[Cite as State v. Braddy, 2012-Ohio-4720.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 97816

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

CHESTER BRADDY

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-420714 

 BEFORE: Jones, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Cooney, J. 

 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 11, 2012
-iATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Brian R. McGraw 

1370 Ontario Street, Suite 2000 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

Daniel Van 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.: 

{¶1} Appellant Chester Braddy appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for a 

de novo sentencing hearing to properly advise of postrelease control. We affirm. 

{¶2} On July 31, 2003, a jury convicted Braddy of multiple counts of rape and 

gross sexual imposition, as well as one count of endangering children. The trial court 

imposed an aggregate prison sentence of 20 years to life. After a House Bill 180 

hearing, Braddy was classified as a sexual predator. Braddy appealed his convictions, 

which we affirmed in a decision dated June 17, 2004. State v. Braddy, 8th Dist. No. 

83462, 2004-Ohio-3128. 

{¶3} On October 14, 2011, Braddy filed a motion, pro se, seeking a de novo 

sentencing hearing on the grounds that postrelease control had not been properly imposed. 

 Braddy also argued that his original sentence was not a final appealable order. 

{¶4} On November 28, 2011, the trial court convened a hearing that was limited to 

the proper imposition of postrelease control. The trial court appointed counsel to 

represent Braddy, who consented to an appearance via video satellite. After finding that 

Braddy’s original sentence was a final appealable order, the trial court proceeded to 

properly impose postrelease control. Braddy now appeals and asserts one error for our 

review: 
Assignment of Error I: Regarding the failure to properly advise of post 

release control, the court should reconsider and overrule State v. Fischer 

and return to the standard enunciated in State v. Bezak.

{¶5} Preliminarily, we note that in State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 

2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, the Ohio Supreme Court held that where postrelease 

control was erroneously imposed, resentencing is limited to proper imposition of 

postrelease control. Id. The defendant is not entitled to be resentenced on the entire 

sentence — only the portion that is void may be vacated and otherwise amended. State v. 

Gregley, 8th Dist. No. 97469, 2012-Ohio-3450. 

{¶6} In the instant case, it is undisputed that postrelease control was not properly 

imposed because the trial court merely stated that “post release control is part of this 

prison sentence for the maximum period allowed for the above felony(s) under R.C. 

2967.28.” The trial court never informed Braddy that it was a mandatory period of five 

years and did not explain the consequences of violating postrelease control. R.C. 

2967.28(B)(1). See also State v. Griffin, 8th Dist. No. 83724, 2004-Ohio-4344, ¶ 13, 

quoting State v. Jones, 8th Dist. No. 77657, 2001 Ohio App. Lexis 2330 (May 24, 2001). 

As previously stated, at the resentencing hearing, the trial court properly imposed 

postrelease control. 

{¶7} Consequently, although Braddy was entitled to a new sentencing hearing 

under Bezak, pursuant to Fischer that hearing was limited to the issue of postrelease 

control, which is precisely what occurred in this case. State v. Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 
318, 2012-Ohio-1908, 972 N.E.2d 509. As an appellate court, we are without power to 

overrule a supreme court decision as appellant proposes. 

{¶8} The sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶9} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into 

execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is 

terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and 

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCUR