As Web services came on line at the DSA it became apparent to Major Sobey that an

alternative was available to solve E-mail forwarding problems experienced by key personnel

(CG, ADC, Chief of Staff, etc.) as they moved between Division CPs. Using the skills of

Lieutenant Colonel Glen Edisen, Staff Sergeant Hall, and with the support of Major Roger

Stanfield, email servers were allocated to the DSA. These servers, for secure and non-secure

email, used the same communications links as the Web Server but allowed consistent and

reliable e-mail service for the entire Division Battle Space while simultaneously providing a

single stable receipt point for e-mail forwarding from Camp Pendleton. E-mail was critically

important to the modern battlefield for commanders, key staff officers, and Division CPs. This

initiative was highly successful in meeting this operational imperative. Headquarters Battalion

Communications Company tackled a series of like issues in preparation for combat operations.

The number of Liaison Officers, full staff participation, and the additional requirements for

radio, telephone, and data support threatened to overwhelm the communication support

available. The computer support network needed to be changed from a simple 'flat network' to a

more complicated series of Virtual Local Area Networks (VLAN5), which took time for the

Marines to learn. With practice and the implementation of new procedures, the Communication

Company Marines were able to streamline setup and operation of the Division Main CP to six

hours rather than the twelve to twenty four hours it had previously taken.

Personnel Issues - Assigning Troops to Tasks

Once deployment decisions were made, the Division faced the task of getting its Fleet

Assistance Program (FAP) and Force Protection Marines back from the Marine Corps Bases (to

which they were temporarily assigned.) On 6 January, at the Division's request, the MEF

published a plan for returning Marines that were currently serving in these billets. The Division

implemented a plan to ensure these Marines were included in the deployment preparations of

their combat units right along with non-FAP personnel. Base Commanders at both Camp

Pendleton and Twenty-nine Palms gave urgent, whole-hearted support to this time-sensitive

issue. This was consistent with their continued strong support of deployment requirements, Key

Volunteer Networks (KVN), casualty notification, and a host of other requirements. The home

base and station commanders scrambled to fill the void left by deploying combat units, providing

unwavering support throughout the campaign.

On 8 January, Headquarters Marine Corps released Marine Corps Bulletin (MCBUL) 1900

establishing a 'Stop Loss/Stop Move' personnel policy. This stabilized personnel numbers and

mitigated many of the problems with planning and tracking for Permanent Changes of Station

(PCS), End of Active Service (EAS), and retirements. Although required to stabilize deployment

planning, the policy was not without impact on individual Marines. Many Marines had to cancel

new job opportunities, freeze career changes, cancel retirement ceremonies, or extend on the

Unit Deployment Program (UDP). The fidelity, valor, and patriotism of the Marines asked to

give the Corps 'just a little more' were noteworthy. The Division CG did not hear a single

request mast from the many hundreds of effected Marines who unselfishly put the needs of the

Corps and country ahead of their personal wishes. Always leaning into the next fight, Lieutenant

Colonel Powalski and her team began efforts that anticipated early release of these Marines once

their talents were no longer required.

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Public Affairs Preparations

At this time, the 1st Marine Division Public Affairs Office (PAO) was informed that a large

number of media personnel that had worked with the Marine Corps in Afghanistan had asked to

accompany the Marine Corps should they deploy to Iraq. The PAO, led by Captain Joe Plenzler,

started building a positive relationship

with them and putting together a 'by

name' list of requested media to embed

in 1st Marine Division in the event of

combat operations.

A retired Marine, Colonel Dick

Camp, reminded the Division that during

the Korean War, a Saturday Evening Post

journalist had accompanied a squad of

Marines from Camp Pendleton through

18 months of combat. The reporting

provided the American public an up-front

and personal account of the sacrifices

junior Marines made for their country.

Marines show their courage to the world through Now, ABC's Nightline funded a similar embedded media personnel. effort that resulted in a weekly broadcast

of Fox Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (F/2/5) on the nation's airwaves as they readied for

deployment. The ratings for the show significantly increased as a result of the weekly

broadcasts. As the unit deployed, Nightline increased the number of broadcast episodes to two

per week. The reports were so popular that ABC began re-broadcasting the stories on Good

Morning America and other news shows. Other news outlets followed smaller Division units,

including squad-sized elements from 7th Marines. The collaboration between journalist Mike

Cerre, the PAO, and F 2/5 brought the fine young Marines and Sailors of 1st Marine Division

right into the living rooms of America.

The Division PAO embarked on a media blitzkrieg hosting more than 400 reporters in 40

days - blanketing the media with 1st Marine Division stories. The PAO put together media

opportunities, often hitch-hiking with the media due to the scarcity of available vehicles. In one

instance, a media convoy from Camp Commando visited 1st Tank Battalion at Udairi Range

during a full-blown Arabian sandstorm. With visibility at less than 50 feet and battling 40 - 60

mph winds, the tanks couldn't see their targets on the range. The story of the Marines operating

in harsh weather conditions carried the headlines and taught the reporters about the tenacity of

our young Marines and a good lesson of what to expect should they decide to embed with the

Division for combat operations

Concurrently, the Division PAO began exploring the feasibility of many TV media's request

to bring along hard-wired, satellite transmission capable, 4-wheel-drive, diesel, desert colored

vehicles and night vision qualified drivers to support their broadcasts while embedded with the

Division. The PAO determined that allowing the media to use their own vehicles would benefit

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the Division by ameliorating some of the logistical burden on the receiving units (a TV crew

generally requires 15 large boxes of lift and space to haul their gear) and allow the media to

broadcast "live on the fly" in combat. The Division PAO requested that I MEF appeal the

USCENTCOM prohibition on media vehicles in embedded units. Most TV media opted to

assign vehicles to their embedded correspondents in the hope that the verdict would be positive

and fielded the vehicles on short term embeds with Division units. On all early tests, they

performed soundly.

On 10 March, the Division PA section met with the 80 reporters assigned to embed within

tactical units at the Hilton Hotel in Kuwait City and began the media integration process. Media

members were issued NBC suits, masks and nerve agent antidote kits. They received anthrax

and smallpox vaccinations and briefings on ground rules, organization, and missions. The

Division PA section worked hard to answer hundreds of questions, and ensure the media were

prepared to embed. During one briefing a reporter skeptically asked, "Really, how close are you

going to allow me to get to the front lines?" Captain Plenzler retorted, "I can put you in the back

of an AAV with 18 pissed-off grunts, drive you within 300 meters of the enemy objective and

send you in the assault while the Marines you are with storm the enemy's trench lines and drive

their bayonets into the hearts of the enemy." The room went silent. You could have heard a pin

drop. "Is he serious?" whispered one skittish reporter. The Division would later deliver, in

scores.

"I can put you in the back of an AA V with 18 pissed-off grunts, drive you within 300

meters of the enemy objective and send you in the assault while the Marines you are with

storm the enemy's trench lines and drive their bayonets into the hearts of the enemy."

On 11 March, the Division assembled their 80 reporters and transported them to LSAMatilda to integrate them into the Blue Diamond family. Each battalion assigned a Marine to be

the 'media buddy' for each correspondent. The PAO made it clear that, "In the St Marine

Division the media do not have 'handlers' or 'escorts'. If you want an 'escort' take $500 and go to

Palm Springs. Here in this Division we are going to adopt you media members and show you

the ropes. You are going to be part of the family."

The following morning, the media accompanied by their 'media buddies' and PA Liaison

Teams in LAVs, 7-ton trucks, and HMMWVs bid their farewell to LSA-Matilda and started their

odyssey. The regiments and battalions each conducted their own welcome aboard and assigned

the media to their tactical units.

The Division PA section continued to prepare for combat operations and moved with the

Division Main to its tactical assembly area. Early on March 19, the Division received the

directive from CENTCOM Public Affairs that no media vehicles were to be allowed on the

battlefield. The Division PAO contacted the regiments to pass the bad news. In the chaos that

ensued, units attempted to re-load TV media equipment onto jam-packed tactical vehicles. Some

journalists opted to stay put, and follow the units in their own vehicles despite the restriction.

There was an eye-opening lesson for future combat operations, as this decision made the

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difference between headlining on the evening news and receiving sporadic coverage at best. For

example, the US Army's embedded media, whose media vehicles found their way to the fight

regardless of policy, dominated the airwaves due to their ability to broadcast on the fly. Marine

embeds who relinquished their vehicles faced significant challenges in getting their product out.

They eventually adapted and overcame most communications difficulties with the hard work and

assistance of the Marines.

Camp Commando, Kuwait, grows in size as more forces are deployed to theater.

89
Chapter 3

Adjustments to the Plan and Combat Rehearsals

Now that the Marines were intheater, the requirement to remain

alert was even more important.

The terrorist murder of two Army

civilian contractors just outside the

Camp Doha base, and repeated

terrorist threats, heightened the

security posture. The Iraqis had

certainly attempted to infiltrate

agents into the areas of Kuwait

where US forces were staging, and

were likely monitoring the actions

of all US forces in the country. The Commandant of the Marine Corps (and former While waiting for the Division's Commanding General of I MEF), General Michael

secure communications equipment Hagee, speaks to Marines as tlzeypreparefor war

to arrive, the Division was forced

to use couriers for secure communications between sites. Units still conducted nonsecure business over cellular telephones operating on the civilian network, but even

unclassified sensitive information was at risk of compromise. As the Division neared the

final weeks before combat operations were to begin, the CG re-emphasized the force

protection guidance he had provided to his Marines in August. Due caution was

exercised in all activity, including armed Marines traveling in multi-vehicle convoys,

Guardian Angel use, and secure Entry Control Points (ECPs) to all LSA areas. The

Division carefully monitored all terrorist threat indicators. The Marines considered

themselves 'hard targets', and were prepared if the enemy chose to initiate hostilities

early through a terrorist-style attack. By their discipline, the Marines sent a message of

intimidation to the Iraqis on the other side of the border. Despite the heightened security

posture, however, the priority of effort was clearly on combat preparation. The Division

focused on being 'No worse enemy' as it prepared to send a shockwave through the Iraqi

army.

As expected, the operational plans continued to change even well after the Division

arrived in Kuwait. The Division took these changes in-stride, and was careful not to be

too wedded to a base plan. Planning now took a back seat to training and rehearsals as

the Division planned to win this fight through 'brilliance in the basics'. The tactical,

physical, and moral readiness of the individual Marine was going to be the harbinger of

success, not reliance on a scripted plan. Mental agility, habitual relationships, and wellhoned tactics, would earn the Division the speed necessary to reduce risk. Division

leaders worked to reinforce the aggressive spirit and mental toughness of their Marines

during the last weeks of preparation. Whatever the Iraqis were planning, the Marines of

the Division would be prepared to crush any resistance in their path.

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The Iraqis Welcome the New Year

The presence of the Marines in Kuwait exacerbated an already grim manpower

situation for the Iraqi chain of command. Iraqi desertion rates accelerated as enemy

forces heard the distant booms of US artillery firing at Udairi range during the quiet

desert nights. As desertion rates continued to rise, the Regime began to take more drastic

measures to enforce discipline. Reports of arrests and executions of Iraqi deserters

increased. Despite the enemy's poor morale, however, the Iraqis were beginning to make

some visible preparations for the coming Coalition attack. The Iraqis clearly expected an

extended air campaign prior to actions on the ground, and focused their preparations on

increasing their ability to survive such an attack. Over the month of January, extensive

trenching and canal extensions were dug in Al Kut, An Nasiriyah, and Baghdad. Like

raindrops on a pond, the surface of Iraq was soon dotted with revetments, both new and

old. Survivability revetments appeared just outside the garrisons of every Republican

Guard (RG) unit, and Regular Army (RA) units began to make survivability moves

outside their own garrison positions. The RG Divisions around Al Kut and Baghdad

gave every indication that they intended to survive a US bombing campaign by dispersal,

frequent movement, and by digging in. The Marines of the Division were very impressed

with the prowess demonstrated by the Iraqi engineers. The Iraqi soldiers might not have

a reputation as great combat infantrymen, but their engineers were a marvel. A marked

increase in the use of decoy artillery pieces in many of the new revetments was also noted

in the Rumaylah and Al Kut areas. The Iraqis had been on the receiving end of US air

power before, and it was clear that they had learned some lessons. There was a large

body of information available from open sources regarding the recent successes the

Serbians had achieved in eluding US air power, and it looked like the Iraqis had done

their homework..

Kuwaiti oil wells burn in 1991 after the Iraqi Regime set them ablaze. The possibility of the Iraqis

executing a similar 'Scorched Earth' campaign in Iraq was a significant threat.

Curiously, little evidence existed of integrated, prepared defensive positions. All of

the revetments observed were haphazardly arranged, not seemingly oriented to defend

from one particular direction or another. Apart from the revetment digging, activity

levels among Iraqi units seemed to be no greater than seasonal norms. If the Iraqis were

91
preparing for an air attack, why were they not also preparing ground defenses? Some

intelligence assessments began to make sweeping extrapolations from the limited data

available. The existence of additional revetments in a given area, for example, was

assessed as an indication that the unit doing the digging was about to be massively

reinforced. Alarmist reporting of this type began to increase, and reports of Iraqi suicide

units or terrorist forces operating in Kuwait were frequent. Reports surfaced on a variety

of heinous tactics to be used by the Iraqis including electrified water obstacles, poisoned

water supplies, widespread inundation warfare, chemical-laced fire trenches, and suicide

commando units. In actuality, none of these tactics were ever used effectively against

Blue Diamond (either because of Iraqi inability or the unexpected rapidity of the US

ground attack.)

The status of the South Rumaylah oilfield infrastructure became a daily obsession for

the watching Division. As visibility of these strategic objectives continued to increase,

conflicting reports of whether or not they were wired for destruction were received

almost daily. The Division received reports from several seemingly reliable sources that

indicated that the oilfield infrastructure was not rigged for destruction. Other sources,

just as reliable, referenced the arrival of Regime forces, explosives smuggled across the

Syrian border, or conventional defenses as imminent risks to the infrastructure. Every

intelligence report was carefully scrutinized for indications of Iraqi mischief in the

oilfields.

At this time, there were also no indications that any Iraqi units had caught-on to the

complex capitulation instructions that were formulated for them by staffs at US higher

headquarters. Although individual and mass surrenders were anticipated, there were no

reports that any organized Iraqi units planned to lay down their arms or coordinate

actions with the Coalition. Multiple source reporting did indicate a continued rise in

desertion rates among Iraqi units, and gave indications that some Iraqi forces were

planning to surrender at earliest opportunity. In many units, officers began to punish

soldiers for wearing civilian clothes under their uniforms. In other units, the officers

demanded bribes to allow soldiers to remain in a leave status, and took to wearing

civilian clothes themselves. Regular Army units reportedly had to be locked out of their

barracks in order to get them to conduct night training. Even the Republican Guard was

not immune to morale problems, as the rank and file of many RG units were fearful that

they would receive 'special attention' from the US air campaign. Yet, despite the morale

problems, the Regime reportedly maintained tight control over the military through

intimidation and fear. Stories abounded of Regime execution squads murdering

uncooperative or insufficiently motivated soldiers. Fear of Regime reprisals appeared to

be the most significant motivator for keeping military forces in-line, and the Division

assessed that many Iraqis would fight only out of their fear of their own Regime.

During February, the Iraqi high command was attempting to execute the elements of

some defensive plan, but it was difficult to ascertain exactly what that plan was. Smallscale deployments of battalions and battery-sized artillery units were noted in the vicinity

of Al Basrah and Al Faw. In early January, the RA 14th and 18th Infantry Divisions

showed indications they were deploying from their Al-Amarah garrisons to the Al Faw

92
peninsula and the Al Qurnah regions, drawing the attention of US leaders at all levels.

The deployment of the IV Corps infantry to strategic defensive ground was logical,

especially given their limited mobility. If the Iraqis did not make strategic moves during

this permissive environment (prior to the commencement of US air strikes) they would

probably lose their chance. Given the penchant of Saddam Hussein for using the

international press as his own intelligence tool, the Division was not surprised to note that

the Iraqi artillery and infantry units began to appear in the Al Faw peninsula just a few

days after the international press reported a planned British amphibious assault in this

location.

It was not just the Iraqi RA that was moving. The Division noted throughout January

that the Regime was reinforcing the southern zone just across the border from the

Marines. This reinforcement included elements of the RG, the Mujahadin E Kalq (an

Iranian dissident group beholden to the Iraqi Regime), and Fedeyeen troops. These

forces had much higher loyalty to the Regime, and were likely sent to bolster the stamina

of the RA in zone. The internal security situation in the south appeared to be

deteriorating, with anti-Regime opposition seething among the Shia inhabitants. The

Regime needed to do something about the security environment in the South, especially

in the Al Basrah and An Nasiriyah areas. The Regime forces were reportedly spending

75% of their effort controlling internal dissent, and only 25% preparing for a ground

invasion. Baath party officials were relocating to schools and mosques, and the military

In late February, the Iraqis began to reposition Regular Army forces in the South, but there was still

no discernable coordinated defensive plan.

93
was enduring more frequent officer purges. This context helped explain much of the

Iraqi's apparent inaction. Even with the presence of US forces in Kuwait, the Regime

likely thought that a ground invasion was not inevitable. Perhaps the Regime knew it

could not prevail on the

ground, so was taking every

precaution to ensure that the

mere threat of an invasion did

not precipitate a popular

uprising. If so, many military

forces in southern Iraq were

tied down in the vicinity of

their garrisons because that is

where their internal security

mission was most pressing.

The BM-21 Multiple Rocket Launcher System was a highly As the Regime shored-up its mobile Iraqi missile system that could rapidly mass fires. internal security situation, it

began to threaten tribal leaders, military commanders, and the southern populace with

retaliation for any failure to provide a vigorous defense against the Americans. The

Republican Guard also continued to give every indication that it would give battle closer

to the Regime centers in Baghdad and Al Kut.

On 2 February, Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, promised a massive 'zero

hour' missile attack if the US invaded Iraq. Regime statements in the public press also

included references to missile counterattacks against US forces in Kuwait. Later in the

month, indicators of the redeployment of Surface-to-Surface Missiles to southern Iraq

appeared, lending credibility to this threat. It was possible the Iraqis were preparing to

offset their poor conventional defensive capability by using preemptive chemical attacks

against US forces. The combination of an increased chemical threat, and the possible

repositioning of potential delivery systems within range of the Division's assembly areas

was received with some attention. Later, the Division was to detect even more specific

threats, and would drive the targeting cycle against these missile systems. The Marines

of the Division remained alert, but now steeled themselves for the possibility that they

might have to fight their way up to the border under the long-range artillery of the enemy.

Developments in Fire Support Planning

The Division became familiar with the 'kilibox' system, a geographical reference

established by the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC). The Killbox

Interdiction (KI) reference grid system was defined by drawing parallel lines along the

00-minute and 30-minute lines of latitude and longitude, dividing the AO into a

patchwork of squares approximately 55 km on a side. Each kilibox was further

subdivided into nine smaller sections approximately 18 km on a side, referred to as

'keypads' (from the practice of designating them according to the arrangement of the

numbers on a telephone keypad.) A number of fire support planners advanced the idea

that kiliboxes made the Battlefield Coordination Line (BCL) obsolete on the modern nonlinear battlefield. These officers argued that the BCL was not necessary in this situation,

94
since the MEF could open and close kiliboxes wherever it chose to focus or deny the fires

of the MAW, including Close Air Support (CAS). This concept was generally referred to

as the 'Kick-CAS' CONOPS, taking its name from CENTCOM's concept of operations

for the employment of 1(1 and CAS. To facilitate the permissive engagement of highpayoff targets with air short of the BCL, the Division's planners turned to kiliboxes to

meet the requirement.

With kiliboxes as a centerpiece of its fire support coordination plan, the Division

became very comfortable with them. For example, many FACs who did not receive the

Special Operating Instructions (SPINS) of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) used killbox

corners as geographic references for the control of CAS, instead of more conventional

measures like holding areas and contact points. In fact, the general familiarity with this

system eventually rose to the point that regimental air officers contacted the DASC

directly to open up kiliboxes in their zones short of the BCL, posing a new battlespace

management challenge to the Division FSCC. Fires planners came up with a prioritized

target list (eventually numbering about seventy targets), which was planned to be pasted

into the final hours of the last pre-hostility Operation Southern Watch ATO. This would

allow for a planned sequence of shaping fires, even if a short decision timeline did not

allow for wholesale ATO rewriting. MAW planners later indicated that they would need

about eight hours to service these targets. In the case of a simultaneous A-day and Gday, the MEF would be prepared to make up for the deficit of shaping by using CAS

sorties to prep the battlefield. Accordingly, the MAW planned to 'spike' to generate a

high volume of CAS sorties during the first ATO of the Operation. As with maneuver,

timing was critical because of the need to achieve tactical surprise and simultaneity of

The 'Kilibox' Grid System divided the battlespace into a two-letter grid system, with subdivisions similar to

a numeric keypad. The grid was used to standardize target reference information.

95
action across the CFLCC objectives east and west of 1st Marine Division's zone.

The entire targeting process was significantly hampered by the thousands of sites

placed on the Restricted Target List (RTL) at the theater level, based on general

characterization alone. This meant that many Iraqi combat units and tactical objectives

were protected by a somewhat arbitrary restriction on shaping fires. Some of the most

important Division shaping objectives had been placed on the RTL by this nation-wide

generalized approach, with no coordination with tactical units or apparent thought to

specified objectives. The Targeting Guidance Working Group, and the detailed planning

that followed, allowed the early clearance of Division shaping targets on the RTL, and

prepared the Division well to adapt swiftly to a rapidly changing situation as the final

hours counted down to G-day.

Operational Planning Update — The Highway 1 Corridor

On 9 February, the Division was to benefit from a fortuitous change in battlefield

geometry. The unfinished Highway 1 corridor had previously been in the V Corps zone,

just to the west of the 1st Marine Division zone. When complete, Highway 1 was going

to be Iraq's Baghdad to Basrah expressway. During the previous summer, the Division

had explored the possibility of using this battlespace to enable the envelopment of Al

Highway 1 offered a better route to threaten Baghdad from the south in support of

the main effort. The boundary shjft that gave this unfinished highway to the

Division was a critical factor in the successful attack.

96
Kut, but had been rebuffed by CFLCC. The Army plan had changed, and the Army V

Corps planned to shift much of its combat power to the western attack corridors in their

zone, leaving this major avenue of approach unused on their eastern flank. Out of

concern for the main effort's open flank, CFLCC offered the Highway 1 corridor and the

surrounding battlespace to the MEF. The MEF planners solicited the opinion of the

Division, as it was not known if the incomplete highway was suitable as a maneuver

corridor. The Division planners were dumbstruck at their good fortune. Where the

Division scheme of maneuver had been previously dependent on a tenuous combination

of goat-paths, canal roads, and cross-country marches, the Division was being offered a

well-developed highway bed, large sections of which were paved. Using JSTARS

Moving Target Indicators, recent U-2 imagery, HUMINT reporting and map studies, the

G-2's Sergeant David Auwen, Sergeant Christopher Cloutier, and Lance Corporal

Marcellus Moore did an exhaustive study to independently verify the viability of the

Highway 1 corridor. They found it to be well-suited for a maneuver force. Iraqi civilian

traffic was known to use the route, and it seemed to offer solid trafficability for military

vehicles. Better still, the route could be improved to carry large-scale logistics traffic

with some effort. With the recommendation of the G-2, the Division requested and

received the Highway 1 corridor battlespace.

Based on this intelligence and new battlespace, the Division reconvened the OPT and

briefed the CG on 11 February. There was an immediate recognition among the

Division's tactical planners that this avenue of approach could significantly improve the

Division's speed to Baghdad. Opening the Highway 1 corridor would also allow the

Division to disperse in its maneuver to the Tigris over multiple avenues of approach;

presenting less of a target for WMD, and reducing reliance on a single route (Highway

7). The CG made it clear that his ideal was for each RCT commander to have his own

attack route. In addition to offering additional maneuver flexibility, a portion of

Highway 1 north of Ad Diwaniyah had even been turned into an airstrip by the Iraqis,

complete with a control tower and a collapsible railing in the median. This airstrip, the

Sheikh Hantush highway airstrip (usually shortened to 'Hantush' or 'Hantush airstrip') was

in a perfect position to serve as a KC- 130 serviced FARP. If the airstrip could be seized

and defended, it would provide a critical refueling point for forces before they crossed the

Tigris. The result would be the Division getting across the Tigris with tanks nearly full,

ready to push on to Baghdad.

There was another advantage to Highway 1, made clear when the Division

Intelligence planner mapped out the detailed laydown of the outer defenses of Baghdad.

This analysis revealed an interesting gap in the enemy's assessed indirect fire support

plan. The Iraqis had pulled the Al Nida Division tight up against the Diyala River,

blocking the routes to Baghdad from the east. At the same time, the Baghdad RG

Division had gone to ground in Al Kut, establishing a positional defense primarily

oriented to the east and south. In between, there was a 50-kilometer gap between the

indirect fire range fans of the two defensive positions. At this stage in the planning, the

Iraqis had not yet attempted to close that gap. The 'seam' between these defensive belts

would make the Baghdad RG Division even more vulnerable to Blue Diamond's planned

enveloping attack, and now the Highway 1 corridor offered an ideal way to exploit it.

97
Highway 27, which branched off Highway 1 near the Hantush airfield, offered a narrow,

paved route that ran all the way to the Tigris River Bridge in An Numaniyah.

Operational Planning Update - Running the Seam

The Division planners immediately went to work to exploit the opportunity of

running the seam between the enemy's defensive belts. The Highway 1 corridor stabbed

straight at the underside of Baghdad, perhaps opening up an attack route for the Division

to arrive in Baghdad even faster than previously thought possible. The Iraqis did not

have any positional defenses blocking this route. In the enemy's eyes, the unfinished

Highway 1 roadbed probably did not appear to be a credible attack corridor for American

forces (similar to many US assessments.) The narrow Highway 27, slicing to the

northeast between the defensive belts of the enemy, probably seemed even less credible,

as it went in a direction away from Baghdad. For the Division, the opportunity to attack

an unprepared enemy from an unexpected direction seemed too good to pass up. Feinting

an attack up Highway 1 would at least fix the Medina Division in support of US V Corps

(the CFLCC main effort). The plan offered better support to the main effort, and an

opportunity to achieve tactical surprise. By using Highway 1, the Division could satisfy

the CG's intent of offering alternative corridors for the RCT commanders, and could use

the 'fix and bypass' tactic against the Baghdad Republican Guard Division in Al Kut.

The Blue Diamond CG and G-3 review the operational plan in light of the changing enemy

situation on the ground.

98