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i 

56–269 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–133] 

ARMY ACQUISITION AND 

MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 10, 2010 
(II) 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, JR., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT BOUSUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 10, 2010, Army Acquisition and Modernization Programs . 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 10, 2010 ................................................................................... 47 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2010 

ARMY ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking Member, 

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 4 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Gilmore, Dr. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense .................................................................................. 30 

Lennox, Lt. Gen. Robert P., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army,

G–8 ........................................................................................................................ 5 

Markowitz, Dr. David M., Director of Capabilities Integration, Prioritization, 

and Analysis and Technical Advisor to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the 

Army, G–3 ............................................................................................................. 12 

Phillips, Lt. Gen. William N., USA, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics ........................ 8 

Sullivan, Michael J., Director of Acquisition and Sourcing, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 37 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Gilmore, Dr. J. Michael .................................................................................... 82 

Lennox, Lt. Gen. Robert P., joint with Lt. Gen. William N. Phillips 

and Dr. David M. Markowitz ....................................................................... 54 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 51 

Sullivan, Michael J. .......................................................................................... 92 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Kissell ......................................................................................................... 113 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Kissell ......................................................................................................... 117 

Mr. Owens ......................................................................................................... 117 

(1) 

ARMY ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 10, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:11 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. SMITH. We will go ahead and call the meeting to order. We 

just finished up a series of votes, so I am sure there will be other 

members trickling in. We want to be respectful of our witness’ time 

and take advantage of it as much as we can. We are fortunate in 

the sense that we have now a lengthy debate on the House floor, 

so we will not have votes for quite a while and should be able to 

get the hearing in without the normal interruptions—so pleased 

about that. And we will go ahead and get started. 

The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the 

Army’s acquisition and modernization budget request for fiscal year 

2011. And we welcome our witnesses for today. We have Lieutenant General Robert R. Lennox, who is the Deputy Chief of Staff, 

G–8. We have Lieutenant General William Phillips, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics 

and Technology, and Dr. David M. Markowitz, Director of Capabilities, Integration, Prioritization and Analysis and technical advisor 

to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3. 

You must have a very big business card—or, sorry, not big so 

much as lengthy, lots of words on it. 

That will be our first panel. We will have a second panel as well. 

Dr. J. Michael Gilmore, who is the Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and 

Mr. Michael Sullivan from the General Accounting—Accountability 

Office (GAO), director of acquisition and sources. So we will have 

two panels of witnesses today. 

In addition to these witnesses, the subcommittee specifically requested that the Army bring subject matter experts on all the 

major programs in the budget, so members should not hesitate to 

ask detailed questions. 

And I will leave it to your gentlemen’s judgment as to who is 

best to answer those. All we ask is if we do have people come up, 

they be sure and speak clearly into the microphone and identify 

themselves before they answer questions. 
2 

The Army’s fiscal year 2011 base budget includes $10.3 billion in research, development, test and evaluation and $21.3 billion in procurement. The Army is requesting an additional $150 million for 

R&D and $8.9 billion in procurement in the overseas contingency 

operations (OCO), formally known as the supplemental. So we have 

a new name for it, but it is the same issue. And we will hopefully 

have that up sometime soon as well. Overall, this total request for $42.9 billion appears to be a solid 

request that will provide the Army with most of what it needs for 

today’s wars and investments in future capabilities. And I think 

that is the major challenge of this committee. We have many obligations and, obviously, national security is of utmost importance at 

all times, but particularly important when we have our troops at 

war in two separate places in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

At the same time, even with those critical needs, we live in a 

world of finite resources, finite resources that seem to be getting 

more finite all the time, so I respect the difficult job that you gentlemen have to balance those needs, make sure we are providing 

for the warfighter, and at the same time doing it in a way that we 

can afford. It is a big challenge, and that is what this committee 

is going to be very focused on. 

With regard to specific programs, this hearing will highlight several new initiatives and changes to ongoing programs. First, the 

subcommittee expects to hear an update on the Army’s new Ground 

Combat Vehicle (GCV) program. This program, begun in the wake 

of the termination in the Future Combat Systems’ (FCS) manned 

vehicles, seeks to field a new infantry carrier by 2017. And as we 

go forward with this, the committee’s main concern is that, frankly, 

we get a better result than we got out of Future Combat Systems. 

And we understand the challenges. It is our view that a big, big 

part of the challenge was that we set a very, very aggressive set 

of specifics, capabilities that we were looking for out of these programs that were perhaps a little bit unrealistic in terms of what 

they were going to be able to achieve. At the same time, we then 

set it on a very aggressive schedule, which put us in a position of 

having to authorize procurement of pieces of equipment that had 

not yet tested out. 

It was a bad combination, and we hope we have all learned from 

that experience as we go forward with the Ground Combat Vehicle, 

as well as our other programs, to make sure that we are realistic 

about the capabilities that we can accomplish and then set a 

timeline that makes sense, because we want to make sure that we 

are not procuring stuff that has not yet been proven to work. 

To do that, I think we need to be very diligent on those issues 

as we go forward. The Ground Combat Vehicle will be a central 

piece of that. 

So we hope we will do better on that. And I think similar things 

can be said about the other pieces that are left of the Future Combat Systems program, which is now dubbed the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team (EIBCT). 

Again, a lot of the pieces of that were very ambitious, and we did 

not quite measure up. And as we we are going forward with determinations of what to buy out of those remaining pieces, we want 

to make sure that it has tested out. We had some very concerning 
3 

test results recently on a number of the programs within the 

EIBCT, and we want to make sure that those are fixed before we 

go forward and buy more. 

And we also have a concern that the Future Combat Systems 

program, even though it has been officially terminated, its base 

contract with the lead systems integrators (LSI), Boeing and SAIC, 

lives on. So we have sort of main contractors for a program that 

has now been changed. 

As a result of this contract, the Army appears destined to be 

committed to using an LSI for the EIBCT program through 2014, 

more than five years after the base FCS program was terminated 

by the Department. So we will want to see how that balances out. 

I am curious about your thoughts on that. 

With regard to the Stryker vehicle program, I am aware that the 

Army is considering a new double-V hull upgrade for some 

Strykers in order to improve their protection against Improvised 

Explosive Devices (IEDs). I look forward to hearing an update on 

the status of that plan today. We obviously consider this to be a 

very important issue, since it is force protection focused. 

At the same time, we want to make sure that we can do it in 

a way that doesn’t take away the advantages that the Stryker 

gives us. We have a number of the Stryker brigades actually out 

of my district, out of Fort Lewis. I have had the opportunity to talk 

to a number of soldiers from within those brigades. They love the 

Stryker. They love the Stryker mainly because of how mobile it is. 

It gives them at least a little bit of the ability to control their own 

destiny in a firefight or if they encounter an IED. 

So we want to make sure we strike that balance. At the same 

time, if we can make it safer, do it in a responsible way and get 

this program done, we would love to be able to get that done. So 

I want to hear from you about how we can go about doing that. 

Another issue facing the Army this year is the future of the M4 

carbine. Now, the Army has fielded hundreds of thousands of these 

weapons in recent years and is now looking at both an upgrade 

program and a potentially new weapon development effort as well. 

And basically, you know, what we are going to be looking at on 

that is, you know, balancing the reports, and there were a lot of 

troubling reports about the performance of the M4 with a lot of the 

tasks that have frankly shown it to be performing quite well. And 

if it is performing quite well and if in fact this is just anecdotal stories about problems with the gun, not a systemic problem, then obviously that is the most cost effective way to deal with it. 

We also want to hear more about how you plan to balance the 

looking at a new gun while at the same time looking at ways to 

update the one that you have. How are you planning on balancing 

that out to meet the needs and do so in a cost effective way? 

Finally, today’s hearing also covers areas that don’t get that 

much attention in the media, but which represent very large annual investments by the Army: communications, equipment and 

trucks. 

This is a critical year for the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), 

which recently transitioned to the Army for program management. 

The success or failure of elements of this program will have long- 
4 

lasting implications for Army communications and network equipment. 

In the area of trucks, the Army continues to spend billions a year 

on a wide range of vehicles. Of note this year is a shift to production for Army medium trucks from BAE to Oshkosh. We are also 

interested and we understand at both BAE and Oshkosh with different vehicles, we have a fair number of vehicles that have been 

completed but have not yet been distributed. And we are curious 

about the reason for that delay and how big a problem you think 

that delay is and what we are doing to deal with it, if in fact it 

is a problem. 

In addition, the Army’s future plans for Humvee production appear to have changed significantly with funding for new U.S. Army 

Humvees being zeroed out in the 2011 budget submission, and we 

would be curious to hear more about your thinking behind that decision and the future, how it impacts the future of our tactical vehicles. 

With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member on the committee, Mr. Bartlett, for his opening statement. And I will also ask 

unanimous consent to submit—I have additional comments in my 

statement that I did not read—to submit those for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Bartlett. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND 

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I would like to take this opportunity to welcome my friend 

from Washington to the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee and 

congratulate him on his selection as chairman. This subcommittee 

has a long record of working together in order to properly equip our 

Army and Air Force. I am looking forward to working with you. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, welcome. 

To our witnesses for both panels, thank you for being here. We 

are very fortunate to have each of you serving our country and to 

have you here today. I would also like to congratulate General Phillips on his recent promotion to lieutenant general. 

Mr. Chairman, I have just a couple of issues I would like to 

quickly highlight. First is in regards to electromagnetic pulse 

(EMP). Essentially all of our new weapons systems have been built 

with a waiver for EMP hardening. I won’t get into the details here, 

although I believe it is an extremely important issue. General Phillips and I briefly discussed this last week, so I know the Army 

plans on following up with me in the near future to discuss my concerns. 

In addition, I continue to be concerned about the continued decline in research and development (R&D) funding. From 1983 till 

today, our investment in basic defense research as a percentage of 

GDP has declined by 50 percent. As a farmer, I will tell you that 

this is no different or less dangerous than a farmer eating their 

seed corn. 
5 

It is politically easy to cut research, because we can’t see the future harvest from innovation. However, as a scientist and engineer, 

I can guarantee you that unless we reverse the decline in basic applied and advanced research funding, we will cripple America’s 

ability to maintain a technological world leadership in future decades. 

This not only impacts potential future capabilities for our 

warfighters, but also has an industrial base impact. With our technical workforce aging, we are in danger of losing our intellectual 

capital. We need to develop the next generation of engineers and 

scientists that will ensure the world’s greatest innovators reside 

here in this country. So I hope to learn more from the Army in regards to how they are doing in this area. 

Thank you for being here, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Bartlett. And thank you 

for the welcome to the committee. 

It is a privilege to be the chair of this committee. I have served 

on it for many years and appreciate Mr. Bartlett’s leadership and 

very much appreciate what the former chairman, Mr. Abercrombie, 

and Mr. Bartlett did in working in a bipartisan way. There are certainly disagreements on this committee. The great thing about it 

is frequently they are not partisan, and they are always handled 

in a very professional way. And I hope I can live up to the standard 

that Mr. Abercrombie and Mr. Bartlett have set in that regard. 

And with that, we will turn it over to our witnesses for the testimony. My understanding is that General Lennox is going to go 

first. 

General, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. ROBERT P. LENNOX, USA, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, G–8 

General LENNOX. Well, good afternoon, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bartlett and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces. 

We thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Army acquisition and modernization programs and specifically those that involve the fiscal year 2011 budget request. We are pleased to represent the Army leadership, members of the Army acquisition 

workforce, and the more than one million courageous men and 

women in uniform who have deployed to combat over the last eight 

years and have relied on us to provide them with world-class weapons systems and equipment for mission success. 

As Chairman Smith mentioned, my name is Bob Lennox, and I 

am the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army, the G–8. And my responsibility in that capacity is equipping the Army units primarily. 

I am joined today by Lieutenant General Bill Phillips, the Military 

Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, and by Dr. Dave Markowitz, the Director 

of Capabilities Integration, Prioritization and Analysis in the Army 

G–357. 

I will start the comments, sir, by talking about Army modernization and what is different this year from last. In our primary three 

lines of effort that we are going to be following in Army moderniza-
6 

tion, first is our plan. Our first line of effort is buying new, buying 

new equipment to fill capability gaps. 

The Secretary of Defense has talked recently about winning today’s wars and then having the capability to hedge against an uncertain future. And that is the aim of our procurement, and I think 

you will see it. Our main focus in our modernization program is the 

Brigade Combat Team modernization strategy. If you will permit 

me, I will come back and talk about that a little bit later. 

But we have also invested in a number of capabilities designed 

to win today’s wars. So, for example, the Extended Range MultiPurpose (ERMP) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). We have invested in fiscal year 2011 about $500 million in an Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability designed to help 

win today’s fight. In fact, there is a Quick Reaction Capability in 

Afghanistan performing today. 

We are buying aviation capabilities. We are forming the 12th 

Combat Aviation Brigade, and in fiscal year 2011 we begin the purchase of the 13th Combat Aviation Brigade. And it will be about 

$6.6 billion invested in the 13th Combat Aviation Brigade. 

And we are buying to equip our reserve component. In fact, the 

Army National Guard from September 2008 to September 2010 will 

experience 11 percent increase in their equipment on hand and a 

12 percent increase in their modernization rates. So that is the 

first line of effort, buying new capabilities to fill the capability gaps 

that we need for today and in the future. 

The second one is sustaining existing systems through the insertion of upgraded capabilities, recapitalization, and then in fact divesting capabilities that we no longer need, trying to keep our 

forces relevant and capable for the future. 

For example, we are talking about the OH–58 Delta Kiowa Warrior. We see having to sustain the Kiowa Warrior through 2025, 

and we are investing in upgrades not only to the safety of the airframe, but enhancing the cockpit and sensors as well. This includes 

efforts to lighten the soldier’s load. 

And I was fortunate enough to talk to the committee about 13 

months ago about force protection. I understand there is a committee hearing on this next week. 

But we are comfortable talking about those issues today, improvements on things like the Improved Outer Tactical Vest 

(IOTV), fielding plate carriers that are about six pounds lighter 

than the IOTV to help our soldiers lighten the load and what they 

carry, and then divesting our oldest equipment, the UH1 Huey, 

born in Vietnam. The last one went out of the inventory in December 2009. 

And the last M35 deuce and a half truck that you have heard 

about over all these many years will be out of the inventory by the 

end of fiscal year 2011. So that is our second priority area: continuing to sustain and upgrade the fleet that we have got and divesting capabilities that are no longer useful. 

The third area is fielding according to Army priorities. And in 

October of 2009, we published the Army equipping strategy. And 

in there we talked about going away from a tiered readiness approach to one that fields the soldiers with the equipment they need 

to be successful in combat. 
7 

So every soldier going to combat, regardless of component, regardless of being in the active force, the National Guard or Reserve 

component, is fielded with the very finest equipment that we can 

field. And this includes priority and National Guard units doing 

homeland security missions, disaster relief, and support to civil authorities. 

And you will find that in the National Guard, for example, our 

investment from 2001 through the end of our program in 2015 will 

amount to an average of $3.4 billion a year to enhance their readiness for those missions. 

Now, if you will permit me, sir, I will go back to our Brigade 

Combat Team modernization strategy and spend a few moments on 

what we think is our hallmark effort. And this is the main change 

on our modernization strategy from last year to this year when we 

had a Future Combat Systems focused modernization strategy, and 

today it has changed to the Brigade Combat Team modernization 

strategy. 

There are four elements to the Brigade Combat Team modernization strategy. The first is incremental improvements to our network. Empowering soldiers, dismounted soldiers, is one of the critical aspects of our incremental modernization strategy in the area 

of network, giving them the capability to receive digital information 

to know where they are, where the enemy is, and empower them 

on the ground to make the most knowledgeable decisions in an era 

where the individual soldier is so much more important than even 

ever before. 

The second aspect of that is to being able to accomplish battle 

command on the move. Today we fielded the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN–T) Increment One program, the 

Warfighter Information Network Increment One, and that is about 

fielded. And that starts to provide broadband capability down to 

our lowest units. Increment Two, which fields starting in fiscal 

year 2012, starts to deliver a capability of battle command on the 

move. And Increment Three, then, adds an aerial layer and enhances that battle command on the move capability. That is element one of our Brigade Combat Team modernization strategy. 

Our second one is the pledge that we will incorporate the Mine 

Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and the MRAP All 

Terrain Vehicle (ATV) into our formations. 

The third tenet is accelerating and fielding of capability packages 

to Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). These are the FCS 

spinouts that we think are technologically ready, that include 

things like small robots, unmanned sensors, the Class I UAV unmanned aerial vehicle, vertical launch vehicle, to 29 IBCTs, Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, by fiscal year 2016. 

Now, as Chairman Smith mentioned, these did have some challenges in their initial round of testing. They were found to be oversize in some case, overweight in other cases, and in some cases the 

mean time between failures did not measure up to the standards 

we want. 

There are two more testing opportunities. There is one this August, and there is one next summer. We think we are on a path 

to demonstrate the capabilities that we can accomplish those capabilities. 
8 

But I want to assure this committee that if the capabilities do 

not measure up, we will not go forward with those capabilities, and 

we will not put them in the hands of our soldiers. And I think you 

will find if you look at the history of some of the capability spinouts, that we have made those kinds of decisions on systems that 

have not measured up in the past. 

And, finally, the last part of our Brigade Combat Team modernization strategy is the Ground Combat Vehicle. We think this 

is critically important. It is designed to provide a versatile range 

of capabilities that include force protection, off-road mobility, urban 

operational mobility, and to contain the size, weight and power to 

carry the network and expanded capabilities that we need today 

and into the future. 

In closing, in support of the Army modernization, the Army has 

submitted a research development and acquisition budget request 

of about $32 billion for fiscal year 2011. We believe that this budget appropriately allocates resources between bridging advanced 

technologies for our soldiers currently in the fight and developing 

new technologies to bring the required capabilities to soldiers in 

the future. As such, we meet our leadership’s intent of concurrently 

preparing our soldiers for success today and transforming to meet 

the demands of the 21st century. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bartlett and members of the committee, on 

behalf of the soldiers and their families, we greatly appreciate the 

tremendous support we receive from this Congress and the American people. In order to successfully implement the plans we shared 

with you today, we urge your continued support. 

Providing all of America’s sons and daughters who serve in our 

Army with the most capable equipment for the battles they are 

fighting today and are likely to face in the future are the responsibilities that the Army takes seriously and is committed to accomplishing. Thank you for your time. I will now be followed by Lieutenant General Phillips. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Lennox, General Phillips, and Dr. Markowitz can be found in the Appendix on page 54.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, General. 

General Phillips. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM N. PHILLIPS, USA, MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS 

General PHILLIPS. Chairman Smith, Congressman Bartlett, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I, too, am grateful for 

this opportunity to discuss the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget 

in Army acquisition and modernization programs. 

With this budget request, we are investing in the future force capabilities while enhancing the capabilities of our soldiers in the 

current fight. I am pleased to appear before you today with General 

Lennox and Dr. Markowitz. We are very grateful to the members 

of this subcommittee for what you have done to provide our Army 

and our soldiers the equipment that we have today that are in combat. 

If I could just reflect upon my most recent assignment, which 

was 11 months, a little over 11 months in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
9 

serving beside our soldiers, they are amazing on the field of battle. 

And they are amazing for a number of reasons. 

Number one, the American people have entrusted us with their 

sons and daughters, their most precious assets. Secondly, this committee and the Congress and the American people have provided 

us the resources with which we can build and develop programs 

and put them in the hands of our soldiers. 

For those two things in particular, I have watched them operate 

on the field of battle, and I have been so impressed with how they 

operate. They truly are amazing, so thank you and the American 

people for entrusting us with those resources to be able to be successful. And we constantly strive in support of the American people 

to be good stewards of those resources. 

Sir, today is a great day for the Army and a great day for the 

Army Acquisition Corps. This morning at 1030 hours, the Under 

Secretary of the Army swore in Dr. Malcolm O’Neill, formerly Lieutenant General Malcolm O’Neill, as the Army Acquisition Executive 

and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics 

and Technology. He takes over from Mr. Dean Popps, who has 

served our Army so well over the last eight years. So, sir, it was 

an honor to welcome Dr. O’Neill to our team. 

Mr. Chairman, the Army has a comprehensive modernization 

plan, as articulated by General Lennox. With lessons learned from 

more than eight years of persistent conflict focused on future challenges and promising technology investments, we are pursuing a 

capabilities-based incremental modernization strategy. 

Number one, develop and incorporate new capabilities and technology. Modernize and capitalize existing equipment and reset and 

invest those that are no longer necessary for our formations. And 

number three, we will field and distribute capabilities in accordance with the Army’s resource priorities and also the Army’s force 

generation. 

I understand, Mr. Chairman, that there are several programs of 

interest to this committee, and with your permission I will briefly 

discuss their status. 

We have organized the combat formation in a modular construct 

focused on the Brigade Combat Team. General Lennox has stated 

the Brigade Combat Team modernization plan includes modernizing the network over time, rapidly developing and fielding a new 

Ground Combat Vehicle, and incrementally fielding capability 

package that best meet the needs of soldiers and units as they 

train and then get ready to deploy. 

Increment One of the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team systems, including the network integration kit Class I unmanned aerial system, the small unmanned ground vehicles, and urban and 

tactical unattended ground sensors, have been approved by the Defense Acquisition Executive for low rate initial production. 

The Army released a request for a proposal for the technology development phase of the Ground Combat Vehicle in late February. 

It will be our first combat vehicle designed from the ground up to 

operate in an IED environment. 

With regard to the existing vehicles upgrades, the Army’s combat 

platform modernization program is focused on standardizing the 31 

heavy Brigade Combat Team sets with two variants of our domi-
10 

nant combat platforms. That is the M1A1 and A2 Abrams and the 

M2 Bradley fighting vehicles. 

The Stryker program received full rate production decision on 8 

of 10 variants. This versatile and lethal vehicle can be deployed in 

trouble spots worldwide in all spectrums of operations. 

The Paladin Integrated Management Program (PIM), or Paladin 

PIM, is the Army’s first fire support modernization effort for the 

Paladin howitzer to enhance the delivery of accurate and timely 

fires where and when needed. It is an important cornerstone of our 

modernization strategy. 

Modernization of our tactical wheeled vehicles is providing our 

soldiers with the best possible protection, payload and performance. 

At the heart of our plans is the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) 

with the Marines to replace the Humvee starting in about 2015. 

We will continue to procure and field the family of medium tactical vehicles to replace vehicles in the immediate fleet that are 

over 30 years old. Recapitalization of our family of heavy tactical 

vehicle fleet will focus on variants of the aging Heavy Expanded 

Mobile Tactical Truck, better known as the HEMTT, as well as incorporate much of MRAP into our future forces as they are released 

from current operations. 

On another matter of great importance, the Army is committed 

to continuing to improve our small arms capabilities. We are fielding a new semiautomatic sniper rifle, the M110, a new 40-millimeter grenade launcher, and developing a light 50-millimeter machine gun. 

We are also taking a dual approach regarding the M4 to improve 

the current weapon system as we look forward to a new carbine requirement, as you mentioned in your opening comments, Mr. 

Chairman. 

We are also working to deliver the best ammunition to our 

warfighters while at the same time fostering environmental stewardship. The M855 A–1 cartridge designed for the M16 and M4 

family of weapons and the M249 squad automatic weapons meet 

both of these goals as a green program while providing consistent 

shot-to-shot performance against all targets. They will be available 

for fielding in June. 

Information is key to success on the battlefield, and our new radios will provide enhanced communication capabilities to our 

forces. The Joint Tactical Radio System will provide a mobile tactical radio communications network. The Ground Mobile Radio 

(GMR) will provide multi-channel operations within integrated 

global positioning system capability and the handheld manpack 

and small form fit program, which will provide, among several capabilities, a small, form fit radio for various ground sensors, unattended vehicles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. 

Our aviation platforms continue to meet tremendous challenges 

of today’s combat environment. Continued modernization of our 

helicopter fleet—Black Hawks, Chinooks, Apaches—is absolutely 

vital to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. And, sir, having flown 

in Iraq and Afghanistan in practically every aircraft that the Army 

is flying with today, they have performed magnificently—to date, 

about 3.7 million combat hours across both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
11 

As General Lennox stated, we remain committed to the requirement for a manned armed aerial scout helicopter. A formal Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) is ongoing as we continue with upgrades 

of the Kiowa Warrior fleet. The Army is partnering with the Air 

Force and fully endorses the joint force theater lift effort. 

The light utility helicopter, or Lakota, continues to meet all cost, 

schedule and performance targets and has been fielded to the National Guard across 13 states to conduct disaster relief, counter 

drug operations, and institutional training missions as well as test 

and training centers for the Army. 

Army unmanned aircraft systems are vital capability for our deployed forces. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are significantly enhanced by platforms such as the Raven, 

Shadow, Constant Hawk, Persistent Threat Detection System, or 

PTDS, as well as the enhanced medium range reconnaissance and 

surveillance system which evolved from the Aerial Common Sensor 

program of a few years ago. Additionally, the Extended Range 

Multi-Purpose UAV system is also on the verge of providing us a 

tremendous capability on the field of battle. 

On another important issue, Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the 

support by the members of this subcommittee and Members of Congress as we work to rebuild the acquisition and contracting workforce to handle the increased workload in managing our acquisition 

programs as well as a number of contracted actions and contracted 

dollars, which in the last 15 years has increased by about 500 percent along with a subsequent reduction in the number of people. 

Along with the additional workforce personnel, we thank you for 

authorizing five additional general officers for acquisition. We have 

promoted three colonels to general officer as of this date. And most 

recently, I served as the commanding general of Joint Contracting 

Command Iraq and Afghanistan. And currently in Iraq and Afghanistan today, we have Brigadier General Camille Nichols, another Army general. 

So with your help and the help of the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, we are working aggressively to reverse the years of decline in authorized strength levels and restore the skill level of our 

acquisition and contracting workforce to deal with the growing 

complexities of our business environment. 

At the same time, the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act 

of 2009 is helping us to ensure that our programs are healthy and 

that all problems are identified and program adjustments made to 

them to keep them healthy. By building more discipline, oversight 

and transparency into the process, we are better able to provide 

services, deliver mature technologies, and rapidly procure the 

equipment that our warfighters require and deserve. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this Subcommittee 

of Air Land Forces, your deep and abiding commitment to our men 

and women in uniform is widely recognized throughout our ranks. 

We thank you for your continued support of the outstanding men 

and women of the United States Army and their families. Mr. 

Chairman, I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Phillips, General Lennox, and Dr. Markowitz can be found in the Appendix on page 54.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 
12 

Dr. Markowitz. And if you could keep your comments relatively 

brief, I want to make sure we give members a chance to ask some 

questions. I think that has been a pretty good and thorough outline 

of what we are talking about. If we could keep it in sort of the fiveminute range, that would be great. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID M. MARKOWITZ, DIRECTOR OF CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION, PRIORITIZATION, AND ANALYSIS 

AND TECHNICAL ADVISOR TO THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF 

OF THE ARMY, G–3 

Dr. MARKOWITZ. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bartlett, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before you to discuss the Army’s modernization program and requirements processes. 

My name is David Markowitz, and I am the Director of Capabilities Integration within the Army G–3. The directorate is responsible for the review, validation and approval of material requirements. Additionally, we recommend overall program priorities to 

Lieutenant General Thurman. As requested in your letter, I will 

briefly highlight important aspects of the requirements process for 

both current operational needs and long-term programs. 

Let me start first with operational needs statements, or ONSs. 

ONSs support the Chief of Staff of the Army’s vision to build a 

versatile mix with tailorable and networked organizations. An ONS 

is a request from a commander in the field to headquarters Department of the Army for either existing equipment or new capabilities 

to meet unexpected mission demands. 

In 2009 the Department of the Army received or was processing 

approximately 2,500 ONSs, requests from commanders in the field 

asking for more than 6,000 separate types of equipment. The vast 

majority of these requests were for existing Army items. 

Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements, or JUONSs, are 

similar to ONSs, except the request goes through joint channels. 

They are approved by the joint staff and assigned to a service or 

agency by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. There are far 

fewer JUONSs, but they are almost entirely for new capability development. The Department of the Army is currently working on 

roughly 10 JUONSs. 

