J-S55007-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.N.W.

APPEAL OF: N.D.W., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 931 WDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 24, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 4 of 2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JANUARY 29, 2021

N.D.W. (“Father”) appeals from the June 24, 2020 orphan’s court order 

granting the petition filed by Armstrong County Children and Youth Services 

(“CYS”) to involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his son, C.N.W. We 

affirm.

Father and S.W. (“Mother”) are plagued by substance abuse, 

homelessness, and incarceration.1 CYS twice initiated services for the family 

before the incidents that preceded the instant termination of parental rights 

proceedings. The agency first became involved with the family during October 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights on June 11, 2020, and 

she did not participate in this appeal. Notably, Mother currently resides with 

her grandmother in Saxonburg, Pennsylvania and she interacts with C.N.W. 

at the home of his pre-adoptive parents, the maternal grandparents.
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2015, when C.N.W. was born with symptoms of withdrawal due to Mother’s

prenatal abuse of heroin and cocaine. Although CYS eventually closed that 

case, the agency opened a new case seven months later in May 2016, after

police discovered Mother intoxicated in public with the infant. The agency 

temporarily placed C.N.W. with his maternal grandparents (“Maternal 

Grandparents”) but eventually returned him to the family residence under the 

agency’s protective supervision. It closed that second case in January 2017.

The following month, the agency’s intervention was required once more

to address the ongoing substance abuse of Mother and Father. The situation 

continued to deteriorate and, with both parents’ consent, the juvenile court 

adjudicated C.N.W. dependent on August 24, 2017. He remained at the family 

residence under the protective supervision of CYS until the agency finally 

removed him from the home after separate incidents where Mother was 

arrested for an intoxication-related assault, and Father overdosed on opiates. 

On February 15, 2018, CYS placed C.N.W. with Maternal Grandparents, where 

he has remained. 

CYS developed a family service plan (“FSP”) that required Father to 

address his problems with substance abuse, secure adequate housing, and to 

cooperate with CYS. Between May 2018 and May 2019, Father’s progress was 

minimal. During August 2019, Father made brief headway in conjunction with 

a period of criminal probation, rehabilitation, and his transition to a halfway 
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house. The improvement was ephemeral, however, and by December 2019, 

his compliance with the FSP had deteriorated beyond recovery. 

On January 29, 2020, CYS filed a petition for the involuntary termination 

of parental rights under the grounds outlined in 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), 

(a)(5), and (a)(8) and § 2511(b). As of that date, C.N.W. had been in 

continuous placement with Maternal Grandparents for approximately two 

years. During the ensuing hearing, CYS presented Tiffany Cline, the 

caseworker assigned to the family, who testified about the history of the case 

and Father’s slow progress toward reunification.2 Ms. Cline recounted Father’s 

struggle to maintain appropriate housing when he was not incarcerated, and 

his discharge from a mental health treatment program for noncompliance. 

She highlighted that substance abuse was the primary cause of C.N.W.’s

placement and indicated that Father failed to complete a rehabilitation 

program and maintain sobriety. At the time of the hearing, Father was 

incarcerated for retail theft and faced further criminal prosecution on drug-

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2 Consistent with our Supreme Court’s holding In re Adoption of K.M.G., 

240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 2020), we verify that the orphans’ court appointed Paula 

LaStrapes, Esquire, the guardian ad litem during the dependency proceedings, 

to represent C.N.W. in the termination proceedings pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2313(a). See id. (reiterating, absent a conflict between legal interest and 

best interests, one attorney may serve dual role of guardian ad litem and 

§ 2313 counsel). Attorney LaStrapes informed the orphans’ court that fouryear-old C.N.W. was unable to articulate a preferred outcome of the 

termination proceedings, and therefore, she did not discern a conflict of 

interest. See N.T., 6/10/20, at 50-51. 
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related charges, including possession with intent to deliver. In short, Ms. Cline 

testified that the circumstances that led to C.N.W’s placement continued to 

exist and that the child was thriving in the care of Maternal Grandparents, a 

pre-adoptive resource. 

Subsequent to the hearing, the trial court entered a thorough 

memorandum and decree terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

§ 2511(a)(1),(5), (8) and § 2511(b).

3

 Father timely filed a notice of appeal 

and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), and the orphans’ court entered an opinion 

that relied upon the reasons outlined in its prior memorandum and decree. 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/27/20, at 1. 

Father raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as 

a matter of law in finding that [CYS] had proven grounds for the 

involuntary termination of appellant's parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (5), and (8) by clear and convincing 

evidence? 

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a 

matter of law in concluding that termination of appellant's parental 

rights would serve the needs and welfare of the child pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)? 

Father’s brief at 4. 

Our standard of review is well settled:

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3 While the orphans’ court terminated parental rights under 2511(a)(1), (5), 

and (8), it subsequently acknowledged that CYS failed to establish the grounds 

for termination under subsections 2511(a)(1). See Trial Court Opinion, 

7/27/20, at 1. 
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The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up).

Involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. As the party petitioning for 

termination of parental rights, CYS “must prove the statutory criteria for that 

termination by at least clear and convincing evidence.” In re T.R., 465 A.2d 

642, 644 (Pa. 1983). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as “testimony 

that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact 

to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise 

facts in issue.” Matter of Sylvester, 555 A.2d 1202, 1203–04 (Pa. 1989).

Father asserts that CYS failed to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence the statutory grounds for the termination of his parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (5), and (8) and (b). In order to affirm 

termination, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection 

of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). As the orphans’ court’s opinion focused on 
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§ 2511(a)(8) and § 2511(b), we will similarly confine our review to these 

sections, which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . . .

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an 

agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 

removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child. 

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b). 

In order to satisfy the requirements of § 2511(a)(8) in the case at bar, 

CYS was required to produce clear and convincing evidence that: (1) C.N.W. 

has been removed from Father for at least twelve months; (2) the conditions 

which led to the child’s removal continue to exist; and (3) involuntary 

termination of parental rights would best serve the children’s needs and 
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welfare. See In Re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275–1276 

(Pa.Super. 2003). “Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8), does not

require an evaluation of [Father's] willingness or ability to remedy the 

conditions that led to placement of [his] children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S.,

901 A.2d 502, 511 (Pa.Super. 2006) (emphasis in original).

C.N.W. has been in the care of CYS since February 15, 2018, due to, 

inter alia, concerns about Father’s drug abuse and criminal activity. As CYS 

did not file its petition to terminate Father’s parental rights until January 29, 

2020, approximately twenty-three and one-half months later, the agency 

satisfied the threshold requirement of § 2511(a)(8). Likewise, since Father 

concedes that the conditions which led to C.N.W.’s placement continue to 

exist, we do not address the prong of § 2511(a)(8) relating to Father’s ongoing 

substance abuse criminal activity. 

The crux of Father’s contention relates to the trial court’s needs and 

welfare analysis under § (a)(8), which he asserts is both coextensive with the 

parallel component of § (a)(5) and separate from the determination pursuant 

to § 2511(b), regarding whether the termination of parental rights serves the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.

Specifically, Father asserts that the orphans’ court’s analysis under § (a)(8) 

was deficient insofar as the court did not perform a thorough examination of 

the parent-child bond as required by § 2511(b). See Father’s brief at 17-18 

(“[CYS] failed to prove each separate element of subsection (a)([8]) by clear 
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and convincing evidence, and the trial court lacked the evidence necessary to 

conduct a full and proper analysis of the Child’s needs and welfare.”). Father 

misstates the extent of the orphans’ court’s needs and welfare analysis 

under § (a). 

Contrary to Father’s protestations, § (a)(8) does not require the 

developed bond-effect analysis that is central to § 2511(b). As this Court 

previously explained, 

Section 2511(a)(8) explicitly requires an evaluation of the 

needs and welfare of the child prior to proceeding to Section 

2511(b), which focuses on the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. Thus, the analysis under 

Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for the needs of the child in addition 

to the behavior of the parent. 

In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008–09 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc). Hence, 

while § 2511(b) focuses chiefly on the existence of a beneficial parent-child 

bond and the potential effects of severing that bond, the needs-and-welfare 

component of § 2511(a)(8) centers primarily on the parent’s actions and 

inactions. Indeed, “only if a court determines that the parent’s conduct 

warrants termination of his or her parental rights, pursuant to Section 

2511(a), does a court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to 

Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under 

the standard of best interests of the child.” Id. at 1009 (quotations and 

citation omitted). Thus, the orphans’ court did not err or abuse its discretion 

by forgoing an in-depth analysis of the parent-child bond under § 2511(a)(8). 
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In addressing the needs and welfare prong of § 2511(a)(8), the orphans’ 

court observed:

Finally, by all accounts, C.N.W. is doing very well at Maternal 

Grandparents’ house, where he has lived for almost two and onehalf years. He will be entering school soon and is progressing 

normally. He is comfortable at their home and has visits with 

Mother on a regular basis. He has had visits with Father at 

Father’s apartment in Indiana and at the Armstrong County Jail. 

Although their relationship is not overly-strained, given the fact 

that Father has not performed any substantial parental duties for 

a period exceeding two years, the Court concludes that the 

perpetual nature of Father’s substance abuse and his continued 

incarnation compels a finding that C.N.W.’s best interest and 

welfare would be served by termination of Father’s parental rights.

Trial Court Opinion, at 11-12. 

As Father does not challenge the orphans’ court’s rationale beyond 

asserting that the court neglected the bond-effect analysis, and because the 

certified record supports the court’s conclusion that C.N.W. is progressing with 

Maternal Grandparents and that Father’s behavior is detrimental to his son’s 

best interests, we do not disturb it. 

