U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

45–513 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–77] 

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NATIONAL 

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE REGARDING 

AL QAEDA 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

INTELLIGENCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 25, 2007 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

MARK E. UDALL, Colorado 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

BILL NATTER, Professional Staff Member 

ALEX KUGAJEVSKY, Professional Staff Member 

ANDREW TABLER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas, Chairman 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

RUSH D. HOLT, New Jersey 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

MIKE THOMPSON, California 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

NANCY PELOSI, California, Speaker, Ex Officio Member 

JOHN A. BOEHNER, Ohio, Minority Leader, Ex Officio Member 

MICHAEL DELANEY, Staff Director 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2007 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, July 25, 2007, Implications of the National Intelligence Estimate 

Regarding al Qaeda ............................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, July 25, 2007 ....................................................................................... 57 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 2007 

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 

REGARDING AL QAEDA 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hoekstra, Hon. Peter, a Representative from Michigan, Ranking Member, 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence .................................................... 5 

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence ....................................................................... 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Clapper, Hon. James R., Jr., Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; 

accompanied by Mary Beth Long, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for International Security Affairs; Peter F. Verga, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense; Michael E. Leiter, Principal Deputy Director of the National Counterterrorism Center and Director of the 

Interagency Task Force on Homeland Threats, Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence; and Edward Gistaro, National Intelligence Officer 

for Transnational Threats, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 

beginning on page ................................................................................................ 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Clapper, Hon. James R., Jr. ............................................................................ 78 

Gistaro, Edward, joint with Michael E. Leiter ............................................... 94 

Hoekstra, Hon. Peter ........................................................................................ 71 

Hunter, Hon. Duncan ....................................................................................... 68 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre ....................................................................................... 63 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Committee on 

Armed Services ............................................................................................. 76 

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 61 
Page

VI 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate 

‘‘Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States’’ dated 

April 2006 ...................................................................................................... 103 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Eshoo .......................................................................................................... 109 

Mr. Issa ............................................................................................................. 109 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 113 

Mr. Skelton ....................................................................................................... 113 
(1) 

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

ESTIMATE REGARDING AL QAEDA 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, MEETING JOINTLY WITH THE PERMANENT

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, Washington, 

DC, Wednesday, July 25, 2007. 

The committees met, pursuant to call, at 1:13 p.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the 

Armed Services Committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, let me welcome today’s 

panelists. Joe Clapper, thank you for being with us, Secretary 

Long, Secretary Verga, Mr. Leiter and Mr. Gistaro. Everyone is 

here. So thank you. 

This is a very special hearing today, as you will soon learn, that 

this is pretty much a once-in-a-decade hearing, and we appreciate 

you being with us today. 

We convene to examine and discuss the implications of the recent 

National Intelligence Estimate, also known as NIE. We are joined 

by and welcome our colleagues from the Intelligence Committee. 

The NIE is entitled: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland. 

The unclassified key judgments contained within include pronouncement that the most persistent threat facing the U.S. homeland over the next three years is the one posed by terrorists and 

especially al Qaeda. As a Nation, we find ourselves in this strategic 

situation after pouring billions of dollars and thousands of troops 

into Iraq. This tremendous sacrifice has diverted our Nation from 

the real war on terror and subjected the Nation to an unacceptable 

level of risk. 

This committee has spent a great deal of time looking at the 

strain on our service members as well as on our equipment. We are 

tasked with ensuring that our military is ready to respond to the 

next contingency wherever it may be. But we must also ensure that 

we can deal with today’s threats, and I am deeply concerned that 

we have not paid sufficient attention to the places that threaten us 

the most. 

Chasing windmills has kept our eye off the more important 

struggle, the ones with roots in Afghanistan. The recent NIE points 

this picture out clearly, an unstable region within the borders of 

Pakistan described as strong and resurgent al Qaeda, that warns 

of a heightened threat environment. In short, it is not good news. 
2 

We have asked today’s panelists to join us for a discussion about 

the scope of the NIE, its assumptions, its implications for our Nation. 

As chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I am also concerned about the implications for the Department of Defense 

(DOD). Must we re-examine the Department of Defense’s force posture? Must we re-assess the Department of Defense’s modernization priorities? Must we revamp the Department’s policies in order 

to address the near-term-threat scenario? These are the pressing 

questions that I look forward to further examination. 

Let me first then recognize the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Silver Reyes, for any comments he may have; and then 

I will go to Ranking Member Hunter and Ranking Member Hoekstra; and I will have some administrative comments shortly thereafter. Mr. Reyes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 61.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE 

ON INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Chairman Skelton. Good afternoon. 

As chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I am pleased at this opportunity to conduct our work in 

open session and to convene a hearing with my colleagues on the 

House Armed Services Committee. Especially since I also serve as 

a member of the Armed Services Committee, I know how closely 

our committees work together to safeguard our Nation and empower our military and intelligence professionals. 

I want to also add my personal welcome to our panel of experts. 

When focusing on an issue as important as al Qaeda, which is 

the topic of today’s hearing, it is critical that our committees work 

closely together. I want to thank my good friend and colleague, Ike 

Skelton, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, for 

his leadership and his partnership, as well as our two ranking 

members, Mr. Hunter and Mr. Hoekstra. 

Today, we will specifically focus on the resurgence of al Qaeda 

as reflected in the July 2007, National Intelligence Estimate entitled: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland. I would like to 

thank our witnesses for joining us here today because your testimony will help our committees work together to examine this very 

critical issue to our country. 

Our efforts to defeat al Qaeda and protect our Nation are not 

separate intelligence or military issues. In order to defeat this most 

urgent threat, all instruments of our national power must work together seamlessly. This joint hearing reflects that approach. 

Four years ago, President Bush told the American people that al 

Qaeda was on the run and that they are not a problem anymore. 

However, the NIE released earlier this month indicates that today 

our Intelligence Community believes otherwise. The NIE states 

that the U.S. homeland will face, and I quote, a persistent and 

evolving terrorist threat over the next three years and that al 

Qaeda has regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability. 
3 

Essentially, the NIE reflect that al Qaeda is not just a problem 

but the most serious threat to our Nation’s security. This is a grave 

issue, and it is critical that Congress know how our country can 

protect itself and ensure that this does not happen again. 

One of our main challenges is that, while the Bush Administration assumed al Qaeda was no longer a threat, the Administration 

has focused our resources in Iraq. This war, which costs the American people approximately $10 billion a month, has diverted needed 

funds and personnel from eliminating the threat of al Qaeda. 

The NIE, however, points out that the al Qaeda threat emanates 

from Afghanistan and Pakistan and not Iraq, and the United 

States has missed critical opportunities to address that threat. 

Moreover, there are signs that the war in Iraq has had an even 

greater negative impact. It appears that our presence in Iraq may 

actually be helping al Qaeda. 

As the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism noted, 

the war in Iraq has become a recruiting tool and training ground 

for terrorists; and, as the new NIE assesses, al Qaeda’s association 

with al Qaeda in Iraq helps al Qaeda raise funds and recruit 

operatives, including for attacks against our country. 

These are critically important issues to the American public, and 

I look forward today to a productive hearing that will not only tell 

us more about the threat laid out in the NIE but how we can best 

fight this threat more effectively. The men and women of the U.S. 

Intelligence Community, the men and women of the U.S. Armed 

Forces and the American public as a whole deserve this careful 

consideration. 

Finally, as I have consistently noted since assuming the chairmanship of the House Intelligence Committee, the threat of terrorism is not a political issue. There is no room for partisan politics 

in the realm of national security. So I look forward to working with 

all of my colleagues, both Republicans and Democrats, to further 

safeguard our Nation; and, as always, I invite all of them to work 

with us. 

Thank you again for joining us here today, and thank you to the 

members of our respective committees who are here as well. 

I would now like to turn it back over to the chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the Appendix on page 63.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from California, the ranking member of the 

House Armed Services Committee, Mr. Hunter. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you and House Intelligence Committee Chairman Reyes for holding the hearing on a topic that I think is very 

critical to both committees, and let me join you in welcoming our 

witnesses today. I think it is important that they are here. 

Over the last week or so, we have been bombarded by lots of public statements that I think have ignored or misrepresented, innocently or intentionally, the findings of the latest National Intel-
4 

ligence Estimate. So, to our witnesses, your testimony is therefore 

timely and welcome, as it should hopefully correct many 

misstatements that are currently circulating. 

I think this summary captures what the Intelligence Community 

and the policymakers and other experts have said about the al 

Qaeda threat and what many will point to as a most important 

finding in the NIE, and that is that al Qaeda is resurgent. 

As we discuss the terrorist threats that confront our homeland, 

we are going to examine our security strategy based on what the 

enemy is doing and could possibly do. However, we can’t lose sight 

that the summary that we provided is very much the same view 

of the situation as al Qaeda’s; and I think we have to remember 

that, in 2004, Osama bin Laden said this, and I quote: The world’s 

millstone and pillar is in Baghdad, the capital of the Caliphate. 

And later Zawahiri, his number two and principal strategist, 

clearly laid out al Qaeda’s strategy for Iraq; and he said, and I 

quote: The first stage, expel the Americans from Iraq. The second 

stage, establish an Islamic authority or emirate, then develop it 

and support it until it achieves the level of a Caliphate. The third 

stage, extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring 

Iraq. Unquote. 

Al Qaeda has been waging an offensive war against us and our 

values for a lot of years, and the group’s clearly stated desire is to 

see us, the West, and the freedom that we represent defeated and 

destroyed. 

Bin Laden’s view of the importance of Iraq has never wavered, 

nor his desire to attack us again on our soil. Yet, despite al Qaeda’s 

effort to break our will, we are also resurgent, in our view, and continue to deny the very opportunities bin Laden hopes to exploit. 

The recent surge in Iraq—and I would commend all my colleagues to take a look at especially the activities in Anbar Province 

and the progress that our Marines have made there. But the recent 

surge in Iraq, our continued strong military presence in Afghanistan and our unwavering dedication to the Iraqi and Afghan people 

have pushed al Qaeda back. Our worldwide efforts, as mentioned 

in the National Intelligence Estimate, have constrained al Qaeda 

in its operations. 

I would just say to folks who find it extremely unusual that we 

have not sustained another attack on American soil, I would remind my colleagues that we have had an aggressive, forward-leaning operation against al Qaeda since the strike on 9/11. It is difficult to plan an attack when some of your planners don’t show up 

at the meeting because they have been killed or captured; and that 

is what has happened on many, many occasions. 

I think we have got to put today’s discussion in perspective. I am 

greatly concerned with al Qaeda’s resurgence in the Pakistani tribal area of North Waziristan, and I have expressed my concern in 

a February letter to the President on that point. 

In al Qaeda, we are facing a determined, persistent foe who demands our continued dedication and resolve. They pose a continuing and grave threat to our Nation. We all know that. We can’t 

focus our efforts solely on the group’s physical base in the border 

region of Afghanistan and Pakistan, or in Iraq. It seeks to export 

violence from these regions not just to neighboring countries but 
5 

also to the U.S. homeland. It seeks to inspire violent cells in Europe, Africa, Asia and the United States. 

I think we people who thought that the operations were confined 

to Iraq and to Afghanistan were shocked from this view with the 

events that took place in Great Britain a couple of weeks ago. It 

seeks to use cyberspace and emerging technologies to facilitate its 

operation, and it seeks to terrorize our nations with violence. 

But, most of all, al Qaeda seeks to break our will; and that is 

something we cannot allow. We have a say in what happens, and 

we cannot limit our perspective on the threats that we face and the 

impact we can have on those threats. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony and discussion 

of today’s hearing and especially as we hear about the actual assessments found in the NIE, the National Intelligence Estimate, 

not the many misstatements circulating in the press. 

As the National Intelligence Estimate rightly states, al Qaeda 

poses the greatest terrorist threat to our Nation, but the estimate 

addresses a much broader range of terrorist groups and threats, 

and I truly hope that we will examine the overall terrorist assessment and what we can do to address the myriad threats we face. 

Let’s not limit our perspective and discussion to a narrow portion 

of this very important subject. 

Mr. Chairman and Chairman Reyes, thank you for bringing this 

very important joint hearing to our respective committees. I look 

forward to the testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Appendix on page 68.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from California. 

Now the ranking member on the Intelligence Committee, the 

gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Hoekstra. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER HOEKSTRA, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MICHIGAN, RANKING MEMBER, PERMANENT SELECT 

COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Chairman Skelton. It is good to be 

with you and Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member Hunter. 

It is also good to welcome this distinguished panel to be with us 

today. Thank you for being here. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to start out today by pointing to a critical 

piece of intelligence, perhaps the most important piece of actionable 

intelligence written in the unclassified NIE. It states, quote: We 

judge that the United States currently is in a heightened threat environment, end of quote. 

When you read a statement like this, it is impossible to not have 

your thoughts returned to 9/11, that fateful morning when al 

Qaeda attacked the United States in a way that none of us will 

ever forget. I think of what I felt that day. I can only imagine what 

the families who lost loved ones faced on that day. I can only think 

of the emotions that went through this Nation as we watched this 

attack and the aftermath played out on live TV. 

When I think of all this, I can only help but ask one question, 

have we as a Congress done all we can to strengthen our intelligence capability to protect our homeland? Have we given the people who are in front of us today the necessary tools to keep us safe? 
6 

Have we sufficiently prepared the Nation for the long struggle we 

face in the fight against radical jihad? 

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, today we have to answer to that 

question ‘‘no.’’ We have assembled before us top officials of DOD intelligence and counterterrorism; and for the next several hours we 

will subject them to all manner of speeches, questioning, while ignoring perhaps the one critical area the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has told all of us, told Congress and the American 

people, the tool that he needs and the tool that needs our attention 

today. It is a comprehensive modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). 

Testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 

Director McConnell explained the problem very clearly. Quote: 

There are circumstances in which the government seeks to monitor 

for purposes of protecting the Nation from terrorist attacks the 

communications of foreign persons who are physically located in 

foreign countries, and the government is required under FISA to 

obtain a court order to authorize this collection. End of quote. 

Further explaining the challenge, Director McConnell has stated: 

We are missing a significant portion of what we should be getting. 

End of quote. 

The Director of National Intelligence is telling us we are missing 

vital intelligence that our Nation should be collecting to protect our 

homeland, foreign intelligence from foreign terrorists in foreign 

countries, and we can’t collect it. 

The NIE that we are going to be talking about today says we 

judge that the United States currently is in a heightened threatened environment. If I haven’t ever heard a clearer call for action, 

this is it. This is a wake-up call for Congress and for America. At 

a time of increased threat, we are handicapping ourselves in the 

fight against al Qaeda and radical jihadism. 

The hearing we should be having right now, that we should have 

had already and should have completed, is one on moving legislation to fix this FISA problem and close this terrorism loophole. We 

have a known intelligence problem, we face a heightened terrorist 

risk, we have a simple fix to address one of the major FISA problems, and we have over a week before Congress goes on recess. 

Al Qaeda is not going to take a break. They haven’t taken a 

break while this loophole existed, they won’t take a break until we 

fix it, if we fix it, and they won’t take a break while we take a recess during August. Congress needs to fix it, and we need to fix it 

before we go on recess. 

Why? In a video released on July 5 entitled: The Advice of One 

Concerned, Zawahiri lays out al Qaeda’s strategy which was built 

on the notion that, in this world, there are outlying states in places 

such as Asia and Africa and other parts of the world and there are 

the core states. They are the center of the global system. Who are 

the core states? America and the European Union. 

The tape goes on. Quote: The only way to confront them, according to al Qaeda’s theory, is by taking the war from the outlying 

states to the central states or the core states, in which case the 

damage and the consequences of this damage will take place in the 

central states. End of quote. 
7 

It means that they are planning and they want to attack us here 

in the United States. The tale of the tape is clear, al Qaeda believes it is winning in Iraq, laying the foundation for a post-America Caliphate with its center there and ultimately extending the 

jihad wave to the rest of the world. 

If al Qaeda intends to fight us globally and here in the homeland, we must be prepared to do the same. We cannot expect to 

leave one part of the battlefield without consequences on another 

part. In short, it is my fear if we precipitously leave Iraq, al Qaeda 

has every intention of following us home. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing what the 

witnesses have to say about the NIE key judgments that we face 

a heightened terrorist risk, what challenges the Intelligence Community faces in collecting against those terrorist threats and what 

they are doing to address those challenges and any recommendations they have for Congress to strengthen our intelligence capabilities against a terrorist threat. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hoekstra can be found in the Appendix on page 71.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen. 

Before I recognize Secretary Clapper and the other panelists for 

opening statements, let me offer a few administrative comments, if 

I may. 

Let me first suggest that you make your comments as succinct 

as possible. Without objection, each of your prepared statements 

will be placed in the record. Those on the Armed Services Committee are used to my comments staying in 25 words or less. You 

can say it in a few more words than that, but do your best to condense your comments because there will be a good number of questions. 

