W e wi l l us e t he t erm s “r est ri ct i o n” and “ co nd i t i o n” i nt erchangeab l y i n t hi s o p i ni o n. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 10, 200 5 S es sio n RICHARD A. DEMONBRE UN v. METRO POLI TAN BOARD OF Z ONI NG AP PE ALS OF THE M ETR OPO LITA N G OVE RN MEN T OF NA SHV ILLE

AN D D AV IDSO N C OUN TY, TEN NES SEE Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 02C-1999 C arol Solom an, Jud ge

No. M2004- 02402-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Dece m ber 7, 2005

The Metr opolitan Davidson Cou n t y Boa rd of Z oning A ppeals (“ the B Z A”) g rante d Richard A. De mon br e un (“ theL a nd ow ne r” ) a sp e c ia l e xce pti on pe rm it t o u se his re sid e nti a lly -zo ne d p ro pe rty a s a sp e c ia l e ve nt si te. Th e L and ow ne r f ile d a pe tit ionfo r w ri t of

c e rt ior ari a ndsu pe rs e de a s, challeng ing the validity

of seve ral re strictions imposed upon the permit. The trial court he ld that 1
sever al of the r estrictions wer e unsupported b y m at er i al evidenc e, and thus, a ccor ding to the trial c ou rt , w e re arb itr ari ly

imp os e d b y

the B Z A. Th e B Z A app e a ls the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n w ith respe ct to the conditions found to be ar bitrary . We affirm in part and re verse in part.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in Par t; Re verse d in P art; Case Re m anded

C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined.

Ka rl F . D e a n, Di re c tor

of L a w, J. B ro ok s F ox a ndJohn L . K e nn e dy , M e tr op oli ta n A tto rn e y s, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f

or the a ppellant, The Me tropolitan Boa rd of Z oning A p p eals of T he M e tr o p o l i t a n G o v e r n m e n to f N a s h v i l l e a n d D a v i d s o n C o u n t y.

Robert W. Rut herf

ord, Na shville, Tennessee , for the a ppellee, Richa

rd A. De monbreun.

OP IN ION-2- I.

Th eL and own er ow ns a hal f-acre pi ece of pro pert y lo cat ed at 74 6 Ben to n Av enu e in so uth e a st Nashville. The pr operty lies within an R6, residentially -zoned district and spec i fi ca l l y i n the Woodland-in-Waverly

residential ne ighbor

hood

. W o o dland-in-Waverly is a historic urban
n e i g h b o rh o o d s h o w c a s i n g h o u s e s b u i l ta s e ar l y a s t h e 1 9 t h c e n t u r y. T h e L a n d o w n e r ’ s p r o p e r t y, wh ic h h e b o u g h t i n 1 9 9 5 , in c lu d e s a h o u s e b u il t i n 1 9 0 6 a n d o n e o f th e f e w f u n c ti o n in g o r ig inal car riag e houses in Da vidson County

.

I n 1 99 9, the L a nd ow ne r p e tit ion e d th e B Z A f or a sp e c ia l e xce pti onpe rm it t o u se his ne wl y re no vated pr op e rty

a s a “ Hi sto ri c Ho me Ev e nts ” sit e , w hic h p e rm it w ou ld e na ble him to acc ommodate wed d in g s , p a rties, and other

specia l event func tions on the property . The B Z A g rante d the L andowne r t he permit but included the following conditions: (1) the permit would expire in one y ear , in order to g ive the B Z A a c hance to review t h e p er m i t and seehow the conditions wer e working ; (2) the pe rmit was for the L andow n er ’s use only ; (3) vale t parking was re quired if more than 25 people attended an event; (4) larg e buses were not allowed on the stre et, but shuttle buses wer e permitted; (5) the number of people attending an event wa s subject t o a m ax imum of the number of pa

rking space s times two with a 150-person c ap; (6) a maxi mum of two events we re permitted ea ch we ek; (7) e ach e vent had to end and cleanup had to comme nce b y 9 : 0 0 p.m. on wee knights a nd by

11:00 p.m. on Friday and S aturday nights; and (8) no tents were allowed in the fr on t y ard . In 2 00 0, theB Z A a g a in g rante d th e L a nd ow ne r’ s p e rm it w iththe sa me c on dit ion s; ho we ve r, in 2 00 1, the B Z A u na nim ou sly de nie d th e L a nd ow ne r’ s th ir d p e rm it a pp lic a tio n b e c aus e of te sti mon y

fr om Wo od la nd -i n- Wav e rl y re sid e nts re g ard ing his no nc omp lianc e wi th c e rt a in p e rm it conditions. Pursuant to the rules of the B Z A, t h e L an d o wn er reapplied f or the pe rmit six months afte r the 2001 de nial. The latter application is the one pr esently befor e us.

