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i 

51–760 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–25] 

SPACE AND U.S. SECURITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 18, 2009 
(II) 

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

BOB DEGRASSE, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ZACH STEACY, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 18, 2009, Space and U.S. Security ........................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 18, 2009 ................................................................................... 29 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 2009 

SPACE AND U.S. SECURITY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California, Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 1 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 2 

WITNESSES 

Armor, Maj. Gen. James, USAF (Ret.), Owner and CEO, The Armor Group, 

LLC ........................................................................................................................ 9 

Krepon, Michael, Co-founder, The Henry L. Stimson Center .............................. 7 

MacDonald, Bruce W., Author of Recent Council on Foreign Relations Study 

on China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security .................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Armor, Maj. Gen. James .................................................................................. 56 

Krepon, Michael ................................................................................................ 45 

MacDonald, Bruce W. ....................................................................................... 33 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

SPACE AND U.S. SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 18, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:00 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen O. Tauscher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee will come to order. 

Today, in open session, we will review three broad issues related 

to space and U.S. security. First, do we have the right policy to ensure the security of our space assets? Second, do we have the right 

investment strategy? And finally, what role can diplomacy play in 

ensuring the security of our space assets? 

We have three nongovernmental witnesses with us today. Each 

participated in a special Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) study 

on these subjects commissioned not long after the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test. 

First, Mr. Bruce MacDonald, the author of the Council study, is 

here with us. From 1995 to 1999, he was Assistant Director for National Security at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, as well as Senior Director for Science and Technology 

on the National Security Council (NSC) staff. He is also a former 

House Armed Services Committee staffer. 

Next, Mr. Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson 

Center. Mr. Krepon is a longtime advocate for rules of the road in 

space. He is also a diplomat scholar at the University of Virginia, 

where he teaches in the politics department. 

Finally, retired Air Force Major General James Armor, owner 

and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Armor Group. General 

Armor’s last job in the military was as Director of the National Security Space Office. He also served as the head of the National Reconnaissance Office’s (NRO’s) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operation. 

I want to welcome each of our distinguished witnesses. It is a 

pleasure to have you before the subcommittee today. 

This subcommittee has been eager to have a public discussion of 

these complicated, often classified subjects, and the Council report 

provides just that opportunity. 
2 

I was particularly impressed by the depth and breadth of the advisory committee for this report. The committee included Admiral 

Dennis C. Blair, now the Director of National Intelligence (DNI); 

Air Force Lieutenant General David A. Deptula; Mr. Keith R. Hall, 

former Director of the National Reconnaissance Office; and Ms. 

Theresa Hitchens of the Center for Defense Information. 

Before we begin, I wanted to highlight one report recommendation from each of the three areas we will discuss today. 

In the policy arena, the Council report recommends that the 

President and the National Security Council should modify national space policy to allow negotiated restrictions on the basis of 

verifiability and U.S. interests. 

In the programmatic realm, the report states that the Department of Defense (DOD) should evaluate all future space programs 

and initiatives in terms of their contribution to stability and deterrence in addition to its other criteria, and place greater emphasis 

on survivable ground-based offensive capabilities with reversible effects than on space-based capabilities. 

In the diplomatic arena, the report recommends that the State 

Department and DOD should expand dialogue with China to establish rules of the road, codes of conduct, and other confidence-building measures, as well as to build upon current military-to-military 

dialogue on space issues. 

As you can see, the Council report has given us plenty to talk 

about this afternoon. 

With that, let us begin, and let me turn to my very good friend 

and our distinguished Ranking Member from Ohio, Mr. Turner, for 

any comments he may have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

So many times when we have hearings or issues that we are 

looking at, and it is always in context of the news of the day, and 

I feel like I can’t go past the news of the day without recognizing 

that the Associated Press (AP) is reporting that the Obama Administration is indicating its choice for Under Secretary of State for 

Arms Control and International Security to be none other than our 

own Chairman, Ellen Tauscher. We wish her well in that, and I 

congratulate you on that. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. I am going to send your tax returns to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), if you don’t mind. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, you certainly have a tremendous amount of 

experience that we have as evident in this subcommittee, and we 

wish you well in that. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. TURNER. With that, then, I also want to thank Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Krepon, and General Armor for being with us today. 

The Council of Foreign Relations report, which forms the basis of 

our discussion today, is a first-rate product, and I want to commend Mr. MacDonald for his work on it. 

Today’s discussion focuses on the policies and capabilities that 

best provide for the security of our space assets. The current space 
3 

policy, for the first time, recognized space assets as vital to U.S. 

national interests. Space is critical to modern-day military operations and contributes over $200 billion annually to the economy. 

This subcommittee, largely in part due to the efforts of my predecessor Mr. Everett and our Chair, soon to be Under Secretary, 

sought to promote a greater understanding about the importance 

of space assets and the potential consequences of their loss. 

An array of potential threats can hold our Nation’s space capabilities at risk and degrade U.S. advantages in space. A prime example, according to the Pentagon’s annual China military report, 

is China’s pursuit of a multidimensional program to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by its potential adversaries. This 

includes the direct-ascent ASAT China tested in 2007. 

The expansion in the number of space-faring nations and satellites launched each year also increases the risk of accidental collisions, such as the one we saw last month between a commercial 

satellite and a Russian spacecraft. 

We have a nexus of challenges before us. First and foremost, I 

believe we have considerable gaps and shortfalls in space intelligence and in our knowledge of foreign space capabilities and intent. Robust space intelligence is a prerequisite for Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and protection, and it also greatly influences decisions made about our space policies and posture. 

I would ask our witnesses to provide their assessment of our Nation’s space intelligence capabilities, and also any thoughts on 

whether our intelligence enterprise is adequately organized and 

managed to fulfill future capabilities and challenges in this area. 

Second, what changes in policy do you recommend to increase 

our security in space? I am particularly interested in how we apply 

the model of deterrence to space. What capabilities will we need? 

How would we demonstrate the credibility of such a deterrent? And 

how would we manage escalation when the U.S. may have more to 

lose than a potential adversary? 

Third, a greater emphasis on Space Situational Awareness and 

space protection capabilities has been strongly supported by this 

committee. In the 2008 defense bill, we required the defense Intelligence Communities (IC) to develop a space protection strategy. In 

your view, what are the next steps to implement the strategy, and 

where do we still have gaps and shortfalls? 

Fourth, our current national security space architecture is comprised of relatively few, and very complex monolithic systems. The 

loss of one satellite, whether by intent or accident, could have widespread consequences for battlefield users reliant on its capabilities. 

Do you have thoughts on how we might change our acquisition 

strategies to increase the survivability and resiliency of our space 

architecture? 

And lastly, securing our interests in space requires a ‘‘whole of 

government’’ approach that also includes diplomatic efforts, as 

highlighted in Mr. MacDonald’s report; however, space is a challenging area that requires balancing our desire to protect our most 

sensitive cutting-edge technologies with promoting greater international cooperation in space. Often these are complementary, but 

sometimes they are not. What space security topics are the most 
4 

promising candidates for greater diplomatic efforts? We appreciate 

your comments there. 

The desire to seek a space-weapons ban treaty was featured as 

part of President Obama’s defense agenda. Defining space weapons 

and establishing an effective verification regime are incredibly 

problematic. I also remain skeptical that China, in particular, 

would halt its space programs, when reports of their across-theboard counterspace capabilities and investments suggest otherwise. 

An alternative approach that establishes rules of the road has 

been suggested by one of our witness. Collision avoidance may be 

a logical first step; however, I would like a greater understanding 

of what these would entail, and would also ask that you consult 

with our military commanders to elicit their views. My immediate 

concern is that we do not disadvantage U.S. space capabilities. 

One also has to consider how much transparency about space assets we want. Imagine if we were required to report on the location 

status of our nuclear submarines. 

Thank you for being with us today and providing your critical 

thoughts on the issue of space security. I look forward to a candid 

discussion and thank you for being here. And thank you, Madam 

Chair, for your leadership. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner, for those kind 

remarks, and thank you for your statement. 

We will begin with Mr. MacDonald. Bruce, the floor is yours, as 

we received your formal statement. We look forward to brief remarks, and we entered your statement in the record, and the floor 

is yours. 

STATEMENT OF BRUCE W. MACDONALD, AUTHOR OF RECENT 

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS STUDY ON CHINA, SPACE 

WEAPONS, AND U.S. SECURITY 

Mr. MACDONALD. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, Ranking 

Member Turner, and members of the subcommittee. It is really a 

privilege for me to be here today to talk about this vital issue. 

I want to make clear at the outset, I am speaking purely in a 

private capacity and not on behalf of the Strategic Posture Review 

Commission, U.S. Institute of Peace, or the Council on Foreign Relations. 

The subcommittee has posed three excellent questions for this 

hearing: One—and I will give short answers to each and then 

elaborate just a bit—do we have the right national policy to ensure 

the security of our space assets? I think our policy is deficient in 

doctrine and strategy, and needs urgent attention to avoid major 

problems. 

Do we have the right investment strategy for protecting and defending critical space assets? Briefly, I have only modest confidence 

in this, but I have to say mostly because a few of the details of the 

strategy are publicly known, so it is hard for me to say. 

What role can diplomacy play in assuring the security of our 

space assets? I think diplomacy has a vital role to be played, but 

unfortunately it alone cannot solve our space issues. 

The rivers of information and services that our space assets provide allow our decisionmakers and weapons both to be more effec-
5 

tive than ever before, giving us vital advantages in our economy 

and our conventional and strategic nuclear strength. 

The threats to our space assets come in many forms, some hostile 

and some not. I have often said that Murphy’s Law and Mother 

Nature pose some of the biggest threats that we can face sometimes in a lot of areas. One of the biggest threats is what we just 

don’t know about objects in space, the intentions of those who put 

them there, and the very strategic landscape of space itself. 

Our overall goal in space, I believe, should be space stability. We 

have an overriding interest in maintaining the function of our 

space assets and to see that the huge benefits they provide are always there. But our space assets are exposed and fragile. They 

can’t run, they can’t hide, they can’t defend themselves, and we depend on them more so than any other country. And these assets 

face three major and growing threats. 

One, with the proliferation of space and other technologies, especially anti-satellite capability demonstrated two years ago, China 

could exploit our space dependence to seriously threaten our space 

assets within a decade if it chose to do so. 

Second, space traffic is heavier than it has ever been and getting 

more so, but there is no Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for 

space. 

And third, space debris poses a growing threat to all space assets, as the recent collision between the U.S. satellite and an old 

Russian Cosmos illustrates. At current rates of debris accumulation, the debris threat could grow 1,200 percent over the next 25 

years. I am concerned that current space policy does not answer 

key stability issues. 

In 2006, the new policy declared for the first time that U.S. space 

assets are a vital national interest. This policy reserves the right 

to deny adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests. But attacking other space capabilities invites attacks on our own vital national interests, we have said. This, to 

me, is contradictory. Why would we want to threaten actions that 

invite retaliation against our vital national interests where we 

have more at stake than our adversaries? But this contradiction is 

never explained. 

It could make sense if our space doctrine seeks only to deter attacks, not initiate them, but our policy says not a word on this. 

There is inherent risk of strategic and crisis space instability in the 

next decade or so, it seems to me, if we are not careful. 

I am one who believes that the United States can and should remain preeminent in space, but I believe we are currently incautious in our military space policy. The United States needs a space 

protection strategy that focuses on stability, deterrence, and a 

space architecture with backups in case we lose services. 

Now, the difficult question about offensive space capabilities in 

space. If it is possible to establish a space regime where no one had 

offensive space capability, we should certainly do so. If we can 

maintain space deterrence by other than offensive means, we 

should certainly do so. We must think long and hard, I think, before deploying space offense. But if no alternative to it exists, then 

we should develop some offensive capability, but in a deterrence 

context. 
6 

The United States and China, and to some extent Russia as well, 

have already crossed the space Rubicon of sorts. Anti-satellite capabilities already developed cannot be uninvented, and missile defense with inherent anti-satellite capabilities is here to stay. U.S. 

space capabilities must be preserved and, while defensive steps can 

help, and we should distribute our space capabilities across many 

more platforms to reduce the vulnerability of any one, that may not 

be enough. 

We must be careful, though, as we acquire offensive capabilities, 

not to create a self-fulfilling prophecy, stimulating the very threat 

that worries us most. Above all, we should escape the space policy 

and doctrinal vacuum I believe we are now in, where as result it 

seems that our space acquisition seems to shape our policy, rather 

than our policy shaping acquisition. We should seek a posture not 

of space dominance, but of space preeminence, which would assure 

that we remain the space leader with more advanced space capabilities than anyone. We would continue to derive more military 

and economic benefit from space than others, and we would leverage this preeminence in better weapons, better intelligence and, I 

would argue most of all, better military decision-making made possible by the superior space-enabled information and communications that we get. 

I saw a while back that General Tom Moorman, the retired Air 

Force Vice Chief of Staff, said that in addition to planning and programs, it is important to encourage a debate on space power to include development of a space deterrent theory. We need something 

similar to the intellectual ferment that surrounded nuclear deterrence. I think General Moorman, unfortunately, confirms here that 

this kind of thinking is not happening today. So we are drifting 

into an increasingly unstable space environment. 

Another major drawback of our policy is its rejection of space 

arms control. The past few years the United States was alone in 

the world in opposing space arms control issues. There was one 

vote in the United Nations where the vote was 162 to 1, and we 

were the 1. All of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

allies were on the other side. This allowed Russia and China to 

credibly mischaracterize our stance as hostile. 

Diplomacy and arms control alone cannot solve our space problems, but they can help. Our space arms control allergy should end. 

Review of space diplomacy and arms control should be an Administration priority. One option that deserves special attention is the 

ban on debris-producing space actions, especially kinetic energy 

anti-satellite tests. 

In conclusion, we are entering a new era in space, but we don’t 

seem to understand its strategic landscape, so we are stumbling 

into the future. Let us take steps now to reduce the risks that are 

coming right at us. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. MacDonald. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. MacDonald can be found in the 

Appendix on page 33.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Krepon, the floor is yours. 
7 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KREPON, CO-FOUNDER, THE HENRY 

L. STIMSON CENTER 

Mr. KREPON. Madam Chairman, thank you for convening us. 

My quick answers to your three hard questions: I don’t think we 

have a sound strategy now. There are some missing pieces, and I 

will talk about one of them. 

I am not that well qualified to answer your second important 

question about an investment strategy, but General Armor is well 

qualified to answer that question, and the answers he has come up 

with make a whole lot of sense to me. 

And the third question, the role of diplomacy, is the one I really 

want to focus on. 

I should say I spent a fair amount of time in my youth in this 

room and learned a lot here, but you sure don’t look like L. Mendel 

Rivers. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. KREPON. Satellites are as vulnerable as they are invaluable, 

and are becoming more vulnerable and more invaluable all the 

time. So how do we gain confidence that these essential satellites 

will be available when needed? 

No satellite has been damaged or destroyed in a crisis or in conflict yet. And so, if and when this happens, it is going to be a big 

event, and it is most likely not going to be an isolated event. Warfare in space is likely to be accompanied by warfare on the ground. 

The U.S. will still win if our space assets are damaged, but victory 

will be very costly, and there will be huge collateral damage to the 

people we are fighting. 

So, put another way, everybody suffers if warfare in space occurs, 

including all major powers that have assets in space. And if there 

is uncontrolled escalation as a result of warfare in space, then the 

losses will be incalculable. 

Many deterrent strategists—and, Mr. Turner, this goes to your 

question about deterrence—there are some really smart people who 

worked on deterrence and nuclear deterrence, and they came up 

with library shelves’ worth of books on escalation control and escalation dominance and, fortunately, none of these theories were tested. But, at least to me, these plans were not very convincing. 

And so, I ask you, how much trust can you and the members of 

this subcommittee place on plans for escalation control and escalation dominance in space when it is so easy to mess up space, or 

at least parts of it, and they happen to be the parts we care about 

the most? 

So, shooting our way out of this dilemma of satellite vulnerability, it is a last option, and even then it may not be a wise option, in my view. But that means we still have to deter unwise decisions by other folks to start this game going. And so how do we 

best deter attacks on U.S. satellites? Our experience with nuclear 

deterrence isn’t the best guide. 

