escorted to 2/23 and 1st Marines. After several days without resupply, and subsisting on only one

MRE per day, the Marines of RCT-1 were glad to see the convoy roll up. The uninterrupted

flow of logistics from RRP-24 to RCT-1 via surface transport greatly alleviated the critical

shortfalls the RCT had been operating under.

From Stabilization to Combat Operation

The battalions of the Division were

experiencing significant success in

bringing peace to the locals in the

Division's zone. Local civilians in Ad

Diwaniyah were actively cooperating

with the Marines, and had pointed out

a sizable paramilitary stronghold in a

local schoolhouse located in a grove of

palm trees. The locals were eager to

have the Marines of the Division

conduct an operation against this

position, but with Blue Diamond

moving back into the attack north, this

would have to be passed down from

EOD Marines prepare to destroy a cache of enemy mortar 2/5 to 3/4. Acting on another local tip, rounds. . the Marines of 2/5 identified a sizable

weapons cache 3 km to the east of Ad Diwaniyah. "This thing is like Falibrook," quoted the

excited EOD team members referring to the extensive naval ammunition supply station at their

home base, a Camp Pendleton landmark. The weapons storage facility included over 40 bunkers

containing everything from RPGs to thousands of brand new 155mm artillery rounds. The

Division expressed its appreciation to the Iraqi General Staff for assisting with its artillery

ammunition re-supply.

Inchon Stretches to Cover All of Highway 7

With elements spread along the length of

Highway 7, RCT-1 was now conducting missions in

Al Hayy, Qalat Sikar, Ash Shattrah, and Al Fajr. The

RCT span of control was over 100 kilometers along

the route. In addition to straddling a large section of

battlespace, the RCT also straddled a range of

missions that ranged from wresting control away from

Baath party thugs, to civil-military operations.

The Reconnaissance Battalion had been relieved

at the Qalat Sikar airfield by 1/4, and now established

a 360-degree perimeter around the intersection of

Highway 7 and 17, guarding the multiple avenues of The sun sets as Marines continue to patrol

approach. On 30 March, 1/4 (less the units at the along Highway 7.

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airfield) conducted a relief in place with 3/1 and defended the Highway 7 avenue of approach

from the south. That night saw a spike in enemy activity as 1/4 was probed by a squad-sized unit

and the Recon Battalion came under intense enemy rocket fire from the direction of Al Hayy.

With extremely limited visibility, 1/4 relied heavily on the Javelin gunners and their Command

Launch Unit (CLU) thermal sights to observe the activities outside their perimeter. As Corporal

Michael Reyna scanned his sector with the CLU, he picked up the unmistakable thermal

signature of individuals with AK-47s and RPGs moving along a ditch approximately 150 meters

north of the battalion's defensive line. The Marines engaged the enemy, spoiling his plan to

launch a surprise attack. Caught by surprise, the enemy hastily and inaccurately launched two

RPGs that sailed harmlessly above the forward command group's AAVC-7. Unable to

effectively direct their fire against the wall of steel that honed in on their position, the would-be

ambushers beat a hasty retreat and left their boots in the mud in the process. Shortly thereafter,

the distinct sounds of a multiple rocket launcher releasing its load were heard. The enemy had

pre-registered fires against this intersection, and was now executing a well-planned artillery raid.

The first rounds impacted very close to the Recon perimeter, and Major Rich Whitmer, the

Battalion S-3 was sure the next rounds would be adjusted right into their position. The fires were

unobserved, however, and the rounds continued to impact just outside the perimeter. Rudely

awakened, but unharmed, the battalion command group tried to get a few hours of sleep before

their mission the next day.

31 March

1st Marine Division on the Move Again

The Division attack plan for its push across the Tigris River would entail all three RCTs

acting in a coordinated action of fire, maneuver, and exploitation. RCT- 1 would serve as the

fixing force for the attack, fixing the Baghdad RG Division by fires from a position south of Al

Kut on Highway 7. The RCT, with the Recon Battalion attached, would establish blocking

positions on both sides of the Gharraf River

south of Al Kut, and commence its fires

from these positions. RCT-5 would attack

to seize the Hantush Airstrip, seize a

crossing over the Saddam canal, then finally

to seize crossings over the Tigris River in

the vicinity of An Numaniyah. The RCT

would lead with 3d LAR Battalion to

Hantush, who would continue to feint north

along Highway 1 in order to fix the Medina

Division from the south. First LAR would

attack in trace of 3( LAR and set up

An LA V-25 from 3d LAR Battalion moves forward to blocking positions south of the small town

particivate in a feint against the Medina Division of Ash Shumali. They would allow the lead

elements of RCT-5 to pass through, then follow in support. First Battalion, 5th Marines would

attack to seize the Highway 27 Bridge over the Saddam canal, while 2d Tanks and 3/5 would

make the attack into An Numaniyah to seize the 600 meter long bridge over the Tigris located

there. Second Battalion, 5th Marines would provide security to the RCT's western flank, and

guide the 8th Engineer Support Battalion to an alternate crossing site to the west of An

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Numaniyah. The alternate crossing site was upwind of An Numaniyah, and gave the Division a

good location to construct another bridge it could use if the An Numaniyah bridge was disabled

or closed down by persistent chemicals. The exploitation would come from RCT-7, who would

follow in trace of RCT-5 to the Tigris, seizing the An Numaniyah Airfield in the process. Third

Battalion, 7th Marines would relieve RCT-5 at the bridge site, and secure the town of An

Numaniyah itself.

Details of the attack plan. RCT-1 would fix forces in Al Kut while RCT- 7 and RCT-5 crossed the Tigris at An

Numaniyah. RCT-7 would attack east toward Al Kut, while RCT-5 would continue to roll to Baghdad. RCT-1

and the Reconnaissance Battalion would conduct a roundabout march to link-un with the Division.

All of these attacks facilitated the movement of the exploitation force, as 3/4 and 1/7 would

conduct a coordinated attack to the east on both sides of the river, attacking the Baghdad RG

Division in its defensive positions on the outskirts of the Al Kut urban area.

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Back to Hantush Airstrip

With the Wolfpack back in the lead, RCT-5 re-attacked to Hantush. This time, there was

little resistance until they reached the airstrip itself. There, an Iraqi AAA unit, firing in direct

fire mode, engaged them. Wolfpack continued the attack through the airfield, taking 15 EPWs

and destroying 12 AAA pieces. They opened the critical FARP for the Division and continued

to push up Highway 1. Their continued advance up Highway I was meant to give the enemy

reason to believe that the Division's attack would continue up the main route to Baghdad. Over

the next several days, 3d LAR aggressively patrolled north of the Hantush airstrip to the limit of

the Division's zone. In the process, they discovered two Al Samoud Surface-to-Surface missiles

(recently declared in violation of UN resolutions) and tagged them for destruction. In one

engagement, Bravo Company, 4th LAR Battalion, engaged and defeated an infantry

counterattack in the vicinity of Al Madhatiyah.

While the Wolfpack attacked

through Hantush, 1 St LAR turned

northeast just prior to the airfield and

established a blocking position near the

small town of Ash Shumali to prevent

any potential enemy forces from

attacking south. Highlander conducted

reconnaissance of potential routes

around the town and sent security

patrols inside the town center, where

they discovered a Baath party

headquarters. The inhabitants of

Shumali informed the patrol that the

Scouts from 1st LAR Battalion search buildings in Ash Baath members had already fled. With

ShumalL the town secure, the lead elements of

RCT-5 continued up Highway 27.

The MWSS Engineers followed closely on the heels of RCT-5 as they cleared the airfield.

Within hours, they had cleared and improved it. The MWSS and CSSG Marines immediately

laid out the bladders for a fuel farm. The CG of 3d MAW, Major General Amos, arrived on

scene for a personal inspection, and declared it fit for KC- 130 operations. The plan became a

reality, and within 24 hours the field was in full operation, with critical fuel and supplies pouring

in. When the first KC-130 landed at Hantush, it marked the logistics turning point in the attack

to Baghdad. Hantush was the first KC- 130 serviced hard-surface airfield north of the Euphrates,

and was to enable the delivery of the fuel that the RCTs used to continue the attack from Al Kut

to Baghdad.

The seizure of Hantush demonstrated the criticality of 3d MAW support as Division units

stretched the 1st FSSG's arc of sustainment. CASEVAC helicopters positioned with the RCTs

and Division CPs shortened the distance and time from point of injury to treatment. CH-53s

brought pre-staged ammunition packages to units beyond the end of secure roads. MWSS

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Marines dispensed fuel to the Division's vehicles and many others as they moved up Highway 1.

In addition to providing fuel and ordnance to rotary wing CAS aircraft, FARPs became supply

points for ground units. The Division worked with 3" MAW to get ten KC- 130 sorties and six

CH-53E sorties each day to bring 50,000 gallons of fuel, 88 pallets of MREs, petroleum oil and

lubricants and miscellaneous parts into Hantush and Wrigley (an expeditionary airstrip further

south, near the Division Main CP on Highway 1.)

The Division also requested that 3d MAW lift 20,000 gallons of fuel with two CH-53s daily

to Qalat Sikar to sustain the Division's movement along Highway 7, its eastern line of

communication. The Wing went so far as to bring pallets of MREs from its own stocks to

dispense to Marines at this critical FARP (although the

Division Marines kidded their Wing comrades that they

would rather have them bring the steak and lobster

from their chow hail.) Shortly thereafter, the Marine

Logistics Command began to take advantage of KC130-capable airstrips as major logistics nodes. They

staged MREs at Au As Saleem Air Base and Joe Foss

Airfield (in Camp Matilda, Kuwait) to shorten supply

lines from theater stocks to front-line Marines. The

strength of the relationship between Division and Wing

staffs paid dividends from the LD to Baghdad. CSSG11 appreciated the reinforcing capability of the Wing, Marines of 3d MA Westablish a

as both organizations committed body and soul to forward operating base at Hantush

keeping the Division on the move. Airstrip to support actions near Al Kut.

With the successful seizure of Hantush Airstrip, the Division surged ahead to stage itself for

the continued attack. The Division Forward CP jumped and established itself several kilometers

east of Hantush, along Highway 27. The roadway was jammed with bridge companies, MWSS

vehicles, combat forces, and logistics trains from CSSC-115. The limited area around the

airfield became a parking lot. The TMC pushed forward to take charge of the intersection, and

soon had traffic flowing to the northeast. RCT-S's lead elements gained some maneuver space

by pushing toward the Saddam canal Bridge, which lay about 23 km further up the road.

There were a number of contacts that day as units moved to the northeast. MPs from the

TMCC were ambushed by 82 mm mortars and direct fire from a cluster of mud buildings along

Highway 27. They immediately attacked through the ambush and discovered a squad of

paramilitary fighters using women and children as human shields. The MPs killed or chased off

the paramilitary fighters without causing any civilian casualties, much to the relief of the families

that lived in the compound. The Iraqi women and children had been forced to stand in a row at

the intervisibility line between the paramilitary fighters and the Marines.

That evening, the Division continued to shape the battlespace in detail for the next day's

attack. Using the Pioneer, the Division was able to identify a small defensive position at the

Highway 27 Bridge over the Saddam canal. The Iraqis had prepared what appeared to be a small

ambush on the southwest side of the canal, while creating a conventional defensive line along the

northeast side. This position was attacked by air and reduced. The targeteers turned to several

large military facilities to the northwest of Highway 27 between the Saddam Canal and Tigris

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River, and found vehicle activity in a large ammunition storage area. This target, far from any

populated areas, was subjected to sustained aviation fires and later, a B-52 strike. The Division

remained like a coiled spring, ready to push up Highway 27 the next morning.

