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FIRST AMENDMENT AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE 

REFORM AFTER CITIZENS UNITED 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 

CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 3, 2010 

Serial No. 111–71 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

JUDY CHU, California 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

DANIEL MAFFEI, New York 

[Vacant] 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

PERRY APELBAUM, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

JERROLD NADLER, New York, Chairman 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JUDY CHU, California 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

DAVID LACHMANN, Chief of Staff 

PAUL B. TAYLOR, Minority Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

FEBRUARY 3, 2010 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil 

Rights, and Civil Liberties .................................................................................. 1 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Wisconsin, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the 

Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties .................................................. 3 

The Honorable Lamar Smith., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......................... 4 

The Honorable Steve King, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Iowa, and Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, 

and Civil Liberties ............................................................................................... 6 

The Honorable Mel Watt, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

North Carolina, and Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil 

Rights, and Civil Liberties .................................................................................. 6 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Laurence H. Tribe, Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard Law 

School, Cambridge, MA 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

Ms. Monica Y. Youn, Counsel and Director of the Campaign Finance Reform 

Project, Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law, 

New York, NY 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 28 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 31 

Mr. Sean D. Parnell, President, Center for Competitive Politics, Alexandria, 

VA 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 48 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 50 

Mr. Donald J. Simon, Partner, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & 

Perry, LLP, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 70 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 73 

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 111 

(1) 

FIRST AMENDMENT AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE 

REFORM AFTER CITIZENS UNITED 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2010 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in 

room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jerrold 

Nadler (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Nadler, Watt, Scott, Delahunt, Johnson, 

Baldwin, Cohen, Jackson Lee, Sensenbrenner, King, Jordan, and 

Gohmert. 

Also present: Representative Smith, ex officio. 

Staff present: (Majority) David Lachmann, Subcommittee Chief 

of Staff; Elizabeth Kendall, Counsel; and Paul Taylor, Minority 

Counsel. 

Mr. NADLER. Good morning. This hearing of the Subcommittee 

on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties will come to 

order. 

I will start by recognizing myself for an opening statement. 

Today’s hearing examines the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 

the case of Citizens United v. FEC. It is a case which poses a great 

threat to the integrity of our democratic system. 

The subcommittee will examine the Court’s reasoning, the scope 

of the decision, its likely impact and what options Congress may 

have at its disposal remaining to deal with the problems we are 

likely to encounter now that the Court has declared open season 

on democracy. 

One of the things that strikes me, and I am sure that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who are constantly assailing 

judicial activism will agree, is the extent to which an extraordinarily activist Court reached out to issue this decision. 

The justices answered a question they weren’t asked in order to 

overturn a century of precedent which they had reaffirmed only recently. The only real change has been one of Court membership. 

The Court sought to decide the case on the broadest constitutional grounds when it could easily have resolved the question on 

much narrower grounds. 

Finally, the Court substituted its judgment of what constitutes 

corruption in politics for that of the democratically representatives 

in the Congress and in most of the State legislatures who have acVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:02 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\020310\54761.000 HJUD1 PsN: 54761
2 

tually participated in the process and who understand firsthand 

the corrosive effect of money in politics. The absence of Justice 

O’Connor, the only former legislator on the Court, may have made 

a real difference in this case. 

Chief Justice Roberts’ concurrence in particular was a virtual 

manifesto for the judicial activists looking to overturn—looking for 

an excuse to overturn longstanding precedent even when those 

precedents weren’t properly before the Court. 

It can be considered a warning shot and it bodes ill for the future 

and certainly ill for stare decisis in the future. His opinion hardly 

reads like the words of an umpire who is simply following precedent in deciding cases as narrowly as possible. 

In fact, it certainly doesn’t sound like the man who presented 

himself to the Senate at his confirmation hearings. In fact, it certainly raises questions as to the truthfulness of his testimony at 

the confirmation hearings. 

Justice Stevens stated the basic issue clearly in his dissent, ‘‘The 

conceit that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the Court’s disposition of this case. 

‘‘In the context of election to public office, the distinction between 

corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they may 

make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not 

actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because 

they may be managed and controlled by non-residents, their interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. 

‘‘The financial resources, legal structure and instrumental orientation of corporations raises legitimate concerns about their role 

in the electoral process. Lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not a democratic—if not also a democratic duty, to 

take measures designed to guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national races.’’ 

I would even wonder, in light of the majority’s finding that a corporation and a natural person are the same, et cetera, what this 

means for our antitrust law. 

Is it against the Constitution for Congress to decree, for example, 

that corporations may be too big, that they must be broken up 

under certain circumstances, without having found them guilty of 

serious felonies? 

We couldn’t impose a death penalty on an individual just because 

we didn’t like his or her influence. Are we now going to face that 

with corporations? That is the implication. 

Former Justice O’Connor discussed the threat to the integrity of 

the judiciary in a recent speech at Georgetown University Law 

Center. She said, ‘‘This rising judicial campaigning makes last 

week’s opinion in Citizens United a problem for an independent judiciary. No State can possibly benefit from having that much 

money injected into a political campaign.’’ And she was, of course, 

referring specifically to a judicial political campaign. 

So now that corporations, including those controlled by foreign 

interests, have the same rights as any voter, what is in store for 

our democracy? What other rights will the Court confer on corporaVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:02 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\020310\54761.000 HJUD1 PsN: 54761
3 

tions? Perhaps one day we will have Exxon as a colleague here in 

Congress. Many would say we already do. 

And what can Congress, within the bounds set by the Court, still 

do to control the influence of the monied aristocracy in our political 

process? 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses on this very important issue, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

The Chair now recognizes the distinguished Ranking Member for 

5 minutes for an opening statement. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Guess what? I don’t agree with his analysis at all. And prior to 

the—— 

Mr. NADLER. Right. Yes. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER [continuing]. Prior to the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Citizens United v. FEC, Federal law prohibited corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make 

independent expenditures for speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate for Federal office. 

Those formerly illegal electioneering communications were defined as any broadcast, cable or satellite communication that refers 

to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office and is made 

within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election. 

The Supreme Court concluded that these laws constituted an 

outright ban on speech backed by criminal sanctions and in clear 

violation of the First Amendment. 

In particular, the Court stated that under that unconstitutional 

law, the following acts would be felonies: The Sierra Club runs an 

ad within the crucial phase of 60 days before the general election 

that exhorts the public to disapprove of a congressman who favors 

logging in national forests; the National Rifle Association publishes 

a book urging the public to vote for the challenger because the incumbent U.S. senator supports a handgun ban; and the American 

Civil Liberties Union creates a Web site telling the public to vote 

for a presidential candidate in light of that candidate’s defense of 

free speech. 

The Court concluded that these prohibitions are classic examples 

of censorship and appropriately struck down the law. Now we are 

going to hear about all sorts of attempts to undercut the Supreme 

Court’s ruling by statute. 

But the Supreme Court in its decision made clear that any alternative regulations that produced a chilling effect on free speech 

would also be unconstitutional, including any alternative that requires lengthy legal proceedings to determine what sort of speech 

a corporation can or cannot engage in during Federal elections. 

As the majority wrote, ‘‘It is well known that the public begins 

to concentrate on elections only in the weeks immediately before 

they are held. There are short time frames in which a speech can 

have influence. The speaker’s ability to engage in political speech 

that could have the chance of persuading voters is stifled if the 

speaker must first commence a protracted lawsuit. By the time the 

lawsuit concludes, the election will be over and the litigants in 

most cases will have neither the incentive nor perhaps the resources to carry on.’’ 

4 

So in expressing its appropriate concern for alternative regulations that would chill free speech, the Court has already gone a 

long way toward pouring cold water on a lot of proposals made by 

opponents of the decision to further limit free speech. 

The hysterical cries in some quarters, maybe here today, regarding the Supreme Court’s decision are in stark contrast to the everyday unconstitutional—uncontroversial, I am sorry, democratic elections that have been held in 26 States representing 60 percent of 

the Nation’s populations that already allow corporate independent 

expenditures in State elections. 

The result will be no different when the same rules are applied 

that were already applied in 26 States in their State elections 

when they are applied to Federal elections. 

The Citizens United case has also caused some opponents of the 

decision to focus their attention on another piece of Federal legislation called the Fair Elections Now Act, which would use tax dollars 

to fund congressional campaigns in what amounts to a hundreds of 

millions of dollars taxpayer bailout of politicians. 

This solution to what opponents call the problem of free speech 

is a red herring, since corporations will still be able to make independent expenditures regardless of how their candidates fund their 

campaigns. 

This would also make the White House red-faced, as President 

Obama became the first presidential candidate in history to forego 

public financing in the general election because he expected he 

could raise millions more without it, and did. 

With those concerns in mind, I look forward to hearing from all 

of our witnesses today and yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

In the interest of proceeding to our witnesses and mindful of our 

busy schedules, I normally ask that other Members submit their 

statements for the record. 

I understand that a number of Members have asked that they be 

able to deliver an opening statement, and I will recognize them as 

they seek recognition, but first I will recognize the distinguished 

Ranking Member of the full Committee, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for recognizing me. 

In 2002, Congress passed Federal campaign finance restrictions 

that I, along with most Republicans, opposed because we felt they 

were unconstitutional. 

That legislation limited how much money corporations, nonprofits and unions could spend on television ads that support or oppose a Federal candidate 30 days before a primary election and 60 

days before a general election. 

Corporations, nonprofits and unions are simply collections of individuals who have pooled their financial resources to pursue common goals. The law Congress passed severely limited these groups’ 

ability to voice their political opinions. 

Last month the Supreme Court held that the political speech restrictions in that law are unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 

As the Court stated, political speech is ‘‘indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy,’’ regardless of whether the speech comes 

from an individual or from a corporation. In other words, free 

5 

speech is free regardless of whether it is exercised by one person 

or collectively by 100 people. 

The law the Supreme Court struck down also exempted media 

corporations from those restrictions. This gives the national media’s well established bias free reign during elections while muzzling the voices of many citizens. 

The national media largely criticized the Supreme Court’s ruling. 

The New York Times called it disastrous and the Washington Post 

called it dangerous. 

An exception was my hometown newspaper, the San Antonio Express-News, which pointed out the unfairness of campaign finance 

laws restricting the free speech of all organizations except the 

media. 

As the Express-News stated, while the media could make endorsements right up to the day of an election, all other organizations were restricted in their opinions. As the editorial explained, 

it makes no sense to restrict speech prior to an election, arguably 

the period when the exercise of political speech is most important. 

The national media should acknowledge that free speech is free 

regardless of whether it is exercised by newspaper editorial boards 

or by everyday Americans. 

As the Supreme Court determined, the views expressed by media 

corporations often ‘‘have little or no correlation to the public support’’ of those views. As such, other corporations should be treated 

no differently than media corporations. 

Finally, some opponents of the Supreme Court’s decision in support of free speech, including the President, claim the decision 

would open the floodgates to foreign influence in American elections. Not true, as someone said recently. 

The Supreme Court’s decision actually kept in place current laws 

that prohibit foreign corporations from influencing American elections. 

Under current law, a foreign national may not directly or indirectly contribute to a candidate or party or pay for a broadcast, 

cable or satellite communication that refers to a Federal candidate 

before an election. 