To signal deterrence—nuclear deterrence—we and the Soviets 

tested on the average of one nuclear weapon a week, from the 

Cuban missile crisis to the fall of the Berlin Wall, to signal deterrence. And to signal deterrence, we and they deployed large numbers of weapons and launches ready for use on short order. Now 

is this what we want for space? To deter somebody else in space? 
8 

Deterring warfare in space has taken very little effort so far. 

There have been several dozen anti-satellite tests during the whole 

history of the space age, just a handful of tests with destructive effect creating debris fields. Just a handful. Unfortunately, two of 

these tests have happened pretty recently. The Chinese test; a U.S. 

test, which was not a debris-causing event, but it was using a satellite for target practice; and we haven’t heard from the Russians, 

and we may hear from the Russians. 

So a small number of dedicated anti-satellite weapons have been 

deployed in the past during the Cold War, but they were 

mothballed. They weren’t very operationally useful. And our military, and even the Soviet military, didn’t put too much stock in 

these weapons. 

In my view, one reason why superpower competition didn’t extend very far with dedicated anti-satellite weapons and ASAT tests 

is because they were not needed. We, and they, had so many different ways to mess up satellites using capability that was designed for other purposes. That is still the case. We don’t need to 

use satellites for target practice to convince other folks that we 

have the means today to affect their satellites if they mess with 

ours. 

I think another reason why we and the Soviets didn’t go so far 

down this path was because these satellites then, as now, are connected to nuclear forces. And do you really want to open that Pandora’s box? 

So I actually have some confidence that, looking forward, we can 

again avoid the use of weapons against satellites during crisis or 

in wartime, which would vastly be to our advantage. I think we can 

do this. 

I don’t think we need to carry out more ASAT tests to reinforce 

a deterrence message. But we are missing a diplomatic piece, because remember, during the Cold War, deterrence, which was a 

clenched fist, also needed reassurance, which was what we then 

called arms control. And deterrence without reassurance makes 

people very uneasy. And not just abroad, but also at home. 

So how do we fit these two pieces together? Our primary enemy 

up there is debris. Debris does not recognize U.S. preeminence in 

space. It doesn’t. Debris is our enemy. Debris is also the enemy of 

other major space-faring nations. This problem we just had with 

the International Space Station, with three spacefarers scrambling 

into an escape module, we are going to see this again. It is going 

to happen. 

We have actually lost a shuttle because of debris, a different kind 

of debris, the debris from the foam on an external fuel tank which 

punctured the Columbia, which we found out about on reentry. But 

that is a different kind of a problem, but debris is going to threaten 

manned space operations to a much greater extent, and our satellites that are essential for our warfighters. 

So, two ideas for you to consider about debris. One is a very narrow-banded treaty that would be a verifiable treaty that bans destructive methods against man-made space objects. Nothing in this 

world is totally verifiable, but a ban against destructive methods 

which create debris fields is something we can see. And since the 

more debris that is up there, the more disadvantaged we become, 
9 

but also the more disadvantaged everybody becomes who relies on 

satellites. This one could have traction. It could have traction. I 

would ask to you consider this. 

The second possibility for you to consider is a code of conduct 

that would have one of its provisions pledges against harmful interference against space objects—space objects, the satellites themselves. A code of conduct like the Incidents at Sea Agreement that 

our Navy follows, or the Dangerous Military Practices Agreement 

that our Army and our Air Force follows, they are rules of the road. 

You know, the rules in peacetime are different from the rules in 

wartime; but even in war, there are some rules that are in our advantage to follow. 

And I would urge you to think long and hard about the diplomatic piece that deals with this debris problem, which is a clear 

and present danger to our preeminence in space. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Krepon. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Krepon can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. General Armor, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JAMES ARMOR, USAF (RET.), 

OWNER AND CEO, THE ARMOR GROUP, LLC 

General ARMOR. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Turner, 

members of the subcommittee, I am very pleased to be here today 

to testify on the vital issue of space and U.S. security. I am also 

happy to be at the table with two very thoughtful and far more experienced and well-spoken policy professionals, Mr. Bruce MacDonald, with whom I had the privilege of working on the subject 

report, and Mr. Krepon, who I have had some edifying discussions 

both here and abroad on space treaties and rules of the road. 

Today, I am speaking purely in a private capacity. My comments 

do not represent the views of the United States Air Force, with 

which I proudly served for 34 years, or any of my current professional affiliations. 

I understand today’s hearing is about space security, but I want 

to take a step back and put a broader context on the state of the 

United States space program and motivate why today’s hearing is 

so important. 

As my fellow witnesses have pointed out, the U.S. is exquisitely 

dependent on space. But it is not just for warfighting and intelligence, it is for economic well-being, our technological vitality, and 

our international standing and leadership. This bears repeating 

often because, while the U.S. currently leads the world in space, 

there are numerous problems other than simple security threats 

that jeopardize our continued leadership. 

We face near-term mission gaps in our important space capabilities, both military and civil. Our space industry and workforce is 

losing its competitive edge. Our engagement and influence in international space activities has declined, and there is widespread program overreach. 

In many respects, I think all of the Nation’s space sectors are in 

worse condition today than they were a decade or more ago. To a 

point, as our security and well-being has grown more reliant on 
10 

space capabilities, they have become increasingly vulnerable to 

breakdown and disruption, as well as to attack. It is with this 

sense of urgency that I now return to today’s timely discussion 

about space security. 

You have my written testimony, so let me just summarize the 

main points, briefly addressing each of the three broad issues that 

you stated in your invitation. 

While I think I am more in agreement with Mr. MacDonald than 

it will on the surface appear, do we have the right national policy 

to assure security of our space assets? I think the answer is fundamentally yes, we do. Since the beginning of the space age, each 

President has issued a national space policy, and each policy has 

been remarkably consistent in its broad goals. The space policy 

issued in October 2006 gave me, as a military and intelligence 

space professional, the policy guidance I needed, and it was totally 

consistent with policies from earlier Administrations. 

However, I must acknowledge that the rest of the world clearly 

thought its language quite provocative, and it became a major distraction to any positive discussions on any of a number of space 

issues that I engaged in. I, therefore, think we might generally 

benefit from a change in tone in the written policy, and I fully expect the Obama Administration, typical of every new Administration, to do just that. But I don’t think the fundamental policy objectives will or need to change. 

The real problem is not the policy, it is the lack of means to implement the policy. We are missing a national space strategy to define the means and set the priorities among those policy objectives, 

and we are missing a governance structure for implementation and 

oversight of that policy. 

During last year’s campaign, President Obama discussed the 

need for a National Space Council, and I think that is an important 

decision. The Administration needs to establish an effective White 

House focal point and apparatus within the Executive Office of the 

President, such as the Space Council, to actively establish direction, set priorities, provide management oversight, and coordinate 

actions across the agencies. Good policy is not self-actualizing. A 

national space strategy, and leadership and oversight mechanism 

are needed. 

I must also add, Madam Chairwoman, that the Congress shares 

many of the same stovepipes in its committee structure across the 

space sectors and technical disciplines, and I might recommend 

that you seriously consider reviving a bipartisan, bicameral Congressional Space Caucus to promote cross-committee space discussions. 

The second issue is, do we have the right investment strategy for 

protecting and defending critical space assets and capabilities? No, 

I don’t believe we do. Up to now, we have designed and built our 

space capabilities assuming space is, essentially, a sanctuary. But 

in the last 15 years, space has become both a contested and a competitive domain with a blossoming number of space-faring entities 

and potential threats, both intentional, like China’s ASAT, and unintentional, like spectral interference and debris. 

My answer for needed investment boils down to three interrelated recommendations. Number one, Space Situational Aware-
11 

ness. I think we are in great agreement there. Our current space 

surveillance network is not fully chartered or resourced to support 

civil, commercial and allied operations. The Space Situational 

Awareness system that the U.S. needs is one that is capable of 

prompt and unequivocal attribution of any space incident to a 

cause or agent, whether that be something bad or just bad space 

weather that day. This includes not only the orbital elements, but 

satellite operating status, space weather conditions, spectral interference, debris cognizance, and more. 

Closely related to Space Situational Awareness is the need for 

foreign space intelligence. And I heard Mr. Turner bring this up. 

The U.S. gave us most of its space intelligence capability in the 

1990s, and it requires significant reinvestment. I watched it fade, 

and it was a heartbreaking thing to see those professionals disappear over the decade. 

