DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, LINDA PAGELSEN, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, 

ADAM HARRIS, ANN REESE, BROOKE BOYER, TIM PRINCE, MATT WASHINGTON, B G WRIGHT, 

CHRIS WHITE, CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, Administrative Aide 

PART 3 

Page 

Africom ....................................................................................... 1 

Navy and Marine Corps Military Personnel ..................... 57 

Combat Aircraft Acquisition ................................................. 167 

Army Aviation Programs ....................................................... 223 

Shipbuilding Programs .......................................................... 273 

Missile Defense Agency .......................................................... 329 

Fiscal Year 2010 Department of Defense Budget 

Overview Hearing ................................................................ 413 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 


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PART 3—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2010 


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2010 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ROBERT E. ‘‘BUD’’ CRAMER, JR., Alabama 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, LINDA PAGELSEN, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, 

ADAM HARRIS, ANN REESE, BROOKE BOYER, TIM PRINCE, MATT WASHINGTON, B G WRIGHT, 

CHRIS WHITE, CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, Administrative Aide 

PART 3 

Page 

Africom ....................................................................................... 1 

Navy and Marine Corps Military Personnel ..................... 57 

Combat Aircraft Acquisition ................................................. 167 

Army Aviation Programs ....................................................... 223 

Shipbuilding Programs .......................................................... 273 

Missile Defense Agency .......................................................... 329 

Fiscal Year 2010 Department of Defense Budget 

Overview Hearing ................................................................ 413 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

56–285 WASHINGTON : 2010 


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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

MICHAEL HONDA, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

JERRY LEWIS, California 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New 

Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

BEVERLY PHETO, Clerk and Staff Director 

(II)


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(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2010 

THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 2009. 

AFRICOM 

WITNESSES 

GENERAL WILLIAM E. WARD, USA COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND 

MARY PLEFFNER, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

JERRY LANIER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

OPENING STATEMENT

Mr. BISHOP. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Good morning. This morning the committee will hold a hearing 

regarding the United States Africa Command, AFRICOM. We are 

pleased to welcome General William Ward, AFRICOM’s commander. 

General, thank you for your service, and thank you for being 

here this morning. You have had a long and distinguished career. 

I will just say to the committee that I was extremely proud to be 

able to witness the excitement when you received your four stars. 

So it is a very special privilege to have you here and to welcome 

you to the subcommittee. 

With AFRICOM fully functional for 6 months, this hearing offers 

a timely opportunity for the subcommittee to get an update on how 

the stand-up of this new command is progressing and on the challenges and opportunities it is confronting in Africa. 

For too long, the United States has paid Africa very little attention, focusing on the continent only long enough to respond to crises. Within the Department of Defense, the responsibility for Africa 

has heretofore been divided among three separate commands: European Command, Central Command and Pacific Command. With 

everyone responsible for Africa, no one was responsible for Africa. 

U.S. attention to the continent has been uneven, inconsistent and 

poorly organized to adequately anticipate, prevent, or respond to 

the crises on the continent. 

Africa occupies about 31⁄2 times the size of the land area of the 

Continental United States. It is home to nearly 900 million people 

and 53 nations. It is rich in human and natural resources, and Africa’s strategic importance has never been more obvious than it is 

today, a fact that the United States has been somewhat late in recognizing. 

Over the last decade, China, Iran and al Qaeda have all made 

significant and growing investments in Africa. It is in this context 


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that AFRICOM was conceived to create one unified command, to 

maintain a consistent focus, and to coordinate DOD policy toward 

the vast and increasingly important continent. But AFRICOM, the 

debut of the Africa Command, has not gone smoothly. 

First, in the context of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a lack of outreach to African leaders allowed suspicion to grow with potential 

African partners who feared that AFRICOM was the first step toward the establishment of a large, permanent U.S. troop presence 

on the continent. Not surprisingly, only one African nation, Liberia, 

publicly expressed its willingness to host AFRICOM’s headquarters, which are still located in Stuttgart, Germany. No government agreed to host any one of the five regional integration 

teams—the small, lightly staffed mini-headquarters that would 

have allowed AFRICOM to maintain closer, more consistent contact 

with African leadership. 

Second, unfortunately, the Rumsfeld Pentagon declared that 

AFRICOM would be taking the lead on all U.S. policy toward Africa. That was a stance that was not only untrue, but it was also 

unhelpful in persuading the Department of State and the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) to share with 

AFRICOM the advice and expertise that AFRICOM has sought 

from those interagency partners. 

Finally, AFRICOM’s purpose, mission and organization were not 

adequately explained to this body to assuage the concerns that the 

new combatant command was not just one more in a long line of 

instances where the Department of Defense was taking over the responsibilities that rightly belonged to the State Department. 

Questions from members of the committee will very likely address these issues and many others, and I think that we can look 

forward to a very interesting and useful question-and-answer session. 

General, before we hear your testimony, I would like to call on 

the Ranking Member, my good friend and mentor, Mr. Bill Young, 

for any comments that he would like to make. 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I want to welcome General Ward here. 

This is a very important issue. Africa is a very important part 

of the world, and our presence there is extremely important. I 

know the General knows that at one point, there were those in the 

Congress who thought that the Africa Command should be disbanded and eliminated. We resisted that because we think it is important. The work you do is very, very important, and is good for 

the United States and for our relationship with the African communities. 

So, General, thank you for being here today, and we appreciate 

the good work that you are doing. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Young. 

General Ward, please proceed with your summarized statement. 

Your entire statement, of course, will be placed in the record. 


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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL WARD

General WARD. Well, Congressman Bishop, thank you very much, 

sir, and it does seem like almost 3 years ago when I pinned on the 

fourth star. It was only yesterday, but in other respects, it seems 

an eternity ago. Three years, in fact, has not gone by quickly. 

Mr. Young and distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to provide this overview of the United States 

Africa Command. With me today are Ms. Mary Pleffner from our 

Department of Commerce as well as Mr. Jerry Lanier from our Department of State. 

Today Africa Command is executing our mission of conducting 

sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs and military-sponsored activities to promote a stable and secure African environment. We work in concert with other U.S. Government agencies as well as with international partners to ensure 

that our activities are harmonized. Our strategy is based on military-to-military efforts to enhance the security capability and the 

capacity of our African partners. 

In many engagements with African leaders during my time as 

commander of U.S. Africa Command and previously as deputy commander for the United States European Command, the consistent 

message that they gave me is their intent for African nations to 

provide for their own security. Most welcome our assistance in 

reaching their goals for security forces that are legitimate and professional, that have the will and means to dissuade, deter and defeat transnational threats, to perform with integrity, and that are 

increasingly able to support international peace efforts. 

We work as a part of the overall United States Government effort. We work closely with the Department of State, with the Chiefs 

of Mission and country teams, with the United States Agency for 

International Development, with the Departments of Treasury, 

Commerce, Homeland Security, Agriculture, and other agencies 

that do work on the continent. Like Secretary Gates and Admiral 

Mullen, I fully support enhancements to the capabilities of our 

interagency teammates. 

Similarly, we reach out to international partners, including Europeans, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, 

private organizations, and academia. Their perspectives on the situation in Africa are valuable. The United States Africa Command 

is involved in military training, education, sustainment, and logistic support among other activities that occur throughout our area 

of responsibility. 

The Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa, headquartered 

in Djibouti, conducts training, education and civil military assistance that helps prevent conflict and promote regional cooperation 

among nations of eastern Africa. 

Operation Enduring Freedom, Trans-Sahara, is the military component of the Department of State’s counterterrorism partnership 

with North and West Africa nations. 

Africa Endeavor is an annual communications and interoperability exercise that this year will include 23 African nations. We 

support the State Department’s African Contingency Operations 

Training and Assistance, (ACOTA) that trains, roughly, 20 battalVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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ions of peacekeepers a year. The peacekeepers have deployed to 

United Nations and African Union missions across the continent. 

Recently, we have helped deploy Rwandans and some of their cargo 

to the United Nations’ mission in Darfur. Continuing deployments 

of the Africa Partnership Station provide training to the navies and 

coast guards of maritime nations in the Gulf of Guinea and the 

East Coast of Africa, helping them better secure their own territorial waters. 

Given the lack of infrastructure within Africa and the island nations, our sustainment infrastructure, forward operating sites and 

en route infrastructure are vital. I endorse upgrades to these activities and in keeping these key infrastructure nodes in service. The 

enduring presence at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti makes possible 

our engagement in East Africa and in other parts of the continent 

as well as supports our U.S. strategic goals in that part of the 

world. 

It is my honor to serve with our uniformed and civilian women 

and men of the Department of Defense as well as our interagency 

teammates who are making a difference on the continent every 

day. Their dedicated efforts are a testament to the spirit and determination of the American people and our commitment to contributing to the well-being and security of our Nation and the people 

of Africa. 

Again, thank you for your support, and I look forward to further 

participation in this important hearing. Thank you, sir. 

[The statement of General Ward follows:] 


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THREE D STRATEGY

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, General. 

This is a very, very significant and important command that has 

been stood up. Certainly, I think it can and will play a very, very 

vital role in our national security. 

The Appropriations Committee noted in a report that accompanied the 2009 Defense Appropriations bill that traditional U.S. 

military operations are not an appropriate response to many of the 

challenges that are facing Africa, including poverty, famine, armed 

conflicts, political corruption, and the spread of HIV/AIDS. 

Of course, AFRICOM has responded to this concern by saying 

that your programs are driven by the Three D strategy—Diplomacy, Development and Defense—which aims to balance the full 

spectrum of our national security resources to meet the challenges 

that Africa faces today. 

Would you state for the record for us what the Three D strategy 

is and how it is being used by AFRICOM, and why it is important 

to incorporate the diplomatic and development efforts in planning 

operations of the combatant command and, where there is a conflict, who the final arbiter is when DOD, State or USAID disagree 

about a course of action and who pays for it? 

General WARD. Thank you, sir. 

First, as you pointed out, we clearly understand that when you 

look at the Three D—Defense, Diplomacy, Development—those activities work, in my mind’s eye, in a very harmonious way. Mr. 

Bishop, I will tell you that it did not just occur to me in this assignment how critical those linkages are. 

Beginning with my time on the continent almost 20 years ago, 

going through my time in the Balkans as I commanded the stabilization force for NATO, my time in the Middle East and working 

activities there, what is very apparent to me is that in order to 

produce stability in an area, security has to take hold so that development and diplomacy—those actions and attitudes of elected representatives who do things in support of their people—occur together. 

So the Three D strategy recognizes the importance of a coherent 

approach to what we do that causes elements of security to be 

closely supportive of those things that need to go on in the field of 

development as well as diplomacy, institutions of government, that 

take care of its people so that they are, in fact, working as effectively as they can work. 

Our role in that is not to do development, not to do diplomacy 

but to assure ourselves, as best we can, that those activities that 

we perform in the defense arena are as supportive of those other 

two legs of the triad as possible. Everyone who would be involved 

in that would, in fact, pay for their part of it. The activities that 

we do are obviously paid for by our defense budget as a part of our 

role in accomplishing that Three D strategy. 

I think I would say that, when you look at what we do compared 

to the totality of what is being done on the continent, our portion 

of that budget is very small. I cannot cite the numbers, but I can 

cite an example. 


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If you look at a program, just one, the PEPFAR—the initiative 

for the prevention of HIV/AIDS—that program is well in excess of 

$6 million on the continent. Our total program of activities on the 

continent are much, much, much less. So we do not have numbers 

in our defense activities that in any way compare to what is going 

on in those other activities—development and diplomacy. In our efforts, we work very closely with the Department of State and with 

USAID so that our activities are, in fact, complementary to what 

is being done by the other elements of our government. 

Most significantly, the Ambassadors and the country teams have 

a very heavy say in what we do, to the degree—if an Ambassador 

or a country team recommends against doing some particular military or security activity, we do not do it, because our activities fully 

support or align with our foreign policy objectives. We look to our 

Ambassadors. We look to our work that we do in the relationship 

we have with the Department of State and also inside the U.S. 

Agency for International Development, to ensure that our work 

complements theirs and does not contradict theirs. 

Mr. BISHOP. I have to agree with you. I think the fiscal year 2009 budget was $400 million, and USAID spent $6 billion. 

General WARD. I meant billion. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. This was just on the HIV/AIDS programs. 

When there is disagreement, though, who is the arbiter? Do you 

defer always to the Ambassador? 

General WARD. Quite candidly, we get to resolution prior to getting to the conflict, and I will tell you how I try to do this. 

As we developed our campaign strategy, our theater plans—and 

we did this now beginning almost a year ago at the onset of planning right here in Washington, D.C.—we met with the Department 

of State and with USAID. As we developed our strategy and as we 

are now developing our campaign plans, those agencies are a part 

of our planning process so that as we move ahead, we are not coming up with programs and projects that are outside the parameters 

of what they would see as important activities for us to accomplish 

in support of the development and diplomacy. 

We carry it a step further when it comes to the execution of those 

plans and programs and in working very closely with the Ambassador and with the country teams. Then ultimately, if we go 

through all of that process and it comes to the execution on the 

ground, for timing reasons and for the atmospherics of a particular 

situation, if the Ambassador says, ‘‘I do not think we should be 

doing that just yet,’’ then I would say we would not do it. 

So who resolves the conflict? Typically, we do not have conflicts, 

but if something were to occur that would say that doing a particular military activity at this point in time is not wise and that 

comes from our diplomatic community, I would defer to that recommendation. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Young. 

PIRACY

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

General, a lot of things are going on in Africa that are troublesome to the United States, that are troublesome to the world and 


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that are troublesome to anyone who is civilized. I am talking about 

Somalia, and I am talking about the piracy off the coast—the 

kidnappings, the holdings for ransom, the taking over of ships with 

oil and arms and things like this. Do you play a role in any of these 

issues? 

General WARD. Thank you, Representative Young. 

Yes, sir, we do. The at-sea portion of our counter-piracy effort is 

conducted by the U.S. Central Command. So we are fully aware of 

those activities. We are fully involved in what they are doing, the 

work of that combined task force at sea. That coalition of international forces from various nations will come together to conduct 

naval patrolling at sea. 

When it comes to the suspected pirates who may be apprehended 

as a result of those counter-piracy actions, we play a role, as those 

pirates are then brought ashore on the continent. We work with 

the governments of East Africa for their taking those suspected pirates into custody and in further adjudication of the particular 

case. 

We also are involved in the work that we do—and you talked 

about East Africa, the nations of East Africa—in helping them to 

increase their capacity to provide better control over their territorial waters, which, in fact, is a counter-piracy measure as those 

nations have better control over their sovereign force. We do that. 

We know that for Somalia, in particular, the lack of an effective 

government is clearly the root of why we have these pirate activities to the degree that they occur. Clearly, they could occur anywhere. Piracy is not a new phenomenon in this world, but to the 

degree that they occur, the lack of an effective government in Somalia is a part of that. 

To that degree, we clearly support, again, our stated foreign policy objectives of support to this Transitional Federal Government 

and what is done there to help them be more effective in governing 

their territory. Should our policy dictate otherwise, we then would 

be involved, as so stated, by our foreign policy. So we see the lack 

of effective governance as one of the root causes of the piracy efforts. 

We support those counter-piracy efforts as they go on, as we 

work with our friends and neighbors, both our fellow agencies, including Central Command, as well as working with the nations in 

the East of Africa to adjudicate suspected pirates once they have 

been apprehended. 

Mr. YOUNG. General, the Navy, of course, has the primary responsibility in dealing with the pirates. But in the Somalia area, 

are you called on to provide any direct or indirect military support 

of any of the activities in or around Somalia? 

General WARD. My command is not, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Say that again, please. 

General WARD. My command is not. 

Mr. YOUNG. It is not. 

General WARD. It is not. 

Mr. YOUNG. As for your military presence, actually as far as personnel under your control, you have a very small command, actually, don’t you? 


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General WARD. A very small command. We do not have a military presence in Somalia, my command. 

IMPROVEMENTS TO HEADQUARTERS

Mr. YOUNG. Well, you have a military presence in Stuttgart, Germany. Several of our staff members paid a visit to your headquarters last year, and what they found was a headquarters that 

was relatively inefficient, with wires strewn across the floor, trying 

to keep all of the electronics together. 

Do we have anything in a budget request to improve or to make 

more effective your headquarters in Stuttgart? 

General WARD. I think we do. That is a work in progress, Mr. 

Young, what was seen a bit ago. Every day, improvements are 

made. I count it as a victory when I can pick up the phone or can 

send an e-mail and it goes to the same address. And we are getting 

more and more of that in that way. 

I think as to the renovations to our IT infrastructure and to our 

force protection requirements, we have seen steady progress now 

over the year and a half that we have begun to renovate our facilities. We have a bit more to go, and some of that additional work 

is, in fact, in the budget submission that we have sent forward. 

Mr. YOUNG. I am aware that there is no real consideration of 

moving your headquarters to Africa, but is there any consideration 

of moving it to another location other than Stuttgart? 

General WARD. Not at this time, sir. I would say that the work 

that we are doing there in Stuttgart is work that—because Stuttgart is one of our enduring communities overseas, that work—regardless of my command being there for another 3, 5 or 10 years, 

whatever the case may be, I have—or permanently, I just do not 

know—there is no consideration. But regardless, those enhancements to that infrastructure would be used by whatever U.S. Government activity that would fall in on it, because it is one of our 

overseas enduring locations. 

Mr. YOUNG. Okay. General, thanks for what you do. We appreciate the importance of what it is that you do and what your command does, and thank you very much for being here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General WARD. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

LOCATION OF AFRICOM HEADQUARTERS

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General, good morning. 

General WARD. Good morning, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I am most proud of you. 

General WARD. Thank you. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I have watched this since the announcement 

last February 2007 when the former administration announced a 

new command. I know that you were fully operational in October 

of 2008, just recently, a year and a half, as you say, just under a 

year and a half. I have watched your career. I am most proud of 

what you have done for our country as well as for your new command assignment. 


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I was going to ask the Germany question on Stuttgart, and you 

have explained it. It has been one of our best partners over the 

years, probably since World War II and beyond. Yet I did not understand why we were not moving it, and I understand it takes 

time to get up. You have said 3, 5, 10 years from now. 

Do you foresee our having the command on the continent ever? 

Is it necessary? 

General WARD. Thank you for that, Ms. Kilpatrick. 

Two things. There is clearly a potential that the headquarters 

could be somewhere located on the continent of Africa—or some 

portion of the headquarters. In today’s environment, it is not essential. It is not something that is important for now and what we are 

doing. From my perspective, our work that we do is the important 

thing. Our program is the important thing. Our staff headquarters 

with the planning that it does, quite frankly, could be done from 

anywhere, that planning function. 

Right now, Africans see us as partners and allies, not as part of 

their problem. So, for many reasons, being on the continent today 

is not something that is either necessary or has been sought after, 

because it is not the central part of doing what we need to do to 

bring value added to our program on the continent. 

Our presence on the continent, as leaders of Africa have told me 

and as our Ambassadors and country teams have told me, is better 

realized through our offices of security cooperation—those programs that we implement, the support that we provide; not the 

headquarters function, the planning function—— 

MILITARY TO MILITARY (MIL TO MIL)

Ms. KILPATRICK. Okay. Hold it. I appreciate that. 

So when I was reading military to military—mil-to-mil, I guess, 

as you call it—what exactly is that as it relates to my former question? Is it mil-to-mil toward governments of the world? I know 

throughout this, you have called them ‘‘states’’ and not ‘‘countries,’’ 

and there must be a reason for that. We call them ‘‘countries.’’ You 

call them ‘‘states.’’ Is there a reason for that? 

General WARD. They are countries. They are nations. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And they have their own hierarchy and whatever. What is the mil-to-mil? What does that really mean in the capacity that our command in Africa serves? What does that mean? 

General WARD. It refers to the work that we do with the militaries of the nations of Africa as they attempt to increase their capacity to be more professional, to be able to conduct themselves as 

legitimate military with integrity. 

So it is the work that we do, from training, to providing the sorts 

of orientation, to how militaries perform in legitimate societies. It 

is young soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and sometimes civilians 

who are working with the militaries of these nations to increase 

their capacity to be more effective in providing security for themselves. It is helping them understand proper techniques for boarding if they see something in their territorial waters that ought not 

be there. 

How do you board a vessel that has not been transmitting its intent to ensure that your personnel are as safe as they can be as 

well as protecting those with whom you are about to interact? It 


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is our program called the Africa Deployment Assistance Phase 

Training, where nations of Africa in their quest to provide for their 

own security have said, we will volunteer and we will support 

peacekeeping efforts in places like Darfur, Somalia, but we need 

some help to get there. 

So it is training assistance that we provide when they pack an 

airplane or they load a train to conduct a rail movement. It is the 

training to determine how you properly secure cargo, how you properly pack the back of an airplane so that what is being loaded is 

loaded in a way that does not cause some unintended explosion, because you do not pack flammables with foodstuffs or ammunition 

or things like that. 

It is that sort of military professionalization enhancement activities that this military-to military work that we do is about. That 

is the focus of the military exercises—interoperability—so they can 

work better as neighbors. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And bring the confidence and the exactness they 

need as well. 

General WARD. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Finally, when we started out—I think the 

Chairman alluded to that—we did not have any communities that 

would want that cooperation. 

Have we moved in our diplomatic relationships with them to 

have a better understanding and relationship whereby that might 

now be possible? 

General WARD. That is a great question, ma’am. 

Ironically, even at the outset when we had this debate about 

whether or not they wanted the command on the continent, they 

had never said they did not want that level of cooperation. That 

level of cooperation has always been desired, and that was the 

point about it because they never said, ‘‘We do not want to cooperate with America.’’ They have never said that. 

As for the programs that were in existence prior to the creation 

of the United States Africa Command, being conducted as Mr. 

Bishop indicated, heretofore through three different commands, our 

message was we will not see any degradation of those programs because that was a fear that they had had. So that is why the focus 

on adding value to the programs was my focus as opposed to a 

focus about where we might station our headquarters that created 

the misperceptions about what our intentions were. So therefore 

that whole argument was not helpful to promoting our national security interests or in supporting the interests of the Africans in increasing their capacity to provide for their own security. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I like that. I think that is exactly the way to 

proceed. Thank you, General, for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

NO-FLY ZONES

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you for your service. 

Apropos of your discussion with my colleague as to the issues of 

expectation with a new administration and not pointing fingers at 

the last administration, there is an expectation that we will be conVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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centrating more of our efforts, not only through military but a lot 

on the people behind you, in looking at the needs of the African 

Continent and in understanding that there are many sovereign nations and that there are also expectations on the African Continent 

that we will be more involved in critical issues. Some of the greatest crimes against humanity have occurred in Africa. Periodically, 

we hear calls for intervention when humanitarian crises reach the 

extremes that some of these cases have. 

I just wonder, are you prepared in that regard? I mean there has 

been talk of no-fly zones. This is more than transporting members 

of the African Union and troops, but are you ready? Do you, perhaps, anticipate that we may be doing more there than we are 

now? 

General WARD. Thank you for that, sir. 

Two things. The forces that we use to do our engagement, which 

is the preponderance of our activities—our theater security cooperation, our military-to-military engagement, our forces that 

could range from individuals up to small sizes of groups, squads, 

platoons, ranging 10, 15—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What I am talking about is we see, obviously, cases of incredible horrors and deprivation, of unbelievable 

starvation, and people are saying here at home, why aren’t we 

doing something about it? In some ways, you can use AID and you 

could use the State Department, but in reality, you often need the 

power and might and mobility of the military to get the job done. 

I just wondered how you are putting that into your overall calculations as a possibility. 

General WARD. What we do, sir, is our development of plans, addressing contingencies, be they disaster assistance relief, humanitarian assistance, but our planning then identifies the resources 

that would be required to execute that plan. I do not have forces 

assigned to do those missions. I would be required to submit a request for forces that would then be received by Joint Staff and 

acted upon by the Secretary of Defense, because it would require 

the allocation of forces to conduct the military work that would be 

required to do in order to satisfy a situation that you have described. 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Okay. Weapons of mass destruction. There 

is a feeling that some of those who have been operating in the Middle East will find fertile ground in certain countries. Have you 

found evidence of that? I know you work pretty closely with the 

Intel Community and a variety of others—the DEA, the Drug Enforcement Agency. 

What have you found? How are you dealing with it since many 

countries do not have the ability, quite honestly, to stop that type 

of trafficking or to stop the development of this type of an activity, 

or who do not have the military or, perhaps, the political will to 

do anything about it? 

General WARD. Well, first, I would say here that I have no direct 

knowledge or evidence of that occurring. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, one of the reasons the command was 

set up, though, was for the possible proliferation or advancement 


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of weapons of mass destruction finding their way to the African 

Continent in those countries that might be somewhat conducive to 

that type of activity. Correct me if I am wrong. 

General WARD. No. No. That is clearly a part of our mission set. 

The work that we do in working with the host nations and their 

security structure and apparatus are specifically designed to address their capacity to, in fact, deal with that should it arise. 

As I was saying, I see no evidence of that at the current time, 

but our ongoing effort and our persistent engagement is, in fact, 

designed to help them increase their capacity to prevent that from 

occurring. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So, just for the record, you see no evidence 

of that type of activity? 

General WARD. Correct. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. All right. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Visclosky. 

General WARD. But, sir, if I may, the threat is clearly there and 

the potential is there. So therefore the work that we do with these 

nations is to address that threat and to hopefully prevent it from 

occurring. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Moran. 

SUDAN

Mr. MORAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Ward, thanks for testifying. More importantly, thank 

you for your service on one of the few continents that, despite conditions, seems to look up to the United States for leadership. 

The budget for AFRICOM took a big hit last year in this committee, largely I think because there was insufficient coordination, 

explanation, et cetera of what you were planning. So the committee 

wiped out most of the budget from $300–plus million down to about 

$80 million that was restored in conference with just a $40 million 

cut, as I recall. But I think this is something that we need to get 

a better understanding of as to what you are doing. Frankly, if we 

are going to adopt the so-called ‘‘smart power’’ premise that it is 

more effective, then this is the kind of activity that we need to invest in. 

I know China is doing it particularly in Africa but also in South 

America and on any number of continents, and they are making 

progress in establishing relationships. We had a very substantial 

study done by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). If anybody is interested in it, we can share it, but this is a clear strategy 

with a substantial investment on China’s part. 

One of the problematic things about China’s involvement is that 

it is amoral. I am not saying immoral. They just have no moral 

compass with which they make these decisions, and that becomes 

abundantly clear in their relationship with President al-Bashir of 

Sudan. One of the reasons Khartoum is as prosperous as it is is 

because of China’s investment, frankly, so our sanctions would 

have very little effect. 

I was just at a conference on Sudan, and the situation is getting 

much grimmer because the International Criminal Court has indicted Bashir. He has chosen to take it out on the Darfurian people 


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by withdrawing all of the aid agencies—the nonprofits, the NGOs. 

So it will continue the policy of genocide, perhaps in a less direct 

but equally effective way. It will be a genocide of starvation, of unclean water—unsanitary water—which will spread disease; and of 

course, it will be the lack of health care. 

One outbreak, whether it be meningitis or whatever in those 

camps, spreads to everybody. We know about the dramatic instances of genocidal activity sanctioned by the Khartoum regime 

and of the gang rapes of every woman regardless of age, from the 

very youngest to the oldest. 

Something has to be done. We now have a presence on the continent but, really, no intervention in what Bashir has accomplished 

with regard to the genocide of the Darfurian people. Three hundred 

thousand have been killed, all told, about 2.5 million in that country. It looks as though, if there is not some intervention, as many 

as another 1.5 million are vulnerable to the same fate. 

I have gone on for a few minutes to give you an opportunity to 

compose your thoughts. 

How do you think we as a Nation should address this outrage 

against humanity occurring in Sudan? 

General WARD. Sir, thank you for that. 

Like all of us, I think it is absolutely terrible these crimes—the 

rapes, the killings—that are committed against any human being, 

and it is something that we abhor as any person would, the absolutely disdainful and horrible treatment of a human being. 

I think from the standpoint of how we approach it, it is something that, as you point out, is the role of the world community in 

addressing those sorts of things. I think it certainly requires that 

type of a consensus because, otherwise, the gaps that might exist 

in whatever may occur could be filled by someone else who would 

not have the same sentiment. So I think, from that regard, it does 

imply a consensus approach to solving a very complex and terrible 

situation. 

Obviously, I do not sit in those circles, sir, so as our policy formulations are determined, you are aware there are military aspects to 

that then. Because of where that country sits, in my area of responsibility, then I will clearly be charged with taking the appropriate action to deal with the military aspects of whatever policy 

that might be determined. 

It is something that the world community, I am sure, is paying 

attention to. I know we are paying attention to it. As that discussion continues for determining what those activities will be, I think 

it makes good sense for us to be prepared and to be ready to do 

whatever part we are asked to do in support of that policy decision. 

Mr. MORAN. Could I ask one follow-up? 

Mr. BISHOP. The gentleman’s time has expired, but go ahead, Mr. 

Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. I thank the indulgence of the Chairman. 

That is a perfect answer. It could have been just as well given 

by any diplomat with the State Department. It is exactly what you 

are supposed to say. 

We have sent somebody over—a nice guy. We have told him to 

go jaw-bone, which will have zero result. As you know, you are very 

well-informed and you are experienced. From what I can gather, 


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you are pretty much a caring person as well, so you must have 

come up with some ideas in your mind. I mean, if you do not want 

to share them publicly, I would like to hear them. 

For example, if the President were to pull you aside and say, 

‘‘General, what do you think we should be doing with regard to 

Darfur?’’ that is what I would like to hear. Now, you may want to 

be discreet and tell me afterwards, but that is what I am trying 

to get your perspective on, because it is tough to just stand by and 

see it happen with our hands in our pockets. 

General WARD. Yes, sir. The thing I would say—and I would be 

happy to share some of that with you, sir. 

The thing that I would say is it is no one thing. It is a combination of things that are required here. The military piece of it would 

be only a single piece. There are many things that would need to 

occur, and I think we ought to be approaching it in that very holistic way, sir; because to address it in only a single line, without considering those other lines would only achieve, if at all, very shortterm results. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Tiahrt. 

CHINESE ECONOMIC PRESENCE IN AFRICA

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Ward, for serving the country. I know you 

could do a lot of things, but serving the country is what you have 

chosen, so I appreciate it very much. 

Recently, I visited the Command and General Staff College at 

Fort Leavenworth, and I met a young man who is an officer from 

one of the countries in Africa. And I cannot remember the country 

off the top of my head, but I hope that you will find those officers 

who go through the school and will continue a relationship with 

them, because many of them become, eventually, their countries’ 

leaders and they could become tremendous allies. 

I was reading Time magazine. Its latest issue had 10 trends that 

they see coming in the future. One of them was the economic expansion in Africa, and they highlighted a lot of involvement by the 

Chinese in purchasing businesses. I was wondering what your perspective is of the Chinese presence in Africa. Is it military? Is it 

economic? 

We know from this recent spy who defected to America from 

China that they are conducting a lot of activities in the counterintelligence area, but that they are also trying to penetrate our 

economy as well as our defenses. 

I wonder, military-wise, is their presence in Africa very large? Is 

it small? What is your perspective on that? 

General WARD. Sir, I thank you. 

From what I have determined, the Chinese presence in Africa is 

largely geared towards economics—access to resources. I do not see 

a great presence militarily. I do see Chinese military personnel on 

the continent. A lot of them are involved in infrastructure activities, engineers, doing engineering sorts of work—roads, building 

buildings, et cetera. I think that is being done in response to their 

desire for access to resources there on the continent. 


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The point that you made to begin with, sir, with respect to the 

officer at Fort Leavenworth as a part of our International Military 

Education and Training Program, I, too, think that is a very important program. I think it is one of the things that, quite candidly, 

provides us our best long-term return on investment with respect 

to militaries and security structures on the continent of Africa that 

perform with integrity because of the exposure of those men and 

women who come to our country, who participate in that training 

and who carry those experiences back to their countries. So I am 

a firm supporter of that. 

The point that you made with respect to keeping in touch with 

those individuals is an extremely critical one to me as well. 

Mr. TIAHRT. One other tool that I think is available to us is, in 

a lot of Third World countries, if we develop trade with them, with 

their governments, in the form of defense products, sometimes that 

is a longtime trade relationship that becomes a political relationship that becomes a good ally. There is some hardware available 

like that—it is called the AT6B—that may be a good tool to move 

them. It is a light aircraft. It has great ISR capability. It may be 

a tool that you want to look into as far as what you use in assistance of that as well, but it certainly could be an open door for a 

lot of these governments that need to become good allies in the future, and I hope you will take a look at that. 

General WARD. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BISHOP. Ms. Kaptur. 

RELIGIOUS PRACTICES

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Welcome. It is good to have you before us this morning. 

From your vast experience, General Ward, just comment about 

the changing nature of religious practice across Africa, of the different faith groups—Islam, Christianity and different tribal religious practices. You can comment country-specific or just overall. 

As you look at the sweep of history, what do you see happening 

across Africa? 

General WARD. Well, I thank you for that, ma’am. I do not know 

if I would be an expert on that, though. I would offer a few observations. 

Clearly, the role of the tribes, of the clans, and the historical and 

cultural attitudes still are very, very predominant regardless of 

what the religion may be—Christianity, Islam or other. I think 

that is still, to this day, very, very instrumental in whatever religious belief that may be being practiced. I think there are clear 

groupings, and religion remains a priority; it remains a focus. Most 

nations in Africa pay attention to religion in ways that define their 

society based on their culture. 

One of the things that for our command is very important is this 

notion of how we understand cultures, how we understand the society, how we understand the people, because of how that influences 

who they are. And then, quite candidly, how it should be guiding 

our interactions with them so that we approach it from understanding who they are as a people. 


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Recently, in South Africa, my command participated in a worldwide chaplain conference, with chaplains from various militaries 

from around the world, to include from the Continent of Africa. 

They gathered to discuss the role of religion in military societies— 

correction—in the military institutions, not so much from the 

standpoint of directing or guiding, but does it have a role in the 

values, in the morals, et cetera, et cetera, of a religious military institution. 

The fact that the meeting even occurred acknowledged that there 

is a role to be played, that there is a place for this in military 

units, again, not promoting one religion or another but in drawing 

upon those common tenets that might be there from, as I said, 

treating people with dignity and respect, the value of a human 

being, values in a more broad sense, professionalism, what that 

contributes to professional militaries. 

So there is an awareness of it. I think there is an ongoing discussion of the role that the militaries could play—correction—that religions could play in the military. 

ROLE OF RELIGION IN POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Ms. KAPTUR. If I could interrupt, General, in a nation like 

Kenya, for example, if one looks at some of the political instabilities 

there and you tried to peel off the different layers of what might 

be contributing to that, the role of religion and of a religious affinity, rising fervor among some groups, I think, would be very, very 

important to understand in the work that AFRICOM may be about 

here. 

I do not think we as a country are very good at understanding 

that in other nations, and sometimes we try to contain it in very 

inappropriate ways, and we end up shooting ourselves in the foot. 

So I think particularly across northern Africa—and I am not an 

expert on the nations of Africa—I have noted kind of an inability 

to accommodate what is really going on in some of these societies. 

What you said about tribes is very interesting. You know, there 

is a tribal loyalty first. What draws people? I have often thought 

that—for example, from our country, many of the organizations 

that I am aware of from our State of Ohio who are working in Africa are doing much better work—many of them have religious 

underpinnings of some sort—than the Government of the United 

States in building lasting friendships and in really helping people, 

particularly those who are desperate. 

So I will just place that on the table, and I am sure that my time 

has expired here, but I thank you very much, and I do hope you 

pay greater attention to that. Thank you. 

General WARD. Thank you. 

Mr. BISHOP. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am all set, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. BISHOP. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE—HORN OF AFRICA

Ms. KILPATRICK. Just one thing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 

usually do not have a second time at this. 


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The Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa, in Djibouti, 

they have a special program that deals with counter-extremism 

and a strategy of, as they call it, cooperative conflict prevention. 

Talk to us about that. The Horn is a very important part of the 

continent. 

What about that program? Is it helpful in that the Horn may be 

doing other things? 

I understand yours is a military command and that what we 

need on the continent are all kinds of agencies working together to 

rectify some of the things that are wrong in that part of the world 

where over 800 million people live, and similarly around the world, 

where many other countries are in conflict. We have severe conflict 

on the continent. That is why I am glad you are there, that we are 

there in a military capacity, not to mention that all the other 

things are not needed. We need them, too. 

In the Horn specifically and as it relates to the cooperation conflict prevention strategy on it—you may call it something else— 

what exactly is that? 

General WARD. Thank you for that, ma’am. 

Two things. First, what we have found is that when we bring together various nations and their military structures together, we 

bring them together sometimes for the first time to work together, 

to cooperate, to see a regional issue through a common lens. So, for 

us, this notion of cooperative conflict prevention describes the fact 

that, together, they can in fact address a common threat, but to address that common threat requires some degree of collaboration, of 

cooperation, of working together, of building trust and confidence 

among themselves, not just in a bilateral way with us. 

So this program that exists in the Combined Joint Task Force— 

Horn of Africa, where we conduct seminars, training exercises, 

brings in nations who are neighbors but who might not otherwise 

be exposed to one another. In so doing, something that might arise 

as an issue does not, because they are talking, they are interacting, 

they are within the command, they are in Djibouti. 

We have a robust liaison program whereby the nations that are 

a part of the East Africa region, the Horn of Africa, bring their officers into the command, as well as liaison officers, sharing back and 

forth with their home governments what is being done, again, increasing confidence, increasing trust among themselves, increasing 

understanding. 

In so doing, that cooperative arrangement serves to help prevent 

something that might otherwise occur in the form of mistaken perceptions and misunderstandings of intent. It reduces the likelihood 

of that when you come together and you work in a cooperative way. 

It just takes away some of the potential for some of those conflicts 

that may have been unintended. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And your command is the lead in bringing that 

together; is that right? 

General WARD. Well, we do it. Others do it as well, but we clearly recognize that it is a very important part of our engagement 

strategy. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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AFRICOM STAFFING

Mr. BISHOP. I thank the gentlelady. 

Let me ask you, General, in regards to your interagency support 

for AFRICOM, originally you had sought to fill 25 percent of the 

staff positions from other than DOD agencies. As of March 1 of this 

year, it appears that that objective has been abandoned and that 

only 2 percent of the AFRICOM staff has worked for agencies other 

than DOD. By the end of March, 29 of the 1,058 filled positions will 

be occupied by interagency staff, including 5 from USAID, 5 from 

the Department of State, and others from Commerce, Energy, and 

Homeland Security. 

Why has AFRICOM abandoned the original goal of 25 percent 

non-DOD staff? What is the preferred mix of DOD versus non-DOD 

staff? Has it been difficult to recruit staff from the other agencies? 

How does that shortage of the non-DOD staff affect your ability to 

execute the Three D strategy? 

General WARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Two things. 

I wouldn’t say we have abandoned it. I don’t know if Kip Ward 

ever had it as a goal. I think that, as the command was going 

through its formulation, as our transition team was considering 

how the command might be organized, how it might be formed, 

what its dynamic might be, this was—and I will be very candid 

with you—this was just, kind of, thrown on the table as a goal. It 

may have been rooted more in the ability, some budgetary considerations. 

But I will tell you that today, from my perspective, what we are 

receiving from our interagency partners is very adequate to our 

work and ensuring that the perspectives of what goes on by our 

other governmental agencies are represented in our command because of the way we have matrixed our organization, because of the 

way that we are looking at how we integrate those members from 

the interagency who are a part of our command into our structure 

from the highest levels, including, as you know, one of my deputies, 

through echelon, as we work our various groups and committees. 

We are working with the interagency, and it is not just those 

who are there in a permanent way. There are those who come in 

on a continuous basis, in a TDY function to come in and work, to 

understand the role that they could play. 

Mr. BISHOP. Do you think that the balance is sufficient? Do you 

want to increase the non-DOD, or do you think it is good the way 

it is? Do we need to help in that regard? 

General WARD. It is continually evolving, sir. And I think that 

there are additional spaces that we think would be good to have 

in the command. But, again, we are learning about that. And, as 

we learn about it, then we go out and we request that. And, in 

most instances, the agencies are providing the support that we 

would seek. 

Mr. BISHOP. I raise that question because the concern that was 

expressed in the report language and by the Committee in the 2009 

bill reflects the fact that we are not completely clear on the role 

that the non-DOD agencies are playing, and that they really don’t 

want DOD to be assuming functions of State and USAID. And, of 

course, if you don’t have the staff to perform the USAID work, it 


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would appear as if you would have to do it or it doesn’t get done. 

And if it doesn’t get done, then that defeats your mission. 

That was the reason I was trying to go there. And if there is 

something that we can do to help, just share that with us. 

General WARD. Okay, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Frelinghuysen? 

SOCIO-CULTURAL ANALYSIS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for another bite 

at the apple. I would like to, sort of, follow up where Ms. Kaptur 

was going a few minutes ago. 

General, in a speech to the United Kingdom Royal United Services Institute back in September—we monitor you each and every 

day here—you said, and I quote, ‘‘A lot of activity goes on in a continent through our nongovernmental organizations. Academia is involved. I showed you early on this thing about knowledge development. When I was in previous assignments, someone came to me, 

would talk about, ‘Well, Ward, you need a cultural anthropologist 

on your team. You need to have someone to help you understand 

the human dimension. You need to have some human terrain analysis.’ ’’ 

As you know, we do have such groups. Recently, better advertised, perhaps, in ways that are not so positive. But I hear that the 

Army’s human terrain system or something like it may be headed 

to Africa, and I understand that actually advertisements have already gone out with help-wanted ads for a new socio-cultural cell 

within your command. I, quite honestly, think it is a positive development. I think that is great. 

Can you tell us what we are doing and why you are doing it? I 

think we know why you are doing it. Lessons learned from Iraq 

and Afghanistan. But can you put some flesh on the bones? 

General WARD. Yes, sir. I thank you. 

That is pretty good there, sir. You go back to that RUSI. And I 

have not changed—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Just because you are in Stuttgart doesn’t 

mean you are out of our line of sight here. 

General WARD. Exactly, sir. 

I have not changed my impression. We need to have a better understanding of those with whom we deal if we are to make a difference that makes sense from their point of view, and unless it 

does, it won’t last. Our intent, sir, is to cause our activities to create the lasting enhancements to a secure environment. And we 

don’t do that if we don’t understand our partners. 

This business of socio-cultural awareness, human terrain analysis—and I probably shouldn’t be using all those buzz words—but 

it is about how we understand one another. And it is not lost on 

me nor those of my command that when we sit with our partners 

and we look at ways of moving ahead, if we don’t see things from 

their point of view, then we will miss the mark. 

This endeavor, as we look to build within our Intelligence and 

Knowledge Development Directorate, not the typical J-coded structures—J1, J2, J3—that you hear in most organizations, but Intelligence and Knowledge Development, as we attempt to build our 

base of understanding so that when we deal with our partners in 


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our various partner nations, we can see things from their perspective a little bit better. 

It impacts, sometimes, patience. You know, we Americans are 

very impatient. I mean, we see things, typically, in hours and days. 

For many of our African partners, it is years and decades. Again, 

it is a culture—it is an appreciation of the culture. 

And so these entities, be they cells or teams, but these entities 

are designed to help us, as we sit and do our planning, to have a 

clearer understanding of our partner so that we propose activities, 

engagements, strategies, it reflects what is meaningful to them, obviously aligned with our objectives and, hopefully, that achieving a 

desired and permanent result that leads to peace. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, I am glad you are, you know, moving 

ahead with it. And it doesn’t in any way negate the good work of 

those team members you have behind you, who, in some ways, do 

some pretty serious intelligence and economic and social investigation and obviously come up with recommendations. But I think 

having these teams on the ground is indeed reassuring. 

And let me just say parenthetically, because we are sort of contractor-centric around here, that it is not always—there are contractors, and there are contractors. And sometimes pulling together 

these people does necessitate some outside help that might not be 

innate within a governmental structure. So thank you for what you 

are doing in that regard. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BISHOP. Ms. Kaptur. 

REMARKS OF MS. KAPTUR

Ms. KAPTUR. Yes, I would just like to offer an opinion—that is 

the good thing about being elected and having some seniority, you 

can offer an opinion; no one has to listen to you—but how the 

United States approaches its presence in places with high levels of 

what we term ‘‘poverty,’’ ‘‘economic poverty.’’ And I don’t think we 

are very good. 

If one looks at Latin America, some would say today there is a 

growing divide between the nations of Latin America and the 

United States, despite the investment by our country in billions 

and billions and billions of dollars in military assistance and organizations such as WHINSEC, formerly School of the Americas. 

And as I listen to you, General, talk about connections with the 

militaries of various nations, my mind goes to the kind of structure 

that we have funded for a long time relative to Latin America. 

Something hasn’t quite happened there, in that, as you look at elections of leaders in that part of the world, despite our efforts to try 

to stop it, leaders and their followers turn more and more against 

the United States. 

And I think it is very instructive, as one looks at a new command 

and this enormous continent of Africa—which I view, tragically, as 

a continent that has been exploited for centuries, whether it is 

labor, the export of labor or the internal movement of labor within 

the African continent today. If one looks at the—if you look at the 

spread of AIDS in Africa, from South Africa up to Kenya, if you 

look at the diamond trade and you start understanding a little bit 


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about that, you go, ‘‘Oh, well, here we go then.’’ There is an economic underpinning to the exploitation. 

You mention oil bunkering on page 6 of your testimony, and I 

think about Nigeria and the role of the oil trade and what is happening there. And I mentioned the diamond trade and other resources. There is a lot of extractive exploitation that has gone on 

by interests outside of the boundaries of the nations of Africa. 

And I look at our country, and I think to myself—and we were 

in Pakistan about a year ago, and we have this command over 

there, you know, from Egypt all the way to beyond Pakistan. And 

we think that somehow we are going to manage all of this. 

And you talk to the leaders of those countries, and you find their 

understanding of poverty within their own countries is almost 

zero—almost zero. And yet, as you embrace Africa, first you embrace poverty and the movement of people away from Africa just 

seeking a better life because their governments can’t function. 

And I say to myself, what is a better model? What is a better 

model for us to embrace societies that are very different than ours 

that have been historically exploited? And, you know, I don’t think 

we have it. 

And I think if you go down the path of WHINSEC, you are not 

going to succeed. I think you are better off to go back to George 

Marshall’s, spend some time down at the George Marshall house 

down there at Fort Benning—I think that is in Congressman 

Bishop’s district, if I am not mistaken—and just sit there and read 

his works. You have probably done a lot of that anyway. 

But we are missing the boat. We are missing the boat. We don’t 

seem to be able to transfer democratic practices very efficiently. 

We had somebody in here the other day from the Army and Marine Corps, and they were saying that what they are going to do 

in Afghanistan now is they are going to take our soldiers who come 

from rural areas and they are going to equip them with machine 

guns and they are going to teach the people of Afghanistan how to 

farm. And I sat here and I listened to that, and I thought, ‘‘Good 

luck.’’ 

So I think that I would just urge you to be a very harsh judge 

of what the Department of Defense has done in the past with very 

good intentions. But if one looks politically at what is happening, 

the proof is in the pudding that it is not working. 

So I thank you very much for listening. 

REGIONAL INTEGRATION TEAMS

Mr. BISHOP. I have one other question I wanted to ask General 

Ward. And I appreciate the gentlelady’s remarks. 

AFRICOM is one of our combatant commands that is designated 

‘‘combat command plus.’’ And I think the ‘‘plus’’ is because of the 

development and diplomacy that is really so much a part of it. And 

it is really a unique approach. I think only SOUTHCOM has really 

utilized that approach in the past. 

General Ward, I don’t know if you have any thoughts about it, 

but some are thinking that this might be a new model for our military engagements as we try to improve our national security 

around the world, particularly in places like Africa and the other 

commands where we are. 


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Let me just ask you one question about your regional integration 

teams. In 2008, you cancelled your plans to open five offices to 

house the small regional integration teams of five or 10 staff people, which would have been dispersed across the continent. 

Why did you cancel the plans for those teams? Which nations or 

regions did you ask or did you approach to host those regional integration teams? 

And given the expense and the logistics requirements of moving 

staff around the continent and how big the continent is, isn’t it important to have a presence in those regional locations? 

And do you have any plans to try to re-establish, to go forward 

with the regional integration teams in 2010? 

General WARD. Thank you, Chairman. 

If I might, Representative Kaptur mentioned about this integration issue. And before I get to the RITs, what I would say is that 

we recognize that the long-term viability of a nation rests in, as I 

mentioned, the integration of those three elements: security, development, and diplomacy. 

Our part of that triad is the security part. It needs to be happening hand in hand with the work being done in the development 

arena as well as in the diplomacy arena, with the representative, 

some effective governance, taking care of its people. 

So we fully recognize that those are integrally linked activities, 

only one of which we are responsible for. The diplomacy, the development falls with other agencies of our government. And that is 

why my point about, you know, I clearly endorse their capabilities 

being required as much as ours are needed, because, without that, 

then we don’t get the lasting benefit of a stable environment. 

With respect to the regional integration teams, kind of like the 

notion of how many interagency people do you need. Again, that 

initial planning team, with that concept, it was a concept, quite 

candidly, one that, as I thought about it more and more, and as I 

listened to our on-continent presence, the ambassadors, as well as 

the nations with whom we were dealing, that is not what they felt 

was most important. 

What they felt was most important was, when it came to executing programs in their countries, having an element in place that 

could provide a day-to-day assistance to them. That wasn’t being 

provided by these regional integration teams. That is provided by 

our offices of security cooperation. 

So, therefore, my priority is to reinforce, to buttress, to build 

those teams, because that is what is important in our delivery of 

programs on the continent. The planning function, the integration 

of our activity function is done at my headquarters, within the 

headquarters. This notion of how we look at the various regions of 

the continent, we are taking care of that. 

And, given the infrastructure on the continent, you know, getting 

around is not facilitated, quite candidly, by being on the continent. 

Most infrastructure travel to Africa requires movement through 

Europe, Frankfurt, Paris. And so it is not facilitated by being there, 

from that coordination point of view, outside of the particular country you are in. 


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TRAVEL REQUIREMENTS TO/FROM AOR

Mr. BISHOP. Sir, I am glad you touched upon that. That is a good 

segue onto your transportation challenges. Of course, 11.7 million 

square miles is a pretty big area to cover. And we appropriated, in 

2009, $30 million for operational airlift support. Of that amount, 

$17.5 million was provided to your air component, which is the 

17th Air Force, for military airlift support. And $12.5 million of 

that was for U.S. Transportation Command, TRANSCOM, for the 

purposes of contracting for AFRICOM staff travel support. 

What are the travel requirements of AFRICOM leadership and 

senior staff to and from your area of responsibility? And how much 

of your travel requirement is taken care of by military air, and how 

much of it is contracted out for commercial services? 

General WARD. Right now, sir, my staff travel is required for our 

coordination, our exercise planning. We conduct various in-process 

reviews as we prepare to conduct major seminars. That is a pretty 

robust travel requirement for my staff to move around the continent. 

The funds that you described there include also the funds for 

moving military supplies and equipment, as these exercises are 

conducted. And so that portion that was provided to my 17th Air 

Force takes care of transporting our military equipment, personnel 

in pursuit of exercises, relief activities, logistics sustainment, 

the—— 

Mr. BISHOP. You haven’t had a lot of that, though, have you? 

General WARD. Haven’t had a lot of it. We did Flintlock. We did 

Africa Endeavor. And we certainly look to have that increase, because, again, the point that Ms. Kilpatrick made, our partner countries are asking us for more. 

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. 

General WARD. And so this would be very helpful in that mobility requirement that we have for moving around the continent. 

Mr. BISHOP. So that is the military air portion. With the 

TRANSCOM portion, are the services that are contracted for your 

staff use, is it private air service, or is it commercial air service? 

Or what kind of air services are you using with the TRANSCOM 

contractor? 

General WARD. The TRANSCOM contract is both. We have just 

received word of a private contractor, hasn’t started just yet, it will 

start at the end of this month, the first of next month, for helping 

with my staff’s travel around the continent. And that will start, I 

think, the first of April, sir, that TRANSCOM has done that contract for. 

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. Finally, with regard to that, do you have any 

challenges, do you foresee there being challenges in your having to 

utilize commercial transportation for mobility around Africa? 

General WARD. Oh, yes, sir, there are challenges. The challenges 

are in routing, in scheduling, in frequency of schedules. I had a 

case of one of my staff, who missed one of the twice-a-week departures and had to spend an additional 4 days because of just the infrequency. I think there is one carrier that is authorized to travel 

from—African carrier—from Africa back to our continent. So there 

are challenges in the commercial airline scheduling regime. 


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Mr. BISHOP. So is that why you need to rely on the private? 

General WARD. That is why we need the dedicated travel in 

order to do our coordination for building the relationships, yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Rothman, do you—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. No, thank you. I am going to be reading the general’s testimony. Thank you. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

Ms. Kilpatrick, do you have anything else? 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I am fine, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. BISHOP. Good. 

General Ward, thank you for your testimony today. 

The Committee is adjourned until it reconvenes this afternoon at 

1:30. 


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THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 2009. 

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS MILITARY PERSONNEL 

WITNESSES 

BARNEY BARNUM, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR 

MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS 

VICE ADMIRAL MARK E. FERGUSON III, U.S. NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL 

PERSONNEL AND DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (MANPOWER, PERSONNEL, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION) 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD S. COLEMAN, DEPUTY COMMANDANT 

FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES MARINE 

CORPS 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. Let me start the hearing, but let me read something here to the Committee. 

‘‘Captain Harvey C. ‘Barney’ Barnum, Jr. 

‘‘Rank and organization: Captain (then Lt.), U.S. Marine Corps, 

Company H, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Marine Division reinforce. Place and date: Ky Phu in Quang Tin Province, Republic of 

Vietnam, 18 December 1965. 

‘‘Entered service at: Cheshire, Connecticut. Born: 21 July 1940, 

Cheshire, Connecticut. 

‘‘Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk 

of his life above and beyond the call of duty. When the company 

was suddenly pinned down by a hail of extremely accurate enemy 

fire and was quickly separated from the remainder of the battalion 

by over 500 meters of open and fire-swept ground, and casualties 

mounted rapidly. Lt. Barnum quickly made a hazardous reconnaissance of the area, seeking targets for his artillery. Finding the rifle 

company commander mortally wounded and radio operator killed, 

he, with complete disregard for his safety, gave aid to the dying 

commander, then removed the radio from the dead operator and 

strapped it to himself. He immediately assumed command of the 

rifle company, and moving at once into the midst of the heavy fire, 

rallying and giving encouragement to all units, reorganized them 

to replace the loss of key personnel and led their attacks on enemy 

positions from which deadly fire continued to come. His sound and 

swift decisions and his obvious calm served to stabilize the badly 

decimated units and his gallant example as he stood exposed repeatedly to point out targets served as an inspiration to all. Provided with two armed helicopters, he moved fearlessly through 

enemy fire to control the air attack against the firmly entrenched 

enemy while skillfully directing one platoon in a successful counterattack on the key enemy positions. Having thus cleared a small 

area, he requested and directed the landing of two transport helicopters for the evacuation of the dead and wounded. He then asVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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sisted in the mopping up and final seizure of the battalion’s objective. His gallant initiative and heroic conduct reflected great credit 

upon himself and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the 

Marine Corps and the U.S. Naval Service,’’ for which he received 

the Medal of Honor. 

Welcome. 

I was on the board reviewing medals of honor and all medals in 

Vietnam and the first Marines. Never had one who rose to this 

level. We are proud of you. 

And with that, we ask you for any testimony you may have. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MR. BARNUM

Mr. BARNUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other distinguished 

Members of the Subcommittee. It is an honor for me to be with you 

today to testify on the Department of the Navy’s manpower and 

personnel. My remarks will be brief so we can get on with the 

questioning and get into the areas that you want to focus on. 

You know, as we sit in this room, this hearing room today in 

peace and security, we are at war and it is the young men and 

women of the Navy/Marine Corps team that are on the tip of the 

spear in Iraq and Afghanistan. Your Navy and Marine Corps have 

met all personnel requirements of the combatant commanders that 

are prosecuting the overseas contingency operations and our most 

precious asset, our Marines and Sailors, have confronted the challenges of this war head on. They are performing marvelously. They 

make us proud. They are truly the linchpin to our success. 

I am accompanied today by Lieutenant General Coleman, the 

Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Vice 

Admiral Ferguson, the Chief of Navy Personnel. Our mission is to 

provide the right people at the right time and at the right place 

and at the best value, while ensuring the welfare of our most important asset: Sailors, Marines, civilian personnel and their families; and, together, we look forward to answering your questions as 

we prepare to assist you in understanding how we support our 

Sailors, our Marines, our civilian personnel, and our families. 

Thank you, sir. 

No written statement for Mr. Barnum—Committee requested 

statement from the Service Chiefs only. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen, do you have any comments? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Just it is my pleasure to welcome you here 

today. I apologize for being late. It is an honor to be in your presence, Mr. Barnum, as well as the Admiral and the General. Thank 

you very much. 

Mr. MURTHA. We will ask the Admiral next, although we feel the 

Navy is part of the Marine Corps. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL FERGUSON

Admiral FERGUSON. I appreciate that courtesy. 

Chairman Murtha and the distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to review with you today the 

Navy’s recruiting and retention efforts, as well as our end-strength 

projections for this fiscal year. 


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We remain today a global Navy, with over 40 percent of our 

forces underway or deployed. We have increased our operational 

availability through the fleet response plan and are engaging in 

new mission areas in support of the joint force. 

We continue to play a key role in support of joint operations in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and across the globe by providing approximately 

14,000 Sailors as individual augmentees. With this high operational tempo, we remain vigilant concerning stress on our Sailors 

and their families. We ensure that Sailors have adequate opportunity to rest and spend time at home between deployments and 

provide them a comprehensive continuum of care. 

The tone of the force is positive. Sailors and their families continue to express satisfaction with the morale and leadership at 

their commands, their health care, their benefits and compensation. 

Over the past year, we have been successful in recruiting highquality Sailors. In 2008, we achieved our enlisted and officer goals 

across both the Active and Reserve components, while exceeding 

DOD quality standards in all recruit categories. For the first time 

in 5 years, we achieved overall Active and Reserve medical officer 

recruiting goals. 

To ensure the long-term health of the force, we are transitioning 

from a posture of reducing end strength to one we term stabilizing 

the force. To meet global demands and minimize stress on the 

force, the Secretary of the Navy used his end strength waiver authority for both 2008 and 2009. We project to finish 2009 within 

2 percent above our statutory end strength authorization. 

The comprehensive benefits provided by the Congress for our 

service members, combined with the current economic conditions, 

have resulted in significantly increased retention and lower attrition across the force. We began this fiscal year with an end 

strength of approximately 332,000. Despite cutting 3,000 accessions, reducing bonuses and being more selective with whom we 

allow to reenlist, we expect to end this fiscal year at approximately 

the same level. Consequently, we project that our current appropriated funding levels for manpower and personnel will be insufficient for this fiscal year. 

Our stabilization strategy has been directed at sustaining a highquality force able to respond to new mission areas within our fiscal 

authorities. We are guided by the following principles: continue to 

attract and recruit our Nation’s best and brightest; retain the best 

Sailors; and target those incentives we use to retain only those 

with the critical skills needed to meet mission sets; balance the 

force in terms of seniority, experience, and skills; safeguard the careers of our top performers and insure promotion rates; and provide the fleet and the joint force stable and predictable manning. 

On behalf of all the men and women in uniform who sacrifice 

daily and their families, I want to extend my sincere appreciation 

to the committee and the Congress for your unwavering support for 

our Navy. 

Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Admiral Ferguson follows:] 


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Mr. MURTHA. General Coleman. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL COLEMAN

General COLEMAN. Chairman Murtha, distinguished members of 

the Subcommittee, it is my privilege to appear before you today to 

discuss Marine Corps personnel. 

I would like to make a few key points. 

First, in regard to our end strength growth, the Marine Corps 

achieved unprecedented success in fiscal year 2008, growing by 

over 12,000 Marines; and we fully expect to reach our goal of 

202,000 during fiscal year 2009, 2 years ahead of schedule. We owe 

this historic success in large part to our recruiters, who continue 

to meet all accession goals while maintaining the highest quality 

standards. 

Thank you for your continued support of our enlisted incentives, 

which help to make this achievement possible. 

Secondly, our active component retention continues to be successful. In fiscal year 2008, we achieved an unprecedented 36 percent 

retention rate among our first-term Marines and are building on 

that success so far in 2009. 

We thank you for your support of our selective reenlistment 

bonus program. It will remain the foundation of our retention efforts as we work to maintain vital Marine Corps leadership and experience. 

Third, I want to reiterate that a top priority of the Commandant 

of the Marine Corps is caring for our wounded warriors and for the 

families of all our Marines. Our Wounded Warrior Regiment is diligently at work implementing a new and historic approach to 

wounded warrior care which makes thriving, not just surviving, the 

expectation of our wounded, ill, and injured Marines. Likewise, our 

family readiness programs have undergone a host of significant improvements which continue today. 

In closing, I want to thank you and the other Members of Congress for your support and partnership. They have been central to 

the strength that your Marine Corps enjoys today. It will continue 

to be essential as we work to shape the Marine Corps for the future 

so that we will always remain the most ready when the Nation is 

least ready. 

I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The statement of General Coleman follows:] 


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RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Mr. MURTHA. I just visited Fort Carson and Fort Benning, and 

I see a difference between what I am hearing here today and what 

I heard at those two bases. I met with 12 enlisted people at both 

bases. Their complaints were diverse, but, in a sense, it ends up 

by saying the people coming into the Army today are not meeting 

the standards they should meet, that the people coming into the 

Army today are less than the standards that we accept. 

These are Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) that I met with. 

All of them have been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan or both and 

they picked the people. They were concerned that the Army doesn’t 

have the high school graduates you used to have; they didn’t have 

the quality they used to have. 

Now, I realize they have got a bigger problem in recruiting because they have a lot more people they have to recruit. Is this true 

of the Marine Corps? 

General COLEMAN. No, sir, it is not. 

A couple of things, sir. The DOD goal is 90 percent high school 

grad; Marine Corps is 96 percent high school grad. One A, the goal 

is 60 percent; we are at 66 percent. I will use a Colonel that just 

retired 2 months ago. He said he was a recruiter during the ’80s, 

the ’90s, and now 2000, over 30 years. The recruit today is as good, 

if not better, than any recruit he has ever recruited. 

Mr. MURTHA. Navy? 

Admiral FERGUSON. I would echo that our recruit quality is the 

finest that we have seen over my career, 94 to 95 percent high 

school grads, 74 percent upper middle group. We see extraordinary 

performance of these young people coming in. 

Mr. MURTHA. The Army also had an Antideficiency Act violation, 

we feel, because they requested funds for personnel problems. They 

closed out the books last year and ended up without adequate 

funds available. Do you have that problem, either in the Navy or 

the Marine Corps? 

Admiral FERGUSON. Regarding 2008, when the Secretary approved the end strength over execution for last year to meet the IA 

demand and fleet manning, we did a reprogramming, which was 

supported by the Congress, to cover those funds. So we did not 

have one in 2008. This year, we project that we will require additional funds to meet the manpower training requirements. 

General COLEMAN. That is the same with us, sir. We would like 

to think that as we get up to 202,000 Marines, which we will get 

there this year, I believe, in the June–July time frame, we will do 

it well and with quality. But we will still need to shape this force. 

And then there are some facets, some Military Occupational Specialities (MOSs) that, no matter how much money we can raise or 

we can offer them, they won’t take it, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, I asked you before the hearing started, with 

no problem, basically no problems, why we are having a hearing? 

But it is—you said you are going to give us some good news. Well, 

that is good to hear some good news, because we have been getting 

so much bad news lately from the Army. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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Admiral, Mr. Secretary, can we talk a little bit about the Navy’s 

nuclear enterprise? 

We had the Air Force in I think within the last couple of weeks, 

and in some ways we were disturbed by some of the things we 

heard but then encouraged by some of the steps that the Air Force 

has sort of taken to sort of correct some things. 

In some of the reports we have read, there has been, obviously, 

mention of some of the Navy’s involvement in the nuclear enterprise, which is of course a major responsibility. And there was 

some indication that perhaps there are some issues that you have. 

Can you talk to us a little bit about how focused you are? I mean, 

there are some manning issues that I think you pointed out in your 

testimony. 

Admiral FERGUSON. From experience, I am a nuclear trained officer that came up through—interviewed with Admiral Rickover and 

came through the nuclear propulsion program. 

The Navy has a very strong entrenched program of accountability, of oversight, and of supervision that is largely centered 

today within the submarine force as the keeper of the Trident deterrent. We looked very carefully at the Schlesinger Report and the 

other lessons. As you know, Admiral Donald did that review for the 

Air Force. We have gone back at the direction of the Secretary, 

looked at all our own practices; and, where necessary, we increased 

personnel that were available, both in the production and maintenance of the facilities, and looked at security. We feel very comfortable in our review of the focus of the supervision and of the governance. 

The CNO appointed to the Director of the Navy staff, Vice Admiral Harvey, to head the Nuclear Weapons Council, which is comprised of three stars and those individuals that oversee this facility. 

So that, coupled with the oversight by Naval reactors and Admiral 

Donald, we feel like it has our focus and attention. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, on page 15 of your testimony, you 

speak about retention in the nuclear propulsion program. Correct 

me if I am wrong. Are you 922 Sailors short of your manning requirements across all zones? Is that accurate? 

Admiral FERGUSON. That is correct. And those are primarily for 

manning on aircraft carriers and submarines involved in the operation of nuclear power plants, as opposed to the weapons enterprise, which is separate. So the way that we address that is 

through the enlistment bonuses, selective reenlistment bonuses, 

and increased recruiting. For next year, we have increased the 

number of operators that we will access initially by over 600. We 

feel that, even with those shortfalls, the ships are safe and operating correctly. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Your report says, and I quote, ‘‘We have 

met our submarine officer retention goals only once in 5 years, and 

we expect to fall 2 percent short of our target in fiscal year 2009.’’ 

Correct me if I am wrong. The submarine forces are currently at 

452 officers short of requirements? 

‘‘Demand critical billets Navy-wide.’’ End of quotation. Is that accurate? 

Admiral FERGUSON. Yes, but that is spread across from ensign 

all the way up through captain, through all six pay grades in the 


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force. So we got support of the Congress last year to raise those bonuses for nuclear officers up to $30,000 dollars a year, and so the 

issue with those officers is their high level of training. They are in 

great demand in the civilian sector, both in the conventional and 

nuclear industry, as well as in other engineering disciplines. We 

work very hard at retaining them and also giving them adequate 

compensation. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you are addressing the challenge. 

Admiral FERGUSON. Right. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And identifying more people that are capable. 

Admiral FERGUSON. That is correct. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

BONUSES

Mr. MORAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Given the fact that the economy and the esprit de corps is working very well in the Marine Corps and Navy in terms of recruitment and retention, do you still need the bonuses? 

Why don’t you tell us, first of all, how much in the way of bonuses have been given out? And then I would like to know whether 

this should be an ongoing thing, or is it possible that we could cut 

back on the bonuses since it is questionable whether you need that 

additional incentive anymore? 

General COLEMAN. Yes, sir. In fiscal year 2009, our retention 

bonus budget was $400 million—401, and recruiting, $61.6 million. 

We did a whale of a job with that, sir. As I said, we believe that 

we will be where we need to be this year numberwise but we will 

still need to shape the force. The amount of money that we will 

need in 2010, I would not hazard a guess. I would say that, yes, 

sir, we will still need bonuses. There are MOSs, such as explosive 

ordnance disposal, air crewmen on a C–130, and linguists that we 

are in steep competition with the civilian force, so we will need 

some bonuses. 

Will we always need it to stay at the level we are at? Will that 

be able to drop? I would venture to say probably, sir, but I could 

not hazard a guess now on what we will need in 2010. 

Mr. MORAN. So the bonuses are primarily used for the MOSs 

that are in particular demand, where the private sector is more 

competitive in terms of salary and competition. 

General COLEMAN. I would say mostly. But there may not be call 

for a 0311 rifleman out in the civilian world, but we certainly need 

him in Afghanistan and Iraq, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. You mentioned Afghanistan. Of the increase in deployment of 17,000, what portion are Marine Corps and Navy? 

General COLEMAN. Marine Corps is about 10,000 of that sir. 

Mr. MORAN. 10,000 of the 17,000? 

General COLEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. Are Marine Corps? 

General COLEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Admiral FERGUSON. I think the Navy’s share—we haven’t got the 

firm requirement request for forces—but is somewhere between 

1,000 and 2,000. 


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Mr. MORAN. So you are talking as much as 12,000 out of 17,000 

are non-Army personnel going into Afghanistan. 

Admiral FERGUSON. That is our understanding. 

Mr. MORAN. I didn’t realize that. 

Let me ask you about dealing with PTSD. You have done a much 

improved job, but I am told that Children’s Hospital here in D.C. 

has had more than 1,000 children of veterans, recent combat personnel, admitted primarily for mental health problems. That is a 

very substantial number. Are you able to use any of that money 

that this Subcommittee has provided for the problems associated 

with the children of combat personnel? 

Admiral FERGUSON. We instituted in 2008 a program run by the 

Bureau of Medicine, Families OverComing Under Stress. And we 

reach out to families in that program through the medical treatment centers. We also provide support through the family support 

centers and chaplains and those located on base, and family service 

centers, and we have improved those programs as well. 

General COLEMAN. Sir, I would jump on that and concur with the 

Admiral. There are at least nine of our major bases the program 

that Admiral Ferguson is speaking to. So, yes, sir, we are reaching 

out. It is a holistic view of taking care of a family. 

Congress was kind enough last year to give the Marine Corps 

quite a bit of money to take care of our families. We have spent 

the money wisely and taken care of our families because it is a holistic approach. A Marine joins the Marine Corps, but he or she 

only stays if the family is being taken care of and the family feels 

that they are a part of the Marine Corps, also, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. Related to that, you have gotten the ratio of dwell 

time up to 1 to 1.2. But how much of that time generally is with 

family versus still away from family in training? 

Admiral FERGUSON. Right. The Navy ratio is about 1 to 3, 1 to 

2.8 for most units. We also levy the additional requirement is that 

when they are home they have to be not training or not underway 

for greater than 50 percent of the time. To break that limit, the 

CNO has to approve it. So our lowest limits in some of the highstress units is about 53, 54 percent home. 

General COLEMAN. Sir, we are not there yet. Our goal is when 

the unit—and most units are in their 1 to 1 or better. There are 

some actually less. 

But you come home from a deployment and you get a 30-day 

block leave where there is no away-from-home time, as far as the 

Marine Corps is concerned. Prior to you deploying again, there is 

another 30-day block time. But before you deploy, actually leave 

CONUS to go, there is a 30-day block training at Mojave Viper out 

at Twentynine Palms, California. So we could not say to you that 

the dwell time when you are home for 7 months, that you are home 

for those 7 months. That would be an incorrect statement, sir. 

Mr. MORAN. Let me ask one more question, if I could. 

We have asked for the number of contractors. We got it from the 

Army, haven’t gotten it from the Navy and Marine Corps. This goes 

to our Assistant Secretary here for Manpower. Are you working on 

that report, how many contractors you are relying upon? 


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Mr. BARNUM. I really can’t say we are. Because those fundings 

come out of O&M, whereas we are dealing with the personnel end, 

so I would have to get back for the record on that. 

Mr. MORAN. Okay. Well, we have been concerned about the integration of contract personnel, as you know, into what would normally be considered inherently military roles. So we are interested 

in that information. 

[The information follows:] 

In responding we assume that the question refers to the requirement for inventories and reviews of contracts for services set forth in Section 807 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, which amends Section 2330a 

of Title 10, U.S. Code. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development 

and Acquisition has assigned this task to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy for Acquisition and Logistics Management. 

The Department of Defense is implementing Section 807 in phases with first submissions provided during FY 2008 by the Department of the Army. In accordance 

with Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) Memorandum 

dated May 16, 2008, the Department of the Navy (DoN) will deliver a prototype inventory list for review and approval in FY 2009. According to the current implementation schedule, this prototype inventory list will be submitted to the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy (DPAP) in June 2009 

who will in turn formally submit the prototype list to Congress. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Bishop. 

STOP LOSS AND INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, gentlemen, and welcome to 

the Committee. 

Let me just talk a little bit about personnel as it relates to stop 

loss and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). As I understand it, the 

Marine Corps has not utilized stop/loss, really, since 2003. However, you have utilized the IRR significantly. I think you have got 

up to about 10,000 people or thereabouts in that category. Is that 

right? 

General COLEMAN. IRR yes, sir. But you are speaking total, not 

involuntary? You are just speaking Ready Reserve, is that correct, 

sir? 

Mr. BISHOP. Yes, Individual Ready Reserve, people who were discharged subject to being recalled in the IRR and who have been recalled who are now serving. And I am asking that you have allotted 

2,500 to be activated at any one time. Is that right? 

General COLEMAN. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. And there have been two activations. How is that 

affecting your NCO ranks? 

General COLEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Because it is my understanding that you can get a 

marine private a lot quicker than you can the officers and the 

NCOs who have to supervise them. 

General COLEMAN. That is correct, sir. 

Of that number, to date, we have only involuntarily recalled 

1,800. So there is a great difference between—— 

As you would note, sir, if I get out of the Marine Corps and my 

enlistment ends at the 4-year mark and I go into the IRR, but 

there is a war and the country calls and I raise my hand to go, 

then that is one thing. The harder part is when I don’t raise my 

hand to go and you tell me, okay, come on, I need you anyway. So 

we have done some of both. 


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But the invol has only been about 1,800 and the Commandant 

has decided, on his own, that this 9 tech 2, this unit that is going 

to leave during May of this year, April-May this year to April-May 

of next year, is—we are taking 350 Involuntary Reserves, and that 

is the last time we are doing that. 

Mr. BISHOP. What are the specialties of the involuntaries? 

General COLEMAN. Sir, we need combat arms. All these folks will 

deploy. They will go to Iraq or Afghanistan. Nobody’s going to stay 

back in Albany and do anything there. They will all deploy. But the 

specialties we are looking for, combat arms, motor T drivers, explosive ordnance, those—the critical MOSs that we need for the fight, 

sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Okay. What about the maintenance people? 

General COLEMAN. Maintenance also, yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. So that would be somebody from Albany? 

General COLEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. The logistics folks. 

General COLEMAN. Yes, sir, and they are doing a whale of a job. 

Because, as you know, with General Williams down there even the 

active duty are being deployed. It is not often that we take Marines 

from supporting the establishment and pull them forward as we 

have in this long war, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. And you think this is going to be the last time. 

General COLEMAN. This will be the last time. The Commandant 

has said this is the last time we will involuntary recall anyone. 

Mr. BISHOP. From the IRR. 

General COLEMAN. From the IRR, yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rogers. 

RECRUITING

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. 

Let me ask each of you, what is the size of your recruiting force 

out there? 

Admiral FERGUSON. I will take that. 

I have about 3,800 recruiters in the field and about another 

2,800 to 3,000 support personnel as classifiers and administrative 

support on top of that. 

General COLEMAN. I will take that one for the record sir. I don’t 

know. 

Mr. ROGERS. Answer for the record then. 

[The information follows:] 

What is the size of the Marine Corps’ recruiting force? 

Currently, the Marine Corps Recruiting Command’s total strength (comprised of 

Marines and Civilians) is 6,465, which includes 3,610 recruiters. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you know how many recruiting stations? 

General COLEMAN. But every marine is a recruiter, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. You have got a full house then. How 

many stations do you have? 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rogers, if you will yield, let me tell you a story 

about recruiting. 

When I went in the Marine Corps, my mother cried, because I 

left college right in the middle of the Korean War. My second 

brother went to the Marine Corps; she cried. My third brother went 


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to the Marine Corps; she cried. When the fourth one was ready to 

go, she cried because she thought he was going to the Army. 

She wrote to me. The Marine Corps put so much information out 

that you know you better go to the Marine Corps. And my dad was 

in the Army. 

Mr. MORAN. And he said that in front of the Army General that 

was here. 

Mr. ROGERS. How many recruiting stations do we have? 

Admiral FERGUSON. Navy has approximately 1,400. 

General COLEMAN. Sir, recruiting, I am not in charge of recruiting so that is another one I will take for the record, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

Please provide the number of Marine Corps Recruiting Stations. 

The Marine corps has a total of 48 Recruiting Stations. 

Mr. ROGERS. Have you noticed, and you may have answered this 

already, Have you noticed a change during these harder economic 

times in the ability to attract recruits? 

Admiral FERGUSON. From our standpoint, the quality coming in 

through the door is higher, many with associate degrees and other 

advanced degrees. And we are using fewer waivers. Waivers are 

down about 18 percent this year within the Navy. So much higher 

quality, great willingness to serve, and less issues with waivers. 

General COLEMAN. Sir, we were well on our way before the downturn, so at this point we have not noticed any noticeable difference 

in the number of recruits. We have not lowered our quality in any 

way, shape, or form, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you co-locate recruiting stations between the 

services? 

Admiral FERGUSON. Approximately 93 percent of our stations are 

co-located. 

General COLEMAN. Yes, sir. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Mr. ROGERS. One specific note of concern that I want to ask you 

about is suicide prevention. Have you been asked about this today 

already? 

General COLEMAN. No, sir. Not yet today, no, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. I am told it is the second leading cause of death in 

the Marines. What can you tell us about the trends and the causes 

and what you are doing about it? 

General COLEMAN. Sir, that is, as far as the Commandant is concerned, one of his biggest concerns. He charged the Assistant Commandant with having a standdown. So he brought all of his senior 

leaders to Quantico to discuss this. 

We are tracking this. We are fully engaged. We have ordered the 

standdown during the month of March so that every Marine will 

receive suicide training during the month of March. That is the 

whole listing. And then at the junior level, because most of our suicides are in the very junior, 18 to 24 years old, 95 percent of them 

in that age group, so they are getting hands-on leadership in addition to what we have done. 

Every commander from the O–6 level on has been charged with 

making a video that every recruit sees, or every Marine sees, 


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whether they have been in the command for 3 years or are just 

coming into the command. And we are also setting up a hot line 

so that folks can call. Ninety percent of the suicides in the Marine 

Corps have to do with a relationship that has gone south. 

Mr. ROGERS. You mean with the spouse? 

General COLEMAN. Female, male or that sort of—whether spouse, 

girlfriend, whatever. But the vast, vast majority have something to 

do with that. 

Mr. MURTHA. Will the gentleman yield? 

That doesn’t mean the relationship wasn’t caused because the 

guy was deployed or the man or woman was deployed? 

General COLEMAN. Oh, no, sir, in no way shape or form. All I am 

saying is, most of our suicides, a bad relationship is what—— 

Mr. MURTHA. One of the things I found was, talking to the Army, 

some of the Army personnel said the spouses ought to have counseling, also. Because the problem is that they are away so long, 

they are young kids, and they can’t handle the money. They get 

themselves into trouble. 

So I mentioned this to the health people and said to them, you 

know, let’s have some counseling for the family, in addition to calling the troops in and give them counseling before they go overseas. 

General COLEMAN. Yes, sir. And I don’t want to take up time, but 

if I could just say one thing. Every one is a bad one. But you 

scratch your head and you always say, what could I do differently? 

I have been a commander a number of times. In the first command, we lost no Marines to suicide. The second command, we lost 

three. One was a young man that I knew from Jersey, and I was 

at Camp Lejeune, and he went home on a long weekend. Danny is 

his name. He came home after the long weekend. 

Now, he had gone to college for a year and dropped out of college. 

And when he went home a year into it, he saw all his college buddies who had gone to college and ran track; and he was a track 

star. And he came back, and no one noticed that he was down. It 

was just that he came back. And it would be the same with me if 

I went home and then came back after a weekend or whatever, you 

are down. 

Well, Danny went from North Carolina, from Camp Lejeune. He 

went down to Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, and checked into a 

hotel. Went to a store and got a bucket, a bag of sand, and a rope 

and went out into the pool, put the sand in the bucket, put it in 

the water, tied it to his leg and jumped in the water. 

And you ask yourself, what could I have done differently? 

So, I mean, we are all over this. No commander, from any branch 

of the service, wants to see that happen. 

So we are doing everything we can, even involving the young Marines in staging. ‘‘Staging’’ is probably not the right word, but they 

put on a show that what it does to the family and your fellow Marines after you are gone. This is a tough one. And we are looking 

inside. 

But you are right, sir. We have to educate the families also that 

they can see the signs. 

And I apologize for taking up all that time, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Would you like to respond? 


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Admiral FERGUSON. We, also, like the Marine Corps, consider 

this a primary responsibility of the chain of command. And we 

have introduced several programs on operational stress control. 

Our data for the year is about 11.6 per 100,000, well below the normalized rate. But each one is a tragedy. 

So we are seeing, similar to what Mr. Murtha indicated, is the 

first indicators are often the family. And we are getting warnings 

through the family support centers, through the chaplains, and 

through these other warning indicators; and we are going after 

them aggressively and supporting the families. 

Mr. ROGERS. And, lastly, have you noticed whether or not the 

suicides are more prevalent amongst personnel who have been deployed recently or are on deployment, as opposed to—— 

Admiral FERGUSON. Within the Navy, our data shows that, of 

those who committed suicide, less than half had deployed in the 

previous 3 years. So we don’t see a correlation between deployments. We see that it is generally males, 25 to 35, with a failed 

relationship or depression, and some familiarity with a weapon are 

the primary causal factors. 

Mr. BARNUM. The Marine Corps numbers, sir, for 2003 to 2008, 

16 percent committed suicide in country, in Iraq or Afghanistan, 32 

percent after they were deployed, and 52 percent had no deployment history. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

HEALTH AND WELLNESS

Ms. KILPATRICK. I am stunned. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I want to commend each of you for your service. 

Medal of Honor, sir, Captain, thank you so much for the work that 

you have done for our country. General Coleman, as well, all of 

your history and all of that; as well as you, Admiral. You all bring 

years of experience and dedication to our country, and I just want 

to say thank you for that. 

I was going to do suicides, but I am not touching that. 

Multiple deployments—and suicides are up everywhere. And I 

don’t know if we looked at World War II or Vietnam or Korea, if 

we found deployment had any effect on suicides. But I guess they 

have. I would sit here and think that the time of war—and I know 

one thing I have found, too, after visiting some time ago, just recently, I should say, up in Congressman—Chairman Dicks’ district 

on a Trident submarine for the first time. Admiral, I have read 

about them a long time, finally looked into that scope, got a picture 

for my dad who is a Navy man. Just all that you go through. 

One thing they told us on this Committee—and I have seen it 

even now, having gone on an aircraft carrier and submarines—is 

that the young men and women, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, Soldiers, the like, they are dedicated. I served on one of the academy 

boards, and that is what I found, the dedication from the young 

people—and they’re children. I am a grandmother, so they’re children. 

I find in our testimony that we have seen recently that, in addition to academics, healthiness or not is probably the next most critical thing that you all face as you talk to your recruits. And I am 


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leaving suicide. But what about the health and wellness and the 

other thing with health care in the military lacking in terms of 

physicians? We have heard testimony on that as well. You may 

find it. You don’t have to go there. The nutrition part of what they 

are, who they are, if they can maintain themselves. How much does 

that play into getting on those narrow ladders in the Trident and 

being effective in their daily responsibilities and whether or not 

they are depressed by that? 

I am trying to find out, not being a psychologist or any of that, 

but a grandmother, what is causing this. If it is not the deployment, and most people who have sat there have said that it is not, 

that it is other things. They are young, for one thing. Can you shed 

some light on that at all, either of you? 

General COLEMAN. Ma’am, I would just go back to the failed relationships. And I guess, you know, peer pressure now is nothing like 

when I was growing up. The stats for the Marine Corps say they 

are young, they are white, they are in a failed relationship, and I 

would even have thought that maybe, maybe alcohol was in it. But 

it is not, There is nothing that says there was a—you know, somebody was sitting around, and they are drinking too much. It is usually a failed relationship. 

And, again, as the Secretary said, it is not the deployments. I 

think it is the stress because—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. People don’t kill themselves in bad relationships 

when they are out. I guess they do. Some do. 

General COLEMAN. They do. But there is stress when I deploy. 

But because I deploy, there is stress on the folks back home, 

whether at home or at the unit, because now there is more work 

for the folks back there. So it is a stressful all over. 

But I wish we could go, you know, pick up a book and say, this 

is it, and go attack it. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Admiral. 

Admiral FERGUSON. I would offer that when we looked and analyzed our data for those who had deployed and then committed suicide subsequently, it occurred normally within the first 6 months 

after their return. So we found that the camaraderie, the leadership, and the common purpose of a deployment and that unit cohesiveness sustained those individuals. And then when they returned 

and had the relationship fail or had an issue, that is what set these 

tragic chain of events in motion. 

So we focused a lot on resiliency and building resiliency, both 

through physical training, mental health, and counseling and support; and I think that is the key component in building this in the 

young people who are going through this stressful period. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. So then does our health care system—have we 

adequately taken care of what your needs are, both for the enlisted 

as well as for their families? Is there some area we need to be 

beefing up or doing something different with? 

General COLEMAN. Let me read this, ma’am, and maybe this will 

help us: 

The key risk factors and associated suppressors, most common 

key risk factors reported suicides from 1999 to 2007. Depression, 

34 percent; psychiatric history, 29 percent; anxiety, 23 percent; 


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sense of failure, 20 percent; change in usual mood—that is what 

the Admiral was talking about—20 percent. 

So I just don’t know if we have the number—I don’t know that 

we have the number of medical folks that could cover all that, and 

I don’t know that that is possible. 

Admiral FERGUSON. I would say that an increase in the number 

of mental health professionals in the medical community would be 

appreciated and useful in combating this within the service. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me answer for you folks. 

We have been working closely, as you know, with the mental 

health, with the health system as a whole, and this committee has 

probably done more than any committee in the Congress making 

sure you had what you needed to take care of health care. 

I meet continuously with Mrs. Emery and Dr. Gassels on this 

problem, suicide, and all these other problems that they have. We 

have put in place a plan where they have a case worker and they 

can hire psychologists. 

Now, we have a shortage of psychologists and psychiatrists all 

over the country, so no matter how much money we put in, we 

can’t find enough people and we don’t know exact causes. 

I had an incident. Not long ago, I visited one of the bases. The 

base commander’s son was killed in Iraq. His other son committed 

suicide. His wife and he were devastated by this. They don’t know 

why. He was ready to be commissioned. He would have been deployed. 

And suicide is just part of it. Because we know that we are going 

to have 300,000 people with PTSD, and we know the sooner we get 

them the better off we will be. So we are putting every bit of 

money, because of you, because of this committee, into health care 

that they can accumulate or that they can use in order to help 

solve this problem. 

Suicide, divorce rates are up in the Marine Corps and the Army 

because of these long deployments; and 15-month deployments are 

devastating to these troops. And the Marine Corps, as General 

Coleman said, even though they are home, they are not home. Because they go to schools, they go to training, and they go back over 

before their time is up. So it is a complicated problem. 

We are doing everything we can to make sure that—for instance, 

stop loss. The Secretary made the announcement the other day. He 

said, we are going to take care of stop loss. He didn’t take care of 

stop loss. This committee took care of stop loss. We put the money 

in for stop loss, and we are going to put money in for stop loss, if 

everybody agrees to it for the whole—everybody who was in stop 

loss. I mean, 160,000 were stop loss. We are going to put the 

money in. 

And the services, some of the services argued that they didn’t 

think it was right. Well, hell, you keep a guy 7 months past his 

deployment or past his enlistment, he ought to be given reimbursement for that. And I think this subcommittee will agree with me 

when we go to do that. 

But this is a major problem, this health care situation. So I appreciate Ms. Kilpatrick. This committee has been at the forefront 

of this issue, Bill Young, myself, and all the rest of the committee, 


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a lot of suggestions, a lot of recommendations, and we have tried 

to follow all of them. 

Mr. BARNUM. Mr. Chairman, we sincerely appreciate all the committee has done over the past years. And I think we are leaning 

forward in the saddle, and we are confronting the issues. As General Coleman just said, we wish we could turn the page of the book 

and all the answers would be there. 

But I think that BUMED has taken the lead on many of these. 

We have got a study going on with UCLA now on resiliency within 

the family and other programs, and we are hiring professionals to 

go into units. So I think we have identified the problem and we are 

attacking it. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Bishop, did you have a question on this? 

DEPRESSION

Mr. BISHOP. Yes, sir. I just wanted to weigh in. 

I was listening to the statistics—you said depression, sense of 

failure, anxiety, failure of relationships. Those are more or less the 

symptoms, as opposed to necessarily the problem. The question is, 

why are they depressed? Why do they have a sense of failure? Why 

is there anxiety? And which results in the family rise of divorce? 

I would think that you have got adultery, you have got the strain 

on the relationship when you have got these extended deployments. 

Once that happens, you have got young people, you know, under 

35 years old that may not have the experience and the maturity 

to be able to handle those kind of disappointments. They come 

back, and they have got a child that wasn’t theirs. They come back, 

and they find out that the guy down the street was dating their 

wife, or something of that order. And those kinds of stresses lead 

to the sense of failure. 

I am a failure as a husband. Boom, I blow my brains out. I am 

depressed because my buddy has now been with my wife, and everybody on the post knows it. 

Those are the kinds of—problems that are a result of the multiple deployments which is hidden when you just say that the 

source, the causes of the suicide is depression, sense of failure, anxiety or failure of a relationship. Why does the relationship fail? And 

the strain and the not-sufficient dwell time to reinforce these relationships is what is driving that stress and that suicide rate. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Kingston. 

CHANGING NAME OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to ask a question about this bill that has been offered 

by Walter Jones that changes the name of the Department of the 

Navy and Marine Corps. Do you guys have any opinion? Do you 

hear anybody talking about that might be a more diplomatic way? 

Not necessarily your own opinion, but what kind of opinions do you 

hear? The Chairman has already said he is amending it to change 

the wording around. 

Mr. BARNUM. I think my opinion would be interesting but irrelevant right now. 

I have talked to Congressman Jones; and, of course, having 

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tional aspect and there is a reality aspect. It is not going to change, 

my opinion, the authority of the Secretary of the Navy. I think it 

has brought on a lot of levity to some times when there was tension 

in the room. But I think we have more important things on the 

table to accomplish than changing the name of the Navy to the 

Navy and the Marine Corps. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I just think about the Army several years ago deciding that the Rangers couldn’t have the black beret, that everybody had to have the same color beret. So we are known to do 

things like this. 

Mr. BARNUM. Well, every false step is a learning experience. We 

shouldn’t make that mistake. 

TRAINING

Mr. KINGSTON. My question is, in terms of the training for Afghanistan, you have got 17,000 Marines going there. How is the 

training? Are you able to train on the equipment that you will be 

using? 

General COLEMAN. We will train on like equipment. It will not 

be necessarily the item that you have when you go to Mojave Viper, 

which is at Twentynine Palms, California. It may not be that same 

item, but it will be a like item that will, in most cases, will already 

be there or you will take from your home base. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Are you familiar with the firearms training system that they have in the Army? I don’t know if the Marines have 

it or not. I know a lot of Guard units have it in the Army and then 

the regular Army has it. 

Mr. BARNUM. You are talking about the FAST system, which is 

a simulator? 

Mr. KINGSTON. Yes. 

Mr. BARNUM. Yes. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Are you training on that through the Marines? 

Mr. BARNUM. We have some Reserve units that have utilized 

that system while they were at Twentynine Palms. 

Mr. KINGSTON. It saves money, but it is also basically the real 

weapon itself and very close to lifelike, is that correct? 

Mr. BARNUM. That is very true, and I think that you are going 

to see a lot of that used in our military police units that are scattered around. And it is a good system, and we are using it with 

some deployed units. But the Army and the Coast Guard, as you 

probably know, are the biggest users, as I remember that system. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Is there anything we need to know in terms of 

training the Marines? Is there anything you do not have that we 

need to be aware of? 

General COLEMAN. I think that Congress as a whole and this 

committee specifically has done volumes for us. I would ask that 

we slowly proceed in any drawdown and retention bonuses. That 

would be my fear, is where do we go? And it is not that Marines 

feel that they, okay, this is something that they will always have. 

But in the near term, until we get right-sized and structured correctly, that would be my fear, is that we would do that. Along with, 

as Ms. Kilpatrick said, the health of our people is our biggest concern. So if we can get what we need for the medical side, that 

would be my desire, sir. 


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Mr. KINGSTON. In terms of the physical conditioning, is it just as 

tough as it has always been? Or we had some NCOs tell some folks 

on a codel that they did not think that the newer Soldiers, talking 

about the Army Soldiers, were as physically up to speed as they 

needed to be. Are you seeing that in the Navy or in the Marines? 

Admiral FERGUSON. We run a physical fitness test twice a year. 

That is standard, has not changed within the Navy. What we are 

seeing is probably more of a national issue of the ones coming out 

of high school in the recruiting station. About 50 percent fail the 

physical test the first time they take it. We put them on a remedial 

program and work with them such that after they finish basic military training less than one-half of 1 percent have a problem with 

failure. So we are very comfortable with the physical standards and 

how they are performing. 

General COLEMAN. We train them like we always have, sir, hard. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, we appreciate your coming before the Committee. To my knowledge, we have only had one other Congressional Medal of Honor winner before the committee, and that was 

the guy that took MacArthur out of Corregidor. Buckley was his 

name I think, if I remember. He was the IG for a number of years, 

and they kept him on long past his retirement age. And so we are 

honored to have all three of you, but especially yourself, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. BARNUM. Well, thank you very much. It has been an honor 

to testify. I have got to do a lot of things in my life, and this is 

a first. So thank you very much. 

And I appreciate, I really do, on behalf of the Sailors and Marines that the three of us represent, we really appreciate the efforts 

of this committee. You talk the talk, and you walk the walk. We 

are very appreciative. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. The Committee will adjourn till next week. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the 

answers thereto follow:] 

INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION (IA) REQUIREMENTS

Question. Since September 11, 2001, 76,000 Sailors have served on IA tours. In 

IA assignments Navy Sailors are in some cases filling in for Army and Marine 

Corps personnel. These assignments can be outside a Sailor’s typical occupational 

experience and range from detainee operations to counter-improvised explosive devices operations. The Navy currently has 10,935 IAs and of the, 6,069 IAs are in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. Of the 6,069 IAs approximately 2,059 are noncore requirements. The Navy currently pays the cost of IAs from the base budget and has requested to fund this cost out of the FY2009 supplemental. 

Admiral Ferguson, please explain the IA process. Do sailors volunteer for IA billets or are they involuntarily placed in IA billets? 

Answer. Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) identify requirements, which are 

forwarded to the Joint Staff for validation. Following validation of a Request for 

Forces (RFF) and Joint Manning Documents (JMDs), the requirements are sent to 

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) for Service review and sourcing. Navy reviews requirements based on our capability and capacity to fill them, across both active and 

reserve components. Upon completion of our review a sourcing recommendation is 

forwarded to JFCOM and the Joint Staff and, when ordered by the Secretary of Defense, is released for execution. 

Navy uses two approaches in sourcing Combatant Commander requirements: 

GWOT Support Assignment (GSA) and Individual Augmentee Manpower Management (IAMM). In the GSA process, orders are issued in conjunction with a permaVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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nent change of station; thereby minimizing disruption in the lives of Sailors and 

their families by completion of an IA as part of the normal reassignment process. 

New and unstable requirements in support of overseas contingency operations, 

which cannot be accomplished through the GSA process, may be fulfilled by active 

or reserve component personnel through the legacy IA process, known as IAMM, 

which can occur during the course of a Sailors current assignment. Support for Sailors continues throughout their deployment (First I-stop, training and arrival in theater) and redeployment. 

IA billets are filled through both voluntary and involuntary assignments. By volunteering, Sailors are able to exercise greater influence over the timing and specific 

billet to which they may be assigned. Involuntary assignments are used to fill IAs 

for which no volunteer is identified. To the maximum extent possible, we attempt 

to use the less disruptive GSA approach to fill both voluntary and involuntary IA 

assignments. The predictability of the GSA process incentivizes volunteerism by affording Sailors the opportunity to work an IA into a normal career progression. 

Question. Are sailors ever taken mid-tour and placed in IA billets? 

Answer. To the maximum extent possible, we fill IA assignments through the 

GSA process. However, emerging demands dictate filling an IA requirement through 

a mid-tour IAMM assignment. The current split is approximately 41% IA/GSA, and 

59% IAMM. 

Question. How long does the typical IA assignment last? 

Answer. Typically, an IA assignment runs from 210 days to 365 days in country, 

frequently referred to as ‘‘boots on the ground’’ depending on type of mission. This 

timeframe does not include pre-deployment training. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, some IA billets are outside a Sailor’s typical occupational experience. What are some examples of these IA billets? 

