Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1707-CR-1508 | January 23, 2018 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

David W. Stone IV

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill

Attorney General of Indiana

Monika Prekopa Talbot

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jaclyn M. Edgell,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

January 23, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A05-1707-CR-1508

Appeal from the 

Madison Circuit Court

The Honorable Mark Dudley

Trial Court Cause No.

48C06-1607-F6-1515

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1707-CR-1508 | January 23, 2018 Page 2 of 7

[1] Jacyln M. Edgell appeals the revocation of her probation, raising two issues:

I. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of 

attempted dealing in methamphetamine; and 

II. Whether the sanction of full revocation of probation was an 

abuse of discretion.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 28, 2016, the State charged Edgell with Count I, Level 6 felony possession 

of methamphetamine, Count II, Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, 

and Count III, Level 6 felony maintaining a common nuisance. On January 23, 

2017, Edgell signed a plea agreement which included an agreement that her

executed sentence would be capped at one year. On January 30, 2017, the trial 

court sentenced her to concurrent sentences of one and one-half years on each 

conviction, with 176 days executed and the balance suspended to probation. 

[4] On April 18, 2017, Anderson Police Detective Michael Anderson, a member of the 

Madison County Drug Task Force, together with a confidential informant (“CI”), 

made contact with Kyle Champion, Edgell’s husband, to set up a controlled buy to 

purchase 14.5 grams of methamphetamine. Champion told the CI that Edgell 

would be with him. Although Detective Anderson’s testimony and the probable 

cause affidavit differ on the specific location of the meeting, it is undisputed that 

the four met. 
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[5] When Detective Anderson and the CI arrived at the agreed-upon location, the CI 

called Champion, and Champion and Edgell entered the detective’s undercover 

vehicle. After introductions were made, Edgell and Champion advised the 

detective and the CI that any future drug transactions would have to go through 

Edgell because Champion had a job. At that point, the CI handed Edgell the 

$650.00 that Detective Anderson had previously given him for the 

methamphetamine purchase. Edgell exited the vehicle and walked through an 

empty field toward a house. Detective Anderson, the CI, and Champion waited 

for Edgell for approximately an hour, during which time Edgell spoke to 

Champion and the CI on the phone several times. 

[6] At one point, Champion met Edgell in the field, and then Champion returned to 

the vehicle and explained to the detective and the CI that Edgell’s source was 

having difficulty obtaining the methamphetamine. Edgell eventually called and 

informed Detective Anderson and the CI that her source was unable to provide the 

methamphetamine. Edgell did not deliver any methamphetamine to the detective 

and the CI that day and refunded the $650.00 she had received. 

[7] On April 21, 2017, the State filed a notice of probation violation, alleging that 

Edgell: a) violated the law by committing a new crime, b) failed to report timely to 

the probation department, c) failed to pay her probation fees, d) failed to pay an 

administrative fee, e) failed to not associate with a known felon, and f) failed not to 

be at a place where illegal drugs are being used and possessed. 
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[8] At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing regarding the violation, the prosecutor 

stated that Edgell’s new offense was originally charged as conspiracy to commit 

dealing in methamphetamine but that the charge had since been amended to 

attempted dealing in methamphetamine. The State withdrew the allegation that 

Edgell associated with a known felon. Edgell acknowledged that she had failed to 

pay her probation and administrative fees. 

[9] The trial court found that Edgell violated her probation by committing attempted 

dealing in methamphetamine and by failing to pay her probation and 

administrative fees. The trial court revoked Edgell’s probation and ordered her to 

execute the balance of her sentence at the Madison County Detention Center.

[10]Edgell appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[11]Edgell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the revocation of her 

probation and contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered 

her to serve the remainder of her previously-suspended sentence at the Madison 

County Jail . “‘Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a 

right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.’” Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 

1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 

2007)). “The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke 

probation if the conditions are violated.” Id.; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a). 

“Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than 

incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A05-1707-CR-1508 | January 23, 2018 Page 5 of 7

proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. “If this discretion were not afforded to trial 

courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be 

less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. Accordingly, we review 

a trial court’s probation violation determination for an abuse of discretion. Heaton 

v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). “An abuse of discretion occurs where 

the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or 

when the trial court misinterprets the law.” Jackson, 6 N.E.3d at 1042.

[12]Probation revocation is a two-step process. Id. “First, the trial court must make a 

factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually 

occurred.” Id. (citing Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008)). “Second, if 

a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions 

for the violation.” Id. 

I. Probation Revocation

[13]On appeal, Edgell contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support the 

more serious violation of attempting to commit dealing in methamphetamine. She

concedes that the trial court could revoke her probation based on her failure to pay 

her administrative and probationary fees but argues that such violations rarely 

support the full revocation of probation. 

[14]“A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required 

for commission of the crime, the person engages in conduct that constitutes a 

substantial step toward commission of the crime.” I.C. § 35-41-5-1(a). Edgell 

contends that accepting the money did not constitute a substantial step. 
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[15]However, the evidence shows that she did more than just accept the money. The 

evidence presented shows that Champion told the CI during the first phone call 

that Edgell would be with him at the buy. Furthermore, when Edgell and 

Champion entered the undercover vehicle, they explained to the detective and the 

CI that Edgell would be responsible for any future drug deals. Edgell accepted the 

$650.00 from the CI and left the vehicle to obtain the methamphetamine that they 

wanted to purchase. Her efforts were made clear to the CI and the detective 

through Edgell’s periodic phone calls and her meeting with Champion in a field. 

Edgell tried for an hour to obtain drugs and was unsuccessful only because her 

source was unable to locate any methamphetamine. Edgell argues that this 

scenario does not support the determination that she had attempted to deal in 

methamphetamine but rather shows nothing more than preparation to deal in 

methamphetamine because she never had the methamphetamine in her possession. 

Taking the money, she argues, was no more than preparation which is insufficient 

to constitute attempted dealing and did not amount to a substantial step to deal 

methamphetamine. 

[16]We disagree. The evidence admitted at the hearing showed that Edgell acted with 

the culpability required for the commission of dealing in methamphetamine and 

engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward the commission of 

the crime. 

[17]As recognized above, the State has the burden of proving the violation of a 

condition of probation by a preponderance of the evidence. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 

617. The State satisfied its burden here. 
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II. Revocation of Entire Probation

[18]Next, Edgell contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her 

entire probationary time. “We review a trial court’s sentencing decision in a 

probation revocation proceeding for an abuse of discretion.” Johnson v. State, 62 

N.E.3d 1224, 1229-30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the 

trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 

before the court.” Id. 

[19]If a defendant is found to have violated his or her probation, a trial court may (1) 

continue the defendant on probation; (2) extend the probationary period for not 

more than one year beyond the original period; and/or (3) order all or part of a 

previously suspended sentence to be executed. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). 

[20]We have affirmed the trial court’s determination that Edgell committed the offense 

of attempting dealing in methamphetamine, the most serious of her violations. 

Her attempted procurement and subsequent resale of $650.00 worth of 

methamphetamine occurred less than three months after the trial court sentenced 

her for drug-related felonies and placed her on probation. Committing such an 

offense just after being released to probation from a previous sentence shows not 

only a lack of reform but also a lack of respect for the law. The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion when it ordered Edgell to execute her previously suspended 

sentence in its entirety. 

[21]Affirmed.

[22]Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.