Current Federal Elections Commission regulations, untouched by 

the Citizens United case, also provide that a foreign national may 

not direct, control or indirectly participate in the decision-making 

process of any corporation, labor union or political committee in its 

election-related activities. Obviously, the floodgates to foreign influence can’t be opened if the dam is still in place. 

The Supreme Court’s decision rightly restores to Americans the 

right to voice their opinions during an election and sends a strong 

message to future congresses that attempt to limit free speech. I 

hope this Congress hears that message loud and clear before considering President Obama’s call to reinstate unconstitutional restrictions on free speech. 

Mr. Chairman, on the way to yielding back, let me say I am trying to get to the House floor, so I will miss at least part of the witnesses’ testimony, and that I regret. And I will yield back. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

Does any other Member seek recognition? 

The gentleman from Iowa? 

6 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will make this just 

a brief statement. I echo the statement made by the Ranking Member of the full Committee and the Ranking Member of the Constitution Subcommittee. 

I would make this point, that I think was the most important 

point, which is we have gone along since 2002 without hearing a 

complaint that, at least I recall from the Democrat side of the aisle, 

about the corporate speech of the major news media. 

And the major news media in this country has actively been 

seeking to influence elections. I can recall a newspaper that was 

very involved in a presidential race in Iowa, and when I looked at 

the returns county by county, and it looked like it reflected the distribution of that newspaper almost exactly. 

And when I wrote a letter to the editor and said, ‘‘This is the result of what you have been doing by your partisan and unobjective 

approach,’’ the editor’s response to me was, ‘‘I hope so. It was my 

intent to influence the election.’’ 

And I think we all have some kind of experience in that fashion. 

It is hard to convince the American people, Mr. Chairman, that the 

news media has not been involved in seeking to influence elections 

most aggressively. 

And so I do not understand the aversion to allowing corporate 

speech in a broader category than those people that have full access to the news media and can spend their dollars more effectively 

than perhaps any other corporate structure. 

And in addition, I would point out that I think there is something we might get to see here that is a difference. I don’t think 

it is going to be a dramatic change with the Supreme Court decision that immediately makes a shift. 

But when I start thinking about corporations that have taken positions supporting legislation that is anathema to their corporate 

interests, and I wonder why—and it is because they are trying to 

mitigate the legislative damage that might be brought upon them. 

And the cap and trade legislation is a—I think an excellent case 

in point where the balanced scales of all of those entities that were 

against it began to be convinced that something was going to pass, 

so they lobbied for their carve-outs, and slowly a cap and trade bill 

passed the House of Representatives. 

And I believe that, on balance, it is against the interests in this 

country, and we have that disagreement, Mr. Chairman. But my 

point is corporations now under this decision, Citizens United, may 

be more bold in their involvement. 

They may decide they want to engage in this speech within that 

60-day window more aggressively, and perhaps that will be a way 

that legislation that I believe is bad for America is prevented from 

coming to passage. 

So it is going to be a very interesting hearing. I appreciate you 

holding this. I appreciate being recognized. And I yield back the 

balance of my time. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

I now yield—I now recognize, rather, the gentleman from 

South—North Carolina. 

Mr. WATT. Thank you. Thank you for elevating me back to North 

Carolina. Don’t say South Carolina. 

7 

Let me thank the Chair for holding the hearing first, and I am 

looking forward to the witnesses’ testimony. I have not read the 

case, and I come down kind of between the Ranking Member and 

the Chair in my initial reactions to this. 

I have a lot of ambivalence on this issue. Some of you have heard 

me say on prior occasions that I learned more about the First 

Amendment and free speech in one experience than I learned from 

my constitutional law classes in law school when my senior law 

partner sent me to a county to represent some Native Americans 

who had been demonstrating with tomahawks and other native 

paraphernalia. 

And I got there and, of course, they had been arrested for various 

things—resisting arrest, parading without a permit, this and that. 

And I got there and found that what they were demonstrating 

about was that they didn’t want to go to school with black kids. 

And so I rushed back several counties over to my law office and 

confronted my senior law partner about why he would send me, an 

African American, to represent the Native Americans who were 

demonstrating against going to school with black kids, and he 

looked at me without even hesitation and said, ‘‘Don’t you believe 

in the First Amendment?’’ 

I think I learned something there that kind of permeated the law 

firm that I came out of, that even when you disagree with what 

people are saying, you have to tolerate it and shore yourself up and 

keep moving if you really believe in free speech. 

And I guess it was out of that experience that our law firm went 

on to represent the Ku Klux Klan in several demonstration cases, 

even though we were vigorously opposed to everything they stood 

for. 

So I take the First Amendment and free speech very seriously, 

but I do want to make three quick points about this argument. 

First of all, I think it is a mistake for any of us to treat this as 

a partisan divide. It is not a partisan issue. 

You know, sometimes this Democratic President may benefit 

from it. Sometimes prior Republican Presidents may have benefitted from it. So you know, speech is not Republican or Democratic. It is speech. It is First Amendment right. And we need to 

keep the partisan rhetoric out of this discussion. I think that is a 

serious mistake that some of my colleagues are making. 

Second, I am concerned that while I am a strong, strong believer 

in free speech and the First Amendment, that the courts—or the 

Supreme Court seems to have equated speech and money as if they 

were one and the same. Speech is one thing. Money, just because 

you have it, doesn’t necessarily give you any greater free speech 

rights. 

Next, I am concerned that the Supreme Court seems to define 

the rights of corporations as being identical to the rights of individuals. And I would like to hear the panel’s evaluation of that issue. 

And finally, I have some very serious concerns that the Court 

has engaged systematically on taking over prerogatives that the 

legislative branch should be able to exercise, and that these people 

who say that they don’t believe in legislating from the bench have 

been the ones who seem to be most guilty of doing exactly that. 

8 

I can’t even remember, Mr. Chairman, how I voted on McCainFeingold, to be honest with you. I haven’t gone back to check. Remember, I had some serious reservations about it, about the free 

speech aspect of it, and I may have resolved those concerns to vote 

for it. 

Mr. NADLER. I think you may have voted for McCain and against 

Feingold, or maybe the other way around. [Laughter.] 

Mr. WATT. Might have been. But I don’t know that that is the 

issue. I think this is a serious issue, and we need to treat it so, 

and that is why I came today, to listen to this outstanding panel. 

Maybe I will have a more fixed opinion by the end of the day about 

where I come down on this very delicate issue. 

But maybe that sounds like I am somewhere between the Chairman and the Ranking Member, who seem to be—seem to have 

pretty vigorous opinions, opposite sides. So I am here to listen, and 

I appreciate the Chairman indulging me. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Does anyone else seek recognition? Very good. 

Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit opening statements for inclusion in the record. 

Without objection, the Chair will be authorized to declare a recess of the hearing at any time, although I do not intend to call 

a recess unless we are interrupted by a vote. 

We will now turn to our panel of witnesses. As we ask questions 

of our witnesses, the Chair will recognize Members in the order of 

their seniority on the subcommittee, alternating between majority 

and minority, provided that the Member is present when his or her 

turn arrives. 

Members who are not present when their turns begin will be recognized after the other Members have had the opportunity to ask 

their questions. 

The Chair reserves the right to accommodate a Member who is 

unavoidably late or only able to be with us for a short time. 

Our first witness is Professor Laurence Tribe, who is the Carl M. 

Loeb University Professor at Harvard Law School, where he has 

taught since 1968. He has argued numerous times before the Supreme Court, where he also served as a law clerk to Justice Potter 

Stewart. 

He received an A.B. summa cum laude from Harvard College and 

a J.D. magna cum laude from Harvard Law School. 

Monica Youn—and I hope I am pronouncing that correctly— 

Monica Youn is the director of the Campaign Finance Reform and 

Money in Politics Project of the Brennan Center for Justice. She 

served as counsel of record for the center’s Supreme Court amicus 

brief in Citizens United v. FEC. 

Prior to joining the Brennan Center, she worked in private practice and also served as a law clerk to Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. 

in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Ms. 

Youn received her J.D. from Yale Law School, her master in philosophy from Oxford University, where she was a Rhodes Scholar, and 

her B.A. from Princeton University. 

Sean Parnell is president of the Center for Competitive Politics. 

Previously, Mr. Parnell was vice president for external affairs at 

the Heartland Institute in Chicago. 

9 

Prior to joining Heartland, he worked on political campaigns in 

Iowa, managed a successful congressional campaign, and served as 

finance director for a U.S. Senate race. Mr. Parnell received a degree in economics from Drake University. 

Don Simon is counsel to Democracy 21. He is currently a partner 

at the firm of Sonosky Chambers Sachse Endreson & Perry, LLP 

where he specializes in litigation and administrative law. 

From 1995 to 2000 Mr. Simon served as executive vice president 

and general counsel of Common Cause. In that capacity, he directed the legislative and legal programs for the reform organization. Mr. Simon received his B.A. magna cum laude in 1975 from 

Harvard College and his J.D. cum laude from Harvard Law School 

in 1978. 

I am pleased to welcome all of you. Your written statements in 

their entirety will be made part of the record. I would ask each of 

you to summarize your testimony in 5 minutes or less, although I 

am a little loose with the gavel on time. 

To help you stay within that time, there is a timing light at your 

table. When 1 minute remains, the light will switch from green to 

yellow and then red when the 5 minutes are up. 

Before we begin, it is customary for the Committee to swear in 

its witnesses. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. NADLER. Let the record reflect the witnesses answered in the 

affirmative. 

You may be seated. 

I now recognize Professor Tribe for an opening statement. 

TESTIMONY OF LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CARL M. LOEB UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE, MA 

Mr. TRIBE. Thank you. Chairman Nadler, Members of the Committee, I am honored by your invitation that I testify this morning. 

And with my prepared statement entered into the record, I will 

just touch briefly on where I believe the Court went wrong, why 

it matters, what Congress should do about it and why Congress 

needs to act quickly. 

Where did the Court go wrong? In my view, the majority and 

concurring opinions are no match for Justice Stevens’ 90-page dissent. He shows convincingly, even to someone who is a strong free 

speech believer, as I am, that the majority reached far beyond the 

issues actually presented, failed to justify tossing aside decades of 

precedent, and profoundly distorted both the original meaning and 

the evolving understanding of free speech. 

Why does it matter? When ideological groups or corporate PACs 

collect and spend the money of those who want to support or oppose particular candidates—examples like the Sierra Club or the 

NRA or other PACs—corporations can focus hundreds of thousands 

of dollars on campaign ads, and that is exactly as I believe it 

should be, if that is how people want to spend their money on politics. That is how much—what they want to spend. 

But when entire corporate treasuries become available for electioneering, even though the shareholders who own that money 

never entrusted it to management to use in that way, the amount 

that can be used to drown out individual voices artificially multiVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:02 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\020310\54761.000 HJUD1 PsN: 54761
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plies exponentially, given the trillions of dollars in corporate profits 

that suddenly become available. 

A company like Exxon Mobil just needs to threaten that it will 

spend whatever it takes to defeat a candidate who fails to toe the 

line, and it can greatly improve the odds of getting its way. 

Indeed, just the perception that that is going on breeds a degree 

of cynicism and distrust that can kill meaningful political participation and endanger viable self-government. 

What should Congress do about it? First, I think Congress should 

start by guarding American elections from direct or indirect manipulation by foreign entities and foreign funding. 

The majority in Citizens United emphasized that it didn’t have 

that case before it. But of course, that didn’t stop it from reaching 

out to decide lots of questions it didn’t have before it. 

The fact that it carefully tiptoed up to the water’s edge and not 

beyond I think is a strong signal that the majority agreed with the 

Stevens dissent that the tradition of guarding against foreign influence in American politics would trump the majority’s abstract theory that the identity of who is speaking or bankrolling speech 

makes no First Amendment difference. But the existing restrictions 

on foreign influence are riddled with loopholes and need to be 

tightened. 

Second, I think Congress should enact legislation giving States 

permission to do what would otherwise violate the commerce 

clause—namely, protect their own State elections from manipulation by businesses and dollars from other States. That is something 

that many of the 39 States that elect their judges might well want 

to do. 

Third, acting again under its commerce power, Congress should 

protect corporations—let me repeat that, protect corporations— 

doing business with government from being pressured to pay if 

they are going to play. It should do that by prohibiting such companies from spending money in connection with candidate elections. 

Nearly 75 percent of the 100 largest publicly traded firms are 

Federal contractors. But there is no need for Congress to limit its 

protection of unfettered commerce to the Federal level because you 

do not need the Federal spending power to justify such a law. 

It can be justified the way the Supreme Court has justified 

Hatch Act and other protections for employees whose employers or 

unions might otherwise pressure them into supporting causes that 

they do not endorse. 

Fourth, I think Congress should give more meaningful protection 

to those who buy shares in for-profit companies or funds not in 

order to influence elections but in order to earn a profit. The Citizens United majority insisted that the procedures of corporate democracy could do the job. But the dissent showed how inadequate 

those procedures are at present. 

The majority said fine but ‘‘the remedy is to consider and explore 

other regulatory mechanisms.’’ I think Congress should take the 

Court up on its invitation and should adopt reforms requiring 

shareholder pre-approval for campaign expenditures by for-profit 

business corporations and by making it easier for dissenting shareholders to sue for corporate waste. My prepared statement spells 

that out in more detail. 

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Fifth, to protect both shareholders and voters, the disclaimer and 

disclosure requirements that the Court upheld 8–1 in Citizens 

United have to be tightened so that money cannot be funneled 

through shells with innocuous names like Citizens for Good Health 

and Clean Energy when the real source is Novartis or Mobil Oil. 

And the CEOs of for-profit corporations that bankroll either positive or negative ads should have to own up to their responsibility 

under oath and certify on camera the business purposes of their political expenditures. 

I see the light is on, but if I could go on for a few seconds, I 

would appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. 

Sixth, even after Citizens United, the law bars corporate contributions to candidates and electioneering expenses that are coordinated with their campaigns. But the rules defining coordination 

are hopelessly fuzzy and loophole-ridden. 

So a lot of de facto contributions can sneak under the wire as if 

they were independent. Waiting until the FEC acts is like waiting 

for Godot. Congress needs to codify the rules itself. 

Seventh, public financing needs to be explored, things like the 

Fair Elections Now Act, but that is a far reach in terms of ever ultimately solving the problem, and we can’t afford to wait. 

That is the key point I want to leave with you. Why do we need 

to act now? The reason is that unless Congress adopts reforms like 

these before the November elections, large business interests, including those indirectly funded from overseas, may give us a Congress pre-selected with a view to opposing these various reforms, 

and then it will be too late to do what is needed to hold back the 

potentially distorting corporate flood. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tribe follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAURENCE H. TRIBE


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Mr. NADLER. I thank you. 

Ms. Youn, you are recognized. 

TESTIMONY OF MONICA Y. YOUN, COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR 

OF THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM PROJECT, BRENNAN 

CENTER FOR JUSTICE, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF 

LAW, NEW YORK, NY 

Ms. YOUN. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. 


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As we all know, Congress is debating a range of policy proposals 

to mitigate the disastrous potential consequences of Citizens 

United. These proposals, particularly public financing, voter registration modernization, disclosure and shareholder protection, are 

discussed at greater length in my written testimony. 

And I agree with Professor Tribe that it is crucial that Congress 

act, and act quickly. But whatever legislation Congress ends up 

adopting, this we know for sure—the new reforms may be on a collision course with the present majority of the Supreme Court. 

In the meantime, challenges to other Federal and State campaign finance reforms, including public financing, disclosure laws, 

PAC requirements and soft money restrictions, are on a fast track 

to the Supreme Court as well, brought to you by many of the same 

lawyers that brought Citizens United. 

In defending these reforms, then, and in enacting new ones, it is 

crucial that we push back against the faulty factual assumptions 

upon which the Citizens United majority based its decisions. 

These five justices were in such a hurry to strike down 60 years 

of campaign finance safeguards that they couldn’t even wait for a 

factual record to be developed. But by rushing to judgment, these 

five justices based their decision on nothing more than their own 

gut instincts about how politics actually works. 

These instincts turned out to be, at best, extremely naive, as 

Senator John McCain put it; at worst, dangerous; and at root, just 

plain wrong. 

This Committee can play a crucial role in setting the record 

straight by convening hearings that develop the factual record to 

provide a reality check for the current Supreme Court majority. I 

want to focus my testimony today on three of these faulty assumptions. 

First, the Court assumes that limits on corporate political spending exist because incumbent politicians wish to silence their most 

effective opposition. In fact, Justice Kennedy goes even farther, 

stating that these laws violate the First Amendment because the 

government has ‘‘muffled the voices of corporations in politics.’’ 

I defy anyone watching the debates in Congress regarding the 

banks, health care and climate change to say with a straight face 

that corporations have been unable to express their point of view 

on these matters either to Members of Congress or to the public at 

large. 

What corporations have not been able to do up until this point 

is to buy an election, to bring their treasury funds directly to bear 

in our most sacred of democratic institutions. 

Second, the Court assumes that shareholders have oversight over 

political spending by corporate managers and that disclosure laws 

ensure that voters know who is paying for our politics. 

Once again, this assumption is faulty. First, as a recent Brennan 

Center report points out, Federal law does not currently require 

corporate political spending to be disclosed either to shareholders 

or to corporate boards. 

Similarly, voters can’t detect corporate political activity since, as 

Professor Tribe pointed out just now, corporations commonly mask 

their corporate spending behind misleadingly named euphemisms. 

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In most of the cases, by the time these groups are unmasked, the 

election is already over. 

But disclosure alone is not an adequate safeguard of our democracy. If you fear burglars, you don’t stop locking your doors just because you have invested in a security camera. By the time the 

damage is detected, it is far too late. 

Finally and most disturbingly, the Court assumes that unlimited 

corporate spending poses no threat of corruption. The Court seems 

woefully ignorant of the countless examples of influence peddling 

resulting from corporate independent expenditures. 

But you know, this woeful ignorance is not without limit. For example, in the Caperton case, faced with the ugly truth of what corruption looks like in practice, the Court blinked. It pulled back. 

Justice Kennedy there voted with the four pro-reform justices 

rather than with the Roberts bloc because he was unable to deny, 

faced with the facts, the reality of political corruption, at least in 

judicial campaigns. 

By building a strong factual record on this and other issues, the 

Committee can ensure that this Supreme Court base future decisions in the area of money and politics, on facts rather than fiction. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Youn follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF MONICA Y. YOUN


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Mr. NADLER. I thank you. 

Mr. Parnell is recognized. 


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TESTIMONY OF SEAN D. PARNELL, PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR 

COMPETITIVE POLITICS, ALEXANDRIA, VA 

Mr. PARNELL. Thank you, Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member 

Sensenbrenner, Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. 

To begin, I would like to address the issue of so-called unlimited 

corporate spending. A review of recent political spending in other 

areas by incorporated entities shows that the lack of statutory limits on spending has not led to corporations emptying their treasuries in support of political agendas. 

For example, in the 2002 election cycle, the Republican and Democratic Parties raised approximately $300 million combined in 

soft money from businesses, unions and other organizations during 

a period when after-tax corporate profits totaled over $1 trillion. 

Corporations also failed to avail themselves of their amassed 

wealth in the 2004 election cycle when so-called 527 groups spent 

approximately $612 million in connection with all elections. Most 

of the 527 funding in 2004 came from individuals, ideologically oriented and issue-driven groups, and unions. 

Looking only at Exxon Mobil, which appears to be the popular 

villain of the day, lobbying expenditures in 2008 totaled roughly 

$29 million, while they earned over $45 billion in profits that year. 

And finally, an internal memo regarding Exxon Mobil’s giving to public policy groups in 2002 States that they gave only $5.1 million 

to such groups. In 2002 Exxon Mobil had annual profits of approximately $11.46 billion. 

Simply put, in the past, business corporations, unions and ideologically oriented groups have had ample opportunities to pour unlimited amounts of money into the American political system 

through soft money, 527 groups, lobbying and public policy groups 

and have shown very little interest in putting more than a tiny 

fraction of their resources into these efforts. 

While the Citizens United decision does not pose nearly the 

threat to America’s political system as detractors claim, there may, 

in fact, be some legislation that ought to be considered in light of 

this ruling. 

When considering policy responses, however, it is important to 

note that there are some things which it is clear that Congress 

simply cannot do in light of the Citizens United decision and other 

rulings on campaign finance and the First Amendment. 

Among the options that are unlikely to be permitted by the 

courts would be any sort of tax levied on the exercise of the constitutional right, as proposed in H.R. 4431, or the enactment of legislation that would simply restore pre-Citizens United status quo 

through the back door, such as H.R. 4435, a bill that would apparently forbid publicly traded company from being listed on stock exchanges if they engage in independent expenditures. 

Another consideration to keep in mind is the Supreme Court’s 

admonishment that ‘‘the First Amendment stands against attempts 

to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among 

different speakers which may be a means to control content. There 

is no basis for the proposition that in the political speech context 

the government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored 

speakers.’’ 

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This strongly suggests that the courts are likely to be skeptical 

of laws and regulations that impose burdens only on some 

disfavored incorporated entities while leaving other favored speakers free of similar burdens. 

For example, laws that require for-profit corporations to seek 

shareholder approval for expenditures, such as H.R.s 4487 and 

4537, might be struck down in court because no similar requirement is imposed on unions or other nonprofits. 

The pre-Citizens United status quo may be gone, but there are 

several policy changes that Congress should consider, including 

eliminating the limit on coordinated expenditures between parties 

and candidates and raising contribution limits for individuals, parties and PACs to fully account for inflation since they were first imposed in 1974. 

We at the center believe these measures would be consistent 

with the First Amendment and are actually likely to draw money 

out of the newly permitted world of relatively unregulated corporate express advocacy and into the more heavily regulated 

sphere of candidates, parties and PACs. 

I have attached to my submitted testimony a document entitled 

‘‘After Citizens United: A Moderate, Modern Agenda for Campaign 

Finance Reform’’ that provides additional information on these suggestions and others. 

Finally, I want to make one comment that was not made at the 

Senate hearings yesterday and has not been raised by anybody 

here so far. And that is the subject of book banning. 

The United States Supreme Court, when they first heard oral arguments in Citizens United, was presented by the deputy solicitor 

general of the United States with the argument that under campaign finance regulations it was permitted for the government to 

ban books. 

That is, I would hope, a matter of some interest to the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. 

It is speculation on my part, but it is my belief, when people ask 

why did the United States Supreme Court potentially reach for this 

decision when it was not presented initially with questions of 

whether it should overturn Austin v. Michigan—but it is my own 

speculation that the United States Supreme Court, when informed 

by the deputy solicitor general of the United States that, yes, the 

Federal Government could under campaign finance regulations ban 

books—that the Supreme Court simply decided, ‘‘If you believe that 

you have the authority to ban books, we really need to revisit exactly what authority it is that you believe allows you to ban books.’’ 

I would be happy to talk about this or anything else during the 

question-and-answer period or at any other time. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Parnell follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEAN D. PARNELL


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ATTACHMENT 


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Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Simon? 

TESTIMONY OF DONALD J. SIMON, PARTNER, SONOSKY, 

CHAMBERS, SACHSE, ENDRESON & PERRY, LLP, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify this morning. 

The Citizens United decision represents an enormous transfer of 

power, political power in our country, from citizens to corporations. 


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Until 2 weeks ago, the financing of Federal elections had been limited by law to individuals and to groups of individuals functioning 

through political committees. 

Corporations had been prohibited from using their corporate 

wealth to influence Federal campaigns, a policy that dates back to 

1907 when Congress first banned corporations from directly or indirectly making contributions in Federal elections. 

But now, corporate wealth accumulated in the economic marketplace can be brought to bear directly and without limitation on political campaigns. This will have a major negative effect on the conduct of Federal, State and judicial elections throughout the country. 

An avalanche of independent spending by one or more corporations or trade associations, particularly in the form of negative attack ads, and particularly at the end of a campaign, could make it 

virtually impossible for the candidate to respond and could easily 

have a decisive impact on the outcome of the election. 

Even the threat of such spending is in itself likely to distort the 

legislative process. Members of Congress will, in effect, have a 

Sword of Damocles hanging over their heads. 

Any wrong vote by a Member on an issue of importance to a corporation or trade association could trigger a multi-million-dollar 

campaign to defeat the Member. And every Member will be forced, 

as a practical matter, to consider this consequence in deciding how 

to vote on legislation. 

Now, some have argued that corporations will not take advantage of this new opportunity, that the Supreme Court’s decision is 

really no big deal. These words are comforting, but logic and history suggests otherwise. 

During the 1990’s, when corporations were able to make soft 

money donations to the political parties for use in Federal elections, they did so in the tens and hundreds of millions of dollars 

in each election cycle, until the soft money system was shut down 

in 2002. 

The fact that corporate America had trillion-dollar profits and 

could have spent even more hardly means that the huge sums they 

did spend showed a lack of corporate interest in exploiting opportunities to use their wealth to buy access and influence. 

Given the ongoing legislative agendas that corporations have 

here in Congress, and given the huge financial stakes they have in 

these issues, there is little reason to think companies will not accept the court’s invitation to mount campaigns directly for and 

against candidates. 

Serious students of Congress agree with this view. Former Republican senator Chuck Hagel, for instance, said before the decision was issued that allowing corporate spending would be an astounding blow against good government and responsible government. 

Longtime Washington observer Norm Ornstein wrote in Roll Call 

last week, ‘‘It is not even the money that might be spent. It is the 

threat of spending that will alter many equations on Capitol Hill. 

The impact often will be felt at the margin behind closed doors but 

with huge effects on policy.’’ 

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Now, it is certainly true that some companies may not want their 

names associated with campaign spending. But they may not be at 

all constrained from making expenditures indirectly and secretly by 

giving corporate funds to third-party groups such as the Chamber 

of Commerce, trade associations or other intermediaries which then 

spend the money. 

These expenditures will be made in the name of the intermediary 

but designed to further the political interests of the corporate donors who are the true sources of the funds. 

It is essential for Congress to move swiftly to enact legislation to 

mitigate the damage done by the decision. The organizing principle 

should be to advance legislation that directly responds to the impact of this decision and that can be enacted in time to take effect 

for the 2010 congressional elections. 

With this in mind, Congress should focus on enacting new disclosure rules that would require full disclosure of expenditures, including disclosures of transfers of funds used to make such expenditures; enacting corporate governance provisions that would grant 

shareholders a voice in the political spending done by their corporations; strengthening existing pay-to-play rules to prohibit government contractors from using corporate funds to make independent 

expenditures; strengthening existing coordination standards to ensure that independent spending by a corporation is truly independent of any candidate or party and not coordinated in a de facto 

fashion; addressing the problem created by Citizens United which 

allows a domestic corporation owned or controlled by a foreign national to spend money to influence Federal elections. 

Now, let me just take a minute on that. It is true that foreign 

corporations are still banned by Section 441(e) from making campaign expenditures. But domestic corporations owned or controlled 

by a foreign corporation or, indeed, by a foreign government are not 

covered by Section 441(e) and now are no longer subject to a general corporate ban. 

So these domestic subsidiaries are free to spend money. Although 

an FEC regulation does address this situation, it does so, I believe, 

inadequately, and existing protections should be strengthened and 

made a matter of statutory law. 

Finally, reforming the existing lowest unit rate requirements in 

order to provide better access to low-cost TV to candidates and parties so they have the resources to respond to corporate spending. 

Now, let me just say that this agenda, I think, is notable in its 

modesty. Each of these reforms I think is fully consistent with the 

majority opinion in Citizens United and most of them, indeed, are 

invited by the majority opinion. 

Final word is that there is one more thing Congress should do, 

which is to resist any call to raise contribution limits or to repeal 

the soft money rules. To use Citizens United as an excuse to revive 

the soft money system is nothing less than an argument that one 

means of corruption justifies the introduction of another means of 

corruption. Adding to a problem is no way to solve it. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simon follows:] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD J. SIMON


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Mr. NADLER. I thank you. 

We will begin the questioning by recognizing myself. 

Professor Tribe, let me ask you a number of questions. Let’s talk 

about disclosure, first of all. Let’s say that Exxon—we will use 

them as our bogeyman today for no particular reason except that 

they are well known and large—let’s say that Exxon wants to contribute a lot of money to a given candidate and wants to do it 

through the Citizens for a Clean Environment, which they invented. 

Now, we could, obviously, require that an ad run by such a 

group, if it were completely funded by Exxon, say this ad is funded 

by Exxon, could we not? 

Mr. TRIBE. Yes, certainly—— 

Mr. NADLER. Now, let’s assume—— 

Mr. TRIBE [continuing]. You could say that. 

Mr. NADLER [continuing]. Thank you. But let’s assume that 

Exxon got together with 20 other corporations to provide the financing for Citizens for a Clean Environment. Could we require 

that they list all their contributors or their five largest contributors 

in this 30-second ad? 

Mr. TRIBE. I think it is purely a prudential and not a constitutional matter. That is, in the markup of such a bill, you would have 

thresholds, and you would certainly indicate that any corporation 

above a certain size that had contributed more than a stated percentage of—— 

Mr. NADLER. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. TRIBE [continuing]. The cost has to be disclosed. 

Mr. NADLER. Now, you mentioned pay or play, and you mentioned the Hatch Act. Do you think it would be constitutional with 

this Supreme Court majority for us to say that any corporation 

that does business with the Federal Government cannot use its corporate treasury to fund campaign ads? 

Mr. TRIBE. I believe that would be permissible under the rationale of this opinion because the Court is talking about the rights of 

corporations, and one could protect those rights by shielding them 

from being pressured to pay to play. 

Mr. NADLER. And the same thing with protecting shareholders— 

could we require that before the corporate treasury is used to do 

campaign ads that they must get the written permission of 5 percent of the shareholders? 

Mr. TRIBE. I think you could certainly require that as to for-profit business corporations where there is reason to think that people 

invest either directly or through intermediaries not for ideological 

reasons. I don’t think you could do that with respect to corporations 

which are essentially ideological groups and happen—— 

Mr. NADLER. But the for-profit—— 

Mr. TRIBE [continuing]. To be in corporate form. 

Mr. NADLER [continuing]. Do you think we could require that 

they get the permission on—to engage in a campaign by a specified 

percentage of the shareholders? 

Mr. TRIBE. I believe you could. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Let me turn to foreign control, foreign 

subsidiaries. Now, a number of the princes of Saudi Arabia have 

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dom is that America might become energy independent, and that 

would be a terrible danger to them because we wouldn’t buy their 

oil, and they are right, I think. And I hope we do that. 

Now, they have a motive, therefore, to influence our politics to 

see that we don’t become energy independent, and they have a lot 

of money. Could we require that no corporation with more than, 

say, 5 percent ownership of non-American citizens can use its corporate treasury? 

Mr. TRIBE. I believe, though the majority opinion carefully 

doesn’t address that—it simply says that there are certain limits 

on foreign entities—I believe that there would be five votes at least 

to uphold such a requirement. I can elaborate if you want to know 

what my thought process is, but—— 

Mr. NADLER. Well, let—— 

Mr. TRIBE [continuing]. That is my conclusion. 

Mr. NADLER [continuing]. We will talk later to elaborate, but not 

in this 5 minutes. 

So controlled by foreign nationals, owned or controlled—we know 

they don’t have to own 50 percent of shares in a company to have 

effective control, nor does it have to be a domestic subsidiary. It 

could be an American company with X percent of foreign control, 

and it is effective control. 

Mr. TRIBE. Right. There are lots of ways that foreigners could 

control and influence the American electoral process, and any—— 

Mr. NADLER. Let me—— 

Mr. TRIBE [continuing]. Reasonable way of excluding that—— 

Mr. NADLER [continuing]. Let me ask one other question, and 

then I will get to a different witness. The Court seemed to say— 

and I read the opinions last night. The Court seemed to say very— 

that a corporation essentially is identical to a natural person. 

Now, we don’t treat corporations identically to natural persons. 

If natural persons commit felonies, we put them in jail. When we 

put them in jail they are deprived of their civil rights—the right 

to vote. The courts have held that people in prison have—lose a lot 

of their First Amendment rights. 

Could we constitutionally do the same thing to a corporation if 

we found it guilty of an election law violation and sentence it to 

do no business for 5 years, or sentence it to speak not at all for 

3 years? 

Mr. TRIBE. Perhaps. I think it would depend on the design of the 

law. But obviously, the equation of corporations with individuals is 

only partly metaphoric. That is, as you pointed out in your opening 

statement, you can break up a corporation if it gets too big to fail. 

You can’t break up a person if that—— 

Mr. NADLER. Well, I am beginning to—I am beginning to wonder 

if the Court is going to tell us we can’t break up a corporation unless we convict it of a capital crime. 

Mr. TRIBE. Well, I suppose that is right. The death penalty is a 

separate controversy, of course. 

Mr. NADLER. Yes. 

Mr. Parnell, let me ask you the following. This is an actual case 

that occurred in New York a number of years ago. How would you 

deal with it? How do you think we can constitutionally deal with 

it? 

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The town or city—there is a town of Poughkeepsie and a city of 

Poughkeepsie; I forget which it was. It is a small city in New York. People typically spend $4,000 or $5,000—or at least this was true 

20 years ago when what I am about to say occurred. People would 

typically spend $4,000 or $5,000 at the outside to be elected to the, 

I think, nine-or ten-member city council at the time. 

A very large company wanted to build a mall in the—somewhere 

in Poughkeepsie, and the then-Democratically controlled city council for some reason didn’t want them to do that, so they refused to 

let—to give them permission to build the mall. 

The local Republicans were in favor of the mall, basically, and so 

in the next election the local Republicans did what they normally 

did, spent $4,000 or $5,000 apiece to run for office, but this company came in and spent $20 million on an independent campaign 

expenditure, completely bowled over the local Republicans, who 

had no control of what was going on, made all sorts of allegations 

against the other people, made all sorts of claims on behalf of the 

Republicans, who had nothing to say about the matter and repudiated it afterwards, said, ‘‘I didn’t mean that. I didn’t say that.’’ 

Be that as it may, the Republicans got elected. As they had said 

they would do, they approved the mall. The company then started 

building. Eventually the mall was built. All of this came out in 

public. The local electorate got infuriated. They couldn’t punish the 

company, so they punished the local Republicans, who were really 

not at fault at all. 

But the mall got built, and the local democratic procedure, the— 

of everybody was completely overturned by some company coming 

in and spending—I forget how many millions of dollars in a campaign that normally wouldn’t have totaled, for all people involved, 

$20,000, $30,000, and just completely overwhelmed the local system. 

How do we protect against the use of corporate assets to completely stifle a democratic procedure in a case like that, given this 

decision? 

Mr. PARNELL. Well, I think I would disagree with one of the fundamental premises of your statement there, which is that the 

democratic procedure was somehow thwarted or overturned, because the voters of those towns—they were the ones that—— 

Mr. NADLER. One town. 

Mr. PARNELL. I am sorry? 

Mr. NADLER. One town. 

Mr. PARNELL. Oh, I am sorry, one town. They were the ones who 

had to listen to this million dollars, $500,000, 20—whatever 

amount of money was spent—they were the ones that had to listen 

to the arguments made in those campaign ads or mailers, or whatever it was, and ultimately decide, ‘‘Do I believe this? Do I agree 

with this? Does this make sense to me? Or do I not?’’ 

Mr. NADLER. So in other words, someone has a corporate interest 

to build a mall. 

Mr. PARNELL. Right. 

Mr. NADLER. They come in and spend $20 million, or $5 million, 

or whatever it was, never mentioning the mall, saying that the 

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ple they like elected, although they liked them only on one thing, 

the mall. The mall gets built. 

As soon as the electorate finds out what happened, they get infuriated, do what they can, throw out the hapless beneficiaries of this 

corporate spending. But the town never got a fair hearing on the 

mall. 

Mr. PARNELL. I, again, don’t know that I would agree with your 

description. I mean, there are always factors that come into elections for city council or any other. You have endorsements by organizations. You have media coverage. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. So you think that what happened there is 

okay and we shouldn’t be concerned about something like that 

being replicated. 

Mr. PARNELL. I think that what you—if you want to be concerned 

about anything, I would be concerned about an electorate that 

maybe was not paying attention or discerning enough to be able to 

say, ‘‘These allegations—— 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. 

Mr. PARNELL [continuing]. Are not worth considering in my voting process.’’ I mean, ultimately, voters are sovereign. They are responsible for—— 

Mr. NADLER. But they are sovereign—and you believe that this 

kind of overwhelming thing doesn’t defeat the sovereignty of the 

voters. Okay, that is a philosophical distinction—difference. Thank 

you very much. 

I will now recognize the distinguished Ranking Member of the 

Subcommittee, the gentleman from Wisconsin. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, thank you very much. 

Listening to the Democratic witnesses today, I get the impression 

that they think the sky is falling. And I don’t think the sky is falling, but I think that the Citizens United case is a natural progression to what has happened over the last 35 or 40 years on the 

whole issue of campaign finance. 

You know, let me say that every time Congress and the Court 

has tightened the screws relative to campaign finance, something 

has happened where there is more money that has been gone off 

the books and away from the direct control of candidates and the 

direct responsibility of candidates. 

And let me give you a historical progression. In 1972 there was 

a man that gave several million dollars to Nixon’s campaign. Nixon 

disgraced the presidency. The Watergate Congress passed a campaign finance bill that limited contributions. And what did we get? 

We got PACs, political action committees. 

In 1976 the Supreme Court decided the Buckley case. And the 

Buckley case essentially said that Congress and the States could 

regulate candidates but could not regulate individuals and equated 

the spending of money to influence campaigns as something that 

was protected by the First Amendment. Shortly afterwards, we 

ended up getting soft money as a result of that. 

The McCain-Feingold bill attempted to get rid of soft money, 

which was money not given for candidate advocacy but given to 

parties for party-building activities like voter registration, absentee 

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gold made that illegal, and we had more and more money go off 

the books for the so-called independent expenditures. 

And now the chickens have come home to roost as a result of all 

of these decisions that have been made either legislatively or judicially with the Citizens United case. 

Now, you know, maybe, you know, I am a little bit, you know, 

over reactive as the Democratic witnesses are on this. But I have 

always believed that we don’t need a First Amendment to protect 

politically correct speech. The reason the First Amendment was 

passed by the first Congress was to protect politically incorrect 

speech. 

And the three Democratic witnesses, I think, have accurately zeroed in on speech that is politically incorrect which the Court has 

said is protected by the First Amendment. And they kind of sent 

the message that no matter how hard we try with the statute to 

correct the Citizens United speech—or Citizens United decision, we 

are—that also is going to meet a similar fate as a result of this Supreme Court majority. 

Now, that being said, you know, let me ask the three Democratic 

witnesses, should we try to amend the statute to try to deal with 

this, as each of you have said in a little bit different way, which 

will result in litigation and perhaps the same result? Or should we 

deal with this issue by a constitutional amendment, as Senator 

Kerry and Committee Chairman Conyers have recognized and have 

introduced? 

And I would just like to ask a yes or no answer, beginning with 

you, Professor Tribe. 

Mr. TRIBE. If the only word I can use is yes or no, it would be 

no. But if I may ask, as a matter of personal privilege, to address 

the question of whether we are ‘‘Democratic witnesses,’’ I very 

much agree with Congressman Watt that this is not and should not 

be a partisan issue. 

I know it was the majority that called us here, but I have, for 

example—— 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, I am running out of time. Mr. Parnell 

was invited by me. 

Yes or no, Ms. Youn? 

Ms. YOUN. I would have to say no. I would say let’s push back 

against the First Amendment which, until last month, did not permit this distortion of our democracy. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. 

Mr. Simon? 

Mr. SIMON. I don’t support a constitutional amendment as the 

remedy for this decision. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, I am glad you said—all three of you 

have said that, because if we have a constitutional amendment 

that would mean that Congress would be amending the Bill of 

Rights for the first time in history, and that opens up a very disturbing Pandora’s Box, and I would not support a constitutional 

amendment. 

Going to the next step, if we want to have political responsibility 

consistent with the First Amendment, what about getting rid of all 

of these restrictions and instead have a Federal law that channels 

all of the money through candidate committees, where the canVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:02 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\020310\54761.000 HJUD1 PsN: 54761
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didate is responsible for the source of the financing, the amounts 

of the financing and how that money is expended, but also have a 

law that requires that all of this information be placed on the 

Internet before the money hits the candidate’s bank account? 

Wouldn’t that be the way to very clearly constitutionally deal 

with this issue in a way that does not raise any First Amendment 

questions either as a result of the Citizens United decision or as a 

result of any of the previous decisions the Court has made? 

Let’s start with you, Mr. Parnell, since you were off the hook on 

the last question. 

Mr. PARNELL. Thank you, Congressman. Obviously, yes, I believe 

that—well, actually, I need to kind of separate. You have two different statements in there. 

The idea of simply allowing people to contribute to candidates 

that they support, they believe in, without limits, without restrictions—that is certainly what we believe the First Amendment protects, and so we would be all in favor of the general proposal as 

outlined by you. 

One thing, though—and I may have misunderstood what you 

were saying—you said channeling all of the money through candidates, and that would, if I am understanding you correctly, exclude still independent groups—the National Rifle Association, 

Exxon Mobile, the United Auto Workers. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, the point that I want to make is that 

if any of us up here on the dais accepts a million dollars from 

Exxon Mobil and discloses that prior to the money hitting our bank 

account, I think we all would have a very tough time persuading 

voters to vote for us when the election comes. 

Mr. PARNELL. Yes. Yes. I just wanted to make the point that I 

was a little unsure of what you were saying in terms of independent spending and whether independent spending would still be 

allowed under the statute that you proposed. And obviously, we are 

very keen—— 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I don’t think we can prohibit it. 

Mr. PARNELL. Exactly. I just—— 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Yeah. 

Mr. PARNELL [continuing]. Wanted to make sure that—— 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. And that was not Citizens United. That 

was Buckley. 

Mr. PARNELL. That was Buckley, exactly. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. 

Mr. PARNELL. One of the things that has kind of gotten lost here 

in talking about precedents being overturned is that Austin v. 

Michigan was, in fact, a rejection of a part of Buckley that ruled 

that independent expenditures are not corrupting. They cannot be 

corrupting. 

And so to the extent that the argument is being made that the 

Supreme Court went way out on a limb here in rejecting precedent, 

all they did was actually bring back the original 1976 precedent, 

which I think everybody in the world of campaign finance understands is the guiding precedent in the world of campaign finance. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank you, and—I thank the gentleman. 

96 

And I will now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

If it is any consolation to Mr. Sensenbrenner, I want to assure 

him that I don’t support a constitutional amendment to address 

this issue either, not that that matters, I am sure. 

I actually have two questions that I—maybe will convert this 

from somewhat of an esoteric discussion that sometimes constituents can’t understand to a real-life situation. And I am going to tie 

the two questions together because I think they are related. 

First of all, my first question is do corporations have the same 

rights under our Constitution as individuals, and second, to, related to that, find out what—whether there are any limitations left 

after this Supreme Court decision on what a corporation can do either as an independent uncoordinated expenditure or what—whatever, by postulating this example, which I think my constituents 

will understand very well. 

I come from Charlotte. That is the largest center of my—in my 

congressional district, happens to be the—at least up until the 

banking and economic meltdown, the second largest financial center next to Wall Street. I had more financial interests in my congressional district than any other Member of Congress other than 

Carolyn Maloney. 

I am on the Financial Services Committee, and we have had a 

number of very, very difficult issues both before the financial meltdown and since the financial meltdown in which the banking and 

financial services industry—I won’t call particular names, but everybody in my congressional district will understand who I am 

talking about—were not all that happy with where I come down on 

a lot of these issues—predatory lending. 

I was out there very much aggressively in the front of consumer 

financial protection agency. I am a strong advocate of finding some 

solution to this whole too-big-to-fail issue where there are entities 

in my congressional district that everybody acknowledges under 

the old criteria have been too big to fail. 

Now, the question I want to pose is would there be any limits 

if one or more of those financial entities in my congressional district—would there be any limits left in—after the Supreme Court’s 

decision on what they could do if they really decided they want to 

just get rid of this person in Congress? 

That seems to me to convert this from a constitutional theoretical 

discussion into a real-life potential, although I am not anticipating 

that any of them are going to do that. 

I just want to know what the limitations are left and whether 

there is any way that we can constitutionally reconstruct those limitations as Congress that the Supreme Court as currently constituted might uphold. 

I will stop and listen to Professor Tribe and right on down the 

line, to the extent we have time. Yes. 

Mr. TRIBE. Congressman Watt, I think it is a very realistic example, obviously. It is what is real. And the fact is that after this decision, the limits that are left on what they can do are rather paltry. 

They can’t directly contribute. They can’t tell you, ‘‘Congressman Watt, we will give you $100,000, a million dollars, if you back off 

97 

in terms of a predatory lending or too big to fail or a consumer protection agency.’’ But there are no limits on what they can independently spend getting you defeated or your opponent elected. 

But that doesn’t mean that Congress can’t do something between 

now and November to reinstate limits. That is, these are not ideological groups. They have ideologies, but they are not like the National Rifle Association or the Massachusetts Council—— 

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield for a moment? 

Mr. WATT. I am happy to yield. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Just on that point, would it be legal 

under this decision for some corporation to say to a congressman, 

‘‘I have $10 million to spend for you or against you depending how 

you vote on this bill,’’ or would that be bribery? 

Mr. TRIBE. Unfortunately, it is legal. But what we could do is say 

that since these are not—— 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. TRIBE [continuing]. Ideological groups, they are business 

groups, what they are trying to do is deploy their shareholders’ 

money, money that isn’t theirs, money they haven’t given—been 

given specific permission to spend this way, on political causes. 

And therefore, solutions that focus on corporate democracy, corporate governance, as well as solutions that focus on disclosure, 

could at least reinstate not in full the limits that existed before 

Citizens United, the Citizens United, but they could restrict the degree to which the corporations that you are talking about could 

flood the market. 

Ms. YOUN. I wanted to respond first to your first question about 

whether corporations are, indeed, identical to people. Corporate 

spending of the kind at issue in Citizens United is regulated as a 

commonplace matter by this Congress all the time. 

Corporations really do differ in that regard from individuals. A 

corporation cannot spend its money in violation of the business 

judgment rule. I don’t have to subscribe to such a rule in my personal spending. 

I am allowed to waste as much of my money as I want to on anything I want to. A corporation is not entitled to waste corporate assets. Corporate spending is regulated all the time, and it has never 

been considered a problem for the First Amendment. 

But secondly, I wanted to respond to your very pressing question, 

because these are exactly what we believe the stakes to be in this 

decision. Prior to this decision, if a corporation wanted to come 

after you or after any swing vote on a matter—you know, on a matter of great policy urgency, you know, they had two primary options. 

They could lobby, or they could ask their—you know, they could 

ask people to contribute to their PAC, subject to contribution limits. They could also engage in some limited electioneering-type activity. 

But what this allows them to do is to use every dollar in their 

treasuries to come after you or any other swing voter directly, to 

use every dollar to try to get—you know, to try to take you out. 

And they don’t have to do so based on your support of, for example, the—you know, a consumer financial protection agency. They 

98 

can do so based on whatever smear they feel like is the best expenditure of a $100 million advertising campaign. 

Mr. PARNELL. Congressman, I think $100 million against you 

might be a bit of overkill. I don’t think you need to worry about 

that sort of expenditures. 

No, there are no limits on how much a corporation or a union or 

an advocacy group can spend attempting to either bolster your 

campaign or oppose it. I would like to talk about two limits that 

do exist, however. And these are limits on you. 

And this is a limit on how much you are able to coordinate with 

your party, who presumably would like to see you continue in office. Right now, there is a very limited amount of money that you 

are able to coordinate with them. 

I would think that it might be beneficial, if you are the target 

of a large expenditure aimed at unseating you—I would think it 

might be beneficial for you to be able to have unlimited coordinated 

expenditure with your political party which, after all, exists in part 

to help you get elected. 

And then of course, there is also the contribution limits that remain on you and were not fully indexed for inflation from the 1974 

limits that really limit your ability to raise funds in order to get— 

communicate with the voters on why you should, in fact, retain 

your office. 

Mr. WATT. I am not real anxious to raise those limits, I would 

have to tell you. I think that would be—who was it that made that 

point? I am sorry, I wasn’t supposed to interrupt. 

Go ahead, Mr. Simon. My time is way over—expired, but—— 

Mr. SIMON. I will be brief. We have heard the Chairman’s scenario about what happens at—or has happened at a local level with 

corporate spending, and your hypothetical of what can happen at 

the Federal level. 

And I think, unfortunately, this—both are correct. Both are a vision of the world we are now in, and I think that is why it is so 

disturbing. 

In addition to what Professor Tribe suggested in terms of disclosure remedies, which I think are very important, and corporate 

governance remedies, which may be some way to get a handle on 

this, I think there are no—there is no way to impose a direct limit 

on independent spending by a corporation. 

In your particular hypothetical, however, if the—— 

Mr. WATT. Why not, if a corporation is not the equivalent of an 

individual? 

Mr. SIMON. Well—— 

Mr. WATT. I just don’t understand that. 

Mr. SIMON [continuing]. Because five justices of the Supreme 

Court have said that Congress lacks that power at this point. I 

mean, that is the harm caused by the majority opinion. 

Let me just add, though, in your particular hypothetical, if the 

financial institutions you are talking about are recipients, say, of 

TARP money or Federal bailout money, there may be a way on a 

sort of pay-to-play theory to pose limits on independent spending, 

because I think Federal contractors, recipients of large Federal 

funding, do offer an opportunity for congressional action. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

99 

Before recognizing the gentleman from Iowa, I would just point 

out factually to Mr. Parnell that the law was changed a number 

of years ago. The campaign contribution limits were raised since 

1974, and they have been indexed to inflation. In fact, there is a 

cost-of-living increase now in the law. 

The gentleman from Iowa is recognized. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am not aware that that is the case for PAC contributions, but 

individuals? Would that be a clarification? Yes. 

And I would turn my first attention to Professor Tribe. 

And I appreciate all the witnesses being here today, and it is a 

civic service you are all providing. 

And you referenced in your opening statement, Professor, about 

Justice Stevens’ dissent, which I have to confess I have not read. 

But I would ask if you could, in a succinct way, address anything 

he might have written in his dissent that actually focuses on the 

constitutional question rather than anything that might be broader. 

I have heard a lot about the implications of the decision, not very 

much about the dissent on whether the majority’s opinion was 

grounded in the Constitution. So what was his argument? 

Mr. TRIBE. Well, Representative King, it—I couldn’t do justice to 

all of his 90 pages, and it would take up more than your 5 minutes. 

But his argument was entirely about the Constitution. 

That is, he did rhetorically say that he feared the consequences 

for democracy, but he went back to the founding, talked about the 

concept—how shocked the founders would be if they thought—if 

someone suggested that corporations in general had the same 

rights as individuals. 

Indeed, the equation of money with speech is a rather modern innovation. Used to be that money talks was kind of a metaphor and 

an insult, but it now has become the Constitution of the United 

States. 

And that really begins with decisions like Buckley. It was not 

part of the founding. So he says if you are a genuine originalist, 

he explains in very great historical detail—which Justice Scalia 

tries in his concurring opinion to answer but in my view not very 

successfully, though, believe it or not, I very often agree with Justice Scalia on First Amendment matters. 

He tries to show, Justice Stevens does, that at the founding no 

one would have thought that corporations in general have the same 

rights as people, especially in the electoral area. That is, there was 

a voter-focused concept at the founding. 

Voting was basic, although it wasn’t extended, as we all know, 

tragically, to the entire electorate. And the idea that entities that 

couldn’t vote, like foreign corporations, could influence American 

elections would have been anathema. 

And then he proceeds with the jurisdictional and jurisprudential 

development of the law and really takes apart in a way that would 

be an instructive sort of lesson for law students every argument in 

the majority. 

The majority’s response is at a very abstract level. The majority 

says, ‘‘We have long had a principle that someone’s identity is irrelVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:02 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\020310\54761.000 HJUD1 PsN: 54761
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evant to the value of his speech.’’ And then he refers to a case, 

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 

Now, that is a case with which I agree. But the difference there 

is that the State of Massachusetts tried to engage in controlling politically incorrect speech. That is, they basically—— 

Mr. KING. If I could interrupt for a moment, please, Professor, 

and if I could go back to the point about—— 

Mr. TRIBE. Sure. 

Mr. KING [continuing].—Justice Stevens, did he write about or 

consider the requirements in our past history of ownership of property as a condition to the right to vote? Was that considered in the 

decision? 

Mr. TRIBE. I don’t think that there is a reference to it, except 

that there is a footnote that talks about how the right to vote has 

been broadened by the poll tax amendment. 

Mr. KING. Okay. Well, thank you. I think that lays a little bit 

of the background, and I just wanted some of that into the record. 

And then, I just recall, Ms. Youn, when you talked about the— 

actually, I think you said, ‘‘I defy anyone to take the statement 

that corporations have been unable to express their point of view.’’ 

And in keeping with my opening remarks—and I expressed that 

they are constrained from expressing their point of view, and as I 

operate inside this political bubble that we are in, I see them continually constrained from expressing their point of view. 

And I think they are intimidated from expressing their point of 

view for fear they will be punished. In fact, in a—and this just 

comes across my mind—an Energy and Commerce markup of that 

bill that I mentioned, the cap and trade bill, one of the most stellar 

witnesses who testified most vigorously against cap and trade before he walked out of the room was handed a letter that his corporation would be investigated. 

And so that was a complete open and blatant example of intimidation of a corporation. The rest of the—many of the other corporations—I can’t speak for all of them—were constrained in their testimony because they feared they would be investigated. This corporation was handed the letter as the star witness walked out of the 

chamber. 

So I think they have been constrained. I think they have been 

unable to express their point of view out of fear that—as you referenced, interest for their shareholders and their assets. 

And so I make the argument back to you and give you an opportunity to rebut my argument. 

Mr. TRIBE. Are you directing that—— 

Mr. KING. To Ms. Youn, please. 

Mr. TRIBE. Okay. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Professor. 

Ms. YOUN. I don’t know the circumstances of the exact investigation that you reference. I would say that investigation that is solely 

done to harass a corporation or an individual for its viewpoint is 

intensely problematic. 

But what I would say is that it is important to distinguish in 

these instances between intimidation for whatever reason and government censorship. 

101 

For example, I might be intimidated from, you know, expressing 

my views on—I don’t know—politics in a variety of fora. I might 

fear that someone would come up with a rejoinder. But that is not 

the same thing as censorship. 

Mr. KING. Well, thank you. And then I would turn to Mr. Parnell. 

And I will make this statement. I am a person who comes at this 

thing from a constitutional perspective, and our hearing here is 

about how do we shape legislation that will not be overturned by 

the Court by their view of constitutional perspective. 

But I am not hearing argument about what the Constitution actually allows, and it does go back, in my view, just simply to the 

definition of what is a person, what is an entity, how is your voice 

heard. There are a lot of different ways to analyze that. 

And I would make, again, the point that I want to see free enterprise of speech the same way I want to see free enterprise economically. And this Nation is founded on free enterprise capitalism. 

And some of those freedoms are rooted back in the First Amendment and that ability for that free speech. And as you heard my 

remarks on—in the beginning, Mr. Parnell, about how corporations 

are intimidated from actually the full-throated voice in the political 

arena. 

And I had some reservations, too, because I often sit in a meeting 

and—or I will hear legislation here, and they will say, ‘‘I just want 

to level the playing field.’’ But generally, that means that it wants 

to be tilted a little bit in favor of the advocate for changing the 

angle of the playing field. 

And I understand that this path that has been directed and 

opened up is fraught with peril. But freedom is always fraught 

with peril, and I would ask if you could speak to that issue from 

your perspective. 

Mr. PARNELL. Sure. I mean, obviously, I largely agree with the 

sentiments that you expressed. You know, talking about intimidation of corporations—and certainly, unions get intimidated. Activists get intimidated. 

I note that Congressman Cohen is here. He is the sponsor, I believe, of an anti-SLAPP law that my organization recently signed 

on that is designed to prevent people from filing lawsuits against 

people with the aim of silencing their voices and prohibiting them 

from participating in politics. 

The political process is messy and chaotic, and I am not telling 

you anything that you don’t know, that you have to deal with people who criticize you and who don’t particularly think you are 

doing a good job in office, and it takes money to criticize you. It 

also takes money to praise you. It takes money for you to explain 

to the voters why they should vote for you. 

My group starts with the premise that Congress shall make no 

law, and that kind of settles a lot of these questions for us, and 

I think that that maybe ties in with your perspective on this. You 

know, I don’t really know that I have a lot to add to that. 

Mr. KING. Well—— 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman—— 

102 

Mr. KING [continuing]. Thank you, and I—as watching my time 

conclude, I will restrain my concluding statement and yield back to 

the Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I think this whole thing started when we tried to 

regulate issue ads. We had always regulated express advocacy, 

where you are telling somebody who to vote for and who to vote 

against, but had given a pretty much free pass on issue ads, where 

you can talk about an issue and then tell the public to call them 

and tell them to stop voting that way, or tell them to vote this way 

or that way. 

The issue ads became ‘‘sham’’ issue ads because although it said 

it was really advocacy, and that line was in a fairly bizarre place, 

but the only thing worse than where the line was was anywhere 

else you tried to put it. And so we were kind of stuck in that place. 

I guess we tried to do that with McCain-Feingold, and what the 

Supreme Court apparently did is just wipe out the whole matrix. 

It said, ‘‘Issue ad, express ad, well, you can do anything you want 

anyway.’’ 

Is there any way that we can get back to pre-McCain-Feingold 

where we could at least put some limit on express advocacy and 

give free speech to issue advocacy? 

Mr. TRIBE. Congressman Scott, I think the answer is no. You can 

improve disclosure, corporate governance, try to restrict pay to 

play, which really could take care of a lot of problems, because a 

lot of these companies are on the receiving end of government contracts, government bailouts. 

But even if someone says, quite up front, vote for or against Congressman Scott, vote for his opponent, that is clearly something 

that, if it is independent, they could spend all the money in their 

general treasury on after this decision. 

And since I am not in favor of a constitutional amendment, and 

the Court has the last word on the meaning of the First Amendment, that is going to stay, and you have to operate within that 

framework. 

You know, the Court—I think Justice Jackson once said—is not 

infallible because it is final. That is, it has the last word, but that 

doesn’t make it infallible. Nonetheless, that is what we have to 

work with. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is there any way—you could put limits on what 

someone can contribute to an individual. Is there no limit on what 

individuals and now corporations can spend independently? 

Mr. Parnell? 

Mr. PARNELL. Congressman, no, there are no limits that are— 

based on what an individual or a corporation can spend independently. 

Buckley v. Valeo—the Court ruled that individuals could not be 

restrained in any way in their ability to spend unlimited sums. 

And now, obviously, in Citizens United that has been extended to 

the incorporated entities. 

Mr. SCOTT. Could we do anything under a public financing matrix that could limit anyone, or are we still stuck with the canVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:02 Apr 28, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\020310\54761.000 HJUD1 PsN: 54761
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didates limited by public financing and everybody else spending 

unlimited amounts? 

Ms. YOUN. The voluntary restrictions that candidates accept 

when they enter into a public financing system would allow their 

spending and potentially their acceptance of beneficial independent 

expenditures to be regulated. 

But the Court’s current ruling does not permit independent expenditures outside that arena to be restricted. 

Mr. SCOTT. Wait a minute. You mean coordinated independent 

expenditures. If you have a totally uncoordinated independent expenditure, could a public financing matrix limit that expenditure if 

it is not coordinated? 

Ms. YOUN. It couldn’t limit that expenditure, no. But what it 

could do—— 

Mr. SCOTT. So you might find yourself in a situation where the 

candidate is locked into an agreement to spend so much and then, 

out of the blue, is overwhelmed and limited and defenseless against 

express advocacy ads taking over the campaign. 

Mr. SIMON. Congressman, if I might answer that, heretofore public financing systems have in that situation either lifted the spending limit imposed on the opt-in candidate participating in public financing or given additional public funds to the opt-in candidate in 

order to address unlimited outside spending. 

Unfortunately, there is a trend in a couple of lower court provisions that have invalidated those kinds of remedies for opt-in candidates which is, I think, a controversial reading of a different Supreme Court decision a couple of years ago in Davis v. FEC. 

So I think that particular issue you are pointing to is a matter 

of unsettled law at the moment. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Texas is recognized. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And do appreciate the point of view of all the witnesses. 

And in hearing the discussion earlier about corporate America 

and making it sound as if Republicans believed that corporations 

were too big to fail, I would point out to my friends that on the 

TARP bailout there were twice as many Democrats that voted to 

protect these groups that were too big to fail as there were Republicans, and that the reports indicate that the contributions from 

Wall Street executives to the Democratic Party is consistent with 

what was contributed to President Obama, and that is 4-1 contributed to Democrats and President Obama over Republican candidates—that of the Wall Street executives. 

Some of us wanted to see AIG go to bankruptcy, and those parts 

that were productive and were making a profit be broken up so we 

didn’t have to worry about too big to fail in the future. 

And I am not nearly as concerned as some of our witnesses about 

corporations being able to make contributions and actually toward 

commercials, toward advertising, because what we have seen is corporations are probably the most easily intimidated group of persons, as they are defined, in America. It doesn’t take much of a 

boycott to seem to set them on a different course. 

104 

So it seems to me that the most important thing that we should 

never get away from—and I know this has been mentioned, but it 

is transparency. And I would love to co-sponsor any kind of legislation that required greater transparency. 

And I would be open to anything you might suggest in the way 

of laws to control foreign contributions toward manipulation of our 

elections. 

I don’t know whether you would want to put a limit, say, at 5 

percent—no greater than 5 percent ownership of a corporation by 

foreign entities, and what kind of disclosures might be most helpful 

in getting to transparency, because I don’t mind corporate persons 

buying advertising, but I sure do want to know who owns that corporation and make sure that it is not a significant amount of foreign ownership trying to manipulate our U.S. elections. 

So as you have time to think in the days ahead, I would love to 

hear from you on any thoughts you might have. If you have some 

today, I am glad to hear that, too. 

Mr. TRIBE. Congressman Gohmert, I certainly agree with you 

that transparency is extremely important. And in my prepared 

statement, I tried to suggest how the disclosure requirements 

should be tightened. 

But I think the Chairman’s example of the company that was 

really interested in having that mall built, and it was willing to 

spend millions of dollars to completely swamp the amounts that 

were otherwise spent—that is a good example of how transparency 

alone won’t solve the problem. 

Everyone knew which companies were putting that money in. 

The fact is that those companies could not constitutionally be required to disclose all of their motives. They came in and had ads 

that didn’t say anything about the mall one way or the other. 

And that is why other forms of protection—I mean, a lot of people who invested in those companies that wanted to build the mall 

didn’t put their money there because of that alone. They—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. And I can understand that example, and I see my 

time is going to an end. But I would also point to you numerous 

times when, you know, as we have seen repeatedly, Americans love 

an underdog. And if it looks like the big guy is whipping up on the 

little guy, they seem to flock to the little guy. 

If one party ends up having the White House and both houses, 

then people start being bothered by—like that. They like what the 

founders did, and that is contention. That is a little bit of gridlock 

so government doesn’t run out and make too many laws to take 

away their liberties. 

And I would also mention, when we talk about government intimidation, how about—and I hope my friend as Chairman of the 

Crime Committee—he and I are working on over-criminalization. 

I see this morning a story that the IRS has put out—posted a 

solicitation for 60 new Remington model 870 Police 12 gauge pump 

shotguns, and maybe we need a hearing to see what the IRS wants 

to do with those 60—because that sounds intimidating to me. I 

don’t know, maybe—— 

Mr. TRIBE. I think it would intimidate not only a corporation, but 

it would scare me. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, thank you. 

105 

But I appreciate the time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

I will now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. On this issue, I heard the Ranking Member of 

the full Committee talk about the issue of foreign corporations or 

foreign influence. 

You know, my understanding of the financial markets is that 

American domestically-domiciled corporations are open to have 

their shares traded on the financial markets. Am I correct in that 

rather—— 

Mr. TRIBE. Certainly. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, one could develop scenarios where 

simply because an American corporation was incorporated in the 

State of Delaware, for example—might very well have a significant 

share of its stock held by foreigners. 

One can even speculate that national corporations, whether they 

be state-owned oil companies or state-owned enterprises, could, in 

fact, have substantial holdings in American corporations. 

Does that present a problem to any of you? 

Mr. TRIBE. I think it is a terrible problem, Congressman 

Delahunt. That is, if you believe, as the founders did, that one of 

the dangers America faces is the danger that nations and their 

residents that are not necessarily friendly to us will be able, behind 

the scenes, to manipulate American elections. 

Current law is not structured adequately to protect against that. 

Even a wholly-owned domestic corporation with Saudi Arabia or 

some other country pulling the financial strings is liberated by this 

decision to powerfully affect the outcome of State, local and Federal 

elections. 

And the only way to deal with that—and it is important that it 

be dealt with quickly—is to tighten dramatically the restrictions on 

foreign influence on American elections. That is where I think Congress ought to start, because I believe there would be wide consensus on the virtue of doing that. That is not a Democratic or a 

Republican issue. 

We have always said that politics stops at the water’s edge. That 

usually means that when people go abroad we are one Nation indivisible. But here, I think it should work the other way, that we 

really don’t want other nations directly or indirectly to be pulling 

the strings in American elections. And the law should be tightened 

to deal with that. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, when I hear the statement made by 

my good friend from Texas that, you know, there—or at least the 

inference that I drew from his observation was that we don’t have 

to be concerned about it because our laws are on the books. 

But that seems—if I can finish, Mr. Parnell—— 

Mr. PARNELL. I am sorry, I thought you were wrapping up. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Oh, no. No. 

Mr. PARNELL. Okay. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am not wrapping up yet. But I will let you 

know when I wrap up. 

But my point is that there is a concern that I have about foreigners, foreign corporations. In some cases I don’t know who owns 

106 

what anymore in this global economy. We talk about the global 

economy, and we don’t know who owns what. 

You know, we talk about Exxon Mobil. Who are the shareholders 

of Exxon Mobil? Are there relationships between State oil companies elsewhere and subsidiaries, therefore, Ms. Youn? 

Ms. YOUN. Well, I mean, that is exactly one of the issues. I mean, 

China Telecom America is a U.S. corporation that is incorporated 

in Delaware. China Construction America is incorporated in Delaware. Two—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Now, China Telcom—is that a state-owned—Chinese Communist state-owned entity? 

Ms. YOUN. I don’t have that information. But I think that 

the—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. So we don’t know. 

Ms. YOUN. I don’t know. But the foreign-owned corporations’ 

problem is only, I think, a subset of the bigger problem where, if 

a corporation is to buy an election out from under us, we the voters 

don’t have anyone we can hold accountable, like in the Poughkeepsie example. There is no one we can vote out in that—— 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right, but my point is—and I understand the 

larger issue, but my point is we hear a lot here in Congress and 

obviously in the media about terrorists and terrorism. 

You know, one can conjure up a conspiracy, if you will, that there 

is a cabal out there that is purchasing X number of shares of an 

American corporation that will exercise influence not in the best interests of the United States, necessarily. 

And I think we all know that, you know, shareholders do have 

some influence occasionally but, you know, maybe there is a director that is susceptible to certain influence. I know this sounds like 

a Ludlum novel, but a lot of what I hear today sounds like a 

Ludlum novel. 

I mean, I think we have got to be concerned about the possibility 

of individuals or corporations or adversaries who are hostile to the 

United States and to our interests and who might very well be advocates for acts of terrorism against the United States to be influencing our elections. 

And I have now wrapped up. And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Georgia for 5 minutes. 

And we have a series of five votes which will probably take about 

45 minutes. Maybe we can wrap up in time. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Parnell, can you tell us who the Center for Competitive Politics is? 

Mr. PARNELL. Sure. The Center for Competitive Politics was 

founded by former FEC commissioner Bradley Smith in 2005. Our 

mission is to focus on promoting and protecting the First Amendment political rights of speech, assembly and petition—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Where do you get your funding from? 

Mr. PARNELL. We get our funding from American citizens who 

share our perspective on the First Amendment. 

Mr. JOHNSON. How do you market to them, through what vehicles? 

107 

Mr. PARNELL. Sure. We find individuals who we believe share 

our perspective on campaign finance, and we ask them to contribute. It is probably not that much of a different process from 

what you go through when you are raising money. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, let me ask you this. Isn’t it true that your 

firm—you are the president—Center for Competitive Politics—isn’t 

it a fact that you also accept contributions from corporations? 

Mr. PARNELL. I would accept contributions from corporations, but 

I—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. But do you? 

Mr. PARNELL [continuing]. Have not yet received any, at least 

not—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Have you ever received in connection with the 

Center for Competitive Politics a contribution from corporations? 

Mr. PARNELL. In 2008 I received one contribution that amounted 

to about 1 percent of our total receipts. And in 2007 I received another corporate contribution that also amounted to about 1 percent 

of our receipts. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, now, you don’t have to make any kind of 

public disclosure of who you receive money from, is that correct? 

Mr. PARNELL. I am sorry, the question was did I oppose—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. No, no. You don’t have to disclose to the public 

who your corporations or who your contributors are. 

Mr. PARNELL. That is correct. All (c)(3) organizations—well, most 

(c)(3) organizations do not have to disclose their donors. There are 

some circumstances under which some donations are disclosed. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, it seems a little suspicious to me that on the 

eve of this hearing you would then be announced as the Republican 

witness. How long ago did you agree to testify in front of this panel 

in a private way with your Republican friends? 

Mr. PARNELL. I was asked last week. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And any particular reason why you did not want 

that information to get out until yesterday? 

Mr. PARNELL. I was asked by the minority not to preempt the 

Committee’s announcement that I would be testifying. My understanding is that it is kind of considered bad form to announce that 

you are testifying before the Committee has officially invited 

you—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. 

Mr. PARNELL [continuing]. To testify. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Well, and the Committee in this sense 

would be the minority party, the Republicans. They would be the 

ones that would extend the invitation to you, correct? 

Mr. PARNELL. Officially, the letter I received was from Chairman 

Nadler. But yes, it was through Chairman Sensenbrenner’s staff or 

the Committee minority party staff that I was invited. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, now, let me ask you this question. You are 

not here to support the notion that corporations should have a 

right to actually vote in the United States political arena. 

Mr. PARNELL. Certainly not. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And so they are a little different than individuals, 

persons, here in America, live human beings registered to vote, correct? 

Mr. PARNELL. Of course they are. 

108 

Mr. JOHNSON. And now, I am wondering whether or not this ruling in Citizens United has adversely impacted the ability of the average American walking the streets, blood flowing through their 

veins and through their heart and everything and, you know, 

breathing the air—that we are trying to get cleaned up, by the 

way—against the insidious advertising budgets of corporations like 

Exxon—$45 billion dollar a year profit. 

But do you think that our—don’t you think—let me ask it like 

that—that the citizens’ right to control what goes on in the political 

arena—their right to vote—is adversely impacted by this decision 

in Citizens United? 

And also, I want to get into your explanation for why you 

thought—or your speculation as to why you think the United 

States Supreme Court would stoop to this level of judicial activism 

and also this legislating from the bench argument, those two arguments being used against Democratic nominees for judgeships, 

Federal judgeships. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The witness may answer briefly. 

Mr. PARNELL. Okay. I will try. The first thing to remember about 

corporations, whether they are unions, whether they are for-profit 

corporations, or whether it is the National Rifle Association, is they 

are associations of individuals gathered together for a particular 

purpose—perhaps collective bargaining, perhaps to make a profit. 

So no, I don’t believe that the rights of average citizens are, you 

know, diminished by this because average citizens are union members. They are stockholders. They are members of NARAL ProChoice America. They are members of the Sierra Club. 

What this decision does is it allows those associated entities to 

speak on behalf of, in a more effective manner, you know, what 

citizens could do by themselves. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I now recognize the gentlelady from Wisconsin. 

Ms. BALDWIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I know in thinking about the impact of this case, a lot of us, 

since we have all stood for election and do every 2 years, think 

about it in the context of congressional races. But I am very, very 

intrigued about the impact this could have on judicial races. 

I know, Professor Tribe, you referenced that in your opening 

statement. My home State of Wisconsin has seen in the last couple 

of election cycles some of the nastiest and most partisan judicial 

races for our State supreme court in a long time. And also, there 

is—clearly, we have local judgeship elections in the State of Wisconsin also. 

In your testimony, Professor Tribe, you said 39 States have judicial elections. I think it is 21 that have supreme court judge—they 

are elected by the voters. 

I wonder if you could speak in a little more detail about the impact that you believe Citizens United may have on judicial races. 

Mr. TRIBE. Certainly, Representative Baldwin. I think that Citizens United, by extension of its reasoning, prevents States from imposing flat prohibitions on business for-profit corporations’ independent expenditures in State and local elections, including judicial 

elections. 

109 

Now, some of those States already failed to have limits, but they 

were considering imposing them in light of the experiences in Wisconsin, in Minnesota, in Michigan, in some other States. 

But this pours cold water on those direct efforts, which is why 

in my testimony I suggested one possibility for States, and that is 

at least trying to prevent out-of-state interests from influencing the 

outcome of those elections, something that you couldn’t do because 

of the commerce clause without Congress giving permission. 

It is sort of like the situation in the health insurance industry 

where I think the permission that States were given to build a wall 

proved to be a terrible idea, and one of the things that I guess you 

all are considering now is changing the antitrust exemption. 

But one area where it might make sense to take advantage of the 

ability of States to ensure that foreigners, as it were—and Justice 

Stevens pointed out that vis-a-vis your State of Wisconsin the citizens of other States may be foreigners—that they are not allowed 

to influence outcomes. 

But one other thing that I think this decision does, by signaling 

the danger of virtually unlimited independent corporate expenditures—and some of them, until we tighten the coordination rules, 

may not be all that independent. 

But one thing it does is highlight the necessity to seriously consider what Justice O’Connor has made really a crusade, in which 

I am going to be helping her in every way I can, for States to consider whether they should go to a different way of selecting judges, 

perhaps merit selection followed by retention elections, because the 

importance of preserving an independent State judiciary is extremely crucial to the rule of law in this country, as I am sure you 

know. 

And I think this decision may give an impetus to that movement, 

because even if you do all the things that I have recommended in 

terms of transparency, corporate governance, the exclusion of outsiders, the exclusion of pay to play—even if you do all of that, this 

decision still leaves a margin of corporate influence that you might 

want to try to restrict by not having elections for judges. 

Ms. YOUN. What the—— 

Ms. BALDWIN. Ms. Youn? Yes. 

Ms. YOUN [contiinuing]. What the Wisconsin example really 

brings home as well is the extent to which the deregulatory push 

by the Roberts Court is taking options off the table for State government. 

Wisconsin, in response to this massive corruption scandal, recently passed a judicial public financing system. That judicial public financing system is now being constitutionally attacked by the 

same groups that brought the Citizens United challenge. 

And you know, the degree to which a State can act to keep even 

its judiciary clean is being radically constricted. 

Mr. PARNELL. If I could, I want to take exception to something 

that Ms. Youn said where she described the scandal or corruption 

in Wisconsin. I don’t regard people speaking up, saying, ‘‘This is a 

terrible candidate,’’ or, ‘‘This is a great candidate,’’ as corruption. 

It may be in some minds unwelcome, or unpleasant, or false, 

even, but I would really hesitate before describing free speech in 

the context of a political campaign as somehow being corrupting. 

110 

And real quickly, if I could—— 

Ms. BALDWIN. Well, no, actually, I am running out of time to ask 

my final question, but—— 

Mr. NADLER. I am sorry, the gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Ms. BALDWIN. Oh. 

Mr. NADLER. We have 18 seconds to go on the vote on the floor. 

The gentlelady from Texas has agreed to 1 minute so we could 

wrap the hearing up and not ask the witnesses to stay for an hour 

of votes on the floor. 

Gentlelady from Texas is recognized for 1 minute. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Professor Tribe, my son went to Harvard, and I am going to try 

and be bionic in my words and point to you. Judge Alito was, seemingly was very unhappy with the President’s comments during the 

State of the Union. 

My question to you is—we have to live with the First Amendment. My question to you is how badly will this skew not only the 

First Amendment and one’s right to stand on a position, but what 

legislative fix would you say this Congress needs to look at again? 

Mr. TRIBE. It seems to me, without taking too much of your time, 

that there are several things that you should look at—limiting foreign influence; limiting influence of out-of-State corporations in 

State elections; limiting pay to play by enacting rules that tell companies that are contracting with State, local or Federal Government or receiving Federal money that one condition of that is that 

they not engage in electioneering, which in turn could expose them 

to all kinds of pressures; looking at better disclosure rules so that 

disclosure is required not only of the identity of the group that puts 

the ad but where their money is coming from; tighter anti-coordination rules; and finally, protections for genuine shareholder democracy by requiring shareholder approval. 

Those are things I think you can look at, and I don’t think that 

Justice Alito’s statement or mouthing of the words that I am sure 

he didn’t expect to be on camera, that ‘‘you are not correct,’’ really 

should be seen as negative. On the contrary, that gives us an insight. 

What that means is that he probably would support restrictions 

on foreign corporate intrusion into elections, because that is what 

he was reacting to. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

I thank the lady for—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Mr. NADLER. We thank the lady for cooperating. 

Without objection, all Members have 5 legislative days to submit 

to the Chair additional written questions for the witnesses which 

we will forward and ask the witnesses to respond as promptly as 

they can so that their answers may be made part of the record. 

Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit any additional materials for inclusion in the record. 

We thank the witnesses. 

And the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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