On J uly 3, 2002, the BZ A held a public hearing on the L andowne r’s ne w application. The BZ A heard from numerous witnesses, both in support of and in opposit ion to the application. The rec ord bef

ore the BZ A also includes numer ous letters and emails, which wer e sent to the B Z A by supporting and opposing r esidents living in the Woodland-in-Waverly neigh b o rh o o d . At the conclusion of the hearing, the BZ A, by a vote of four- to-one, g rante d the L andowne r’s a pplication, no tin g that he ha d s a tis fi e d th e ne c e ssa ry c ri te ri a fo r a sp e c ia l e xce pti on pe rm it to op e rate “ Hi sto ri c Home Eve nts” on his property . This time the BZ A imposed the following set of slig htly -diffe rent conditions on the permit: ( 1) the permit was issued f or a pe riod of time not to exceed one y ear ; (2) the permit was for the L andowne r’s use only ; (3) vale t parking was required for all eve nts with more than 25 people in attendanc e; (4) larg e buses wer e not allowed on the stree t, but shutt le buses we re permitted; (5) the maxi mum number of people allowed at eac h event wa s not to exceed the number of par king spa ces unde r contra ct times two with a 150-per son m ax i m u m ; (6) a maxi mum of two e ve nts we re perm it te d e a c h w e e k; ( 7) e ve nts and event c leanup ha d to be complete d by 9:0 0 p .m. on wee knights a nd by

11:00 p.m. on Friday

and Saturday

nights; (8) no social business/activity of-3-

any kind could be cond ucted in the f ront y ard; a nd (9) no other residential pr operty

could be use d in conjunction with the permit.

The L andowne r subseque ntly filed a pe tition for writ of ce rtiorari and superse deas, a sserting that the evidenc e failed to justi fy certain aspec ts of conditions ( 1), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8). The trial court g rante d the L andowne r’s petition. I n its memorandum opinion filed Aug ust 31, 2004, the trial court he ld that most of the conditions challeng ed by the L andowne r “w ere not based on mate rial evidenc e but on opinions, beliefs and othe r matters not a part of the rec ord.” Specifica lly , the trial c ou rt fo un d that the on e -y e ar tim e lim it on the pe rm it, the 15 0- pe rs on ma ximum pe r e ve nt, the lim it on two events pe r we ek, the time-of -day limit ation by

which completion of e v en t cleanup was require d, and the pr ohibition on activities in the front y ard w ere unsupported by materia l evidence

. The BZ A appeals the trial cour t’s determination with respect to these five c onditions. I t claims that there was a mple materia l evidence to support all of the re strictions imposed by it on the L andowne r’s pe rm it.

II.
The dispositive issue on this appea l is whether the t rial court err ed in finding that five of the B Z A’ s c on dit ion s w e re un su pp orte d b y ma te ri a l e vid e nc e . T he qu e sti on of wh e the r the re is sufficie nt evidenceto sustain a zoning act i o n i s a question of law. MC Props., In c. v. City of Chat tanooga , 99 4 S.W. 2d 13 2, 13 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 9) . H e nc e , a pp e llate re vie w i s de novo wi th no presumption of cor

rec tness. Id.

III

.

J udicial re view of an action by an administrative body is by way of the c ommon law writ of certiorari. See Te nn
. Cod e An n. § 27-8 -10 1 (2 000) ; see also Mc Cal le n v . City of

Me mphis , 786 S.W .2d 633, 639 (Tenn. 1990) . I n such a r eview, the action o f the a dminist rative body may be reve rsed or

modified only upon a dete rmination that the ac tion was: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory

provisions; (2) in excess of statutory authority ; (3) an unla wful proc edure ; (4) ar bitrary or ca prious; or (5) unsupported by materia l evidence

. Massey v. Shelby Cou nty Retirem ent Bd. , 813 S.W .2d 462, 464 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
Our scope of re view of this matter is no broade r t han that of t he trial court. “Whether [an] a c tio n b y [a] lo c a l g overnm ent al body is l e g isl a tiv e or

a dmi nis tr a tiv e in n a tur e , th e c ou rt sh ou ld ref rain fr om substitut ing its judgme nt for the broad discr etionary authority of the loca l gove rnmental body .” McCallen , 786 S.W .2d at 641-42. Courts ar e not permi t t ed to reweig h the evidenc e or scrutinize the intrinsic corre ctness of the decision. Laffe rty v. City of Winchester , 46 S.W .3d 752,T enn
. Co de Ann. § 13

- 7- 20 6(a) ( 19 99 ) s t at es t hat 2

[t]h e z o n ing o rd ina n c e m a y p ro v id e tha t the b o a rd o f ap p e a ls m a y, i n a p p ro p ria te
cas es and s ubj ect t o t he pri nci pl es , s t andar ds, r ul es , condi t i ons an d s af egu ar ds s et fo rt h i n t he o rdinance, m ake spec i al excep t i o ns t o t he t erm s o f t he zo ni ng re g u la tio n s in h a rm o n y w ith the ir g e n e ra l p u rp o se a n d inte n t.

. . .
T enn
. Co de Ann. § 13

- 7- 20 7(2) ( 19 99 ) f ur t her provi des t hat t he l ocal zo ni ng b oard o f appeal s ha s t he po wer t o “ [ h] ear a n d d e c id e , i n a c c o rd a n c e w ith the p ro v isio n s o f an y su c h o rd ina n c e , re q u e sts fo r sp e c ia l ex c e p tio n s. . .
. -4- 75 9 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 200 0). How eve r, a c ou rt sh ou ld i nv a lid a te a

de c isi on that is c le arl y

ill e g a l, arbitra ry , or ca pricious. McCallen , 786 S.W .2d at 642.

I f thereis no evidence to support an ac tion of an admini strative board, it is arbitrary
. Sexton v . And e rso n Cou nty , 5 87 S.W. 2d66 3, 66 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 97 9) . T he bo ard ’s de te rm inatio n mu st be su pp orte d b y

“ mor e than a sc int ill a

or g lim me r o f e vid e nc e
. . . . I t mu st b e of a su bs ta nti a l, materia l nature.” Pa c e v . Ga rb ag e Di spos alDist. , 390 S.W .2d 461, 463 (Tenn. 1965) . The “material evidenc e” sta ndard r equire s “such r eleva nt evidence as a r easona ble mind might ac cept as ade quate to support a rational conclusion and such as to furnish a rea sonably sound basis for the action under consideration.” Id

. We a re f urther mindful that “ mere beliefs, opinions and fe ars of
n eig hborhood re sidents do not constitut e material evidenc e.” M u l l i n s v . C it y o f K n o x v i lle , 665 S.W .2d 393, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

I V.

Our a naly sis of whethe r t h e t ri al court erre d in its findings beg ins with a review of the authority under w hich the B Z A was ope rating in the instant case. L ocal g overnme ntal entities are specific ally authorized to pr escribe g uidelines and standards f or zoning boa

rds to follow in issuing specia l exception permits. See Tenn. Code An n
. § § 13-7-206( a), - 207(2). The zoning la w for 2 Nashville and D avidson County provides the following with re spect to the B Z A’s issuance of such pe rm its :

A. B urden of P ro o f. A special exception permit shall not be

considere d an entitlement, and shall be g rante d by the boar d of zoning appea ls only afte r t he applicant has demonstrated to the satisfac tion of thebo ardthat a ll o f the re qu ir e d s ta nd ard s a reme t. B . Or din a nc e Compli a nc e
. Th e pr op os e d u se sh a ll c omp ly wi th a ll applicable regulations, including any specific standards f

or the proposed use set forth in this titl e, unles s circumstances qua lify the specia l except i o n fo r a va rianc e in ac cordance w ith Chapter 17.40,-5- Article V I I I

. Any acc essory use to a spec ial exception must receive e xpre ss a uth oriza tio n f

ro m th e bo ardof

zon ing app e a ls. C. Inte g ri ty of Ad

ja c e nt Ar e a s. A spe c ia l exce pti on us e pe rm it s ha ll be g rante d pro vided that the boar d finds that the use is so desig ned, located and proposed to be operated that the publ ic health, safety and welfa re will be protected. The board shall determine from its review that adequate public fa ci l ities are a vailable to ac commodate the proposed use, and that approva l of the permit will not adve rsely aff ect o t h er property

in the are a to the extent that it will impair the re a so na blelon g -t e rm

us e of tho se pr op e rt ie s. Th e bo ardma y re qu e st a r ep o rt fr o mt h e m et ro p o l i t an p l an n i n g co m m i s s i o n re gar d i n g l o n grang e plans for

land use de velopment. D. Desig n and Ar chitectur al Compatibili ty . The ope rational a nd ph y sic a l c ha

ra c te ri sti c s o f the sp e c ia l e xce pti on sh a ll n ot a dve rs e ly impact abutting properties, including those loc ated a cross stre et fr on ta g e s. Site de sig n a nd arc hit e c tur a l f e a tur e s w hic h c on tr ibu te to com patibilityinclude, but ar e not limited to, landscaping , draina g e, a c c e ss andc ir c ulatio n, bu ild ing style a nd h e i g h t , b u l k , s c a le , s e tba c ks , op e n a re a s, ro of slo pe s, bu ild ingorie ntatio n, ov e rh a ng s, po rc he s, orna me nta l f

e a tur e s, e xterior

ma te ri a ls andc olo rs
. E. Natural Feature s. Special exception uses in reside ntial zone districts must complywith the nonresidential tree protec tion reg ulations and other natura l site features shall be prese rved t o t he g reatest ext en t p o s sible so as to minim ize the intrusion of no nr e sid e nti a l st

ru c tur e s a ndpa

rking are a s. F. Historic Preser vation. Fe ature s of historical sig nificanc e shall not be adve rsely

aff ecte d by the gra nting of

any specia l exception. The metropolitanh is to ric zo n in g c o mmissi on shall be consulted r eg arding those features esse ntial to preser ve the historica l integrity of a building or site of

historical sig nificanc e. G. T raffic Impact. The applicant sha ll demonstrate how the proposed use will not adversely aff ect the sa fety

and conve nience of vehicular and pede strian circulation in the are a. The board of zoning appea ls may

requirea tra ffic impac t study for any specia l exception land use.

* * *-6- I . Hazard Protec tion. The proposed use shall rea sonably prot ect persons a nd property

from er osion, flooding, f ire, noise, g lare or sim ila r h a zar ds

. J. Spec ial Condi tions. Notwithst anding a finding by the board of zon i n g a ppeals that a special exc eption application sati sfies the minimu m dev elopment standards of this art icle, the board may
re str ic t th e ho ur

s o f op e ra tio n, e sta bli sh pe rm it e x pir ati on da te s, re qu ire ex tra or

din ar y se tba c k

s a nd im po se ot he r re as on ab le conditions nece ssary to protect the public health, safety and w elfare.

Metro Code of L aws (“ M.C.L .”) § 17.16.150 ( empha s i s ad d ed ). The g rant of a specia l exception permit to operate “Historic H ome Events” is further subjec t t o t h e fo llowing se t of standar ds and lim itatio ns :

C. H ist oric Ho me Ev e nts

.

1. L ot S ize . T he min imu m bu lk stand ard fo r the zon e dis tr ic t sh a ll ap p l y. 2. L ocation. The events shall be w ithin a historically signific ant structure , as dete rmined by the historic zoning commission. 3. Parking . Whe re t h e minimum parking space standard r equire s a dd iti on a l pa

rking are a to be c on str

uc te d, su c h a

re a sh a ll c omp ly

wi th the perimeter pa

rking lot landscaping acc ording to Chapter 17.24 of this co d e. I n urban se ttings, the boa rd of zoning a

ppeals may consider on-stree t parking to satisfy the minimum parking standa rd, provided ther e is a finding of suffic ient available public space

. 4. Signs. Signs f

or adve rtising sha ll not be permitted. 5. Meals. Mea l s er v i ce shall be re stricted to patrons of the spec ial event only , and not to the g ener al public. 6. Owner -Oc cupied. The owner of the propertym u s t reside perma nen tl y

inth e h is to r ic h o me
. Wh e r e th e r e is mo r e th a n o ne owner of the home, or

wher e an e state, cor

poration, limited partne rship or similar entity is t h e o wner, a per son with controlling interes t , or possessing the larg est number of outstanding sha

res owned by an y single individual or corpor ation, shall reside perma nently

in the historic home. I f two or more persons own equa l share s that repr esent the larg est owner ship, at least one of the per sons shall reside pe rmane ntly

in the historic home. 7. Frequenc

y of Eve nts. The board of zoning appeals may limit the
nu mb e r a nd

fre qu e nc

y of e v e nts to m ini mi ze dis tur ba nc e to su rro un din g p ro

pe rti e s.-7-

M.C.L

. § 1 7

. 1 6

. 1 6 0

. C. ( e mp h a s is a d d e d )

. A s n o te d e ar li e r , th e B Z A f o u n d th a t th e L a n d o w ner satisfied the c riteria f

or the spec ial exception permit, but, as authorized by the above -empha siz ed provisions, the BZ A also chose to impose certain conditions on the permit. Our focus is, there fore , upon whether the evidenc e supports the BZ A’s imposition of the conditions, which werechalleng ed by the L andowne r and f

ound to be ar

bitrary by the trial court.

The first condition w e addre ss is the BZ A’s limit ation of the pe rmit to “a period of time not to exceed one y ear .” The L andowne r ag ree s with the t rial court’s conclusion that the re cord c ontains no justification for this condition. He ar g ues that this condition is i n the nature of e nfo rc e me nt and bey ond the jurisdiction of the B Z A. We ag ree with the BZ A’s ar g ument that there is material evidenc e to support this restriction on the L andowne r’s pe rmit. The gove rning ordinanc e authorizes the B Z A t o e sta

bli sh pe rm it e xpir a tio n d a te s. M. C.L

. § 17 .1 6. 15 0. J. Th e B Z A h a s a n in te re st i n asce rtaining whether

a permit holder is abiding by its standards and c onditions. Furthermore , no thi ng in the app lic ablezon ing la w pr e c lud e s the B Z A’ s e sta bli sh me nt of a pe rm it e xpir a tio n d a te so le ly fo r the pu rp os e of

re vie w ande nf

or c e me nt p ur

po se s.

Whil e ac knowledg ing the BZ A’s authority to impose an expiration date on the permit, the trial court he ld that the rec ord wa s devoid of evide nce justify ing the BZ A’s imposit ion of a one- y ear expiration. W e do not ag ree . I n addition to presenting evidenc e re g arding noise, traff ic, and parking pr ob le ms c aus e d by

theL a nd ow ne r’ s e ve nts , th e op po sit ionte sti fi e d to , a ndpr e se nte d c ha rt s, le tte rs , a nde ma ils re fl e c tin g , the L and owne r’ s p re vio us no nc omp lianc e wi th p e rm it c on dit ion s a ndhis continued oper ation afte r the B Z A’s denia l in 2001. Evidence a lso established that the L andowne r continued to oper ate a fter he was served with a c ease -and- desist notice in April , 2002. The L andowne r admitted ce rtain violations of the permit and als o ac k n owledg ed that, for a period of time, he had ope rate d his f acility without a permit. I n light of the L andowne r’s doc umented history of no nc omp lia nc e a ndthe c on tin ue d c omp la int s b y ne ig hb ori ng re sid e nts , th e B Z A c ou ld r e a so na bly conclude that a re view of the permit within twelve months was nec essary and appr opriate. Thus, we ho ld that th e c on dit ionpr ov idi ng that th e pe rm it i s “ fo r a pe ri odof tim e no t to e xce e d one y e ar” is supported by

materia l evidence

.

We next consider the BZ A’s ca pping of the m axim um number of g uests allowed to attend a n e ve nt at 15 0 p e op le . T he tr ia l cou rt “ wa s una ble to fi nd a ny e vid e nc e wh a tso e ve r u po n w hic h th is c on dit ionwa s b a se d. ” We dis a g re e
. Th e e vid e nc e be fo re the B Z A inc lud e d the te sti mon y , e ma ils and letter s of num erous W oodland-in-Waverly residents stating t heir opposit ion to the L andowne r’s continued use of his pr operty for “Historic Home Events” beca use of noise and other disturbanc es cause d by the events. One neig hbor testified that the noise had kept his c hild up at night, and that he and his two-y ear -old had encountere d intox icated gue sts while walking in the neig hborhood one day . Another ne ighbor

emailed a complaint to the BZ A not ing a particular event with many car s and people in attendanc e, the prese nce of a “VERY loud” band, and the use of a microphone in the f

ront y ard

. (C apit a lizatio n in e ma il)

. Ye t a no the r ne ig hb or te sti fi e d to wi tne ssi ng a lin e of e ve nt t ra ff ic-8-

make U- turn afte r U-turn on a nar row n ei gh b orhood stree t. The opposition’s complaints and sta tements reg arding specific disturbance s and the fa ct that the re sidents of the Woodland-inWaverly neig hborhood live in such close proxi mity to one another supports the B Z A’s imposition of thi s c o n d i t i o n
. T h e B Z A h a d e v i d e n c e f r o m w h i c h i t c o u l d r e a s o n ab l y c o n c l u d e t h a t e ve nts te nd e d to dis tur

b the su rr ou nd ing re sid e nts ; and log ic wo uld re fl e c t tha t the reis a natur a l r e la tio ns hip betwee n the number of

people at an eve nt and the mag nitude of the disturbanc e.

The B Z A ar g ues that thereis material evide nce to support the restriction limiti ng the L a nd ow ner to tw o e ve nts pe r w e e k. Th e ratio na le be hin d th e L a nd ow ne r’ s c ha lle ng e to this c on dit ion wa s tha t, be c aus e the e vid e nc e su g g e ste d tha t sma lle r e ve nts ( i.e., re tr e a ts andlun c he on s) had no adve rse impac t on the neig hborhood, the B Z A’s failure to dif fer entiate be tween sm all

e v e nts and lar ge e v e nts was a

rbitrary . The trial c ourt determin ed t h at the evide nce did not support the condi t i o n l i m i t i ng the L andowne r to two eve nts per we ek, and that “the evide nce w ould more rea sonably

sustain a contra

ry position.” Given our limited scope of r eview in this ca se, we cannot ag ree with the trial court’s determination that this condition was unsupported by materia l evidence

. The B Z A’s condition limiti ng the L andowne r to two eve nts per we ek is not rende red a rbitrary or unsupported by

materia l evidence

s im p ly b e c a u s ethe re cord a lso would have supporte d two differ ent app ro a c he s, on e fo r s ma ll e ve nts a ndon e fo r l a rg e e ve nts . A ll that mu st e xist f or thi s con dit ionto be upheld is “suc h rele vant evidenc e as a rea sonable mind might a cce pt as adequate to support” the two events per week limitation. Pace , 390 S.W .2d at 463. The opposition’s testimonyand evide nce re gar d i n g gen er al , an d s p ec i fi c, d i s t u rb an ce s ca u s ed b y t h e Lan d o wn er ’s ev en t s co u l d l ea d t h e B ZA to rea sonably

con cl u d e that a limit on the number of e vents held ea ch we ek wa s appropriate. See M. C.L . § 17 .1 6. 16 0. C. 7. (n oti ng that th e B Z A c a n li mit the nu mbe r andfr e qu e nc y of e ve nts to minimi ze disturbance to surr ounding pr operties)

.

We n e xt co ns ide r the B Z A’ s c on dit ion re qu ir ing the c omp le tio n o f e ve nts and event c leanup by 9:00 p.m. on weeknig hts and 11:00 p.m. on weeke nds. The L andowner ar g ues that there is no materia l evidence to support this conditi on. The trial c ourt found “that some evidenc e exists i n the rec ord which w ould justi fy limit ing the time for eve nts, but t h at no evidenc e exists reg arding the c le a n u p a ft e rw ard .” Th us , the tr ia l c ou rt he ld that “ the tot a lit y of that po rt ionof the [B Z A’ s p e rm it] reg arding time limi ts on clean up” was unsupporte d by materia l e vidence

. We a g ree with the trial c ou rt ’s c on c lus ionre g ard ing thi s c on dit ion . T e sti mon y a nde ma ils no te ins ta nc e s o f l a te nig ht n ois e cause d by lo u d m u s i c and the like on the L andowne r’s prope rty ; however , the re cord is devoid of testimonyor docume nted complaints sug g esting that event c leanup a ctivities wer e the cause of any such disturbance s. We hold there is material evidenc e to support the BZ A’s time r estriction on the actua l events, but not on event c leanup a ctivities.

