure 

to identify oneself by itself does not violate the law.

But to succeed on his § 1983 claim, Vanegas must

overcome qualified immunity by showing that the officers 

violated a clearly established right at the time of his arrest. 

Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. “A right is clearly established 

when it is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official 

would have understood that what he is doing violates that 

right.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7 (2021) 

(per curiam) (simplified). This is a forgiving standard: it 

“protects all but the plainly incompetent.” Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (simplified).

“Qualified immunity gives government officials 

breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments 

about open legal questions.” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Gelhaus, 

871 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2017) (simplified). So, it’s not 

enough that the legal answer be “suggested by then-existing 
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 15

precedent”; the answer must be “so well defined” that “the 

legal principle clearly prohibit[s] the officer’s conduct in the 

particular circumstances before him.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 

at 590. In other words, qualified immunity still attaches

when officers “reasonably but mistakenly concluded that 

probable cause [wa]s present.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 591 

(simplified); see also Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 

1442–43 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Even absent probable cause, 

qualified immunity is available if a reasonable police officer 

could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful, in 

light of clearly established law and the information the 

searching officers possessed.”).

No “controlling authority” or “robust consensus of 

cases” prohibited Officer Klotz from arresting Vanegas 

under the facts confronting him. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589 

(simplified). Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has 

said that arresting a person for failing to provide an 

identification violates the Constitution. In fact, we have both 

said the opposite. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. of Humboldt 

Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004) (upholding a state law 

permitting arrest for failure to identify oneself—where the 

request for identification is reasonably related to 

circumstances justifying the stop—as “consistent with 

Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable 

searches and seizures”); United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 

862, 869 (9th Cir. 2019) (“In some circumstances, a 

suspect may be required to respond to an officer’s request 

to identify herself, and may be arrested if she does not.”).

And no California case clearly establishes that Officer 

Klotz should have known he lacked probable cause to arrest 

Vanegas for failing to identify himself in the course of the 

stalking investigation. Indeed, multiple district courts, 

including the one here, thought Officer Klotz could make the 
16 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

arrest. See Nakamura v. City of Hermosa Beach, 2009 WL 

1445400, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Abdel-Shafy v. City of San 

Jose, 2019 WL 570759, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Vanegas v. 

City of Pasadena, 2021 WL 1917126, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2021). 

And so did we. See Kuhlken v. Cnty. of San Diego, 764 F. 

App’x 612 (9th Cir. 2019).

Thus, even if Vanegas’s failure to identify himself did 

not provide probable cause to arrest under § 148(a)(1)—a 

question we need not and do not decide—Officer Klotz had 

“breathing room” to make the purported mistake of law and 

he and the other officers are entitled to qualified immunity 

for Vanegas’s arrest.

III.

§ 1983 Claim Against the City

Vanegas also appeals the dismissal of his § 1983 claim 

against the City of Pasadena. Civil rights suits against local 

governments for constitutional violations by its officers 

cannot proceed on respondeat superior liability. AE ex rel. 

Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 

2012). Known as Monell liability, a plaintiff must instead 

establish that “the local government had a deliberate policy, 

custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the 

constitutional violation they suffered.” Id. (simplified); see 

also Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

Monell liability can turn on a municipality’s failure to 

train its officers, but the failure must amount to a “deliberate 

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police 

come into contact.” Flores v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 

1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 

489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). To allege such a failure, the 

plaintiff must establish “sufficient facts to support a 
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 17

reasonable inference (1) of a constitutional violation; (2) of 

a municipal training policy that amounts to a deliberate 

indifference to constitutional rights; and (3) that the 

constitutional injury would not have resulted if the 

municipality properly trained their employees.” Benavidez 

v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153−54 (9th Cir. 

2021). Monell liability is “at its most tenuous where a claim 

turns on a failure to train.” Id. at 1154 (simplified).

Vanegas alleged a failure to train and argues that factual 

disputes exist on whether the City of Pasadena failed to train 

its officers on the “well-established” right to refuse to 

identify oneself prior to arrest. But, as we discussed above, 

we doubt that any such right is so “well established” that its 

alleged omission from training would constitute deliberate 

indifference on the part of the City. See Flores, 758 F.3d 

at 1158 (the failure to train must be “a conscious or 

deliberate choice on the part of a municipality” (simplified)). 