Let remind everyone we are in open session. We should refrain 

from any discussion of classified information. A closed briefing will 

be held immediately after this session, and members should proceed to room 2216. I remind everyone that classified matters can 

be discussed in the follow-on meeting, not here before us today. 

Also, given the large size of the gathering, we intend to strictly 

adhere to the five-minute rule and recognize those present at the 

time of the gavel according to the seniority and alternate between 

the majority and the minority in the respective committee memberships. 

Members arriving after the gavel with be recognized in accordance with the order of the arrival, again, alternating from majority 

to minority. 

Ladies and gentlemen, 5 minutes means 5 minutes, not 5 minutes and 15 seconds, because we really need to get as many in as 

we can. 

With that, Secretary Clapper, we appreciate you being with us 

today, and each of you. The floor is yours, General. 
8 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED 

BY MARY BETH LONG, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; PETER 

F. VERGA, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 

HOMELAND DEFENSE; MICHAEL E. LEITER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM 

CENTER AND DIRECTOR OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK 

FORCE ON HOMELAND THREATS, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 

OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; AND EDWARD GISTARO, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR TRANSNATIONAL 

THREATS, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR. 

Secretary CLAPPER. Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Chairman 

Reyes, Congressman Hunter, Congressman Hoekstra, and distinguished members of the committees. 

First, let me thank you both or thank you all for your strong support for the Department of Defense and for the Intelligence Community and for conducting this unique two-committee hearing, 

which is symbolic of the confluence of the Department of Defense 

and the Intelligence Community. 

We are here, as you indicated, this afternoon to discuss the implications of the recent National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat to the homeland. A couple of introductory comments. 

As I said in my confirmation hearing in March, as Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, I am not in the business of doing 

analysis or producing intelligence, so I am not going to produce any 

new intelligence here today. 

Second, I am supported by subject matter experts whom I would 

like to introduce from the Department of Defense: Mr. Peter Verga 

to my immediate left, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Homeland 

Defense; and, to his left, Ms. Mary Beth Long, Acting Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. To my 

right, from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Mr. 

Mike Leiter, who is the Deputy Director of the National Counterterrorism Center and the Director of the Interagency Task Force on 

Homeland Threats; and, to his right, Mr. Edward Gistaro, National 

Intelligence Office for Transnational Threats and a principal author of this National Intelligence Estimate. 

Six years after September 11th, 2001, we have not suffered a 

successful attack on our homeland. This is not for lack of will on 

the part of our enemy. Al Qaeda and al Qaeda extremists have carried out terrorist attacks in more than two dozen nations since 9/ 

11. Al Qaeda has and will continue to attempt visually dramatic 

mass casualty attacks here at home; and they will continue to attempt to acquire chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials. And if they are successful in obtaining these materials, we 

believe they would use them. 

As the NIE makes clear, we face a resilient and resourceful 

enemy that will make every effort to protect and regenerate key 

elements of its capability to attack us and others. 
9 

Allow me to make three points about this NIE and what it 

means for our current security environment. The findings of this 

estimate are not a surprise. We are at work with an enemy not 

confined in national boundaries or a single ethnic group. Our fight 

against extremists in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world has 

kept our Nation safe from attacks here at home. 

This war, like all wars, is not an engineering project. The task 

and challenges cannot be laid out ahead of time and accomplished 

according to a predetermined schedule. As the troops say, the 

enemy gets a vote. We must and will continue to transform and adjust and respond accordingly. 

The NIE makes it clear that our operations in Iraq are not distinct from the war on terror. To quote what I consider a most salient point in the NIE, al Qaeda will probably seek to leverage the 

contact and capabilities of al Qaeda in Iraq, its most visible and capable affiliate. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committees, thank you for 

your attention. We look forward to your questions, and I appreciate 

your willingness to accept our statements for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Clapper can be found in 

the Appendix on page 78.] 

Secretary CLAPPER. I believe Mr. Gistaro has an opening statement as well. Mr. Chairman, if I may defer to Mr. Gistaro. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gistaro, I suppose after you give your testimony—to whom do we go next, General? 

Secretary CLAPPER. That is, I believe, it. There are two opening 

statements, myself and Mr. Gistaro. 

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Mr. Gistaro, please. 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD GISTARO 

Mr. GISTARO. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank 

you very much for having us here today. I will be very brief, since 

the unclassified key judgments have been submitted to the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 103.] 

I think one important thing for the committee to understand is 

this is an estimate that couldn’t have been written several years 

ago. It is because of congressional reforms, it is because of the DNI, 

it is because of the Intelligence Reform Act, it is because of the 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission findings that we 

were able to have a brand new community participate and produce 

this estimate. 

Certainly we have the traditional members of the Intelligence 

Community fully involved—Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Administration (NSA), National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) and 

others. I think what was new were our new partners in the community—National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI). I think it is very important to note that they were full participants from the beginning in the production of this estimate and 

particularly when we are dealing with threats to the U.S. homeland, threats from homegrown terrorist groups and threats from 

single-issue terrorist groups that the FBI follows very closely. It 
10 

was their input that made this estimate possible. I think for that 

point it is very important for the Intelligence Community that this 

paper was produced and we were able to produce it as a new, 

broader community. 

I will not go into the key judgments at this time, sir, since they 

are part of the record and out of respect for the committee’s time. 

Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Gistaro and Mr. Leiter can 

be found in the Appendix on page 94.] 

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, General, Mr. Leiter, Mary 

Beth Long, Mr. Verga do not have opening statements. 

Ms. LONG. That is correct. 

Secretary CLAPPER. That is correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. Then if those are the prepared opening statements, I will resume mine and call upon the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, a couple of points that I think are very important. We have 

learned many things post–9/11, one of which has been that, as we 

give our military and law enforcement agencies every conceivable 

tool that we can in order to protect us, we also have to be mindful 

that we don’t want to have the terrorists succeed by compromising 

the rights of our American citizens. I think that is a basic and fundamental responsibility of the Congress. 

I say that because when we provided the legislation, the PATRIOT Act, we provided some key tools that now we have found 

have been used inappropriately. One example was the national security letters that were utilized by the FBI. 

I think it is important that we do our business in a very careful 

and orchestrated, regular way; and I think it is vitally important 

that all of us understand that, in terms of addressing whatever 

changes need to be made under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as my ranking member mentioned, we want to do that. 

We want to give and make the adjustments that are necessary, but 

we also want to be careful doing that. 

So, over the course of the last month, month and a half, we have 

been having hearings to address that very issue. We have been trying to understand exactly what issues and what problems those 

that have had to work with FISA have had to address as they went 

about their business. At some point in the fall, we will look at 

whatever legislative fixes need to be made. 

A lot I think depends on information that you give us about the 

threat, and certainly the NIE is one issue that we want to be very 

careful in evaluating. But I also think that we don’t want to be 

stampeded to make changes that ultimately we may have to 

change because we didn’t do it carefully and in a regular way. 

So we are addressing those kinds of issues. We don’t want to do 

something that is not carefully thought out. 

In that vein, there are some options that we are looking at to be 

able to perhaps give the Director of National Intelligence the flexibility to do the kinds of things that he has told us are necessary. 

So we are not just sitting on our hands. We are working very 

quickly and very importantly in a structured way to get to that. 
11 

But I guess one of the fundamental questions that I would like 

the panelists to address is the following. It is two parts. I want to 

know if the war in Iraq has made Iraq a more hospitable situation 

for al Qaeda than it was before the U.S. invasion, number one. 

Number two, is al Qaeda using our presence in Iraq to help recruit 

terrorists around the world? And what specifically is al Qaeda 

doing, as you pointed out in the NIE, to be a concern to us in the 

way that it is gathering strength? Answer that question with three 

parts. 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. 

With regard to the second part first, sir, the Community sees 

three different ways that Iraq impacts the threats to the U.S. 

homeland. 

First, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is the only affiliate of al Qaeda that 

has stated its intention to attack the U.S. homeland. That is number one. 

Number two, we are concerned that the al Qaeda core in Pakistan might be able to leverage some of the capability of al Qaeda 

in Iraq for its own plotting against the U.S. homeland. 

Third, sir, as you pointed out, al Qaeda in Pakistan, Afghanistan 

has made the conflict in Iraq a central point in its own propaganda; 

and it has used the conflict there to raise resources, recruit and to 

energize the broader extremist community to focus on attacks 

against western interests, U.S. interests and the U.S. homeland. 

With regard to your first point, sir, as the President spoke yesterday, Zawahiri pledges allegiance to bin Laden in 2004. We certainly see very close ideological ties between al Qaeda in Iraq and 

al Qaeda core. We see shared experiences and personal histories 

between the leaderships in the organizations, and we see some 

overlapping of certain facilitation networks. 

Al Qaeda in Pakistan tries to provide strategic guidance and encouragement to AQI, but it also defers to AQI to make tactical decisions on the ground with regard to its operations inside of Iraq. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hunter, please. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, you have made clear in your statements that al 

Qaeda wants to attack America. I guess my first question would be, 

is there compelling evidence for the securing of the southern border 

of the United States against that backdrop? I am talking about the 

2,000-mile southern border. 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, there is no doubt that al Qaeda has 

an expressed interest in penetrating U.S. homeland defenses either 

through legitimate or illegitimate means. In that regard, the southern border clearly poses a challenge for the U.S. Government to secure the entire homeland. 

Mr. HUNTER. Second, you have made a point also that al Qaeda 

has established what we denied them in Afghanistan in the initial 

campaign, which is safe haven. And it was done initially after the 

Pakistan forces made a deal with tribal leadership and in that narrow strip of land, the Waziristan area, to the effect that they would 

pull out Pakistan forces in return for vague assurances that the 

tribes would not work with and would ‘‘distance’’ themselves from 

al Qaeda, as vague as that sounds. 
12 

In recent times, the Pakistan government has reacted, now has 

sent in some military forces. There has been some contact and 

some confrontation. Give me your view on whether the Pakistan reaction is adequate, whether it is working, whether it is working to 

deny safe haven and to scrub that area or whether it is simply a 

symbolic reaction, a ceremonial reaction. 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, at this point, let me make two points. In the 

estimate, we talk about the global counterterrorism efforts that 

have been very effective over the last five years. I think we have 

to give a tremendous amount of credit to Pakistan, which has been 

a critical ally in this fight. President Musharraf has faced at least 

three assassination attempts personally because of his assistance 

to us. 

Some of the most critical arrests that have occurred of senior al 

Qaeda members have occurred in Pakistan by the Pakistanis. As 

you noted, sir, they have lost hundreds of their soldiers and police 

in this fight. We have to give them credit for that. 

I think al Qaeda is now in a part of Pakistan that is largely inaccessible to Pakistani forces. The Pakistani government always has 

been and it is a difficult operating environment for them. 

I think the efforts that you refer to, sir, are only in the first week 

or so of implementation; and so at this point it is much too early 

to try to provide an assessment of the impact of these latest Pakistani moves on the safe haven in the Federally Administered Tribal 

Areas (FATA). 

Mr. HUNTER. Why do you say they are inaccessible? 

Mr. GISTARO. I think there are a number of different reasons. 

The topography is very hostile, very barren. I think the population 

that does exist there has always been outside the control of 

Islamabad and is sympathetic to al Qaeda both in terms of its religious ideology as well as their tribal traditions of hospitality to outsiders. It is a very difficult environment for outside forces to operate in. 

Mr. HUNTER. I understand it is difficult, but it is not inaccessible. The 10th Mountain Division soldiers have gone up to 10 and 

12,000 elevations in Afghanistan and carried the fight to the 

enemy. Has the Pakistan government indicated that they are not 

going to try to penetrate these areas at all, or are they trying to 

penetrate them? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, we are rapidly getting outside my area of expertise. 

Mr. HUNTER. I will pursue that later. Let me just ask one last 

question. 

Clearly, al Qaeda has now been involved in high-visibility bombings of civilian populations in Iraq that have been spread across 

not only American television, international television, but television in the Arab world. Has that diminished the popularity of al 

Qaeda, the bombings of civilians? In newscasts which identify the 

bombings as being attributed to al Qaeda, has that diminished 

their popularity in the general Muslim community worldwide? 

What is your take on that? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, to the extent that we can measure how those 

attacks are broadcast on Arab television and such, I don’t think we 

have detected an increase in the criticism of AQI. But what I would 
13 

like to do, sir, is take that question for the record and get you a 

more authoritative answer. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 113.] 

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. Hoekstra. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think, as the panel has stated, AQ in Iraq has become affiliated 

with AQ core or al Qaeda, as we historically know it, is that correct? 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Operating then with bases in Pakistan, Afghanistan, in Iraq? 

Mr. GISTARO. I am sorry? 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Having bases or located in Pakistan, Afghanistan 

and in Iraq? 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. And that—probably attempting to communicate 

on a regular basis between those locations to share strategy and direction. 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. But I think, because of U.S. and allied efforts in both the south Asia theater and in Iraq, that ability to 

communicate at times is quite difficult. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. That at some times we may have disrupted it. 

We also have established that they pretty much have a similar 

series of objectives, which is to be successful in Iraq, destabilize the 

region, eliminate the State of Israel, attack the West and establish 

the Caliphate, is that correct? 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. They have set it in different orders at different 

places. They share the objective of attacking the United States and 

the West. 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. And it is possible that as they are communicating, or trying to communicate, they might—is it reasonable to 

assume that they might try to share information about the type of 

training that might be necessary to attack the U.S.? 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. I think a lot of that destructive expertise 

is made public on the Internet. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. It may also be appropriate they will try to talk 

about how they may finance an attack against the West or the 

United States? 

Mr. GISTARO. I have not seen evidence of that, sir. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. If they are going to plan on attacking the United 

States, wouldn’t we expect they would be talking about how they 

would finance an effort like that? 

Mr. GISTARO. That is entirely possible, sir. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Wouldn’t they also have to talk about who would 

carry out an attack like that? 

Mr. GISTARO. That is also possible, sir. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. What the target would be. 

Mr. GISTARO. Possibly. 
14 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Methods. 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. The timing. 

Mr. GISTARO. Possibly. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. I mean, isn’t that the kind of information that 

you as an Intelligence Community are trying to get from al Qaeda? 

If you believe that they are going to attack the United States, that 

you are trying to figure out where are they training for this, how 

are they financing it, who is going to do it, what the methods are, 

what the timing would be? 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. And a lot of that communication would be happening in the areas where they are located, which would be the 

ungoverned areas in Pakistan and what AQ in Iraq is doing. 

Mr. GISTARO. I think that is a possibility, sir, but, again, we do 

not see that. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. You do not see that. Is perhaps part of the reason 

we don’t see that is that is the kind of information that the Director of the DNI is talking about when he says that we are missing 

significant parts of information? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, I think as a Community, and certainly as reflected in the estimate, we take very seriously our own intelligence 

gaps and what we do not know. 

Mr. HOEKSTRA. Again, it is not the primary focus, but this is just 

pointing out and highlighting this kind of information as to the financing, the participants. This information that we are trying to 

get when foreign terrorists are communicating in foreign locations, 

that is the kind of information that we need to get and that we are 

significantly blind to, at least as Director McConnell has identified 

it. 

I hope again that this is an issue that we address before we recess and go on break in August. 

With that, I will yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlemen. 

According to my information sheet here, going down the list of 

those who were here when the gavel went down, Mr. Cramer from 

Alabama, five minutes. 

Mr. CRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all the chairmen and ranking members, witnesses for this opportunity today, as 

tough as it is in this open hearing, to address issues that are at 

this level of sensitivity. 

Based on what I have heard so far, are you saying that al Qaeda 

and al Qaeda in Iraq are one and the same organization? 

Mr. GISTARO. The way the relationship is described in the NIE 

is al Qaeda in Iraq is an affiliate organization to al Qaeda in south 

Asia. 

Mr. CRAMER. Let me help you with that. Then the answer to that 

is, yes, they are basically one and the same organization? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, as the President described yesterday, we are 

dealing with al Qaeda that has a decentralized command and control structure; and I don’t want to leave a false impression that we 

are talking about a monolithic organization. 
15 

Mr. CRAMER. So if, as the NIE reflects, we are concerned about 

a threat to the homeland here, who calls that shot from al Qaeda? 

Mr. GISTARO. The primary concern is al Qaeda in south Asia organizing its own plots against the United States. What we are concerned about is that AQI, as the most visible and capable affiliate 

of al Qaeda, has also expressed an interest in attacking inside the 

United States. 

Mr. CRAMER. What kind of presence did al Qaeda have in Iraq 

in 2003? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, by 2003, Zarqawi had established his presence 

inside the country; by 2004, he was pledging his loyalty to bin 

Laden. 

Mr. CRAMER. Can you measure or compare their presence in 

2003 versus their presence in Iraq today? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, beyond the top leadership, I think that is a 

question we would either have to answer in closed session—— 

Mr. CRAMER. All right. Then I will defer that to the closed session. 

In the NIE, it states that the threat from al Qaeda is through 

greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups. What are those 

regional terrorist groups? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, in addition to AQI, we are very concerned 

about the Sunni jihadist groups in north Africa, formally known as 

the GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Pre ́dication et le Combat), now 

again pledging loyalty to al Qaeda and renaming themselves al 

Qaeda in the Maghreb. 

Mr. CRAMER. And to what extent is al Qaeda capable of placing 

operatives in the United States? Or, in your opinion, do they have 

operatives already in the United States; and, if so, in what number? Generally speaking. 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, we do not see and the FBI does not see al 

Qaeda figures here inside the United States with links back to the 

senior leadership at this time. What the NIE talks about is our 

concern that we see increased efforts on the part of al Qaeda to try 

and find, train and deploy people who could get into this country. 

Mr. CRAMER. And then—‘‘why’’ questions are always tough—why 

haven’t we eliminated the threat in al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, as we talk about in the paper, I think the critical variable here is safe haven and being able to find a physical 

space in what is essentially the wild west of the tribal areas of 

Pakistan with which to rebuild capabilities. 

Mr. CRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from New Jersey, Jim Saxton. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Clapper, please feel free to refer this question to whoever on the panel may be the most appropriate to answer it, or 

yourself. 

In 2006, it appeared from here that al Qaeda pretty much had 

their run and could go wherever they wanted, do whatever they 

wanted pretty much in Iraq, with the exception of where our Special Forces and others got in their way. More recently, we have 

seen press reports and other reports that in the al Anbar Province 
16 

the tribal leaders turned against al Qaeda and essentially banished 

them from that province. More recently, we have seen evidence 

that the same thing is happening in the Province of Babil, of 

Diyala, of Salah ad Din, of Ninawa and in Baghdad itself. 

Would you give us an update on that or please have somebody 

tell us what you know about that. 

Secretary CLAPPER. Sir, I read the same reporting; and I think 

this is in large measure a case of the enemy of my enemy is my 

friend. I think this is a case of increasing disenchantment with AQI 

on the part of many people in Iraq. So that is a trend that appears 

to be emerging. 

Mr. SAXTON. What does that mean to us from the standpoint of 

our involvement in the conflict in Iraq? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, I think it reflects the effect of our sustaining the attacks on the offensive against AQI; and, more specifically, I think it is a reflection of the effectiveness of the surge. 

We all look forward to the report that General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker are expected to render in September about what 

the significance of these indications mean. 

Mr. SAXTON. Do you think that part of it may be that the tribal 

leaders and those fathers and mothers in the tribe are observing 

what it is that al Qaeda is about and have decided they don’t want 

it for their children? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Sir, that is certainly possible. I don’t purport 

to be the expert on what the dynamics are, but I would think that 

sort of thing certainly plays out in their minds. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. 

Let me ask another question. I happen to represent the town in 

New Jersey, Cherry Hill, where the Fort Dix—the group that became known as the Fort Dix Six were arrested. The indictment 

against them said that they were inspired by al Qaeda, and I am 

wondering what that means to us exactly and also what role the 

Internet play in bringing groups like that together and providing 

training opportunities for them and also if we know whether 

groups such as the Fort Dix Six have direct contact of any kind 

with al Qaeda members outside the country. 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, certainly the Fort Dix Six represent 

something which is becoming an increasing concern for us over the 

past several years and that is radicalized, violent extremists within 

the United States who are, as you said, inspired by al Qaeda. It 

is something that both the Department of Homeland Security and 

the FBI and the National Counterterrorism Center focus much of 

our attention on. 

We have not—as I believe Mr. Gistaro mentioned, we have not 

received any communication between those individuals and senior 

al Qaeda leadership. That is certainly something that we fear, but 

it is not something that we have seen. 

With respect to the use of the Internet and the value of the 

Internet, undoubtedly al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups 

have come to use the Internet quite effectively both for communication, direct person-to-person e-mail, also for radicalization through 

Web sites, as well as propagating information about how to build 

and use certain weapons. 
17 

Mr. SAXTON. Have you any evidence that there are other groups 

that are of similar nature that currently exist in the states? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, I think for both intelligence and law 

enforcement reasons it would be inappropriate for me to comment 

in the open session, but we would be happy to talk to you in closed 

session. 

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Smith from the State of Washington. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

A couple of questions I want to focus on, al Qaeda’s strength in 

Iraq and then the best way for us to policy and different ways to 

get at them in their safe haven in the FATA region of Pakistan. 

Focusing on the strength in Iraq piece, we have heard a lot about 

how a lot of the local Iraqis have turned on al Qaeda, and I think 

Mr. Saxton points out a lot of good reasons for that. What is our 

assessment now of their relative strength with the Iraqi population? Certainly they have the ability to commit terrorist acts. Do 

they still have some number of Iraqis who are sympathetic with 

them actively working with them? 

I know at one time they had very sophisticated in some towns 

sort of almost their own little government structures set up in different towns and different places. Does that still exist in some 

places? Do they still have the Iraqi support? Or have they descended down to the point where primarily their strength is simply 

the foreign fighters coming across the borders giving them the 

strength to make attacks? 

If you can assess what their strength with the population is. I 

ask that because a safe haven requires some support from the local 

population. 

And juxtaposing that with the situation with Pakistan where 

they seem to have that support from the local population, how 

should we go about upending that support? The local tribal leaders 

have clearly given safe haven in the FATA to elements of al Qaeda. 

What is our best way to work with Pakistan to uproot them? 

I have a bias there; and that bias is I don’t think threatening 

Pakistan and saying you have to do more, you have to do more is 

the best way to do that. We need to show Pakistan we are a longterm partner. By and large, I think the Bush Administration has 

done that. I want to make sure that we don’t change course. 

If you could hit those two areas, whoever you think it best to answer it, I would appreciate it. 

Secretary CLAPPER. Let me take a stab at it, and I will defer to 

others. 

I think, as Mr. Gistaro indicated, we have to give Pakistan credit 

for what they attempted to do. With respect to the FATA, President 

Musharraf has embarked on a longer-term program of social improvement, economic improvement in the ungoverned areas, but 

this will only have payoff on a long term, certainly probably beyond 

the timeframe of the NIE, which was three years. 

Mr. SMITH. Is there hope, in your opinion, for getting the tribal 

leaders to sort of turn on al Qaeda in a similar way they did in 

al Anbar in the FATA? 
18 

Secretary CLAPPER. I don’t think we should have great expectation of this, given the tribal dynamics in the FATA. But as well, 

though, I think we would be remiss, as the Pakistani government 

would be remiss, without attempting to make some positive 

changes in the quality of life, if you will, of the tribes in that area. 

However, there are deep-seated, long, historical dynamics that I 

think are going to make that a challenge. 

As well, I think we have also attempted to provide assistance to 

the Pakistani government, the Frontier Corps and their ability to 

observe improvement in intelligence surveillance reconnaissance, 

sharing actionable intelligence with the Pakistanis, providing 

equipment, helicopters, night vision goggles and the like to help 

them better observe what is going on and take appropriate action. 

This is going to be a long-haul process, not something that is 

going to occur, certainly I don’t think a demonstrable change within the three-year timeframe of the NIE. 

Any other comments? 

Mr. SMITH. If you could hit the Iraq piece, because my time is 

limited. I agree with you, and I think we need to make that longterm commitment to Pakistan as a matter of policy, we in Congress 

as well as the Administration. 

If you could hit the Iraq piece, al Qaeda’s strength there. 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, estimates vary within the Intelligence Community as to the size of AQI. I think it is safe to say most would agree 

there are several thousand members in the organization. Ninety 

percent of those members, those foot soldiers are going to be Iraqis, 

we believe. 

In terms of the motivation for people joining, it differs I think 

based on what part of the country. If you are in a mixed area, 

AQI’s argument that you have to join up to protect your Sunni 

brothers and sisters from the Shi’a is a more compelling argument. 

If you are in a place like al Anbar, I think they probably try to use 

the religious argument. 

Mr. SMITH. They are not having a lot of success right now. 

Mr. GISTARO. No, sir, especially in a place like Anbar. I think 

people have decided that that harsh, coercive form of Islam is not 

what they want to live under. 

Mr. SMITH. The big judgment—and I know al Qaeda wants to 

control Iraq. A year ago they stated that they did, even though 

they didn’t. So there is no question that is their ambition. Isn’t it 

highly unlikely, given the situation with the Shi’a, the Kurds, the 

way the Sunnis feel about them, that al Qaeda would have the 

local support necessary to get any meaningful control of Iraq? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, I think if you go back to the Iraq estimate of 

January of this year, it talks about not taking over the country per 

se but pockets within Iraq that they might be able to exploit. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlemen. 

The gentleman from New York, John McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen 

and good lady, thank you for being here. 

Mr. Secretary, you probably heard the opening reference by the 

distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee about the 

2006 NIE. I just happen to have a copy of it. It speaks about Iraq 
19 

being a recruiting tool cause celebre, in the terminology of the NIE. 

Do you recall that document from memory? I know this is not precisely on point of our topic today. 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Let me put it a different way. You would agree 

that it is the assessment of the Intelligence Committee or Intelligence Community that Iraq is serving as a recruiting mechanism 

for al Qaeda in Iraq? 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MCHUGH. I think that it is interesting in 2006 the document 

then went on to say, ‘‘Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves and be perceived to have failed, we judge fewer fighters 

would be inspired to carry on the fight.’’ 

Does that mean the way to beat their recruiting is to beat them? 

Is that what it was saying? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, as I read that key judgment, I think it is more 

focused on the people who are actually inside of Iraq right now 

fighting us. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Let me ask it a different way. 

What kind of recruiting tool for al Qaeda, in general, at large 

would an American defeat in Iraq serve? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, I think the two estimates do make the judgment that if al Qaeda perceives a victory in Iraq, that that will embolden them, and they will use that for their own purposes to generate resources and enthusiasm for their cause. 

Mr. MCHUGH. As you pursue in the multiheaded hydra of Iraq— 

and let us agree that they are not all the same, yet they are creating affiliations—do you think Iraq and Afghanistan is an either/ 

or situation, or do you think we ought to be focusing on potential 

success in both? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, I think we should—this is a global—it 

is a global campaign, and so I don’t think it is zero sum or either/ 

or. It is both. 

Mr. MCHUGH. So when some suggest that, you know, we are diverting resources away from Afghanistan, away from the mathematical judgments that may assume, you would agree, perhaps, 

that our actions in Iraq are indeed important in the war against 

al Qaeda? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Yeah. Absolutely, yes, sir. 

Mr. MCHUGH. I thank you. 

I was interested in the line of questioning that the distinguished 

Ranking Member of the Intelligence Committee had, where I believe it was correctly stated that you don’t have any indication, no 

sources, no information that these groups are having contact in the 

United States. It seemed to be a total lack of threat, is that—or 

certainly lack of information as to your ability to assess the threat. 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, what I would say is we have strategic 

warnings of al Qaeda’s intent to strike either Western Europe or 

the homeland. We continue to look at various individuals throughout the world to try and determine their links to al Qaeda or other 

al Qaeda affiliates. 

Mr. MCHUGH. So, thus, the reason for the heightened threat 

level in the United States, even though we don’t have any specific 

threat against the homeland; am I correct in that? 
20 

Mr. LEITER. Correct. 

Mr. MCHUGH. I would also say—thank you, gentlemen. 

I would also say that I certainly, from my perspective on both 

this committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the Intelligence Committee, I think that Mr. Hoekstra’s opening comments 

about concerns with respect to the adaptability and the efficiency 

and effectiveness of FISA, as we know how it operates and how it 

is not operating, now to demand our immediate attention, not in 

the fall but now. 

I share the Chairman’s and others’ concerns very deeply that we 

have to have a balanced approach in how we authorize our intelligence services. If the cost of defeating the terrorists is the loss of 

our basic pillars of freedom, then it is a pretty hollow victory. 

But there are things about FISA that I think we have learned 

very clearly—and I hope we get a chance to talk a bit about this 

more in the closed session. That is, not bringing into question 

American citizens’ rights that totally involve the ability to find out 

what foreign terrorists and foreign places are saying, doing, thinking, and threatening to do against the United States, and we ought 

to be acting now. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. His time has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing. 

In May of 2003, President Bush said that al Qaeda is on the run, 

that the group of terrorists who attacked our country is slowly but 

surely being decimated, and right now about all of the top al Qaeda 

operatives are either jailed or dead. In either case, they are not a 

problem anymore. 

In the 2006 NIE, you said that we had seriously damaged the 

leadership of al Qaeda and disrupted its operations. 

And now today in the 2007 NIE you say that al Qaeda has rebuilt its capabilities and that they are in a safe haven and they are 

doing well. 

What happened? How do we lose this ground? How do we go 

from on the run in 2003, to today, where al Qaeda is rested, training, and successfully recruiting new al Qaeda members? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, with regard to the two National Intelligence 

Estimates, if you take the 2006 estimates, I think the next sentence in that key judgment says that al Qaeda will remain the 

greatest terrorist threat to the U.S. interest and U.S. homeland in 

2006. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I understand that. But we went from a well-stated position where we are gaining the upper hand, to a position now 

where they are in a safe haven, they have increased their training, 

they have increased their recruiting. They are gaining great success, and we should be very concerned about that. What happened? 

Mr. GISTARO. I think the key development there is they were 

able to relocate their leadership node to an area where it was much 

more difficult to get at them. 

Mr. THOMPSON. This is the Federal Administrative Tribal Areas? 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. 
21 

Mr. THOMPSON. What happened? We took our eye off of them? 

We allowed them to reoperate, regroup and replenish? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, I think an alternative way to look at that is 

we took away the safe haven in Afghanistan. They went to urban 

areas in Pakistan. Working with the Pakistanis, we pushed them 

out of the urban areas of Pakistan. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Was Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda in Iraq 

when we went into Iraq? 

Mr. GISTARO. No, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Where did we take the safe haven away from 

them? 

Mr. GISTARO. Afghanistan, the urban areas of Pakistan. We 

pushed them out of the urban areas of Pakistan to South 

Waziristan. And then in about March of 2004, the Pakistanis went 

in and pushed them out of South Waziristan. They relocated to 

North Waziristan and other places in the Pak/Afghani area. Much 

more difficult for the Pakistanis to find them and do something 

about it. 

They used that safe haven to regenerate the operational leadership that is involved in developing and executing external operation. 

Then we also saw cases that the top leadership was able to exploit that comfort zone in the tribal areas to exert a little more influence on the organization. And then the fourth component is we 

see their operational tempo of bringing people in to train for Western operations picking up. 

Mr. THOMPSON. As I recall, Secretary Rumsfeld had called off a 

raid on senior al Qaeda members in that Pakistan area because he 

thought it was going to create a—or stated that it was going to create a rift between our allies and Pakistan and our country. 

Were those press reports correct? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Sir, we looked at that and actually did not 

pin that down to a specific case in point. Operations are planned 

and occasionally called off for a variety of reasons. They are reviewed, you know, at subsequent levels. So I don’t know about the 

specific case. It could well have happened. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Can you comment on our relationship with our 

Pakistani allies today and whether or not Musharraf is doing all 

that he could do to let us operate in, and his forces also operating 

in the Federal Administrative Tribal Area, to go after these safe 

havens? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, if the criterion is the Pakistani government doing 100 percent of what we might like, probably not. I do 

think, though—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. In your judgment, are they doing all that should 

be done in order to ferret out these safe havens? 

Secretary CLAPPER. I think they are doing what they can, given 

the constraints that were—that Mr. Gistaro previously outlined 

with the dynamics, et cetera—— 

Mr. THOMPSON. I hate to interrupt. 

Can we count on these safe havens continuing to be safe for quite 

some time to come? 
22 

Secretary CLAPPER. No, sir. I think our objective will be to neutralize, not eliminate but certainly make this safe haven, as we 

have the others, less safe and less appealing for AQ. 

Mr. REYES [presiding]. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gistaro, what is the date that the NIE was issued? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, I believe it was last Tuesday. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. So the key judgment that we are under a 

heightened threat is applicable for last Tuesday? 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. It is not a heightened level of threat for this 

fall? It is a heightened level of threat now. 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, I think what we said was because of al Qaeda’s 

undiminished intent to attack us here, because we see the regenerating capability that we are entering a heightened threat environment for the duration of the three-year time estimate on the 

paper. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. So that heightened threat level will continue 

until you tell us different, I guess, or you have other facts, something else happens that in some way reduces that threat? 

Mr. LEITER. If I may, I want to draw a slight distinction between 

the National Intelligence Estimate and the daily counterterrorism 

intelligence that we process. 

In that regard, we do think we are in a heightened threat of strategic warning right now. And whether or not the three-year period 

stays the same, we have a separate and distinct heightened concern now. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Gistaro, I want to ask about one other thing. In the public 

key judgments of the NIE, it seems to me you put a lot of emphasis 

on evolving threat, adaptable enemy; they are watching what we 

do and they change accordingly. 