Having found that the certified record supports the orphans’ court’s 

finding that CYS established the statutory grounds to terminate Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(8), we next address the court’s needs 

and welfare analysis pursuant to 2511(b). Again, Father frames his argument 

as challenging whether CYS established its burden of proving by clear and 

convincing evidence that the termination of parental rights would serve the 

needs and welfare of C.N.W. Father’s brief at 19. However, the gravamen of 

this assertion is that termination is not the least drastic alternative in light of 
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the likelihood that Mother will remain in contact with the child despite 

relinquishing her parental rights. Father asserts that utilizing a less severe

alternative to terminating his parental rights, such as the transfer of legal and 

physical custody of his son to Maternal Grandparents, would serve the child’s 

interest “while preserving [Fathers’] ability to be the Father figure he desires 

to be for the Child.” Father’s brief at 21. 

Father’s desire to preserve his parental rights in order to perform his 

parental duties at this juncture has little bearing on the pertinent analysis. It 

is beyond cavil that a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, 

alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. See In re Z.P., 994 

A.2d 1108, 1121, (Pa.Super. 2010). Moreover, at the time of the hearing, 

C.N.W. had been in the current placement, his third since his birth in 2015,

for approximately twenty-eight consecutive months, and the child is entitled 

to permanency and stability. A child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in 

the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities 

of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Thus, Father’s eleventh-hour attempt to invoke 

a potentially less drastic alternative to the termination of his parental rights 

fails. 

Finally, we observe that the certified record support’s the orphans’ 

court’s well-reasoned analysis with respect to § 2511(b). This Court has 

explained the requisite analysis as follows: 

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 
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emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we 

instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and 

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in 

cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa.Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent 

of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 63.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010). As a general 

matter, Pennsylvania does not require the orphans’ court to enlist a formal 

bonding evaluation, and the court’s needs and welfare analysis need not hinge 

upon expert testimony. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2011). 

In relation to § 2511(b), the orphans’ court provided as follows:

First, as the [c]ourt already had found, C.N.W. is doing well 

residing with Maternal Grandmother, with whom he has had a very 

close relationship for the past several years. Second, although 

Mother currently resides with her grandmother in Saxonburg, she 

visits with C.N.W. on a regular basis at Maternal Grandparents’ 

residence. Third, and despite Father’s protestations to the 

contrary, Maternal Grandparents have not at any point 

unreasonably prevented Father from having visits with C.N.W. 

Maternal Grandparents transported C.N.W. to Indiana, 

Pennsylvania for [weekly visits during] 2019 and further permitted 

C.N.W.’s visitation with Father at the Armstrong County Jail. 

Given the significant dangers that both [p]arents’ drug abuse

presented to C.N.W., the [c]ourt does not find that Maternal 

Grandparents in any way acted unreasonably in protecting 

C.N.W.’s physical and emotional welfare during his placement. 

Although Father testified that he still has a good relationship 

C.N.W., the [c]ourt must take note that for the past almost three 

years, Father parented C.N.W. if at all, though the auspices of 

[CYS], . . . with protective supervision through placement. During 

that period, Father overdosed, lost his housing, was incarcerated 
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for extended periods, and spent no small amount of time housed 

at drug rehabilitation facilities. Father overdosed while C.N.W. 

was in his care and will not be available to parent at all for at least 

the next several months, if not years. Given these facts, the Court 

must conclude that C.N.W.’s developmental, emotional, and 

physical needs will be best served by termination of Father’s 

parental rights and his adoption by Maternal Grandparents. Any 

relationship that would be maintained with Father for the 

foreseeable future would have to be facilitated through a state 

correctional facility located outside of Armstrong County. A 

healthy, supportive, and structured parent - child relationship 

necessary for C.N.W.’s development will be impossible by that 

means. Thus, and notwithstanding Father's love and affection for 

C.N.W., the Court finds that C.N.W.’s needs and welfare compel 

termination of Father’s parental rights at this time.

Trial Court Opinion, at 12-13. 

The certified record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion. During 

the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Cline testified that C.N.W. is thriving in Maternal 

Grandparents’ pre-adoptive home, and he is strongly attached to them in their 

role as parental resources. N.T., 6/10/20, at 35. He is happy in the home, 

and despite his turbulent history with Mother and Father, he is “pretty much 

a typical 4-year-old.” Id. at 35, 36. Moreover, Father’s sporadic 

imprisonment hampered his contact with C.N.W., and while CYS facilitated 

visitations while Father was incarcerated locally at the Armstrong County Jail, 

his subsequent imprisonment at a state facility precluded in-person contact. 

Id. at 44. In fact, because of the COVID pandemic, C.N.W. has not had 

physical contact with either parent since February 2020. Id. In sum, Ms. 

Cline reiterated the agency’s position that terminating Father’s parental rights 

serves C.N.W.’s best interests. Id. at 46. 
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The certified record bears out that C.N.W. is best served by terminating 

Father’s parental rights in anticipation of adoption by Maternal Grandparents. 

Stated plainly, for the majority of his life, C.N.W. has been in placement with 

his Maternal Grandparents, who continue to provide a stable, loving 

environment that consistently satisfied his developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare notwithstanding his parents’ chronic drug abuse. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/29/2021