IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Floyd May (#B-17282), )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 12 C 5350

)

v. ) District Judge John W. Darrah

) Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox

Dr. Jacqueline Mitchell, )

)

Defendant. )

)

ORDER

The defendant=s motion to enforce the settlement agreement [#51] is granted. The 

defendant is directed to re-mail the plaintiff a final settlement agreement and general release. 

The court orders the plaintiff to sign the settlement agreement within twenty-one days of the date 

of this order. If the plaintiff fails to execute the settlement agreement within twenty-one days, the 

court will issue a report and recommendation advising the district judge to enforce the settlement 

agreement.

STATEMENT

The plaintiff, an Illinois state prisoner, has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. The plaintiff claims that the defendant, a dentist at the Stateville 

Correctional Center, violated the plaintiff=s constitutional rights by acting with deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs. More specifically, the plaintiff alleges that he lost a 

tooth because the defendant denied him timely, needed dental care. This matter is before the 

court for ruling on the defendant=s motion to enforce the parties= settlement agreement. For the 

reasons stated in this order, the motion is granted. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

State contract law governs settlement agreements. Magallanes v. Ill. Bell Telephone Co., 

535 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2008); Leibowitz v. Trebels, No. 12 C 1536, 2012 WL 5559554, at 

*3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2012) (Lefkow, J.). Under Illinois law, an oral settlement agreement is 

valid and binding so long as there is an offer, acceptance, and a meeting of the minds on all 

material terms. Dillard v. Starcon Int=l, Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2007); Artuk, Inc. v. 

AKT Corporation, No. 13 C 3911, 2014 WL 3895920, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2014) (Holderman, 

J.) (citations omitted); In re Estate of LeBloch, 2013 Ill. App. 121093-U, 2013 WL 2643998, at 

*4 (Ill. App. 2nd Dist. 2013). A meeting of the minds occurs Awhere there has been assent to the 

same things in the same sense on all essential terms and conditions.@ IMI Norgren, Inc., v. D & 

D Tooling Mfg., Inc., 306 F. Supp.2d 796, 802 (N.D. Ill. 2004); see also Dynegy Marketing and 
Trade v. Multiut Corp., 648 F.3d 506, 515 (7th Cir. 2011) (in order there to be a contract between 

parties, there must be a meeting of the minds or mutual assent as to the terms of the contract); St. 

George Investments LLC v. QuamTel, Inc., No. 12 C 9186, 2014 WL 812157, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 

Mar. 3, 2014) (Dow, J.) (citations omitted). AAbsent mistake or fraud, a settlement agreement 

will not be disturbed or set aside lightly.@ LaSalle Nat. Trust, N.A. v. Lamet, 2014 Ill. App. 

121730-U, 2014 WL 1047881, at *8 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2014). 

BACKGROUND

The parties engaged in lengthy settlement negotiations over the course of about a year. 

In the defendant=s September 13, 2013, status report, he indicated that the plaintiff had made a 

Anew@ settlement demand. (Defendant=s Status Report, doc. no. 19, & 4.) In a later motion for a 

settlement conference, the defendant reported that the parties had reached an agreement in 

principle, but that the plaintiff was waffling on the exact terms. (Defendant=s Motion for 

Settlement Conference and Extension of Time, doc. no. 34, && 3-5; see also Defendant=s Status 

Report, doc. no. 40, & 4). 

At a settlement conference held on March 12, 2014, the parties were able to reach a 

settlement agreement. The parties agreed that the plaintiff would receive a beard trimmer and 

television in exchange for dismissal. The plaintiff having agreed to the terms of the settlement 

agreement on the record, the court ordered him to execute the agreement. See Minute Entry of 

March 12, 2014 (Cox, J.). However, at a hearing on April 15, 2014, the plaintiff attempted to 

revise the terms, on the basis that he anticipated a transfer to a facility that permitted television 

sets but not typewriters. In order to allay the plaintiff=s concerns, the court requested that the 

Attorney General inquire with the Illinois Department of Corrections about the possibility 

granting the plaintiff access to a typewriter at the Pontiac Correctional Center. See Minute Entry 

of April 15, 2014 (Cox, J.); see also Minute Entry of April 29, 2014 (Cox, J.) Ultimately, 

defense counsel was able to make arrangements for the plaintiff to get a typewriter; accordingly, 

the court directed the plaintiff to sign new settlement agreement documents. See Minute Entry 

of May 13, 2014 (Cox, J.). 

At a hearing on June 25, 2014, the plaintiff indicated that he refused to sign the settlement 

agreement as prepared by defense counsel because, in the interim, Pontiac officials had 

confiscated certain items from him. The plaintiff called for a new settlement agreement that 

involved the return of the items in question. However, the court ruled that the seizure of those 

items did not relate to the instant case. See Minute Entry of June 25, 2014 (Cox, J.). Because 

the plaintiff failed to execute the settlement agreement, the defendant filed the instant motion to 

enforce.

ANALYSIS

The court finds that the plaintiff entered into a valid, legally binding, and enforceable 

settlement agreement. Throughout the protracted settlement process, the plaintiff vacillated and 

backed out of multiple tentative settlement agreements. But once the parties ironed out the 

definitive terms of a settlement agreement, and the plaintiff agreed to those terms on the record, 
he was bound to that accord. There was offer, acceptance, and a meeting of the minds as to all 

of the material terms of the settlement agreement in this case. 

The plaintiff is mistaken that he can unilaterally modify the terms of the binding 

settlement agreement. The plaintiff appears to misapprehend the meaning of the term, AThis 

Agreement may not be changed, modified or assigned except by the written agreement of the 

Plaintiff, the IDOC, and the Illinois Attorney General.@ (See Plaintiff=s Exhibit B, ASettlement 

and General Release,@ & 10.) That provision means that all parties to the agreement must agree 

to any modification, and not that the plaintiff himself can change the terms at will. 

Furthermore, the court interprets the inclusion of the condition that the plaintiff=s 

Acontinued possession of [the typewriter and beard trimmer] will be subject to all policies and 

procedures of the Illinois Department of Corrections@ to mean only that the plaintiff cannot 

misuse those items. Obvious concerns of prison safety and security preclude the plaintiff from 

maintaining possession of the typewriter and beard trimmer carte blanche. The court can 

envision, for example, parts of the typewriter being used to make keys or weapons, or the 

plaintiff charging fellow prisoners for barber services. Such abuses of the privilege would likely 

justify confiscation of either item. The plaintiff=s reliance on Rowe v. Jones, 483 F.3d 791 (7th 

Cir. 2007), and 18 U.S.C. ' 3626, both of which discuss consent decrees rather than settlement 

agreements, is equally misplaced. 

In short, the plaintiff has provided no legitimate reason why the court should not enforce 

the agreement or why he should be permitted to rescind his acceptance. The court can only 

conclude that the plaintiff, after making the agreement, decided once again that he no longer 

liked the deal. But A[o]nce a valid settlement agreement has been made, buyer=s remorse will 

not render the agreement unenforceable. A mere change of mind is not sufficient grounds for 

setting aside a settlement agreement.@ Millard v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. 08 C 3752, 2010 WL 

3515746, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2010) (Brown, J.) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

AA party to a settlement cannot avoid the agreement merely because he subsequently believes the 

settlement insufficient.... If a party to a ... suit who has previously authorized a settlement 

changes his mind ..., that party remains bound by the terms of the agreement.@ Glass v. Rock 

Island Refining Corp., 788 F.2d 450, 454-55 (7th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); see also Millard, 

2010 WL 3515746 at *3; Coldwell Banker Real Estate LLC v. Centanne, No. 10 C 2299, 2010 

WL 4313766, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2010) (Dow, J.) (same). APost-acceptance conduct does 

not retract an earlier acceptance.@ Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 709 (7th Cir. 2010). The 

plaintiff=s change of heart and wish to incorporate additional boons is insufficient under Illinois 

law to overturn the parties= contractual agreement. The court must enforce the terms of the clear 

and unambiguous terms of the settlement agreement as agreed to by both parties in open court. 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant=s motion to enforce the settlement agreement is 

granted. The defendant is directed to re-mail the plaintiff a final settlement agreement and 

general release. The court orders the plaintiff to sign the settlement agreement within twenty-one 

days of the date of this order. If the plaintiff fails to execute the settlement agreement within 

twenty-one days, the court will recommend to the District Judge that the settlement agreement be 

enforced.

Date: September 10, 2014 /s/ Susan E. Cox