This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains documents other than rules or

proposed rules that are applicable to the

public. Notices of hearings and investigations,

committee meetings, agency decisions and

rulings, delegations of authority, filing of

petitions and applications and agency

statements of organization and functions are

examples of documents appearing in this

section.

Notices Federal Register

41908 

Vol. 78, No. 134 

Friday, July 12, 2013 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service 

[Docket No. APHIS–2012–0076] 

Plants for Planting Whose Importation 

Is Not Authorized Pending Pest Risk 

Analysis; Notice of Availability of Data 

Sheets for Taxa of Plants for Planting 

That Are Quarantine Pests or Hosts of 

Quarantine Pests 

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service, USDA. 

ACTION: Notice of availability and 

request for comments; reopening of 

comment period. 

SUMMARY: We are reopening the 

comment period for a notice that made 

available to the public data sheets 

detailing the scientific evidence we 

evaluated in making the determination 

that certain taxa of plants for planting 

are quarantine pests or hosts of 

quarantine pests and, therefore, should 

be added to our lists of plants for 

planting whose importation is not 

authorized pending pest risk analysis. 

This action will allow interested 

persons additional time to prepare and 

submit comments. 

DATES: The comment period for the 

notice published May 6, 2013 (78 FR 

26316) is reopened. We will consider all 

comments that we receive on or before 

August 12, 2013. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by either of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov/ 

#!documentDetail;D=APHIS-2012-0076- 

0001. 

• Postal Mail/Commercial Delivery: 

Send your comment to Docket No. 

APHIS–2012–0076, Regulatory Analysis 

and Development, PPD, APHIS, Station 

3A–03.8, 4700 River Road Unit 118, 

Riverdale, MD 20737–1238. 

Supporting documents and any 

comments we receive on this docket 

may be viewed at http:// 

www.regulations.gov/ 

#!docketDetail;D=APHIS-2012-0076 or 

in our reading room, which is located in 

room 1141 of the USDA South Building, 

14th Street and Independence Avenue 

SW., Washington, DC. Normal reading 

room hours are 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except 

holidays. To be sure someone is there to 

help you, please call (202) 799–7039 

before coming. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. 

Arnold Tschanz, Senior Regulatory 

Policy Specialist, Plants for Planting 

Policy, RPM, PPQ, APHIS, 4700 River 

Road Unit 133, Riverdale, MD 20737– 

1236; (301) 851–2179. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On May 6, 

2013, we published in the Federal 

Register (78 FR 26316–26317, Docket 

No. APHIS–2012–0076) a notice that 

made available to the public data sheets 

detailing the scientific evidence we 

evaluated in making the determination 

that certain taxa of plants for planting 

are quarantine pests or hosts of 

quarantine pests and, therefore, should 

be added to our lists of plants for 

planting whose importation is not 

authorized pending pest risk analysis. 

Comments on the notice were 

required to be received on or before July 

5, 2013. We are reopening the comment 

period on Docket No. APHIS–2012– 

0076 for an additional 30 days. This 

action will allow interested persons 

additional time to prepare and submit 

comments. We will also consider all 

comments received between July 6, 

2013 (the day after the close of the 

original comment period) and the date 

of this notice. 

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 450 and 7701–7772 

and 7781–7786; 21 U.S.C. 136 and 136a; 7 

CFR 2.22, 2.80, and 371.3. 

Done in Washington, DC, this 26th day of 

June, 2013. 

Kevin Shea, 

Administrator, Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service. 

[FR Doc. 2013–16722 Filed 7–11–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3410–34–P 

CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD 

INVESTIGATION BOARD 

Sunshine Act Meeting 

TIME AND DATE: July 25, 2013, 9:30 a.m.– 

4:30 p.m. EDT. 

PLACE: Ronald Reagan Building and 

International Trade Center, Horizon 

Room, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., 

Washington, DC 20004. 

STATUS: Open to the public. 