Attack on Ash Shattrah

With the forward elements of RCT- 1 pushing north of Al Hayy to fix the Baghdad RG

Division, the RCT was also required to support an additional mission in Ash Shattrah. This

small town astride Highway 7 remained a troublesome source of Baath activity, and a haven for

Regime fighters. Several days earlier, a 3d MAW support convoy had passed through the town,

attempting to reach the Qalat Sikar airfield. The

convoy had come under fire, and in the

confusion, there was a vehicle crash. The

convoy withdrew from the city, and later

discovered that an MWSS Marine had been left

behind in one of the crashed vehicles. On 30

March, 3/1 was ordered to move to isolate the

town in support of clandestine forces that were

planning to attack Baath party facilities and

search for evidence of the missing Marine. The

battalion went into attack positions, isolating

Ash Shattrah. When the other forces (Iraqi

irregulars) that were to conduct the attacks did

not arrive at the linkup point the RCT took An Iraqi civilian tries to keep up with his . . transportation on Highway 7. matters into their own hands. Working with

information from informants in the town, the

RCT S-2, Major Tom Sharp, and his crew, were able to precisely identify the buildings housing

the Baath members. They also identified a hospital that was said to hold the body of the Marine

(who reportedly had been killed in the earlier vehicle crash.) The RCT nominated the targets

(minus the hospital, of course) for precision strike, and planned to send 3/1 into the town to

search the hospital for evidence of the Marine. The next day, the nominated targets were struck,

and 7 of 9 were destroyed. The precision of the strikes marveled the local populace, who turned

out into the streets in droves to witness the demonstration of both firepower and restraint. Into

the confusion, 3/1 raced into the town. They quickly searched for signs of remaining Baathists

and the missing Marine. At the hospital, they confirmed that the Marine had been killed in the

initial crash, and that his body had been buried by the local citizens outside of the town. The

recovery task was passed to TF Tarawa for exploitation, and 3/1 hurried north to go into the

attack on Al Kut.

Inchon Attacks to Al Kut

RCT-1 elements continued to receive indirect fire from artillery raids being conducted out of

Al Hayy. These enemy artillery units had been moving from the cover of the urban area to firing

positions south of the city. In fact, some of these systems had been spotted displacing during the

previous night. Aerial intelligence from the Pioneer UAV and two P-3 missions (with Division

observers Colonel Jim Lukeman and Major Mike Rodgers aboard) discovered the movement and

237
efforts were started to take out the weapon systems. As attack aircraft checked on station, the

frustration began to build as none of the aircraft were configured with a sensor capable of

positively identifying the mobile artillery pieces. Pilots felt the frustration of the RCT as they

could make out movement through their night

vision goggles, but were unable to

discriminate the target well enough to be

certain it was enemy artillery. With the

friendly fire close calls that had occurred in

the recent past, Marine pilots wanted to be

certain this was foe and not friend.

Unfortunately, the positive identification was

never achieved. RCT- 1 began planning for a

ground takedown of Al Hayy and the source

of the indirect fire. The RCT planned to

attack with the Reconnaissance Battalion

moving along the west side of the Gharraf The Cannon Cockers deliver shaping fires on the

River to block the city from the west and Baghdad Infantry Division.

north. Alpha Company of 1st Tanks, and 1/4

would attack north along Highway 7, and act as the hammer to Recon Battalion's anvil. Their

mission was to attack into the city, destroy any enemy, and put a stop to the artillery attacks.

On the western flank of the RCT- 1 attack, the Reconnaissance Battalion made its way up

Route 7A on the west side of the Gharraf River. The Battalion planned to get into blocking

positions on the west side of the river, keeping enemy forces from withdrawing to the west out of

town. The Battalion made good progress up the poor road. As before, the terrain limited the

Battalion's movement, and they found themselves in a column of companies, on top of the raised

levee road for much of its

length. As the Battalion

column approached a sharp

bend in the river, paramilitary

forces ambushed them. This

was a well-placed ambush,

supported by mortars and AAA

guns being used in direct fire

mode. The Battalion quickly

executed its reaction plan,

pulled back out of the ambush

kill-zone, and called in

supporting arms. Once again, Life continues as it did thousands of years ago, even as modern armies

battle nearby. the Battalion began to receive

incoming mortar fire, and

watched its approach. The first

rounds impacted about 800 meters from the column, but the second series were much closer.

The third series began to land in the water next to the Battalion, and they waited for the next set

to be right on target. Miraculously, the mortar fire ceased. The air support soon arrived, and

cleared the ambush positions.

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The Reconnaissance Battalion moved up the remaining distance to the bridges at Al Hayy,

and approached the northernmost. Despite their earlier scrap, their arrival at the town from the

west was an absolute surprise for the enemy in Al Hayy. The Battalion could see Iraqis running

through the streets on the far side of the river as they reacted to the presence of the Marines. The

enemy managed to man fighting positions and began to fire. The enemy positions were well

prepared, and they were able to pour heavy fire on the Marines. Recon Battalion was able to

gain fire superiority with its heavy machine guns, and fought its way across the Al Hayy Bridge.

RCT- 1 was still south of Al Hayy on Highway 7, 50 Recon Battalion continued their attack all

the way to Highway 7. The Battalion was ordered to conduct patrols and establish a blocking

position to the north of the city, on the east side of the river. That night, the Recon Battalion

engaged hundreds of targets as enemy forces attempted to flee to the north up Highway 7. Bravo

Company under Captain Craig Schwetjewas patrolling to the west of Highway 7 when they

detected hundreds of paramilitaries attempting to bypass the battalion's blocking position on the

highway. Once again, 1/1 1 provided devastating fires, and the enemy forces trying to bypass the

Recon Battalion's positions were destroyed.

As the Recon Battalion was pushing up the west bank of the river, 1/4 conducted a

simultaneous attack north along Highway 7 on the east side of the river towards Al Hayy. As 1/4

continued its attack north, it uncovered numerous weapons caches along the way. Just south of

the city, the battalion received mortar fire, and Captain Coby Moran, the battalion's Weapons

Company commander and fire support coordinator, called in the 'snowstorm' report and

requested close air support. The RCT- 1 Air Officer vectored a section of AH- 1 Ws to the

battalion, and they promptly

identified and destroyed an Iraqi

tank, artillery piece, and other Iraqi

weapons systems. As RCT-1 kept

pressing the enemy, they began to

find the route littered with

abandoned equipment. As the

Blue Diamond attack began to

break their will, the Iraqi fighters

continued to abandon their

positions and weapons. The

assaulting companies found

abandoned uniforms, small arms,

RPGs, and hundreds of 120mm

A suspicious Iraqi vehicle is disabled and searched at a mortar rounds. checkpoint.

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1 April

The Saddam Canal

By the morning of 1 April,

the enemy's resistance had

been severely weakened.

The intelligence assessment

of the Baghdad RG Division

was that 80% of its major

weapons systems had been

destroyed. The status of the

infantry in the Division's

three brigades was harder to

ascertain, but without their

supporting arms they lacked

much of their former combat

power. The Baghdad RG

Division had always had

mobility problems due to a

shortage of transport

vehicles, but now it was truly

fixed. To the west, the Destroyed Iraqi armor near the Saddam Canal enemy position on Highway

27 near the Saddam Canal

bridge remained, as did the positions near the An Numaniyah Bridge. The conventional defense

of Al Kut had been significantly disrupted, but the paramilitary threat remained unclear. The

paramilitary forces had rallied in the defense of An Nasiriyah even when conventional forces had

failed, and had given TF Tarawa a tough time of it in the city. Here in Al Kut and An

Numaniyah, closer to the Regime center, would the reception be any different? The Division

continued its attack, with the full expectation of hard fighting on the way to the key bridges.

This threat caused the CG to issue additional guidance to the attacking commanders. This attack

would be conducted with deliberation and

maximize the usage of shaping and

preparatory fires. Positions confronted were

to be reduced by fires prior to assault. The

enemy showed every indication of a

weakened posture, and the risk of

unnecessary casualties precluded a rush into

the enemy's prepared defenses. In keeping

with the CG's intent, the Division Forward

CP and their imbedded DASC coordinated a

number of B-52 strikes on the ammunition

storage area along the west flank of RCT-5's

attack. RCT-5 was locked and loaded for

Marines from Charlie Company, 1/5 in the attack. their attack, aiming to seize the Tigris River

crossings.

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