UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JOSEPH P. SMITH )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 12 C 4546

v. )

) Judge Sara L. Ellis

CAPTAIN MARK ALTMAN, )

)

Defendant. )

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER

After a trial in October 2014, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff Joseph P. 

Smith and against Defendant Captain Mark Altman on Smith’s claim of excessive force under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Judgment was entered for Smith on October 29, 2014. On November 25, 2014, 

Smith filed a Bill of Costs, seeking $29,721.18 in costs, with that amount mainly comprised of 

printing, transcript, and expert witness fees. On February 27, 2015, Smith filed a Petition for 

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, requesting $581,250.00 in attorneys’ fees for pre-trial and trial work, 

and an additional amount of fees and costs for post-trial work [225]. Altman and the City of 

Chicago (“Defendants”) filed objections to Smith’s Petition on March 20, 2015, arguing that the

total requested fees and costs should be reduced to $332,314.20. Defendants also moved to 

strike certain exhibits to Smith’s reply in support of his Petition [245], which is granted. For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court awards Smith $467,182.10 in attorneys’ fees and $12,651.93

in costs.1

 

1 This Amended Opinion corrects a typo in the expert witness fees amount that was also reflected in the total amount 

of attorneys’ fees awarded in the Court’s Opinion and Order issued July 15, 2015, Doc. 266.

 
LEGAL STANDARD

The Court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to a 

prevailing party in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Expert witness fees may be 

included, at the Court’s discretion, in the award of attorneys’ fees. Id. § 1988(c). In deciding a 

reasonable award of attorneys’ fees, the Court begins by calculating the lodestar amount. 

Johnson v. GDF, Inc., 668 F.3d 927, 929–30 (7th Cir. 2012). The lodestar amount is calculated 

by multiplying the hours reasonably expended by the plaintiff’s attorneys by their reasonable 

hourly rates. Id. The Court may then adjust the lodestar amount depending on a variety of 

factors, including the degree of success, the novelty and difficulty of the issues, awards in similar 

cases, and the relationship between the lodestar amount and the damages awarded. Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.3, 434, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983); Moriarty v. 

Svec, 233 F.3d 955, 967–68 (7th Cir. 2000). “A plaintiff who achieves ‘excellent results’ should 

receive the entire lodestar, but where ‘a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success,’ the 

lodestar ‘may be an excessive amount.’” Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d 547, 556 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435–36). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) states that unless a federal statute, the Federal 

Rules, or the Court provide otherwise, costs should be allowed to the prevailing party. Pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the Court may tax as costs certain fees, including fees for service of 

summons and subpoenas, fees for “transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case,” and fees 

for “exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are 

necessarily obtained for use in the case.” The prevailing party is presumptively entitled to costs. 

Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 864 (7th Cir. 2005). The prevailing party 

maintains the burden of establishing that the potentially recoverable costs incurred were 

2
reasonable and necessary. Trs. of Chi. Plastering Inst. Pension Trust v. Cork Plastering Co., 570 

F.3d 890, 906 (7th Cir. 2009). If that burden is satisfied, the losing party bears the burden of 

showing that the costs are inappropriate. Beamon, 411 F.3d at 864. The Court enjoys “wide 

discretion in determining and awarding reasonable costs.” Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. 

Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633, 642 (7th Cir. 1991). 

ANALYSIS

I. Attorneys’ Fees 

A. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Certain Exhibits Attached to Smith’s Reply

As an initial matter, Defendants move to strike Exhibits D and I attached to Smith’s 

Reply to Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs [244]. 

Because Smith’s reply attaches evidence to which Defendants have not had an opportunity to 

respond and was not tendered during the Local Rule 54.3 process, that Motion is granted.

Smith filed his initial reply on March 27, 2015, along with a Motion for Leave to File 

Brief in Excess of Fifteen Pages because his reply was thirty-one pages long [240, 242]. That 

request was granted, but the Court limited the reply to twenty-five pages. Exhibit I of the initial 

reply consisted of two affidavits. Smith then filed his shortened reply on April 1, 2015 [244], 

and with that filing added an additional affidavit to Exhibit I. Exhibit D is titled “Revenue Detail 

Report from Adult & Pediatric Orthopedics SC for the Service Dates 01/01/2011–03/25/2015.”

Amended Exhibit I is comprised of three affidavits from Mr. Horwitz’s clients, each of whom 

states: “I have paid Mr. Horwitz for representing me [/my son] in this matter. His billing rate 

was $500 per hour.” Doc. 244-1. 

Altman argues that Smith did not tender these documents during the Local Rule 54.3 

meet and confer process and did not provide them before filing the reply and amended reply, and 

3
therefore, the Court should strike them. This district’s rules require that the party moving for 

fees shall, if requested, provide the time and work records on which the motion will be based and

provide representative business records to support their claimed hourly rates, in order to 

streamline the attorneys’ fee process before the Court. N.D. Ill. L. R. 54.3(d). Smith’s response 

to the motion offers no explanation why these documents were not produced to Altman per the 

Local Rules. See Doc. 254. 

Similarly, Smith offers no excuse why these documents were included in the second reply 

but not attached to his initial submission of March 27, 2014.

2

 Exhibit D is captioned a Revenue 

Detail Report with service dates of January 1, 2011 through March 25, 2015, but the last 

itemized entry is dated October 10, 2014. Doc. 242-4. The documents attached as Exhibit I 

were signed on March 26, 2015 (the day before Smith filed his original reply) and March 27, 

2015 (the day he filed the original reply). 

Smith argues that his reply does not raise any new arguments or new facts and therefore 

this late evidence should be considered. However, the billing records contained in Exhibit D and 

the client attestations in Exhibit I are new facts that Smith wishes the Court to consider when 

determining hourly rates and allowable costs. New arguments, facts, and exhibits offered in a 

party’s reply do not allow the other side a fair opportunity to respond and therefore the Court 

must disregard them. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1295 n.7 

(7th Cir. 1989) (refusing to consider argument made first in reply); Gold v. Wolpert, 876 F.2d 

1327, 1331 n.6 (7th Cir. 1989) (“It is well-settled that new arguments cannot be made in reply. 

This goes for new facts too.” (citation omitted)); Louisma v Automated Fin., LLC, No. 11 CV 

2 Smith includes a footnote in his second reply brief stating that Exhibit I had been supplemented with an additional 

affidavit from Mr. Marquez and that Mr. Marquez sent his affidavit to Mr. Horwitz on March 30, 2015. Doc. 244 p. 

17 n.2. This does not explain why Smith had not secured this affidavit during the almost five months between the 

entry of judgment at trial and the filing of his fee petition.

4

 
2104, 2011 WL 5105377, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Ill, Oct. 27, 2011) (“This practice of raising arguments 

and offering exhibits for the first time in a reply brief must be avoided so as to provide the nonmoving party a fair opportunity to file a comprehensive response.”). Smith cites an unpublished 

Southern District of Illinois case to argue the new affidavits may be considered, but in that case 

the magistrate judge denied that motion to strike while specifically noting that the other party 

would have a chance to object to the newly attached evidence after the Report and 

Recommendation was filed. See United States ex rel. Liotine v. CDW-Gov’t, Inc., No. 3:05-cv00033-DRH-PMF, 2013 WL 2156567, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Ill. May 17, 2013). No such opportunity 

is available to Defendants here. 

Exhibits D and I to Smith’s Reply (Doc. 242-4 and Doc. 244-1) are stricken and will not 

be considered by the Court in its decision on Smith’s Petition for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.

B. Calculating the Reasonable Hourly Rate

For pre-trial and trial work, Smith seeks $581,250.00 in attorneys’ fees, as follows:

Attorneys & Paralegal Hours Rate Total

Blake Horwitz 290.65 $500.00 $145,325.00

Uma Bansal 870.10 $350.00 $304,535.00

Amanda Yarusso 194.80 $400.00 $77,920.00

Jonathan Levy 145.45 $200.00 $29,090.00

Jeff Grossich 109.80 $100.00 $10,980.00

Sergio Moreno 134.00 $100.00 $13,400.00

Total 1744.80 $581.250.00

An attorney’s reasonable hourly rate is “derived from the market rate for the services 

rendered.” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

5
Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2003)). The Court will “presume that an 

attorney’s actual billing rate for similar litigation is appropriate to use as the market rate.” Id. 

“The best evidence of the market rate is the amount the attorney actually bills for similar work, 

but if that rate can’t be determined, then the district court may rely on evidence of rates charged 

by similarly experienced attorneys in the community and evidence of rates set for the attorney in 

similar cases.” Montanez, 755 F.3d at 553. Smith bears the burden of producing “satisfactory 

evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with 

those prevailing in the community.” Pickett, 664 F.3d at 640 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 

886, 895 n.11, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1984)). If Smith does not meet his initial 

burden, the Court may make its own determination of a reasonable rate. Id. If Smith meets his 

burden, the burden then shifts to Defendants to offer evidence to show “a good reason why a 

lower rate is essential.” Id. (quoting People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 1307, 

1313 (7th Cir. 1996)). Once the Court has determined the lodestar amount, it may adjust that 

amount based on factors “not subsumed by the lodestar calculation.” Id. 

1. Blake Horwitz

Mr. Horwitz requests a fee of $500.00 an hour, citing his experience and success in civil 

rights litigation. Mr. Horwitz supports this rate by citing to: itemized billing records from state 

and federal cases from 2013–2015 (Doc. 262); his own affidavit stating that he currently bills 

clients at $500.00 an hour and was awarded $400 an hour in 2006 and 2008 and $425.00 an hour 

in 2012, 2013, and 2014 (Doc. 225-1 at 27–28); the affidavits of two civil rights litigators 

attesting to the reasonableness of the requested rate (Doc. 225-1 at 31, 34); and the fees award by 

Judge Shah in Ferguson v. George, No. 13 C 6609, Doc. 84 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2014). 

Defendants respond that Mr. Horwitz’s awarded rate should be $425.00 per hour.

6
Considering the affidavits first, Mr. Horwitz’s statement standing alone is not enough to 

establish the market rate. See Harper v. City of Chi. Heights, 223 F.3d 593, 604 (7th Cir. 2000) 

(“[A]n attorney’s self-serving affidavit alone cannot establish the market rate for that attorney’s 

services . . . .”). Similarly, Mr. Lipschultz and Mr. Kulis’ affidavits, to the extent that they state 

that Mr. Horwitz’s requested rate is reasonable, are of little help to the Court, because affidavits 

that “merely opine” on another attorney’s market rate rather than “provide evidence as to what 

the comparable attorneys charge for similar services” have little probative value. Pickett, 664 

F.3d at 647. However, these affidavits, particularly Mr. Kulis’, show what attorneys with 

comparable civil rights experience charge for similar cases. Mr. Horwitz has been practicing law 

for twenty-seven years and has specialized in civil rights litigation for twenty-four years. Mr. 

Lipschultz bills $335.00 per hour for civil rights cases after fourteen years of practice. Mr. Kulis 

has been practicing law seven years longer than Mr. Horwitz and had a $475.00 per hour rate 

approved in 2011. These affidavits point to a market rate between $335.00 and $475.00 per hour 

for civil rights litigators with between fourteen and thirty-four years’ experience. 

Mr. Horwitz also relies on the Laffey Matrix, adjusted upward for the Chicago market, to 

justify his requested $500.00 rate. The Seventh Circuit has “expressed some skepticism about 

applying the Laffey Matrix outside Washington, D.C.” and leaves it to the trial court’s discretion 

whether the matrix is useful for a particular case. Montanez, 755 F.3d at 554. The adjusted 

Laffey Matrix rates for attorneys with eleven to nineteen years’ experience ($478.00/hour) and 

twenty-plus years’ experience ($541.00/hour) are well above the rates established by the 

affidavits submitted by Mr. Horwitz ($335.00/hour for fourteen years’ experience and 

$475.00/hour for thirty-four years’ experience). The Court, already hesitant to use as a 

comparator something for which the Seventh Circuit has expressed skepticism, finds that the 

7
Matrix is not a useful measure where it is so out of sync with the market rate shown in the thirdparty affidavits. See Pickett, 664 F.3d at 640 (calling third-party affidavits “that attest to the 

billing rates of comparable attorneys” the “next best evidence” of an attorney’s market rate when 

the attorney uses contingent fee agreements and the hourly rate cannot be easily determined). 

Mr. Horwitz also attaches billing records from several cases, including state criminal

cases, state tort cases, one federal civil rights case, and one matter that involved both a federal 

civil rights case (that had proceeded to the amended complaint stage) and a state tort case. Doc. 

262. Defendants object to these bills as unsubstantiated and not proof that Mr. Horwitz charged 

his clients the amounts listed or that his clients actually paid that amount. Defendants also 

complain that one-third of the billing records were not produced during the meet and confer 

process. Defendants do not identify which specific records were not disclosed and do not move 

to strike any particular parts of this exhibit, therefore the Court will consider the billing records. 

The Seventh Circuit has directed district courts to “presume that an attorney’s actual 

billing rate for similar litigation is appropriate to use as the market rate,” however the applicant 

bears the burden to produce satisfactory evidence to show the requested rate is in line with 

prevailing market rates. Pickett, 664 F.3d at 640. Of the six bills submitted by Mr. Horwitz in 

support of his requested $500.00/hour rate, only two of the matters are federal civil rights cases, 

and of those, one is a bill that blends a false arrest claim filed in state court and a civil rights 

claim filed in federal court. The closest comparator to this case is the federal civil rights case 

that has progressed to the second amended complaint stage. That case has involved discovery, 

including discovery motion practice, investigation, response to a motion to dismiss, hearing 

attendance, client communication, communication with opposing counsel, drafting an answer to 

a counterclaim, and drafting of pleadings. In that case, on-going for almost two years, Mr. 

8
Horwitz claims approximately 20 hours of work. It well may be that Mr. Horwitz would bill an 

additional approximately 270 hours of work to take that matter to trial, bringing this case in line 

with the almost 291 hours he claims for this case. With this bill, Mr. Horwitz has shown some 

evidence that his market rate for similar litigation is $500 per hour and with the collection of 

bills, he has shown that he has billed $500.00 per hour for his recent state and federal work. 

However, Mr. Horwitz has not convinced the Court that $500.00 per hour is in line with 

market rates for federal civil rights litigation. See id. Mr. Horwitz’s own affidavit attests that he 

has been awarded $400.00 per hour in 2006 and 2008, and $425.00 per hour in 2012, 2013, and 

2014. The last award of $425 per hour was in November 2014 by Judge Shah in the Ferguson

case, a § 1983 case that Mr. Horwitz uses to argue that because an attorney with nine years’ 

experience was awarded $400.00 per hour, and although he himself was awarded only $425.00 

per hour in that case, he should receive $500.00 per hour in this case. The Seventh Circuit has 

explained that “rates awarded in similar cases are clearly evidence of an attorney’s market rate.” 

People Who Care, 90 F.3d at 1312. That Mr. Horwitz was awarded $425.00 per hour in a civil 

rights case less than one year ago is strong evidence of his market rate. Indeed, that rate was for 

work done in 2013, and a significant amount of the work in this case was also performed in 

2013. It would not be appropriate for this Court to award Mr. Horwitz a higher rate for similar 

work done in the same year. This rate has also been recently approved for Mr. Horwitz by other 

courts in this district. See Bronzino v. Sheldon, No. 09 C 1048, 2013 WL 1667911, at *3 (N.D. 

Ill. Apr. 17, 2013) ($425.00/hour requested) and Smith v. City of Chicago, No. 09 CV 4754, Doc. 

229 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2012) ($425.00/hour requested). Likewise, the third-party attorney 

affidavits from other practitioners, as discussed above, point to a market rate of between $335.00 

per hour and $475.00 per hour for civil rights litigators with between fourteen and thirty-four 

9
years’ experience. Mr. Kulis had a rate of $475.00 approved by another Northern District court 

in 2011, but he also has an additional decade of civil rights practice experience. Although Mr. 

Lipschultz attests that his rate of $335.00 per hour was approved by a Northern District of 

Illinois court “several years ago and is likely higher today,” Doc. 225-1, p. 32 ¶ 11, that does not 

require a bump in Mr. Horwitz’s rate by $75.00 per hour when his rate was so recently approved 

at $425.00 per hour.

The Court agrees with Defendants that Mr. Horwitz’s market rate is shown to be $425.00 

per hour. 

2. Uma Bansal

Ms. Bansal requests an hourly rate of $350.00 per hour. In support of this rate, Ms. 

Bansal argues that she has eight years of experience, including bringing five cases to trial, and 

that she was the attorney who primarily prepared this case for trial. She cites a 2012 $285.00 per 

hour award in a police misconduct matter in this district and requests an increase to $350.00 per 

hour, citing generally her experience since that time working on complex litigation. In support 

she submits her own affidavit and the affidavit of Deidre Baumann, who attests that, having 

worked with Ms. Bansal, a rate of $350.00 per hour is fair and comparable to rates charged by 

similarly experienced civil rights attorneys. Mr. Lipschultz’s affidavit also states that Ms. 

Bansal’s requested $350.00 per hour rate is reasonable. Ms. Bansal’s affidavit states that she 

bills her time at $350.00 in her own law practice and that the Horwitz Law Firm bills her time at 

$350.00 per hour. Ms. Bansal has not submitted any bills or documentation to verify this 

amount. She also cites the approved rate of $400.00 per hour in the Ferguson matter to another 

attorney with nine years’ experience and the awards of $340.00 per hour to two attorneys with 

six years’ experience in Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich, No. 05 C 4265, 

10
2006 WL 3694851, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2006). Again, Ms. Bansal’s own attestations and 

those of other attorneys to the reasonableness of her requested rate, without more, are of limited 

use to the Court. See Harper, 223 F.3d at 604; Pickett, 664 F.3d at 647. 

Defendants argue that Ms. Bansal has only five years’ experience in civil rights litigation, 

as her first years of practice were primarily in intellectual property law and as a litigation 

associate with an unspecified focus. The Court does look to the market rate “for lawyers 

engaged in the type of litigation in which the fee is being sought.” Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 

914, 920 (7th Cir. 1996); Jimenez v. City of Chicago, No. 09 C 8081, 2012 WL 5512266, at *3 

(N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2012) (looking to civil rights versus general litigation experience in 

determining fee rates). Reviewing Ms. Bansal’s affidavit, it appears that she has five years of

civil rights experience. As discussed above, the market rate as established by the affidavits 

submitted in support of Mr. Horwitz’s requested rate is between $335.00 per hour and $475.00 

per hour for civil rights litigators with between fourteen and thirty-four years’ experience. Ms. 

Bansal was recently awarded a rate of $285.00 per hour. The Court finds this amount to be 

proportionally within the established market rate and reasonable for an attorney of her 

experience. See Golden v. World Sec. Agency, Inc., No. 10 CV 7673, 2014 WL 37829, at *3 

(N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2014) (approving $250.00 per hour for attorney with five and a half years’ 

experience); Jimenez, 2012 WL 5512266, at *3 (approving $275 per hour for attorney with four 

years civil rights litigation experience, plus two years litigation experience and a federal 

appellate clerkship). Ms. Bansal’s rate is set at $285.00 per hour. 

3. Amanda Yarusso

Ms. Yarusso requests an hourly rate of $400.00 per hour. In support of this rate, she cites 

her eleven years of civil rights litigation experience, including her substantial trial experience 

11
and participation as lead counsel in civil rights cases. Ms. Yarusso cites to the $400.00 per hour 

award in Ferguson to an attorney with nine years of civil rights litigation experience. She also 

cites her awarded rate of $350.00 per hour three years ago in Gibson v. City of Chicago, 873 F.

Supp. 2d 975, 985 (N.D. Ill. 2012), and argues that her increased experience in the interim and 

greater level of participation in this case warrant a $50.00 per hour increase. She points to an 

award of $395.00 per hour as a reasonable rate for an attorney with nine years civil rights 

experience in Gibson. Ms. Yarusso also provides her own affidavit and supplemental affidavit 

attesting to her experience, the affidavit of Mr. Kosoglad (the attorney awarded the $400.00 per 

hour rate in Ferguson), and a declaration by Torreya Hamilton that attests that Ms. Yarusso’s 

requested rate is reasonable and states her own hourly rates (either awarded or negotiated) as 

$425.00 per hour (in 2010, 2013, and 2014), $395.00 per hour (in 2011 & 2012), and $400.00 

per hour (in 2013). Ms. Hamilton also states that she currently bills $435.00 per hour and has 

been practicing law for nineteen years (with seventeen of those years in civil rights litigation). 

Ms. Hamilton’s affidavit places her rates (ranging from $395.00 to $435.00 per hour) 

directly in line with the market rates of $335.00 for fourteen years’ experience and $475.00 for 

someone with thirty-four years’ experience as established above. The Gibson award to Ms. 

Yarusso of $350.00 is slightly above this benchmark considering she has eleven, rather than 

fourteen, years’ experience. Mr. Kosoglad’s award of $400.00 appears to be an outlier in terms 

of market rates and must have been an exceptionally litigated case.

Defendants argue for a rate of $350.00 per hour, based on the previously awarded or 

negotiated rate of that amount for similar trial participation by Ms. Yarusso. Defendants further 

argue that Ms. Yarusso has not established why a $50.00 per hour increase from that amount is 

12
justified, that her experience is better compared to other attorneys in other fee award cases, and 

that a $50.00 increase is too high compared to the average 3% raise of the American worker. 

Ms. Yarusso did an excellent job in court on this case. The Court finds persuasive the 

2012 award of her rate as $350.00 despite the fact that it is slightly above the market rates as 

presented with this Petition. Ms. Yarusso’s rate is set at $350.00 per hour. 

4. Jonathan Levy

Mr. Levy requests an hourly rate of $200.00 per hour. He has been practicing for a little 

over a year (sixteen months), concentrating in § 1983 and employment discrimination. In 

support, Mr. Levy presents his affidavit, attesting to his experience and that his work is billed at 

$200.00 per hour by the Horwitz Law Firm. Multiple bills are attached to the fee petition 

reflecting this rate. Defendants argue that a rate of $150.00 per hour is more appropriate 

considering Mr. Levy’s lack of experience and limited role at trial. The Court agrees that, 

although Mr. Levy’s billing rate is presumptively reasonable, it does not reflect the market rate 

for attorneys of his experience level. And Mr. Levy’s attempt to compare himself to associates 

with many more years’ experience is unavailing. A rate of $150.00 per hour is reasonable. See 

Alcazar-Anselmo v. City of Chicago, No. 07 C 5246, 2011 WL 3236024, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 

2011) (approving $150.00 per hour rate for recent law school graduate). Mr. Levy’s rate is set at 

$150.00 per hour.

5. Jeff Grossich & Sergio Moreno

Jeff Grossich, a law clerk, and Sergio Moreno, a paralegal, each request an hourly rate of 

$100.00 per hour. Defendants do not contest these rates and the Court finds them to be 

reasonable. 

13
C. Requested Hours for Pre-Trial & Trial Work

Defendants challenge the reasonableness of certain requested hours. To assist the Court 

in determining the lodestar amount, “[t]he party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence 

supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. Where the documentation of hours is 

inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The 

Court must also exclude from its initial fee calculation hours that are not “reasonably expended.” 

Id. at 434. Hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” should be cut. Id.

1. Vagueness & Block Billing

Defendants ask the Court to reduce Ms. Bansal’s hours by 15 percent (130.5 hours) due 

to what they characterize as pervasive billing entries that are vague. If a party claims hours that 

are vague or inadequately documented, the Court “may either strike the problematic entries or (in 

recognition of the impracticalities of requiring courts to do an item-by-item accounting) reduce 

the proposed fee by a reasonable percentage.” Harper, 223 F.3d at 605. 

Smith’s initial arguments that Defendants have waived these objections by requesting 

percentage deductions rather than specific objections to time entries and that Defendants did not 

comply with Local Rule 54.3 in supporting these requested reductions are rejected. The parties 

have submitted the meet-and-confer documentation to the Court and the Court finds it adequate. 

Smith further argues in his Reply that Defendants failed to produce billing records as required by 

the Local Rules and therefore are in a weak position to argue that his attorneys’ hours expended 

are unreasonable. However, Defendants did provide billing information during the meet-andconfer process. The other party’s billed hours are not a necessary part of the fee petition, but 

rather a benchmark to allow the Court to consider reasonableness. See Delgado v. Mak, No. 06 

14
C 3757, 2009 WL 211862, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (considering plaintiff’s requested hours 

despite failure of defendants to provide any billing records). 

Smith further argues that the entries are not vague or can be understood from context. 

However, the Court finds that a small percentage of Ms. Bansal’s entries are too vague to be 

evaluated. See, e.g. Doc. 225-1 at 71, 80 (“Discuss upcoming depositions with Blake (.2)” or 

“Discuss to Blake (.9)”). Therefore the Court finds a five percent reduction in Ms. Bansal’s 

requested hours (43.51 hours) is warranted.

Defendants also request that the Court reduce Ms. Yarusso’s time by 17.4 hours to 

account for instances of block billing. When time records do not show the time spent on 

individual tasks, the Court cannot determine whether the claimed time is reasonable. Therefore 

the Seventh Circuit has rejected block billing. Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., 421 F. 

Supp. 2d 1117, 1119 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“The Seventh Circuit has made it very clear that a fee 

applicant must show the time spent on specific tasks rather than simply the total time spent on a 

bundle of tasks.”). Of the six block entries identified by Defendants, the Court finds that the 

10/6/14 (4.5 hours), 10/15/14 (9.5 hours), 10/21/14 (5.8 hours), 10/22/14 (6.0 hours), and 

10/24/14 (3.5 hours) entries are not sufficiently detailed to allow the Court to determine the 

reasonableness of the charged time (29.3 total hours). The Court may disallow hours or reduce 

the entire fee award by a percentage when an attorney does not sufficiently document his or her 

time. See Gibson v. City of Chicago, 873 F. Supp. 2d 975, 986 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Therefore, the 

Court finds that it is reasonable to reduce Ms. Yarusso’s hours by 14.65 hours (half of the 29.3 

total block-billed hours).

15
2. Attorneys Billing for Paralegal or Administrative Tasks

Defendants argue that 9.23 hours of Mr. Horwitz, 20.9 hours of Ms. Bansal, 4 hours of 

Ms. Yarusso, and 9.73 hours of Mr. Levy’s billed time are paralegal tasks and should be billed at 

the rate of $100.00 per hour. The Court may not “award fees at attorneys’ rates for work that 

does not require that level of skill.” O’Brien v. Panino’s, Inc., No. 10 C 2991, 2011 WL 

3610076, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2011) (citing Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 

544, 553 (7th Cir. 1999)). 

Smith argues that Mr. Horwitz’s time spent during trial organizing exhibits was vital to 

the presentation and success of the case. The Court agrees that some trial exhibit organization on 

the part of the lead trial counsel is reasonable, but considers over six hours of such work to be 

excessive. Therefore the Court will allow two hours of this work at Mr. Horwitz’s approved 

attorney rate. The pre-trial activities listed in Defendants’ Response Exhibit 3, Table 3B for Mr. 

Horwitz are clerical or better suited to a paralegal billing rate. Therefore the Court will reduce 

Mr. Horwitz’s hours by 7.23 hours. Those hours will be billed at $100.00 per hour. 

Similarly, Smith argues that the approximately seven hours Ms. Bansal spent organizing 

and outlining medical records contributed to her direct examination of the Plaintiff. The Court 

finds that 14.4 of the challenged hours are for paralegal-level work, but the organization and 

outlining of medical records and calculation of bills (6.5 hours) should be billed at Ms. Bansal’s 

awarded attorney rate. Therefore the Court will reduce Ms. Bansal’s total hours by 14.4 hours 

and bill those at $100.00 per hour. 

Smith argues that Ms. Yarusso’s disputed 4 hours preparing itemized and updated 

statements of attorneys’ fees is necessarily lawyer work, since it requires compiling detail and 

attributing time. The Court agrees, however four hours on this task is not reasonable. Therefore 

16
the Court reduces this to 2.5 hours billed at Ms. Yarusso’s awarded attorney rate. Similarly, the 

Court reduces Mr. Levy’s claimed 271 minutes preparing his attorneys’ fee statement to 2.5 

hours to be billed at his awarded attorney rate and determines that the other contested tasks 

(totaling 5.22 hours) are better billed at a paralegal rate of $100.00 per hour.

Defendants also argue that Smith’s attorneys and paralegal cannot bill for purely 

administrative tasks, and includes a table of contested fees. See Response, Ex. 3, Table 3C. Fees 

are not to be awarded for “clerical or secretarial tasks, which should be absorbed as overhead 

into the attorneys’ billing rate.” Id. The Court agrees that, for this reason Ms. Bansal’s hours 

will be reduced by 3.1 hours, Mr. Levy’s hours will be reduced by 1.45 hours, and Mr. Moreno’s 

hours will be reduced by 34.2 hours.

3. Lack of Diligence

Defendants ask the Court to reduce Mr. Horwitz’s time by 17.07 hours and Ms. Bansal’s 

time by 20.2 hours for time spent on Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Expert Discovery and 

Defendants’ Motions to Quash Subpoenas, which Defendants characterize as needless expenses 

attributable to Smith’s lack of diligence in meeting expert and fact discovery deadlines. The 

“touchstone” in determining whether an attorney’s time is compensable, even if spent on an 

unsuccessful argument or motion, is whether that argument (or here motion) was “reasonable.” 

See Jaffee v. Redmond, 142 F.3d 409, 414 (7th Cir. 1998). The requested reductions are for 

discovery motions necessitated by Smith’s counsel’s own failure to meet the expert discovery 

cut-off, requiring an additional, last minute request to extend expert discovery and from the 

issuance of subpoenas long after fact discovery had closed. Both motions were resolved in 

Defendants’ favor. The Court agrees that the work expended on these motions was not 

reasonable, as they were necessitated by counsel’s own failure to meet clear, long-standing (and 

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already extended) court deadlines. The Court will reduce Mr. Horwitz’s hours by 17.07 and Ms. 

Bansal’s hours by 20.2. 

4. Excessive, Duplicative, and Unnecessary Time Entries

As discussed above, fees should not be awarded for excessive, duplicative, and 

unnecessary charges. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Defendants seek an 8% reduction in counsel’s 

hours for duplicative billing for internal communications, which they estimate to be 

approximately 163 billed hours or 9.3% of the total hours billed. While communications among 

lawyers and staff are not presumptively unreasonable, this percentage of requested time is twice

the percentage approved by the Seventh Circuit after a similar challenge. See Tchemkou v. 

Mukasey, 517 F.3d 506, 511–12 (7th Cir. 2008). Therefore, the Court finds these hours are

inflated, primarily due to billing in increments .1 of an hour, or six minutes, for email review. 

See Taylor v. Law Offices of Vincent Peter Cignarale, LLC, No. 11 CV 4853, 2011 WL 

6102020, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2011). The Court therefore finds that it is reasonable to reduce 

the total requested hours by 5% (1% for each of the attorneys overbilling these amounts). Mr. 

Horwitz’s hours are reduced by 14.53 hours, Ms. Bansal’s hours are reduced by 43.51 hours, Ms. 

Yarusso’s hours are reduced by 9.74 hours, Mr. Levy’s hours are reduced by 7.27 hours, Mr. 

Grossich’s hours are reduced by 5.49 hours, and Mr. Moreno’s hours are reduced by 6.7 hours. 

5. Overstaffing

Defendants seek a 20% reduction of all hours requested due to Smith’s alleged 

overstaffing of the case. Defendants argue that the participation of three lawyers, a law clerk, a 

paralegal, and then the addition of Ms. Yarusso to the trial team, was excessive for a

straightforward single defendant, single plaintiff § 1983 case, especially considering that 

Defendant Altman was represented by two lawyers and a paralegal at trial. Smith argues that the 

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addition of Ms. Yarusso increased efficiency because trial tasks were clearly divided, she 

stepped into the lead attorney role when Mr. Horwitz was absent for witness preparation, and her 

billing rate is lower than that of Mr. Horwitz, decreasing fees. Smith further argues that the 

Court should look to whether duplicative work is billed rather than the number of attorneys. 

A court must scrutinize fee requests for additional attorneys to ensure that their work is 

reasonable and fully justified. See Schlacher v. Law Offices of Phillip J. Rotche & Assocs., P.C., 

574 F.3d 852, 858–59 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Though efficiency can sometimes be increased through 

collaboration, overstaffing cases inefficiently is common, and district courts are therefore 

encouraged to scrutinize fee petitions for duplicative billing when multiple lawyers seek fees.”

(citations omitted)); LaSalvia v. City of Evanston, No. 10 C 3076, 2012 WL 2502703, at *2 

(N.D. Ill. June 28, 2012) (reducing hours sought for attorney added to trial team). 

The Court declines to reduce counsels’ fees by 20% across-the-board because of the 

addition of Ms. Yarusso to the trial team. However, throughout the trial it was clear that the 

three attorneys at counsel table, plus the additional associate and law clerk sometimes in 

attendance, was overstaffing—as demonstrated by the multiple voices in almost every sidebar, 

no matter the witness or issue. After reviewing the billing records, the Court finds that some trial 

hours billed by multiple attorneys are duplicative and reduces the requested fees as follows: Mr. 

Horwitz’s hours are reduced by 3.5 hours, Ms. Bansal’s hours are reduced by 30.25 hours, Ms. 

Yarusso’s hours are reduced by 33.55 hours, and Mr. Levy’s hours are reduced by 2.75 hours.

6. Time Spent Reading Minute Orders

Defendants seek a reduction of .1 hours from Ms. Yarusso’s time and 6.2 hours from Ms. 

Bansal’s time for fees sought for reading this Court’s minute orders. Defendants assert that the 

itemized bills submitted by Smith in support of the fee petition show that it is not the Horwitz 

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Law Firm’s general practice to bill clients in tenths of an hour for such activity, and therefore 

this amount should not be awarded as fees. Smith argues that the time billed was the minimal 

allowed and review of Court orders is an important aspect of case work. The Court agrees

review of orders is compensable; however, billing in six minute increments for the review of a 

single minute order is excessive. See Taylor, 2011 WL 6102020, at *2 (reducing by two-thirds 

fees billed in 0.1-hour increments requested for email review). This amount of time for a 

minimal task would not be passed along to the client. Therefore the Court will reduce Ms. 

Bansal’s requested hours for this task by 3.1 hours.

7. Excessive Time Spent on Basic Tasks

Defendants request that Mr. Levy’s time for performing certain basic tasks be reduced by 

30% (16.52 hours) because, as a first-year attorney, he billed more than was reasonable for these 

tasks and this time would not be passed along to a paying client. Smith argues that Mr. Levy’s 

work was important to the case. The Court has reviewed the disputed time and agrees that a 

reduction for excessive time spent on basic tasks (including reading cases) is warranted. The 

Court reduces Mr. Levy’s time by 16.52 hours.

Defendants also request that Mr. Grossich’s time for performing basic legal research, 

writing, and reading was excessive and should be reduced by 50% (24.07 hours). Defendants 

also ask the Court to reduce Mr. Grossich’s time by 25% (10.55 hours) for excess time spent 

reading and abstracting depositions. Smith counters that this case presented unique legal issues, 

necessitating in-depth research, and that using Mr. Grossich to complete the time-consuming task 

of abstracting depositions was an efficient use of resources. The Court agrees that this case 

presented novel and difficult legal issues; however, having reviewed the time identified by 

Defendants as excessive for legal research and memoranda writing, the Court agrees that some 

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reduction is warranted—over six hours of research for a four-page memorandum on designation 

of an expert as a witness, for example, is excessive. The Court will reduce these hours by one 

fourth. Mr. Grossich’s time will be reduced by 12.04 hours. The Court also agrees that the time 

spent abstracting depositions is excessive and would not be passed along to a paying client. See 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (“Hours that are not properly billed to one’s client also are not properly 

billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.”). The Court reduces Mr. Grossich’s 

time by an additional 10.55 hours. 