To ensure the Army is providing the right capability at the right 

time, we have regular weekly meetings with theater that review, 

validate and source theater needs. Over the past two years, we 

have created a prioritization process to ensure that our limited resources are used in the most urgent demands. 

The process is timely by collapsing the requirements, resourcing 

the acquisition activities into a condensed synchronized effort. 

Based on lessons learned, the Army updated Army Regulation 71– 

9 this past December to codify these changes. 

The Army is also taking steps to assess the material that we 

have rapidly fielded to support the war. The Army set up the capability development for rapid transition process. Run by our Training and Doctrine Command, we obtain warfighter feedback, including assessments by the Army Test and Evaluation Command’s re-
13 

ports, to make recommendations on what to do with the capability 

for the long-term. 

There are three types of recommendations: incorporate into a 

program of record, sustain only for the war effort, or terminate. 

Today, the Army has reviewed 452 new material capabilities with 

10 percent recommended for transition to an acquisition program, 

25 percent for termination, and the remainder to sustain for the 

war. 

As to long-term requirements, the Army is internalizing the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army’s guidance 

on implementing a cost culture within the Army. This closely 

aligns with the goals of the 2009 Weapons Systems Reforms Act. 

We are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s cost 

assessment and program evaluation agency on announcement of alternatives, guidance and implementation. We are also working 

with the acquisition community to ensure that requirements from 

major defense acquisition programs are reassessed annually to see 

if certain capabilities are causing large cost growth. 

Additionally, under the leadership of the Under Secretary of the 

Army and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, we are performing 

a series of capability portfolio reviews to set the context for modernization. This is a new endeavor recently begun this calendar 

year. 

We are holistically examining separate capabilities like tactical 

wheeled vehicles or precision munitions and making recommendations to revalidate, modify or terminate requirements. The Secretary of the Army has asked that after one year we assess our 

progress and make recommendations for institutionalizing this activity. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my opening remarks, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Markowitz, General Lennox, 

and General Phillips can be found in the Appendix on page 54.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We will in the 

questions try to keep to the five-minute rule, even for me and the 

ranking member, because I want to give all members a chance. We 

will go through multiple rounds of questioning, if necessary, to 

make sure we get all members’ questions, but do want to keep it 

moving as quickly as possible. 

And so, gentlemen, as you are answering a question, if you see 

the five-minute light is up, if you could try to—I mean, I don’t want 

you to stop in mid-sentence or anything, but if you could try to 

wrap it up as quickly as possible, that would be appreciated. 

I am going to start asking about the EIBCT program. And I 

guess the question we have, and I know the statement that you are 

not going to field anything that isn’t ready to go, and yet we don’t 

at the moment have the tests that show that most of this is ready 

to go, so the first question is, you know, why not just delay it for 

a year? 

Why is there a budget request for procurement on this stuff in 

there? That kind of puts us back into the betting on the come problem that we had with Future Combat Systems. Why did you make 

that decision in this specific instance? 
14 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, great question. What we have learned 

from the FCS program throughout its years of development, what 

we wanted to do in coordination with OSD was to leverage our investment in FCS itself. So as we look forward to bringing our strategy for the capabilities packages that encompasses the EIBCT, we 

worked with OSD and developed a strategy at the direction of 

OSD, actually, to be able to field the capability as soon as possible. 

So we developed the capability packages, but we know that within those packages itself, each item may not be as mature as the 

other items. And as General Lennox said in his opening comment, 

we are not going to field anything that is not suitable, effective on 

the field of battle for our soldiers. 

Mr. SMITH. But cutting through that, I think you are saying 

some of it is ready, some of it is not. You are going to buy what 

is ready. But is that actually the case? I mean, what are the pieces 

of it that have tested out that you are confident right now to buy? 

General PHILLIPS. Sure, we have that test that we just did for 

the Limited User Test (LUT) last August, last summer, for the 

EIBCT pieces, the network integration kit, the Small Unmanned 

Ground Vehicles (SUG–Vs), the Tactical Unattended Ground Sensor (TUGS) and the Urban Unattended Ground Sensor (UUGS), 

there were some issues that—— 

Mr. SMITH. I think there are about maybe three people in this 

whole room who understand what you just said—— 

General PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. But that is okay—— 

General PHILLIPS. The small unground—— 

Mr. SMITH. Go ahead, please. 

General PHILLIPS. The small unground vehicle, the tactical and 

urban ground systems, the sensors that you would use inside a 

IBCT. We know there are issues with them through the limited 

user test that we just had. 

In conversation with Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 

(DOT&E) and GAO, we know that we have challenges that we face 

like, for instance, weight on some of the small unmanned ground 

sensors. Some of them are about almost twice the weight that they 

should be. We know that we have reliability challenges with some 

of those IBCT systems. 

But what those tests have allowed us to do is understand where 

those challenges are. And for us, we have to design or develop fixes 

into those systems. We know 94 percent of the fixes associated with 

the limited user test last September, and right now we are in the 

process of implementing those fixes, so when we go through the 

next fix and then the next session would be a test in August of another limited user test, we will hope to have 94 percent of those 

issues fixed. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, just so you know, the committee’s going to keep 

a careful eye on this, obviously. We are very early in the process. 

You know, it will be a while before we passed the final bill. But, 

you know, our inclusion of these items is going to depend on our 

confidence as well as yours about what is going to be fielded and 

what is not going to be fielded. 

The other question about some of these components, the new 

components, is some of them are very expensive, much more expen-
15 

sive than what they are replacing. And, you know, we have to sort 

of measure the capabilities versus cost. Are we really getting that 

much more capability? 

And one example that has been brought to my attention is the 

unmanned aerial system (UAS) for the EIBCT will cost $360,000 

each when the Army’s current similar system, the Raven UAV, 

costs $17,000. You know, basic question is first of all, do you accept 

those numbers as being roughly accurate? And if so, then basically 

what you are saying is this new thing is going to be 21 times better 

than the old thing, to use a technical term. Is that really the case? 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I would answer part of this and then let 

General Lennox take it from there. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

General PHILLIPS. But you have to look at the maturity of the 

program as well when you compare one to the other and the capability that it provides. Raven is a very mature system. I think we 

fielded well over 800 of those in theater already flying today. 

And the Class I UAV is still in development as a part of the 

EIBCT, so when you are early in development, some of those systems are going to be expensive, but as you go forward into more 

toward full rate production, the costs of those systems are going to 

certainly be reduced. And then it is a measure. You hit it right on 

the head—the capability that it provides versus the cost, because 

that is the balance that you have to achieve. 

Mr. SMITH. Just off the top, what is the increased capability here 

with this UAV versus the old one? 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, the current Class I UAV weighs about 17 

pounds. It provides you a hover stare capability. It is not a fixed 

wing like the Raven, so you can hover over a certain location, and 

you can just get the stare down capability with that UAV. It is relatively easy to fly with soldiers. It has been tested in a test environment at Fort Benning, at Yuma and many instances. 

Soldiers like this system. It provides them great ISR capability, 

great situational awareness of what is happening on the battlefield, 

to fly over a building and to hover and give that stare down capability. Great situational awareness, sir. 

But there are issues with that system. One is the noise. It is a 

noisy system that we need to reduce the decibels on the field of battle. That was one of the issues that came out of the recent LUT 

is how can we reduce the acoustics associated with this vehicle. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

General, did you have anything quickly? I am out of time, 

but—— 

General LENNOX. Sir, I think General Phillips covered it. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Great. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

My first question is a follow-up to my opening statement for either General Phillips or General Lennox. Could you comment on 

the Army’s research and development funding in the near term and 

far term? Specifically, could you give us an idea of how the Army 

is leveraging capabilities from its science and technology budget? 
16 

I would also like to ask you to provide the committee with an assessment of how the Army might use additional funds for research 

and development, if they were made available. 

General LENNOX. Sir, thanks for your question. The Army has 

kept over the last several years research, development, test and 

evaluation funding at about—RDT&E funding at about the same 

level, so it has been consistent over the last couple of years. 

We think the amount that we are asking for in fiscal year 2011 

is adequate. We have had remarkable successes, as you know from 

your background, in the investments we made in Science and Technology (S&T) and some from Fort Detrick, as you are well aware, 

the investment in some of the bandages and work that the Medical 

Research Command did there in adding capabilities to help stop 

and staunch the loss of blood very quickly. 

There have been a number of systems and capabilities that we 

have taken to the battlefield that have come out of our S&T program, a lot of work on future armor capability. So it is very important to us, and we think we have about the right amount, sir. 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I would just add a couple of things. One 

is OSD has been working with us very closely, and they have designated the Army in a couple of areas to be able to focus on key 

things. One is focal plane array for Infrared (IR) high definition. 

We have the best sensors on the battlefield today. With this S&T 

investment of about $93 million, which brings up to about $160-orso million this year in this kind of technology, it will ensure that 

we have the edge for our soldiers that are using the next generation of IR sensors. 

The other one that I would share with you, sir, would be force 

protection. Our investment out of that $1.9 billion that General 

Lennox just mentioned, the majority of that will go into force protection systems. The OSD has designated the Army as the deployment force protection task force lead, and we are going to invest 

about $170 million in that effort alone. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

I have a second question for Dr. Markowitz or General Lennox. 

During our Air Force posture hearing, we had an opportunity to 

discuss the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program with General 

Schwartz. I still have some concerns about the ability to meet the 

original validated Army Joint Cargo Aircraft requirement, which I 

believe was for 78 planes. 

In a series of hearings, no one has said that that requirement 

has gone away. As you know, the Quadrennial Roles and Missions 

Review released last year clearly stated the option that provided 

most value to the joint force was to assign the C–27J to the Air 

Force and the Army. As you may know, the Army uses its plane. 

The Air Force has the plane. We now are going to have only 38 

planes. There is a clearly validated use for that plane in this country by the Guard for national security issues. 

And my question is how are we going to meet the Army’s originally validated needs of 78 planes, plus the stateside needs was 

only was only 38 planes? 

General LENNOX. Sir, you are right. The actual Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved number is for 75 Joint 

Cargo Aircraft. There was a commitment for 78. The Army had 
17 

said they would buy 54, and I believe the Air Force would buy the 

remainder. And currently, when that program transferred to the 

Air Force, I think it currently stands at about 38 aircraft, so I 

think you have all the facts correct. 

We in the Army believe we have a requirement for the direct 

support role of fixed wing aircraft. We have had a recent pilot 

interact that has demonstrated that this has proved tremendously 

successful. There are two C–130s that the Air Force has dedicated 

to a Combat Aviation Brigade, proved tremendously successful, and 

we are waiting for the combatant commander in Afghanistan to ask 

for that capability. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The original 78 planes—there has been no study 

after that to indicate that the Army requirement is in fact anything 

less than the original 75, 78 planes, correct? 

General LENNOX. Not that I am aware of, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, the Army continues to say they need 78 planes. 

The program has been transferred to the Air Force, who didn’t 

want the program. They now have only 38 planes. Clearly, the 

needs of the Army cannot be met with this, and this provides us 

with a continuing challenge. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Before I call on Mr. Kissell, I just want to follow up briefly on 

something I asked earlier when we were talking about the cost of 

the new UAV. I get that as you build them over time, you have the 

possibility of the cost getting down. I would note that apparently 

we have committed to nine brigade sets of that UAV, and the average $260,000 cost is for all nine. 

So that is pretty far out down to the right before we start to see 

that coming back down, so I would be interested in—not now, but 

perhaps a better explanation for how that additional cost is justified, because that piece of it doesn’t seem to help that much in this 

particular instance. 

Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would also like 

to join the ranking member in welcoming you to your new capacity 

with our committee as our chairman, looking forward to working 

with you. 

And, gentlemen, welcome to our committee. And I have two or 

three questions, and I really hadn’t figured out who is best to answer them, so when I ask the question, whoever wants to jump in, 

I would appreciate it. 

We had a full committee hearing this morning. We had commanders for European Command, Africa Command and the Joint 

Forces Command. Two of the three commanders cited as one of 

their big concerns is cyber security. Just wondering what are we 

doing in technology and procurement and development to alleviate 

these concerns. 

General LENNOX. I think we are looking at each other, because 

we don’t have a very good answer for you, sir. But let me start. The 

Army is committed to the Department of Defense’s stand up of 

Cyber Command, and we have recently signed up for Army Cyber 

Command. So we will be standing up a three-star headquarters 

dedicated to this effort. 
18 

I think that I will have to take for the record, unless someone 

else has a better answer on the specific cyber kind of procurement 

things that we are doing to support that effort. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 113.] 

Mr. KISSELL. I would appreciate that very much. 

It was mentioned in one of the opening remarks about the National Guard. I am from North Carolina, and our general, General 

Ingram, and who is head of our North Carolina Guard, was with 

me today, expressing some concerns as we bring into these Army 

aviation brigades that where is equipment going to come from to 

supply these additional demands? 

He had heard rumors along the line that we would either be taking the equipment from existing Guard capabilities or they would 

be shut off from new equipment until these brigades were, you 

know, fully supplied. I think you did mention that there would be, 

like, 11 or 12 percent increase in equipment going to the Guard. 

What can I tell General Ingram so he won’t have to worry about 

this? 

General LENNOX. First, sir, General Ingram has done a remarkable job with the North Carolina Guard, and their deployments and 

soldiers have done a fantastic job in combat. My compliments to 

you and to your state’s National Guard team. 

We are standing up two Combat Aviation Brigades. The 12th 

Combat Aviation Brigade is a collection of currently existing active 

component units that we are putting together and fielding to deliver a capability to alleviate the heavy demand in combat of aviation requirements. That is happening right away out of current assets. 

The 13th Combat Aviation Brigade has been fully funded over 

the program to be fielded in fiscal year 2017. The Secretary of Defense has asked us to come back to see if there is a way to expedite 

fielding that capability either through early procurement or 

through a combination of pooling assets from both the active and 

reserve component forces that can get that capability for the Nation to deploy faster. 

It is our commitment to every Guard unit that we will modernize 

their equipment. And in the end, if there is a Secretary of Defense 

approved borrowing action under 1225.6, we will note that, and 

they will be reimbursed with planned and programmed aircraft. 

Mr. KISSELL. So I can tell General Ingram that it is going to be 

okay. 

General LENNOX. I believe so, sir. 

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. 

Last question. We have from time to time people come to us with 

good ideas. And they are kind of research and development. I share 

the ranking member’s concern that if we don’t fund the R&D at a 

high level, that it is just very shortsighted. 

We have had people come to us with ideas, and these are very 

legitimate ideas on how to make body armor stronger and lighter 

in weight, a more of a classified nature of vehicle that the Army 

is looking for, and an idea that would help our equipment engines 

last longer. What do I tell these people? How should they proceed 
19 

in getting these ideas listened to and for you to become aware of 

them so that you can be aware of these good ideas? 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, that is a great question. And what I would 

ask is that they engage with us in the acquisition community. At 

various times for various systems, we will send out requests for information, and we will run industry conferences. 

And we have program executive offices (PEO) that exist all 

throughout our Army that manage programs. Well, today we manage over 700 programs. One of those is PEO Soldier that you mentioned about body armor. We are always looking for industry, to 

talk to industry and have them interface with us and to provide us 

their feedback. 

For GCV we held two industry conferences—Ground Combat Vehicle—two industry conferences where we got about, I think, about 

40 or so, maybe more than that, white papers back from industry. 

We welcome industry’s input into our processes, sir. And if you 

have someone in particular that you would like us to talk to, we 

would certainly be glad to chat with them. 

Mr. KISSELL. We will follow up. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and thank you 

for your service. 

Talking about the M4, I just want to stick with that. If it is 

shown that we need a new weapon and that we are going to replace the M4 or the M16, the issue that I have, basically, is that 

Title 10 limits companies allowed to bid on critical small arms components for specified small arms, including the M4. You know this. 

There are three companies right now that are allowed to bid based 

on Title 10. 

One of those companies makes the Ma Deuce. The other two 

can’t compete for small arms. Out of those two that are allowed to 

actually compete for small arms, one of those is a foreign company, 

a Belgian company. So there is only one American company that 

can compete with itself, I guess, being the one American company, 

if you want an American manufacturer for either the upgrade to 

the upper receiver of the M4, which we are thinking about doing, 

if needed, or for a brand-new replacement for it. 

Last year the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) again 

required a report on the small arms industrial base while also giving the Secretary of Defense the authority to expand, modify or 

change the companies in small arms production in the industrial 

base. 

I understand that in December the Army denied entry to one or 

more well-known domestic small arms companies, including the 

largest gunmaker in the entire nation. The largest gunmaker in 

America was excluded as a small arms option for the M4. 

Based on the changes made in the fiscal year 2010 NDAA to expand or modify the companies in the small arms production industrial base, can you explain why the Army is not embracing competition? That is my first question—two more to follow here. 
20 

Have you urged Secretary Gates to modify or change the companies in the small arms production industrial base? And lastly, are 

you confident that by limiting competition, if your answer is no to 

those first two, are you confident that by limiting competition to 

these three companies based on a decade-old study, that our soldiers and Marines and pretty much everybody in every service, as 

we are all going to use the same thing pretty much, are you confident that they are getting the best bang for their buck and that 

the American taxpayers are getting the best bang for their buck, 

too? 

General PHILLIPS. Congressman, thank you for your question and 

thank you for your service. 

A couple of points. The M4 is an extraordinary weapon today. We 

have continued to improve it. Over 400,000 have been fielded 

today. It performs extraordinarily well in theater. In my 11-plus 

months there, I heard one complaint, and it was from a division 

commander about the magazine on the M4. 

Mr. HUNTER. Sir, I don’t mean to interrupt. I like the M16 and 

the M4. I have shot targets at 500 meters away in the, you know, 

prone position. I am a triple expert rifle, pistol. I like it, too. What 

I am saying is, if we have to upgrade it, if Congress or DOD or you 

deem that it is necessary, then what? Those are where my questions go here. 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, got it. And our dual strategy, really, is to, 

number one, upgrade the M4 as we know it today. And we believe 

that we, do a full and open competition process, we will be able to 

upgrade the M4, which will add to the already 62 improvements 

that we have made over time to that weapon system. 

The other piece of the dual strategy is to go out with full and 

open competition for what might be the follow-on to an M4. And 

the capability development document is being drafted now. 

We think that the ammunition—or, I am sorry, the small arms 

industrial base is very robust and that there will be adequate competition there. And we know that in the previous National Defense 

Authorization Act that on the 31st of March of this year that the 

Secretary of Defense will have the authority to actually waive some 

of those requirements so we can go forward with full and open competition, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Have you urged him to waive those requirements 

to allow more than one competitor into the open competition? 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, we have not at this point. The study that 

you mentioned earlier in one of your comments is being prepared 

now within the Army. The reason it took a little bit of time is because we had to go out to about 14 different organizations that 

have a stake in the weapons systems that we are preparing. It 

wasn’t an easy task just internal to the Army. We had to go out 

to get that information. And we should have that back to OSD 

near-term probably within the next 30 days, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, sir. And, you know, basically what we 

are looking at here is if you only have one competitor—it is a great 

company, by the way; it is a great rifle that we have now—but it 

is not competition if you only have one company competing for it. 

I don’t think we ought to allow a foreign company also to be 

making the next carbine, if we choose to make it or to upgrade the 
21 

one that we have now. I think it ought to be an American company, 

and I think we ought to do everything in our power to urge Secretary Gates, and your power as well, to let all of these great 

American small arms manufacturers into this fight. But thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to just 

make a few brief remarks, and then I am going to yield the balance 

of my time to Mr. Bartlett. 

JCA C–27—I am not particularly troubled by the fact that the 

Air Force has been at least given the maintenance, sustainment, 

modernization end of this, since Army just was fixated on contractor base services and doesn’t really have the interest or capability to do depot work on something like this. 

The Air Force can do that. And I suppose the Air Force could 

have the platform as long as it is providing Army with the services 

that Army needs and in the way that Army needs those services 

provided. 

And the challenge that we had in Vietnam, and certainly history 

suggests it is not going to work real well if what we get now is 

what happened in Vietnam, is that where lift is concerned, at least, 

the Air Force has a strategic view and where this kind of lift is concerned, Army has a very tactical view. And that clash did not serve 

us well with—was it the Grizzly? I can’t remember the platform in 

Vietnam. 

General LENNOX. Caribou, sir. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Caribou? And ultimately, we concluded that 

Army had to have the platform. 

To what Mr. Bartlett previously said about requirements, I 

would simply add that the latest study I am aware of is Institute 

for Defense Analyses’s (IDA) analysis of different mixes of lift, 

given different kinds of challenges. And if we believe that we are 

going to have these kinds of long-term, simmering conflicts in the 

future, IDA concluded that we didn’t just need 78. We needed 98 

of these things to be most cost-effective across the board. 

So I hope Army is thinking about more than 38 in the future 

here, even if Air Force happens to have the platform, you know, 

temporarily or permanently, because it seems to me Army’s view 

is more than 38, based on all Army has said thus far. And then 

IDA chimes in and, at least for the conflicts that it looks like we 

are going to be in for a little while, says it should be even more 

than that. 

And with that, let me just transfer it back to Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I thank the gentleman very much for yielding. I 

would first like to identify myself with the concerns of Mr. Hunter. 

You can’t have a full and open competition if you have excluded 

many of the potential players. I have no idea why we have done 

this. 

Back to the Joint Cargo Aircraft, specifically I would like to know 

how the Army is currently meeting this requirement in Operation 

Enduring Freedom (OEF). For example, what is the impact to the 

sustainment and availability of the CH–47? I understand that because we don’t have enough of the Joint Cargo Aircraft, we are now 
22 

using helicopters and commercial rented, leased aircraft to meet 

these needs. Is that correct? 

General LENNOX. Sir, it is correct. There are record uses of the 

CH–47 in Afghanistan. It is a climate and an area that lends itself 

to helicopters, but there are record uses of the CH–47, and that is 

putting quite a burden on the fleet. And there is contract aircraft 

being used to the tune of about $8 million a month, I believe. But 

I will follow up specifics on the amounts. 

I think it is up to the combatant commander to some extent, so 

I don’t want to necessarily say that this is the right solution or it 

is not the right solution. The combatant commander gets a chance 

to say, request what kind of airport support they need based on 

what they see in their theater. 

Mr. BARTLETT. But when he runs out of Joint Cargo Aircraft, 

then he has to use something else, correct? 

General LENNOX. Sir, right now there are C–130s being used. I 

don’t think we have yet deployed our first Joint Cargo Aircraft to 

Afghanistan. I think that won’t happen until next year. And we are 

using a combination today of C–130s in small numbers and contract aircraft and relying on the CH–47 Chinook. 

Mr. BARTLETT. But aren’t many of the airstrips there pretty 

short, so that we are limited in where we can use the 130? 

General LENNOX. I am not an expert, sir, on the C–130 and the 

airstrip constraints there. I do know that there was infrastructure 

constraints there in terms of how much room there is on the 

ground. And I do think that affects how many C–130s you can 

bring into theater. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes, it is my understanding that in Afghanistan 

the Joint Cargo Aircraft is even more essential because of this infrastructure availability. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for yielding, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I understand that we are going to have a hearing, upcoming 

hearing, Seapower Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee, where we 

will be discussing force protection issues, but since the Army has 

the preponderance of folks on the ground, I would like to ask some 

of your views in terms of modernization. 

First one would be the helmet. I understand that our current 

Kevlar helmet does not protect against 7.62 mm. And I wonder if 

you could first address what is being done there. 

General LENNOX. Sir, I would like to not talk about the specifics 

of what the helmet can and cannot do. We are looking at a more 

capable version of the helmet in concert with the Marine Corps. 

The initial effort, I understand, has run into some challenges in 

terms of meeting those requirements, so it has been delayed a little 

bit. But the Army is after providing at the same weight, so we 

don’t add weight to the soldier load, a more capable helmet. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Where are we at right now in terms of reducing 

the load requirement in terms of the protective vest? 

General LENNOX. Sir, we made substantial requirements since I 

testified before this committee last year. The IOTV itself, the im-
23 

proved outer tactical vest, is lower in weight than the earlier 

version of the outer tactical vest by, I think, about three pounds. 

The plate carriers that are designed specifically for soldiers to 

wear in high altitudes in eastern Afghanistan, for example, dismounted soldiers that will be climbing hills, that is about six 

pounds lighter. And we have fielded those now in substantial numbers. 

In addition, we have done things like improve the boots, improve 

the vest, and improve some of the machine gun weight. So we are 

trying everything we can to take some of that weight off the soldiers. 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, the only thing I would add to that is that 

we are trying to give the commander options as well, so depending 

on what kind of environment they are in. Obviously, they are in 

combat. You want the maximum number of protection. But if they 

are back on a forward operating base, then you might need a lesser 

level of protection, so you might go from 31 pounds, pull a couple 

of plates out and go down to 25 pounds. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Would that be taking out the side Small Arms 

Protective Insert (SAPI) plates? Very well. 

In terms of we take casualties through snipers, and the preponderance of casualties, I think, in Afghanistan are through snipers 

and through IEDs, roadside bombs, can you tell me—in terms of 

modernization we were talking about various ISR platforms. Is 

there anything on the horizon to provide better force protection for 

our folks on the—for our soldiers and Marines on the ground? 

General LENNOX. Sir, the Army is committed to tackling the common IED problem where we do receive most of our casualties. And 

as you know, there is no panacea. We have recently fielded the 

MRAP ATV vehicle to provide enhanced protection and off-road capability, thanks to the help of Congress and the Department of Defense. 

We have fielded a number of efforts to enhance ISR. Task Force 

Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize (ODIN)—Afghanistan, 

which was very effective in Iraq, is now fielded in Afghanistan. A 

number of different ISR platforms are being fielded. Human terrain 

teams are out there trying to make a difference, and ground clearance vehicles have been taken from Iraq, where the instances are 

lower, and moved to Afghanistan. So there is a full court press in 

a number of different ways. It has not solved the problem, but I 

think we have made dramatic improvements. 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I would add to that that we have fielded 

systems like the Persistent Threat Detection System. There are six 

of those in Afghanistan. I have watched them personally operate in 

Iraq inside the headquarters, and that gives a forward operating 

base a tremendous capability to protect against threats that exist 

within a few kilometers of the forward operating base (FOB) itself. 

You mentioned sniper. As a part of our investment in S&T, we 

are going after trying to see if we can defeat the sniper by acoustics, and some of those are classified programs—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. Sure. 

General PHILLIPS [continuing]. That we are going to push forward to try to go after that threat in particular. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, I—— 
24 

Yes, did you have a—— 

Dr. MARKOWITZ. Yes, sir, it is just that we have worked very 

closely with OSD. They have had a special task force on counter 

IED activities. We work closely with them and with theater. 

There is a large list of new and improved capabilities that we are 

working, all the ranging from more persistent forms of stare to different types of explosive detections, chemical sniffers, to different 

types of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and contractors in the field to kind of help the linguists and those other areas 

of identifying and targeting the IED network. So we are looking 

across the full range, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could, one comment? And that 

is that I think we have learned one thing, and we cannot up-armor 

ourselves out of this, you know, in terms of protecting our soldiers 

and Marines on the ground. And so I think really we obviously 

need to focus on ISR capabilities. Every time we increase, you 

know, the weight of our vehicles, they increase the size of their explosives. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here and thank you for your efforts 

in modernization. 

And I appreciate so much the service of Congressman Coffman. 

He served, and so as he discusses the issues, he is telling you from 

his experience in the combat theaters. So I appreciate him so 

much. 

On the other hand, I just went through training, and that is at 

the National Training Center. It was an extraordinary experience 

10 years ago, and I tell you this as a compliment. All of the equipment I have is in a museum, and so from the boot to the helmet. 

And so I just want to thank you all for expediting. 

And I want to join with Mr. Kissell that as people bring innovations to us, I know we want to get these to you as quickly as possible. And in particular, I have been very intrigued at initiatives 

brought to my office concerning fire suppression capability. And 

that concerns me so much with, as indicated by the munitions, but 

virtually anything to reduce the possibility of just the heinous nature of fire. 

Could any of you comment on what is the latest on that? And 

what can we do to help you? 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I share your concerns about that, and my 

old boss, who is Dr. Markowitz’s boss, is Lieutenant General Thurman, and he underscored enough that we have to do everything 

possible to limit the impact of fire and the damage that it does to 

our soldiers. 

On each vehicle there are multiple ways of addressing it to aim 

at protecting soldiers. First and foremost is the fielding of the fire 

resistant uniform. We have done that in the old version. As we are 

about to produce another uniform, fire resistant will be the very 

first thing to go into it. 
25 

We are experimenting with different kinds of limits to protect the 

soldiers now so that—they wouldn’t wear the old hoods; too heavy, 

too hot—so we are experimenting with lighter variants. 

On each vehicle there are about three different ways to suppress 

fire. First is the optical sensor that senses fire and automatically 

shuts off the fuel and reacts. Because of complaints, comments, lessons learned from theater, we have added external fuel cutoff 

valves that a first responder at the scene can pull this, if the fuel 

has not been cut off, and cut the fuel out. 

And then as we build our vehicles, and especially our heavy 

trucks, we have added things like blankets and fire resistant coatings around the fuel tanks. And those are all some of the things 

that we have done. I think we have done some extensive experimentation. There have been people with ideas. I think we have 

looked at every idea that has come forward, and we welcome an opportunity to do that again, sir. 

Mr. WILSON. And how would we, if people bring innovations to 

us, how could we expedite that—not show favoritism as much as 

to promote the protection for our troops? 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, a couple of ways, and I will go back to my 

earlier comments. We have various program executive offices. Offices that may have responsibility for that: Aviation in Huntsville 

for aviation systems, Tactical Wheeled Vehicles up in Warren. We 

have the Rapid Equipping Force that would welcome any industry 

partner who has an idea that could bring that forward. 

We welcome those ideas, because as General Lennox said, what 

we do today is not enough. We must do better tomorrow to protect 

our soldiers and give them the best equipment. And that includes 

fire protection. As an aviator for 30 years flying in helicopters, you 

sort of grow up thinking about fire, because helicopters, if they 

crash, they are probably going to burn. 

We have the same kind of mentality now, I believe, in our tactical wheeled systems and our other systems, and we need to continue to grow the same kind of protection inside of them. We welcome industry’s ideas. If we can help with anyone in particular, sir, 

we will gladly engage. 

General LENNOX. Send them our way, sir. We will get them to 

the right people. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, and I appreciate that. And it is not just for 

me. I obviously would want it for every Member of Congress as 

people bring in innovations to us. 

And since I have only got 30 seconds, I also want to thank you 

all for promoting unmanned aerial vehicles. I say this as a parent. 

I had two sons serve in Iraq, and I always hoped that there was 

a UAV overhead. And so the technology that has been promoted 

and presented for our troops, we as American citizens appreciate 

that, and I only want more, so for our troops. 

Thank you very much. I yield my time. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Platts. 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I want to just thank all of our witnesses and especially 

thank you for your service. And the work you do is so important. 

As Congressman Wilson just said, what you are doing truly is 
26 

about the safety of our troops on the ground and those in uniform. 

You, both generals, you certainly appreciate that more than I can. 

On this specific follow-up to Mr. Kissell and Mr. Wilson, if it is 

possible, because I think we all have that opportunity where an industry in our districts comes to us and says, ‘‘Hey, we have got a 

great new idea, state-of-the-art,’’ if it is possible for the record back 

to the committee to share in your offices who would be the right 

person or person and so we all have that, and then we can just direct. 

That would be wonderful with my district, central Pennsylvania, 

heavy manufacturing base and a long history of support, industrial, 

military industrial, BAE Systems, General Dynamics. Going way 

back, my brother, who runs forklift at Harley Davidson, when he 

started there he was on the bomb line at Harley Davidson. Not 

many people knew there were bombs casings being made in the 

same factory as bikes, but that has now moved on elsewhere. 

The specific question—Mr. Hunter kind of touched on the M4 

issue pretty in detail, and Roscoe, Mr. Bartlett, followed up on the 

importance of that competition being healthy, engaged—is there 

any more detail on the specific timeframe of the upgrades versus 

the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the new version, or the, you 

know, the advanced, you know, next stage, where we stand on 

that? 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, we expect in the next maybe up to 60 days 

or so, but within the next 60 days, we anticipate that we will get 

the RFP out for the upgrade to the M4 carbine, the upgrade competition. 

I think when we went out for a Request for Information (RFI), 

we got over 20 responses back from industry, so we are pretty confident that we have the capability out there with a robust industrial base, that we will be able to accomplish the upgrades that we 

want for the—— 

Now I will transition to the actual competition for another, the 

follow-on, the next generation, per se. And that critical—or that capability development document is still going forward to the Joint 

Requirements and Oversight Council. We would like to get it out 

this fiscal year, but I can’t commit to you that we will be able to 

do that until we get the requirements through the process to OSD 

and vetted. And then we will get the RFP on the street as soon as 

possible. 

If I could also state, we want full and open competition for this 

new system, so that is what we will go forward with and that is 

what we will present to OSD as well, sir. 

Mr. PLATTS. Okay. I appreciate that and the emphasis on full 

and open, and probably goes without saying that we got great 

American manufacturers here that—full and open so American jobs 

are created as we go forward with that new version. 

And did I understand correctly that one of the challenges has 

been that 14 different entities—it is not just the Army, but who 

you are partnering with in the other branches and that use the 

same weapons platform? 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, many, many services, Special Operations 

Command (SOCOM), Marines, others use our weapons. And a lot 

of the systems that we buy are used by the other services. Another 
27 

example away from small arms, but ammunition, single manager 

for conventional ammunition is PEO Ammunition at Picatinny Arsenal. So our Army program executive office buys bombs and bullets and other ammunition systems for the other services. 

So many of the requirements that we have today that we have 

worked within our acquisition process are actually borne joint before the requirement is ever approved. I hope that answers your 

question, sir. 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you. And just a final comment on the M4. It 

is not the 7.62 mm, but my 13-year-old’s Christmas present that 

he was just hoping for under the tree was the .22 caliber version 

of the M4 that does shoot wonderfully. We target shoot a lot, and 

so another vote of confidence in the M4—different caliber, but a 

great weapon. 

So appreciate the advancements that you are doing and ultimately how that does translate to the men and women out there 

in harm’s way, us doing everything we can. And my thanks, if you 

can convey back to your staffs, both civilian and uniformed, in the 

important work you are doing on that acquisition and research development and all of that. It is so important to protecting our heroes out there, so—— 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, you bet. Will do. 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Actually, I will follow up on that and ask what is sort of the— 

what I think the logical is here, that if the M4 is performing so 

well, why are we having a competition to go out and try to build 

a new rifle? And as I understand it, you are also looking at ways 

to update the current M4. So I am worried that this has been sort 

of—it was pushed a little bit politically, because there were some 

stories about the M4 not performing well. 

And to your credit, to the Army’s credit, now, you did a thorough 

investigation of whether or not that was happening. And the answer that seemed to come back was that, no, it is not happening, 

that, you know, every weapon that we are going to put out there 

could, you know, potentially it won’t perform perfectly. There will 

be problems. 

But relative to any, you know, comparable study of the effectiveness, the M4 is, as Mr. Hunter, who has operated it, pointed out, 

it works. And yet after all that, the result is we are going through, 

you know, what is going to be a somewhat costly study to try to 

look at an alternative. And I agree with the comments of my colleagues about if we go through that process, we do want to make 

it as open to competition as possible. My question is why are we 

going through that process? 

General LENNOX. Sir, I think the Secretary of the Army decided 

about this time last year to commit to a full and open competition 

as a result of some of the concerns that you mentioned. The current 

system can compete against that, so we think that the outcome of 

this, you know, the M4 was stand on its own or not, or it might 

encourage innovation so something better could come from it, 

so—— 
28 

Mr. SMITH. So it is possible that you go through this process 

analysis of alternatives, analysis of ways to retrofit the existing M4 

and you say, ‘‘You know what? We got what we want. We are going 

to stick with it.’’ 

Okay. That is helpful. 

General LENNOX. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. That definitely answers that piece of the question. 

I had mentioned in my opening statement about the backlog of 

trucks that are completed, but not being shipped where they are 

supposed to go. Could you talk a little bit about that? 

General LENNOX. Yes, sir. There are about 5,000 medium tactical 

vehicles now at a plant in San Antonio awaiting shipment. Most 

of those came about because as the truck was being developed, we 

asked for an armored cab. And we did our testing simultaneous 

with production, so we discovered things in the testing that then 

had to go back and be modified in the truck before it can be accepted, so—— 

Mr. SMITH. Trucks aren’t actually—they are not ready. 

General LENNOX. They are not ready. Those are not ready. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

General LENNOX. We have heavy trucks. We have about 14 

heavy trucks that also have to undergo some modification, minor 

modifications before they are accepted. They all have distribution 

instructions so that the minute they are ready and accepted by the 

Program Manager (PM), they are capable of being shipped. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. And just could you walk us a little bit through 

in more detail the Stryker decision on, you know, upgrading them, 

you know, to making them, basically up-armor them so they can 

survive blasts, if they happen to come across one? 

And specifically, one of the questions that in talking to a number 

of people about this I have not had 100 percent clarified is if we 

decide to go with this double-V format—personally, as a proud University of Washington graduate, I think they should have called it 

a W but, you know, nothing is perfect—if they do in fact do that, 

is it possible—and I think in speaking with you gentlemen, I think 

you said it wasn’t—to put that new hull on the existing Strykers? 

Or would it have to be simply, okay, we are going to change the 

Stryker going forward? I mean, that is one of the big questions I 

have about this proposal. 

General LENNOX. Yes, sir, you have got it exactly right. It would 

require a completely new hull, so it is a new production vehicle. 

Mr. SMITH. You could not put it on the existing—— 

General LENNOX. You cannot retrofit it, sir. I think they have 

tried to do some of that, and they found out that the welding—you 

don’t sustain the same force protection when you do it. 

I would like to compliment the members on their encouragement 

of innovation and ideas. GD is the one—General Dynamics Land 

System actually came up with this idea for the double-V shaped 

hull, brought it to us. And that was in January, and now this is 

March, and I believe the Secretary of the Army or Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology has 

sent this forward to OSD. 
29 

Our goal is to produce the test vehicles. If they work, we have 

one brigade set of vehicles that we sent to Afghanistan and put it 

in the hands of our soldiers, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. And that is the goal of this committee is, you know, 

as I mentioned in my opening comments is the Stryker is great in 

many ways. If there is a way to make it more survivable and better 

protect our soldiers, you know, on our committee we want to get 

those out there as quickly as possible, so we want to work on that. 

I did have a—I will ask just one more question and see if any 

more members have. Could you talk about the Humvee recapitalization program a little bit, what your plans are, because I understand your plan is not to build any new Humvees, but there are 

looks—you are looking at ways to update the ones that we have? 

Can you walk us through what your plans are on that? 

General LENNOX. Yes, sir. The Army has met its acquisition objective on Humvees, so we have actually accelerated stopping the 

buying of Humvees a couple of years early, somewhat influenced by 

the fact that in theater commanders are reluctant to let soldiers go 

out because of vulnerability of the Humvee. We have—— 

Mr. SMITH. They are relying more on the Stryker and the MRAP. 

Is that—— 

General LENNOX. Yes, sir. Exactly. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

General LENNOX. We have in fact requested funding in the 2011 

OCO bill to start a recap program for Humvees. We have currently 

a recap program that is about to end at several of our depots. So 

what the Army is wrestling with now is how to bridge the capability between the ending of that program this year, maybe early 

next year, and the 2011 funding that we are requesting. 

Our plan is to recap some of the oldest Humvees and make sure 

that we bring them up to a capability where they are useful until 

we can bridge them into the JLTV of the future. 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, if I could add just to that very quickly, we 

are going to issue the—really, the last order for Army Humvees 

this month to AM General. And that is going to happen actually 

probably in the next few days. However, on the horizon, our emerging requirements from other services, we have over 150,000 

Humvees operating in the Army today, other services, Special Operations Command, foreign military sales. 

So what we know that are emerging requirements on the horizon 

will probably keep AM General and producing new Humvees probably through the first couple of months of fiscal year 2013 not 

through Army orders, but through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 

and other services. 

Mr. SMITH. I would be really curious to pursue that. And I am 

way over time here, but to find out, you know, if the Humvees 

aren’t actually being used, and you mentioned a couple of other 

areas where they might be, you know, building more of them, recapitalizing them, I mean if we are doing that on a program the 

military is reluctant to use, I would really want to look closely at 

the wisdom of pursuing that. So we will follow up on that more. 

Sorry—just turned myself off. 

I do want to get the second panel up here, but I also want to respect members. I am not going around to everybody, but I will give 
30 

Mr. Bartlett a chance to ask further questions, if he has them, and 

I will just sort of ask if any of the other members have anything 

for the good of the order they want to add to this panel. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I just have one comment, Mr. Chairman. It was 

fairly obvious, I think, to almost everybody for a number of years 

that Future Combat Systems was in real trouble. And, you know, 

we have to find some way to pull the plug earlier before we spend 

extra billions and billions of dollars. I hope that somebody is looking at this as a model on how we can do better in the future. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. An outstanding point. Thank you. 

Any other members have anything further for this panel? 

Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. First, I apologize. Thank you for service. And secondly, to just chime in with Mr. Bartlett, we ought to know that 

a proposed weapons system is in trouble when we cannot explain 

it in a way that, you know, normal Members of Congress can understand. 

And the Future Combat Systems was this evolving thing that nobody ever really understood. We just shouldn’t even come forward 

with things that we can’t present with some specificity. It is really 

unfortunate, because we did waste an awful lot of money trying to 

pursue that before it got killed. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Any other members’ comments? 

Well, thank you very much. Appreciate your service and your testimony. And we look forward to working with you on all these very, 

very important issues. 

With that, we will go to our next panel, Dr. Michael Gilmore and 

Mr. Michael Sullivan. And we will take a brief break here while 

we are waiting for people to change positions. 

Mr. SMITH. Looks like we are about ready to go. I will give you 

gentlemen another extra minute there to give folks a chance to 

take their seats. 

Thank you very much. We have introduced our witnesses earlier, 

but I would do it one more time. Dr. J. Michael Gilmore, who is 

the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Michael J. Sullivan, Government Accountability Office, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing. 

And, Dr. Gilmore, my understanding is that you are going to go 

first. You may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF DR. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Dr. GILMORE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. 

At your request I am here today to discuss test planning and test 

results for the systems composing Increment One of the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team, or EIBCT, as I will refer to it, as 

well as test planning results for selected components of the Joint 

Tactical Radio System, or JTRS program, as well as results from 
31 

testing of the Army’s Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle System, or ERMP. So I will just go through those 

in turn. 

Beginning first with the EIBCT, the Army conducted what they 

called a limited user test, which is a test under fairly operationally 

realistic conditions. 

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry. I forgot to do this with the first panel as 

well. You have submitted statements for the record. Those statements will be read into the record, and you don’t have to read the 

whole thing. We will put it into the record. You summarize as best 

you see fit. Thank you. 

Dr. GILMORE. Okay. And that is what I am doing. I am not planning on reading all of that statement that I submitted. 

The Army conducted a limited user test of the EIBCT during August through September of 2009 at Fort Bliss. This was the first 

test in an operationally realistic environment of the components of 

the EIBCT system. It was a force-on-force test consisting of an infantry company and a scout platoon equipped with all of the 

EIBCT systems—and I will explain more of what they were individually—executing missions against an opposing threat force. 

And then also there is the non-line of sight launch system 

(NLOS–LS), which consists of rockets with a capability to attack 

moving and stationary targets, mostly vehicles, up to a range of 40 

kilometers. And there was actual live firing under operationally realistic conditions, a test done of that system in January and February of this year. 

And so based on the results of those tests, as well as developmental testing that preceded those tests, my assessment is that 

each of the EIBCT systems requires further development prior to 

conducting initial operational test and evaluation, which under current schedules would take place in fiscal year 2011. 

And all of the systems have notable performance deficiencies, 

and the demonstrator liability for each of the systems falls below 

the Army’s requirements, and in many instances well below the 

Army’s requirements. 

Now, taking the individual systems, the non-line of sight launch 

system, or NLOS–LS, requires further developmental and operational flight testing to demonstrate improved reliability and the 

required performance of the precision attack missiles infrared seeker. 

During a recently conducted flight test under operationally realistic conditions, two of six missiles fired achieved target hits, and 

four missed their targets. The reason for one of the failures has 

been identified fairly definitively. The Army has a pretty good idea 

of what led to two of the other failures. And then the last failure, 

the root cause is still under investigation. 

But testing has demonstrated NLOS–LS is making progress in 

some areas. The missile warhead can kill armored vehicles when 

it hits vulnerable areas. And missiles using what is called the laser 

designate mode when a laser is shined on a target and the seeker 

in the missile tries to hit that spot on the target, in that mode 

there has been demonstrated success where five of seven targets 

have been hit in both operational and developmental testing. 
32 

And in a limited user test that was conducted in 2009—that was 

before this most recent flight testing—where the operation of 

NLOS–LS with simulated, it was demonstrated to be interoperable 

with the Army’s fire support network and in those simulated engagements was effective in processing electronic fire commands and 

in engaging enemy targets. But those were simulations. 

As far as the Class I Unmanned Aerial System is concerned— 

that is the air vehicle with an electro-optical and infra-red sensor 

that can be used to observe enemy movements—that system meets 

most of the Army’s requirements for air vehicle flight and sensor 

performance. And it was used extensively during the recently conducted limited user test, the one that was conducted last year. 

However, it suffers from poor reliability, and it is also, as General Phillips noted, noisy. It can be heard from a fair number of 

kilometers away. It also can be spotted from a fair number of kilometers away. That is a double-edged sword. Sometimes that is actually good. In the testing it was observed to actually scare some 

of the opposing force away. It made them want to take cover, but 

in general it is a problem. 

Because it was unreliable, that UAS, that unmanned aerial system, was not employed as the backpackable company and platoon 

level asset that was envisioned by the Army, and that is a potential 

problem, because the UAS lacks the range to be employed regularly 

in combat as it was in the test. 

As far as the small unmanned ground vehicle is concerned, the 

SUG–V, it demonstrated a capability to remotely investigate potential threats. However, the range over which it can be operated, 

which is supposed to be on the order of a kilometer, in the test was 

demonstrated to be much shorter, on the order of 50 to 75 meters 

when there were a lot of buildings around, and on the order of 100 

meters or so in more open terrain. 

That is a problem, because it exposes the operators to hostile fire 

and identification. And in fact, a number of the operators in the 

limited user test were evaluated as being killed, because they were 

exposed. 

Both the urban unattended ground sensor, the UUGS, and the 

tactical unattended ground sensor, the TUGS, demonstrated little 

contribution to unit situational awareness. The images they collected were often blank or blurry and provided little actionable intelligence, and very few of the images were sent forward to higher 

echelons of command and beyond the platoon and company level. 

As far as the network integration kit is concerned, it is composed 

of computers and in particular the ground mobile radio that is part 

of the JTRS system. That has demonstrated a capability to receive 

sensor data and pass messages, and still images over the Army’s 

current battle command network, but it is falling well short of the 

Army’s reliability requirements, and soldiers report that it is very 

difficult to use. 

Also, its ability to pass information securely and reliably within 

a network composed of many nodes is yet to be demonstrated. And 

in fact, some of the testing that has been done demonstrates that 

it has problems forming a 30-node network. 

According to the Army’s Test and Evaluation Command, the 

greatest reliability likely to be achieved without substantial rede-
33 

sign for the network integration kit, the two sensors and the small 

and ground vehicle, as well as the Class I UAS, is below the required reliability for each system. So if the maximum reliability 

that you can get by fixing without major redesign is below the required reliability, that means, then, an extensive redesign would be 

needed to achieve the required reliability. 

Finally, the Army will execute a second limited user test of all 

the systems during August through September of this year, and 

this will be an opportunity to assess the fixes that the Army is now 

identifying. Some of the changes that are being made to systems 

that were mentioned by General Phillips, I think, were identified 

before these tests, the limited user tests were done. 

The Army is in the process of doing production qualification and 

other testing of the systems that presumably will surface additional improvements and changes that have to be made. It is going 

to be challenging to get all of those changes in so that we can test 

production representative equipment in this upcoming limited user 

test. 

That is the goal at this point, and then, of course, the initial 

operational test that is supposed to take place next year. We also 

want to test production representative equipment with all the 

changes incorporated. 

As far as the JTRS, ground mobile radio or GMR, and the 

handheld manpacks small form factor or HMS radios are concerned, those programs are working at a complete system development prior to testing in an operational environment scheduled for 

November of 2010, this year. 

But these tests are dependent upon the success of the developmental testing that is ongoing, the development of supporting 

waveforms, how the radios actually transmit information, and network management tools that is how the radios are formed into a 

network and how that network is managed, and the completion of 

other requirements, including radio network architectures that 

means which units will have the radios and which units will communicate with one another, and then plans for managing the network. So there is a lot of work that needs to be done for those tests 

to be executed correctly. 

The rifleman radio, which is part of the HMS program, conducted a limited user test in April 2009 that highlighted deficiencies in reliability, battery life range, and also what we call an 

immature concept of operations. The soldiers basically had a hard 

time figuring out how to use the radios to maximum advantage. 

That radio, the rifleman radio, reliability battery life and transmission range were well below user requirements by factors of two 

to four. There is a new version of that, upgraded version of that 

radio in development, which is supposed to address many of those 

problems, but we haven’t tested it yet. 

The program will conduct a series of tests from April through 

June of this year to verify correction of deficiencies identified in 

this limited user test, and the results of these tests will support an 

acquisition review in August of this year, and the rifleman radio 

initial operational test in November of 2010. 

Manpack radio development testing is being conducted, leading 

to a limited user test in November of 2010, so that testing for a 
34 

number of these radios is supposed to sort of come together late 

this year. But completion of the planning for that test again awaits 

user requirements, including network management plans. 

The ground mobile radio, or GMR, is experiencing now an eightmonth delay in developmental testing due to late delivery of hardware and software. And what that has resulted in is basically a 

compression of the schedule for doing the testing. So they still want 

to do the operationally realistic testing on the same schedule. That 

means there is going to be less time available to test, find problems 

and fix them leading up to that operationally realistic test. 

Execution of that test, that limited user test, depends upon not 

just fixing problems that are discovered in that now shortened developmental test program, but also delivery of a functional wideband networking waveform (WNW) that is very important. That 

has to be incorporated in the ground mobile radio in order for it 

to transmit large amounts of information like, for example, images 

from the sensors I just described, among other things. 

Developmental versions of that WNW, wideband networking 

waveform, performed poorly in tests that have been conducted and 

drew concerns from the National Security Agency with regard to 

security features. GMR—our program is working to integrate a 

new functional, secure WNW in the GMR prior to a November 2010 

limited user test. 

The GMR is a critical component of the network integration kit, 

and if it is delayed, then presumably there could also be an effect, 

perhaps the delay, on fielding the EIBCT systems. 

Now, the overall schedule leading to all of these tests, as I have 

already alluded to, contains substantial risk, because there is little 

time to address corrective actions. There is dependence upon yet to 

be demonstrated waveforms and network management capability, 

and these requirements need to be finalized. 

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry to break in here. It is just that all this 

prompts a question that I just can’t wait to ask. And that is it does 

not seem like these things are going to be ready anytime soon within the configuration that we would need them to be. I mean, the 

UAV alone—I mean, if the whole big advantage of the new UAV 

is that, you know, it has got that hoverability, hoverability doesn’t 

do you much good if everybody can hear it, and, you know, on down 

the line of all what you put forward. 

In your estimation at this point, does it make sense to have any 

procurement money going in at this point for these programs, all 

of which, if I am hearing you correctly, are not just a little tweak 

here, a little tweak there—I mean, they are way off from meeting 

the capabilities that we are asking them for. 

I don’t know if you view it as part of your job to make this type 

of a judgment as to whether or not we should be procuring these 

things, but I am curious in light of that, you know, explanation of 

all those deficiencies in all those programs, is it foreseeable that by 

the end of this year they will have those things fixed to a level that 

makes sense to buy them? It doesn’t seem to me—I mean, a layman’s view, but—— 

Dr. GILMORE. I would really rather demure on saying whether I 

think it makes sense to try and proceed with production, and the 
35 

reason is that I am supposed to be the objective evaluator of the 

systems. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Let me ask the question differently. 

Dr. GILMORE. But let me say this. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Dr. GILMORE. Let me say this, which I think will respond to part 

of your question. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Dr. GILMORE. It will be a challenge, a major challenge, to correct 

all the deficiencies that we have identified. And the Army acknowledges that. The performance deficiencies that I noted are a concern, 

but the reliability problems are a particular concern. 

Based on the experts that we have consulted, the reliability 

shortfalls that were demonstrated in this test normally would 

imply that you would need on the order of perhaps two years to do 

redesign efforts in order to be ready and meet the reliability requirements that the Army currently says it wants to meet. 

Now, later this year and in fact throughout the year, but later 

this year, I think in the November timeframe, the Army is going 

to need to review progress in improving reliability of the systems 

and also review whether all of those requirements actually makes 

sense, because there is a history of requiring more reliability than 

is needed. We want systems that are reliable, but sometimes we try 

to press too far. And we will obviously be involved with the Army 

in doing that kind of an evaluation, so—— 

Mr. SMITH. And I get that but, you know, in this instance, and 

I will inquire further of you and of others, it doesn’t seem like, you 

know, we are looking for a big leap ahead in ability and, gosh, you 

know, we are only getting about halfway there, but we are still 

leaping ahead. 

I am struggling with a lot of these things to see how they are 

any better than what we have right now. Now, granted, I am sure 

there is an answer to that, and I will try to get that. But that, I 

think, is the big question. Is there progress here at all in terms of 

the capability over what we are buying now for a lot less money 

in some instances? 

Dr. GILMORE. Well, we have worked with the Army at the direction of Dr. Carter to institute what we call a comparative test now 

for the initial operational test and evaluation, which will be done 

next fiscal year. But in that test we are going to have a battalion 

that is equipped as the units are being deployed now, conducting 

the same missions and being evaluated in the same way that a battalion equipped with these systems—— 

Mr. SMITH. And when is that? I am sorry—when is that test? 

Dr. GILMORE. That is next year. That is next fiscal year that initial operational test is going to be conducted. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Dr. GILMORE. So we will have information at that time on how 

well the systems are improving the capability of the unit through 

all what we are buying. And we need a battalion’s worth of equipment in order to do that test. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Sorry to hijack there—please. 

Dr. GILMORE. Oh, I do it for you. 
36 

Then as far as the ERMP, which is the last system that your letter asked me to assess, the secretary directed a surge in ISR, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support for operations in 

both Afghanistan and Iraq. And as part of that surge, the ERMP 

Quick Reaction Capability (QRC), there is one unit that has already been deployed, and there is a second QRC that will be deployed later this year. 

And in the ERMP we have something that we developed for all 

these major systems called a test and evaluation master plan 

(TEMP), which describes how they should be tested. And that socalled TEMP calls for a series of operational tests conducted in conjunction with the unit training to support that surge. 

So what we are doing is incorporating into our test planning 

training to support the surge. These units, these ERMP units, are 

being deployed before full operational testing takes place, but we 

are trying to incorporate the training and other things that need 

to be done to get the units out there early as part of our testing 

plan. And so far that has been quite successful. 

The initial operational test and evaluation of the full system is 

scheduled to be conducted in September 2011 with a full rate production decision in April 2012. And as I said, there will be at least 

two of these quick reaction units that have been deployed prior to 

that testing. 

The Army conducted what they call a customer test in April of 

last year, and my office provided what we call an early fielding report, which is required under law in that circumstance, to the defense committees in September 2009, assessing the ability of that 

first Quick Reaction Capability of that unit to accomplish its wartime mission. 

And what we found was that—and that testing was conducted in 

flights over Edwards Air Force Base—what we found was that that 

unit did effectively employ the ERMP as it existed at that time, although the ERMP, the aircraft, was limited in its capability at that 

time. It didn’t have synthetic aperture radar. It was not able to employ hellfire missiles. It did not have a secure line of sight communications, and it didn’t have satellite communications capability at 

that time. 

The development just hadn’t proceeded far enough for all those 

capabilities to be ready, but since that customer test in April 2009, 

actually all of those systems, all of those additional capabilities 

have been incorporated in the aircraft, and they are being used in 

Iraq right now, and they will be available for the next QRC when 

it deploys later this year. 

The Army plans to conduct another limited user test at the National Training Center this time with the Quick Reaction Capability II unit, so that unit will be involved in testing, and at the 

same time it will be training for its deployment later this year. And 

as part of that testing and training, it will also be operating with 

other units with which it will be operating when they all go to the 

theater later this year. 

Full production representative testing will occur in an initial operating test in fiscal year 2011 for ERMP, and then there will be 

a follow-on operational test in 2012, because there are going to be 
37 

additional capabilities, in particular new synthetic aperture radar 

incorporated in the aircraft that we need to test later on. 

And all of those tests will be conducted in conjunction with the 

unit’s deployment to the National Training Center, so there will be 

testing and training that we will be combining in that series. 

And so my assessment of what has happened with ERMP, notwithstanding the fact that we are deploying this capability before 

we have done full operational testing, the testing that has been 

done has been robust, and it has been very useful, because it has 

been combined with the training, and we do need to get these capabilities out as quickly as we can. And I think this is a good example 

of how we have been able to do that and also test them. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore can be found in the Appendix on page 82.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. Sullivan. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION AND SOURCING, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Bartlett and other members of the committee. 

Before I start, I would just like to introduce Bill Graveline here 

to my left. He has been the assistant director on the Future Combat Systems program for GAO for longer than probably he wanted 

to be—probably 8 to 10—well, since 2003. So he has got all of our 

corporate knowledge, and I am kind of new to it. I have him in case 

your questions get too tough. 

It is my pleasure to be here with you today to discuss the current 

status of the Army’s modernization efforts since the secretary’s decision to restructure the Future Combat Systems program back in 

April. 

My testimony will focus on current challenges and opportunities 

for the Army as it moves forward with its modernization plans, including its current contracting activities, our views on the status 

of the Brigade Combat Team initial increments, and our views on 

the ground combat development effort as well. 

For the time being, the Army is using the modified Future Combat Systems development contract to continue to increments of development of the Brigade Combat Team equipment and its supporting network. It has also awarded a contract to procure a long 

lead items for the initial Brigade Combat Team equipment and has 

issued a modification to that contract recently to begin low rate initial—— 

Mr. SMITH. If I could ask, Mr. Sullivan, your testimony—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Gilmore did a pretty thorough job of covering a 

lot of the specific details of that. If you see things that are redundant, if we could please move past that. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Okay. 

Mr. SMITH. We want to get to some questions. I think we get 

kind of the overall gist. If there is something new in addition that 

you want to add—— 
38 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Okay. What I would probably do is just summarize our views on how the testing went and where they are today 

in the acquisition strategy. 

In light of the issues that we have discussed here today and the 

problems that they have had in the task and focusing mostly on 

the reliability problems that they had, we are concerned at this 

point that the Army’s production decision that was approved by the 

Department is too risky at this point. 

The Army is proceeding with procurement despite having acknowledged that the systems are immature, unreliable and can’t 

perform as required. The decision to move into production with this 

risk is also at variance with DOD’s own acquisition policies, some 

of the new policies and some of the best practices that emphasize 

knowledge-based and incremental product development. 

As a result, in our soon to be released report, which is out for 

comment right now and with the committee, I believe—it is still in 

draft form—but we are intending to recommend that the Army correct all of the maturity and reliability issues with the initial increment that testing has or will identify before the Department approves any additional production lots moving forward and before 

any of the systems are fielded. So that is kind of where we are on 

Increment One and follow-on increments. 

Our views on the Ground Combat Vehicle development effort are 

perhaps a little more optimistic at this point. DOD made a material development decision this February, and over the next several 

months, it will be conducting an analysis of alternatives, which has 

recently been kicked off. 

Once the analysis of alternatives is done, I believe, in early fall 

this year, it is planning to follow that with a Milestone A decision 

on whether to award multiple contracts to begin technology development in order to mature technologies prior to going to Milestone 

B. 

In addition, it is currently proposing the use of competitive prototyping with multiple contractors during technology development, 

which will emphasize mature technologies. And it is planning a 

preliminary design review to validate contractor readiness to go to 

systems integration prior to Milestone B in fiscal year 2013. 

These are all pretty much plans that go according to a lot of the 

new policies that have been laid in, a lot of the acquisition reforms 

that were heard about last year, and tend to follow best practices, 

although they are still very much in their infancy and can change. 

Current plans are to deliver the initial vehicle in fiscal year 2017, 

about seven years from Milestone A to first delivery. 

So, Mr. Chairman, as you can see, the current post-Future Combat Systems modernization environment is mixed with what is 

going on today, and it is still taking form. It is important to note 

that when we add up all of the funding available in the Future 

Years Defense Plan (FYDP) today for ongoing development and 

procurement funding for Brigade Combat Team increments and development funding for the Ground Combat Vehicle, this represents 

about $24 billion of investment in the Army’s plan budget from 

2011 through 2015. 

With that amount of money on the line, it is critical to get these 

things right this time, we think. That is why we will also be recom-
39 

mending that the Army report to the Congress by the end of the 

fiscal year the details of its new modernization acquisition strategy 

in full, including plans for program management and contracting 

strategies. 

Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement, and I will be happy 

to take questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the Appendix on page 92.] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

On the Ground Combat Vehicle, it seems that the Army’s—you 

know, they have issued their request for proposal for it at the same 

time they are doing an analysis of alternatives, as I understand it. 

Does that fit with the acquisition policies when you do the analysis 

of alternatives first and then make the request? How do those two 

things mesh? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is a good question, and I think there is probably a nuanced answer to this because, first of all, I think the analysis of alternatives they are doing is not—you know, there are different types, I guess, of analysis of alternatives. 

If you are trying to come up with a material solution for a new 

capability to defeat a new threat or something like that, you might 

start an AOA much more broadly and consider first whether you 

need an airplane, a tank or a ship, and then kind of get down to 

what the material solution would be. 

In this case, I think it is pretty clear that they are replacing 

Ground Combat Vehicle, so they start out, I think, with less broad 

scope that way. That is less risky, in my opinion. 

What we have done is we have looked at it and asked why they 

would need to be, is there a reason to be concurrently? Is there an 

urgent need for these, the Ground Combat Vehicle, right now that 

they have to press it into an acquisition program and start spending a lot of money today? And if there isn’t, why not take the time? 

Do an analysis of alternatives, which should be informing proposals 

anyway, probably, for new technology. 

That would be the question that we have right now. Why? You 

know, there is no truly urgent need to get this program going now, 

so why not do the AOA first and then see what you get out of that 

and see if that can inform contractors’ proposals. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

And, Dr. Gilmore, back on the EIBCT and then the other component parts, I think, you know, what I am going to need to research 

more carefully is what exactly is the increase in capabilities, as I 

said. I mean, it is pretty clear that the program is not where they 

want it to be and that it is going to take a bit of a pull together 

there. 

Now, that has all kinds of implications in terms of budgetary decisions in the short term, but I am also curious that if we are going 

to make that type of investment, I think it is going to need to be 

a little bit clearer, at least to me, why, you know, what is the improvement? 

And I would ask you one question about that. So we are going 

to field a battalion, basically, of the new equipment and tough it 

out as opposed to a battalion of the old equipment. Can you walk 

me through—and this is my ignorance to a certain extent—the tim-
40 

ing on that, why that is happening? It is happening next year, as 

I understand it. In the meantime we are procuring and moving forward with a lot of this equipment and testing it. 

I guess I don’t understand how that sort of plays out. You would 

like to have that test performed first before you even buy all this 

stuff and figure out whether or not it is going to help you. Is this 

something they have done historically in a lot of other programs? 

Can you enlighten me a little bit? 

Dr. GILMORE. Actually, with regard to conducting initial operational test and evaluation, the low rate initial production units 

are used to do that. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Dr. GILMORE. So typically, we start to produce, but we would like 

to make sure that we have production—we have to make sure that 

we have production representative equipment in those so-called, 

low rate initial production (LRIP), units. Those are what we buy 

in order to do operational testing. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Dr. GILMORE. Now, of course, we oftentimes also buy more of 

these LRIP units than are actually needed for testing for the reasons. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Dr. GILMORE. But the short answer to your question is yes, this 

is what we typically do. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. And is there an additional threshold in terms 

of—because, obviously, you don’t want to procure a bunch of stuff 

that you know isn’t going to work, just to run this test. So I imagined there is an initial threshold of, okay, let us get it to this point, 

and then we procure for the test that we are talking about. Is that 

the way it plays out? 

Dr. GILMORE. Our major concern, I mean, the exact threshold 

that is associated with approving Milestone C, it has not been my 

experience there is an exact threshold. There is a lot of judgment 

involved there—— 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Dr. GILMORE [continuing]. Judgment on the part of the Department’s leadership, particularly the Under Secretary for Acquisition. 

And Dr. Carter in his acquisition decision memorandum (ADM), 

which I assume you have read, acknowledged clearly all of the 

problems that I have discussed—— 

Mr. SMITH. But made the decision to go ahead. 

Dr. GILMORE. But as I recall, the ADM said because of the secretary’s direction to provide capability to our soldiers in the field 

as quickly as possible, we will proceed. But he has specified a number of constraints on funding. There are also a number of reviews 

that he is going to conduct throughout the year, including reviews 

of the results of this production qualification testing and other testing on the EIBCT systems. There are going to be at least two of 

those reviews this year to review those results. 

So, yes, we do use these LRIP units. It is a matter of judgment 

as to when a Milestone C is granted, you know, whether it should 

be granted, given progress in the program. When it is to initial 

operational test and evaluation, which will be in the fourth quarter 

of 2011—I think you were pressing me for a little bit more speci-
41 

ficity on when it would be—it is currently scheduled for the fourth 

quarter of 2011. 

We would insist upon fully production representative equipment, 

and there are other so-called operational test and readiness criteria 

that are specified in this test and evaluation master plan, capabilities in terms of reliability and performance that the equipment 

should have demonstrated at that point. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Dr. GILMORE. Basically, it needs to be fully production representative. 

Mr. SMITH. Makes sense. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Gilmore, as you know, the Increment One Early Infantry Brigade acquisition decision memorandum signed by Dr. Carter directs DOT&E and the Army to conduct, as part of the initial operational test and evaluation, a comparative test of the EIBCT 

equipped units with units equipped as currently deployed for operations. 

Given the reliability and maturity concerns that have already 

been discussed, this is obviously going to be a very important test. 

Can you give us an idea of how the planning is going, if you have 

any issues or concerns going forward with this comparative test? 

Dr. GILMORE. As was directed in the ADM you mentioned, I was 

asked to work with the Army to develop an initial plan, which I 

have done, which was also supposed to contain detailed information 

on the measures of effectiveness and measures of performance that 

we would use to compare the ability of both of these units equipped 

with the systems and not, to accomplish wartime missions. And 

that has all been done. 

The planning will continue over the next many months. We have 

to decide on what kinds of scenarios that we are going to use. I am 

interested in making sure that we have distressing scenarios, you 

know, a mission that will be hard to accomplish, that involves surprise, so that we can discern the benefits in situational awareness 

that the sensors in the EIBCT system are supposed to provide. 

They are supposed to provide enhanced situational awareness, 

and then the NLOS–LS is supposed to provide a somewhat unique 

capability to hit moving targets, and so we want to make sure that 

scenarios are constructed to highlight those features as well or 

show that we haven’t achieved an increase in capability in that regard. 

So I guess I would say in summary that we have started well. 

We have detailed measures of effectiveness that we will continue 

to look at and evolve. And we have embarked on a process to define 

the scenarios and do the other planning that is necessary, and that 

is going well. 

The one thing I am concerned about, and I am concerned about 

this with regard to the second limited user test that is, you know, 

another company level test that is supposed to be done later this 

year, is that we not repeat the problems that we had in the limited 

user test that was done this past year, where we had a good test 

plan, but we did not execute it. 
42 

We did not collect as much data as we could. We think that a 

number of the failures that occurred actually weren’t reported, so 

probably these estimates of reliability that are in my detailed testimony are actually optimistic, even though they are not very good. 

We want to make sure that we don’t commit those same mistakes again, and we are working hard with the Army, with the 

Army Test and Evaluation Command, to make sure that we have 

enough observers and enough gatherers of data and interpreters of 

data and analyzers of data so that we don’t re-create those problems that really caused a lot of lost information in the last test. 

And given my conversations with the leadership of the Army 

Test and Evaluation Command and the interactions my staff is 

continuing to have with them, I am fairly confident we won’t recreate those problems. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Sullivan, this is more of an acquisition policy lessons learned 

kind of question. I would like for you to compare and contrast two 

things. Number one, what went wrong in terms of acquisition strategies with the DOD Army decision to begin low rate production for 

Increment One of BCT modernization with two, what the Army is 

promising and what we hope transpires as they move ahead with 

the Ground Combat Vehicle? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Good question. I think what went wrong 

with the Increment One is basically if you look at DOD’s new policies and the things that have come out of some of the legislation 

that was passed last year, and if you look at best practices that 

GAO has looked at a lot from some world-class companies, who developed some pretty complicated products, what you find is the new 

policy calls for reliability growth curves coming out of the critical 

design review that is based on production representative prototypes. 

Add to it that before you have a Milestone C, typically, you want 

to have a reliability growth curve established, which is basically 

mean time between failure rates and things like that that you have 

plotted on a curve and you have established on that curve a trend 

towards improvement. 

That is what you need to have established in order to reduce the 

risk enough to go to low rate procurement. And we don’t believe 

they did that. We think that they have not established the trend 

yet and so that the decision to begin low rate production and commit procurement dollars to that Increment One is too early and too 

risky. That is what we mean when we say it is at variance with 

the new policies and with best practices. 

But what we see in Ground Combat Vehicle is a program, a plan 

that has been laid out that really pretty much you can see that 

they have taken the reform legislation, the changes to the acquisition policies that have been put into the 5000 Series, and looked 

at a lot of the best practices and are trying to do things much more 

incrementally, much more knowledge-based. 

They have a plan now to go with only mature technologies. They 

are going to do a lot of competition early. There are a lot of systems 

engineering funding upfront in order to get requirements right. 

You know, the one thing we would question why they are doing— 

they have let proposals out before they are done with an AOA, but 
43 

we still think the AOA will be done in time to inform the technology development part of this. 

And so the program as is laid out now reduces risks at the proper time. It is trying to—it has got plans in there to balance requirements, to take care of the trade space before they made that Milestone B decision, which is where really the big money starts getting 

spent on an acquisition program. 

The Increment One for the Brigade Combat Teams has rushed— 

they have kind of rushed through that low rate procurement decision. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Dr. GILMORE. If I could, I would like to make one comment on 

reliability growth planning with regard to the EIBCT. The test and 

evaluation master plan for EIBCT has recently been revised. It is 

setting in my office. It now incorporates detailed reliability growth 

planning and reliability growth curves in testing. So I think that 

is relevant to the discussion. 

Mr. SMITH. And just so I follow up a little bit and be educated 

along the way here—I know some of it; I have seen some of it, but 

keeping track of all of it is complicated, but very important—as I 

understand it, we already in 2010 we have procured the money for 

the test battalion, basically. 

And they haven’t spent that yet for the very simple reason that 

they don’t have a product worth buying yet. So they have still got 

that money. And then what they are asking us to do and what has 

been put into this budget is actually to procure—and correct if I am 

wrong—three out of the nine brigades long-term with that equipment, which just initially, you know, it seems like a pretty big pull. 

So that is going beyond the test step, before any of this testing 

is done, and that even if you were willing to take that risk with 

this program, because you do have to take some risks. I do recognize that. We want to get this stuff in the field so that, you know, 

our troops have what they need. And you can’t, you know, wait for 

everything to be perfect before you do that. I understand that balance. 

But within the acquisition area, this sort of advance procurement 

before testing is approved, again as I understand it, it is supposed 

to be somewhere in the 10 percent of what you are buying range. 

Three out of nine rather comfortably above 10 percent—doesn’t 

that violate the acquisition reform approach that we have done? 

And what do your—first of all, does it? And second of all, what 

would be the justification for doing that? 

Did you want to—— 

Dr. GILMORE. As I am reading the ADM here, it says that Dr. 

Carter approved low rate initial production for one Brigade Combat 

Team and long lead of no more than $70 million, which is a down 

payment for the second Brigade Combat Team. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Dr. GILMORE. And anything in addition to that is going to be dependent upon the results of the testing and everything else that is 

done this year and the outcome of these two in progress reviews 

that are going to be conducted. That is my understanding. 

Mr. SMITH. That is two instead of three. 
44 

Dr. GILMORE. Yes, well, it is sort of one-plus instead of three. It 

is one—he approved the procurement for one EIBCT and long lead, 

but not for funding for the second. So, yes, we have started, but 

we haven’t committed to all three. 

And then procurement of the non-line of sight launch system was 

limited to $35 million, depending on completion of flight testing, 

and that flight testing was just completed last month. And that 

will be the subject of some of these reviews that take place over 

the next few months. 

So I add that information to you. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Dr. GILMORE. That is my understanding of what is going on. And 

I think I have already commented upon, as much as I can—— 

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely. 

Dr. GILMORE [continuing]. On the rationale for the Milestone C 

decision to proceed with low rate initial procurement. 

Mr. SMITH. Gotcha. 

Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, I wouldn’t dispute that Dr. Carter looked at 

this very carefully and understands the risks and has put some decision-making in there to try to mitigate those risks. 

But I guess what we see is when you have—if I could just for 

a minute, in 2003 that—in 2003 when Future Combat Systems 

started as another transaction, by the way, that was right after the 

Department did their last policy revisions for acquisition policy and 

tried to put more risk mitigation into those policies. 

This is just so reminiscent of that. You know, you have policies 

for a reason. So there is momentum. I guess my point is that they 

are past Milestone C now. 

I believe—don’t quote me on this, but I think somewhere around 

$400 million of procurement money is in the fiscal year 2010 budget, and another 600-and-some, so by next year, if that budget holds, 

they will have $1 billion of procurement money invested in Increment One, and they don’t know the reliability at all at this point. 

So it is a variance threat. 

Mr. SMITH. No, that certainly seems to me to be at least worthy 

of a raised eyebrow and further inquiry. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. And I think that is kind of where we are now as 

with the raised eyebrow, you know. It is just beginning, and we 

want to stay in there. The recommendations we are making, we 

don’t believe they are draconian in any way and probably are reasonable. So we have to keep an eye on them. 

Mr. SMITH. I think that is all we have got. 

Oh, sorry. Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I would like to join the chairman in his concern 

about rush to procurement, when the equipment that we are now 

using is not demonstratively deficient. I think of the MRAPs program, and clearly, there was a clear and urgent need for MRAPs, 

and we pulled out all the stops and made that procurement in 

record time. 

But where there is no driving need like that, I am having some 

trouble, along with the chairman, understanding why we rush so 

much with such huge expenditures of money. If what we have got 
45 

is pretty good, why can’t we do it very deliberatively with much 

less expenditure of money and much less risk? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I just think that is an excellent point. In MRAP, 

you know, they made the trades early, told the warfighter what 

they were going to get before they started, and then delivered that. 

And here, the requirements may go down on this before it is all 

done, and that should have happened in Milestone B—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. Right. 

Mr. SULLIVAN [continuing]. Or before Milestone C, anyway. 

Mr. SMITH. And I will just conclude by saying that is something 

we are going to be taking a very, very close look at, you know, is 

the requirements. 

And throughout this whole discussion, I am reminded of something that my predecessor, Mr. Abercrombie, said about the Future 

Combat Systems, which was, you know, it seems like the Army, 

you know, was tired of the Navy and the Air Force having all these 

big-ticket items going way crazy over budget and getting all the 

money. And, you know, they are the Army, so they get just a little 

piece here, a little there, so they had to come up with their own 

massive program so they could get a piece of that as well. He, obviously, was being facetious. 

And I do understand clearly the need, you know, to update our 

brigades as we go forward. But I think we have to go from just sort 

of that general understanding that with technology, with improvements and innovation, we want to try to get, you know, the best 

equipment out there as often as we can with a clear understanding 

of what that improvement is, not just the general notion that, you 

know, the next thing we build is always going to be better than the 

last thing we built, so we had better start building something new, 

which I realize is not what they have done. 

But they have got to come up with much more specificity as to 

why this is getting better and how it is going to get better, if we 

are going to proceed on this. And we will continue to work on that 

in the weeks and months ahead before we do our bill out of committee. 

And then I imagine we will continue to work on this throughout 

the legislative process as, you know, any of these problems will 

have some ongoing testing. There will be certainly further analysis, 

and we will want to see that on a regular updated basis and make 

adjustments accordingly in what is in our authorization bill. 

So I thank you gentlemen for your work—very technical, very 

difficult, and very, very important to do our best to get it as right 

as we possibly can. And we certainly could not do that without both 

of you and our previous panel as well. So thank you very much for 

your testimony. 

And with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 10, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 10, 2010 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 10, 2010 

(113) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL 

General LENNOX. The Army is actively acquiring and pursuing a broad range of 

capabilities to counter an equally broad range of cyber threats. For example, the 

Army is acquiring capabilities that not only address network and enclave perimeter 

security but also host-based security, e-mail security, web security, cyber situational 

awareness, cyber forensics analysis and other requirements. Concurrently, the Army 

is transforming the business processes for procurement and acquisition of products 

that defend against cyber attacks, beginning with its process for vetting Information 

Assurance (IA) products. The Army has hosted several meetings with other DoD organizations, including Office of the Secretary of Defense/Networks Information Integration (OSD/NII) and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), to discuss 

testing at the product level. The Army is actively engaged with OSD/NII in the 

staffing of DODI 8100.EE, Unified Capability, which is intended to establish procedures for achieving reciprocity throughout DoD for key information technology products. [See page 18.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 10, 2010 

(117) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL 

Mr. KISSELL. During the hearing I asked about the Army’s procurement and acquisition of products to defend against cyber attacks. Is the Army pursuing feasible 

solutions to the wide variety of cyberthreats? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. The Army is actively acquiring and pursuing a broad range of capabilities to counter an equally broad range of cyber 

threats. For example, the Army is acquiring capabilities that not only address network and enclave perimeter security but also host-based security, e-mail security, 

web security, cyber situational awareness, cyber forensics analysis and other requirements. Concurrently, the Army is transforming the business processes for procurement and acquisition of products that defend against cyber attacks, beginning 

with its process for vetting Information Assurance (IA) products. The Army has 

hosted several meetings with other DoD organizations, including Office of the Secretary of Defense/Networks Information Integration (OSD/NII) and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), to discuss testing at the product level. The Army 

is actively engaged with OSD/NII in the staffing of DODI 8100.EE, Unified Capability, which is intended to establish procedures for achieving reciprocity throughout 

DoD for key information technology products. 

Mr. KISSELL. Is the Army integrated into the national defense strategy? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. Yes, the Army is fully integrated into the 

national defense strategy. As stated in the report of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense 

Review, the national defense strategy recognizes that ‘‘the Department of Defense 

balances resources and risk among four priority objectives: prevail in today’s wars, 

prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide 

range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.’’ 

Due to our national objectives and the character of the conflict in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, Army forces—multipurpose and special operations—are the forces of choice for 

prevailing in today’s wars. Both of those wars involve operations among the people 

which highly value the human intelligence capabilities of ground forces and the discriminate, precision application of force that only ground forces can provide. Your 

Army also provides the expeditionary endurance necessary to convert immediate 

battlefield successes into longstanding strategic success. 

In nearly all of our Nation’s wars, significant ground forces have played a central 

role in achieving our national political objectives. The same is true today in Afghanistan and Iraq. Army forces are versatile. They can be employed across the spectrum 

of operations to support civil authorities and render assistance to distressed people, 

to restore basic services to populations, to secure and rebuild nations as part of the 

interagency team, and defeat state and non-state forces that threaten our national 

interests or our allies. 

Finally, the priority objective of preserving and enhancing the All-Volunteer Force 

is aimed, we believe, directly at the Army. Our Soldiers and their Families have 

willingly and selflessly deployed multiple times to Iraq and Afghanistan, but the 

stress of eight plus years at war is felt on every Army installation, in every Army 

unit, and in every Army Family. We are dedicated to doing whatever is necessary 

to fully support those Soldiers and Families that have dedicated their lives to the 

defense of our Nation. 

Mr. KISSELL. How does Cyber Command plan on organizing, training, and coordinating with the Services? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. As Cyber Command is under the purview 

of U.S. Strategic Command, issues related to that organization are outside our purview upon which to provide a response. 

Mr. KISSELL. Is the Army vulnerable to an attack that could compromise operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Korea? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. Just like any organization with a large 

computer network, the Army faces daily risk of attacks and is constantly identifying 

and defending against new and emerging threats. While network security in a combat zone is of high importance and has its own specific and particular challenges, 

the Army approaches network security at a global level. Vulnerabilities in any part 

of the network potentially create a possible attack vector, which ultimately could af-
118 

fect Army operations. Risks range from something as simple as poor user training 

and out-of-date anti-virus software, to complex cyber attacks requiring the investment of millions of dollars to mitigate if the attack is successful. These costs do not 

begin to qualify or to quantify the impact to operations when a network is unavailable. 

Currently, thousands of potential threats are defeated every day via technology 

fielded through multiple layers of network defense; and a structured, tiered response to actual incidents that minimizes the impact and the cost to operations. Additionally, the Army continues to identify and to invest in new technologies in order 

to keep pace with the known and predicted threats. 

To meet the unique capabilities that Army operations require, the Army, under 

a three-star billet, will stand up Army Forces Cyber Command (ARFORCYBER), 

which also will support U.S. Cyber Command. The majority of the forces for a combined Army operations center are already in place at Fort Belvoir, VA. The new 

command will bring unprecedented unity of effort and will synchronize all Army 

forces operating within the cyber domain. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS 

Mr. OWENS. Section 818 of the Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization 

Act allows the Secretary of Defense to ‘‘eliminate, modify, or add to the firms included in the small arms production base.’’ The original small arms industrial base 

legislation limiting competition was based on a 1994 Army Science Board report. 

Since the industry has substantially changed in the last 16 years, what changes will 

you make to the small arms industrial base to expand competition and encourage 

innovation? 

General LENNOX. The Army will review its requirements for small arms critical 

repair parts and industrial capability to meet those repair parts requirements. If 

and when the Army determines that changes are supportable, the Army will make 

appropriate recommendations for change to the Secretary of Defense. At this time, 

the Army has no difficulty in acquiring critical repair parts, barrels, bolts and receivers, for the designated small arms. 

Mr. OWENS. The Army Procurement Justification Book indicates the Army requests $20.1 million to procure 11,494 M4 carbines and that the carbines will be 

procured from Colt Manufacturing Company, Inc. with a sole source, firm fixed price 

contract. Why is this a sole source contract and not competitively bid? 

General LENNOX. The Army is initiating a new Individual Carbine full and open 

competition to potentially replace the M4. Until the new carbine is fielded, the Army 

must continue to sustain the M4 capability. If the Army were to compete the production of the M4, and a new vendor was selected, it would take up to two years 

to qualify the new vendor’s production line and would cause up to a two year break 

in M4 deliveries. As a result, the Army’s plans to seek a sole source justification 

and authorization for these reduced production deliveries. 

Mr. OWENS. What are the Army’s plans to develop, test, and compete a followon to the M4? 

General LENNOX. The Army will initiate a Full and Open competition for the next 

Individual Carbine (IC) as soon as the IC Capabilities Development Document is 

validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The candidate weapon systems will undergo various environmental and performance testing before the selection of the best overall candidate. The successful offeror will take over delivery of 

carbines to the Army as soon as it successfully completes all necessary additional 

testing, the production line quality is verified, and the production capacity is sufficient to meet the Force’s fielding requirements. 

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