Filed 10/7/24 P. v. Geason CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROBERT GERROD GEASON II,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B333478

 (Los Angeles County

 Super Ct. No. KA127534)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Juan C. Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed as 

modified.

James M. Crawford, under appointment by Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Jason Tran and Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________________
2

A jury convicted Robert Gerrod Geason II (defendant) of 

battery resulting in serious bodily injury and willful infliction of 

corporal injury in the context of a dating relationship in violation 

of Penal Code sections 243, subdivision (d)1 and 273.5, 

subdivision (a), respectively, after he picked up and slammed 

Dong Doe (Dong) headfirst onto a concrete surface, resulting in 

her suffering traumatic brain injury and other impairments. 

Defendant appeals his convictions, arguing that the trial court 

erred in admitting evidence of prior uncharged acts under 

Evidence Code section 1109, which codifies a statutory exception 

to the general ban on propensity evidence when the charged 

offenses involve domestic violence. Specifically, defendant 

contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting 

evidence that defendant once punched Dong in the face while she 

was driving and that he repeatedly stole the side mirror from her 

car. Defendant further contends the car-part theft was not a 

prior act of “domestic violence” within the meaning of Evidence 

Code section 1109. We affirm as modified (1) to strike the 

restitution fines, which the trial court did not orally impose, from 

the abstract of judgment; and (2) to add the mandatory court fees 

to the trial court’s oral pronouncement, consistent with the 

abstract of judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

According to the evidence presented at trial, Dong and 

defendant met in 2018 and dated for five to six months during

2020. At some point, Dong “tried to break up with [defendant] 

because he hid[] . . . his background” from her. Approximately 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless other indicated.
3

three or four months after they began their relationship, 

defendant became aggressive with Dong, including, on one 

occasion, punching her in the face while she was driving. 

Defendant also began showing up to Dong’s home unannounced

in the early hours of the morning. After her car’s right side-view 

mirror was stolen three times, Dong confronted defendant about 

the thefts. 

One of Dong’s text messages to defendant read, “[in] all 

honesty, I feel so miserable waking up knowing I still have to 

keep in contact with you so you don’t keep damaging [my 

property] and calling my work place. I really hope you’ll find 

someone else and fall in love with another girl soon.” Dong 

complained in another text message that the cost of replacing the 

repeatedly removed car mirror had risen from $200 to $550. 

Defendant responded, “It will get taken care of. Don’t trip.” 

Dong texted defendant, “all the kissing and hugging really isn’t 

worth getting my car damaged and more troubles in the future. 

I just want to focus on work and my mom.” Defendant told Dong, 

“Let me know the total and I’ll bring you the cash at Cal Poly 

[Pomona] and [] that will be it. I’m tired of back and forth.” 

Dong agreed to meet defendant at Cal Poly on May 4, 2021, 

so that defendant could give her $500 to replace her mirror. 

Dong arrived at the parking lot in front of the bookstore, hid her 

phone in her car to prevent defendant from destroying it, and 

walked to meet defendant. Defendant approached Dong, and 

demanded that she tell him where her phone was. Dong

responded that she had left her phone at home, and defendant 

proceeded to search her backpack. Not finding the phone, 

defendant walked to Dong’s car, and Dong followed him. 

Dong’s next memory was waking up in a hospital. 
4

A Cal Poly bookstore employee witnessed defendant and 

Dong yelling at each other, and heard defendant say, “Give me 

the keys bitch,” in a “hostile and aggressive tone.” The arguing 

ended, and “the two of them turned around and started walking 

in opposite directions. And then [defendant] stopped and turned 

back around[,] . . . moved into a crouched position and started 

moving back towards [Dong]. And she didn’t seem to notice that 

he was coming.” Defendant “grabbed [Dong] from behind” in a 

“bear hug,” and the two struggled for a couple of seconds. 

Defendant then “picked her up and . . . threw her onto the floor,” 

causing “a dull thud on the concrete,” followed by silence. 

Dong sustained fractures to various parts of her skull and 

suffered a traumatic brain injury. Her brain was so swollen that 

a large part of her skull had to be removed, and a band 

connecting the brain’s hemispheres cut, so that the brain could 

fall out of the skull’s base until the swelling subsided. When 

these measures failed to control the swelling, the neurosurgeon 

“took out a clot from her left temporal lobe . . . [and] remove[d] 

some of her bruised and dead brain to make more space.” Dong’s 

treating physicians induced a medically necessitated coma. As a 

result of the attack, Dong’s left limbs “do not work as well as the 

right,” and her personality has changed. According to her 

neurosurgeon, “She will never make a full recovery.” 

II. Procedural Background

The People charged defendant with one count of battery 

with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 1), and one 

count of injuring a dating companion resulting in a traumatic 

condition (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2). The People further alleged, 

as to the first count, that defendant personally inflicted great 

bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence 
5

(§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), and, in connection with both counts, that, 

as contemplated by California Rules of Court, rule 4.421: the 

crimes involved great violence or other acts disclosing a high 

degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (id., subd. (a)(1));

Dong was a particularly vulnerable victim (id., (a)(3)); defendant

engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious danger to society 

(id., subd. (b)(1)); defendant has suffered prior convictions as an 

adult and sustained petitions in juvenile dependency proceedings 

that are numerous and of increasing seriousness (id., subd. 

(b)(2)); and defendant previously performed unsatisfactorily on 

probation, mandatory supervision, post release community 

supervision, and parole (id., subd. (b)(5)). 

The matter proceeded to trial by jury, and the jury found 

defendant guilty of both counts. It further found true all 

allegations under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421. The 

trial court sentenced defendant to nine years in state prison on 

count 2, comprised of a four-year base term, plus five years for 

the enhancement under section 12022.7, subdivision (e) for great 

bodily injury involving domestic violence, and stayed the 

sentence imposed under section 654 for count 1. 

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting 

the uncharged acts of domestic violence—theft of Dong’s car 

mirror, and defendant’s punching her while she drove. He 

further argues that the fines and fees reflected in the minute 

order and abstract of judgment must be stricken because the trial 

court failed to orally impose them. 
6

I. Uncharged Acts Admitted Under Evidence Code 

Sections 1109 and 352

Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting 

evidence of his past uncharged acts of domestic violence because 

the probative value was substantially outweighed by undue 

prejudice (Evid. Code, § 352) and, additionally, with respect to 

the car mirror thefts, that the uncharged acts were not “domestic 

violence” under Evidence Code section 1109. Defendant’s 

argument regarding applicability of Evidence Code section 1109 

to the car mirror thefts raises a question of statutory 

interpretation subject to de novo review. (People v. Mendoza 

(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 294.) We review the trial court’s 

rulings on Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of discretion. 

(People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1295.) 

A. Governing Principles

Generally, “evidence of a person’s character or a trait of 

his . . . character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of 

reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his . . . conduct) is 

inadmissible when offered to prove his . . . conduct on a specified 

occasion.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) However, “in a 

criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense 

involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s 

commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible 

by section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to 

Section 352.” (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1).) Section 1109 of 

the Evidence Code “reflect[s] the Legislature’s determination that 

in . . . domestic violence cases, ‘similar prior offenses are uniquely 

probative of a defendant’s guilt on a later occasion.’ ” (People v. 

Robinson (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1345, 1352.) 
7

B. Defendant’s Theft of Dong’s Mirror Qualifies as 

“Domestic Violence” Under the Statutory Definition

Evidence Code section 1109, defines “domestic violence” 

as having the meaning set forth in section 13700, and, “if the act 

occurred no more than five years before the charged offense,” 

additionally has the meaning set forth in Family Code 

section 6211. (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (d)(3).) Family Code 

section 6211 defines domestic violence as “abuse” committed 

against someone with whom the perpetrator has had a dating 

relationship. The Law Revision Commission notes to Family 

Code section 6211 refer to Family Code Section 6203 for the 

definition of “abuse.” Family Code section 6203, in turn, defines 

“abuse” to include “engag[ing] in any behavior that has been or 

could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320,” and expressly 

provides that “[a]buse is not limited to the actual infliction of 

physical injury or assault.” (Fam. Code, § 6203, subds. (a)(4) &

(b).) The behaviors listed in section Family Code section 6320 

include “destroying personal property” and “disturbing the peace 

of the other party,” (Fam. Code, § 6320, subds. (a) & (c).) 

“Section 1109 applies if the [uncharged] offense falls within the 

Family Code definition of domestic violence even if it does not fall 

within the more restrictive Penal Code definition.” (People v. 

Ogle (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1144 (Ogle).) 

The parties do not dispute that the uncharged acts occurred 

within five years of the charged offenses, making both the Family 

Code and the Penal Code definitions of “domestic violence” 

applicable. (Ogle, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143.)
8

Defendant’s argument that the mirror theft does not 

qualify as “an act of domestic violence,” is at odds with the 

express language of the Family Code definition, which provides 

that domestic violence includes “abuse,” and that “abuse” is 

“not limited to . . . infliction of physical injury” and includes 

“destroying [the] personal property” of another. (Fam. Code, 

§§ 6203, subds. (a)(4), (b); 6320, subd. (a).) The evidence also 

indicates the repeated vandalizing of Dong’s car, in addition to 

constituting a “destr[uction] [of her] personal property,” was 

activity “disturbing the peace of the other party.” (Fam. Code,

§ 6320, subds. (a) & (c); see N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 

595, 603 [disturbing the peace means “ ‘conduct that destroys the 

mental or emotional calm of the other party’ ”].) 

C. Admitting Evidence of Prior Uncharged Acts Was 

Within the Trial Court’s Discretion

Under Evidence Code section 352, “[t]he court in its 

discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 

will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 

substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or 

of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)

Here, the uncharged conduct was squarely within the 

parameters of Evidence Code section 1109 and the risk of undue 

prejudice was minimal, particularly given the extreme brutality 

of the charged offense and the substantially lower level of harm 

inflicted by the uncharged acts. (See People v. Mani (2022) 74 

Cal.App.5th 343, 372 [incidents that were “not significantly more 

inflammatory than the charged offenses” posed no substantial 

danger of undue prejudice]; accord People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 

1, 31-32.) Nor are we persuaded by defendant’s argument that 
9

the evidence of prior uncharged acts posed “a substantial risk the 

jury would confuse the issues and punish [defendant] . . . for [] 

unproven allegations.” (See People v. Wilson (2023) 89 

Cal.App.5th 1006, 1014 [“Jurors are credited with intelligence 

and common sense,” and “[w]e ‘presume they generally 

understand and follow the instructions’ ”].)

Having concluded there was no error, we decline to address 

the parties’ arguments on whether any error was harmless. 

II. Fines and Fees

Defendant argues the fines and fees set forth in the 

abstract of judgment—$300 restitution fine, $300 parole 

revocation fine, $80 court operations assessment, and $60 

criminal conviction assessment—must be stricken because the 

trial court did not impose them during its oral pronouncement of 

judgment at the sentencing hearing. “Courts may correct clerical 

errors at any time, and appellate courts . . . that have properly 

assumed jurisdiction of cases have ordered correction of abstracts 

of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of 

sentencing courts.” (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 

185.) 

The People concede the two $300 fines should be stricken in 

view of their omission from the trial court’s oral pronouncement, 

and we agree. We likewise agree with the People’s position that 

the required fee assessments of $60 and $80 may remain (see 

People v. Sencion (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 480, 484-485 [modifying 

oral pronouncement to impose court fees consistent with the 

abstract of judgment].) 
10

DISPOSITION

The abstract of judgment is modified to strike the $300 

restitution fine and the $300 parole revocation fine. 

The judgment is otherwise affirmed. 

DAVIS, J.*

We Concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

MOOR, J.

*

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.