The capability for situational awareness with attribution is the 

basis of any international discussions about the space environment, 

debris, space operating conventions, or rules of the road. It is also 

foundational to any space deterrent regime that we might discuss. 

The second investment shortfall is our current satellite architectures. Every critical space system and support infrastructure, civil 

and military, needs to be recapitalized to ensure that it can operate 

in a contested domain, at least to the extent that it would be needed during a crisis. There is no silver bullet here. There is a number 

of good options, small satellites, mixed space and terrestrial systems. There is good protection technology in some cases and many 

others. 

Each constellation needs to develop its own approach, but it 

needs to do so in the context of an integrated national space strategy, which we don’t really have, and sound assessment of specific 

natural and man-made threats by space intelligence. 

I may surprise you here, but the third vital investment need is 

for the commercial space segment. As a 34-year national security 

space professional, I am not really willing to compromise U.S. security but, as a student of history, I am convinced that a robust commercial space regime will enhance both global stability and U.S. security. 

Mahan’s famous theory of seapower was, fundamentally, not 

about battleships; it was about sea lines of commerce and maritime 

industry. Therefore, I recommend direct investment and space 

technology and other incentives toward growing a robust U.S. commercial space industry. I believe an essential part of this is to 

begin making progress toward a space traffic management system. 

Currently, however, there is no organization assigned responsibility 

for space traffic management. 

The Air Force operates a space surveillance system. The FAA 

Commercial Transportation Office grants launch and reentry licenses, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) grants orbital location and spectrum, and there are other organizations as 

well. So joint study by these agencies to develop an investment 

framework for a space traffic management system might be useful, 

and I would be happy to answer any more questions you might 

have on that. 
12 

Working toward a commercially secure space operating environment is an opportunity for U.S. global leadership that could address significant portions of space security, and it will let me segue 

back to the committee’s third and final question, the role of diplomacy. 

I think diplomacy plays an essential role in ensuring the security 

of our space assets and in global U.S. space leadership. The U.S. 

must be actively engaged in discussions at all levels if it expects 

to help set a productive agenda. But, as Mr. MacDonald pointed 

out, diplomacy and arms control cannot, by themselves, solve all of 

our space security problems. So I would recommend that U.S. space 

diplomacy have three features. 

The first one is just set a good example and positive precedents 

in space. Now, note, this implies that the U.S. is actively conducting the full range of space activities. You can’t really set a good 

example from the bench. 

The second is to engage in wider discussions about space rules 

of the road, but be forthright about limiting expectations on unverifiable agreements that might unnecessarily restrain both space 

commerce or U.S. civil and national security freedom of action. 

Finally, third, help establish a concrete foundation of technical 

standards and operating protocols that will encourage a safe, legal 

space operating regime. I believe the most productive near-term effort is being done by all the major space agencies in the multinational Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, which is 

part of the International Standards Organization. A future space 

traffic management system can build on the technical confidence 

and the professional and civil agencies there, similar to what the 

International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, and the FAA do 

for air traffic management. 

In summary, the space enterprise is critical to the Nation, and 

its security is essential. It is on a declining trajectory, I believe, 

that puts the U.S. leadership at risk and requires sustained strategic leadership, investment and diplomatic initiative by the Administration and Congress. 

This concludes my remarks, and I look forward to your questions 

and discussion. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, General. 

[The prepared statement of General Armor can be found in the 

Appendix on page 56.] 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. MacDonald, in your testimony you observe 

that the debate the over the United States’ Offensive-space capabilities has often resulted in simplistic answers on both sides of the 

question. Can you give the subcommittee a couple of examples 

where you think offensive capabilities are appropriate and, alternatively, where they may be counterproductive? 

Mr. MACDONALD. Let me maybe take the second one first, if I 

may. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Sure. 

Mr. MACDONALD. My sense is that offensive capabilities are 

something that we should only do if there really isn’t another approach to do it. The key goal, again, should be deterrence and stability in space. 
13 

I came to the conclusion and my recommendation about offensive 

capabilities somewhat reluctantly, I must admit. When I started 

my study, I was pretty much thinking that wasn’t a good idea, but 

I saw the need that we had—that we had to deter. But there are 

some ways that we could do that that I think would be counterproductive. 

To pick an extreme example, a nuclear burst up in the 

ionosphere or Lower Earth Orbit (LEO) would be a tremendously 

effective ASAT weapon, but it would have horribly self-destructive, 

collateral side effects. So that would be going to one extreme. 

But areas where it might be, is if we had—and I listed in my report and, I think, in my full statement, at least seven conditions 

or requirements, and one very much would be that any effects 

should be temporary and reversible so that there is no physical 

damage—permanent physical damage, and that there is not a tremendous loss. Those satellites, as has been pointed out, can be extraordinarily expensive. But I think that if we need to respond to 

somebody else’s first use, for example, I think that there could be 

merit, potential merit, in such capabilities. 

But again, the idea is that the effect should be temporary, not 

permanent. I would leave it at that, but we could talk more if you 

would like. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Sure. Mr. Krepon, your testimony describes the 

national security benefits to the United States of establishing a 

space code of conduct. Could you expand on why you think it might 

be more appropriate to pursue the development of rules of the road 

rather than a formal arms control agreement banning destructive 

ASAT testing? 

Mr. KREPON. Madam Chairman, I don’t think the two are mutually exclusive. I think one could go into a forum being open to both 

possibilities. 

The idea of an all-encompassing ban on weapons in space, to me, 

poses insuperable problems—problems of verification, problems of 

definition. But if I hone in on destructive effects against man-made 

objects in space, I may well need to invest, as General Armor has 

stated, in improving my ability to watch the heavens. 

But when there is a debris cloud where there was once a singular 

orbital body, I think we can reasonably infer that that body has 

broken up, and we have to figure out the reasons for it. And there 

will be preceding actions to help us come to a logical conclusion 

about why that orb has become a mutating debris cloud. 

So I would say let us be open to both, but a key element has to 

be debris. Whichever way you go, it has to be debris, which is why 

the notion of traffic management, collision avoidance is so essential 

at this moment in time. So the code of conduct piece that, I think, 

deserves a lot of attention is traffic management. If you will, we 

need an FAA-type body for space. Even if we hate the notion of a 

small international body dealing with this problem, the consequences of major debris events are so profound and so long-lasting that I hope we will be open-minded toward this. 

Now, one last point, and then I will shut up. The Bush Administration placed a lot of emphasis on bottom-up approaches to come 

up with rules of the road. I think this was part of the allergy to 

diplomacy. And we did succeed with a bottom-up approach that 
14 

produced voluntary debris mitigation guidelines, and it was just— 

this deal was done just last year, was finalized, I think, in the 

United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly last year. It took 14 years 

to do that, 14 years to do that, during which the debris population 

doubled. That is the trackable debris population. The small stuff, 

which can also kill you, there is a lot more of it up there. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Let me ask if you there is an analogy to a homeowners’ association. Since we apparently think we all own it, that 

there would be clear guidelines. You know, you have to mow your 

lawn, you have to clean up after yourself, you are responsible for 

this. There is a sense of transparency. 

I think that there is an FAA piece here, because traffic obviously 

is a component of management. But what I hear you saying, I 

think, is that there is nothing mutually exclusive about codes of 

conduct and moving forward into some more formal agreements 

but, in the basics, you have to agree that you like the neighborhood, and you want to keep the neighborhood a certain way, very 

much like when you decide to buy in a neighborhood, you are 

meant to add value, not detract value. 

Mr. KREPON. If there are no rules, there are no rule-breakers. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. That is very good. General Armor, in your testimony you recommend determined Science and Technology (S&T) 

investment and other incentives toward growing a robust United 

States commercial space industry. In this context, can you talk 

about how the United States should balance its responsibilities to 

prevent the export of sensitive technologies and the need to develop 

a globally competitive United States space industry? 

General ARMOR. Yes, ma’am, Madam Chairwoman. That is a 

very tough trade to make. We do need to be careful about technology transfer in general. We need to be precise in protecting critical technology proliferating to parties we especially don’t want to 

have. But on the other hand, we need an open commerce, international commerce, because the world has gone global. 

Right now some of the—I believe some of the trade restrictions 

have prevented our own industry from expanding like it should. 

Our second- and third-tier parts vendors are basically dying right 

now. And, in fact, there was a recent article about counterfeit 

parts, that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) is having engineers look, because we were having to import 

more overseas parts instead of our own. I think that traces back 

to some of our own trade restrictions. 

So, yes, we do need to be very careful and pick the regime on 

technology to protect, but industry moves very fast, and so I think 

we need a mechanism that keeps up with that technology and protects what needs to be protected. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

I would like to turn to Mr. Turner, Ranking Member. The floor 

is yours. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you again for 

your discussion. And one of the things that is really, really helpful 

is the concepts that we are dealing with in these policy discussions 

you so eloquently are able to describe. And I am going to ask you 

to embellish some of the discussion you have been having because 
15 

I think it is real important. And as we do a forum like this, it is 

good to get from you the descriptions of these elements. 

When you are talking about a space weapons treaty versus rules 

of the road, many of you were discussing the issues of verification 

and definition. Could you embellish that for a moment so that people can get an understanding of what are some of the problems in 

verification and in definition? Because we know what the different 

areas that a satellite can be challenged with, and it would be great 

to hear your descriptions of those as we try to balance that issue 

of rules of the road versus space weapons treaty. 

Mr. Krepon, starting with you. 

Mr. KREPON. Yes. As Bruce has said, I can use a nuclear weapon 

to destroy satellites. In 1962, before a limited test ban treaty was 

completed by President Kennedy, we carried out a weapons test 

over one megaton that killed or destroyed every satellite that was 

in Low Earth Orbit. There weren’t many, and they weren’t all ours. 

We learned a very important lesson from that. So we can use nuclear weapons to kill satellites. We can use ballistic missiles if they 

have enough legs. So a Medium-range Ballistic Missile, an oceanspanning ballistic missile can be adapted for use against satellites. 

Defense interceptors can be used, adapted, against satellites. We 

demonstrated that last year. Lasers, jammers, there are a lots of 

things out there that have vital military uses that can all serve as 

anti-satellite weapons. 

Do we ban them all? Do we prohibit them all? How do we verify 

if somebody is not hiding one in the basement? 

So this all-encompassing treaty may not be such a good idea. 

Mr. TURNER. And in that we are a country that clearly, in the 

area of verification, we are going to comply, so we always have to 

have a concern as to what our ability is to verify others’ compliance. Let us continue down the way as you talk about the issue of 

a space weapons treaty versus rules of the road, verification, and 

definition. 

Mr. MACDONALD. If I could, picking up on what Michael was saying, I think the key thing here, and it is a problem the previous 

Administration did an excellent job of identifying, and that is I 

think that bans on weapons can be problematic, unlike, for example, an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) or strategic bomber or a missile-firing submarine, which are very big, and there are 

ways that we can monitor those. 

The kinds of things that could do—perform an anti-satellite test 

first very often are smaller to begin with, and then because they 

are multipurpose, it is easy to claim that we didn’t build it as an 

anti-satellite weapon, we built it for some other reason. But as Michael alluded to, actions in space are a lot more visible. 

I think a more productive approach to take is to seek to put constraints on harmful actions, not necessarily on weapons. To use 

maybe what is probably a bad analogy: under the right circumstances, guns are not illegal, but shooting somebody with a gun 

is. What is at issue is not the possession of the gun, but, rather, 

how it is used. 

So in the same way I think that the most productive approach 

from an arms control perspective would be one that seeks to inhibit 
16 

or limit actions unless somehow there is something that is so big 

or prominent that you can address it. 

Mr. TURNER. General. 

General ARMOR. Well, as Mr. MacDonald knows, I have had difficulty looking at space in the sense of nuclear deterrence. To me, 

space is by far a more conventional domain, not a nuclear one. So 

I have trouble with the nuclear analogy right off the bat. 

That said, defining an ASAT is very difficult; therefore, you 

know, doing some sort of treaty for no ASATs, I think, is unverifiable and not a productive path. 

If I can address one thing Mr. Krepon said, I do believe that it 

took a long time to get some of these earlier lower-level agreements, but that was because there was no compelling reason. Now 

with some of the collisions and other things that have happened in 

space, that has stepped up tremendously. And I do believe that 

some of the rules of the road discussion that he is proposing would 

also help accelerate some of the more technical discussions as well. 

So I am in favor of that. 

I also agree with Mr. MacDonald that maybe treaties against 

harmful actions, not things, may be a more productive line of logic. 

Mr. KREPON. Mr. Turner, because we have all of these other latent capabilities to punish others in space, it seems to me we have 

an insurance policy, and we are not going to let go of that insurance policy. If we focus in on destructive methods, actions that 

produce debris clouds, we have an insurance policy against noncompliance. We can respond in kind, but we don’t have to respond 

in kind. 

So I would urge you to be open to this narrow-banded approach, 

which is a verifiable treaty approach. The Administration may decide not to go there for whatever reason but, to me, it would be in 

the net interest of the United States to pursue this. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, that takes me to the other area of your discussion, and the issue of deterrence, when you were discussing it. 

Yesterday, we had General Chilton, Commander of the U.S. Strat 

Command before us, and we were asking him, if someone attacks 

our satellite, what are the consequences? And you look at deterrents. There are two main components—there are other components, but two main components. And one is that there are consequences if someone should attack our satellite systems, and/or 

that there may be mechanisms whereby they might not be successful in attacking them. You can have defensive systems, or you can 

have just policies that indicate what the consequences would be. 

I would be interested in your discussion, Mr. Krepon. You started 

with the concept of deterrence isn’t that effective. If you could just 

discuss a little bit on the concept of how you see—what are we not 

doing besides just diplomacy that we ought to be doing as you look 

at our space assets in the area of deterrence? 

Mr. KREPON. Just to be clear, I think deterrence is essential in 

space. We don’t want people messing with our satellites, especially 

in crisis or when our troops are in harm’s way. So deterrence is a 

key piece, and I am trying to argue that we have the means to 

deter, we have the means to punish. We can punish on the ground. 

We can punish in space. It is our choosing what works best for us. 

So please don’t misunderstand me. Deterrence is crucial. 
17 

How do we reinforce deterrence? General Armor has some excellent ideas. I don’t know a single person in this field who is—maybe 

my knowledge is limited—but I don’t know anybody who is arguing 

that we ought to invest hugely in a small number of wonderful satellites that can do everything. I don’t think—nobody is arguing that 

case. 

Mr. TURNER. What I am interested in, what are we missing? If 

there are things that you think we need to be doing that we are 

not doing that would be significant, I would appreciate your perspective there. 

Mr. KREPON. The piece that is most missing, to my way of thinking, is better Space Situational Awareness. Who did what to whom? 

Who may collide with whoever else? And the diplomacy piece. 

Mr. MACDONALD. To continue along that line, I agree. I think 

that deterrence, though, unfortunately from a doctrinal point of 

view, deterrence is missing. One thing when I was writing my report for the Council on Foreign Relations, I was searching. There 

has to be something in here about deterrence; I guess I am not 

looking in the right places. And I finally found an article that was 

written by one former Bush Administration person who was literally on the way out the door, retiring, worked as a Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense. And I went to him and I said, where is this 

better developed? And he said, you are it. I practically fell on the 

floor. I could not believe it. 

I am not trying to tout myself, but he said on the inside, he 

didn’t see any discussion of how deterrence works in space, how we 

would want to operate. If you take a look at space war games—I 

have heard that it is beginning to change a little bit—but if you 

ever take part in a war game, it is kind of a classic thing. There 

is always a phase of it that there is the crisis buildup, but everybody just wants to get through that to where the real action is, 

which is when the war starts. And I was saying, no, no, you want 

to focus on the crisis, because you want to try to avoid a conflict 

in space in the first place. 

So I think one of the things we crucially need is more development of what our doctrine should be in space and how does it work. 

What are the dangerous areas? What are the areas where there are 

opportunities? Which, by the way, is not to short what my colleagues have said; I think space intelligence is crucially important. 

Space Situational Awareness, we need to know what is going on. 

What does it say, for example, and Michael briefly alluded to it, 

the smallest objects we can reliably track are 10 centimeters in diameter, yet people know that objects 1 centimeter or more can be 

lethal to satellites, and there are 17,000 or so pieces that are 10 

centimeters in diameter. There are hundreds of thousands that are 

one centimeter or more. So there are hundreds of thousands of lethal objects growing at a rate of 10 percent a year whizzing around 

there, and we don’t know where they are. I mean, I am just flabbergasted by that. 

There are technical approaches to deal with that, but—I know 

you hear this all the time—that takes resources, and somehow the 

requirement for that kind of Space Situational Awareness always 

seems to fall off the table, there are other priorities. And if we are 

experiencing one or two incidents a month now, imagine 25 years 
18 

from now when we will be experiencing two or three incidents or 

four incidents a week, or even almost daily. So we need to be more 

active in those areas as well. 

General ARMOR. Yes, sir. One of the difficulties I have with talking about space deterrence is that none of our adversaries depend 

on space the same way we do. So I think Mr. Krepon was on the 

right track here about responding in kind. If they are attacked, responding in kind is probably going to be ineffective, so a deterrence 

regime would have to go beyond the space domain, I think, right 

off the bat. 

Let me say that another reason for an offensive space capability 

might be the converse argument, that if there was a potential adversary that held advantage over us in some other area, that we 

might want to respond out of kind with a space offensive capability. 

I am not advocating that. I am just saying that is in the realm of 

discussion here. 

As far as what we are not doing, I will go back and harp on the 

Space Situational Awareness and space intelligence again. I will 

foot-stomp on that. But the one I really want to get across, again, 

is that we are not organized to address the space domain. My beloved Air Force is focused on using space for military purpose. They 

are not really resourced or chartered to secure the space domain 

for all legal use. And it is sort of unfair at this point to hold them 

accountable for collisions or anything else because it is just not in 

their job jar. 

I think we need a strong executive branch national strategy that 

says, hey, look, securing the space domain for all legal use is an 

important part of our policy objectives, and here is the organization 

that I am going to hold accountable for seeing that it is done, and 

here is a budget, and, you know, work with the State Department 

so that we can collaborate with all of our international partners 

and allies and other space-faring entities. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Turner. 

I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from New 

Mexico, Mr. Heinrich. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. MacDonald—and forgive me, my voice is failing today—but 

given the successful anti-satellite test from China, the unpredictability of the debris problem—or maybe I should have the predictability of the problem that debris creates, what kind of satellite replacement capabilities do we currently have in place? And can you 

speak to the importance and need for rapid reaction satellites or 

other—I think you used the phrase ‘‘backups’’? 

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes. My understanding of the kind of capabilities we have today, Congressman, fall into two categories. One is 

the backups on the ground, and the other is backups already orbiting in space. And I think that those are wise steps to take. 

There is an initiative called Operationally Responsive Space 

(ORS), which is another way to get things up quickly that might 

be damaged. The only drawback, everyone acknowledges, to Operationally Responsive Space is that satellites are expensive, of 

course, even the smaller, leaner ones, so it is not cheap to have a 

few spares hanging around in your warehouse. But nonetheless, 
19 

when you think about how much value they deliver, steps like that 

are very good. 

I am worried about the—again, the growth of debris and other 

things that could pose a real threat to these. Another thing we 

need as well, is when a satellite is either injured or disabled, we 

need some mechanism or way that we learn that it is disabled or 

injured, some kind of self-awareness capability, if you will, on the 

satellite that can transmit back to Earth so that we know what is 

going on up there. Once again, we don’t have that. 

And I take onboard what General Armor says about it is not in 

the Air Force’s job jar. The problem is that it is not in anybody’s 

job jar. God bless the Air Force, they have done a remarkable job 

just in letting people know what is out there that is 10 centimeters 

in diameter. The whole world can access this information on the 

World Wide Web. They not only can access it, they do access it, and 

operators overseas very much depend on it. 

So I think there are a number of steps that we can take, and we 

are taking, but I am not convinced so far that we have as much 

as we need. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you. 

General Armor, do you have any thoughts on the role of Operationally Responsive Space in sort of creating a resiliency in our 

entire system? 

General ARMOR. Yes, sir. I do believe that a responsive or 

smallsats are a part of the answer, but they are not a silver bullet. 

I mean, they are one part of making all of our constellations a little 

more robust so that there is a deterrent effect. You are not going 

to take it out with a single shot. 

Keep in mind that most of these smaller satellites are far less 

capable than the ones that they might replace. If you put these on 

orbit and had two or three or four flying, you make the targeting 

a lot harder and the payoff smaller if anybody attacks them. There 

are a number of trades that you can do here, and Operationally Responsive is one. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Mr. MacDonald, I think you said earlier that 

there are some technical approaches to dealing with the—or potential approaches to dealing with the debris issue, and I don’t want 

to mischaracterize what you said. But in addition to the need for 

a ban on behaviors that worsen the debris problem, are there—and 

what are they if there are—the technical approaches that might 

address moving the ever-growing problem with debris in the other 

direction? 

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, this is a case where an ounce of prevention is worth a ton of cure, because it is very expensive to get a 

vacuum cleaner up in space. I was just over at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) a few weeks ago, and 

I was talking about concepts, and we were kicking a few back and 

forth, but we all agreed this would be very expensive. 

And so the whole emphasis—and here I will give the Bush Administration good marks—I think they were seized with the importance of the issue of debris. But we absolutely need to continue it. 

So most of the technical means I am thinking of really involve 

prevention as opposed to—I mean, I could talk about possible 

cleanup options, but it will be a long time before that becomes 
20 

practical. And there are guidelines that we have worked out with 

other countries on how to minimize this. 

I was speaking—in fact, there was a wonderful event here about 

a year ago here in this building, I believe, and the chairman of the 

international group that coordinated space debris was there. And 

I asked him, I said—and the Chinese have been, to their credit, 

very active participants in this—and I asked him, how did the Chinese react after their space test? And he said, ‘‘oh, they were very 

embarrassed.’’ They were not, needless to say, informed about this, 

and, in fact, so much so that the Chinese basically—the next meeting was supposed to be in Beijing, and they suddenly became ill 

and deferred it for three months. 

So the Chinese can be good participants, but this was a case 

within China where the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was not 

talking to the others in the civilian side. 

Mr. HEINRICH. You might say it is hard to use a vacuum in a 

vacuum. 

But to that point that you brought up about the Chinese, are we 

going to see—was that a case where the PLA just didn’t think 

about the ramifications that that debris field might have on their 

own infrastructure? 

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, I have heard some stories. I have had 

some interactions with the Chinese, and the story that I have 

heard that I put the most credibility by is that the scientists and 

engineers in the PLA who have been working on this have been 

working on it for a long time, and like scientists and engineers anywhere, they wanted to do the test to see if it worked, you know, 

one, because scientists and engineers like to do that; and secondly, 

they wanted to be able to justify all the money that they have been 

spending in this area. 

And they knew they had to tell—according to the story—they 

had to tell the Foreign Ministry, so they did what any good bureaucrat would do—and remember, the Chinese invented bureaucracy 

4,000 years ago, so they are really good at it—and that is, I am 

told that they informed the Foreign Ministry in advance about this, 

but they informed in such a technical, obscure way that nobody at 

the Foreign Ministry understood what they were being told. This 

allowed the PLA people to say, did you inform the Foreign Ministry? And they checked the box that said ‘‘yes,’’ but, in fact, nobody 

understood the significance of this. 

But I am told that, in fact, China was really shocked by the very 

strong worldwide reaction, and I think that kind of worldwide reaction had a beneficial effect. I don’t think the PLA, in general, is as 

open to the rest of the world as other parts of the Chinese government are. So I think that—I hope that they have learned a good 

lesson, but we will have to see how that plays out in the future. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Heinrich. 

I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I appreciate the work that each of you has done to put more intellectual vigor and effort into space strategy and space policy. 
21 

I am struck by Mr. MacDonald’s comment that our strategy 

comes from our acquisition; basically we buy what we can and then 

figure out a strategy on how to use it, rather than getting the 

strategy first and having our acquisition come from there. 

So, General, I want to kind of get to a little more practical, I 

guess, because this committee, as well as the Intelligence Committee, at least has had a very difficult time with space acquisition 

and mounting costs and delays. And certainly the country’s strategy comes, in part, from our inability to have a successful acquisition strategy. 

I know you talked about smallsats in previous answers, but give 

us some more assistance about how our government, our country, 

can do better on the acquisition side if we are going to have a strategy we still have got to implement. 

General ARMOR. Yes, sir. There have been some recent acquisition studies, and I don’t recall who they were, I think Tom Young 

did one, and I think there was another one—I am sorry, I am at 

a loss to recall—that really covered those answers very well. And 

I am sorry, I didn’t really come prepared to talk about that today. 

But from my view on the inside over the last 15 years, watching 

the professional acquisition corps and the scientific technical engineering and math-skilled people in the service and acquisition 

corps disappear in the 1990s, to me it was an inevitable result that 

we would have these kind of problems with our complex system acquisition not just in space, but across the board. And I think, sir, 

I will stop there. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Thornberry, if you will yield, I think this is 

an excellent—as usual you come up with some of the best questions—I think this is an excellent question. I think what we would 

try to do is empower our staff to, at a minimum, if not a hearing, 

come up with a briefing where we could start to tease away some 

of this issue. I think you are right. We have been troubled for a 

long time trying to get the horse before the cart, and why don’t we 

try to work with you on that. I think this is a very good level of 

interest on your part, and I know we all are interested in that. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I appreciate it, Madam Chair. 

It does occur. As we were talking about strategy and space policy 

and what is possible with diplomacy and so forth, none of that is 

going to matter unless we can buy stuff on a reasonable time 

frame, and it is going to do what we want it to do. And we have 

enormous difficulties there, so I appreciate it. 

Mr. MacDonald, a while ago General Armor said, and I will paraphrase, we can’t get into a tit-for-tat on ‘‘your satellite versus our 

satellite’’ because we are so much more dependent upon space than 

anybody else. Do you agree with that? And how does that help inform us on what deterrence means when we put it in—when it includes at least—not limited to, but includes a space context? 

Mr. MACDONALD. Well, it is a very important point that General 

Armor makes and that you have repeated. I address this a little 

bit in the Council on Foreign Relations report. While it is true 

today that we depend far more on our space assets than other 

countries, China is generally considered to be moving up fast, and 

if this were a classified hearing, I could say a little more. But let 

me leave it to say there will come a time when China is going to 
22 

be dependent on its space assets as well, and there would be more 

of that dynamic. 

But one thing about deterrence, and I will take onboard what Michael Krepon has said, that we should not, were any of our assets 

to be attacked, we should not feel constrained that the only way 

that we could respond would be relative to space. Sometimes, attacking U.S. space assets is called an ‘‘asymmetric attack’’ because 

it would have a disproportionate effect on our force, but we should 

have our own asymmetric ways of attacking as well, of responding. 

But I think the whole idea that when you are dealing with a 

country like China, fortunately, while China is not exactly our best 

friend, we are not bitter enemies either. And we are almost getting 

to the point of such mutual dependency where neither one—the 

only issue where we could see coming to blows would be over Taiwan, and we are hoping, of course, that that is not going to happen. 

But I think the short answer is that we need not feel constrained 

to respond in ways related to space. But China is going to become 

a lot more dependent on space assets pretty soon, and that would 

provide a way of—offensive capabilities there would provide one 

way of deterring such attacks. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I would just say I hope we don’t limit our 

space policy to what China does and being responsive to them. 

They are not the only folks out there in the world. And just for me, 

I would want to be careful. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry. 

I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. 

Langevin, for five minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Gentlemen, thank you. I appreciate your testimony here today. 

My question first is for Mr. MacDonald, and if this has come up 

already, I apologize. I came from another hearing a little bit late. 

Recently, the Chinese have announced that they plan to further develop their space program by building a new space station in 2011. 

As with our early program, China’s is run through their military, 

and news reports have noted that the purpose of the station would 

be for scientific and military research. 

Do you think this is a move by China to increase their strategic 

military capabilities in space? And if so, what are the strategic implications for the U.S., our national security, and for the peaceful 

development of space? And as a follow-on to that, should the U.S. 

be moving more aggressively to bring China in as a partner in 

space exploration in an effort to dissuade them from focusing their 

efforts on military space technology, and what efforts could our Nation take to increase this cooperation? 

Mr. MACDONALD. Thank you, Congressman. Two very good questions. Let me take the second one first. 

I think we should be actively exploring ways to cooperate with 

China wherever possible. Eleven years ago we had the problem of 

technology being transferred improperly to China, which led to a 

very strong response that we have now had for 11 years. I have 

heard from a lot of people that say that our response was too 

strong, and that we ought to take another look at those restrictions 

that were placed on technology transfer and interaction with 

China, and let us hold to the ones that make sense, but either the 
23 

ones that are outdated or just don’t work, we should consider dropping or modifying so that we can interact with them more. China 

is not our enemy on this. I think we ought to see ways that we 

could bring them in, if you will. 

On the question of their proposed space station, we had seen this 

coming for some time. My take is that their space station itself 

would not pose an important strategic problem for the United 

States, but it would in the sense of what it signified that their capabilities would be and what they might be able to do, not with the 

space station itself, but with other systems they could develop. 

There are all kinds of technologies that might be relevant to capabilities that would be somewhat worrisome. Proximity operations; i.e., what do you do when you are very close to something? 

We heard this from the Soviets back in the ASAT discussions we 

had with them back in the late 1970s when they accused our space 

shuttle of being a potential anti-satellite weapon. We had to go 

around the mulberry tree on that one. 

The concern I would have is more the capabilities that such a 

space station would demonstrate that they have, rather than an intrinsic threat from the space station itself. 

Mr. KREPON. Sir, if I may add, the Chinese presence in space, 

not just with the space station, but their manned missions, makes 

them more vulnerable to the debris problem. We have had to 

change out the windows on the space shuttle over 70 times because 

of very small debris hits, paint flecks that have left, thankfully, 

shallow craters on the windows of the space shuttle. 

So for whatever reason, the Chinese carried out the most irresponsible anti-satellite test the world has ever seen, which will endanger their space operations as well as their satellites. 

So I am of the view that it may be possible to carve out a zone 

of cooperation in this area, preventing debris-producing anti-satellite tests in the future. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. This is maybe a good follow-on to my next question, Mr. Krepon. Unlike nuclear deterrence, space deterrence 

works on the principle of preventing the addition of weapons into 

space. With anti-satellite capabilities increasing worldwide, the 

U.S. clearly has the most to lose strategically and financially in the 

space arena, which is why I believe we have to ensure that space 

doesn’t become a battlefield. And I believe that the solution lies in 

the whole-government approach to space security. 

So can you provide us with some specific steps that the U.S. can 

take to ensure that not only our interests are preserved, but that 

access to space for peaceful research remains open for the U.S. and 

other nations? 

Mr. KREPON. Well, the point Mr. Thornberry made, I think, is 

just foundational. If we can’t get our act together to get the assets 

we need into space in a timely, cost-efficient manner, then we are 

just going to be scrambling. So that is just key. 

But we need to have a better sense of what is going on up there, 

especially with this debris population. We are the best in the world, 

but we are still deficient. And you will be making some investment 

decisions that matter with respect to Space Situational Awareness. 

And as I said, maybe before you came in, we have all sorts of 

ways to mess up satellites now. So that is part of the deterrence 
24 

piece. But what we have been missing over the last eight years has 

been a reinforcing diplomatic piece, and I am hopeful that we will 

add that to the complement. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I agree. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

I am going to yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Turner, and 

then I am going to go to Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you so much. 

I wanted to put a footnote down here that I appreciated the comments of General Armor and Mr. MacDonald concerning the industrial base and our ability to support it both on export restrictions 

and its impact and in our acquisition policies. Yesterday General 

Chilton raised the same issue with us, with Rick Larsen raising it 

as an important issue, and, of course, Mr. Langevin raising it 

today. This is an issue that the committee is interested in, and 

Madam Chairman has indicated an interest in. So I appreciate that 

you mentioned it as we go through our issues of vulnerability, because it is one that is important. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Lamborn for five minutes, the gentleman 

from Colorado. 

Mr. LAMBORN. General Armor, I would like to ask a question of 

you, but anyone else who wishes to comment is welcome to also. 

There are some commercial operators who provide things like optical imaging in the space architecture, and to some degree there are 

public and private partnerships going on, contracts where these optical images are being purchased. So with this growing commercial 

capability, I believe that there is less—that that is a way of sharing 

the risk and broadening out the risk, because private investors, at 

no cost to the taxpayer, are starting to put up satellites, and, even 

more so, that the military or Intelligence Community can directly 

use. 

