UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MARSHAUN BOYKIN, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) No. 12 C 04447 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) Judge Edmond E. Chang 

THOMAS DART, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Marshaun Boykin was a detainee at the Cook County Jail. He brings 

this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart, Dr. 

Jonathan Howard, Dr. David Kelner, and Dr. Michael Moreno.1 See R. 13, First Am. 

Compl. Boykin alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical 

needs in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 27-30. 

Defendants now move for summary judgment, arguing that Boykin failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit as required by the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. See R. 58, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 

For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion is granted. 

 1This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Citation to the 

docket is “R.” followed by the entry number and, when necessary, the page/paragraph 

number. Citations to the Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements of Fact is “DSOF” [R. 59] 

followed by a paragraph number. 
2 

I. Background

In deciding Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court views the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Marshaun Boykin has 

been an inmate in the Cook County Jail since May 2011. First Am. Compl. ¶ 11.2

Boykin suffers from depression and bipolar disorder and has been prescribed 

medication for these diagnoses. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. In late 2011, Boykin attempted 

suicide. Id. ¶ 13. He was scheduled for a psychiatric evaluation, during which he 

claims he was refused treatment by Defendant Dr. Jonathan Howard, a psychiatrist 

at Cook County Jail. Id. ¶¶ 8, 13. A short time later, Boykin expressed thoughts of 

suicide to Cook County correctional officers. Id. ¶ 14. Boykin alleges that these 

officers “took no action.” Id. He attempted suicide again and was given another 

psychiatric evaluation. Id. Boykin claims that at his second evaluation, Howard did 

not take his condition seriously and misdiagnosed Boykin with antisocial 

personality disorder and malingering. Id. Boykin alleges that Defendants Dr. David 

Kelner and Dr. Michael Moreno, both psychiatrists at the Cook County Jail, also 

denied Boykin psychiatric treatment based on this misdiagnosis. Id. ¶¶ 9-10, 14. 

Boykin next told Cook County correctional officers that he had suicidal 

thoughts in April 2012. First Am. Compl. ¶ 15. He claims that they again did 

nothing. Id. Boykin attempted suicide a third time. Id. After this attempt, Boykin 

was visited by a mental health specialist who scheduled him for another psychiatric 

 2After Boykin was convicted in Cook County Circuit Court, he was transferred out of 

Cook County Jail to the Illinois Department of Corrections. DSOF ¶ 2. 
3 

evaluation. Id. ¶ 16. Boykin claims that the appointment was cancelled. Id. The 

following month, Boykin claims he again reported thoughts of suicide to Cook 

County correctional officers, who did nothing. Id. ¶ 17. Boykin attempted suicide for 

the fourth time. Id. He claims that he was again denied medical assistance and sent 

back into the general population. Id. 

Cook County Jail has established a grievance procedure to address inmate 

complaints. DSOF ¶ 11. The procedure requires an inmate to file a written 

grievance within fifteen days of the event giving rise to the complaint. Id. ¶ 12; R. 

59-4, Defs.’ Exh. D, Mueller Aff. Exh. 1, Sheriff’s Order 11.14.5.0 at 2. Within 48 

hours of a grievance being filed, a Correctional Rehabilitation Worker (CRW) must 

assign the grievance a case number and enter it into the record-keeping system. 

DSOF ¶ 17; Defs.’ Exh. D, Mueller Aff. Exh. 1, Sheriff’s Order 11.14.5.0 at 2. If a 

grievance relates to healthcare or medical treatment, it is forwarded to Cermak 

Health Services, the hospital at the Cook County Department of Corrections. DSOF 

¶¶ 3-5, 18. All grievances must be resolved in “a timely fashion (not to exceed 30 

days from the date the grievance was filed).” Defs.’ Exh. D, Mueller Aff. Exh. 1, 

Sheriff’s Order 11.14.5.0 at 3. If a grievance cannot be resolved within 30 days, the 

CRW must notify the both the detainee and the divisional Superintendent. Id. An 

inmate may appeal a grievance decision within five working days of his receipt of 

that decision. Id. The Administrator of Program Services must review the grievance 

appeal within ten days and reply to the inmate in writing. Id. 
4 

Boykin filed several grievances related to his medical care at Cook County 

Jail. DSOF ¶¶ 23-30; R. 76, Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 1-2. On May 8, 2012, Boykin filed a 

grievance complaining that he was not receiving adequate medical attention. DSOF 

¶ 26; R. 59-3, Defs.’ Exh. C, Grievances at Boykin_00004-05. This grievance was 

assigned a tracking number and forwarded to Cermak Health Services. DSOF ¶ 26. 

The Cermak Health Services staff wrote a response to the grievance on June 4, 

2012. Id.; Defs.’ Exh. C, Grievances at Boykin_00011. Boykin received the response 

on July 12, 2012 and appealed it the same day. DSOF ¶ 26. Boykin submitted 

another grievance alleging lack of medical attention on May 22, 2012. Id. ¶ 27; 

Defs.’ Exh. C, Grievances at Boykin_00006. It was forwarded to Cermak Health 

Services, which responded on June 25, 2012. DSOF ¶ 27; Defs.’ Exh. C, Grievances 

at Boykin_00013. Boykin received the response on July 15, 2012, and he appealed 

it. DSOF ¶ 27. Boykin also submitted a grievance regarding his medical care on 

May 29, 2012. Id. ¶ 28; Defs.’ Exh. C, Grievances at Boykin_00007. Cermak Health 

Services responded on June 26, 2013, and the response was delivered to Boykin on 

July 12, 2012. DSOF ¶ 28; Defs.’ Exh. C, Grievances at Boykin_00012. Again, 

Boykin appealed the response on the same day. DSOF ¶28. Boykin submitted his 

next grievance regarding his medical treatment on June 12, 2012. DSOF ¶ 29; Defs.’ 

Exh. C, Grievances at Boykin_00008. Cermak Health Services responded on August 

3, 2012, and Boykin received the response on August 16, 2012. DSOF ¶ 29; Defs.’ 

Exh. C, Grievances at Boykin_00014. Boykin’s final grievance regarding medical 

treatment was filed on August 4, 2012. DSOF ¶ 30; Defs.’ Exh. C, Grievances at 
5 

Boykin_00010. Cermak Health Services responded on September 7, 2012, and 

Boykin received the response on September 18, 2012. DSOF ¶ 30; Defs.’ Exh. C, 

Grievances at Boykin_00015. 

Boykin signed his complaint for this lawsuit on May 11, 2012. See R. 8, 

Compl. at 6. At some point between May 11, 2012 and June 5, 2012, Boykin mailed 

his complaint to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of Illinois. See Docket Entry 1 for 12-cv-04447 (noting that the complaint 

was postmarked June 5, 2012). On June 7, 2012, the Clerk of the Court received 

Boykin’s complaint. See Compl. at 1 (showing a “received” stamp of June 7, 2012). 

Boykin moved to proceed in forma pauperis. See R. 3, Application for Leave to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Boykin’s motion was granted, and the complaint was 

marked as filed on June 21, 2012. See R. 5, June 11, 2012 Minute Entry; Compl. at 

1 (showing a “filed” stamp of June 21, 2012). Defendants now move for summary 

judgment on the issue of exhaustion under the PLRA. See Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating 

summary judgment motions, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 
6 

U.S. 372, 378 (2007). The Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make 

credibility determinations, Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 

704 (7th Cir. 2011), and must consider only competent evidence of a type otherwise 

admissible at trial, Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009). The party 

seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that there is no 

genuine dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Carmichael v. Village of Palatine, 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th 

Cir. 2008). If this burden is met, the adverse party must then “set forth specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 

III. Analysis

A. Grievances in the Record 

A plaintiff alleging a violation of his civil rights under § 1983 is not typically 

required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. See Patsy v. Bd. of 

Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). Congress has created an exception to this 

general rule for inmates alleging constitutional deprivations concerning prison 

conditions. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002). Under the PLRA, “[n]o 

action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this 

title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This is a strict requirement. To exhaust 

administrative remedies, prisoners must “file complaints and appeals in the place, 
7 

and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 

F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). “This means the prisoner must give the prison’s 

grievance system a fair opportunity to consider the grievance, which requires the 

complaining prisoner to comply with the system’s critical procedural rules.” Fluker 

v. Cnty. of Kankakee, 741 F.3d 787, 791 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 

548 U.S. 81, 95 (2006)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). If a 

prisoner fails to use the administrative process properly, his claim may be 

indefinitely unexhausted. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Boykin filed several grievances related to his claims of deliberate indifference 

to medical needs, and the parties cite to the same set of grievances in their 

summary judgment filings. See Defs.’ Exh. C, Grievances; Pl.’s Exhs. 6, 10. Boykin’s 

earliest-filed grievance related to his medical treatment at Cook County Jail was 

filed on May 8, 2012.3 Defs.’ Exh. C, Grievances at Boykin_00004-05; Pl.’s Exh. 10 at 

 3Both parties also include two grievances filed by Boykin prior to the May 8, 2012 

grievance. See Defs.’ Exh. C, Grievances at Boykin_00001-03; Pl.’s Exh. 6 at 1; Pl.’s Exh. 10 

at 1-2. Neither of these grievances (which were processed as requests rather than 

grievances) relate to the claims alleged in Boykin’s complaint. The first request was filed on 

January 12, 2012. Defs.’ Exh. C, Grievances at Boykin_00001. In this request, Boykin asks 

for copies of all grievances that he had submitted. Id. The request does not mention 

Boykin’s medical treatment. Id. The second request was filed on May 4, 2012. Id. at 

Boykin_00003. In this request, Boykin asks to receive mental health incident reports and 

copies of his mental health records. Id. Boykin states in the request form that he wants 

these documents so that “when I go home I can get my medication in the world.” Id. He does 

not complain about his medical treatment in this request. Id. Neither of these requests 

addresses the deliberate indifference to medical need that Boykin alleges in his complaint. 

See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27-30. The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to give prison 

officials an opportunity to correct perceived problems in advance of litigation. See Cannon v. 

Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 2005). Requests and grievances unrelated to the 

claim ultimately advanced in litigation do not, therefore, have any effect on the exhaustion 

requirement of the PLRA. Cf. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating 

that exhaustion requires that “a prison has received notice of, and an opportunity to 

correct, a problem”). 
8 

7-9. The response to this grievance was written on June 4, 2012, but Boykin did not 

receive the response until July 12, 2012. Defs.’ Exh. C, Grievances at Boykin_00011. 

Boykin argues that the Cook County Jail grievance procedure was unavailable to 

him because the prison officials did not respond to his grievances in a timely 

fashion. See Pl.’s Br. at 4. It is true that the PLRA only requires a prisoner to 

exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” to him. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(a). Prison officials’ failure to respond to a prisoner’s claim may render 

administrative remedies unavailable. See Brengettcy v. Horton, 423 F.3d 674, 682 

(7th Cir. 2005) (noting that failure to respond to grievances, particularly because 

the Cook County Jail policy “does not instruct a prisoner on what he is to do when 

the [Cook County Department of Corrections] fails to respond to his grievance,” is 

sufficient to render administrative remedies unavailable). The PLRA does not 

“permit prison officials to exploit the exhaustion requirement through indefinite 

delay in responding to grievances.” Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 

2002) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

Although the response to Boykin’s grievance was late, Boykin filed his suit 

before allowing the administrative process to run its course, and thus failed to 

exhaust under the PLRA. Critically, prisoners must completely exhaust 

administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 suit. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 

F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[E]xhaustion must precede litigation.”). Because the 

exhaustion requirement serves “to alert prison officials to perceived problems and to 

enable them to take corrective action without first incurring the hassle and expense 
9 

of litigation,” it would defeat the requirement’s purpose to ask the prison “to 

address issues that are now the subject of pending litigation.” Cannon v. 

Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 2005). Even if a prisoner exhausts his 

remedies while the suit is pending, the suit must be dismissed. Ford, 362 F.3d at 

401 (“[I]f the prisoner does exhaust, but files suit early, then dismissal of the 

premature action may be followed by a new suit that unquestionably post-dates the 

administrative decision.”); Perez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th 

Cir. 1999) (“[T]he district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on the merits, 

even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.”). 

The Cook County Jail grievance procedure allows prison officials 30 days 

from the date a grievance was filed to respond to the prisoner’s complaint. Defs.’ 

Exh. D, Mueller Aff. Exh. 1, Sheriff’s Order 11.14.5.0 at 2. If the grievance cannot 

be resolved in 30 days, the CRW must notify both the inmate and the divisional 

Superintendent. Id. Boykin’s earliest-filed grievance was filed May 8, 2012.4 He 

“brought” this lawsuit for the purposes of the PLRA when he mailed his complaint 

to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 

See Ford, 362 F.3d at 398 (“[The plaintiff] thought that mailing the complaint to the 

court was enough to bring suit; we hold that, for purposes of § 1997e(a), it was.”). 

Although the record is unclear as to precisely when Boykin mailed his complaint, it 

could have been no later than June 5, 2012, when the envelope was postmarked. See 

Docket Entry 1 for 12-cv-04447 (noting that the complaint was postmarked June 5, 

 4If Boykin filed suit too early to properly exhaust the earliest-filed grievance related 

to his medical treatment, then he will also have filed too early to exhaust the later-filed 

grievances. 
10 

2012). June 5, 2012 is only 28 days after May 8, 2012, when Boykin filed his earliest 

grievance related to the events alleged in his complaint. Boykin therefore brought 

his lawsuit before giving the administrative procedures a full opportunity to 

address his grievance. As of June 5, 2012, the grievance procedure was operating as 

it was supposed to. An inmate filed a grievance, and was awaiting a response within 

the timeframe set forth in the grievance procedure. Even if the administrative 

procedures were later made unavailable,5 they were not unavailable when Boykin 

filed his lawsuit. The PLRA is clear that “if administrative remedies are available, 

 5It is not immediately clear that administrative remedies would have become 

“unavailable” to Boykin if he had received no response on the 31st day after he filed his 

grievance. The PLRA does not allow prison officials to “exploit the exhaustion requirement 

through indefinite delay in responding to grievances,” Lewis, 300 F.3d at 833 (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted), but it is not clear what, if anything, a prisoner 

must do if he does not receive a timely response. Often, when courts have found that 

administrative remedies were unavailable due to failure to respond by prison officials, the 

inmate had filed several unsuccessful grievances and asked about the failure to respond. 

See Dole, 438 F.3d at 807-13; Brengettcy, 423 F.3d at 682-83. In Brengettcy, administrative 

remedies were unavailable because the prisoner had “done all that is reasonable to exhaust 

his administrative remedies.” Brengettcy, 423 F.3d at 682. Although the prisoner in 

Brengettcy had filed several grievances and followed up on his unanswered ones, it is not 

clear that the Seventh Circuit’s holding rested on those grounds. Based on the same 

administrative procedure at issue here, the Seventh Circuit noted that “the policy does not 

instruct a prisoner on what he is to do when the CCDOC fails to respond to his grievance 

and there is no decision to appeal,” and determined that the defendant was not entitled to 

judgment on exhaustion grounds. Id. It is not clear what role, if any, the number of 

unanswered grievances or a prisoner’s follow up should play in the unavailability of 

administrative remedies. Cf. Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that 

it is “problematic” to require a prisoner to file a second grievance to compel the prison to 

give him the relief he was promised in a response to his first grievance, but ultimately 

affirming dismissal on exhaustion grounds). Several courts, distinguishing Brengettcy, have 

found that “[s]imply submitting a grievance and not receiving a response is insufficient to 

establish that the grievance process is unavailable.” Goldsmith v. Zolecki, No. 12 C 3965, 

2013 WL 5699302, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2013); see also Taylor v. Cook Cnty., No. 11 C 

7427, 2013 WL 2285806, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2013); Logan v. Emerson, No. 10 C 4418, 

2012 WL 3292829, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2012); Nesbitt v. Villanueva, No. 09 C 5299, 2010 

WL 4932423, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2010). Because Boykin filed his lawsuit before the 

administrative remedies may have become unavailable, however, it is not necessary to 

decide this question. 
11 

the prisoner must exhaust them.” Twitty v. McCoskey, 226 Fed. App’x 594, 596 (7th 

Cir. 2007). Boykin started the administrative grievance process and then 

abandoned it before it could work. At the time he filed his complaint, the 

administrative process was still available to him, and he had not complied with the 

critical procedural rules of that process. It makes no difference that he later 

exhausted by appealing. See Ford, 362 F.3d at 398-401. Boykin failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies under § 1997e(a). 

B. Additional Grievances 

Boykin brought his § 1983 suit too early to properly exhaust the earliest-filed 

grievance in the record before the Court, and his later-filed grievances are similarly 

unexhausted. But Boykin’s summary judgment filings seem to suggest that he filed 

other grievances related to his medical care at Cook County Jail. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. 

at 2 (stating that “Plaintiff has filed numerous Grievances in an attempt to get the 

medial treatment he need[s] for his condition and they went unanswered” and 

alleging that the grievance forms were lost when Boykin changed facilities). As a 

preliminary matter, it is not clear if Boykin is, in fact, referring to different 

grievances than those already in the record before the Court. In support of his 

statement that he filed numerous grievances, he cites to the grievances already 

before the court (the grievances that he did not exhaust). See Pl.’s Br. at 2, 7 (citing 

to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 6 and 10). He also alleges, however, that the prison failed to 

return his copies of grievances to him when he transferred to a different facility. See 

id. This suggests that Boykin believes there are grievances that are not before the 
12 

Court because they were lost when Boykin moved from one facility to another. See 

id.; see also First Am. Compl. ¶ 19 (claiming that Boykin filed “approximately fifty 

grievances” related to his medical treatment). 

If Boykin is claiming that he filed more grievances related to his medical care 

and that those grievances went unanswered, these claims cannot be considered in 

evaluating the motion for summary judgment. When filing for summary judgment, 

Defendants filed a statement of uncontested facts accompanied by citations to 

supporting evidence as required by Local Rule 56.1. See DSOF; N.D. Ill. L.R. 

56.1(a). Under Local Rule 56.1, Boykin was required to respond to each of 

Defendants’ stated facts, “including, in the case of any disagreement, specific 

references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials 

relied upon,” and, if Boykin wanted to present any additional facts, he was required 

to submit his own statement accompanied by citations to supporting evidence. N.D. 

Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3). Boykin failed to do so. The Court is entitled to require strict 

compliance with Local Rule 56.1, even for pro se litigants. See Cady v. Sheahan, 467 

F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 682-83 (7th Cir. 

2003). When the nonmovant fails to comply with the requirements of Local Rule 

56.1, the moving party’s facts may be deemed admitted. See N.D. Ill. L.R. 

56.1(b)(3)(C) (“All material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving 

party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of the 

opposing party.”); Smith, 321 F.3d at 683. 
13 

In their Local Rule 56.1 statement of uncontested facts, Defendants assert, 

with proper discovery-record support, that the grievances in the record before the 

Court are the result of a thorough search of the grievance records of the Department 

of Corrections. DSOF ¶ 22-23. This search turned up several grievances relating to 

Boykin’s medical treatment, which are before the Court. Id. Defendants state that 

grievance documents are kept in the regular course of business and that the 

grievances before the Court are all the grievances filed by Boykin related to his 

medical treatment that are in Cook County Jail’s records. Id. ¶ 22-23, 32. Because 

Boykin failed to respond to these statements of fact, they are deemed admitted. 

Based on these undisputed facts, the Court holds that the grievances before the 

Court are all of the grievances that Boykin filed related to his medical treatment. 

There is, therefore, no genuine dispute of material fact as to the existence of earlierfiled grievances related to Boykin’s claims for deliberate indifference to medical 

needs. 

This situation exemplifies the reason that courts require strict compliance 

with Local Rule 56.1. “These rules assist the court by organizing the evidence, 

identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each side proposed to 

prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence.” Bordelon v. Chicago School Reform 

Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Boykin’s allegations that he filed more grievances (if that is, in fact, his 

argument) are vague, conclusory, and lack record support. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 2-3. 

His only citations are to the grievances already before the Court and a separate 
14 

lawsuit in which he alleges that he was deprived of his property, including copies of 

grievances (he does not specify which). Id. (citing to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 7 and 10). 

Based on Boykin’s filing, it is difficult to tell if there is actually a dispute of material 

fact, and if there is, how Boykin proposes to prove that fact with admissible 

evidence. Boykin also describes grievances unrelated to his medical treatment as 

“attempt[s] to get the medical treatment he need[s].” Id.; Pl.’s Exhs. 6, 10 (including 

Boykin’s requests of January 12, 2012 and May 4, 2012, neither of which address 

the claims at issue in this lawsuit). Boykin’s overly expansive conception of which 

grievances are really related to the claims in his § 1983 suit further demonstrates 

the need for the compliance with the Local Rule. Boykin’s vague allegations leave 

the Court completely in the dark as to the content of any earlier grievances. If 

Boykin had complied with Local Rule 56.1, he would have had to go through each 

grievance, one by one, to recount (or at least summarize) what the grievance had 

said, the approximate date on which it was filed, and what, if any, response he 

received (to the best of his memory). Even without copies of the grievances, 

compliance with the Local Rule would have given the Court significantly more to go 

on in determining whether there was a genuine dispute of material fact. 

Although the Court is entitled to demand strict compliance with Local Rule 

56.1, it ordinarily affords pro se plaintiffs significant leeway in responding to 

summary judgment filings. In this case, however, Boykin’s pro se status is the result 

of his own unreasonable behavior. The Court specifically recruited extraordinarily 

able counsel to represent Boykin at the outset of this case, given the concern over 
15 

Boykin’s purported suicide attempts. See June 11, 2012 Minute Entry (appointing 

Daniel Rubinstein of Winston & Strawn to represent Boykin). After counsel and his 

team spent many hours representing Boykin and immediately before Defendants 

filed their motion for summary judgment, Boykin asked the Court to relieve his pro 

bono counsel. See R. 57, Mar. 1, 2014 Letter from Boykin. After an ex parte hearing 

(ex parte because it involved attorney-client communications), this Court relieved 

Winston & Strawn from the representation. R. 66, Mar. 26, 2014 Minute Entry. The 

appointed attorneys worked admirably on Boykin’s behalf, and Boykin’s belief that 

they were not fulfilling their professional duties was incorrect and unreasonable. Id. 

Because Boykin had behaved unreasonably in dealing with his appointed counsel, 

this Court decided that no new counsel would be appointed. Id. Because Boykin was 

newly pro se, he was provided with the Local Rule 56.2 notice to pro se litigants, 

detailing the requirements of Local Rule 56.1. See R. 65, Rule 56.2 Motion. Boykin 

was also given nearly four months to respond to the summary judgment motion. See 

Mar. 26, 2014 Minute Entry. Boykin was given ample opportunity both to be 

represented by counsel and to comply with Local Rule 56.1. The Court, therefore, 

will not construe unsupported, vague allegations that might suggest the existence of 

earlier-filed grievances as creating a genuine issue of material fact. 

C. Emergency Grievance Procedures 

Boykin also argues that he was entitled to a faster response to the grievances 

on the record because emergency grievance procedures require a response within 48 

hours of filing the grievance. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 5-6. None of the grievances before 
16 

the Court are marked as emergency grievances. See Defs.’ Exh. C, Grievances; Pl.’s 

Exhs. 6, 10. Boykin argues that these grievances should have been marked as 

emergencies because they concerned an inmate’s imminent suicide, which involves 

“an immediate threat to the welfare of safety of a detainee.” Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 5; 

Defs.’ Exh. D, Mueller Aff. Exh. 1, Sheriff’s Order 11.14.5.0 at 3. Under the Cook 

County Jail grievance policy, however, the detainee initially determines if the 

grievance is an emergency. Defs.’ Exh. D, Mueller Aff. Exh. 1, Sheriff’s Order 

11.14.5.0 at 3 (“If a detainee deems that the grievance is an emergency, the 

supervising Correctional Officer assigned to the living unit, will contact a CRW, or 

in the CRW’s absence, the Shift Commander.”). The CRW or Shift Commander will 

then evaluate whether “the issue raised is an emergency.” Id. Boykin does not 

allege that he initially filed the grievances in the record as emergency grievances. 

Nor does he cite to any record evidence suggesting that he asked that these 

grievances be classified as emergency grievances or that any prison officials denied 

that request. He simply states that his grievances should have been processed as 

emergencies because of their content. If Boykin wanted his grievances to be 

processed as emergencies, the administrative process requires that he classify them 

as such. Id. at 3-4. The grievances before the Court were not emergencies, and 

prison officials therefore had 30 days to respond. Because Boykin did not wait 30 

days before filing suit, he did not exhaust his remedies as required by § 1997e. 
17 

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

is granted. This is a dismissal without prejudice. See Ford, 362 F.3d at 401 (holding 

that “all dismissals under § 1997e(a) should be without prejudice” even if “the 

statute of limitations might provide a good defense” upon refiling). But this is a 

final, appealable order. See id. (citing Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3d 718, 721 (7th 

Cir. 2001)). 

ENTERED: 

 s/Edmond E. Chang 

 Honorable Edmond E. Chang 

 United States District Judge 

DATE: November 4, 2014