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S. Hrg. 111–461 

THE DIPLOMAT’S SHIELD: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY 

IN TODAY’S WORLD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, 

THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 9, 2009 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

PAUL G. KIRK, JR., Massachusetts 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL 

WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

PAUL G. KIRK, JR., Massachusetts 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

LISA M. POWELL, Staff Director 

JOEL C. SPANGENBERG, Professional Staff Member 

JESSICA K. NAGASAKO, Professional Staff Member 

JENNIFER A. HEMINGWAY, Minority Staff Director 

THOMAS A. BISHOP, Minority Professional Staff Member 

BENJAMIN B. RHODESIDE, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 1 

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 2 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2009 

Ambassador Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of State ............................................................................ 4 

Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government 

Accountbility Office .............................................................................................. 6 

Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann (Ret.), President, American Academy of 

Diplomacy ............................................................................................................. 21 

Susan R. Johnson, President, American Foreign Service Association ................ 23 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Boswell, Ambassador Eric J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37 

Ford, Jess T.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44 

Johnson, Susan R.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 70 

Neumann, Ambassador Ronald E. (Ret.): 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 21 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55 

APPENDIX 

Background .............................................................................................................. 77 

Responses to questions submitted for the Record: 

Ambassador Boswell ......................................................................................... 84 

Ambassador Neumann ..................................................................................... 100 

Ms. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 102 

(1) 

THE DIPLOMAT’S SHIELD: DIPLOMATIC 

SECURITY IN TODAY’S WORLD 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT

MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Akaka and Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. I call this hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the 

District of Columbia to order. 

I want to welcome our witnesses and thank you for being here 

today. Today’s hearing, ‘‘The Diplomat’s Shield: Diplomatic Security in Today’s World,’’ will examine the results of a Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) review of the Department of State’s 

Diplomatic Security Bureau, which provides security for the State 

Department worldwide so our diplomats can advance U.S. interests. 

Since the terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and 

Tanzania in August 1998, and the terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001, Diplomatic Security’s (DS) responsibilities have grown 

and evolved. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan further increase the 

challenges of keeping our diplomats safe. 

Last week, President Obama announced his new Afghanistan 

strategy. Thirty-thousand U.S. troops will deploy in support of this 

effort. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the number of 

civilians in Afghanistan will triple by early next year. DS must be 

fully prepared to support an even greater role in protecting our civilians. 

Over the last decade, DS’s budget has increased almost 10-fold, to about $2 billion, and its direct-hire staff has doubled. Unfortunately, these extra resources have not guaranteed DS’s readiness. 

In particular, I have concerns in three areas that I hope will be addressed today. 

First, the State Department must address the ongoing staffing 

challenges. GAO identified key workforce gaps that hinder DS in 

2 

carrying out its duties. Less than half of Regional Security Officers 

serving in language-designated positions meet their proficiency requirements. More than one-third of diplomatic security positions 

are filled by officers below the appropriate grade. And, there are 

personnel gaps at domestic offices and at key posts overseas. I believe that DS should invest more in its workforce by having enough 

people with the experience and language skills necessary to fully 

support its critical missions. 

Understaffing leads to an over-reliance on contractors. GAO 

found that there are 36,000 contractors that work in DS, which is 

about 90 percent of Diplomatic Security’s total workforce. According to GAO, some DS employees are not prepared to manage this 

large contractor workforce. Recent security lapses at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul have illustrated the need for better contractor oversight. 

Second, the State Department must better manage the tension 

between fulfilling its diplomatic operations and providing strong security. Today, State Department employees serve in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other posts where they would have previously been required to evacuate. These diplomatic operations are critical to U.S. 

interests, but providing security for such dangerous missions places 

a great burden on DS. 

Because of these dangers, some of our overseas posts resemble 

fortresses and, for security reasons, may not be in locations considered most appropriate and accessible for diplomatic operations. 

GAO reported that some diplomats are concerned that security 

measures make it more difficult for visitors to attend U.S. embassy 

events, making person-to-person engagement less likely. We must 

be mindful that the way our diplomatic presence is seen and felt 

in other countries may reinforce or undermine our broader diplomatic goals. It is certainly critical that the United States protect 

its personnel from threats, both on and off-post. Security, however, 

must be carried out in concert with our diplomatic mission. 

Finally, I want to emphasize the need for improved strategic 

planning efforts within DS. I support GAO’s recommendation for 

the State Department to conduct a strategic review of Diplomatic 

Security. The Department has already stated that DS will benefit 

from the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. I am 

looking forward to hearing more about this from our State Department witness and how strategic planning for DS can become a part 

of its culture. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. 

But first, Senator Voinovich, your opening statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Senator Akaka, and I appreciate 

your holding this hearing today. I have been concerned about the 

management of the State Department, not only as a Member of 

this Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, 

and the District of Columbia Subcommittee, but also as a former 

member of the Foreign Relations Committee and now on the Appropriations Committee on the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. 

3 

I think that, too often, the management of some of our agencies 

hasn’t been given the consideration that they should have been 

given. I know that Secretary Clinton has indicated that she wants 

to move forward and improve the management, and there is going 

to be a large number of people that are going to be hired by the 

State Department. We are anxious to make sure that they get the 

right people on board to get the job done, and I think that is one 

of the reasons why we are here today because we are concerned 

about the issue of diplomatic security. 

I move around the world and visit some of our embassies and am 

very impressed with some of what I have seen and in other instances, after reading this report, a little bit concerned. It appears 

that the Bureau lacks the strategic planning and with little capacity to prepare for future security needs. I have talked this over 

with my staff and it seems that we just have too many people that 

are under contract, although from what we can tell, those that are 

under contract do a pretty good job. 

I know when I was in Iraq, I had Blackwater—and I asked them 

who was the security. I was in a helicopter. I thought maybe it was 

our guys. No, it was a private security operation. I got out of the 

helicopter and got into a SUV and I wanted to know, who is the 

security, and it is another private operation. And I wanted to find 

out who was training the Iraqi government’s folks in the special 

unit and they were also hired people. Of course, that was the Department of Defense. 

So we would just like to look into how this is being looked at by 

the State Department. I think the thing that bothers me the most, 

and I think, Senator Akaka, you did a good job of laying it out, is 

that it appears that the people that have been brought on don’t 

have the training that they need to get the job done. 

I know I spent a couple of hours over at the State Department 

with Richard Holbrooke and visited with the people, the team he 

is putting together to go to Afghanistan, and I was impressed that 

he is taking his time and trying to make sure he gets the right people and they are not in a big rush to just bring people on, but try 

and find the right ones. 

So I really would like to know just what percentage of the people 

that are going to be doing this ought to be on the government payroll and not private contractors. Are there too many that are on the 

private payroll? 

Second of all, can we do a better job of preparing those individuals that we are asking to do this job? I understand that it takes 

about 3 years to train somebody up for one of these jobs. 

And the other thing I am interested in is who decides whether 

or not the private contractor is doing the job that you are paying 

for? I have found that, too often, they have private sector people 

on, and the question is, does the agency know whether or not they 

are getting a return on the investment that they are putting into 

that private sector. 

So I am anxious to hear your testimony and the other two witnesses to follow. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. 

I want to welcome our first panel of witnesses to the Subcommittee today, Ambassador Eric J. Boswell, the Assistant SecVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Jun 08, 2010 Jkt 056150 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\56150.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
4 

1The prepared statement of Ambassador Boswell appears in the Appendix on page 37. 

retary of State for Diplomatic Security, and Jess T. Ford, the Director of International Affairs and Trade at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. 

As you know, it is the custom of the Subcommittee to swear in 

all witnesses and I would ask you to please stand and raise your 

right hand. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 

so help you, God? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. I do. 

Mr. FORD. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Let it be noted in the record that the 

witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Before we start, I want you to know that your full written statements will be part of the record. I would also like to remind you 

to please limit your oral remarks to 5 minutes. 

Ambassador Boswell, will you please proceed with your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR ERIC J. BOSWELL,1 ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good 

afternoon to you, sir, and to the Members of the Committee, Senator Voinovich, as well. I am very honored to appear before you 

today. I would like to thank you and the Committee Members for 

your continued support and interest in the Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security’s programs. With Congressional support, Diplomatic Security has been able to safeguard American diplomats and facilities 

for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and maintain our robust investigative programs which serve to protect the borders of the 

United States. 

With your permission, I will make this brief statement. While 

Diplomatic Security continues to provide the most secure environment possible for the conduct of America’s foreign policy, as you 

mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks, the scope and 

scale of DS’s responsibilities and authorities have grown immensely 

in response to emerging threats and security incidents. Increased 

resources were necessary for the Bureau to meet the requirements 

of securing our diplomatic facilities in the extremely high-threat 

environments of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other locations. 

The Department currently operates diplomatic missions in locations where, in the past, we might have closed the post and evacuated all personnel when faced with similar threats. 

As you may know, Mr. Chairman, I also served as Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security from 1995 to 1998. This is not the 

same organization as when I left. It is far, far more capable. Not 

only has DS grown in personnel and resources, it has developed the 

organizational structure necessary to meet all of the current challenges as well as those of the future. 

The recently released Government Accountability Office review of 

my Bureau correctly assesses that DS must do more to anticipate 

5 

potential and emerging global security trouble spots in order to create risk management and mitigation strategies that best focus our 

limited resources and prioritize security needs. Such plans must 

also incorporate the strategic management of the resources available for our Bureau to fulfill its mission, both currently and in the 

future. 

Two years ago, Diplomatic Security created the Threat Investigations and Analysis Directorate to enhance our intelligence analysis 

capability. This directorate concentrates our threat analysis and intelligence gathering efforts under one streamlined command structure and fosters closing working relationships among all our analysts and those responsible for investigating, deterring, and mitigating threats. 

Our next challenge is to sharpen our focus, as you mentioned, 

sir, not only on predicting future security threats, but on planning 

in advance for the security solutions and resources needed for tomorrow’s crises and foreign policy initiatives. Over the coming 

months, we will begin working toward the development of a strategic planning unit charged with ensuring that DS is even better 

positioned to support future foreign policy initiatives and manage 

global security threats and incidents. 

At the same time, we must balance our resources and security 

requirements to achieve an effective mix of highly-skilled personnel 

while controlling costs associated with requirements that have 

grown tremendously over the last 20 years. We are embarked on 

a new Bureau-wide planning process that will allow us to better 

measure the performance of our 120-plus existing programs and 

utilize data to make better and more informed resource decisions. 

Having decision-supported data available will enable DS to determine how well current programs and resources align with the Bureau’s and the Department’s strategic goals. 

DS is actively participating in the State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, (QDDR), that Secretary 

Clinton has focused on improving the Department’s resources and 

training to ensure the right people for the right job at the right 

time are in place to conduct diplomacy around the world. We are 

also participating in the QDDR working group responsible for the 

foreign affairs community’s activities and contingency response environments. 

The Department of State operates increasingly in dangerous locations, and this requires extensive resources to mitigate the risk. Although DS’s workforce has grown substantially over the past decade, the fluid nature of the security environments in Afghanistan, 

Iraq, and Pakistan presents an ongoing challenge to our program 

and staffing structures in those and other posts. 

To meet the challenge of securing U.S. diplomatic operations 

under wartime conditions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other highthreat zones, DS relies on Worldwide Personal Protective Services 

contract (WPPS), to provide protective security, aviation support, 

and fixed guard services. These contracts allow the scalability required for increased threats or new operational requirements and 

provide specialized services in extraordinary circumstances. 

In recognition of the early challenges DS experienced in contract 

oversight, specifically in Iraq, we have improved contract officers 

6 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Ford appears in the Appendix on page 44. 

representative training for all security officer personnel and increased agent staffing in Iraq and Afghanistan to directly supervise 

the personal security contractors. 

In addition, DS has established a new Security Protective Specialist skill code, a limited non-career Federal employment category 

designed to augment DS special agents by providing direct oversight of WPPS protected motorcades in critical threat locations 

where such resources are needed most. We are similarly evaluating 

other staffing options to adequately cover this important oversight 

function. 

Although the Bureau is experiencing a surge in new positions, 

uneven staff intake in the 1990s has resulted in significant experience gaps in our agent and security engineering corps. To limit the 

effects of this experience gap, we have increased training and mentoring programs and carefully identified personnel capable of serving in what we call stretch assignments. 

Over the past 10 years, the Bureau has embarked on an ambitious recruitment and hiring program. We have increased our outreach to colleges and universities with an eye toward building a 

professional service that reflects America’s diversity. In order to 

quickly deploy highly-qualified personnel into the field, we have revamped some of our training programs and are carefully evaluating 

our entire agent training program to ensure that the instruction 

provided to new and existing DS special agents is relevant to the 

new realities of our Bureau’s mission. 

DS continues to strive to meet the security needs of the Department in increasingly dangerous locations by anticipating needs and 

dedicating appropriate resources to accomplish our mission. 

Through these changes, DS remains one of the most dynamic agencies in the U.S. Federal law enforcement and security community. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to brief you on the 

global mission of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and on our 

unique ability to safeguard Americans working in some of the most 

dangerous locations abroad and the taxing requirements that we 

face. With your continued support, we will ensure Diplomatic Security remains a valuable and effective resource for protecting our 

people, our programs, facilities, and interests around the world. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ambassador Boswell, for 

your statement. 

Mr. Ford, will you please proceed with your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF JESS T. FORD,1 DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL 

AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 

OFFICE 

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Voinovich. I 

am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of State’s 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which is responsible for protection 

of people, information, and property at over 400 embassies, consulates, and domestic locations. 

Since 1998, and the bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa, the scope and complexity of threats facing Americans abroad 

and at home has increased significantly. Diplomatic security must 

7 

be prepared to counter such threats, such as crime, espionage, visa, 

passport fraud, technological intrusions, political violence, and terrorism. 

My statement today is based on our report, which we released 2 

days ago, and was requested by this Subcommittee. I am going to 

briefly summarize our findings. 

We found that since 1998, DS’s mission and activities, and subsequently its resources, have grown considerably in reaction to the 

security threats and incidents that I just outlined. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the need to enhance the physical security of 

our embassies and our facilities domestically, the increased protection missions that DS has to undertake, investigations of passport 

fraud and visa fraud, have all led to significant budgetary and personnel growth. 

Diplomatic Security’s budget has increased 10-fold since 1998, from approximately $200 million to about $2 billion today. 

In addition, the size of DS’s direct-hire workforce has doubled 

since 1998. The number of direct-hire security specialists, special 

agents, engineers, technicians, and couriers has increased from approximately 1,000 in 1998 to over 2,000 today. 

At the same time, the Diplomatic Security Bureau has increased 

its use of contractors to support its security operations worldwide, 

specifically through increases in their guard force and the use of 

contractors to provide protective details for American diplomats in 

high-threat environments. 

As a consequence of this growth, Diplomatic Security faces policy 

and operational challenges. First, DS is maintaining missions in 

increasingly dangerous locations, necessitating the use of more resources and making it more difficult to provide security in these locations. 

Second, although DS has grown considerably in staff over the 

past 10 years, it still faces significant staffing shortages in domestic offices. It still has a number of language deficiencies of its staff. 

And it still has experience gaps, as well as other operational challenges which need to be addressed. 

Finally, State has not benefited from good strategic planning for 

the Bureau, which is an area that we made recommendations for 

in our report. 

We identified several operational challenges that impede DS 

from effectively carrying out its missions. Just to cite some examples, staffing shortages in its domestic offices. In 2008, about onethird of DS’s domestic offices operated with a 25 percent vacancy 

rate or higher. Several offices reported that this shortage of staff 

affected their ability to conduct their work, resulting in case backlogs and inadequate training opportunities. 

Foreign language deficiencies. As you cited in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, we found that about 53 percent of the Regional Security Officers overseas do not speak or read at the level 

required of their positions, and we concluded that these foreign language shortfalls could negatively affect several aspects of U.S. diplomacy, including security operations. To cite an example, an officer at one post told us that because she could not speak the language, she had to transfer a sensitive phone call from an informant 

on a potential criminal activity to one of her locally-engaged staff. 

8 

Experience gaps. Our analysis showed that about 34 percent of 

DS’s positions, not including Baghdad, are filled with officers below 

the position grade. For example, several Assistant Regional Security Officers with whom we met in the course of our work indicated 

that they did not feel adequately prepared for their jobs, particularly with the responsibility to manage large security contracts. We 

previously reported that experience gaps can compromise diplomatic readiness. 

Balancing security and diplomatic missions. DS’s desire to provide the best security possible to its staff overseas has at times resulted in tension within the Department over its diplomatic mission versus its security needs. For example, Diplomatic Security 

has established strict policies concerning access to facilities that 

usually include both personal and vehicle screening. Some public 

affairs officers that we met with indicated that they were frustrated that they could not operate as freely as they would like, and 

this continues to be a challenge within the Department in terms 

of balancing appropriate security versus enhancing our diplomatic 

posture outside the embassy walls. 

In our view, the increasing growth and expanded missions and 

operational challenges facing the Bureau require a strategic review 

of the Department. While DS has undertaken some planning efforts, we found that they had not adequately addressed the resource needs or management challenges that we outlined in our report. Several senior Diplomatic Security officers indicated that DS 

remains largely reactive in nature, stating that several reasons for 

the lack of long-term planning was that they had to react to policy 

decisions made elsewhere in the Department or in the White House 

or in the Congress. 

Finally, past efforts to strategically plan at DS have not resulted 

in good, solid strategic planning. We cited an example in our report. In fiscal year 2006, DS indicated that it needed to develop a 

workforce planning strategy to recruit, sustain efforts, and find 

highly-skilled personnel and that they needed to establish a training flow, which I can discuss later, to help deal with staff shortages. We found, as of 2009, that these issues had not yet been resolved. 

In our report, we recommend that the Secretary of State, as part 

of the Quadrennial Diplomatic Review, conduct a strategic review 

of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to ensure that its missions 

and activities address the Department’s priority needs and address 

the challenges that we outline in our report. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy 

to answer any of your questions. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Ford. 

Ambassador Boswell, last week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified that the United States is on track to triple the number 

of civilian positions in Afghanistan to 974 by early next year. How 

will this large increase impact DS operations in Afghanistan, and 

how much additional DS staffing will be required? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, that will be a great challenge to DS, as the surge in Iraq was some years ago. But we have 

the advantage this time of having a little more advance notice. We 

are going to be doubling the staff of our security office in Kabul 

9 

and we have, shall we say, a large resource package included in the 

discussions that will go forward regarding the budget for 2011. But 

it is a very significant change. 

At the moment, the DS agents in Afghanistan largely protect the 

U.S. mission in Kabul. They do not have responsibilities outside of 

Kabul. We, the U.S. Government, are going to be opening up two 

new consulates in Afghanistan this year—next year, I should say, 

in 2010, one in Mazari Sharif and another one in Herat in the 

West. Those consulates will be protected by DS agents. The civilian 

personnel that are further in the field, mostly in the south and the 

east, are under the protection of the military. 

Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Boswell, the State Department just 

announced its intention to find a new contractor to provide security 

at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul after reviewing allegations of misconduct and security lapses by the current contractor. A prominent 

government watchdog group questions whether embassy security in 

a combat zone should be handled by the private sector instead of 

by government employees. Has the State Department considered 

whether these positions in combat zones should be performed inhouse? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Yes, sir, we have. That contract, which as 

you mentioned the Department has decided not to exercise a renewal, an option year in that contract, is going to be recompeted. 

It is going to be recompeted among guard companies. I have to 

clarify that what we are talking about here are the guards that 

provide the static security around the embassy in Kabul. They man 

the guard posts around the embassy in Kabul. They check the vehicles. They man the checkpoints. They screen the people that are 

admitted to the compound. These are not the people that provide 

bodyguard services that protect our people when we move. These 

are the fixed-post guards. 

Around the world, that function has been provided by contractors 

for many years. I don’t see any real chance that they could be provided by direct-hire U.S. Government employees or military simply 

because there are so many. You mentioned the number of people 

we have in DS, and the proportion of which are contractors. Out 

of the 34,000 people that you mentioned, something like, I think, 

32,000 are these fixed-post guards that guard embassies around 

the world, just like the fixed-post people that stand outside the 

Capitol or around the State Department, and that has been a successful program for many years. 

Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Boswell, according to the GAO report, DS is planning to replace some contractors with Federal employees. Please tell us more about DS’s plans for reducing the number of contractors. 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Yes, sir. I think it is fair to say that the 

civilian surges in Afghanistan and Iraq, and also in Pakistan, 

which we haven’t mentioned quite yet, severely challenge DS from 

the point of view of stretching us and making very great demands 

on our resources. And I think DS did extremely well in stepping 

up to the plate and meeting those challenges. But I think one of 

the places where we could have done better and we didn’t was in 

the administrative—in providing the administrative tail that supports the teeth, the agents in the field. 

10 

And this was pointed out in a recent State Department inspection, also, of DS, that we had under-resourced the administrative 

management end, mostly in the States, in both headquarters and 

our field offices. So we are significantly increasing the number of 

direct-hire people for positions that have in the past been filled by 

contractors. 

By contractors, I don’t mean guards. I don’t mean bodyguards. I 

mean, these are administrative and technical kind of positions— 

secretaries, analysts, this sort of stuff. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Ford, your report states that when the 

United States removes its remaining forces from Iraq by the end 

of 2011, it will impact Diplomatic Security’s operations. What specific challenges do you foresee? 

Mr. FORD. Well, we haven’t seen the plan yet for exactly how 

that withdrawal is going to be—how it is going to be impacted in 

terms of the civilian side. As the military withdraws, DS already 

has a very large presence in Iraq. We believe that it will affect DS 

because some of the protective services that the military may be 

providing currently could be transferred over to DS, but we don’t 

have any specific information with regard to what the staffing implications of that might be. 

In our report, we had indicated that DS had 81 special agents 

in Iraq, which is by far the largest number of any overseas post. 

So the point we were making in our report is there is likely to be 

some implications for DS as we withdraw our forces from Iraq, just 

like there will be as we surge into Afghanistan. But we have not 

yet been briefed on what the actual numbers will be and what the 

resource implications might be for providing protective services in 

Iraq once our military starts to withdraw. 

Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Boswell, would you have anything 

to add to that question? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Only to say that it is certainly a major 

challenge facing us. As the military withdraws, we, the Department, will take over certain functions that are now performed by 

the military, and I can give you an example. The police training 

function, which is currently done by the military, will be handled 

by the Department. That will mean a significant increase in the 

number of direct-hire U.S. Government employees and contractors 

that will be assigned to the embassy in Baghdad and also around 

the country, and that will be a big challenge for us because they 

will have to be protected. This is a significant staff increase and 

these folks’ business is not in Baghdad. It is out in the countryside, 

and we will have to protect them. We are seeking the resources 

necessary to do that. 

There is a very active planning operation regarding Iraq in 2010. 

It is department-wide. We are very much a part of it and this aspect is one of the things that we are considering very closely. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. One of the things that always bothered me 

about Iraq was the lack of planning documented in several books, 

Assassins Gate, The Fiasco, and a few others. We were lucky that 

toward the end, we got our act together, and it seems to me that 

we are doing a much better job of preparing for the mission in Afghanistan. 

11 

Do you have a critical plan put in place? You mentioned that you 

know in terms of Iraq who is going to leave; so you are in a green 

zone and you know how much security is being provided by the 

military, but when they are gone, how are those people going to be 

taken care of. I don’t think very much was said about the number 

of people that we are going to leave in Iraq that may continue with 

provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). But has somebody really 

sat down on a piece of paper and scoped it out so that you have 

confidence that once troops are received in 2011, that you are going 

to be able to take care of your folks? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Yes, we are, Senator. As I mentioned, 

there is a very active planning program that is going on, not only 

in the Department, but involves Ambassador Chris Hill’s staff in 

Baghdad, as well. I think it is reasonable to say here that the Department will have a significant presence in the countryside. It is 

likely that we will open up new consulates which do not exist now. 

And it is also likely that there will be some, what we are going to 

call Enduring Presence posts, which is where State Department 

employees will be out in the countryside, and we are very actively 

planning, one, for that, and two, how we are going to protect them. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Is there any paper anywhere that we could 

look at that would kind of give us the long-range plan and the commitment in Iraq so that we have some idea of where folks are going 

and how long we anticipate their being there? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. I am not aware of any paper that exists. 

This is a planning process that is going on. I don’t think I could 

tell you that there is a formal roadmap out there yet, but I do 

know that the planning is going on and is being factored into the 

President’s 2011 budget request. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be a good 

idea for us to talk maybe with Foreign Relations or to really get 

an idea of just what the commitment is going to be made in Iraq 

once the troops leave there. 

The other thing that I think that hasn’t been underscored in the 

President’s presentation, or quite frankly, I don’t think it has been 

brought up. I have seen some of the other hearings. What are the 

plans that we have to move folks out to do the PRTs and the government infrastructure building and so forth that we have in Afghanistan? How long do we think that we are going to need to do 

that in order to stabilize those communities? It is a big part of it, 

I think. We talk about the military side of this, but I think that 

we may not be as candid as what we should be. 

In other words, the information that I got was that we are probably going to have to have folks there for a longer period than what 

the President presented, though I wholeheartedly support the idea 

of putting the pressure on them to get them to do the things that 

they are supposed to be doing. But this recent comment by Karzai 

about the fact that we are going to have to be there for a long time, 

and one of the things that we are not talking about is if we have 

an Afghanistan army, we are going to have to pay for it. They 

haven’t got the money to pay for it. It is a little bit different than 

Iraq. 

But beyond that—you are going to have a lot of people over 

there, and I would be very interested in knowing, because of this 

12 

very good plan that was shared with me, what are you going to do 

to make sure that when they get out in the boonies, that they are 

being taken care of? 

I did hear that you are going to initially rely on the military, is 

that right? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Yes, sir. The arrangement that has been 

made is that the Diplomatic Security are responsible for the staff 

that are at the embassy in Kabul and associated missions in Kabul 

and also our two consulates, the two future consulates. And as you 

said, sir, I think we are going to be there quite a long time. 

But the protection for the civilians that are embedded with the 

military in the field is provided by the military. I think the rule 

of thumb is something like about 10 civilians per battalion out 

there, 8 to 10, something like that. I am sure it is not cookie-cutter, 

but that is roughly the number, and those people will be protected 

by the military. 

Senator VOINOVICH. You indicated that you have done an analysis of the people that should be governmental and replacing contractors. Do you have that anywhere written down, about what 

somebody did? Have you made some decisions to say, we are going 

to have people that are going to be on the Federal payroll rather 

than have contractors, is that correct? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Yes, sir. I want to clarify that is not 

wholesale replacement of a lot of contractors. What has been the 

subject of controversy is the degree to which the U.S. Government 

relies on contractors, largely in the field, and that, I am afraid, is 

not going to change from a security point of view. We really have 

no alternative to using contractors both as our fixed-post guards, 

and I don’t think really any substantive reason not to use contractors for that purpose, but also as a sort of force multiplier for us 

so that we can deal with protecting our people when we get surges 

like this. 

For example, there are something like 1,000 bodyguards, including the ones who protected you when you were there, in Iraq right 

now. That number can go up and down and change. I don’t see any 

way that those contractors will be replaced by direct-hire people. 

The Commission on Wartime Contracting is looking at that, among 

other things, and I don’t imagine that they are going to come up 

with an alternative to that. 

Senator VOINOVICH. May I ask you something? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Sure. 

Senator VOINOVICH. You say it has been happening for a long 

time, and you might comment on it, but has somebody really sat 

down and looked at a piece of paper and said, these folks are costing us X number of dollars, they have certain competencies that we 

need, compared if they were direct hires, and how does that work 

out from a dollars and cents point of view? In other words, you are 

saying, basically, we are going to stay with those people. We have 

been with those people. Has anybody ever thought of developing a 

cadre of individuals within the Department that could do the same 

thing, and is there a reason that you don’t want to do that in terms 

of recruitment or cost? Is it really cheaper to hire these people? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Yes, sir. I want to—that is a long and 

complex subject, but I will do my best to answer it. And right off 

13 

the top, I need to make very clear the differentiation between fixedpost guards, to man a perimeter, and the bodyguards, who are 

much more controversial, the Blackwaters of this world. 

There is no question—I don’t think I need a study to tell you that 

hiring Ghanaians to stand fixed-post around our embassy in 

Accra—which is what happens in every single country in the world 

except the combat zones, that is, except for Afghanistan and Iraq— 

that hiring local nationals is far cheaper than trying to hire some 

American contractor who will put Americans in there. Not only 

that, it is not necessary. 

These are contractors who—and some of them are under personal 

services agreements, they don’t work for a guard company. 

Senator VOINOVICH. And, by the way, that has reminded me. 

Senator Akaka, when you have traveled, you are right. They have 

a lot of folks, professionals that have been attached to the embassies for years that are nationals that are providing security. 

Thanks for reminding me of that. 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Yes, indeed, and that is the great bulk of 

the contractors. They go home at night. They don’t go into some 

guard camp somewhere. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So the fact is, it is cheaper. 

Ambassador BOSWELL. It is much cheaper, infinitely cheaper. 

Now, the second category is the security guards, the bodyguards— 

Blackwater, DynCorp, and Triple Canopy. There has been a question of whether it is cheaper to do it with Americans on contract, 

or perhaps U.S. military—and I believe the Congressional Budget 

Office (CBO) came out with a study last year in which they put up 

the true cost, or as best they could get to it of the true cost of a 

civilian contractor, bodyguard, and a military person, and when it 

came out, it was very close to the same. 

Obviously, if we substituted military, that is 1,000 new military 

in Iraq at a time when we are drawing down the military, it is 

really not very practical. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. 

Mr. Ford, you testified that GAO identified both domestic and 

overseas DS offices with significant staffing gaps. I want to set the 

stage for why this issue is so important. Would you please describe 

how these staffing shortfalls could affect our diplomatic missions 

and the security of State Department personnel? And I would like 

to ask for any additional remarks from Ambassador Boswell, as 

well, on this. 

Mr. FORD. Most of the staffing gaps that we identified in our 

work tended to be in the domestic offices here in the United States. 

I think, typically, what was happening was that DS would receive 

protective missions for things like the Olympics, or they needed to 

staff positions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which was their highest 

priority, and they tended to use agents that were here on domestic 

assignments. And so the domestic offices here that are responsible 

for things like passport fraud, visa fraud, other investigatory-type 

missions that DS has, those were where the shortfalls tended to be 

in terms of the mission. 

So we had some examples we cited in our report. I think one of 

the examples, as I recall, was in the Houston field office, which we 

14 

indicated they had about a 50 percent staff vacancy last year. 

When we consulted with them about what the implications of that, 

they told us that it resulted in case backlogs on such things as the 

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. 

So some of the implications of the DS having to shift resources 

to conduct, say, work in Afghanistan and Iraq by taking people 

from the domestic offices, resulted in mission shortfalls here domestically, and that is probably where most of the impact occurred, 

based on our analysis. 

Now, we also visited a number of overseas locations in which we 

talked to a number of DS folks and other embassy employees at 

various overseas missions that were not necessarily the highest priority, compared to Pakistan, Iraq, and places like that. DS officials 

told us a lot of their folks were shifted over to work in those locations which had some negative implications in terms of what Regional Security Officers (RSOs) wanted to do with their individual 

locations. 

We also found that it impacted DS’s ability to provide sufficient 

training for all of its staff because there isn’t a sufficient training 

float within DS—and, by the way, this is a State Department-wide 

problem, it is not unique to DS—where staff are not able to get the 

training they need because they need to go overseas and immediately fill a position, which in some cases resulted in people that 

may not be as experienced as they should be to fulfill that mission, 

and we cited some examples in our report of people telling us, I am 

not sure I am fully trained to do my job. I am going to have to 

learn from the job training what I need to do here. 

So those are some of the, I guess you could say, negative implications of staffing shortages that DS is faced with because of these 

other higher priorities. 

Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Boswell, do you have anything to 

add to that? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Yes, sir. I think it is true, as I mentioned 

earlier, that the challenge, the stress of trying to staff up major initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan had a downstream effect, or 

backstream effect. We were dealing with our highest challenge. We 

were dealing with our highest priority. 

It is true that it caused some vacancies in domestic field offices. 

I think we have gone a long way toward addressing that. Our vacancy rate in the field offices is much lower now than the figures 

used in the GAO report, which were, I think, for 2008. We have 

a vacancy rate in the domestic field offices now of 16 percent Foreign Service and Civil Service and we are working to close that last 

remaining gap. 

I would like to take a little issue with what Mr. Ford said in 

terms of training. I don’t think any DS agent had their training cut 

short, that is, their agent training cut short to go to any assignment overseas. We just wouldn’t do that. But I think where we did 

fall short is on the issue of language. And I know, Senator Voinovich, this is something that you are very interested in and that the 

Director General testified about before this Committee several 

weeks ago. 

The GAO report accurately points out that we have about 50 percent of the DS jobs overseas that are language designated that do 

15 

not have people that have tested at that level. And I think there 

was some curtailment of language training or waivers put into 

place to get people out. 

Having said that, as I mentioned at the top, I was in this job 10 

years ago at a time when there were very few Diplomatic Security 

positions overseas that were ever language-designated. It was just 

not part of the deal. And I am very pleased now to see that the 

Bureau and the corps of agents has evolved in a good direction in 

the sense that many more agents are getting language training, including hard language training—Chinese—over a long period of 

time. That had not been done in the past. 

Now we are still catching up. There are a lot of positions that 

were language-designated that we haven’t had the chance or the 

time—they haven’t been designated long enough for us to be able 

to put people with that kind of training in. But I can assure you 

that it is a very high priority of mine of making sure that agents 

get the right kind of language training to go to their posts. The 

human resources people at the State Department are very much 

adhering to this, as well. There are much fewer language waivers 

that are being approved. But we have a certain amount of catching 

up to do in that regard. 

Senator AKAKA. Ambassador, senior diplomats worldwide have 

been provided fully-armored cars to protect them from terrorist attacks. Both Ambassador Neumann and Ms. Johnson state that in 

some situations, the use of high-profile armored vehicles may put 

our diplomats at greater risk. Also, in some cases, these vehicles 

may not be the correct ones for the local terrain. 

Is Diplomatic Security also hearing these concerns, and are there 

steps DS can take to provide more flexible, lower-profile security 

wherever it is appropriate? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Yes, sir. One of the other bits of culture 

shock I had coming back to this job after 10 years’ absence was to 

find, as is mentioned in the report, that whereas 10 years ago, 

there were a very relatively small number of armored vehicles out 

in the field—there are a relatively small number of embassies 

where the ambassador rode in an armored vehicle—now it is thousands of armored vehicles, and certainly every ambassador is required to have an armored vehicle, and in many places it is more 

than one. I think we have 3,000 armored vehicles, maybe more 

than that, in the field, mostly in the combat zones, as is appropriate. 

In terms of what kind of vehicles, I think it is a fair criticism. 

We are to some degree limited, I have to remind the panel, we are 

limited by America. The kind of American vehicle that you can put 

heavy armoring on is a Chevy Suburban, and that is a lot of what 

is out there. 

I think we have made a good deal of progress. We do have some 

other kinds of vehicles, particularly in places where we are exempt 

from Buy America because of right-hand drive, for example—Pakistan is a place like that—but also we are, I think, making a lot of 

progress in mixing up the kind of vehicles that we are using, a 

combination of high-profile, low-profile vehicles, and vehicles much 

better adapted to the terrain, as you mentioned. I think that is a 

16 

fair criticism, but I think we are moving in the right direction on 

that. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador Boswell. 

Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes. I would just like to get back to the issue 

of the training float. How is the Department coming on that? I 

mean, that impacts you, but it impacts everybody else, too. 

Ambassador BOSWELL. The training float has been a dream of department managers for many years. I think the Department got 

some training positions on a one-time basis in 2009 and DS got its 

share of those positions, but that is a one-time shot. We have never 

been able to maintain, you could call it a training float—it has had 

many other names over the years—Man in Motion. It is not just 

training. There are always gaps between assignments in the Foreign Service. It is just the nature of the game. There are leaves. 

There is training. There is home leave. And there are the complications that result from trying to match up a departure date with an 

arrival date. And so those gaps exist and it would be nice to have 

that kind of float, but I don’t think—we have never seen it. 

Senator VOINOVICH. In terms of the language gap, either you hire 

new people that have the languages or you take the people that are 

there and you upgrade their language skills. In order to do that, 

you have to give them time off for that to occur, which means that 

if they are not doing their job, then somebody else has to do it. You 

are saying that, still, you are not to the point where you are robbing Peter to pay Paul. 

Ambassador BOSWELL. No, sir. I didn’t mean to imply that at all. 

The Department has always had it as a matter of principle that we 

will train our people. If people come on board with languages, that 

is fine. That is great. But we will train our people, including the 

DS agents, and we intend to train our people to the language required by the position. 

We have taken steps such as, for example, advertising world language—advertising means putting out a list that DS agents can 

compete for, can express their preferences for jobs, in which we 

have world language lists advertised well ahead of time so that we 

can properly put people into training to fulfill a language requirement. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Just one other thing, just for information 

purposes. You have an embassy and they have people with various 

jobs. You have people from the CIA, and you have people from the 

military. Then is there somebody that has a special slot for your 

operation in each of the embassies, that is kind of the security coordinator? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Almost every embassy in the world has 

what is called a Regional Security Officer. That is the chief security 

officer for the embassy. It is always a DS agent. Some of them are 

very senior and manage enormous operations. Some of them are 

very small. But there is a RSO at virtually every post. 

My dad was the head of Security years ago for the State Department when there were, in the 1960s, probably 20 security officers 

in the field in the Department, in the Foreign Service, and they 

were truly regional because there were only about 20 of them. But 

there is nothing regional about the jobs now. There are very few 

17 

security officers that are responsible for more than one country. Regional Security Officers are the chief security official and the 

chief—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. And they are State Department employees 

that are—— 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Always. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes. So really, in effect, if that is the case, 

that is the group of people that you are trying to bring on board 

and train up to take on these positions, would that be—— 

Ambassador BOSWELL. That is right. We have about 700 agents 

in the field, security officers in the field. About a little under half 

of our entire agent population is in the field, and the ones that are 

stateside spend a lot of time doing temporary duty (TDY) in the 

field. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I don’t have any other questions. 

Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Boswell, in August my staff traveled to U.S. embassies and consulates in the Near East and Central Asia and saw firsthand posts that looked like fortresses. Of 

course, strong security measures are necessary to protect embassy 

personnel. Nonetheless, our diplomats informed my staff that these 

posts make it more difficult to build relationships with the local 

population, either due to stringent security standards or the relative inaccessibility of these posts. 

How do we build better relationships and increase our public diplomacy while ensuring that posts are well protected? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, my responsibility is the 

security part of the balance, but it is a balance that we are trying 

to reach and we in security try to play our part in helping the Foreign Service, the rest of the Foreign Service, achieve that balance. 

Having said that, I think if somebody was here from the Bureau 

of Overseas Buildings Operation that is responsible for building 

embassies, they would tell you that they work very closely with 

Diplomatic Security to try to produce designs and buildings and 

standards that are more, what shall I say, approachable, humane, 

a little less of the fortress. 

But you have got to understand, also, that in the wake of the terrorist attacks on our embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania in 1998, 

the Congress mandated new standards for buildings and the Department went through an incredibly intense building program. I 

think we built 50 new embassies, or maybe it is 60—65 new embassies, thank you, in the last several years. And to do that in an economical way, much use was made of something called a standard 

embassy design. A standard embassy design is not very pretty, I 

will tell you that right now. It is very functional. And many of the 

embassies that your staff saw in Central Asia were certainly of 

that kind of design. 

I do think that we have made a lot of effort in the Department, 

have made a lot of effort to make these buildings a little less fortress-like, but, Senator, I am a big fan of very secure buildings. 

When I get a threat, when I sit in my morning meeting and look 

at threats in new places, one of the first questions I ask is, what 

kind of building do we have there to protect our people? And I am 

very reassured when it is one of these new buildings. 

18 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Ambassador Boswell, Ambassador 

Neumann stated in his written testimony that the State Department needs to give its deploying officers secure communication devices to be used in the field, because officers currently rely on the 

military for these capabilities. Is the Department considering doing 

this, and are there any obstacles to moving forward on this? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. We have a capability, fly-away packages 

that we use for secure communications in certain instances, for example, when the Secretary travels. But they are not in general use, 

as Ambassador Neumann pointed out in his statement. 

The State Department personnel in the field in Afghanistan, for 

example, as I mentioned, are closely linked to the military and do 

use the military communications. We need to do some more on our 

side, though. I think some things are being done. We have just, for 

example, in Afghanistan, made available our open net, which is not 

classified—it is sensitive, but unclassified, but nevertheless, it is a 

step in the right direction—to all the people that we have in Afghanistan. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Ford, the GAO report identified the challenges DS faces of balancing security with State’s diplomatic mission. Do you have any recommendations on how DS and State’s 

diplomatic corps can best achieve this balance? 

Mr. FORD. Well, we haven’t got a report that has a recommendation in it on this issue. I think, based on working in this area for 

many years, I think the key thing here is communication. There is 

sometimes miscommunication that occurs between security folks 

that work for DS and the diplomatic side of the house, which is trying to accomplish an outreach mission or reach a broader audience 

in an individual country, and in many cases, there is just a lack 

of communication about what types of security is necessary for 

them to conduct their work and how to get outside the building. 

So, I mean, I would say, at a minimum—and this may be a training issue—we need to make sure that our security folks are sensitive to what the diplomatic mission is and we need to make sure 

our diplomatic folks are sensitive to security, the security mission 

that DS has. 

When you talk to both DS officials in the field and State Department employees in the field, I often hear perceptions that indicate 

that one doesn’t really understand what the other’s job is, and as 

a consequence, there are sometimes some negative viewpoints on 

both parts with regard to what the mission is overseas. So I think 

the main thing is to make sure, through training and through 

other communication mechanisms, that the Department makes it 

clear there are certain reasons why we have security standards in 

our embassies and in our packages for people that want to go outside the embassy. And I think on the DS side, there needs to be 

an understanding that we want to outreach to the local population 

there because we have other diplomatic objectives. So in my mind, 

communication is the key. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you very much. That was my final 

question. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you have a criterion that you use in 

terms of where you are going to build the new embassies? By that, 

I mean I was in China in 2005 and they were building a new emVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Jun 08, 2010 Jkt 056150 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\56150.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
19 

bassy 45 minutes outside of Beijing and it is just a long distance 

away. Currently—or maybe they have already moved—it was 

downtown, very close to other embassies. So it is now way out 

somewhere else. Is there something that you could go to to say that 

we made the decision to move it there for 10 different reasons, or 

is there a standard? In Macedonia, they got one of the prize pieces 

of property in the area way out, I think in a residential area, to 

build their new—it is probably built, too, but what is the criteria 

that you use about where you put these places? 

It gets back to something I am going to ask the next panel about, 

is that you get them way out someplace where you are not close 

to the business area or maybe other embassies. Does anybody 

weigh that in terms of its location and the image that it is going 

to create? 

For example, the biggest one was the one we built in Iraq. I 

mean, who in the devil ever figured to build that thing? What was 

the basis for their building it? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. The short answer to your question, Senator, is that there is a standard and it does govern, to a large degree, where we put our embassies, and that is the requirement, the 

classic requirement, well known, for a 100-foot setback between our 

buildings, buildings occupied by Americans, and the edge of the 

property where the wall is. That is an essential, in fact, probably 

the most important security measure that I can put into place is 

that 100-foot setback. 

And, of course, that means if you are going to have a significant 

embassy, that means you need a significant piece of land, and a 

significant piece of land of that size is often very difficult to find. 

So it is true that new embassies, and as I mentioned before in my 

testimony, there have been an awful lot of new embassies built, 

that many of them are not right in the downtown core. I would put 

in parenthetically that the one in Beijing is in the downtown—Beijing is a pretty big city, but it is not in some field. It is in town 

and is, in fact, in an area where a lot of other embassies are being 

developed. 

Senator VOINOVICH. You are talking about the new one? 

Ambassador BOSWELL. The new one. I am very intimately familiar with it. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. Well, that is good news to me, because 

I was told that they were building it way out and it would take the 

ambassador 35 or 40 minutes to come down to meetings and—— 

Ambassador BOSWELL. I think, it was not being built way out. It 

is just that Beijing is a very big city and it has been built in a different part of town. And it is true that it is farther away from the 

ambassador’s residence. But in terms of where it is in Beijing, it 

is in a very active area—the Intercontinental Hotel is right across 

the street from it, and several other embassies. 

It is also true, I think, that while we do have embassies that are 

distant—that has been one of the byproducts of building these new 

embassies—towns and cities grow up around embassies. I was part, 

years ago, of putting together the real estate package for our embassy in Oman, a critical high-threat post at the time, brand new 

embassy. We got a lot of criticism for having to put together a site 

that was half-an-hour away from the downtown location where the 

20 

old, very difficult to defend embassy was. And the site was in a 

bunch of tomato fields owned by local farmers, and it was a 13-acre 

site. And I went back to that site last year where the new embassy 

has been in place for 15 years and the town has grown up around 

it. It is a highly prestigious area of Oman with an enormous number of other buildings around it, including prestigious buildings. 

So I am not saying that happens in every case, but that certainly 

happened there. 

Senator VOINOVICH. And some, like in the U.K., in London, that 

prized piece of property, the State Department folks said, we are 

going to get so much money for this that it will help pay for the 

new embassy. 

Ambassador BOSWELL. That is right, sir. But the reason for the 

new embassy was simply that the existing embassy is extremely—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. Too close to the street. 

Ambassador BOSWELL [continuing]. Difficult to protect, almost 

impossible to protect well. About as much unattractive barbed wire 

and barriers and things have been put around that rather classic, 

famous embassy, and there is a real threat in London, as we have 

witnessed in the last few years. So that embassy is being sold—I 

think it has been sold, though we are still in it. A rather remarkable new site has been found. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I have seen it. 

Ambassador BOSWELL. Centrally located and expensive. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

I want to thank our first panel for being here today. Your responses will be helpful as we continue to review DS. And again, I 

thank you and wish you well in your positions. Thank you. 

Now, I would like to call up panel two. Our second panel of witnesses are Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann, the President of the 

American Academy of Diplomacy, and Susan R. Johnson, the President of the American Foreign Service Association. 

As you know, it is the custom of the Subcommittee to swear in 

witnesses and I will ask you to stand and raise your right hand. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give the Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 

so help you, God? 

Ms. JOHNSON. I do. 

Ambassador NEUMANN. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Let the record note that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Before we start, I want you to know that your full written statement will be part of the record. I would also like to remind you to 

please limit your oral remarks to 5 minutes. 

Ambassador Neumann, will you please proceed with your statement. 

21 

1The prepared statement of Ambassador Neumann appears in the Appendix on page 55. 

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR RONALD E. NEUMANN (RET.),1

PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF DIPLOMACY 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Chairman Akaka and Senator Voinovich, 

thank you for inviting me to appear again before you. As you know, 

I am not a security specialist. Rather, I speak to you as one who 

has lived with security issues, been under fire, and served in three 

critical threat posts, two as Ambassador. 

First, however, I would like to pay special tribute to the brave 

and hard-working RSOs and ARSOs, security officers, who have 

protected me and my mission in dangerous times. I also would like 

to acknowledge my respect for the people of DynCorp and 

Blackwater, who protected me in Iraq and Afghanistan. They performed with courage, judgment, and restraint, and one lost his leg 

in the process. Whatever fault now attaches to others, I owe all 

those gallant men, State Department and contractor employees, my 

gratitude, and I wanted to have this moment to express it. 

To sum up, the problems that I wanted to talk about are the inadequate security communications that you referred to in the previous panel; security mobility issues, especially the need for expanded air assets that may be required; utilizing local security 

forces for PRTs and branch posts; and accepting some greater degree of risk when the gains warrant; and finally, the consideration 

of funds for security emergencies. 

The GAO report observed the changing security conditions that 

govern our life, and that has produced a vast expansion of security 

facilities and resources. But there are still gaps between some of 

our standards and practices and the needs that we have to serve. 

We lack the standards, not the equipment, to provide secure, 

deployable, computer-based communications. We have had this 

problem for years and we have never solved it. We have delegated 

it to the military, but that is going to be a problem as they go 

away. And, frankly, we have people serving with allied militaries 

that don’t have compatible, secure communications. 

This is a bureaucratic issue. This is an issue of willpower. The 

military protects the exact same secrets in deployable circumstances. It is time for State to summon the willpower to resolve the 

bureaucratic problems involved and find a way to send deployable 

secure computers to the field with our officers. I would add, this 

is not exclusively a DS problem. This is a problem between bureaus 

and standards. 

You raised the comment in the previous panel from my testimony 

about our vehicles. I think we have made progress in Afghanistan 

and Iraq on the mix of vehicles. I think we still have a problem 

in some areas. I am probably a little out of date. I know DS has 

made a good deal of progress on that and I think it is something 

that needs close attention and further follow-up work. 

I would note that part of the problem is also a congressionallymandated problem. That is the Buy America standards. But Congress has supported waivers and changes and I hope you will continue to do that. 

As the military redeploys from Iraq, we are going to face complex 

issues of how to handle protection for our movements. State may 

22 

need much more robust vehicle maintenance capabilities than it 

now has, and I think State should consider having greater air assets of its own, both fixed and rotary wing, in these critical threat 

areas. 

I understand there is some planning going on for this, but many 

issues remain to be settled and future funding is a significant 

issue. These resources and the authorities to use them wisely need 

to be thought about now and budgeted for. Supplemental budgets 

are not the answer. They are neither sustainable nor dependable 

for year-to-year operating costs. This problem, as you well know, 

goes to everybody, Administration and Congress alike, but really, 

it is time to stop flinching from the requirement to pay for the mitigation of the dangers we ask our personnel to accept. 

Operating in areas like Afghanistan and Iraq requires we adopt 

new ways of thinking about risk. Our Foreign Service officers are 

not soldiers, but our Nation’s need for informed judgments on complicated economic and political subjects does not end when risk 

arises. And you cannot coordinate effectively over the telephone 

with foreigners that work on face-to-face and personal relationships. 

We are hampered not only by issues of numbers of vehicles and 

shortages of RSOs, but by our self-imposed standards, often described informally as zero tolerance. We have avoided the problem 

in the field by turning over the security to the military so that our 

people are moving on different standards than those which we 

would use if they were secured by RSOs. But as the military withdraws from Iraq and we are on our own, or as we establish branch 

posts in Afghanistan, we are going to face increased problems. 

I want to be clear. I do not advocate that we easily assume high 

levels of risk for civilians, and I absolutely would be opposed to ordering officers to take risks they consider unreasonable. But we 

must find better answers than we have to date. We have made 

progress in Iraq. We have too many places where we have 48-hour 

requirements still for movements in cultures that don’t make appointments 48 hours in advance for necessary work. 

We have to have standards that allow for the use of judgment 

in weighing the risk of doing something against the grain to be derived from the action. I want to be clear. I am not criticizing the 

excellent RSOs who worked for me. They did a fine job. I hope we 

are beyond the issues of the past in which dedicated officers frequently pushed the bureaucratic boundaries to accomplish what 

they often correctly believed to be essential tasks. These were not 

matters of officers necessarily taking foolish risks or using bad 

judgment—although I have known that to happen. Rather, the 

point is to note the tension between security standards and what 

we need to know and do. 

I believe we have made progress, but I believe we are going to 

find this problem coming back in spades. And so we do need to 

focus on it. 

Some speak of risk management. It is an antiseptic and bureaucratic term to avoid saying that someone may get killed or hurt 

taking a risk that seemed sensible at the time. But it is the flexibility to make such difficult decisions that we need to strengthen 

on two different levels. 

23 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 70. 

One is in the field. You talked in the last panel about security 

officers and regular officers not understanding each other. I think 

that is true. I think we need to move to having this kind of training 

be a part of regular training for all State Department officers, not 

just senior officers and security officers. There is no telling when 

you go to a quiet, sleepy post whether you are going to have the 

next coup in the world. So this needs to be part of the training that 

we don’t do anyway. 

The second issue concerns Washington. We need a more systematic policy on where the balance should lie between local responsibility and Washington responsibility. I believe we have made some 

progress. I think it is probably too dependent on individual officers. 

And I think that if we are going to ask people to take risks, they 

need to know that they are going to have some bureaucratic backup if they get unlucky. 

As we go to the PRTs, branch posts, we have repeatedly had 

problems for the last 8 years on how we secure these people and 

we have not done well with our answers historically. Delegating 

the protection of civilians to the military has been only partially 

successful, in my judgment. I, frankly, do not believe that our military will be able—that is not willing, I don’t question their willingness—but I do question that they will have the resources to secure 

all our people and allow them to move with the frequency required 

of their mission. 

Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Neumann, will you please summarize your statement? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Yes, that is about it. I think we can use 

local security. I think we know how to do it, but we have to make 

decisions. We have to fund it. 

And finally, I would just make two last points, Mr. Chairman. 

One is we need some kind of financial reserve, because the State 

Department does not have the resources—the Defense Department 

does—to swing money in a crisis. That would take a lot of work 

with Congress to design in a way that wouldn’t be a slush fund. 

The last thing is strategic planning. We haven’t done nearly 

enough. We need to do a lot more. It is hard. We don’t have enough 

people. But I think we are still playing catch-up in the strategic 

planning. Thank you, sir. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Ambassador Neumann. Ms. Johnson, 

please proceed with your statement. 

TESTIMONY OF SUSAN R. JOHNSON,1 PRESIDENT, AMERICAN 

FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION 

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you, Chairman Akaka and Senator Voinovich. Thank you again for inviting the American Foreign Service 

Association (AFSA) to testify on this important and complex issue. 

I welcome the opportunity to share some of our perspectives and 

to be testifying again along with Ambassador Neumann, with 

whom we almost always agree. 

AFSA is proud to represent Diplomatic Security Specialists at 

the State Department. They make up about 10 percent of our total 

membership, and we are proud to salute their dedication, courage, 

24 

and hard work to protect both our overall mission and our personnel. 

The challenges and demands facing the Foreign Service abroad, 

as well as concern for security and safety of our diplomatic personnel, have grown exponentially over the last two decades. For 

reasons of security, centrally located and accessible embassies and 

missions seem to be largely a thing of the past. Our ability to travel throughout many of the countries we are assigned to is far from 

what it used to be. 

As the young daughter of a career Foreign Service Officer, I recall traveling into remote areas of the Sahara, and later in what 

was then Ethiopia, going horseback riding after school with friends 

from the U.S. base at Kagnew Station, many miles into the country 

outside of our consulate general in Asmara. These now seem like 

distant memories. 

The need for increased vigilance and better security measures 

has led to new and tougher security standards, constricting access 

to and travel outside of our embassies and missions. We can no 

longer rely primarily on the ability of host countries to provide adequate security. Finding the right balance between prudent and effective security measures and policies, and the ability to do our jobs 

as diplomats effectively is more challenging than ever. 

AFSA welcomes the GAO report calling for strategic review of 

the recent growth in the mission and the resources required by the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security. We support the GAO recommendations. We also concur with Ambassador Neumann’s points and recommendations. 

Within the last 6 years, I served in Iraq as a senior advisor to 

the Iraqi Foreign Ministry from July through December of 2003, 

and then for the next 3 years in Bosnia as a Deputy High Representative and supervisor of Brcko District, a high-profile position 

that came with a full security detail—armored vehicle, lead and follow cars, a U.S.-led team of local security personnel provided for 

under a DynCorp contract. This Close Protection Unit, as it was 

called, was dedicated, highly professional, and if I had to have security 24/7, I couldn’t have had better people. But along with many 

others I questioned then, and I still do today, whether that particular security package was needed in Bosnia 10 years and more 

after the Dayton Peace Accords. It seemed that it was either an all 

or nothing proposition. Either you have the whole package or you 

have nothing, and nothing was not the right answer, either. 

In Iraq in 2003, as I have described in my written testimony, the 

stated policy was all travel outside the Green Zone required full 

military escort. I arrived with the first induction or surge of civilian advisors and it was quickly apparent that such escort was not 

available to the majority of the civilian advisors, although we needed to travel to our respective ministries, especially in this early and 

chaotic period. Many of us considered a several-vehicle military 

convoy, with civilians wearing armored vests and helmets, projected a high-profile potential target and that it was safer and more 

effective for us to travel quietly under the radar, avoiding regular 

time tables and taking other prudent security measures. So we did 

that in order to do our jobs, and fortunately, no disaster occurred. 

25 

My personal experiences there and in other posts lead me to suggest, first, the need for more and better internal dialogue or communication between the policy and security sides of the State Department on what is the best security posture. 

Second, that the one-size-fits-all approach is not the best one for 

us today. 

And third, that senior officials on the ground in country should 

have more flexibility and take more responsibility to determine 

which mix of security measures is most appropriate in a given situation at a given point in time. I second the remarks that Ambassador Neumann made that this can’t be left to personal decisions 

of individuals ambassadors of deputy chiefs of mission (DCMs). 

There has to be some bureaucratic support. There has to be some 

consensus that lays out guidelines for this, because you can’t expect 

someone to take a position that I am going to authorize or have 

somebody take on a risk when the other side of it is, you take all 

responsibility if anything goes wrong. There has to be a better way. 

Finally, the increased prominence of security issues today underscores the need to do more to avoid the experience gaps highlighted 

in this and other GAO reports prepared for this Subcommittee. 

Lack of experiences, from my perspective, increases security risk at 

both the personal and the mission level, and having season, experienced veterans in the right positions decreases those risks. The 

training now offered at Foreign Service Institutes (FSI) certainly 

heightens security awareness, but it cannot be expected to substitute for years of accumulated experience. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am happy to respond to any 

questions that you may have. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

As you know, GAO found that over half of the Regional Security 

Officers do not have the language competency that they require. 

What impact could this have on overseas security for our diplomats, and what recommendations do you have to improve their 

language competency? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. I will go first. 

Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Neumann. 

Ambassador NEUMANN. It is a help when they have language. 

Regional Services Offices are not only responsible for protection, 

they are also responsible for negotiating and working out a lot of 

security arrangements with the host government. Being able to do 

that directly rather than depend on translators that may be inadequate is a big advantage. I don’t think we are hurting in a fatal 

way, but we need to do it. 

It goes back, however, to this issue of training float questions, 

Senator Akaka and Senator Voinovich, you were raising earlier. 

First, State has to have enough people to be able to take them off 

the line and train them. Otherwise, we are just flapping our gums. 

Second, they have to have a strategic plan for how they are going 

to use the training. I don’t yet see that emerging, and it is something that is of quite a bit of concern to me. State management is 

drinking out of a fire hose, trying to assign the people they are getting. It is a good problem to have, but I am concerned that if we 

don’t have the plan and the budget—as you and I have talked 

about, it gets more difficult next year—you are not going to have 

26 

a template to fill in against for the long term. So I see that need 

to lay out the strategic plan as the next critical piece beyond getting the bodies. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Ms. Johnson. 

Ms. JOHNSON. I would agree that there is an impact, but it is felt 

most greatly in the most difficult or dangerous countries. The lack 

of language skills really depends on which country. In some places, 

it is important. In others, less so. 

I think that as part of this planning effort that Ambassador Neumann has mentioned and others have mentioned, there needs to be 

a review of the criteria for designating language-designated positions in general, and certainly for DS officers, and the levels at 

which those languages should be, taking into consideration that we 

need higher levels of proficiency in sensitive, difficult, dangerous 

countries and maybe lower levels in countries where that is not the 

case and where use and knowledge, good command of the English 

language is much greater. 

I think to do that—DS is now recruiting many people who don’t 

have any experience with learning languages and don’t necessarily 

have any aptitude for learning languages, and I think we need to 

recognize that it may take longer and we may need to review the 

approach we have to the language training and then reinforcing it 

once we have given it. So I think that whole approach of the Department to language training needs to be more carefully targeted 

and a little more creative in the way we give the training, particularly to differentiate more between those people who have strong 

language aptitude and experience with learning languages and 

those who don’t. And right now, we don’t. We mix everybody together to the advantage of both groups. 

Ambassador NEUMANN. But don’t look at me when you talk 

about strong language aptitude. [Laughter.] 

Senator AKAKA. To both of you, GAO testified that Diplomatic 

Security’s workload likely will increase as the military transitions 

out of Iraq. Ambassador Neumann, you mentioned that, also. What 

should the State Department be doing to ensure that the transition 

is a smooth one? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. There are several things. Some of them, 

they may be doing. Remember, I am now out of the Department 

for a couple of years, so I may be behind. 

The first thing is they need to plan for what the post is supposed 

to do. What are the missions you are going to have to accomplish, 

in broad terms, how much you are going to have to move as well 

as to protect the base. Then you backplan from that and say, OK, 

what does that mean that I need in terms of people for security details, facilities, and vehicles. And then from there, you go to looking 

at your choices for how you are going to fill those needs. 

I doubt that the process is yet well advanced. They should be 

doing it right now because they have to give you the budget because those things are not going to be there, I am reasonably sure, 

in the current budgets because we didn’t have to pay for them, the 

military paid for them. So that whole planning process needs to 

take place at a pretty high level of detail in order to come to the 

Congress with a request for the requisite assets that is really solidly documented, and I think there is work on that now. I don’t 

27 

mean that they are asleep at the switch, but I think that they are 

probably not up to the speed they themselves would like to be. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Johnson. 

Ms. JOHNSON. Well, I would agree with the points that Ambassador Neumann just made. I guess one consideration for me, representing rank-and-file or the people, is that whatever planning is 

going forth or might go forth in the future, that perhaps AFSA 

have a role or a seat at the table in some of this so that we can 

provide a constructive value-added to this process factoring in the 

unfiltered views of people who have served in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and who have practical, first-hand experience and views on what 

are likely to be the problems, the conditions. It is a little hard to 

look ahead and see what analysis we are going to make as to what 

are going to be the conditions on the ground after our military 

withdraws and, therefore, what can we take on as civilians. 

But this is another area where I am not sure what the Department is doing. I would agree that if the planning is not very far 

along, and I would like to work with management to see that AFSA 

is somehow involved in an ongoing basis in this and that we can 

figure out a role together as to how we can add to the process so 

that the end product is, in fact, better, and better understood by 

the people who are going to have to implement it. 

Senator AKAKA. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes. I sit at these hearings, and it is my 

11th year—Senator Akaka, you have been around longer than I 

have and you will be around longer than I have, because I am leaving the end of the next year—and I always wonder about these 

hearings and what comes out of it. I have asked my staff, Senator 

Akaka, to go back over some of the hearings that we have had and 

the questions that we have had and these folks that are here to 

testify today. 

In terms of the practical things that the two of us can do and 

the Subcommittee can do, when I think about Iraq—and I was on 

Foreign Affairs and I look back on that—we assumed, based on 

what was told to us, that they had figured this out, and the fact 

is, they didn’t and we thought they did. Now, I met with Richard 

Holbrooke and his team. I was very impressed with what it was, 

and he was saying that people are complaining because we are not 

bringing people on fast enough, but I am trying to do this thing in 

a way that we can get the best people and so forth. I was impressed with that. 

But if you were in our shoes, how would you go about making 

sure that the plan in terms of Iraq has been well thought out in 

terms of human capital and security and the other things, kind of 

a critical path about the things that we need to do, and to get an 

idea of just how long we are going to be in Iraq, because we are 

not talking about that. It is the same thing that I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, in terms of Afghanistan. I mean, to my knowledge, nobody has talked about the commitment that we are going 

to make towards nation building, and anybody that knows what is 

going on has got to understand that is as much important or more 

important than the military side. But very little attention has been 

paid to that. 

28 

How do we get a guarantee that, in fact, Holbrooke has got it figured out, the State Department has got it figured out, about how 

many people and how long and where they are going to be and all 

the other details to make sure that 2 years from now, when I am 

no longer in the U.S. Senate, I don’t read about some fiasco over 

there where somebody didn’t do their homework and we are in real 

trouble because the planning wasn’t done? How do we get that information? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. The best realism I can give you—and I 

certainly agree with your going in proposition. I came to Iraq just 

after Ms. Johnson did and I drove the same unarmored vehicles in 

the same fashion with the same dubious adherence to regulation 

because they had not thought out these issues. 

I would segregate my answer into two pieces. They are not going 

to think of everything. Afghanistan is too much in flux and too 

changing. You will read of something that is not thought of. So part 

of what we have to do is to look at our capacity to react when we 

become aware of the thing, whatever it is, that we didn’t think of. 

Senator VOINOVICH. But you ought to have a plan, at least—— 

Ambassador NEUMANN. You ought to have a plan. You ought not 

to be guilty of not having thought of the things that were squarely 

in front of your nose and which we have seen ourselves mess up 

before. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Now, is that ordinarily somebody, if I got a 

hold of Richard Holbrooke and said, do you have something written 

down that shows that you have thought, and here is the plan, how 

many people, human capital, etc., do you think that is in place? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. I think it is in place in theory. I think 

that some of that theory will be very thin, I mean, especially when 

you talk about—and I want to be realistic here. When you talk 

about putting new people on the job to do jobs that have never 

been done, there is going to be a limit to how much you can think 

that through in a vacuum. So when those people arrive, there is 

always going to be a certain amount of muddle, quite frankly, while 

real humans work out what they can really do in a complex place. 

I, frankly, have every expectation that there is going to be a huge 

amount of muddle, particularly on the civilian surge, when we actually get people. And we don’t own enough people who have the 

requisite qualifications. I mean, not just we don’t own them in the 

State Department, they don’t exist in America. 

So part of the planning is going to be, how are you going to learn 

from your mistakes? How is the plan going to be flexible enough 

that you can adapt instead of having to just come up here on the 

Hill and defend what may have been an inadequate plan because 

you didn’t see something and say it was right when, in fact, what 

you really want to say is, I learned something and am fixing it. 

The other piece is the detail of planning, which I think your staff 

is going to have to work on. What are the questions—I think, sir, 

you have got to go beyond does the plan exist to say, what are the 

questions you are trying to answer in your plan, and it needs to 

get down to a level of detail on numbers of—not just numbers of 

people, but how many people are going to secure them. 

Right now, the answer that is being given, as I understand it, to 

how you are going to handle security and movement of your civilVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:17 Jun 08, 2010 Jkt 056150 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\56150.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
29 

ian surge is the ‘‘military is going to do it.’’ I am very skeptical that 

the answer is going to be adequate to the job. But I think that goes 

beyond people just arguing about views and saying, OK, what is it 

you are going to have to do and how are you going to do it, and 

why do you think the military can do this? And I think it is just 

going to be a lot of grilling from you all, frankly. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Ms. Johnson. 

Ms. JOHNSON. I hope I am not going out on a limb here, but as 

I reflect on this question, I know that you have been asking and 

urging the Department to produce various plans on various things, 

and those plans may or may not be in the works and may or may 

not be forthcoming. So it is possible you will have to—and the only 

thing I know of that sort of ensures that you will get a product is 

to tie it to money. 

The other question is the quality of the plan. I think the thinking 

and planning up front is critical, and one of the weaknesses in 

State Department planning from my perspective is that it is insufficiently inclusive, if it is done at all. Not enough people get to have 

input. Not enough people get to see it and critique it or ‘‘Red 

Game’’ it. 

Second, once you have your plan, and as Ambassador Neumann 

says, it is not going to be perfect and it is not going to foresee everything and there will be some unexpected things that happen, so 

make sure that you have two critical factors addressed, and that 

is good communication and good mobility. 

And then, third, try to get the best people you can into those 

dangerous places. And if you have those mix of things there, I 

think our chances of avoiding any sort of catastrophe and dealing 

with the unexpected emergencies are rather good. But we often 

don’t have—in fact, right now, we are missing most of those ingredients. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I have some more questions, Senator Akaka, 

but it is your turn. 

Senator AKAKA. Fine. Ambassador Neumann, in your testimony, 

you mention that the State Department needs more people to do 

strategic planning, and that is one of your priorities. This may impact the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and perhaps later efforts. Along with adding more personnel, how will the 

State Department’s culture need to change to support ongoing strategic planning? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Clearly, there are cultural changes. 

Some of that, I think, is that we have to get a plan right for professional growth in the Service as a whole. We have not had that in 

the past, or we haven’t had the choice, frankly, because we didn’t 

have the people. Now, we are getting with thanks for what the 

Congress has done, what this Committee has supported, they are 

getting large numbers of people. The numbers are going to change 

the complexion of the Department. We have worked on the basis 

of the old training the young, but the old are retiring and the 

young are multiplying, and so the result is that more and more 

people are going to be trained more often by people that don’t have 

nearly as much experience and seniority as they used to have. 

So I think we have got to grow—we have got to create a new paradigm, a new plan that looks at professional development—not just 

30 

formal training at FSI, not just language training, but professional 

development writ large, as our military colleagues have managed 

to think about it for some time. I think if we get that plan in place, 

although it will change and shift over the years, that we will then 

begin to grow people with somewhat different attitudes toward a 

number of the things you are concerned about. 

If we don’t have a strategic plan for professional development, 

then I think it will all be ad hoc. I think you will get pieces of what 

you want, but you will always be kind of cramming it down against 

the grain. 

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Johnson, you testified that some U.S. embassies have become less accessible, and Senator Voinovich was 

speaking about this, moved to the outskirts of capital cities and 

have a fortress profile that may send the signal of a militarized 

America. What needs to happen to make our embassies more accessible while continuing to meet security requirements? 

Ms. JOHNSON. Well, that is a tough question because we have 

embarked over the last decade in this direction that we are currently on of building already 65 or more of these kind of fortresslike embassies outside the center, and we often see that the properties that we sell are taken over by other European powers and 

they use it for an embassy. I am thinking of Zagreb right now. 

One concern is that in trying to defend ourselves from attack and 

trying to address the security of our diplomats and our people overseas, we are always going to be fighting the last technology. We are 

now working with this 100-foot setback and it is my understanding 

that this might have been either imposed by Congress or perhaps 

was in the Inman report, but it was something that now appears 

to be cast into law or cast in stone. 

But I think we are reading now about suicide bombers and attacks that are taking place at 500 feet detonated and are still blowing up entire buildings, and so it is very possible that the technology in the hands of the people who are setting off explosions is 

going to make the 100-foot setback obsolete. So I am not sure that 

particular defensive tactic is going to serve us well over the long 

term and we may find that we have spent a great deal of money 

to fight the last war and we will just be confronted with a new set. 

So I am not sure that I have the answer to that, but I know that 

it is a problem for conducting diplomacy, and from where I sit, in 

many of the posts I have been in in the last decade, I am finding 

that the business world and the non-governmental organization 

(NGO) world is becoming better informed and more knowledgeable 

about what is going on in the country where they are living and 

working than many of the people in our fortresses, who are handicapped by many constraints that make it impossible for them to get 

out, form the relationships, and get their finger really on the pulse 

of the country that they are in. 

And I think we need to think about this as we develop a vision 

for what is going to be the mission of the Diplomatic Security of 

the United States in the coming years. What is the vision? Is the 

vision that we are going to be increasingly involved in nation building, in post-conflict or even continuing conflict, fragile or failed 

states, and that we are going to build up for that, or is there some 

other notion? 

31 

And how does the role of the U.S. Government fit with what the 

private sector is now doing? And how do we, in looking at publicprivate partnership models, how do we get a better grip on what 

is the appropriate and optimal role for the public part of that, let 

us say the embassy, and what is the appropriate role for the private part, the private sector? And who should be coordinating? 

Should the embassy play some sort of clearinghouse role, or what 

should be the role of the embassy in all of this? 

I think many of these questions are not really being addressed 

in the ‘‘public square,’’ are not being addressed with sufficient 

thought. We may end up spending a lot of money and training even 

for the wrong things if we don’t figure this out. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Ambassador Neumann, you recommend that Foreign Service Officers at the State Department and 

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 

should be given risk management training. How do you suggest the 

Department implement this training, and who should be in charge 

of providing it? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. New curriculum will have to be developed. Right now, this is, I think, primarily a mid-level and seniorlevel training issue. It is not a junior level one. But it does go to 

this question of people not understanding each other. That came up 

with GAO and what you talked about in the first panel, Senator 

Akaka. 

So I think it is not that hard to have professionals invent roleplaying scenarios, curriculum, training, but right now, we are not 

even doing much—we are doing mid-level training in a series of 

postage stamp modules that we try to cram into people’s transfer 

summer. I think this is the kind of thing that you need in-service 

training to expose officers to very broadly across the Foreign Service. 

For instance, the State Department has done team exercises, crisis exercises, for years, where they have teams that travel out to 

embassies and they do simulations and go through a crisis. So you 

could build some of this kind of training into that. You could build 

it into training here. But right now, we are not doing it, so we are 

getting past the question of misunderstanding that you raised only 

by accident, or by officers who live both of the different worlds, but 

not everybody needs to do four wars the way I did. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I really didn’t understand, Ambassador Neumann. You are talking about communications and computers that 

are secure, and tell me about that. I am not clear. 

Ambassador NEUMANN. I am trying to be a little careful, because 

there are some issues that are still forward projection and have security implications. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. 

Ambassador NEUMANN. But basically, when we first sent officers 

to Iraq, we gave them no deployable secure computers. Until they 

got on the military net, they had only unsecure methods of receiving information, which means they were blind to a lot of threat information and they could not report appropriately—with appropriate classification, in all cases, developments in their own areas. 

32 

That problem has not really been fixed. Right now, what we have 

done is we have done a workaround. We send them out with the 

U.S. military. They are using the military computers. I know it is 

the same government, but they have completely different standards 

from the State Department on what they can take to the field and 

how they can use it. 

As long as we are with them, our officers can use their computers or similar computers. They can talk to our computers. As 

soon as they go off on their own, its different. If you have big 

groups like the team you send out if an embassy is bombed, they 

do have a communications package. But when you are talking 

about a few officers going someplace, the State Department does 

not own any releasable, usable technology they can give an officer 

to put him in secure contact with his embassy. He can use his private account. He can use his Yahoo!. I don’t think that is a very 

good way to handle what we need to control, and so either we don’t 

control or we don’t have enough protection on what we control, and 

we haven’t figured this out. 

So right now, take North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 

for instance or another problem. In Afghanistan about half of the 

PRTs, as you know, are NATO PRTs. We have State and USAID 

people in a lot of those PRTs. They work on a functionally different 

computer system that does not talk—I mean, you cannot cross-communicate secure communications between NATO communications 

and either the American military or our computers. 

So I can get a State officer out in a PRT with a NATO force and 

they can be friendly and give him their computer, but he can’t send 

to my account in the embassy. We were physically dealing with 

this in Kabul. We actually were running fiber optic cable off the 

telephone poles, down the street, to connect my office with General 

McNeil’s so that we had a NATO communication. He had the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) so he and I 

could talk to each other. But the headquarters didn’t. So we had 

to go out and buy computers that aren’t in the State Department’s 

system, run fiber optic cable off of telephone poles, and connect— 

and then we had to physically handle data because you can’t electronically move it from one system to the other. I think this is ridiculous. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So the point is that there needs to be a lot 

more coordination, to start off with, that you would have these secure computers, and they probably are going to have to talk with 

the military part of this—— 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Exactly. But it is a bureaucratic issue of 

what standards are acceptable. 

Senator VOINOVICH. All right. So what you try to do is have uniform standards. You have got consistency there and you can talk. 

It really gets back to the other thing about—I will never forget, 

when I was in Iraq, we went out to one of the camps, and I don’t 

even know if there are any State Department people that were 

there. There will always be military people. But the fact of the 

matter is that they had developed a very good relationship with 

these sheiks. You could just tell. They were talking. There was like 

kind of a little celebration and it was that kind of thing that makes 

a difference. 

33 

It seems to me that if you are going to do the Afghanistan and 

you are going to have your military out there, that one of the 

things you are going to make sure is that they are trained in 

counterterrorism and they are trying to make friends. But then 

that kind of segues in with your State Department people, so there 

is a movement there from one to the other that probably is as effective as anything that we can do. 

Lots of challenges. 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Yes, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. You talk about the whole concept of having 

an overall plan for human capital and training and the rest of it. 

So often, what we do is we spend all our time putting out fires and 

never have time—— 

Ambassador NEUMANN. That is, I think, part of what is happening right now in the State Department. I mean, in one way, it 

is a good problem. I would rather they have the problem of suddenly having a lot of people to deal with than not having that problem. But the fact is, or my impression—remember, I am on the outside, I don’t speak for the Administration—but my impression is 

that they are now so beleaguered trying to get people assigned that 

they are having a lot of trouble dealing with the sort of out-year 

big strategic issues. 

How do you fill the knowledge gap between bringing people in at 

the bottom and the fact that a lot of what we need is not just bodies, but a certain level of experience, and what is your long-term 

training? Your staffs were both involved with us in preparing the 

report of the Academies on the budget. And we made a big deal in 

that of the need for a training and transition float. In my judgment, the State Department needs, though, to come up with a strategic plan for training. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Let me just ask you one other thing. The 

last time around, I was disappointed in Secretary Rice because she 

had Mr. Zoellick in there and then she had Mr. Negroponte in 

there, and then they finally got Mr. Kennedy, and then they had 

the lady that was there trying to focus on management, similar to 

Colin Powell and Mr. Armitage, who it seemed to me had a really 

good focus on human capital planning. 

Where do you think we are right now? Ms. Johnson, they have 

the new organization. Secretary Clinton has decided to have one 

person in charge of policy, and the other in terms of management. 

Is there anybody over there, from your observations, that is getting 

up early in the morning and staying up late at night working on 

management, working on developing the human capital, the training, and looking at the big issues that the Department has to undertake if you are really going to get the job done overall? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. I think they are all getting up early in 

the morning and staying late at night. Whether they are thinking 

about the correct issues—I think they are trying to. I don’t think, 

actually, I can answer the question and I think we will have to see 

what comes out—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. Who is in charge of that? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. QDDR? Well, it was under Mr. Lew, I believe—— 

34 

Ms. JOHNSON. Yes. I mean, we have two deputy secretaries, and 

Mr. Lew is doing that with Anne-Marie Slaughter of Policy Planning. The two of them are co-chairing the QDDR effort, and there 

are five or six working groups under it that are working on different things. And, in fact, we at AFSA are trying to see how we 

might relate to those different working groups. Some of them affect 

USAID in particular, and we are concerned with getting our 

USAID folks in touch with the people who are doing that kind of 

planning. 

Senator VOINOVICH. In terms of the plan, the recommendations 

that you made, do you know if anybody is spending any time looking at those recommendations from the Academy to see if they are 

implementing them or following through or responding? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Not very much. They are certainly interested in the numbers. I don’t think they are using the plan. We are 

talking to the Director General’s Office about having the Academy 

take on another planning effort; that is try to help; don’t feel proprietary about it. If they could do it without us, we don’t need to 

be horning in, but we have got an awful lot of experience in the 

Academy, an awful lot of knowledge, and we would like to find a 

way to work with them to make some of that knowledge useful— 

Tom Pickering’s favorite joke, we are 200 members with 7,000 

years of experience and we would like to make some of that available to help with this effort. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very 

much for having this hearing. I don’t have any other questions. But 

this has been a great hearing and I am fired up, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you very much, Senator Voinovich. 

What are your top three recommendations for improving our diplomatic security efforts within the State Department? 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Ms. Johnson, I will let you go first for a 

change. 

Ms. JOHNSON. I listened with great interest to Assistant Secretary Boswell give his testimony and talk about what they are 

planning and what they are trying to do. I would go back to, I 

think, the suggestions that I made in my oral testimony earlier, is 

consistent with what Mr. Ford from GAO was saying. 

The need for more, and I say better, communication between the 

policy side and the Diplomatic Security side, because all of these 

either misunderstandings or miscommunications. And I think that 

communication has to happen at multiple levels, and some of it 

could be by having more joint training, where DS people and other 

officers are taking or addressing the same issues together in the 

same room from their different perspectives. I think that always 

adds value to both sides. 

So first is just to find ways to pay more attention to that dialogue, because I don’t think it really exists in any kind of consistent systematic or formal way. It is ad hoc and unrecorded and 

out of date and we need a new one. 

Second, I think, would be some discussion about whether this basically one-size-fits-all approach needs to be changed, and the fact 

that we have these unique situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, I 

think, give a good opportunity to reassess that and to say we need 

a more differentiated approach. 

35 

And the last thing has to do with finding a way to take advantage of AFSA’s connection and ability to get the unfiltered views 

of our members, because—and compare those unfiltered views with 

whatever else is coming up through the more hierarchial system. 

We often hear very different things from our members than what 

apparently management is hearing when they ask the question. So 

I think we need to confront that a little bit and see what is happening. 

Why is it that people feel that they can say—and do say—one 

thing to us where it is not necessarily for attribution and another 

thing in their more official capacity? We need to narrow that gap. 

There will always be a little bit of a gap there, but I think we need 

to narrow it a bit. If it gets too far out of whack, it is a signal that 

we need to open the discussion and management needs to send a 

signal, as Secretary Clinton has said and said early on, that she 

encourages and wants to hear different points of view. But I don’t 

think people have internalized that yet. 

I will turn it over to you. 

Ambassador NEUMANN. Well, you know the real estate joke about 

three things that are most important, location, location, and location. I think in this case, I would say plan, plan, plan. We have 

got a lot of big issues. It also picks up Ms. Johnson’s issue of the 

need to talk across functional and substantive lines. But if one 

doesn’t plan, then you are always reacting and our budget cycle is 

not conducive to acting in a reactive mode, because then you can’t 

get the resources to, in fact, react. Then you have to pull from 

someplace else. You just cascade your problems. You shuffle them 

from one place to another. So of the things I laid out, I think planning is my overall priority. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Well, I want to thank you both very 

much and thank all of our witnesses today. 

Our diplomats repeatedly have been targets of attacks and DS is 

charged with keeping them safe so they can advance U.S. interests 

abroad. You have provided key insights in support of this effort. 

Additionally, I am hopeful that Diplomatic Security will begin 

taking a strategic approach to addressing its staffing and operational challenges. This is critically important, since the Department must be fully prepared for new challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other crises that may emerge. 

The hearing record will be open for one week for additional statements or questions other Members may have. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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