The fina l challeng ed condition is the BZ A’s prohibition on “socia l business/activityof any kind to be conducte d in the front y ard.” The trial court was not “ persua ded that material evidenc e was pre sented to the [BZ A] which would support such a c ondition.” The only evidenc e in the re cord which re lates to this condition is as follows: most we ddings held at the L andowne r’s property occurW e dec l i n e t o s t at e wh at w e t h i n k t h os e r es t r i ct i on s mi g h t be

. I t i s n ot for u s t o i mpos e n ew con di t i on s n ot 3 im p o se d b y the B Z A . T h e o n ly q u e stio n fo r us i s w h e the r t h e re is m a te ria l e v id e n c e to su p p o rt a giv e n c o n d iti o n . W e d o no t f ind m a te ria l ev id e n c e to su p p o rt a c o n d itio n a b s o lu te ly f o rb id d ing the L a n d o w n e r to us e his fro n t yar d in
conne ct i on wi t h a l l ev ent s , r ega r dl es s of t y pe or s i ze. -9- in the front y ard; the L andowne r’s 1999 and 2000 specia l exception permit included a pr ohibition on “tents in the front y ard” ; the L andowne r admitted that he violated this condition on at least one occa sion; testim ony

and pictures establish that the L andowne r pl ace d a lar g e white c urtain ar ound the pe ri me te r o f the fr on t y ardfo r o ne e ve nt; a ndthe rewe re c omp la int s re g ard ing c ro wd s, c ha ir s, and microphone use i n t h e fr ont y ard. While there is evidence from which the BZ A could have rea sonably

conclude d that activities in the front y ard should be r estricted, we f ind a lack of evidenc e 3 supporting a blanket prohibition of activities, reg ardle ss of type or siz e, on this valuable part of the L andowne r’s prope rty . Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the trial court’s judgme nt w ith r espec t to this blanket prohibition.

T h e B ZA fu rt h er ar gu es t h at , b ec au s e th e L an d o wn er p ro m i s ed , d u ri n g t h e B ZA’ s h ea ri n g, to “ wa lk the c ha lk” a nd“ c omp ly wi th a ny c on dit ion s” imp os e d b y

theB Z A, he is r e qu ir e d to c omp ly with the challeng ed conditions. It is true that the L andowne r per sonally pledge d t o ab i d e by

any co n d i t i o n s i f th e B ZA w o u l d aga i n gra n th i ma s p ec i al ex ce p t i o n p er m i t ; b u tt h e Lan d o wn er ’s p l ed ge c a nn ot b e c on str

ue d a s c art e blanc he to imp os e a ny a nda ll r e stric tio ns a s may se e m a pp ro pria te to the B Z A r e g ardl ess of w he the r the re is m a te ri a l e vid e nc e to s up po rt the m. H is p le dg e c e rt a inl y cannot be seen a s an ag ree ment to abide by arbitra rily -imposed re strictions.

V.

The BZ A also raises the issue of whether the trial court err ed in issuing its wr i t of superse deas at the outset of this case
. The trial c ourt’s writ orde red the BZ A to desist from enf orcing the conditions challeng ed by the L andowne r until the trial court determined the merits of the challeng ed conditions. The BZA moved to dissolve the writ of super sedea s in Aug ust, 2002, and in F e br ua ry , 2 00 4, bu t th e tria l c ou rt de nie d b othmot ion s. Th e B Z A a rg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s writ e xce e de d th e c ou rt ’s auth ority to mai ntai n th e status qu o w he n it g a ve the L a nd ow ne r the ri g ht t o conduct his eve nts without several of the conditions im p o s ed b y the B Z A. See McKee v . Bd. of Ele c tio ns , 116 S.W .2d 1033, 1037 (Tenn. 1938) (stating that the writ of supe rsede as does not have authority “bey ond that of a stay order , maintaining the status quo as of the time of its issuance , . . . ”)

. The issue of w h e th e r th e w r it o f s u p e r s e d e a s w a s to o e xp a n s iv e is n o w mo o t. A c c o r d in g ly , we decline to a ddress it.-10- V I.
The judg ment of the trial c ourt finding no materia l evidenceto support the require ment of the completion of event cleanup activities by a ce rtain time and the pr ohibition on t he L andowne r’s “socia l business/activity ” use of his front y ard is aff

irmed. The judg ment of the trial c ourt finding no ma te ri a l e vid e nc e to s up p o r t th eo ne -y e ar l imi ta tio n o n th e L a nd ow ne r’ s sp e c ia l e xce pti on pe rm it, the 150-pe rson limitation on t he number of g uests allowed to at t en d an eve nt at the L andowne r’s property , and the two- event limitation per we ek is reve rsed. This ca se is rema nded to the t rial court for such further proce eding s, if any , as may be re quired, c onsistent with thi s opinion. Ex erc ising our discretion, we tax t he costs on appe al one- half to the a ppell an t , t h e B Z A, and one -half to the appellee , Richard A. D emonbre un.

_______________________________ CHARLES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE