CLD-079 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 16-4107 

___________ 

ALEX LEROY LOVEJOY 

v. 

RICHARD A. LEWIS; MICHAEL L. ROZMAN; 

EDWARD M. MARSICO, JR.; JOSEPH P. CARDINALE, JR. 

 Alex L. Lovejoy, Appellant 

____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil No. 3-15-cv-02495) 

District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani 

____________________________________ 

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 

December 21, 2016 

Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and BARRY, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: January 6, 2017) 

_________ 

OPINION*

_________ 

PER CURIAM 

                                                                

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2

 Alex Leroy Lovejoy appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint. 

We will summarily affirm. 

 In December 2015, Lovejoy, an inmate confined at SCI-Graterford, filed a civil 

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 

alleging violations of his Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

Lovejoy contended that on March 22, 2001, President Judge Richard A. Lewis of the 

Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas instructed Lovejoy “to never come back to the 

State of Pennsylvania” and that if Lovejoy did, Judge Lewis would “make an example 

out of him.” 

 In October 2002, a jury found Lovejoy guilty of third-degree murder. Lovejoy 

claimed that Judge Lewis made good on his promise to “make an example” of him by 

improperly disregarding a juror’s ambiguous response during the post-verdict juror 

polling in front of Lovejoy at the conclusion of the trial,1

 and sentencing him to twentyto-forty years’ incarceration for third-degree murder as if the jury had reached a 

unanimous verdict. In addition to the claims asserted against Judge Lewis, Lovejoy also 

named Dauphin County District Attorney Edward M. Marsico, Jr., Dauphin County 

Deputy District Attorney Joseph P. Cardinale, Jr., and Dauphin County Assistant District 

Attorney Michael L. Rozman for failing to intervene or correct the alleged injustice. 

                                                                

1

 Lovejoy alleges that when the jurors were polled for their verdict for the charge of 

murder in the third degree, one juror, who had previously voted “Not guilty” for murder 

in the first degree, responded “As I wrote.” Lovejoy claims that this response indicates a 

“not guilty” verdict, which would have resulted in “hanging the jury.” 
3

 In June 2016, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A(a), the Magistrate 

Judge recommended dismissing Lovejoy’s complaint with prejudice as his claims were 

barred by the statute of limitations, and explained that amendment would be futile as the 

statute of limitations had lapsed eleven years prior. Over Lovejoy’s objections, the 

District Court, by order entered on October 31, 2016, adopted the recommendations of 

the Magistrate Judge. Lovejoy appeals. 

 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because Lovejoy has been 

granted in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we review this appeal for 

possible dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We exercise plenary review of 

the District Court's order dismissing Lovejoy’s complaint. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 

F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 

 We agree with the District Court that Lovejoy’s complaint is barred by the statute 

of limitations for the reasons given by the Magistrate Judge in her Report and 

Recommendations. Moreover, we agree with the District Court that even if the complaint 

were timely, it is also barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, 

the United States Supreme Court unequivocally held that “in order to recover damages 

for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by 

actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,” a plaintiff 

bringing a § 1983 action must prove that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on 

appeal, expunged, or called into question. Id. at 486-87. Because 

Lovejoy’s allegations — that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous 

verdict, see United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 815 (3d Cir. 1996), and was 
4

therefore erroneously sentenced — necessarily challenge the legality of his conviction 

and sentence, he must demonstrate that his conviction has been invalidated to proceed 

with this suit. He has failed to do so. Thus, the District Court properly dismissed his 

complaint under Heck.2

 

 Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 

affirm the judgment of the District Court.

                                                                

2

 Lovejoy’s complaint, which sought damages from both the presiding judge and the 

prosecutors involved in his case, is also barred under the doctrines of judicial and 

prosecutorial immunity. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967) (holding 

judges are immune “from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial 

jurisdiction” even when “accused of acting maliciously and corruptly”); see also Buckley 

v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (holding “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in 

preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the 

course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute 

immunity”).