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STRENGTHENING NASA’S TECHNOLOGY

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 22, 2009

Serial No. 111–58

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov 
(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chair 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

JIM MATHESON, Utah 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona 

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio 

KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

HON. GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona, Chair 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR., 

Wisconsin 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

RICHARD OBERMANN Subcommittee Staff Director 

PAM WHITNEY Democratic Professional Staff Member 

ALLEN LI Democratic Professional Staff Member 

KEN MONROE Republican Professional Staff Member 

ED FEDDEMAN Republican Professional Staff Member 

DEVIN BRYANT Research Assistant 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

October 22, 2009

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Gabrielle Giffords, Chairwoman, Subcommittee 

on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. 

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 18

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19

Statement by Representative Pete Olson, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................... 20

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 21

Statement by Representative Charles A. Wilson, Subcommittee on Space and 

Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 22

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 22

Witnesses:

Dr. Robert D. Braun, Co-Chair of the Committee To Review the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts, Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, 

National Research Council 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 23

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 25

Biography .......................................................................................................... 33

Dr. Raymond S. Colladay, Vice Chair of the Committee on Rationale and 

Goals of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Aeronautics and Space Engineering 

Board, National Research Council 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 34

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 35

Biography .......................................................................................................... 36

Mr. Christopher Scolese, Associate Administrator, National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 37

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 38

Discussion 

Program Attributes .............................................................................................. 44

Public Relations/Student Relations .................................................................... 45

Collapse of NIAC .................................................................................................. 46

Manned Spaceflight ............................................................................................. 47

Non-Mission Budget ............................................................................................. 48

Patents .................................................................................................................. 51

Benefit to Taxpayer ............................................................................................. 51

Space Elevator ...................................................................................................... 51

Finding Water ...................................................................................................... 52

Beaming Energy ................................................................................................... 52

Sharing Between Military and Commercial Developers ................................... 53

ITAR ...................................................................................................................... 53

NASA Organizational Structure ......................................................................... 55
Page

IV

Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Dr. Robert D. Braun, Co-Chair of the Committee To Review the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts, Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, 

National Research Council .................................................................................. 58

Dr. Raymond S. Colladay, Vice Chair of the Committee on Rationale and 

Goals of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Aeronautics and Space Engineering 

Board, National Research Council ...................................................................... 62
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STRENGTHENING NASA’S TECHNOLOGY 

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gabrielle Giffords 

[Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
2
3

HEARING CHARTER

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS 

Strengthening NASA’s Technology Development 

Programs 

OCTOBER 22 2009

10 A.M.–NOON

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

I. Purpose and Issues: 

On October 22, 2009 the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics will hold a 

hearing on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) efforts to 

define advanced concepts and develop innovative technologies. The hearing will examine (1) the opportunities, challenges, and issues identified in external reviews associated with NASA’s analysis of advanced concepts and long-term development of 

technology; (2) NASA’s progress in responding to the provisions in NASA Authorization Acts and recommendations from external reviews associated with technology 

development; and (3) NASA’s efforts to collaborate and coordinate with other Federal agencies on technology development issues. The hearing will focus on the following questions and issues:

• What are the key findings and recommendations from external critiques of 

NASA’s efforts to conduct advanced concept analysis and long-term technology 

development? Did they find NASA’s existing approach for defining advanced 

concepts and developing innovative technologies to be effective? What are the 

budgetary implications of recommended actions?

• What results can an agency expect to achieve by conducting a broadly focused 

long-term program dedicated to stimulating innovation and developing new 

concepts and capabilities that are not tied to existing requirements? In the absence of a long-term technology program, how can an agency develop and infuse paradigm-shifting technologies that could create opportunities for future 

missions?

• If an advanced technology entity is established in NASA, what key lessons can 

the agency learn from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s 

(DARPA) historical evolution in roles, structure, culture, and mission? Is a 

separate entity required or could its objectives be achieved within the current 

organizational structure?

• Are NASA’s flight-system development programs exposed to greater uncertainty 

and risks when new concepts and technologies are matured within the programs themselves?

• Should time horizons be placed on the development of visionary advanced concepts to ensure that projects are not too far out of alignment with the nearerterm horizons of mission programs? How might these time horizons be determined?

• Has NASA been responsive to the provisions in authorization legislation directing greater commitment to robust technology research and development initiatives in aeronautics, exploration and space and Earth sciences? Has the 

agency implemented the recommendations from external reviews for conducting advanced technology development in the agency?

• To what extent does NASA coordinate and collaborate with other Federal 

agencies and departments in planning and conducting long-term aeronautics 

and space technology development? Have potential overlaps in agency technology research and development activities been identified as a result of such 

coordination? Has collaboration resulted in greater; synergy among Federal 

agencies conducting long-term technology development?
4

II. Scheduled Witnesses: 

• Dr. Robert D. Braun Co-Chair of the Committee to Review the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board National Research Council

• Dr. Raymond S. Colladay Vice Chair of the Committee on the Rationale 

and Goals of the U.S. Civil Space Program Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board National Research Council

• Mr. Christopher Scolese Associate Administrator National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration

III. Overview 

Since its creation in 1958, NASA has been one (if the nation’s leading technology 

development engines through its investments in advanced aeronautics and space research and technology. Concepts and advanced technologies such as high-energy 

cryogenic engines, thermal protection for reusable launch vehicles, electric propulsion, solar and nuclear energy power systems, automation and robotics, and sophisticated sensors enabled landing on the moon, travel to other planets, and monitoring 

of the Earth’s environment. These technologies have transformed the way we live 

today as evidenced by the ubiquitous presence of and reliance on satellite communications, space-based weather observations, and advanced aviation navigation systems. NASA’s technology development efforts and programs have involved several 

objectives ranging from soliciting visionary advanced techno0gy concepts to developing technologies for mission-specific requirements, advancing instrument capabilities, and qualifying hardware for space flight, among other technology activities to 

support NASA missions and programs. 

The critical importance of technology development was emphasized in the Summary Report of the Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee which was 

tasked to. review the U.S. plans for human spaceflight. The report said:

‘‘The Committee strongly believes it is time for NASA to reassume its crucial role 

of developing new technologies for space. Today, the alternatives available for exploration systems are severely limited because of the lack of a strategic investment in technology development in past decades. NASA ow has an opportunity 

to develop a technology roadmap that is aligned with an exploration mission 

that will last for decades. If appropriately funded, a technology development program would re-engage the minds at American universities, in industry and within NASA. The investments should be designed to increase the capabilities and 

reduce the costs of future exploration. This will benefit human and robotic exploration, the commercial space community, and other U.S. government users.’’

With regards to technology development, the summary of key findings included 

the following observation:

‘‘Technology development for exploration and commercial space: Investment in a 

well-designed and adequately funded space technology program is critical to enable progress in exploration. Exploration strategies can proceed more readily and 

economically if the requisite technology has been developed in advance. This investment will also benefit robotic exploration, the U.S. commercial space industry 

and other U.S. government users.’’

The need to invest in technology development was also stressed in a recent Space 

News interview (August 24, 2009) of Norman Augustine, Chairman of the Review 

of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee. Responding to the question of whether he sees a need to reform the way the U.S. government conducts research and 

development, he responded:

‘‘Developing components of systems during systems development or tests is a very 

costly way to do that. Far better to develop components and when they’ve been 

proven go and develop them and put them into systems. That suggests a need 

for very strong technology programs, which are particularly vulnerable to budget 

pressures when they’re in the same funding bin as the major programs; so when 

the major programs gets a cold, the technology program gets pneumonia. We’ve 

seen that happen at NASA. So it takes great discipline to continue to invest in 

technology programs that won’t pay off for five, 10, 15 years. But if you don’t 

do it, you end up having component failures that stop you in the midst of system 

development where the money burn rate is very high.’’

Another important benefit of technology development lies in its inspirational 

value. Visionary advanced technology projects have been noted as attracting young 

talent into NASA and the space program. Regarding that point, the National Re-
5

search Council (NRC) report on Fostering Visions for the Future: A Review of the 

NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts stated:

‘‘One of NASA’s roles is to inspire tie public with a spirit of discovery and exploration, and NASA is at its best when it accomplishes this through significant 

scientific and technical achievement in aeronautic and space. By fostering the 

identification and development of innovative advanced concepts, and by its actions to advertise the results of its projects to the public at large, NIAC [NASA 

Institute for Advanced Concepts] served NASA well in support of this inspirational role. A NIAC-like entity facilitates the introduction of valuable products, 

intellectual and material, into NASA. It broadens the population that can contribute creative ideas and concepts to NASA, a breadth that has generated significant new ideas. These aspects of the success of the previous NIAC form a 

compelling set of reasons to reinstate an organization with this charter.’’

Conversely, not having a robust technology development program has been shown 

to contribute to a greater risk of incorporating immature technologies into flight-system development programs. As was highlighted during the Subcommittee’s March 

4, 2009 hearing on Cost Management Issues in NASA’s Acquisitions and Programs, 

NASA’s attempts to mature technologies during flight-system development programs have resulted in schedule delays and cost ’growth. 

Concerns about technology development in NASA have been raised in two recent 

reports by the NRC. The aforementioned report on the NASA Institute for Advanced 

Concepts (NIAC) found that the termination in 2007 of the NIAC left the agency 

without an advanced concepts entity focused at looking beyond today’s known needs. 

As a result, it said that NASA lost its only innovation-focused capability for seeking 

out fax-reaching, advanced concepts and future capabilities. When NIAC was formed 

in 1998, its purpose was to fund research concepts and products deemed to be revolutionary and realizable in no fewer than 10 and no more than 40 years. The expectation was that such a program would allow technology risks to be mitigated. This 

in turn would reduce subsequent development costs and enable new aid more ambitious research goals to be pursued. The NIAC was terminated in Fiscal year 2007, 

the report said, ‘‘as part of a general elimination of a majority of the ESMD [Exploration Systems Mission Directorate] elements not directly aligned with the near-term 

objectives of the Vision for Exploration.’’ Many of the projects funded by NIAC were 

designed for deeper space exploration, or were technologies to be used on Earth, 

such as an electromagnetic system for formation flying. 

In describing the impact of NIAC’s termination, the NRC report stated:

‘‘The termination of NIAC reflects a larger issue within NASA related to the demise of advanced concepts and technology development programs throughout the 

agency. To effectively infuse advanced concepts into its future systems, NASA 

needs to become an organization that values and nurtures the creation and maturation of advanced aeronautics and space concepts. Working for NASA, NIAC 

helped serve this advanced concepts need for almost 10 years and demonstrated 

its success in creating a community of innovators focused on advanced concepts 

that may impact future NASA missions.’’

Another NRC report, entitled America’s Future In Space: Aligning The Civil Space 

Program With National Needs, recommended that ‘‘NASA should revitalize its advanced technology development program by establishing a DARPA-like organization 

within NASA as a priority mission area to support preeminent civil, national security 

(if dual-use), and commercial space programs.’’ The Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA) is the central ‘‘high-risk, high reward’’ research and development organization for the Department of Defense. Established as a agency of the 

Department of Defense (DOD) in 1958, DARPA funds researchers in industry, universities, government laboratories and elsewhere to conduct high-risk, high-reward 

research and development projects that will benefit U.S. national security. The 

agency’s research runs the gamut from conducting basic, fundamental scientific investigations in a laboratory setting to building full-scale prototypes of military systems. 

The absence of an adequate long-term technology development capability in 

NASA’s science and exploration directorates has been noted by the Congress and addressed in legislation. The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 [P.L. 110–422] encouraged NASA to emphasize long-term technology development. Specific to technology 

development in exploration, the Act directed the NASA Administrator to carry out 

a program of long-term exploration-related technology research and development. 

With regards to missions, the Act directed the Administrator toestablish an intraDirectorate long-term technology development program for space and Earth science 

within the Science Mission Directorate for the development of new technology. 
6

Today, technology development is conducted by NASA in four primary areas, 

namely (1) exploration, where the agency develops and matures advanced technology, integrates that technology into prototype systems, and transitions knowledge 

and technology (some of which requires use of the International Space Station) to 

the Constellation Program, (2) science, where technology development is conducted 

in conjunction with individual mission development activities such as the James 

Webb Space Telescope, (3) aeronautics research, where NASA supports a very broad 

spectrum of research and development (R&D) activity, and (4) the Innovative Partnerships Program (IPP) which facilitates both technology infusion and technology 

transfer. 

Thus, although technology development at NASA is being performed or sponsored 

today in several areas, it is not aimed at looking beyond today’s known needs and 

is primarily focused on satisfying the needs of its mission directorates. As a result, 

NASA is not , pursuing breakthrough technologies that are not explicitly focused on 

defined requirements. At today’s hearing, wee will hear from the Co-Chair and Vice 

Chair of the two NRC reviews that were previously referenced. We will also hear 

from NASA’s Associate Administrator on what the agency is doing in response to 

direction and recommendations from authorizing legislation and external reviews as 

they pertain to technology development. 

BACKGOUND INFORMATION 

IV. Technology Development Activities in NASA 

At the present time, technology development in NASA is being conducted primarily in these areas:

Exploration. The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate’s Advanced Capabilities Division (ACD) provides the knowledge, technology, and innovation that 

will enable current and future exploration missions. ACD is composed of three 

major programs: the Lunar Precursor Robotic Program (LPRP), Human Research Program (HRP), and the Exploration Technology Development Program 

(ETDP). Some of that research is performed on the International Space Station. 

According to NASA, these ACD programs and their projects provide knowledge 

as a result of ground-based research and technology development, research conducted in space, and observations from robotic flight missions. ACD also develops and matures advanced technology, integrates that technology into 

pi1ototype systems, and transitions knowledge and technology to the Constellation program. Through its activities, NASA says that ACD provides operational 

and technical risk mitigation for Constellation Projects.

Science. Technology development is conducted in the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) in conjunction with individual mission development activities. For 

example, NASA took additional time and resources to mature several critical 

technologies needed by the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST). The JWST 

contains several innovations, including lightweight optics, a deployable 

sunshield, and a folding segmented mirror.

Although it is being terminated this fiscal year, SMD has also conducted technology development using the New Millennium Program (NMP) whose objective is 

to flight-validate revolutionary spacecraft and instrument technologies—a capability 

that could enhance the science return of future missions, while reducing their cost 

and risk. Established in 1995, the purpose of NMP was to identify breakthrough 

spacecraft and instrument technologies, accelerate the infusion of revolutionary 

technologies into NASA science missions by validating them in the hazardous environment of space, and provide new and lower cost capabilities for Earth and space 

science missions by reducing the risks to the first users. Validation is needed because, as missions become progressively more difficult, more advanced capabilities 

are needed, thus opening new, untried technologies to be used for the first time on 

complex exploration missions. The program consisted of a series of Deep-Space and 

Earth Orbiting missions that were technology-driven, in contrast to the more traditional science-driven space exploration missions of the past. The first NMP Deep 

Space mission, DS1, was launched on October 24, 1998. Since that time, NASA successfully validated a solar-powered ion propulsion system, a miniaturized deep space 

transponder, autonomous operations and navigation software, and other capabilities. 

NMP funding was eliminated from the FY2009 budget, effectively leading to the 

program’s cancellation.

• Aeronautics Research. In contrast to technology development in exploration 

and science where the recipient of the work is almost exclusively a NASA program or mission, technology development in aeronautics benefits a wide range 
7

of entities. The Aeronautics Research Mission directorate (ARMD) supports a 

very broad spectrum of R&D activity and not merely along the continuum of 

basic through applied research, development, prototyping, and testing. As was 

noted by the 2006 NRC report on Aeronautics Innovation: NASA’s Challenges 

and Opportunities, ‘‘ARMD has no institutional responsibility, resources, or capacity to directly implement technologies that the program develops except in 

unique prototypes or demonstration vehicles. Rather, implementation in public 

or commercial systems is dependent on a host of other stakeholders.’’ The NRC 

also noted that ‘‘the constraints on NASA’s aeronaut1cs program budget have 

direct and indirect bearings on innovation’’, adding further that ‘‘Several participants in the committee’s workshops expressed the concern that too many 

NASA aeronautics projects stopped short of full demonstration of their technical success and utility to users. Experience shows that a potential innovation 

must be reduced to practice in the complex environment in which it will function before it will be accepted as credible and adopted by the target user community). Such demonstrations in aeronautics often require large expenditures, 

as has been amply demonstrated by prior NASA and DOD advanced technology demonstrations. The costs of such demonstration programs normally 

amount to hundreds of millions of dollars. A major part of these demonstration costs is attributable to the systems phenomenon described earlier—unless 

the technology can be shown to perform as part of the highly integrated system 

in which it will be used, the prospective user community is likely to discount 

it.’’ In NASA’s FY 2010 budget requests, the agency proposes to complement 

its fundamental aeronautics research with systems level research starting 

with the Environmentally Responsible Aviation (ERA) project.

• Innovative Partnerships Program. According to NASA, its Innovative Partnerships Program (IPP) provides the organizational structure for acquiring, maturing, infusing and commercial technology and capabilities for the agency’s 

Mission Directorates, programs and projects through vestments and partnerships with industry, academia, government agencies and National Laboratories. As such, IPP facilitates both technology infusion and technology transfer. NASA says that in addition to leveraging technology investments, dualuse technology-related partnerships, and technology solutions for NASA, IPP 

enables cost avoidance, and accelerates technology maturation. According to 

NASA, it uses several elements for doing that, namely Technology Infusion 

(using the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, the Small 

Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program, and the IPP Seed Fund), Innovation Incubator (which includes prize competitions such as Centennial 

Challenges), and Partnership Development. In its Fiscal Year 2010 budget 

submission justification, NASA says that in FY 10, ‘‘NASA’s SBIR/STTR programs will continue to provide high-priority technology needs for NASA with 

specific technology needs developed in close coordination with NASA’s Mission 

Directorates and other NASA-wide efforts to determine priorities for future 

technology requirements.’’

Mr. Christopher Scolese, NASA’s Associate Administrator, can provide additional 

details at the hearing on the agency’s technology development initiatives.

V. Authorizing Legislation 

NASA’s past two authorizations included reference to technology development. 

NASA Authorization Act of 2005

P.L. 109–155 [Sec. 421] authorized the NASA Administrator to establish aeronautics research and development initiatives to develop and demonstrate, in a relevant environment, technologies that would enable improvements in several commercial aircraft performance characteristics, namely noise, energy consumption, and 

emissions. The Act also authorized the Administrator to (1) develop and demonstrate, in a relevant environment, airframe and propulsion technologies to enable 

efficient, economical overland flight of supersonic civil transport aircraft with no significant impact on the environment; (2) establish rotorcraft initiatives that improve 

safety, noise, and environmental impact; (3) conduct hypersonics research with the 

objective of exploring the science and technology of hypersonic flight using airbreathing propulsion concepts, through a mix of theoretical work, basic and applied 

research, and development of flight research demonstration vehicles; (4) develop revolutionary aeronautical concepts with the intent of pushing technology barriers beyond current subsonic technology; (5) conduct fuel cell-powered aircraft research; 

and (6) establish a program to conduct Mars aircraft research that would develop 
8

and test concepts for an uncrewed aircraft that could operate for sustained periods 

in the atmosphere of Mars.

NASA Authorization Act of 2008

The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 [P.L. 110-422] emphasized long-team technology development in NASA. Specifically, Sec. 2 of the Act stated that ‘‘NASA 

should make a sustained commitment to a robust long-term technology development 

activity. Such investments represent the critically important ‘seed corn’ on which 

NASA’s ability to carry out challenging and productive missions in the future will 

depend.’’

Specific to technology development in exploration, the Sec. 405 of the Act stated 

that a ‘‘robust program of long-term exploration related technology research and development will be essential for the success and sustainability of any enduring initiative of human and robotic exploration of the solar system.’’ The Act also directed the 

NASA Administrator to ‘‘carry out a program of long-term exploration-related technology research and development, including such things as in-space propulsion, 

power systems, life support, and advanced avionics that are not tied to specific flight 

projects. The program shall have the funding goal of ensuring that the technology 

research and development can be completed in a timely manner in order to support 

the safe, successful, and sustainable exploration, of the solar system. In addition, in 

order to ensure that the broadest range of innovative concepts and technologies are 

captured, the long-term technology program shall have the goal of having a significant portion of its funding available for external grants and contracts with universities, research institutions, and industry.’’

With regards to technology development in science missions, Sec. 501 of the Act 

directed the Administrator to ‘‘establish an in a-Directorate long-term technology development program for space and Earth science within the Science Mission Directorate for the development of new technology. The program shall be independent of 

the flight projects under development. NASA shall have a goal of funding the intraDirectorate technology development program at a level of 5 percent of the total 

Science Mission Directorate annual budget. The program shall be structured to include competitively awarded grants and contracts.’’

VI. NRC Reviews of Technology Development in NASA 

Advanced technology development at NASA has been analyzed in several reports 

and surveys conducted by the National Academies’ National Research Council.

NRC’s Report Fostering Visions for the Future: A Review of the NASA Institute for 

Advanced Concepts 

Congress directed the NRC to conduct a review of the effectiveness of the NASA 

Institute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC) and to make recommendations concerning 

the importance of such a program to NASA and to the nation as a whole, including 

the proper role of NASA and the Federal Government in fostering scientific innovation and creativity and in developing advanced concepts for future systems—NASA 

formed NIAC in 1998 to provide an independent source of advanced aeronautical 

and space concepts that could dramatically impact how NASA develops and conducts its missions. The institute was terminated in 2007. 

The NRC report, entitled Fostering Visions for the Future: A Review of the NASA 

Institute for Advanced Conceits, was released on August 7, 2009. The Committee to 

Review the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts found the NIAC to be effective 

in developing revolutionary advanced concepts and stated:

‘‘Until August 2007, NIAC provided an independent open forum, a high-level 

point of entry to NASA for an external community of innovators, and an external 

capability for analysis and definition of advanced aeronautics and space concepts to complement the advanced concept activities conducted within NASA. 

Throughout its 9-year existence, NIAC inspired an atmosphere for inn, ovation 

that stretched the imagination and encouraged creativity. Utilizing an open, 

Web-based environment to conduct solicitations, perform peer review, administer 

grant awards, and publicize its activities, this small program succeeded in fostering a community of external innovators to investigate advanced concepts that 

might have a significant impact on future NASA missions in a 10 to 40 year 

time frame. Funded at approximately $4 million per year, NIAC received a total 

of $36.2 million in NASA funding, more than 75 percent of which was used directly for grants. NIAC received more than 1300 proposals and awarded 168 

grants, for a total of $27.3 million. There were 126 Phase I grants awarded for 

6 months of initial study. Upon successful completion of Phase I and based on 

the continued promise of the advanced concept, 42 Phase II grants were awarded 
9

by NIAC for 2 years of additional concept maturation. Many NIAC grantees 

went on to receive additional funding for continued development of their concept 

from NASA, other government agencies, or private industry. In addition to developing revolutionary advanced concepts, NIAC increased public interest in science 

and engineering and provided motivation to the nation’s youth to study technical 

subjects.’’

However, the NRC report said that frequent organizational changes, the last of 

which placed the NIAC in a mission directorate where mission objectives were not 

well aligned, preceded termination of the activity:

‘‘Originally conceived as reporting to the agency’s chief technologist so that infusion across all NASA enterprises could be assured, NIAC operated in an environment of frequent NASA organizational changes. In 2004, NASA management of 

NIAC was transferred to the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, where it 

was not well aligned with its sponsor’s near-term mission objectives. NIAC was 

terminated in 2007.’’

In the course of its review, the committee found:

• ‘‘The NIAC program to be effective in achieving its mission and accomplishing 

its stated goals. At present, there is no NASA organization responsible for solicitation, evaluation, and maturation of advanced concepts, defined as those 

at technology readiness level (TRL) 1 or 2, or responsible for subsequent infusion of worthy candidate concepts into NASA planning and development activities. Testimony from several sectors confirmed that NASA and the nation 

must maintain a mechanism to investigate visionary, far-reaching advanced 

concepts in order to achieve NASA’s mission.’’ [The measurement of Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) is used by NASA and other agencies to assess 

the maturity of evolving technologies prior to incorporating that technology 

into a system or subsystem. For example, at the TRL 3 level, active research 

and development (R&D) is initiated. This must include both analytical studies 

to set the technology into an appropriate context and laboratory-based studies 

to physically validate that the analytical predictions are correct. In contrast, 

a TRL 7 level requires an actual system prototype demonstration in a space 

environment, a much higher level of maturity.]

• When it was formed, NIAC was to be ‘‘managed by a high-level agency executive concerned with the objectives and needs of all NASA enterprises and missions. The committee found that NIAC was most successful as a program with 

cross-cutting applicability to NASA’s enterprises and missions. When it was 

transferred to a mission-specific directorate, NIAC lost its alignment with 

sponsor objectives and priorities.’’

• ‘‘While NIAC’s internet-based technical review and management processes were 

found to be effective and should be continued in NIAC2 [the NRC’s characterization of a follow-on effort], the committee found a few policies that may have 

hastened NIAC’s demise. Key among these was (1) the complete focus on revolutionary advanced concepts and (2) the exclusion of NASA personnel from 

participation in NIAC awards or research teams. NIAC’s focus on revolutionary advanced concepts with a time horizon of 10 to 40 years in the future 

often put its projects too far out of alignment with the nearer-term 1orizons 

of the NASA mission directorates, thereby diminishing the potential for infusion into NASA mission plans.’’

• ‘‘NIAC was formed to provide an independent, open forum for the external 

analysis and definition of space and aeronautics advanced concepts to complement the advanced concepts activities conducted within NASA; hence, NIAC 

solicitations were closed to NASA participants. NIAC was formed at a time 

when there was adequate funding for development of novel, long-term ideas internal to NASA. As internal funding for advanced concepts and technology diminished or became more focused on flight-system development am( operations, the cultural disconnect between the development activities internal and 

external to the agency grew, and transitioning of NIAC concepts to the NASA 

miss-on directorates became more difficult.’’

• ‘‘That 14 NIAC Phase I and Phase II projects, which were awarded $7 million 

by NIAC, received an additional $23.8 million in funding from a wide range 

of organizations, demonstrating the significance of the nation’s investment in 

NIAC’s advanced concepts. NIAC matured 12 of the 42 Phase II advanced concepts (29 percent), as measured by receipt of post-NIAC funding; 9 of them (21 

percent) received post-NIAC funding from NASA itself. The committee also 

found that three NIAC Phase II efforts (7 percent of the Phase II awards) ap-
10

pear to have impacted NASA’s long-term plans, and two of these efforts have 

either already been incorporated or are currently under consideration by the 

NRC Astronomy and Astrophysics Decadal Survey as future NASA missions. 

In addition, the committee received much testimony that the potential for receipt of a NIAC Phase III award is needed to aid the transition of the most 

highly promising projects.’’

• ‘‘A persistent NIAC challenge was the lack of a NASA interface to receive the 

hand-off of promising project. ‘‘

The committee recommended that:

• ‘‘NASA should reestablish a NIAC-like entity, referred to in this report as 

NIAC2, to seek out visionary, far-reaching, advanced concepts with the potential of significant benefit to accomplishing relevant to NASA’s charter and to 

begin the process of maturing these advanced concepts for infusion into 

NASA’s missions.’’

• ‘‘NIAC2 should report to the Office of the Administrator, be outside mission 

directorates, and be chartered to address NASA-wide mission and technology 

needs. To increase NIAC2’s relevance, NASA mission directorates should contribute thematic areas for consideration The committee also recommends that 

a NIAC2 organization should be funded and administered separately from 

NASA development programs, mission directorates, and institutional constraints. Future NIAC2 proposal opportunities should continue to be managed 

and peer-reviewed outside the agency.’’

• ‘‘NIAC2 should expand its scope to include concepts that are scientifically 

and/or technically innovative and have the potential to provide major benefit 

to a future NASA mission in 10 years and beyond.’’

• ‘‘Future NIAC2 proposal opportunities be open to principal investigators or 

teams both internal and external to NASA.’’

• ‘‘Future NIAC2 proposal opportunities include the potential selection of a 

small number of Phase III ‘‘proof of concept’’ awards for up to $5 million each 

for 4 years to demonstrate and resolve fundamental feasibility issues and that 

such awards be selected jointly by NIAC2 and NSA management.’’

• ‘‘NASA consider reestablishing an aeronautics and space systems technology 

development enterprise. Its purpose would be to provide maturation opportunities and agency expertise for visionary, far-reaching concepts and technologies.’’

• ‘‘Identification of center technical champions and provision for the technical 

participation of NASA field center personnel in NIAC2 efforts. Participation of 

NASA personnel can be expected to increase as NIAC2 projects mature.’’

In its concluding remarks, the committee’s report stated:

• ‘‘The termination of NIAC reflects a larger issue within NASA related to the 

demise of advanced concepts and technology development programs throughout 

the agency. To effectively infuse advanced concepts into its future systems, 

NASA needs to become an organization that values and nurtures the creation 

and maturation of advanced aeronautics and space concepts. Working for 

NASA, NIAC helped serve this advanced concepts need for almost 10 years 

and demonstrated its success in creating a community of innovators focused 

on advanced concepts that may impact future NASA missions. NIAC2 can look 

out for advanced concepts beyond the current development programs. It can 

work on the edges where requirements are not yet known, focused on what program managers would want if they knew that they needed it. However, this 

independent organization that nurtures technology push must also be balanced 

by a meaningful program of technology pull from the mission directorates, 

running in parallel and focused on nearer-term phased activities. Towards 

this objective, the committee recommends that NASA consider reestablishing 

an aeronautics and space systems technology development enterprise. Its purpose would be to provide maturation opportunities and agency expertise for visionary, far-reaching concepts and technologies. NASA’s considerations should 

include implications for the agency’s strategic plan, organizations, resource 

distributions, field center foci, and mission selection process. The technology 

development approaches used by other Federal agencies can serve as a benchmark in this examination.’’

Dr. Robert D. Braun, Co-Chair of the Committee to Review the NASA Institute 

for Advanced Concepts which produced this report, will be a witness at the hearing 

and can provide additional details on the committee’s review.
11

NRC’s Report America’s Future in Space: Aligning the Civil Space Program with National Needs 

The NRC recently released a report recommending a series of measures to better 

align the civil space program with national needs. The report, prepared under the 

oversight of both the NRC’s Space Studies Board and Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, is entitled America’s Future In Space: Aligning The Civil Space Program With National Needs. To contribute to realizing national objectives such as 

‘‘Providing clean and affordable energy’’ and ‘‘Protecting the environment now and 

for future generations’’, the Committee on the Rationale and Goals of the U.S. Civil 

Space Program identified four foundational elements it viewed as ‘‘critical to a purposeful, effective, strategic U.S. space program, without which U.S. space efforts will 

lack robustness, realism, sustainability, and affordability.’’ These are:

1. ‘‘Coordinated national strategie—implementing national space policy coherently across all civilian agencies in support of national needs and priorities 

and aligning attention to shared interests of civil and national security space 

activities.

2. A competent technical workforce—sufficient in size, talent, and experience to 

address difficult and pressing challenges.

3. An effectively sized and structured infrastructure—realizing synergy from the 

public and private sectors and from international partnerships.

4. A priority investment in technology and innovation—strengthening and sustaining the U.S. capacity to meet national needs through transformational advances.’’

The foundational element citing investment in technology and innovation led to 

a committee recommendation on advanced space technology. The report recommended that ‘‘NASA should revitalize its advanced technology development program by establishing a DARPA-like organization within NASA as a priority mission 

area to support preeminent civil, national security (if dual-use), and commercial 

space programs.’’

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is the central ‘‘high-risk, highreward’’ research and development organization for the Department of Defense. Established as a DOD agency in 1958, DARPA fund researchers in industry, universities, government laboratories and elsewhere to conduct high-risk, high-reward research and development projects that will benefit U.S. national security. The agency’s research runs the gamut from conducting basic, fundamental scientific investigations in a laboratory setting to building full-scale prototypes of military systems. 

At the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee’s hearing on External Perspectives on 

the FY 2010 NASA Budget Request and Related Issues held on June 18, 2009, Dr. 

Raymond Colladay, Vice Chair of the committee that authored the report, advocated 

for a focused, risk reduction technology program in NASA. In his prepared statement, he stated:

‘‘Aeronautics is underfunded, but a broad based, innovative advanced space technology development program that is organizationally independent of ongoing 

hardware development programs is nonexistent. The downward trend started 

soon after aeronautics and space technology, once logically managed together, 

were split apart. A decision soon followed to focus technology specifically on 

major development program needs by moving the resources to mission areas it 

intended to serve. Predictably, once all technology development was placed with 

the major development efforts it became near-term oriented as a risk reduction 

effort back-stopping hardware development. The Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board sponsored study on the Exploration Technology Development Program for Constellation done last year expressed concern on just that point of the 

need for more emphasis on longer-term research. With budget and schedule pressures as demanding as ever, the situation has not improved. Clearly, there is a 

need for focused, risk-reduction technology that is defined by explicit mission requirements and funded by the mission office, but it does not fill the need for the 

agency on a broader level to pursue long-term technology ‘‘push’’ well out in front 

of requirements and broad in scope supporting civil (not just NASA) and commercial space. An agency that has inspired us with bold missions and spectacular accomplishments needs to be investing in technology that continually seeks 

to transform state-of-the-art capabilities and enable future missions that some 

day we may want to do, if we only knew how.’’

In his prepared statement, Dr. Colladay called on NASA to revitalize its advanced 

space technology development program:
12

‘‘NASA should revitalize advanced space technology development as a priority 

mission area of the agency. It should engage the best science and engineering talent in the country wherever it resides in universities, industry, NASA centers or 

other government labs focused on world-class research and innovation and not 

driven by the need to maintain ten healthy centers. It should support not only 

future NASA missions, but other government agencies and commercial space. 

The ‘‘customers ‘‘ for its technology products would be industry, NASA itself; 

other government agencies like NOAA, and military space where dual-use technology is applicable. Having this broad mandate would make it similar in the 

breadth of customers served to the NASA role in aeronautics with its heritage 

in NACA going back almost a century.

The responsibility to provide for this advanced technology base for civil space activities rests with NASA, in partnership with universities, other government 

agencies, and industry. The ‘‘customers ‘‘ for the products of technology are 

NASA, NOAA, industry, and military space programs in which multiple-use 

technology is applicable. Because of budget pressures and institutional priorities, 

however, NASA has largely abandoned its role in supporting the broad portfolio 

of civil space applications, and the space technology base has thus been allowed 

to erode and is now deficient. The former NASA advanced technology development program no longer exists. Most of what remained was moved to the Constellation Program and has become oriented specifically to risk reduction supporting the ongoing internal development program.

To fulfill NASA’s broader mandate, an independent advanced technology development effort is required, much like that accomplished by DARPA in the DOD, 

focused not so much on technology that today’s program managers require, but 

on what future program managers would wish they could have if they knew they 

needed it, or would want if they knew they could have it. This effort should engage the best science and engineering talent in the country wherever it resides—

in universities, industry, NASA centers, or other government laboratories—independent of pressures to sustain competency at the NASA centers. A DARPA-like 

organization established within NASA should report to NASA’s Administrator, 

be independent of ongoing NASA development programs, and focus on supporting the broad civil space portfolio through the competitive funding of worldclass technology and innovation projects at universities, federally funded research and development centers, government research laboratories, and NASA 

centers.’’

Dr. Colladay will be a witness at today’s hearing and can provide additional details on the committee’s review. Furthermore, as a former head of DARPA, he can 

provide insight into that agency’s past activities.

NRC’s Report A Constrained Space Exploration Technology Program 

In January 2004, President George W. Bush announced the nation’s new space 

policy by issuing the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE), which instructed NASA 

to ‘‘extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to 

the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other 

destinations.’’ NASA was also directed to ‘‘develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration,’’ among other objectives. In response to the direction 

regarding the development of innovative technologies, NASA focused its resources 

on maturing the technologies necessary for exploration. NASA’s Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) was implemented to support, develop, and ultimately provide the necessary technologies for the agency’s Constellation flight program.

The NRC’s Committee to Review NASA’s Exploration Technology Development Program was asked to perform an independent assessment of NASA’s Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) and to offer findings and recommendations related to ‘‘the relevance of ETDP research to the objectives of the Vision for Space Exploration, to any gaps in the ETDP research portfolio, and to the quality of ETDP 

research.’’

In its report entitled A Constrained Space Exploration Technology Program: A Review of NASA’s Exploration Technology Development Program released in 2008, the 

committee stated it found the ETDP to be making progress toward the stated goals 

of technology development. However, the committee also found the technology development program to be ‘‘operating within significant constraints that limit its ability 

to successfully accomplish those goals. The constraints include the still-dynamic nature of the Constellation Program requirements, the constraints imposed by a limited 
13

budget, the aggressive time-scale of early technology deliverables, and the desire 

within NASA to fully employ the NASA workforce.’’

The report noted the limitations in scope of the technology development program:

‘‘Because of the constraints cited above, the ETDP as created by NASA is a supporting technology program very closely coupled to the near-term needs of the 

Constellation Program. The ETDP is focused on only incremental gains in capability, and it has two programmatic gaps (integration of the human system, and 

nuclear thermal propulsion). NASA has in effect suspended research in a number of technology areas traditionally within the agency’s scope and has in many 

areas essentially ended support for longer-term technology research traditionally 

carried out within NASA and with strong university collaboration. These actions 

could have important consequences for aspects of the VSE beyond the initial, 

short-duration lunar missions-including an extended human presence on the 

Moon and human exploration of Mars and beyond.’’

The findings in the report associated with advanced technology development included the following:

• ‘‘The range of technologies covered in the 22 ETDP projects will, in principle, 

enable many of the early endeavors currently imagined in NASA’s Exploration 

Systems Architecture Study architecture, but not the entire VSE. In examining 

the projects and the scope of the ETDP, the committee found two significant 

technology gaps and also identified several crosscutting issues that are characteristic of many of the 22 ETDP projects or of the overall management of 

the ETDP. A fundamental concern that reflects all of these issues is that the 

ETDP is currently focused on the short-term challenges of the VSE and is addressing the near-term technologies needed to meet these challenges. Although 

it is clear that much of this focus results from the constraints on the program, 

the committee is concerned that the short-term approach characteristic of the 

current ETDP will have long-term consequences and result in compromised 

long-term decisions. Extensibility to longer lunar missions and to human exploration of Mars is at risk in the current research portfolio.’’

• ‘‘The ETDP has become NASA’s principal space technology program. It is 

highly focused and is structured as a supporting technology program to the 

Constellation Program, designed to advance technologies at TRL 3 and above 

toward TRL 6.

• Because of this shift toward the relatively mature end of the technology investment spectrum, which is very closely coupled to the near-term needs of the 

Constellation Program, NASA has also in effect suspended research in a number of technology areas traditionally within the agency’s scope, and it has in 

many areas essentially ended support for longer-term (TRL 1–2) technology research. ‘‘

• ‘‘Although the ETDP has a well-conceived process for managing the programmatic risk of its own technology development, the committee found a lack 

of clarity in the way that the ETDP accounts for the contributions of its technology developments to reducing exploration (i.e., Constellation) program risk 

to reducing operational and human health risks, and to considering humandesign-factor issues in operations.’’

• ‘‘While the ETDP has a good administrative process for determining the formal mechanics of technology transfer, it could improve the effectiveness of the 

human side of the process by reviewing and adopting effective practice in this 

area, with the objective of developing a methodology of technology transfer 

from the development project to the flight project that ensures the successful 

infusion of the technology.’’

• ‘‘The ETDP is currently focused on technologies at or above TRL 3, a focus 

driven by the need to bring together all of the available resources of NASA to 

reduce nearer-term Constellation mission risk and at the same time reduce potential Constellation Program schedule slippages within the assigned budget 

profile.’’

• ‘‘Most ETDP projects represent incremental gains in capability, which is not 

inconsistent with the focus on projects at TRL 3 and above. NASA has largely 

ended investments in longer-term space technologies that will enable later 

phases of the VSE, allow technology to ‘‘support decisions about ... destinations,’’ in the words of the VSE, and in general preserve the technology leadership of the United States. In assessing the balance between near-term and far-
14

term technology investments, the committee found that the current balance of 

the ETDP is too heavily weighted toward near-term investments.’’

The committee recommended that:

• ‘‘Managers in the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate and Exploration 

Technology Development Program should review and carefully consider the 

committee’s ratings of the individual ETDP projects and should develop and 

implement a plan to improve each project to a level that would be rated by 

a subsequent review as demonstrating ‘‘appropriate capabilities and quality, 

accomplishment, and plan.’’

• Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) project managers 

should clearly identify the interrelationships between human health and 

human factor risks and requirements on the one hand and technology development on the other and should ensure that those risks and requirements are addressed in their project plans. Each ETDP project manager should be able to 

show clearly where that project fits within the integrated Exploration Systems 

Mission Directorate Advanced Capabilities Program (which includes the 

ETDP, the Lunar Precursor Robotic Program, and the Human Research Program), and this integrated program plan should include all elements necessary 

to achieve the Vision for Space Exploration.

• Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) project managers 

should systematically include representatives of the Human Research Program 

on the ETDP technology development teams.

• The Exploration Technology Development Program should initiate a technology project to evaluate experimentally candidate nuclear thermal rocket 

(NTR) fuels for materials and thermal characteristics. Using these data, the 

Exploration Systems Mission Directorate should assess the potential benefit of 

using an NTR for lunar missions and should continue to assess the impact 

on Mars missions.

• The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (EMSD) should review its process for the management of technology development to ensure the timely delivery 

of technologies for seamless integration into its flight programs. In particular, 

the ESMD should (1) review and incorporate the considerable expertise in the 

management and transfer of technology in the larger aerospace, government, 

and industrial communities; (2) strengthen its management approach by, for 

instance, appointing a program-level system engineer to ensure that requirements are developed, maintained, and validated in a consistent and complete 

manner across the entire program; and (3) address the following three issues 

in particular: (a) the need for a careful assessment of the impact of its technologies on human and operational risk, (b) the need for definition and management of technology requirements, and (c) the importance of recognizing the 

human elements in the eventual effective transfer and infusion of technology.

• The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate should identify longer-term technology needs for the wider Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) that cannot be 

met by the existing projects in the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) portfolio, which are currently at technology readiness level 

(TRL) 3 or above. To meet longer-term technology needs, the committee recommends that the ETDP seed lower-TRL concepts that target sustainability 

and extensibility to long-term lunar and Mars missions, thus opening the TRL 

pipeline, re-engaging the academic community, and beginning to incorporate 

the innovation in technology development that will be necessary to complete the 

VSE.

• The Exploration Technology Development Program should institute external 

advisory teams for each project that (I) undertake a serious examination of potential external collaborations and identify those that could enhance project efficiency, (2) conduct peer review of existing internal activities, and (3) participate in a number of significant design reviews for the project.

• The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate should implement cooperative research programs that support the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) mission with qualified university, industry, or national laboratory researchers, particularly in low-technology-readiness-level projects. These 

programs should both support the ETDP mission and develop a pipeline of 

qualified and inspired future NASA personnel to ensure the long-term sustainability of U.S. leadership in space exploration.

• The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate should evaluate its test capabilities and develop a comprehensive overall integrated test and validation plan 
15

for all Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) projects. All 

ETDP projects should be reviewed for the absence of key tests (ground and/

or flight), especially those that are required to advance key technologies to technology readiness level (TRL) 6. Where new facilities or flight tests are required, 

conceptual designs for the facilities or flight tests should be developed in order 

to establish plans and resource requirements needed to include the necessary 

testing in all ETDP projects.’’

NRC’s Report NASA’s Beyond Einstein Program: An Architecture for Implementation 

NRC released a report in September 2007 entitled ‘‘NASA’s Beyond Einstein Program: An Architecture for Implementation.’’ Prompted by Congress and the Office of 

Science and Technology Policy, NASA and the Department of Energy asked the committee to assess the five proposed mission concepts for achieving the goals of the 

Beyond Einstein space-based physics research initiative, and recommend one for 

first development and launch. 

As part of its charge, the committee was tasked with determining the realism of 

preliminary technology and management plans, and cost estimates of the candidate 

Beyond Einstein mission set. Five mission areas—Joint Dark Energy Mission, Black 

Hole Finder Probe, Inflation Probe, and Einstein Great Observatories—comprised 11 

mission candidates. Criteria used by the committee included plans for the maturing 

of critical mission technology, technical performance margins, schedule margins, 

risk-mitigation plans, and the proposal’s estimated costs versus independent probable cost estimates prepared by the committee. 

The committee worked with an experienced outside contractor to develop independent cost estimates and a probable cost range for each candidate mission. The 

probable cost ranges were also compared with those of previous missions of similar 

scope and complexity. In all cases, the committee found higher costs and longer 

schedules than those estimated by the mission teams. The committee observed that 

this is typical of the differences between the estimates developed by mission teams 

and by independent cost estimators at this early stage of a program. Given the long 

history of missions comparable to the Beyond Einstein mission candidates, the committee said that it believed that the most realistic cost range for each of these missions is significantly more than the current estimates provided by the research 

teams. 

In discussing its assessment of mission readiness, the committee stressed the importance of technology readiness as a key consideration in the decision to proceed 

to mission development. The committee said that ideally, mission development 

should not commence until all new technologies necessary for mission success have 

reached a certain level of technology readiness. Experience has shown, the committee added, ‘‘that NASA and other missions pay the price when a mission enters 

development prematurely.’’

NRC’s Decadal Surveys of Science Missions 

The four completed decadal surveys established by the NRC to recommend ground 

and space-based programs in Science missions for the next decade—in the areas of 

astronomy and astrophysics, solar and space physics research, solar system exploration, and Earth science research and applications—strongly endorsed the need for 

technology development to enable future missions.

Astronomy and Astrophysics in the New Millennium 

With regard to the importance of investing in technology, this decadal survey, 

completed in 2001, stated that:

‘‘Technological innovation has often enabled astronomical discovery. Most of the 

major discoveries listed at the beginning of this chapter were possible only because of the remarkable advances in technology in the past two decades. Continued investment in technology in this decade is required for many of the initiatives recommended in this report.’’

‘‘It is essential to maintain funding for the planned technology development if 

NASA is to keep these missions on schedule and within budget. Targeted technology programs involving a joint effort between engineers and scientists will be 

essential to success in these projects. As noted above, the committee endorses 

NASA’s policy of completing the technological development of a mission prior to 

starting it.’’

‘‘Longer-range investments in technology in this decade are needed to enable the 

major projects in the next decade-and to make them more cost-effective.’’
16

The Sun to the Earth—and Beyond: A Decadal Research Strategy in Solar and 

Space Physics

Completed in 2003, this decadal survey recommended that NASA:

• ‘‘Assign high priority to the development of advanced propulsion and power 

technologies required for the exploration of the outer planets, the inner and 

outer heliosphere, and the local interstellar medium. Such technologies include 

solar sails, space nuclear power systems, and high-efficiency solar arrays. 

Equally high priority should be given to the development of lower-cost launch 

vehicles for Explorer-class missions and to the reopening of the radioisotope 

thermoelectric generator (RTG) production line.’’

• ‘‘Continue to give high priority to the development and testing of advanced 

spacecraft technologies through such programs as the New Millennium Program and its advanced technology program.’’

• ‘‘Continue to assign high priority, through its recently established new instrument development programs, to supporting the development of advanced instrumentation for solar and space physics missions and programs.’’

• ‘‘Accelerate the development of command-and-control and data acquisition 

technologies for constellation missions.’’

New Frontiers in the Solar System: An Integrated Exploration Strategy 

With regards to technology development, this decadal survey, completed in 2003, 

recommended that NASA:

• ‘‘Commit to significant new investments in advanced technology so that future 

high-priority flight missions can succeed Unfortunately, erosion has occurred 

in the level of investment in technology in the past several years. Flight-development costs have increased over projections, and investments in advanced 

technologies have been redirected to maintain flight-mission development 

schedules and performance. For most of the history of planetary exploration, 

large-cost flight missions such as Voyager, Viking, Galileo, and Cassini have 

carried a large portion of the technology-development burden in their development costs. During the change in the last decade to a larger number of lowercost flight missions, the consequent loss of technology development by large 

missions was compensated by adding separate technology-development cost 

lines to the planetary exploration portfolio, such as X2000 [NASA’s X2000 Program was created in 1997 to infuse new technologies that would enable new, 

lower-cost and higher-performance spacecraft], under an understood policy of 

‘‘no mission start before its technological time.’’ This mechanism was intended 

to separate and remove the uncertainties in technological development from 

early flight-development costs. However, flight-mission costs have been underestimated, and development plans have been too success-oriented, resulting in 

erosion of technology-development lines by transfer to flight-development costs. 

This trend needs to be reversed in order to realize the flight missions recommended in this report.’’

Earth Science and Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond

Relative to technology development, this decadal survey, completed in 2007, recommended that:

‘‘U.S. civil space agencies should aggressively pursue technology development 

that supports the missions recommended’’ in the survey; ‘‘plan for transitions 

to continue demonstrably useful research observations on a sustained, or operational, basis; and foster innovative space-based concepts. In particular:

• NASA should increase investment in both mission focused and cross-cutting technology development to decrease technical risk in the recommended 

missions andpromote cost reduction across multiple missions. Early technology focused investments through extended mission Phase A studies are 

essential.

• To restore more frequent launch opportunities and to facilitate the demonstration of innovative ideas and higher-risk technologies, NASA should 

create a new Venture class of low-cost research and application missions 

(¥100 million to $200 million). These missions should focus on fostering 

revolutionary innovation and on training future leaders of space-based 

Earth science and applications.
17

• NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] should increase investment in identifying and facilitating the transition of demonstrably useful research observations to operational use.

The Venture class of missions, in particular, would replace and be very different 

from the current ESSP mission line, which is increasingly a competitive means 

for implementing NASA’s strategic missions. Priority would be given to cost-effective, innovative missions rather than those with excessive scientific and technological requirements. The Venture class could include stand-alone missions 

that use simple, small instruments, spacecraft, and launch vehicles; more complex instruments of opportunity flown on partner spacecraft and launch vehicles; 

or complex sets of instruments flown on suitable suborbital platforms to address 

focused sets of scientific questions. These missions could focus on establishing 

new research avenues or on demonstrating key application-oriented measurements. Key to the success of such a program will be maintaining a steady stream 

of opportunities for community participation in the development of innovative 

ideas, which requires that strict schedule and cost guidelines be enforced for the 

program participants.’’

NRC’s Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics 

The idea of conducting a decadal survey of aeronautics originated in discussions 

among NRC’s Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, the Office of Management 

and Budget, and congressional committees with an interest in civil aviation. As a 

result, the Congress and NASA requested NRC to undertake a decadal survey of 

civil aeronautics research and technology (R&T) priorities that would help NASA 

fulfill its responsibility to preserve U.S. leadership in aeronautics technology. Issued 

in 2006, the resultant report presented a set of strategic objectives for the next decade of R&T and provided a set of high-priority R&T challenges—characterized by 

five common themes—for both NASA and non-NASA researchers, and an analysis 

of key barriers that must be overcome to reach the strategic objectives. 

The report encouraged NASA to closely coordinate and cooperate with other public 

and private organizations to take advantage of advances in cross-cutting technology 

funded by Federal agencies and private industry and to develop each new technology to a level of readiness that is appropriate for that technology, given that industry’s interest in continuing the development of new technologies varies depending on urgency and expected payoff.
18

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. The hearing will now come to order. 

Good morning, everyone. I would like to welcome all of our witnesses here today. We look forward to your testimony and are so 

pleased that you are here with us. 

Today is a very busy day on the Hill, and I am going to try to 

be brief in my opening so that we will have as much time as possible for discussion. However, I think it is important to note right 

at the outset that based on all of our witnesses’ testimony there is 

an agreement on the importance of a vital and robust technology 

development program at NASA and a need to revitalize NASA’s existing technology development activities. 

And I think it is fair to say that all three would likely agree that 

NASA has been under-investing in technology development in recent years. Given that two of our witnesses represent distinguished 

committees of the National Academies and the third is one of the 

most senior officials at NASA, I think those views warrant our 

close attention. 

Yet to some extent our witnesses are preaching to the choir 

today. This subcommittee has been concerned for some time about 

the state of NASA’s long-term technology programs, and we highlighted the need for action in last year’s NASA’s Reauthorization 

Act. To quote finding number ten from that act, ‘‘NASA should 

make a sustained commitment to a robust, long-term technology 

development activity.’’ Such investments represent critically important seed corn on which NASA’s ability to carry out challenging 

and productive missions in the future will depend. 

I would also note that the summary report of the Augustine 

Panel that has been reviewing NASA’s human spaceflight plans 

also acknowledged the importance of technology development. And 

I quote from them. ‘‘The committee strongly believes it is time for 

NASA to reassume its critical role for developing new technologies 

for space.’’ 

That is a sentiment on the Augustine Panel which I believe that 

we all heartedly concur. NASA’s technology development activities 

are critical not just to NASA’s future but to the quality of life for 

all of our citizens and for our Nation’s competitiveness. 

Discussions of technology development can wind up sounding 

pretty wonky, so let me be clear why I think NASA’s efforts are so 

important and need to be supported. This is a photograph. Actually, we were having a recent discussion about this photograph. I 

know that it is available on the NASA website. It is a picture of 

a standard commercial airplane that I believe really makes a 

strong point. As you look at it you will see some of the most major 

systems and technologies from research undertaken or funded by 

NASA. It is an aircraft that many members of Congress, actually 

the majority of us, fly every single week to come here to work, and 

yet I bet very few of them or even members of the public at large 

recognize that NASA R&D has made this airplane and others possible. 

This picture is just one illustration of the impact of NASA’s research on our society and our economy. I have no doubt that each 

of NASA’s other enterprises could produce similar examples, and I 

hope that they will because it is a story that needs to be told time 

and time again. So I don’t think any of the members here today 
19

need to be convinced that NASA should pursue a vigorous program 

of technology development. Rather, we want to explore what it will 

take to get such a revitalized program in place at the agency. 

And in that regard I want to state my strong belief that we don’t 

revitalize technology development at NASA by robbing Peter to pay 

Paul. That is carving out funding from an already under-funded 

Constellation program so that the long-term technology program 

can be augmented. I believe this would be penny wise and pound 

foolish. You don’t fix one under-funded program by taking money 

from another under-funded program and expect anything good as 

a result. 

In addition, I suspect that there may not be a one-size-fits-all organizational structure for technology development at NASA, but I 

want to hear from our witnesses on that topic, as I know that each 

of them have been thinking a lot about this issue. 

But it is not just a question of either money or how the organizational deck chairs are arranged. NASA has to be smart and opportunistic in seeking out ways to get its technologies out to the private sector and to other potential government users. That is probably a topic for its own hearing, but perhaps our witnesses here 

today will have some thoughts on what NASA could possibly do in 

that regard. 

So I look forward to an interesting and informative discussion. 

I will ask my colleagues today if we can please refrain from asking 

our NASA witnesses about NASA’s response to the Augustine 

Panel, which is scheduled to be released later today. We know that 

Mr. Scolese is not going to be able to make a comment at this 

point, and we will have other opportunities in the future to get 

NASA’s perspective in the next coming weeks. 

So with that again, I would like to welcome our witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Giffords follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN GABRIELLE GIFFORDS

Good morning. I want to welcome each of our witnesses to today’s hearing. 

We look forward to your testimony. 

Today is a very busy day on the Hill, and I will be brief in my opening remarks 

so that we have as much time as possible for discussion. 

However, I think it’s important to note right at the outset that, based on their 

written testimony, all three of our witnesses agree on the importance of a vital and 

robust technology development program at NASA, and the need to revitalize NASA’s 

existing technology development activities. 

And I think it is fair to say that all three would likely agree that NASA has been 

under-investing in technology development in recent years. 

Given that two of our witnesses represent distinguished committees of the National Academies, and the third is one of the most senior officials at NASA, I think 

those views warrant our close attention. 

Yet, to some extent, our witnesses are ‘‘preaching to the choir’’ today. 

This Subcommittee has been concerned for some time about the state of NASA’s 

long-term technology programs, and we highlighted the need for action in last year’s 

NASA Authorization Act. 

To quote Finding #10 from that Act:

‘‘NASA should make a sustained commitment to a robust long-term technology 

development activity. Such investments represent critically important ‘seed 

corn’ on which NASA’s ability to carry out challenging and productive missions 

in the future will depend.’’

I would also note that the summary report of the Augustine panel that has been 

reviewing NASA’s human space flight plans also acknowledged the importance of 

technology development:
20

• ‘‘The Committee strongly believes it is time for NASA to reassume its crucial 

role of developing new technologies for space.’’

That is a sentiment of the Augustine panel with which I heartily concur. 

NASA’s technology development activities are critical not just to NASA’s future, 

but to the quality of life of our citizens and our nation’s competitiveness. 

Discussions of technology development can wind up sounding pretty ‘‘wonky’’, so 

let me be clear why I think NASA’s efforts are so important and need to be supported. 

Here’s a picture of a standard commercial aircraft that I think makes my point. 

As you look at it, you will see that almost all of its major systems and technologies came from research undertaken or funded by NASA. 

Here is an aircraft that probably many Members of Congress get in several times 

a week, and yet I bet very few of them—or members of the public at large—recognize that NASA R&D made that plane possible. 

And this picture is just one illustration of the impact of NASA’s research on our 

society and our economy. 

I have no doubt that each of NASA’s other enterprises could provide similar examples and I hope they will—it’s a story that needs telling and re-telling. 

So 1 don’t think any of the Members here today need to be convinced that NASA 

should pursue a vigorous program of technology development. 

Rather, we want to explore what it will take to get such a revitalized program 

in place at the agency. 

In that regard, I want to state my strong belief that we don’t revitalize technology 

development at NASA by ‘‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’’. 

That is, carving out funding from an already underfunded Constellation program 

so that the long-term technology program can be augmented would be penny-wise 

and pound-foolish—you don’t fix one underfunded program by taking funding from 

another underfunded program and expect anything good to result. 

In addition, I suspect that there may not be a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ organizational 

structure for technology development at NASA, but I want to hear from our witnesses on that topic, as I know that each of them have been thinking a lot about 

that issue. 

But it’s not just a question of either money or how the organizational deck chairs 

arearranged—NASA has to be smart and opportunistic in seeking out ways to get 

its technologies out to the private sector and to other potential government users. 

That’s probably a topic for a hearing in its own right, but perhaps our witnesses 

here today will have some thoughts on what NASA might do. 

Well, I look forward to an interesting and informative discussion today. 

However, in that discussion, I would ask my colleagues to refrain from asking our 

NASA witness about NASA’s response to the report of the Augustine panel, which 

is scheduled to bereleased today. 

He is not going to be able to comment on the report at this point, and we will 

have other opportunities to get NASA’s perspectives on it in the coming weeks. 

With that, I again want to welcome our witnesses, and I’d now like to turn to Mr. 

Olson for any opening remarks he might care to make. 

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. And now I would like to turn to Mr. 

Olson for any opening comments that he would like to make. 

Mr. OLSON. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for calling this 

morning’s hearing to examine NASA’s efforts to foster development 

of advanced and innovative technologies. Let me begin by thanking 

our witnesses for their appearance today before this subcommittee. 

I recognize that each of you spent considerable time and effort preparing for this hearing, and in some cases traveling considerable 

distances to be here. Please note that this committee appreciates—

the subcommittee appreciates your efforts as well as the wisdom 

and experience that you bring and that we will refer to your guidance in the months and years ahead. 

In the public’s mind NASA is synonymous with highly-innovative, cutting-edge technologies. NASA and its predecessor agency, 

NACA [National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics], have 

amassed a century’s worth of remarkable achievements that advance the state of the art in aeronautics and astronautics in many 
21

extraordinary ways. Collectively, they have directly contributed to 

this country’s high standard of living both in terms of directly contributing to a strong industrial base but also through the unanticipated use of technologies and new and creative applications developed by the private sector. 

It would be difficult to catalog the number and scope of innovations and the technological spin-offs that have sprung from their 

work. But suffice to say that the products springing from NASA’s 

technological genius permeates our daily lives, most notably the 

transportation, communications, propulsion, and medical industries. 

In recent years NASA has restructured the way it stimulates development of new technologies, moving away from an independent, 

centralized office towards a diverse, less-structured effort influenced more by the needs of individual missions and programs. 

Views expressed by the external science community seem to suggest that NASA ought to return to the former model. 

I look forward to hearing from this morning’s witnesses on the 

most appropriate way to perpetuate NASA’s record of technology 

innovation and development. Issues I hope will be explored include 

how to best—how best to broadly reach across the science and engineering communities, to stimulate, develop, and assess the most 

creative needs, to what level of maturity should promising concepts 

be funded, and how can the most promising technologies be transferred into specific agency projects and missions, as well as benefit 

the commercial sector. 

And one last issue. What is the best way to ensure that advanced 

concepts and technology development efforts have the necessary 

funding and management stability. I can’t think of any other civilian federal agency that has done more to improve our Nation’s economic and technical prowess than NASA. And it is not because 

NASA is in the business of advancing our social wellbeing. Rather 

their technological discoveries and innovations developed in the 

pursuit of challenging space and aeronautics missions have been 

acquired and adapted by others in many creative products and 

services. It is the genius of American people that has made taking 

those products and turn them into something for our economy. 

And before closing, I want to again recognize and thank Chris 

Scolese for his long service and strong leadership at NASA. 

Through the first half of this year you have led the agency during 

an always-challenging period of transition between Administrations. Your steady hand and candor is appreciated by the Congress 

and more importantly by the men and women who work at NASA. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Olson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE PETE OLSON

Madam Chairwoman, thank you for calling this morning’s hearing to examine 

NASA’s efforts to foster and manage the development of advanced and innovative 

technologies. 

Let me begin by thanking our witnesses for their appearance today before this 

subcommittee. I recognize that each of you have spent considerable time and effort 

preparing for this hearing, and in some cases traveling considerable distance to be 

here. Please know that this subcommittee appreciates your efforts, as well as the 

wisdom and experience that you bring, and that we will refer to your guidance in 

the months and years ahead. 
22

In the public’s mind, NASA is synonymous with highly innovative, cutting edge 

technologies. NASA and its predecessor agency, NACA, have amassed a century’s 

worth of remarkable achievements that advanced the state of the art in aeronautics 

and astronautics in many extraordinary ways. Collectively, they have directly contributed to this country’s high standard of living, both in terms of directly contributing to a strong industrial base, but also through the unanticipated use of technologies in new and creative applications developed by the private sector. It would 

be difficult to catalog the number and scope of innovations, and the technological 

spin-offs that have sprung from their work. But suffice it to say that the products 

springing from NASA’s technical genius permeates our daily lives, most notably in 

the transportation, communications, propulsion, and medical industries. 

In recent years NASA has restructured the way it stimulates the development of 

new technologies, moving away from an independent, centralized office toward a diverse, less-structured effort influenced more by the needs of individual missions and 

programs. 

Views expressed by the external science community seem to suggest that NASA 

ought to return to the former model. 

I look forward to hearing from this morning’s witnesses on the most appropriate 

way to perpetuate NASA’s enviable record of technology innovation and development. Issues I hope will be explored include how best to broadly reach across the 

science and engineering communities to stimulate, develop and assess the most creative ideas; to what level of maturity should promising concepts be funded; and how 

can the most promising technologies be transferred into specific agency projects and 

missions, as well as benefit the commercial sector. And one last issue: What is the 

best way to ensure that advanced concepts and technology development efforts have 

the necessary funding and management stability? 

I can’t think of any other civilian federal agency that has done more to improve 

our nation’s economic and technical prowess than NASA. And it’s not because NASA 

is in the business of advancing our social well-being; rather, their technological discoveries and innovations—developed in the pursuit of challenging space and aeronautics missions—have been acquired and adapted by others in many creative products and services. 

Before closing, I want to again recognize and thank Chris Scolese for his long 

service and strong leadership at NASA. Through the first half of this year he led 

the agency during an always challenging period of transition between Administrations. His steady hand and candor was appreciated by Congress, and more importantly, by the men and women at NASA. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back my time. 

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Olson. Very well said. I 

am glad you are the Ranking Member. Is there anyone else that 

would like to make an opening statement? 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman, Chairwoman Giffords. 

Thank you for this important hearing, and thank you for the leadership that you have shown on Science and Technology. 

NASA’s efforts in the field of advanced concepts and technology 

development have not only moved the field of space and aeronautics forward but have improved our lives through the use of satellite communications, space-based weather observations, and aviation navigation systems. 

In this time of transition and budget constraints I believe it is 

important that NASA continue to have a focus on the technologies 

necessary for not just the next space mission but the missions that 

are in our distant future. 

Panelists, thank you for joining us today and providing your 

opinions and expertise to this subcommittee. I look forward to 

working with each of you, as well as my fellow committee members, as we seek to continue NASA’s ability to explore the far 

reaches of this universe and inspire our country. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]
23

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES A. WILSON

Thank you Chairwoman Giffords for holding this importanthearing. 

NASA’s efforts in the field of advanced concepts and technology development have 

not only moved the field of space and aeronautics forward, but have improved our 

lives thoughthe use of satellite communication, spaced-based weather observations, 

and aviation navigation systems. In this time of transition and budget constraints, 

I believe it isimportant that NASA continue to have a focus on the technologies necessary for not just the next space mission, but the missions that are in the distant 

future. 

Panelists, thank you for joining us today and providing your opinions and expertise tothis Subcommittee. I look forward to working with each of you, as well as my 

fellow Committee members, as we seek to continue NASA’s ability to explore the 

far reaches of this universe and inspire our country.

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Anyone else? 

Okay. At this time I would like to introduce our witnesses. First 

up we have Dr. Robert Braun, who is the Co-Chair of the National 

Research Council’s Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board Committee to Review the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts. We 

also have with us today Dr. Raymond S. Colladay, who is Vice 

Chair of the Committee on the Rationale and Goals of the U.S. 

Civil Space Program and Chair of the National Research Council’s 

Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board. And we have with us 

Mr. Christopher Scolese, who is the Associate Administrator at 

NASA and who has served with distinction as the Acting NASA 

Administrator until Administrator Bolden was confirmed. So welcome all. 

As our witnesses know, you will each have 5 minutes for your 

spoken testimony. Your written testimony has been included for 

the record for this hearing, and when you have completed each of 

your testimony, we will begin a round of questions, and all the 

members will have 5 minutes to question the panel. 

We would like to start today with Dr. Braun. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT D. BRAUN, CO-CHAIR OF THE 

COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE NASA INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED CONCEPTS, AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ENGINEERING BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 

Dr. BRAUN. Chairwoman Giffords, Ranking Member Olson, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the honor of appearing before you today to discuss the approaches to strengthen 

NASA’s advanced concept and technology development programs. 

My name is Robert Braun. The views I express today have been 

shaped through a 22-year career in aerospace engineering in both 

government and academic positions. Today I speak to you as the 

Co-Chair of the National Research Council’s committee to review 

the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts. 

With your permission I would like to summarize my views this 

morning, leaving sufficient time to answer your questions. I would 

like to begin with a summary of our NRC report. 

NASA established the NASA Institute of Advanced Concepts 

[NIAC] in 1998, to provide an independent, open forum for the external analysis and definition of revolutionary space and aeronautics concepts. These were concepts that could impact a NASA 

mission 10 to 40 years in the future. 

Funded at approximately $4 million per year or roughly .02 percent of NASA’s budget, NIAC operated for approximately 9 years 
24

and received a total of 1,309 proposals from which they made 126 

phase one awards and 42 phase two awards, primarily to small 

businesses and universities throughout the country. 

At its inception NIAC was envisioned as a cross-cutting program 

reporting to the agency’s chief technologist. However, in 2004, 

NIAC program management within NASA was transferred into one 

of the mission directorates, NASA’s Exploration Systems Mission 

Directorate, and in 2007, NIAC was terminated. 

I would like to highlight the following four key findings and recommendations from our committee report. One, NIAC met its mission and accomplished its stated goals. Two, NASA and the Nation 

need a NIAC-like organization. Three, the original NASA implementation of NIAC as an external organization managed above and 

across the mission directorates was effective, and four, modifications could be made both within NIAC itself and within NASA to 

improve the effectiveness of this enterprise. Chief among these 

modifications would be potentially reestablishing an aeronautics 

and space systems technology development enterprise within NASA 

itself. 

In my view a NASA strongly positioned for the future should include a brand of mission focused near-term, capability based, midrange, and discipline based, long-term technology investments strategically guided by continuously engaged advanced concepts program. 

However, at present there is no NASA organization responsible 

for the solicitation, evaluation, and maturation of advanced concepts or for the subsequent infusion of those worthy concepts into 

NASA’s strategic planning process. 

In addition, while mid-range capability-based technology investments are perhaps the most critical for a forward-looking agency 

like NASA, within NASA today it is this type of technology investment that is actually minimal. In my opinion this is not appropriate for an agency whose purpose includes demonstrating this 

Nation’s scientific and technological prowess. Or one that is trying 

to inspire the next generation of engineers and scientists. A technology-poor NASA greatly hampers our aeronautics and spaceflight 

development programs. 

As an example, we cannot continue to rely on 1970s era technology to land systems on Mars, particularly if we want to one day 

build towards eventual human exploration. Another example, as 

stated by both the Aldridge Commission in 2004, and the Augustine Commission this year, we cannot plan a sustainable human 

exploration program without strong technology leverage. 

Based on these observations I suggest NASA establish a formal 

enterprise to continuously evaluate, prioritize, and mature a strategically selected set of technologies in the relevant environments. 

Many positive outcomes are likely from a long-term, broadly-focused NASA advanced concepts and technology development program. 

Chief among these consequences is the provision of a more exciting aeronautics and space future than our country has today. A 

suite of game-changing space and aeronautic discoveries are within 

our Nation’s grasps. Each of these advances would also serve as a 

spark to a technology-based economy, an international symbol of 
25

our country’s scientific innovation, engineering creativity, and technological skill, and a component of the remedy to our Nation’s scientific and mathematic literacy challenges. 

Our Nation needs to dream big, and achieving large goals is precisely what America has come to expect of NASA. With a stronger 

focus on technology development NASA would be well poised to deliver on some of societies’ grand challenges. 

This completes my introductory remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Braun follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. BRAUN

Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member Olson and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the honor of appearing before you today to discuss approaches to strengthen NASA’s advanced concept and technology development programs. My name is Robert D. Braun. The views I express today have been shaped 

through a twenty-two year aerospace engineering career in government and academia. For sixteen years, I served on the technical staff of the NASA Langley Research Center. At NASA, I developed advanced space exploration concepts, managed 

multiple technology development efforts, and contributed to the design, development, test and operation of several robotic Mars flight systems. For the past 6 

years, I have served on the faculty of the Daniel Guggenheim School of Aerospace 

Engineering at the Georgia Institute of Technology. As Director of Georgia Tech’s 

Space Systems Design Laboratory, 1 lead an active research and educational program focused on the design of advanced flight systems and technologies for planetary exploration. The advanced space systems concept and technology maturation 

skills being developed by the undergraduate and graduate students at Georgia Tech 

are of significant interest to NASA, the U.S. Air Force, DARPA, our national labs, 

industry, and others in academia. It gives me great pride to work closely with these 

students, who are on their way to becoming the space systems engineers of our nation’s future. 

Today, I speak to you as the Co-chair of the National Research Council’s Committee to Review the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts, which recently released our report Fostering Visions for the Future: A Review of the NASA Institute 

for Advanced Concepts. The committee’s twelve members were chosen by the NRC 

for their experience with advanced space and aeronautical concepts and their insight into cogent approaches to spark scientific innovation and creativity. They represent a diverse cross-section of aerospace sector experience, including NASA, 

DARPA, the SETT Institute, industry, and academia. The committee was co-chaired 

by Dianne S. Wiley, a Technical Fellow at Boeing Phantom Works and myself. I 

must say that it was a pleasure to work through the NRC with this talented and 

experienced group of people. 

In response to the first question posed by the subcommittee, I would like to begin 

by summarizing our committee report.

Fostering Visions of the Future: A Review of the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts 

NASA established the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC) in 1998 to 

provide an independent, open forum for the external analysis and definition of revolutionary space and aeronautics concepts to complement the advanced concepts activities conducted within the Agency. Funded at approximately $4 million per year 

(roughly 0.02% of NASA’s budget), MIAC received a total of $36.2 million in NASA 

funding during the 9 years of its existence. As directed by the NASA SOW, NIAC 

focused on revolutionary advanced concept studies that could impact a NASA mission 10 to 40 years in the future. NIAC inspired an atmosphere of innovation that 

stretched the imagination and encouraged creativity. In response to its yearly solicitations, NIAC received a total of 1309 proposals, and made 126 Phase I awards and 

42 Phase II awards, primarily to small businesses and universities, but also to large 

businesses and national laboratories. To reduce costs and maximize public accessibility, NIAC utilized an open, web-based environment to conduct solicitations, perform peer review, administer grant awards, and publicize its activities. NIAC received an ‘‘Excellent’ performance rating in each NASA annual review held. Many 

NIAC grantees went on to receive additional funding for continued development of 

their concept from NASA, other government agencies or private industry. In addi-
26

tion to developing revolutionary concepts, NIAC placed an emphasis on science and 

engineering education as well as public outreach. At its inception, NIAC was envisioned as a crosscutting program reporting to the Agency’s Chief Technologist. In 

2004, when the NASA Office of Aerospace Technology was dissolved, NIAC program 

management was transferred into the NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. In 2007, NIAC was terminated. 

In 2008, Congress directed the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct a review of the effectiveness of NIAC and to make recommendations concerning the importance of such a program to NASA and to the nation. Our committee was given 

the following statement of task:

1) Evaluate NIAC’s effectiveness in meeting its mission.

2) Evaluate the method by which grantees were selected.

3) Make recommendations on whether NIAC or a successor entity should be 

funded by the Federal Government.

4) Make recommendations as to how the Federal Government in general and 

NASA in particular should solicit and infuse advanced concepts Into its future systems.

In evaluating NIAC’s performance, the committee addressed the following questions:

1) To what extent were the NIAC-sponsored advanced concept studies innovative and technically competent?

2) How effective was NIAC in infusing advanced concepts into NASA’s strategic 

vision, future mission plans, and technology development programs?

3) How relevant were these studies to the aerospace sector at large?

4) How well did NIAC leverage potential partnerships or cost-sharing arrangements?

5) What potential approaches could NASA pursue in the future to generate advanced concepts either internally or from external sources of innovation?

The key findings and recommendations from our report can be summarized in the 

following seven statements:

1) NIAC met its mission and accomplished its stated goals. The committee 

found that NIAC’s approach to implementing its functions successfully met NASAdefined objectives, resulted in a cost-effective and timely execution of advanced concept studies, afforded an opportunity for external input of new ideas to the agency, 

and subsequently provided broad public exposure of NASA programs. NIAC was 

successful in encouraging and supporting a wide community of innovators from diverse disciplines and institutions as evidenced by receipt of 1309 proposals in its 9-

year lifetime. The 126 NIAC Phase I studies were led by a total of 109 distinct principal investigators, each of whom led a research team of 3-10 personnel, often across 

multiple organizations. The majority of the NIAC-supported efforts were highly innovative. Many were successful. in pushing the state of the art. Overall, the efforts 

supported produced results commensurate with the funding and risk involved. 

2) NIAC had infusion successes and challenges. One important NIAC performance metric defined in the NASA SOW was achievement of 5 to 10 percent infusion of NIAC-developed Phase II concepts into NASA’s long-term plans. One way to 

gauge such infusion is to look at the receipt of post-NIAC funding for the continued 

development of a NIAC-funded concept. The committee found that 14 NIAC Phase 

I and Phase II projects, which were awarded $7 million by NIAC, received an additional $23.8 million in funding from a wide range of organizations, demonstrating 

the significance of the nation’s investment in these NIAC advanced concepts. NIAC 

matured 12 of the 42 Phase II advanced concepts (29 percent), as measured by receipt of post-NIAC funding. In fact, 9 of these (21 percent) received post-NIAC funding from NASA itself. Over the long term, the ultimate criterion for NIAC success 

is the number of funded projects that make their way into the relevant NASA mission directorate decadal survey, strategic plan, or mission stream. The committee 

found that three NIAC Phase II efforts (7 percent of the Phase II awards) appear 

to have impacted NASA’s long-term plans. Of significance, two of these efforts have 

either already been incorporated or are currently under consideration by the NRC 

Astronomy and Astrophysics Decadal Survey as future NASA missions: the MAXIM 

x-ray interferometry concept for black hole imaging and the New Worlds Observer 

constellation for exoplanet discovery. Considering the 40-year planning horizon of 

NIAC activities coupled with the 9-year existence of MIAC, the committee believes 

it is likely that the number of NIAC Phase II projects considered for NASA missions 

will continue to increase over time. 
27

1Section 102.c.4 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 includes provision for the 

conduct of the aeronautical and space activities of the United States toward establishment of 

long-range studies of the potential benefits to be gained from, the opportunities for, and the 

problems involved in the utilization of aeronautical and space activities for peaceful and scientific purposes. 

On the other hand, by design, the maturity of NIAC Phase II products was such 

that a substantial additional infusion of resources was needed before these advanced 

concepts could be deemed technically viable for implementation as part of a future 

NASA mission or flight program. The committee found that this technology readiness immaturity created infusion difficulties for the NIAC program and innovators, 

causing promising ideas to wither on the vine. 

3) NASA and the nation need a NIAC-like organization. NASA is now an 

agency largely oriented toward flight-system development and operations. Priorities 

have thus diminished within NASA for long-range research and development efforts. 

At present, there is no NASA organization responsible for solicitation, evaluation, 

and maturation of advanced concepts (defined as those at technology readiness level 

one or two) or responsible for subsequent infusion of worthy concepts into NASA 

planning and development activities. Over the past few years, such NASA efforts 

have been ad hoc, lacking in long-term stability, and not integrated into the agency’s strategic planning process. Managed in this fashion, advanced concept efforts 

will rarely produce mature products and the agency is at risk of driving away many 

of its most creative personnel. Our committee believes that NASA and the nation 

would be well served by maintaining a mechanism to investigate visionary, farreaching advanced concepts as part of NASA’s mission.1 Concepts deemed feasible 

could be used to inform NASA’s strategic planning process. Long-term, these concepts and technologies offer the potential for dramatic improvements in performance 

and/or cost of future aeronautical and space systems. As such, the committee recommends that NASA should reestablish a NIAC-like entity, referred to in our report 

as NIAC2, to seek out visionary, far-reaching, advanced concepts with the potential 

of significant benefit to accomplishing NASA’s charter and to begin the process of 

maturing these advanced concepts for infusion into NASA’s missions. The existence 

of such an organization would also demonstrate that NASA continues to be a driver 

of innovation and technological competitiveness, potentially serving as a critical element of NASA’s public and educational value to the nation. 

4) The original NASA implementation of NIAC as an external organization managed above and across the mission directorates was effective.

When it was initially formed, NIAC was managed by a high-level agency executive 

concerned with the objectives and needs of all NASA enterprises and missions. The 

committee found that NIAC was most successful as a program with crosscutting applicability to NASA’s enterprises and missions. When it was transferred to a mission-specific directorate, NIAC lost its alignment with sponsor objectives and priorities. To allow for sustained implementation of NIAC2 infusion objectives, the committee recommends that NIAC2 report to the Office of the Administrator, be outside 

mission directorates, and be chartered to address NASA-wide mission and technology needs. To increase NIAC2’s relevance, NASA mission directorates should contribute thematic areas for consideration in the proposal solicitation process. The 

committee also recommends that this NIAC2 organization be funded and administered separately from NASA development programs, mission directorates, and institutional constraints. Future NIAC2 proposal opportunities should continue to be 

managed and peer-reviewed outside the agency. 

5) NIAC2 modifications should be made to improve effectiveness. While 

NIAC’s Internet-based technical review and management processes were found to be 

effective and should be continued in NIAC2, the committee found a few policies that 

may have hastened NIAC’s demise. Key among these was (1) the exclusive focus on 

revolutionary advanced concepts, (2) the exclusion of NASA personnel from participation in NIAC awards or research teams, and (3) the immaturity of NIAC Phase 

II products relative to that required for implementation as part of a future NASA 

mission or flight program. 

By definition, visionary advanced concepts will not be near-term. However, in our 

committee discussions, it was felt that NIAC’s complete focus on revolutionary concepts (as directed in its NASA SOW) was too long-term, creating a cultural mismatch between the NIAC products and its mission-focused sponsors and causing infusion difficulties for the NIAC innovators. As such, the committee recommends that 

the key selection requirement for NIAC2 proposal opportunities be that the concept 

is scientifically and/or technically innovative and has the potential to provide major 

benefit to a future NASA mission of 10 years and beyond. While 10 years and beyond includes concepts that could be 40 years or farther in the future, the com-
28

2Similar findings are made in A Constrained Space Exploration Technology Program: A Review of NASA’s Exploration Technology Development Program, The National Academies Press, 

Washington, D.C., 2008; and America’s Future in Space: Aligning the Civil Space Program with 

National Needs, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2009. 3Section 102.c.5 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 includes provision for the 

conduct of the aeronautical and space activities of the United States for the preservation of the 

role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in 

the application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the atmosphere. 

mittee felt that these modifications in focus would likely result in NIAC2 efforts 

with a higher probability of infusion into NASA’s strategic planning process. 

NIAC was formed to provide an independent, open forum for the external analysis 

and definition of space and aeronautics advanced concepts to complement the advanced concepts activities conducted within NASA; hence, NIAC solicitations were 

closed to NASA participants. However, NIAC was formed at a time when there was 

adequate funding internal to NASA for development of novel, long-term ideas. As 

internal NASA funding for advanced concepts and technology diminished or became 

more focused on flight-system development and operations, the cultural disconnect 

between the development activities internal and external to the agency grew, and 

transitioning of NIAC concepts to the NASA mission directorates became more difficult. The committee recommends that future NIAC2 proposal opportunities be 

open to principal investigators or teams both internal and external to NASA. 

In addition, the committee believes that the potential for receipt of a NIAC2 

Phase III award is needed to aid the transition of the most highly promising 

projects. Therefore, the committee recommends that future NIAC2 proposal opportunities include the potential selection of a small number of Phase III ‘‘proof of concept’’ awards for up to $5 million each over as much as 4 years to demonstrate and 

resolve fundamental feasibility issues and that such awards be selected jointly by 

NIAC2 and NASA management. 

6) NASA modifications should be made to improve effectiveness. The lack 

of a NASA interface to receive the hand-off of promising projects was a persistent 

NIAC challenge. To improve the manner in which advanced concepts are infused 

into its future systems and to build a culture that continuously strives to advance 

technology, the committee recommends that NASA consider reestablishing an aeronautics and space systems technology development enterprise.2 Such an organization would serve to preserve the leadership role of the United States in aeronautical 

and space systems technology.3 Its NIAC2-oriented purpose would be to provide 

maturation opportunities and agency expertise for visionary, far-reaching concepts 

and technologies. NASA’s considerations for such an enterprise should include implications for the agency’s strategic plan, effective organizational approaches, resource 

distributions, field center foci, and mission selection process. Increased participation 

of NASA field center personnel, beyond review and management functions, should 

also significantly enhance advanced concept maturation and infusion into NASA 

mission planning. The committee also recommends identification of center technical 

champions and provision for the technical participation of NASA field center personnel in NIAC2 efforts. Participation of NASA personnel is expected to increase as 

NIAC2 projects mature. 

7) The budget requirement for a strong advanced concepts development 

activity reaches a steady-state value of approximately $10M per year. Our 

committee believes that the NIAC was generally funded appropriately (approximately $4M/year) for its stated Phase I and Phase II objectives. We believe that 

NIAC2 proposal opportunities should be defined as follows: Phase I up to $100,000 

each for 1 year; Phase II, up to $500,000 each for 2 years; Phase III proof-of-concept 

awards for up to $5 million each over as much as 4 years. Clearly, the number of 

such awards could be used as a control on the overall program budget. For example, 

in the first year of NIAC2, perhaps a dozen Phase I awards would be made for 

$1.2M, plus administrative costs. Including 4 Phase II awards in the following year 

would push the required yearly budget to approximately $2.2M (plus administrative 

costs). As a strawman, note that if NIAC2 funded 12 Phase I awards, 4 Phase II 

awards, and 1 Phase Ill award in each subsequent year, the budget requirement 

would increase by $1.25M each year until reaching a steady-state value of $8.2M 

in year six and beyond (plus administrative costs). In a strategy like this, the overall program budget is largely dependent on selection of the Phase III awards. If 

NASA saw value in the potential offered by multiple Phase III proposals, additional 

funds could be secured. If funding were tight in a given year, no Phase III awards 

would be made. 

NIAC2 funding decisions should be made within the context of a well-funded 

NASA aeronautics and space systems technology enterprise that is both actively 
29

4 A Constrained Space Exploration Technology Program: A Review of NASA’s Exploration 

Technology Development Program, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2008. 

seeking advanced system concepts and maturing the requisite technological solutions. Large-scale technology development aspects of this enterprise were beyond the 

committee’s charter, and would require considerably more funding than the $10M 

proposed for NIAC2. These larger funding issues are addressed in my response to 

the subcommittee’s next question. 

In addressing the subcommittee’s remaining questions, I am guided by my personal experience in NASA and academia. Although the NRC NIAC committee’s discussions touched on these topics, this committee was not specifically tasked to address these broader subjects. 

In response to the second question posed by the subcommittee, I would like to define the scope of a broadly focused long-term program dedicated to stimulate innovation and develop new concepts and capabilities, and then describe the results our 

nation should expect from such a program.

Three Technology Development Classes and the Need for a Strengthened 

Capability-Based Technology Development Effort within NASA 

In my experience, there are three general classes of technology development programs: mission-focused (near-term), discipline-based (long-term), and capabilitybased (mid-range). A NASA strongly positioned for the future should sponsor a 

blend of these three technology development classes, strategically guided by the results of a continuously engaged advanced concepts program. It is in this way that 

an advanced concepts program can be used to inform an organization’s strategic 

planning process and provide value to its technology investment decisions. The success of such an enterprise will clearly be dependent on the group of program managers and systems engineers making technology readiness assessment and technology investment decisions for the agency. Passionate, hard-charging systems engineers and program managers who remain objectively focused on the long-term development needs of the agency, independent of the agency’s institutional constraints, 

and out of the proverbial technology sandbox will be required. A series of competitively awarded activities spanning near-term, mid-term and long-term aeronautics 

and space systems needs is likely the best means of implementing a successful technology development program. Competitive awards should be made based on an objective assessment of the agency’s strategic need, the proposed technical scope and 

product realism. 

Mission-focused technology programs abound in most current large NASA programs. Consider, for example, NASA’s human spaceflight program. In development 

of the Constellation architecture, priority was given to near-term systems with the 

goal of an early initial operational capability—existing technology with low risk was 

the Constellation mantra. In fact, funding from a wide range of NASA advanced 

technology programs was redirected to enable this capability. However, even with 

its near-term focus and budgetary challenges, the Constellation program required 

and funded a small number of mission-focused technologies to enable qualification 

of the key technologies required for mission success. These mission-focused technology programs include a lunar-return capable heatshield, an autonomous landing 

and hazard avoidance system for lunar landing operations, and lunar in-situ resource utilization.4 Without such technological advances, NASA’s current approach 

to returning humans to the Moon would be dramatically impacted. Similar missionfocused technology investments have allowed NASA’s robotic exploration program to 

pursue advanced science missions like the Mars Science Laboratory and Webb Space 

Telescope. Clearly, these are important investments that require NASA funding. 

However, these mission-focused activities are not the only technology investments 

that an agency that prides itself on innovation and pushing-the-boundary should 

pursue. 

Within NASA, the ARMD Fundamental Aeronautics program is the only present 

program of which I am aware that is pursuing discipline-based technological solutions. Longer term by nature and generally funded at a much lower level, these 

technology advances are often pursued with the promise of enabling dramatic performance improvements in one or more aerospace disciplines, and the potential for 

major system advances across multiple future programs. While ARMD funding is 

largely directed internal to NASA and its aeronautics challenges, examples of possible discipline-based technology investments include laminar flow control technology, high-temperature materials and structures, hypersonic airbreathing propulsion, advanced in-space propulsion, robust navigation and control algorithms, highefficiency solar power systems, radiation protection systems, and inflatable struc-
30

5 Report on the President’s Commission on Implementation of U.S. Space Exploration Policy: 

A Journey to Inspire, Innovate and Discover, June 2004. 6Summary Report on the Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans, September 2009. 7 NASA Innovation and Technology Initiative: Enabling NASA’s Future and Addressing National Needs, Briefing to NRC ASEB by Dr. Laurie Leshin, NASA, October 2009.

tures. In addition, NASA can now offer unique, discipline-based microgravity research opportunities through effective utilization of the International Space Station. 

The United States boasts a tremendously successful robotic Mars program. Continuous orbital observations of the Mars surface have been made for more than a 

decade and six robotic systems have now been placed on the surface of Mars. While 

each of these six landed missions has been an incredible technological accomplishment in itself, these robotic systems have each landed less than 0.6 metric tons 

within landing footprints on the order of hundreds of kilometers. At present, robotic 

exploration systems engineers are struggling with the challenges of increasing landed mass capability to just 1 metric ton (less than half the Earth weight of a 2009 

Ford Explorer) while improving landed accuracy to 10 kilometers for the Mars 

Science Laboratory project. Meanwhile, the planning of subsequent robotic exploration missions under consideration for the 2020 decade may require several metric 

tons in landed mass capability and current plans for human exploration of Mars call 

for landing 40–80 metric ton surface elements within close proximity (tens of meters) of pre-positioned robotic assets. These future mission requirements cannot be 

met with NASA’s present suite of entry, descent and landing technologies and are 

one reason that human Mars exploration is viewed as a ‘‘bridge too far’’ by many 

in the aerospace and public policy communities. However, analysis suggests that 

there are a handful of promising entry, descent and landing capabilities that may 

prove feasible for these larger landed systems, enabling future Mars exploration 

concepts of which today we can only dream. These technologies are termed capabilities because these same general systems may also prove advantageous for Earthreturn missions or missions to other planets—such developments are not specific to 

a single mission. Additional capability-focused technology needs abound in deep 

space exploration, astrophysics, aeronautics, and Earth science. In each case, NASA 

technology investment is critical—for without such an investment, these future missions will simply not occur. 

Strategic assessment of our nation’s future spaceflight technology needs was performed by both the Aldridge Commission 5 in 2004 and the Augustine Commission 6

in 2009. Each commission concluded that successful development of a set of enabling 

technologies (or capabilities) is critical to attainment of human and robotic exploration objectives within reasonable schedule and affordable cost. The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 furthered this sentiment by codifying it into law. Section 405 

of this Act states, ‘‘A robust program of long-term exploration-related research and 

development will be essential for the success and sustainability of any enduring initiative of human and robotic exploration of the solar system.’’ This Act further states 

that this program shall not be tied to specific flight projects. I strongly agree with 

the capability-based technology sentiment expressed by these two Presidential Commissions and the NASA Authorization Act of 2008. 

While mid-term, capability-based technology investments are perhaps the most 

critical for a forward-looking Agency like NASA; within NASA today, this type of 

technology investment is minimal. NASA presently invests approximately $1.35B on 

a range of near-term, mid-range and long-term technologies 7 Approximately twothirds of this investment is directed toward near-term mission-focused technologies 

that are strongly coupled to NASA’s existing programs. This allocation leaves approximately $0.45B (less than 3% of NASA’s total budget) for capability-based technology development and discipline-based fundamental research that is not tied to 

existing program requirements. However, at present, a majority of these remaining 

funds are allocated to the longer-term ARMD Fundamental Aeronautics program, 

leaving little mid-range capability-based technology investment. 

Anticipated Results from a Broadly Focused Long-Term NASA Program to 

Develop Advanced Concepts and their Associated Technologies 

Many positive outcomes are likely from a long-term, broadly focused NASA advanced concepts and technology development program that include mission-focused, 

capability-based and discipline-based components. Chief among these consequences 

is the provision of a more vital and productive aeronautics and space future than 

our country has today. Each year, in the first lecture of my freshman Introduction 

to Aerospace Engineering class, I share with these recent high-school graduates a 

list of accomplishments that I believe our nation’s civil aeronautics and space program is capable of achieving in my lifetime:
31

Ten Anticipated Paradigm-Changing Civil Aeronautics and Space Advances

1) Quantify Causes, Trends and Effects of Long-Term Earth Climate Change

2) Accurately Forecast the Emergence of Major Storms and Natural Disasters

3) Develop and Utilize Efficient Space-Based Energy Sources

4) Prepare an Asteroid Defense

5) Identify Life Elsewhere in our Solar System

6) Ientify Earth-like Worlds Around Other Stars

7) Initiate Interstellar Robotic Exploration

8) Achieve Reliable Commercial Low-Earth Orbit Transportation

9) Achieve Affordable Supersonic Business Travel

10) Achieve Permanent Human Presence Beyond the Cradle of Earth

Advances of this type are more than a single professor’s dream—they are a spark 

to a technology-based economy, an international symbol of our country’s scientific 

and technological leadership, and a component of the remedy to our nation’s scientific and mathematics literacy challenges. I genuinely believe that game-changers 

like these are within our nation’s grasp. Capability-based technology investment, focused leadership and stability of purpose are the only elements holding us back. 

Landing humans on Mars requires an investment in advanced technology, as does 

developing a telescope capable of detecting Earth-size planets around other stars, 

flying a new generation of human-rated launch systems, or identifying life elsewhere in our solar system. Our nation needs to dream big, and large goals, like 

these, are precisely the kind of objectives that our nation has come to expect of 

NASA. It is equally clear that in the absence of sustained, broad-based technology 

investments, the United States will not continue to make significant advances in 

aeronautics, space, and the associated sectors of our society. Investments of this 

scale will not be without cost. I believe that our nation would be well served by investing at least 10% of NASA’s budget in support of the technologies required to 

dramatically advance entirely new aeronautics and space endeavors (in contrast to 

an investment of less than 3% today). 

In this same class, I often ask the students why they are choosing to become aerospace engineers. In general, these 18-year olds are motivated by a strong desire to 

contribute to humanity’s future by solving our nation’s grand technological challenges. They want to work with others (and in organizations) who feel the same 

way. As such, a well managed, broad-based advanced concepts and technology development enterprise can serve as a catalyst to revitalize our nation’s aerospace workforce with the best and brightest of tomorrow. Such an organization can also serve 

to demonstrate that NASA continues to be a driver of scientific innovation, engineering creativity and technological competitiveness for our country and around the 

world. 

NASA technology innovation efforts are also bound to stimulate the university 

and commercial sectors, create new business and increase the number of high-tech 

jobs across our nation. As a small-scale example, NIAC efforts contributed to the 

launch of a new business division within ENSCO and two entirely new businesses 

(Space Elevator: Black Line Ascension and Liftport). 

In response to the third question posed by the subcommittee, I would like to briefly discuss the additional uncertainty and risk associated with developing new concepts and technologies within NASA’s flight projects.

Technology Development within NASA’s Missions Contribute Significant 

Cost and Schedule Risk 

Implementation of NASA space flight missions is fraught with complex systems 

engineering challenges due to the extreme environment in which these systems 

must reliably operate. Completing a spaceflight mission within its established budget and schedule constraints is one of the most difficult undertakings in the engineering field. As such, I have great respect for those within NASA who have succeeded 

in these endeavors. These missions demand a focus on technical excellence across 

the organization, a systems engineering approach to project implementation, technical insight and crisp decision-making from project managers, clear communication 

across the organization, and early risk identification, prioritization, and mitigation. 

In addition, trades between performance, cost, schedule and risk are generally constrained by program-level decisions and public policy decisions made outside the 

project’s control. In my view, adding requirements for technology development to a 

NASA flight project in the implementation. phase is inherently risky and a poor program management practice. 
32

In March 2009, in testimony presented before this subcommittee entitled, NASA 

Projects Need More Disciplined Oversight and Management to Address Key Challenges, a GAO representative described her analysis of thirteen NASA flight projects 

in the implementation phase. In this project phase, systems design is completed, scientific instruments are integrated, and the flight system is fabricated and prepared 

for launch, Prior to entering the implementation phase, it is standard NASA practice to have finalized requirements, concepts and technologies and establish a baseline project plan. Ten of the thirteen NASA projects in the implementation phase 

assessed by the GAO experienced significant cost and/or schedule growth from their 

project baselines. Of the five causes of cost and/or schedule growth cited by the 

GAO, two issues pertain directly to technology development risk: technology immaturity and modifications required to previously considered heritage items. The common symptom of these two causes is a technological readiness considerably below 

that estimated by the project. The GAO report concludes, ‘‘Simply put, projects that 

start with mature technologies experience less cost growth than those that start 

with immature technologies.’’ I fully agree with this statement. 

NASA also knows this lesson. In fact, NASA requires all technologies used in its 

competitive missions to be at a technology readiness level of six (system/subsystem 

model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment) or higher by the beginning of the project implementation phase. In a competitive proposal, failure to 

have such a technology maturation plan is cited as a major weakness. As such, few, 

if any, competed missions begin plementation while still developing technology. 

However, this same approach is not generally applied to NASA’s larger space flight 

programs, which often rely on large technology advancements as part of project implementation due to the significant performance gains that they are attempting to 

achieve. As a result, large, non-competed projects tend to encounter significant cost 

overruns and/or schedule delays as a result of technology risk. Insisting on an adequate formulation phase in which technology risk is firmly retired, before committing project implementation funding, is the most straightforward means for reducing 

the cost and schedule risk of these large NASA missions. 

In response to the fourth question posed by the subcommittee, I would like to 

briefly discuss the time horizons required for the development of advanced concept 

and technology development programs.

Time Horizons on Advanced Concept and Technology Development Programs 

A long-term, broadly focused NASA advanced concepts and technology development enterprise should span multiple timeframes in which the maturation plan for 

a given technology should be coupled to the agency’s strategic planning process 

through ongoing NIAC2 advanced concept studies. Within this enterprise, one can 

envision a blend of technology development timeframes spanning 2–5 years for mission-focused technology (moderate $ investment), 5–15 years for capability-based 

technology (large $ investment), and 15–40 years for discipline-based technology 

(modest $ investment). Competitive awards across these technology classes should 

be made on a 2–3 year cycle depending on the milestones achieved and funding 

availability. Technology project development lifecycles spanning 2–5 years are anticipated. In this scenario, the technology development enterprise should partner 

with NASA’s existing flight programs such that the mission-focused technologies it 

funds benefit from at least a 50% cost contribution from the relevant mission directorate. This strategy should allow for capability-based technologies, which are not 

tied to NASA’s existing missions, to dominate the investment portfolio of the technology development enterprise. This emphasis on capability-based technology is absent in NASA today. A broad range of discipline-based investments should also be 

funded at a lower level. 

Use of NIAC2 as a long-term asset to inform NASA’s strategic planning process 

is a key component of this plan. NIAC2 can look out for advanced concepts beyond 

the current development programs. It can work on the edges where requirements 

are not yet known, focused on what program managers would want if they knew 

that they needed it. However, it is also clear that for this independent organization 

that nurtures technology push to succeed, it must be partnered with a substantive 

NASA enterprise of technology pull, managed at the agency-level and working in 

concert with NASA’s existing mission directorates.

Summary 

There is little capability-based technology development within NASA today and no 

NASA organization responsible for solicitation, evaluation, and maturation of advanced concepts or responsible for subsequent infusion of worthy concepts into 
33

NASA’s strategic planning process. In my view, this is not acceptable for an agency 

whose purpose includes demonstrating this nation’s scientific and technological 

prowess, or one that is trying to Inspire the next generation of engineers and scientists. A technology-poor NASA greatly hampers our aeronautics and space flight 

development programs. We cannot continue to rely on 1970’s-era technology to land 

systems on Mars, particularly if we want to build toward eventual human exploration. We cannot continue to explore the solar system robotically without advanced 

in-space propulsion and atmospheric flight technologies as part of our future mission 

portfolio. We cannot plan a sustainable human exploration program without strong 

technology leverage. Strategic assessment of our nation’s future spaceflight technology needs was performed by both the Aldridge Commission in 2004 and the Augustine Commission in 2009. Each commission concluded that successful development of a set of enabling technologies (or capabilities) was critical to attainment of 

space exploration objectives within a reasonable schedule and affordable cost. The 

NASA Authorization Act of 2008 furthered this sentiment by codifying it into law. 

Based on these inputs, I suggest NASA establish a formal enterprise to continuously 

evaluate, prioritize, and mature these technologies in the relevant environments. 

Within this enterprise, a blend of technology development activities spanning mission-focused technology (2–5 year maturation timeframe, moderate $ investment), 

capability-based technology (5–15 year maturation timeframe, large $ investment), 

and discipline-based technology (15–40 year maturation timeframe, modest $ investment) should be pursued. 

Our nation would be well served by investing at least 10% of NASA’s budget in 

support of the technologies required to dramatically advance entirely new aeronautics and space endeavors (in contrast to an investment of less than 3% today). 

This investment would include a small amount for advanced concepts so difficult to 

achieve that their chance of individual success within a decade is less than 10%, 

yet concepts so innovative that their success could serve as game-changers for this 

vital, national industry. Our nation needs to dream big, and large goals are precisely what our nation has come to expect of NASA. Major breakthroughs are needed to address our society’s energy, health, transportation, and environment challenges. While NASA investments alone will not solve these grand challenges, NASA 

has proven to have a unique ability to attract and motivate many of the country’s 

best young minds into educational programs and careers in engineering and science. 

Although it is not possible to predict which advanced aerospace concepts will 

produce.paradigm-shifting results, it is certainly true that, in the absence of research on such concepts, the United States will not make revolutionary technological advances in aeronautics and space and long-term societal goals in these and 

related areas will remain beyond our reach.

BIOGRAPHY FOR ROBERT D. BRAUN

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Thank you, Dr. Braun. 
34

Dr. Colladay. 

STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND S. COLLADAY, VICE CHAIR OF 

THE COMMITTEE ON RATIONALE AND GOALS OF THE U.S. 

CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM, AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ENGINEERING BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 

Dr. COLLADAY. Thank you, Chairwoman Giffords and members of 

the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before 

you today to address a subject that is very important to the country 

and has been particularly in my crosshairs for the last 3 or 4 years 

in the National Research Council [NRC] and Aeronautics and 

Space Engineering Board. 

Aerospace is one sector where the U.S. remains preeminent, and 

we have in large part NASA to thank for that, but our future leadership depends on continued investment in long-term, advanced 

technology R&D. In our NRC report on America’s Future in Space 

we describe the many reasons why space is important to the country, including the recognition that space generates high-end jobs in 

science, engineering, and math, supplying the workforce for the 

aerospace sector of our economy that remains the envy of the 

world. 

Beyond that it inspires an interest in technical fields of study 

that is and will continue to be of vital importance to our economic 

competitiveness. Sustaining U.S. leadership in space depends on 

having a sufficiently broad and deep technology base that pushes 

the frontiers of our knowledge, leads to innovation and new systems, and challenges conventional wisdom with transformational 

technology. 

When it comes to truly game-changing technical breakthroughs, 

a long-term view is particularly important, and such a perspective 

is almost exclusively the domain of the government. Long-term advanced technology R&D does not happen in industry because the 

return on investment is years away, and it does not happen in academia without sustained, stable government funding. 

With that perspective in mind I would like to make a few observations. To fulfill its broad mandate in civil and commercial space, 

NASA should revitalize its advanced technology development program as a priority mission area. Its technology R&D mission 

should be independent of the major development programs and report to the administrator or some equivalent management structure of our government’s model to give it the stature equal to the 

agency’s other mission areas. In our report we refer to a DARPA 

[Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency]-like organization in 

NASA to convey this spot. It should engage the best science and 

engineering talent in the country wherever it resides, in universities, industry, NASA centers, and other government laboratories. 

It should be relieved of at least the first order of institution requirements to maintain core competencies at the ten NASA centers. In order to ensure that the research can draw on the best 

ideas and talent wherever it should reside. It should serve not just 

NASA but civil space customers including commercial space and 

other government agencies or departments much like its aeronautics program and its predecessor NACA has done for almost 100 

years. 
35

A comprehensive assessment of the current state of the art of advanced space technology would be helpful to ensure that any new 

investment in technology R&D would be building on the most advanced technology base currently available. 

Whatever governance model NASA chooses for managing a technology enterprise, it needs to address technology relevance and 

transition. The ultimate user community determines the products 

of technology R&D remain useful and relevant, and technology 

transition is a process that must be managed with all the stakeholders involved. 

In summary, the country expects NASA to be a leader, pushing 

the frontiers of air and space applications and missions as called 

for in the Space Act. But to do so NASA needs to replenish the underpinning technology that makes it possible. 

That completes my brief summary of my remarks, and I would 

be open, of course, to questions later. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Colladay follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAYMOND S. COLLADAY

Madam Chairwoman and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear 

before you today. My name is Ray Colladay and the personal views I express are 

shaped by my 40 years of experience in aerospace, through positions I have held 

in government, industry, and academia. I chair the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of the National Research Council (NRC) and also served as 

Vice Chair of the Academy funded study on ‘‘AMERICA’S FUTURE IN SPACE: 

ALIGNING THE CIVIL SPACE PROGRAM WITH NATIONAL NEEDS’’. Although 

I have insights into NASA acquired through those and other positions, my views are 

my own and do not represent an official position of the NRC. 

With your permission, I would like to submit my prepared testimony for the 

record and summarize my views for you here this morning. 

In the previously mentioned NRC report on ‘‘America’s Future In Space’’, we observed that space has become ubiquitous and permeates nearly every aspect of our 

daily lives. We concluded that if properly aligned and coordinated, U.S. civil space 

can provide technological, economic, and societal benefits that contribute to solutions to the nation’s most pressing problems. The study detailed seven recommendations for U.S. leadership in space, but among the most actionable of those recommendations—one that we called ‘‘foundational’’ in the sense that it was among 

those that enabled other goals and recommendations to be met—was that NASA 

needs to revitalize its advanced technology development program as a priority mission area in the agency. 

Because of budget pressures and institutional priorities, however, NASA has 

largely abandoned its role in supporting the broad portfolio of civil space applications, and the space technology base has thus been allowed to erode and is now deficient. The former NASA advanced technology development program no longer exists. 

Most of what remained was moved to the Constellation Program and has become 

oriented largely to risk reduction supporting the ongoing internal development program. Elements of that former advanced technology R&D focused on space science 

missions—primarily advanced instrument development—was also moved. Although 

it continues under the science mission directorate, and good work is being done, 

there is no longer the broader mandate to enhance the technology base and explore 

breakthrough technology that could possibly transform future science missions by 

influencing future requirements instead of simply responding to those already established. 

The NRC report observed that future U.S. leadership in space requires a foundation of sustained technology advances that can enable the development of more capable, reliable, and lower-cost spacecraft and launch vehicles to achieve space program goals. A strong advanced technology development foundation is needed also to 

enhance technology readiness of new missions, mitigate their technological risks, 

improve the quality of cost estimates, and thereby contribute to better overall mission cost management. Space research and development efforts can take advantage 

of advances from other fields—and can contribute back to those fields. For example, 

civil space programs can benefit from and contribute to the state of the art in advanced materials, computational design and modeling, batteries and other energy 
36

storage devices, fuel-cell and compact nuclear power systems, fault-tolerant electronics and software, optics, and robotics. This scientific synergy extends the ability 

to accomplish more capable and dramatic missions in space, as well as to contribute 

to broader national interests driving innovation in other areas of terrestrial application. The unique challenges of the space environment make demands on technology 

in ways that often accelerate the development pace and advance understanding of 

the foundations of technologies. The responsibility to provide for this advanced technology base for civil space activities rests with NASA, in partnership with universities, other government agencies, and industry. The ‘‘customers’’ for the products 

of technology are NASA, NOAA, industry, and military space programs in which 

multiple-use technology is applicable. 

To fulfill NASA’s broader mandate, the study concluded that an independent advanced technology development effort is required, much like that accomplished by 

DARPA in the DOD, focused not so much on technology that today’s program managers require, but on what future program managers would wish they could have 

if they knew they needed it, or would want if they knew they could have it. This 

effort should engage the best science and engineering talent in the country wherever 

it resides in universities, industry, NASA centers, or other government laboratories 

independent of pressures to sustain competency at the NASA centers. A DARPAlike organization established within NASA should report to NASA’s Administrator, 

be independent of ongoing NASA development programs, and focus on supporting 

the broad civil space portfolio through the competitive funding of world-class technology and innovation projects at universities, industry, federally-funded research 

and development centers, government research laboratories, and NASA centers. The 

responsibilities of the organization should be similar to those of NASA’s aeronautics 

research in the sense that the research activities should be supportive of the needs 

of the private sector as well as the government—a mission well understood and supported by NASA going back to its predecessor, NACA. 

Establishing an independent organization focused on broadly enhancing the technology base for civil and commercial space does not mean the development programs 

and operational mission areas of NASA do not need their own technology research 

and development resources to mature technology ready for transition and for risk 

reduction. Furthermore, a technology management process is needed that draws the 

interests of all stakeholders to common ground to assure the investment in technology is relevant to the needs of the eventual users and that a plan exists for its 

transition. This process creates a healthy tension between technology push and user 

pull. 

The DARPA-like reference is not to be taken too literally, since what works well 

in the Department of Defense needs to be adapted to the NASA culture. But the 

reason for the reference is to address the need for an advanced technology mission 

to be given priority, be organizationally independent, be authorized to pursue technical excellence and research quality wherever it resides relieved of NASA institutional requirements, and be encouraged to promote and sponsor transformational, 

game-changing innovation that is not necessarily formally tied to existing, well-defined requirements. 

The country expects NASA to be a leader pushing the frontiers of air and space 

applications and missions as called for in the Space Act. But to do so, they need 

to replenish the underpinning technology that makes it possible. I believe it is time 

to make technology research and development an explicit priority as part of the 

agency’s broader mission. 

Thank you. That completes my prepared remarks and I would be pleased to take 

questions you may have.

BIOGRAPHY FOR RAYMOND S. COLLADAY

RAYMOND S. COLLADAY is a retired corporate officer of the Lockheed Martin 

Corporation and the former President of the Lockheed Martin Astronautics company 

in Denver. Before entering the private sector, he held positions of Director of 

DARPA—the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department 

of Defense and was Associate Administrator of NASA where he had senior executive 

responsibility for the agency’s aeronautics and space research and technology development including operations oversight of Ames, Langley, Dryden, and Glenn Research Centers. Dr. Colladay started his aerospace career at NASA Glenn Research 

Center in propulsion R&D before moving to NASA Headquarters where he held a 

number of leadership positions before being appointed Associate Administrator of 

the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology. He has been a member of the Air 

Force Scientific Advisory Board and various Defense Science Board summer studies. 

Currently, he owns an aerospace consulting company, RC Space Enterprises, Inc.; 
37

teaches leadership and ethics for the Colorado School of Mines; and serves on a 

number of boards, steering committees, and commissions. He received his B.S., M.S., 

and Ph.D. degrees in mechanical engineering from Michigan State University and 

attended the Harvard Business School’s Advanced Management Program. He is a 

fellow of the AIAA and of the American Astronautical Society. Dr. Colladay is Chairman of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of the National Academies. He has two daughters and four grandchildren and resides in Golden, Colorado with his wife of 44 years.

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Thank you, Dr. Colladay. 

Mr. Scolese. 

STATEMENT OF MR. CHRISTOPHER SCOLESE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. SCOLESE. Chairwoman Giffords, Ranking Member Olson, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss NASA’s technology development programs. 

NASA has been at the forefront of aeronautics and space research since the early 20th century. The complex research missions 

that NASA is asked to do to explore the unknown serve as stimulus to innovation. As a result, NASA and its predecessor, NACA, 

traditionally balanced our technology activities to meet both the 

needs of our near-term missions and our long-term plans. 

Recent National Academy reviews of NASA innovation and technology development endorsed increased emphasis on innovative 

technologies and approaches to achieving broadly defined NASA 

and national goals. These reports and others suggested that NASA 

should increase emphasis first in disruptive or game-changing technology, and second in maturing technologies for flight. 

In answers to the subcommittee’s question about the timeframe 

for technology investment, NASA believes the timeframe from 

these early technology activities should be long enough to allow for 

revolutionary impact, yet not too long so as to mask clear applicability to NASA or national needs or in the 10 to 20-year timeframe. 

Managing all of the investment areas will require a hybrid of management processes, with strong agency-wide planning and coordination. One size does not fit all. 

Mission directorate investments focused on mission needs will be 

best managed within those directorates. Early-stage innovation, 

disruptive, and strongly-crossed cutting investments are best 

served by an independent management structure still responsive to 

the needs of the mission. 

With regard to the committee’s question on authorization legislation directing greater commitment to robust technology research 

and development initiatives, three examples stand out. In aeronautics we formulated the new environmentally-responsible aviation project to develop technologies related to improving the air 

space system to be more environmentally friendly. Multiple collaborations are underway with other federal agencies and private entities to make use of the space station as a national laboratory. And 

in science the most recent annual competitions for instrument technology development emphasized cross-cutting technologies. 

The subcommittee asked how NASA develops and infused gamechanging technology solutions without a dedicated long-term technology program. NASA does invest in a limited number of game-
38

changing technologies through its innovative partnership program 

and within our mission and engineering organizations. Examples 

include optical communications and large pressurized composite 

structures. NASA routinely coordinates with other federal agencies 

to develop technologies and concepts of mutual interest. 

The NASA aeronautics research portfolio is strongly aligned with 

the National Aeronautics R&D policy and plan and the high-level 

goals of the NRC decadal survey. And as mentioned, the Space Station National Laboratory has been made available to other U.S. 

government agencies, academic institutions, private firms, and nonprofit institutions. 

For example, NASA funded approximately 250 investigations related to ISS [International Space Station] life science research and 

exploration, many of which leveraged additional funding from the 

National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Health, the 

Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy. Our Nation 

has made great progress throughout its history because of the enormously difficult challenges it has embraced. The grand challenge to 

build an intercontinental railway or the Apollo Lunar Program not 

only utilized our best talent but also created new technologies, inspired generations to pursue challenging goals, created new industries, and ultimately improved our country and the world. Similar 

opportunities are in front of us now, and NASA most assuredly can 

contribute. 

Chairwoman Giffords, I would be happy to respond to any questions you or the other members of the subcommittee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Scolese follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER SCOLESE

Chairwoman Giffords and other Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear today to discuss NASA’s technology development programs. 

As a research and development Agency, a balanced portfolio of R&D at NASA serves 

the Nation directly and is a catalyst for innovation as well. My testimony will address how NASA technology is relevant to the Nation and the communities that 

comprise it, and how that might be strengthened. 

In your letter inviting me to testify, you asked that I address a number of specific 

questions related to technology development at NASA. My statement will address 

those questions, as well as provide additional context. 

NASA has been at the forefront of aeronautics research and development since 

the early 20th Century, and space technology since the mid 20th Century. During 

that time, NASA and its predecessor organization, the National Advisory Committee 

for Aeronautics (NACA), balanced near-term missions and long-term research to 

benefit the Nation and the world. Over the past few years, however, NASA has 

prioritized short-term mission needs over long-term research. Much new technology 

in terms of materials, systems, components, and software that benefits our missions 

as well as others is developed through the NASA Mission Directorates, the Innovative Partnerships Program, and the Centers. The NASA mission focus also serves 

technology development by focusing activities on technologies needed to address current and future problems as well as providing the test bed for demonstrating these 

new technologies.

NASA Response to Recent External Reviews

Several recent external reviews have addressed the issues of innovation and technology development at NASA, with a strikingly common set of themes. Although the 

final report is still pending, the Summary Report of the Review of U.S. Human 

Space Flight Plans Committee strongly endorsed increased focus on innovative technologies and approaches to achieving broadly defined NASA and national goals. This 

technology and innovation focus was included in all new program options suggested 

by the Committee in its Summary Report. The recently released National Research 

Council (NRC) report, ‘‘America’s Future in Space,’’ specifically calls for NASA to 
39

create a capability to develop game changing approaches to National challenges. 

This recommendation is similar to one made by the Aldridge commission in 2004. 

Finally, the recent NRC report ‘‘Fostering Visions for the Future: A Review of the 

NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts’’ is also highly relevant. It suggests re-creating an early stage innovation engine like the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts (NIAC). These NRC reports especially emphasize the need for some organizational independence from the mission-focused parts of the agency in order to provide 

stability to the investment and a more risk-tolerant environment to foster innovation. They recommend a broad reach, across disciplines and organizations, to ensure 

the best ideas are brought forth and supported. All suggest that failure to invest 

in technology and innovation puts the Agency’s future viability at great risk. 

In recognition of the need to rebalance near-term mission and far-term technology 

and innovation investments, the Agency chartered an internal study team to investigate the barriers to NASA innovation and make suggestions for approaches to address these barriers. The study team had participation from across NASA Mission 

Directorates, Centers, and Offices. 

The barriers to innovation identified by our internal study team agree with many 

of the findings of the external committee reports with respect to both the overall 

shortfall and the focus. NASA’s investments in innovation and technology have been 

focused on the near term, especially in the space-related disciplines. In addition, the 

Agency could do a better job in many areas of engaging partners from across academia, industry and other Government agencies in its technology development efforts. This would allow both the most innovative ideas to be brought forward, and 

the broadest application of NASA-supported capabilities to address broader National 

needs in areas of high priority to the Nation. 

Also recognized in multiple studies is the importance of capabilities for taking 

technology from the lab bench to demonstration for flight use. This is an area which 

has traditionally been left to flight projects which typically cannot assume the risk 

and/or cost for technologies that are not enabling the mission, and requires a diversity of approaches to ensure that the needs of the ultimate user community are fully 

addressed. Driven by the specifics of the technology and the target use, successful 

approaches can be as simple as environmental and life testing or as complex as 

demonstration packages on host missions or dedicated flight demonstrations. 

NASA is planning to use an integrated portfolio management approach, balancing 

needs from across the Agency, balancing near-term and long-term investments, and 

ensuring that resources are appropriately leveraged across the various mission 

areas to secure the maximum impact for our investments. NASA will examine reward structures and culture to encourage more risk-taking in innovation activities. 

Although our ‘‘failure is not an option’’ ethic is essential in the spaceflight arena 

where lives are at stake, innovation demands pushing the envelope, occasionally 

failing, and learning from those failures to drive game-changing solutions to NASA’s 

grand challenges.

NASA Missions Require Technology to Address Extreme Conditions

NASA’s missions require technology beyond state-of-the-art, where hardware and 

systems meet the extreme conditions of space and high-performance aeronautics. 

The environments in which humans, spacecraft, and equipment must work pose 

unique challenges, prompting development of unique capabilities. 

Science missions face a variety of extreme environments, with over 90 spacecraft 

operating or planned to operate throughout the solar system and beyond. For example, the Juno spacecraft being prepared for launch in 2011 must survive a five-year 

journey to Jupiter and operate for about a year on solar power in an area where 

there is 25 times less sunlight than at Earth and at temperatures that may approach ¥275 degrees Fahrenheit, requiring some of the most hardy and efficient 

solar arrays ever built. The James Webb Space Telescope, a 6.5-meter (∼21 feet) 

space telescope, will need to operate at about 35 degrees above absolute zero or 

¥396 degrees Fahrenheit. Another example is Solar Probe Plus, which is planned 

to launch no later than 2018 and will operate just 3.7 million miles above the Sun’s 

‘‘surface,’’ some seven times closer than any spacecraft has come before. At its closest approach, Solar Probe Plus’ shield must withstand temperatures up to 2,600 degrees Fahrenheit, while allowing the payload of science instruments to operate at 

or near room temperature. 

While more protected inside the Earth’s magnetic field, NASA and its partners 

must enable humans to live and conduct experiments in space on the International 

Space Station—a 500 metric ton, football-field sized, permanently crewed, full-service space platform operating at an altitude of 350 kilometers in a 51.6 degree inclination to the Earth’s equator. Research for flight beyond low-Earth orbit must en-
40

able long-term human health in micro-gravity, under varying radiation conditions, 

with remote medical assistance. Lastly, although operating on Earth, aeronautics 

research must make air vehicle concepts, such as vertical lift and supersonic flight 

practical for commercial use, and enable significant increases in air transportation 

capacity while still protecting the environment, ensuring safety, dramatically improving efficiency, and revolutionizing the flow of air traffic.

Relevance of Mission Technology to other Sectors

NASA technology development over the last decade has by and large focused on 

the needs of the missions. This situation raised the importance of infusion into 

NASA missions of technology developed jointly in partnerships with industry, academia, other Federal agencies, and other external entities. Interestingly, the advanced nature of NASA technology, combined with the emphasis on partnering, 

served to increase the likelihood of additional relevance to other market sectors and 

communities. 

As an example, the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) partners with the Small 

Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program to develop key technologies for the 

Mars Science Laboratory (MSL). SMD worked with Microwave Power Technology of 

Campbell, California, to develop a small-format Carbon Nanotube Field Emission 

cathode (CNTFE) X-ray tube for the Chemistry & Mineralogy instrument on MSL. 

While a tungsten cathode was ultimately baselined for the flight tube, the form, fit 

and function of the flight tube was derived from this SBIR project. 

The Innovative Partnerships Program works through its offices at all ten field 

centers to facilitate the transfer of Agency-developed technologies for commercial application and other public benefits. Licensing, together with a wide portfolio of innovative partnering mechanisms, results in commercial products that contribute to the 

development of services and technologies in health and medicine, transportation, 

public safety, consumer goods, agriculture, environmental resources, computer technology, manufacturing, and other key industrial sectors. Each year, NASA documents 40-50 of the best current examples of how mission technology has yielded 

public benefit in the annual Spinoff publication.

Game-Changing or Paradigm Shifting Solutions

Due to the near-term program focus of NASA’s current technology programs, the 

likelihood of developing and infusing mission ‘‘game-changing’’ technology is reduced. Still, with clear challenges on the demand-side, significant emphasis on 

partnering, and continuing programs with universities, such paradigm-shifting solutions do nonetheless occur, often with additional applicability outside of NASA. 

NASA’s Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) is developing very highperformance lithium ion battery cells that significantly exceed current state-of-theart, and are highly reliable, self-contained Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) regenerative fuel cells. Current automotive fuel cells are not regenerative and consume oxygen from the atmosphere plus hydrogen from onboard storage tanks to 

generate electricity. The PEM regenerative cell uses electricity to convert water into 

hydrogen and oxygen stored in tanks that can later be reconverted back into electricity. In space applications, such advances in energy storage systems would be 

useful to human explorers on a terrestrial surface where there is a decreased ability 

to create solar energy. This technology also could be useful to farms and businesses 

that need large kilowatt power generated during off-peak hours on the grid or from 

other sources. 

The NASA partnership with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(DARPA), industry, universities, the Internet Research Task Force and several 

international space agencies has created the new technology of ‘‘Delay Tolerant Networking’’ (DTN), which enables the extension of the Earth’s Internet to sustain communications over interplanetary distances—for example to and from the Moon and 

Mars. This technology has been spun-off to enable many new terrestrial applications 

where the Internet can be extended into highly stressed communications environments, such as remote villages, battery-powered sensor webs and undersea communications. Military applications of DTN are substantial, allowing the dissemination 

of critical battlefield situational awareness information into areas where communications networks are sparse and subject to a high degree of disruption. 

NASA, in partnership with the Air Force Research Lab and Boeing, successfully 

completed flight experiments of the X–48B Blended Wing Body (BWB) advanced aircraft at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center. The BWB is a hybrid configuration combining the best attributes of a conventional ‘‘tube-and-wing’’ aircraft with 

a flying wing. It has the potential to meet expected future Next Generation Air 
41

Transportation System requirements for low noise, low emissions, and high efficiency. It is the first time a dynamically scaled BWB was flown. The experiments 

demonstrated the basic flying qualities of the X–48B and the effectiveness of the onboard flight control system. NASA is continuing to research the BWB concept along 

with other unique configurations in order to enable future vehicles that profoundly 

improve the efficiency and capabilities of air transportation. 

Other examples include optical communications, in-space propulsion, and tools 

and techniques such as modeling and simulation for Earth science, or shell buckling 

test facility and analysis for significantly reduced weight and cost of next-generation 

launch vehicles. A program similar to the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts 

(MIAC) would be valuable in identifying other game changing technologies.

Technology Innovation and Leveraging

The NASA Innovation Partnerships Program (IPP) continues to pioneer the use 

of non-traditional approaches such as the Centennial Challenges Program which 

uses incentive prizes to spark innovation and drive technology to meet the Agency’s 

high-performance technology challenges. A key result of the Centennial Challenges 

competitions is the demonstration of dramatic efficiencies in the research and development process when compared with typical industry practices. 

The Lunar Lander Challenge requires that teams build and fly a reusable rocketpowered vehicle that can mimic a robotic flight to and from the surface of the moon, 

but in an Earth-based demonstration. Teams must design, build and test these vehicles without any government support or funding. The return on investment with an 

incentive prize can be enormous, and this contest has yielded working prototypes 

from multiple sources. Two teams have successfully flown vehicles and qualified for 

prizes and others are planning to fly later this month. Additional NASA partnerships and commercial ventures have resulted from this incentive prize. 

Another example is the Regolith Excavation Challenge which recently took place 

at Moffett Field in California. The goal was to use either a teleoperated or autonomous device to excavate at least 150 kilograms of simulated lunar regolith within 

thirty minutes. Nineteen teams competed with working robots, and three teams met 

the minimum requirements and claimed prize money, with the winning team from 

Worcester Polytechnic Institute excavating over 500 kilograms. The Regolith Excavation Challenge is important because future lunar astronauts may ‘‘live off the 

land’’ by excavating lunar regolith and extracting useful materials from it, such as 

oxygen and even recently discovered water molecules that seem to be bound within 

lunar topsoil. The competing teams advanced the technology necessary for this kind 

of operation without a lot of investment from NASA. 

Additionally, the NASA IPP Partnership Seed Fund enhances the Agency’s ability 

to meet mission technology goals by providing seed funding to overcome technical 

barriers with cost-shared, joint-development partnerships between non-NASA partners, NASA Programs and Projects and NASA Centers. Seed Fund projects have 

highly leveraged NASA’s investment and resulted in many important technologies 

including: two different lunar tire designs from partnerships with Michelin and 

Goodyear; a prototype inflatable lunar habitat that was field tested in Antarctica 

in partnership with the National Science Foundation and ILC Dover; and testing 

of alternative fuels for aircraft engines in partnership with Pratt & Whitney and 

the Air Force Research Laboratory.

Coordination and Collaboration with Partners

NASA and its partners leverage mutual interest in many technologies across the 

missions. For example, ESMD has a research portfolio related to its Exploration 

Technology Development Program and Human Research Program that will benefit 

future space explorers as well as other organizations on Earth. NASA is funding approximately 250 investigations related to ISS research and exploration that include 

approximately 80 active flight investigations. Investigators in the life sciences do 

not depend solely on NASA for the totality of their research funding. Most NASA 

funded investigators receive funding from other agencies as well, including the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Health, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy for related research efforts. In fact, NASA 

often works directly with these agencies through working groups and Space Act 

Agreements. The ESMD has nearly 100 agreements in the form of Memoranda of 

Agreement and Understanding with other Federal agencies and international partners. The synergy between these Federal agencies is clear and coordinated. 

In FY 2008, about half of SMD’s investment in technology programs was in mission-specific technology developments tied to NASA flight missions. The remainder 
42

was for Principal Investigator-led research investigations, suborbital research programs (which are often used to test new technologies and instruments in suborbital 

context before they are manifested on space-borne missions), and a dedicated Earth 

science technology program to enable the highest priority missions called for in the 

National Research Council Earth Science Decadal Survey. These latter investments 

supported 21 instrument incubation projects that are broadly aimed at addressing 

science measurement objectives put forward in the Earth Science Decadal Survey. 

These new projects include a carbon dioxide (CO2) laser sounder for the Active Sensing of CO2 Emission over Nights, Days, and Seasons (ASENDS) mission (a Tier 2 

mission in the decadal survey), a multi-parameter atmospheric profiling radar for 

the Aerosol/Cloud/Ecocsystems (ACE) mission (a Tier 2 mission) and a laser ranging 

frequency stabilization subsystem for the follow-on Gravity Recovery and Climate 

Experiment (GRACE–II) mission (a Tier 3 mission). These Earth Science measurements will enable us to better understand how the Earth’s climate, water cycle, carbon cycle, and living beings interact and how they impact society. 

NASA also works with industry partners who can adapt these technologies to 

serve broader societal needs. Perhaps the world’s most famous telescope, the Hubble 

Space Telescope has given us more than close-up views of our galaxy; it has served 

as a technological engine for various industries. Technologies developed for Hubble 

have enabled surgeons to perform micro-invasive arthroscopic surgery with increased precision, made breast biopsies less invasive and more accurate using imaging technology, and led to optimized semiconductor manufacturing through precision 

optics and advanced scheduling software. 

As NASA transitions the ISS from the assembly phase to the full utilization 

phase, the ISS will be operated as a U.S. National Laboratory and thus made available to other U.S. government agencies, academic institutions, private firms and 

non-profit organizations. At that stage, the research benefits will extend beyond 

NASA and begin accruing in areas related to U.S. national needs in such areas as 

improvement in human health and energy systems research. 

Improvement in human health is the mission of the National Institute of Health 

(NIH). The NIH entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with NASA to use 

the ISS for research. In Spring 2009, NTH issued a three-year rolling announcement 

for research grants in areas including: (I) cancer; (2) heart, lung and blood disorders; 

(3) aging; (4) arthritis and musculoskeletal and skin diseases; (5) biomedical imaging and bioengineering; (6) child health and human development; and, (7) neurological disorders and stroke. Research is scheduled to begin by the end of 2010. 

In preparation for full utilization phase of the Space Station, NASA has entered 

into agreements with private firms such as Astrogenetix, Inc. as pathfinders for the 

future. Based on basic research funded by NASA under prior grants, the company 

is now pursing vaccine development under microgravity conditions. A vaccine target 

for salmonella-induced food poisoning was discovered in 2009, and the company is 

seeking investigational new drug status from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Follow-on experiments are underway on a variety of bacterial pathogens, including Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureas (MRSA), which is responsible 

for, almost 20,000 human deaths per year. 

The NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) has a research 

portfolio, predominately focused on long-term foundational research, which is both 

comprehensive and coordinated in order to make substantial improvements to the 

future air transportation system. There is strong alignment of NASA’s aeronautics 

research portfolio with the National Aeronautics Research and Development Policy 

and Plan and the high level goals of the National Research Council’s Decadal Survey on Civil Aeronautics (2006), which identify short and long-term strategic aeronautics research and technology goals for our Nation. A good example is the development of new vehicle concepts that are much more efficient and exhibit dramatic 

reductions of emissions and noise impacts. NASA fundamental research has paved 

the way for concepts such as hybrid wing body vehicles that are quite different from 

the ‘‘tube and wing’’ aircraft that are familiar today. Research includes novel propulsion systems and support for the creation of new alternative fuels that show promise 

for even more improved environmentally friendly performance. 

Similar to the other Mission Directorates, ARMD utilizes a variety of mechanisms 

to engage academia and industry, including industry working groups and technical 

interchange meetings at the program and project level, Space Act Agreements for 

cooperative partnerships with industry, and the NASA Research Announcement 

(NRA) process that provides full and open competition for the best and most promising research ideas. Cooperative partnerships with industry consortia result in significant leveraging of resources for all partners and can provide opportunities to test 

the value of component-technology advances in full system-level contexts. All research results, whether generated by NASA internally or by its partners through 
43

the NRA, are openly disseminated through archival publications and conference proceedings as well as NASA publications to benefit the broad U.S. aeronautics community while ensuring the dissemination policy is consistent with National security 

and foreign policy guidelines. 

NASA aeronautics research is conducted in a highly collaborative environment 

among Federal agencies. The National Aeronautics Research and Development Policy and Plan provides the strategic framework that facilitates coordination among 

the Federal agencies. NASA builds upon this framework to coordinate with other 

Agencies when appropriate. For example, to facilitate the transition of advanced 

ideas and technologies into the aircraft fleet, NASA is partnering with the Federal 

Aviation Administration’s Continuous Low Emissions, Energy and Noise (CLEEN) 

program to guide efforts to mature technologies that have already shown promise 

to the point where they can be adopted by the current and future aircraft fleet. Additionally, NASA and the U.S. Air Force have established an Executive Research 

Council that meets at least twice a year to ensure close coordination and collaboration. Another example of a significant partnership effort involving NASA that spans 

multiple government and commercial organizations is the Commercial Aviation 

Safety Team, which was recently honored with the prestigious Collier Trophy for reducing fatal air transport accidents by 83 percent in a decade.

Response to NASA Authorization Act Direction Related to Technology Development

With regard to NASA’s response to the provisions in authorization legislation directing greater commitment to robust technology research and development initiatives in aeronautics, exploration, and space and Earth sciences, several examples 

stand out. 

NASA has responded to authorization language pertaining to further investment 

in the development of technologies related to environmentally friendly aircraft by 

formulating the new Environmentally Responsible Aviation Project under the new 

Integrated Systems Research Program in order to build on recent developments in 

the existing research programs. This new effort will include further technology advancement and research in conjunction with academic and commercial partners. 

Work is also ongoing to ensure that new vehicles are accurately modeled in air traffic management simulations, but further research can improve the fidelity of these 

simulations to facilitate the development of new procedures, processes and techniques for managing air traffic. 

While NASA-sponsored investigations on the Space Station are currently focused 

largely on enabling future long-duration human space exploration missions, Congress designated the U.S. portion of the Space Station as a National Laboratory 

making its facilities available to other federal agencies and private entities. These 

collaborations are well underway. 

In addition to non-mission focused technology activities previously mentioned, 

NASA’s Science program continues to emphasize the role of cross-cutting technologies in the annual competitions for its major technology development programs 

such as the Planetary Instrument Definition and Development Program and the 

Earth Science Instrument Incubator Program. We have already conducted a review 

to determine the highest-priority, cross-cutting technologies, and we will use those 

priorities in making future selection decisions for technologies. Key cross-cutting 

technologies of interest to science include sensors (e.g., Light Detection and Ranging 

LIDARs, long-life lasers, in situ sensors and tools), information systems (e.g., data 

processing, large-scale numerical simulation/modeling, and data management, mining and visualization tools), platforms (e.g., photovoltaic and radioisotope power systems, chemical and electrical propulsion, radiation-hardened computer processors, 

low power/low mass application-specific integrated circuits), suborbital technologies 

(including sounding rockets, balloons, and unmanned aircraft systems), large lightweight deployable structures (especially telescopes and antennas), and integrated 

modeling techniques (e.g., structural, optical, thermal, and instrument models that 

share the same databases).

Conclusion

The National Academy of Sciences issued a warning in its report Rising Above the 

Gathering Storm: ‘‘The United States faces an enormous challenge because of the 

disparity it faces in labor costs. Science and technology provide the opportunity to 

overcome that disparity by creating scientists and engineers with the ability to create entire new industries—much as has been done in the past.’’ The Academy recommended increasing America’s talent pool by vastly improving K–12 mathematics 
44

and science education; strengthening the Nation’s commitment to long-term basic 

research; developing top students, scientists, and engineers; and, ensuring that the 

United States is the premier nation in the world for innovation. 

Most assuredly, NASA can contribute. As the Agency pursues demanding missions 

in Earth science and climate research, human and robotic exploration, astronomy 

and astrophysics, solar physics, and aeronautics, NASA must answer several fundamental questions: Is there water on Mars? Can humans live for extended periods 

in space, and if so can they live on the resources they find? What can we do to inform choices on mitigating and adapting to global change? Are there other solar systems like ours in the universe? As noted earlier, the missions created to answer 

those questions utilize specialized hardware that must endure extreme environmental conditions and demand functionality beyond that required for Earth-based 

applications. 

The NASA mission focus and ability to develop technology from infancy to application provides an extraordinary forcing function for innovation. The Agency’s technology challenges are multidimensional, requiring multidisciplinary solutions. 

Shared with the academic community, these challenges help prepare graduate students by enabling them to work on real-world challenges early in their careers. 

NASA technology lends itself to practical collaboration across government, academia, and industry. In addition, technology development linked to exciting NASA 

missions can provide a low risk avenue to encourage K–12 students. Finally, most 

NASA projects require large-scale system engineering. Addressing challenges with 

these characteristics has a powerful galvanizing effect on educational institutions 

and students, and thus on the aerospace industry, other industries, and on NASA. 

Our Nation has made great progress throughout its history because of the enormously difficult challenges it has encountered. The grand challenge to build an 

intercontinental railway, or to land a man on the Moon and return him safely to 

the Earth, not only utilized our best talent, but also created new technologies, inspired generations to pursue challenging goals, created new industries, and ultimately improved our country and the world. Similar opportunities are in front of 

us now. 

Chairwoman Giffords, I would be happy to respond to any questions you or the 

other Members of the Subcommittee may have.

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Thank you. At this point we are going to 

start our first round of questions, and the Chair recognizes herself 

for 5 minutes. 

I would like to start with Mr. Scolese. You have heard testimony 

from the other panelists about some—the recommendations of why 

this is important and the suggestions that this really matters, and 

it needs to be reinstituted. We have heard about the importance of 

advanced technology development at NASA, but could you speak 

more specifically about the attributes of such a program? How 

would NASA structure a short-term, a mid-term, and a long-range 

term program in terms of the needs of the agency and its various 

mission directorates? 

And also, should we expect to see any changes in NASA’s technology development programs in the fiscal year 2011 budget? 

PROGRAM ATTRIBUTES

Mr. SCOLESE. Certainly. In terms of the short-term technologies 

and even the mid-term technologies we have our programs largely 

aligned with our missions. So they tend to stay within the mission 

directorates, and those are moving along fairly well. 

As an example, in the science mission directorate we invest 

about 10 percent of their budget in technology development. That 

is where we go off and look at the instruments that we may need 

in the future or entry descent and landing as Dr. Braun mentioned 

earlier for going to Mars with different payloads. So for those, as 

I mentioned in my testimony, we would expect those to stay within 

the mission directorates. 
45

The longer-term technologies, typically we would like to look at 

things that are cross-cutting, that could affect more than one mission area; aeronautics, science, or human spaceflight programs. 

Those don’t tend to fit well within a mission directorate, and we 

would think that if we went off to do those, we would take a step 

back and look at a more coordinated process across our directorates. Whether that would be as Dr. Colladay mentioned an entity that reported to the administrator or it would be put into some 

other organization, I couldn’t say at this time. 

And to your last question or last part of the question, earlier this 

year we recognized and we recognized before that our investments 

in technology have changed. They have changed their focus to a 

more near-term focus as opposed to the longer-term focus for a variety of reasons. So we asked a team to go off and look at what we 

could do. 

So, yes, I will, you will—can expect to see some changes in how 

NASA does technology in the future. 

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. The next question I have is something 

that is based on what our recent new administrator said to the 

general public, and he said that the President tasked him to make 

NASA inspire young people again, and in that same vein NRC’s report on the NIAC basically went on to talk about that role of 

NASA’s importance for inspiring the public with a spirit of discovery and exploration. 

So I guess I would like to start with Dr. Braun. If you could 

elaborate on your committee’s work in terms of what you regard as 

inspirational, educational, the contributions that NIAC has made 

and then turning to Mr. Scolese, I would like to hear some of the 

elements in this technology program that we could pull that in, and 

of course, from Dr. Colladay as well. 

PUBLIC RELATIONS/STUDENT RELATIONS

Mr. BRAUN. Okay. In addition to the work that was funded directly by NIAC with the external innovators, NIAC did have a student fellows program and also was very visible in a public outreach 

campaign. So to address your question directly I think our committee felt that NIAC did an excellent job of actually earning positive public support for NASA through its actions and of inspiring 

students actually around the country to be a little more creative 

and to think outside the box. So that was certainly true. 

In—if I could add one other point, in my discussions with students on campus, you know, that occurs most days, you know, 

when I am not here in Washington, DC, students are really interested in the future much farther beyond say the next 5 or 10 years 

in general. You know, they are people that are about to enter the 

workforce, and they are going to be in the workforce for 20 to 40 

years, and so visionary, far-reaching technology programs, innovation and creativity are things that pull them into engineering and 

science in general. Thank you. 

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Mr. Scolese. 

Mr. SCOLESE. Well, I would agree with all of that. Engineers and 

scientists want to think about the future, and they want to work 

on things for the future. So our missions automatically inspire people to want to go off and do that. 
46

But specifically some things that we are doing today to help work 

that is we have a suborbital program with sounding rockets and 

balloons as an example. It is not strictly the technology part, but 

it gives students and graduate students, undergraduate students 

an opportunity to develop and experiment, test it in a real flighttype environment where there isn’t the overwhelming pressure to 

succeed as you would have with a mission. So we find those opportunities and in any technology program we would do, we want to 

engage, and in fact, any technology program we do today we do engage universities as well as industry, but in particular the universities to get the graduate students and then undergraduate students engaged in these activities. And in some cases even high 

school students. 

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Dr. Colladay. 

Mr. COLLADAY. NASA has a mission that in itself excites people, 

and so in many respects you have one of the easiest jobs I can 

imagine to generate the kind of enthusiasm that will lead people 

into engineering careers and science careers. 

There is two things that—and it starts very early. There is two—

at a young age. There is two things that seem to be in our genetic 

wiring. Kids love dinosaurs, and they love space, and NASA can 

really capture the interest in space because they have real interesting problems to solve. And in many respects defining those problems and then translating them into technical solutions is what engineering students and scientists like to wrestle with. 

So I think the mission is there to generate that kind of excitement. 

Chairwoman GIFFORDS. Thank you, Dr. Colladay. 

The Chair is going to recognize Mr. Olson. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I have a question 

for Dr. Braun and Dr. Colladay. 

Your report provides good insight into the demise of NIAC, but 

given its unique roll and relatively small cost why was NASA so 

indifferent about NIAC’s fortunes? Why was it allowed to close? 

Where were its advocates, and why did they fail? 

COLLAPSE OF NIAC 

Mr. BRAUN. Well, I can only give you my opinion on that, and 

I am happy to do so. I, of course, wasn’t in NASA at the time. What 

happened with the NIAC is that it was envisioned originally as a 

cross-cutting program outside the mission directorates that was 

seeking advanced technology and infusing them into NASA’s missions. 

With the dissolution of the aerospace technology enterprise at 

NASA, the former Code R in 2004, NIAC got moved into the exploration systems mission directorate, and shortly after that with the 

budget crunch if you, you know, to use my words, with the budget 

crunch to get the Constellation program going and getting humans 

back to the moon, a pretty strong effort was made throughout the 

agency to squeeze down and remove many of the technology development programs. Not just the NIAC. Nobody—I am fairly certain 

that nobody within NASA went directly after the little $4 million 

NIAC Program, but in sweeping out a lot of these larger technology 

programs, NIAC was also removed in 2007. 
47

Mr. OLSON. Dr. Colladay. 

Mr. COLLADAY. Well, I would agree with that observation. I 

would also say that protecting the resources for really innovative, 

far-term, advanced technology requires a champion. It requires a 

person that has enough stature at the table in the budget battles 

that come every year to defend that investment, because at the end 

of the day it is a good-faith investment in the future. And if that 

advocate, that champion for advanced technology isn’t at the table, 

it is pretty hard in budget crunch time with scarce resources as 

NASA has faced over the recent years to defend a program, even 

though it is only $4 million. It is—every little bit is important. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you for those answers, and I have a question 

for you, Mr. Scolese. In your statement you highlight a number of 

technology development activities ongoing across the agency’s mission directorate, but I notice there were no mention of Ares, Orion, 

or Constellation. And for the record could you describe two or three 

technology development activities associated with our future 

manned spaceflight program? 

MANNED SPACEFLIGHT

Mr. SCOLESE. Certainly. There is actually a number of activities 

that are in what we term our Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, which is where the Constellation Program is with Orion and 

Ares and the ground systems that support that. Some of the farreaching technologies that we are looking at there that can help 

not only human spaceflight but others, one is a composite crew 

module, and that may sound a little different, but most everything 

that we have manufactured for human spaceflight has been made 

out of metallics; aluminum or steel of one type or another. And 

there is certain benefits if we could go off and use structures that 

are made out of essentially plastics. 

However, we have been using them on the science missions for 

many years because they give us certain benefits that allow us to 

make those missions much better, but we haven’t applied them 

broadly to large structures because we haven’t been able to find 

any theory that tells us how to build them. 

So we decided that we needed to go off and understand that technology and develop that technology and chose to build a crew module very similar to Orion out of a composite structure. We worked 

that with all of our NASA centers basically because our science 

centers have lots of experience with composites. Our Langley Research Center has worked on composite structures for aircraft elements, and Marshall Spaceflight Center has worked on composites 

for rocket parts. And you can go around to all of our various centers that have analytical techniques, but we needed to be able to 

go off and build it. 

So we went off and worked with industry and academia to build 

it, test it. It has a pressurized system, and we are in the process 

now of testing it. The good news is is we are developing a theory. 

Our tests are now going to see how well we did with that theory. 

The good news is so far with the initial tests that we have done, 

theory and application are turning out to match very closely, so 

that is very good. The applications are probably not for the crew 

module, probably not for Orion, but downstream if we went to send 
48

people to Mars or the moon or libration points, wherever it may be, 

will allow us to make structures that are more efficient, perhaps 

lighter, and better understood. 

It has commercial applications. Already the aircraft industry is 

looking at what we are doing and talking about large fuselage as 

opposed to just segments of the fuselage or the wings. So it has 

proven to have a very—it is a very good technology. 

Another area to follow on with what Dr. Braun said, is going to 

Mars. Ultimately we want to send humans to Mars, and as Dr. 

Braun said, all of our technology is based on the 1970s when we 

went off and did Viking. The Mars Science Lab is the largest thing 

we are going to land on Mars, and we are struggling with the fundamental physics of being able to get that done. 

So what we have done partnering with all of our mission directorates is we have instrumented that spacecraft so that we can get 

some really good data finally on the atmospheric profile and what 

actually happens as we are descending through that—the Martian 

atmosphere. 

In addition, if you look at MSL, it is about the same size as the 

Orion capsule. So we are also going to use that in helping to improve the design of the Orion capsule as well. 

So those are just two examples of what we are doing in or associated with the Constellation program. 

Mr. OLSON. Thanks for that answer. I mean, those are pretty impressive examples of what we are doing with that technology. 

And finally I would just like to close, one question for all of you. 

What percentage of the NASA budget should be devoted to nonmission-oriented technology development in your opinion? Humble 

opinions? 

NON-MISSION BUDGET

Mr. COLLADAY. Somehow I knew that question would come. I 

have said in a number of different forums that I thought an advanced high-tech agency or any organization with a mission like 

NASA should fence or protect resources at the level of about 10 

percent of the total budget for really advanced, innovative technology development. 

Now, the fuzziness comes in how much of that is really nearterm, mid-term, and far-term, because technology development 

needs to be mission specific in the mission directorates as well. But 

I would say a good starting point in answering that question would 

be 10 percent of the budget, at least building to that, and that includes aeronautics, too. I mean, I would put the space technology 

and aeronautics together at 10 percent. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Dr. Colladay. Dr. Braun. 

Mr. BRAUN. Yeah. Well, I would—I agree completely with Dr. 

Colladay’s assessment. In my written testimony I suggested that at 

least 10 percent of NASA’s budget should support technologies required to dramatically advance entirely new aeronautics and space 

endeavors. And so the way I view this question is that is 10 percent above and beyond mission-focused technologies. NASA obviously needs to be doing mission-focused technology development 

work. The examples that Mr. Scolese gave are excellent examples 

of that, and that work needs to continue. 
49

But in addition to that work, which could be jointly funded by 

mission directorates and a cross-cutting technology enterprise, in 

addition to that work something like 10 percent of the agency’s 

budget devoted to new endeavors in aeronautics and space is about 

right to an agency whose goal is to push the frontier and to be looking at the boundaries. Thank you. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you for that answer, and Mr. Scolese, if you 

feel comfortable answering the question, we would love to hear it. 

Mr. SCOLESE. Well, you know there are certain questions that I 

have to kind of dance around a little. This is one of them. Clearly 

it is hard to disagree with what was said. A research organization 

like NASA is—does need to invest, and we do, and we have to determine those priorities in conjunction with you and the Administration. 

What I can say, though, on the very positive side is that in our 

aeronautics area most of that budget is research and development. 

You can see that sort of with that figure that was shown earlier. 

In our other areas we have to go off and look, and the pressures 

of the mission often do cause some issues, but that is exactly why 

we went off earlier this year to start looking at what we can do, 

how can we organize, and how can we, you know, find a better way 

to go off and advance technologies. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much for your answers, and Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. [Presiding] Thank you, Ranking Member Olson, 

and Congresswoman Fudge, would you have some questions? 

Ms. FUDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you for 

being here today. I just have a couple of questions. 

The first one for any of the panel members. NASA’s funding for 

research and technology for spacecraft systems for future missions 

has been significantly reduced over more than a decade. A summary report of the review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee stated that investment in a well-designed and adequatelyfunded space technology program is critical to enable progress in 

exploration. NASA’s science mission also requires significant advancements in spacecraft technology to enable exciting new missions. 

What increases in funding in critical areas such as power, propulsion, communication, and other technologies is needed to assure 

that these technologies are developed to support future missions? 

And in conjunction with that, how will the research and technology 

funding be managed and dispersed? 

Mr. SCOLESE. Well, I guess I got voted. All of those things are 

critical for both, as you said, both the human spaceflight and the 

robotics missions. It is hard to say how much and when. I can tell 

you that we are looking at all of those areas today and perhaps 

give some examples in—of what we are doing, and that should 

probably lead to areas of further investigation. 

Clearly in communications we are very limited. We are limited 

in terrestrial communications because the bandwidth is being used 

for other services. So we are moving towards optical communications, and in space that is pretty easy. You don’t have to worry 

about an atmosphere, you don’t have to worry about clouds. So we 

are making an investment in optical communications that will 
50

allow us to get more data back in a way that will be more stimulating to the public for sure but also get more for the scientific community. 

Today at Mars we have a fleet of satellites in orbit around Mars 

and on the surface, and we cannot bring back all the data because 

we just do not have enough bandwidth with the RF, with the radio 

frequency links that we have. So this is an area that we are spending a lot of time in. 

Propulsion. If we are ever going to get humans to Mars, if we are 

ever going to get our probes to the far reaches of the solar system 

efficiently, we need better propulsion techniques. Some of those we 

are working on today. Ion propulsion is an area that we are now 

relying on. We use it from the early days in our communications 

satellites, but we are now relying on it for space missions. The 

Dawn Mission that is going to the asteroid belt is entirely dependent on ion propulsion, and that is a very efficient propulsion that 

is being developed with industry but at principally the Glenn Research Center and Jet Propulsion Laboratory. And it has now been 

adapted by some universities to go off and do missions. 

So those are just a couple of examples, but you are exactly right. 

We can go further in each of those areas to go off and find newer 

technologies and developments of technologies that will enable 

those missions. I could add life support, having humans live—today 

we have humans that can spend 6 months on orbit at a time, but 

they are close to earth. If things really get bad for whatever reason, 

they can come home. When we start sending humans beyond, certainly beyond low-Earth orbit but even beyond the moon, we need 

to have systems that will keep humans alive and be reliable for 

hundreds of days to years. And those are technologies that we are 

all looking at and can do more in. 

Ms. FUDGE. Thank you. My last question, NASA’s in-house research and technology expertise has been instrumental in both assuring advancement of critical technologies and supporting their 

demonstration and utilization in NASA missions. These capabilities 

at NASA centers are essential for effectively managing NASA’s 

technology portfolio. 

It is also needed for developing and effectively leading partnerships with industry and universities. What is and can be done further to ensure that these in-house civil service capability is maintained and strengthened, particularly in light of reduced center 

civil service complement over the past several years and an aging 

workforce with a high percentage of retirement-eligible personnel? 

Mr. SCOLESE. Well, certainly having exciting programs, be they 

technology or missions, is something that is critical. We believe we 

have the legislative authorities and the contracting tools to allow 

us to partner appropriately with industry and some examples you 

have again on your desk of areas in aeronautics where we have 

some very strong relationships with companies and other organizations. On those we can generally speak only in terms of the general 

benefit because those companies want to maintain their competitive advantage. 

In the space arena it is a little more obvious because there aren’t 

as many organizations that are involved there. But I think we have 

some good partnerships there. I think if—further if you look at our 
51

Innovative Partnership Program, what we call IPP, where we do a 

lot of work with the small business community, we have a lot of 

examples where we have gone off and actually transitioned the 

technology to other areas. 

One example is an endoscope that is used in heart surgery now 

is a spin-off of a NASA activity that we went off and worked ultimately with a small business. So those are just some examples of 

some areas that we can do. 

Ms. FUDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. This is for anyone on 

the panel here. What is the situation where we are doing research, 

the Federal Government is paying for this research, and who ends 

up with the patents for new discoveries? 

PATENTS

Mr. SCOLESE. Well, unfortunately, the answer is it depends. 

The—for things where there is clearly—the government is the lead 

on it, the government owns the patent on that or the—and of 

course, the credit for the patent goes to the individual that developed the technology. And depending on the agreements that are 

made, if it is done in conjunction with a university or if it is in conjunction with an industry, whoever those agreements are worked 

to and where the majority of the activity comes determines who the 

patent owner will ultimately be. 

BENEFIT TO TAXPAYER

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you think that the taxpayers are being 

well served and represented in those negotiations as to who owns—

if we finance research, I mean, the taxpayers finance research. 

Should we not demand that we have the financial benefit, meaning 

the patent benefit from financing the research? 

Mr. SCOLESE. Well, yes, sir, and that is what I was trying to get 

at. In some of our cases where we have agreements it is only for 

them to use our test facilities, not to go off where we are putting 

in resources, and they may reimburse us for those test facilities. 

So that is why I was getting at. It depends if the government 

funds it, we own the patent. There is no question about that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Good. That is what I needed to know. 

Mr. SCOLESE. Yeah. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It seems to me that would be a source of revenue that we could utilize when we talk about expanding the budget for people. Maybe we could make sure that we are receiving the 

benefits from that research. 

Is there any research being done on the space elevator concept? 

SPACE ELEVATOR

Mr. SCOLESE. I would have to answer that one for the record, sir. 

I don’t know at this time. I know that there is a prize—or not a 

prize. There is a technology activity that would allow that to be 

proposed to, but I do not know what was proposed this year. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Are we—I would imagine we just had 

a launch and a hit on the moon to find out if there is ice that is—
52

we could utilize. Do we have research going on to find out if there 

is ice on the moon, how we can use that ice to further the space 

program? 

FINDING WATER

Mr. SCOLESE. Well, yes, sir, we do, because while we are not as 

sure about the moon, we are very sure about Mars. We have 

touched ice on Mars, and we know there is a lot of water there. 

So we do have activities that are related to what we call in-situ resource utilization, where we can take advantage of the resources 

that are available to us and then go off and use them. And in the 

case of water in particular, if we have fuel cells, we separate the 

water into hydrogen and oxygen and then ultimately combine it to 

use it either as a rocket fuel or to use it as a fuel to generate electricity. 

BEAMING ENERGY

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. The—is there much being done on 

beaming energy, or is that something that we did 10 years ago or 

15 years ago and not doing it anymore? 

Mr. SCOLESE. We actually have an experiment that we are looking at for doing on the space station to do that. I don’t know what 

the current manifest is, but low-power beaming to get some idea 

of what we can do there and what the practical limitations are. So 

it has not gone away. It is— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Good. 

Mr. SCOLESE. —still with us. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It would seem to me that that is one thing 

that people just—I have talked about this about 10 years ago I remember, and it just seemed to me to have a lot of potential but a 

lot of—most other people don’t think it has much potential, but if 

we can beam energy, can we—that could actually enable us to put 

heavier objects into space because we don’t have to carry its own, 

their own fuel. 

Mr. SCOLESE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The—let me see. Got to mention something 

about children and dinosaurs and space. I have—my wife and I 

were blessed with triplets 5-1/2 years ago, one boy and two girls. 

I just wanted to reconfirm that they are excited about dinosaurs 

and space. So with that said thank you very much. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Congressman, thank you. Congressman Miller. 

Edwards. Excuse me. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Donna Edwards from Maryland. Thank you for 

your testimony. I actually wanted to follow up on a couple of 

things. 

One is I do think it is—and I appreciate your testimony to—as 

to the difficulty balancing long and near-term goals, and I guess 

there is stuff in-between and investments and strategies in those 

because although I think a lot of the public really thinks about 

NASA as sort of the one place in government where people really 

are thinking well out into the future, that because of budget and 

other kinds of pressures and performance pressures that we perhaps are not looking as much into the future as we need to be, and 
53

that means in terms of investment in research and advanced technologies. 

And so I wanted to actually follow up from Mr. Rohrabacher’s 

question regarding intellectual property and intellectual property 

rights, because I think that, again, is a tough balance to strike. If 

you are trying to, you know, if you want to put out, you know, requests for really innovative research, then, you know, a scientist 

and researcher or an investigator wants to have some skin in the 

game, and part of that skin is potentially that, you know, great 

patent down the line. 

And so I wonder if you could comment for me about how we can 

strike that balance of intellectual property rights and sharing so 

that we get, you know, the greatest bang for the buck and benefit 

as taxpayers but also incentivize some of our researchers to do that 

cutting-edge, risk-taking investigative work that we know should 

continue into the future. 

And then I am also very interested to know on that question 

there are technologies and research going on in commercial 

spaceflight, in military space, and it seems that there are lots of 

walls and barriers in terms of sharing that innovative, intellectual 

property that is developed in each one of these spheres that I think 

gets in the way. You know, for example, if a technology is developed on the military space side, then we have, you know, some 

competitors around the world who are actually using some of those 

technologies and sharing them and commercializing them, but right 

here in this country those same technologies can’t be shared on our 

civilian and commercial side. And that is a real downer when it 

comes to making investments in research. 

And so I wonder if you can give me some thoughts about that 

and what we might think about in the Congress to try to mitigate 

that. 

SHARING BETWEEN MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL

DEVELOPERS

Mr. SCOLESE. Certainly. If I can take the last question first, the 

barriers for us to work with the—with our colleagues in other agencies in the government are not so great. We typically can do that 

quite well, and oftentimes when you are doing a research or a technology activity, it is not always known in the agencies which ones 

are there. So we have to have much stronger dialogues and that 

is something that I think we are all working on much more diligently now than we have in the past. 

But even in the past we had, for instance, a technology, I forget 

the exact name because it keeps on changing, but a technology 

working group where our NASA chief engineer and before that our 

chief technologist would work with their DARPA colleagues and 

other colleagues from the Department of Defense or Department of 

Energy to go off and find areas of common interest. 

ITAR 

Further on that second part, the area where we really find that 

we hurt ourselves and we could really use help is with the ITAR, 

the International Traffic in and Arms Regulations, because that 
54

really limits our ability to take U.S. developed capabilities and 

bring those overseas where it could bring benefit to our companies. 

And even in the government, it is very difficult in government-togovernment interactions for us to take technologies that we have 

and make them available so that it is a U.S.-developed technology 

and a U.S.-managed technology. 

Instead, we develop it, someone sees it, and they will go off and 

invest their resources to go off and make the profit. 

Ms. EDWARDS. I have an example of that right in my district. 

Mr. SCOLESE. I am sure you do. 

Ms. EDWARDS. And that is why I asked. 

Mr. SCOLESE. Yes. Well, we both kind of worked at the same 

place at one point, so I figured that was probably the answer. On 

the earlier question about the intellectual property rights, it would 

probably be better if I took that one for the record and gave you 

all of the types of contracts that we have. Some have greater liberties for the inventor to go off and have property rights for those 

even if the government is funding it. 

But it depends a lot on what that agreement says. So we have 

space act agreements and contracts and grants, and they are all a 

little bit different. So why don’t I take for the record to get you a 

summary of what those are and what the intellectual property 

rights are associated with those various ones. 

Ms. EDWARDS. I would appreciate that. Thank you. 

Mr. SCOLESE. Okay. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. The Chair is going to ask a few questions or make 

a few comments really. I think most of my questions have been answered. 

This visual aid that was produced is absolutely impressive. I 

would say that you could also put a hospital room with a bed and 

a patient on this very page, and there would probably be greater 

than 18 improvements that have happened because of NASA, from 

the early diagnosis of breast cancer because of the innovations in 

the Hubble Telescope, to the miniaturizations of instruments that 

you have mentioned, to many, many things that have happened 

over the last 2 decades as a direct result of the innovations at 

NASA that we did not know were going to occur. 

And that is one of the great benefits of research and development, one of the great benefits of science is that science has to prepare to discover, and then after it discovers, it discovers further 

what it did not know was there. I think Einstein said that research 

is something he does when he doesn’t know what he is doing, and 

so I think we need to really emphasize the fact that research and 

development, whether it is the discovery of the Van Allen radiation 

fields, whether it is our continuing effort to improve materials so 

that we can further discover whether it be the neutron scattering 

and the elastic properties of radiation in material is absolutely critical to the advancement of science. 

And NASA has been at the forefront of that, and I might take 

just one liberty to say that I think it is the absolute soul of America, both in its intellectual capabilities and equity and also in 

America’s future, and I appreciate each and every one of you being 

here and coming from the Alabama Fifth District and Marshall 

Space Flight Center, you can see that I am a little bit prejudiced. 
55

But I think Ranking Member Olson has another question. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One more question for 

Dr. Colladay, and Dr. Colladay, you used to run NASA’s Office of 

Aeronautics and Space Technology. NASA separated those research 

fields a few years ago with aeronautics placed in its own mission 

directorate and space technology placed into the exploration systems mission directorate. 

Was that a good idea, or should the two be reunited into a single 

office? And as a follow up, would reuniting them strengthen technology developed by NASA, or is money the issue, not organization? 

And finally, would reuniting them suffice rather than creating a 

DARPA-like organization? I know it is a lot. 

NASA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Mr. COLLADAY. Well, there were good and valid reasons for having the two combined when you get to the far-term, long-term base 

research, because when you are working computational fluid dynamics and advanced materials and the basic navigation and controls and sort of the basic disciplinary research and it is a long way 

from application, the people doing the research didn’t always know 

they were spending an aeronautics R&D dollar or a space technology dollar. They were working on important and exciting engineering and science problems. 

And so there was—there were certain number of advantages of 

having them together. They had to be defended separately. It gave 

enough critical mass that that person at the table that was—that 

I had spoke of as the champion defending advanced R&D had a big 

enough portfolio to be at the table. 

But that is not the only way to do it. It—there are a lot of different governance models. Whatever governance model you look at, 

certain things have to be attended to, and I mention it in my remarks. One is when it is separate organizationally and put together as it was 20 years ago, aeronautics and space technology, 

you really have to put a lot of effort into making sure that what 

is being done is relevant. 

You get criticism that, oh, they are just off playing in the sandbox. That is unfair a lot of times, but it points to the need and the 

organization that is responsible for advanced technology to make 

sure they are working with the user community, they are working 

with the ultimate developers to make sure that what they are 

working on has a transition path, it is relevant, and then a management approach or a governance model is in place to manage the 

transition of these great things that come out of the research that 

have to later be developed. 

One thing in being a director of DARPA that I learned, it is, you 

know, we quit doing the research when we had proof of concept. If 

we proved that something was feasible, that was enough. We were 

off doing something else. A lot of work, a lot of hard work and 

money goes into taking those ideas and putting them to practice. 

And so it is not enough to develop the technology, prove feasibility, create this environment where it is all right to take risks. 

You do all those things, and that is important, but there is—the 

ultimate user and the developer has to run with the early technology development along and parallel to manage the transition. 
56

I don’t know that on my watch in NASA that we always did a 

good enough job on those two points; relevancy, making sure that 

the ultimate user was involved, and that we managed the transition from what was code R into application. And the application 

sometimes wasn’t with NASA at all. It was with industry. 

Mr. OLSON. Thank you very much for that answer, Dr. Colladay. 

I see I have run out of my time. I yield back my time. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GRIFFITH. Thank you, Ranking Member Olson. I am reminded before we close that the concept for high-speed CT Scanning was available to us 30 and 40 years ago. The coefficient of absorption and expansion I can remember working out problems with 

my slide rule and taking me a great deal of time, and it depended 

on our development outside of the concept of high-speed computing 

that allowed us to develop the CT Scan or even though we had the 

concept proven many, many decades before, so I think as pure 

R&D, pure science begins to develop. We serendipitously discover 

things over here that apply over here, and we can’t always predict 

that. 

Before we bring the hearing to a close, I want to thank each and 

every one of you for being here, and thank the witnesses and also 

our participants. 

The record will remain open for 2 weeks for additional statements from the members and for answers to any follow-up questions the subcommittee may ask of the witnesses. The witnesses 

are excused, and the hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(57)

Appendix: 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
58

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. Robert D. Braun, Co-Chair of the Committee To Review the Nasa 

Institute for Advanced Concepts, Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, National Research Council

Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords

Disclosure: Since the October 22 hearing, I have had significant interaction with 

NASA personnel on this subject. However, the responses provided here to your questions reflect the deliberations of the National Academy Committee to Review the 

NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts and my own individual thoughts. I have indicated my personal views as such in the following responses.

Q1. In your prepared statement, you indicate that your panel felt that the former 

NIAC’s complete focus on revolutionary concepts was too long term. As a result, 

your committee recommended that the new NIAC2 program should adopt a 

standard of ‘‘technically innovative’’ rather than ‘‘revolutionary’’, as was formerly 

used. By changing the standard to no longer stress revolutionary capabilities, 

would NASA run the risk of missing out on game-changing technologies?

A1. By definition, visionary advanced concepts will not be near-term. However, in 

our committee discussions, it was felt that NIAC’s complete focus on revolutionary 

concepts (as directed in its NASA SOW) was too long-term, creating a cultural mismatch between the NIAC products and its mission-focused sponsors and causing infusion difficulties for the MIAC innovators. As such, the committee recommended 

that the key selection requirement for NIAC2 proposal opportunities be that the 

concept is scientifically and/or technically innovative and has the potential to provide major benefit to a future NASA mission of 10 years and beyond. While 10 years 

and beyond includes concepts that could be 40 years or farther in the future and 

revolutionary concepts are certainly scientifically and/or technically innovative, the 

committee felt that these modifications in focus would likely result in NIAC2 efforts 

with a higher probability of infusion into NASA’s strategic planning process. In the 

committee’s opinion, these changes would not constrain NASA from receiving and 

selecting revolutionary concepts (and their associated game-changing technologies) 

through future NIAC2 solicitations. Rather, such a change would also allow consideration of more near-term concepts, still a decade or more away from fruition, that 

have a higher likelihood of infusion into future NASA missions. The NIAC2 selection process would have to be designed to provide the appropriate balance between 

advanced concepts one decade or multiple decades into the future. 

In addition, while NIAC’s efforts were (and NIAC2’s efforts should remain) on advanced concepts, other elements of a broadly focused NASA technology development 

program could specifically target proving the feasibility of game-changing technologies. Such demonstrations are likely to cost significantly more than a NIAC2 

Phase I or Phase II concept study and require additional schedule. The proper suite 

of game-changing technology investments should result from integration of advanced 

systems analysis work (e.g., NIAC2 studies) overlaid upon a detailed set of technology roadmapping activities, developed by the knowledgeable technical community 

(both NASA and external technologists).

Q2. In your view, what would be an appropriate suite of NASA investments to address near-term, mid-term, and long-term technology needs?

A2. In my experience, there are three general classes of technology development 

programs: mission-focused (near-term), discipline-based (long-term), and capabilitybased (mid-range). NASA presently refers to these classes as mission-focused, earlystage and game-changing innovation, and crosscutting capabilities, respectively. 

While mid-term, capability-based technology investments are perhaps the most critical for a forward-looking Agency like NASA, within NASA today, this type of technology investment is minimal. In my view, this is not acceptable for an agency 

whose purpose includes demonstrating this nation’s scientific and technological 

prowess, or one that is trying to inspire the next generation of engineers and scientists. It is from these capability-based technology developments (crosscutting capabilities) that NASA’s next generation of missions will sprout. Today, a technologypoor NASA greatly hampers our aeronautics and space flight development programs. The lack of a crosscutting capability technology maturation program is perhaps the greatest deficiency in NASA’s current approach to technology development. 

I believe that NASA would be well served through a blend of technology development activities including the mission-focused technology presently performed in the 

NASA mission directorates (2–5 year maturation timeframe, moderate $ invest-
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ment), capability-based technology (5–15 year maturation timeframe, large $ investment), and discipline-based technology (15–40 year maturation timeframe, modest 

$ investment). On top of the mission-focused technologies currently being pursued 

within the NASA mission directorates, a broadly-focused NASA technology development program should include a large number of small $ value ‘‘seed-fund’’ awards 

for long-term visionary concepts and early stage innovation, a smaller number of 

moderate $ value awards to mature a competitively selected set of game-changing 

technologies, and a few high $ value awards to mature selected crosscutting technologies to flight readiness status. I believe our nation would be well served by investing at least 10% of NASA’s budget in support of the technologies required to 

dramatically advance entirely new aeronautics and space endeavors (in contrast to 

an investment of less than 3% today). This investment would include a small 

amount for advanced concepts so difficult to achieve that their chance of individual 

success within a decade is less than 10%, yet concepts so innovative that their success could serve as game-changers for this vital, national industry.

Q3. Your report indicates that the committee considered the model of each NASA Directorate having its own NIAC-like entity.

a. What are the pros and cons of having such ‘‘sub-NIAC’’ units within each mission directorate?

b. Why did your panel ultimately reject that model?

A3. The committee determined that two aspects that led to NIAC’s termination 

were that (1) its focus was on far-term mission concepts that were not closely 

aligned with the lunar exploration architecture, and that (2) NIAC had limited success in infusing advanced concepts into NASA’s strategic plans. Recognizing this relevance problem, the committee considered whether or not each NASA directorate 

should have its own NIAC-like entity. One potential advantage of such an arrangement is that each ‘‘sub-NIAC’’ could focus specifically on the advanced system and 

mission needs of its associated directorate, which likely would help each such organization to be more relevant to the directorate and would facilitate the infusion of 

results obtained. However, there are several disadvantages to such an arrangement, 

including (1) the management challenge of multiple mission directorate independent 

solicitations, (2) the need for proposers to be able to place their advanced concept 

within a specific mission directorate (whereas, many of the advanced concepts pursued by NIAC were at the intersection of multiple mission directorates), and (3) the 

integration of these mission-directorate advanced concepts with an eventual crosscutting capabilities demonstration program. In such a scenario, each mission directorate may also need to carry the funds and development programs to mature selected advanced concepts to flight readiness. As such, in the opinion of the committee, the efficiencies resulting from having a single organization solicit and manage advanced concepts for NASA as a whole were significantly compelling.

Q4. You said in your prepared statement that the lack of a NASA interface to receive 

the hand-off of promising projects was a persistent MIAC challenge. Consequently, your panel recommended improvement in how advanced concepts are 

infused into future systems.

a. Can you elaborate on what reestablishing an aeronautics and space systems 

technology development enterprise would entail from an organizational, programmatic, and cultural perspective?

b. What would the relationship between the proposed NIAC2 and this new enterprise?

c. If the enterprise is not established, could you still have a NIAC2 entity? Where 

would it reside organizationally?

A4. In the committee’s opinion, the lack of a NASA interface to receive the handoff of promising projects was a persistent NIAC challenge. To improve the manner 

in which advanced concepts are infused into its future systems and to build a culture that continuously strives to advance technology, the committee recommended 

that NASA consider reestablishing an aeronautics and space systems technology development enterprise. Such an organization would serve to preserve and increase 

the leadership role of the United States in aeronautical and space systems technology. Successfully reestablishing such an enterprise would have significant organizational, programmatic and cultural ramifications for NASA. As such, NASA’s considerations for such an enterprise should include implications for the agency’s strategic plan, effective organizational approaches, resource distributions, field center 

foci, and mission selection process. There are multiple organizational models that 
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NASA could choose to employ. To allow for successful, sustained implementation of 

a broadly focused NASA technology development program, such an enterprise 

should report to the Office of the Administrator, be outside the existing mission directorates, and be chartered to address NASA-wide mission and technology needs. 

In my opinion, the cultural challenges facing such an enterprise, within NASA, 

are significant, as NASA has not been organized for the objective of technology development and innovation its development for some time. The reestablishment of 

creativity and innovation across the existing NASA workforce, and in the Agency’s 

hiring practices, must be championed by this organization. Strong interactions with 

the academic community, national laboratories and industry research and development centers must be reestablished. Most importantly, this new NASA enterprise 

must be given permission to occasionally fail. A program focused on game-changing 

technology innovation should not be expected to succeed in each investment. However, on the whole, and over time, dramatic advances in aerospace technology that 

enable entirely new NASA missions and potentially, solutions to a wide variety of 

our society’s grand technological challenges should be both expected and measured. 

Programmatically, this new enterprise must invest broadly across a wide range of 

innovations, across near-term, mid-range and long-term technology and advanced 

concepts efforts. This new enterprise must engage the top science and engineering 

talent in our nation, teaming NASA, industry and academic organizations, in coordination with other government agencies, independent of the workforce constraints at 

the NASA Centers. For long-term success, the budget stability of this enterprise 

must be assured. 

If a broadly focused aeronautics and space systems technology development enterprise were farmed within NASA, the committee recommends that NIAC2 be an active element of its program, providing a broad range of advanced concept studies 

from both NASA and external innovators. The committee further believes that establishment of a NIAC2 activity is required whether or not a broadly focused aeronautics and space systems technology development enterprise is formed at NASA. 

If this new technology and innovation enterprise were not formed, the committee 

recommends that NIAC2 should report directly to the Office of the Administrator, 

be outside mission directorates, and be chartered to address NASA-wide mission 

and technology needs. However, the committee would like to point out that without 

establishment of a broadly focused aeronautics and space systems technology development enterprise, NIAC2 infusion objectives will likely continue to be a challenge.

Q5. Your panel’s report stated that DARPA was the most frequently referenced model 

of success for advanced concept development.

a. What other models did your panel discuss?

b. In your opinion, in establishing a follow-on entity such as NIAC2, is it more 

important for NASA to have the right structure or the right priority?

A5. The committee spent a significant amount of time investigating and discussing 

DARPA and its model for advanced concept development and technology maturation. We also investigated and discussed previous and current NASA approaches including NASA’s former Office of Aerospace Technology and former Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology, NASA roadmapping, Decadal Survey process and Vision mission studies conducted within or for the NASA Science Mission Directorate, 

and the Exploration Technology Development Program within the NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. NASA Langley’s Aerospace Systems Concepts 

and Analysis organization was discussed as were related approaches to concept development at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. Long-term research and innovation models at AFOSR, ARPA-E and NSF were 

also discussed as were advanced concept development approaches utilized by universities and industry. 

In my opinion, in establishing a NIAC2, it is most important for NASA to give 

this advanced concepts organization sufficient priority, Agency-level visibility, freedom to establish the right technical content, and a stable funding level. The right 

program structure is an important asset for efficiency, but is not an absolute necessity.

Q6. Your panel’s report indicates that potential awardees are concerned about investigator retention of rights data and associated intellectual property. How might 

NASA address their concern while ensuring the agency’s investment is also protected?

A6. The committee heard from some MAC awardees, particularly small businesses 

that were uncomfortable with what they understood to be their rights to intellectual 

property developed under a NIAC award. While not uniform in these expressions, 
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some NIAC awardees expressed uncertainties about the status of intellectual property for proposals submitted to NIAC and the status of intellectual property rights 

for work developed under NIAC support. As such, the committee recommended that 

NIAC2 develop and document a policy allowing awardees rights to data and associated intellectual property to address these issues before soliciting any proposals. As 

an organization with a focus on the development of new concepts and technologies, 

NIAC was and NIAC2 would be in an ideal position to foster an innovative program 

of intellectual property management and train its innovators in how to manage intellectual property and their rights in compliance with the law and government policy. The committee also recommended that NASA, through NIAC2, allow awardees 

to retain rights to data and associated intellectual property developed under NIAC2 

awards. The committee believes that in these matters the financial risk to the government is small, while the potential commercial benefit to our nation is large.
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Dr. Raymond S. Colladay, Vice Chair of the Committee on Rationale 

and Goals of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Aeronautics and Space Engineering 

Board, National Research Council

Questions submitted by Chairwoman Gabrielle Giffords

Q1. Your committee’s report states that ‘‘Space activities provide economic opportunities, stimulate innovation and support services that prove the quality of life. US. 

economic competitiveness is directly affected by our ability to perform in this sector and the many sectors enabled and supported by space activities. ‘‘The report 

also says that ‘‘The United States is now living on the innovation funded in the 

past’’.

Q1a. Is your report suggesting that NASA is no longer in a position of enabling significant technological innovation?

A1,1a. Nothing that a commitment to fund advanced technology research and development would not solve. NASA has the people with the skills and a clear charter 

in the Space Act to conduct technology research and development that can lead to 

the kind of innovation envisioned in the report. It takes a commitment to invest the 

resources to sustain such research over the long haul—something that has been 

missing lately.

Q1b. In today’s environment where near term challenges command our attention and 

resources, how do we convince the rest of the Congress that the ‘‘seed corn’’ of 

technology development is a critical top priority?

A1,1b. The best rationale for investment in technology research and development is 

based on making the case for the importance of maintaining our technological competitiveness. NASA’s mission and US prestige that comes with the space program 

rests on technological excellence—excellence which cannot be sustained without upfront investment in technology. Unfortunately, the case is easier to make now, because the consequences of not making the necessary investments are evident today 

in cost overruns; less capable missions, fewer good technical options to meet requirements, and a lack of true game-changing opportunities.

Q2. Your report discusses the broad customer base that would benefit from the 

multi-use technologies including NASA, NOAA, industry, and military space 

programs. Some multi-use technologies might be of more interest and pertinence 

to certain users.

Q2a. How would the selection process ensure balance among the users?

A2,2a. If NASA is truly conducting and sponsoring technology research and development at the cutting edge boundaries of science and engineering for space applications, balance among ultimate users of the resulting technology is best addressed 

later in the process during transition to application. DOD and/or industry will adapt 

whatever technological breakthroughs appear to be in their best interests and they 

should pay for it when it reaches that stage. NASA can be a catalyst for innovation 

by investing in very advanced concepts where balance is based on competition of the 

best ideas from the most talented people with the greatest potential pay-off.

Q2b. How would a DARPA-like entity balance technologies that address long-term 

user needs and in supporting highly visionary technology concepts for which 

uses are not yet known or defined?

A2,2b. If a DARPA-like entity is created to address technology research and development, then its mission should be weighted primarily towards the highly visionary 

technology concepts. That is the part of the R&D spectrum that is most in need of 

emphasis in NASA right now.

Q2c. Who should provide the funding for such multi-use technology efforts?

A2,2c. NASA should. It is explicit in their charter and the ultimate user is, as you 

say, not yet defined. It will always require orders-of-magnitude more money to transition products of technology research and development to application, which is 

when others (e.g. DOD or industry) should expect to carry the funding load.

Q3. Your report notes that one of the goals of the civil space program should be ‘‘To 

provide technological, economic, and societal benefits that contribute to the nation’s most pressing problems.’’
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Q3a. How would the DARPA-like entity discussed in your report address broader, 

national needs?

A3,3a. NASA should stay closely bound to their space and aeronautics mission. It 

is a very stressing mission that pushes the boundaries of engineering disciplines 

that benefit broader national needs when considering potential applications beyond 

aviation and space: As such, space and aeronautics is an engine for technological 

innovation, but the ultimate application of the technology may be in fields far from 

aerospace. DARPA has been most effective when it stays focused on its military mission, but the technology breakthroughs it has enabled have led to advances far beyond just the military. Clearly, however, NASA should partner and collaborate with 

their research counterparts in DOD, industry, and other government agencies and 

departments in a culture of cooperation in technology R&D.

Q3b. How would technology areas be prioritized, especially if the goal of the DARPAlike organization is to ‘‘support preeminent civil, national security. . ., and 

commercial space programs’’ as your committee recommends?

A3,3b. Priorities should be established through a competition of ideas—the best research, by the best people, with the best ideas. There will always be limited funding, 

so the competition should be intense.

Q4. DARPA is often characterized as having a risk -taking culture, one that conducts 

long-term, high-risk, high payoff research, is tolerant of failure, and is open to 

learning. Is it realistic to expect such risk taking to succeed in NASA in light 

of fiscal constraints that emphasize near term mission success?

A4. You raise one the strongest arguments in my opinion to separate an organization within NASA to undertake this very advanced, game-changing technology research and development. As a whole, NASA must and should be risk averse, particularly with human space flight. Mission success is paramount in human space 

flight and also in many of the grand space science mission. if the charter for innovative technology research and development is dispersed throughout the agency in all 

the mission areas, it can be very confusing to the culture and the workforce to say 

safety and mission success is paramount and at the same time parse the message 

that there needs to be a high tolerance for risk and failure is acceptable if reaching 

for an aggressive goal. it seems to me that the leadership can encourage a DARPAlike organization with NASA to take that high-risk path if it is understood that rest 

of the organization, particularly human space flight, stays focused on safety and 

mission success where failure cannot be an option. Advanced technology research 

and development is precisely where risk should be taken and in so doing, the risk 

is wrung out before the technology is applied to an operational mission.

Q5. You note in your prepared statement that DARPA-like organization adapted for 

NASA should be ‘‘relieved of NASA institutional requirements’’. Could you elaborate on what requirements you would target?

A5. If technology R&D is to promote a competition of the best ideas by the best people wherever they reside—NASA Centers, universities, other government labs, or industry—then resources should not be preferred to the particular NASA Centers in 

need of institutional support such as building a centers core competency. It may 

happen that it accomplishes exactly that, but it should be because the people or the 

ideas from that center are best in class.

Q6. Regarding your panel’s recommendation that NASA revitalize its advanced technology development program by establishing a DARPA-like organization within 

NASA, can you clarify what would happen to the advanced aeronautics research 

currently conducted in ARMD under your approach?

A6. There are many organizational models and most have been tried in one form 

or another. Aeronautics could be part of it, like it once was, and there are arguments both for and against. Either way, aeronautics in NASA is a vitally important 

mission area and needs to be supported either as part of a DARPA-like organization 

whose charter is broadly ‘‘aerospace’’, or separate.

Æ