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: The 

Chemical Safety and Hazard 

Investigation Board (CSB) will convene 

a public meeting on Thursday, July 25, 

2013, starting at 9:30 a.m. EDT at the 

Ronald Reagan Building and 

International Trade Center, Horizon 

Room, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., 

Washington, DC 20004. Between 9:30 

a.m. and 12:15 p.m., the Board will 

consider and vote on the status 

designations of the following three 

recommendations issued by the CSB to 

the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration: (1) 2001–05–I–DE–1 

(revision of Process Safety Management 

standard to clarify coverage of 

atmospheric storage tanks connected to 

process vessels); (2) 2005–04–I–TX–9 

(revision of Process Safety Management 

standard to require management of 

change reviews for certain 

organizational changes); and (3) 2010– 

07–I–CT–1 (issuance of a general 

industry and construction standards for 

fuel gas safety). 

Beginning at 1:30 p.m. EDT, the Board 

will consider and vote on the status 

designations of four recommendations 

related to the issuance of a general 

industry standard for combustible dusts 

as follows (1) 2006–1–H–R1 (from 

Combustible Dust Study); (2) 2008–5–I– 

GA–R11 (from Imperial Sugar report); 

(3) 2011–4–I–TN– and (4) 2011–4–I– 

TN–R2 (from Hoeganaes case study), 

and possibly other items at the 

discretion of the Chair. 

This notice is to provide information 

to the public concerning the matters 

related to the seven recommendations to 

OSHA listed above, which will be 

considered during the meeting. At the 

meeting, the staff will present their 

evaluations of the implementation of 

these seven recommendations. 

Following the staff presentations in the 

morning and afternoon, the Board will 

hear brief statements from OSHA, 

interested stakeholders, and the public. 

The Board will consider these analyses 

and vote on the status to assign to each 

recommendation according to Board 

Order 22 [http://www.csb.gov/assets/ 

Record/BO_22.pdf.]. 

In addition, at this meeting, the CSB 

will also consider the potential 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES

Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 134 / Friday, July 12, 2013 / Notices 41909 

designation of a general industry 

standard for combustible dust as a 

‘‘Most Wanted Chemical Safety 

Improvement’’ issue under Board Order 

46 [http://www.csb.gov/assets/Record/ 

Order_046_(06122012).pdf]. 

The following section contains 

summaries of the staff evaluations for 

the recommendations that will be 

presented to the Board for 

consideration. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Recommendation to the U.S. 

Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration 2001–05–I–DE–1 

Recommendation Text 

Ensure coverage under the Process 

Safety Management Standard (29 CFR 

1910.119) of atmospheric storage tanks 

that could be involved in a potential 

catastrophic release as a result of being 

interconnected to a covered process 

with 10,000 pounds of a flammable 

substance. 

Rationale for Recommendation 

The recommendation followed a fatal 

explosion involving a poorly 

maintained and corroded atmospheric 

aboveground tank containing spent 

sulfuric acid and flammable 

hydrocarbons at the Motiva Enterprises 

refinery in Delaware City in July 2001. 

The company considered the tank to be 

exempt from the OSHA Process Safety 

Management standard under the 1997 

Meer decision. This decision was issued 

by an administrative law judge of the 

U.S. Occupational Safety and Health 

Review Commission. The decision, 

exempts from PSM coverage, 

‘‘flammable liquids stored in 

atmospheric tanks or transferred which 

are kept below their normal boiling 

point without benefit of chilling or 

refrigeration.’’ The CSB Motiva 

investigation concluded that if Motiva 

had adhered to a PSM standard 

requirements for the tank, the accident 

could have been avoided. 

Summary of OSHA Response to the 

Recommendation 

OSHA does not agree that it is 

necessary to revise the PSM standard in 

order to clarify the issues of coverage of 

tanks connected to processes. As an 

alternative, OSHA reported to the CSB 

in 2003 that it would issue a revised 

PSM Compliance Directive that would 

clarify to all its compliance officers and 

to the regulated parties that tanks like 

the one at Motiva (which OSHA 

contended had a process function as 

well as a storage function) were covered 

under PSM. To date, however, OSHA 

has not revised its compliance directive. 

An August 2012 communication from 

the Assistant Secretary projected 

completion of a revision in 6–9 months, 

and the agency’s Spring 2013 regulatory 

agenda indicates that it is considering 

‘‘clarifying the PSM exception for 

atmospheric storage tanks’’ as part of a 

broader revision of its PSM standard, 29 

CFR 1910.119. 

Summary Evaluation 

Because ten years have passed and 

OSHA has yet to take any regulatory or 

other actions which would address the 

intent of the recommendation, CSB staff 

propose that the Board vote to designate 

Recommendation 2001–5–I–DE–R1 with 

the status ‘‘Open-Unacceptable 

Response.’’ 

Recommendation to the U.S. 

Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration 2005–04–I–TX–R9 

Recommendation Text 

Amend the OSHA PSM standard to 

require that a management of change 

(MOC) review be conducted for 

organizational changes that may impact 

process safety including: 

(a) Major organizational changes such 

as mergers, acquisitions, or 

reorganizations; 

(b) Personnel changes, including 

changes in staffing levels or staff 

experience; and 

(c) Policy changes, such as budget 

cutting. 

Rationale for Recommendation 

The CSB investigation of the 2005 

explosions and fire at the former BP 

refinery in Texas City, Texas revealed 

that poorly managed corporate mergers, 

leadership and organizational changes, 

and budget cuts increased the risk of 

catastrophic accidents at the site. The 

CSB also noted that a 2002 survey 

revealed that organizational change was 

assessed in the Management of Change 

(MOC) programs of only forty-four 

percent (44%) of chemical processing 

companies, strongly suggesting that 

assessment of such organizational 

factors are not widely used in the 

industry. While OSHA’s Process Safety 

Management (PSM) standard (29 CFR 

1910.119) requires MOC analyses for 

changes to ‘‘process chemicals, 

technology, equipment, procedures; 

and, changes to facilities that affect a 

covered process,’’ the CSB concluded 

that it does not explicitly require that 

employers conduct MOC reviews for 

organizational, personnel and policy 

changes that could affect process safety. 

Consequently, the CSB recommended 

that OSHA amend the PSM standard to 

clarify that MOC reviews must be 

conducted for organizational, personnel, 

and policy changes that may impact 

process safety. 

Summary of OSHA Response to the 

Recommendation 

OSHA responded that the PSM 

standard already requires employers to 

develop and implement MOC reviews to 

determine the adequacy of all 

contemplated changes with respect to 

their safety and health impacts as they 

relate to ‘‘process chemicals, 

technology, equipment, procedures, and 

facilities.’’ In OSHA’s view, these are 

the types of changes encompassed by 

the CSB recommendation. In addition, 

OSHA sent a memorandum to all 

Regional Administrators to clarify this 

policy with regard to the coverage of 

organizational changes under the PSM’s 

management of change requirements. 

The policy clarification was to be 

provided to OSHA’s compliance 

officers. OSHA’s Spring 2013 regulatory 

agenda indicates that the agency is 

considering expanding the scope of its 

PSM standard to ‘‘require greater 

organizational management of change 

from employers.’’ 

Summary Evaluation 

A policy memorandum to OSHA 

Regional Administrators is not the 

permanent regulatory change 

envisioned by the Board, which sought 

an explicit change in the requirements 

of the standard through through 

rulemaking procedures. For this reason, 

staff propose that the Board vote to 

designate Recommendation 2005–04–I– 

TX–R9 with the status: ‘‘Open— 

Unacceptable Response.’’ 

Urgent Recommendation to the U.S. 

Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration 2010–07–I–CT–UR1 

Recommendation Text 

Promulgate regulations that address 

fuel gas safety for both construction and 

general industry. At a minimum: 

a. Prohibit the release of flammable gas to 

the atmosphere for the purpose of cleaning 

fuel gas piping. 

b. Prohibit flammable gas venting or 

purging indoors. Prohibit venting or purging 

outdoors where fuel gas may form a 

flammable atmosphere in the vicinity of 

workers and/or ignition sources. 

c. Prohibit any work activity in areas where 

the concentration of flammable gas exceeds 

a fixed low percentage of the lower explosive 

limit (LEL) determined by appropriate 

combustible gas monitoring. 

d. Require that companies develop 

flammable gas safety procedures and training 

that involves contractors, workers, and their 

representatives in decision-making. 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES

41910 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 134 / Friday, July 12, 2013 / Notices 

Rationale for Recommendation 

The CSB investigated two natural gas 

explosions (Kleen Energy Natural Gas 

Explosion and ConAgra Natural Gas 

Explosion and Ammonia Release) and 

concluded that the fire and explosion 

hazards of releasing flammable gas in 

the presence of workers and ignition 

sources can be largely or entirely 

avoided through the use of currently 

available inherently safer methods than 

those currently in use in most 

workplaces. These CSB reports focused 

particularly on the hazards of gas 

purging in industrial establishments and 

‘‘gas blows’’ conducted during the 

construction of gas-fired power plants; 

reports of these investigations can be 

found in the CSB Web page 

(www.csb.gov). The CSB also found that 

OSHA has three gas-specific standards 

for flammable gases that are used far 

less frequently in the workplace than 

natural gas. These existing gas standards 

apply to liquefied petroleum gases 

(propane and butane, 1910.110), 

hydrogen (1910.103) and acetylene 

(1910.102). Yet the Agency has no 

comprehensive fuel gas safety standard, 

despite the fact that fuel gases pose 

serious explosion and fire hazards and 

are in much more widespread use in 

OSHA-regulated workplaces. 

Summary of OSHA Response to the 

Recommendation 

OSHA’s initial response to the 

recommendation described several 

forceful enforcement actions affecting 

the industry sector conducting ‘‘gas 

blows’’ during the construction of 

power plants—which the CSB 

commended—but stated only that it 

would ‘‘consider’’ a new fuel gas 

standard during its next regulatory 

review. In a subsequent notification, 

however, OSHA reported that it did not 

‘‘believe this is the appropriate time to 

initiate the regulatory process.’’ Briefly 

stated, OSHA indicated that ‘‘the most 

prudent approach for OSHA is to 

monitor the implementation’’ of two 

recently revised NFPA standards and 

‘‘evaluate their effectiveness at 

controlling the targeted hazards, and 

then determine if additional rulemaking 

is necessary to protect workers.’’ 

Moreover, OSHA did not include fuel 

gas rulemaking in the Agency’s most 

recent regulatory agenda (Spring 2013), 

indicating that it has no current 

intention to begin rulemaking in this 

arena. 

Summary Evaluation 

Per 42 U.S.C. 7412(6)(J), OSHA must 

inform the CSB within 180 days 

whether it will initiate rulemaking (and 

provide a timetable), or not initiate 

rulemaking (and explain why). OSHA’s 

latest response to the CSB 

recommendation indicates that the 

agency does not currently intend to 

pursue rulemaking, and provides a 

rationale for this decision. 

CSB’s Board Order 22 obligates staff 

to recommend an ‘‘Open- Unacceptable 

Response’’ status for urgent 

recommendations that ‘‘[have] not been 

responded to in an acceptable manner 

within 6 months and [are] not at a point 

where completion is imminent.’’ In this 

case, OSHA’s apparently indefinite 

postponement of any regulatory action 

on fuel gases is inconsistent with the 

intent of the recommendation and staff 

propose that the Board vote to change 

the status of Recommendation 2010–07– 

I–CT–UR1 to ‘‘Open-Unacceptable 

Response.’’ 

Recommendations to the U.S. 

Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration Related to the 

Prevention of Combustible Dust Fires 

and Explosions 

Recommendation Text 

Recommendation 2006–1–H–R1 (from 

the Combustible Dust Hazard 

Investigation Study): 

Issue a standard designed to prevent 

combustible dust fires and explosions in 

general industry. Base the standard on 

current National Fire Protection Association 

(NFPA) dust explosion standards (including 

NFPA 654 and NFPA 484), and include at 

least—hazard assessment,—engineering 

controls,—housekeeping,—building 

design,—explosion protection,—operating 

procedures, and—worker training. 

Recommendation 2008–5–I–GA–R11 

(from the Imperial Sugar report): 

Proceed expeditiously, consistent with the 

Chemical Safety Board’s November 2006 

recommendation and OSHA’s announced 

intention to conduct rulemaking, to 

promulgate a comprehensive standard to 

reduce or eliminate hazards from fire and 

explosion from combustible powders and 

dust. 

Recommendation 2011–4–I–TN–R1 

(from the Hoeganaes case study): 

Ensure that the forthcoming OSHA 

Combustible Dust Standard includes 

coverage for combustible metal dusts 

including iron and steel powders. 

Recommendation 2011–4–I–TN–R2 

(from the Hoeganaes case study): 

Develop and publish a proposed 

combustible dust standard for general 

industry within one year of the approval of 

this case study. 

