07-20654

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-20654

Summary Calendar

KENNETH M MORRIS

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES LLC

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:04-CV-423

Before REAVLEY, WIENER, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Kenneth M. Morris appeals the district court’s judgment,

following a jury trial, in favor of defendant Equifax Information Services, LLC.

Morris claims thatthe district courtfailed to fully and correctly instructthe jury

concerning the term “willfully fails,” which requires us to vacate the judgment

for the defendant on Morris’s willful violation claim under the Fair Credit

Reporting Act (FCRA). Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 7, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
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2

The relevant facts are set forth in our previous decision in this case,

Morris v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 457 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2006). Therefore, we

do not need to repeat them here. It is sufficient to say that Morris claimed in his

lawsuit, among other things, that Equifax violated the reinvestigation

requirements of the FCRA, 17 U.S.C. § 1681i. Question 4 of the jury charge and

the district court’s Special Instructions Regarding Question 4 are the subject of

this appeal. Question 4 asked whether Equifax willfully failed to comply with

the reinvestigation requirements in the FCRA. The jury answer this question

in the negative. In the Special Instructions Regarding Question 4, the district

court explained the meaning of “willfully fails.” Morris’s sole argument on

appeal is that the district court erred by not including part of his proffered

Special Instructions.

We review jury instructions and special interrogatories for abuse of

discretion. EEOC v. Manville Sales Corp., 27 F.3d 1089, 1096 (5th Cir. 1994).

Where a party argues that the district court erred in refusing to give a proffered

jury instruction, that party must show as a threshold matter that the proposed

instruction correctly stated the law. Russell v. Plano Bank & Trust, 130 F.3d

715, 719 (5th Cir. 1997). Once that threshold is met, we generally apply a

two-part test in considering a challenge to the district court’s jury instructions.

The party challenging the instructions must first “demonstrate that the charge

as a whole creates substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been

properly guided in its deliberations.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, even where a jury instruction was erroneous, “we will not reverse if we

determine, based upon the entire record, that the challenged instruction could

not have affected the outcome of the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks
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omitted). In applying this test to determine whether the instruction was

erroneous, we accord substantial deference to the decisions of the district court.

Id. 

As in initial matter, it is unclear whether Morris’s proposed additions to

the Special Instructions correctly stated the law. But even assuming arguendo

that they did, we affirm the judgment of the district court because Morris has

not shown that the district court’s charge “as a whole creates substantial and

ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been properly guided in its

deliberations.” In Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. GEICO, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007), the

Supreme Court articulated the standards by which a claim for willful violations

of the FCRA should be evaluated. The district court’s Special Instruction

sufficiently explained the Safeco standards to the jury so thatit could determine

whether Equifax committed a willful violation. Although the Special

Instructions could have gone into more detail aboutthe Safeco test, which might

have been accomplished by adding something similar to those additions proposed

by Morris, “[i]t is only required that the trial court correctly and adequately

instruct the jury as to the law to be followed in deciding the issues[;] the court

is not compelled to give every correct instruction offered by the parties.”

Alexander v. Conveyors & Dumpers, Inc., 731 F.2d 1221, 1227 (5th Cir. 1984). 

The ultimate test remains whether the instructions that were actually

given were adequate, see Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 425 (5th Cir.

1985), and we believe that in this case the district court’s Special Instructions

were acceptable. “A party is entitled to reversal for a district court’s failure to

give a particularly requested instruction only if the jury was misled by the

instructions that were actually given. The court is under no obligation to couch
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the charge in terms requested by counsel.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). Because we cannot say that the jury was misled by the instructions,

we affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED