IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

DR. NICHOLAS ANGELOPOULOS, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Case No. 12-cv-5836 

 ) 

KEYSTONE ORTHOPEDIC SPECIALISTS, ) Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. 

S.C., WACHN, LLC, and MARTIN R. HALL, ) 

M.D., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for entry of judgment under Rule 58 [440]. The 

Court denied the motion without prejudice on January 18, 2018, to allow the parties time to 

conduct limited, targeted additional discovery concerning damages. With the benefit of the 

parties’ supplemental submissions, the Court now proceeds to a ruling on Plaintiff’s motion 

[440]. For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s motion for entry of judgment under Rule 58 

[440] is granted in part and denied in part. The Court awards Plaintiff $178,954.29 in 

compensatory damages on Count 1 and denies Plaintiff’s request for equitable relief on Count 3. 

Consistent with the jury’s verdict, the award on Count 1 operates in favor of Plaintiff and against 

Defendants Hall and Keystone. The Court also awards Plaintiff prejudgment interest on the 

remaining counts and anticipates entering a final Rule 58 judgment order at the next status 

hearing in this case, which is set for July 18, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. Counsel are directed to confer 

and submit to the Proposed Order Box a proposed final judgment order—agreed, if possible—

incorporating all of the jury’s and the Court’s rulings no later than July 16, 2018. The Court 
2 

anticipates setting a briefing schedule on the anticipated Rule 59 motions at the July 18 status 

hearing. 

I. Background 

 Plaintiff Dr. Nicholas Angelopoulos (“Plaintiff”), an anesthesiologist, brought suit 

against his former business partner, Dr. Martin Hall (“Hall”), a medical practice owned by Hall, 

Keystone Orthopedic Specialists, S.C. (“Keystone”), and a limited liability company formed by 

Plaintiff, Hall, and other physicians called WACHN LLC (“WACHN”) (collectively, 

“Defendants”) for fraudulently filing an information return in violation of the Internal Revenue 

Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7434 (Count 1), common law fraud (Count 2), breach of fiduciary duty (Count 

3), breach of the WACHN operating agreement and Keystone Agreement (Counts 5 and 6), and 

unjust enrichment. These claims and their factual background are described in detail in the 

Court’s prior rules on motions to dismiss and summary judgment, knowledge of which is 

assumed here. See [258], [303]. 

 On June 6, 2017, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on all of the counts that 

proceeded to trial—Counts 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6. By agreement of the parties, the issue of damages in 

the event of a verdict for Plaintiff on Count 1 was reserved for determination by the Court. 

Plaintiff now seeks a damages award on Count 1, as well as prejudgment interest on Counts 2, 3, 

5, and 6 and equitable relief on Count 3—all of which Plaintiff would like incorporated into a 

Rule 58 final judgment order. Defendants oppose most of the relief sought by Plaintiff. 

II. Analysis 

 A. Count 1 Damages 

 In Count 1 of his complaint, Plaintiff sought recovery under 26 U.S.C. § 7434 based on 

allegations that Keystone and Hall caused a fraudulent IRS Form 1099 (“1099”) to be filed in 
3 

Plaintiff’s name reporting more than $159,000 as taxable income for tax year 2007. Plaintiff 

acknowledged that approximately $38,000 should have been reported on the 1099, but claimed 

that the excess amount was included by Keystone and Hall out of spite arising out of the larger 

disputes between the parties. The jury agreed with Plaintiff as to liability. By agreement of the 

parties, the calculation of damages will be done by the Court. 

 Section 7434(b) governs “damages” for the filing of a “fraudulent information return.” It 

permits the Court to award either (1) a flat sum of $5,000 or (2) the sum of (a) “any actual 

damages sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate cause of the filing of the fraudulent return 

(including any costs attributable to resolving deficiencies asserted as a result of such filing),” (b) 

the “costs” of the civil action, and (c) “in the court’s discretion, reasonable attorneys’ fees.” 

Defendants insist that a minimal $5,000 award is sufficient compensation, while Plaintiff seeks 

an award of more than $325,000. Plaintiff’s requested award includes all of the attorneys’ fees 

and accounting expert expenses that he incurred in the underlying tax court proceedings as well 

as roughly 25% of certain categories of attorneys’ fees and expert expenses in this litigation—

amounts that Plaintiff submits “fairly pertained to proving Count 1 and that would have been 

necessary even if Count 1 had been the only count.” [440] at 12. 

 In its January 18, 2018 order [476], the Court set out four principles that it intended to 

use in its analysis of Plaintiff’s damages. First, the Court recognized that since a taxpayer may 

need to initiate costly proceedings to resolve the receipt of a fraudulently inflated 1099, it would 

be unjust not to compensate the taxpayer for the costs incurred in connection with such 

proceedings. Second, because distinguishing between a proper 1099 filing and a fraudulent one 

may require lay taxpayers to employ both legal and accounting assistance, attorneys’ fees and 

expert witness fees properly lie within the scope of expenses potentially reimbursable to a 
4 

wronged taxpayer. Third, the Court will not second-guess Plaintiff’s decision to retain 

professional assistance to sort out any alleged deficiencies associated with his return. Fourth, the 

Court will use “reasonableness” as its touchstone in considering Plaintiff’s request for fees. 

In its January 18, 2018 opinion, the Court rejected both Plaintiff’s contention that 

damages could be determined based on the cursory records submitted with the briefs and 

Defendants’ position (set forth in their motion for partial findings under Rule 52(c)) that Plaintiff 

waived any opportunity to develop arguments for a bench trial on Count 1 damages. Instead, the 

Court allowed limited and proportional discovery on Plaintiff’s Count 1 damages claim, 

including short depositions of Plaintiff’s lawyers and accountants, with a focus on justifying the 

reasonableness of the substantive work for which the individuals billed their time and the results 

achieved. The Court advised that additional information on the reasonableness of the fees and 

costs incurred in the tax proceeding would be critical to the Court’s ability to assess Plaintiff’s 

claim to reimbursement of those fees and costs, which amounts to more than $90,000. The Court 

further recognized that the depositions may allow the lawyers in this case to provide additional 

insight into the extent to which Count 1 was a “central issue in the case” as Plaintiff contended, 

or a more peripheral one as Defendants contended. The Court’s hope was that depositions would 

streamline the Count 1 bench trial considerably. It appears that they have, as counsel have 

agreed the Court that the Count 1 damages can be determined based on the parties’ papers 

(briefs, transcripts, billing records).

 In cases involving the award of fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights lawsuits, which 

guide the Court’s analysis of reasonableness here, there is a “strong presumption that the lodestar 

figure—the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate—represents a ‘reasonable’ fee.” 

Murphy v. Smith, -- U.S. --, 138 S. Ct. 784, 789 (2018) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Delaware 
5 

Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). This is the “guiding light” of the Supreme Court’s “fee shifting jurisprudence.” Id. 

(quoting Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Nonetheless, “the lodestar figure is just the ‘starting point,” and “though it is presumptively 

reasonable, the figure may be excessive when ‘a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited 

success.’” Thorncreek Apartments III, LLC v. Mich, 886 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting 

Hensley v. Echerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)). 

 “A reasonable hourly rate is based on the local market rate for the attorney’s services.” 

Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d 547, 553 (7th Cir. 2014). “The best evidence of the market rate is 

the amount the attorney actually bills for similar work, but if that rate can’t be determined, then 

the district court may rely on evidence of rates charged by similarly experienced attorneys in the 

community and evidence of rates set for the attorney in similar cases.” Id. Additionally, the 

Laffey Matrix—a guideline the United States Attorney’s Office in Washington, D.C., has created 

to estimate reasonable attorneys’ fees—”can assist the district court with the challenging task of 

determining a reasonable hourly rate.” Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Center, 664 F.3d 632, 

648 (7th Cir. 2011); see also, e.g., McDonough v. Briatta, 935 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903 (N.D. Ill. 

2013) (plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to show that his attorneys’ hourly rate in civil rights 

harassment suit were reasonable where he submitted hourly rates for each attorney based on 

years of practice, the Laffey Matrix provided suggested hourly rates based on years of practice, 

and the rates charged by plaintiff’s counsel were equal to the rates set out in the Laffey Matrix). 

However, the Laffey Matrix is “only one factor in determining a reasonable rate,” and “has never 

formally [been] adopted” in the Seventh Circuit. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 873 F. Supp. 2d 

975, 983–84 (N.D. Ill. 2012). “The party seeking a fee award bears the burden of establishing 
6 

the market rate for the work; if the lawyers fail to carry that burden, the district court can 

independently determine the appropriate rate.” Montanez, 755 F.3d at 553. 

 The Seventh Circuit has “rejected the notion that the fees must be calculated 

proportionally to damages.” Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2017) 

(quoting Anderson v. AB Painting & Sandblasting, Inc., 578 F.3d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 2009)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). It has also rejected the argument that a “prevailing party can 

never have a fee award that is greater than the damages award.” Schlacher v. Law Offices of 

Phillip J. Rotche & Assocs., P.C., 574 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Deicher v. City of 

Evansville, 545 F.3d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But while 

there “is not a categorical ban on considering proportionality,” proportionality is one of the 

factors that the Court may consider in determining a reasonable fee. Sommerfield, 863 F.3d at 

651. 

 The case law is well established on how district courts should determine which “legal 

services [were] reasonably devoted to the successful portion of the litigation.” Richardson v. 

City of Chicago, 740 F.3d 1099, 1103 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court is guided by this case law in 

determining which legal services were reasonably devoted to Count 1, which is the only claim 

for which Plaintiff is entitled to seek attorneys’ fees as a component of its damages award. “If an 

attorney’s billing records permit the calculation of the hours devoted to the claims on which the 

plaintiff prevailed, then all a judge need do is determine the market rate for an hour of the 

lawyer’s time and whether the fee generated by multiplying the hours by the rate is reasonable in 

relation to the value of the case[.]” Id. “But when the lawyer’s billing records do not permit 

time to be allocated between winning and losing claims, estimation is inevitable.” Id. Where 

“the plaintiff’s claims for relief *** involve a common core of facts or [are] based on related 
7 

legal theories,” “[m]uch of counsel’s time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, 

making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis.” Hensley, 461 U.S. 

at 435. Such lawsuits “cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims” and “[i]nstead the district 

court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to 

the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id. 

With these principles in mind, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s fee request. Plaintiff seeks 

compensation for all of the expenses he incurred in the tax court proceeding, 25% of the 

expenses he incurred in this litigation through trial, 100% of the expenses he incurred post-trial 

on Count 1, and 25% of the expenses he incurred post-trial on mixed claims, minus 25% of the 

amount that Plaintiff was awarded as a discovery sanction. In particular, Plaintiff requests a total 

of $369,466.13, composed of the following: 

Fee Type Amount Billed Damages Requested 

Tax court attorneys’ fees (Jenner) $49,758.75 $49,758.75 (100%) 

Tax dispute accountants’ fees (Vlahos) $40,875.00 $40,875 (100%) 

Litigation attorneys’ fees through trial 

(Jenner) 

$143,438.27 $35,859.57 (25%) 

Litigation attorneys’ fees through trial (Gair) $764,627.82 $191,156.96 (25%) 

Litigation attorneys’ fees post-trial on Count 

1 (Gair) 

$32,767.50 $32,767.50 (100%) 

Litigation attorneys’ fees post-trial on mixed 

claims (Gair) 

$36,847.02 $9,211.76 (25%) 

PBC expert fees $64,521.40 $16,130.25 (25%) 

Less amount awarded as discovery sanction ($25,175.00) $6,293.75 (25%) 

 Total: $1,107.660.76 Total: $369,466.13 
8 

 Beginning with the fees associated with the tax court proceeding, the Court concludes 

that Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of 100% of his fees because in his settlement with the 

IRS he agreed to pay taxes on a portion of the amount reported on the 1099. Instead, the Court 

will award Plaintiff 76% of the amount he requests, given that Plaintiff obtained the IRS’s 

agreement that 76% of the amount reported on the 1099 should not have been included 

($121,567 out of the $159,577 reported). 

 Other than that reduction to account for Plaintiff’s partial success in the tax court, the 

Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ arguments for further reducing the award of fees 

associated with the tax court proceeding. Gail Morse, an experienced tax attorney at Jenner & 

Block (“Jenner”), represented Plaintiff in the tax court and charged Plaintiff her standard rate. 

Defendants argue that, “[o]ther than Ms. Morse’s justification of her own particular work in this 

case, there is absolutely no objective evidence to suggest that her approach is reasonable or 

standard in tax court, or that the rates charged are within the industry norm for this type of case.” 

[488] at 8. However, Ms. Morse charged her standard rates, which is the best evidence of the 

market rate, Montanez, 755 F.3d at 553, and Jenner’s rates were 87% of the Laffey Matrix rates. 

Further, despite being given the opportunity to conduct targeted discovery and depose Ms. 

Morse, Defendants do not point to any work that she did that was unnecessary or took an 

unreasonably long time to complete. 

 Defendants also argue that Ms. Morse spent a portion of her time on issues that were 

unrelated to Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants, including the sale of some property that 

Plaintiff owned individually. As support, they cite to an “Information Document Request” that 

the IRS sent Plaintiff, [486] at 9. In addition to documents pertaining to WACHN, the form also 

requests information relating to “Form 4797 Sale of Business Property.” Id. This document 
9 

does not support Defendants’ argument. It is not clear what the business property is, whether it 

had anything to do with the 1099, or whether any of Ms. Morse’s billings were attributable to the 

business property. Defendants could have asked Ms. Morse about this issue in a deposition, but 

there is no indication that they made any effort to do so. Moreover, Defendants make no effort 

to calculate how much the Jenner tax court bill should be reduced to account for time spent on 

the business property. 

 Defendants also criticize how Plaintiff allocated Jenner’s bills between the tax court case 

and this litigation. Ryan Laurie of the Gair firm reviewed Jenner’s bills and allocated costs 

between the tax court case and other litigation. First he looked at the biller on the file with the 

understanding that tax lawyer Ms. Morse was primarily working on the tax court case and the 

other attorneys were primarily working on the federal court litigation. Second, he read each 

billing entry to determine which entries related to tax court issues. Defendants argue that this 

allocation was inappropriate because Jenner does not delineate between the two proceedings in 

its bills and Mr. Gair testified that efforts to distinguish between the work creates a “false 

dichotomy.” [488] at 9. The Court concludes that Mr. Laurie’s method of allocating costs was 

reasonable. It is not disputed that Ms. Morse worked primarily on the tax court case. And 

Defendants did not identify any items allocated to the tax court case that they believe should 

have been attributed to this litigation. As Plaintiff points out, “[d]uring Laurie’s deposition, 

counsel for Hall reviewed only a single entry on the Jenner bills identified by Laurie to the tax 

court case, which in fact reflected on its face that it dealt with that matter.” [482] at 4. 

 The Court now turns to the bills of Plaintiff’s accountant in the tax court proceeding, Mr. 

Vlahos. Vlahos billed $40,875 at his normal hourly rate of $150 per hour for four types of work: 

1) dealing with the 1099 in connection with filing the 2007 tax return, 2) handling the IRS audit 
10 

initiated because of the 1099, 3) preparing schedules and forms in conjunction with Jenner for 

presentation to the tax court, and 4) preparing four years of amended returns that had to be fixed 

after the tax court’s favorable ruling. Defendants criticize Mr. Vlahos’ bills because they are not 

itemized and “note[] work on an additional issue not included in Count 1, namely a Form 1065 

K-1.” [488] at 9. Regardless of whether Mr. Vlahos’ bills were itemized to Defendants’ 

satisfaction, he also submitted his underlying time sheets, he kept both the time sheets and billing 

records in the ordinary course of business, and he testified that the $40,875 fairly and accurately 

captured the fees he charged for his work in connection with the 1099. [484-1] at 117. As to the 

Form 1065 K-1, Defendants did not ask Vlahos at his deposition about any work on that form; 

the only mention of the Form 1065 K-1 is in part of a bill quoted during the deposition, which 

stated in one paragraph: “For Professional Services Rendered in Regards To *** Compilation 

and review of data to prepare the 2007 Individual Tax Return Forms U.S. 1040 and·IL-1040 as it 

relates to questionable 1099-MISC and 1065 K-1 received from Keystone Orthopedic Specialist, 

S.C. and WACHN, LLC and proper disclosure of such on the returns.” [484-1] at 115. Based on 

this very limited information, it appears that the 1065 K-1 was another “questionable” form 

received from Keystone with the 1099. All of the work that Vlahos described in his deposition 

related to the 1099. To the extent he spent any time on a 1065 K-1, there is no indication that it 

was a significant amount or is separable from the work related to the 1099. 

 In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to damages equal to 76% of the total 

amount he spent on attorneys and his accountant pursuing the tax Court case, or $68,881.65. 

 The Court next considers the fees that Plaintiff incurred pursuing this litigation. Jenner 

handled the litigation until late 2013, when the Gair firm took over. Matthew Devine was the 

lead litigation partner for Jenner. Mr. Devine states in his declaration that he was extremely 
11 

careful about the bill to Plaintiff and wrote off some time and did not record other time. Jenner’s 

attorneys charged their standard rates, which were 87% of the Laffey Matrix rates. In total, 

Jenner charged Plaintiff $300,471.66. Plaintiff paid $198,197.02 and Jenner agreed to write off 

the remainder. Subtracting the amount paid on the tax court matter and the write-offs, Jenner’s 

bill for litigation was $143,438.27. Plaintiff is seeking compensation for 25% of this amount, or 

$35,859.57. 

 Chris Gair was the lead litigation partner for the Gair firm. His normal hourly rate was 

$550. He discounted his rate to $425 until February 2018. Then another partner, Vilia Dedinas, 

took over as the lead attorney. Her rate was $325, but she charged Plaintiff between $50 and 

$225 per hour. The Gair firm rates were 54% of the Laffey Matrix rates and 70% of Gair’s 

normal rates. By the conclusion of the trial, the Gair firm billed Plaintiff $764,627.82 for work 

on the litigation. Plaintiff seeks compensation for 25% of this amount, or $191,156.96. 

 Plaintiff also hired an expert, Jay Sanders of PBC Advisors. Sanders has more than thirty 

years of experience providing accounting services to medical practices. Sanders prepared an 

expert report with eight opinions, including one opinion (No. 7) directly addressing the 1099-

MISC. Sanders also testified at trial. Sanders charged Plaintiff his standard hourly rate of $320 

for trial preparation and a discounted rate of $320 for trial testimony, for a total bill of 

$64,521.40. Plaintiff seeks compensation for 25% of that amount, or $16,130.25. 

 Defendants do not challenge the reasonableness of the rates charged or number of hours 

worked by Plaintiff’s litigation attorneys and expert. See, e.g., [460] at 13-14 (statement by 

Defendants that they “are not contesting the Gair firm’s billing rates. . . [or] the number of hours 

that the Gair firm put into this litigation.”). Based on the undisputed records submitted by 
12 

Plaintiff, the Court concludes that both firms’ fees were reasonable when compared to the 

attorneys’ standard rates and the Laffey Matrix rates. 

