## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re R.G. , 2012 IL App (1st) 120193

Appellate Court Caption In r e R

. G. and A.M., Minors (The People of the State of I llinois
, Petitioner-Appellee
, v. Raquel M. and Roy rel G., RespondentsAppellants).

District & N o. First District, F ourth Division Docke t Nos. 1-12-0193, 1-12- 0207 cons.

Rule 23 Order

filed Rule 23 Order withdrawn Opinion filed J une 11, 2012

J uly 12, 2012 September 6, 2012

Held (Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Responden t mother’s children wer e both neg lected due to an injurious environment a

nd abused due to a substantial risk of phy sical injury

.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of C ook C o unty , No. 10-J A-175-76; the Hon. Candac e J. Fabri, Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Abishi C. Cunningham, J r., Public Def ender
, of Chicag o (R o bert C. Drizi n , As sistant Public Def ender
, of counsel), and L aw Offic es of Gilbert C. Schumm, of Elk Grove V illage , for a ppellants.

Anita M. Alvare z, State’s Attorney
, of Chicag o (Na ncy Ki s i ck i and J ennife r Streete r, of c ounsel), for the People.

Robert F. Har

ris, Public Guar dian, of Chicag o (Ka ss A. Plain and Christopher Will iams, of counse l), guardia n ad litem

.

Panel PRES I DI NG J USTI CE LAVI

N delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J u s t i ces Fitzge rald Smit h and Sterba concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 A.M. was born on J une 7, 2005, and his sister R.G. was born September 18, 2008. They had the same mother, but diffe re n t fathe rs. When A.M. was just three months of ag e, he suffe red a brain injury

as a r esult of being sever ely shaken by his f ather
, who was arr ested, char g ed, convicted and sentenc ed to 10 y ear s in prison for his conduct. The Depa rtment of Children and Family Service s (DCFS), which was involved in so rt i n g o u t the pare nting issues in the wake of the child’s perma nent neurolog ical injuries, ultimately decide d to allow A.M. to remain in his mother’s home, w ith an offe r of “ intact family service s.” ¶ 2 Subsequent to A.M.’s injury and DCFS’s involvement, A.M.’s mother (Ms. M.) bec ame involved with a man ref

err ed to here in as “Mr. G.,” who fathe red R.G. This man h ad an extensive criminal history that involved druguse and dome stic battery

. ¶ 3 A.M. suffe red from various neurolog ical sequela e as a result of h i s fa t h er’s battery
, including cer ebra l palsy
, a global developmental delay
, visual deficie ncies a nd a failure to thrive. Unable to wal k or cra wl in any meaning ful way , he is only able to move about by bouncing himself in a cross-le g g ed position or by pulling himself rea rwa rd on his buttocks. Be cause of the m an n er i n wh i ch he thrashes about, he is in need of various forms of protec tion to war d off injury

. This obviously includes visual observation, but he also must

wea r a he lmet at all times that he is capa ble of movingabout. ¶ 4 Severa l y ear s afte r the birth of his sister, A.M. ag ai n ca m e u n d er t h e supervision of DCFS, when h i s mother took him to L aRabida Hospital wher e doctors found him to have various fra cture s to his lower extremiti es, ribs and spinal verte brae

. The boy was transfe rre d
to the C omer’s Children’ s Hospital at t he University of C hicag o, wher e diagnostic studi es

-2-confirme d the exist ence of the va rious fra cture s in various states of he aling

. ¶ 5 These finding s led the State of I llinois to seek temporar y custody of both children, as they

wer e living toge ther with their mother and Mr. G. The State also filed petitions of war dship for both children, alleg ing that A.M. was phy sically abused and that both children wer e neg lected due to an injurious environment. On a te mporary basis, the trial cour

t placed the children in DCF S custody on Marc h 3, 2010.

¶ 6 I . Procedur al B ackground ¶ 7 The court conducte d an adjudicator y hearing beg inning in mid-Augu s t 2 0 1 1 . A.M.’s
pare nts wer e eac h prese nt, but R.G.’s fathe r did not attend. The State produce d evidenc e in the form of the transcript from the ear lier hearing, medical rec ords from Comer Hospital and the testimony of Dr. Kelley Staley
, the pediatric ian who treated A.M. upon his admission to that i n stitut ion. Dr. Staley testified at some considera ble length about the injuries that she diagnosed on the boy ’s body and also testified about a compre hensive repor t prepa red at Comer, the so-ca lled “M P E E C ” repor t which was admitted into evidenc e. This repor t analy zed the medical finding s along with historical information provided by Ms. M. during the cour se of tre atment. ¶ 8 Dr. Staley
, who was tender ed, without objection, as an expert in pediatric abuse, was an assistant profe ssor of pediatric s at Comer. She had completed her residenc y at Comer in 2006 and was not y et board cer tified in child abuse and neg lect. S taley testified t hat t he team of profe ssionals at Comer worke d toge ther to treat the injured childre n who came under their

car e and a lso to make rec ommendations about ea ch child’s we lfare

. ¶ 9 Dr. Staley actua lly beg an treating A.M. while a resident at University of Chicag o when the initial neur ologic al injuries from his shaking trauma wer e rec og nized in 2005. Then, in J anuar y 2008, Dr. Staley was a m em b er of the child protec tion service s team at Comer Hospital and treated A.M. for an arm fra cture , which at that time Dr. Staley did not view as suspicious based up o n t he explanation Ms. M. provided to the hospital. When A.M. was brought to L aRabida for a routine examination in J anuar y 2010, the phy sician at L aRabida,

conce rned that A.M. neede d further evaluation of his injuries, contac ted Dr. Staley
, who was then an attending phy sician at Comer. A.M. was ultimately transfe rre d to Comer. Dr. Staley
, in her capa city as attending phy sician, order ed various radiolog ical studies and blood work, while consulting w ith other specia lists. The results of the X-r ay studies reve aled two tibial fra cture s, one of which was noticeably older than the other. Ms. M. g ave a history for the injury that involved the child’s leg g etting stuck in the bed, requiring her to yank the leg fre e, which st ruck Dr. S taley as a competent cause for t he newer leg fra cture , as op p o sed t o the other fra cture , which was sever al wee ks older and likely cause d by a direc t blow to the are a. In this reg ard, Ms. M. said that A.M. fre quently fe l l from his bed, but the doctor was

co n ce rned that the child had not been taken in for treatment of any such trauma, wh i ch should have oc curr ed, bec ause the trauma w ould have be en quite painf ul. ¶ 10 Dr. Staley also testified about four rib fra cture s, which wer e noted to be in various stag es of healing
, indicating that they had occur red at differ ent times. The doctor found it signific ant from a poten t i al ab u s e standpoint that these injuries occur red in multipl e occur

renc es as

-3-opposed fr om a sing le incident. Whil e Dr. Staley felt it possible that A.M. c ould frac ture a

rib or multipl e ribs i n a fa l l from his bed, she doubted that the child’s way of bouncing around the home on his buttocks would be a competent cause for a rib fra cture

. Significa ntly
, Dr. Staley testified that the rib fra cture s in question wer e not attributable to “routine household minor acc idents,” as family membe r s h a d s ug g ested. In fac t, Dr. Staley opined that
most nonambulatory children like A.M. suffe r such injuries as a result of abuse. In Staley ’s opinions, these rib fra cture s wer e infli cted, not acc idental. Dr. St aley later te stified that all of these injuries occur

red w ithin a thr ee- month pe riod of time a nd that it wa s appar ent that the child had suffe red no such injuries from J anuar y 2010 until October 2010, while he was not in his m other’s c ustody

. ¶ 11 Some of the blood work reve aled an in j u ry t o A.M .’s liver, which was expressed in marke dly elevated enzy

mes, which c ould have be en attributable to a medication that A.M.

was taking
, but Dr. Staley ruled t h at possibili ty out as a result of the enzy mes decr easing whi l e the child was still taking the medication. Once that cause was ruled out, Dr. Staley opined that the liver injury was c aused by

blunt force trauma. ¶ 12 Finally , Dr. Staley testified that she wa s unable to of fer an opinion on the c ause of two lumbar ver

tebra e which w erefound to be fr actur ed. ¶ 13 The State a lso offer ed the testimony of Alicia Picke tt, a social worke r, who testified to various conver sations that she had with Ms. M. and Mr. G. about the possible circ umstances surroundingthe var ious injuries to A.M. ¶ 14 Wit h this evidenc e, the State and p ub l i c gu ar d i an re s t ed an d M s

. M. called D r. Christopher Sulli van, another Comer phy sician, as a witness. Coincidentally eno u gh
, Dr. Sulli van had also treated A.M. on three occa sions while he was a patient at Comer Children’s Hospital. The ba

ttle of the experts in this case , there fore
, was of phy sicians from the s ame institution who had eac h treated the child. Dr. Sulli van had at least three deca des of expertise in pediatric orthopedic surg ery , with an emphasis in neurolog ical disorders and fra cture s. Dr. Sulli van revie wed the enti re char t from Comer Hospital, the “MPEEC” repor t and also draf ted his own repor

t. In his repor t an d i n his testimony
, Dr. Sulli van opined that the elevated liver enzy

mes wer e found i n the absenc e of any abdominal fluid, leading him to conclude that the l iver was not traumatica lly injured i n the m anner sug g ested by

the State. Significa ntly
, Dr. Sulli van was of the opinion that the two tibia fra cture s wer e self-inflicte d by A.M. in the manner that he bounced up and down as he moved about the home a nd that the rib fra cture s could have been caus ed b y fa l l i n g into furniture or ont o a floor. This was confirme d, in his view, by what he observe d in a video of A. M

. b o un ci n g from a flexed position with his ankles crossed

. Dr

. S u llivan believed that the rib fra cture s wer e likely
asy mptomatic and also noted that A.M. did not show “norma l pain avoidanc e.” He also was of t he opinion that the rib fr actur es could have occ urre d at the same time. Dr. Sullivan felt that the absenc e of injuries in the most rec ent 10 months (while out of his mother’s custody )

was attributable to his decr ease d seizure activity

. Dr. Sulli van also place d some considera ble emphasis on test results that indicated an abnorma l bone density i n A.M. that could predispose him to fra cture s. ¶ 15 Ms. M. then called the children’ s g randmother
, Vanda
, who testified that she had never

-4-seen Ms. M. abuse or harm A.M. in any way

. She also confirme d the rough manner that the

child moved himself about and compared it to the bucking of a horse’s head, while noting that the movements we re f ast and a g g ressive.

¶ 16 I I . The Tr ial Court’s Ruling ¶ 17 Following closing arg uments, the trial court found that A.M. had been phy sically abused and that both A.M. and R.G. wer e neg lected due to an injurious environment and abused due
to a substantial risk of phy sical injury

. The court char acte ri z ed th e case as a “battle of experts” and stated that while Dr. Sulli van was an “excellent orthopae dic surg eon,” the court noted that it found him to be “ver y car eless in this case .” The trial court found it signific ant t h at Dr

. S ullivan was unawa re of A.M.’s initial elevated enzy me levels, that he failed t o proper ly identify a posterior rib fra cture and that he was car eless in the actua l prepa ration of his report, a

nd these fa ctors we re a ll troubling to the point that the court wa s not confident i n t he doctor’s opinions on the matters of leg al substance in the hearing. Meanwhile
, t h e court found Dr. S taley ’s t es t i m o n y to be “very car eful,” acknow ledg ing that her ex tensive experience in child abuse madeup for he r lac k of orthopedic experience

. ¶ 18 The trial court found the timing of A.M

. ’s i n j u ri es t o b e p ar t icularly damningfor
respon d en ts, noting that there was a period of sever al y ear s following the brain injury in which A.M. suffe red only one explained injury
, followed by a period of time with numerous unexplained injuries clustere d toge ther, followed by a period of 10 months with no injuries while he wa s place d in foster c are

.

¶ 19 I I I . The Dispositional Hea ring ¶ 20 Followingthe adjudicatory hearing, the court held a dispositi onal hearing to de termine whether responde nts wer e “unable to pare nt” and whether the nee ds of the childre n would be better serve d in the custody of DCFS. The S tate’s e vidence included a se rvice plan and

a family assessment (re fer red to here inafter cumulatively as service plan) for Ms. M. and Mr. G. The service plan stated that Ms. M. demonstrated an inability to support or protect the children from risk of harm, while Mr. G.’s lack o f capa city to pare nt posed a continuing threat to the children’ s well-be ing. The service plan also detailed Mr. G.’s arr est following his phy sical assa

ult on Ms. M. i n November 2010. ¶ 21 The State ne x t submitted a thera py repor t from Dec ember

2011 for Ms. M. This repor t related that Ms. M. had bee n actively attending thera

py sessions which larg ely cente red on h elpi ng Ms. M. addre ss her thoughts and fee lings reg arding her domestic viole n ce experience
, case involvement, past relationships, and curr ent s tressors. The repor t rela y ed

conce rns reg arding Ms. M.’s own doubt as to whether she can car e for A.M. Ultimately
, the
repor t stated t h at h er p oor coping skills called into question her ability to car e for the two children while working a full-time job. F in a lly
, the State submitt ed a J uly 2011 psycholog ical eval u at ion repor

t. The evaluation stated that “her dependa ncy and immaturity need to be radic ally chang ed for her to become a safe ty -driven mother and woman,” and added that “her defe nsive style wil l compromise her ability to live with adequa te m eans to support herse lf and her children.”

-5-¶ 22 Ms. M. tender ed four exhibi ts to the c ourt in support of her ability to reg ain custody of her children. Three of these exhibi ts established her succe ssful completion of a pare nting class at th e Sinai Parenting Institut e and the fourth was a cer tificate of completion of an infant CPR course. ¶ 23 The State then called its firs t wi t n es s , Mattie Fr anklin, the case worke r for the family since Marc h 2010. Fr anklin testified that for the previous two y ear s, both A.M. and R.G. had been place d in specia liz ed foster car e with R.G.’s g randmother

. Fr anklin related that the home was found to be safe and appropr iate and that the g randmother had ensure d that A.M. attended his specia l medical appointment s and also kept R.G. up to date with all of her medical needs. Fr anklin testified that Ms. M. had succe ssfully completed reco m m ended service s of DCFS and noted that she had persona lly supervised some of Ms. M.’s weekly supervised visits with both children, in which she observe d t h at Ms. M. demonstrated
appropr iate par entingskills. ¶ 24 Fr anklin testified that Mr. G. moved to Wis consin in October 2010 and althoug h she did
not have a curr ent mailing addre ss for him, she was able to speak with him on the telephone. Fr anklin stated that although Mr. G. was not curr entl y i n v o l v ed with the rec ommended service s, she would continue to attempt to find ser v i ce p ro v iders for him in Wis consin. Finally
, Fr anklin testified that based on a conver sation with the grandmother /foster pare nt, Mr. G. wa s appar ently

visiti ngA.M. and R.G. on a w eekly basis. ¶ 25 In conclusion, Franklin s tated that Ms. M. had made “substantial” prog ress toward t he
g oal returning her children to her home, with Mr. G. only making “some” progress. Fr anklin

rec ommended that both children be adjudicate d war ds of the court with a rec ommendation that D. J ean Orteg a Piron (DCFS) be appointed their leg al guardia n with a return- home g oal of 12 months. ¶ 26 FollowingFr anklin’s re commendation, the tria l court adjudg ed both R .G. and A.M. a s

war ds of the court and found both Ms. M. and Mr. G. “unable to pare nt.” A return- home g oal for both A.M. and R.G. was set at 12 months, and both children wer e place d into DCFS
guardia nship. ¶ 27 Followingthese proc eeding s, both Ms. M. and Mr. G. filed timely notices of a

ppeal.

¶ 28 ANALYSI S ¶ 29 Respondents contend that the trial court’ s o rd er s fi nding them unable to pare nt were ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e. Ba s ed o n the briefs that both parties filed, howeve r, it is unclea

r wh i ch s p ec ific order they are appea ling from. Whil e both parties include “unable to pare nt,” a term specific to the dispositi on o rd er , the entirety of their
arguments relates to issues stemming from the adjudicator y order

. This issue is only further muddled by Ms. M.’s notice of appea l, which states she is appea ling the adjudicator y order

. There fore
, while it is unclea r whether the responde nts are attempting to appeal fr o m the adjudicator

y order finding of abuse and neg lect or the dispositi on order finding them “unable to pare nt,” i t is patently clea r t hat neither has provided arg ument reg arding the disposition order

. Due to this fac t, while neither party has forf eited revie w of the issue, eac h has forf eited revie w of the argument. See I ll. S. Ct. R. 341(h)( 7) (ef f. J uly 1, 2008) (points not argued in

-6-an appe llant’s openingbrief a re f orfe ited). ¶ 30 Despite this confusion in both responde nts’ briefs, we will assume, based on the content of t heir arguments, that responde nts are actua lly contending that th e t ri al co urt err ed in its adjudicator

y order
, wh i ch found that A.M. was abused or neg lected due to an injurious environment pursuant to section 2-3(1) (b), phy sically abused pursuant to section 2-3(2) (i) and abused based on a substantial risk of phy sical injury pursuant to section 2-3(2) (ii) of the J uvenile Court Act of 1987 (Ac t) (705 I L CS 405/2-3(1)(b), 2-3(2) (i), (ii) (West 2010)). The adjudicator

y order also found that R.G. was abused or neg lected pursuant to section 2-3(1) (b) and 2-3( 2)(ii) of the Act (705 I L CS 405/ 2-3(1) (b), ( 2)(ii) (West 2010))

. ¶ 31 In a petition f

or adjudication of war dship unde r the Act, the “ ‘best interest of the child is the paramount consideration.’ ” In re F.S.
, 347 I ll. App. 3d 55, 62 (2004) ( quoting In re K.G.
, 288 I ll. App. 3d 728, 734-35 (1997))

. The State must prove its alleg ation of neg lect or abuse by a preponde ranc e o f t h e evidence. In re N.B.
, 191 I ll. 2d 338, 343 (2000). “Preponde ranc e of the evidence is that amount of evidence that leads a trier of fac t to find that the fac t at issue is more probable than not.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) F.S.
, 347 I ll. App. 3d at 62. Upon revie w, the trial court’s finding “[shall] not be disturbed unless it is
ag ainst the m anife st weight of t he evidence.” In re E.S.
, 324 I ll. App. 3 d 6 6 1
, 6 67 (2001). “The trial court has the best opportunity to observe the demea nor and conduct of the parties and witnesses and, there fore
, it is in the best position to deter mine the cre dibilit y and weight of the witnesses’ testimony .” Id

. As a result, “the trial court is aff orded broad discretion when deter mining the e x istence of

abuse.” In re R.M

. , 307 I ll. App. 3d 541, 551 (1999).

¶ 32 I . Phy sical Abuse ¶ 33 Respondents contend that the State failed to pr ovide a theory or direc t evidenc e of who

was a ct u al l y responsible for inflicting A.M.’s injuries or an explanation of how A.M. was injured. At the same time, they argue that there was substantial cre dible expert testimony by Dr. Sulli van which further ed their theory that A. M .’s injuries wer e self-inflicte d. Ms. M., citing In re Cornica J.
, 351 I ll. App. 3d 557 (2004), also argues that the t es t i m o n y o f o ne medical e x pert a lone is insufficient for a findingof abuse and neg lect. ¶ 34 Section 2-3 of the A ct provides:

“(2) Those who are abused include any minor under 18 year s of ag e whose pare nt or immediate family member, or any person responsible for the minor’s welfa re , o r any person who is in the same family or household as the minor, or any individual r esiding in the same home a s the minor, or a pa ramour of the minor’s par ent: (i) inflicts, cause s to be inflicted, or all o ws t o b e inflicted upon such minor phy sical injury
, by other than acc idental means, which cause s death, disfigur ement, impairment o f p h y sical or emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function[.] ” 705 I L CS 405/ 2-3(2) (i) (West 2010). Notably
, section 2-3(2) (i) require s that the phy sical injury occur by “other than acc idental”

means and does not require specific intent to harm the chi l d

. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re M

arcus H. , 297 I ll. App. 3d 1089, 1098 (1998).

-7-¶ 35 Notwi t h s t anding responde nts’ contentions, the focus of an adjudicator y hearing is not whether the responde nt abused the minor but rathe r on whether the minor was abused. In re J.C.
, 2011 I L App (1st) 111374, ¶ 20. There fore
, who committed the alleg ed abuse of A.M. is of no particula

r conseque nce in an adjudicator y hearing. Second, upon close revie w of Cornica
, we find that Ms. M. misrepre sents h er contention that the testimony of a single medical ex pert is i nsufficie nt evidence to sustain a trial court’ s finding. A lthough Cornica did reve rse the trial court’s finding due to an insufficienc y of evidenc e, it did so beca use the testimony of t hat wit ness was insufficient, not that mu l t i p l e ex perts would be required for

some rea son. In re Cornica J

. , 351 I ll. App. 3d 557 (2004). In fac t, the dissent attacked the State’s expert’s testimony and noted that she only relied on three “objec tive” test results in rende ring her op i n i o n

. Id

. at 573 (Ka pala, J
., dissenting)

. The court also found that the

rema inder of the tests relied upon by the medical expert wer e “subjec tive” and ro u t i n ely criticized for being “ ‘open to interpre tation.’ ” Id . at 568 (majority op.). Finally
, the court stated that out of the three objective tests that wer e used, one of the three
, an I Q test, has routinely been dismiss ed as insufficient on i t s own to deem a pare nt unable to “discha rg e pare ntal responsibilities.” Id

. at 569. For these rea sons, we are unpersua ded by responde nts’
arguments based upon that c ase. ¶ 36 Respondents’ remai n i n g ar gu m en t on this issue is their contention that the trial court relied too h ea v ily on Dr. S taley ’s t estimony while di scre diting Dr. Sulli van’s due to a few “ty pos” in his repor

t. Whil e acknow ledg ing that Dr. Staley is a board- cer tified phy sician in child abuse, responde nts a rgue that her testimony was g iven too muc h cre dit since she was

a rec ent medical school g radua te who had a mere five y ear s’ experience when she examined A.M. in 2010. R em ar k ab l y enough, even though Dr. Staley was involved in this child’s
treatment on three separ ate admissions, the respo n d en t s sug g est that she had minimal i n v o l v ement with him, and even s ug g ested in closing arg ument to the court that the entire dura t i o n o f her persona l treatment of A.M. was all of 20 minutes. At the same time, responde nts highlight t h e u n d eniably impressive cre dentials of their medical expert, Dr. Sulli van, a doctor for nearly 32 y ea rs wi th extensive experience with pediatric orthopedic
surg ery with a specia l emphasis on neurolog ical disorders such as cer ebra l palsy
, and argue that his “conf

ident and well-re asoned testimony ” was improperly discredited, due mere ly to

a few ty pog raphic al err ors i n a re p o rt that Dr. Sulli van was g iven only 24 hours to write. Respondents did not detail the amount of time that Dr. Sulli van actua lly spent with A.M. in the hospital but place particula r emphasis on the fac t that he visited with the child and observe d a video of his ambulatory technique in the course of acting as a consultant for this hearing. ¶ 37 T o b ri ef

l y re i t era te, Dr. Sulli van testified that A.M.’s neurolog ical limit ati o n s , h i s ambulatory state and lack of self-a voidan ce o f i n

juries caused hi m to have a propensity to thrash about on the floor and bounce into furniture throug hout the home. These movements forc ed A.M. to wea

r a helmet for his own protec tion. Dr. Sulli van opined that not only wer e these neurolog ical disorders the most likely cause of all of A.M.’s injuries, but they also

m ad e i t d i fficult for him to express that he was injured, which, in responde nts’ view
, explained why

they could not specific ally

identify how and whe n A.M. was injure d. ¶ 38 De s pite these contentions, we find that the State’s evidenc e supported the trial court’ s

-8-finding that the injuries to A.M. wer e nonacc idental. First, the State provided the testimony

of Dr. Staley
, in which she detailed A.M.’s injuries and her expert opinion on their causation, while also opining that the injuries wer e not self-inflicte d. In sum, she stated th at A. M.’s multipl e rib injuries and raised liver enzy mes wer e due to phy sical abuse, not a result of daily h o u s e h o ld activity

. Dr. Staley ’s testimony was also supported by the “MPEEC” repor t, wh ic h conclude d that the rib fra ct u re s an d liver injury wer e due to some ty pe of excessive forc e trauma. ¶ 39 Finally
, despite respondents’ urging
, it is well s ettled t hat t he trier of fact i s in the best position to weigh the cre dibility of experts, leaving us reluc tant to second- guess the finding s of the trial court in a “ ‘battle of experts.’ ” See Ave ry v. State Fa rm Mu t ual Automobile Insurance Co

. , 216 I ll. 2d 100, 216 (2005) (Fre eman, J
., concur ring in part and dissenting in part, joined by

Kilbride, J.); In re De tention of Titt lebach
, 324 I ll. App. 3d 6, 11 (2001). There fore
, we find the trial court’s decisi o n t o be rea sonable and based on the evidenc e prese nted at trial. Simpl y put, the trial court’s finding of neg lect was not ag ainst the manifest weight of the evide nce pr esente d at trial.

¶ 40 I I . Abuse Dueto Subst antial Risk of Phy sical Injury ¶ 41 Respondents next contend that the trial co u rt’s finding that A.M. was abused due to a substantial risk of phy sical injury (sec t i o n 2 -3 (2 )(ii) of the Act) was ag ainst the manifest weight of the evide nce. T his section states: “(2) Those who are abused include any minor under 18 y ear s of ag e whose pare nt or immediate family member, or any person responsible for the minor’s welfa re, o r any person who is in the same family or household as the minor, or a ny individual residing in the same home a s the minor, or a pa ramour of the minor’s par ent:

*** (ii) cre ates a substantial risk of phy sical injury to such minor by other than

acc idental means which would be likely to c ause death, disfigureme nt, impairment of emotional health, o r lose or impairment of any bodily function[.] ” 705 I L CS 405/2-3(2)( ii) (West 2010). ¶ 42 The same evidenc e that supports the phy sical abuse finding also supports the trial court’ s finding that the State proved by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that A.M. was abused due
to a substan t i al ri s k of phy sical injury

. See In re F.S.
, 347 I ll. App. 3d 55, 66 (2004). Acc ording ly , the trial cour t’s findingpursuant in this spe cific w as not ag ainst the manifest weight of the evide nce.

¶ 43 I I I . Neg lected D ue to an Injurious Environment ¶ 44 Respondents next contend that the t rial court’s finding that A.M. was ne g lected due to an injurious environment (se ction 2-3(1) (b) of the Act) was a g ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e. Section 2-3( 1)(b) of the Ac t states that those who ar e neg lected inc lude “a ny minor under 18 y ear s of ag e whose environment is injurious to his or her welfa re.” 705 I L CS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2010).

-9-¶ 45 “ ‘N egl ect’ is g ener ally viewed as a failure to exercise the reg ard that circ u m s t an ce s

justly demand and encompa ss willful as well as unintentional disreg ard of pare ntal duties.” In r e S

. D.
, 2 20 I ll. App. 3d 498, 502 (1991). “An injurious environment is an amorphous

conce pt that cannot be define d with particula rity but has been interpre ted to in clude the brea ch of a pare nt’s duty to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for his or her children.” In re D.W

. , 386 I ll. App. 3d 124, 135 (2008). ¶ 46 The same evidenc e that supports the phy sical abuse finding and the finding of abuse due
to a substantial risk of phy sical injury s upports the finding that the State proved, by a preponde ranc e o f th e e v ide nce, that A.M. was neg lected due to an injurious environment. See In re F.S.
, 347 I ll. App. 3d at 67. As d etailed above, the injuries to A.M. wer e “nonac cidental” and occ urre d on multipl e occ asions. Acc ording ly , the t rial cour t’s finding pursuant to section 2-3(1) (b) of the Act was not ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e.

¶ 47 IV. Finding s Reg ardingR.G. ¶ 48 Fi n al l y , the trial court found that R.G. was neg lected due to an injurious environ m en t (sec tion 2-3(1) (b)) and abused due to substantial risk of phy sical injury (sec tion 2-3(2) (ii)). ¶ 49 It is well settled that the State may use the evidenc e of neg lect and abuse of one child as evidenc e of abuse and n eglect of another child who lives in the same household and for whom the same pare nt is also responsible. See In re D.W

. , 386 I ll. App. 3d 124, 139 (2008) (citing In re T.B.
, 215 I ll. App. 3d 1059, 1062-63 (1991) (“Where an injurious environment has been found t o exis t, the t rial court need not wait unt il the child bec o m es a victim or i s emotionally

damag ed permanently in order to remove the child from the household.”)) ; In

re R.R.
, 409 I ll. App. 3d 1041, 1045 (2 0 1 1 ) (“Proof of neg lect of one minor is admissible evidenc e on the issue of

neg lect to any

other minor for

whom the par ent is responsible.”)

. ¶ 50 Fur

thermore
, section 2-18(3) of the Act addre sses this exact situation, stating, “[I ]n any hearing under this act, proof of abuse [or] neg lect *** of one minor shall be admissible evidenc e on the issue of the abuse [or] neg lect *** of any other minor for wh o m the responde nt is responsible.” 705 I L CS 405/ 2-18(3) (West 2010). ¶ 51 Thus, the evidenc e supporting the neg lect and abuse finding for A.M. supports the abuse and neg lect finding for R.G., who lived in the same home and for whom Mr. G. and Ms. M.

wer e re sponsible. There fore , as stated a bove, the tria l court’s finding s pursuant to sections 2-3(1) (b) a

nd 2-3(2) (ii) wer e not ag ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e. ¶ 52 We theref

ore a ffirm the r

ulings of the trial court in all re spects.

¶ 53 Affir

med.

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