D. The Lodestar Amount for Pre-Trial & Trial Work

Therefore, for pre-trial and trial work, the Court calculates the lodestar amount as 

follows:

Attorneys & Paralegal Hours Rate Total

Blake Horwitz 248.32 $425.00 $105,536.00

Uma Bansal 712.03 $285.00 $202,928.55

Amanda Yarusso 135.36 $350.00 $47,376.00

Jonathan Levy 110.49 $150.00 $16,573.50

Jeff Grossich 81.72 $100.00 $8,172.00

Sergio Moreno 93.1 $100.00 $9,310.00

Attorney hours billed at 

$100.00 paralegal rate

26.85 $100.00 $2,685.00

Total 1364.37 $409,631.05

E. Post-Trial Motion Practice Attorneys’ Fees 

Smith requests the following additional hours for his attorneys’ post-trial work:

Attorneys & Paralegal Hours

21
Blake Horwitz 80.88

Uma Bansal 89.2

Amanda Yarusso 21.5

Jonathan Levy 68.45

Jeff Grossich 29.39

Sergio Moreno 14.55

Total 303.09

A prevailing plaintiff is entitled to compensation for preparation of the fee request and 

post-trial work. See Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 777 (7th Cir. 1988). Defendants

challenge several aspects of the requested hours. First, Defendant request a reduction of Ms. 

Yarusso’s hours by 1.45, which is 50% of the 2.9 hours spent in communication with other 

attorneys on the team. The Court agrees that inter-attorney communications as 18% of the 

requested hours is excessive and appears to be mostly Ms. Yarusso and Ms. Bansal discussing 

the attorneys’ fees briefing, which was extensive but not overly complex. See Tchemkou, 517 

F.3d at 511–12 (rejecting request for internal communications totaling approximately 9% of total 

requested fee, approving equivalent of less than 5% of requested hours). The Court will reduce 

Ms. Yarusso’s hours by 1.45. 

Defendants also challenge certain tasks as properly billed at paralegal rates or improperly 

billed because they are non-compensable administrative tasks. The Court agrees that gathering 

and organizing exhibits, preparing timesheets, and filing petitions are best compensated at a 

paralegal rate of $100.00 per hour. The Court reduces Ms. Bansal’s post-trial hours by 5.3 hours 

and will assess those hours at the $100.00 per hour paralegal rate. Also, ordering transcripts and 

22
delivering courtesy copies are administrative tasks that are not appropriate fees. The Court 

reduces Mr. Moreno’s post-trial hours by 1.92 hours. 

Defendants also request a reduction in Mr. Levy’s and Mr. Grossich’s hours (22.1 hours 

and 9.47 hours, respectively) for excessive time spent on basic tasks. The Court does find five 

hours to read trial testimony, particularly by someone who observed portions of the trial, to be 

excessive. Similarly, 44.22 hours of research on post-trial issues, especially the nearly 20 hours 

of research on jury, new trial, and “trial issues,” to be unreasonable. Similarly, the 14.48 hours 

researching subrogation, wages, and damages over the course of two days shows a lack of 

efficiency and likely would not have been billed to the client. Therefore, the Court will reduce 

Mr. Levy’s hours by 22.1 hours. The Court likewise does not believe that a client of this civil 

rights law firm would be billed for over 8 hours of research by a clerk into typical jury verdicts 

on Illinois state claims for pain and suffering. Mr. Grossich’s other research tasks, as listed in 

Doc. 238-6 at 3 (Table 5C) are excessive and will be reduced. Mr. Grossich’s hours are reduced 

by 9.47 hours.

Defendants request the Court reduce Mr. Horwitz’s time by 1.33 hours because the 

redactions on certain time entries make it impossible to determine the reasonableness of the time 

expended. The Court agrees that the entries on 12/1/14 (0.05 hours), 12/3/14 (0.32 hours), and 

12/4/14 (0.28 hours) are completely or almost completely redacted and therefore unintelligible. 

The Court reduces Mr. Horwitz’s hours by 0.65 hours. 

Finally, Defendants request a 20% reduction in the post-trial billing hours for all 

attorneys and the paralegal due to overstaffing. Smith asserts that the post-trial tasks were 

divided among the attorneys, with Mr. Horwitz handling the substantive post-trial motions and 

Ms. Yarusso and Ms. Bansal working on the fees briefing. The Court agrees that it is excessive 

23
to have Mr. Yarusso and Ms. Bansal both briefing the fees petition and therefore reduces Ms. 

Bansal’s hours by 15% for that overlap (13.38 hours). Furthermore, four to five attorneys to 

research and draft the post-trial motions is excessive. Although the set-off motion presented 

unique questions of law, this should not require four attorneys’ attention. Mr. Horwitz, Ms. 

Bansal, Mr. Levy and Mr. Grossich all billed time for research on the set-off motion. The Court 

will therefore reduce each of their time by 20% for this inefficiency. Mr. Horwitz’s hours are 

reduced by 16 hours, Ms. Bansal’s hours are reduced by 17.84 hours, Mr. Levy’s hours are 

reduced by 13.69 hours, and Mr. Grossich’s hours are reduced by 5.88 hours. 

Therefore the lodestar for post-trial work is the following:

Attorneys & Paralegal Hours Rate Total

Blake Horwitz 63.35 $425.00 $26,923.75

Uma Bansal 52.68 $285.00 $15,013.80

Amanda Yarusso 20.05 $350.00 $7,017.50

Jonathan Levy 32.66 $150.00 $4,899.00

Jeff Grossich 14.04 $100.00 $1,404.00

Sergio Moreno 12.63 $100.00 $1,263.00

Attorney hours billed at 

$100.00 paralegal rate

5.3 $100.00 $530.00

Total 200.71 $57,051.05

F. Adjustment of the Lodestar

Once the Court has determined the lodestar amount, it may then adjust that amount up or 

down in light of the plaintiff’s “level of success.” Spegon, 175 F.3d at 557 (quoting Hensley, 

461 U.S. at 436). Defendants ask the Court to reduce the lodestar, arguing that the hours 

24
requested are, as a whole, unreasonable compared to defense counsel’s hours—an approximate 

difference of 1000 additional hours by Smith’s counsel, or 2.5 times the number of hours billed 

by Defendants’ counsel. The Court rejects Defendants’ request to reduce the lodestar based on a 

comparison of Smith’s counsel’s total hours to their own—although over a thousand hours is a 

large investment in a case, plaintiffs carry the burden of proof and therefore often expend more 

hours on a case than defendants. See Delgado, 2009 WL 211862, at *5 (“[M]any courts have 

remarked that usually a plaintiff, who has to carry the burden of proof, spends a great deal more 

time on litigation than a defendant.” (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks)). Smith asks 

the Court to increase the lodestar based on the large jury verdict in his favor. Defendants assert 

that an additional upward adjustment is not required because not all of the requested hours for 

the entire litigation are reasonable. The Court finds that the lodestar amount is appropriate to 

fully compensate Smith’s counsel for an excellent result without any upward adjustment. See 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 (“Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should 

recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended 

on the litigation, and indeed in some cases of exceptional success an enhanced award may be 

justified.”). Although the trial resulted in a large jury award, this trial and the long litigation 

preceding it was not otherwise so exceptional so as to merit an upward adjustment. 

II. Costs

Smith seeks $32,151.93 in costs for pre-trial, trial, and post-trial work. See Doc. 225-4 

and Doc. 244 at 22.

3

 Defendants challenge these amounts as inappropriate, excessive, or 

inadequately documented. As discussed above, the prevailing party is presumptively entitled to 

recoverable costs, but bears the burden of showing that those costs were reasonable and 

3 Note, there seems to be an addition error in Exhibit D. The total requested for pre-trial and trial work is 

$29,941.88, not the $29,721.18 listed. And Smith increases the total post-trial transcript fees sought (from 

$2,134.65 to $2,210.05) in his reply. Doc. 244. 

25

 
necessary. Beamon, 411 F.3d at 864; Chi. Plastering Inst. Pension Trust, 570 F.3d at 906. Only 

the costs listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 are recoverable—these include fees of the clerk, fees for 

transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case, and docket fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1920. 

Defendants specifically challenge the $19,500.00 requested for expert witnesses and $2,135.65 

to court reporters post-trial. The Court will examine each category of claimed costs in turn.

A. Fees of the Clerk

Smith seeks $350.00 for fees to the clerk. The $350.00 docketing fee for the complaint is 

authorized by statute and therefore recoverable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1). 

B. Fees for Service of Summons and Subpoena

Smith seeks $65.57 for postage and delivery and $51.37 for “subpoena.” In support 

Smith provides a transaction detail report from the Horwitz Law Firm indicating charges to 

Smith for these line items. Defendants have not contested these items and they seem to fall 

within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See Tchemkou, 517 F.3d at 512–13 (“[T]his court has 

construed section 1920 to include amounts spent on filing fees, postage, telephone calls and 

delivery charges[.]”). The requested $116.94 for service of summons and subpoena is 

recoverable.

C. Transcripts

Smith seeks $8,695.86 in fees for transcripts for pre-trial and trial work and $2,135.65 in 

transcript fees for post-trial work. Defendants challenge the post-trial amount as without 

itemization, documentation, or proof of payment. Defendants do not otherwise challenge the 

transcripts. Section 1920(2) allows Defendants to recover fees for transcripts that were 

necessarily obtained for use in the case, but the recoverable cost is limited to the regular copy 

rate established by the Judicial Conference of the United States that was in effect at the time the 

26
transcript or deposition was filed unless another rate was previously provided for by order of the 

Court. N.D. Ill. L.R. 54.1(b). The regular copy rate is $3.65 per page for an original transcript 

and $4.85 for an expedited transcript. See Maximum Transcript Rates, http://www.ilnd.uscourts.

gov/home/clerksoffice/CLERKS_OFFICE/CrtReporter/trnscrpt.htm. Defendants do not 

challenge the $8,695.86 in fees for pre-trial and trial transcripts and those fees are allowed. As 

for the post-trial transcript costs, Smith argues that he did not receive an invoice from the court 

reporter until March 24, 2015 (after the February 27, 2015 Fee Petition and the initial Bill of 

Costs was filed on November 25, 2014). That $1981.20 invoice is dated March 4, 2015. The 

other invoices are dated before the Fee Petition was filed, but Defendants do not make any 

substantive argument that these otherwise allowable and supported (if somewhat late) costs 

should be denied. These post-trial transcript costs are awarded.

D. Fees and Disbursements for Printing; Docket Fees

Defendants make no objection to the $1,114.48 requested by Smith in printing fees. 

These costs are allowed. Similarly, the $164.40 requested in docket fees is allowed.

E. Total Costs Awarded

The Court therefore awards $12,651.93 in costs to Smith.

F. Court-Appointed Experts

Defendants dispute the $19,500.00 in claimed costs for expert witnesses as not 

appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and based on insufficient documentation. Defendants also 

dispute the $500.00 for Dr. Sweeney’s rebuttal report, which was barred by the Court. Expert 

fees are recoverable as part of an award of attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c). This 

section does not require that the expert be court-appointed. See Warfield v. City of Chicago, 733 

27
F. Supp. 2d 950, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2010). Smith seeks $11,700.00 for non-retained expert/treating 

physician Dr. Sweeney’s trial testimony and $7,800.00 for Dr. Levin.

Dr. Sweeney testified at trial and prepared a rebuttal expert report. Whether or not that 

report was ultimately allowed, those fees are reasonable and sufficiently documented. 

Defendants challenge the “Health Insurance Claim Form” submitted in support of Dr. Sweeney’s 

$11,200.00 fee for one day of trial testimony. Although it is an odd format, this is a bill of sorts 

and the Court will not disallow this cost on this basis. $11,700.00 is recoverable for Dr. 

Sweeney’s testimony. 

Defendants also challenge the documentation for Dr. Levin’s fees. Smith includes a bill 

from Dr. Levin in the amount of $5,850.00 for his evidence deposition on October 10, 2014. 

That fee is reasonable and sufficiently documented. Smith also includes a check for $1,950.00 

made out to Dr. Levin; however, Smith provides no explanation of this additional charge except 

that Dr. Levin charges $1,950.00 per hour. Without any explanation of the charged cost, the 

Court cannot determine whether this amount is reasonable and it will not be awarded.

Smith will be awarded $17,550.00 in fees for these expert witnesses.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Smith $467,182.10 in fees and $12,651.93 in 

costs. Defendants’ motion to strike [245] is granted.

Dated: September 21, 2015 ______________________

SARA L. ELLIS

United States District Judge

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