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i 

54–775 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–34] 

FUTURE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE 

UNITED STATES NAVY AND MARINE 

CORPS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 26, 2009 
(II) 

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

WILL EBBS, Professional Staff Member 

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member 

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member 

ELIZABETH DRUMMOND, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 26, 2009, Future Roles and Missions of the United States 

Navy and Marine Corps ...................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 26, 2009 ...................................................................................... 31 

THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 2009 

FUTURE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND 

MARINE CORPS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, 

Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee .......................................... 2 

Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman, Seapower 

and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee ........................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Barnett, Dr. Thomas P.M., Senior Managing Director, Enterra Solutions, 

LLC ........................................................................................................................ 8 

Houley, Rear Adm. William P., USN (Ret.) ........................................................... 4 

O’Rourke, Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service .......................................................................................................................... 12 

Thompson, Dr. Loren B., Chief Operating Officer, Lexington Institute ............. 10 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd .......................................................................................... 37 

Barnett, Dr. Thomas P.M. ............................................................................... 50 

Houley, Rear Adm. William P. ........................................................................ 39 

O’Rourke, Ronald .............................................................................................. 77 

Taylor, Hon. Gene ............................................................................................. 35 

Thompson, Dr. Loren B. ................................................................................... 65 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

FUTURE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 26, 2009. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gene Taylor (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. TAYLOR. The hearing will come to order. Today the subcommittee meets in open session to explore future naval capabilities and force structure. 

Today’s hearing is unique for this subcommittee. We are typically 

addressing the budget directly or conducting oversight on troubled 

programs. Today, we have the opportunity to discuss alternative visions of roles and missions for the United States Navy and the 

United States Marine Corps with a very distinguished panel of witnesses. 

Today’s witnesses have not been handpicked to present any particular position of force structure requirements. The subcommittee 

has been particularly careful not to guide or steer our witnesses’ 

testimony. 

Our panel was selected by their expertise and strategic analysis 

along with widespread admiration for their previous published 

work. In fact, until I read their prepared testimony, prior to this 

hearing, I had no idea what any of them might say. That is exactly 

the type of hearing that the ranking member and I wanted to have. 

Sometimes the field will get too focused here in Congress on 

budget requests and specific acquisition programs and fail to stand 

back and look at the big picture, to verify the overall strategy of 

the Navy and our Nation’s needs. 

Our Navy has evolved over the years to complement the national 

strategy. This was true long before we used terms like ‘‘national 

strategy.’’ Our first Navy was a commerce protection force, not a 

global power. President Teddy Roosevelt and the Great White Fleet 

brought our Nation into preeminence on the world stage as a naval 

power, a power that was centered on battleships. 

The Second World War changed the view of seapower to a carrier 

battle group and the dominance of air power. Who knows what the 

next 30 years will bring? I hope that our witnesses will share their 
2 

views on the future force and the challenges that that force may 

face. 

The fact of the matter is, however, that within a few weeks, the 

Department of Defense will send over a budget request with a detailed plan for the construction of naval vessels and aircraft. This 

subcommittee will need to analyze that request in a very short period of time and make recommendations to our full committee and 

into the full House for acceptance or modification. 

That is why a hearing such as today is so useful. Listening to 

varying opinions always helps the final decision process. We have 

an extremely distinguished panel with us today. 

Mr. O’Rourke is no stranger to the subcommittee. We have routinely relied on his counsel during our yearly budget deliberations. 

Dr. Thompson, from the Lexington Institute, is widely regarded as 

an expert in naval affairs and has published extensively on maritime subjects. 

Rear Admiral Houley is a retired submarine officer who has commanded at the ship, squadron, and group level with tours at the 

Pentagon crafting naval strategy. I recommend his recent article in 

the United States Navy Institute Proceedings Magazine for a detailed analysis of naval roles and missions. 

Dr. Barnett is a widely published author and speaker who has 

led a transformation in Pentagon thinking with his first book, ‘‘The 

Pentagon’s New Map—War and Peace in the 21st Century.’’ 

I would like to thank all of our witnesses for appearing with a 

special thanks to Dr. Barnett for coming from out of town. We look 

forward to their discussion today. 

Without objection, it is the chair’s opinion that due to the broad 

topic today, and the probability that the witnesses would have 

slightly different viewpoints, the subcommittee will relax the normal rules for questioning and allow dialogue between members and 

follow-up questions without the loss of time. 

I would now like to recognize our friend from Missouri, the ranking member, Congressman Todd Akin. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I must say that I have 

been looking forward to our hearing this morning with some considerable anticipation because of your reputations that proceed you. 

And as a new ranking member on this committee, I am in a sense 

the new guy. And so I have a lot of questions and that makes it 

even more interesting. 

And I do understand that without a clear understanding of the 

world in which the Navy will operate in the coming years and the 

missions the Navy will likely be called upon to perform, we cannot 

possibly put any procurement or research program into context. 

Therefore, it is useful to seek the Navy’s opinion on these matters. I had the opportunity to discuss some of these ideas at length 

with the Chief of Naval Operations this week, actually about a 10- 
3 

hour meeting with him in an airplane where he was cooped up and 

couldn’t escape. 

I am confident that the Navy is actively attempting to adapt to 

changing threats, the diversity of threats and to meet the challenges of their latest maritime strategy. But any large institution 

has difficulty responding rapidly to changing threats and strategic 

objectives. 

Sadly, such was the case with the Navy in 1941. The service and 

the Nation had to come to grips with the power of the airplane as 

a naval weapon the hard way. I believe that a similar paradigm 

shift may be underway, and we should do our best not to be taken 

by surprise. 

This is why it is also important for the subcommittee to hear 

from independent observers, such as yourselves, to seek your assessment of the significant changes to the external environment in 

which our sea services operate. 

We also seek your guidance as to the tough choices the services 

will have to make going forward. I hope this hearing will be a way 

for us to explore the constraint and assumptions that should frame 

any reasonable discussion about future force structure alternatives 

as well as possible force size. 

I hope that you can offer suggestions about how we should evaluate recommendations that come to us via the fiscal year 2010 budget, the naval operating concept and the quadrennial defense review. For example, does Navy remain more or less relevant over 

the next 25 years given the United States strategic objectives, anticipated global threats and balance of power? 

What is the role of our current weapons systems in the future? 

What is the role of emerging technology such as directed energy 

and unmanned vehicles in the future force structure? How important is the role of information in the future, and how should the 

Navy position itself to connect, analyze, disseminate and deny its 

adversaries access to information? 

Given the cost of shipbuilding, how does the Navy maintain a 

global presence, incise itself for peacetime operations? Is it through 

ships or should it be through other platforms? 

With these questions in mind, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude. I 

have slightly longer statement that I would ask be entered for the 

record. Thank you again for holding this hearing today. 

To our witnesses, I appreciate you being with us and truly look 

forward to our discussion. Thank you. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Without objection, the gentleman’s full statement 

will be entered for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am told that Dr. Barnett is tied up in traffic. So 

if we don’t mind, we are going to begin with Admiral Houley. 

Admiral, normally in this committee, we ask our witnesses to 

speak for five minutes. Given the good fortune that we have to 

have all of our witnesses here today, we are going to deviate. So 

please, if you can, try to keep it under 10. 
4 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. WILLIAM P. HOULEY, USN (RET.) 

Admiral HOULEY. I am very proud to be here this morning. And 

I am also very appreciative that you and your committee would 

take the time to have this kind of a conversation along the way, 

because even if we only have the slightest opportunity to influence 

the deliberations that are going on right now, I know that we are 

very, very appreciative. 

Everybody thinks their own point of view is absolutely the right 

one. I am certainly no exception to that, and I find as I get older, 

I become even more and more certain of my position, even though 

the total number of facts I have to support it seems to go down 

with my age. 

I am honored, Mr. Chairman, to be asked to join this discussion, 

and I am well aware that most of you in this room have been considering force structure issues for many, many years. I also know 

it is easy to criticize any end result. 

I certainly have done so over my years of service. Let me first 

frame my remarks as follows: I respect the fact that those in a position of active Navy leadership are better informed than myself. 

I hope that none of my comments are interpreted as a challenge 

to the Navy’s budget request. 

I appreciate that every new year brings special circumstances, 

and obviously this year, in particular, is no exception. And the remarkable economic situation makes your decisions all the more important to our future. 

While I know that a discussion of background material is extraneous here, and I have no desire to insult the wisdom of this committee, I must apologize beforehand for repeating some obvious 

facts in this statement. 

The first is that the Navy’s existing force level can be argued to 

be inadequate or barely adequate, but the oceans are vast. Our position of leadership in the free world is clear. And the number of 

ships we have cannot logically be argued to be excessive. 

Second, since ship lifetimes can only be extended so far, we cannot solve our problems by painting over rust. Third, the mix of our 

ships can only be changed very gradually, and any war or conflict 

will have to be faced with a come-as-you-are force. That remains 

true even if we were suddenly to find ourselves in complete agreement about the kind of Navy that we need for tomorrow. 