Rationale for Recommendations 

After investigating three deadly 

combustible dust accidents that claimed 

the lives of fourteen workers in 2003, 

the CSB conducted a comprehensive 

combustible dust hazard investigation 

study. Released in late 2006, the study 

concluded that voluntary consensus 

standards and enhanced regulatory 

enforcement efforts are insufficient to 

prevent dust fires and explosions that 

occur across a broad range of industries. 

The CSB therefore recommended that 

OSHA issue a combustible dust general 

industry standard. In 2009, after 

investigating the catastrophic sugar dust 

explosions at the Imperial Sugar 

Refinery in Port Wentworth, Georgia 

that killed 14 workers, the CSB issued 

a second recommendation calling on 

OSHA to ‘‘proceed expeditiously’’ with 

the rulemaking. In 2011, following its 

investigation of three iron dust-related 

incidents at the Hoeganaes Corporation 

facility in Gallatin, Tennessee, that 

killed five workers, the CSB issued two 

more recommendations to OSHA 

regarding the dust rulemaking: one 

calling for the inclusion of metal dust in 

the scope of the standard, and a second 

calling for issuance of a proposed rule 

within one year. 

Summary of OSHA Response to the 

Recommendations 

Initially resistant to the CSB’s 

recommendation to develop a new 

standard, in October 2007, OSHA 

launched a National Emphasis Program 

to improve regulatory enforcement in 

workplaces handling combustible dust. 

The program was revised and reissued 

in March 2008 to better target affected 

industries. That same month, OSHA 

distributed a combustible dust Safety 

and Health Information Bulletin (SHIB) 

to approximately 30,000 workplaces 

within industries with potential dust 

hazards. 

In April 2009, OSHA indicated that it 

would commence a combustible dust 

rulemaking, and issued an Advanced 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the 

Federal Register in October 2009. That 

winter, OSHA held a series of 

stakeholder meetings, but twice 

postponed the next step in the 

rulemaking process, the Small Business 

Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 

(SBREFA) Panel Review. In May 2011, 

OSHA held a Combustible Dust Expert 

Forum in May 2011. In January 2012, 

shortly after the release of CSB’s most 

recent recommendations to the agency, 

OSHA released its Fall 2011 

Semiannual Regulatory Agenda, which 

indicated that an estimated date for the 

next step in the rulemaking process was 

‘‘undetermined.’’ OSHA reiterated its 

commitment to developing a standard, 

however, in a June 14, 2012 letter to the 

CSB, and its most recent Semiannual 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES

Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 134 / Friday, July 12, 2013 / Notices 41911 

Regulatory Agenda estimates that the 

SBREFA Panel Review will be held in 

October 2013. 

Summary Evaluation 

OSHA has initiated a rulemaking to 

issue a combustible dust standard and 

continues to undertake noteworthy and 

important regulatory enforcement and 

educational efforts to prevent and 

control combustible dust hazards in the 

workplace. The federal rulemaking 

process is complex; however, a 

combustible dust general industry 

standard is urgently needed to prevent 

future fires and explosions from 

claiming the lives of American workers. 

In addition, more than six years have 

passed since the CSB first issued a 

recommendation for this standard. 

Therefore, staff propose that the Board 

vote to designate all four 

recommendations with the status: 

‘‘Open-Unacceptable Response.’’ 

No factual analyses, conclusions, or 

findings presented by staff should be 

considered final. Only after the Board 

has considered the staff presentations 

and voted to approve a change in status 

of the recommendation should that 

status be considered final. 

Additional Information 

The meeting will be free and open to 

the public. If you require a translator or 

interpreter, please notify the individual 

listed below as the ‘‘Contact Person for 

Further Information,’’ at least five 

business days prior to the meeting. 

The CSB is an independent federal 

agency charged with investigating 

accidents and hazards that result, or 

may result, in the catastrophic release of 

extremely hazardous substances. The 

agency’s Board Members are appointed 

by the President and confirmed by the 

Senate. CSB investigations look into all 

aspects of chemical accidents and 

hazards, including physical causes such 

as equipment failure as well as 

inadequacies in regulations, industry 

standards, and safety management 

systems. 

PUBLIC COMMENT: Members of the public 

are invited to make brief statements to 

the Board at the conclusion of the staff 

presentations in the morning and 

afternoon. The time provided for public 

statements will depend upon the 

number of people who wish to speak. 

Speakers should assume that their 

presentations will be limited to five 

minutes or less, and may submit written 

statements for the record. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Hillary J. Cohen, Communications 

Manager, hillary.cohen@csb.gov or (202) 

446–8094. General information about 

the CSB can be found on the agency 

Web site at: www.csb.gov. 

Rafael Moure-Eraso, 

Chairperson. 

[FR Doc. 2013–16838 Filed 7–10–13; 4:15 pm] 

BILLING CODE 6350–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Foreign-Trade Zones Board 

[B–27–2013] 

Foreign-Trade Zone 161—Sedgwick 

County, Kansas; Authorization of 

Production Activity; Siemens Energy, 

Inc. (Wind Turbine Nacelles and Hubs); 

Hutchinson, Kansas 

On March 7, 2013, Siemens Energy, 

Inc., an operator of FTZ 161, submitted 

a notification of proposed production 

activity to the Foreign-Trade Zones 

(FTZ) Board. 

The notification was processed in 

accordance with the regulations of the 

FTZ Board (15 CFR part 400), including 

notice in the Federal Register inviting 

public comment (78 FR 20888, April 8, 

2013). The FTZ Board has determined 

that no further review of the activity is 

warranted at this time. The production 

activity described in the notification is 

authorized, subject to the FTZ Act and 

the FTZ Board’s regulations, including 

Section 400.14. 

Dated: July 8, 2013. 

Andrew McGilvray, 

Executive Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2013–16784 Filed 7–11–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Foreign-Trade Zones Board 

[B–25–2013] 

Foreign-Trade Zone 39—Dallas-Fort 

Worth, Texas; CSI Calendering, Inc. 

(Rubber Coated Textile Fabric); 

Arlington, Texas 

On March 4, 2013, the Dallas/Fort 

Worth International Airport Board, 

grantee of FTZ 39, submitted a 

notification of proposed production 

activity to the Foreign-Trade Zones 

(FTZ) Board on behalf of CSI 

Calendering, Inc., in Arlington, Texas. 

The notification was processed in 

accordance with the regulations of the 

FTZ Board (15 CFR part 400), including 

notice in the Federal Register inviting 

public comment (78 FR 18314, March 

26, 2013). Pursuant to Section 400.37, 

the FTZ Board has determined that 

further review is warranted and has not 

authorized the proposed activity. If the 

applicant wishes to seek authorization 

for this activity, it will need to submit 

an application for production authority, 

pursuant to Section 400.23. 

Dated: July 5, 2013. 

Andrew McGilvray, 

Executive Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2013–16777 Filed 7–11–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

RIN 0648–XC008 

Endangered and Threatened Species; 

Recovery Plans 

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

Commerce. 

ACTION: Notice of availability. 

SUMMARY: We, NMFS, announce the 

adoption of an Endangered Species Act 

(ESA) recovery plan for Lower Columbia 

River Chinook salmon (Oncoryhnchus 

tschawytscha), Lower Columbia coho 

salmon (O. kisutch), and Columbia 

River chum salmon (O. keta) 

evolutionarily significant units (ESUs) 

and the Lower Columbia River steelhead 

(O. mykiss) distinct population segment 

(DPS), all of which are listed as 

threatened under the ESA. The 

geographic area covered by the plan is 

the Lower Columbia River mainstem 

and tributaries downstream of (and 

including) the White Salmon River in 

Washington and the Hood River in 

Oregon. As required by the ESA, the 

plan contains objective, measurable 

delisting criteria, site-specific 

management actions necessary to 

achieve the plan’s goals, and estimates 

of the time and costs required to 

implement recovery actions. The 

Endangered Species Act (ESA) Recovery 

Plan for Lower Columbia River Chinook 

Salmon, Lower Columbia River Coho 

Salmon, Columbia River Chum Salmon, 

and Lower Columbia River Steelhead 

(Plan) and our summary of and 

responses to public comments on the 

Proposed Plan are now available. 

ADDRESSES: Electronic copies of the 

Plan and a summary of and response to 

public comments on the Proposed Plan 

are available on-line at http://www.nwr.

noaa.gov/protected_species/salmon_

steelhead/recovery_planning_and_

implementation/lower_columbia_river/

lower_columbia_river_recovery_plan_

for_salmon_steelhead.html. A CD–ROM 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES