This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 MICHAEL C. DOLVIN, 2 Petitioner-Appellant, 3 v. No. 34,798 4 MICHAEL M. RUECKHAUS and THE 5 NEW MEXICO MEDICAL REVIEW 6 COMMISSION, 7 Respondents-Appellees. 8 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY 9 James Waylon Counts, District Judge 10 Michael C. Dolvin 11 Alamogordo, NM 12 Pro Se Appellant 13 Gallagher, Casados & Mann, P.C. 14 Harriett J. Hickman 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 for Appellees 17 MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 SUTIN, Judge. 192 {1} Plaintiff appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of 1 certiorari; Plaintiff asked the district c ourt to order the Medical Review Commission 2 (the Commission) to allow him to represent himself on a pro se basis before the 3 Commission. We issued a notice of proposed disposition proposing to affirm. In 4 response, the following documents have b een filed: a memorandum in opposition and 5 a motion to amend the docketing statement by Plaintiff; a response indicating 6 Defendants have no objecti on to the proposed disposition and a response opposing 7 Plaintiff’s request to amend his docketi ng statement by Defendants; and a motion to 8 strike, request for sanctions, and form al objection by Plaintiff, objecting to 9 Defendants’ response opposing the motion to amend. After carefully considering all 10 of the discussion contained in Plaintiff’s various pleadings, we remain convinced that 11 summary affirmance is appropriate in this case. In addition, we deny Plaintiff’s 12 motions, as discussed in this opinion. 13
{2} Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the Docketing Statement and Motion to Strike 14 Defendants’ Response Thereto: The motion to amend the docketing statement 15 duplicates arguments made elsewhere in Plai ntiff’s appellate pleadings, either in his 16 docketing statement or in his memorandum in opposition. We haveconsidered all of 17 those arguments in arriving at our disposition in this case. Therefore, we deny the 18 motion to amend the docketing statement as an unnecessary and duplicative pleading. 193 {3} As for the motion to strike and request for sanctions, we note the following. 1 Defendants filed a two-pageresponse (excluding the si gnature page) opposing the 2 motion to amend the docketing statement, arguing in essence that amending the 3 docketing statement would be futile because it would not ch ange the outcome of this 4 appeal. Plaintiff then filed an eighteen- page motion (excluding the signature page) 5 accusing opposing counsel of engaging infraud and of acting unethically and 6 requesting that this Court impose sancti ons. Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ 7 response is in reality a second memorandum supporting the proposed disposition 8 contained in our notice, and this is apparently the basis for Plaintiff’s outrage. We 9 disagree. Defendants’ response is a straightforward and brief reiteration of the reasons 10 why Plaintiff’s appeal is without merit and why allowing amendment of the docketing 11 statement would therefore be futile. We deny Plaintiff’s motion in its entirety and 12 caution Plaintiff to refrain from engaging inthe type of hyperbole exhibited by the 13 motion—accusations of fraud and unethical behavior are not appropriate simply 14 because Plaintiff believes that a Rule of Appellate Procedure has been violated. This 15 is especially true where, as here, Plaintiff’s belief is unfounded. 16
{4} Merits: We made two main points in our notice of proposed summary 17 disposition: first, we proposed to agree th at pro se litigants must be provided some 18 mechanism by which they may bring a medical-malpractice lawsuit; second, we 194 proposed to hold that we need not decidein this case what mechanism would be 1 appropriate, because Plaintiff has not established his standing to bring a medical2 malpractice claim on behalf of his deceased mother. In response, Plaintiff has filed a 3 lengthy memorandum in opposition raising a number of arguments. While we need 4 not address each argument indi vidually, we are compelled to comment on some of the 5 assertions made by Plaintiff. 6
{5} We note first that on pages 6 and 7 of the memorandum, Plaintiff accuses the 7 district court of acting out of malicious motives and of intentionally sabotaging 8 Plaintiff’s case. The basis of these accusations is Plaintiff’s contention that the district 9 court took an “outrageously” long time, four months, to rule on Plaintiff’s motion for 10 reconsideration. [MIO 6-7] We caution Plaintiff, as we did with respect to his motion 11 to strike, to refrain from these types of baseless accusations in his pleadings. Contrary 12 to his assertion, four months is not an “outrageously” long time for a district court to 13 rule on a party’s motion; in fact, it is extremely common for a motion to wait that 14 long, or longer, for a decision. This is b ecause the district courts are underfunded and 15 overworked and have many more cases waiti ng for decisions other than Plaintiff’s. 16 The mere fact that Plaintiff desired a quick ruling on his motion does not mean that 17 that motion takes top priority with the di strict court, which has trials to conduct, 18 hearings to hold, and decisions to make inmany, many other cases. Plaintiff’s baseless 195 accusations of malice and intentional sabotage are unwarranted and in fact, should 1 they continue, could very well subject him to sanctions. 2
{6} In addition, although Plaintiff contends the district court’s delay harmed him, 3 we have already rejected that contention in the notice of proposed summary 4 disposition. As we pointed out there, by f iling his notice of appeal, Plaintiff deprived 5 the district court of jurisdiction to rule on his motion for reconsideration, which was 6 filed more than thirty days after the distri ct court order Plaintiff was challenging. The 7 district court’s ruling on the motion, therefore, is of no effect, and Plaintiff suffered 8 no harm from the district court’s allege dly “outrageous” delay. We recognize that 9 Plaintiff does not agree with our analysis and contends that he did not deprive the 10 district court of jurisdiction by filing his no tice of appeal. However, we have reviewed 11 Plaintiff’s arguments and do not agree with them. Our analysis in the notice was 12 correct: Plaintiff’s successive motion for rec onsideration, filed more than thirty days 13 after the district court’s order of Oc tober 23, 2014 denying the petition for writ of 14 certiorari, did not render the notice of appeal ineffective; therefore, the notice deprived 15 the district court of jurisdiction to act on the motion for reconsideration. 16
{7} Plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition also contains a lengthy discussion of the 17 question of a pro se litigant’s right to represent himself in a medical-malpractice case, 18 as well as Plaintiff’s right to appear infront of the Commission as a pro se litigant. 196 [MIO 7-16] As we pointed out in the notice of proposed summary disposition, 1 however, we need not address that question inthis case, because Plaintiff did not have 2 standing to represent his deceased mother’s estate in a medical-malpractice action in 3 any forum. Plaintiff argues vigorously that this Court should address the question 4 because pro se litigants in New Mexico need guidance for future cases. Given 5 Plaintiff’s lack of standing, even if we di d decide that a pro se litigant can represent 6 himself before the Commission, or alternatively that a pro se litigant may bypass the 7 Commission and proceed directly to district court, that decision would be of no use 8 to Plaintiff in this appeal. In effect, therefore, it would be no more than an advisory 9 opinion that would have no impact on the partie s in this particular case, and this Court 10 does not issue advisory opinions. See Insure N.M., LLC v. McGonigle , 2000-NMCA11 018, ¶ 27, 128 N.M. 611, 995 P.2d 1053. Resolution of the question of a self12 represented individual’s ability to maintaina medical-malpractice action must wait for 13 a case in which that resolution will make a practical difference to the parties in that 14

case. 15
{8} Plaintiff next addresses the standing i ssue that was the basis for our proposed 16 affirmance in the notice. [MIO 16-21] He first argues that the Commission, rather than 17 immediately informing him that it would not consider his submission, held onto it for 18 a year. [MIO 17-19] He does not explain, however, how this fact has any impact on 197 the standing question. The bottom line is, Pl aintiff has never been appointed personal 1 representative of his mother’s estate, and in our notice we cited case law indicating 2 that a medical-malpractice action brought on behalf of a deceased individual must be 3 brought by a personal representative of the deceased individual’s estate. Mackey v. 4 Burke , 1984-NMCA-028, ¶ 7, 102 N.M. 294, 694 P.2d 1359, overruled on other 5 grounds by Chavez v. Regents of Univ. of N.M. , 1985-NMSC-114, ¶¶ 5, 20, 103 N.M. 6 606, 711 P.2d 883. The fact that the Commission did not inform Plaintiff of this 7 problem for some period of time does not somehow confer personal-representative 8 standing upon Plaintiff. 9
{9} Plaintiff also argues that his case had merit because a pro se litigant has a right 10 to appear pro se before the Commission. [M IO 19] Assuming that is true, a question 11 we decline to decide in this case, the right would only apply if Plaintiff was presenting 12 a medical-malpractice claim on behalf of himself, not on behalf of another individual 13 or, as in this case, his mother’s estate. This argument therefore has no effect on the 14 standing question. 15
{10} Plaintiff contends that dismissal of his petition should not be affirmed because 16 this Court has forgiven a flaw ed procedure in a prior case, Chisholm v. Rueckhaus , 17 1997-NMCA-112, 124 N.M. 255, 948 P.2d 707. Plai ntiff requests similar relief in this 18 appeal. [MIO 20] In Chisholm , in order to protect a minor child’s interests, we 198 remanded the case so the district court c ould appoint an attorn ey or a guardian ad 1 litem to pursue a malpractice action on behalf of the minor child. 1997-NMCA-112, 2 ¶¶ 12-14. The basis of that action was New Mexico courts’ strong interest in 3 protecting the rights of minor children, an interest that is not present in this case. We 4 therefore decline Plaintiff’s request to betreated in the same manner as the minor 5 child was treated in Chisholm

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{11} Plaintiff next appears to maintain that this case involves not only the estate’s 7 potential interest in the medical-malpracti ce action, but his own rights as well. [MIO 8 20] He in effect claims that his petition for writ of certiorari should not have been 9 denied because he should have been allo wed to litigate his own interests. However, 10 both below and on appeal the gravamen of Plaintiff’s action was to pursue a medical11 malpractice case as a result of allegedl y deficient medical treatment provided to 12 Plaintiff’s mother, not to Plaintiff himself. The rights that have been allegedly denied 13 to Plaintiff all concern the question of whether he will be able to pursue that medical14 malpractice claim on a pro se basis. As wehave discussed in the notice and in this 15 opinion, if Plaintiff had been pursuing a claim for medical malpractice committed 16 against him personally, his right to do so w ould need to be recognized. However, that 17 is not the situation here and any “rights” Plaintiff is atte mpting to assert are derivative 189 of the medical-malpractice action that he does not have standing to pursue. For that 1 reason, we reject this argument. 2
{12} Plaintiff points out that he presented evidence of his special relationship with 3 his mother to the district court, including th e fact that he was her legal representative 4 for medical purposes when she was hospitalized and that he was her only child. [MIO 5 20] As we pointed out in the notice, the key issue is not what type of relationship 6 Plaintiff had with his mother or whether he is her sole heir; instead, the applicable law 7 requires that an action such as this be pursued by the duly appointed personal 8 representative of the deceased individual’s estate. Mackey , 1984-NMCA-028, ¶ 7. 9 Unless and until Plaintiff satisfies that prerequisite by obtaining appointment as 10 personal representative of the estate, he will not have standing to pursue a medical11 malpractice action on behalf of his deceased mother. 12
{13} Plaintiff complains of several actions by this Court that allegedly have “grossly 13 violated” his “civil and constitutional rights, ” such as considering only one docketing 14 statement that Plaintiff contends he was forced to file prematurely. [MIO 21] We do 15 not agree with Plaintiff’s complaints. We have reviewed several pleadings filed by 16 Plaintiff and have thereby obtained a complete picture of his legal and factual 17 arguments. Thus, he has had a full and fair opportunity to present those arguments, 18 and in fact has had more of an opportunity to do so than does the typical appellant, 1910 who does not file the same number of moti ons and other pleadings as Plaintiff has 1 filed in this case. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, he has su ffered no deprivation of 2 constitutional rights as a result of our handli ng of his appeal; we have simply ruled 3 against him. 4
{14} We take this opportunity to again point out an issue we briefly mentioned in the 5 notice of proposed summary disposition. In that notice we noted the possibility that 6 Plaintiff might be named as personal repres entative of his mother’s estate at some 7 point, and we expressed no opinion concerning the impact this pending case might 8 have on statute of limitations questions thatmight arise in any future case Plaintiff 9 might file. To that suggestion we also add the following: nothing in this opinion or in 10 our notice should be read to imply that Plaintiff, even if he wereto become personal 11 representative of his mother’s estate, shoul d be allowed to pursue a pro se medical12 malpractice action on behalf of that estate. As we have stated, a pro se litigant should 13 have the right to pursue such an action on behalf of himself, butthat is a different 14 matter than attempting to represent an estate on a pro se basis, merely because the 15 would-be litigant has been appointed pers onal representative. In fact, in other 16 jurisdictions such pro se representati on has been prohibited as the unauthorized 17 practice of law. See, e.g. , City of Downey v. Johnson , 263 Cal. App.2d 775, 779-80 18 (1968) (citing cases). We need not decidewhether that prohibition would apply in 1911 New Mexico; we merely emphasize that our discussion in this opinion and in our 1 notice should not be construed as any typeof implied permission allowing a personal 2 representative to bring a pro se action for me dical malpractice on behalf of an estate. 3
{15} Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s 4 petition for writ of certiorari. 5
{16} IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

__________________________________ 7 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 8

WE CONCUR: 9

_______________________________ 10 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 11

_______________________________ 12 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 13