 The primary dispute concerning the litigation-related fees is the portion of the fees that 

are attributable to Count 1. Plaintiff contends that the 25% he requests is reasonable—even 

conservative—because it is impossible to divide pre-verdict work on the lawsuit between Count 

1 and the other counts of his complaint. According to Plaintiff: “[J]ust about all the work on the 

case, and the whole trial, was devoted to proving that while Hall claimed on the bucket reports 

and 1099 that Angelopoulos owed him hundreds of thousands of dollars, it was actually the other 

way around. Hall’s fraudulent figures were contained in the bucket reports, and he then carried 

those phony numbers directly into his ‘calculation’ of the 1099 and the 1099 itself.” [482] at 12. 

Plaintiff also points out that Section 7434 does not create liability for one who issues an incorrect 

1099 but only someone who issues one that is intentionally fraudulent, and argues that the whole 

panoply of proof was offered and necessary to show fraudulent intent on Count 1. Plaintiff 

further argues that 25% is reasonable given his success on all claims and counterclaims and large 

jury award of approximately $2 million, the settlement history, in which Defendants never 

offered more than $87,000, and the hard-fought nature of the case. 

 Defendants disagree that Plaintiff’s claims are inextricably intertwined. They explain 

that, “[p]rior to ever filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff was well aware of the particular bases for each 

and every number” included on the 1099, “even conceding that $38,010.45 of it was right.” 

[488] at 13. Defendants also assert that the fees requested are unreasonable because Plaintiff 

made the case more complicated than necessary, Plaintiff’s counsel “fostered an environment in 

which counsel could not expect to reach certain agreements or engage in routine practice that 
13 

they may otherwise in other cases,” [488] at 21-22, and some allocation must be made for the 

Dubin Defendant’s settlement with Plaintiff. 

 Taking into account all of the parties’ arguments, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is 

entitled to a substantial award, but not the entire 25% of litigation-related fees that he requests. 

This case was hotly litigated for many years, with the parties filing five motions to dismiss, five 

motions to compel, a summary judgment motion, numerous motions in limine, at least two posttrial motions, and preparing for and conducting an 8-day jury trial with over a dozen witnesses 

and 174 exhibits. While the parties might have streamlined the proceeding and reduced their 

costs by being more cooperative, the Court cannot say that this was Plaintiff’s fault, such that his 

damages award should be reduced. Defendants certainly contributed to the high volume of work 

necessary to resolve this case, for instance by filing a summary judgment motion on claims for 

which there were numerous disputed questions of material fact. Plaintiff’s counsel also obtained 

an excellent result for their client. Plaintiff prevailed on every count of his complaint and on 

Defendants’ counterclaim, obtaining a jury verdict of $990,000 in compensatory damages, $1 

million in punitive damages, and $200,000 in interest. This result also supports Plaintiff’s 

position that he was not unreasonable in refusing to settle for the much lower amount that 

Defendants offered. 

 Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s award of compensatory damages should be limited to those fees 

that are reasonably attributable to the litigation work on Count 1. There is no easy way to 

determine this, given that some of the work supported multiple claims and Plaintiff’s counsel 

(like Defendants’ counsel) did not note in their billing entries the particular claims on which they 

were working. The Court does not fault counsel for this, nor does it expect them to be able to 

separate out the bills now. Instead, the Court must make its best estimate of the fees that are 
14 

reasonably attributable to Count 1. Only a handful of the entries on Defendants’ “bucket 

reports” were at issue in Count 1: $100,000 was for money Plaintiff had already paid, two $6,061 

payments for loan payments after his resignation, and $9,445 for funds Plaintiff did not owe to 

Midwest Diagnostics. As Defendants point out, proving that these entries were false did not 

require a “full rehashing of industry standards and recalculation of all bucket reports.” [488] at 

13. And while Plaintiff’s discovery and evidence concerning other items on the bucket list 

provided additional support for Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants acted with fraudulent intent, 

it was not necessary to prevail on Count 1. The Court therefore is not convinced that Plaintiff’s 

attorneys would have done 25% of the total work if Count 1 were the only issue in the case. 

Instead, the Court concludes that 10% is a reasonable estimate of the time that should be 

attributed to Count 1. 

 In addition, Plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for the fees that it incurred litigating 

claims against the Dubin Defendants given that those claims were settled. Defendants raise the 

issue of a setoff for work done on claims against the Dubin Defendants in their supplemental 

brief, but make no attempt to even estimate how much time Plaintiff spent litigating against those 

defendants. Comparing the confidential settlement figure to the amount that Plaintiff won from 

Defendants at trial, and taking into account that the Dubin Defendants were dismissed two and 

half years before the case went to trial, the Court concludes that a small “Dubin discount”—5% 

off the top of the total amount that Plaintiff incurred litigating this case through trial—is 

appropriate. The total amount billed for the litigation, minus the amount Plaintiff was awarded 

as a discovery sanction, is $947,412.49. Reduced by 5%, the amount is $900,041.87. Taking 

10% of that, Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of $90,004.19 for the litigation-related 

fees incurred through trial. 
15 

 That leaves the litigation-related fees that Plaintiff has incurred since the trial ended. 

Post-trial, the Gair firm billed Plaintiff $32,767.50 for work that it attributes to Count 1 and 

$36,847.02 for work on “mixed” claims. The Court will award Plaintiff damages equivalent to 

50% of the post-trial work on Count 1 ($16,383.75)—as both sides could have taken more 

reasonable positions on those issues—and 10% of the post-trial work on mixed claims 

($3,684.70) for a total award of $20,068.45 for post-trial work. 

 In total, the Court awards Plaintiff $178,954.29 as compensatory damages on Count 1, 

composed of the following amounts: 

Fee Type Amount Awarded (% of amount billed) 

Tax court-related (Jenner and Vlahos) $68,881.65 (76%)

Litigation-related, through trial $90,004.19 (9.5%)

Post-trial, Count 1 $16,383.75 (50%)

Post-trial, mixed claims $3,684.70 (10%)

Total $178,954.29 

B. Prejudgment Interest on Plaintiff’s State Law Claims 

The Court determined in its January 18, 2018 order that Plaintiff was entitled to an award 

of prejudgment interest, at a market rate and without compounding, from the date on which 

Plaintiff first made a formal demand on Defendants—November 8, 2011. See [476] at 9-11. As 

noted above, the Court requests that, by July 16, 2018, the parties work together on a proposed 

final judgment order incorporating this and all of the other jury and court rulings. 

 
16 

 C. Equitable relief on Count 3 

 Plaintiff’s request for equitable relief on Count 3 is denied for the reasons explained in 

the Court’s January 18, 2018 order. See [476] at 11-12.

III. Conclusion 

 For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for entry of judgment under Rule 58 [440] is granted 

in part and denied in part. The Court awards Plaintiff $178,954.29 in compensatory damages on 

Count 1 and denies Plaintiff’s request for equitable relief on Count 3. Consistent with the jury’s 

verdict, the award on Count 1 operates in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants Hall and 

Keystone. The Court also awards Plaintiff prejudgment interest on the remaining counts and 

anticipates entering a final Rule 58 judgment order at the next status hearing in this case, which 

is set for July 18, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. Counsel are directed to confer and submit to the Proposed 

Order Box a proposed final judgment order—agreed, if possible—incorporating all of the jury’s 

and the Court’s rulings no later than July 16, 2018. The Court anticipates setting a briefing 

schedule on the anticipated Rule 59 motions at the July 18 status hearing. 

Date: July 9, 2018 

 _____________________________________ 

 Robert M. Dow, Jr. 

 United States District Judge