not fit the exceptions we have made for purely legal issues. See State v. 

Babayan,106 Nev. 155, 174, 787 P.2d 805, 819-20 (1990) (granting writ of 

mandamus dismissing an indictment to prevent "gross miscarriage of 

justice"). Therefore, extraordinary relief is not warranted on this claim. 

Second, Lakeman contends that the indictment is inadequate 

because it fails to allege facts that show that he engaged in activity that 

directly resulted in the victim's death. We disagree. 

[T]he second degree felony murder rule applies 

only where the felony is inherently dangerous, 

where death or injury is a directly foreseeable 

consequence of the illegal act, and where there is 

an immediate and direct causal 

relationship—without the intervention of some 

other source or agency—between the actions of the 

defendant and the victim's death. 

Labastida v. State, 115 Nev. 298, 307, 986 P.2d 443, 448-49 (1999). The 

predicate felony must be the immediate and direct cause of the victim's 

death to sustain a conviction. Seeid. at 307, 986 P.2d at 449 (vacating 

conviction for second-degree felony murder where victim's death was the 

direct result of another's abuse and not the defendant's neglect). While 

the indictment alleges that Lakeman indirectly engaged in the felonies of 

criminal neglect of patients and performance of an act in reckless 

disregard of persons or property, it maintains that those crimes were the 

direct and immediate cause of the victim's death. Therefore, he has not 

demonstrated that extraordinary relief is warranted on this claim. 

Third, Lakemen argues that the indictment fails to allege 

what specific acts he committed in order to permit him to defend against 

the charges. He further contends that it fails to allege how he aided and 

abetted in the acts. We disagree. The State advances a limited number of 

theories of prosecution. It identifies how each defendant participated in 

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those alleged theories. See State v. Kirkpatrick,94 Nev. 628, 630, 584 

P.2d 670, 671-72 (1978) (providing where one offense may be committed by 

one or more specified means, an accused must be prepared to defend 

against all means alleged). Therefore, the counts are sufficiently precise 

as to "who is alleged to have done what," State v. Hancock,114 Nev. 161, 

165, 955 P.2d 183, 185 (1998) (internal quotations omitted), and are 

sufficient to put Lakeman on notice of the nature of the offense and the 

essential facts sufficient for him to prepare a defense, Jennings v. State, 

116 Nev. 488, 490, 998 P.2d 557, 559 (2000). Lakeman failed to 

demonstrate that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in 

denying his petition. 

Lastly, Lakeman contends that the State erred in instructing 

the grand jury in two respects. First, he asserts that the State failed to 

instruct the grand jury that second-degree felony murder required the 

jurors to find the predicate crime was the immediate cause of the victim's 

death and that the State incorrectly instructed the grand jury that it need 

not find a particular theory of liability. While the State must instruct the 

grand jury on the elements of the offense alleged, see NRS 172.095(2), we 

have never required the State to instruct the grand jury on the law 

concerning theories of liability, see Schuster v. Dist. Ct., 123 Nev. 187, 

192, 160 P.3d 873, 876 (2007) (observing prosecuting attorney is not 

required to instruct grand jury on law); Hyler v. Sheriff, 93 Nev. 561, 564, 

571 P.2d 114, 116 (1977) (stating that "it is not mandatory for the 

prosecuting attorney to instruct the grand jury on the law"). The State 

had no obligation to instruct the grand jury on the different theories of 

second-degree murder. The record indicates that the grand jury was 

provided the relevant statutes and the indictment set forth the elements of 

3 
the crime. Second, Lakeman contends that the State instructed the jury 

that it was not required to find a particular theory of criminal liability to 

sustain the indictment for second-degree murder. However, the State's 

comment, when read in context, does not alleviate the State's burden of 

proof before the grand jury. Therefore, we conclude that extraordinary 

relief is not warranted on this ground. 

Having considered Lakeman's contentions and concluded that 

they lack merit, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

J. 

J. 

Hardesty 

p. ' 

Parraguirre 

C 

Cherry 

cc: Hon. Valerie Adair, District Judge 

Santacroce Law Offices, Ltd. 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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