So what do you see that the future should be for sharing—for 

having these kind of partnerships in the future? And should that 

be part of our strategy to consciously and expressly rely, to some 

extent, on commercial operators? 

General ARMOR. Yes, sir, Congressman Lamborn. I generally 

agree with what you are saying. And my earlier testimony, I am 

an advocate for constructing a strong commercial space business in 

the United States. The methods that you are talking about are 

definitely a good way to do that. I mean, even when the government deployed the Global Positioning System (GPS), they had really no idea of all the commercial applications that spun off of that, 

and now it is part of our infrastructure. 

The imagery sharing, public-private financing, that is a way. I 

would find other incentives, whether it is tax breaks or whatever, 

to incentivize it even further. I know NASA is using the Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) program to buy launch vehicles and other 

resupply. Yes, I believe that there is a broad spectrum of government-commercial practices and acquisition techniques that could 

help stimulate that. 

And if I could go back a little bit to Madam Chairwoman’s analogy, to the homeowner analogy, you know, maybe part of the licensing process for the growing commercial business is that they 
25 

take care of their own orbits, just like you have to clean your own 

sidewalks and make your neighborhood look nice, so that they 

would be held accountable, either by insurance or some commercial 

mechanism, or they would be penalized or fined if they mess up 

their orbital regime that has been assigned to them by the FCC or 

other government traffic management authority. 

I digressed a little bit there, but I think I answered your question, sir. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Either of you other two gentlemen? 

Mr. MACDONALD. If I could just add to that a little bit, and I 

don’t want to beat the homeowner analogy to death, but if you take 

one step up from that, I think if you were a small businessman, 

and you wanted to locate the town, you would want to make sure 

that it had appropriate police and fire protection, and sewage and 

water, and that sort of thing. 

In the same way, I think that the potential for the private sector 

in space is really exciting and, as General Armor said, it is amazing how the private sector has figured a way to leverage off the 

GPS satellites. But I think private operators would count on the 

fact that there is some basic infrastructure support, like the Space 

Situational Awareness, that they could inform private operators 

where the debris is, what to watch out for, and that there is kind 

of a kind of traffic cop role, the traffic management, so that they 

don’t end up losing an investment, that kind of thing. 

But I think that there is—and that is a way in which government can be very helpful is in providing that basic infrastructure 

support to allow the private sector to go full-speed ahead and take 

advantage of it. 

Mr. KREPON. Our Armed Forces never have enough pictures, so 

I am totally in support of this. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Are there any policies that you would advocate to 

make sure that this happens, or should we just continue as we are 

now where it is pretty informal? 

General ARMOR. My understanding, and I am a year or so out 

of date, was that there already is policy that encourages the use 

of commercial systems. It has been a matter of, you know, implementing that policy. And I am back to my ‘‘we need a national 

strategy and a mechanism to implement it’’ argument. So—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. 

I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Arizona, 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

May I go ahead and take this opportunity to congratulate you on 

the news that the Administration has tapped you for a very important position. I know that there is probably a lot of things to still 

do, and I don’t even know what your own conclusions are, but it 

is certainly an honor for any Member to be tapped by a Presidential Administration for something as significant as that. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. General Armor, following the Iridium satellite incidents, we were all impressed with the survivability of the Iridium 

constellation in terms of being able to function relatively uninter-
26 

rupted, even with the loss of one of its members, as it were. I wonder, relating to our other defense satellites systems and constellations, do you think we have enough redundancy, or enough system 

redundancy, in some of those to accomplish the same thing, or is 

this something we should be focusing on significantly more? 

General ARMOR. I don’t think we have robust enough constellations, and we are looking at gaps in many of our capabilities coming up. I wouldn’t necessarily, you know, say that all of them could 

take the same approach that Iridium does. It has sort of a unique 

66-ball satellite constellation, whereas with an imagery system, for 

example, you can’t do it that way yet. Maybe in the future there 

may be a technique for a large, dispersed matrix kind of imagery 

approach to doing business, but that technology isn’t here today. 

And some things are done at geostationary, where it is a different—you know, laws of physics in effect here. But the Iridium 

approach is effective, it is very robust, and you can have accidents, 

and it is commercially sound so they didn’t upset too many customers, and they are happy with that. 

Mr. FRANKS. General Armor, I guess everybody probably asked 

you this already, but what is your assessment of the root cause of 

the February 2000 Iridium incident? What do you believe happened, and do you think it was preventable? 

General ARMOR. I guess, technically, it was preventable if we had 

assigned the resources and the intellectual capacity to do that. 

There is a law of large numbers in effect here. There is a lot of 

stuff out there, and statistics is going to get you at some point. 

Again, had we focused attention that particular conjunction, yeah, 

maybe we could have maneuvered that particular Iridium satellite. 

But it really was an outside event. I mean, it was a law-of-largenumber event here. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. MacDonald, did you have a thought? 

Mr. MACDONALD. Yes. One dimension of that is the Air Force 

does a wonderful job, as I said earlier, in putting information out 

about these 17,000 different orbiting objects, but it is not their job 

responsibility, and it would cost them a lot more money if they 

were to go through the complex calculations to try to figure out 

possibilities for collisions. 

Right now the policy—and I am not faulting the Air Force at all 

on this—is here is the information, but if you have a problem, you 

have got to figure it out. One possible service we could do would 

be to provide the kind of capability that would allow this—and the 

technical term for is it is ‘‘conjunction analysis’’—sounds like a 

grammatical term, but it is not—basically where you would analyze 

to see where collisions might happen. But right now the Air Force 

isn’t given the resources and doesn’t do that kind of thing. And the 

Iridium people, for whatever reason, didn’t figure it out, and so we 

unfortunately had this accident. But we did have the backup capability. 

And I wanted, too, just if I could, to take this chance to point out 

something that this committee did 16 years ago when, over the objections of the Air Force, it funded the Defense Support Program 

(DSP) 23, the last missile launch detection satellite, and said, no— 

Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), the new system, is coming 

online, but it may not come on as fast as we think. Guess what? 
27 

It has not come on as fast as we thought, and so that DSP 23 satellite, it ought to have ‘‘Courtesy of the House Armed Services 

Committee’’ on the decal on the side of it. And it was very thoughtful and a lot of foresight on the part of this committee to ensure 

that we have the backup for that absolutely crucial capability that 

our Nation depends on. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. 

Mr. Krepon, I was impressed with your emphasis on the space 

junk, and I am wondering now—this is not one of my official questions—but when you are going to invent some type of a satellite 

that will come along in parallel orbit and pick this stuff up and 

load it and bring it back to Earth? 

Mr. KREPON. This stuff is traveling at 10 times the speed of a 

rifle bullet. 

Mr. FRANKS. I know it is. I am talking about a parallel orbit, just 

got to come alongside it. 

Mr. KREPON. Right now we have one proven method, and that is 

the atmosphere. 

Mr. FRANKS. We are looking for you to invent something. 

Mr. KREPON. Just let me tag on to your last question, Mr. 

Franks, because this may be a problem of the law of large numbers. But with every collision, the numbers grow big time. And I 

am not technically qualified here, but I have read people who are 

technically qualified who are warning us that we can expect a collision every couple of years now. So this is a serious problem. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. MACDONALD. Just to build on that, the estimates I have seen 

is that the space debris is growing at about 10 percent a year. And 

if you just do the math on that, that is why I mentioned in my 

statement that 25 years from now the debris problem will be 1,200 

percent greater than it is right now. And Michael is exactly right, 

the problem will be far worse. Some are worried that you could set 

up a slow chain reaction where, because a collision creates more 

debris, and you could get into a chain reaction situation if you are 

not careful. 

Mr. FRANKS. So an arithmetic addition of objects means a geometric increase in collisions, for example. Scary situation. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Franks. 

Gentlemen, let me thank you on behalf of the committee and the 

people that we represent, the American people, for your individual 

and collective service to this country, and especially your presence 

at the committee today. It is invaluable to us to have your expertise and your significant pedigrees. 

You always respond, and we can’t thank you enough for what 

you do for the American people. It is very, very important work. 

Space, it is a big place cosmically and physically, and obviously we 

have some very, very important issues to work on to make sure 

that we get this right. You have aided us significantly today, and 

on behalf of my subcommittee, I want to thank you very much. 

And the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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