J. A19042/18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

KENNETH LICHTENBERGER, :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellant :

:

v. :

:

GEISINGER COMMUNITY MEDICAL 

CENTER, GEISINGER HEALTH SYSTEM 

FOUNDATION, DEEPAK SINGH, M.D., 

KAELY AIKMAN, PA-C AND 

TODD ELLISON, PA-C

:

:

:

:

:

No. 142 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment Entered February 15, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County

Civil Division at No. 16-CV-3362

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., NICHOLS, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED: MARCH 27, 2019

Kenneth Lichtenberger appeals from the February 15, 2018 judgment 

entered in favor of Geisinger Community Medical Center (“GCMC”), Geisinger 

Health System Foundation (“Health System”), Deppak Singh, M.D. 

(“Dr. Singh”), Kaeley Aikman, PA-C (“Aikman”), and Todd Ellison, PA-C 

(“Ellison”) (collectively, “appellees”) and against appellant. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the following:

[Appellant] underwent Coronary Artery Bypass Graft 

(CABG) surgery on September 11, 2014. Part of the 

surgical procedure involved the harvesting of the 

greater saphenous vein in his left leg so that it could 

be used to facilitate bypassing the blockages 

discovered in his coronary artery. While the bypass 

portion of the procedure was accomplished without 
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any complications, [appellant] filed suit alleging 

injuries caused as a result of the harvesting of his left 

greater saphenous vein. [Appellant] sued his cardiac 

surgeon, Deepak Singh, M.D., the two physician’s 

assistants who performed the saphenous vein 

harvest, Kaely Aikman, PA-C and Todd Ellison, PA-C, 

and [GCMC], where his surgery was 

performed.[Footnote 1] [Appellant’s] Second 

Amended Complaint contained claims of negligence 

against the individual [appellees], vicarious liability 

against [GCMC] and corporate negligence against 

GCMC.[Footnote 2]

[Footnote 1] [Appellant] also named 

[Health System] as a defendant, but 

stipulated to the withdrawal of his claims 

against that entity prior to trial.

[Footnote 2] We granted summary 

judgment in favor of GCMC on the 

corporate negligence claim on July 6, 

2017.

The case proceeded to a jury trial on July 10, 2017. 

On July 14, 2017, a jury returned a verdict finding no 

negligence on the part of any of [appellees].

[Appellant] thereafter filed a Motion for New Trial 

pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(a)(1) on July 24, 2017. 

[Appellees] responded on August 10, 2017. Oral

argument was scheduled and held on October 17, 

2017. 

Trial court opinion, 12/15/17 at 1-2.

The record reflects that the trial court denied appellant’s motion for a 

new trial on December 15, 2017. On January 16, 2018, appellant filed a notice 

of appeal. On January 17, 2018, the trial court ordered appellant to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied. The trial court then filed with this 
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court a copy of its December 15, 2017 opinion which disposed of the issues 

raised in appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement.

The record further reflects that on February 12, 2018, this court entered 

an order directing appellant to praecipe the trial court prothonotary to enter 

judgment and file with the prothonotary of this court, within 10 days, a 

certified copy of the trial court docket reflecting the entry of judgment in order 

to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 301, which sets forth the requirements for a final 

appealable order. (Order of court, 2/12/18.) This court further ordered that 

when appellant complied with Rule 301, this court would treat appellant’s 

previously filed notice of appeal as filed after the entry of judgment. Appellant 

timely complied. The record reflects that judgment was entered in favor of 

appellees on February 15, 2018. By order entered February 26, 2018, this 

court discharged its February 12, 2018 order.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] Whether the trial court committed error by 

refusing to permit [appellant’s] Expert Bruce P. 

Mindich, M.D. to testify as to the applicable 

standard of care for harvesting a saphenous 

vein[?]

[2.] Whether the trial court erred in refusing to 

permit [appellant] to offer testimony and 

evidence of the statement by Russell Stahl, M.D. 

regarding the diagnosis of [appellant’s] leg pain 

after it was reported to Dr. Stahl[?]

[3.] Whether the trial court erred in permitting 

[appellees] to present testimony and evidence 

on the known risks and complications associated 
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with the harvesting of the saphenous vein in 

Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery[?]

[4.] Whether the trial court erred in permitting

[appellees] to present testimony and evidence 

on the September 3, 2015 report of Bruce P. 

Mindich, M.D. that was sent to [appellees] for 

settlement purposes prior to the 

commencement of [appellant’s] lawsuit[?]

Appellant’s brief at 3.

“[W]hen reviewing the denial of a motion for new trial, we must 

determine if the trial court committed an abuse of discretion or error of law 

that controlled the outcome of the case.” Estate of Hicks v. Dana 

Companies, LLC, 984 A.2d 943, 951 (Pa.Super. 2009) (en banc), appeal 

denied, 19 A.3d 1051 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted).

The issues raised by appellant challenge various evidentiary rulings 

made by the trial court.

Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion 

of the trial court and we review the trial court’s 

determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence 

for an abuse of discretion. To constitute reversible 

error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be 

erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the 

complaining party.

Id. at 961 (citations omitted). “Additionally, [e]videntiary rulings which did 

not affect the verdict will not provide a basis for disturbing the jury’s 

judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; brackets in 

original).
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Appellant first complains that the trial court erred when it refused to 

permit appellant’s medical liability expert, Bruce P. Mindich, M.D., to testify 

as to the applicable standard of care for harvesting a saphenous vein.

The admission of expert testimony is within the trial 

court’s sound discretion and we will not disturb that 

decision without a showing of manifest abuse of 

discretion. An expert’s testimony on direct 

examination is to be limited to the fair scope of the 

expert’s pre-trial report. In applying the fair scope 

rule, we focus on the word “fair.” Departure from the 

expert’s report becomes a concern if the trial 

testimony “would prevent the adversary from 

preparing a meaningful response, or which would 

mislead the adversary as to the nature of the 

response.” Therefore, the opposing party must be 

prejudiced as a result of the testimony going beyond 

the fair scope of the expert’s report before admission 

of the testimony is considered reversible error. We 

will not find error in the admission of testimony that 

the opposing party had notice of or was not prejudiced 

by.

Whitaker v. Frankford Hosp. of City of Philadelphia, 984 A.2d 512, 522 

(Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omitted).

The record reflects that during discovery, appellant submitted the 

May 24, 2016 expert report of Dr. Mindich1 wherein Dr. Mindich opined, in 

relevant part:

The anatomy of the saphenous nerve and saphenous 

vein in the area of venous excision in connection with 

 

1 The record reflects that Dr. Mindich authored a substantially similar expert 

report, which is dated September 3, 2015, prior to appellant’s instituting the 

underlying action. The record further reflects that Dr. Mindich submitted a 

supplemental report dated May 9, 2017, stating that he had reviewed the 

reports of appellees’ experts and that those reports did not alter his original 

opinion. (Supplemental report of Bruce P. Mindich, M.D., 5/9/17.)
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[appellant’s] coronary by-pass surgery is well known. 

Under the accepted relevant standard of care the 

injuries to [appellant] resulting from the underlying 

injury to the saphenous nerve occurring at the time of 

his coronary by-pass surgery--whether it was 

inadvertently cut, tied-off or otherwise grossly 

impacted as a result of his surgery--were readily 

avoidable.

Based upon the foregoing, it is my professional 

opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty 

that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited 

in the surgery, treatment, practice of medicine or 

work performed in connection with [appellant’s] 

coronary by-pass surgery by Dr. Deepak Singh, M.D., 

K. Aikman, PA-C, and T. Ellison, PA-C at [GCMC], 

Scranton PA on September 11, 2014 fell outside 

acceptable professional standards and that such 

conduct was the cause bringing about the harm 

suffered by [appellant].

Report of Bruce P. Mindich, M.D., 5/24/16 at 1-2.

In precluding Dr. Mindich from testifying as to the acceptable 

professional standards, the trial court explained:

. . . Dr. Mindich’s reports opined that the actions of 

[appellees] “fell outside acceptable professional

standards” and that “such conduct was the cause 

bringing about the harm suffered by [appellant].”

However, Dr. Mindich never identified in any of his 

reports what those “acceptable professional 

standards” consisted of. Dr. Mindich never identified 

what medical records he reviewed before drafting his 

report. His report simply stated, “pursuant to your 

request, I have reviewed certain medical records 

relating to the cardiothoracic surgery performed on 

[appellant]. . . . The records reviewed were all of 

those which were included with your letter.” See, 

May 24, 2016 report of Bruce P. Mindich, M.D. to 

Attorney Carl J. Greco. Moreover, nowhere in his 

report does Dr. Mindich identify what the “acceptable 

professional standards” were against which he was 
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measuring the conduct of [appellees]. Dr. Mindich 

just simply and generally states that it is his 

professional opinion “to a reasonable degree of 

medical certainty that the care, skill or knowledge 

exercised or exhibited in the surgery, treatment, 

practice of medicine or work performed in connection 

with [appellant’s] coronary by-pass surgery by 

[appellees] . . . fell outside acceptable professional 

standards.” (emphasis added). Dr. Mindich’s report, 

essentially, is a disjunctive kitchen sink approach that 

measures the conduct of [appellees] without revealing 

or identifying his yardstick. To allow Dr. Mindich to 

identify the acceptable standard of care for the first 

time from the witness stand deprived [appellees] of 

an appropriate opportunity to prepare a response to 

his testimony. In short, we conclude that since 

Dr. Mindich did not identify the acceptable standards

of care in his report, testimony beyond his report 

would not have been, in our view, within the “fair 

scope” of his report. Indeed, Dr. Mindich’s report was 

completely silent regarding any standard of care, or 

even breach for that matter, concerning [appellee

Dr.] Singh’s supervisory capacity over the physician’s 

assistants Aikman and Ellison. His report provided 

absolutely no basis for any proposed testimony on 

that topic. We do not think it consistent with 

Rule 4003.5[

2] to allow an expert to define the 

standard of care from the witness stand without first 

identifying it in a report.

Trial court opinion, 12/15/17 at 8-9.

A reading of Dr. Mindich’s May 24, 2016 expert report demonstrates 

that he failed to set forth the applicable standard of care; rather, Dr. Mindich 

merely opined that certain conduct “fell outside acceptable professional 

standards” without identifying those “acceptable professional standards.” 

(Report of Bruce P. Mindich, 5/24/16 at 2.) Therefore, the trial court properly

 

2 Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.5(c) sets forth the fair scope rule.
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precluded Dr. Mindich from testifying at trial as to the applicable standard of 

care.

Appellant next complains that the trial court erred by precluding 

appellant and his neighbor from testifying regarding the alleged statement 

made to them by Russell Stahl, M.D., a non-party physician, that Dr. Stahl’s 

colleague had nicked appellant’s nerve because the statement was admissible 

under Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 803(4) and (25).

Rule 803 provides, in relevant part:

The following are not excluded by the rule against 

hearsay,[

3] regardless of whether the declarant is 

available as a witness:

. . . .

(4) Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or 

Treatment. A statement that:

(A) is made for--and is 

reasonably pertinent to--

medical treatment or 

diagnosis in contemplation of 

treatment; and

(B) describes medical history, 

past or present symptoms, 

pain, or sensations, or the 

inception or general character 

of the cause or external 

source thereof, insofar as 

 

3 Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines “hearsay” as “a statement that 

(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; 

and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in 

the statement. Pa.R.E. 801(c). “Hearsay is not admissible except ‘as provided 

by the [[R]ules of Evidence], by other rules prescribed by the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court, or by statute.” Pa.R.E. 802.
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reasonably pertinent to 

treatment, or diagnosis in 

contemplation of treatment.

. . . .

(25) An Opposing Party’s Statement. The 

statement is offered against an opposing 

party and:

. . . .

(D) was made by the party’s 

agent or employee on a 

matter within the scope of 

that relationship and while it 

existed; or

. . . .

Pa.R.E. 803(4) & (25)(D).

With respect to the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule set 

forth in Rule 803(4), our supreme court has explained that this exception: 

provides that testimony repeating out-of-court 

statements which were made for the purposes of 

receiving medical treatment are admissible as 

substantive evidence. As early as 1884, this Court 

stated that “nothing is better settled than that 

statements of a patient to his physician, as to the 

character and seat of his sensations, made for the 

purpose of receiving medical advice, are competent 

evidence. . . .” Lichtenwallner v. Laubach, 105 Pa. 

366 (1884).

The law in Pennsylvania . . . has been that 

statements to a doctor were admissible 

insofar as they were necessary and proper 

for diagnosis and treatment of the injury 

and referred to symptoms, feelings and 

conditions.
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. . . . Given these descriptions of the medical

treatment exception, it becomes apparent that there 

are essentially two requirements for a statement to 

come within this exception. First, the declarant must 

make the statement for the purpose of receiving 

medical treatment, Lichtenwallner v. Laubach, and 

second, the statement must be necessary and proper 

for diagnosis and treatment[.]

Commonwealth v. Smith, 681 A.2d 1288, 1291 (Pa. 1996) (some internal 

citations omitted).

Here, the trial court properly concluded that the medical treatment 

exception to the hearsay rule does not apply because the statement that 

Dr. Stahl allegedly made to appellant and his neighbor was not made by a 

patient for the purpose of receiving medical treatment.

With respect to the admission by a party opponent exception under 

Rule 803(25)(D), the proponent of the statement must demonstrate that: 

“(1) the declarant was an agent or employee of a party opponent; (2) the 

declarant made the statement while employed by the party opponent; and 

(3) the statement concerned a matter within the scope of agency or 

employment.” Harris v. Toys “R” Us-Penn, Inc., 880 A.2d 1270, 1275 

(Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted).

Here, appellant claims that the trial court erred in not admitting 

Dr. Stahl’s statement that Dr. Stahl’s colleague had nicked appellant’s nerve 

under Rule 803(25)(D) because:

The trial record clearly supports the existence of an 

ostensible agency relationship between Dr. Stahl 
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and [GCMC]. In fact, in response to questioning, 

Dr. Singh stated:

Q. Who’s Dr. Stahl?

A. Dr. Stahl at that time was one of my 

colleagues and partners. And he 

was primarily in charge of this 

campus or the Scranton campus.

Dr. Singh went on to testify that, “At [GCMC], 

Dr. Stahl is in charge” with respect to determining 

individuals’ roles in surgery. Further, the statement 

is clearly within the scope of this relationship: it 

directly relates to the reason that [appellant] was 

admitted to [GCMC]; the cardiothoracic evaluation he 

underwent with Dr. Stahl when admitted to the 

hospital; and the surgery that [appellant] underwent 

and that is at the center of this action. Finally, the 

statement was made during the existence of that 

relationship. The requirements of Pa. R.E. 803(25)(D) 

where [sic] clearly met, however, the court committed 

an abuse of discretion and failed to apply this 

exception to the hearsay rule when ruling on Plaintiff’s 

Motion for a New Trial.

Appellant’s brief at 29 (emphasis added).

Contrary to appellant’s assertion, ostensible agency is a theory of 

liability and not a consideration under the admission by party opponent 

exception to the hearsay rule. 

To gain admissibility under Rule 803(25)(D), appellant was first required 

to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Stahl made the 

statement while an agent of GCMC. An agency relationship may be created 

by:

(1) express authority, (2) implied authority, 

(3) apparent authority, and/or (4) authority by 
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estoppel. Express authority exists where the principal 

deliberately and specifically grants authority to the 

agent as to certain matters. Implied authority exists 

in situations where the agent’s actions are “proper, 

usual and necessary” to carry out express agency. 

Apparent agency exists where the principal, by word 

or conduct, causes people with whom the alleged 

agent deals to believe that the principal has granted 

the agent authority to act. Authority by estoppel 

occurs when the principal fails to take reasonable 

steps to disavow the third party of their belief that the 

purported agent was authorized to act on behalf of the 

principal.

* * *

The basic elements of agency are the manifestation 

by the principal that the agent shall act for him, the 

agent’s acceptance of the undertaking and the 

understanding of the parties that the principal is to be 

in control of the undertaking. The creation of an 

agency relationship requires no special formalities. 

The existence of an agency relationship is a question 

of fact. The party asserting the existence of an agency 

relationship bears the burden of proving it by a fair 

preponderance of the evidence. In establishing 

agency, one need not furnish direct proof of specific 

authority, provided it can be inferred from the facts 

that at least an implied intention to create the 

relationship of principal and agent existed.

CONRAIL v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 182 A.2d 1011, 1027 (Pa.Super. 

2018).

Here, appellant neither claims on appeal nor did he demonstrate below

the existence of an agency relationship between GCMC and Dr. Stahl by

express authority, implied authority, apparent authority, and/or authority by 

estoppel. Appellant merely cites to Dr. Singh’s testimony that he and 

Dr. Stahl were “colleagues and partners” and that Dr. Stahl “was primarily in 
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charge of this campus or the Scranton campus” to support the existence of an 

“ostensible agency” relationship between Dr. Stahl and GCMC. (Appellant’s 

brief at 29.) Notwithstanding the fact that the ostensible agency theory of 

liability has no bearing on admissibility of the statement under 

Rule 803(25)(D), the record supports the trial court’s determination that 

appellant failed to lay a foundation to support the conclusion that Dr. Stahl 

was GCMC’s agent. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when 

it held that the statement was not admissible under Rule 803(25)(D).

Appellant next complains that the trial court erred when it permitted 

appellees to introduce evidence of known risks and complications of harvesting 

the saphenous vein in coronary artery bypass surgery. In this assignment of 

error, appellant calls this court’s attention to four pages of testimony of 

defense expert Dr. Walter Pae, Jr., wherein appellant claims Dr. Pae 

impermissibly and “continually testified before the jury that [appellant’s] 

injuries were a known risk and complication associated with the harvesting of 

the saphenous vein.” (Appellant’s brief at 37-39, citing notes of testimony,

7/12/17 at 181-182, 184-185.)

Our review of Dr. Pae’s testimony reveals that appellant failed to object 

to any of the testimony that he now challenges as inadmissible.

4

 It is well 

settled that a failure to object before the trial court results in waiver of the 

 

4 We note that a review of Dr. Pae’s testimony on direct and re-direct 

examinations reveals that appellant did not object to any of Dr. Pae’s 

testimony. (Notes of testimony, 7/12/17 at 173-189, 195-197.)
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issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court 

are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”); see also

Burnhauser v. Bumberger, 745 A.2d 1256, 1259 (Pa.Super. 2000) (failure 

to object before the trial court results in waiver of issue on appeal).

Appellant nevertheless claims that he preserved his objection to 

Dr. Pae’s challenged testimony because

[p]rior to the direct testimony of Dr. Mindich, the 

[trial] court ruled on the extent of the testimony that 

Dr. Mindich would be allowed to provide on the 

applicable standard of care. In light of the ruling on 

the scope of Dr. Mindich’s testimony, over the 

objection and argument of [appellant’s] counsel, the 

court erred again in ruling that such testimony would 

“open the door” to testimony regarding the known 

risks and complications associated with the harvesting 

of a saphenous vein in CABG Surgery.

Appellant’s reply brief at 10.

Even if we gave appellant the benefit of the doubt that the argument he 

advanced at trial regarding the fair scope of Dr. Mindich’s report that preceded

the trial court’s ruling with respect to the scope of Dr. Mindich’s testimony 

somehow preserved his objection to Dr. Pae’s testimony, his claim would fail.

In Mitchell v. Shikora, 161 A.3d 970, 975 (Pa.Super. 2017), we held 

that evidence of risks and complications of a surgical procedure may be 

admissible to establish the relevant standard of care, but such evidence is 

irrelevant to the determination of whether the defendant acted within the 

applicable standard of care in medical negligence cases that do not advance 

an informed consent claim.
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Here, with respect to evidence of risks and complications, the trial court 

ruled as follows:

[THE COURT:] [B]ased on my reading of Mitchell, I’m 

going to say at this stage of the game we won’t be 

taking any evidence on the discussion of risks or 

complications, okay, based on my reading of Mitchell. 

Mitchell does not provide an out and out ban of 

evidence of risk and complications in the absence of 

an informed consent claim.

But based on the circumstances that we have right 

now, I think it’s sufficient to preclude that evidence. I 

will say that if evidence is brought forth either by way 

of direct or cross examination which might open that 

door, I will consider using it or allowing it in at the 

appropriate time. But as we stand right now[] it’s not 

coming in [. . . .]

Notes of testimony, 7/10/17 at 24-25.

During direct examination, and despite the trial court’s proper ruling 

precluding Dr. Mindich from testifying as to the applicable standard of care as 

outside the fair scope of his expert report, Dr. Mindich testified that “the 

standard of care demands that you do not cause damage to the nerve that 

runs near the saphenous vein.” (Id. at 69.) At this point, evidence of risks 

and complications became admissible to establish the applicable standard of 

care.

Appellant finally complains that the trial court erred in permitting 

Dr. Mindich to be cross-examined with respect to the doctor’s September 3, 

2015 expert report that was sent as an enclosure to correspondence that 

appellant’s counsel sent to Dr. Singh, GCMC, and Health System that placed 
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them on notice of appellant’s claims and attempted to settle the case in 

violation of Pa.R.E. 408. (Appellant’s brief at 40-43; see also correspondence 

dated 9/11/15 from appellant’s counsel to Dr. Singh, GCMC, and Health 

System stamped “for settlement purposes only”.)

Rule 408(a) provides that:

Evidence of the following is not admissible--on behalf 

of any party--either to prove or disprove the validity 

or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior 

inconsistent statement or a contradiction:

(1) furnishing, promising, or offering--or 

accepting, promising to accept, or offering 

to accept--a valuable consideration in 

compromising or attempting to 

compromise the claim; and

(2) conduct or a statement made during 

compromise negotiations about the claim.

Pa.R.E. 408(a).

Stated differently, offers of settlement or compromise of a disputed 

claim are not admissible in evidence to prove liability for or invalidity of the 

claim or its amount. See Pa.R.E. 408; see also McMullen v. Kutz, 925 A.2d 

832, 835 (Pa.Super. 2007).

Here, Dr. Mindich’s September 3, 2015 expert report sets forth his

conclusion that in his:

professional opinion to a reasonable degree of medical 

certainty that the care, skill or knowledge exercised 

or exhibited in the surgery, treatment, practice of 

medicine or work performed in connection with 

[appellant’s] coronary by-pass surgery by Dr. Deepak 

Singh, M.D., at [GCMC], Scranton PA on 
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September 11, 2014 fell outside acceptable 

professional standards and that such conduct was the 

cause bringing about the harm suffered by 

[appellant].

Report of Bruce P. Mindich, M.D., 9/3/15 at 2.

The record reflects that Dr. Mindich’s September 3, 2015 report and his 

May 24, 2016 expert report are identical but for the addition of Aikman’s and 

Ellison’s names in the May 24, 2016 report. The record further reflects that 

during argument on this issue, counsel for GCMC stated that she received the 

report from appellant’s counsel but that she did not solicit the report. (Notes 

of testimony, 9/12/17 at 10.) Nothing in the record demonstrates that the 

jury was informed that the September 3, 2015 report was an enclosure to 

unsolicited correspondence from appellant’s counsel to GCMC, Health System, 

and Dr. Singh marked “for settlement purposes only.” 

Therefore, appellant fails to demonstrate how Dr. Mindich’s 

September 3, 2015 report furnished, promised, or offered a valuable 

consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim during 

settlement negotiations to render it inadmissible under Rule 408. We find no 

abuse of discretion.

Judgment affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/27/2019