Seems to me in that situation, information is more critical for us 

than ever about who is doing what and what methods they are 

looking at and that sort of thing; would you agree? 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I am interested. In the opening statements, a 

couple of times it was mentioned that the al Qaeda threat emanates from the Pak/Afghan border. And you just had a number of 

questions about the safe haven that they have been allowed to establish again. 

But a number of authors and scholars would say that we are putting too much emphasis in some ways on a physical location. As a 

matter of fact, somebody I heard recently said al Qaeda has an ideology that has become a movement. 

And I would like for either of the two of you to address that. 

If we were to wipe out every al Qaeda person in the Pakistan 

and Afghanistan area, does that mean we can start carrying shampoo onto airplanes again? Does that mean we don’t have to screen 

all cargo, which apparently is in a bill that we are about to vote 

on? 

Talk to me about safe havens, and if we knock out number one 

and number two, does that mean we don’t have to worry anymore? 
23 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, I think all of the things you just listed would 

definitely have an impact on the threat that we face. I think it is 

important to know that later in the key judgments, we really do 

talk about and focus on that globalization and technology developments mean that people are able to become alienated, find others 

who share their alienation, become more radicalized, group together and find destructive expertise, without ever having gone to 

a training camp or put themselves in contact with a terrorist leader. 

The homegrown terrorist threat, I think that is much more enduring. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Leiter, that is where I want to go because 

the thing that has concerned me the most—I think the military 

folks are doing a good job. We are doing, with some exceptions in 

intelligence, we are doing okay. But I worry about a national strategy to combat the ideology. NCTC has that tasking to develop a national strategy that goes across military and—but combating a 

movement, an ideology that has become a movement, is not something we do very well. Can you reassure me that we are doing better than it looks like we are? 

Mr. LEITER. I absolutely agree. Ideology, you can take everyone 

out of the FATA but the ideology will live on to some extent. The 

national implementation plan the President signed and approved in 

June 2006 sets forth four strategic objectives. One of those four is 

winning the war of ideas. And that plan is a blueprint for the entire U.S. Government. And it is not just the people sitting up here. 

It is the State Department, Department of Homeland Security, it 

is all of the departments that deal with the quote/unquote, ‘‘war of 

ideas.’’ And I think that plan, which has now been in place for 

about a year, we have seen some progress. For example, the creation of a counterterrorism messaging center within the State Department under Secretary Karen Hughes. 

These are initial steps. 

There is no doubt that when we call this a long war, it is because 

ideology and extremists’ views are not reversed overnight, and I believe that we have to attack this and work at this at all levels, the 

most extreme, and also into the liberal elites of the Muslim world. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I hope we can develop a greater sense of urgency on that as well as the other issues. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry. 

Ms. Tauscher. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I think the reason we are at somewhat of a wide 

variance on importance of what is happening right now is because 

there is a wide variance of what is happening in the two NIEs. 

These are documents that are not similar, in my mind, having read 

both of them. If they had been transposed—for instance, last week 

was the 2006 document—I would certainly feel a lot better. 

The problem is that the 2006 document is kind of like a sleeping 

pill; take it and you are going to feel better tomorrow. Unfortunately, we woke up and we have the 2007 NIE which set my hair 

on fire. It is unambiguous about the current threat, and it says to 

me that we have not been successful in dealing with the threat of 

al Qaeda, its ability to recruit, its ability to reconstitute itself. 
24 

And that something—I am suspicious—that something we have 

been doing has caused us to not be able to defeat what everyone 

has agreed for a very long time is our number one enemy: people 

that really, really want to kill us and are really trying hard to do 

it. 

And I think that if we all kind of agree on where we are right 

now, if that is true, then we have every reason to be concerned. 

What is it that has caused us to not find and kill Osama bin 

Laden? Because he is hiding in the FATA? 

Mr. GISTARO. Ma’am, if I could just address the difference between the two NIEs, I think they are different papers trying to answer different questions. 

The 2006 estimate was really looking at the underlying trends 

driving extremism within the Sunni community worldwide. This 

paper that we are discussing today is much more tightly focused 

on intent and capabilities to attack us here. And I think that those 

different—the different focus of the two papers may explain why 

we have different language and perceptions. They have radically 

different—— 

Ms. TAUSCHER. With all due respect, they seem like they are 

written by different people, with different methodologies, setting a 

framework for people to understand. 

This is the difference between, gee, I am really worried there 

may be something happening up the street, you may want to walk 

faster. That is one set of comments. The other is run, run, run, run 

for your life. That is the difference between these two documents. 

Now, if you are trying to tell me that this is about somebody 

writing in a different style or that different methodologies were 

used, I don’t really think that is what you mean to have me believe. 

Mr. GISTARO. No, ma’am. I think they were trying to answer fundamentally different questions. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Can I make a suggestion? Until the problem 

changes, until we find and kill Osama bin Laden, that is all I really want from you people is to tell me what the status of al Qaeda 

is and whether they have, in fact, reconstituted themselves, which 

is what you tell us they have, that they have refinanced themselves, that they have rested, that they have actually franchised 

themselves into Iraq and probably other places, all the time while 

I think many of us thought, and certainly my constituents believed, 

that we were trying to get them. 

Mr. LEITER. If I may, there is a historical event which, to at least 

some degree I can talk about in open session, which changed this 

trend, which is the North Waziristan peace agreement. And Pervez 

Musharraf has noted the agreement that was signed for North 

Waziristan has not necessarily helped eliminating the safe haven 

in the FATA. So that was something that was just before the 2006 

NIE. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. But with all due respect, you have gone through 

the chronology of 2001 to 2007, where you basically said this is like 

a balloon; you push here, it bubbles out over there. We have 

watched them hop, skip, and jump pretty much with freedom and 

ability to reconstitute from Afghanistan to Pakistan urban areas to 

South Waziristan to North Waziristan. They can move pretty much 
25 

where they want in that whole entire area, and have for the last 

seven years. And we haven’t found them and killed them. 

Mr. LEITER. Respectfully, ma’am, some of them have been found 

and killed, and I would just note that it is not a constant trend either way. We have had ups and downs. The elimination of the Afghan safe haven did diminish capabilities for a period, and they did 

reconstitute somewhere, and they were chased from the urban 

areas, and they did reconstitute somewhere. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, if I can make a suggestion. I think these 

NIEs have to be congruent with each other. They have to be sideby-side documents. We have to have a way to look at them and say, 

this is what you told me the last time and this is where we are 

going up or down. Simply a little thing like this or a little thing 

like that can be very helpful. 

We can’t have this complete divergence as we have had in these 

two documents, because it causes a tremendous amount of anxiety 

for the population when they hear about the NIE on divergence, 

and for those of us who think we are watching this closely, to see 

such a swing from what our expectations have been—that we have 

actually decapitated these guys in 2006, and now they are traveling 

around wherever they want reconstituting, refinancing, and being 

more robust. 

Mr. LEITER. And my last note would be, ma’am, that the NIEs 

really are snapshots in time so they don’t come out all that often. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. You better take them from the same camera because the pictures have got to look a little bit familiar. 

Mr. LEITER. I would say the stream of intelligence we have seen 

has tried to provide those regular updates. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I will yield back. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. I would like to thank you all for being here today. 

And I particularly appreciate your sincerity and your concern that 

indeed we are in a long war. We are in a global war. 

I, in reading the national intelligence report, was, like so many 

people here, so saddened to see the regeneration of al Qaeda and 

particularly to see that it is coming from the ungoverned tribal 

areas of Pakistan. I have had the opportunity to visit Pakistan four 

times. I visited with President Musharraf. It hasn’t been stated 

here today, but he himself, he has been subject to at least four assassination attempts by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), affiliated with al 

Qaeda. 

I actually feel like President Musharraf is doing the best and his 

military is doing the best that they can under the circumstances, 

and indeed maybe they have learned a tragic lesson based on the 

treaty that they had in Waziristan. 

Additionally, I see it in their interest to create border security 

with Afghanistan, which is beneficial to Afghanistan. Additionally, 

to create border security with India. India has lost 60,000 people 

due to cross-border terrorism coming out of Pakistan. 

But we truly are—I am very grateful for the government of Pakistan, and I think it is to the interest of the people of Pakistan that 

there be stability. 
26 

Another point I want to make, too, is that with the terrorist 

threat emanating largely out of the ungoverned tribal area of Afghanistan, I believe that it shows that our troops are indeed on the 

offense in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and this is stopping the terrorists’ 

capabilities of a direct threat to the United States. And so I am 

more grateful than ever for the American military being on the offense. 

It has been stated that the great concern we have are safe havens. The Washington Post has identified that if we are not successful in Iraq, that safe havens would be created with terrorist 

training camps to attack the United States. 

I would like to know—is this the issue of safe havens? Is this 

how an insurgency, a terrorist organization, can best threaten the 

American—or worst threaten the American people? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir. 

Mr. REYES. Can I ask you to pull your microphone pretty close? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, I think we have identified physical space 

where people can come, gather, and plot as a fairly important ingredient in the ability of terrorists to develop and execute a plot. 

That said, it is not absolutely required. We see indications that 

people are able, without ever going to a camp or safe haven, able 

to radicalize themselves, find like-minded individuals, gain destructive expertise and actually conduct attacks. 

Mr. WILSON. Three weeks ago, we had the extraordinary circumstance of physicians in England and London and then at Glasgow. Has it been determined what training they had or what was 

the inspiration? And indeed the attack on the Glasgow airport certainly should concern the American people. That looked like any 

school in the United States. It looked like any supermarket. 

We need to understand the threat to our country as evidenced by 

Glasgow. 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, we are working very, very closely with 

the British intelligence and law enforcement officials, and we certainly look at what happened there and try to apply that to preventative measures here in the United States. Beyond that, because of very strict British laws, I think it is difficult for us to comment in open session. 

Mr. WILSON. And additionally, the success of killing al Qaeda 

leadership of Algeria, Egypt. Zarqawi himself in Iraq has stated 

that there hadn’t been progress. Well, indeed, the leadership 

around the world has been killed, even though obviously they have 

successors. 

But, again, I want to thank you for your efforts and look forward 

to the balance of your presentation. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. 

I would like to ask Secretary Clapper, in your—in the NIE, the 

public part of it says the main threat comes from Islamic terrorist 

groups themselves, especially al Qaeda, driven by their 

undiminished attempt to attack the homeland. 

On a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the most lethal and imminent 

threat, how much of a threat to the U.S. homeland is al Qaeda in 

Iraq? 
27 

Secretary CLAPPER. It is difficult to put it on a scale. I just would 

reiterate what the NIE stated, though, about the professed intent 

of AQI. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand about intent. I am asking about capability. On a scale of 1 to 10, what is their capability to attack 

the homeland? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, as the Intelligence Community has looked at 

this issue, the judgment that they have stated is that currently the 

bulk of AQI’s resources are focused on the battle inside of Iraq. 

Mr. ANDREWS. So is that a 10 or is it a 1? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, one of the things we tried to avoid in this estimate was to try and put a number like that, because it can just 

be misinterpreted. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Or perhaps misused. 

I would ask a similar question about al Qaeda in the FATA 

areas. 

How do you assess its relative capability to attack the homeland 

from the FATA areas? Is it greater than AQI in Iraq? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, as we look at both intent and capabilities, I 

think with regard to AQ in South Asia, the intent is totally 

undiminished in terms of capabilities, the core elements of the capability they need to attack us here. We see a negative trend from 

our standpoint in terms of safe haven, leadership, and training and 

recruitment of operatives. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Are they more capable or less capable of attacking 

us from the FATA relative to Iraq? 

Mr. GISTARO. We are primarily concerned with al Qaeda in South 

Asia. 

Mr. ANDREWS. So they are more capable in the areas of the 

FATA than they are in Iraq, right? 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Secretary Clapper, if we were to put aside the difficulties with Pakistani politics, which is—I know we can’t do, but 

if the Pakistanis would let us do whatever we wanted to in the 

FATA areas diplomatically, intelligence-wise, militarily, to the extent that you would want to answer that question in this forum, 

what would that be? What is the optimal situation for us in the 

FATA areas? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, I think probably a greater freedom of 

action, first on the part of Pakistanis themselves. Even though they 

have done a lot, if they could do more, and if there were, I think, 

speaking personally, probably more freedom of action on our part 

to engage in Pakistan. 

I might ask Ms. Long—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Let me ask a question. 

If we received a report this afternoon that there was plans fairly 

well along the line and we felt it was in our interest to intercede 

with a Special Forces strike, are we able to do that? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, yes, sir. We would be. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Why did you hesitate? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Just was thinking about the extent to which 

I would want to discuss that in open session. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Okay. No. I understand that. 
28 

What suggestions that you could give us in open session would 

you make as far as moving us closer to that optimal position you 

just described? As a Congress, what could we do that would help 

us move toward a situation where we have greater freedom of 

movement in the FATA areas? 

Secretary CLAPPER. I think if we simply continue the efforts we 

have now underway, particularly the continuation of the dialogue 

with President Musharraf, working with his military, administrative interior, the aid and assistance that we have flowing to Pakistan, I think we need to continue that and, of course, accordingly 

would—we would hope the Congress would support that. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I think you understand this, but I want to say it. 

The American people, both Republican and Democrat, want this 

job done by the United States to the extent that that is achievable. 

We do not want to farm this one out. If it can be done, we want 

it done by our people. 

Mr. VERGA. I wouldn’t want the American people who might be 

watching this to get the impression that if there were information 

or opportunity to strike a blow to protect the American people in 

the FATA that we would not take immediate advantage of that opportunity. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. REYES. Mr. Cole. 

Mr. COLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you gentlemen, and lady, for being here. 

I am intrigued by a couple of points and actually struck by the 

same things that Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Thornberry were. So let 

me ask you this, because when you look at the two NIEs, it creates 

a great deal of consternation. 

Is it possible that—well, let me put it to you this way: Is our intelligence and understanding that much better, or is our situation 

that much worse? 

Mr. GISTARO. That is an excellent question, sir. 

I think it is probably a little bit of both. I think one of the reforms in the NIE process that has been instituted under the DNI 

is that no NIE is sacred and that when we are going to produce 

a new one, you don’t start with the last NIE and assume that one 

is absolutely true and you just have to go on from there. You go 

back and do a zero-based intelligence review. 

Mr. COLE. So we sort of need to look on our understanding as 

evolving here and very difficult to say we got it right then, so what 

we know now, we can draw a very straight line from it. 

Mr. GISTARO. As part of our trade craft, we absolutely try to 

avoid that mind-set. That said, I think the intelligence has changed 

in the last year. And the judgments in the current NIE are driven 

by the intelligence we have seen in the last year. 

Mr. COLE. Let me also ask you this. Again, I agree very much 

with Mr. Thornberry’s comments that we are dealing as much with 

the movement as we are with a man or a group of men or an organization. 

If we got what everybody up here would want us to get, that is 

we got Osama bin Laden tomorrow, and we are able to kill or capture him, would it fundamentally change the nature of the chal-
29 

lenge or the threat that we are dealing with, or would that still 

exist? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, the community actually spent a lot of time 

talking about that exact point. Because it is in the classified section 

of the paper, I would prefer to go into detail on that in closed session if I could. 

Mr. COLE. Absolutely. 

Let me ask you this, then, and switch the focus and the time I 

have got left to al Qaeda in Iraq. 

And in your judgment, is our focus there a diversion or is it still 

an integral part of the ongoing struggle with al Qaeda? We are sort 

of chasing a lesser target there at a great deal of expense, great 

deal of resources. Or is the focus there still worthwhile? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, I believe it is clearly still worthwhile 

that that is the significant threat. It is a significant component of 

the larger global AQ threat. So absolutely. 

Mr. COLE. Given the fact, Mr. Secretary, you know clearly we 

have multiple struggles going on in Iraq. We have got civil strife, 

we have got tension between ethnic and sectarian groups. I mean, 

I don’t mean to give you a challenge. Is it even possible to disentangle these threads? 

You know, we got a lot of policy pronouncement in Washington 

that we should just focus on al Qaeda in Iraq, and somehow everything that is happening domestically in terms of the government or 

the rivalries or the jockeying of power is sort of irrelevant. 

Do we have the luxury of that kind of clarity and that kind of 

isolation of the problem in an area as complex as Iraq? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, I think you have accurately characterized the complexity of the situation there. Certainly the al Qaeda 

threat is crucial. It is crucial that we continue our campaign 

against it. But that is against the backdrop of all of the other complexities and the dynamics in Iraq. 

And I am not sure it is possible to cleanly disaggregate those 

various components of the complexity, as you correctly allude. 

Ms. LONG. Congressman, if I could augment that answer. Excuse 

the augmentation. 

One of the things we are learning about al Qaeda is that they 

play upon the societal divisions that preexist, whether it is tribal, 

Shi’a, Sunni or otherwise. And by exacerbating those tribal and 

other divisions, they actually play into the criminal and other elements of what is going on in complex societies like Iraq and in the 

FATA. 

So your point is exactly right, sir. To disaggregate what actually 

al Qaeda is focusing on, which is to force those divisions in society 

to be a conflict against not only those people but our brave men 

and women in the Coalition force is very, very difficult. 

Mr. COLE. I know I don’t have much time. But, again, we sort 

of do a lot of historic revisionism, but there is clearly very adaptable multifaceted—well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will hold that 

for another time. 

Mr. REYES. Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you all for being here. 

When you were asked about what has changed, I think one of the 

things that you cited was the change in the Waziristan agreement. 
30 

And yet there has been some, I guess, points of view that would 

suggest that it is not really just there in the FATA regions that al 

Qaeda has been reconstituted, but in fact it is across Pakistan, and 

that there are more problems than just looking at FATA regions. 

Would you agree with that and, if so, what do you believe is the 

situation there as you get it in a broader context? 

Mr. LEITER. I think we are talking about al Qaeda core senior 

leadership. I actually would—the vast majority of what we are 

talking about is in North Waziristan. So I would not say it is a 

Pakistan-wide problem. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Anybody disagree with that? 

Okay. I know that there have been several articles that would 

suggest that—that is great, and I wanted to give you a chance to 

clarify that. Thank you. 

One of the other issues that we focused on is that the changes 

that have occurred in the al Anbar area and the fact that both 

Sunni and Shi’a tribal leaders have come together in many ways 

to fight al Qaeda. There is a downside to that, as we know. 

And I wonder in terms of the intelligence that you are receiving, 

if you believe that we ought to be looking at that downside, or that 

this is just a risk that we need to take in terms of the strengthening in many ways of those tribal communities and the tribal 

leaders as they fight al Qaeda. 

I guess the follow-up question to that is if, in fact, we are seeing 

that shift and that is true, is then al Qaeda in Iraq being seen 

quite differently by at least that area of the country and do—are 

they that much less a threat? 

Ms. LONG. Ma’am, I can address that from a non-intelligence 

standpoint. 

I am not sure what you are referring to when you say the flip 

side. I think you may be referring to the public discussion about 

arming the tribes or militia in al Anbar. And, you know, from the 

statements of the Secretary, these were the folks who were well 

armed to begin with. But it is very important and you are exactly 

right that what has happened there is a shift in attitude. And I believe it was Congressman Hoekstra that pointed out that the important point of the forcefulness behind the theory and the ideology 

of al Qaeda is the attitude. 

So when we take a look at the tribes, whether they are in al 

Anbar, in other places where they made the fundamental commitment to enforce the government, to reinforce the government of 

Iraq and to counter what they consider are a foreign and hostile 

threat, and that is al Qaeda in Iraq, that is a good thing. And what 

we are trying to do is encourage that by empowering them, by 

guiding them, and by institutionalizing that effort. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Are you saying from the point of view 

of intelligence, then, there is really no downside to that? 

Ms. LONG. I can’t speak to the intelligence fact. I was referring 

my colleagues to that point. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I just wanted to have a chance, because certainly some military leaders would suggest that it is a 

very cautionary way to proceed and we certainly need to do that. 
31 

May I just turn really quickly. I am trying to get a sense in 

terms of priorities and certainly in terms of the Department and 

where you have put your resources. Obviously they are limited. 

Would you say that—has there been a shift in resources from the 

last NIE report than the report today, or the 2007 report? Does 

that NIE make a difference in terms of the way you would utilize 

resources? And certainly individuals who were focusing on whether 

it is al Qaeda, al Qaeda in Iraq, whether it is Pakistan, the FATA 

region; have you shifted your resources at all? 

Secretary CLAPPER. I think in general terms, the NIEs have simply served to reinforce the course that the Department has been on. 

It has undertaken a lot of actions in response to this shift and to 

focus on terrorism. 

So changes in the unified command plan, the expansion of our 

Special Operations capabilities, to name a couple of specific examples. I think the NIEs have simply, despite perhaps the somewhat 

different approach, different purposes, but I think the underlying 

fundamental themes have served to reinforce the direction the Department is taking. 

At the same time, though, we have other issues that we must— 

the Department has to wrestle with in terms of nation states, potential nation states, peer competitors, et cetera, apart from the 

war on terrorism. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady very much. 

Mr. Mike Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank each of you for your efforts to answer our questions today and for your service. 

This document is obviously a very important one, and that is, as 

you hear the questions of the members as we look to issues of policy and of actions, it is something that will guide us to a great extent. 

It saddens me, though, that so many times the National Intelligence Estimate is used for political purposes. Last time when the 

National Intelligence Estimate came out, there was a great amount 

of political hay that was made over al Qaeda’s reaction to our presence in Iraq. And I heard some of that today as we went down the 

questions about al Qaeda. 

And it just strikes me, because there is some of this that just 

seems obvious. 

And so I have a few questions for you that really have been troubling me since we began the discussion on the last National Intelligence Estimate as people have tried to take it and put it forward 

to the American people for, I think, political purposes that don’t 

help our discussion. 

Are there any of you that believe, or did you have any intelligence information that would have indicated that al Qaeda would 

have liked us more by our entering Iraq, or that they would have 

been supportive of us entering Iraq? Does anyone have any information that al Qaeda would have liked and been supportive of us 

going into Iraq? 

I suspect the answer is no. And the reason why I suspect the answer is no is because whenever I hear someone make big hay over 
32 

al Qaeda is upset that we are in Iraq, I think that should win a 

blooming obvious award, because we can’t imagine they would have 

thought anything else. 

Now, I wasn’t here when we voted to go here in Iraq. So I am 

not one of those who is here to try to make the point of what we 

knew and didn’t know. But it just troubles me when people try to 

make the point that Iraq is—about Iraq’s—about al Qaeda’s reaction to our presence in Iraq, when it seems to me it was pretty obvious what their reaction was going to be. 

Looking to post-9/11, are there any of you that believed or did 

you have any information that would have indicated that after we 

were attacked on 9/11, that al Qaeda was done, that they were satisfied with their attack on our country and that on 9/12, al Qaeda 

posed no risk to our country? 

Anyone? 

No. I suspected the answer was no. 

So today it would be back to the blooming obvious award that al 

Qaeda would not have changed its intent. 

Now, what is not obvious and what I think was so important 

about Ellen Tauscher’s discussion is it is not obvious that the capabilities, the timing in which they have capabilities that are waning, 

or the times that their capabilities are escalating, and I look forward to our classified discussion as we learn more of that. 

The other question I have for you is, is there anyplace in the 

Middle East where the United States has troops where al Qaeda 

is not present? You don’t have to tell me where. But is it—is it a 

yes or a no? Is there a place where we have troops in the Middle 

East where al Qaeda has no presence? 

I would suspect the answer is no. 

Mr. LEITER. We could probably give you very limited examples, 

but yes. 

Mr. TURNER. Very limited. I appreciate you saying it. 

It also seems to me that it is pretty obvious that there is no one 

who would have suspected that our going into Iraq would not have 

resulted in al Qaeda following us. 

Something else that is not a surprise. 

Well, turning to another portion of your report that we have not 

discussed, you are talking about Lebanese Hezbollah, and you go 

on to say that they might pose a threat for attacking the homeland 

if it perceives the United States as posing a direct threat to the 

group or to Iran. Obviously they have been—we have seen significant military action that has occurred in that area. 

Can you please describe further what your thoughts are there 

with respect to their views of the United States as a threat and 

then their threat to us? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, this was one of the parts of the key judgments 

that we scrubbed pretty hard from a security standpoint, and I 

would much prefer to discuss it in closed session. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I will wait for my questions there. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to call on Mr. Murphy right now. And 

after he asks his questions, we are going to have a 10-minute recess. 

Mr. Murphy. 
33 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you Mr. Secretary, distinguished witnesses for your testimony today. 

Are you telling us that in the entire unclassified NIE, that the 

name Osama bin Laden is never mentioned? And this fits a pattern 

where even the President said about bin Laden, and I quote, ‘‘I 

truly am not that concerned about him,’’ unquote. 

The folks in the Eighth Congressional District of Pennsylvania 

are concerned about him and about bringing him to justice because 

he is the one who is responsible for the murder of 3,000 innocent 

Americans. 

So will you please explain to me why, and I quote, ‘‘the most authoritative written judgments on national security,’’ end quote, does 

not include our efforts to capture and kill Osama bin Laden? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, what we were trying to assess in the estimate 

was the intent and capabilities of al Qaeda and other terrorist 

groups against the United States. 

Bin Laden’s influence on that is discussed pretty thoroughly in 

the paper. It was not to assess in broad terms U.S. counterterrorism policy. 

Mr. MURPHY. Sir, in the whole NIE it is not—his name is not 

mentioned at all in the NIE. He is still the leader of al Qaeda. 

Mr. GISTARO. No, sir. He is discussed quite a bit in the body of 

the paper. 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I have asked this line of questioning in the 

past. I think it is important also getting to the bottom of it. The past 5 years, the aid, the $5.6 billion aid to Pakistan to com- bat terrorism, it is about $80 million dollars a month with no 

strings attached. No questions asked, no accountability. And I believe it is quite disturbing that the NIE states that al Qaeda has 

found a safe haven in the Pakistani tribal region. 

When I was in Pakistan and Afghanistan a few months ago, they 

expressed a willingness to help out on the border region and also 

the border of Afghanistan, and asked for the Afghan Army to assist 

in their efforts. And currently the House of Representatives and 

the Senate are working out compromises to our bill implementing 

the 9/11 Commission recommendations. 

One provision that is being negotiated and I believe incorporated 

into the final bill, is a section on Pakistan that would limit aid to 

Pakistan unless the President issues a determination that Pakistan 

is making all possible efforts to prevent the Taliban from operating 

in areas under its sovereign control, including the FATA, the Federal Administered Tribal Areas. 

The Administration has proposed even this minimal effort to promote accountability, stating it would be counterproductive to fostering a closer relationship with Pakistan. 

In light of the troubling findings of the NIE over Pakistan’s failure to fight terrorism, does this Administration, in particular does 

DOD and NCTC oppose efforts, such as those in the 9/11 bill, 

which demand accountability, including specific benchmarks with 

respect to Pakistan’s effort in rooting out terrorism? 

Ms. LONG. I would like to go ahead and answer that on behalf 

of the Department of Defense. 

I would take some difference of perspective of your statement regarding that no one holds Pakistan accountable. And as a matter 
34 

of fact, there are extensive exchanges between the Department and 

the Pakistani government to account for and to follow through on 

how the aid that we provide them is utilized. 

For example, I believe it was Congressman Smith talked about 

the policy implications and the policy lines of our assistance to 

Pakistan. And those extend to development of the military, as you 

are well aware, with the Frontier Corps, and it also extends to nonkinetic measures such as economic and other developmental efforts 

in order to bring stability from a political economic standpoint to 

the FATA. 

So I do believe that the Department in particular, and while 

State Department is not here, does account for and does follow very 

closely the utilization of the aid that is provided to Pakistan. 

Mr. MURPHY. But the reality of on the ground is we knew this 

intelligence before the NIE came out. We have known for at least 

since I have been in Congress, for seven months, the fact that we 

knew this was—this region of the world was a safe haven for al 

Qaeda. And we continue to give $80 million dollars a month to the 

tune of $5.6 billion to President Musharraf who has called off his 

military, the Pakistani Army, and basically outsourced this tribal 

area and allowed al Qaeda and the Taliban to grow stronger and 

stronger. 

Ms. LONG. Once again, sir, I would disagree with you. To date, 

approximately 700 Pakistani security services have died in support 

of the effort to stabilize the FATA and other regions. And I believe 

as of today, some 100,000 Pakistani security forces are in that region contributing to the global war on terror. 

Mr. MURPHY. Ms. Long, is it your testimony today that President 

Musharraf has not called off the Pakistani Army in that section, 

the FATA section, in the past? 

Ms. LONG. It is my testimony today that it is my understanding 

that there is Pakistani military and other security forces present 

in the FATA, yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

We will now have a 10-minute recess, and Dr. Gingrey, you will 

be the next member called upon. 

Ms. ESHOO. Could I ask a courtesy of you to maybe announce the 

order of members that are still to be called on? 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We can do that. 

I have Dr. Gingrey, Mr. Loebsack, Mr. Wilson—Ms. Wilson, excuse me. Mr. Holt, Mr. Franks, Mr. Sestak, Mr. Issa. That is as far 

down as I can go as of this moment, if that helps any. 

Ten-minute recess. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. We are back in session. The gentleman from 

Georgia, Mr. Gingrey. 

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead, Doctor. 

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I want to thank the 

witnesses for sharing their time with us this afternoon. It has been 

a great hearing. 

My colleague from Ohio asked the question a little while ago, and 

he talked about the blooming obvious award to some of his rhetorical questions. And I thought I would offer a couple or few rhetor-
35 

ical questions as well, and I think the answer, at least from my 

perspective, is blooming obvious, but I would welcome the witnesses to actually answer the questions if they felt qualified to do 

so. 

And this is the first question, when a well qualified team of cancer specialists—now, remember, I am an OB/GYN physician so I 

am coming at this analogy obviously from the medical perspective—but when a well qualified team of cancer specialists agree on 

a plan of therapy for a patient’s cure, and this plan is based on all 

available medical information at the time of initial treatment, and 

they apply that therapy consistent with the known standards of 

care at that point in time, yet the cancer comes back, is that medical team guilty of malpractice? 

Now the other question then is, if the answer is no, if this same 

team, knowing that the successful treatment of this recurrent disease, now the cancer has come back, it is going to be much more 

difficult, much more difficult as we all know, so they decide to 

withdraw their care from the patient and move on to some other 

battle that they are more likely to be successful in, would you then 

say that they are guilty of malpractice or even abandonment of the 

patient? I think that blooming obvious answer to this rhetorical 

question is yes. 

We have all heard the old adage, and I am old enough to remember when people would say, oh, goodness, you have got a cancer, 

but don’t let them cut on it, don’t let that doctor cut on it, because 

it will spread it. 

And what I am getting at, we are talking about, we have been 

here a long time today, we are really taking this National Intelligence Estimate in regard to al Qaeda and the fact that we went 

after the cancer with the best knowledge that we had, the best of 

our ability at the time, and the cancer, al Qaeda, according to the 

National Intelligence Estimate, has come back. It has come back 

with a vengeance. It is going to be tougher, and it is tougher to 

wipe them out because this spread a little bit. 

Do you gentlemen think that we should give up in a situation 

like this, or should we continue to fight the cancer, because there 

is still a chance for a cure? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, I am not a medical doctor, sir, but I 

think your analogy, and even though the questions and statements 

are rhetorical, I think they are correct. 

The answer to your first rhetorical question is, of course, no. At 

least I don’t think it subscribes to the common understanding of 

what medical malpractice would be. 

I think what we have here is somewhat of just a chronic condition that is going to be with us for a long time, and we have to, 

I think, resolve that this is a long running condition. And hopefully 

we will find a cure for it some day, as we will hopefully find a cure 

for cancer. In the meantime, we have to attack it using a variety 

of means and methods, as we are, and we have to take it on wherever it occurs and wherever we can get to it. 

Dr. GINGREY. Still got a little time for other answers. 

Mr. VERGA. Sir, I would obviously agree with you and the only 

other additional comment that I would make is, while al Qaeda is 

a very resilient organization, they have in fact reconstituted them-
36 

selves. I have a hard time imagining how much worse it would be 

had we not undertaken the actions we have undertaken since September 11th, and I have a vivid imagination. 

Dr. GINGREY. I will say this, in regard to that comment about, 

oh, don’t let the doctors cut on that cancer, I can assure you, and 

I am not a cancer specialist either, but if you just look at it and 

hope that it will go away and that you don’t disturb the hornets’ 

nest and think they will like us, it will surely kill you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman from Georgia. 

Mr. Holt. 

Mr. HOLT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses. 

I would like to follow on some of the questioning of Mr. Thompson and Ms. Tauscher about the difference, and that you have 

heard from others today, about the difference between the NIEs 

where in 2006 it talked about seriously disrupting the leadership 

of al Qaeda and now saying that it has reconstituted and is as 

great a threat as ever. 

You took a couple of—made a couple of efforts at trying to explain some of the differences. At one point, you said, well, we took 

away the safe haven in Afghanistan. But that, of course, had happened long before the 2006 NIE. So that can’t be the explanation 

of what has changed. Then you said, well, the policy of Pakistan 

and the tribal areas has changed. And that certainly is true. 

So let me just ask you to say it outright, are you or are you not 

saying that the Pakistani policy, Musharraf ’s policy in the tribal 

area has changed in a way that has led to either tolerating al 

Qaeda or aiding directly or indirectly al Qaeda? Are you saying 

that? 

Mr. LEITER. Congressman, the North Waziristan Peace Agreement contributed to al Qaeda developing over the past year a safe 

haven. It made them more secure. If I can add one thing though, 

you noted that taking away Afghanistan in 2001 couldn’t have any 

effect. My point was that this has not been a constant evolution. 

That taking away the safe haven for al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 

2001 did for a period disrupt its ability to plan and plot. Their 

movement to the urban areas gave them opportunity to regenerate. 

Attacking them there allowed them to move and so on and so on. 

Mr. HOLT. Well, I think that there is an important policy implication of what you have just said about the change in Pakistan. Let 

me go to another question; what sort of control does al Qaeda, al 

Qaeda in Pakistan or wherever the leadership is, have over al 

Qaeda in Iraq for tactics and operational planning. What sort of 

control do they have? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, I think the President laid it out pretty clearly 

yesterday. 

Mr. HOLT. I am asking you. You have studied this, and he is getting his information from you, I hope. 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. I think what the President said was, we 

do not see al Qaeda in South Asia exercising tactical control over 

AQI. That they have deferred to AQI. 

Mr. HOLT. Now you also said in answer, Mr. Gistaro, in answer 

to Mr. Thompson’s question, that al Qaeda was not in Iraq at the 
37 

time that the U.S. went in. When did they go in? When did they 

appear if it was after we entered? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, I think we—the Intelligence Community looks 

at the 2004 swearing of bayat on the part of Zarqawi to al Qaeda 

as the point where we started to talk about al Qaeda in Iraq. 

Mr. HOLT. Why? Why did they go in? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, I think, and I defer to others on the panel, 

there was a terrorist presence in Iraq. It decided in 2004 to align 

itself formally with al Qaeda. 

Ms. LONG. Congressman Holt, if I actually might clarify just two 

points. You asked a moment ago about the policy implications of 

the North Waziristan Agreement. It was unclear from where the 

conversation left off, that agreement is no longer in effect, sir, and 

in fact has been abandoned. The Pakistani government made the 

policy decision to return the army, which had maneuvered itself 

away from some of the centers to garrisons and along the border. 

They have returned significant forces to Northern Waziristan as 

well as realigned the forces within Northern Waziristan. 

So I didn’t want to let that go with a misinterpretation that the 

agreement was still in effect and, therefore, that we had not and 

the Pakistanis had not made the appropriate policy adjustments. 

Mr. HOLT. Let me just wrap up by saying, you have published 

an unclassified version of this so clearly you mean it for public consumption. It is leaving the public very confused. We have gone 

from the President saying in 2003 that the nearly one-half of al 

Qaeda senior operatives have been captured; and then, a few 

months later, that nearly two-thirds have been captured and killed; 

and a year later, maybe three-quarters have been killed. We have 

gone from orange to yellow to red warnings, and now we have conflicting NIEs barely a year apart. It is leaving Americans very confused about what we really know and whether what we are stating 

are facts or political assertions. 

Ms. LONG. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go ahead and answer 

that question. 

The CHAIRMAN. Please. 

Ms. LONG. Sir, it is a confusing situation in part because it is a 

complex situation and the nature of counterinsurgency of terrorism, 

and particularly this target, is a very dynamic target. And it has 

adapted and changed to our tactics and procedures, and continues 

to do so. You are exactly right in that we owe it to the U.S. public 

not to boil this down to sound bites and to ensure that they understand the complexity and the difficulty of this terrorist target, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Let’s go back. We went 

into Iraq in March 2003; am I correct? The answer is, yes. At what 

point did we realize there was an insurgency? Anybody? 

Secretary CLAPPER. I think soon after the end of active hostilities. 

The CHAIRMAN. That would have been around May 1st, 2003, am 

I correct? 

Secretary CLAPPER. I think we began to see early when— I was 

the director of NGA at the time, and I think we began to see early 

signs that there was a coherent national thing, but there were certainly the earmarks of an insurgency. 
38 

The CHAIRMAN. Was this basically the Baathists of yesteryear of 

the Saddam Hussein Sunni group? 

Secretary CLAPPER. I think it was a combination of interests 

using terrorist tactics, Sunnis versus Shi’as; disaffected Baathists, 

yes. Then, as things evolved, we began to see the association with 

AQI or al Qaeda moving in and exploiting the situation and galvanizing the terrorist movement in Iraq. 

The CHAIRMAN. When did the al Qaeda or foreign fighters, if they 

are the same thing, move in and begin assisting the insurgency? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, if you do go back, Zarqawi was already in Iraq 

even before we invaded. I think he had started to establish those 

networks to bring foreign fighters into Iraq, primarily to be the suicide bombers that he started using with increasing frequency in 

2004 and 2005. 

The CHAIRMAN. When was that? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir? 

The CHAIRMAN. When was that? When was there a presence of 

al Qaeda assisting or working with the Sunni insurgency? And 

using May 1st as a focal point, from that point. 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, we began to use the term al Qaeda in Iraq in 

2004 after Zarqawi pledged his bayat. 

The CHAIRMAN. So that would be the following year. 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Not until then. 

Mr. GISTARO. We were certainly aware of Zarqawi and what he 

was doing. 

The CHAIRMAN. When were you aware of Zarqawi and what he 

was doing? 

Mr. GISTARO. We saw evidence he was in Iraq even as early as 

I believe 2002. 

The CHAIRMAN. When did he begin his activities? 

Mr. GISTARO. Sir, I think this is something I need to take as a 

question for the record to make sure I can give you an accurate answer. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am getting a little fuzzy there. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Will the chairman yield. The fact of the matter is 

Zarqawi was in Iraq, but he was there as an insurgent independent; that he didn’t even have a good relationship with Osama 

bin Laden; in fact, Osama bin Laden rejected his overtures until 

it was convenient for al Qaeda to take credit for the kind of insurgency going on in Iraq. And at that point, they finally accepted the 

overtures of Zarqawi. And all of the insurgency activity he was involved in, on an entirely different basis, became associated with al 

Qaeda, and that is how the situation evolved. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let’s proceed. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank all of you for 

being here. Sometimes it is easy for those of us that have the opportunity to kind of second guess you to forget that you are the invisible front line of freedom in this country, and we appreciate you 

very much. I know you have a difficult job. 

I was struck by the comments of both Mr. Gingrey and Mr. Turner about some of the obvious questions. And part of the problem 

is that sometimes in this body, self-evident truths have become less 
39 

self-evident. And it seems like truth sometimes gets disinvited from 

the debate. So if you grant me diplomatic immunity, let me just try 

to do a little bit of the same thing they did. 

Ms. Long, when you mentioned that al Qaeda was very adept at 

being able to not only assess but to understand the political dynamics in a given area and to exploit those in ways that are pretty 

insidious, do you not think that they also are able to assess our 

own political dynamics here and exploit them to a great degree as 

well? 

Ms. LONG. Absolutely. In fact, I believe that there is intelligence 

as well as anecdotal information that they watch our political dynamic as well as our dialogue very carefully in order to gauge our 

weaknesses as well as our strengths. 

Mr. FRANKS. I think it is probably one of the greatest challenges 

that we have here, is that al Qaeda is an insidiously intelligent and 

dangerous group that has profound commitment to their ultimate 

end, and our challenge sometimes is to diminish their capacity. 

With that in mind, let me ask you again, Ms. Long, do you think 

that al Qaeda feels emboldened and strengthened—and this is a 

terribly unfair question to you; it is a political question, but it also 

has a pretty straightforward answer, probably—do you think al 

Qaeda is emboldened or encouraged by calls in this body for us to 

withdraw from Iraq? 

Ms. LONG. I think debate about what we do in Iraq and the manner in which we do it is very important, and I think public dialogue 

and discussion about that is critical to our democracy, and I think 

that, to the extent that individuals see that both internally and externally, they know this is a fundamental principle of America, 

that we have dialog. 

I do think we need to be careful that we don’t inadvertently either dissuade our allies from being aware, and knowing our commitment, as well as emboldening our enemies. 

Mr. FRANKS. If they had a vote, Mr. Verga, do you think that al 

Qaeda would vote for us to withdraw or to stay and fight? 

Mr. VERGA. I think they would like us to withdraw. 

Mr. FRANKS. Think they would like for us to withdraw. Let me 

ask you, Mr. Verga, let me not characterize, what do you think the 

reason is that we see this drawing into Iraq of al Qaeda? Why are 

they coming into Iraq to fight us? 

Mr. VERGA. One, because we are there. We are fighting them 

there because they are there. And they see it as an opportunity to 

hand us a defeat which would help them get to their end, which 

is ultimately an Islamic Caliphate that spans the world. 

Mr. FRANKS. Osama bin Laden said not so long ago said, this 

battle of two rivers, Iraq, is the critical battle. He said that this is 

the important thing. So if Iraq is not important to Osama bin 

Laden, if it is not important in the battle against al Qaeda, if it 

is not important in the battle against Islamic terrorism, if it is not 

important in the battle against jihad, then somebody needs to explain that to al Qaeda, because they don’t understand. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Verga, what do you think happens if we 

withdraw too soon from Iraq before that government can stand? 

What happens there? What does al Qaeda do, and what advantage 

do they gain by that happening? 
40 

Mr. VERGA. I think the biggest negative would be to establish a 

Taliban-type state that we had in Afghanistan prior to going into 

Afghanistan in a country which has much more indigenous capability. Iraq is a much more advanced country than Afghanistan 

was. And if you have an Islamic state bent on exporting Islamic 

fundamentalism around the world, they would have an operating 

base. I think the implications for the region and the implications 

for the safety and security of America would be profound. 

That is my best professional judgment, that leaving Iraq precipitously without setting the conditions for the Iraqi people to be able 

to have a stable country is not in the best interest of the United 

States. 

Mr. FRANKS. I suppose it doesn’t shock you to know that I agree 

with you completely on that. 

Mr. Gistaro, I think you mentioned earlier that the assessment 

is that the potential capacity to attack the United States comes 

more from al Qaeda in Asia than it does in Iraq, but Iraq has probably the clearest open statement that they want to attack the 

United States. 

So I ask this question, it is a little bit fuzzy, but is it possible 

that the reason that we deem the al Qaeda capacity in Iraq to be 

less than that of al Qaeda in Asia is because they don’t have the 

safe haven in Iraq because our people are there and are engaging 

them? Does that have anything to do with diminishing their capacity? 

Mr. GISTARO. Yes, sir. The Intelligence Community assesses that 

AQI, the bulk of its resources are focused on the conflict inside of 

Iraq at this time. 

Mr. FRANKS. I guess, I am about out of time here, but I want to 

thank all of you again. I hope that you stay with it. I think this 

is the most dangerous enemy that we have faced in terms of the 

ideological commitment that they have and that, unlike some of the 

dynamics of the past, it is no longer an equation of what is their 

intent, how can we diminish that; it is the equation of, how do we 

prevent them the capacity to do this country great damage, and 

how do we gain the confidence and the cooperation of the Iraqi people? I would submit to you that I believe that the rhetoric in this 

institution can have two negative consequences: It can embolden 

the enemy and can reduce the commitment on the part of our allies 

to cooperate. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on Mr. Sestak, it is my understanding that Mr. Leiter must leave at this moment and someone 

will take his place. Am I correct? 

Mr. LEITER. I do, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for the opportunity 

to speak with you. Taking my place, and I apologize for having to 

leave early, will be the NCTC’s director of intelligence, Andy 

Liepman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The name again? 

Mr. LEITER. Andy Liepman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. LEITER. Again, thank you for your time, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Leiter. 

Thank you so much. 

Mr. Sestak. 
41 

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The largest phrase I will walk out of here with you is yours, Mr. 

Gistaro, a safe haven, Pakistan. I can remember, I guess during 

the war when we went into Afghanistan, General Hayden, head of 

the NSA at that time, said to General Franks—excuse me, Franks 

said to Hayden, give me some actionable intelligence. And Hayden 

replied, give me some action, Franks, and I will give you some intelligence. 

We have a safe haven, so there is no action. They just sit there, 

so we can’t get intelligence, if Hayden’s comment was correct. 

You said, General, that we want to use—we want to attack it by 

every means, by a variety of means. Actually who probably should 

be sitting here at this table is the State Department. But you are 

the closest to it, Ms. Long, and then you, General. 

How do you get action so you can get intelligence in what you 

described as a safe haven that the might of America can’t get the 

intelligence in a certain place in the world? This is for you, Ms. 

Long, or General, either one. 

Ms. LONG. I think there are a variety of ways of getting action. 

We have talked a lot today about the kinetic aspects, and I think 

what you are alluding to is, as a result of kinetic activity, you can 

get prisoners or detainees or you can learn—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Much more than that. To the General’s point, there 

is a lot of means to get action. 

Ms. LONG. I was starting there, and I was about to say that actually I think one of the things we have learned, in al Anbar for example, is it is the non-kinetic means is sometimes more productive 

as an intelligence producer, and that is persuading folks—— 

Mr. SESTAK. How do we do that to Pakistan? What is the action 

you recommend? 

Ms. LONG. We have a three-pronged effort that I think is effective. And that is economic development so that the people of the 

FATA and Northern Waziristan in particular see their world 

changing so that they can affiliate themselves—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Will that take time? 

Ms. LONG. Time. 

Mr. SESTAK. In the near term, because he is just sitting there. 

Ms. LONG. One of the other things that we are doing near term 

and actually as we speak is we are developing the capabilities of 

the Pakistani army as well as frontier forces. 

Mr. SESTAK. But he has a treaty. 

Ms. LONG. That treaty is no longer in effect. And as a matter of 

fact—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Why did we wait? If the treaty was giving him safe 

haven, why didn’t we ask them to break it earlier? 

Ms. LONG. I think there is a misperception that we were standing by as this treaty was in effect. That is incorrect. In fact, our 

military and other efforts to not only provide military and other 

support as well as economic development to Pakistan were ongoing 

during the treaty, sir. 

Mr. SESTAK. General, any recommendations? 

Secretary CLAPPER. As I said earlier, I just think we need to continue on all fronts, whether it is assistance to the Pakistanis. I 
42 

think Ms. Long makes a very good point about it is not just the 

kinetic. 

Mr. SESTAK. Would you change anything we are doing now to try 

to get more action, or some action? 

Secretary CLAPPER. I think we need to continue what we are already doing. 

Mr. SESTAK. It hasn’t produced anything in Pakistan. 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, I don’t think that is necessarily the 

case. I think it is producing something. I think the treaty with the 

tribes in Waziristan was a good thing to try. It was done in good 

faith. It didn’t work out, and now it has ended, so we try another 

approach. I think that is characteristic of what needs to be done 

here, is to call on all forces, kinetic and non-kinetic. 

Mr. SESTAK. General, can I follow up? You said attack by a variety of means. When General Eikenberry left Afghanistan, he was 

asked, does Iran work toward our interest in Afghanistan for stability? His answer was yes at that time, not because they love us, 

but because they didn’t like al Qaeda and Taliban, and put money 

into building roads. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) had 

said that we would spiral into chaos in Iraq if we redeploy precipitously in 18 months. 

When asked, Dr. Fingar, did that include the influence if it was 

to be one of the means by which we want to get stability in Iraq 

to negotiate with him, to work with him to see if they can have an 

impact, would that change your answer of spiraling into chaos, 

since they don’t, he said, want a failed government, would that 

have changed your answer? He said probably. 

In attacking by variety of means these insurgents and all, would 

working, in your intelligence estimate, with Iran help address this 

problem in Iraq? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, in the first instance, I think any Iranian element that poses a direct threat to U.S. Forces in Iraq certainly has been and will be dealt with. Beyond that, the limited 

dialogue that Ambassador Crocker has had with the Iranians to 

implore them to reduce, eliminate their engagement, their support 

for the insurgents in Iraq is the right thing to do. 

Mr. SESTAK. I am out of time. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Gallegly. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks 

to all the witness for being here today. General Clapper, it is pretty 

common knowledge that in order to get to al Qaeda, we need to be 

able to surveil the al Qaeda network and their use of modern telecommunications. How is FISA’s inability to provide you with the 

proper tool to effectively listen to the terrorist communications impacting your ability to protect the homeland? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Sir, I think it would be best if we left that 

for a closed session discussion. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Would it be safe to say that it is clear that al 

Qaeda is using modern telecommunications? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Absolutely, they are. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. And it is important that in order to get through 

to al Qaeda, we really need to get to the core by getting through 

the network. 
43 

Secretary CLAPPER. Yes, sir, that is correct. That is, as I am sure 

you appreciate, is why the interest in updating, modernizing the 

FISA legislation, not only to improve the efficiency of our attack 

against al Qaeda communications and use of the Internet, et 

cetera, but at the same time to ensure that civil liberty considerations are addressed as well. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. But without getting into the specifics and the 

overall effect on the homeland, the current status of FISA does 

have an impact on our ability to do our job. 

Secretary CLAPPER. It does. It is not as efficient and as responsive as it needs to be, and that is a factor occasioned by the huge 

change in technology that has occurred since the original FISA legislation was enacted. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Kind of like between the Motorola cell phones of 

20 years ago that look like a shoe box compared to these today that 

you can make a vanilla malt with. 

Secretary CLAPPER. Even more basic than that. We have gone 

from an era of putting alligator clips on telephone lines to the technology you just indicated. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, General Clapper. 

The CHAIRMAN. Jan Schakowsky. 

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, both chairmen, 

and I thank our witnesses today. In 2002, before the vote on the 

use of force, I said, am I the only one who sees that the emperor 

has no clothes? Well, now, many years later, most Americans now 

see that the emperor has no clothes. What we have been doing has 

simply not been working, in my view. Almost 6 years now after 9/ 

11, when al Qaeda did attack us, 3,400-plus American troops are 

dead; a thousand-plus contractors, who we don’t even count, are 

dead; tens of thousands of Iraqis; nearly a half a trillion dollars 

borrowed; $12 billion a month; $12 million an hour. And the level 

of threat from al Qaeda we are learning is high, perhaps as high 

as it ever was, and growing. 

I wanted to just read something from the Strategic Reset, which 

is from the Center for American Progress: The current Iraq strategy is exactly what al Qaeda wants. The United States, distracted 

and pinned down by Iraq’s internal conflicts, trapped in a quagmire 

that has become the perfect rallying cry and recruitment tool for 

al Qaeda, United States has no good options given the strategic 

and tactical mistakes made on Iraq since 2002, but simply staying 

the course with an indefinite military presence is not advancing 

U.S. interests. 

So we heard the President say in May 2003, al Qaeda is on the 

run. That group of terrorists who attacked our country is slowly 

but surely being disseminated. Right now, half of the al Qaeda 

operatives are either jailed or dead. In either case, they are not a 

problem any more. Then we have talk about the 2006 NIE, and 

then the latest where al Qaeda has protected or regenerated key 

elements of its homeland attack capability. This is six years later 

now. 

And so we know also that al Qaeda in Iraq, which we are talking 

about the threat from there, did not exist prior to the U.S. occupation, and in Pakistan, now, we have what I call an al Qaeda-free 

zone. 
44 

Mr. Verga, you said you don’t want the American people to get 

the wrong idea, but why wouldn’t they? I am looking at a July 

25th, 2007, article that says a secret military operation in early 

2005 to capture senior members of al Qaeda in Pakistan’s tribal 

areas was aborted after top Bush Administration officials decided 

it was too risky and could jeopardize relations with Pakistan according to intelligence and military officials. 

Why wouldn’t they get the wrong idea about our seriousness 

about capturing Osama bin Laden? Let me make a few more 

points. 

The other thing I don’t understand is why we haven’t focused 

more on Saudi Arabia. Another article, July 15th, 2007, in the LA 

Times: Fighters from Saudi Arabia are thought to have carried out 

more suicide bombings than any other nationality. About 45 percent of all foreign militants targeting U.S. troops and Iraqi civilian 

and security forces are from Saudi Arabia; 15 percent from Syria 

and Lebanon; 10 percent from North Africa, according to U.S. military official figures made available to the Times. 

So I wanted an answer about the threat, which I didn’t see mentioned in the unclassified report, from Saudi Arabia. So those are 

two allies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. 

Finally, I wanted to ask your opinion then of what the latest revealed strategy of the significant American role in Iraq for the next 

two years, the joint campaign plan, could yield us in terms of getting Osama bin Laden and those people who really are trying to 

attack us, the bad guys that we know who have killed us? 

When I look at the articles about that two-year presence, what 

I see is about trying to stabilize Iraq, reduce the threat to Iraqis, 

but nothing about how we are really going to—seems to me we 

missed the boat. We took a turn from Afghanistan where we were 

fighting al Qaeda, and we went to a place that has only enabled 

al Qaeda to organize to use our Iraq occupation as a gathering 

point. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Issa from California. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Long, Secretary Long, as a key advisor to the Secretary of 

Defense this hearing is on Iraq, and I don’t want to stray too far 

from it, but I feel I must. As al Qaeda builds its network of foreign 

fighter recruiting, and they clearly have done that and used Iraq 

as one of the central recruiting points, and of course, they continue 

to use Israel and the plight of the Palestinians as another key recruiting. 

But recently, near Tripoli, Lebanon, it was shown that a huge 

amount of foreign fighters came into a Palestinian camp and in 

fact, and I use the words of the prime minister, he calls them al 

Qaeda-like, does not want to call them al Qaeda, but they are 

clearly foreign fighters, clearly Sunnis, clearly were recruited to 

come in, commit crimes and kill Lebanese armed forces when they 

came to respond to a bank robbery. 

One, how do you respond to that event? And two, which is going 

to be more broadly for the panel, when we spend $12 billion a 

month in Iraq, what is the excuse of having a key potential second 
45 

front get only 20 Humvees when we promised them three quarters 

of a billion dollars a year earlier at the time of that attack? 

As a matter of fact, at the time of the attack, just as a little note, 

they only had 600 artillery rounds to put into the target because 

we hadn’t kept any of our significant promises for resupply. I need 

to use about half my time on you and then go to General Clapper. 

Ms. LONG. I can, actually, sir. You are referring to the Lebanese 

armed forces (LAF) activities against the Palestinian armed enclaves in Tripoli and northern Lebanon as well as some of the activities that the LAF has undertaken in southern Lebanon. The 

first point is, you are exactly correct that foreign fighters have 

moved into Lebanon, and as you know, and not the subject of this 

particular hearing, those have been in order to strengthen 

Hezbollah as well as the activity going on in the north that were 

contrary to the Siniora government. It is important for you to be 

aware that the Department of Defense as well as the Department 

of State have reinvigorated and augmented our support to the 

Siniora government as well as Lebanese armed forces. 

As you are aware, sir, it wasn’t until quite recently chronologically that the Lebanese government, to the extent it was one, 

was Syrian-backed, and some would argue a Syrian puppet. Prior 

to that, you are exactly right, not a lot of resources went into the 

building of the armed forces. 

Mr. ISSA. I appreciate your response, but I am going to make a 

quick comment back. This is the typical talk we get in these hearings and is nice to have a public hearing so we can make a public 

answer. 

It has been two years since the assassination of Hariri. The 

March 14th coalition swept in a new organization, clearly anti-Syrian, and the Syrians were driven out, and we pledged to, in fact, 

support that legitimate government. The President invited the 

prime minister and had him at the White House. 

What I was asking, and I am going to have to go on to General Clapper, but what I was asking is, why, when we spend $12 billion 

a month, when the amount of weapons going into Iraq and Afghanistan is so huge, we couldn’t get more than 20 Humvees in a damn 

year? That is the question. It answers itself. And I apologize, but 

your answer that it has been a short term, a year or two of a nation that had no military, whose 113s are lucky just to be diesel 

and not gas, who go back to when I was a lieutenant, and then to 

say, well, it wasn’t enough time, is simply disingenuous. 

Additionally, and I know you don’t like being called disingenuous, King Abdullah offered to ship and train from his excess stock 

of our equipment, and we said no, and his equipment still sits 

there. 

Ms. LONG. That is inaccurate. I apologize for interrupting. We 

have gotten a lot more equipment into Lebanon than 20 Humvees. 

I will brief you and your staff as to the amount of equipment. 

Mr. ISSA. I would look forward to it because I will compare it 

with the list I received in Lebanon. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 109.] 

General Clapper, the followup question for you, it is interesting 

that you began your career as a lieutenant flying over Laos and 
46 

Cambodia. That was at a time when they were not open antagonists to us; were they? 

Secretary CLAPPER. That is right, sir. 

Mr. ISSA. They, in fact, simply were unable or unwilling to fight 

an enemy of ours, and they were being used in order to traffic in 

people who would kill Americans. And at that time, in the beginning of your career, we would not accept that foreign fighters and 

weapons and resupply came in through other sovereign nations; we 

would not accept their sovereignty if they were not able to maintain their sovereignty. 

So my question to you today, from a standpoint of Iraq, is, why 

is it we respect the sovereignty to the letter of Syria and Iran while 

clearly foreign fighters, munitions and others, either with or without the assistance of those countries, come into us; why is it that 

we do not have a next-generation of aircraft like the one you flew 

over Laos and Cambodia with eyes and ears and, yes, munitions, 

if necessary? That is as to Iraq, and obviously Pakistan would be 

exactly the same question. 

How do you answer why what was right when you were a lieutenant somehow is off limits as a Secretary? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, the conditions were not quite—the 

analogy is a little different. When I was flying the mission, EC–47 

missions, which were a World War II aircraft with World War II 

engines at the time. 

Mr. ISSA. You were eating K rations when you got home. 

Secretary CLAPPER. Of course, the target was specifically the 

North Vietnamese military formations that were moving through 

Laos, and the component of the Laotian government that was supportive acceeded to that. And of course, the conditions today I believe with Pakistan are just different. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

John Tierney. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I am going to start by making a brief statement 

as opposed to questioning, then hope to move to questions. I just 

want to put enough on the record here to clarify. There has been 

some other statements made about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and I think some of it may be construed as misleading by others. That act has been changed dozens of times since 

it was first enacted, and it was changed a number of times since 

9/11. The President instituted his program without ever coming 

back to Congress and asking that any changes be made in order 

to take care of any imperfections he might have seen in it. 

We have had numerous hearings now, both open hearings and 

classified hearings in the Intelligence Committee and subcommittees. The Administration has barely been able to articulate any 

particular problems with it, but the ones we can gather are they 

may need some staffing of people, additional staffing of people to 

implement the act as it is written. The other is that the act already 

allows for foreign-to-foreign communications to be intercepted. This 

Administration, for reasons we probably can talk about in classified 

sessions, has chosen to say it wants a warrant nonetheless. 
47 

We don’t need to go to an extent that some people have proposed, 

which would open up all United States communications to indiscriminate interception, but I do want to state, Mr. Schiff and Mr. 

Flake, in a bipartisan manner, Ms. Harman and others have taken 

care of that issue in a piece of legislation that failed to get bipartisan support. Senator Feinstein introduced a similar fix in the 

Senate. I hope that people won’t get caught up in this 

hyperventilation to think this Congress hasn’t been acting on that. 

Rather than make it into a political issue, I am hoping we can get 

back to legislation that Mr. Schiff, Mr. Flake and Ms. Harman and 

others have filed so we can clear up that issue and stop playing 

politics. 

On another matter here, I think the NIE states clearly the importance of eliminating key al Qaeda leaders. It states specifically 

that the loss of key leaders, specifically, Osama bin Laden, Ayman 

Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, of course, is already gone, in rapid succession probably would cause the group to fracture into smaller 

groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry 

on the mission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate 

strains and disagreements. We assess that the resulting splinter 

groups would at least for a time pose a less serious threat to the 

United States’ interests than does al Qaeda originally. 

I suppose that was true back right after September 11, 2001, and 

that is why we went into Afghanistan and why the entire Congress 

voted to go in. I also suspect, unfortunately, it was remaining to 

be true when this President diverted troops out of Afghanistan and 

into Iraq, which at that point in time did not have any al Qaeda 

people involved in that situation. And that is true today. It is still 

important to go after Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri and other 

leaders on that basis, but yet the President has disbanded a special 

intelligence group that was focused solely on that avenue and has 

continued to support the Musharraf regime in Pakistan, which 

some people would argue isn’t doing enough in that FATA area, the 

tribal area to take care of Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri. 

Does anybody here think it is not important at this time to put 

some focus on trying to get Osama bin Laden and al-Zawahiri and 

deal with that situation? Is there anybody here arguing it is not 

important to go after them? 

Assuming, then, that before Mr. Musharraf made the deal with 

the tribal chiefs in the Waziristan area, we had unrest there, we 

had Taliban, we had people that were causing problems, that is 

why he said he made the pact, because he thought that was going 

to get their cooperation in moving those out, so it was a preexisting 

problem; it didn’t happen because of the pact. Now the pact is in 

place, and we have some incidents that may have exacerbated the 

situation. The fact of the matter is that he is now by some reports 

trying to reinstitute those pacts. 

Ms. Long, you say that that is not the case. So are the reports 

that we are reading that this is still an effort on the part of the 

Musharraf government to reinstitute the pacts with the tribal leaders no longer accurate? You are uncertain, or can you adamantly 

state the United States government is working with Musharraf to 

be sure he doesn’t reinstitute that policy? 
48 

Ms. LONG. Sir, what I actually stated was that the Northern 

Waziristan Agreement instituted last year arguably was violated 

by both sides and has been abandoned by both sides and that 

Musharraf has moved subsequent to that to not only reconfigure 

figure the Pakistani armed forces, particularly the army, but also 

put more in the area. 

Mr. TIERNEY. My time is running, but during the time when that 

obviously wasn’t working, why did the United States fail to work 

with General Musharraf and convince him to do something other 

than to stand by and abide by that pact and watch that get worse? 

Ms. LONG. Sir, we were not standing by. As a matter of fact, I 

myself traveled to Peshawar as well in order to dialogue with the 

Pakistanis on the meaning of that agreement. And in fact, that 

agreement, some would argue, was an attempt not only to deal 

with the al Qaeda presence there but also the Taliban. 

As you are aware, the Taliban and other extremists in that area 

are also a threat not only externally but internally to Pakistan. We 

did not stand by. During that time frame, we increased our aid to 

the Pakistani military, and we began serious dialogue and efforts 

to train the Pakistani frontier forces, which were the element that 

the Pak government at the time was looking to as the primary element to reinstitute stability to Northern Waziristan. 

It is true that President Musharraf and various elements of the 

Pakistani government are looking at a variety of means, including 

small agreements in villages and other places, in order to gain stability. Some would argue that the approach isn’t too different from 

the approach we are taking in al Anbar in that they are looking 

to change tribal minds in order to gain them on the side of what 

the Pakistani military is trying to do, sir. So I can’t categorically 

say there are no agreements being contemplated at this time. I actually would hope that the Musharraf government is looking at all 

means to stabilize the region. 

Mr. REYES [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Tierney. 

Mr. Ruppersberger. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. There has been a lot said today, a lot of 

questions. I hope I am not repetitive. I had to be at another hearing and on the floor. I want to focus, I guess, and I am not sure 

who on the panel could answer the question, about the issue of terrorism on our borders. 

I think, if you look at the history and where we are now, when 

we went into Iraq, there were really no terrorists in Iraq at that 

time. Al Qaeda, if they were, I think Saddam Hussein probably 

would have killed them. Now I think we can all say that with all 

the issues that are going on, that Iraq has been a training ground 

for al Qaeda and is very serious. 

The way I see the situation, and I have been there four times, 

is, you have Sunni-Shi’a, and is almost as if we are the security 

guards for the Iraqi government in Iraq right now. And then you 

have al Qaeda there throwing bombs and doing whatever needs to 

be done. I think clearly that the strategy has to change in Iraq, and 

there are different opinions on that. 

I heard the President on the radio this morning, and I think, unfortunately, he made the argument that we need to stay in Iraq because that is going to protect us from an attack on our shores. 
49 

Well, al Qaeda is throughout the world right now. I think it is a 

very radical organization, and they recruit people throughout the 

world. 

I am very concerned about the threats in the United States. I believe that one of the reasons we haven’t had an attack is that al 

Qaeda has been focused in a lot of areas, and they want a big attack in the United States, an attack that is possibly some type of 

nuclear attack. The only way we are going to stop that, I believe, 

is through good intelligence. 

My concern is, do we have the resources, from an international 

level, which is what CIA and NSA are doing, to get back to the 

United States, to our Federal, State and local? FBI, who is really 

in charge; I think the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) is probably the best resource we have to stop the terrorism. The FBI is 

attempting to set up their own intelligence, the national security 

branch. But I am very concerned they are not where they need to 

be yet. They have good leadership there, but they need a lot of resources, and what makes it work is Federal, State and local. 

My question is, right now, we know that when eventually we 

leave Iraq, hopefully sooner than later, that Sunni and Shi’a are 

going to still be having their issues, but al Qaeda that are trained 

might come over to our borders and threaten us. What are we 

doing to make sure that we are getting the resources, the intelligence to our Federal, State and local, that we are identifying the 

cells in the United States. 

I will say one other thing; then maybe you can answer the question. The only way we are going to ever deal with the issue of terrorism, we are not going to be able to fight our way out of it; we 

are going to have to get the Muslim community throughout the 

world and let them come out and say, God does not want you to 

kill, that there is a one percent or less of Islam that is basically 

hurting our religion, and we are going to have to rally; that is the 

way we are going to stop this terrorism down the road. 

Getting back to the United States, we have Muslim Sunnis here, 

very active in the communities, do a lot. But they have children 

who have been in a very insular society and yet have gone to public 

schools. I am sure they have an issue with what we do in this country. 

What are we doing to help get the intelligence to our FBI and 

our State and locals in the United States? 

Mr. LIEPMAN. Congressman, NCTC was formed partly as a result 

of the 9/11 and WMD Commissions, and Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). One of the 

primary motivations in that was to improve the latch-up between 

our foreign intelligence operations at CIA and DIA and such, and 

our law enforcement, FBI, DHS. And I see every day analysts from 

the law enforcement side and the foreign intelligence side sitting 

side by side with access to each other’s information. We are certainly not perfect yet. We are still breaking through some stovepipes. But I think the sharing environment between the two main 

communities is better than it has ever been. We, in fact, are 

launching right now a new endeavor to make available Federal 

products to our State and local and tribal partners. We do that entirely through the DHS and the FBI. We need to be careful that 
50 

we give them the information that is useful and we not flood them 

with the amount of information that is available. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Do we have the resources that are necessary? There is so much money going to Iraq. Do we have the resources to deal with that? That is my last question because the red 

light came on. 

Mr. LIEPMAN. We are doing pretty well on that. Congress has 

been quite generous to us so far. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And the communication between FBI and 

Homeland Security. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Ruppersberger. 

Ms. Eshoo. 

Ms. ESHOO. Thank you. Thank you to the witnesses for your answers today but, most importantly, for your service to our country. 

I can’t help but think that you all in the positions that you hold 

are trapped in a bad policy, trapped in a bad policy. 

As we examine the impacts of the key judgments in the NIE, I 

believe it directs itself toward that. Now there is a huge fall-off, as 

has been stated earlier this afternoon, between the NIE of this 

year, of 2007, and the previous one. I think everyone in this room 

and everyone in the country, regardless of what their political affiliation is, would agree that the statement in this NIE that al 

Qaeda has, quote, protected or regenerated key elements of its 

homeland attack capability, is bad news for our country. 

I want to get to a couple of areas of questioning relative to the 

NIE and the resources that are appropriated by us that you have 

and how they are being used to address this. But I first want to 

make an observation, before I get to that, on what some of my colleagues have put forward today, which is really very, very troubling, and I think misleading. It has been suggested that we are 

blind, the term we are blind in terms of intelligence on al Qaeda 

because of FISA. 

Now the first question that comes to my mind is, how indeed 

could this NIE have been put forward if in fact we are blind? Does 

anyone on the panel believe that we are blind? 

Secretary CLAPPER. No, ma’am. 

Ms. ESHOO. That is the term that has been used. Does anyone 

believe that we are blind? 

Does anyone believe that we are blind? 

No one. 

I mean, it is very important to get down on the record, because 

I think it is a disservice to what all of you do, first of all, to suggest 

that. And we know better because fear is the most powerful of 

human emotions. We owe more to the American people than just 

trying to scare the hell out of them and say after all of the expenditure of life and limb and the investment that the American people 

are now making, $10 billion a month in Iraq alone, that we are 

blind. So thank you for your observation on that. 

Now let me get to resources. 

The NCTC. I would like you to tell the committee how many people you have devoted to the shortfall that the DNI or the gap that 

the DNI has spoken of. How many actual people do you have devoted to this? 
51 

Mr. LEIPMAN. I am not sure which shortfall we are talking about. 

We currently have 400, slightly more than 400 government workers 

in NCTC. 

Ms. ESHOO. I am not asking you how many you have in your 

agency. I am asking you how many you have working on your intelligence portion of what the committee hearing is about today to secure the intelligence. This is about the NIE. This is a startling 

NIE. 

Mr. LEIPMAN. Ma’am, we have 230 analysts right now. All of 

them work on terrorism, the majority of whom focus on the nexus 

of foreign intelligence and domestic threat. 

Ms. ESHOO. Well, in a secured setting, those are not the numbers 

that we received. 

To General Clapper, it is nice to see you again. Can you tell us 

about the resources, how you break down your resources and use 

them in this area? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, the totality of the resources apart from 

NCTC, or there are other organizations. 

Ms. ESHOO. The context—my direct question was the DNI has 

said that there is a gap in the ability to track terrorists’ communications. So how many people, both at NCTC and in your agency, 

General Clapper, do you have on this? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, I think to be perfectly accurate about 

this, to include the population of NSA, which we shouldn’t discuss 

that in open session anyway, and we would have to research that. 

And so I would like to take that for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 109.] 

Ms. ESHOO. Is that the same for NCTC? 

Mr. LEIPMAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. ESHOO. Let me ask the following question. There is $10 billion being spent in Iraq per month. What would— 

what amount of that and what impact would it have relative to 

what the NIE describes as the huge challenge that we have today 

in Pakistan? 

Secretary CLAPPER. If I understand your question, ma’am, of the 

money that is being expended in Iraq on a monthly basis and if 

that were used for some other purpose; is that your question. 

Ms. ESHOO. Well, again, the hearing today is on the implications 

of the NIE regarding al Qaeda. Now, the NIE, in its unclassified 

summary with the key elements in it, directs itself to what we 

know we have been talking about here today. 

I believe that what we are doing in Iraq has really brought us 

to the descriptions that are in this NIE. That doesn’t seem to be 

the policy of our country because of the administration. 

So given what the NIE has described, I would like to have an ap- plication of $10 billion to what the NIE directs itself toward, and 

the description of America’s enemies and where they are growing 

and posing that much more of a threat to our country. 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, a part of that threat emanates from 

Iraq. I mean, we have to—as we discussed earlier, we need to take 

on al Qaeda wherever it is. It happens right now that one of the 

places that it is present is in Iraq. 

Ms. ESHOO. Let me ask it this way. 
52 

Mr. REYES [presiding]. Can you wrap it up? 

Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I have been here since early this 

afternoon. I just want to finish with this question. 

Mr. REYES. I have, too. 

Ms. ESHOO. In terms of al Qaeda, which is a—there are many 

franchises. They are all over the world. They are limber. They are 

entrepreneurial. And the NIE describes the kind of threat that they 

are posing not only in Iraq, AQI, that is now growing, but elsewhere. What percentage of this overall world al Qaeda threat is in 

Iraq? What percentage do you attribute to Pakistan? And then 

what to other countries? 

Secretary CLAPPER. I believe, again, it would probably be best 

served to research that in the interest of accuracy and get that and 

provide that for the record. 

If you are talking about our estimates on the population of al 

Qaeda in various countries, if that is what you are—— 

Ms. ESHOO. It seems to me we assign resources to priorities. So 

I just want to know how you broke down the percentage. 

Thank you. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. REYES. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. I really like the analogy that the gentleman from Georgia used earlier about cancer. And on 9/11, we 

discovered a big cancer, and we went after the root causes of the 

cancer. We went into a place that was a safe haven for al Qaeda, 

and it was Afghanistan, and we rooted out and ran off the Taliban 

who had provided the safe haven for al Qaeda; isn’t that correct? 

Mr. LEIPMAN. Yes, sir. That is correct. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And it was not Iraq that was providing the safe 

haven; it was Afghanistan, correct? 

Mr. LEIPMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. JOHNSON. But then we have a misdiagnosis that took place. 

We had already diagnosed the cancer, and then we got a diagnosis 

of high blood pressure emanating from Iraq. We were told that Iraq 

was the place where—had a relationship with al Qaeda. We found 

out that that was not true. Misdiagnosis. We were told that there 

were weapons of mass destruction. That was not true. We were told 

that there was an attempt to obtain nuclear materials from Niger, 

and that turned out to not be true. 

And then instead of doing follow-up treatments for the cancer in 

Afghanistan, we then shifted our focus into treating the high blood 

pressure that was not even—which was a misdiagnosis, and we 

then enabled the cancer to spread to other organs. 

And so now we have a situation where, because we took our attention off of clearing up the residual cancer, if you will, down in 

Afghanistan that had been run off into the mountains of Pakistan, 

now we got a resurgence of the situation with both the Taliban and 

Afghanistan in Pakistan. 

And it really was not this agreement on September the 5th that 

President Musharraf of Pakistan signed with the tribal elders that 

led to the resurgence of this cancer, was it? Because that had started a long time ago when we shifted our attention to the misdiagnosis. 
53 

Am I speaking correctly here or what? 

Ms. LONG. Congressman, if I may, I am not going to—I went to 

law school, not medical school. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Me, too. 

Ms. LONG. I do think it is important to note that shift of focus 

or not, it is important to remember that we have had about—I 

think we believe we currently have some 23,600 U.S. troops in Afghanistan along with our 26 NATO partners as well as the Coalition members, so we have never—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. We have got roughly about 145,000 troops now 

bogged down in a civil war in Iraq. And in that war in Iraq, we 

have fostered more terrorist development. 

And so I say these things to just point out the fact that the 

American people don’t really have a lot of confidence in this Administration to actually confront the issues that are addressed in the 

National Intelligence Estimate that has been compiled by you all, 

and we appreciate the great work that you have done. 

But let me ask you in terms of al Qaeda’s ability to obtain chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) material, what are 

those prospects now, and has our government been preparing for 

the possibility that those kinds of attacks could be levied upon the 

American people inside the boundaries of the United States of 

America? 

Mr. VERGA. Al Qaeda has the stated objective of obtaining weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear 

materials. Even before the NIE came out, we recognized that as a 

threat. 

We have had—in 1996 there was a Defense Against Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Act that was passed that the Department of Defense has been doing for training in about 120 cities around the 

country. The Congress has authorized and funded 55 National 

Guard weapons of mass destruction civil support teams—excuse 

me, 52 of which are now operational. The other three will be operational shortly. 

United States Northern Command and the Secretary of Defense 

has authorized them, a force package necessary to respond to a 

CBRN attack inside the United States. 

So the short answer to your question is yes, we recognize the 

threat and yes, we have been preparing to deal with it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton, has a question and 

the gentleman from Texas has a question, and then we will, with 

the agreement of the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, we 

will then go into a closed session which will be in room 2212. 

All right. Mr. Saxton, then Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. SAXTON. I just want to take one minute to thank you for 

holding this hearing and to express my great appreciation for the 

time the witnesses have spent with us testifying here today, and 

thank you all for the job that you are doing, which is a very, very 

difficult one. 

I will never forget being in this room in 1990 when the Secretary 

of Defense came here and said, I have got good news and bad news. 
54 

He said the good news is the Soviet Union is going to go away. The 

bad news is the threat isn’t. It is just going to change. 

And unfortunately he—fortunately he suggested, unfortunately 

we never carried through with making the changes that were necessary to meet the new threat, because we didn’t know what the 

new threat was going to be, nor did anybody else in this country, 

until well into the 1990’s. 

And so what you have heard today from some of the members 

is a level of frustration, not so much from those of us who lived 

through the 1990’s and 2001 here in this room and in the adjoining 

rooms, but from folks who got into this, came a little bit later than 

those of us who had the opportunity to watch the changes manifest 

themselves and to deal with the frustrations of trying to change 

our political structure, the structure of our Administration, the 

structure of our intelligence-gathering apparatus and the structure 

of our military. Keeping in mind that the only military people who 

train for this mission were people numbering about 40,000 who 

happened to belong to the Special Operations Command. The rest 

of our military was configured for a completely different mission. 

And so I appreciate the frustration that I hear from some of our 

colleagues, but I just wanted you to know that those of us who 

have perhaps lived through this in a different setting than some 

others understand how difficult it is to change and how difficult it 

is to meet this new threat. 

And there are lots of analogies that can be used which I will save 

for another time. 

But thank you for what you do. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. I just want to quickly wrap up by—I also want to 

echo my good friend from Jersey’s comments thanking you for your 

service, because I know you have been here a long time this afternoon, and it has to be frustrating knowing the challenge that we 

face in trying to figure out how can we best apply the precious resources that we have. 

But I have—in March I was in Afghanistan with General 

McNeal, and at the time we were talking about the reported spring 

offensive that was—that the Taliban had threatened to charge, to 

implement. And he told us that he had asked for additional troops, 

and the answer had been ‘‘no’’ because of Iraq, because we were 

using all of the available troops in Iraq. And so there were no reinforcements. 

I mention that because there are real consequences to what Mr. 

Johnson and others have said about the effort that is taking up 

precious resources in Iraq versus our ability to support Afghanistan 

the way at least General McNeal and others would like. 

The other thing that the—the other comment that I have is it is 

my understanding, General Clapper, that it is a well-known fact 

that Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri do not communicate by any 

means that we would be able to intercept using our FISA capabilities; is that true or not? 

Secretary CLAPPER. Well, to the best of our knowledge, we believe that they use couriers or some other means, but they are certainly very OPSEC, operation security conscious. 
55 

Mr. REYES. Just very quickly. Where are they on our target list? 

Are they—are they in the top 10 or—— 

Secretary CLAPPER. They are still considered very high priority. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. 

And thank you again, and, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Let me thank the members of the Intelligence Committee, members of the Armed Services Committee that have been here today, 

and special thanks to the panel. And I want to say publicly, we appreciate your service and your being with us today, and some of the 

questions have been difficult. We appreciate your candor and your 

answers. 

So then, without objection, we will close this part of the hearing 

and go to room 2212. But you have to get into 2212 through next 

door, 2216. 

So don’t get lost between here and there in the middle, and we 

will take that up in just a few minutes. 

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the committees proceeded in closed 

session.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 25, 2007 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 25, 2007 

(61) 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 25, 2007 

(103) 
104 
105 
106 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JULY 25, 2007 

(109) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. ESHOO 

Secretary CLAPPER. The ability to track terrorist communications is not solely a 

number of personnel issue. The ability to effectively exploit terrorist communications involves several factors: the appropriate technology to collect communications, 

analyze the data, and disseminate the intelligence. Additionally, having the right 

‘‘mix’’ and balance of human resources to conduct the business of exploiting communications has and always will be a never ending challenge to the Intelligence Community. The right ‘‘mix’’ includes linguists, technology experts, and communications 

and all-source analysts to put the ‘‘terrorist’’ intelligence puzzle together. 

More importantly, the advancement in modern communications over the last 30 

years has afforded terrorists the ability to effectively communicate with each other 

without much recourse. The gap discussed by the DNI was created because the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) did not keep pace with these changes in 

technology. Merely adding resources did not solve the fundamental flaw in the FISA 

requiring the Intelligence Community to spend time and effort providing privacy 

protections to foreigners overseas. The gap was mitigated when Congress enacted 

the Protect America Act (PAA) and updated FISA. To effectively track terrorist communications, we need people, the right ‘‘mix’’ of people, the technology and updated 

legal authorities; without these elements, we put our country at risk for warning 

against a terrorist attack. [See page 51.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ISSA 

Ms. LONG. Ms. Mary Beth Long provided the information to Rep. Darrell Issa in 

a letter dated 9 August 2007. [The letter is retained in the committee files and can 

be viewed upon request.] [See page 45.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 25, 2007 

(113) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON 

The CHAIRMAN. When was witness aware of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and what was 

he doing? 

Mr. GISTARO. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had been an active participant in a variety 

of militant/terrorist activities since the early 1990s, working with a broad network 

of associates, including al-Qa’ida. Following U.S. and Coalition action in Afghanistan in late-2001, al-Zarqawi looked to capitalize on the growing instability in the 

region to advance his terrorist agenda, including through longstanding relationships 

and personal ties with like-minded extremists stretching from Afghanistan to the 

Levant. Our understanding is al-Zarqawi had reestablished ties by mid-2002 to extremists in Iraq to broaden his network and expand his capability to undertake terrorist operations against Israeli, Jordanian, and other western interests in the region. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. Clearly, al-Qaeda has now been involved in high-visibility bombings 

of civilian populations in Iraq that have been spread across not only American television, international television, but television in the Arab world. Has that diminished the popularity of al-Qaeda. the bombings of civilians? In newscasts which 

identify the bombings as being attributed to al-Qaeda, has that diminished their 

popularity in the general Muslim community worldwide? What is your take on that? 

Mr. GISTARO. Over the past several years, we have seen indications that public 

support in predominantly Muslim countries for al-Qa’ida’s tactics has continued to 

wane. Results of a Pew Poll study released in July 2007 showed a drop in support 

for suicide bombing in seven of eight Muslim countries surveyed between 2002 and 

2007, and declining confidence in Usama Bin Ladin in all seven Muslim countries 

surveyed between 2003 and 2007—with the greatest decrease in Jordan, reflecting 

widespread condemnation of the 9 November 2005 attacks on hotels in Amman. 

Data from this same study found that a majority of respondents in 11 of 12 predominantly Muslim countries cited television as their primary source of news, suggesting that most Muslim audiences primarily receive information on al-Qa’ida targeting of civilians through television broadcasts. 

Aside from the study results, we also have seen al-Qa’ida take steps over the past 

year to continue to defend or clarify tactics used, specifically related to bombings 

of Muslim civilians. In an early-April 2008 response to questions submitted by alQa’ida supporters and sympathizers from mid-December 2007 through mid-January 

2008 via an ‘‘open interview’’ on the Internet, Ayman al-Zawahiri defended and justified situations in which al-Qa’ida actions resulted in Muslim civilian casualties. 

Zawahiri’s comments addressed questioners who specifically cited Muslim casualties 

from the December 2007 Algeria bombings conducted by al-Qa’ida in the Maghreb. 

Zawahiri’s defense was also likely in part a response to comments made by several 

leading and influential clerics, including Sayid Imam al-Sharif, aka Dr. Fadl, a 

Zawahiri mentor and early ideological leader of the jihadist movement, who have 

publicly raised questions over the last year about al-Qa’ida’s use of tactics that result in civilian deaths. 

Æ