No matter what the arguments may be concerning how to 

prioritize future threats, we cannot delay augmentation of our current fleet numbers or allow continuing deterioration of those numbers through inaction. Ship construction and modernization is but 

one of many issues. This committee knows there is no magic out 

there, and I have none to offer. But some aspects of the Navy’s 

challenges, as I see it, are quite clear. 

I have mentioned one: We have too few ships. Replacements are 

being built and commissioned at a slower rate than existing ships 

are being retired. Since nothing is cheap, what can be done? 

First, let’s go back to those obvious facts that I mentioned. CVNs, 

that is nuclear powered aircraft carriers, are more than the backbone and heart of the Navy. They forestall the need for access that 

can be denied us in many parts of the world for many of the scenarios we will continue to face. 
5 

They are not only the first asset a President considers when 

faced with a military challenge. They are one of the few unquestioned resources our Nation will require in the future. These ships 

are enormously expensive and take a long time to build, but they 

are the essence of force projection, the ultimate expeditionary force. 

And any math required for the Navy budget should begin with 

CVNs. 

I would spend my full time on this point, but it would be an insult to your intelligence. I have to say, I am very concerned about 

this topic. Carriers may be unassailable to budget cuts in my mind, 

but they are very expensive, and there are a lot of very important 

people who are desperately looking for money to fund urgent priorities. 

This subcommittee has a better chance of protecting carriers 

than almost any entity. Stand firm in protecting this priority. 

Moving on, as a lifetime submariner, I can only thank the Congress for its wisdom in permitting multi-year procurement of Fast 

Attack Submarines (SSNs), perhaps the one step that will permit 

this Nation to maintain a force level to execute their many missions with which this committee has first-hand familiarity. 

The retirement rate of these ships is frightening, and you have 

already taken action to allow the Navy to do the right thing. Our 

submariners will always take care of these versatile ships. Unfortunately, addressing naval challenges through new classes of ships 

carries a heavy price. 

Not only do they always cost more than predicted, no matter 

where the fault finger is pointed after the bill is added up, the 

money cannot be recaptured until we climb a long distance up a 

lessons-learned curve. 

We must augment, not decrement, fleet size. Therefore, I would 

emphasize these points: First, I recommend against additional 

DDG–1000s (Zumwalt class destroyers), not because it will not be 

a fine ship, but it is too expensive. It takes too long to build and 

will inevitably lead to a lower total number of ships in the fleet. 

The one outcome we cannot permit. 

I recommend as many improved DDG–51s (Arleigh-Burke class 

destroyers) as we can afford. We know how to build them. The 

value for cost is high. The maintenance is affordable. And we know 

how and when to make improvements in them. 

Now how about the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)? I used to have 

a nifty set of remarks appropriate only among retired admirals 

about how dumb an idea this was. It was not helpful, but guess 

what? After everyone is done beating everyone else up over the excessive cost, the lousy contractor performance, the poor coordination that was demonstrated, requirements creep and so on, we finally got two hulls built. 

LCSs will move toward a reasonable unit cost much faster than 

the next idea that comes down the chute. Essentially, everyone 

agrees that part of the Navy mix must include a lower-end ship, 

not too many I hope. Once we get these ships running right, the 

Navy will converge on the right combination of war-fighting modules. 

And these ships will become workhorses that we can move 

around the world and address some of the U.S. naval presence re-
6 

quirements that do not require battle groups. I am beginning to 

wish I had thought up this idea. 

In a recent article in Naval Institute Proceedings, to which the 

chairman referred, written in collaboration with Rear Admiral Jim 

Stark, we made two points I would repeat here. 

The first dealt with the ship’s requirement process where we 

talked about doing a better job of controlling the number of good 

ideas we would like to include in new ships. This, by the way, 

bears directly on the acquisition reform question. 

Adding promising technologies, more robust combat, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) 

systems is tempting for obvious reasons, especially given the range 

of solutions, range of scenarios that these ships may face. 

But at some point, it is counterproductive to augmenting the 

number of ships in the Navy. Scrubbing the requirements process 

is easier said than done, but the key is that once we reach our decision at the outset, we must have absolute control over subsequent 

changes to those requirements. 

In our opinion, the authority to approve such changes should be 

limited to the Secretary of the Navy. But the important point here 

is to limit the number of requirements-driven change orders that 

have such a big impact on ship construction costs. 

The second point deals with Marine Corps support. This mission 

is fundamental and none of the variety of military challenges of the 

last few years has changed that. The number and mix of vessels 

needed to provide the requisite lift for the Marines has changed 

over the past two decades. 

These ships have become larger, more expensive and more capable, while at the same time, the number required has declined. Because amphibious ships are employed in combination, they should 

be judged on the capability of the expeditionary strike group or amphibious ready group as a whole, rather than on the size and the 

cost of individual units. This should be a less controversial aspect 

of the fleet numbers and mix issue than some others. 

On the subject of acquisition reform, I know we all agree it is important, and we would like to address the problems and prescribe 

the right cures. I listened with fascination the other night when 

the President addressed this issue. And, of course, nobody knows 

better than the people in this room, you can go and ask anybody 

if we ought to have acquisition reform, and it is impossible to have 

any answer other than yes. 

The problem, of course, the devil is in the details. I hope before 

we enact new layers of directives in legislation that the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Congress, and others will talk 

to folks who have demonstrated real expertise in buying expensive, 

complicated products from major defense contractors. Expertise is 

established by records of personal accomplishment not by the title 

on office doors. 

We cannot address acquisition reform by adding more rules and 

regulations. That is how we got to where we are. Ostensibly, the 

idea of adding more rules and regulations has appeal because it 

precludes repetition of past problems. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral. 

Admiral HOULEY. Sir, 
7 

Mr. TAYLOR. Before you go any further, I want a recommended 

list from you of the five people that you think are the best at that. 

Admiral HOULEY. I would be delighted to—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much, sir. 

Admiral HOULEY [continuing]. Provide that, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Please proceed. 

Admiral HOULEY. Current regulations are excessive in number 

and in complication, and we are one of the sources of our own problems rather than part of the solution. We must avoid walking 

around the real problems and further complicating an already overly complex process. 

There are a lot of serious-minded men and women who have 

proved themselves in acquisition and business. Making the system 

work should be their challenge to address. 

And I might add parenthetically, since the chairman has given 

me this invitation to provide some names, one of my past experiences was the defense reform principal for the Secretary of Defense 

when Secretary Cohen was in his position. 

I should have known before I went there that naive men and 

women should not walk into a job that is titled, ‘‘Defense Reform,’’ 

because it—it sounds like a really good idea, but unsurprisingly, it 

is rather difficult to do, and one of the difficulties, and I believe everybody in this room knows it, is everybody is in favor of reform. 

Everybody is in favor of fixing things until it affects their job description, and then suddenly, their interest and enthusiasm seems 

to diminish very quickly. 

You ladies and gentlemen are all students of history. So many 

of our Nation’s predecessors in friendly and not-so-friendly countries have encountered financial pressures akin to our own today. 

Slowly, they saved money by agreeing to fewer and fewer ships 

with less and less capability. 

Without apparently realizing when they were doing so, these nations eventually gave up their ability to project power in a meaningful manner. Even when the lights go on and the circumstances 

make it obvious that this has happened, they discover that to regain strength of this kind requires a reversal of policies that, in the 

best of circumstances, would take many years and be prohibitively 

expensive. 

I guess one of the concerns that we all share is that, over a period of years, we keep chipping away at the size and strength of 

the Navy and no particular decision is fatal. No particular decision 

has enormous impact on the future, but the net result of coming 

up with a smaller and less capable Navy over a period of time, unfortunately, does not change the number of challenges that Navy 

is expected to face. 

We cannot afford to make this mistake. Our responsibilities are 

too great, and there is no backup plan. This is why I believe that 

while your challenge is of great importance, it is not incredibly 

complex. 

We need to augment our fleet in numbers and in capability and 

limit the introduction of new ship classes and big changes to the 

maximum degree possible. That is why I feel that, although, every 

year you are obviously faced with important decisions to make and 

important issues to be addressed, one of which is always, what 
8 

kind of a Navy do we need? What sort of threat are we building 

the Navy for? 

Those are important, useful questions, and I support exploring 

them to whatever degree you can. But I will say that what we end 

up doing has marginal impact on the long range, and if we don’t 

get out of the business of building new classes of ships, for a while 

at least, we are in a world of trouble. 

And if we don’t get on with the business of building more ships, 

we are in a world of trouble. So I am much more interested in trying to improve our progress in shipbuilding. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Houley can be found in the 

Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral, thank you very much. We have now been 

joined by Dr. Barnett. 

Dr. Barnett. We are going to waive the normal 5-minute rule for 

our witnesses, but if you could keep it under 10, we would greatly 

appreciate it in fairness to the other witnesses. 

STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS P.M. BARNETT, SENIOR 

MANAGING DIRECTOR, ENTERRA SOLUTIONS, LLC 

Dr. BARNETT. Having spent the last decade arguing that America’s grand strategy should center on fostering globalization’s advance, I welcomed the Department of Navy’s 2007 Maritime Strategic Concept that stated, ‘‘As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime forces will be 

deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, 

law, people and governance.’’ 

In my mind, rather than simply chasing after today’s ever-changing lineup of relatively minor and manageable maritime security 

threats, the Department of Navy logically locates its long-term 

operational center of gravity amidst globalization’s tumultuous advance. 

For it is primarily, overwhelmingly, in these frontier-like regions 

that we locate virtually all of the mass violence, all of the terrorism, and all of the instability in the system, all the failed states. 

Moreover, this strategic bias towards globalization’s frontier regions, especially the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, makes 

eminent sense in a time horizon likely to witness the disappearance of the three major war scenarios that currently justify our Nation’s continued funding of our big-war force. 

Namely, a Taiwan that integrates economically with mainland 

China; an Iran, whose successful pursuit of a nuclear capacity will 

soon rule out any potential major U.S. intervention; and a North 

Korea, whose inevitable collapse presents no significant possibility 

of triggering major war among intervening great powers. 

As our leviathan’s primary war-fighting rationales fade with 

time, its proponents will seek to sell both this body and the American public on the notion of coming resource wars with other great 

powers. This logic, in my opinion, is an artifact from the Cold War 

era, during which the notion of zero-sum competition for Third 

World resources held significant plausibility, primarily because economic connectivity between the capitalist West and the socialist 

East was severely limited. 
9 

But as the recent financial contagion proved, that trifurcated 

global economy no longer exists. The level of financial interdependence among and across globalization’s major markets in addition to 

supply chain networks renders moot the specter of zero-sum resource competition among the world’s great powers. 

If anything, global warming’s long-term effects on agricultural 

production around the planet will dramatically increase both EastWest and North-South interdependency as a result of the emerging 

global middle class’s burgeoning demand for more resource-intensive foods. 

To the extent that rising demand goes unmet or developing region suffers significant resource shortages in the future, we are exceedingly unlikely to see resumed great power conflict as a result. 

Rather, we will witness even more destabilizing civil strife in many 

fragile states. 

As such, I see a future in which the small-wars force, more Army 

and Marines, experiences continued significant growth in its global 

workload, while the big-war force, more Navy and Air Force, experiences the opposite. 

As a result, I predict the Department of Navy’s blue-water fleet 

will shrink significantly over the next couple decades, while its 

green/brown-water fleet will expand dramatically along with associated personnel requirements, notably with the Marines. 

As our current naval leviathan force enjoys a significant, as in 

several times over, combat advantage over any other force out 

there today, and I would cite Bob Work’s analysis on that, our decisions regarding new capital ship development should center largely 

on the issue of preserving industrial base. 

My advice in this regard is that America should go as slow and 

as low as possible in the production of such supremely expensive 

platforms, meaning we accept that our low number of buys per design class will be quite costly. But I like maintaining that technological hedge. 

To the extent the fleet numbers are kept up, such procurement 

should largely benefit the small-war force’s need for many cheap 

and small boats, preferably of the sort that can be utilized by our 

forces for some period of time and then given away to developing 

country navies to boost their maritime governance capacity, a key 

goal going forward. 

Along these lines, I firmly support the Navy’s Global Maritime 

Partnerships Initiative, especially when our naval forces expand cooperation with rising great powers like China and India, two countries whose militaries remain far too myopically structured around 

border-conflict scenarios for China, Taiwan, for India, Kashmir. 

America must dramatically widen its definition of strategic allies 

going forward, as the combination of an overleveraged United 

States and a demographically moribund Europe and Japan no 

longer constitutes a quorum of great powers sufficient to address 

today’s global security agenda. 

In short, I want allies with million man armies who are having 

lots of babies, rising defense budgets and are willing to go places 

and kill people in defense of their interests. 

To conclude, given America’s ongoing ground operations, our 

Navy faces severe budgetary pressures on future shipbuilding. 
10 

Those pressures will only grow with the current global economic 

crisis, which fortunately generates similar pressures on navies 

around the world. 

Considering these trends as a whole, I would rather abuse the 

Navy fleetwise before doing the same to either the Marine Corps 

or the Coast Guard. Why? Our national security community currently accepts far too much risk and casualties and instability on 

the low end of the conflict spectrum while continuing to spend far 

too much money on building up combat capabilities for fantastic 

war-fighting scenarios. 

In effect, we stuff our big-war force while starving our smallwars force, accepting far too many avoidable real-time casualties in 

the latter while hedging excessively against theoretical future casualties in the former. I consider this risk-management approach to 

be both strategically and morally unsound. 

As Congress proceeds to judge the naval services long-range 

plans, my suggested standard is simple: Give America’s naval 

forces fewer big ships with fewer personnel on them and many 

more smaller ships with far more personnel on them. 

In my professional opinion, the Department of Navy is moving 

aggressively and logically toward engaging the world’s security environment as it truly is versus myopically obsessing over China’s 

potential as some long-term, near-peer competitor. 

I suggest that Congress not stand in the way of this much-needed and long-delayed evolution, even as it considers with great deliberation the requirements of preserving industrial base. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Barnett can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes Dr. Thompson. If you would, try to 

keep it under 10 minutes, doctor. 

STATEMENT OF DR. LOREN B. THOMPSON, CHIEF OPERATING 

OFFICER, LEXINGTON INSTITUTE 

Dr. THOMPSON. I am going to try to keep it under five. I don’t 

have a vote on the subcommittee, but I would like to second the 

chair’s endorsement of Admiral Houley’s article in the January Proceedings. I thought it was very well done and one of the largest 

concentrations of common sense I have seen in a long time. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I would like to 

briefly review the military and economic challenges our Nation 

faces and then draw some conclusions about the outlook for naval 

ship construction. 

The security challenges we face today are not worse than what 

we faced 20 years ago. I mean, what could be worse than having 

10,000 nuclear warheads aimed at your country? However, the 

challenges are more diverse. Many of the challenges that trouble 

us most today, such as failed states, Islamic terrorism, nuclear proliferation, barely affected our military plans at all during the Cold 

War. 

But that world is now long gone, replaced by a landscape of dangers that are at once ambiguous and ubiquitous thanks to the information revolution. In this new world, the joint force must be all 
11 

things to all people, because we simply can’t predict how the threat 

is going to change from year to year. 

The sea services now spend much of their time engaged in nontraditional missions, and those missions often must be carried out 

even farther from home than in the past. To take just one example 

of this, Strait of Hormuz, where two of our warships collided last 

week, is literally on the opposite side of the world from San Diego. 

So changes in the character and location of the security challenges we face by themselves would be enough to warrant a 

rethink of what kind of Navy we need. However, that will not be 

the biggest concern we have in the decade ahead. 

The biggest concern we will have is that our economy is in decline, and the federal government is out of money. How broke is 

the federal government? The federal government is so broke, that 

during the 2 hours we will be meeting here this morning, it will 

spend $400 million that it does not have. It is so broke, that the federal debt has doubled to $11 trillion 

in just 8 years, and according to the Congressional Budget Office 

(CBO), it threatens to double again in the next 8 years. The federal 

government is so broke, that we are sustaining our defense posture, in part, by borrowing money from the country we say we are 

getting ready to fight. 

Now, how crazy is that? There is no time in living memory when 

U.S. finances have been in such bad shape, and therefore, all the 

things we thought we knew about the future availability of funding 

for the joint force are now suspect. 

I have attached to the remarks I gave the subcommittee my 

cover story from the current issue of Armed Forces Journal about 

the impact of our economic decline on military preparedness. Suffice it to say that the days when 5 percent of the world’s population, us, could sustain nearly 50 percent of the world’s military 

spending are coming to an end. 

What that means for naval ship construction is that current 

Navy plans are not affordable. If we build the kind of networked, 

interoperable national fleet envisioned in the Joint Maritime Strategy, then we can get very good results from the warships we do 

buy. 

But we cannot get Navy ship numbers above 300 any time again 

unless we purchase smaller, cheaper warships. Unfortunately, that 

approach will not work with aircraft carriers or submarines where 

we are locked into costs and construction rates that can only be cut 

by substantially reducing our global presence and war-fighting capability. 

We must sustain production of the Ford class of future aircraft 

carriers at the rate of one every four years. Otherwise, the number 

of flattops in the fleet will not get back to the number of 12 that 

is required. And we must build a Virginia class of attack submarines at the rate of two per year for the foreseeable future if we 

are to avoid huge gaps in undersea warfare and in intelligence 

gathering capabilities, intelligence gathering being their single 

most important function today. 

Thus, the savings that are needed to bring naval ship construction into alignment with likely resources will have to be found 

mainly in surface combatants and vessels associated with amphib-
12 

ious warfare. The Navy has already begun the necessary adjustments by proposing to cancel the DDG–1000 destroyer, which is too 

costly and ill-suited to the emerging threat environment. 

Terminating production at three vessels, and preferably at two, 

while continuing construction of versatile Aegis destroyers, is the 

only sensible response to military and fiscal realities. 

With regard to smaller surface combatants, the Navy needs to 

make a choice between the two versions of Littoral Combat Ship 

and consider supplementing LCS with the more conventional National Security Cutter being built by the Coast Guard. 

Now, I don’t mean we need to choose between the two versions 

of LCS today. We need to give them both a fair chance to show 

themselves in operational environments. But eventually, we have 

to choose. 

It is much too early to call LCS a failed program. The lead ship 

was delivered to the fleet in half the usual time, and it had a very 

successful inspection. But the warships will cost more than expected, and more importantly, there are uncertainties surrounding 

the concept of operations. 

While the National Security Cutter is slower, and it requires 

deeper water to operate, it has similar onboard equipment, and 

longer endurance make it potentially applicable to many, many 

missions. 

The amphibious fleet presents a bigger puzzle, because it appears that the stated requirement for 33 warships is too small 

given the need to establish global fleet stations and the fact that 

all of our up-armored equipment is heavier and bulkier than what 

we were planning to put on the ships. 

Now, the decision to use the LPD–17 (Amphibious Transport 

Dock ship) hull as a replacement for aging LSD vessels is a step 

toward greater affordability. It reduces design costs and extends serial production of a known hull. However, there are real doubts 

about the affordability of the future maritime prepositioning force, 

and I guess one signal of that is the fact that when the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) sent their 2010 revised guidance 

to the Pentagon on January 29th for preparation of the next budget, they actually suggested canceling the Maritime Prepositioning 

Ships for the future. 

I would be pleased to elaborate on my views concerning all these 

programs during the question and answer period and also any additional programs concerning aircraft that you are interested in 

bringing up or networks. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Thompson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 65.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much, sir. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Ron O’Rourke. 

STATEMENT OF RONALD O’ROURKE, SPECIALIST IN NAVAL 

AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Chairman Taylor, Congressman Akin, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak today on the future of the Navy. With your permission, I would like to submit my statement for the record and summarize it briefly here. 
13 

Mr. TAYLOR. Without objection. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. The future of the Navy is a topic with a lot of 

dimensions. So I tried to focus on some aspects that may be of particular interest to the subcommittee. An initial point is that, given 

the long lives of Navy ships, many ships currently in service will 

still be in service 10 to 20 years from now. And so, in this sense, 

a part of the future Navy is already with us today. 

A second point is that the relatively low shipbuilding rate in recent years has increased the challenge of achieving and maintaining a 313-ship fleet. The shipbuilding rate has averaged about 5.4 

ships per year for the last 17 years. 

You can’t build ships at that kind of rate for that many years 

without getting behind the eight ball for achieving and maintaining 

a 313-ship Navy. Something like 12 ships per year will now be 

needed in coming years for a 313-ship fleet. 

A third point is that current technical trends in Navy acquisitions suggest that the future Navy will likely feature an increasing 

use of unmanned vehicles, networking capabilities and open architecture computers and software, as well as ships with reduced crew 

sizes, integrated electric drive, common hull designs and components and increased modularity. 

The future Navy will also likely feature a continued necking 

down in aircraft types, models and series and possibly new types 

of weapons such as directed-energy weapons. 

Some think tanks have recently published proposals for future 

Navy ship force structure, and what is notable about these proposals is how they would take the Navy in different directions. 

What these proposals illustrate is how the Navy currently is at a 

decision point in terms of future mission priorities, and how choices 

about those mission priorities can lead to differing versions of the 

future Navy. 

To examine this issue, I organized potential future Navy operations into four general categories using a scheme similar to one 

that I have presented at the Naval War College and the Center for 

Naval Analyses. 

One of these categories includes things like engagement and 

partnership-building operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and maritime security operations. Another 

category includes counterterrorism and irregular warfare. A third 

concerns operations relating to larger scale conventional conflicts 

on the continental landmass, and the fourth category relates to 

countering improved Chinese naval forces. 

My testimony discusses how putting a planning emphasis on a 

given category can lead to investments in certain platforms and capabilities. Policymakers can choose to emphasize any or all of these 

categories. In theory, these choices should reflect broader decisions 

about U.S. security strategy, and given resource constraints, the 

decision to place more emphasis on one category could require putting less emphasis on others. 

My statement also discusses some additional planning considerations including the importance of forward deployed presence as a 

planning metric. Maintaining forward deployments can be important or even critical to performing operations in all four categories. 

And maintaining such deployments can sometimes require having 
14 

more ships in inventory than might be required solely for combat 

operations. 

Finally, my statement discusses a number of shipbuilding issues 

relating to the future Navy. One of these concerns how potential 

changes in the aircraft carrier force level goal might affect the 

schedule for procuring future carriers. A second issue concerns reported potential out-year reductions in attack submarine procurement. 

A third issue concerns the potential viability of a CG(X) (cruiser) 

program of eight ships procured at a rate of one ship every three 

years, which is an option the Navy reportedly has considered. A 

fourth issue concerns the future procurement of destroyers where 

OSD’s position of ambiguity from last year has recently changed to 

a position that might be called modified ambiguity. 

And a fifth issue concerns whether procurement of LCSs should 

be supplemented with procurement of other smaller surface combatants. My statement also discusses shipbuilding issues such as 

amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships and the possibility 

of building ships with extensive growth margins so that they might 

be easily backfitted later on with significant amounts of additional 

weapons and sensors. 

The main point I want to leave you with is that the Navy in coming years can go in various directions depending on choices that are 

made about how much emphasis to place on preparing for various 

kinds of operations. An absence of clear decisions on planning priorities could result in a Navy that muddles along with no clear 

focus and potentially inadequate capabilities for performing certain 

desired missions. 

Without a clear sense of priorities, program decisions might be 

made more by budget drills and Navy plans and programs could be 

subject to repeated shifts as successive Navy leaders link their own 

interpretations to an unclear list of operational priorities. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening remarks, and I will be 

happy to answer any questions the subcommittee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Rourke can be found in the Appendix on page 77.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman. 

We now recognize our ranking member, Mr. Akin, for five minutes. I am sorry, Mr. Akin, unlimited time for the ranking member. 

Mr. AKIN. I will try to take that in advisement. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The first question I have, I guess, is a really basic one. I asked 

it to another panel of witnesses, and they didn’t really answer the 

question. So I thought I would try it on you, and that is, particularly, this was in light of the DDG situation, but is the purchasing 

strategy, which I just recently found out was pretty much dictated 

by Goldwater-Nichols, where the Navy sets the requirements and 

then different people in acquisition basically work with a contractor 

to build something. 

Is that a good way overall to be acquiring ships, or is that process mechanically somewhat structurally not as good as it should 

be? And I am asking the question coming as an outsider but many 

years ago working for IBM, and we used to manage projects. 
15 

And one of the very single first rule is, if you have got a project 

that is a priority, you put one person in charge of it, and you put 

your finger in their belly button and say, ‘‘Look, here is the deal, 

you are going to have this much money and this is what the product is going to have to look like, and we are going to hold you accountable for making that work.’’ 

What I saw here on the DDG was that it looked like somebody 

had shot a rudder out from under a ship and it was kind of wandering around. So my question to you is, structurally, is that process in need of repair, first question. 

Dr. THOMPSON. I would like to respond first by making two 

points: First of all, my recollection is that when the GoldwaterNichols legislation was passed, we had a handful of programs that 

had major cost overruns, schedule problems, or technical hurdles. 

Near as I can tell, they almost all do now. 

So I would have to conclude that if the purpose was to reform 

and make more efficient the acquisition process, it has failed. It 

certainly has managed to increase the number of parking spaces at 

the Pentagon, but whether it has increased the number of weapons 

systems or the efficiency with which they are fielded, I think is extremely doubtful. 

The second point I would like to make is, you know, I normally 

don’t focus on Navy. I normally focus on aerospace and networks. 

What I have noticed though is that across all the war-fighting communities and across all the services, we have a system where there 

are simply too many players. 

It starts at the requirements level, and it ends up at the user 

level, but so many people at each stage in the process are participating in the concept of operations, the selection of the contractor, 

the definition of the operational requirements that it is impossible 

to field anything that is cheap. 

It doesn’t matter how simple the original concept is, whether it 

is boots or bullets. It is going to end up more expensive than if IBM 

had built it. 

Mr. AKIN. Excuse me, I made a little Freudian slip here. I was 

talking about LCS and not DDG. I am sorry. 

Dr. THOMPSON. Well, I can be more specific on that. In the case 

of the Littoral Combat Ship, what we have here is a very exciting 

idea, but it was an idea that was generated by the Navy under 

pressure from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to come up 

with neat ideas. They are known as transformational ideas. 

It may be a real breakthrough in naval warfare, but the way 

they tried to do it, the business plan, the going to the second-tier 

yards, the definition of all sorts of capabilities not previously resident on frigates or other small warships, guaranteed there would 

be problems. 

Now, I actually think the program is not going that badly. But 

let’s face it, it is not going to come in at $220 million a copy, and 

I think the larger problem, which nobody has focused on yet, is 

that this is still a neat idea. We don’t know how it is going to do 

out in the Indian Ocean with four crews for every three ships, with 

40-knot fuel costs, you know, and all those other things that are 

associated like the modular mission packages. 
16 

The jury is still out on whether the concept will work. The boats 

aren’t bad for what we are trying to do, but whether they actually 

fit in well with our naval force structure and concept of operations, 

we won’t know that for a while. 

Admiral HOULEY. First of all, the thesis of your question compares IBM to the defense system, and for the very reason you 

pointed out. The direct answer to your question is the system that 

we have is lousy, and it has not worked very well, though well intended. 

And the reason that it can’t work very well is because there are 

too many cooks, and therein we are back to our acquisition reform. 

And I know you don’t want to spend the morning on this question, 

but the reason that it doesn’t work is not only because there are 

too many players, but because we are always trying to accomplish 

so many things at the same time. 

You will recall that Goldwater-Nichols was not terribly well received by the military services. We have since learned our manners 

as well as learned all of the good things that came from that rationale. But when we were back in the process that we are in right 

now, the military kind of shut itself out of the debate and had to 

live with the results without being able to influence them. 

And every time you add somebody, even if it is somebody who is 

terribly well respected who can play with the, in this case, the requirements process, you are bound to be going in the wrong direction. One of the points that Dr. Thompson made that is particularly 

important to remember is, as I said in my statement, there is lots 

of blame to go around about LCS, and that is a process that you 

all have probably spent a lot of time on already. 

But one of the things that was central to all of that is that the 

Navy saw that they had to do something. And so they went ahead 

and did something rather than determining what needed to be 

done and coming to you and to all of the other people in the process 

with an answer. 

So it kind of stunk, and it began there, and it just kept on going 

and unraveling, and it has not helped with more people. So I am 

back to the same thing. The direct answer to your question is, it 

is not helpful, and it is not good, although the intentions were honorable and indeed have probably given us many benefits. 

Mr. AKIN. Well, I appreciate what you are saying, because I am 

of the opinion that you could take good people and put them in a 

bad system and you get bad results. And that can happen very easily. That is why I am asking the very specific question about the 

structure of how we approach this. 

And I don’t think we should zing people for being future-thinking 

and saying, let’s get moving and let’s drive this process more rapidly. But we have to know how we are doing that. But thank you, 

I was going to—Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Just a few additional points. It is worth remembering that the LCS program was pursued deliberately as one that 

would be done differently from the normal shipbuilding process. 

And so if there are problems in that program, they are not necessarily representative of problems in the larger process. 

In particular, the LCS program, I think, as just been alluded to, 

was pursued with a strong focus on reducing acquisition cycle time, 
17 

and so they were very interested in doing things very quickly, and 

that got them into a situation of concurrency between design and 

construction, which is one of the oldest no-no’s in defense acquisition. And it led to a situation of haste makes waste. 

So there were problems in that program, but whether that says 

something necessarily about the default process for shipbuilding is 

less clear, because the LCS started off trying to do something different in the first place. In terms of that general process, there is 

a couple points I can mention, and one has to do with requirements 

control, requirements discipline. 

And there was a period in the 1990s when the requirements police, as it were in the Navy, which was a body called the Ship 

Characteristics Board or the Ship Characteristics Improvement 

Board, or the SCIB, was weakened or disestablished. 

And during that period of time, they were not there to police the 

requirements process for Navy ship designs, and there is at least 

one ship that was designed during that period, which some people 

have said suffered requirements growth because of the weakening 

or the disestablishment of the SCIB during that period. 

The Navy since that time has taken steps to reestablish that requirements police force under a different name and to apply it not 

only to shipbuilding but to aircraft and other acquisition as well. 

You raised the question of whether there should be stronger centralized control, and I think that is a fair question. 

Because other observers have raised this issue as well, and when 

they do, they point to other examples of where the Navy has successfully pursued very complex and technical acquisition efforts because there was centralized control. And the examples that are 

usually raised are the setup that we have for naval nuclear propulsion, the Naval Reactors Office, the Special Systems Project Office, 

or SSP, that brought ballistic missiles into the Navy. 

And a third example that is sometimes raised is the rather centralized control for the Aegis development program during the 

1970s and 1980s and into more recent years. Those setups are all 

somewhat different from one another, but they all featured strong 

control with ultimately direct accountability by one person at the 

top. 

But there is one other issue that I think is important in shipbuilding, which is that shipbuilding is a long-term process. It takes 

many years for a program to pan out. And so there is a long time 

between when somebody might make a promise about a shipbuilding program and when the results start coming in. 

And that raises the question of whether there should be some 

steps taken to make it more possible for somebody who makes a 

promise at the front end of the process to still be around at the 

back end of the process to be held accountable for it. 

And one option to do that would be to set up a director of shipbuilding with a very long tenure somewhat similar to what you 

have, for example, with the director of naval reactors (DONR). 

Now, there is pluses and minuses to the option of establishing offices with long tenures, and you would have to carefully think 

about that. 

But that is one option for getting at the issue of possibly making 

sure that if a promise is made about a shipbuilding program in 
18 

year (A) that that same person will still be there to be held accountable for that process years down the road when the return 

data starts to come in. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you very much. 

Dr. BARNETT. If I could—— 

Mr. AKIN. Do you want to do a fourth response, Mr. Chairman? 

Dr. BARNETT. If I could just follow quickly with a historical note. 

I worked with Art Sybrowsky at the Naval War College during the 

time period where he dreamed up the LCS, and then I worked as 

an assistant with him in the Office of Force Transformation during 

the first two years of operation. 

I will tell you just as an historical note, which is important, I 

think, that what they were trying to do with LCS was to kind of 

break this mentality within the Navy that its ships were, in effect, 

sort of a glass jaw that if we lost one, it was catastrophic. 

Okay? So he was trying to introduce a fighter pilot mentality toward accepting more risks within the fleet. That is why they went 

for a small ship that would be close and operate in the littoral, accept much higher levels of risk, and some of the original designs 

really focused on things like almost a command module that could 

eject like a fighter pilot ejects out of a plane. 

Okay? So the dream was to bring a much higher tolerance of 

risk, get much closer to the actual land security environment. What 

happened with that dream was that it was subjected to a system 

that purposely tries to drain all risk out of ship design. So it 

junked it up. It put all sorts of bells and whistles. The modularity 

was lost. All sorts of defensive measures and things that, kind of, 

codified the design made it stagnant and static were introduced 

over time. 

And my perception of that process, it is right out of Allen Drury’s 

novel, ‘‘The Pentagon,’’ which was about the creation of a landing 

craft air cushion (LCAC) during a crisis situation where the Navy 

wanted to dream up this new landing craft vehicle to deal with this 

crisis that was developing. 

And because the military kept adding all these bells and whistles, the machinery was never delivered. The war never happened, 

and the whole system kind of ground to a pointless halt. I saw that 

problem with the LCS. I thought it was a good attempt to move 

the Navy towards a different risk tolerance, and it failed because 

the system simply does not allow any sort of risk. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you very much, gentlemen. It has been very 

helpful. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I very much appreciate the gentleman’s comments. 

I would also remind the gentleman that one thing that we, as both 

congressmen and parents, can never tolerate is the thought of a 

disposable ship, because a disposable ship could lead to a disposable crew, and we are not going to have that. 

Dr. BARNETT. Well, my argument, you know, it is similar to what 

the Army’s moved towards in terms of counterinsurgency. You accept more tactical risk to garner more strategic gain. And 

Sybrowsky’s concern in that regard was that the Navy was, in effect, pricing or risking itself out of utility or relevance, which is 

worse. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Barnett. 
19 

The chair now recognizes the chairman of the Readiness Committee, Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much for appearing before our committee this morning. I think we have had some wonderful testimony this morning. You know, yesterday, I had a hearing with 

Navy officials to discuss the shortfalls in Navy operations and 

maintenance (O&M) on the accounts for ship maintenance. 

And the impact of underfunding ship maintenance means a decreased platform, life expectancy and decreased fleet readiness. 

Since each service is facing budget constraints, in your opinion, 

how can the Navy balance sustainment and maintenance cost with 

the acquisition of future platforms? 

Do you think acquisition reform is the answer to some of these 

problems that we have? Anybody that would like to. 

Dr. THOMPSON. Well, one of the things you can do, Congressman 

Ortiz, that we have not done well in the past is to build reliability 

and maintainability into the war-fighting system. Just to take a 

simple example, the way that we have designed the Virginia class 

attack submarines, there is no midlife refueling. It has got a life 

of the ship core. 

Because there is no midlife refueling, you have managed to keep 

it in service longer and save a lot of money that our other nuclear 

systems have to expend in order to stay operational for their full 

service life. So that would be a fairly large but kind of obvious example of how you can save money. 

The Littoral Combat Ship was actually designed with the notion 

of maintainability and readiness in mind. That is one of the reasons why there are actually four crews associated with each of the 

three ships. It allows you to turn the ship around faster. It allows 

you to get more productivity out of the vessel. So there is a lot of 

different ideas for doing that. 

But as Mr. O’Rourke said up front, it takes so long to implement 

these programs that, a lot of the time, the great ideas go off the 

track before we come to fruition. And in that regard, I would just 

like to go back to one thing I said in my opening remarks. 

The Littoral Combat Ship is not a failed program. We haven’t 

had enough time. It has only run half the length of a normal development program for a warship. So calling it failed now is really a 

prescription for wasting a ton of money and starting over with 

nothing to show for it. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, sir. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Just very quickly, the issue you are raising has 

been termed by others sometimes as the tension between current 

readiness and future readiness, current readiness being promoted 

through the maintenance of ships that you have; future readiness 

being prepared for by the ships that you are building for the future. And that is an ongoing tension within the Navy’s budget right 

now. 

My sense is that the Navy believes that they must pay a certain 

amount of priority to maintaining the ships that they have, especially since we are in the midst of two wars right now, and that 

can come at the expense of the shipbuilding budget, which supports 

future readiness. 
20 

And there is one other tension as well: One way that you can 

help to reduce the competition between these two things is to build 

future ships, as Loren mentioned, so that they require less maintenance during their life cycles. And that can mean building the 

ships with higher quality materials or more ruggedness in their 

structure. 

And the irony there is that taking steps to do that in a ship’s 

design can actually make it more expensive to procure. So as we 

look at the idea of trying to reduce the cost of shipbuilding, we 

need to remember that there can be a cost down the road for reducing a ship’s procurement cost, because it can have the effect of increasing the amount of maintenance that that ship might need to 

receive over its life cycle. And that would add to this continuing 

tension between current and future readiness. 

Admiral HOULEY. One comment that I would add to this discussion, and I agree with what has been said thus far, is the area that 

you are looking into or were discussing yesterday, I dare say will 

never disappear from the agenda over the next 500 years. 

But I think it is fair to say that the issue of apparent underfunding of operation and maintenance, which always seems to show 

up during the year as we run into successive problems that may 

or may not have been foreseen. Our ability to deal with those problems and the number that we have that should have been anticipated, I think has actually gotten better over the years. 

And if we can certainly not ignore that problem because nobody 

knows better than you the number of dollars that are involved 

here. It is huge. So it is a lucrative and important target to spend 

time on, but I think that the abuses and the problems are the ones 

that have gotten heavy emphasis here already this morning, acquisition reform, requirements reform, better discipline and accountability so that we have as much confidence as we can, given that 

we are dealing with human beings as well as ships, that we are 

policing or managing our meager resources as well as we reasonably can. 

My hats are off to the Navy. I think they are doing a better job 

since I left than they were when I was there. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Just one short question. You know, we talked about 

a new ship comes out, either we put too much technology, too much 

equipment or we don’t put enough, and it goes back to that $1 billion ship that run aground and hit a coral reef. Did we have the 

right equipment? 

I mean, I just cannot understand. I was in the Army. I was not 

in the Navy, so I don’t understand much of the Navy. I am learning 

with my chairman here. But I would think that when you build a 

ship that is going to cost taxpayers $1 billion, that you would have 

the right technology so you won’t run aground or hit a coral reef. 

I mean—— 

Admiral HOULEY. You know, no one knows better than us that 

have done this that no matter how good your training is and how 

good your selection is of people, and you know what wonderful people we have. I mean, they are not just dedicated; they are really, 

really smart people. But periodically, and once again, this committee gets lots of focus on this, periodically, somebody goes out 
21 

there and does something that you just can’t believe how bad it 

was. 

I mean, sometimes when you unravel all the facts, you tend to 

find some extenuating circumstances, but more often, the more 

careful you look, you wonder where did we go wrong? Not where 

did the captain go wrong, but where did we go wrong? And I am 

afraid it is human nature. 

What you get out of this is exactly what you put into it, and that 

is a series of fleet commanders and Chiefs of Naval Operations 

(CNOs) who always emphasize the enormous and importance of investment and the training side of what we do to limit those kinds 

of things. Whether it is the loss of an F–22 or wrecking, as you say, 

a multi-billion dollar warship, those things happen. 

And we can’t legislate against them. We can just very carefully 

examine what the lessons are to be learned. I am very proud of my 

association with the nuclear program, and one of the things that 

I am proudest of is Admiral Rickover’s insistence on the importance 

of training to the point of tediousness and certainly aggravation in 

the interest of making sure that we don’t make mistakes in the 

areas we can. 

So I don’t think there is a good answer to your very, very good 

question that it is going to make you feel better. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. 

Dr. BARNETT. I would add—there is an inherent tension between 

the Navy’s desire to maintain its utility and to promote its utility 

as a node within a network force that projects combat power. So 

there is the desire to put a lot of technology on these platforms. 

There is tension between that and the Navy’s more prosaic role as 

a networker with other navies and other coast guards around the 

world. 

And so it has a lot to do with your definition of the maritime security threat. Do you want to emphasize the very high technology, 

the possibilities of very high technology, high-end combat scenarios, 

or do you see more of the problem being kind of basic maritime 

governance? 

And when you junk up those forces, those platforms to the point 

where we have a hard time even talking to some of these other navies around the world, because the disparity between our levels of 

technology and theirs are vast. 

You know, then I think, you know, we go too much in the role 

of preserving sort of our big scary leviathan force, and we kind of 

take us out of the role of that all important networking force where 

you see a world that really needs a lot of mentoring in terms of 

small navies that have very little governance capacity off their 

coast, and where there is a lot of environmental damage and piracy 

and illegal movements of goods and so forth. 

So it is a tough tradeoff, but I think we have to see the Navy 

move more in the direction of administering to the system rather 

than kind of slavishly make any effort to remain relevant in highend war-fighting scenarios. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman. 

Admiral Houley. One of our continual frustrations, since the 

number of you who have touched on the LCS program, and I am 
22 

calling on your expertise here, what I think I see are the people 

that the superintendent of shipbuilding will look at a set of plans, 

will go on that vessel and basically, just make sure that the plans 

are followed. 

What I don’t see, and I wish I saw, and that is why I am asking 

for your advice here, is someone in the superintendent of 

shipbuilding’s office who looks at that as it is being built and turns 

to the shipbuilder and says, ‘‘There is a better way to do this; there 

is a better machine out there,’’ where we can get more ships for our 

dollars. 

I mean, we have right off the bat an inherent conflict. The shipbuilder wants to make the most money per ship. We want to get 

the most ships we can get for the money we have, and what I don’t 

see the superintendent of shipbuilding is that person who is prodding the builder to get better at what he does. 

I am going to ask you for another list of people who could inform 

this committee how we can best accomplish that goal, because having got rid of the lead systems integrators, we are going to have 

to bring that back in-house, and we want to empower the people 

who have that job working for our Nation to get the most ships per 

dollar. 

We want to find those people, and I want you to help me find 

them. 

With that, the chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you 

so much for joining us today. We appreciate you bringing your expertise to us and allowing us to ask you some questions. We really 

appreciate that. 

I want to refer in general back to January 2009, when the Navy 

announced a decision to home-port a nuclear carrier at Mayport 

Naval Station in Florida. And Mayport’s never home-ported a nuclear-powered carrier, and we are told that the military construction price tag will be $456 million plus a one-time maintenance cost 

of $85 million and a $24 million cost in personnel change of station. 

That is $565 million total. 

Additionally, the Navy estimates that it will cost $25.5 million in 

annual recurring costs compared to keeping a carrier in Norfolk. 

This is due to the recurring cost of base operating support, 

sustainment, restoration, modernization costs, travel and per diem 

for transient maintenance labor. 

And I am just trying to understand all this in context and want 

to get your thoughts on this. If you could help me maybe understand how maintenance and readiness might be conducted on an 

aircraft carrier should one move to Florida as an element of the 

fourth fleet. 

And in your knowledge of this decision making, do you think the 

right people were consulted on the maintenance impacts of this arrangement during the Navy’s decision-making process? And will 

the Navy be able to do or perform all the required maintenance 

work in Mayport, or will a Mayport home-ported carrier still need 

to travel to Norfolk for certain maintenance work? 

Admiral HOULEY. I think that question, I would be much more 

comfortable addressing in the Officer’s Club than I am in a hearing 
23 

in this building. No one appreciates better than a congressman 

that the question you just asked is a business question, a military 

question, and a political question. 

And the answer, clearly, changes depending on what your focus 

is. If my major concern were jobs in Florida, then obviously, my answer would be significantly different than as a former naval officer 

responsible for being able to add and subtract over whatever accounts I was responsible for at the time, the answer is pretty simple, you stay in Norfolk and don’t complicate the problem, especially with the nuclear propulsion plant issues that are quickly 

raised. 

But I don’t think that I am qualified to answer, or to address 

maybe is a better way to put it, the question, because I am not in 

full possession of all of the considerations. The simple, easy naval 

answer from a blue suiter, I think, more often than not, would be 

to please you at the expense of Mr. Florida. 

But I don’t presume to be able to balance all of these pressures. 

Dr. THOMPSON. You know, I think it is not a hard tradeoff to 

make. I can’t imagine any set of circumstances in which it would 

be cost effective to move a nuclear aircraft carrier back to Mayport, 

or to Mayport. I can’t imagine any set of circumstances, unless our 

working assumption is that Norfolk won’t be there in 10 years. 

Other than that, it makes no economic sense. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. As you know, I maintain a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on this issue, and it presents both 

sides without making a recommendation since CRS reports don’t do 

that. But to answer your narrower question of where will the maintenance take place, as you know, the military construction 

(MILCON) for that proposed move includes the construction of a 

nuclear maintenance facility. 

So some forms of maintenance on the ship, up to a certain level, 

would be conducted in the Mayport home port. But if the ship were 

to need depot-level maintenance, if it needed to go into a shipyard 

for higher levels of maintenance, then the ship, presumably, would 

travel back to Virginia for that. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Just to put in perspective to the whole issue about 

maintenance. You know, the Navy has recently suspended their 

ship maintenance due to funding shortfalls, and it is unfunded 

budget requirements of 2009 are at 4.6 billion, and the sea service 

has a backlog of nearly 800 million in unfunded modernization and 

restoration projects at its four nuclear-capable shipyards. 

And, you know, putting in perspective, again, I am going to ask 

this not from a political standpoint but purely from an analytical 

standpoint. Given these funding requirements, it would appear 

that spending more money to duplicate a maintenance capability 

there in Mayport, would only exacerbate the woes that exist right 

now. 

And do you feel that this is actually a good decision in light of 

those current conditions that we are having to deal with? Or do you 

believe that there might be a better way to pursue this to make 

sure the capability exists? But also, when we are looking at porting 

decisions, should those elements be kept in mind with that current 

backlog? 
24 

Dr. THOMPSON. If I could offer a pointed albeit academic response 

to that, in preparing my opening remarks, I looked at the CBO 

study of how much money we are going to be spending this year. 

It is $1.85 trillion above and beyond what we are going to be taking 

in. That works out to $5 billion a day in deficit, or as I said, about 

$400 million during the time that we are having this hearing. 

In those sorts of circumstances, to waste money, which is what 

this is, waste money on something that is not germane to the 

Navy’s war-fighting capability simply guarantees that the size of 

the fleet and its capabilities will diminish at a faster pace in the 

future. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. In my report, I do get at this issue, which is sort 

of the bottom-line issue. It concerns the strategic benefit that might 

accrue from moving the carrier down to Mayport and how that 

measures up against other strategic benefits that might be produced by spending that money in other ways. 

For policymakers, I think that is the bottom-line question. You 

can spend the money to move the carrier down to Mayport, and the 

Navy will tell you that that generates certain strategic advantages 

as they see it in terms of dispersing the home-porting arrangements for carriers on the East Coast. And then it would become an 

issue of coming to a judgment on what is the value of that strategic 

dispersion as the Navy presents it versus the potential value of 

spending that money in other ways. 

And that is the question for policymakers. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Chair thanks the gentleman from Virginia. 

We now recognize the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, for five minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and as you said in 

your opening remarks, and obviously, we have got a budget that is 

coming out in May, which the content of this hearing is going to 

be very helpful. In addition to that, we are also looking at another 

quadrennial defense review that is beginning the process right 

now. 

In the last review, the number of attack submarines that was 

pegged was 48, and I just was wondering whether the witnesses 

had any opinions about whether or not that number should change, 

stay the same? Mr. O’Rourke’s report mentioned that there is some 

discussion about reducing the fleet size down to 40. 

So obviously, this issue is going to be swirling around out there, 

and maybe starting with you, Mr. Thompson, and going across. 

Dr. THOMPSON. Congressman, I believe that on that on the glide 

path we are on, we are actually headed for not more than about 

41 circa 2028. Electric Boat built those Los Angeles class attack 

subs so efficiently back in the 1970s and 1980s that they all retire 

very quickly going into the next two decades, and that has the consequence of reducing our attack sub numbers well below 48. 

You know, we skipped six years in the 1990s with no construction. I guess that was the switch over from Seawolf to what we now 

call the Virginia class, and then we delayed ramping up the construction of the Virginia class. It is not until 2011 that we get to 

two a year. I am not sure we are ever going to build them at three 

a year. 
25 

So, although the lowest number I have heard the Joint Staff say 

was prudent was 48, we are actually headed for a considerably 

lower number. At the very least, we have to produce two a year, 

but anybody who suggests doing anything less than that is really 

putting our intelligence gathering capabilities and our undersea 

warfare capabilities at risk. 

Admiral HOULEY. When I retired from active duty, the number 

was 75, plus or minus a couple. That is still my favorite number. 

So you can take that one and put it wherever it deserves to be. I 

said in my opening remarks that to me the most important thing 

is what has already been accomplished, and that is the multi-year 

capability. 

We all know those submarines are terribly expensive. They too 

take a lot of time to build. And with that multi-year procurement 

and a level of two a year, you never get to a number a submariner 

likes or even a strategic thinker likes. But all of these things have 

to be considered in the same light that you all look at them. 

There is a whole Navy here, not just a submarine Navy. You are 

all more than well aware of the issues involved with procurement 

if the numbers drop too low. Not only do you start paying way too 

much money for things, but in some cases, you have problems getting them at all. And given that all of our nuclear shipbuilding is 

wrapped up in two classes of ships, the amount of business that we 

do is pretty limited. 

So I think that it is good to have a number, and it is good for 

these studies to continue and they never stop. They are done by 

friends; they are done by foes depending on what your definition 

of either is. And they do illuminate the issues and bring them up 

to date. But I think we kind of are where we are. 

And if we have the ability to sustain two a year, then we can 

argue about a lot of other things. We have got a new class of ships 

we are going to have to eventually build. That is going to be another big challenge for you all as well as for the Navy and strategic 

thinkers. It is just going to get tougher and tougher. 

And, to me, I like where we are not because it gets us to the 

right number of submarines, but it provides a line of defense for 

the moment, at least, which I am sure will be reviewed. 

Dr. BARNETT. I am generally comfortable with the glide path that 

we are currently on. I don’t have a real problem with us going from 

48 to the low 40s. Two things I like to cite, you know, historically, 

the utility of submarines in my mind has decreased fairly dramatically over the last six decades. 

There hasn’t been a major submarine battle since the Second 

World War. There has been five torpedoes fired in two incidences 

in the last six plus decades. Yes, we are seeing certain countries 

in an anti-access strategy reach for cheap asymmetrical capabilities 

in terms of diesel submarines. You know, if we are really worried 

about that, my answer is not to come up with a highly technological answer for that. 

My answer is simply to symmetricize the situation. I mean, for 

us to get in the business of building simple, cheap diesel submarines and meeting that threat head-on if we really seriously consider that a big threat. And whenever I hear surveillance issues, 

underwater capabilities of submarines, I tend to think that is over-
26 

valued. I don’t see that much utility in building submarines for 

surveillance reasons. 

Dr. THOMPSON. Could I comment on that? I think the problem 

the undersea warfare community has is that much of what it does 

is not in the public domain. And so we are left guessing about precisely how the submarines are being used. The fact of the matter 

is that most of the mission days are spent on intelligence gathering. 

And that doesn’t necessarily mean looking for submarines. It also 

means doing signals intelligence collection for long periods of time, 

covertly, off the coast of places like Syria, China, Iran and so on. 

Now, the Navy’s never going to talk about that in public. But to 

suggest that the reason why we can safely go to the low 40s is because we don’t use a lot of torpedoes anymore is kind of missing 

the point about why we buy submarines in the first place. 

Dr. BARNETT. Again, my follow would be that there is a tendency 

to sell the secrecy argument and the value of what we get from 

that intelligence gathering. I think the question has to be asked 

whether we need $2 billion undersea platforms to gather that intelligence. Or whether there are other means that are equally applicable that give us a large array of capabilities over the long term. 

Dr. THOMPSON. I guess the next step is to cut the number of imagery satellites and signals intelligence satellites too since those 

are secret also. 

Dr. BARNETT. No, no. It is a question of bouncing between those 

two. I would much rather see my money go into that kind of capability than—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Gentlemen—— 

Dr. BARNETT [continuing]. Buying submarines. 

Mr. TAYLOR. We gave the chairman of Readiness, out of respect, 

a bit more than five minutes, but you are fairly new here, we can’t 

do that. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter. Five minutes. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a fantastic panel. First of all, I would like to comment on Dr. Barnett’s 

comments on the Navy’s risk and relevance. I think when you see 

boxers going at it, each boxer stays out of distance, out of reach 

until he wants to strike, and then he moves in. 

I think in order to stay relevant, I am Marines, this is easy to 

say, but you have to be willing to close with the enemy and take 

them on. That is why I think the LCSs are important, and being 

able to move them. 

What I would like to hear your opinion on is on our over-the-horizon capability with the Marine Corps and our ability to breach a 

country, basically, breach a country, build a beachhead and invade 

if we had to with something such as the expeditionary fighting vehicle. Do you see a need for that in the future? 

Dr. BARNETT. In general, I don’t see a rising requirement for 

forcible entry amphibious from the sea. 

Mr. HUNTER. You didn’t call me general; you are saying in general? 

Dr. BARNETT. I said in general. 

Mr. HUNTER. Oh, good. I thought you—I am a captain. Okay, 

good. 
27 

Dr. BARNETT. Well, my role is to call everybody general or admiral, because it usually flatters. But I don’t see a rising requirement 

there. You know, in general, I think most of the places we are 

going to access are going to be permissive in terms of entry. And 

most of our problems are going to be encountered once we get 

there. 

So I am more interested in fortifying the Marines on an individual basis than I am seeking the technological solutions for how 

they enter in any situation. 

Dr. THOMPSON. You know, I remember in August of 2001, a reporter asked me whether we would be in a land war in Asia any 

time in the next 10 years, and I said, ‘‘No, we are not going to be 

in a land war in Asia any time in the next 10 years.’’ And sure 

enough, I was right. We were in two land wars in Asia within three 

years. 

It is not possible to know the future. And, you know, you get into 

problems like DDG–1000 or into questions about LCS if you key 

your capability too closely to the threat that is preoccupying you at 

a particular time. You really have to build multi-mission capabilities that are flexible, versatile because the threats change, especially now. 

Given that, the notion that the Marine Corps is going to spend 

the next 10 or 20 or 30 years trying to get ashore in vehicles like 

the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) is really a pretty tenuous 

war-fighting concept. Now, I understand that the view today is that 

we are going to use rotorcraft for the most part to go over the 

beach, but you still need a vehicle that can get ashore. 

And while the cost of the expeditionary fighting vehicle has gone 

up considerably, the program is actually doing quite well since it 

was restructured. I always ask people when they say, ‘‘Should we 

kill it,’’ is ‘‘Well, what is your alternative?’’ I don’t see any alternative. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I think it is also worth noting that independent 

of the idea of doing forcible entry, amphibious ships are increasingly recognized as having value and performing many of the other 

kinds of operations that I mentioned in my testimony earlier including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, engagement 

and partnership building and maritime security operations. 

So, even if you were to discount the idea of doing large landings 

ashore in a nonbenign setting, you might still wind up deciding 

that you need a significant number of amphibious ships for these 

other kinds of missions. 

Admiral HOULEY. I strongly agree with Mr. O’Rourke’s comment 

there. And while as a submariner my testimony about vehicles is 

worthless, the one thing that ties most of what we have talked 

about today together is the fact that no matter what you believe 

in terms of the ordering of threats in the future, the fact that they 

will be all over the globe is not up for debate. 

And the fact that whether you are looking at aircraft carriers or 

whether you are looking at amphibious ready groups or whether 

you are looking at the helicopters that were briefly mentioned here, 

all of those things are part of what the Navy does. 

And our case for ourselves may change in terms of the importance of this, that, or the other thing, but the importance of the 
28 

Marine capability to be moved to deal with whatever it is that we 

are trying to deal with, that case will not be subject to much criticism or question. 

So it is perfectly worth having discussions about vehicles, which 

unfortunately, I can’t help with. But I am really enamored with the 

fact that the cases for expeditionary forces seem to be increasing 

rapidly rather than decreasing, even though the scenarios may be 

something to have a debate about. 

Dr. BARNETT. I also agree with the notion that amphibious ships 

are highly useful for that kind of lower end, less forcible entry kind 

of situations, which I think will proliferate, and I see other powers 

reaching for that kind of tool kit as well. So I see them responding 

to the environment, and I see us responding to the environment by 

maintaining certain numbers in that regard. 

I don’t advocate worrying too much about the forcible aspect of 

it, but I do see a lot—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, doctor. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair thanks the gentleman. 

We have been called to the floor for what is probably going to be 

seven votes. Another committee has scheduled this room starting 

shortly after 12. So we are going to recognize Ms. Pingree for the 

last set of questions. 

I would ask that our panel, and again, I very much appreciate 

you being here. I hope you appreciate for a change that this was 

actually a hearing. You all did most of the talking. And I think 

that was a welcome change from what often happens in this room. 

So we are going to recognize Ms. Pingree. We are going to encourage each of the members who did not get a chance to submit 

questions for the record. 

The chair now recognizes Ms. Pingree for five minutes. 

Ms. PINGREE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I appreciate the fact 

that you don’t have a lot of time to answer our questions, and my 

colleagues want to get to a vote. And so I will try to be brief here 

on something that clearly is complicated issue. 

As you can see, I am down here in the row with the freshman. 

And so I am a newly elected member from a district where shipbuilding is of critical importance, and we have had a longstanding 

relationship with the decisions that are made by the Navy. 

So my two questions, which are kind of broad, and you may say 

that you want to get back to me or talk to me at a future moment. 

One, I think, is for Mr. O’Rourke. You know, it would be very helpful to me, and perhaps this is an entire separate hearing, but to 

really understand factually what the differences are between the 

DDG–1000 and the 51. 

You know, that comes up even though that is not what the topic 

of the hearing is today, many of you have made recommendations 

around this. This is clearly a change here in the direction that the 

Navy is taking. 

And I think I need a better understanding of whether this is all 

about the budget and the concerns that are being raised around 

that or how that will substantially change what we are going about 

doing. 
29 

Maybe kind of blended together here, and again, I understand 

these are broad, complex topics. But for Rear Admiral Houley, and 

you discussed this a little bit, but, you know, it is very hard to understand as a newcomer to this process why the major shifts happen in the Navy strategy around their ability to sort of plan for the 

future of what is best to build for the Navy, how we could have 

come to this point of making such a dramatic shift after going 

down one path. 

And again, I understand that we are all dealing with budget constraints that we have to be honest in our assessment of what it 

really costs in the future, but why does the Navy seem to be incapable of planning for future budgeting and unable to understand 

or at least face what future costs are going to be when they are 

making these major decisions about what we are going to be building? 

I know a couple of you mentioned at some point, the importance 

of preserving an industrial base, and for me, looking at this, not 

just someone who is deeply concerned about the workers in our district but also someone who wants to make sure that, in the future, 

we have good shipbuilders who are ready to go and good yards with 

the capacity to build them. 

It seems increasingly difficult to make these kinds of changes, 

and you know, why does that happen? 

Admiral HOULEY. Let me be mercifully brief, mercifully simplistic and, therefore, give you a really lousy but very straightforward answer. There is an analogy here between the Seawolf 

submarine and the submarines that we are now building, the Virginia class. 

The overall criticism was that we were building in Seawolf, a 

ship that was overly complex, overly capable and, therefore, by definition, overly expensive for the threat as projected by anybody. 

Everybody thinks DDG–1000 would be a marvelous ship and a 

great credit to the Navy, but we would only be able to build a few 

of them. We would have to go through a nightmare of lessons to 

be learned before we ever got to that point, and in the end, the 

number of ships that we would add to the Navy would be continually smaller than the number we are taking out in old age. 

We can’t afford it. Now, I am not going to even touch the comment about why is the Navy incapable, because I don’t agree with 

the premise of the question. These things are not simple, and sometimes, naval leadership has to do what the country or the Congress 

expects them to do. Sometimes we even have to do things we don’t 

agree with. But that is part of what we do for a living. 

I am not trying to suggest here that I think the CNO has been 

told, ‘‘You can’t ask for the DDG–1000.’’ I don’t think that is the 

case, but I think that it is his measured wisdom that that is not 

in the best interest of the Navy given the overall shipbuilding situation, which we have tried to address here. 

Now, that is not a complete answer to your question, which as 

you said, it is a 45-day question, and—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Ms. Pingree? We are down to two minutes before we 

vote. So—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Congresswoman, just very quickly—— 
30 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. O’Rourke. I have really got to gavel you, but if 

you want to carry on this conversation privately, I would appreciate that. 

Thank you very much, Ms. Pingree. 

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
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