[Cite as State v. Summers , 2020-Ohio-741.]

COURT OF APPEALS FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee

-vsBOBBY J. SUMMERS Defendant-Appellant JUDGES: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P. J. Hon. John W. Wise, J. Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. Case No. 2019 CA 00041

O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Municipal Cou rt, 19 TRC 2012

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 2, 2020

APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant JOSEPH M. SABO MICHAEL S. COX, JR. ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR BURKETT & SANDERSON 136 West Main Street, Suite 101 738 East Main Street Lancaster, Ohio 43130 Lancaster, Ohio 43130Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00041 2
Wise, John, J. {¶1} Appellant Bobby J. Summers appeals his sentence and conviction on one count of Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence entered in the Fairfield County Municipal Court following a no contest plea. {¶2} Appellee is State of Ohio. {¶3} Preliminarily, we note this case is before this Court on the ac celerated calendar which is governed by App.R. 11.1. Subsection (E), dete rmination and judgment on appeal, provides in pertinen t part: “The appeal will be dete rmined as provided by App.R. 11.1. It shall be sufficient compliance with App.R. 12(A ) for the statement of the reason for the court's decision as to each error to be in brief and conclusionary form.” {¶4} One of the important purposes of the accelerated calendar is to enable an appellate court to render a brief and conclusory decision more quickly than in a case on the regular calendar where the briefs, facts, and legal issues are more complicated. Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn ., 11 Ohio App.3d 158, 463 N.E.2d 655 (10th Dist. 1983). {¶5} This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforemen tioned rules. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE {¶6} The facts and procedural history are as follows: {¶7} On March 9, 2019, in Fairfield County, Ohio, Trooper Muck with the Ohio State Highway Patrol observed a vehicle driving erratically. (T . at 6). According to Trooper Muck, the vehicle stopped suddenly at a red light and backed up in the roadway. Id . At that point, Trooper Muck initiated a traffic stop on the vehicl e and made contact with theFairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00041 3
driver, who was later identified as Appellant Bobby J. Summers. Id . Based on the observation of the odor of marijuana and alcohol coming from th e vehicle, Appellant’s admission to consuming two beers in Columbus, and Appellant's r ed, bloodshot, and glassy eyes, Trooper Muck had Appellant exit the vehicle to per form field sobriety tests.
Id . at 6-7. {¶8} While performing field sobriety tests on Appellant, Trooper Muc k observed six out of six clues on the HGN test, three out of eight clues on the walk and turn test, and one out of four clues on the one-leg stand test. Id. at 7. Appellant was subsequently placed under arrest for Operating a Motor Vehicle Under the Inf luence of Alcohol or Drugs (hereinafter "OVI"). Id . Appellant submitted to a breath test, which revealed a .10 bl ood alcohol content. Id

. {¶9} Appellant was charged with OVI under R.C. §4511.19(A)(1)(a) and R.C. §4511.19(A)(1)(d), a third offense within ten years. Id. {¶10} On August 1, 2019, Appellant entered a plea of no contest to th e charge of OVI under R.C. §4511.19(A)(1)(a), and the trial court found him guilty based on the recitation of the above facts by the Appellee. {¶11} In determining whether the violation constituted a third offens e within ten years, the State set forth that Appellant was previously arrest ed and charged with OVI on January 31, 2012, in Case No. TRC 12108596, and again on March 7, 2012, in Case No. TRC 12124316. Id. Appellant was convicted on those two separate OVI charges on June 25, 2012, in Franklin County Municipal Court. Id . at 7-8. {¶12} Appellant did not dispute the facts of the case as recited by t he State. Id. at 8. Rather, Appellant argued that the instant offense, in TRC 19 02012, should be classifiedFairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00041 4
as a second offense within ten years due to Appellant’s prior t wo OVI convictions occurring simultaneously on June 25, 2012. Id. at 8-9. After hearing the arguments from both parties, the trial court found the instant offense in TRC 1902012 to con stitute a third offense within ten years. Id. at 9. {¶13} The trial court then sentenced Appellant to a minimum fine of E ight Hundred and Fifty ($850.00) Dollars, with a two year Ohio operator's li cense suspension backdated to March 9, 2019, as well as a thirty (30) day jail sente nce to run concurrently with a contemporaneous felony conviction. The trial court declined t o place Appellant on Community Control Supervision based on his current supervision through the Fairfield County Common Pleas Court. (Sentencing Entry TRC 19-02012, file d August 1, 2019; Sent. T. at 6-13). {¶14} Appellant now appeals, assigning the following errors for revie w: ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR {¶15} “I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR IN FINDING THAT AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAD COMMITTED TWO PRIOR OPERATING A VEHICLE UNDER THE INFLUENCE VIOLATIONS IN TEN YEARS.”
I. {¶16} In his sole assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial cou rt erred in finding that Appellant had committed two prior OVI violations. We disagree. {¶17} Appellant herein was convicted of an unclassified misdemeanor O VI, in violation of R.C. §4511.19(A)(1)(a). The trial court imposed a mandatory jail sentence of 30 days, citing R.C. §4511.19(G)(1)(c), which states in pertine nt part:Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00041 5
{¶18} R.C. §4511.19 provides: *** (G)(1) Whoever violates any provision of divisions (A)(1)(a) t o (i) or (A)(2) of this section is guilty of operating a vehicle under t he influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them. Whoever vio lates division (A)(1)(j) of this section is guilty of operating a veh icle while under the influence of a listed controlled substance or a listed meta bolite of a controlled substance. The court shall sentence the offender for either offense under Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code, except as othe rwise authorized or required by divisions (G)(1)(a) to (e) of this se ction: *** (c) Except as otherwise provided in division (G)(1)(e) of this section, an offender who, within ten years of the offense, previously ha s been convicted of or pleaded guilty to two violations of division (A ) or (B) of this section or other equivalent offenses is guilty of a misdemeanor

. ... (i) If the sentence is being imposed for a violation of divisi on (A)(1)(a) * * *, a mandatory jail term of thirty consecutive days

. * * * The court may impose a jail term in addition to the thirty-day mandatory jail term. Notwithstanding the jail terms set forth in sections 2929.21 to 2929.28 of the revised code, the additional jail term shall not exceed one year, and the cumulative jail term imposed for the offense shall not exceed o ne year. {¶19} In accordance, the cited provision requires a mandatory 30-day jail term for offenders with two prior OVI convictions within the last ten ye ars.Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00041 6
{¶20} Upon review, we find no ambiguity in the statute and no merit i n Appellant’s argument that his two prior convictions should be treated as on e conviction because he was sentenced on both cases during the same sentencing hearing. {¶21} In the present case, evidence was presented that Appellant had previously been convicted of two prior violations of R.C. §4511.19 and tha t both of those convictions occurred within ten years of the current offense. Said prior co nvictions were separate and distinct incidents occurring on January 31, 2012, and March 7, 2012, and charged under separate case numbers, TRC 121108596 and TRC 12124317, respecti vely. While, Appellant was convicted and sentenced on both of these offenses on June 25, 2012, said offenses remained separate, distinct convictions. {¶22} Based on the foregoing, we find no error in the trial court’s s entence in this
matter. {¶23} The judgment of the M unicipal Court of Fairf ield County, Ohio, is affirmed.

By: Wise, John, J. Hoffman, P. J., and Wise, Earle, J., concur.

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