And a failure-to-train theory of Monell liability usually 

requires a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by 

untrained employees.” See id. at 1159 (quoting Connick v. 

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)). Vanegas fails to 

establish such a pattern here. See also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs 

of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407–08 (1997) 

(explaining that a “one-time negligent administration” of a 

training program does not “tend to show . . . the lack of 

proper training”). We thus affirm the dismissal of Vanegas’s 

claim against the City.

IV.

Because probable cause supports his arrest under 

California Penal Code § 415(2) and qualified immunity 

shields the officers from liability for his arrest under 
18 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1), we hold that Vanegas is 

not entitled to relief under § 1983.

AFFIRMED.

BUMATAY, Circuit Judge, concurring:

Although we properly affirmed the dismissal of Javier 

Vanegas’s false-arrest claim on qualified immunity, I’m left 

wondering whether California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) 

authorizes officers to arrest a person based on the refusal to 

produce identification during a police investigation.

This question is important because probable cause 

generally defeats a claim like Vanegas’s, Nieves v. Bartlett, 

139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019), and we look to state law to 

determine “[w]hether an officer is authorized to make an 

arrest,” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979).

So, I think it’s reasonable to consider whether 

§ 148(a)(1) provided the probable cause to arrest Vanegas 

under the facts here. I suspect it doesn’t.

*

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) punishes “[e]very 

person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public 

officer [or] peace officer, . . . in the discharge or attempt to 

discharge any duty of his or her office or employment.”

Several federal cases have interpreted the law to mandate

cooperation with an officer’s request to produce 

identification during a valid police investigation. See, e.g., 

Kuhlken v. Cnty. of San Diego, 764 F. App’x 612, 613 (9th 
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 19

Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (“Deputy Smith had probable 

cause to arrest Fox for a violation of California Penal Code 

§ 148(a)(1) . . . . It is undisputed that Fox refused to provide 

identification upon request[.]”); Abdel-Shafy v. City of San 

Jose, 2019 WL 570759, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Once 

Plaintiff refused to identify herself, the Officers then had the 

probable cause to arrest her for resisting, obstructing, or 

delaying the investigation under Cal. Penal Code 

§ 148(a)(1).”); Nakamura v. City of Hermosa Beach, 2009 

WL 1445400, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“Plaintiff . . .

hamper[ed] the investigation by refusing to provide either 

his name or identification,” which provided probable cause 

to arrest under § 148(a)(1)). As a matter of plain text and 

common sense, these decisions are reasonable 

interpretations of the law. After all, failing to produce an 

identification will often delay a police investigation.

But California courts have not been so quick to endorse 

that view of § 148(a)(1). Instead, under California law, the 

scope of the law appears more nuanced. No California court, 

for example, has definitively ruled that § 148(a)(1) 

criminalizes the mere failure to identify oneself to police 

officers during a valid police investigation. While several 

California cases have blessed § 148(a)(1) arrests involving 

the failure to produce identification, those cases seemingly 

required something more.

Take a recent example—People v. Knoedler, 257 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 586, 589 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2019). There, 

the defendant was caught with an open beer can on the street 

and an officer asked him for an identification to issue him a 

citation. Id. at 587. The defendant refused and was charged 

with resisting under § 148(a)(1). Id. at 588. While accepting 

that the “failure to identify oneself cannot, on its own, justify 

an arrest” under § 148(a)(1), the court upheld the arrest 
20 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

because the “officer was attempting to write defendant a 

citation for a municipal code infraction.” Id. at 589. The 

arrest was valid because officers had both “reasonable 

suspicion for the initial detention and probable cause to cite 

[the] defendant.” Id. “Without any way to identify the 

person who is being cited,” the court concluded that “the 

police cannot perform their duties.” Id.

Another California court suggested that “a simple refusal 

to identify one’s self” doesn’t violate § 148(a)(1). People v. 

Lopez, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 921, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). In 

that case, the court affirmed a § 148(a)(1) conviction when 

the defendant was “belligerent, refused to give his name, 

refused to keep his hands visible, and refused to submit to a 

patdown.” Id. But the court made clear that the defendant’s 

arrest was a “far cry” from a mere “refusal to identify 

himself.” Id. Instead, the lack of cooperation was “coupled 

with” belligerent conduct that interfered with the officer’s 

patdown search. Id.

On the other hand, a § 148(a)(1) charge is appropriate for 

failing to disclose one’s identity in the “narrow context of a 

booking interview” for a felony arrest. People v. Quiroga, 

20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 450–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). After a 

felony arrest takes place, the court held that “[w]ithout 

knowing the identity of a suspect, it is impossible to arrange 

for bail or to conduct an arraignment” and it would 

“impede[] the administration of justice.” Id. at 452. But the 

court drew the distinction narrowly. Before a felony arrest, 

the court warned that “the statute must be applied with great 

caution.” Id. at 450. So, for example, the court noted that a 

person who protested repeatedly before complying with an 

officer’s orders could not be prosecuted under § 148(a)(1) 

because such actions were protected by the First 

Amendment. Id. at 448. Indeed, one California court has 
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 21

held that even refusing to give identification after a 

misdemeanor arrest, but pre-booking, isn’t prosecutable 

under § 148(a)(1). See In re Chase C., 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 381, 

392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).

And finally, back in 1980, another California court 

questioned whether “a person who merely refuses to identify 

himself or to answer questions” violates § 148(a)(1). In re 

Gregory S., 169 Cal. Rptr. 540, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 

There, when a 15-year-old boy refused to identify himself or 

respond to the questions of an officer investigating a 

neighbor’s complaint of “mischief,” the court held the 

officer had no ground to arrest him. Id. at 543, 548. In part, 

the court concluded that the officer already partially knew 

the boy’s identity so it was doubtful that his refusal to 

identify himself delayed the investigation. Id. at 548. But 

the court also noted that the California Legislature had 

required persons to identify themselves in several prescribed 

situations, see, e.g., Cal. Veh. Code §§ 40302, 12951, and 

that because none of those statutory conditions existed, a 

§ 148(a)(1) charge was improper. Id.

In sum, I have found no California court case that 

categorically holds that the failure to identify oneself to an 

officer during a police investigation—without more—

furnishes probable cause to arrest under § 148(a)(1). Indeed, 

California courts have suggested the opposite. Nor have the 

officers here offered a California case finding probable cause 

for § 148(a)(1) under similar facts. See Edgerly v. City & 

Cnty. of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(Probable cause “must . . . exist under some specific criminal 

statute.”). So even though the officers must receive qualified 
22 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

immunity here, Javier Vanegas might be right that officers 

lacked probable cause to arrest him for violating § 148(a)(1).

*

I welcome Judge Bress’s spirited disagreement with my 

analysis of California law. Such debates, I hope, will help 

clarify the law. I make just a few points in rebuttal.

First, I am truly agnostic on whether § 148(a)(1) should

permit the arrest of a person who fails to identify themselves 

to investigating officers. My concern here is that federal 

courts may have gotten out ahead of California courts in 

interpreting the law.

Second, I agree with Judge Bress that the Fourth 

Amendment protects officers who make reasonable mistakes 

about whether the law supports an arrest. See Heien v. North 

Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66 (2014). But it promotes the law 

to clarify whether a mistake was made in the first place.

Third, contrary to Judge Bress’s view, this question was 

squarely presented in this appeal. Deciding this case on 

other grounds doesn’t make the issue irrelevant.

And finally, if Judge Bress is right that California law is 

so clear, it should have been an easy task to come up with 

California caselaw supporting his view. The lack of any 

should give us all pause.

BRESS, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I am compelled to write separately in this straightforward 

case only to address Judge Bumatay’s separate concurring 
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 23

opinion, which expounds on California criminal law and 

suggests that various federal court decisions interpreting 

California law may be wrongly decided. I write to make 

clear that, in my respectful view, Judge Bumatay’s 

evaluation of California law is both unnecessary to our 

resolution of this case and substantively incorrect, 

advocating a narrow interpretation of California Penal Code 

§ 148(a)(1) that California courts have not embraced.1

I

Judge Bumatay writes separately on the question of 

whether California law “holds that the failure to identify 

oneself to an officer during a police investigation—without 

more—furnishes probable cause to arrest under 

§ 148(a)(1).” Concurrence 21. That question is not 

presented in this case. Vanegas threatened an attorney 

following a court proceeding. That alone provided probable 

cause for his arrest under California Penal Code § 415(2), as 

the majority opinion correctly holds. Maj. Op. 11–12. And 

so that is sufficient to dispose of Vanegas’s § 1983 claim 

asserting a Fourth Amendment violation for allegedly 

wrongful arrest.

There was also independent probable cause to arrest 

Vanegas for violating California Penal Code § 148(a)(1), 

which punishes “[e]very person who willfully resists, delays, 

or obstructs any public officer [or] peace officer, . . . in the 

discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office 

or employment.” Officer Klotz did not just stop Vanegas 

1 All my references to the concurring opinion refer to Judge 

Bumatay’s separate concurring opinion, not Judge Benitez’s separate 

concurrence (the latter expresses some views that are similar to mine 

here).
24 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

randomly on the street and demand identification; he stopped 

Vanegas in response to a report of a person who was 

threatening another near a courthouse. Given the centrality 

of Vanegas’s identity to the investigation, officers had 

probable cause to arrest Vanegas under § 148(a)(1) for 

“resist[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing]” a lawful 

investigation into a § 415(2) violation—a violation for 

which officers already had probable cause to arrest Vanegas 

in the first place. See Edgerly v. City & County of San 

Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2010) (an officer has 

probable cause to arrest if the facts and circumstances “were 

sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the 

[suspect] had committed or was committing an offense”) 

(quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).

The majority opinion holds that the officers should 

receive qualified immunity for any arrest under § 148(a)(1) 

because it was not clearly established that they lacked 

probable cause to make an arrest on that basis. Maj. Op. 14–

16. That is true as far as it goes, which is what allows me to 

join the majority opinion in full. Of course, this holding is 

itself merely an alternative ground for decision because 

officers had probable cause to arrest Vanegas for violating 

§ 415(2), as the majority opinion earlier concludes. So, this 

is an easy case: Vanegas violated at least two California 

criminal laws, there was probable cause to arrest him under 

either or both, and at the very least the officers get qualified 

immunity.

Judge Bumatay’s concurrence nonetheless opines on 

whether “the failure to identify oneself to an officer during a 

police investigation—without more—furnishes probable 

cause to arrest under § 148(a)(1)” (by “more,” I take the 

concurrence to mean “more” than refusal to provide 

identification in response to a valid Terry stop, see Terry v. 
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 25

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Concurrence 21. There is no 

reason to opine on that issue here because even if “more” is 

required for a violation of California criminal law, we have 

the “more” here, namely, the earlier violation of § 415(2), 

for which there was already independent probable cause to 

arrest Vanegas. We cannot disaggregate the sequence of 

events here into the earlier harassment and the later refusal 

to provide identification; the latter was directly connected to 

the former.

As a matter of federal constitutional law under the Fourth 

Amendment, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hiibel v. Sixth 

Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 

542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004), resolves that a person can be 

lawfully arrested for failure to provide identification during 

a valid Terry stop, if the request for identification is 

reasonably related to the stop. There is no question that 

officers here at the very least had reasonable suspicion to 

stop Vanegas under Terry (indeed, the majority opinion 

holds they had probable cause to arrest him under § 415(2)). 

So the only point on which Judge Bumatay’s concurrence is 

separately opining is whether California’s substantive 

criminal law in § 148(a)(1) should be interpreted more 

narrowly than the nearly identically worded Nevada law that 

the Supreme Court addressed in Hiibel.

That question of California law is not only not presented 

on the facts of this case, deciding it would be unnecessary 

even with the right facts. With sufficient supporting 

information, officers are entitled to make arrests based on 

reasonable, even if ultimately mistaken, views of the law. 

See, e.g., Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66 (2014); 

Barrera v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 12 F.4th 617, 620–21 (6th 

Cir. 2021). Even if the facts presented it in this case, we still 

would not need to resolve whether California law would 
26 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

criminalize a failure to provide identification in response to 

a valid Terry stop, or whether something “more” would be 

required.

Why? Because the officers’ belief that they had probable 

cause to arrest in that situation would at least be a reasonable 

interpretation of California law. And because it is 

reasonable, “we need not decide exactly what [§ 148(a)(1)] 

means.” Barrera, 12 F.4th at 621; see also id. at 624 

(explaining that “we need not resolve each mete and bound 

of” a state criminal statute because “[w]e need only decide 

whether the officers’ interpretation sinks to unreasonable”). 

The majority opinion winds up in essentially the same place 

by resolving the § 148(a)(1) question under the second prong 

of the qualified immunity analysis. See Maj. Op. 14–16; see 

also Barrera, 12 F.4th at 624–25 (noting that whether a court 

concludes there is no constitutional violation or no clearly 

established law, “either one permits a federal court to resolve 

a qualified-immunity defense without deciding exactly what 

state law means”).

I thus see no reason to broach the not-presented, legally 

irrelevant question of California state law that Judge 

Bumatay’s concurrence considers. Questions of state law, 

including the reach of state criminal law, are for the states in 

the first instance. Sometimes we find ourselves needing to 

address them in a given case. But there is no reason to do so 

here, especially when the interpretation of California law 

that seemingly concerns Judge Bumatay would be 

constitutional under Hiibel.

II

Because Judge Bumatay’s concurring opinion has raised 

the issue, however, it is worth making clear that I do not 

think its reading of California law is correct. The 
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 27

concurrence asserts that “California courts have suggested” 

that a person cannot be arrested based on the refusal to 

produce identification to a police officer during a valid Terry 

stop. Concurrence 21. That seems to me incorrect: the 

California cases the concurrence cites do not demonstrate 

that something more than a valid Terry stop is required 

before a refusal to provide identification comes within the 

prohibitory bounds of § 148(a)(1).

Consider People v. Knoedler, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586 (Cal. 

App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2019). The concurrence suggests 

Knoedler “accept[ed]” that “the ‘failure to identify oneself 

cannot, on its own, justify an arrest’ under § 148(a)(1).” 

Concurrence 19 (quoting Knoedler, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

at 589). But rather than “accepting” that proposition, 

Knoedler—which affirmed a § 148(a)(1) conviction—

merely quoted it from Belay v. City of Gardena, 2017 WL 

1628398 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2017). Belay, in turn, 

quoted and relied on earlier Ninth Circuit cases that were 

decided before Hiibel, and that contain statements of law 

squarely at odds with that case. See Belay, 2017 WL 

1628398 at *4 (quoting United States v. Christian, 356 F.3d 

1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004)) (citing Martinelli v. City of 

Beaumont, 820 F.2d 1491, 1494 (9th Cir. 1987); Lawson v. 

Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981); and Carey v. 

Nevada Gaming Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 

2002)). Knoedler therefore does not support the 

concurrence’s interpretation of California law.

The concurrence points also to People v. Lopez, 13 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), claiming that the court 

there “suggested” that “‘a simple refusal to identify one’s 

self’ does not violate § 148(a)(1).” Concurrence 20. But 

Lopez does not “suggest” that. The defendant in Lopez, who 

was suspected of threatening a woman and potentially 
28 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

carrying a gun, was “combative,” kicked officers who were 

attempting to pat him down, and refused to comply even 

after officers shot him with a nonlethal beanbag. 13 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d at 923. Lopez therefore presented a clear-cut 

violation of § 148(a)(1). In noting that the defendant’s 

resistance went far beyond refusing to identify himself, 

Lopez did not suggest that a refusal to self-identify cannot 

amount to a violation of § 148(a)(1). See id. The court was 

merely emphasizing that the case before it was an easy one, 

and it was distinguishing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 

(1979), in which officers demanded identification while 

“lack[ing] any reasonable suspicion” of criminal conduct. 

See Lopez, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 924 (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. 

at 53) (emphasis added). Lopez was not purporting to define 

any kind of floor for violating § 148(a)(1).

The other cases the concurrence cites were themselves 

distinguished in Knoedler. Knoedler distinguished People v. 

Quiroga, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), on the 

grounds that it considered the defendant’s refusal to identify 

himself after arrest. Knoedler 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 589. 

Knoedler explained that a misdemeanor defendant’s postarrest failure to disclose his identity does “not delay or 

obstruct the arresting officer because ‘[t]he arrest ha[s] 

already been effected’ and the defendant ha[s] not yet been 

brought to the jail for booking.” Id. (quoting Quiroga, 

20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449) (alteration in original). Knoedler

distinguished In re Chase C., 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 381 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 2015), for the same reason. See Knoedler, 257 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d at 589–90.

In contrast, Vanegas here refused to identify himself to 

an officer who had not yet arrested him and who was 

searching for him by name. And although the concurrence 

correctly notes that Quiroga called for “great caution” when 
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 29

applying § 148(a)(1), this warning was based upon the 

court’s concern that applying the statute to speech could 

sometimes run afoul of the First Amendment. Quiroga, 

20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 450. No such concern has been raised 

here. Even so, Quiroga itself noted that “[n]o decision has 

interpreted [§ 148(a)(1)] to apply only to physical acts, and 

the statutory language does not suggest such a limitation.” 

Id.

Finally, Knoedler also distinguished In re Gregory S., 

169 Cal. Rptr. 540, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), another case 

on which the concurrence relies. Although that case found 

no violation of § 148(a)(1) based on the defendant’s failure 

to identify himself, “the court made it clear its holding was 

fact-specific.” Knoedler, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 590 (citing In 

re Gregory S., 169 Cal. Rptr. at 548). Indeed, in that case, 

the officer recognized the defendant from previous 

interactions, and already knew his surname and address. In 

re Gregory S., 169 Cal. Rptr. at 543, 548. Under those 

circumstances, the defendant’s failure to provide his first 

name “could not have ‘delayed the officer to a degree 

justifying arrest.’” Knoedler 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 590 

(quoting In re Gregory S. 169 Cal. Rptr. at 548).

Gregory S. thus does not support any broader 

conclusions about the reach of § 148(a)(1), as the 

concurrence would ascribe. The concurrence quotes 

Gregory S. as “question[ing] whether ‘a person who merely 

refuses to identify himself or to answer questions’ violates 

§ 148(a)(1).” Concurrence 21 (quoting Gregory S., 169 Cal. 

Rptr. at 548). But the full quote is: “We find no authority to 

support the [trial] court’s legal conclusion that a person who 

merely refuses to identify himself or to answer questions in 

a context similar to that before us thereby violates Penal 
30 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

Code section 148 or otherwise furnishes ground for arrest.” 

Gregory S., 169 Cal. Rptr. at 548 (emphasis added).

In sum, California courts have not suggested that a mere 

refusal to identify oneself cannot justify a conviction or 

arrest under § 148(a)(1) unless there is something “more” 

than reasonable suspicion for the precipitating stop. 

California courts could of course so hold. But I would have 

refrained from unnecessarily suggesting that they have.2

Because Judge Bumatay’s concurrence rests on an 

overreading of California case law, it also errs in implying 

that three federal decisions—Kuhlken v. County of San 

Diego, 764 F. App’x 612 (9th Cir. 2019), Abdel-Shafy v. City 

of San Jose, 2019 WL 570759 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2019) 

(Koh, J.), and Nakamura v. City of Hermosa Beach, 2009 

WL 1445400 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2009) aff’d, 372 F. App’x 

787 (9th Cir. 2010)—may have misinterpreted the scope of 

§ 148(a)(1). Concurrence 18–19. There is no reason to think 

that is true. And none of these cases involved a random 

demand from a police officer for identification.

In Kuhlken, an officer responded to a report that a 

woman had used her car to run over another person. 

Kuhlken v. County of San Diego, 2018 WL 454444 at *2 

(S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2018), aff’d, 764 F. App’x 612 (9th Cir. 

2019). Because of the involvement of a vehicle, the woman 

was obligated to provide her driver’s license to the officer 

under California Vehicle Code § 12951. Id. at *6. Yet when 

2 Judge Bumatay faults me for not citing a California case 

definitively stating that failure to provide identification in response to a 

valid Terry stop qualifies as a violation of § 148(a)(1). Concurrence 22. 

But it is not my position that such a case exists. My position is that Judge 

Bumatay’s concurrence errs in suggesting that California courts have 

endorsed the opposite rule.
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 31

the officer requested the woman’s identification, she refused 

to provide it and physically resisted being detained. Id.

at *4. Under these circumstances, we did not err when we 

concluded that the officer had probable cause to arrest the 

woman under § 148(a)(1) (and § 12951(b)), in the course of 

investigating “a potentially serious crime.” 764 F. App’x 

at 613.

Similarly, in Abdel-Shafy, 2019 WL 570759, the plaintiff 

was arrested for violating § 148(a)(1). The plaintiff had 

taken part in a verbal altercation with a man she did not 

know, and the plaintiff’s husband subsequently showed up 

and apparently assaulted the man. Id. at *1–2 & n.1. When 

officers arrived, the man identified the plaintiff and her 

husband as the parties involved in the dispute. Id. at *1. The 

plaintiff refused to identify herself despite repeated requests 

and warnings that she would be arrested if she continued to 

refuse. Id. at *2. The plaintiff was arrested and ultimately 

charged with violating § 148(a)(1). Id.

When she later brought unlawful arrest claims under 

§ 1983, the district court dismissed her claims. Id. at *8. The 

court’s holding was explicitly premised on its 

determinations that the plaintiff was subject to a lawful Terry

stop, and that the officers’ request for identification was 

reasonably related to that stop. Id. I see no reason to doubt 

the district court’s conclusion in that case.

Finally, the concurrence suggests that Nakamura, 2009 

WL 1445400, held that a mere refusal to identify oneself 

alone provides probable cause to arrest under § 148(a)(1). 

Concurrence 19. But in Nakamura, a person identified as a 

possible stalker had failed to stop walking away despite an 

officer’s repeated instructions to stop, giving the officer the 

reasonable impression that the suspect was trying to flee. 

2009 WL 1445400 at *4, *6, *8. Even once the suspect 
32 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

acknowledged the officer and stopped, he refused to provide 

his identification. Id. at *8. The district court concluded 

that, “[t]aken as a whole, [the suspect’s] uncontroverted 

behavior provided [the officer] with probable cause to arrest 

him” for violating § 148(a)(1). Id. (emphasis added). Again, 

nothing in California case law suggests this reasonable 

determination was infirm. Indeed, Judge Bumatay’s 

concurrence itself acknowledges that the three federal cases 

he identifies reflect “reasonable interpretations of the law” 

based on “plain text and common sense.” Concurrence 19.

* * *

In short, California case law does not support the 

limitations Judge Bumatay’s concurrence would impose on 

§ 148(a)(1), nor is there reason to question the federal cases 

he identifies. But my broader point is that the debate here is 

beside the point: future § 1983 cases involving § 148(a)(1) 

will not need to resolve the exact scope of that provision, just 

as we have no need to resolve it here. Nor could we resolve 

it anyway. The matter is for the California courts to decide.

BENITEZ, District Judge, concurring:

I agree with the court that summary judgment was 

properly granted for the City of Pasadena and its police 

officers. I write separately to explain that this is an easy 

case.

Appellant paints this as a case of the police 

unconstitutionally arresting him for simply refusing to 

divulge his identity. Although, undoubtedly, an arrest for 

refusing to give one’s name without at least reasonable 

suspicion would be an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 
VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA 33

Amendment, that is not this case. This was not a slow crime 

day for the police. Time was not passing idly by with no 

police work to do and a quiet police radio. The officer was 

not walking down streets and interrogating citizens about 

crimes yet to come. That would be an unreasonable seizure. 

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).

No. In this case, a crime had been reported. From his 

police radio, the police officer had a description (a man), a 

place (walking north near the courthouse on Garfield 

Avenue), and a name: Javier Vanegas. When Officer Klotz 

found a lone man walking near the courthouse travelling 

north on Garfield Avenue he stopped the suspect and asked 

for his name. Vanegas’ name was reasonably related to the 

circumstances justifying the stop. His name was central to 

the investigation of a crime, whether the crime was stalking 

(Cal. Pen. Code § 646.9) or maliciously disturbing another 

by loud noise (Cal. Pen. Code § 415). At that point, the 

detective had probable cause to arrest for either offense and 

he had probable cause to arrest for violating Cal. Pen. Code 

§ 148(a)(1) when Vanegas refused to disclose his name. 

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187–88 

(2004). Otherwise, the police officer would have been 

facing a Hobson’s choice: if the suspect did not identify 

himself, the officer would have to either let the suspect 

escape or possibly arrest and traumatize an innocent citizen. 

That would be unreasonable.

Even if the officer did not have probable cause to arrest 

for the reported crime, Vanegas obstructed a permissible 

investigation. “The Fourth Amendment does not require a 

policeman who lacks the precise level of information 

necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his 

shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. 

On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence 
34 VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA

of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. . . .

A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine

his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while 

obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light 

of the facts known to the officer at the time.” Adams v. 

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145–146 (1972) (emphasis added). 

And reasonableness is the cornerstone of the Fourth 

Amendment.