Answer. Approximately 4,440 Sailors are serving as IAs supporting ‘‘temporary’’ 

missions. These are capabilities for which Navy does not have a standard military 

force employment package. Examples include Civil Affairs, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and Detainee Operations. Approximately 2,700 Sailors are serving as IAs supporting ‘‘adaptive core’’ missions. These are capabilities for which a 

service can expand a core capability to perform with additional training and equipping. Examples include Counter-IED operations, Military Police, and Base Operations. 

Questions. Since these IA billets are outside the Navy’s core mission, please explain how Sailors are trained for these billets? 

Answer. Training is coordinated by US Fleet Forces Command through Joint 

Forces Command and Army, to provide mission specific training conducted by Army 

at various training sites that meet Central Command standards. For example, Civil 

Affairs and PRT training is conducted at Ft Bragg and Detainee Operations can be 

conducted at Ft Lewis, Washington and Ft Dix. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, what IA billets line up with the Navy’s core mission 

and how are they filled? 

Answer. Approximately 7,000 Sailors are serving as IAs in support of ‘‘core’’ missions. Core missions are capabilities for which the service is uniquely responsible 

(Title 10) and has a standard, mission-ready, capable military force employment 

package. Examples include construction (Seabees), airlift support, cargo handling, 

maritime and port security, and medical/Marine Corps support. 

Question. Does the Navy fill core IA billets first, then noncore IA billets or vice 

versa? 

Answer. Navy does not source IA billets based on whether they are core or noncore, rather sources augmentation requirements based on Joint Staff guidance, typically as Combatant Commander demand is reviewed and approved by Joint Staff. 

The Services source these as they occur based on capability and capacity. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, is the Navy experiencing any problems filling these 

IA missions? 

Answer. Currently, we are meeting 100% of our IA missions with qualified Sailors 

while sustaining appropriate dwell time. Growth in certain critical skill sets demands specialties such as Intel, Supply, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Engineer and 

certain Medical Professions, which may present increased challenges in meeting the 

demand without a reduction in dwell time for our Sailors. 

Question. Mr. Barnum, are any of the IA billets being assimilated into the Navy’s 

Core mission? 

Answer. Navy is not growing any new mission areas due to demand. For example, 

Navy is not building Detainee Companies, Embedded Training Teams or PRTs as 

part of its Core Mission. Additionally, Navy uses existing skill sets with additional 

training that support Adaptive Core Mission areas. The Department has agreed to 


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fund some skill sets that support Adaptive Core requirements and will support traditional Navy missions. 

Question. If so, how many were once performed by the Army and Marine Corps? 

Answer. Not applicable 

Question. Mr. Barnum, are there any new missions and requirements that the 

Navy may take on in the future? 

Answer. Navy’s stabilization strategy is directed at sustaining a high quality force 

to meet the demands of the Maritime Strategy and the joint warfighter, while at 

the same time being able to respond to new mission areas. New and expanded mission areas include riverine warfare, cyber and missile defense, and SEAL/SOF (intelligence, naval coastal warfare, UAV, submarine operations). 

Question. Mr. Barnum, how many sailors are currently deployed in the Central 

Command Area of Responsibility and of that how many are used for IA missions? 

Answer. As of 16 March, thee were a total ∼ 23,800 Sailors deployed in the 

CENTCOM AOR. Of those, ∼ 14,400 are ashore and ∼ 9,400 afloat. The forces ashore 

include ∼ 8,200 augmentees sourced with a mix of Active and Reserve personnel. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, what was the overall scope of the Navy’s IA billet 

responsibilities over the last several years to the present? 

Answer. We have experienced growth over the past two and half years. In August 

of 2006 there were ∼ 9,500 augmentation requirements. This has increased 

to ∼ 11,000 requirements in April 2009. Navy expects these requirements to increase 

supporting operations in Afghanistan, for additional ∼ 1,600 from its current level. 

This includes current and expected support to Marine Corps units. Navy’s contribution will remain steady provided no new growth is requested. Additionally, Navy 

contribution in Iraq is aligned to Battlespace (Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar/Base Operations/Navy Mobile Construction Battalions) and Specific Mission 

areas (Detainee Operations). As missions are returned to the Iraqis and Central 

Command reduces its footprint, then Navy may see a reduction. 

NAVY END STRENGTH

Question. Admiral Ferguson, given that the Navy IA billet demand appears to 

only be increasing, what does the Navy expect its future end strength to be (active 

duty, guard, and reserve numbers)? 

Answer. I expect to finish FY09 at an end strength level of approximately 

331,000. At this point in the FY10 budget build, I expect to need fewer Sailors next 

year, but that number is contingent on pending decisions. On the reserve side, I expect to finish FY09 around 66,700 end strength. FY10 reserve requirements are 

likely to be less, although they are also contingent on pending decisions. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, please explain how ‘‘sailor behavior’’ is driving this 

over strength and what actions you are taking to get to the planned fiscal year 2009 

end strength? 

Answer. We are experiencing increased retention and reduced attrition behaviors 

likely attributable to the economy. This is resulting in greater than planned for endstrength. 

To meet Combatant Commander Individual Augmentation demand and reduce 

stress on the force, the Secretary of the Navy approved a fiscal year 2009 end 

strength level two percent above our current authorization. While this action was 

operationally driven, it will allow us to remain within Secretary of the Navy approved end strength levels. 

To maintain a balanced force in terms of seniority, experience, and skills, we have 

implemented a comprehensive force stabilization strategy. We have also implemented, or will implement, a number of force shaping measures, including: time in 

grade waivers, reducing or eliminating selective reenlistment bonuses, performancebased continuation boards for enlisted personnel with greater than 20 years of service, Perform to Serve and voluntary early separations. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, what is the additional cost of this over strength? 

Answer. The total cost due to over strength is $952M. 

MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH

Question. General Coleman, adding more enlisted Marines means adding more officers to lead them, but growing officers remains a struggle because of the time it 

takes to train an officer. What steps are the Marine Corps taking to match the officer side of growth to enlisted side? 

Answer. The Marine Corps increased both input and throughput for our officers, 

specifically: 

• Increased its share of graduates from the Naval Academy and NROTC 


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• Lifted caps on, and encouraged the participation in, the enlisted-to-officer programs. • Provided for incentives to encourage officer accessions through the College Loan 

Repayment Program and the Officer Accession Incentive (FY09 initiative). • Increased staffing and billeting space at officer training venues to increase 

through-put thus reducing time-to-train (OCS, TBS, and MOS schools). 

Question. When do you think that the Marine Corps will reach the correct ratio 

of officers to enlisted? 

Answer. The Marine Corps expects to have the necessary officer-to-enlisted ratio 

by the end of FY 2010. 

NAVY RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. Admiral Ferguson, since the Navy is doing well in both the retention 

and recruiting side, what force shaping measures will the Navy use to get the ‘‘right 

mix’’ of personnel it needs? 

Answer. Navy will continue to focus on performance while maintaining a balance 

between seniority, experience, and skills. To do this, we have instituted a number 

of measures on the enlisted side including adjusting reenlistment bonuses, incorporating ‘‘Perform to Serve’’ through 14 years of service, allowing time-in-grade 

waivers for retirement, and implementing a continuation board for E7–E9 with over 

20 years of service. On the officer side, we will use a probationary officer review 

board intended to identify the highest performing officers for retention, we are similarly allowing waivers of active duty minimum service requirement, in targeted communities, to permit officers who will otherwise separate upon completing their service obligation, to depart the Navy up to one year early. 

In addition, we are adjusting our reenlistment bonuses to retain our best Sailors 

with critical skills. We also have focused our recruiting efforts on matching individuals to critical ratings. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, since you are doing so well with retaining and recruiting sailors, will this help ease the burden of IA billets? 

Answer.Yes; the success we have experienced with recruiting and retaining highquality Sailors will enable us to better fill our IA requirements and meet Fleet manning requirements. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, has the Navy instituted any retraining efforts for officers and enlisted, targeting career fields with overages and shifting them into career fields with identified shortages? If so, please explain how the Navy chooses the 

personnel to retrain, and the average cost to the Navy to retrain these sailors. 

Answer. Navy active and reserve components have existing programs and processes designed for targeting and retraining enlisted Sailors from overmanned to 

undermanned skill sets. Enlisted Sailors in overmanned ratings are initially identified during Career Development Boards. These sailors are encouraged to consider 

a conversion to an undermanned rating for which they are fully qualified. Additionally, the Perform to Serve (PTS) process requires all Sailors with less than 14 years 

of service to request reenlistment approval in their current rating or to convert to 

undermanned ratings based on the needs of the Navy. To achieve proper manning 

levels with Sailors possessing the appropriate skill sets, bonuses are paid to those 

who qualify for, and agree to convert to, ratings with identified shortages. Some ratings require traditional classroom training, while others can be accomplished 

through on-the-job training. 

Currently no officer designators are overmanned such that redesignation is required. However, through the lateral transfer/force shaping process, opportunities 

exist for redesignation and retraining. Additionally, individuals who do not make it 

through initial training pipelines may apply to redesignate to another, undermanned, community. If accepted they will be retrained in that community. 

Both active and reserve components have tools available to educate members of 

the enlisted and officer communities to become familiar with other career fields 

(training requirements, occupational details, sea/shore rotations, and geographic demand). Opportunities exist for Sailors in overmanned ratings/designators to retrain 

into undermanned ratings/designators as they transition between Navy components. 

Costs associated with retraining and redesignating Sailors are negligible, since 

personnel are assigned to available training seats previously budgeted as part of the 

annual training plan. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, since retention is at an all time high and recruiting 

is doing very well, are critical career fields having an easier time being filed? If not, 

why, and what efforts are being taken to fill shortages? 

Answer. Navy continues to experience sustained recruiting success, increased retention, and reduced attrition. While enlisted active and reserve recruiting goals 


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have been met for 23 straight months through March 2009, this fiscal year is 

marked by higher retention and lower attrition than predicted due to pressure from 

the current national economy. 

This fiscal year, Navy has been successful recruiting critical skills. As of April 20, 

we have recruited greater than 93 percent of the requirement for Nuclear Field enlisted recruits, SEALS, Special Warfare Combat Crewman, Navy Divers, Explosive 

Ordnance Disposal Technicians, and Enlisted Aircrew. Two ratings we continue to 

focus on are Cryptologic Technician Interpretive (CTI) at 77.6 percent and Enlisted 

Aircrew Rescue Swimmers (AIRR) at 55.5 percent. CTI is one of very few ratings 

still available for a retention bonus and, combined with a $20K enlistment bonus, 

the fill rate is increasing. We are attempting to get healthy in the AIRR rating 

through the combination of a $25K enlistment bonus and filling with recruits who 

are unable to complete SEAL training, by reclassifying these individuals as Rescue 

Swimmers. 

The positive retention environment Navy has experienced this year is reflected 

across the majority of critical skills including Special Operations, EOD, Divers, Missile Technicians, and CTIs. Strength increases based upon new mission requirements require Special Warfare Boat Operator and Computer Network Technician retention over execution to achieve force requirements. Nuclear operators, dental and 

medical officers, and Independent Duty Corpsman remain a focus as competition 

from the civilian sector and high operational tempo continue to challenge retention 

in these fields. Given the change in retention and loss behavior, we are focused on 

stabilizing the force through a targeted investment approach—reducing or eliminating monetary incentives where they are not needed and through continued investment in critical skills. 

Question. Mr. Barnum, has the Navy analyzed why critical-mission military occupational specialties have consistently been under-filled? What is the operational impact of these shortages? What resources are needed to fill these positions? 

Answer. Yes, Navy has conducted such analysis. 

Unprecedented recruiting success, coupled with historic retention rates and low 

attrition, continues to strengthen the health of critical-mission ratings. As the Global War on Terrorism took shape, Navy developed strategies to grow in some of the 

mission-critical ratings. 

Navy developed a multi-pronged approach to growing in mission-critical ratings. 

We expanded Navy Recruiting efforts through dedication of manpower, increased 

enlistment bonuses and focused recruiting programs; we conducted in-depth training 

pipeline analyses to identify efficiency gains; and we focused retention bonuses to 

ensure community health and retained growth. Since many mission-critical ratings 

are in demand by the civilian economy, it is vital that we maintain specific enlistment and retention bonuses, and continue with plans to expand training throughout. 

Operational impact upon critical skill shortages creates considerable stress on the 

force in terms of additional deployments and ‘‘away-from-home’’ time, impacting the 

Sailors and their families, and ultimately community health and retention. The 

SEAL officer community, for example, is the cohort arguable experiencing the greatest OPTEMPO in terms of combat deployments: an average of four combat deployments per Officer. It is currently 68 percent manned and is still in a DOD-directed 

growth phase. Consequently, it is easy to see how the loss of just one SEAL significantly impacts the community’s long-term health. Forward-deployed operational jobs 

are considered the most critical fills; where shortages occur, the CONUS-based, nondeployable jobs go unfilled, introduced shortfalls in the training commands (and 

staffs) which directly impacts the readiness of the Force. 

Question. Mr. Barnum, recruiting and retention goals are often relayed to Congress in the aggregate, providing little or no visibility into how each occupational 

specialty is staffed. Please provide the Committee details on recruiting and retention by military occupational specialty (MOS). 

Answer. Please see the attached regarding the details on recruiting and retention 

for enlisted and officer communities in the Navy. 

Navy recruiting continues to do well for both enlisted and officer communities. We 

do have certain specialties that continually require attention, especially the officer 

and enlisted nuclear fields and healthy profession officers. 

For enlisted, retention is broken down into zones and is calculated by the number 

of individuals who have re-listed and are currently on active duty in the particular 

zone. The three zones Navy is most concerned about are Zones A, B, and C. Zone 

A is 0–6 years on active duty, Zone B is 6–10 years, and Zone C is 10–14 years. 

For officers, retention is community specific since each community has specific 

milestones an officer is required to meet. 


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MARINE CORPS RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. Mr. Barnum, are there plans to analyze how to keep mission-critical 

MOSs filled, and what is the operational impact of these shortages? 

Answer. The Marine Corps is constantly analyzing how to fill all MOSs, HD/LD 

MOSs in particular. Accession and Retention Plans are developed to fill all MOS requirements. Shortages in mission-critical MOSs have an operational impact on the 

Marines currently in the MOS as they will have less opportunity for dwell. Individually, Marines in these MOSs likely have less opportunity to experience other aspects of the Marine Corps, e.g., Special Duty Assignments, that tend to provide for 

professional growth as a Marine leader and to positively affect retention propensity. 

Commanders and their Marines always work toward the mission and mitigate the 

consequences of shortages in mission-critical MOSs. 

Question. General Coleman, the Committee is very concerned regarding the recruitment and retention of mission-critical Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). 

Given the poor state of the economy and increased retention, has the fill rate for 

these MOSs improved? If not, what steps are you taking to fill these positions? 

Answer. Fill rates in critical MOSs have greatly improved during FY09. Prudent 

use of Enlistment Bonuses has allowed us to increase the numbers of accessions in 

our critical programs that will support shortfalls and reenlistments in the future. 

With respect to retention, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB) have allowed us to 

reenlist 291 more Marines from our ten most critical MOSs as compared to the 

same time last year. Challenges continue for some MOSs (i.e. Intel, EOD, etc.) that 

are both lateral move MOSs and increased as a result of the 202K growth. Again, 

a strong SRB program has allowed us to entice Marines to reenlist for a lateral 

move into these critical MOSs. 

Question. General Coleman, recruiting and retention goals are often relayed to 

Congress in the aggregate, providing little or no visibility into how each occupational specialty is staffed. Please provide the Committee with details on recruiting 

and retention by MOS? • 76% (31 OF 41) Occ Fields are ≥ 90% of 202K requirement 

3 over 110% (03,31,46) 

Largest Occ Field 03XX (Infantry) at 119% (+6,185) • 24% (10 of 41) Occ Fields are < 90% of 202K requirement 

Shortest Occ Field 73XX (Enlisted Flight Crews) at 69% (¥156) • 83% (34 OF 41) Occ Fields are forecasted to be ≥ 90% of 202K requirement by 

end of FY09 • All Occupational fields forecasted to be ≥ 90% of 202K requirement by end of 

FY12 

NAVY ENLISTMENT AND RETENTION BONUSES

Question. Admiral Ferguson, to date, what was the total dollar amount spent on 

Navy recruiting and retention bonuses for FY2009? Answer. To date, Navy has spent approximately $423M on recruiting and retention bonuses. This amount includes both initial and anniversary payments. 

Question. General Coleman, to date, what was the total dollar amount spent on 

Marine Corps recruiting and retention bonuses for FY2009? Answer. To date, the Marine Corps has spent $30.9M on Enlistment Bonuses and $236.2M on retention bonuses. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, what is the range of individual bonuses for recruiting? For retention? Please explain why there are differences. 

Answer. There are a wide range of bonuses used by Navy to recruit and retain 

Sailors. While the bonus programs may vary in programmatic details, they are all 

derived from market analysis. We adjust the specific bonus amount for a given skill 

in response to the projected effect current and future economic conditions will have 

on manning and retention levels. 

Bonuses are employed in recruiting to attract individuals with specialized, critical 

skills. Most ratings in the Navy are eligible for Enlistment Bonuses (EB) such as 

language proficiency. In response to demand for Navy employment, Navy Recruiting 

Command has cut the number of active duty EB eligible ratings from 52 to just 10 

in FY09. Because recruitment of Sailors begins as much as one year before accession 

on active duty, recruitment bonuses are based almost entirely on current conditions 

rather than on economic projections over the lifetime of a Sailor. Currently, EBs 

range from $6,000 to $40,000 for active duty accessions and are paid at gates based 

on program specifications such as completion of Recruit Training, completion of ‘‘A’’ 

or ‘‘C’’ School, or completion of specialized training curriculum. For FY08, 45% of 

the 38,485 active duty accessions took an enlistment bonus. For FY09, 48% of the 

projected 35,500 active duty accessions have elected to receive an EB. 


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Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) amounts can range from $0, where we have 

determined a bonus is not needed to meet our retention goals for a given rating/ 

skill, to a maximum of $90,000, used to retain personnel in some of our most critical, highly-technical skill sets, where training investments and replacement costs 

are high. Within this range, Navy employs econometric modeling to target SRB payment levels to achieve critical skill retention. For example, at the beginning of FY09 

approximately 38,000 of 270,000 sailors were eligible for SRB. To date, we have reenlisted 9,163 members, and under our most recent award plan released 11 March 

about 5,500 eligible sailors remained who had not made their reenlistment decision. 

We have also instituted several retention bonus programs under the umbrella of 

the Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) authorized in 37 U.S. Code 355. In general, bonus programs under this authority are targeted at very specific, hard to retain and hard to replace populations at the more senior points in the career continuum. CSRB amounts can be as much as $150,000 lump-sum payments for Special 

Operations Technicians (i.e., SEALs) with 19 years of service who agree to remain 

on active duty for 6 years. Members are not authorized to receive more than one 

bonus at a time. 

Question. General Coleman, what is the range of individual bonuses for recruiting? For retention? Please explain why there are differences. 

Answer. The range for recruiting bonuses is $5–$25K. There are two objectives 

of recruiting bonuses. One, is to attract qualified applicants into specific programs 

which are either critically short or to fill those technical fields that require high 

educational or test prerequisites. Two, is to ship recruits at specific times of the year 

which optimizes the training process. This range accurately reflects those aspects 

in detail. 

Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB) range from a low of $5,500 to a high of 

$89,000. There are differences for three primary reasons: (1) some MOSs had high 

inventories which required a lower reenlistment rate; (2) increase in 202K requirements; and (3) civilian employment opportunities. 

Fifty-four MOSs (approx. 25%) had no bonus offered in FY09. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, have you found any imbalances or inequities in your 

recruiting and retention bonus structure? 

Answer. Our bonus rate is market-driven and offered only to a portion of individuals in the Navy. The amounts are established based on current and projected economic conditions and accession and retention rates versus service demand. As the 

economic environment changes, bonus amounts are routinely adjusted based on 

analysis of recruiting and retention behavior. In general, the adaptive model of the 

current bonus structure serves us well. The agile and flexible nature of the structure, coupled with continuous analysis, allows us to constructively address any imbalances or inequities that may arise. 

Question. General Coleman, have you found any imbalances or inequities in your 

recruiting and retention bonus structure? 

Answer. No. There have been no imbalances in recruiting bonuses. Recruiting bonuses are currently structured to make every recruiting program or skill set equally 

attainable as well as ensure that the manpower flow to recruit training is optimized. 

Linguists, which have a $25K bonus, require very high test and security entrance 

requirements as well as a difficult two year school. Shipping bonuses which are a 

$5K bonus, gives the Marine Corps the ability to ship recruits in the more difficult 

shipping months, which greatly increases the optimization of training by decreasing 

uneven flow rates. 

Our SRB program is designed to shape and sustain the career force needed to 

meet the 202K force structure requirements. Some MOSs with greater demand are 

paid more e.g., Intel, EOD, Linguist, Recon, etc. 

Question. Mr. Barnum, does the Department of the Navy plan to review its recruiting and retention bonus program for both the Navy and Marine Corps? 

Answer. The Navy continually analyzes the monetary incentives it provides to attract, recruit, and retain the highest quality individuals. We have taken a targeted 

investment approach to ensure we are using monetary incentives to attract and retain the skill sets and quantity required to meet mission requirements. This year 

we have reduced reenlistment bonuses and accession bonuses for the Active Component. Although we have reduced these incentives, they remain an invaluable tool 

and we will need to remain flexible for any future increase or decrease to respond 

to changing economic conditions. 

For the Reserve Component we have maintained bonus payment amounts over 

the past year. However, we have refined, and continue to refine, the targeted groups 

so that recruitment and retention bonuses are only given to those members in 

undermanned and critical skill sets. 


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The Marine Corps conducts an annual review of enlistment and Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) programs in an effort to optimize the resources required to 

maintain the 202K force. 

Question. Mr. Barnum, are there plans to promote non-monetary bonuses such as 

tuition assistance and the new G.I. Bill? 

Answer. The Navy is continually looking at opportunities to promote non-monetary incentives to attract and retain the best and brightest. These include education 

benefits (TA and Post 9/11 G.I. Bill), paternity leave (approved by Congress in the 

NDAA 2009), Career Intermission Program, telework, and career path flexibility. 

We believe that we have to be a leader in human resource solutions, exploring innovative ways to deliver the highest quality Sailor to the Fleet. 

The Marine Corps uses tuition assistance and post-service education funding as 

part of both recruiting and retention. There are intangibles such as earning the title 

of a ‘‘United States Marine,’’ being part of a small, elite fighting organization, duty 

station options, etc. that come into play in recruiting and retaining Marines. We expect that the new G.I. Bill will both entice Marines to leave or stay in depending 

on their individual situations. Transferability of educational benefits to spouse, and/ 

or children will certainly be attractive to our career force and should help retain 

Marines with more that six years of service. True impacts of the new G.I. Bill will 

not be seen until 2010 and beyond. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, is there any concern that enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses are now viewed by sailors as an entitlement instead of a bonus? 

Answer. Any compensation package that is sustained over time and not adjusted 

to market forces could be viewed as an entitlement by some service members. Navy 

has recently adjusted both its enlistment and reenlistment bonus to respond to current market forces. Navy will continue to analyze monetary incentive levels, and use 

only what is necessary to incentivize the retention behavior to support our many 

requirements. 

Question. General Coleman, is there any concern that enlistment and reenlistment bonuses are now viewed by Marines as an entitlement instead of a bonus? 

Answer. Yes, and we need to remain cognizant of these expectations as we manage our bonus programs. However, the Marine Corps has always emphasized the 

intangibles of service—the pride of being a Marine and the bond that is forged in 

combat. Additionally, Marines are well aware that bonuses are tied to career force 

reenlistment requirements, are analyzed each year, and may change based on current and future manpower needs. Furthermore, recruiting bonuses are only given 

to those recruits with the higher test scores or prerequisites, which mean that some 

recruits will not even qualify for a recruiting bonus. 

Question. Mr. Barnum, since the state of the economy has contributed significantly towards recruiting and retention success, do the Navy and Marine Corps plan 

to reduce or eliminate bonuses? If so, what bonuses will be reduced or eliminated? 

Answer. The Navy continually analyzes the monetary incentives it provides to attract, recruit, and retain the highest quality individuals. We have taken a targeted 

investment approach to ensure we are using monetary incentives to attract and retain only the skills sets and quantity required to meet mission requirements. This 

year we have reduced reenlistment bonuses and accession bonuses. Although we 

have reduced these incentives, they remain an invaluable tool and we will need to 

remain flexible for any future increase or decrease to respond to changing economic 

conditions. 

Every year, the Marine Corps reviews both its Enlistment Bonus (EB) and Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Programs to insure they best support both the accession and retention requirements to support the 202K force. Bonuses are increased 

or decreased based on the yearly end strength and inventory (MOS) requirements. 

We are currently reviewing our plans for FY10, and based on FY09 results EBs and 

SRBs will be adjusted as required. We anticipate publishing the retention plan in 

June and the accession plan in late summer. 

Question. Mr. Barnum, can you provide the committee with a complete list of all 

recruitment and retention bonuses for each MOS? Can you also provide the average 

bonus of each MOS? 

Answer. There are a wide range of bonuses used by Navy to recruit and retain 

Sailors. While the bonus programs may vary in programmatic details, they are all 

derived from detailed analysis. We adjust the specific bonus amount for a given skill 

in response to the projected effect current and future economic conditions will have 

on manning and retention levels. 

Bonuses are employed in recruiting to attract individuals with specialized, critical 

skills. Most ratings in the Navy are eligible for Enlistment Bonuses (EB) such as 

language proficiency. In response to unprecedented demand for Navy employment, 

Navy Recruiting Command has cut the number of active duty EB eligible ratings 


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from 52 to just 10 in FY09. Because recruitment of Sailors begins as much as one 

year before accession on active duty, recruitment bonuses are based almost entirely 

on current conditions rather than on economic projections over the lifetime of a Sailor. Currently, EBs range from $6,000 to $40,000 for active duty accessions and are 

paid at gates based on program specifications such as completion of Recruit Training, completion of ‘‘A’’ or ‘‘C’’ School, or completion of specialized training curriculum. For FY08, 45% of the 38,485 active duty accessions took an enlistment 

bonus. For FY09, 48% of the projected 35,500 active duty accessions have elected 

to receive an EB. In response to unprecedented demand for Navy employment, NRC 

has cut the number of active duty EB eligible ratings from 32 to just ten. 

Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) amounts can range from $0, where we have 

determined a bonus is not needed to meet our retention goals for a given rating/ 

skill, to a maximum of $90,000, used to retain personnel in some of our most critical, highly-technical skill sets, where training investments and replacement costs 

are high. Within this range, Navy employs econometric modeling to target SRB payment levels to achieve critical skill retention. For example, at the beginning of FY09 

approximately 38,000 of 270,000 sailors were eligible for SRB. To date, we have reenlisted 9,163 members, and under our most recent award plan released 11 March 

about 5,500 eligible sailors remain who had not made their reenlistment decision. 

We have also instituted several retention bonus programs under the umbrella of 

the Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) authorized in 37 U.S. Code § 355. In general, bonus programs under this authority are targeted at very specific, hard to retain and hard to replace populations at the more senior points in the career continuum. CSRB amounts can be as much as $150,000 lump-sum payments for Special 

Operations Technicians (i.e., SEALs) with 19 years of service who agree to remain 

on active duty for 6 years. Members are not authorized to receive more than one 

bonus at a time. 

In addition to the bonuses used to recruit and retain Sailors, Navy employs other 

pays to incentivize Sailors to accept assignments which entail a level of responsibility above and beyond what is normally expected (including when these kinds of 

assignments may occur throughout a career in a particular rating/skill), are chronically hard-to-fill, or are located in less desirable locations. These include pays such 

as Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP), Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP), Career 

Enlisted Flyer Incentive Pay (CEFIP), etc. 

The Marine Corps’ SRB program is designed to shape and sustain the career force 

needed to meet the 202K force structure requirements. The Marine Corps’ bonus 

program operates in a similar manner as the Navy’s. 

More specifics regarding these various bonuses and special and incentive pays can 

be found in the attached files. 


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Question. Admiral Ferguson, are there any MOSs that, even with bonuses, you 

still have a problem filling? 

Answer. Yes. Nuclear operators and certain medical professionals continue to be 

a challenge. 


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Question. Mr. Barnum, can you provide the Committee with a complete list of all 

recruitment and retention bonuses for each MOS? Can you provide the average 

bonus of each MOS? 

Answer. (Defer Retention Bonus Issues to N13) 

The effective Enlistment Bonus (EB) award level message determines the amount 

of EB that may be awarded and may be accompanied with the Navy College Fund 

(NCF). The authorization in effect for a particular Recruit is determined by the date 

the Recruit enters the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) and can vary based on ship 

month. Navy continually reviews the recruiting/enlistment bonus programs and adjusts bonuses and incentives accordingly with the needs of the Navy; therefore the 

average bonus of each rating depends wholly on a Recruit’s entry into the DEP and 

the effective EB authorization message. Those ratings not listed below have an EB 

of $0; however, they can be eligible for other enlistment programs including the 

Loan Repayment Program, College First, Accelerate to Excellence and Language 

Proficiency for eligible foreign languages. Additionally, Navy offers a Physical 

Screening Test EB for Special Warfare, Special Operations and Air Rescue rates. 

Rating-Program Ship months EB EB–NCF Combo 

Aviation Electronics Computer Field-FTS APR–SEP ...................................... $6,000 

Avionics-FTS .............................................. APR–SEP ...................................... 8,000 

Cryptologic Technician Interpretive-ATF ... APR–SEP ...................................... 20,000 $13,000/350 per month. 

Information Technician-SG ....................... APR–SEP ...................................... 15,000 

Musician-SG .............................................. APR–SEP ...................................... 15,000 

Submarine Electronics Computer Field5YO.APR–SEP ...................................... 10,000 

Nuclear Field ............................................. NOV–JAN ...................................... 23,000 $12,000/350 per month. 

FEB–MAY ..................................... 25,000 $13,00/350 per month. 

JUN–OCT ...................................... 21,000 $11,000/350 per month. 

Air Rescue-ATF .......................................... OCT–SEP ...................................... 25,000 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal-ATF ............. OCT–SEP ...................................... 40,000 

Navy Diver-ATF .......................................... OCT–SEP ...................................... 25,000 

Special Boats-ATF ..................................... OCT–SEP ...................................... 25,000 

Special Operations-ATF ............................. OCT–SEP ...................................... 40,000 

FTS-Full Time Support.

ATF-Advanced Technical Field.

SG-School Guarantee.

5YO-5 Year Obligation.


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Question. Admiral Ferguson, are there any MOSs that, even with bonuses, you 

still have a problem filing? 

Answer.Yes. Nuclear operators and certain medical professionals continue to be 

a challenge. 

Question. General Coleman, are there any MOSs that, even with bonuses, you are 

still having problems filling? 

Answer. Yes. Although we have had tremendous reenlistment successes we still 

have some lateral move MOSs that may potentially fall short this FY. Two examples 

include 0211s (Counter Intell/Humint Specialists) and 2336s (Explosive Ordinance 

Disposal Technician). 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 EXECUTION

Question. Admiral Ferguson, the Navy over-executed its end strength in fiscal 

year 2008 and continues to do so in fiscal year 2009, what factors are contributing 

to the over-execution of end strength and what steps will the Navy take to address 

this problem? 

Answer. The economy has impacted the behavior of the force. We are seeing increased retention, as well as significantly reduced attrition. To meet Combatant 

Commander Individual Argumentation demand and reduce stress on the force, Secretary of the Navy approved a fiscal year 2009 end strength level above our current 

authorization. To maintain a balanced force in terms of seniority, experience, and 

skills, we have implemented a comprehensive force stabilization strategy. We have 

implemented, or will implement, a number of force shaping measures including time 

in grade waivers, reducing or eliminating selective reenlistment bonuses, performance-based continuation boards for enlisted personnel with greater than 20 years of 

service, and voluntary early separations. We have also reduced accessions and controlled the number of reenlistments and short-term extensions we allow. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, when can the Committee expect to see a reprogramming request to address the shortfall due to the Navy’s over strength and how much 

will it be? 

Answer. Navy is conducting a mid-year review of program execution and will assess our ability to reprogram funds. We have not determined the reprogramming 

amount, but anticipate preparing a proposal for OSD to support a summer submission to the Congress. Currently, the FY09 MPN shortfall is projected to be approximately $350 million. 

Question. Mr. Barnum, currently, what is the monthly ‘‘burn rate’’ for the Navy 

and Marine Corps’ personnel costs? 

Answer. The DoN monthly burn rates (in $Millions) through February 2009 are: 

MPN ............................................................................................................. $2,159 

RPN ............................................................................................................. 151.9 

MPMC ......................................................................................................... 1,086 

RPMC .......................................................................................................... 49.1 

Question. Mr. Barnum, when do you anticipate the Navy and Marine Corps’ military personnel accounts will run out of money in FY 2009? 

Answer. Projections based on expenditures through February 2009 for run out 

dates without the proposed FY2009 Overseas Contingency Operations Supplemental 

Budget (OCOSB): 

MPN ........................................................... 6 September 2009. 

RPN ............................................................ 22 September 2009. 

MPMC ........................................................ 21 August 2009. 

RPMC ......................................................... 12 September 2009. 

SAILORS IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. The new Administration announced that it will send an additional 

17,000 personnel to Afghanistan. 

Admiral Ferguson, how many sailors are going? 

Answer. It is yet to be determined which specific missions that Navy will be supporting are directly linked to the 17,000. Navy has agreed to support an additional ∼ 61,600 requirements that are believed to be inclusive of the 17,000. 

Question. General Coleman, how many of the 17,000 servicemembers being sent 

to Afghanistan are Marines? 

Answer. Currently, there are approximately 3,300 Marines in Afghanistan. 2nd 

MEB will have approximately 10,100 Marines once fully established. 

Question. General Coleman, of the Marines being sent, how many will be on their 

first and how many will be on their second tour? 


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Answer. The next rotation of units deploying to Afghanistan will deploy in November. These units will not stabilize for deployment until the May/June time 

frame. However, as an example, the typical deploying infantry battalion—46.4% of 

the Marines are on their first deployment; 39% are on a second deployment; and 

14.6% are on a third or greater deployment. These percentages would generally be 

mirrored in other deploying units. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, do Sailors deploying to Afghanistan, train with the 

same equipment they will use when deployed? 

Answer. The equipment used to train Operation Enduring Freedom bound Sailors 

is the same Ready For Issue/Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment— 

initial issue for Iraq. Actual employment will depend on the mission in theater. Routinely theater asks for specific communication training based on equipment. Army 

has standard equipment in both Iraq and Afghanistan, absent some vehicle differences, the training is standard. 

Question. General Coleman do Marines deploying to Afghanistan, train with the 

same equipment they will use when deployed. 

Answer. Marines train with the same individual equipment that they will deploy 

with. They will train with the same type of major end items (i.e. Humvees, mortars, 

etc.), but will fall in on the equipment sets already in theater when they arrive in 

Afghanistan. This is the same procedure as Iraq. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, what sort of physical conditioning is done to prepare 

Sailors for deployment? 

Answer. Sailors are required to have passed the current Physical Readiness Test. 

Once reporting to training, they conduct physical training daily as well as train with 

full battle gear, e.g., 1–2 mile hikes fully loaded. 

Question. How is physical fitness maintained once Sailors are deployed? 

Answer. In theater, it is the parent organization that is required to ensure physical readiness which Sailors must participate in. 

Question. General Coleman, what sort of physical conditioning is done to prepare 

Marines for deployments? How is physical fitness maintained once Marines are deployed? 

Answer. A combination of strength, mobility and anaerobic/aerobic endurance 

training is conducted by Marines prior to deployment. A typical week’s physical 

training plan includes load bearing conditioning hikes, weight lifting using compound functional movements and agility training such as sprint workouts with 

changes of directions and jumps. The goal of predeployment physical training is to 

enhance a Marine’s physical capacity across a broad spectrum of physical skills. All 

training is done in a progressive manner with controls applied such as programmed 

rest to allow for adaptations and to mitigate injuries. 

The Marine Corps measures basic fitness levels with two semi-annual tests: the 

Physical Fitness Test, consisting of pull-up, abdominal crunches and a three mile 

run, that assesses general fitness; and the Combat Fitness Test consisting of three 

events that more accurately assess battlefield physical capabilities such as repeatedly lifting ammunition boxes and sprinting while carrying a wounded comrade. 

Other mandatory Service programs that contribute considerably to every Marine’s 

fitness include the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program and the requirement for 

periodic swimming requalifications. 

During deployment, Marines remain fit through the conduct of rigorous missions 

under demanding operational conditions, augmented by the continuous unit and individual physical fitness training which is a vital element of our Marine Corps regimen. 

Question. Admiral Ferguson, how do Sailors prepare for high altitude operations 

such as those they will perform in Afghanistan? 

Answer. There is no additional training to prepare Sailors for altitude extremes 

in Afghanistan. 

Question. General Coleman, how do Marines prepare for high altitude operations 

such as those they will perform in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Fortunately, our Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Center 

(MAGTFC) in 29 Palms, California and our Mountain Warfare Training Center 

(MWTC) in Bridgeport, California closely approximate the environmental conditions 

(to include altitudes) found in Afghanistan Regional Commands (RC) South and 

East. Marine units deploying to RC South conduct their mission rehearsal exercise 

(MRX) at 20 Palms prior to deploying. Marine Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) 


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deploying to RC East in Afghanistan conduct their predeployment training at the 

Mountain Warfare Training Center (MWTC) in Bridgeport, California, where the altitude ranges from 6,800 to 11,300 feet and there is significantly complex, compartmentalized terrain. At these two operational venues, Marines conduct a number of 

tactical exercises while exposed to Afghanistan-like environmental conditions. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 2009. 

COMBAT AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION 

WITNESSES 

VICE ADMIRAL DAVID ARCHITZEL, USN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MARK D. SHACKELFORD, MILITARY DEPUTY, 

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. We will start the hearing. Let me welcome the two 

distinguished guests today. General Shackelford flew the first F– 

22, the first one to fly it. He was a younger fellow. He tells me it 

is a vast improvement. It took a long time to get out in the field. 

It was something we discussed before the hearing started, was 

some stability in the program, some way we can make sure the 

programs are safe. We do that all the time. 

Bill Young and myself, we try to always buy the most we can buy 

once the program is mature so we get the best price and stability 

so the industry and the Air Force and the services understand. It 

is very difficult when you don’t get a budget. For instance, here we 

are into the budget process, we don’t have a budget here in the 

House. We don’t have the details of the supplemental from the Defense Department. We were supposed to get it last week. We 

haven’t gotten it yet. We know that is not your responsibility, but 

it hampers us in getting our work done. 

We are trying to get a feel for what we can get done in the supplemental, which helps us with the base bill. But we know the constraints you are under because of the fact that the budget is not 

ready yet and you are constrained. Some questions you can’t answer because you don’t know what the results are going to be. We 

appreciate that. 

But we also have to get these hearings in. We will have had 42 

hearings and briefings between now and the 6th of April, so we are 

doing the best we can to hold up our end of the bargain. But we 

just need more information, and we appreciate your coming before 

the committee. 

Mr. Young. 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, let me welcome our witnesses and 

look forward to our testimony this morning. I apologize for walking 

in a few minutes late. Traffic was really heavy on 395 this morning. 


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Mr. MURTHA. I don’t envy Bill Young. He lives out there in the 

rich section. He lives a long ways out. 

Mr. YOUNG. Actually, I live so far away because it was much less 

expensive. But the city has moved out 35 miles to where I live. 

Anyway, I apologize for being late, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. We will listen to your summarized statement and 

get right to the questions. Admiral. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ARCHITZEL

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Young, and 

distinguished members of the committee, it is my honor to appear 

before you today to discuss the Department of the Navy’s Tactical 

Aviation program. I would like to submit my written statement for 

the record. 

Mr. MURTHA. Without objection. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. The fiscal year 2009 budget ensures that the 

Navy and Marine Corps maintain a joint force capable of meeting 

the wide spectrum of threats to our Nation. The Department continues the development and low rate procurement of the F–35 

Lightning 2 aircraft and the development of the E2D Advanced 

Hawkeye, the EA–18G Growler aircraft, the CH–53 Heavy Lift Replacement aircraft, unmanned aviation, and new strike weapons 

capabilities. 

In total, the Navy and Marine Corps aviation will procure 134 

additional tactical and fixed wing aircraft, 69 rotary wing aircraft, 

and three unmanned systems, for a total of 206 aircraft with our 

fiscal year 2009 funding. 

The Navy is committed to funding and fielding the Joint Strike 

Fighter as an affordable, multi-mission fifth generation strike fighter. The program is in its 8th year of a 13-year system design and 

development SDD program. There are presently three jets in flight 

test. The remaining SDD and low rate initial production, or LRIP 

aircraft, are in production. The initial Short Takeoff and Vertical 

Landing, or STOVL test aircraft, BF–1, took its first flight in June 

of 2008 and has flown 14 sorties to date. Initial STOVL mode operations are on track for this summer at Naval Air Station, Patuxent 

River, Maryland. 

BF–2, the second STOVL aircraft, first flew on 25 February of 

this year and returned with no flight discrepancies noted. All F– 

35 variants are projected to meet their respective key performance 

parameters, and while the JSF production comes on line, the AV– 

8B Harrier still comprises 40 percent of the Marine tactical aviation and will remain in the active inventory until at least 2021. 

Fiscal year 2009 provided funding for upgrades that will ensure 

the AV–8B remains viable and relevant in support of the Marine 

air-ground task force and combat and command requirements. 

The F/A–18E and F Super Hornet and the EA–18G Growler are 

doing extremely well, delivering a superior capability to the 

warfighter on cost and on schedule. We have delivered over 268 

Super Hornets to the fleet and procured 426 aircraft through fiscal 

year 2008. The program continues to make technological advances 

in concert with the required spiral development plan. 

Earlier this year, we deployed our first and second F/A–18 ‘‘F’’ 

or Foxtrot Squadrons with a new APG–79 active electronically 


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scanned array AESA radar aboard the CVN 76; that is, the USS 

RONALD REAGAN and CVN 73, the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, with outstanding results, five times the reliability and 

more than three times the performance over legacy Hornets. The 

APG–79 radar in particular is an acquisition success story. 

The EA18–G Growler is currently in operational evaluation, E– 

1, and we will have delivered the aircraft to the fleet for training 

purposes in Naval Air Station Whidbey Island. In fiscal year 2009, 

we will procure 22 aircraft and transition our first squadron, VAQ 

132, this summer. Initial operating capability, or IOC, is on track 

for late 2009. While we are awaiting the Growler and JSF, the 

Navy and Marine Corps will continue to utilize the EA–6B Prowler 

aircraft on an extremely high deployment tempo, supporting operations against growing and extremely high and diverse warfare 

threats. Ongoing structural improvements and planned improvement capabilities 3, or ICAP 3 program upgrades, have extended 

this aircraft’s service life and will deliver increasing capability 

through its retirement from the Navy in 2012 and the Marine 

Corps in 2019. 

The E–2D Advanced Hawkeye program has completed over 90 

percent of its SDD program and an Operational Assessment, or 

OAS, and has currently two aircraft in flight test. The program will 

be presented to the Defense Acquisition Board for a milestone decision this month. 

This program is absolutely critical to the Navy maintaining our 

continued superiority in tactical air operations against advanced 

threats. The technology is extremely challenging, but it is achievable. 

Funding reductions have resulted in the loss of two aircraft, one 

from the 2009 and advanced procurement for the second would be 

in 2009 as well or two aircraft in total. 

Major reductions in budget appropriations such as experienced in 

the FY 2009 President’s Budget request will not allow the successes demanded by today’s fiscal environment and this committee. 

We are finding new ways to acquire the Navy’s weapons systems, 

as with the P–8A Poseidon, which is the replacement aircraft for 

the P–3, where we are leveraging the efficiency of a commercial 

production product, the Boeing 737 800E airline, to realize the 

technologically advanced product in a shortened acquisition 

timeline. This aircraft will deliver 9 years after program initiation, 

when it will be both extremely capable and affordable. The program will commence flight tests later this year. Initial operating 

capability with one squadron of six aircraft will be in fiscal year 

2013. 

Lastly, we remain committed to the vision to meld manned and 

unmanned air systems, or UAS, in the future of tactical aviation 

by exploring an unmanned combat air system, or UCAS, capability. 

Our current demonstration efforts include maturing technologies 

for actual aircraft carrier catapult launches and arrested landings 

as well as the carrier controlled airspace integration. These 

testings will begin with first flight in 2009 and take to the carrier 

at the end of 2011, sir. 


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It is a pleasure to testify before the Committee today. I welcome 

your questions regarding the Department of Navy’s tactical air programs. 

[The statement of Admiral Architzel follows:] 


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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL SHACKELFORD

Mr. MURTHA. General Shackelford. 

General SHACKELFORD. Good morning Chairman Murtha, Congressman Young, members of the committee. It is my pleasure to 

be here today to discuss Air Force combat aircraft acquisition and 

other programs that are important to your Air Force and Nation. 

I ask that my written statement be submitted for the record. 

Mr. MURTHA. Without objection. 

General SHACKELFORD. My remarks today will address the 

progress on weapons systems in our global power acquisition portfolio and the status of the combat search and rescue recapitalization effort. 

This month, the Air Force accepted its 136th F–22 aircraft. F– 

22 production is currently delivering Lot 7 aircraft ahead of scheduled contract delivery dates at a rate of about two per month. 

When the plant delivers the last Lot 9 aircraft in December 2011, 

the Air Force will have completed the program of record of 183 

Raptors. 

Also this month, F–35 AA–1 completed its 75th test flight, and 

in November of last year accomplished its first supersonic flight. 

The cooperative avionics test bed continues to demonstrate unprecedented risk reduction for this stage of major weapons system development. We project the F–35 will meet all key performance parameters. 

We continue to upgrade our legacy fighter fleet to enhance capabilities in support of current contingency operations. Our F–16s, 

the bulk of the fighter fleet, are undergoing structural upgrades to 

replace life-limited structural components. The common configuration implementation program and avionics update continues with 

modifications that include a new mission computer, color displays, 

an air-to-air interrogator, Link 16, and the joint helmet mounted 

queuing system. We expect the F–16 to be a capable element of the 

fighter force through 2024. 

The F–15A through D fleet returned to flying status following 

the November 2007 mishap after engineering analysis confirmed 

safety of flight. Of the 407 aircraft in the inventory, nine were 

grounded due to the longeron crack. The Air Force repaired five, 

and four were retired due to proximity to planned retirement. The 

Air Force will conduct a full scale fatigue test and aircraft teardown and improve structural monitoring to establish the maximum 

F–15 service life and more effectively manage the structural health 

of the fleet. 

The F–15E, which was not affected by the longeron crack, continues to support ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 

Air Force improved the F–15E’s ability to rapidly engage and destroy time sensitive targets by adding secure radios and data links 

for faster communications with ground units and forward controllers, by integrating the latest precision weapons that improve accuracy as well as reduce collateral damage, by adding a helmetmounted queuing system that reduces the F–15E’s time to engage 

a target by up to 80 percent, and by adding a state-of-the-art active 

electronically scanned array radar system that not only addresses 

sustainment issues, but also gives the F–15E advanced capabilities 


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to identify and engage targets and protect itself from enemy 

threats. 

An A–10 service life extension program and overhaul programs 

will allow us to continue flying these venerable aircraft. The Air 

Force is currently upgrading 337 A–10s to the C configuration with 

precision engagement capability, anticipating completion by the 

end of fiscal year 2011. 

The B–1 was once solely a nuclear deterrent, but the Air Force 

refocused its capabilities through modernizing its conventional 

lethality. A perfect example of the B–1’s potential was realized by 

adding the advanced targeting pod to the platform’s sensor suite. 

In an acquisition success, the Air Force and industry responded to 

AFCENT’s highest Urgent Operational Need requirement by energizing a fast track development and procurement timeline. Thanks 

to supplemental funding, the 34th Bomb Squadron from Ellsworth 

Air Force Base, South Dakota, was able to deploy a full contingent 

of Sniper-equipped B–1 bombers to support both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom operations in June 2008 

without a single break in daily combat operations. 

B–2 availability has steadily increased over the past five years, 

largely due to focused efforts to enhance low observable maintenance, such as the highly successful alternate high frequency material program. The B–2 faces increasing pressure to upgrade avionics, originally designed over 20 years ago. The three increment 

Extremely High Frequency Satellite Communications and Computer Upgrade program seeks first in increment one to upgrade the 

Spirit’s flight management computers as an enabler for future avionics efforts. Increment two integrates the family of beyond-line-ofsight terminals along with a low observable antenna to provide secure, survivable, strategic communications, while increment three 

will connect the B–2 into the Global Information Grid. 

Increment one of EHF SATCOM and Computer Upgrade is currently in engineering and manufacturing development and on track 

to begin procurement in fiscal year 2011 for fleet installations beginning at the end of fiscal year 2013. The B–2 is also receiving 

a new radar antenna and upgrading selected radar components as 

part of the radar modernization program. 

The Air Force has invested in B–52 modernization programs to 

keep the platform operationally relevant by adding satellite and 

nuclear survivable and secure wideband high data rate communications, advanced targeting pods, both Sniper and Litening, aircraft 

computer and data transfer unit upgrades, and smart weapons integrated to improve conventional weapons capability. With the B– 

1 Lancer and the B–2 Spirit, the B–52 Stratofortress serves as a 

key component of the United States long-range bomber force. 

To recapitalize our rescue helicopter fleet, the Air Force intends 

to replace 101 aging HH–60G Pave Hawk helicopters with 141 

CSAR–X aircraft. The CSAR–X is currently in source selection, 

with an expected contract award targeted for spring of this year. 

Desired initial operational capability is third quarter of fiscal year 

2013, with a required IOC by second quarter of fiscal year 2015. 

We are building a 21st century Air Force prepared to succeed 

strategically, operationally, and tactically. These highly capable 

and lethal aviation programs bring global vigilance, global reach, 


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and global power to the joint fight. They are critical enablers to the 

joint force. 

[The statement of General Shackelford follows:] 


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REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. Well, thank you very much. Just a couple things 

that I wanted to comment on. 

One, we talk about a stable ability to buy for industry and for 

the military. Last year, we in our negotiations with the Senate had 

to cut out one E–2D, the Advanced Hawkeye. Since you use this 

in Iraq, the Navy uses that Hawkeye, we are going to see if we can 

work that out in the supplemental, since that is something that is 

used in the battle group flying in the war zone. 

Second is the F–22s. We need an answer. I never believed they 

would build the 600—some that they said they were going to buy 

in the first place. One of the complaints I have had over and over 

again is the military consistently asks for more than they know 

they are going to get because it cuts the price down when you average it out. But we have to pick up the tab. 

But we do need as soon as possible answers on these things. And 

I know it is not your fault, I know it is OSD and OMB that are 

making the decisions now. But it makes it very difficult for us to 

do a supplemental, do another supplemental, and then at the same 

time come up with a base bill. 

So I don’t know what kind of influence you two have on the process, but we need some answers. We were supposed to get them last 

week, we were supposed to get them this week. The Staff Director 

now tells me it will probably be next Friday before we get the details so we can go forward with recommending to the subcommittee. Bill and I have always counseled very closely before we 

recommend to the subcommittee and then go to the full committee 

with this supplemental. 

So we know you are in a difficult position, but we need the information so we can do a more thorough job in making sure we are 

getting the most cost-effective programs. 

Mr. Young. 

GENERAL AIRCRAFT PROGRAM STATUS

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I am looking for some good news 

today. As I read your testimonies and I listen to what you tell us, 

I am not sure there is a lot of good news here. We hear about the 

Joint Strike Fighter having developmental problems and cost overruns. You are talking about buying more Joint Strike Fighters, but 

the program is not as robust as we would like it to be. F–22, as 

Chairman Murtha has just said, we are not sure where you are on 

the F–22 program. The B–52 is pretty old. We are talking about 

trying to make it live a little bit longer because B–1 has problems, 

B–2 has some problems. 

Tell us some good news. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Well, if I could, I believe the progress we 

need on the Joint Strike Fighter, as an example, is absolutely critical to the Navy of the future. We need that program to IOC in 

2012 for the Marine Corps, the STOVL variant, and 2015 for the 

Navy. We built our force upon that, and indications as we move 

forward now is while the JSF variants have slipped somewhat in 

production, as we go forward the quality has been good. We need 

to keep that stable and keep going with the program. As we get 


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into it, I think we will find more and more stability and better performance as we get deeper into the program, sir. 

That is part of what we need to do to recapitalize, if you will, 

our Strike Fighter force. These are the fifth generation fighters 

that we will need in the future and we need to get stable production going. Where we see that stable production, we see success stories. 

I believe you will see the benefit of stable production in the Hornet case of the E and F, as a success story. That program, and its 

progression into the Growler where we melded it into the existing 

Hornet multiyear, and took advantage of building off the F–18F 

Lot 30, missionizing it to the Growler. This was a significant step 

forward that allowed us to bring that program forward. 

The P–8 is another example of what I think is a pretty significant step. This is the first time we have taken and produced on a 

commercial line, a militarized variant of a Boeing 737, which is the 

replacement aircraft for the P–3. That aircraft, as I mentioned, has 

taken only 9 years from concept development to fielding and when 

you look at some of these other timelines is pretty significant, sir. 

It is moving along well. It is on cost. It is meeting its objectives 

as we go forward. So there is another example for you as well. 

General SHACKELFORD. Mr. Young, if I could comment on a couple of programs. First of all, in the area of urgent operational 

needs, which, granted, are not generally new weapons systems, but 

they are improvements to existing weapons systems, we have had 

an incredible amount of success over the last year providing urgent 

needs to the warfighter, to enhance the capability of weapons systems, be it the targeting pods on the B–1 with the laptop interface 

in the cockpit as an interim step towards integration; be it secure 

or beyond-line-of-sight radios to the F–15Es, the A–10s and the F– 

16s that are operating in the high terrain of Afghanistan; be it the 

joint air-dropped, precision air-dropped system that is essentially a 

GPS-guided pallet for delivery of supplies; or fielding of variations 

of weapons, typically laser-guided/GPS-guided weapons combined 

to give us a moving target capability. 

But beyond that, when you think about something like the F–22 

program, we have a mature production line for the F–22 right now. 

Mr. MURTHA. Say that again? Move your mike closer. 

General SHACKELFORD. Is that all right, sir? 

We have a mature production line for the F–22 that is delivering 

aircraft on or ahead of schedule, and many of them are coming 

along as zero defect aircraft. As we get that aircraft fielded and 

into the hands of the young aviators who are now learning how to 

employ that weapons system, we are discovering all kinds of new 

things about what we can do with the F–22, which then we have 

to take and follow back into our tactics, techniques and procedures 

to most effectively take advantage of what we have. 

The F–35 is at a very critical point right now because we are 

somewhat pass midway in the system design and development 

phase, but we are right on the ragged edge of beginning the flight 

test program with all the flight test aircraft, the developmental test 

aircraft to be delivered out this year. 

When it comes to a prediction about what the future of the F– 

35 holds, those predictions are based on assumptions. Those asVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00197 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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sumptions typically are based on some kind of best practice that we 

have in our cost estimating or scheduling paradigms. We will find 

out whether those assumptions are valid or not beginning this year 

as those flight test aircraft are delivered. 

Meanwhile, that program does have an incredibly robust laboratory and development lab infrastructure, including that cooperative 

avionics test bed, which is going to go a long way towards maturing 

the avionics and bypassing many of the problems we have had on 

earlier weapons systems and their development, taking care of that 

risk reduction early so that we are surprised by fewer things as we 

move forward into the program. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, I thank both of you for those reports that appear to be somewhat positive. But what worries me, and I will be 

very honest with you, there are some in the Congress and some in 

the government who have stated openly that they believe that 

some of these aircraft that we are talking about are Cold War relics and that we will never need them again. Of course, nobody can 

be sure of that. It is not only important, but it is absolutely essential that we are able to maintain complete control of any air over 

the battlefield. 

So I think you will find this subcommittee is prepared to do 

whatever it is that we need to do to be supportive of decisions you 

make, but it is important that you do make those decisions. I know 

that sometimes the decision is not entirely up to each one of you 

as individuals, but it seems like we are just going around in some 

circles here. Maybe that is just a feeling that I have and maybe 

that is totally not accurate. 

But we need to keep these airplanes going. We need to get them 

into robust programs. We need to get them into the inventory. If 

we never have to use them, we should be thankful, but in the event 

we have to use them, we sure as heck better have them. 

Anyway, I am here to support keeping Navy aviation and United 

States Air Force more capable than ever. We will have some specific questions as we go through the hearing this morning, but 

those are just my general thoughts. 

I thank both of you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

F–22 AIRCRAFT

Mr. MURTHA. Go to the F–22 again, because last year we put 

money for advanced procurement in to make sure the line didn’t 

come to a stop. It sounds like you are saying the line is going well, 

and our concern had been that if that line closed down and we 

made the wrong decision, then it would be very expensive down the 

road. 

What do we have to do this year to make sure until a decision 

is made? If they keep putting this decision off, is there something 

we need to do in the supplemental? 

General SHACKELFORD. Mr. Chairman, the Air Force obviously 

supports the Secretary of Defense’s position on bridging the production line until a decision can be made attributable to the new administration, and that in fact is what is in place right now. The Defense Department—— 


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Mr. MURTHA. Let me make sure from a technical standpoint this 

subcommittee understands. You are saying we will need more 

money this year in order to have the bridge? 

General SHACKELFORD. I am talking about the fiscal year 2009 

funds to take care of the four aircraft that are currently in Lot 10, 

the proposed Lot 10. The action was taken between last November 

and just a few weeks ago to make sure that the production line for 

those four aircraft is preserved. 

Now, this is advance procurement funds so we are not actually 

building those aircraft yet. 

Mr. MURTHA. I understand. 

General SHACKELFORD. It is advance procurement funds, to lay 

in the initial supply chain, if you will, for the components that will 

be built up eventually into F–22 aircraft. 

Mr. MURTHA. So the subcontract is a problem. If you don’t have 

that money, the subcontractors start to go away. Is that basically 

the technical problem? 

General SHACKELFORD. It is actually the supplier base before you 

even get to the subcontractors. 

Mr. MURTHA. That is what I am talking about, the supplier base, 

which is the subcontractors, that if they don’t have the advance 

procurement money it dries up. We got the same problem as if we 

shut down the line and started it back up again. 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. If we reach a point where they 

do not consider the future of the program to be solid enough for 

them to continue building whatever component they are providing, 

then we wind up with a break in that supplier base, and that is 

what we are protecting right now for those four aircraft. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky. 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER ALTERNATE ENGINE

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I want to ask about the alternative engine for the Joint 

Strike Fighter. For the last 3 years, the committee has directed the 

Department to fund an alternative engine and has provided about 

$1 billion. In each year the Department has elected not to follow 

the direction. With 2,000 jets, you don’t think competition would 

help as far as pricing and reliability? 

General SHACKELFORD. Sir, while the Air Force and certainly the 

Defense Department support the notion of competition as being 

good, particularly in the manner of saving dollars for the taxpayer, 

the business case analysis that we have at this point, that the Defense Department has supported, shows that we would not be saving funds by bringing on that second engine. So in spite of the potential for competition, the business case doesn’t support it at this 

point, and therefore the Department doesn’t support the second engine. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Could you explain the rationale of that report basically? What is the thesis? 

General SHACKELFORD. There are several elements that go into 

that. Part of it is the investment required early on for the continued development of the second engine. Those dollars, were they 

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increasing the unit cost on an annual basis for those aircraft, making them less affordable at that time. 

Likewise, the learning curve, which has a direct impact on the 

unit cost of the engines, be it the primary engine or an alternate 

engine, gets shallowed out sooner. Therefore, we don’t save as 

much from a learning perspective in the increased production of 

the original engine. When you factor those items together, the costbenefit does not equal a favorable number. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Am I correct in understanding that the engine 

that will be used to power the Marine Corps variant of the Joint 

Strike Fighter experienced significant problems over the last year 

which delayed the first flight? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. The problems experienced with the engine 

related to blades have been resolved and the engines are now in 

the BF–1 and BF–2 and both are proceeding in flight testing. The 

Pratt & Whitney engine issues and the root causes of the blade 

failure were resolved last year. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is the contractor still waiting for a certified engine? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. On the F–135, on the Pratt & Whitney engine, it continues to go through tests on 11,000 hours on 16 engines 

and the program continues to move forward on the development of 

that engine. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is the contractor waiting for a certified engine? 

General SHACKELFORD. The engine is certified. It is in the aircraft and the aircraft is on the hover pit beginning initial evaluations in the short takeoff vertical land mode, not yet having flown 

in that mode. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. So the engine is certified to begin short takeoff 

and vertical landing testing? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Yes, sir, it is. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Both the House and the Senate feel very strongly 

about the alternative engine. I can remember years ago when Pratt 

& Whitney was having big problems with one of their engines, we 

put GE engines in and that saved the day. We had an alternative 

to it. That is why this subcommittee feels so strongly, our experiences. There are times when you need not only competition, but 

you need something out there. So we feel very strongly about this. 

I know your answer was well, it comes out of production. Well, 

that is not the point. At some point the competition we feel in the 

long period of time, as long as these airplanes run, as long as we 

have these programs going, that we feel it would be actually costeffective to have the competition. So we expect the Air Force to 

eventually build this alternative engine. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER COMBAT CAPABILITY

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Maybe competition—good morning, gentlemen—from another perspective, what the Russians are doing, what 

the Chinese are doing, Indian capabilities. Some of the things that 

happened in the Taiwan Strait in just the last week or so, I don’t 


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like the notion that we would ever be in a position where we 

wouldn’t be able to exert our superiority. 

The Joint Strike Fighter, can you talk a little bit about its 

dogfighting ability, either of you? I still have a good memory of 

going out to Langley, and obviously I think the Raptor is a remarkable plane but the Raptor has stealth. The Joint Strike Fighter has 

less stealth. But I am interested in sort of air-to-air combat capability vis-a-vis what our adversaries have in terms of capabilities. 

General SHACKELFORD. Sir, the F–22 and F–35 are really complementary. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I know they are complementary. They are 

part of our team. 

General SHACKELFORD. What the F–35 lacks that the F–22 has 

is altitude capability, speed capability, and a certain amount of 

agility. And while it has an air-to-air weapons capability in the internal carriage mode that is nothing to shy away from—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How many air-to-air missiles does the 

Joint—— 

General SHACKELFORD. Internally, four AIM–120 AMRAAMs. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And that is internal? 

General SHACKELFORD. Internal, yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So for additional capability you would have 

to have things on the outside of the aircraft, is that right? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. To add the heat seeking missile, 

the AIM–9X, that would be external carriage. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And when you do that, obviously you have 

a bigger footprint, I assume, right? Whatever the stealth capabilities is you somewhat minimize? 

General SHACKELFORD. Any change to the outside of the aircraft 

has a negative effect generally on low observables. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So how does that aircraft compare with, 

shall we say, the foreign competition, our likely adversaries. What 

are the Russians and Chinese doing? Because the issue here to me 

is that there are a lot of what we call integrated air defense systems out there, and I just sort of wonder what the capability of the 

Joint Strike Fighter is vis-a-vis those types of defense capabilities 

that our adversaries have and that seem to be proliferating? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. The comparative nature with the 

foreign weapons systems is something outside of my specific area. 

So we could get back to you with a direct comparison, if you would 

like. 

[The information follows:] 

The F–35 Joint Strike Fighter Lightning II will achieve an initial operational capability with the Air Force in Fiscal Year 2013, joining our active force to complement America’s other fifth generation fighter, the F–22 Raptor. Fifth generation 

aircraft combine the attributes of stealth, maneuverability, multi-role, and sensor 

fusion to allow them to gain access into denied airspace against today’s—and tomorrow’s—air and ground threats projected to be possessed by near-peer potential adversaries. While both possess the attributes of fifth generation fighters, the F–22 is 

optimized for air dominance through unparalleled speed, acceleration and maneuverability, while the F–35 is optimized for global persistent attack through increased payload and range. 

General SHACKELFORD. From an acquisition perspective, the 

things that the F–35 brings, the stealth capability is important because the foreign competitors do not have that. The integrated aviVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00201 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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onics are important because the foreign competitors haven’t 

reached that stage yet. When you combine those things with—particularly the stealth with the avionics with the weapons systems—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You are talking about the Joint Strike 

Fighter here? 

General SHACKELFORD. The F–35, yes, sir. When you combine 

those things, you do put the F–35 in an advantageous sense, even 

if it is in a maneuvering capacity on par with an international competitor, because he will be able to engage prior to a visual fight 

where the maneuverability becomes more significant. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But if you add things that are not internal, 

you obviously have a bigger—you know, the air defense systems 

have some ability to sort of spot you, don’t they? 

General SHACKELFORD. The air defense systems, the surface-toair missiles, particularly the higher end, newer air defense systems 

that are proliferating around, will have a much more difficult time 

finding an F–35 than any fourth generation fighter. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Even with all the add-ons that are not internal? Your footprint isn’t larger? 

General SHACKELFORD. Once you reach a phase of the battle 

where you can afford to add external stores to the F–35, then those 

integrated air defense systems are less significant. The early portions of the battle are when the clean airplane—that is, its smallest 

signature, are most important. Those are the times when you 

would prefer not to add external stores. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Bishop. 

F–22 REQUIREMENTS AND PERFORMANCE

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

General Shackelford, I know you can’t speak for the fiscal year 

2010 proposed budget, but we have seen some press reports, some 

quoting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, discussing a new number 

for the F–22’s combat requirement of at least 243 to 250. 

Can you discuss this new so-called moderate risk number and 

whether it is backed up by some classified campaign-based analysis? In an unclassified manner, obviously, can you explain why the 

Air Force needs more than 183 in the tactical air fighter mix? Some 

people have suggested that the F–22 and the F–35 do the same 

thing. Of course, the Air Force’s response is that they are complementary and they are different. 

Can you explain how they are different and how they are complementary in the context of your need for additional F–22s? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. Thank you for your interest in 

those fifth generation fighters. 

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force has previously said that 381 

are too many and 183 are not enough. What comes out as the new 

number he has reserved the right to bring to the Secretary of Defense, and I expect some number to come out of the budget when 

it is released next month. 

As to how we judge those numbers and over time how we have 

changed the numbers, a great deal of analysis goes on in the background using scenarios that have various assumptions as to what 


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is going to take place in the scenario and what force structure is 

brought to that scenario. So it is more than just a single weapons 

system scenario, and in this case would include both F–22s and F– 

35s. 

As that analysis takes place, part of the calculus, if you will, is 

what level of risk is there in accomplishing the national military 

strategy given those scenarios and how they interact. So depending 

on how you judge what is acceptable risk, that will lead you to 

some number and that number, that sort of number is what contributes to changing those requirements. 

Mr. BISHOP. What is the difference in the F–22 and the F–35? 

General SHACKELFORD. Both aircraft bring stealth technology, integrated avionics, advanced weapons systems, maneuverability. 

The F–22 is optimized from a super-cruise maneuverability or agility perspective and sensor suite for air-to-air battle. It has air-toground capability in a supplemental sense which is growing 

through the modernization program. 

The F–35 has less performance, but a much different sensor suite 

optimized for detecting and identifying targets on the ground with 

a much larger weapon load, albeit external at some point once you 

get to a phase in the battle that you can afford to carry external 

stores. 

So complementary in nature that both of them have the ability 

to take on an integrated air defense system with the advantage 

really being initially for the F–22. But as we move farther into that 

battle, the F–35’s strengths in terms of persistent ground attack 

will start to carry the day in terms of supporting the rest of the 

joint force. 

CSAR HELICOPTER

Mr. BISHOP. Let’s switch gears for a moment and talk about the 

combat search and rescue helicopter program. The Air Force has 

said that the combat search and rescue helicopter replacement program is the second highest priority, behind only the tanker replacement program. 

What is the status of the request for proposals, what is driving 

the need for the new combat search and rescue helicopter, and will 

these assets continue to be low density high demand, or will we 

buy enough and prove them sufficiently so they become part of the 

Air Force’s expeditionary force? 

The Secretary of Defense has started to use the combat search 

and rescue assets to assist in medical evacuations in Afghanistan. 

How does that differ from the traditional combat search and rescue 

mission, and how will this impact the number of aircraft that are 

required by the Air Force as some of them will be retasked for 

medical evacuations? 

General SHACKELFORD. The Combat Search and Rescue X helicopter program, CSAR–X, is in source selection right now. We are 

expecting a contract award late this spring and it is moving forward. That program replaces 101 HH–60Gs, our present CSAR helicopter, with 141 aircraft, bringing to mind two issues; sufficiency 

in numbers and capability. The number changed from 101 to 141, 

intended to get out of the low density, high demand category. The 


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capability changes for the new helicopter intended to address shortfalls that the current HH–60G has in performing the mission. 

Mr. BISHOP. What are those shortfalls? 

General SHACKELFORD. These would be self-protection, the load 

out it can carry, how it handles higher elevations as we are seeing 

in the Afghanistan type of theater, range. So those are all addressed through this acquisition program. 

Mr. BISHOP. So you have longer range in the new ones? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. When it comes to the role of 

combat search and rescue, this is a long-time role that the Air 

Force has taken on, and it differs from the use of helicopters in, 

say, a general utility role. Typically the medical evacuation mission 

is more of a general utility type of role for any helicopter and they 

are so tasked either out of the Army or the Air Force. 

Combat search and rescue is a riskier, much more offensive and 

self-protective type of mission, and today’s CSAR helicopters are 

called upon in the theater when there is a medevac mission that 

is in a higher risk type of context, maybe low visibility or night, 

for instance, where the special equipment on board those helicopters and the special training of the personnel is valuable for 

personnel recovery. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. I appreciate that line of questioning, because this 

Committee has been in the forefront of trying to make sure you 

have what you need, and we just found out it takes 72 minutes to 

get an injured person on average in Afghanistan to the hospital, 

and therefore our death-to-injury ratio is much higher in Afghanistan than it is in Iraq. 

We went out to Nellis, I sent staff out, I went out to Nellis, and 

we put $100 million to upgrade. We know the Air Force is involved 

in trying to help the Army in increasing the number of medevac 

helicopters in Afghanistan. So we are in the forefront on this issue. 

We think it is as important as anything you can possibly do. 

Mr. Kingston. 

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SHORTFALL

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a few questions 

for the Admiral and then one for the Air Force. 

The first question, Admiral, and I will just go through them, you 

say you have a shortfall of 125 aircraft. I was wondering how you 

get those numbers, just generally. For example, does it include 

your grounded aircraft? You have 39 P–3s that are grounded. And 

then I guess along that line, you have 157 P–3s. How many does 

it take to track a sub? How do you decide how many P–3s you actually need? Also, did we ever figure out what the Chinese learned 

when they seized the P–3? 

Then finally, do you feel like the Prowlers are going to be okay 

for 5 more years, 10 more years, or is that something we should 

start focusing on? 

Then, General, I had a question for you on the F–22 on the performance-based logistic contracts. Where will that work be done 

and what is the cost-effectiveness of that? How much money does 

that save the taxpayers to have it done by a contractor? As I understand it, that business model did not come before the contract was 


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signed, then the contract was signed and then we are working up 

the cost-effectiveness of it. And that is not an unfriendly question. 

I just wanted to know more about it. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Congressman, thank you for the questions. 

First, let me begin by saying as we are here today, future force requirements are under review and will be subject to further determination. 

But to your question you raised specifically addressing a shortfall, you also talked about 125 aircraft and then mentioned P–3s. 

If we talk about shortfall, the Strike Fighter shortfall will be one 

piece. We have shortfalls in other areas. For example, P–3s, as you 

get redstripes to P–3s, which is basically taking P–3s offline due 

to fatigue and other things in life, we need to do additional maintenance on them. As we take those aircraft offline, that creates a 

shortfall. 

Let me address first, again emphasizing that future force structure is under review, but as an acquisition person I will address 

your question specifically so as not to be evasive. 

In the FY2009 President’s Budget submission, there was a force 

structure in place for tactical aviation. That involved supporting 11 

carriers, 10 air wings and three Marine air wings. When you look 

to that force and project it forward with the current burn rate and 

projected burn rate of the aircraft on life cycle that is attendant 

with them, we did predict or project it out to be at that time 125 

aircraft, tactical aircraft, short. 

Your next question was how would you make that up? It is 

through a combination of factors, where we would first ensure the 

ramp rate of the JSF to meet our 2012 and 2015 IOCs for the Marine Corps and the Navy. It is absolutely critical that we do that, 

and the numbers that are supported within the JSF program office. 

The second thing we have to do is manage our existing inventory. 

The F/A–18 E/F program today, as I mentioned, is executing extremely well. The program of record for that aircraft would have 

23 F/A–18 F/Fs in the 2009 budget, and additionally the program 

would buy out at around 506 total F/A–18 A/B/C/D aircraft. When 

you add that to the existing F/A–18 A/B/C/D legacy Hornets, which 

the number of those is around 600 and some odd number of aircraft, you say well, do you even have a shortfall? 

These aircraft, the Hornets, when they first came online, had a 

notional life of 6,000 hours. We have done center bill replacements 

on Lot 17 and below Hornets to bring them up to be able to fly to 

8,000 hours. Every time we look at extending service life, we do so 

through a service life assessment program. That feeds into a service life extension program. We looked at whether we could get 

those aircraft up to 8,600 hours. To do that would require an investment of about half a million dollars per aircraft we estimate, 

and would give you about 2 years additional flight service. By that, 

I mean you are figuring the notional fly rates of around 30 hours 

per month per aircraft. If you do the math it comes up about 2 additional years. 

To fill the short gap with legacy you would have to go to additional hours. The question was how far could you go with the Hornets in lifetime. There is a SLAP analysis conducted to investigate 

going from 8,600 to 10,000 hours. This is a significant investment 


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that would take a significant amount of maintenance and depot 

work to bring those aircraft up to speed. This effort is not funded, 

that is not in the plan today; but it is being looked at to see what 

we do if need be. 

The third thing we do is manage by bureau number on these aircraft today. We know exactly what the fatigue life is for each one 

of these airplanes. When we first started into the hornet looking 

at fatigue life, it was wing-root. We were concerned about traps 

and cats, how many landings we could get in these airplanes. We 

took that from 2,000 up to 2,700. Then we got into things like 

wing-root fatigue life issues, where we had to look into airframe 

concerns and how we resolve those concerns to get additional 

hours. All those go forward as we do that. We look at every individual jet, what it has on it. 

For example, if we had Marine Hornets that had cats and traps 

because they have been more shore based than at sea, but had limited flight hours, we could exchange them with the Navy and Marine Corps. The same thing with the Navy. We might have more 

hours left, but not cats and traps on them because they have been 

at sea. We could then look to share those as well, to bring that and 

fill that as much as we could as we go forward. That is how you 

would manage the force to cover that shortfall. 

P–3 FORCE STRUCTURE

Mr. KINGSTON. I know that that is a lot longer answer than I figured. That explains it. I got to back off though and see if I could 

get you to talk about the Chinese and the P–3, and then if we have 

time, Mr. Chairman, get to the F–22 question. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. To the P–3 question, you had on force composition. That is dictated by combatant commanders’ needs 

throughout the world. You go through in various theaters of operation you have and that is what dictates our force structure for the 

P–3. The P–8 is a planned replacement of the P–3 where the program of record would put us at a 108 aircraft requirement and that 

is again based on the training and equipping and providing for 

those squadrons as they go forward. 

You said was there intel. I can take that for the record about the 

impacts of the EP–3. That episode, I can certainly come back with 

that, sir. 

[The information follows:] 

Regretfully, due to the sensitive nature of this subject, I am unable to provide a 

response in this forum. However, a briefing could be made available to you if so desired. 

ELECTRONIC ATTACK AIRCRAFT

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Your last question was on Prowlers. We will 

continue to maintain our Prowlers as we go forward. The Navy’s 

position is we are bringing on the Growler, which is a tremendously capable airplane. It has 88 envisioned in the program of 

record. It will replace, as I mentioned, our squadrons of Prowlers 

in the Navy today. The Navy is also decommissioning its expeditionary squadron, so we will be at essentially 10 Growler squadrons as we come forward with IOC at the end of this year. 


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Then what will be the future for the Marine Corps. As the Navy 

brings the Growlers on, the Marine Corps will keep the Prowlers 

in service until sundown of 2019 for them. The Marine Corps are 

going to rely on the JSF in terms of STOVL variant. We are also 

kicking off a study this year, funded in the 2009 budget which is 

an AoA for the next generation Jammer. That is their plan as they 

go forward. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Okay. 

F–22 PERFORMANCE BASED LOGISTICS

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. Thank you for your question on 

performance-based logistics. That area in general, the supply chain 

is one that is ripe for continuous process improvement, and performance-based logistics contracting is the fruit of some of that improvement. If I recall correctly, the F–22 performance-based logistics contract was a DOD award winner this past year for a success 

story. 

As to the details that you are asking for there, that lives more 

in the sustainment world than the acquisition world. So I would 

ask that you let me take that for the record and get back to you 

in the detail you are looking for. 

[The information follows:] 

The Product Support Integrator (PSI) role includes responsibilities such as supply 

chain management, sustaining engineering, technical data, and customer support. 

The lead PSI is Lockheed Martin in Marietta, GA, with support from Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth, TX and Boeing in Seattle, WA, Pratt and Whitney, located in 

Hartford, CT, is the engine PSI. The current PSI strategy was the result of the program’s evaluation of request for information responses from industry and Ogden Air 

Logistics Center in 2005 and endorsed by the Rand study in 2006. A business case 

analysis evaluating alternative PSI strategies is currently underway and will be 

completed this year. Study results will be integrated into the out year F–22 Performance Based Logistics (PBL) strategy. 

Depot level maintenance is another key aspect of the PBL contract. This work is 

being accomplished in both contractor and Air Force depot facilities. The majority 

of F–22 depot workload is transitioning to Air Force depots over the next several 

years in order to meet Title 10 Core and 50/50 requirements. Oklahoma City ALC 

is partnered with Pratt and Whitney on the F119 engine and is doing both overhaul 

and repair work. Depot level aircraft modifications are being accomplished at Ogden 

ALC, UT, and Lockheed Palmdale, CA. The two locations are roughly equivalent in 

capacity. Airframe component workloads are being transitioned to all three Air Logistics Centers located in Oklahoma City, OK; Ogden, UT; and Warner Robins, GA, 

based on the assigned technology repair center designation. To date, eight organic 

activations are completed to include wheels and brakes, doors and panels and generators. Eight more activations are planned for 2009 to include fuel pumps, environmental control system components, and on board oxygen generation system. Projections show 75% of F–22 depot maintenance will be performed in organic depots in 

2011 and 84% by 2012. 

In 2007, Rand conducted a cost benefit analysis off the proposed strategy prior 

to the PBL contract award. The RAND study results confirmed Lockheed as the PSI 

in 2008 and 2009 as the only viable option in the near term. The study stated that 

over a five year period organic and contractor PSI costs are comparable within study 

assumptions and margins of error. For depot level workloads, each activation is preceded by a comprehensive depot partnering assessment which defines a cost effective activation plan of the subject workload. These assessments have shown that recurring costs at contractor and organic depots are comparable. 

Based on the 2007 RAND study, there were no significant savings, contractor and 

organic costs were comparable. Depot source of repair decisions are primarily based 

on core and 50/50 requirements. 

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review mandated Performance Based Logistics 

implementation within DOD. The F–22 program took a number of steps to flesh out 

the details. The first was a sustainment alternatives study (2004) which considered 

a broad scope of strategies. This study recommended implementing a public/private 


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partnership strategy with the possibility of future competition as the weapon system 

matured. In 2005, the program office released a request for information to determine the potential for competition and better understand program options. Multiple 

responses were received including Ogden Air Logistics Center. All were evaluated 

by an Air Force team and they concluded Lockheed Martin was the only viable 

source for overall weapon system sustainment until weapon system maturity 

(100,000 flight hours, approximately 2011). A similar strategy was developed for 

Pratt & Whitney on the engine except they were to interface with Lockheed Martin, 

the weapon system PSI. In 2007, RAND conducted a cost benefit analysis off the 

proposed strategy prior to PBL contract award. The RAND study results confirmed 

that the Lockheed Martin PSI approach was the only viable option in the near term. 

The study stated that over a five year period organic and contractor PSI costs are 

comparable within study assumptions and margins of error. The study supported 

the proposed F–22 PBL strategy and concurred with completing a full budget cost 

analysis when the program was more mature. The program office kicked off a budget cost analysis in August 2008. The budget cost analysis is evaluating several 

sustainment alternatives across the continuum between full organic and full contractor PSI. Completion of the budget cost analysis is expected in late 2009. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Hinchey. 

STRIKE FIGHTER SHORTFALL

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, General, it is very interesting to be here with you and 

listen to your answers to these questions and the things that you 

are saying. 

I just wanted to follow up a little bit on the tactical shortfall, 

first of all, for the Navy and Marine Corps, which as I understand 

it is continuing to decline. That shortfall is going up in fact. More 

and more aircraft are in need and not being there to deal with the 

circumstances that they have to deal with. The number we are 

being given is 125. The shortfall is about 125 in the context of this 

fiscal year. So, that means it is likely to continue to increase over 

the course of the end of this fiscal year and into next, and that primarily the reason for the shortfall is the delay in the F–35, which 

is an aircraft of substantial priority and which is going to take on 

a lot of this responsibility. I assume all of that is true. 

What is delaying the F–35? Why is it not coming in as quickly 

as it was anticipated? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Thank you for the question, Congressman 

Hinchey. Without repeating myself on the shortfall, again, the force 

structure and composition of the future is under discussion today. 

I will caveat all of what I say with my discussions of a Joint Strike 

Fighter is based on what was submitted for the PB 2009 budget. 

I would emphasize the JSF as we go forward, as an example, we 

need to have the ramp rate for the JSF as it is coming now into 

its production and we see that things are a few months behind 

even today from what we thought they would be. We need to get 

them forward. The quality is excellent. For example, in other areas 

like software development, we should be about 69 percent, it is 

about 70 percent. That is tracking well. There are areas of the program that are doing extremely well. We want to continue to emphasize that. 

What matters is to get into production ramp rates that delivers 

a stable quantity that we can count on to deliver forward. The 

more you slide out to the right, then obviously we are not having 


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the number to fill our air wings as we go forward. We have to plan 

accordingly. 

I think the indication last year was when we had the fiscal year 

2009 budget, it had a long lead for one carrier variant, for example. 

We requested four and it was basically reduced to one. Subsequently, the Congress took action to put an Above Threshold Reprogramming (ATR) on, official reprogramming to return those 

three aircraft, on long-lead material buy for Advance Procurement 

(AP), and that allows us then to not have to slide the IOC as a 

Navy variant, as an example. That is critical. 

To answer your question, it is essential that we maintain the future procurement of the JSF to fill our air wings and that we manage very closely the legacy fleet to match up with that. 

Mr. HINCHEY. We fully understand that. And part of the situation that is causing concern, of course, is the additional pressure 

that is put on the existing airplanes. As an example of that, the 

F–15, which fell apart while it was in flight, I think it was sometime last year. So whether or not anything like that is likely to 

occur of course is a significant issue that we have to deal with, and 

it is one of the reasons why I am sure you are doing everything 

you can to press for that F–35 to move as quickly as possible. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Yes, sir. 

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTER

Mr. HINCHEY. I just wanted to ask a question about the combat 

search and rescue helicopter that you were talking about a few moments ago. You said that the contract for that is going to be coming 

into effect sometime later this spring. 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. Our intent is to award the contract late this spring. 

Mr. HINCHEY. What do you anticipate about that? Do you know 

where the contract is going and what is the context of that contract? How rapidly do you anticipate that these new combat search 

and rescue helicopters are going to be put into play? 

General SHACKELFORD. In terms of timing, the initial operational 

capability for the helicopter is intended to be between the third 

quarter of fiscal year 2013 and the second quarter of 2015. So a 

contract award this spring will lead to about four years from now 

an initial operational capability. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Okay. So you are feeling comfortable with that? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Congressman Hinchey, one thing that is 

similar but not exactly the same in terms of combat SAR, would 

be the Navy’s recapitalizing on its combat SAR assets on the carriers and the Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) and the carrier 

strike groups. That was mentioned before from Mr. Young, as a 

good news story we can hear. The Romeo and Sierra programs are 

doing extremely well. The Romeo, which replaces our anti-surface 

and anti-submarine helo assets at sea, 30 aircraft delivered, and as 

we go forward this year 254 is in the program of record. 

The Sierra is our combat SAR for the carriers and the expeditionary strike groups as you go forward, and those are part of a 

multiyear with the Army that produces the 60 series in general, 

both the Romeos, the Sierras and the Army. That multi-year has 


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been extremely beneficial. As we go forward, we are about 18 sustaining rate on the Sierras, but that will deliver our capability 

there. Not the same helo, but it is a combat SAR. When you mention the combat SAR, that is what the Navy is moving on, and that 

aircraft which will that need for us. 

Mr. HINCHEY. I thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Granger. 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PRODUCTION

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. This is a question to both of you gentlemen. 

General, given the Air Force’s fiscal year 2013 IOC requirement 

and the Marines is fiscal year 2012 and the Navy fiscal year 2015, 

how important is it that the F–35 production stay on track and be 

allowed to ramp up efficiently to high rate production in order to 

stay affordable? 

General SHACKELFORD. Ma’am, thank you for that. It is absolutely critical that the F–35 stay on track. Presently the Air Force 

plan is to ramp to 80 for the conventional takeoff and landing F– 

35A by fiscal year 2015. The production line can handle as many 

as 110, were we able to get to that, or a total of roughly 240 for 

the entire A, B and C production line. Were we able to ramp to 110 

in the Air Force, that would deliver the Air Force’s complement of 

presently program of record 1,763 seven years early, and it would 

save the combined program $13 billion. 

Affordability is one of the pillars of the F–35 program. The more 

we can keep it on track, the more we can buy at economic rates, 

the more economical and affordable it will be. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. Admiral? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Congresswoman Granger, I can only echo 

those comments. As we said before, the JSF is critical to the Navy 

and the Marine Corps. As the program of record, for the Department of Navy it is 680 aircraft. How we split that as we go forward 

in the force structure will determine what the exact numbers fall 

out to be, between the STOVL and carrier Variant. But in the 2009 

budget with the LRIP 3, seven STOVL long-lead with additional 

advance procurement for 14 in the budget rather, and also as I 

mentioned the long-lead for the CV variant. So it is absolutely critical that we maintain those on track for the 2012 IOC for the Marine Corps and 2015 for the Navy. 

Ms. GRANGER. I have a follow-up question also having to do with 

cost. 

The GAO annually expresses concerns about concurrency in programs, and while it is true there is an overlap in production in the 

F–35, isn’t it also true that this makes the programs more affordable, and the lessons learned in F–22, as well as significant investment in laboratory and infrastructure, have significantly reduced 

the risk of overlap in the F–35 program? 

General SHACKELFORD. Ma’am, when the F–35 program first 

started back in 2001, the acquisition strategy was recognized as 

having a fair amount of concurrency, and that was accepted by the 

enterprise, if you will, as an opportune way to move the weapons 


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system forward. That, granted, provides a certain level of risk in 

terms of production before we are complete with development. 

On the other hand, what it allows us to do is take advantage of 

reduced prices, unit costs, by increasing the production not only in 

the program and—perhaps in the purist sense, if you try to actually split the development and the production, the implications for 

industry in terms of a break in production and the expertise required to build the airplanes would be catastrophic in terms of the 

cost implications. 

Now, to mitigate that in the case of the F–35, as we move forward on an annual basis or, more often, when we are discussing 

the program with the defense acquisition executive, each phase of 

the program has entrance criteria or exit criteria that play into the 

maturation of the development of the product. So we have frequent 

opportunities to pause if we see something coming along that is 

going to be a major developmental issue for the aircraft. 

But in a general sense, that trade-off between affordability and 

risk, if you will, is cooked into the F–35 program from the start. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. I think, Congresswoman Granger, your 

question went to, as we have already mentioned, the idea of stability and anything we are going to acquire is always helpful both 

for long-lead material, for economic quantity, for industrial base 

considerations and producibility, and when we perturbate that and 

when we change those quantities or change those ramp rates, it 

has an impact that we have to deal with at that point. 

So, from an acquisition standpoint, if we know we have a stable 

amount we are going to buy and we can then translate that to industry and they can count on that investment, they can make investments in their lines, they can make investments in their—that 

gives them that return on investment that they can assure they are 

going to have. When we start to perturbate that, that has an impact. 

Of course, we also need the same thing back from industry, 

which is, when you say you are going to produce these, we need 

to have them come out in the numbers you said and the quality 

that we need from them, which we are seeing in the case of JSF. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. I thank you both. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT INVENTORY

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first want to commend you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Young and the rest of the subcommittee, for your dedication, understanding and intellect of the 

entire Department of Defense. I am just amazed, having sat here 

now for a month or so and watched all of you; and I want to put 

that on the record. 

I am most proud of you. 

Mr. MURTHA. We are glad to have you on the committee. We appreciate it. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, sir. 

And to the admiral and to the general, the same to you, sir, to 

both of you. As I sat here and prepared for the hearing last night, 

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ities and what you need to know in this business, and I want to 

commend you both, as acquisition men, for your services as you 

represent them well, your knowledge and all of that. 

There has been much talk about the Joint Striker Force as well 

as the F–35, 8 years, 13 in total. As we move to Afghanistan, and 

you talked about the Joint Strike fighters and their coordination, 

the F fighters, will we have enough, will we be able to—because 

the F–35 is not readily available, will we have what we need as we 

move into Afghanistan, a different terrain, different type of equipment and fighters necessary? 

As the acquisition chiefs in your services, can we meet it? Can 

we meet the demands? Will our service be safe? Will we have what 

we need to secure them first, and then to—I don’t know what you 

call ‘‘win’’ because there is no winning in any of this to me. 

Can you comment just a bit on that, first in terms of the equipment and capability and the protection of our men and women who 

have—who will be on the ground and in the air and in the water. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Congresswoman Kilpatrick, thank you. I appreciate it. We don’t often get the acquisition people being told 

what a good job we are doing, so we appreciate that. 

But I will say that as we look forward to your question, which 

is a good one, we are in a position where we don’t know what the 

next future force levels will be, so we are basing things on the here 

and now today. But to your comment, as an acquisition force, we 

have to look across the board both in service and future and what 

we are buying and procuring will be out there. Concerning the 

question you have on Afghanistan, per se, we have to deal with 

what we have today. 

To that aspect of it, I will say we take great pains to make sure 

that we maintain our aircraft in a vigilant way, to make sure that 

we take care of the people who are flying those airplanes and maintain them, that they are the best equipment we can have so we 

don’t have a fair fight. We are not looking for a fair fight. We are 

looking for a fight we can win. We keep our warfighters in mind. 

I have had command of USS Theodore Roosevelt and a squadron 

of aircraft. General Shackelford has had his experience operationally, as well; and I know what it means to be out there in harm’s 

way. We look to that today. 

We mentioned the maintaining of the Strike Fighters today, the 

E and F, the Hornets, the A through D as well. We have to make 

sure we maintain those aircraft so that they can go forward with 

this. It is not just the fighters either, but it is across the board 

whether it is the aircraft we introduce in the theater today, aircraft 

like the V–22s, they go in; whatever it happens to be, we have to 

make sure that we have capable aircraft that are ready and can 

perform the mission needed at the time they are needed. 

Thank you for your question. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, sir. 

General SHACKELFORD. Ma’am, if I may comment, your Air Force 

today is perfectly capable of responding when the combatant commander calls and asks for force structure to support the joint mission, which we are very capable of doing to the extent that we are 

called on in Afghanistan, which from an Air Force perspective 

could largely be thought of from a fighter perspective as ability to 


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support the joint operation with close air support. We use the F– 

15E, the A–10 and the F–16 to do that, and we have ample force 

structure to meet the needs. 

From an acquisition perspective, it brings to mind keeping those 

aircraft relevant for that particular kind of fight. And the types of 

challenges that we have run into in Afghanistan are primarily related to the elevation, the high terrain, line-of-sight kinds of problems when we have ground forces that are down in valleys and 

they either have to communicate or have to get air support, which 

is available and on call. 

So, acquisition-wise, what we have done is equipped those types 

of aircraft with radios that use satellite communication to overcome 

the terrain issues. They are also secure to deal with possible jamming or intrusion by some bad guy that would want to do that. 

We have also deployed a communications gateway, a high-altitude platform that is able to communicate with multiple types of 

radios. There are various varieties of radios and datalinks that 

don’t all speak the same language, so to speak. Well, this gateway 

speaks all of them and translates so that we can get that direct 

communication between the strike aircraft and the folks on the 

ground, be they the engaged troops or the forward air controllers. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Now, we are far more superior than our adversaries, as Mr. Frelinghuysen was asking. We can beat this even as 

we beef up our numbers and all that you have mentioned. Are we 

more superior than an adversary that we will be fighting? 

General SHACKELFORD. I would suggest to you that the sophistication we can bring to the fight would be superior to what the adversary can bring. But again we have to think about the type of 

fight, the irregular warfare that is going on here. We have to make 

sure we are relevant to that context. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rogers. 

F–15 AIRCRAFT

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, welcome. Let me ask you about the F–15. While we 

are waiting on the F–22s and the 35s and whatever else, you still 

have to utilize and rely upon the F–15. And when in December 

2007 one of them crashed, you grounded all of the F–15 aircraft. 

Where do we stand now with the F–15s, and are you sure you 

have got it right? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. That mishap, which was early 

November, resulted in a grounding of the F–15 fleet and a subsequent determination that the F–15Es, the newer airplanes, average 

about 18 years old, were not at risk because of a different structure; so they were taken out of the equation immediately. 

The older F–15, As through Ds, average age of about 27 years 

at this point, were the culprit, and resulted in a great deal of structural analysis that grounded nine aircraft though five of those, four 

of those, four or five of them we were able to go and repair that 

longeron. We retired the other aircraft, but only nine were ultimately at risk of the same type of failure. 


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Following the analysis that led to an establishment of safety of 

flight, the fleet was cleared for operation and it has no performance 

limitations based on that problem with the longeron. There are additional inspections and additional maintenance personnel to make 

sure that we don’t have a recurrence of that particular event. 

It also led to a resurgence, if you will, in the aircraft structural 

integrity program for the F–15, which we have got on contract now 

for a structural teardown of one of the aircraft and starting on contract later this summer a full-scale fatigue test, which we will 

carry out over time and will inform us as to what other potential 

issues we may have for the F–15 in the future, considering we plan 

to keep 176 what are termed ‘‘Golden Eagles’’ out into the mid2020s. 

Mr. ROGERS. So are the Cs and Ds flying now? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. The fleet is flying with no restriction based on that longeron problem. 

Mr. ROGERS. And the Cs and Ds, those are the nine that you repaired? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. As, Bs, Cs and Ds. 

Mr. ROGERS. And you determined that the Es don’t have that 

problem? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes. The structure on the E, because it 

is built for a mission that is a two-seat airplane, as opposed to the 

one seat which, for training versions, had a second seat applied to 

it—a different structure in the longeron area. So the design flaw 

that contributed to the mishap doesn’t exist in the E model. 

Mr. ROGERS. Now, what will happen to the F–15s? What is the 

prognosis of that aircraft? 

General SHACKELFORD. As I mentioned, we have some of them 

identified as Golden Eagles; those will be the 176 that continue to 

receive all of the modernization updates over time so that they remain as relevant as possible out into the mid–2020s. The rest will 

eventually come to a retirement date that will be part of the overall 

force structure planning for the Air Force. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, when the F–22 comes into play, will the Golden Eagle be replaced, supplanted, by the 22? 

General SHACKELFORD. We will have all of our program of record 

F–22s by the end of 2011, so there will be a significant amount of 

time while the F–15 is still in the force structure out to the 2020s; 

so they’ll exist in parallel for quite a long time. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you foresee that the E might have some structural fatigue that beset the C? 

General SHACKELFORD. At this point, I am unaware of any structural issues with the E model, but that is part of that overall aircraft structural integrity program that will go out and look for 

those kind of potential problems. 

Mr. ROGERS. So you will keep a sharp eye on that? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. I mean, these planes are getting pretty old. 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. In fact, the C goes back to what, 1972? 

General SHACKELFORD. Early to mid–1970s was the beginning of 

the F–15A program. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, gentlemen, Mr. Chairman. 


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Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young. 

F–15 GOLDEN EAGLE

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Rogers’ question on the F–15, the Golden Eagle, 

we are hearing something about, I think it is a contractor proposal 

on something called the Silent Eagle. 

What can you tell us about that, General? 

General SHACKELFORD. Sir, I have read those newspaper articles 

just like you have. That particular proposal from the contractor is 

intended to provide a limited amount of stealth capability to the 

international business market—as I understand it, not intended to 

be a competition for anything existing within the U.S. inventory at 

this point. 

Mr. YOUNG. The Navy’s Growler program with the F–18 seems 

to be doing very well. 

Is the Golden Eagle program on target time-wise and cost-wise? 

Is it where you want it to be? 

General SHACKELFORD. To my knowledge, it is healthy. I will go 

back and get specific details on that and report back to you. 

[The information follows:] 

The F–15C/D long-term aircraft fleet, also known as the Golden Eagles, consists 

of 176 aircraft identified to augment the F–22 in the air superiority role of the future. There were originally 179 long-term aircraft, selected in the 1995–1998 timeframe based on condition and load factors, but three have been lost to aircraft mishaps. The Air Force currently expects to be flying these long-term aircraft until at 

least 2025. 

In order to keep the long-term fleet operationally relevant, the Air Force continually evaluates the operational environment in which the aircraft must operate and 

the current and future capabilities these aircraft must have. The 176 F–15C/D long 

term aircraft receive capability and sustainment upgrades to keep them operationally relevant. Other F–15C/Ds, including 54 test and training aircraft, receive only 

safety of flight modifications. If the Air Force determines that a specific long-term 

fleet upgrade is also required for test and training aircraft, then these aircraft are 

modified as well. 

Over the last 10 years, the long-term F–15C/Ds’ upgrades have included engine 

modifications; GPS capability; two radar upgrades; Link-16 data link; a helmetmounted cueing system; an Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) upgrade; and a radio upgrade. These programs have all been successfully completed, except the APG–63(V)3 

Active Electronically Scanned Array radar upgrade, which is still in progress. 

Additional long-term aircraft upgrades that have strong Air Force support and 

may be addressed in future budgets include a cockpit control panel upgrade; a digital video recorder system; an IFF Mode 5 upgrade; a Link-16 data link cryptographic upgrade; a secondar6y power system upgrade; an infrared spectrum 

search and track capability; and an aircraft mission computer upgrade. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

LOW OBSERVABLE AIRCRAFT

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You seem to be focused on the stealth 

issues here. Can you comment a little about the F–22 low observable problems? 

I know a lot of materials are applied to aircraft. Can you talk 

about—there were some problems and have they been addressed? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. As low observable maintenance 

plays into the overall mission-capable rate for the F–22, yes, there 

have been some issues, and we are learning a lot about the F–22 

through those. 


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I might comment that—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Is it manning and materials? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir it is both. The situation in the 

field is in—particularly at Langley Air Force Base where the MC 

rate dipped quite severely, the result of a combination of events 

that had to do with an upcoming inspection, moving experienced 

maintenance personnel out to the new sites at Elmendorf and 

Holloman, a general new experience level within the maintenance 

community. However, those decisions, that were made to favor 

training pilots because of the number that they had there, in lieu 

of keeping up with the low observable (LO) maintenance, did not 

yield aircraft that were not combat capable. Certainly, if we had 

been called on to deploy at that point, we would have taken the 

time to fine tune every aircraft that was going to deploy. 

The details of that situation and specific numbers are over in the 

operational realm. If you would like details on that, I can get those 

for you on the record. 

[The information follows:] 

F–22 mission capable (MC) rates at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia have been affected primarily due to maintaining the F–22 low 

observable (LO) system. These F–22 MC rates are depicted below: 

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE F–22 MC RATES (FY05–FY09) 

FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 

FY09 

(1 Oct–31 

Mar) 

39 ........................................................................................................................... 55 61 55 41 

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE F–22 MC RATES FY09 (Oct 08–Mar 09) 

Oct 08 Nov 08 Dec 08 Jan 09 Feb 09 Mar 09 

18 ........................................................................................................ 27 30 57 60 57 

F–22 LO maintenance has been the leading Not Mission Capable 

(NMC) driver because of LO material reliability, component reliability, manning and management. LO system material durability 

issues are documented and both the F–22 System Program Office 

(SPO) and the manufacturer are actively working technical solutions. Some components beneath LO intrusive panels are less reliable than predicted, but the SPO has an aggressive Reliability and 

Maintainability Maturation Program (RAMMP) that is successfully 

improving reliability of these components. To provide immediate 

manning assistance Lockheed Martin sent their own maintenance 

personnel to assist Langley in their LO maintenance recovery. AF 

also completed a Logistics Composite Model manning study that 

will ‘‘right-size’’ LO maintenance manning. To improve F–22 LO 

maintenance management, the Air Force performed a LO process 

improvement team comprised of field units, major commands, SPO 

and Lockheed Martin to obtain and implement ‘‘best practices’’ 

across all F–22 operating locations. Additionally, the Air Force 

stood up a LO maintenance career field in Feb 09 to better train 

and grow LO maintenance experts. 


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LO maintenance lessons have been learned and Langley Air 

Force Base’s F–22 MC rate is improving. 

General SHACKELFORD. Now, from an acquisition perspective—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, it is such a superior plane, I want to 

make sure that it is the top of the line. 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. And it absolutely is. 

Now, we can make choices when it comes to how much time we 

are going to set an airplane down to fine tune the signature of it, 

and that is how I would describe a lot of this decision process. 

From an acquisition perspective, what we have is an aircraft that 

is 53,000, maybe 58,000 hours into its lifetime, so it is still what 

we would consider to be immature. 

So we are learning lots of new things about particularly LO 

maintenance and the materials which we fold back into changes in 

those materials to move towards a 100,000–hour maturity point 

that has been designated to occur probably late next year where we 

have a meantime between a maintenance key performance parameter to meet and we project to meet that with these changes. But 

in a similar notion, taking that learning and applying it to the F– 

35, which will also be a flightline-maintained LO platform, will 

help us overcome some of these issues and—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But there has been some criticism from a 

lack of stealth with the Joint Strike Fighters. There are certain 

vulnerabilities in that regard; isn’t that accurate? 

General SHACKELFORD. The signature of the F–35 is similar to 

the F–22. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The signature is that similar? 

General SHACKELFORD. It is very similar. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thought the F–22 was pretty invisible. I 

thought there were certain vulnerabilities—— 

Mr. MURTHA. I don’t think we want to get into—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Okay. Well, thank you very much. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky. 

AIRCRAFT PROGRAM COST ESTIMATES

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Admiral and General, by statute, major acquisition programs are 

required to have an independent cost estimate conducted as part 

of the acquisition process, but there is no statute that directs the 

Department to actually fund that independent estimate. 

Several programs are not funded to the estimate but to a lower 

confidence level. One of those programs, and there are others, is 

the Joint Strike Fighter program. What factors are considered in 

funding a program to a lower confidence level than that provided 

by an independent cost estimate? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. The factors that go into cost estimating in 

terms of the producibility, the ability to meet—the ability—the 

producibility, the affordability, the things that go into materials 

that go into the bids that would come forward, what is the confidence in those bids, et cetera? What is our confidence in the vendor’s ability to produce? When you talk confidence factors in terms 

of cost estimating, you get into probability curves which go to about 


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where you would want to fund the airplane in terms of probability 

of meeting or not meeting a certain cost estimate. 

Many, many factors that go into that run the full range from the 

producibility aspect on the producing side to the material side to 

the actual labor rates and how much we know or don’t know on 

those issues as we go forward. So it is a variable input that comes 

back to say what that would be. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is the independent cost estimate usually followed 

or only followed in the breach—in estimating what a program is 

going to cost? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. I don’t mean to be evasive. I would say it 

depends on the program and where it is versus what the services 

or the program’s estimate would be as well as the independent estimate and then doing the determination of where you are. Generally, I would tell you that we end up following the independent 

estimates where they will come in and say, we will have an understanding of what the differences are between an estimate from the 

program or from the Navy or the service versus, say, a Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) estimate that comes in; and where 

we can understand those differences and we can accept risk, we 

might determine not to go to the full CAIG estimate, but we would 

understand what those differences are before we agreed. 

If we can’t and we believe it is, we would fund the estimate that 

is there. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is the budget consideration a factor here, where 

if you go to a lower confidence level as far as what the cost is going 

to be, you can put more program into a given budget request and 

worry about paying for it later? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. 

If I could comment from that perspective, the independent cost 

estimate that we typically use comes from the OSD Cost Analysis 

and Improvement Group For Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1 or the 

larger dollar programs, and their practice is to recommend roughly 

a 50 percent confidence level in those numbers. 

Now, we will typically take that and if we have the ability within 

our budget, particularly at the program start point, which is milestone B, when we go on contract for the development, which is now 

called engineering and manufacturing development, our goal would 

be to fund that at the 80 percent confidence level. And that is a 

new initiative, if you will, within the Air Force, one of the five 

things we are looking for under recapturing acquisition excellence. 

So getting to that point is definitely an issue of, are we oversubscribed in the overall budget in terms of a lot of content and insufficient dollars to fund to the confidence level we would like to. 

So there is a discipline piece on our part to pick and choose what 

we actually start and make sure it is funded at a high confidence 

level at program initiation there at milestone B. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am confused as to what the high confidence 

level is and the 50 percent and the 80 percent. Is that the level in 

the independent estimate, or is that something different? 

General SHACKELFORD. The independent estimate will produce a 

cost curve where there is a probability of that being the cost, based 

on their ability to forecast in their estimating technique. Fifty percent, which is what is typically an OSD Cost and Analysis ImVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00218 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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provement Group (CAIG) number, officially means there is a 50 

percent probability of coming in under that cost, which also means, 

of course, a 50 percent probability of being over the cost. 

If you follow up that curve farther, there is a point where—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Of the independent cost estimate? 

General SHACKELFORD. Of the independent cost estimate. 

If you follow that curve up farther, you will get to a point where 

the probability of the actual cost being below that figure is 80 percent, and that would be the desirable point for starting the program. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. If I could, Congressman, when we talk about 

these numbers of 50 percent probability, above and below, on balance if we looked at all Navy programs, we would find that most 

average out to be at the 50 percent level. 

When we talk about that and when we talk about whether you 

are above or below in terms of where your cost estimate comes in, 

what is really important is the shape of that curve—so what does 

it mean to be—50 percent is one thing, but what does it mean to 

be 10 percent below that in a program? If it is dramatically different, that is significant. 

It is not just the point where you fund the 50 percent point or 

the 80 percent point of a curve, but what is the fidelity that goes 

to generate that curve and that confidence that is there. 

As you go further into a program, it gets more defined and, if you 

will, the shape of that curve gets steeper because the difference between a 50 percent and an 80 percent or a 10 percent would dramatically change as you know more about the program, as you go 

through its development and you start to learn more and more. 

So at the beginning of a program, when you don’t know as much 

as you would like to have, it is there. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Let us take presidential helicopter. You have an 

independent cost estimate. Does that say, per copy, here is what 

it is going to cost? 

Is that what the independent cost estimate says? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. The independent cost estimate will give the 

cost of the program, and in that you could come out and get the 

average unit cost of the airplane. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. You have life-cycle costs, too, for the program? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Right. As well as the nonrecurring and recurring costs going into what you have. 

It is all factored in as you go forward in what is provided in the 

estimates. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. So what is the 50 percent? If they give you a lifecycle cost, here’s what we think it is going to cost, what would be 

the 50 percent? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. The 50 percent would be what would be the 

average per—average unit flyaway cost, for example. That would 

be, what is it going to be and what is your confidence of attaining 

that so—on that particular issue. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Let me ask it a different way, because I don’t 

want to take the committee’s time, because I am not following you 

at all. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me interrupt the gentleman because I have 

said this over and over. 


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Now, you two are responsible for all the acquisition, not only tactical air but all the air. What we get from the services, we get an 

RFP which goes to the industry. The industry underbids it. You exaggerate the number of airplanes you are going to buy, or whatever 

it is you are going to buy, because you know that then reduces the 

cost. So whatever the independent cost estimate is, it doesn’t mean 

anything because in the end we, representing the taxpayer, have 

to pick up the tab for your mistakes. When I say ‘‘your mistakes,’’ 

I am talking about this combination. 

Now, the helicopter, in particular we have the problem of the 

White House saying in order to protect the President, we have to 

add all these provisions. And I had 14 of them in here the other 

day trying to explain to them, Folks, we are not going to build this 

expensive helicopter. We are going to build the first version, but 

not the second version. And we have people on this committee, all 

of us want to protect the President, but when they keep adding criteria to this, it really makes it very difficult for us to come up with 

it. 

Every program is overrun because of that. The ship program, 

same thing: LCS said $188 million. We knew it was going to be a 

lot more than that. 

So it is a combination of things. The problem is, we have to pick 

up the tab. 

You mentioned stability in the program. We want stability in the 

program, but unless industry and the services cooperate and give 

us an honest estimate, then we have a real problem down the road 

and so we have to make up the difference. 

For instance, what happened with the E–2. We had to take one 

out to find $150 million because of all these other things that happened in the budget. So my advice is—and I know how difficult it 

is to have industry not come in with an underestimation and you 

not to estimate you are going to build ‘‘X’’ number, because you 

know you are not going to build ‘‘X’’ number, so that we have a reasonable estimate of what is going to happen; and then we can do 

a better job making sure that you get the money and stabilize the 

program. 

I don’t know if that answers the gentleman’s question, but—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am in agreement with you. 

The other examples are the DDG–1000 program, the advanced 

extremely high frequency satellite program, the CVN–21 aircraft 

carrier, the helicopter program. And the concern I have from a 

budget standpoint is, then every year you get the ripples where, 

okay, now we have got to adjust each one of these programs; and 

as the chairman says, now we have got to find new money. 

Recognizing many of these are unique systems and you are always going to have problems, but you have got a statute, you are 

talking about an independent estimate, and then—— 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Why are we going through the drill? 

I am fine, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Let me mention on a lighter note, I see big changes 

in the services. I had two nephews graduate from the Naval Academy. Big changes in the Navy. 


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But the Air Force has the biggest changes. You mentioned my 

grandson was at the Air Force Academy before we met. I went out 

there to the Air Force Academy and they showed me the mud that 

these guys crawl through. They showed me the tents that they stay 

in. They showed me the combat obstacle courses they went 

through. And I was amazed. 

I don’t know why they showed me that—to make sure that I 

knew how tough it was at the academy. 

And then I happened to get a call from the Secretary of Defense 

while I was out there about another matter. And I told him, I said, 

‘‘They are going through the mud, these poor guys in the Air Force; 

they don’t ever spend any time in the mud.’’ He said, ‘‘It wasn’t like 

that when I was in the Air Force.’’ 

And I see today evidence of that. I mean, your professorial response, which is good. You are the premier fighter pilot in the Air 

Force. I would never have believed that if I hadn’t read your biography. You are the best the Air Force has; and you come up here, 

and yet you know all these technical details. That is a pleasure. 

And, of course, the same way, you guys have got real responsibility. And I know you can’t control what goes over in RFP, but we 

need more honest RFPs and the industry to be more honest, so that 

we can judge this budget and stabilize the damn thing, so we can 

buy in quantities that we would like to buy, so we don’t have these 

estimates which completely distort what we are trying to do. 

So I appreciate your testimony and we appreciate your service to 

the country, and the Committee will adjourn until 10:00 a.m. tomorrow. Thank you very much. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Boyd and the answers thereto follow:] 

LOW OBSERVABLE MAINTENANCE FACILITIES

Question. Low observable maintenance is the leading F–22 non-mission capable 

driver fleet-wide. Are more low observable maintenance facilities necessary to mitigate this problem? 

Answer. Yes, more F–22 low observable maintenance facilities will help mitigate 

the problem. 

F–15 EAGLES

Question. How many planes are associated with a typical F–15 squadron? 

Answer. Both the typical F–15C/D and F–15E squadrons each have 24 primary 

aircraft authorized (PAA). In addition, each squadron typically has a two backup 

aircraft inventory (BAI) plus 1–2 attrition reserve (AR) aircraft. The BAI and AR 

numbers are not fixed and, can change over time. 

Question. How many personnel, contractors, and officers are associated with a typical F–15 squadron? 

Answer. Operational F–15 fighter squadrons are programmed for a crew-to-aircraft ratio of 1:25. This crew ratio captures the line pilot requirement for line units. 

For a squadron with 18 aircraft assigned, the line pilot requirement is 23. For 24 

aircraft the number is 30. Additionally, each squadron is staffed with support functions essential to conduct flying operations, such as standardization and evaluation, 

aviation resource management and administrative support. Finally, leadership of 

the unit and the management of its personnel comprise the remainder of the organization. For a unit with 18 aircraft assigned, the typical unit has 48 personnel (29 

officers and 19 enlisted). For a unit with 24 aircraft, the number is 56 personnel 

(36 officers and 20 enlisted). Contractors are not associated with a typical F–15 

squadron. 


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GOLDEN EAGLES

Question. Does the Air Force intend to upgrade all the F–15C/Ds to be ‘‘Golden 

Eagles’’ or just some portion? 

Answer. There currently are 176 long-term F–15C/D aircraft, also known as Golden Eagles. The Air Force does not intend to upgrade additional F–15C/Ds to longterm status. The existing long-term aircraft will continue to receive upgrades as 

necessary. 

F–15 DRAWDOWNS

Question. Does the Air Force intend to drawdown F–15s earlier than previously 

programmed? If so, is there a comparative ‘‘Smart-Operations’’ study of alternatives 

on the future of the F–15 Force? 

Answer. The Air Force does intend to retire some F–15s earlier than previously 

programmed. The Air Force took a comprehensive look at the fighter force structure 

and determined it was in the best interest of national defense to adjust the number 

of aircraft world-wide to successfully carry out a modernization and recapitalization 

of the fighter fleet to meet the needs of the combatant commanders. The plan accelerates the inevitable retirements of older legacy aircraft and reinvests savings into 

the remaining legacy fighters and bombers, munitions, other key enablers. Although 

the fighter fleet is smaller, the effects provided by the newer modifications, preferred munitions, and critical enablers create a capabilities based bridge from our 

Fiscal Year 2009 legacy dominated force to the fifth generation-enabled fighter. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Boyd.] 


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TUESDAY, MARCH 31, 2009. 

ARMY AVIATION PROGRAMS 

WITNESSES 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL N. ROSS THOMPSON, III, PRINCIPAL MILITARY 

DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY AND DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION CAREER MANAGEMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY 

BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM T. CROSBY, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AVIATION, UNITED STATES ARMY 

BRIGADIER GENERAL WALTER L. DAVIS, DIRECTOR FOR ARMY AVIATION, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G–3/5/7, UNITED 

STATES ARMY 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. BOYD. The Committee will be in order. In the tradition of 

Chairman Murtha’s policy, I will start on time. And we are very 

excited this morning to be holding this hearing on Army Aviation. 

We are very pleased to welcome General N. Ross Thompson, III, 

Principal Military Deputy to the Acting Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; also Brigadier 

General William T. Crosby, Program Executive Officer, Aviation; 

and Brigadier General Walter L. Davis, Director of Army Aviation, 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff. 

General Thompson has appeared before this committee many, 

many times. Welcome back, General Thompson. Generals Crosby 

and Davis, welcome to the hearing to you, gentlemen. You are very 

well qualified to address issues related to Army Aviation, and those 

of us who know a little bit about your careers thank you for being 

here, and thank you for your many years of service to this great 

Nation that we live in. 

I anticipate that we will have a far-ranging discussion this morning. The Army’s premier aviation acquisition program, the Armed 

Reconnaissance Helicopter, has been terminated following a NunnMcCurdy review. The Army has lost more than 40 current Scout 

helicopters. The OH–58D Kiowa Warrior and replacement aircraft 

are sorely needed. No doubt your discussions will address these 

programs for AH–64 Apache, UH–60 Blackhawk, the CH–47 Chinook, and the newest Army helicopter in production, the UH–72A 

Lakota. We will also have questions about various unmanned aerial systems, including the Predator, Shadow, Raven, and the Micro 

Air Vehicle. 

Finally, we will have some questions on the Joint Cargo Aircraft, 

the Army’s new medium-sized multipurpose cargo aircraft, which 

will replace multiple Army platforms. The committee is looking forward to your statement, and we anticipate an interesting and informative question-and-answer session. 


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Before we have your opening statement, General Thompson, I 

would like to recognize, since Mr. Young is not here, I would like 

to call on Mr. Frelinghuysen for any remarks that he may have. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome, and thank you for your service. Aviation assets are important, and let me thank you for providing them. You cannot fight 

wars without aviation. And we are appreciative of, I think, the tremendous job that the Army and our other services have done in 

that regard. And we look forward to your testimony here this 

morning. Thank you again for your service. 

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Rodney. 

And General Thompson, the floor is yours. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMPSON

General THOMPSON. Well, thank you Congressman Boyd, Congressman Frelinghuysen, and distinguished members of the Committee on Defense. I want to really thank you for the opportunity 

to appear again before the Committee today. 

And today we are going to discuss Army Aviation programs. 

Mr. BOYD. General Thompson, is your mike on? 

General THOMPSON. It is, sir. 

Mr. BOYD. The green light is—— 

General THOMPSON. The green light is on. 

Mr. BOYD. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. BISHOP. Turn it to your mouth. 

General THOMPSON. I will talk more directly into the mike. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. He has had all that experience before the 

Committee. I think he will get it. 

General THOMPSON. I do not think I could mumble my way 

through this and get away with it. So again, we are here this 

morning to talk about Army Aviation programs and our mutual efforts to develop and field new and improved equipment and systems to support our warfighters, while ensuring proper fiscal stewardship of the taxpayer dollars. 

With me today, as you highlighted, is Brigadier General Tim 

Crosby, who is the Program Executive Officer for Aviation, who 

does all the acquisition on our aviation systems; and Brigadier 

General Walt Davis, who is the Director for Army Aviation in the 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3 for the Army. 

We have a joint written statement that I respectfully request be 

made a part of the record for today’s hearing. 

DEMAND FOR ARMY AVIATION

Mr. Chairman, with the support of this subcommittee and other 

Members of Congress and the American people, Army Aviation is 

meeting the demands of our overseas contingency operations and 

keeping our aviation assets at a high state of readiness. The demand for our aviation forces and platforms continues to increase, 

and we expect it to peak within the next 60 days, as the Sixth 

Aviation Brigade deploys to Afghanistan. Thus far, we have flown 

more than 3 million flight hours since 2003 in support of operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. Depending on the aircraft type, this is 

three to five times higher than normal mission requirements, but 


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still our aviation fleet is performing extremely well in theater, 

under very challenging and dangerous conditions. It has been 5 

years since the Army, with the support of the Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, terminated the Comanche Helicopter Program and took the resources to allow modernization of 

the entire Army Aviation fleet. Our progress in this regard has 

been steady and significant. And we thank you for your guidance 

and your strong support in those 5 years. 

Today, 9 of the 13 systems identified for funding at Comanche 

termination are in production. And by fiscal year 2011, we will 

have started fielding 3 more of the 13 systems. These programs receive priority so we can field the systems to units that are preparing to deploy to overseas operations or to those that are already 

currently deployed in support of operations. 

Because of the timely modernization of the Army Aviation fleet, 

our warfighters in theater already have the advanced protection 

and support of the CH–47F Chinook and the UH–60 Mike 

Blackhawk helicopters, which are the latest variants of those two 

helicopters, along with Sky Warrior and Raven Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems, and a pre-production variant of the Micro Air Vehicle 

from our Future Combat Systems program to provide enhanced 

force protection. 

The Apache helicopter continues its role as the world’s most lethal and survivable helicopter. Most of these aircraft will enter 

Block III remanufacture with less than 50 percent of the airframe’s 

design life, which is 10,000 hours, remaining. 

Mr. BOYD. General Thompson, we will see if we can get this 

stopped. I think I have got—it is very difficult to hear over that. 

So why don’t we just halt for a second? Is that something in another room? We really want to hear what you have to say, General 

Thompson. 

General THOMPSON. I assure you I did not pay that guy 20 bucks 

to start drilling. 

Mr. BOYD. I hear you. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Good timing. 

APACHE BLOCK III

Mr. BOYD. Isn’t Sherry wonderful? She got it stopped already. 

Thank you. Go ahead. 

General THOMPSON. Okay. Sir, we were talking about the Apache 

Block III. The Block III remanufacture is an ideal opportunity for 

us to insert new airframes into the Apache fleet at a minimal additional cost. The Army is on track with its commitment to modernize also the remaining AH–64 Alphas, the older variants of the 

Apaches in the National Guard. 

LIGHT UTILITY HELICOPTER

The Light Utility Helicopter has enabled us to return 

Blackhawks to the warfighting fleet, and allowed the retirement of 

almost all of the UH–1 Hueys, the Vietnam-era Huey helicopters, 

and the OH–58, Alpha, Kiowa, and Charlie models in both the Active and Reserve components. For the National Guard, this means 

more Blackhawks for homeland security and for disaster relief missions. 


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ARMED RECONNAISSANCE HELICOPTER

The Army and the Department of Defense remain committed to 

the requirement for a manned armed helicopter capability and the 

need to deliver this capability to our soldiers in a responsible and 

timely manner. 

We are currently evaluating what additional enhancements and 

service life extension work will be required to continue to safely 

sustain the Kiowa Warrior fleet until a replacement Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter is procured. 

In other areas of aviation, the first two Joint Cargo Aircraft have 

been delivered to the Army for testing, and 11 are on contract. The 

Aerial Common Sensor program is awaiting the Defense Acquisition Executive’s approval to release the technology development request for proposal so we can get the responses back from industry. 

Our Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems continue to provide enhanced capabilities to our warfighters in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Mr. Chairman, the demands placed on our aviation crews are 

great, but these demands are continually met around the world 

and around the clock. Aviation has an essential and growing role 

in the success of our military operations worldwide, including 

homeland security. Our progress in Army Aviation is steady and 

significant. 

I want to thank you and the members of the Defense Subcommittee for your sound advice and your strong support. This concludes my opening remarks. And Brigadier General Davis and General Crosby and I look forward to your questions. 

The reason that they are here today is to make sure that I get 

all the answers right, or we get all the answers right. I am also 

training the bench, because someday they will be here and I will 

not. And do not let General Crosby’s South Carolina accent fool 

you. He knows quite a bit about Army Aviation. 

[The joint statement of General Thompson, General Crosby and 

General Davis follows:] 


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Mr. BOYD. Thank you very much, General Thompson. I apologize 

for the noise and the interruptions, but would just like to say we 

are going to move directly to questions. But I did want to say that 

all of us on this Committee certainly understand the importance of 

the work that the folks—that you folks and the folks that work for 

you in Army Aviation do. And certainly nobody understands that 

any better than I do, who spent all of my 2 years in uniform in 

an Army uniform, a lot of it in a helicopter being flown around by 

guys like you. So we understand the importance of your role in the 

overall mission. 

And so with that, I would like to call on Mr. Frelinghuysen, recognize him for first questions. 

ARMY AVIATION BRIGADES

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Maybe a few basic facts. How many aviation brigades do we have 

in the Army? And then talk specifically about, General Thompson, 

you said we sent our Sixth Aviation Brigade to Afghanistan; is that 

right? Talk about the aviation assets and where they are in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

General DAVIS. Yes, sir. Again, there are 11 Active component 

aviation brigades. There are eight National Guard aviation brigades. There are also six theater-level brigade structures, a general 

officer over some other structure, and then, sir, we do have some 

assorted capability that is not resident in a combat aviation brigade structure. 

So what we currently have in Iraq are four combat aviation brigades that are deployed in support of Iraq. And as the theater is 

divided up, you have got a brigade that supports essentially a multinational division sector and then in Baghdad. 

And then in Afghanistan, we currently have one combat aviation 

brigade that is located in Regional Command East in support of the 

101st Air Assault Division. The second of two brigades that will go 

into Afghanistan deploys in the May time frame, the 82nd Combat 

Aviation Brigade out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina. So that will 

give us the six combat aviation brigades in theater. 

AVIATION OPTEMPO

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The OPTEMPO which was mentioned in 

your statement—never should downplay it—can you sort of add 

some emphasis onto what the—I mean these air assets, aviation 

assets have been under incredible pressure, obviously, as have the 

men and women who are responsible for them. Can you sort of describe in detail the—what is it—six times the normal—what was 

the comment you made, General Thompson? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. The flying hours on a monthly basis 

are really three to five, three to six times the average that we 

would fly in a normal training environment. But despite that, the 

operational readiness rates of all the helicopter fleets are above the 

standard of 75 percent. In some cases, they are in the high 80 percent, is our ability to maintain those fleets flying while they are in 

a combat environment. So I think we have been very successful 

from that standpoint. 


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The 75 to sometimes 100 hours a month that these airframes are 

flying in very harsh conditions is a testimony, first and foremost, 

to the crews that fly them and the crews that maintain them; but 

also to the testimony to the support structure that is in place to 

get them ready to go to be deployed overseas, to maintain them 

while they are there, and then to reset those airframes when they 

come back so they are ready to go again. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What is the combat tour duration for the 

aviation brigades? 

General DAVIS. Right now, sir, just based on the OPTEMPO that 

you alluded to, and with six brigades going in, the Active component is at about a 1-year to 1.2-year dwell right now. We are on 

the cusp in terms of the numbers of brigades we have with the 

operational tempo and the number of brigades that we have committed to the warfight right now. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So they are getting the dwell time back 

home. What is the dwell time back home, on the average? 

General DAVIS. 1.2 for the Active components, sir, and then—1.2 

years for the Active component units, and then 4 years for the Reserve component. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Could you describe for the Committee the 

process and timeline for returning Army Aviation assets from the 

combat theaters to home stations or to the depot maintenance locations for reset? What is the process? 

General CROSBY. General Thompson mentioned a moment ago 

about the sustainment structure that we put in place. One of the 

things that we have done with my counterpart in the Army Materiel Command, Commander, General Myles, is we send a team over 

there before the brigade comes home, and we look at their aircraft, 

go through and plan the scope of the reset that we will do upon 

their return. 

SPECIAL TECHNICAL INSPECTION AND REPAIR (STIR)

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And much of it, obviously, being really beat 

up as well as it has been maintained, a lot of it is—— 

General CROSBY. Yes, sir. One of the things I wanted to add to 

what General Thompson said is that the OPTEMPO that we are 

flying is such a credit to our soldiers and the fact that they are able 

to maintain those aircraft at those three to six times the normal 

OPTEMPO rate. Now, yes, there is some credit to this Committee, 

to everyone for resourcing them, providing them the additional 

parts and things they need to do that. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We credit your mechanics keeping those 

aircraft—— 

General CROSBY. Those soldiers are doing just an unbelievable 

job to do that. We look at them, and yes, sir, some of them do what 

we call stay behind. They may stay for two rotations if they are in 

really good shape. And that decision is a joint decision that General 

Davis’ team makes, based upon our input back to them, and what 

the resourcing and the dwell times need to be for the aircraft. 

But we look at them from a reset. There is a scope, what we call 

a technical bulletin, that we go through. And it was based upon the 

Special Technical Inspection and Repair (STIR) program that we 

did from the original Desert Shield and Desert Storm when we 


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came home. And we called it STIR back them. Now we call it reset. 

And we go through each of those aircraft and we identify them. 

General THOMPSON. STIR is just a technical inspection. The technical bulletin is just the checklist of things that you would do on 

any piece of equipment. But in this case, it is the aviation systems. 

You just go right down the list and you check everything from the 

top of the helicopter all the way down. You make a determination 

on what it needs in order to put it back into full operational condition. 

General CROSBY. And the scope, the reason I brought that up is 

the scope of that is adaptable to the situation and the theater that 

they are in. We look at them. That is why we do that prelook. We 

adapt that scope of the reset. And then there is a target timeline 

that we have to do and run each of these aircraft through the reset 

inspection that we do. That is all going on while the unit is preparing, they are having their dwell time back home back with their 

families. We take those aircraft. Our goal is to only take those aircraft from a unit one time to do any new mods to the aircraft before they go back and to do the reset at once. 

We are not there. I will tell you we are not there 100 percent because things change so fast. But our objective is one touch from 

that unit, to take it away from that unit so that they have it the 

rest of the time to focus on their training to go back. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BOYD. Mr. Bishop. 

MEDICAL EVACUATION

Mr. BISHOP. I am interested in the Medevac capabilities. In January of this year in testimony before the House Armed Services 

Committee, Secretary of Defense Gates addressed the difference in 

Medevac response times for Iraq and Afghanistan. He noted the 

goal in Iraq was to have a wounded soldier to the hospital within 

an hour. In Afghanistan, he noted that the times were closer to 2 

hours. And of course the Secretary directed increasing the number 

of Medevac helicopters or medical professionals assigned to Afghanistan. 

What are the factors that cause Medevac—I guess it is obvious; 

it takes significantly longer in Afghanistan than Iraq. I guess it is 

terrain and mountainous and infrastructure, or lack of infrastructure. 

But what are the—what additional Medevac assets, both medical 

facilities and aircraft, that have actually arrived in Afghanistan, 

and what additional assets are on the way? And are there remaining shortages with Medevac aircraft, air crews, and forward surgical teams in Afghanistan? And what is the evacuation time today 

in Afghanistan as compared to what it was back in January? And 

are there any significant limitations for our helicopters in Afghanistan? And how does that impact your utilization of the Air Force 

Medevac teams to supplement what the Army has had? 

General DAVIS. Congressman, if I could, you are absolutely right; 

there is a difference with both theaters with respect to the terrain, 

the geography, the positioning of the assets. And the Secretary, as 

well as the leadership for all the services, were very concerned. We 

try to codify as a standard, not a goal, to get a wounded soldier, 


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sailor, airman, marine, or a coalition force or contractor from point 

of injury back to medical care within 60 minutes. And so the goal 

of the Secretary was again to, as you alluded to, sir, was to get parity between the theaters. There were different planning times that 

both theaters were using. 

We have currently put a strategy in place to address that, a 

bridging strategy, and then a strategy which will get resources in 

Afghanistan, which will achieve parity. Currently, the average time 

for evacuation of a soldier, sailor, airman, marine in Iraq is 44 minutes. And currently in Afghanistan it is 71 minutes. And that is 

primarily related to two regions, Regional Commands East and 

South right now, where we have the propensity of our forces. 

The strategy that was put in place was to accelerate capability 

into Afghanistan, and do that as quickly as we could, knowing that 

the 82nd Aviation Brigade, which I mentioned will become the second brigade in Afghanistan, brings additional Medevac capability 

with it, a company of 12 aircraft. 

And so right now what we have done within theater is remissioned the aircraft from the Air Force, the Combat Search and 

Rescue aircraft, HH–60s, to conduct a medical evacuation mission. 

There are two additional forward surgical teams, which gives the 

medical capability on the ground that they need that have been 

resourced by both the Army and the Navy. They will re-mission 

Navy Medevac aircraft as well that are currently resident in Kuwait. They are going to add two more aircraft, and then they are 

going to re-mission aircraft. And that is to take effect this month. 

And so what we will have in May, sir, is when the 82nd Aviation 

Brigade gets in there, they estimated and have projected that they 

will achieve the 60-minute standard for evacuation with the additional Medevac company that comes in with the 82nd and with the 

additional re-missioning and forward surgical teams. 

Mr. BISHOP. Is that going to be accomplished? And I want to congratulate you for moving from 120 minutes to 71 minutes in 3 

months. That is great. And it serves our wounded warriors very 

well. 

Is the increase in times a direct function of the additional assets, 

or is it a function of the assets plus prepositioning of assets in particular locations around Afghanistan closer to the fight? What is accounting for that drop. 

General DAVIS. Yes, sir, it will be additional assets, which will 

allow them to have more locations where they can put assets. And 

again, as we see additional troop increases in Regional Command 

South, that is where that additional aviation brigade will go in as 

well. But it is a combination of increased assets as well as certainly 

working the tactics, techniques, and procedures, and the procedural 

issues from the time that a mission actually occurs and the process 

that the request has to go through. And they are going to do that 

not with just U.S. forces, but with our NATO forces that are there 

as well. So it is a combination of those things, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. What about additional hospitals, medical facilities? 

Are you putting in additional medical facilities also? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. It is not just the aviation assets. 

Because what you heard General Davis indicate is the increased 

Medevac company from the Army and the additional Air Force 


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search-and-rescue aircraft and re-missioning of those and the Navy 

assets. But also it is the additional forward surgical teams, which 

is the top-level surgical care. 

As they looked at the positioning of those teams in theater, there 

has already been an additional Army surgical team put in theater. 

On its way is an additional second Army surgical team and a Navy 

surgical team. So it is putting the medical assets where they are 

needed in theater, and then working the combination of where the 

medical assets are, and then where the Medevac assets are in order 

to get the wounded service members and contractors back to the 

surgical care as quickly as possible. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much. And I appreciate your quick 

response in improving that response time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. Mr. Tiahrt. 

AERIAL COMMON SENSOR

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. 

Thank you for your service to the country. I appreciate it very 

much. 

General Thompson, in your written testimony you talked about 

the ACS, Aerial Common Sensor program, and you say that is it 

is awaiting Defense Acquisition Executive approval. What does 

that mean? What is the tent pole here on ACS? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, on Aerial Common Sensor, the competitive acquisition strategy to take the mission equipment package 

and mount it on an airframe is going to be done through a technology development phase. All of the documentation necessary to 

make that decision have been laid out. I expect in the next week 

to 10 days Mr. Young, the Defense Acquisition Executive, will be 

able to take final action on approving that acquisition strategy so 

that we can go out and begin the competitive process with the industry out there. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Isn’t the electronics pretty well determined? I mean, 

isn’t it already palletized? 

General THOMPSON. It is. The mission packages are pretty well 

known. It is the integration of those mission packages onto a different airframe. 

Mr. TIAHRT. In the first go-round, the airframe could not handle 

the heat and weight as I recall. 

General THOMPSON. That is correct. 

Mr. TIAHRT. And we have not come up with an alternate for the 

airframe? Because you mentioned—one thing I am a little—you 

mentioned the Unmanned Aerial Systems in the next paragraph, 

under the same heading, almost as if you could substitute the mission for a UAV or UAS. And I think that your package is too big 

to put on any single UAS. And I think having the personnel on 

board with all the equipment and integration is pretty important, 

as I understand. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. You are exactly right. And I will 

talk for just a minute, and then I will let General Davis add to 

that. But it is the manned and unmanned teaming as we described 

it. It is the combination of the Unmanned Aerial Systems with the 


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sensors that are appropriately on there, and then the manned systems. 

Today it is Guardrail Common Sensor and Airborne Reconnaissance low-ARL and some other systems that have been bought, in 

particular for use inside of Iraq. But it is the combination of the 

manned and unmanned teaming. As much as possible, we like to 

use common sensor packages that we can mount on both unmanned systems and a manned system. But the operators on the 

Aerial Common Sensor program allow us to take that sensor information and to process this and to get it quickly to the operational 

commanders on the ground who can use that. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Excuse me for interrupting, General, because I have 

limited time. I do not know what, when we say we are awaiting, 

is there a schedule for Mr. Young to rule on this, or is it just still 

in limbo? 

General THOMPSON. No, sir, there is a schedule, and it is tied to 

the final deliberations on submission of the fiscal year 2010 budget. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Okay. So it is tied to the budget. 

General THOMPSON. It is in its final stages right now. Then that 

will trigger his ability to be able to sign the document that allows 

us to go forward. 

LIGHT UTILITY HELICOPTER

Mr. TIAHRT. All right. The other question I had was in relationship to the Light Utility Helicopter. You mentioned in your statement here that the schedule is to begin in April to transition some 

of this work from Germany to Columbus, Georgia—Mississippi. Columbus, Mississippi, I am sorry. 

When you say the schedule is to begin, what does ‘‘begin’’ mean? 

Does that mean they are going to have a ground breaking, or are 

they going to transition manufacturing to an existing facility that 

has been certified by the FAA? 

General CROSBY. I will take that one, sir. Most of the assembly 

today is done at that plant in Columbus, Mississippi. The date that 

you mention that you talk about will be the first one that is started 

and finished in that facility. 

Some of it today, just in schedule as the program was laid out, 

was still assembled or built in Germany and shipped to the facility 

in Columbus for final assembly. The date that you mentioned, I believe it is this summer, April, that first aircraft will go through the 

entire assembly, from the first rivet all the way to delivery, at that 

Columbus facility. All American. 

Mr. TIAHRT. The 65 percent goal that you mentioned is that dollar amount, or is that work content? 

General CROSBY. Sir, I believe that is work content. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Because I want to remind you that when we have 

a Buy American provision, we think of American jobs not just in 

tech orders and spares and logistics support and warehousing and 

inventory and training, we are thinking about manufacturing content. And I have a real concern with the company that is doing 

this, because just recently there was an—ICE, Incorporated, won a 

lawsuit against EADS over the A–400 on an avionics package. During the bidding process, they asked for technical data and for financial—you know, how much it is going to cost. And then once they 


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received that and successfully won a package, then they pull that 

content back to Germany and hold onto it. And they take the technical data and give it to a European supplier. In this case, it was 

a French supplier. And our courts ruled in favor of them. And I do 

not know what the settlement is going to be yet, but it is a loss 

of intellectual property. And I think we are seeing it in the Light 

Utility Helicopter, as well with the airframe. 

They took work content packages, technical data, pricing data 

from Spirit AeroSystems, and then they pulled it back to Europe, 

and they are making the airframe in Germany now, which is what 

that was for. And they are using the manufacturing plan and the 

technical data and the cost package for their German company, and 

it is a subsidized process. 

So Buy American provision to us means work content, it does not 

mean dollar value. I want to make that clear. So I am glad you are 

using work content, because that is the intent I think that we 

have. But I am very concerned about the loss of intellectual property, where in the bidding process what they demand from their 

subs is something they can take right over to their manufacturers 

in Europe and put it into a manufacturing process. And our tax 

dollars end up creating a stronger economy in France and Germany 

than it does in America. 

And right now, every one of us in this room represents people 

who are laid off because of our economy going south. And we want 

to get those jobs back. But we can’t if we allow intellectual property—so please guard intellectual property in the way you write 

your RFPs and set your contracts. 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Tiahrt. Ms. Kaptur. 

PERSONNEL IN THEATER

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen, 

and thank you for your service to our country. I thank you for your 

testimony. 

I just reflect that it seems to be more equipment-oriented rather 

than what I would call mission-oriented. And I want to get into 

mission a little bit if I could. Would you please tell me from Army 

Air how many personnel are currently assigned in the Iraqi theater 

versus the Afghani theater? Approximately. 

General DAVIS. I am sorry, ma’am, I do not have the exact number. But typically in the brigade in Afghanistan, it is going to be 

roughly about 2,500 to 3,000. And then four times that amount in 

Iraq. So roughly 10,000. I apologize, ma’am. I will get the exact 

number and I will bring that back. 

[The information follows:] 

The United States Army Human Resources Command (HRC) receives a monthly 

roster, by Social Security Numer, of deployed Active Duty personnel receiving Hostile Fire Pay. This information is gathered from Defense Finance and Accounting 

Service (DFAS) and Deployed Theater Accountability System (DTAS). It includes all 

Active Duty personnel in the Iraqi and Afghanistan theaters. The Reserve Component (RC) information has been collected from both the ‘‘Stress on the Force Data 

Set’’ and the Total Army Personnel Data Base-Reserve (TAPDB–R). The Reserve 

Component (RC) information is broken down into two categories. The first category 

contains the numbers for Deployed Individual Ready Reserves (IRR) and Individual 


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Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Soldiers. The second category contains the numbers 

for Mobilized Individual Ready Reserves (IRR) and Individual Mobilization 

Augmentee (IMA) Soldiers. Enclosed below is the information for all Aviators (15 

series (Military Occupational Specialty) MOSs and 67J (MEDEVAC Pilot) MOS) 

that are currently deployed or mobilized, whether they are on Joint Manning Document (JMD), Worldwide Individual Augmentee System (WIAS), etc. or in an Aviation Brigade. 

As of 8 April 2009, there are a total of 1099 warrant officers, 670 commissioned 

officers, and 4071 enlisted Soldiers deployed in both theaters. The numbers for Active Duty personnel in each theater are as follows: 318 warrant officers in OEF, 781 

in OIF, 191 commissioned officers in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 479 in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 1109 enlisted Soldiers in OEF, and 2962 in OIF. 

The following information for Reserve Component (RC) personnel is as of 8 May 

2009. There are a total of 8 deployed warrant officers (2 in OEF and 6 in OIF); 6 

deployed commissioned officers (2 in OEF and 4 in OIF); 30 deployed enlisted personnel (4 in OEF and 26 in OIF); 44 mobilized warrant officers (23 in OEF and 21 

in OIF); 108 mobilized commissioned officers (72 in OEF and 36 in OIF); and 113 

mobilized enlisted personnel (14 in OEF and 99 in OIF). 

WO1 CW2 CW3 CW4 CW5 Total 

OEF ................................................................... 7 166 87 44 14 318 

OIF .................................................................... 21 448 183 103 26 781 

Total ......................................................... 28 614 270 147 40 1099 

1LT CPT MAJ LTC COL Total 

OEF ................................................................... 26 98 41 16 10 191 

OIF .................................................................... 56 257 101 50 15 479 

Total ......................................................... 82 355 142 66 25 670 

E01 E02 E03 E04 E05 E06 E07 E08 E09 Total 

OEF ................................................................ 1 14 126 457 253 149 74 31 4 1109 

OIF ................................................................. 10 50 266 1347 666 335 213 70 5 2962 

Total ..................................................... 11 64 392 1804 919 484 287 101 9 4071 

DEPLOYED (IRR AND IMA SOLDIERS)

W01 CW2 CW3 CW4 CW5 Total 

OEF ......................................................................................................... 0 1 0 0 1 2 

OIF .......................................................................................................... 0 3 3 0 0 6 

Total ............................................................................................... 0 4 3 0 1 8 

1LT CPT MAJ LTC COL Total 

OEF ......................................................................................................... 0 1 0 0 1 2 

OIF .......................................................................................................... 0 0 1 2 1 4 

Total ............................................................................................... 0 1 1 2 2 6 

E01 E02 E03 E04 E05 E06 E07 E08 E09 Total 

OEF ................................................................ 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 4 

OIF ................................................................. 0 0 3 13 7 1 1 0 1 26 

Total ..................................................... 0 0 3 16 8 1 1 0 1 30 

Source: TAPDB-R and ‘‘Stress To Force Data Set’’. 


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MOBILIZED (IRR AND IMA SOLDIERS)

WO1 CW2 CW3 CW4 CW5 Total 

OEF ......................................................................................................... 0 2 2 16 3 23 

OIF .......................................................................................................... 0 5 9 7 0 21 

Total ............................................................................................... 0 7 11 23 3 44 

1LT CPT MAJ LTC COL Total 

OEF ......................................................................................................... 1 1 21 34 15 72 

OIF .......................................................................................................... 0 4 22 9 1 36 

Total ............................................................................................... 1 5 43 43 16 108 

E01 E02 E03 E04 E05 E06 E07 E08 E09 Total 

OEF ................................................................ 0 0 1 3 2 0 3 4 1 14 

OIF ................................................................. 0 4 16 52 23 1 2 0 1 99 

Total ..................................................... 0 4 17 55 25 1 5 4 2 113 

Source: TAPDB-R. 

General THOMPSON. What he is giving you, ma’am, is the number 

of soldiers typically assigned to an aviation brigade, and then the 

number of aviation brigades in theater. It is 2,500 and roughly 

10,000. 

BASES AND STAGING AREAS

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. That is very helpful information. At how 

many separate bases or staging areas is your equipment and your 

personnel staged in both the Iraqi theater and the Afghani theater? 

And that can go outside the boundaries of the country. But at how 

many separate bases or staging areas is your equipment and your 

personnel placed in each of those theaters, again trying get a sense 

of the mission versus just equipment? 

General DAVIS. In Afghanistan there is typically one major staging for the aviation brigade itself. And then it will be split out into 

battalion-size task forces. So probably another three or four different locations for the aviation in Afghanistan. In Iraq, There are 

four major areas there. And they have also got their assets split 

out. I do not know exactly how many bases. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Those are all in each of those countries, inside the 

countries? 

General DAVIS. Yes. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. Thank you. 

General THOMPSON. And ma’am, it is really dictated by the operational conditions on the ground. So it is always a balance between 

the operational commander needing attack assets or lift assets or 

Medevac assets in a certain amount of time. 

The other part of the balance is the centralization and the emphasis that we put on the maintenance of the aircraft and the supply and the maintenance systems. It is always that tension that 

dictates the positioning. 

The thing that always wins the day is where the operational 

commander needs assets so they can be responsive to his mission 

requirements. Then we figure out where the logistical positioning 


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is. But there is that balance that goes on all the time that is really 

driven by the operational commander on the ground. 

VULNERABILITIES

Ms. KAPTUR. In looking at both Iraq and the Afghani theaters, 

what do you consider your greatest vulnerabilities in each of those 

theaters today? 

General THOMPSON. I guess I would answer this in a general 

way. There are the very harsh conditions driven by, the weather 

and the sand and the terrain that put the wear and tear on the 

aircraft. From the standpoint of what causes aircraft to be hit and 

shot down, it is small arms fire, in some cases RPGs. The exact details of how we lose aircraft overseas, because we have lost 162 aircraft. 

Ms. KAPTUR. How many again, General? 

General THOMPSON. 162 since the beginning of combat operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Ms. KAPTUR. How many? I didn’t hear. 

General THOMPSON. 162. 

Ms. KAPTUR. 162. Mostly in Iraq? 

General THOMPSON. Mostly in Iraq so far, because that is where 

the bulk of the aviation assets have been since we started Operation Iraqi Freedom. But the exact details of what causes us to lose 

aircraft are something that we can talk about, but I would not 

want to talk about that in this hearing. I would want to talk about 

that in a classified hearing or a classified discussion. 

SKY WARRIOR

Ms. KAPTUR. How important is the Sky Warrior Unmanned Aircraft System to your operations in Afghanistan? 

General DAVIS. Ma’am, it is very important. I mean it is integrated in both theaters, certainly at the theater level and also at 

the division level in the case of Afghanistan. So it is a great capability. There are two variants, early variants of the Sky Warrior 

Extended Range/Multipurpose that are in Afghanistan and Iraq 

right now. So there are 13 total aircraft, but it is very, very important to the integration of the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition mission that the theater performs. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Excuse me, General, 13 between both theaters? 

General DAVIS. That is correct. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. How many do you have in Iraq? 

General DAVIS. We have ten air vehicles in Iraq and three in Afghanistan. 

Ms. KAPTUR. How many of those have been destroyed in combat 

operations to date? And while you are looking for that, could I ask 

you, are the Sky Warriors that are based in Iraq and Afghanistan 

flown by Army personnel or by contractors? 

General DAVIS. A combination of contractor and Army personnel. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Which contractors? What firms? 

General DAVIS. General Atomics is the prime contractor. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What Tomics? 

General DAVIS. General Atomics, a-t-o-m-i-c-s. 

General CROSBY. They are the OEM, original equipment manufacturer, for the system. We sub to them. It is what General Davis 


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is talking about GOCO; it is government owned, contractor operated, in those two locations. We are actively training our soldiers 

to take over that mission. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I was going to ask you whether the UAV operators 

are pilots. 

General CROSBY. They are not. They are sergeants for the Army. 

General DAVIS. We are training the first of the enlisted operators 

for the first variant or the preproduction ER/MP right now at El 

Mirage, California. But they are enlisted operators of those air vehicles. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I think my time has probably expired. Do you anticipate replacing the contracted personnel, then, with enlisted personnel? 

General DAVIS. Over time, yes, ma’am, we sure do. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Over how much time? 

General DAVIS. Ma’am, I do not have an exact timeline, but 

again, we are on the leading edge of training the enlisted operators 

for those right now. 

General CROSBY. We are putting in fielding the quick reaction capability over there, the first one due to arrive this summer. And 

it will be soldiers. As you know, ma’am, the UAS, that is a new 

area for us. And we are learning and developing tactics, techniques, and procedures on how these things are engaging. And we 

are learning so much: what affects the structure, the quantity, the 

number of systems that need to be fielded, where we put them, 

where we station them to provide that soldier the information on 

the battlefield. 

Those three units that General Davis talked about are giving us 

that direct feedback. Even though they are contractor operated, we 

are getting that feedback from the soldier for the future. And that 

guides us how we will build and construct the other systems. So 

it is a learn as we go here. But what we do know is it is a great 

asset to put in the hands of our soldiers. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Ms. Kaptur. Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Have questions been 

asked on the Joint Cargo Aircraft? 

Mr. BOYD. No. 

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Okay. Gentlemen, how many of the Joint Cargo 

Aircraft does the Army plan to buy? And do you know what the Air 

Force number is? 

General DAVIS. The total requirement, sir, is 78; 54 for the Army 

right now, and 24 for the Air Force. I do not know the Air Force 

acquisition strategy right now for the Joint Cargo Aircraft. But our 

number is 54. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Do you know, is there an interrelationship? If 

the Army ends up buying more, would the Air Force buy less or 

vice versa? 

General CROSBY. I think that is left to be determined. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Do you have any communication going on with 

the Air Force to—— 


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General CROSBY. Yes, sir. And there is another one that is 

thrown into that; the Special Operations community is also now 

coming on line. So those are all yet to be determined. The validated 

requirement we have in the Army is, as General Davis said, for 78. 

How that need is met in the mix between the Army and the Air 

Force is to be determined. I think the QDR is going to address part 

of that. 

General THOMPSON. Now, just a correction. The total validated 

requirement is 75 right now, 54 of those for the Army and the others for the Air Force. What General Crosby is alluding to, the Special Operations community is looking at that aircraft and the potential use of that aircraft for their missions. So that number may 

adjust a little bit from the requirements perspective. But right 

now, our plan is to procure 54 for dedicated Army use. The first 

two have been delivered. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Twenty-one would be Air Force. And potentially, 

if Special Operations get involved, the total number of 75 could potentially go higher. 

General THOMPSON. It could, sir. The 21 for the Air Force—because the Air Force on fixed wing assets flies the Special Operations missions with their units—so some of those 21 could be remissioned from the delivery of time-sensitive, mission-critical 

cargo, which is the requirement, they could be re-missioned to Special Operations needs. But that has not been firmly determined yet 

from the requirements process. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And are these planes being assembled at this 

time? Have you had any deliveries yet? 

General CROSBY. Yes, sir. We have had two delivered. In fact, I 

am being beckoned to come speak at the graduation of the first pilots and crew members next week to take over those two aircraft. 

We have, I think, 11 on contract currently. But at this point, only 

two have been delivered. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And where does the assembly take place? Where 

does the integration of military hardware package take place? 

General CROSBY. Today everything is done by Alenia in Italy. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And that is an Italian corporation as well? 

General CROSBY. Yes, sir. Partnered through L3 here in the 

United States. As planned in the overall strategy, the 

groundbreaking ceremony for the new facility in Jacksonville, Florida is set for the 24th of April, which I will attend. And then I believe the first deliveries from that facility are in fiscal year 2013. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And how long will the purchase of these craft extend out to? What would be your plan at this point in time? 

General THOMPSON. Sir, the Army is funded through fiscal year 

2013 for the 54 aircraft. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Why some assembly in Italy, why the rest in 

Jacksonville? 

General THOMPSON. To bring the capability on shore. When we 

did the competitive award of the contract, they won the competitive 

award. But part of the competitive award was to do the mission assembly in the United States. That is going on in Waco, Texas right 

now. Then as General Crosby alluded to, building the production 

facility in Jacksonville, Florida. We would build the back end of the 

54 aircraft, the bulk of them, here in the United States. 


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Mr. VISCLOSKY. Just out of curiosity, it is an Italian corporation. 

Did American manufacturers bid on it and they did not win a contract? 

General CROSBY. The contract is an American corporation. They 

are partnered with L3. L3 is the prime. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is the prime? 

General CROSBY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. But the assembly is taking place in Italy? 

General CROSBY. Initially, yes, sir. Very similar to what happened with the Light Utility Helicopter. That is being transitioned 

to the United States, in accordance with the plan. They will build 

a facility in Jacksonville. First orders in fiscal year 2010, I believe, 

and delivered thereafter. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. With all the aircraft manufacturing, I am just 

curious at this point—forget the aircraft. With all the aircraft that 

have been produced in the United States, we are here in 2007, 

2008, 2009, and there are at least a couple of aircraft where the 

initial assembly and production are taking place overseas because 

they have won a contract, they have an expertise. What is happening here? What has happened? What is happening? 

General THOMPSON. Well, sir, the first thing we do is we put out 

a competitive procurement. So in this particular case, other companies bid on this aircraft. But through the competitive source selection process they were not the winners. It was L3, teamed with 

Alenia, that won the Joint Cargo Aircraft competition. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am not criticizing the process. 

General THOMPSON. Right. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am saying how has this happened that at least 

in a couple of aircraft enumerated here, Mr. Tiahrt had a series of 

questions about intellectual property, that all this is going offshore? Although, albeit it is coming back, but it started offshore. 

How have we found ourselves in this spot as an industrial base? 

I am asking an industrial base question. Any—— 

General THOMPSON. I think—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. It leaves me speechless, too, I got to tell you. 

General THOMPSON. Part of it is the whole globalization of industry. In this particular case they won a fair and open competition. 

We are trying to get as much of that work content brought back 

in the United States. We gave the 65 percent numbers for the LUH 

program. We are bringing the assembly of the Joint Cargo Aircraft 

on shore and building a facility in Jacksonville, Florida. But, if you 

look in any of the defense industries today, most them are teamed 

with global firms; most of those global firms in Europe. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is part of that to make sure they can compete 

in other countries as well then? 

General THOMPSON. I am sorry? 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is that to assist them in their competition in 

other countries, do you think, or is it a lack of expertise? From an 

industrial base standpoint. Forget the contract, forget the cargo 

aircraft. 

General CROSBY. For this one, Alenia plans to come here. And in 

all of their future sales of this aircraft, they plan sales worldwide 

would be for those delivered from Jacksonville. So the American 

workers are going to get the benefit of doing this and providing 


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this, and hopefully the suppliers within our country to support 

that. Again, as you say, this is much bigger an industrial base 

issue. But we are keeping our technology, our folks in this country, 

working to do that. 

Now, both of these systems, when we talk about intellectual 

properties, both of these systems are, if you will, off the shelf, already designed, existing systems out there. And that was one of the 

things that made them attractive in their cost, and why, frankly, 

that they won these competitive contracts, because they already 

were in existence. So we are not losing the technological edge to 

develop something that is not out there and stimulating our technology base. These were systems that are already in existence. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Okay. Gentlemen, thank you. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I sort of want to get back, if I could, to 

some of the unmanned aerial programs. You have got the Sky Warrior, you have got the Shadow, you have got the Raven, you have 

got some tied to the FCS, the Maverick, and you have got something called the Fire Scout. And then the Air Force has its aviation 

assets. 

Can you talk a little bit about airspace coordination? There is a 

lot of stuff up there. I just sort of—can you make some general 

comments? And as we shift to Afghanistan, which has been, as we 

said, sort of asset bereft until recently, what is the likely picture 

going to look like over there in terms of unmanned assets? 

AIRSPACE COORDINATION

General DAVIS. Yes, sir. Just to talk to airspace, in general, sir, 

I mean the airspace coordination is going quite well, actually. 

There are a lot of assets that occupy the airspace, both as the Air 

Force would term, above a coordinating altitude and below that, at 

more of a tactical level at the lower altitudes. And so you have the 

small-sized aircraft, the Raven that you mentioned, that not just 

the Army is using. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I want you in a few minutes to tell the me 

the story of Raven, how well it has been utilized. Give me the overview. 

General DAVIS. So the small aircraft like the Raven, the handheld piece; and then at the brigade level, sir, of course we have the 

Shadow aircraft, which you had mentioned, a little larger aircraft. 

And then certainly at the higher levels where you have the Cessna 

172-sized aircraft for the Air Force’s Predator and the Army’s Extended Range/Multipurpose, but those procedures are worked, 

again, between the services. We have elements that are located in 

our combat aviation brigade that work those procedures. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you have people manning these systems. 

As you have said to Ms. Kaptur, some are contractors, some are 

NCOs. 

General DAVIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The Air Force has, you know, Creech and 

their pilots who operate. 


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General DAVIS. They do, sir. They are operating from a remote 

location. As you know, of course, they have assets physically in theater, though. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Some of these assets are physically in—— 

General DAVIS. They do, sir, for the take-off and landing piece, 

and they hand over the control of the air vehicle back to Creech 

Air Force Base and/or Nellis Air Force Base for those. But again, 

sir, in general the airspace procedures are working very well in, as 

you alluded to, crowded airspace. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Are things complicated in a country like Afghanistan just because of the nature of the topography? Beside, obviously, you know, climatic and weather and—— 

General DAVIS. It is complicated by that, sir. But having said 

that, again as you alluded to, it is a larger area, and you actually 

have less assets there in terms of numbers. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But a likelihood of more assets. 

General DAVIS. We do. With the aviation brigade that is coming 

in in the May time frame, there will be more rotary wing assets 

and some additional Unmanned Aircraft Systems as well, yes, sir. 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am a supporter of the Future Combat 

Systems, so I do not ask this question in any but a positive sense. 

I want to see it come to life. I want to see it fully developed. The 

systems we have out there now, some of which I mentioned, how 

many are compatible with, should we say, the Future Combat Systems? 

General CROSBY. I can take that, sir. There are two—if I could. 

I know you are asking about all of them. But I will take just a second to try and summarize quickly what all we have. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I like the notion that whatever we are 

doing now, you know, in Iraq and Afghanistan—go ahead, please. 

General CROSBY. Yes, sir. The Raven is the small UAV. The 

Shadow is the next one up the line, which is operated by soldiers. 

Both operated by soldiers. Next up is the Warrior that we talked 

about. Then there are the two that are in the FCS bundle, if you 

will, the Class I and the Class IV. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Some of those systems have been deployed; 

is that right? 

General CROSBY. Correct, sir. The Class I is the MAV, Micro Air 

Vehicle. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. That is the Maverick? 

General CROSBY. It is. They call it the MAV, Micro Air Vehicle. 

It has been deployed in an pre-production configuration, again to 

give us that feedback in learning, and is supposed to be part of the 

spin-out. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It has been deployed in Iraq, I understand. 

General CROSBY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Eighteen systems according to—— 

General CROSBY. There are actually 16 deployed of the 18 that 

we have. The other two will have the actual gimbal and will have 

the tactical data link that will give it the interoperability that it 

is supposed to have with the FCS systems. All the other systems 

are not currently today compatible directly with the FCS, except 


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that they will use the one system ground control station. And the 

digital data link, once employed, will give them the ability to share 

that data with the FCS network. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But you are desirous of Future Combat 

Systems as a system of systems. 

General CROSBY. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So there would be, obviously, a push towards compatibility. 

General CROSBY. Correct, sir. I will not tell you they are all 

resourced today. We are looking at them. OSD has been very active 

in having us look at the joint arena across the platforms and being 

able to focus. Our goal is to go through one common ground control 

station, which will then allow us to share the data across the different platforms. 

One of the big successes we have had in the Army is called the 

One System Ground Control Station and the One System Remote 

Video Terminal, which is out there. We fielded thousands of them, 

that the soldiers are getting these feeds directly in their hands, 

real time. 

RAVEN

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. With the Chairman’s indulgence, would you 

describe the Raven? 

General CROSBY. The Raven is the small man-pack transportable 

UAS. Operates off a battery. It has got a small EOI sensor. It is 

man-packed. 

General THOMPSON. Small electro-optic/infrared sensor. 

General CROSBY. I am sorry. I forget these acronyms. The Army 

acquisition objective is 2,182, and the procurement objective is 

2,096. Today we have 1,318 of those systems. And when I say systems, we talk about Ground Control Station, Air Vehicle, all of that 

as a system. They are fielded to date. And of that, with the small 

UAV, we have 1,059 systems. As I said, 291 of those systems are 

deployed. 

General DAVIS. Sir, roughly 800 air vehicles are between Iraq 

and Afghanistan. And again, they are invaluable. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Are they equally successful in both? 

General DAVIS. They are, sir. They are invaluable to our brigade 

combat teams, particularly at the platoon or company battalion 

level, at the lowest level, where our ground forces are reliant on 

having some eyes that they can get on for their missions and their 

targets. So they are invaluable. 

General CROSBY. We in Aviation manage them, but those systems, the small UAV are in the hands of the infantrymen. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Literally. 

General CROSBY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. That is great. 

General THOMPSON. If I can give just sort of some perspective 

here, the Raven is the small UAV that is at the platoon and the 

company level. That is why there are more of them. The Shadow, 

pretty much at the battalion, sometimes at the brigade level. The 

Warrior and the ER/MP, which is the follow-on to the Warrior, at 

the division or more at the theater level. 


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So small to large; lower-level tactical units to the larger-level tactical units, all of those UAVs and the two that are part of the FCS 

program, the Micro Air Vehicle, which looks like a flying ball, and 

the Class IV UAV, which is a helicopter-like unmanned aerial vehicle, those two are part of the FCS program. 

The early preproduction models of the smaller one are being used 

in Iraq today. The intent with the FCS program is to integrate and 

be able to use all of the assets that are out there, not just the ones 

that are being developed as part of the FCS program, those two 

UAVs, but all of the assets that are out there today, Ravens, Shadows, ER/MP, to be able to integrate and operate and get the sensor 

information off of all those platforms, bring it into the network, and 

feed that to where it needs to be for the operational commander on 

the ground, all the way down to the company level or even below. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am glad to hear it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I am done, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BOYD. Mr. Tiahrt. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On the ACS again, in 

your testimony you talk about awaiting Defense Acquisition Executive approval to release the technology development request for 

proposal. And the source selection will result in the award of two 

competing technical development contracts, which will be preliminary designed and prototyping efforts. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Now, these are the—are these two integration packages? Because we talked earlier about some of the pallets are complete, or I think they are—if I understand correctly, they are pretty 

much complete. So is the technical development just the integration package? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. The challenge on the Aerial Common Sensor program is to integrate what is mostly the existing 

sensor packages onto a different airframe. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Are these sensor packages going to be GFE or are 

they included in the technical development? 

General CROSBY. I believe the acquisition strategy supports the 

sensors being developed independently of the airframe. And then, 

as General Thompson said, the challenge will be integration of all 

of those systems. I am not sure, because I don’t manage that program, whether the sensors are GFE or not. But I will take that for 

the record. 

[The information follows:] 

The sensors integrated onto the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) will be competitively procured and selected by the respective contractor teams during the Technology Development phase. The Government does plan to provide the following subsystems to each contractor team as Government Furnished Equpment (GFE): MultiRole Tactical Common Data Link (MR–TCDL); Distributive Common Ground Station—Army (DCGS–A) software; and the Communications High-Accuracy Location 

System (CHALS) precision geolocation system. Providing these subsystems to the 

vendors will reduce integration risks and shorten system acquisition time. 

Mr. TIAHRT. What about the airframe? Is it going to be GFE? 

You are not developing an airframe. You are going to take an existing aircraft. Have you already selected the aircraft? 

General CROSBY. We have not, sir. 

General THOMPSON. We have not selected the aircraft. 


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Mr. TIAHRT. Is that up to the integrator, to select the package 

it will be carried on? 

General THOMPSON. The intent would be for the two that we take 

into the technology development phase and then pick one of those 

to go into the systems development, would be to competitively 

award to an integrator to bring those sensor packages onto an airframe. And that is the source selection. 

Mr. TIAHRT. These technology development packages are absent 

of the system integration and the airframe? Is it just the pallets 

that we are still working on here? I am just trying to figure out 

where this is in the process. 

General CROSBY. Sir, I believe that the challenge and what will 

be done during that technology development phase, as you say, 

those sensors themselves are in existence. But what we have not 

done is put them all on a single platform, as you alluded to earlier. 

Therein lies the challenge of being able to manage with a man in 

the loop or a woman in the loop, in the back, managing all that 

aspect. 

The centrifusion is the challenge of integrating all of those capabilities. We have got sensors out there that, as you say, could be 

GFE. But the integration of all those sensors will be the challenge. 

General THOMPSON. Part of the acquisition strategy is you have 

two get manned capabilities today, the Guardrail Common Sensor 

and the Airborne Reconnaissance Low-ARL-program. Those are two 

fixed-wing manned ISR assets today. A lot of the sensor packages 

and those will be brought over and integrated into the new platform, plus as we upgrade those and put other capabilities on there. 

So the intent, Congressman Tiahrt, is to leverage all of the existing center packages and drive towards commonality as much as 

possible, and mount those onto a new airframe, because the current 

airframes on the Guardrail and ARL have got a lot of wear and 

tear and a lot of age on there, so it is to upgrade that capability. 

Then to right size the ISR capability from the standpoint of how 

many platforms we have got out there. 

Mr. TIAHRT. So the integrator, though, will make some of these 

decisions on which technical packages to include—or you are combining certain packages already that have been selected, you just— 

are you upgrading those individual packages, like what is on 

Guardrail versus—— 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir, we are. From a requirements perspective, the government will decide what packages it wants integrated and then work with whatever the industry team is to do the 

technical work, to make sure that happens onto the airframe. 

Mr. TIAHRT. And you won’t be selecting an aircraft; it will be up 

to the integrator? Or will the Army select an airframe? 

General THOMPSON. Well, the multiple industry competitors that 

compete for this will propose an airframe and we will decide what 

is the best one based on the source selection criteria, again, mapping back to the requirements. We take the requirements; we write 

into contract language what we would like to buy; and then we do 

a competitive process and evaluate the multiple competitors, two or 

more against those requirements; and then pick the best one based 

on a best guidance position. 


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Mr. TIAHRT. Will you consider leasing airframes? Or will you 

want to purchase them? 

General THOMPSON. Currently, the acquisition strategy is not to 

lease airframes, it is to purchase airframes. 

Mr. TIAHRT. It is to buy them. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

CH–47 HELICOPTER

Mr. BOYD. Thank you Mr. Tiahrt. 

General, I have three questions I want to ask regarding issues 

I don’t think have been covered. I want to thank the members, first 

of all, for the very good questions. 

But my first one has to do—and if you will give us sort of an 

overview of the use of the CH–47 and its role in our mission and 

where we are going as it relates to Future Combat Systems and the 

Heavy Lift project that you may have on the drawing board. That 

is question number one. 

The other is that you made reference to—well, let’s do them one 

at a time. I will just do the Chinook first. Explain to the committee 

what the CH–47 is and how it is used in the mission. 

General DAVIS. Yes, sir. The 47—and again, we have got our first 

F models that are in theater now. But it is performing extraordinarily well. Sir, a medium-lift aircraft—I mean, the testimony 

from the commanders on the ground—and I would cite the former 

commander of the 101st Aviation Brigade in Afghanistan—he 

claimed it was the center of gravity for his force on the ground. Not 

just the aviation, but certainly in support of ground combat operations in terms of its flexibility and versatility and what it can lift, 

how much it can lift; its ability to operate at high altitudes in 

terms of those types of very important missions that it does. And 

particularly the F model, which is just a fantastic capability that 

they have right now. So they are reliant on this airframe in Afghanistan. 

Certainly, Congressman Boyd, as you have alluded to, the fielding of Joint Cargo Aircraft would perhaps take pressure off of our 

rotary wing fleet that we have that are doing many of the missioncritical, time-sensitive missions for resupply operations, that type 

of thing. 

Mr. BOYD. But you don’t see it totally replacing that? 

General DAVIS. No, sir, not at all. 

AIRFRAME LIFE

Mr. BOYD. So basically for the committee, the CH–47 is an intheater transport, used to transport men, equipment, supplies, 

whatever, even sometimes weapon systems. 

Okay. The second question has to do with a comment I read, 

General Thompson, in your prepared statement. And that has to do 

with the airframe life of the Army aviation assets in the theater 

that we are working in now, primarily Iraq and other parts of the 

Middle East. 

Ms. Kaptur actually alluded to this issue, and you briefly 

touched on it. But I think in that statement you made some reference to the fact of the diminished airframe life of the aviation asVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00259 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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sets and what that may mean for us in the future. Can you expound on that? 

General THOMPSON. Well, from a general sense, the reference in 

the statement, for the record, is about the Apache airframe life, 

10,000 hours. As we bring an aircraft back to reset it or to do a 

more significant upgrade, we are always looking at how many 

hours are left on that airframe. Then we make a decision to take 

that airframe down and either completely replace the airframe or 

to do all of the structural modifications necessary, so when we put 

that aircraft back together again, it can fly for another 10,000 

hours. We do that on all of our platforms. 

The one we are looking at in particular is the opportunity with 

the Apache Block III upgrade, which of those airframes do we need 

within zero time, if you will, so that we get the full operational life 

back, because it is very expensive to take an aircraft apart, as you 

can imagine, and put it back together again. When you do that, you 

want to do it in the smartest way possible. 

Mr. BOYD. But the point here is that it is operating in the Middle 

East theater that is much tougher than, say, Southeast Asia, for 

example, and would diminish the life of that airframe? 

General CROSBY. What we have found thus far, sir, is that the 

environment of the dust and the sand, it does indeed wear on your 

components; primarily your drive train components, your rotor 

blades, your transmissions. All of those rotating components. It is 

like a sand blaster. We have minimized that through particle separators and we have adapted to those things as best we can. So the 

wear is primarily on the dynamic components more than the airframe. 

The concern I have as the airframe guy is looking at that life. 

We are their own condition aircraft. They are based on how well 

and in what kind of environment, how much weight you put on 

them. If you fly a Chinook at 50,000 pounds all the time, it is obviously going to wear out faster than the one that flew at 30,000 

pounds for most of its life. So we have to plan for that. 

My concerns are we are flying at that OPTEMPO four or five 

times the normal rate. Are we using them up faster? We are minimizing that through the reset program through the funding we 

have been getting to do D-to-D recaps, as we call recapitalization 

of the airframe, that General Thompson alluded to, down at our depots. We are minimizing that. 

But the continued use of those aircraft, yes, sir, it is burning 

them up faster, and we are spending a lot of time being proactive 

trying to manage the life limits on that aircraft. 

Mr. BOYD. So the airframe issue has more to do with the 

OPTEMPO than the environment is what I heard you say? 

General CROSBY. Yes. Yes, sir. 

General THOMPSON. That is a fair take-away point. 

ARMED RECONNAISSANCE HELICOPTER

Mr. BOYD. The last question I have has to do with ARH. And can 

you, General Thompson, give us—or one of you give us a general 

overview of what happened and what we might be doing to mitigate that situation in terms of assets? 


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General THOMPSON. The ARH program, there was a NunnMcCurdy process that we went through and the Defense Acquisition Executive decided not to recertify that program. It was driven 

in large measure because of a 42 percent increase in the expected 

cost of that helicopter over what we had put into the acquisition 

baseline at the time. 

We have got the existing Kiowa Warrior fleet out there today. 

What the Army has done is gone back and reevaluated the requirements—and we submit the 2010 budget and we have talked to that 

Committee and to the other committees and the staffers on the 

Hill—is to reinvest the money into making the Kiowa Warrior fleet 

safe and flyable for the near term because we need to do that. 

We have got 338 of those aircraft today that we are going to continue to be flying. A lot of those are in theater as well as probably 

the most used from a standpoint of density of aircraft in the theater. We have got to continue to maintain the Kiowa aircraft fleet. 

We will reinvest some money to do that with the support of the 

Committee. Then we will go through as we update the requirement, and the plan would be to look at a competitive procurement 

for replacement one day for the Kiowa Warrior fleet. But in the 

meantime, I think you will see us come back and lay out what we 

need to do to maintain the fleet that is out there today. 

That is not dissimilar to what we have done and when we canceled the Commanche and we talk about reinvesting those dollars. 

The Chinooks, the Blackhawks, the Apaches, even though these 

airframes were first produced, in many cases many years ago, it is 

the recapitalization programs and the upgrade programs that we 

put them through, these are safe and flyable aircraft. And we will 

do the same thing for the Kiowa fleet until we eventually replace 

it. 

Mr. BOYD. Yes, Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

KIOWA WARRIOR UPGRADES

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. If the Chairman will yield, where do we 

stand relative to the upgrades? 

General THOMPSON. On which aircraft, the Kiowa? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The Kiowa. 

General THOMPSON. We have 52 or 54 aircraft left to go that 

need to be brought to the system enhancement package capability, 

and then the entire fleet. Then what we are looking at right now 

is what else do we need to do to extend the service life of those aircraft? We have labeled the program 2020 to get those aircraft to 

2020 and beyond. We do that to the entire fleet. We have looked 

at the necessary enhancements that we need to do to that fleet 

from the standpoint of avionics, the sensor package, any structural 

modifications that we need to do. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So we are making some progress? 

General THOMPSON. Yes, sir. We are. We definitely are. We have 

got all of the planning done to be able to execute that program. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And when we get them back online with all 

the avionics and things that we need to upgrade them, how long 

do you anticipate they will be able to fly? Which gets to, obviously, 

the bigger issue the Chairman raises which is, if we didn’t go 


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ahead with the other contract, what is there in the future that 

might replace them? 

General CROSBY. Sir—as General Thompson said, we are calling 

this—Life Support 2020. And those are just a—for lack of a better 

term—a bucket of mods that we need to do to address obsolescence 

and those immediate things that we have, I would say, accepted 

risk on while we were focussing on the ARH. Now that the ARH 

has been delayed, or the pursuance of that ARH capability has 

been delayed, as we relook it there are things that need to be done 

and we have put those into this bucket of Life Support 2020. We 

start now and we would apply all of them and finish the entire 

fleet of all of those mods by fiscal year 2015. But, please, that is 

not a service life extension program. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. How long, to answer my question, will they 

be able to fly with all those upgrades? That sort of begs the question as to what we are looking at in terms of—towards a replacement. 

General CROSBY. I understand. We believe that will carry us 

through the 2020 time frame, dealing with the obsolescence. In the 

meantime, the Army at that time, to determine the scope of what 

we do, either buying a new capability or continuing to upgrade this 

capability, they will do the analysis to determine what scope has 

to be done. These are the things we said needed to immediately be 

done to carry us through that 2020 time frame. 

General THOMPSON. I think the way I would describe it, Congressman Frelinghuysen, is we think we understand what we need 

to do to keep those aircraft safe and flyable until 2020. At that 

point in time, we need to begin to replace the Kiowa aircraft, or 

you would have to do a more significant upgrade if you did not replace it with a new aircraft. That decision point is not yet there. 

That is part of the requirements process. 

So we think we have got it scoped out, of what we need to do 

to keep them until 2020. Then beyond that, it is either buy new 

or upgrade the existing fleet beyond what we have already scoped 

out. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BOYD. Thank you. On that note, General, can you tell us how 

many OH–58s you are short? 

General DAVIS. Sir, we have a 368 aircraft requirement and we 

are short 30. So we have 338 right now. So we do have a strategy 

as well that is pending the final piece of the funding for conversion 

of OH–58 A’s to C’s—AC’s to D’s in order to get us back to our requirement. 

Mr. BOYD. Okay. 

General THOMPSON. The Alpha and Charlie OH–58 aircraft are 

the older versions, and there are still some left, primarily in the 

National Guard. There is roughly 120 or so of those aircraft. So to 

get from where we are with the inventory of 338 Kiowas to the desired objective to have 368, which gives you enough to put in all 

of the formations that fly the Kiowas, we would have to convert 

roughly 30 of those Alpha and Charlies to the Delta model Kiowa. 

We have done the engineering analysis, we are beginning to do the 

engineering analysis to make that happen, and that would be subject to the approval of this committee and the other committees in 


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the Congress. But that would be the plan that we would bring forward. 

Mr. BOYD. Okay, gentlemen. Thank you very much. 

General Thompson, General Crosby and General Davis, I very 

much appreciate your forthcoming testimony and answers to the 

questions. 

And I want to also thank the members for your indulgence and 

participation. And let me close by thanking our wonderful staff, 

Paul Terry, for helping us put on a productive hearing. And this 

Committee hearing is adjourned. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

UH–60 BLACKHAWK HELICOPTER

Question. The UH–60 Blackhawk is a four-bladed, twin-engine, medium lift utility 

helicopter. Its missions include: air assault, general support, MEDEVAC, command 

and control, and special operations. Cruising speed is 152 knots. The Army’s total 

requirement for UH–60s is nearly 2,000 aircraft. 

What has been the performance record of the Blackhawk helicopter in Iraq and 

Afghanistan? What capability shortcomings have been identified in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. The performance of the Blackhawk aircraft in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) has been exceptional. As of 15 April, 224 aircraft were deployed in 

support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and another 53 aircraft were in Afghanistan supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The Blackhawk is a utility aircraft being used in air assault, general support, command and control, and 

aeromedical evacuation (MEDEVAC) roles. The UH–60, in its MEDEVAC role has 

saved countless lives due to its ability to get combat casualties to primary medical 

facilities within the ‘‘golden hour.’’ The UH–60 MEDEVAC has been enhanced with 

a Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR), hoist system, and modern medical interior to assist in casualty extraction and treatment. 

Since February 2003, over 757,339 combat flight hours have been flown by 

Blackhawks in Iraq. 121,346 combat flight hours have been flown in Afghanistan. 

The operational temp in both areas is about three times the operational tempo of 

peace time units or approximately 50 hours/month. While the operational tempo has 

been high, UH–60 mission capability rates regularly exceed 80–85% on average. 

However, we should not lose sight of some of the reasons why we are seeing these 

successes, and how quickly it can change based on funding. 

Supplemental funding provides critical enablers to support this high operational 

tempo and the required readiness to meet missions. Some of these enablers include: 

• Higher Repair parts stockage levels, visibility over requirements, and express 

shipments preclude deployed aircraft being down for part (NMCS) for any length of 

time. 

• Extensive Mission Equipment Packages (MEP) required by HQDA are installed 

on deploying aircraft to provide enhanced aircraft/aircrew survivability in combat 

operations, improved communications and situational awareness, and improved aircraft performance. MEPs also help negate the detrimental effects on aircraft and 

components from operations in the harsh desert environment. 

• Substantial contractor support in theater provides 24 hr scheduled/unscheduled 

maintenance support to units. 

• Additional aircraft modifications such as Sponson mounted Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) for MEDEVAC and Satellite Communications, are installed to meet 

commanders Operational Needs Statements (ONS). 

• Installation of Digital Source Collectors to monitor and provide real-time information on the health and condition of aircraft systems to support the Conditioned 

Based Maintenance (CBM) concept. 

• Aviation Reset’s extensive Special Technical Inspection and Repair (STIR) program provides fully mission capable aircraft back to deployed units in the shortest 

time possible. 

The UH–60 Blackhawk is performing exceptionally well in OEF and OIF. Specific 

shortcomings due to special mission requirement are addressed through the Operational Needs Statement (ONS) process. 

Question. Do any units in the Army, active or reserve component, have older 

model Blackhawks that are considered non-deployable for combat? 


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Answer. No. But this is dependent on where the aircraft are deploying to. If the 

aircraft are deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom 

there is a prescribed mission equipment list these aircraft must have installed before deployment; we call this program PRESET. There is a number of aircraft within the UH–60 fleet that have not been deployed to combat operations in this theater 

and we would not deploy until PRESET was performed on the aircraft. But, these 

aircraft are deployable to other contingencies and deployability would be evaluated 

based on the mission equipment list for the deployment. 

LIGHT UTILITY HELICOPTER (LUH) 

Question. The Army is procuring 322 commercial, off-the-self light utility helicopters to replace aging OH–58 and UH–1 utility helicopters. The new aircraft has 

been designated the UH–72A Lakota. The Army National Guard will receive 200 of 

the aircraft out of the total of 322. 

What are the different models or configurations of the Light Utility Helicopter? 

Answer. There are two basic configurations of the UH–72A Lakota. There is a 

utility version that can carry two pilots, one crewman, and five passengers. There 

is also a Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) configuration that has two pilots, three 

crew seats and room for two NATO standard litters. The MEDEVAC configuration 

also has a hoist A VIP transport configuration has also been introduced that has 

six club seats and may carry two pilots, one crewman and five passengers. There 

are various configurations being introduced for the Combat Training Center (CTC) 

and Army National Guard (ARNG) missions. The CTC will be equipped with the 

necessary equipment to conduct Opposing Force (OPFOR) and Controller missions, 

such as additional radios, sensors and datalink capability. The ARNG Security and 

Support (S&S) will have an electro optical sensor, situational awareness equipment 

and a searchlight. These aircraft will begin to be either retrofitted or produced in 

FY10. 

Question. How many Light Utility Helicopters have been delivered to the Army? 

Answer. 63 UH–72A aircraft have been delivered as of 24 April, 2009. 30 have 

been fielded to the Active Army and 32 to the Army National Guard (ARNG). The 

remaining aircraft will be fielded to the ARNG the first week of May 2009. Four 

more aircraft will be delivered by May 1, 2009. 

Question. Where and to which units have the helicopters been delivered? What 

are the missions? 

Answer. The Active Army has received 30 UH–72A deployed as follows: 

• National Training Center, FT Irwin, CA: 

Æ 6 UH–72A for MEDEVAC mission. 

Æ 10 for General Support missions. 

• Joint Readiness Training Center, FT Polk, LA: 10 UH–72A for General Support 

missions. 

• Training and Readiness Doctrine Command (TRADOC), FT Eustis, VA: 2 UH– 

72A for VIP transport missions. 

• United States Military Academy (USMA), West Point, NY: 2 UH–72A for general support missions. 

The ARNG has received 33 UH–72A deployed as follows: 

• Louisiana ARNG: 4 UH–72A at Pineville for S&S Missions. 

• Mississippi ARNG: 4 UH–72A at Tupelo for S&S Missions. 

• Florida ARNG: 4 UH–72A at Jacksonville for S&S Missions. 

• North Carolina ARNG: 4 UH–72A at Morrisville for S&S Missions. 

• Texas ARNG: 

Æ 2 UH–72A at Austin for S&S Missions. 

Æ 1 UH–72A at Austin for S&S Missions. (to be delivered May 2009)* 

• DC ARNG: 6 UH–72A at Ft. Belvoir, VA for MEDEVAC Missions. 

• Vermont ARNG: 2 UH–72A at Burlington for MEDEVAC Missions. 

• Pennsylvania ARNG: 6 UH–72A at Ft. Indiantown Gap for training missions. 

Question. How has the LUH program performed in terms of cost and schedule? 

Answer. The LUH program has consistently been on schedule and at cost. In the 

FY09 budget, the U.S. Army and Department of Defense accelerated the program 

by increasing production in FY10–14. With the Congressional Add to the program 

in FY09 of 5 aircraft, a total of 97 aircraft were added in the Program Objective 

Memorandum (POM) for FY09–14. This will lead to completion of the program with 

the last fielding in FY15 instead of FY17. 

Question. Is the transfer of assembly to the United States required by the contract? 

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tract between EADS–NA and the U.S. Government relative to the LUH. EADS–NA 

has an internal goal of 65 percent domestic content, which involves continued utilization of existing U.S. suppliers, transfer of assembly/production for some existing 

non U.S. suppliers to the U.S., and evaluation of potential new suppliers in the U.S. 

The contractor, EADS–NA has maintained course on their proposed 3-phase, eventdriven production duplication plan. The first phase, the Light Assembly Line (LAL) 

phase, consists of reassembly of a full UH–72A kit in Columbus, MS. This includes 

installation of rotor blades, tailboom, and landing gear; customization (paint, avionics, and optional equipment); aircraft flight test; and delivery to the U.S. Army. 

The second phase, the Full Assembly Line phase, consists of assembly of a semiequipped UH–72A kit in Columbus, MS. In addition to the LAL functions, this 

phase includes installation of engines, blades, main gear box, tailboom, landing 

gear, doors, communication/navigation equipment, and seats. The final phase, the 

Production Line phase, consists of the full build up of UH–72A aircraft in Columbus, 

MS. To date, 57 aircraft have been produced in the LAL phase, eight have been produced in the Full Assembly Line phase, and two have been produced in the Production Line phase. Production under the first phase will be complete in May 2009, and 

the second phase now accounts for 80 percent of the aircraft in production. The production will be completely transitioned to the U.S. by the end of 2010. 

Question. What is the prescribed readiness rate for the LUH, and what is the reported readiness rate? 

Answer. The LUH contract requires an 80 percent Operational Availability for the 

Active Army units per month. The Army National Guard units perform their own 

field maintenance and the metric for the contractor is based on parts fill rate. The 

UH–72A fleet has averaged over 90 percent availability for the life of the program. 

AH–64 APACHE HELICOPTER

Question. The Longbow Apache is the Army’s current model heavy attack helicopter, capable of armed reconnaissance, close combat, mobile strike, and vertical 

maneuver in day or night and adverse weather conditions. The Apache is a twinengine, four-bladed, tandem seat aircraft. The AH–64 Longbow Block III has a 

30mm cannon, 2.75 inch rockets, Hellfire missiles and modernized pilot night vision 

and sensor equipment. 

Please explain for the Committee the upgrades and advantages of the latest model 

AH–64. 

Answer. The current Longbow Capabilities Production Document (CPD) states; 

‘‘ensure Apache will meet the Army’s attack helicopter requirements within the Future Modular Force through 2025.’’ Further, the CPD identifies known capability 

gaps within the current Apache fleet. 

Apache Block III is a remanufacture program of the older, less capable, versions 

of the current Apache Attack Helicopter. The effort will address obsolescence issues, 

key operations and support drivers, and add capabilities ensuring the aircraft are 

viable combat multipliers through 2025 within the Army’s Future Modular Force. 

The cornerstone to the Block III program is the remanufacture of older Apaches 

while integrating technologically current upgrades into a proven weapon system 

platform. Consequently, Block III is primarily an integration effort and not new 

technology development. Block III will address current system shortfalls by integrating: 

• Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Control Capability 

• Improved Situational Awareness Capabilities 

• Upgraded Communications Suite (obsolescence) 

• Improved Drive and Propulsion Systems (operations and support) 

• Improved Targeting Capabilities (obsolescence) 

• Increased Computer Processing Capability and Speed (obsolescence) 

• Improved Navigation System (obsolescence) 

• Integrated System Diagnostics Improving Overall 

• Maintainability (operations and support) 

Question. What is the current inventory of Apaches, how many have been lost in 

combat operations, how many replacements have been funded and how many of the 

replacements have been delivered? 

Answer. The current Apache fleet inventory is 699. There are 154 AH–64 As and 

545 AH–64Ds. There have been 51 operational losses (20 A models and 31 D models.) All 51 operational losses are funded, with 23 deliveries to date. Deliveries for 

remaining 28 aircraft are scheduled through fiscal year 2011. 

Question. Some early models of the AH–64, all fielded in Army National Guard 

units, are considered non-deployable. Why is that? 


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Answer. The Army made the decision in 2006 that the Army would no longer deploy AH–64A Apache helicopters to OEF/OIF. This policy is based on the increased 

sophistication of the threat in the contemporary operating environment and the resultant survivability equipment required, as well as the need for increased detection 

and targeting capability that the AH–64A does not possess. 

Deployment of AH–64A battalions will require mission equipment package and 

performance enhancements to address the shortcomings that led to their restriction. 

The resultant AH–64A+ would be equipped with the Modernized Target Acquisition 

and Designation Sight (MTADS), Common Mission Warning System (CMWS), Aircraft Survivability Product Improvement (ASPI), and 701D engines. The AH–64 Program Manager’s most optimistic estimate on the initial operating capability of an 

A+ battalion is 2nd Qtr FY12 with a trained battalion deploying in FY13. This is 

slower than current timelines to deploy remanufactured AH–64 Longbow battalions. 

The estimated total cost per AH–64A+ battalion is $158M. This is roughly half 

the cost of converting an AH–64 battalion to AH–64D but provides less capability 

and will not fulfill the Army’s commitment to modernize the National Guard’s Aviation fleet. 

Maintaining an AH–64A+ fleet in the Army creates significant training and 

sustainment challenges and costs. TRADOC no longer qualifies AH–64A aviators in 

flight school. AH–64A pilots are Longbow qualified at Fort Rucker and then attend 

the AH–64A ‘‘dumb down’’ course at the Western Army NG Aviation Training Site 

(WAATS). AH–64A sustainment costs are higher than AH–64D and increase the logistics tails in theater. There is no replacement source for future AH–64A losses. 

Question. The Committee understands that the AH–64A aircraft that were considered nondeployable were to have been replaced by the new production Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter; however, the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter program has 

been terminated with cost and schedule problems. What is the Army’s plan to upgrade the AH–64As in order to make them deployable? Are the upgrades funded? 

Answer. The Army Strategy is to upgrade the four remaining AH–64A battalions 

in the National Guard to AH–64D battalions through a combination of Remanufacture (REMAN) and cascade from the Active Component. This strategy is supportable 

(POM neutral) through a reprogramming of ARH funding. The Army anticipates 

completing the modernization of the National Guard AH–64A battalions no later 

than FY14. 

ARMED RECONNAISSANCE HELICOPTER (ARH) 

Question. The Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter program was designed to serve 

as a replacement and capability upgrade to the Vietnam era OH–58 series helicopter. The ARH program had advanced to the production phase in 2008 and 2009. 

The Army had planned to procure 512 of the aircraft with total program cost of $5.9 

billion. Funding appropriated for Aircraft Procurement, Army for fiscal year 2009 

included $242 million for aircraft production. However, in October 2008 following a 

Nunn-McCurdy review of cost and schedule breaches, the program was decertified. 

The ARH was to be a modified off-the-shelf aircraft. What caused the schedule 

slip and cost growth? 

Answer. The ARH program was originally based on modified commercial off-theshelf and the integration of non-developmental items. The schedule slip is mainly 

attributed to two areas: 

1. While in the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase the time 

frame to design, integrate, and build prototype aircraft was underestimated and 

added several months to first flights of each of the four prototype aircraft. 

2. Some of the components chosen (i.e. sensor and engine), while based on a fielded variant, had considerable development and testing yet to be done. The engine 

proved successful and had very little schedule impact on the program. The Bright 

Star II sensor, on the other hand, had several technical issues that were not easily 

overcome and in turn became the most critical schedule and cost driver of the program. 

Cost growth occurred in both the development and production estimates. The SDD 

contract cost growth was mainly driven by the issues above and due to the need 

to resource other activities required in the weapon systems specification and contract statement of work that were underestimated by the prime contractor. The 

SDD cost growth and contract/technical issues were accounted for and resourced in 

the restructured SDD contract modification accomplished in April 2008. 

The Nunn-McCurdy ‘‘critical’’ unit cost breach included SDD cost increases but 

was primarily driven by significant increases to the production cost estimates which 

came to light with preliminary contractor estimates for the first 10 Low Rate Initial 


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Production (LRIP) aircraft. Production estimate increases were due to significant increases to labor hour estimates, labor rates, and airframe material estimates. 

Question. What is the current status of the ARH program? 

Answer. To support the potential procurement effort, the Army is conducting a 

bottom up review of the Armed Reconnaissance Capability requirements to include 

a thorough assessment of the specific requirements identified for the previous 

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter program as well as initiating a formal analysis 

of alternatives. The analysis will cover the entire spectrum of options, from the potential use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, the use of a Manned/Unmanned aircraft 

mix, to the procurement of a new manned platform. Army and DoD remain committed to the requirement for a manned armed reconnaissance helicopter capability 

to replace the aging Kiowa Warrior and the need to deliver the capability to our 

Soldiers in a responsible and timely manner. 

Question. Does the Army still have a valid requirement for a new, modem armed 

reconnaissance helicopter? 

Answer. The Army has an enduring Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

(JROC) approved requirement for a light, manned, armed reconnaissance helicopter. 

The termination of the ARH program (due to cost overruns) as a result of the NunnMcCurdy process did not in any way decrease the Army’s continuing need for an 

armed scout helicopter. The Army is initiating an analysis of alternatives to determine the best way to meet the armed scout requirement including a detailed analysis of manned-unmanned teaming. 

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT (JAC) 

Question. The Joint Cargo Aircraft (or C–27J) is a medium sized, multi-purpose 

cargo aircraft that supports a full range of sustainment missions. It is planned for 

purchase by both the Army and Air Force. In the Army it replaces multiple older 

platform including the C–12 and C–23. The C27–J is produced by Alenia Aeronautical and L–3 Communications. 

Why does the Army need its own fleet of fixed wing aircraft as opposed to requesting Air Force support? 

Answer. Direct Support fixed wing airlift assets give the tactical commander assets he can plan on with certainty. All the Services recognize this need and currently have some internal aircraft capability for Direct Support fixed wing airlift. 

The cost to the warfighter of not having fixed wing aircraft in Direct Support would 

be the loss of control for the tactical commander to meet the immediate requirements of the ever-changing battlefield. Tactical commanders would lose flexibility to 

meet their unit’s needs in fluid situations. Enemy actions, weather and terrain can 

quickly change the situation. The Air Force is structured and employed to support 

efficient bulk transport of supplies and personnel. Air Force intra-theater airlift in 

General Support enables the push of bulk supplies and personnel across the battlefield. Centralized control of General Support assets allows the JFC to weigh his priorities across the Joint Operating Area. Fixed wing aircraft in Direct Support of 

Army forces provide the tactical commander the required flexibility to meet his 

unit’s immediate needs in dynamic situations, thus enhancing the commander’s 

freedom to maneuver advantageously against the enemy. 

Question. The Committee understands that Alenia and L–3 may team with Boeing 

for final assembly operations in the U.S. What is the status of the teaming agreement and what will be the impact on aircraft production if a teaming arrangement 

is not reached? 

Answer. L–3 and Boeing have not entered into a teaming arrangement and continued efforts to established a teaming arrangement do no exist to our knowledge. 

No aircraft production issues exist due to the lack of a teaming arrangement. Alenia 

is continuing the planning for a U.S. based final assembly operation. 

Question. Is the program on track for full rate production? 

Answer. Yes, the program’s parameters of cost, schedule, and performance are on 

track to support a Full Rate Production decision planned in Calendar Year 2010. 

JOINT FUTURE THEATER LIFT/JOINT HEAVY LIFT

Question. The Committed understands that the Joint Vertical Lift Task Force is 

developing requirements to meet Army and Navy/Marine Corps needs for a heavy 

lift transport rotorcraft. Concurrently the Air Force and Army are studying Joint 

Future Theater Lift which may be a heavy lift rotor craft to enable vertical maneuver. 

The Army and Navy are collaborating in the Joint Vertical Aircraft Task Force; 

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gram. This sounds like a duplication of effort. What is the status of these two Joint 

Heavy Lift programs? 

Answer. The Joint Vertical Aircraft Task Force (JVATF) is an Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored task force that was a follow-on to the Non-Fixed Wing 

Aviation study. The JVATF has been dormant for more than a year but had a goal 

of developing a systems roadmap for the Department of Defense (DoD) vertical aircraft fleet. That activity has been overcome by the ongoing DoD Future Vertical Lift 

(FVL) activity that was initiated by the Secretary of Defense in response to a specific congressional request. The FVL, and the JVATF before it, is addressing the 

complete spectrum of vertical lift systems. ‘Heavy’ is just one aspect of their interest 

area. FVL is a strategic planning activity to define a future systems roadmap. Individual systems will be identified in the resulting plan, but each system will then 

have to proceed with developing its own requirement and program of record through 

the normal Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and the 

Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System process. 

The Joint Future Theater Lift (JFTL) is a joint activity of all the services and 

SOCOM, not just the Army and Air Force. JFTL is a specific joint requirement description in the JCIDS process for a heavy lift transport that will support mounted 

vertical maneuver of medium weight forces, sustainment to the point of need, and 

theater distribution. The Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) is in joint staffing now 

and will be reviewed/approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) 

in June/July 2009. 

Question. Is the Joint Heavy Lift program still joint, or are Army, Air Force and 

Navy/Marine Corps all going in separate directions? 

Answer. Joint Heavy Lift (JHL), which is an Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (OSD (AT&L)) directed Joint Concept Refinement activity, has merged its requirement set into the broader Joint Future Theater 

Lift (JFTL) Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). JHL now represents the Vertical 

Take Off and Landing (VTOL) candidate for filling the JFTL requirement. JHL is 

still fully joint, with representatives from the Army, Navy/Marines, Air Force, Special Operations Command, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration actively contributing to the aircraft designs and technology investigations. 

Question. Will the Joint Heavy Lift aircraft replace the CH–47 Chinook series of 

aircraft? 

Answer. The Joint Future Theater Lift (JFTL) requirement represents mission 

sets that more closely encompass those of the current C–130 aircraft than of any 

existing rotorcraft. JFTL is broadly viewed within the Department of Defense as the 

eventual replacement for the C–130 aircraft. Joint Heavy Lift (JHL), as the Vertical 

Take Off and Landing (VTOL) candidate for the JFTL, is significantly larger than 

either the CH–47 or CH–53K helicopters and is intended to operate over dramatically longer range and with twice the payload of existing rotorcraft systems. If JHL 

is fully developed and procured, there will be an assessment of how it will influence 

the entire lift fleet mix. There is the probability that it will affect the number of 

smaller rotorcraft lift systems needed, but it does not replicate or replace the mission sets of either the CH–47 nor CH–53 tactical rotorcraft. 

Question. What unique airlift capability will the JHL program provide for the 

Army? 

Answer. The complete Capabilities Based Assessment conducted during the JHL 

Concept Refinement activity, concluded that there are six high risk capability gaps 

that could only be fully satisfied with a Vertical Take Off and Landing (VTOL) capability. JHL, if chosen to fill the JFTL requirement, will provide the capability to maneuver by air, medium weight and lighter mounted as well as dismounted forces 

and to sustain those forces as they maneuver on the ground. This is a fundamentally new and significantly greater force capability than the U.S. has ever had. The 

exact payload weights and ranges will be determined during completion of the Capabilities Development Document but the Initial Capabilities Document identifies combinations of payload weights from 20 to 36 tons and ranges from 250nm to over a 

1000nm, depending upon environmental and takeoff and landing conditions. JHL’s 

VTOL capability provides the potential to operate to and from future sea based platforms, offering greater force projection and sustainment opportunities in access denied environments. 

Question. Will the JHL program provide a theater airlift capability for the Army’s 

Future Combat Systems? 

Answer. Yes. The JFTL Initial Capabilities Document contains the requirement 

to maneuver medium weight forces. Designs for JHL, the Vertical Take Off and 

Landing candidate for JFTL, have accounted for the dimensions and maneuver 

weights of existing and developing medium weight forces, including the Future 


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Combat Systems (FCS) family of vehicles. JHL cargo bay designs accommodate the 

Stryker, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Category I/II, FCS, U.S. Marine Corps 

Service Life Extension Program Light Armored Vehicle, two International Organization for Standardization containers, seven 463L pallets, and a plethora of other vehicle and cargo loads. 

SKY WARRIOR UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (UAS) 

Question. Warrior Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are serving in an ever expanding 

role in U.S. Army combat operations. Requests for support regularly exceed assets 

available. Warrior aircraft provide reconnaissance, target designation and direct attack capabilities. The Sky Warrior is a follow on to the Predator/Warrior Alpha. 

How many Warrior/Sky Warrior UAVs are deployed in Iraq and in Afghanistan? 

Answer. Iraq has three Warrior Alpha systems (eight Aircraft each) and one Warrior Block 0 System (two Aircraft). Afghanistan has one Warrior Alpha system 

(three Aircraft). 

Question. How many have been destroyed in combat operations and how? 

Answer. Two Warrior Alpha UAS aircraft were destroyed in Afghanistan. One aircraft was lost due to unknown causes and one was lost after losing the beyond line 

of site link and impacted a mountain at a very high altitude. One ERMP Block 0 

aircraft in Iraq crashed and was destroyed due to contractor operator error. None 

of these losses were associated with takeoff/landing or enemy activity. 

Question. Are the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle operators based in the war Theaters, 

or are they located in the U.S.? Does the Warrior/Sky Warrior have an automatic 

take off and landing capability? 

Answer. All operators are located in theater. Warrior Block 1, Extended Range 

Multi-Purpose has an Automatic Takeoff and Landing System. Warrior A and Warrior Block 0 have air vehicle operators that perform takeoff and landing operations. 

Question. The Army is in the process of surging a Quick Reaction Capability of 

Sky Warrior Block I UASs to the war zones. 

a. Please explain for the Committee what equipment comprises the Quick Reaction Capability and the time line for providing the additional capability in theater. 

b. What are the improvements found in the Block I version of the Sky Warrior? 

Answer. The Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) consists of two Platoons of equipment, one deploying this summer and the second deploying next summer. Each platoon will include four Aircraft, two Army One System Ground Control Stations, 17 

Soldiers and civilian contractors for logistics support and operational augmentation. 

The QRC Block 1 aircraft will have the Automatic Take Off and Landing System 

(ATLS), but as a risk mitigation to this new system and the Army will also deploy 

a proprietary General Atomics shelter that can be used by contractor personnel to 

manually land the aircraft in the event of an ATLS failure. 

The Block I version has significant improvements over the Warrior Alpha. We 

move from a proprietary Ground Control Station and command link to the Army 

One System Ground Control Station and add an Automatic Take Off and Landing 

System to reduce the training requirements. The Block I is a larger aircraft with 

redundant flight controls, a heavy fuel engine, longer endurance, the Starlite Radar, 

communications relay and the ability to carry four Hellfire missiles. 

Question. Is Sky Warrior compatible with Army Future Combat Systems (FCS)? 

Answer. The Extended Range Multi-Purpose will be compatible with FCS; however specific inter-relationships and compatibility will be further examined in the 

2012–2017 Program Objective Memorandum period. 

SHADOW UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) 

Question. The Shadow UAS provides reconnaissance, target acquisition and force 

protection for the Army Brigade Combat Team. A Shadow System consists of four 

aircraft; two ground control stations and various support trucks. Shadow platoons 

are found at Army brigade level. Shadow has a range of 125 kilometers based on 

line of sight communications and endurance of six hours. 

What is the inventory objective and on hand status for Shadow systems? 

Answer. The Army Procurement Objective is 102 systems. 63 systems are fielded, 

each with four Air Vehicles. 

Question. How many Shadow aircraft have been lost in Iraq and what is the current shortage? 

Answer. 112 air vehicles have been lost, listed as Beyond Economic Recovery during Overseas Contingency Operations. None confirmed as combat loss, but characterized as accidents (either material failure or human error). There have been additional incidents, but the Air Vehicles (AVs) were able to be repaired, either on site 

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vided for three replacement AVs per year. Shortages do not exist; adequate replacements are on-hand at the Forward Repair Activity located at LSA Anaconda, Iraq. 

Question. Will data from Shadow be compatible with Army Future Combat Systems (FCS)? 

Answer. Shadow will not be part of the System of Systems Common Operating 

Environment or Battle Command System enabled on the air vehicle because of Size, 

Weight and Power constraints. However, the Universal Ground Control Station will 

be interoperable with FCS. Joint Tactical Radio System is an objective capability. 

Question. Are Shadow systems equally suitable for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. The terrain in Iraq has fewer mountains and less severe winter weather 

conditions than Afghanistan. All aviation operations in Afghanistan are impacted by 

the terrain, high altitudes and winter weather conditions. The high mountains restrict Line of Sight control and create wind and visibility conditions that impact all 

operations. However, the Shadow UAS is capable of operation in the vast majority 

of the areas in Afghanistan where operations are conducted. 

RAVEN UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) 

Question. The Raven Unmanned Aerial System is man-packed and handlaunched. It weighs about four pounds and has flight endurance of 80 minutes. A 

Raven System has three aircraft, a ground station day and night cameras and a 

laser designator. 

Does the Raven provide both still pictures and video? 

Answer. Yes, in addition to display of live mission video, the Raven (RQ–11B) captures both still frame pictures and video. The still frame images are captured in the 

National Imagery Transmission Format (NITF) standard. The images are initially 

stored on the Raven system hub and may be downloaded to the Raven’s associated 

laptop computer as either NITF or JPEG images. Still images stored on the hub 

may be viewed on the Raven hand controller. Video is captured and stored in real 

time on the Raven’s laptop in MPEG 2 format. Telemetry from the flight is embedded in the video and may be extracted during video playback on the laptop using 

Raven’s AV Screener software. The Raven system laptop is currently a Panasonic 

CF–19 Toughbook. U.S. Government Falcon View software with additional software 

applications related to Raven provides the interface and functionality for imagery 

archiving and playback on the system laptop computer. 

Question. Ravens operate at low altitudes, literally right in the ground fight. Are 

Ravens often shot down? 

Answer. No. There is anecdotal evidence of insurgents engaging Ravens with 

small arms fire, but no verifiable incidents of successful shoot downs. 

Question. Can radio frequency clutter cause control of the Raven to be lost? Then 

what happens? 

Answer. Yes, electromagnetic interference from sources operating in frequency 

ranges near the Raven uplink frequency or at high power levels may interfere with 

the Raven data link. If the uplink frequency from the Raven ground control station 

to the aircraft is interrupted for a duration of three continuous seconds, one of three 

actions will occur: the aircraft will enter a Rally mode and land at a preselected 

landing point, finish the programmed flight and proceed to a preselected landing 

point, or may land immediately. Any one of the three options may be selected by 

the operator during mission planning. Loss of the video and telemetry downlink is 

independent of the uplink loss and does not prompt loss of link procedure. Strict 

frequency management procedures and mission planning will reduce the potential 

for loss of link. A ‘‘lock-on’’ process was added to Full-Rate Production systems in 

2007 that links a specific ground station to a specific aircraft to preclude inadvertent interference from other ground stations near the aircraft. The Raven system 

will undergo product enhancement beginning in Fiscal Year 2009 to convert to a 

digital data link. 

Question. How well does the Raven perform in windy conditions? 

Answer. Raven technical manuals specify that the system should normally operate in wind conditions of 20 knots (23 miles per hour) or less. The Raven aircraft 

can cruise at 26 knots (30 miles per hour) and dash at speeds up to 45.7 knots (52.6 

miles per hour). Operators will assess the wind conditions during mission planning 

and, in coordination with commanders, compare the mission priorities to the risks. 

The flight duration of the aircraft will limit operational ranges in windy conditions. 

Winds will impact either the flight to the objective or the return leg. Additional 

power may be consumed when flying against strong winds. Wind conditions will 

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tronic Pan, Tilt and Zoom was integrated in 2006 and greatly enhanced the stability 

of the imagery in windy conditions. 

Question. How many Ravens have been lost in combat operations? 

Answer. There has only been one reported loss of a Raven aircraft due to hostile 

fire, having been directly observed by friendly forces. Other aircraft have been lost 

due to fly-aways in which the aircraft did not return to the recovery site. Determination of the reason for any uncommanded fly-away, or other loss in which the 

aircraft was not recovered, is not technically possible. Since the beginning of combat 

operations, 110 Raven aircraft have been reported lost and unrecovered in Operation Iraqi Freedom and none have been reported lost in Operation Enduring Freedom. 

Question. What is the basis of issue for Raven UAS? 

Answer. Raven systems are currently authorized in both active and reserve component units. The Army Acquisition Objective is 2,182 Systems and the Army Procurement Objective is resource constrained to 2,096 Systems. The bulk of Raven systems are fielded to Brigade Combat Teams. Heavy Brigade Combat Teams and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams are each authorized 15 Raven systems. Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are authorized 17 Raven systems. The current U.S. Army Basis 

of Issue Plan was approved May 18, 2008. The plan approves fielding to Brigade 

Combat Teams, Battlefield Surveillance Brigades (4 each), Fires Brigades (7 each), 

Pathfinder Companies in Combat Aviation Brigades (4 each), Engineer Sapper Companies in Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (3 each), Military Police Companies in 

Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (2 each), and Sustainment Brigades (1 each). Additionally, within Special Forces units, Ravens are authorized in Ranger Battalions 

(4 each), Ranger Regiment Special Troops Battalion (4 each), Special Forces Groups 

(2 each), Special Forces Battalions (2 each), and Special Forces Companies (2 each). 

Training assets are authorized at the US Army Infantry Center and School (17 systems), the Special Warfare Center and School (18 systems), and the US Army Armor 

Center and School (4 systems). 

Question. Is the Raven system equally useful in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. Yes. The original Raven fielding was to Operation Enduring Freedom in 

2003 with the early version known as Raven A. If operations will be at a sustained 

high altitude, an alternate propeller is available to enhance performance at those 

altitudes. 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS CLASS I UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM

Question. The Future Combat Systems Class I Unmanned Aerial System is also 

known as the Micro Air Vehicle, or Maverick. The Maverick provides a network capable situational awareness capability down to platoon level. It has the ability to 

hover and stare at military operations on rural and urban terrain. The vehicle 

weighs about 41 pounds and has vertical take-off and landing capability. 

What has been the feedback from Soldiers who have used the Class I UAS, either 

in training or in combat? 

Answer. Soldiers are positive about the capabilities of the Class I UAS because 

it has provided a very effective capability to the platoon and company levels to perform reconnaissance and surveillance missions in environments (such as urban and 

complex terrain) that are not conducive to larger UAS platforms. The Class I UAS 

provides unique capabilities to the small unit in current operations. Positive feedback has also been provided on how easy the Class I Block 0 is to assemble, deploy 

for flight, and maintain. 

Soldiers say, ‘‘. . . provides significant military utility to the lowest echelon, . . . 

very easy to operate, . . . operating in conjunction with the Stryker the gMAV significantly contributed to maintaining persistent surveillance, . . . the IR Sensor pinpointed the enemy even after the sun went down. We could have really used this 

in Iraq, . . . the UAV helped us identify a breech during the exercise, . . . if this 

had been a real combat situation, it would have saved lives, . . . gMAV would have 

saved lives in Iraq because we could have seen over walls. It would have protected 

our resupply squad, . . . the Class I increases efficiency and decreases risk.’’ 

Lessons learned from operational and experimental assessments are being used 

today in the acceleration of the Class I Block 0 UAS to the Army Evaluation Task 

Force and also in the development of the Class I UAS threshold platform. 

Question. What near-term improvements are planned for the Class I UAS based 

on test flights and Soldier feedback? 

Answer. Each generation of the basic system has improved capabilities that make 

it distinct from the previous generation. The Future Combat Systems (FCS) Class 

I Block 0 UAS is based on the gasoline Micro Air Vehicle (gMAV) platform, which 


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originated as a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Advanced Concept 

Technology Demonstration in 2002. 

For the Class I Block 0 platform (part of the FCS Spin-Out Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team), there are several improvements planned as a result of the FCS 

Preliminary Limited User Test in fiscal year 2008 (FY08). These include a gimbaled 

Electro-Optical (EO) Sensor, a gimbaled Infrared (IR) Sensor, an electric fueler, an 

improved Operator Control Unit, an improved Engine Control Unit, addition of Digital and Command and Control video, and addition of Direct Data Link integration 

(in 2010). 

For the Class I Threshold platform scheduled for FY13, these are the planned improvements. A 10 Horsepower (hp) heavy fuel engine, a combined EO/IR/Laser Designator/Laser Range Finder payload, integration of the Small Form Factor-D and 

Soldier Radio Waveform 1.1 c, addition of Radio Crypto Keying, an electric fueler, 

and an electric starter. 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS CLASS IV UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM

Question. The FCS Class IV UAV or Fire Scout, is a small unmanned helicopter 

that provides brigade level reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition; target designation; communications relay; Nuclear detection; mine detection; signals intelligence and persistent stare. 

How many Fire Scouts does the Army plan to buy and how many has the Army 

taken delivery of so far? 

Answer. A total of 504 air vehicles are planned to meet current Army requirements for fielding, training, and spares. The Army has purchased eight airframes, 

through the Navy Vertical Take-off and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

Firescout contract, for System Development. 

Question. What is the Army doing with the Fire Scouts that have been delivered? 

Are any of the Army’s Fire Scouts in use in Iraq or Afghanistan? 

Answer. Eight prototype Class IV UAS are on contract to support Integrated 

Qualification Tests and Limited User Tests beginning with first flight in April 2011. 

To date, none of the eight prototypes have been fully assembled because key subsystems needed to make the aircraft flyable are still in development and have yet 

to be delivered for integration. Seven of eight airframes have completed Phase I assembly with airframe #8 due to complete in May 2009. Phase II integration (installation of unique mission equipment, payloads, and data links) is scheduled to begin 

with unit A1 in March 2010, as the unique hardware and software are delivered, 

and conclude in June 2011 with Unit A8. 

The Army has not deployed any Class IV Unmanned Aerial System to Iraq or Afghanistan. 

Question. Is the Fire Scout capable of assisting in the counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) effort? 

Answer. Once the Class IV UAS has completed the system development effort and 

passed all testing, it is envisioned that the capabilities offered by the Class IV UAS 

would assist in detecting some IEDs. The Class IV UAS is capable of supporting 

a wide variety of modular mission payloads, including Signal Intelligence payloads 

and optical payloads designed for the counter IED mission. The baseline payload for 

the Class IV UAS is the Airborne Standoff Minefield Detection System Electro-Optical (EO), Infrared (IR), Laser Designator, and Counter Mine sensor. Though not specifically designed for IED detection, the multi-spectral imager on this sensor provides the ability to detect minefields and other small targets, as well as excellent 

counter-camouflage capabilities in varied backgrounds, vegetation, and thermal and 

lighting conditions, which exceeds the capabilities of most other EO/IR sensors. 

Question. Will the Fire Scout be part of technology Spin-Out One to infantry units 

of the Army? 

Answer. The Class IV UAS has been approved as part of the Threshold spin-Out 

fielding beginning in FY 13. The Army continues to work on the specifics of the required capabilities, organizational design, cost, schedule, and performance to meet 

this proposal. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.— End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 1, 2009. 

SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS 

WITNESSES 

VICE ADMIRAL BERNARD J. McCULLOUGH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL 

OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES 

ALLISON STILLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 

(SHIP PROGRAMS) 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. The committee will come to order. 

Today we will hold an open hearing on the state of the Navy 

shipbuilding program, which would be nowhere if it weren’t for this 

committee. I mean, 2 years ago, you requested four ships and we 

ended up with seven or eight. Last year, I don’t remember what 

you requested, but we added at least one. And this year I know you 

don’t know where you are at this point, but if we are going to get 

to 313, we can’t get it to 313—and that is a figure you use—unless 

we build at least 10 per year. Of course, what you say is, every 

year, we are going to do it next year; and, next year, you say, we 

are going to do it next year. So I am looking forward to hearing 

from you. 

We have 283 ships, you said earlier, right now. So we look forward to hearing both you distinguished guests testifying. 

And I recognize Mr. Young. 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much; and I join you 

in welcoming the distinguished witnesses this morning. 

I don’t have a major opening statement other than to say the 

same thing that the chairman did. I remember the days we were 

headed for a 600-ship Navy. Obviously, we didn’t get there; and the 

chairman is concerned about how we get to where the Navy wants 

to be now. 

I recognize that the newer ships that we are building are more 

efficient and you can do more with a ship than you could with the 

one that was built 50 years ago, but we are here to help maintain 

a very strong Navy and the ability to protect the United States 

anywhere in the world that we need to protect. 

So thanks for being here. We look forward to your testimony, and 

don’t be bashful. Tell us what your problems are and what your 

goals are. 

Mr. MURTHA. If you will summarize your statements, without objection, we will put your full statements in the record. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Secretary. 


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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MS. STILLER

Ms. STILLER. Mr. Chairman, Representative Young, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege for Vice Admiral McCullough and I to appear before you today to discuss Navy 

shipbuilding. 

The Department remains committed to achieving an affordable 

fleet and, during this past year, we have created and implemented 

a new policy on acquisition governance. This new governance process’ requires involvement by senior Navy officials and reviews at 

specified points throughout a major acquisition program’s life cycle. 

These reviews evaluate program cost drivers, monitor program 

health, evaluate risk and ensure adequate staffing. As these reviews are accomplished, lessons learned about the governance process as well as systemic program issues, are being addressed. 

In an effort to address cost estimates, we have reinvigorated the 

independent Navy Center for Cost Analysis and established a new, 

highly focused cost estimating tiger team. In shipbuilding, we are 

ensuring that new ship designs are adequately mature before entering ship production. With our shipbuilding contracts, we are implementing cost reduction initiatives, affordability programs, reuse 

of existing designs, and incentives of selected capital improvement 

projects, otherwise known as Capital Expenditures (CAPEX). 

When programs are mature, we are exploring block buys and 

multiyear procurements. Open architecture both for hardware and 

software promises to be a powerful cost avoidance tool as well. 

The Department recognizes that our in-house acquisition workforce has atrophied during the last decade. During this time, the 

Department has become increasingly reliant upon contractors to 

support management and oversight. We have outsourced work better accomplished in house and we are now working to grow that 

talent within the Navy. Some growth will be funded by reallocating 

resources from outsourced work. 

We have been hiring approximately 400 interns per year and, 

with a new acquisition workforce development fund established in 

fiscal year 2009, we will hire an additional hundred interns and 

150 journeymen this year. 

A year of policy changes and acquisition was paralleled by positive activity in ship acquisition. We commissioned nine ships during 2009 and signed contracts for our future fleet. The Navy awarded a contract for Gerald R. Ford, the lead ship of the CVN–78 class. 

The ship design is over 80 percent complete and a thorough production readiness review has been conducted. 

An eight-ship multiyear procurement contract was signed in December for the continuation of Virginia class builds. The contract 

achieves the cost reduction goal of $2 billion per boat in fiscal year 

2005 dollars, starting with the 2012 boats. 

We also awarded detailed design and construction contracts for 

DDGs 1000 and 1001. DDG–1000 fabrication commenced in February of this year, with over 85 percent of the design complete 

prior to the start of construction. LCS–3 was awarded last week 

and negotiations continue for LCS–4. 


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The fiscal year 2010 bids are in process as well. A contract for 

up to 10 Joint High-Speed Vessels was awarded in 2008 and design 

efforts are ongoing. 

The Navy has also awarded the preliminary design work for the 

Mobile Landing Platform, a key component of the Maritime Preposition Force Future and DDG–51 restart advance procurement is 

also in process. 

The Navy has come through many difficulties associated with 

lead ships and sustained production is proceeding. We are addressing issues with the acquisition workforce. We have instituted the 

acquisition governance process to facilitate continual requirements 

in acquisition communication. 

We are committed to meeting the force structure required to 

meet the maritime strategy. Thank you again for your continued 

support of Navy shipbuilding. 

SUMMARY REMARKS OF ADMIRAL MCCULLOUGH

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, Representative Young, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you this 

morning with Ms. Stiller to discuss Navy shipbuilding. 

Before I begin, I would like to mention that, in addition to our 

role in sea power, the Navy currently has about 14,000 Sailors 

serving on the ground in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, specifically Iraq and Afghanistan. They serve in traditional roles with 

the Marine Corps, but also in land service combat support and 

combat service support missions to support the joint commander in 

the Army. We provide these Sailors, in addition to fulfilling our 

commitments to the country and our allies, to provide persistent 

forward presence and incredible combat power in support of the 

Maritime Strategy. 

Today we have a balanced fleet capable of meeting most Combatant Commander demands from persistent presence to counter-piracy, to ballistic missile defense. However, as we look ahead in the 

balance of capability and capacity, we see emerging warfighting requirements in open ocean Submarine Warfare, Anti-Ship Cruise 

Missile, and Theater Ballistic Missile Defense. 

Gaps in these warfare areas pose risks to our forces. State and 

nonstate actors who, in the past, have only posed limited threats 

in the littoral are expanding their reach beyond their shores with 

improved warfighting capabilities. 

A number of countries, who historically have only possessed regional military capabilities, are investing in their Navy to extend 

their reach and influence as they compete in global markets. Our 

Navy will need to outpace other navies’ capabilities as they extend 

their reach. The Navy must be able to assure access in underdeveloped theaters. We also have routinely had access to forward 

staging bases in the past. This may not always be the case in the 

future. 

In order to align our surface combatant and investment strategy 

to meet the evolving warfighting gaps, the Navy plans to truncate 

the DDG–1000 program and reopen the DDG–51 production line, 

as I testified to Congress last summer. This plan best aligns our 


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surface combatant and investment strategy to meet Navy and combatant and commander warfighting needs. 

The reason for the change to the Navy’s DDG plan is to prioritize 

relevant combat capability. Modernizing the Fleet’s cruisers and 

destroyers and executing an affordable shipbuilding plan are crucial to sustaining and constructing a 313-ship Navy with the capacity and capability to meet our country’s global maritime needs. 

The Navy must have the right capacity to meet combatant and 

Commander warfighting requirements and remain a global deterrent. Combatant Commanders continue to request more ships and 

increased presence to expand cooperation with new partners in Africa, the Black Sea, the Baltic region, and the Indian Ocean. This 

is in addition to the President’s requirement to maintain our relationships with current allies and partners. Therefore, the Navy 

must increase capacity to meet Combatant Commander demands 

today for ballistic missile defense, theater security cooperation, and 

steady state security posture, simultaneously developing our fleet 

to meet future demands. 

While the Navy can always be present persistently in areas of 

our choosing, we lack the capacity to be persistently present globally. This creates a presence deficit, if you will, where we are unable to meet Combatant Commander requirements. Africa Command capacity demands will not mitigate the growing European 

Command requirement, and Southern Command has consistently 

required more presence that largely goes unfilled. 

The Navy remains committed to procuring 55 Littoral Combat 

Ships. The LCS program will deliver capabilities to close validated 

warfighting gaps. LCS inherent speed, agility, shallow draft, payload capacity, and reconfigurable mission spaces provides an ideal 

platform for conducting additional missions in support of the maritime strategy to include irregular warfare maritime security operations such as counter-piracy operations. 

The Navy remains committed to an 11 carrier force for the long 

term, which is necessary to ensure that we can respond to national 

crises within the currently prescribed time frames. Our carrier 

force provides the Nation the unique ability to overcome political 

and geographic barriers to access for all missions and project power 

ashore without the need for host nation ports and airfields. 

The Ohio class ballistic missile submarine, originally designed 

for a 30-year service life, will start retiring in 2027 after over 40 

years of service life. The Navy commenced an analysis of alternatives in fiscal year 2008 for a replacement ballistic missile submarine. Early research and development will set the stage for the 

first ship to begin construction in fiscal year 2019. 

The Virginia class submarine is a multi-mission platform that 

fulfills full spectrum requirements. Virginia was designed to dominate the undersea domain in the littorals as well as the open ocean 

in today’s challenging international environment and is replacing 

our aging 688 class submarines. Now in its tenth year of construction, the Virginia program is demonstrating that this critical capability can be delivered affordably and on time. 

The Commandant of the Marine Corps has determined that a 

minimum of 33 assault echelon amphibious ships is necessary to 

support their lift requirements. Specifically, he requested a force of 


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11 aviation-capable ships, 11 LPD 17s, and 11 LSDs. The Chief of 

Naval Operations supports the Commandant’s determination. 

The Navy must maintain its carrier, submarine and amphibious 

force. In addition, we need to increase our surface combatant capacity through increased destroyer procurement and LCS to meet 

Combatant Commander demands today for missile defense, theater 

security cooperation and a steady state security posture. 

I thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Navy shipbuilding 

program and your support of our Navy. I look forward to answering 

your questions. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The joint statement of Admiral McCullough and Ms. Stiller follows:] 


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ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Secretary, you talk about interns. Define what 

you mean by interns. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. It is an entry-level position where we bring 

people into the acquisition community train them. We get them exposure to different programs and disciplines like contracting, budgeting, program management. They serve as a junior employee in 

the organization, and we grow them into acquisition professionals. 

Mr. MURTHA. So these are young engineers just out of college 

or—and they have to go through a certain qualification before they 

can become acquisition experts or you don’t have the spaces or 

what? Why would you just not hire them—why do you call them 

interns? 

Ms. STILLER. Because, in order to be a qualified acquisition professional, there is training that you have to go through. Some of 

the interns are right out of college, but they can be midcareer folks 

that decide they want a job change. For entry into the acquisition 

corps, there are core courses they have to take. We work with them 

to make sure they are getting those courses and that they are 

mentored by folks who have been around for a while conducting the 

knowledge transfer so we have a really good, solid basis for them 

to start their career. 

Mr. MURTHA. I like what you are saying. Because this subcommittee has been in the forefront trying to make sure that there 

is some stability in the shipbuilding industry. And acquisition has 

been a big part of it. It sounds like you are talking about more maturity, more people involved in shipbuilding; and it sounds like you 

will stabilize it at some point. And the LCSs will be a big part of 

it, it sounds like. 

ELECTRO-MAGNETIC AIRCRAFT LAUNCHING SYSTEM

Now, a couple of other questions. On the launching system on 

the carrier, is that going to slow down the carrier, the new launching system? 

Ms. STILLER. We are still analyzing EMALS, the electromagnetic 

launching system that you mentioned. We do not see that it will 

have an impact on the actual schedule of the carrier at this point 

in time. 

Mr. MURTHA. I keep hearing rumors that they are studying the 

alternative, going back to steam. Is that accurate? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. We are looking at all options. 

There has been cost growth to the EMALS system. We are looking at the total cost, both acquisition and life cycle, for EMALS and 

steam. We are looking at schedule and what does that do if we 

went back to steam on CVN–78. We are in the process of getting 

information from industry so that we can make an informed decision. We have had independent technical authorities look at it 

within the Department. 

Mr. MURTHA. You reduced personnel and maintenance by 39 people. Are you to the point where the cost growth overcomes the savings in personnel? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Mr. Chairman, we have looked at that. 

And right now, both due to the reduction in personnel required to 


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man a launching system, the increased operational availability and 

the reliability of the EMAL system, there are still life-cycle savings 

over what we would have if you went back to steam catapults. 

Mr. MURTHA. The Secretary said earlier that, unless these systems were mature, we weren’t getting involved in them. This is a 

pretty big part of, obviously, the carrier. Was it not mature when 

you started—I thought this had been used over and over again. I 

thought we had some stability by going to this EMAL system. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir, there is a development effort that had to 

start and is still continuing to get EMALS to apply to the aircraft 

carrier. The technology itself is not new, but it is the application 

in the aircraft carrier. 

There is a lot of rigor we want to go through for component testing so we understand the liability of the components as well as system testing. We are in the component testing phase right now. We 

have seen minor issues in testing which we have been able to resolve. But there is some concurrency with the schedules and that 

is one of the things we want to evaluate going forward. Is the development schedule still ongoing? How do we mitigate the risk to 

the carrier schedule so that that doesn’t change, we don’t see an 

impact to the carrier schedule. 

Mr. MURTHA. What will it do to the cost of the system if you had 

to switch to steam? 

Ms. STILLER. I don’t have that information yet. We are waiting 

on a cost estimate from Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Newport 

News. 

Mr. MURTHA. What does it look like at this point? Are you going 

to go with the EMALS or are you going to go with the steam? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Right now, Mr. Chairman, the plan is to 

go to with EMALS or to continue with electromagnetic aircraft 

launching system. That is going to be briefed to the CNO and the 

Acting Secretary here in the next week to 10 days. 

We need EMALS technology to support higher energy launches 

of our aircraft. As we look at what we have been doing in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, specifically going into Afghanistan, we have had to up 

the number, if you will, of high energy launches we are executing 

to support sending Super Hornets into Afghanistan. That creates 

excessive wear not only on the aircraft but also on the energy absorption system on the front end of the ship known as the water 

brakes that catch the launch cylinder spears. 

EMALS will give us a steady acceleration across the launch of 

the aircraft down the catapult track and has much less impact on 

both the airplane and the ship when you have the EMAL system 

on the ship. It also gives us much greater energy capacity for the 

high energy launches; or if you are using the standard load configuration on the aircraft, it requires significantly less wind over deck 

on the aircraft carrier. With the reduced requirements for wind 

over deck, it gives you greater operational flexibility in the carrier 

operating areas when you lay them down in an operational theater. 

So the Navy needs the EMALS capabilities as we move forward 

with our next-generation aircraft carrier and aircraft. 

Mr. MURTHA. Is this just a computer design at this point or is 

this being built? 


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Ms. STILLER. No, sir. The components are built and in testing. 

We are working to get the land-based facility at Lakehurst. There 

is an installation ongoing there right now. 

So, no, sir, there are components to this. This is not a design. 

Mr. MURTHA. So it would be extremely expensive if we switched 

back to steam, spending all this money on EMALS at this point? 

Ms. STILLER. Again, sir, I am waiting for the estimate from Newport News, what that would do to the cost and schedule. I just 

don’t have that information yet. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young. 

USS HARTFORD COLLISION

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I want to talk about the LCS program, but, before that, I would 

like for you to tell us what we haven’t read in the newspapers 

about the collision between the submarine and the ship. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Congressman, the investigation is ongoing in that collision. So I would really be remiss to discuss what 

is going on in an internal investigation in a Fleet Commander’s 

area of responsibility. 

It was an unfortunate incident. We are extremely pleased that 

none of the Sailors were badly injured and that both ships were 

able to make port in Bahrain under their own power. The damage 

assessment for both the submarine and the LPD are currently ongoing in Al Manamah, Bahrain. 

Mr. YOUNG. Does it appear that the submarine is fixable? I understand it had more damage than the ship? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. The preliminary reports that I have read 

from the Naval Sea Systems Command indicate that the submarine is repairable, yes, sir. 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Mr. YOUNG. Okay. The LCS program, which has run into some 

problems—you have just awarded the contract for LCS–3, but you 

had cancelled LCS–3 and –4 before because of the experience with 

LCS–1 and LCS–2. Where are we headed? I understand the importance of this new type of ship; and I tell you, Vern Clark, when he 

was CNO, spent a lot of time educating me on the importance of 

LCS. But are we ever going to build 55 of them? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. That is the requirement at the moment— 

55, and we are still planning to. 

Just to give you a sense of where we are today on LCS, LCS– 

1 is delivered. She is in an availability in Norfolk and will wrap 

up early next week. She will go to her acceptance trials at the end 

of the month. We are very pleased with how LCS–1 is proceeding. 

LCS–2 is in construction. The General Dynamics GD-Austal 

team that is down in Mobile and we expect that ship will deliver 

this summer. 

We had a significant event last week. We had main propulsion 

diesel light off on the ship. So the construction is proceeding well. 

So we are much further along with those ships than we were 

when we had awarded LCSs 3 and 4 last time. We have got one 

ship delivered and one very close to delivery. As I said, we have 


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awarded the LCS–3 to the Lockheed Martin team and we are still 

in negotiations with General Dynamics. 

But I feel very comfortable. Those fiscal year 2009 awards are 

tied to the fiscal year 2010 ships. We are awaiting the bids on the 

fiscal year 2010 ships as well. 

Mr. YOUNG. What is the contract cost for the new LCS–3 as compared to the original LCS–3? 

Ms. STILLER. Sir, the fiscal year 2009, the LCS–3 award, the fiscal year 2010 ships are tied to that. We are still in a competitive 

environment. We have not made public that award amount. But I 

am happy to provide that to you but not in an open hearing. 

Mr. YOUNG. Okay. I understand that. Can you tell us if it is more 

or less or the same? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir, it is less. We took a long time here in negotiating these two ’09 ships, because we are really focused on affordability, and we have been working closely with the industry folks 

to figure out how we are driving costs. We work with the requirements community as well on how we can drive costs out of these 

ships. We are on the path to getting affordable LCSs as we go forward, and I think you will see from our 2009 awards that we are 

on that path. 

Mr. YOUNG. LCS–1 and 2, 3 and 4 are different designs, is that 

not correct? I mean, they are not identical ships? 

Ms. STILLER. They are two different designs, yes, sir, that meet 

the same requirements list. But, yes, LCSs 1 and 3 at this point 

are one design and LCS–2, and when we award 4, will be of a similar design. 

We have tried very hard to make sure there is not a lot of change 

between those ships. Obviously, as we learn things in tests and 

trials that we have to fix, we will want to make sure those get on 

the following ships. But these ships should look very similar if they 

are built of that same design. 

Mr. YOUNG. But we are not far enough into the program to know 

whether one design is superior to the other or more cost-effective? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. That is correct, sir; and we still intend 

to compare the ships from both an operational assessment and acquisition cost perspective and a total-life-cycle cost perspective to 

see if we should down select the one particular design. 

Mr. YOUNG. I understand that the military requirements and the 

Navy’s requirements are considerably different than a commercial 

ship. But in a commercial world a contract is pretty much—a design is agreed upon, all these things are done before the contract 

is let and the construction begins. I understand that the Navy has 

different missions, and the mission changes from time to time. So 

you can’t really do that. But are we—will the new acquisition process help us get a little more for the dollar? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. One of the things that we have really been 

taking a hard look at and a hard line on is the percent complete 

in design before we ever start production. For example, DDG–1000, 

the design is over 85 percent complete before we agree to start fabrication on the lead ship. The same thing with CVN–78. It is in the 

80–85 percent range of completion of design before we start construction on that ship. We did not do that on LCSs. We learned 

that lesson again, and I would tell you that we are very focused 


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on making sure that the design is of adequate completion before we 

start construction. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, thank you very much for the information on 

the LCS. 

I am sure other members will want to talk about DDG–1000 and 

maybe even ask about DDX, but, Mr. Chairman, I know I have 

used my time, so I yield back. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MURTHA. We appreciate the pressure you put on to get the 

price down. Because when you originally came to the committee, all 

of us knew—I knew in particular—it wasn’t going to come in at the 

initial cost. So I appreciate you learned a lesson. And we helped 

by pressuring the companies and saying to them, we are not going 

to pay that kind of price, so let’s get this down. When I went to 

both places I told them that. So I appreciate what you have done. 

Ms. Kaptur. 

LEASING OF FOREIGN BUILT SHIPS

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome. Great to have you. 

I am going to go back, Secretary Stiller, to a question I asked you 

last year about leasing of foreign-built ships. As I recall the answer 

last year, there was this schedule that there was a declining path 

of foreign-leased ships. Could you please tell me—you said last 

year that the committee—that the Navy had leased 17 foreign-built 

U.S.-flagged vessels at that point. Could you please tell us how 

many foreign-built ships are currently being leased? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, ma’am, 14. Back in 2002, we were at 22; last 

year, as I testified, we were at 17, and today we are at 14. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What path are you on for the future? 

Ms. STILLER. We continually review the requirements for what 

constitutes a long-term lease. In fact, in my written testimony I 

mentioned there were 28 in long-term charters. Since the written 

testimony, I am down to 26. We bought three leases out, and then 

we added one because it was a 6-month option. We are committed 

to try and drive that out. 

The complicating factor is there are not a lot of U.S.-built commercial vessels out there to meet our needs. We do end up having 

to look at foreign-built ships. Now they have to be U.S. flagged, 

and they have to be U.S. crewed. We have been diligently working 

at this to try to get the number down, and I am happy to say we 

got it down this year. 

CONSTRUCTION OF SMALL VESSELS

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. That is a very good report. 

And how do small shipyards compete for Navy contracts? 

Ms. STILLER. If it is a small vessel, we put out a request for a 

proposal and anybody that wants to compete is certainly welcome 

to compete. We do have a lot of smaller shipyards participating in 

ship acquisition. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Do you ever do briefings for those smaller competitors around the country? 

Ms. STILLER. It depends on the country. We have had industry 

days where we welcome them to come in and hear what our requirements are, and they can ask questions if they think something 


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is going to be a cost driver to us. It is good for us to hear that up 

front so we don’t make a mistake going in. 

Ms. KAPTUR. If you have anything planned—obviously, I am up 

there on the Great Lakes. If there is anything you have planned 

that would permit greater information to be shared with shipyards 

up on the Lakes, we would appreciate that. If you could give us a 

contact that might know a lot about what is going on in the Department, I would certainly appreciate that very, very much. 

SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE

What would happen if Congress were to prohibit the Navy’s ability to enter into leases on foreign-built ships? 

Ms. STILLER. I will get you a detailed answer on that, but I will 

give you my initial impressions. 

Like I said, there are very few U.S.-built commercial ships anymore. It would be very costly for the Department because we would 

likely be forced into building these ships to meet our requirements; 

and my concern would be the warship procurements that we need 

to do, as opposed to these ships that are truly for specified periods 

of time, would the Department have to pay for those ships? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, you have referenced the fact that, in the commercial sector, the number of ships being constructed in this country has gone down and we know that our shipbuilding industrial 

base is really limited now to about six companies. And contractors 

have stated that increased volume, of course, would help stabilize 

the industrial base. 

What do you see as a possibility for us restoring our shipbuilding 

industrial capacity? Can it be done through componentry? I know 

in the automotive industry there are twice as many people employed in the parts plants as the assembly plants, and I am just 

curious in terms of shipbuilding whether the same rule applies and 

whether by saving the componentry we could ultimately save the 

ability to make the larger vessels. How do we really solve the problem of retaining that industrial capacity for ships in our country? 

Ms. STILLER. You make a very good point. There are suppliers, 

obviously, for our ships and so we have to manage that part of the 

industrial base as well. I will give you an example. For submarines, 

over 80 percent of the suppliers are sole source to us now because 

of the low rates. 

Mr. MURTHA. Say that again. 

Ms. STILLER. Over 80 percent of the submarine suppliers are sole 

source. Because we got down to such low levels of procurement. We 

have to watch that industrial base very carefully. 

For example, on the DDG–51, restarting the program, we asked 

for a significant amount of advanced procurement for that restart 

ship because we know that there are some vendors out there that 

the last time we bought components from them was fiscal year 

2002. We know we need to help them restart their line so they can 

get the components going. We have done a very thorough scrub of 

that. So we do monitor our second-tier suppliers that are supplying 

to the shipyards very carefully. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Is there a summary that you have of what you view 

as the ingredients for our shipbuilding capacity? 


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Ms. STILLER. I would say our shipyards have had varying levels 

of success in getting into the commercial side of the House. There 

is a law. The Jones Act requires that ships be procured in a U.S. 

yard if you are going to do trade between a U.S. port and another 

U.S. port. There aren’t a lot of Jones Act ships built in recent past, 

although there are some right now. It just depends on the shipyard. They will tell you that the skill sets to build a commercial 

ship are very different from a warship and it is hard to translate. 

It is hard to tell a nuclear welder you don’t have to be to that level 

of standard to build a commercial ship. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I know my time is close to expiring, if not expired. 

Let me just ask you, could you provide the committee with your 

best summary of what you view is the essential ingredients for our 

defense shipbuilding industrial capacity? What are the ingredients 

of that? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, ma’am. I will be happy to provide that. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Okay. Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department believes that stability in the shipbuilding program is a key ingredient in sustaining a cost effective and capable capacity in the shipbuilding industry. Toward that end, the Department of the Navy will continue to work with the 

Congress to ensure a stable shipbuilding strategy that is aligned with the FY 2010 

President’s Budget. 

The acquisition and requirements communities have developed an affordable long 

term shipbuilding plan that provides the foundation for stability and capacity in the 

industrial base. The goal is to provide a stable long-term shipbuilding plan that reduces industrial base volatility and allows the industry to better match investments 

to meet Navy capabilities. 

The Navy works with its industry partners to consider several factors to control 

costs and improve stability: (1) level loading shipyards to sustain employment levels 

and skill retention, and stabilize workloads through work share opportunities and 

regional outsourcing; (2) greater use of contract incentives, such as multi-year procurement, fixed price contracts and increased competition; (3) reducing ship types, 

maximizing reuse of ship designs and common components, and implementing open 

architecture; (4) maturing ship designs prior to start of construction; and (5) emphasizing design for affordability in both initial design and follow-on ships. The Navy 

is also working with industry to identify capital investment strategies which will 

have cross program benefits. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

SUBMARINE PROCUREMENT

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to talk about those, Ms. Stiller, what you characterize as the low levels of procurement for subs. Generally speaking, on the submarine fleet—and, Admiral, you mentioned it—the 

Chinese seem to be—at least there is evidence that they are working on a 200 sub fleet. The Iranians have some sort of a sub which 

would I think alarm most of us. The Indians I understand are purchasing some subs from Russia. I assume Russia is not standing 

still. 

I know this committee is keenly interested in this issue. And we 

have been—we are procuring—correct me if I am wrong—two Virginia class subs a year; and you have got, I think from your testimony, six under way. Is that correct? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. I believe the number is six that 

have been commissioned. 


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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Could you comment on whether this is 

going to meet our needs, given, let us say, what our potential adversaries are doing in terms of—— 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. I can talk to that. 

You bring up a point about Chinese submarines. The Chinese are 

building submarines today. They have approximately—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Are their subs nuclear and diesel? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. They are both, sir. The ones we worry 

about, obviously, are the high-end, very quiet, diesel—electric submarines. They are exceptionally hard to find. The Chinese have a 

variety of submarines, from those that are extremely loud acoustically to those that are not; and they are increasing the proficiency 

of their crews based on some things that we have seen. So that is 

of concern to us. Our force structure analysis says we need 48 nuclear-powered attack submarines. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Our attack submarines today are Virginia 

and Los Angeles? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Correct, sir. And there are a couple of 

variants to Los Angeles. There are 688s, and then there are improved 688s. So there are our submarines today. And then we have 

the three SeaWolfs, one of which is a special projects boat. 

So we have defined a requirement of 48 submarines. In about the 

2027 time frame—and I might be off one year one way or the 

other—we go down to about 41 submarines. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So there is a retirement process? Have 

some of the Los Angeles class subs been retired? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Between now and 2027, how many of those 

subs will be retired? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. I will have to get you that number, sir. 

I don’t have that in front of me. And I will gladly—— 

[The information follows:] 

Between now and the end of FY 2027 we plan to retire all but six of our current 

Los Angeles class submarines, or a total of 39 retirements. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We are extending the life of some of those? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. We have looked at extending a certain 

number of submarines to help mitigate the aspects of that delta 

that I spoke of, and it fills in the gap somewhat. Beyond that, we 

have recently completed a study with Naval Reactors that looked 

at extending, I believe, about 16 more Los Angeles class submarines, and it is based on fuel consumption and projected fuel 

consumption. And that would mitigate the gap I think by an additional two, if we extend it an additional 16 submarines. There is 

obviously—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. When it is all said and done, today we have 

53. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Fifty-three. How many subs would we have, 

let us say, 5 or 10 years from now? I know the capacity of the Virginia class is pretty incredible, but that doesn’t necessarily get us 

where we need to go. 

Ms. STILLER. One of the things we have done on the acquisition 

side, we accelerated when we went to two submarines a year and 

that is part of this multiyear procurement? We are buying—— 


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Mr. MURTHA. You said ‘‘we’’. This committee? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. We asked for it, and you increased it, sir. 

Ms. STILLER. Two a year in 2011. So we have tried to mitigate 

that from the acquisition side as well. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The notion that our adversaries are willing 

to confront us anywhere in the world—obviously, we need more 

surface ships. But the notion that somehow we would be outflanked 

by—some people sort of demean what the Chinese might be coming 

up with in terms of their subs, but I don’t think we ought to underestimate their capability. 

What about the issue of the converted trident? Is there some activity going on there? Those are the huge subs? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What is going on there? And does that give 

us some more legroom? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. We converted four of the Ohio class submarines into nuclear-power guided missile submarines. OHIO is 

one of those boats. She recently completed her maiden deployment 

as an SSGN, and it was a highly successful deployment. We are 

currently evaluating how those submarines contribute to the overall submarine force to determine if we should recapitalize those 

boats when they go out of service. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you are taking a look at that? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir, we are. 

You asked me how many submarines we will have. We don’t go 

below 48 submarines until 2021. And then it decreases to about 41 

in 2027, as I said, and then the ramp starts back up, and then we 

go over 48 submarines again in 2024. 

Some things we have done to mitigate that are to accelerate or 

decrease the production time on the Virginia class submarines, and 

it started out at about 84 months. It is down to about 66 months 

now. As I said, we retained some of the Los Angeles class submarines that we were going to decommission, and we have looked 

at increasing deployments from 6 to 7 months to try to mitigate 

this gap. As was mentioned, with the help of the committee, we did 

add the second Virginia class submarine in at 2011; and we hadn’t 

planned to do that until 2012. So that also gave us some partial 

mitigation in the submarine gap. 

We take very seriously the submarine threat posed by potential 

adversaries globally. We monitor their activities on a daily basis. 

So we have many programs, not only nuclear-powered submarines 

but things associated with surface ships and distributed arrays and 

airplanes to try to address that threat. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was with—and he didn’t ask me to ask these questions—with 

Admiral Donald over the weekend under the ice, and I can’t tell 

you—if any of you have an opportunity obviously to be on a sub. 

But that particular ice exercise, you can’t help be impressed by the 

dedication of those men on those subs. My God, they work so closely together and with remarkable spirit. It is a special breed of people. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Moran. 


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Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Thank you for saying that, Congressman. 

HOMEPORTING OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Mr. MORAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The former Secretary of the Navy facilitated the decision to move 

an aircraft carrier from Norfolk down to Mayport. But the justification for that relocation is awfully spotty; and the military construction, just to enable it to happen, will cost over $1 billion, just to 

prepare the port. It seems like a questionable expenditure when 

the subcommittee’s concern has been the shipbuilding shortfall and 

the unfunded requirements that exceed $500 million. 

People are going to characterize this as a turf battle between 

States and so on, but I think it really affects more the ability of 

our shipbuilding resources to be used most efficiently and effectively. What is the latest status of this issue and how can you justify spending that kind of money when we have the demand that 

we do for additional ships? 

Either one of you can answer. I think the Admiral should proceed, initially. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, sir. Thanks for that question. 

The Navy thinks it is very important to have a second nuclearpowered carrier base or capacity on the east coast. On the west 

coast, currently, we have Bremerton and San Diego; and each of 

those facilities has the associated nuclear maintenance infrastructure to perform at least I level maintenance, i.e. intermediate-level 

maintenance on the aircraft carrier. 

On the east coast, we have one facility in Norfolk, Virginia. The 

building yards in Norfolk Naval Shipyard and the repair capacity 

are all located within about an 11 nautical mile radius from pier 

12—or pier 14, I think we call it now—where we dock the aircraft 

carriers. So we deem it necessary to have an alternate capacity on 

the east coast should anything happen to preclude getting an aircraft carrier into its own port on return from deployment, or should 

anything happen to the port and we had the carrier force base continue to all be based in Norfolk. 

We have looked at this from a multitude of ways. If you look at 

the carriers typically that we don’t have in long-term maintenance 

or deployed, the ready response force if you will, on the east coast 

there is about 21⁄2 to 3 aircraft carriers at the pier in Norfolk on 

any given day. If you blocked the exit or entrance to that harbor 

for any reason whatsoever, that would tie up 100 percent of the 

ready carrier reserve force that we have available on the east coast. 

If a carrier was returning from deployment and scheduled to go 

into its maintenance availability upon return from deployment and 

was precluded from getting into its own port in Norfolk and you 

don’t have the alternate carrier capacity on the east coast, the carrier would be forced to go to the west coast for maintenance. 

Carriers are not PANAMAX, as you well know, Congressman. So 

it would have to go around South America to get to a maintenance 

base on the west coast. 

Mr. MORAN. Admiral, has that ever happened? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. No, sir, it has never happened. The last 

major hurricane I believe that went into Norfolk and significantly 


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altered the bottom was in about 1803 when Willoughby Spit was 

formed. 

Mr. MORAN. 1803 was the last time—— 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. The last significant hurricane that altered the configuration. 

That said, there are—as you know, the Thimble Shoals channel 

is about 15 nautical miles long, and it is the only way in and out 

of Norfolk for an aircraft carrier. There are two single-point failures on that channel, the Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel and the 

Chesapeake Bay Bridge Tunnel. So I would tell you it is prudent 

operationally to have a second carrier base with its maintenance 

facility or second carrier capacity with maintenance capacity on the 

east coast. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, you have been well briefed certainly, but I 

could tell you that there are many responsible people in the Navy 

who felt that building this kind of redundant port was an unnecessary use of scarce money and that have told me privately—that is 

why I can’t reveal their names publicly—that this was under political pressure from the last White House. The naming of the ship 

and the political benefit seemed to outweigh the use of scarce resources. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Sir, I would tell you I was a Strike Group 

Commander for both Kennedy Carrier Strike Group and Enterprise 

Carrier Strike Group and that was stationed in Mayport. Mayport 

has historically had a carrier base there, a conventional carrier as 

an alternate carrier base on the east coast; and only as we have 

downsized our carrier force have we stationed all the aircraft carriers on the east coast in Norfolk. 

I would tell you again that I think—and I haven’t been well 

briefed. I have looked at this, and I have operated these types of 

capabilities, and I think it is in the Navy’s best interest and in the 

Nation’s best interest to have an alternate carrier capacity on the 

east coast. And the most available port to put that in today is in 

Mayport, and that is where the Navy thinks it should be. 

Mr. MORAN. Just a comment. There are a lot of things that 

would be nice to do if we had sufficient resources; and building 

more ships for a port that is not currently being used is redundant, 

is a questionable use of resources. 

But I have taken up my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Kingston. 

COAST GUARD SHIPS AND MISSIONS

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, do you know if the Coast Guard uses any foreign-built ships? 

Ms. STILLER. I don’t know that. I can find that out and get that 

for you. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I just wondered. 

[The information follows:] 

No, the United States Coast Guard does not own or operate foreign built boats 

or ships. They have used foreign patrol boat designs for manufacturing in the 

United States. They have used only three European designs in the CG, for the 87/ 

110/154. The 87′ CPB and the 154′ Sentinel Class Patrol Boat are Dutch (DAMEN) 

and the 110′ WPB was British (VT Shipbuilding). It is also important to note that 

while they used the parent craft approach, the designs all required enhancements 


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to meet CG requirements, which means that the Detailed Design for each of those 

three ships was completed in the United States. 

Mr. KINGSTON. And, also, do you have any overlap historically 

with Coast Guard roles and Navy roles closer to shore? As your 

fleet has gone down, has Coast Guard filled in any gaps closer to 

home, particularly in the Caribbean? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. I mean, the Coast Guard has a mission 

set, sir, in the Caribbean that the Navy doesn’t necessarily have; 

and, as you well know, under their title in the U.S. Federal code, 

they can execute law enforcement missions where the Navy cannot. 

The Coast Guard has augmented Navy forces in defense of the 

oil platforms in the Northern Arabian Gulf, both Al Basra oil terminal and Khawr al Amaya terminal. And they have augmented 

our forces there with cutters, and we are most grateful for that 

augmentation because it would tie up more of our assets to do that. 

We assist the Coast Guard or operate in conjunction with the 

Coast Guard in counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean. Admiral Stavridis asks for ships routinely not only for theater security cooperation in his AO but to help in the counternarcotics mission. We would like to be able to provide more ships to assist in 

that mission, but, as I said in my oral testimony, because of the 

current number of ships we have and the demands by all of the 

Combatant Commanders, we are routinely unable to fill the level 

of commitment that Admiral Stavridis requests. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Is there anything specific that this committee 

could be of assistance with in terms of that gap? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Sir, as has been mentioned many times, 

the minimum number of ships the Navy needs that we believe to 

fulfill the maritime strategy is 313 ships. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I am speaking specifically where Navy meets 

Coast Guard on the small overlap that you have. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. We have a very good relationship with 

the Coast Guard. We have what we call warfighter talks, which are 

really operational discussions between the two services and work 

to best leverage our procurement programs off of each other. The 

Navy provides the combat systems to Coast Guard ships under 

Navy-type, Navy-owned systems. So our combat systems and communications capability are compatible with the Coast Guard. I 

don’t think there is anything specifically that the committee could 

help with in that regard, but I will look at it, and I will provide 

you feedback, sir. 

SHIP DESIGN INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. KINGSTON. I think we would all be willing, and I think that 

would increase the political constituency on the Hill, to help get 

more ships out there. 

Madam Secretary, as the chairman has stated, I am one of the 

committee members and I think all of us are very interested in this 

internship program that you have and I applaud you for that. But 

I am also wondering, beyond procurement, what about design? For 

example, we hear quite often that America has fallen behind in engineers, particularly as compared to China, which, as Mr. Frelinghuysen has mentioned, appears to be ramping up their sea presVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00299 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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ence all over that area. And then there will be other challenges 

from other countries. 

But we hear that India graduates something like 260,000 engineers a year, China 450,000, America about 60,000. But we also 

know the definition of engineers is different country to country. I 

know in New York there is the Webb Institute, and I assume 100 

percent of their graduates go working for the Navy in terms of ship 

designing, but I know that is only about 100 graduates of a class 

a year. I know it is very small. Are you concerned about the number of engineers that we are getting out there in terms of the ability? 

And then, aside from the Webb Institute, what other leading colleges or universities are helpful on this? And does the lack of an 

NROTC program hurt you or help you? In terms of big picture, is 

that a concern that you have? 

Ms. STILLER. No, sir. I would say that we have been actively recruiting to bring engineers into our naval design areas both on the 

ship side as well as the air side. 

As I mentioned in my oral statement, we have atrophied over 

time the number of government workforce people we had in house. 

We are reversing that trend. We are bringing folks in. 

Likewise, the acquisition intern program that I mentioned, we 

have engineering interns as well within our systems commands. In 

fact, I know that the Naval Sea Systems Command is having a job 

fair next week in this area to attract engineers as well as contract 

types and budget folks. And what is interesting, I think, and is attractive to a young engineer is the responsibility and the fun work 

you get to do when you are working in ship design or weapon system design. They are really fun careers to get into. We have had 

really good success in bringing people. 

Mr. KINGSTON. So you don’t think we are losing any design or 

engineering know-how and there are plenty of smart kids that 

want to take that on? 

Ms. STILLER. I would say yes. Although you did mention the 

Webb Institute, which is a wonderful university that provides us 

wonderful engineering talent. Over the years, the number of naval 

architecture degrees that one can get in this country has gone 

down. I believe Michigan is still available, MIT and Webb and the 

Naval Academy. 

Yes, sir, that has been an area, but there are certainly mechanical engineering and electrical engineering across this country that 

can provide us with really talented folks. 

SOLE SOURCE SUPPLIERS

Mr. KINGSTON. I wanted to ask you one other question, Mr. 

Chairman, if I have time. 

Ms. Kaptur had asked about the sub suppliers, and you said 80 

percent of the suppliers of the submarine force are sole source suppliers. Does that worry you in terms of being too reliant on too few 

industries? And, also, it would appear to me that, over time, if I 

know I am a sole source supplier, that my prices aren’t going to 

be very elastic. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. That is an area that we watch very, very 

closely. 


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In the case of submarines, because we got down to such low levels of procurement—and, in fact, we had a hiatus for a few years 

back in the late 1980s and early 1990s when we weren’t buying 

submarines, and we had to watch that industrial base very carefully. We do have to watch to make sure that they are going to be 

available. 

As we ramp up over time, there may be an opportunity to bring 

second sources of supply in; and we will look at that very carefully. 

We have sole source issues as well on the surface side. It is not 

as dramatic because a component across a destroyer may apply to 

an aircraft carrier. So we have to just watch those as well. But we 

carefully manage it. We watch when folks merge. If we have mergers and acquisitions, we look at those very carefully, too, to see 

what that does to us from a competitive perspective. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

SUPPLEMENTAL SCHEDULE

Mr. MURTHA. Most of the members are here. Let me announce 

the schedule for the supplemental. 

We expect to get the details on the supplemental next Thursday. 

We think by May 5th, we hope, we will be on the floor. Of course, 

you can work your way back to full committee on the 30th. 

The Defense Subcommittee hearing with General Petraeus, that 

is on the supplemental. We hope to have it done by Labor Day. 

Whether it will get done, I don’t know. But we are trying. 

Now the main bill we hope to finish July 30th for House consideration. It is about the same schedule as last year. And it is a very 

ambitious schedule, but we stuck to it last year and got it done. 

So it gives you an idea of the work we have got to do. We have 

several hearings. We have had 20 some already. We had several 

hearings before, and we have some major programs where we don’t 

know where they are. We will get some details or something. 

On the base bill, we think we will get the information—May the 

4th, the information on details on the main bill. 

Okay. All right. Mr. Bishop. 

SHIPBUILDING BEST PRACTICES

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and thank 

you for your testimony today. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen and Mr. Kingston referenced the rising 

threats that we have sea-wise from China, India, Russia, and Iran. 

And from what I have been hearing over the past couple of years 

on the subcommittee, our capacity is becoming less robust and 

more sedentary in terms of our capacity to do what needs to be 

done Navy-wise and to have the kinds of ships that we need that 

the Secretary has indicated is necessary. 

With that background, I wonder about our shipbuilding best 

practices. The GAO released a draft report that said that the Navy 

shipbuilding practices, in comparison to the commercial shipbuilding practices, is an interesting comparison in contrast and indicates that when commercial shipbuilders get ready to build a 

ship, the builder and the buyer agree on all aspects of the ship— 


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the price, the schedule, and performance parameters—before the 

contract is signed. 

It also says in this report that before construction begins that the 

shipbuilders complete the key design phases that correspond with 

the three-dimensional product model. It says that key technologies 

are already known and that the final information on the systems 

that are going to be installed are required to allow the design work 

to finish prior to the beginning of construction. 

Mr. BISHOP. And then once construction begins, in the commercial sector, they very seldom allow change orders. Now, we have 

been told that the Navy has learned this lesson, these lessons, over 

and over and over again, yet seem to not have changed your way 

of doing business. Do you envision incorporating these best practices into the Navy shipbuilding program, and when? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. I believe we have incorporated a number 

of those already into our practice. I mentioned in my oral statement we have an acquisition governance process that we have put 

into place over the last year, and that covers beyond shipbuilding. 

But to give you a sense of a shipbuilding program, as the requirements are defined, we have a conversation between the requirements community and the acquisition community on what are 

the cost drivers going to be? What can we see up front that is going 

to drive costs? And then we can have the debate does that requirement need to hold? 

We continue to have those discussions throughout the program’s 

life cycle. Before we decide to release a request for proposal, we are 

going to look at the proposal together and make sure we are asking 

exactly what we want to buy, and that we are promoting competition where we can. 

As for the design piece of it, as you know, a lead ship’s detail, 

design and construction funding is provided in a single year. Advance procurement is provided ahead of time mainly for components. What we have been doing, what we have instituted, and I 

will say, with the exception of LCS, what we have instituted and 

will continue to institute is: until a design is adequately mature, 

we are not going to authorize going into production of the ships. 

I think we are embracing the commercial model there. 

With respect to change orders, there is policy that has been given 

to ship program managers. It was issued originally in 2001 and reiterated in 2006, that tells a program manager there are only five 

categories of change that he can authorize. These are safety; if 

something is not available anymore, obsolescence; if you found 

something in test and trials; there is a contract defect; or there are 

statutory things passed on to him after the contract has been 

awarded. That has been remarkably successful. For example, in 

Virginia Class, we budgeted about 5 percent for the lead submarine, and we spent less than 4 percent in change orders on that 

submarine. 

Mr. BISHOP. Let me just ask you in that regard, you always historically have built in 5 percent for change orders, and that has 

been historic. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. 


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Mr. BISHOP. And last year you said that you were going to institute these procedures to reduce it, but you are still projecting 5 

percent for change orders. 

Ms. STILLER. Well, I would tell you in the follow-up, Virginia, 

right now we are in the 2 percent or lower range. I think that is 

quite remarkable. 

Mr. BISHOP. But you are budgeting for 5 percent. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir, because we have to budget for things like 

obsolete equipment or a safety item, or if something comes up 

statutorily later, like an environmental issue that we have to go 

address, we have to go address that with the change order money. 

It is not unusual. 

I would tell you on the commercial side they do allow change. It 

is small. But for a warship, we need to also keep pace with the 

threat. If there is a requirement change later on or something we 

need to go and enhance, we have to have the ability to do that. 

Mr. BISHOP. I am concerned, as Mr. Kingston is concerned, with 

the capacity. You seem to be comfortable with the fact that we 

have enough engineers, and your internship program is, you think, 

very promising in terms of developing contract people to do the estimates and engineers to do the design. But I am not as comfortable as you are. I am concerned. 

I am very concerned that with the astronomical number of engineers that China and India are developing compared to the United 

States, that our capacity is falling way behind. And unless we double our efforts, accelerate our efforts, we will remain behind, and 

not only in that particular capacity, but also in the best practices, 

because clearly, you know, we have suffered in best practices. And 

the Navy is not getting equipment that it says it needs in a timely 

fashion. And as Ms. Kaptur referenced, our industrial base is slipping. We have got sole-source contracts. And even I am concerned, 

as Mr. Moran discussed it with the Admiral, the fact that we have 

only one maintenance port on the east coast. That is frightening to 

me. I mean, who knows what this new Chinese Navy could do in 

terms of some kind of terrorist attack that could tie up that port? 

So I am very concerned about our capacity to defend ourselves and 

to maintain the mobility of our naval fleet. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Granger. 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

I want to return just a minute to the LCS. And we know where 

the 1 and 2 are. And 3, the contract has been awarded. What do 

you see as the delivery date for 3? And then what are you anticipating for delivery for 4? 

Ms. STILLER. Ma’am, I will get you the exact delivery date in the 

contract. I cannot remember it. They are notionally a 32- to 36- 

month build cycle. 

[The information follows:] 

LCS–3 (Fort Worth) was awarded to Lockheed Martin on March 23, 2009. LCS– 

4 (Coronado) was awarded to General Dynamics on May 1, 2009. Both ships are expected to deliver in FY 2012. 

Ms. GRANGER. Approximately. 


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Ms. STILLER. About 3 years from now is the delivery plan for 

LCS–3. And once we sign the contract for 4, it would be about 36- 

months until delivery. 

Ms. GRANGER. And then on the acquisition strategy that you discussed before that you are in the process of, whether you will down 

select, that will occur as this is going? 

Ms. STILLER. We do not anticipate, for the fiscal year 2009 and 

2010 ships, that we will make a down select. That will be a decision made further out. Right now the way the contract is structured, there are two ships in 2009 and three in 2010. That is what 

we have asked for bids for. Presumably there will be one winner 

that will have three, and the other will have two in those two fiscal 

years. That is the construct we see right now. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Hinchey. 

GENEAL SHIPBUILDING

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much 

for this very interesting conversation. 

With regard to the engineering circumstances here and in other 

countries, my impression was—and maybe this is not the same 

anymore—that the engineering requirements for engineering graduates in terms of education and other qualifications in places like 

China and India were substantially lower than they are here. Do 

you know about that? 

Ms. STILLER. I am not aware of that, sir, but that could be the 

case. 

Mr. HINCHEY. I think that is something that is quite interesting 

in terms of the engineering abilities of graduates here as opposed 

to engineering graduates in some other countries. Nevertheless, it 

is an interesting kind of issue. 

The importance about the work of the construction of military 

vessels, of course, is fundamentally about the national security of 

the country. But also in the context particularly the circumstances 

with which we are dealing with now, it has some impact on the 

economic circumstances, job creation and job maintenance. So I am 

wondering a little bit more, with some more clarity than at least 

what I understood, about the leasing and manufacturing of military 

vessels in other parts of the country. The leasing is now down to 

what, 20 did you say? 

Ms. STILLER. We currently have 26 ships under lease. Of those, 

14 are foreign built. 

Mr. HINCHEY. And that leasing is going to continue to decline? 

Ms. STILLER. That is our goal. We work with Military Sealift 

Command and U.S. Transportation Command to say, what do you 

really need to transport by sea? How much of that has to be on 

leased vessels versus ships that we own? So there is a constant dialogue. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Is there manufacturing of naval vessels that goes 

on currently in other parts of the world? 

Ms. STILLER. Not for U.S. Navy, no, sir. All of our construction 

is done in the U.S. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Okay. Good. 


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The LCS that was just talked about, I understand that Lockheed 

Martin has been having apparently more success in developing 

their element of the contract than other corporations. Is that true? 

Ms. STILLER. I would tell you that in the case of LCS, Lockheed 

Martin delivered the lead ship. They won the first of the two. So 

they are a bit ahead from General Dynamics. I would not tell you 

that they are doing any better or any worse than each other. They 

have totally different designed ships. LCS–2 is just behind LCS– 

1 because it was awarded a year later. 

Mr. HINCHEY. So these are two different vessels that are 

being—— 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. Two different vessels that meet the same 

set of requirements. 

Mr. HINCHEY. What is the difference in the vessels? 

Ms. STILLER. LCS–1 is a monohull steel ship. LCS–2 is a 

trimaran aluminum ship. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Just for comparison, the beam on LCS– 

2 is about 103 feet, 7 inches, or 4 inches. On LCS–1 it is on the 

order of 58 or 60 feet. The displacement of both vessels is relatively 

the same, on the order of 2,900 tons. The crewing for—core crew 

for an LCS is 40 folks, with 15 to run the mission module and 20 

to run the aviation deck. So the crew totals 75. 

Mr. HINCHEY. I am asked what do you mean by displacement? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. It is the amount of water the ship displaces in tons to float. So people equate it to weight. It is not really 

the weight, but it is how much water the ship pushes out to float. 

GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYERS

Mr. HINCHEY. Okay. Thanks very much. 

I just wanted to ask a question about the destroyer issue, DDG– 

51 and the 1000. The more sophisticated destroyer apparently, the 

1000, is something that is in a new element of development now? 

Ms. STILLER. DDG–1000 has been a program of record for about 

10 years now. We did engineering development models for DDG– 

1000 to prove out technology that we felt was high risk. We have 

come through all the testing, with the exception of the volume 

search radar and the testing that is to go on that we will complete 

by the end of this calendar year. We started fabrication. We have 

completed 85 percent of the design for DDG–1000, and started fabrication of the lead ship in February. 

For the differences in the missions, I will defer to Admiral 

McCullough. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. DDG–1000 was designed to operate in 

the littoral. It has a relatively low-radar cross-section and other 

signature-reduction capabilities. It has 80 missile cells in it. And 

we are doing some work to modify the missiles so they can communicate with the ship, and some modifications to the ship so it can 

communicate with the missiles to give it a limited area anti-air 

warfare capability. It has no ballistic missile defense capability as 

currently built. 

The DDG–51s that we will restart, hopefully, have ballistic missile defense capability in stride, so they can shoot the SM–3 missiles that we have demonstrated both against targets, and then last 

summer against an aberrant satellite. It has anti-air warfare capaVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00305 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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bility, it is less stealthy, and it has better open-ocean anti–submarine warfare capability. 

DDG–1000 is a great program. It is performing to schedule and 

cost, and it is going to deliver the capability that we asked for at 

the time we developed the ship. That said, the world has changed. 

We need a different capability set. 

Mr. HINCHEY. No question. 

How many military personnel are normally on the DDG–1000? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. The DDG–1000’s core crew is about 120 

folks. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Thanks very much. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

SHIP ACQUISITION

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, Admiral. Recently I traveled to Washington State 

with Chairman Dicks and had an opportunity to actually get on the 

aircraft carrier USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN as they were commissioning it and celebrating his 200th. Quite an experience. My father is a World War II Navy man, so I have heard of them all my 

life, and I finally set foot on one. It was an awesome experience. 

We also visited I think it was the USS NEW HAMPSHIRE was a 

Trident submarine, and actually saw the weapons, which was also 

something. 

I am concerned, too, as some of the talk has been this morning, 

and thank you for your service and your intelligence on your area 

that you do. If our colleagues could hear some of what you say, 

they would not attack our budget so much, but they do. It is a lack 

of not knowing, really. I know you have quadrennials coming up. 

I understand with our allies, Canada, U.S., Australia, there is a 

quarterly meeting somewhere here in the U.S. this spring. When 

and where is that? 

Ms. STILLER. That meeting is between me and my counterparts 

from those countries to talk about acquisition issues. They are coming in the first week of May, and we are going to talk about general 

acquisition issues. We have been talking about what their plans 

are for buying, when are they buying their submarines and their 

destroyers, and when are we buying ours, to see if we are going to 

put a demand signal out to the worldwide supplier base. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Are those meetings in Washington? 

Ms. STILLER. This particular one will be in Washington, yes, 

ma’am. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And we did have five shipbuilding companies; 

now we have two. Is that a result of our not moving forward as a 

result of our needs? What is that? 

Ms. STILLER. We still have the six shipbuilding sites, but you are 

right, they are owned by two corporations now. And that has been 

over the last 10 years, where we have seen mergers and consolidations across the defense industrial base. But, yes, we do have two 

corporations that own the six sites where the majority of our large 

warships are built. 


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AMPHIBIOUS LIFT REQUIREMENTS

Ms. KILPATRICK. Admiral, with that said, and also this morning 

I understand the brigade requires 38, and we have 33—it is in my 

notes somewhere—I want to say partners on a brigade. I know we 

are operating under the requirement. You must feel it is enough. 

We have less ships than we need. Our adversaries not yet, but 

maybe in this world, Canada—excuse me, not Canada, that is my 

neighbor—China, India, have more engineers. Should we be worried? And you always say you build to the right ends and all that, 

but talk to me for real. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. I think you are talking about amphibious 

lift when you talk about 38 ships. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. That is it. Is it comparable to brigades? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, ma’am. The 38 ships is necessary, 

given an operational availability of about .885, to give us 34 available ships to lift the assault echelon of two Marine Expeditionary 

Brigades. We have taken some risk in that with the agreement to 

build 33 ships—the 11 aviation capable, the 11 LPD and the 11 

LSDs—that give us about 30 operationally available. That means 

that when we look at the assault echelon, some combat service and 

combat service support equipment will be required to be delivered 

in a follow-on echelon, but we think that is acceptable risk. 

The Marine Corps fights as a Marine Expeditionary Force, which 

is three Marine Expeditionary Brigades. So once the invasion commences, you need an additional Marine Expeditionary Brigade as 

a follow-on echelon. But the Commandant of the Marine Corps and 

the Chief of Naval Operations have agreed to the 33 number as an 

acceptable level of risk to conduct a joint forcible entry operation. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. So you have asked your superiors. They have all 

said that that is enough; you all feel that we meet our needs in 

that regard. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Yes, ma’am, that is correct. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rothman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. No, thank you. 

DDG–51 ADVANCE PROCUREMENT

Mr. MURTHA. I just want a couple of points of clarification. On 

the 51, we put $200 million towards advance procurements. Is that 

money obligated, or are you just looking at it, or what are you 

doing? 

Ms. STILLER. Sir, we have obligated a portion of that money, and 

we have plans to obligate the rest of it as we go through the next 

calendar year. We are trying to buy when we need the components. 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Mr. MURTHA. And the LCS, clarify for me what happens here. 

We are going to buy 55 of them at least. That is what you project. 

Do we buy half and half? Do we buy one that is cheaper? What is 

the projection here? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. We are still doing an assessment, Mr. 

Chairman. I mean, just from touring both the ships, I will tell you 


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that LCS–1 will probably launch and recover remotely-operated vehicles better than LCS–2, and that is just from looking at it. The 

aviation capability, due to the beam on LCS–2, will probably be 

looked at more favorably just because of the sheer size of it. And 

so what we really have to do is operate both of the ships, see how 

they perform to see if we—and then look at acquisition cost and life 

cycle costs to see if we should down select the one or we should 

build 27, essentially, of each type. And we will be working through 

that over the next couple years as we get these two ships in the 

water and get them to sea and operate them. 

Mr. MURTHA. I was just out to—and I know this is not your field, 

but we talked earlier about PTSD, and this committee added $900 

million for PTSD. And I was just out to Bethesda, and they have 

a new wing. And they do not have as many casualties that have 

just come in, but they have a lot of people who are coming back 

with that. One was a blinded captain, West Point graduate, who 

was coming back because he had to take the titanium cap off his 

head. Another one had all kinds of pain for 2 years. 

So the money is filtering out finally, as it does, except we have 

made some big decisions. We have been right, for instance, on the 

past sealift ships, roll-on/roll-off ships. I can remember them. The 

Navy fought it because they were Army ships, and the Navy did 

not want to pay for them. And then the Assistant Secretary came 

before the committee and said, and we did this and we did that. 

I said, no, no, wait a minute, hold up here. 

But at any rate, we want to work with you, and the reason it 

is so important we get as many facts as we can. And I know you 

are limited because you do not know exactly what you are going 

to have. This subcommittee has operated in a bipartisan manner, 

as you know, with Bill Young, Jerry Lewis continually. So we continue to hopefully be able to do that. But we need to know from 

you. And I appreciate your testimony. And one of the staff said, we 

built 2,700 Liberty ships in World War II. Well, we are lucky to 

build—what are we going to build this year, 10? If we help you, you 

will build 10, right? 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. I would love to have 10 ships in 10 

months, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

NUCLEAR POWER

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Just one other question. When we talk 

about the nuclear Navy, obviously we are talking about our sub 

fleet, and we are talking about our carriers. You know, there is 

talk of other surface ships being nuclear powered. Could you make 

just a few comments on that? I think this is a legitimate question. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. National Defense Authorization Act of 

2008 directed that surface combatants or ships that function with 

carrier striking groups or striking forces in the Navy be nuclear 

powered unless the Secretary of Defense testified before Congress 

that it was not in the best interests of the country to do so. So as 

we go through the design of the follow-on cruiser, we are looking 

at nuclear power as an alternative for that ship. It adds up-front 

acquisition costs. It gives operational flexibility. 


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I am a surface nuke, and I have served in aircraft carriers and 

in nuclear-powered cruisers when we used to have those. I would 

tell you that from an economic standpoint, it starts to make sense 

when the energy demand on the ship requires an energy density 

that you would see if you had a ship service distribution load of 

about 78 megawatts. And as we go through the requirements for 

cruisers, if you believe you need a very high-sensitivity, large 

phased-array radar, we could see the power requirements pointing 

us in that direction if that is the path that the AOA dictates, sir. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The military is the largest consumer of fuel 

in the world, and I do think it is worthy, if we are taking a look 

at the future, nuclear-powered surface ships. I am glad you are 

doing it. I think it is certainly entirely reasonable. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Thank you very much. 

The Committee adjourns until 10:00 a.m. tomorrow. 

Admiral MCCULLOUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Boyd and the answers thereto follow:] 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) 

Question. I understand that the LCS mine warfare systems being developed are 

overweight. What is the Navy doing to address those problems so that the LCS can 

have this critical capability? Will this require additional funds? 

Response. The LCS Seaframes are required to carry a Mission Package (MP) payload. The minimum Mission Package payload weight that the LCS seaframe must 

accommodate is specified at 180 metric tons (MT) and the maximum objective payload weight is specified at 210MT. This has imposed a maximum limit on 

embarkable MP weight of 180MT, until the ships are deemed capable to carry more. 

This MP weight includes the mission modules, crew detachments, aircraft, ordnance 

and all offboard vehicle fuel. 

As planned, early Mine Countermeasures (MCM) MPs will not have the full complement of Spiral Alpha capability Mission Systems and support equipment but will 

add MCM systems incrementally as they complete development. These Mission 

Packages are within the ship’s payload weight requirements and will not exceed the 

180MT weight limit. 

The Spiral Alpha MCM MPs will have a full complement of mission systems and 

support equipment. Spiral Alpha MCM MPs initially had an estimated weight that 

was 16MT over the weight limit. The LCS Mission Modules program office (PMS 

420) has made significant progress in reducing the weight of the Spiral Alpha MCM 

MP. The excess weight has been reduced to about 5.1MT. Current work is estimated 

to reduce Spiral Alpha MCM MP weight by an additional 7.5MT, bringing the MP 

within the allowable weight limit. The activity to reduce the weight, currently projected for future packages, includes restowing equipment and systems to improve 

the weight efficiency of containers and stowage systems. This also includes investigations of alternate lightweight materials (aluminum and composites) and improved designs with more efficient structure to hold equipment. 

The MCM MP components that provide the mission performance are not required 

to be changed for the purpose of reducing weight, but as prototype and engineering 

development systems are matured for serial production, there may be opportunities 

to achieve further weight reductions. PMS 420 will work with partner mission system providers to maintain a weight saving focus. 

At this time, no additional funds are required. 

Question. Why is every ship in the Navy not equipped with Degaussing capability? 

Response. Ships are equipped with degaussing systems based on policy 

(OPNAVINST S8950.2) and requirements analysis. All surface combatants, except 

the aluminum hull LCS variant, amphibious ships and aircraft carriers have 

degaussing systems. Some non-combatant ships under the responsibility of the Military Sealift Command also have degaussing systems (e.g. T–AKE). 

Question. Is the Navy still committed to the LCS program from a requirements 

standpoint? 


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Response. Yes. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) remains a program of critical importance to Navy, and continues to be monitored closely. LCS fills compelling and 

consistent warfighting capability gaps in littoral mine countermeasures, surface 

warfare, and anti-submarine warfare. The requirement to gain, sustain, and exploit 

littoral maritime superiority to ensure access and enhance the success of future joint 

operations remains unchanged. The 55-ship LCS program is an essential component 

of the long range shipbuilding program and achieving the Navy force structure objective of at least 313 ships. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Boyd. Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the questions thereto follow:] 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) 

Question. The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is envisioned as a 55 ship class 

that will conduct multiple missions in the littorals. When complete, this ship class 

will represent nearly 20 percent of the 313 ship fleet. The ships have been troubled 

since the program’s inception, due to cost growth and technical issues. The contract 

for the third ship was awarded last week to Lockheed Martin. Contract negotiations 

for the fourth ship (which will be built by General Dynamics in Mobile, Alabama) 

are ongoing. 

Secretary Stiller, the Navy has accepted delivery of the first LCS variant built by 

Lockheed Martin, but is still waiting on delivery of the second LCS variant built 

by General Dynamics. What is your estimate of when this ship will complete sea 

trials and be delivered to the Navy? What has been the biggest cause of delay for 

this ship? 

Response. INDEPENDENCE is 88% complete and is expected to deliver in 2009, 

with Builder’s Trials and Acceptance Trials to complete prior to ship delivery. 

Root causes for continued schedule extensions and cost growth are varied. Some 

are well publicized, with little room for recovery and continue to impact the program: 

• Unrealistic Estimates for Material and Labor 

• Concurrency of Design and Construction 

• Naval Vessel Rules 

• Inadequate Production Plan at the Start of Construction 

• Insufficient Modular Construction and Pre-outfitting 

• Delays to First Article Testing with Subcontractors 

Other root causes were correctable and action plans were developed and executed 

to stem the negative program impacts: 

• Under-staffed Government Program Management/Supervisor of Shipbuilding 

• Slow Recognition of Cost and Schedule Growth 

• Over-emphasis on Schedule 

• Compounded by a lack of Advanced Procurement 

In response, the Navy and Industry team have bolstered the waterfront organizations with key and experienced shipbuilders and developed leading performance indicators that highlight problem areas. Through daily assessments, weekly analysis 

of key metrics on production and test progress, and monthly progress and cost reviews, the Navy and Industry team managers identify variances quickly and ensure 

that corrective actions are implemented and effective. Cost and schedule performance has improved. 

In this latter stage of ship production and testing of a new design, root causes 

tend to lie in technical problems encountered on a daily basis and in this case are 

compounded by immature shipbuilder processes to solve the issues in support of 

scheduled work activity. Delays associated with technical issues, combined with the 

low levels of pre-outfitting at the module stage prior to launch, drive rework, outof-sequence work, and inefficiency. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, the Committee understands that the Navy has awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin for construction of the third LCS. When do you 

anticipate the Navy will award the contract to General Dynamics for the fourth 

LCS? 

Response. General Dynamics—Bath Iron Works (BTW) was awarded a contract on 

May 1, 2009, for LCS FY09 Flight 0+ ship construction, class design services, configuration management services, additional crew and shore support, special studies 

and post delivery support. This award represents Phase I of a competitive twophased acquisition approach to procure FY09/FY10 LCS, with Phase II including potential award of up to three (3) additional LCS Flight 0+ Class ships. 


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Question. Secretary Stiller, the LCS program will be subject to a $460 million cost 

cap starting in fiscal year 2010. Do you envision being able to award the fiscal year 

2010 ships at a value that will meet the requirements of the cost cap or will the 

Navy have to ask for some relief? 

Response. Navy is actively engaged with industry to implement cost reductions with the intent to procure the FY10 ships within the $460M cost cap. Legislative 

relief may be required regarding the LCS cost-cap until manufacturing efficiencies 

can be achieved. 

The Navy has formalized a LCS program affordability and cost reduction effort. 

This effort primarily targets cost drivers in shipbuilder design, Navy specifications, 

and program management costs. Cost reduction opportunities that have potential to 

impact Warfighting requirements are evaluated by OPNAV. 

Question. Admiral McCullough, do you envision the Navy down selecting to a single variant of LCS or do you believe both variants will continue to be constructed 

to fill out the ship class? When will an acquisition strategy be finalized? 

Response. A draft acquisition strategy for FY 2011 and out-year ships is under 

review within the Department of the Navy. It is anticipated that starting in FY 

2011, the Navy will lay the foundation for a bridge to Multi-Year Procurement 

(MYP) of LCSs by exploring a block buy or a contract with options to leverage economic ordering and provide stability for shipyard workload and planning. The strategy will address methods to utilize competition to improve affordability through efficient production rates, facilities and process improvements, advanced procurement 

to take advantage of Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) buys, system commonality, 

and an evaluation of Government versus Contractor furnished material in the combat systems and communication suites and decision points for potential capability 

upgrades. This draft strategy will be briefed to the new USD (AT&L) for review and 

approval. 

The updated acquisition strategy will also incorporate the results of operational 

test and evaluation, Fleet feedback on ship performance and shipbuilder cost performance. The Navy intends to proceed with both variants of the LCS for now and 

plans to use competition as a tool to drive costs lower. During this period, the Navy 

is investigating commonality opportunities. If the Navy decides to select only one 

sea frame for Flight 1 construction, it will continue to use competition to obtain best 

pricing. 

DDG–1000 GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER

Question. Last year, the DDG–1000 Zumwalt Class guided missile destroyer finalized contracts for the two lead ships of the class. The two shipyards that will construct the ships are Bath Iron Works in Maine (General Dynamics) and Ingalls 

Shipbuilding in Mississippi (Northrop Grumman). The contracts were awarded with 

55 percent of the final design complete. Approval was recently granted to Bath Iron 

Works to begin fabrication of the first ship. 

Secretary Stiller, although the Navy has signed the construction contracts for the 

first two ships of the DDG–1000 class, in reality those contracts only account for 

about half the cost of the ship. The remainder will be consumed by government furnished equipment which depends largely on the development of several new technologies that will be introduced on the DDG–100 platform. Are you comfortable that 

the development of these technologies is sufficiently mature; that they will not hold 

up construction or contribute to cost growth? 

Response. Yes. Maturity of the key DDG–1000 developmental systems began in 

the Technology Demonstration Phase with the successful development and test of 

ten Engineering Development Models. Subsequent to a program level Critical Design Review in September 2005, a Milestone B Technology Readiness Assessment 

(TRA) was conducted by an independent panel chaired by the Chief of Naval Research (CNR). A subsequent TRA review is conducted annually, and after each software release. 

The DDG–1000 Zumwalt Class Destroyer Total Ship System (TSS) Production 

Readiness Review (PRR) was successfully conducted on October 28, 2008. As a lead 

up to the review, all of individual systems went through production readiness reviews and the TSS PRR assessed the collective production readiness of the entire 

system to proceed into production. The results of the review were documented in 

a Report to Congress. 

All technologies will achieve the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of 6 (system 

demonstration in a relevant environment) or better by ship installation. The Total 

Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) will achieve TRL 6 upon completion of the 

Software Release 5 System Acceptance Test and Software Certification Panel in 

FY10. 


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Question. Secretary Stiller, how confident are you in the ability of the DDG–1000 

contractors to deliver these two new lead ships for the contracted price when fabrication of the first ship began before the final design was compete? How much of 

the design is now complete? 

Response. The detail design of the ship was, in fact, more complete than any previous surface combatant built to date. Before any construction zone on the ship 

starts production, the detail design for that particular zone is fully completed. At 

the start of construction in February 2009, over 80% of the detail design was complete. Over 85% of the detail design is now complete. 2D extracted drawings (shop 

floor production drawings) have been issued for 20% of the ship. 

Contractor cost and schedule performance for the DDG–1000 program, as measured by the Earned Value Management System (EVMS) are very good high performance indices, low variances, and stable trends on all contracts. Contracts are currently executing near target for both cost and schedule. Following a successful Total 

Ship System Production Readiness Review was conducted October 2008, SECNAV 

submitted a report to Congress certifying readiness to start production in February 

2009. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, when do you expect fabrication of the second ship to 

begin? 

Response. DDG–1001 was anticipated to start fabrication at Northrop Grumman 

Shipbuilding (NGSB) during Fall 2009. A new start fab date will be determined during contract negotiations between General Dynamics Bath Iron Works (BIW) and 

NGSB for the proposed workload swap of DDG–1000 and DDG–51 construction. The 

plan aligns construction responsibilities for FY09 and prior DDG–1000 Class ships 

and selected DDG–51 Class ships between BIW and NGSB through the order of the 

next three planned DDG–51s to ensure shipyard workload stability at both yards, 

leverage learning, stabilize and minimize cost risk for the DDG–1000 program, efficiently re-start DDG–51 construction, facilitate performance improvement opportunities at both shipyards, and maintain two sources of supply for future Navy surface 

combatant shipbuilding programs. 

This plan is in keeping with Secretary Gates’ statement during April 6, 2009 

press conference where he stated that the Department’s FY10 plans depend on 

being able to work out contracts to allow the Navy to efficiently build all three 

DDG–1000 class ships at BIW in Maine and to smoothly restart the DDG–51 class 

construction at NGSB Ingalls shipyard in Mississippi. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, what is the status of the third DDG–1000? Has the 

Navy started contract negotiations? When do you expect the contract for construction of the third ship to award? 

Response. DDG–1002 has been partially funded by Congress and the balance of 

funding was requested in the President’s FY10 budget. The Navy, with General Dynamics Bath Iron Works (BIW), and NGSB have reached an agreement for workload 

swap of DDG–1000 and DDG–51 construction. DDG–1001 was anticipated to start 

fabrication at Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB) during Fall 2009. A new 

start fab date will be determined during contract negotiations. Similarly, the contract award for DDG–1002 is part of those ongoing negotiations. 

The plan aligns construction responsibilities for FY09 and prior DDG–1000 Class 

ships and selected DDG–51 Class ships between BIW and NGSB through the order 

of the next three planned DDG–51s in order to ensure shipyard workload stability 

at both yards, leverage learning, stabilize and minimize cost risk for the DDG–1000 

program, efficiently re-start DDG–51 construction, facilitate performance improvement opportunities at both shipyards, and maintain two sources of supply for future 

Navy surface combatant shipbuilding programs. 

This plan is in keeping with Secretary Gates’ statement during April 6, 2009 

press conference where he stated that the Department’s FY10 plans depend on 

being able to work out contracts to allow the Navy to efficiently build all three 

DDG–1000 class ships at BIW in Maine and to smoothly restart the DDG–51 class 

construction at NGSB Ingalls shipyard in Mississippi. 

Question. The number of required DDG–1000 ships has recently fluctuated between two, three, and seven. How many DDG–1000 ships is the Navy planning to 

buy? 

Response. Navy is building three DDG–1000 ships. The first two ships were appropriated in FY 2007, and split funded in FY 2007 and FY 2008. The third ship 

was appropriated in FY 2009. The FY 2010 President’s Budget Submittal requests 

the second installment of split funding for the balance of the third DDG–1000. 

Question. With all of the money invested in development of the technologies for 

the DDG–1000 program, it seems wasteful to not construct more than three ships 

of the class. Can the DDG–1000 technologies be used on other platforms? 


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Response. DDG–1000 technologies can be used on other platforms. The 10 critical 

technology advancements associated with DDG–1000 are: • Infrared Mockups (IR) • Integrated Deckhouse and Apertures (IDHA) • Dual Band Radar (DBR) • Integrated Power System (IPS) • Autonomic Fire Suppression System (AFSS) • Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) • Advanced Gun System (AGS) 

• Peripheral Vertical Launch System (PVLS)/Advanced VLS 

• Integrated Undersea Warfare (IUSW) 

• Hull Form Scale Model 

Eight of the ten critical technologies listed above could have application to future 

combatants. The AGS is being considered in the Joint Fires Analysis of Alternatives. 

The DBR will be installed in CVN 78. 

In addition, technologies such as AFSS and TSCE will have utility for incorporation in future surface ship and carrier designs. Navy has learned a great deal from 

DDG–1000 research and development and will continue to insert proven technologies in future ship designs wherever appropriate. 

DDG–51 DESTROYER PROGRAM

Question. The Navy is completing construction of the initial 62 ships in the DDG– 

51 program. Last year, the Committee provided $200 million to the Navy to re-start 

the DDG–51 production line and continue DDG–51 procurement. 

Secretary Stiller, what is the status of the DDG–51 funding that the Committee 

provided to the Navy last year to assist in re-starting the DDG–51 production line? 

Response. Congress appropriated $200M of FY09 Advanced Procurement (AP) 

funding to preserve the option to restart the DDG–51 class program. The Navy has 

obligated $10.9M of FY09 AP, and plans to obligate the remaining $188.7M in June 

2009. In addition, the Navy plans to reprogram an additional $128.6M in AP to procure long lead items including Main Reduction Gears and Class Standard Equipment. 

To date, for the DDG–51 re-start, the Navy has obligated $10.9M for the following: 

• $5.0M for shipbuilder Advance Planning 

• $1.6M for Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) (OE–120A Antenna) 

• $3.3M for Exterior Communications High Frequency Radio Group 

(EXCOMM HFRG) 

• $1.0M for TOMAHAWK 

Question. Secretary Stiller, since the Committe provided the initial funding for 

continuing DDG–51 production, do you have a good estimate for the total cost of 

re-starting DDG–51 production? 

Response. The cost to restart DDG–51 production includes increases in basic construction and Government Furnished Equipment. The basic construction restart 

costs include the loss of learning associated with a production gap, and cost for new 

suppliers associated with purchase specification material primarily driven by Main 

Reduction Gear. The GFE restart costs include production start up, obsolescence, 

and vendor requalification’s. The table below summaries the production restart 

issues associated with basic construction and GFE vendors. 

Production restart Vendor Issue 

Shipbuilder (Purchase Specification Material) ... Various ......................... New suppliers, production line restart. 

Main Reduction Gears ......................................... Philadelphia Gear ........ Production line restart. 

AEGIS Fire Control System Director/Controller 

(MK 82/MK200).

General Dynamics ........ Production line restart. 

MK 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) ................. Lockheed Martin ........... Restart of production line for mechanical 

equipment. 

MK 45 Gun Weapon System ................................ BAE Systems & McNally 

Industries.

Restart production line for weathershields, 

loader drums, and ammunition hoists. 

Surface Bessel Torpedo Tubes (SVTT) ................ BAE Systems ................ Restart production line. 

SPS–67 Surface Search Radar System .............. DRS & EDO/AIL ............ Production line restart and new contracts required for below deck equipment and antennas. 


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Production restart Vendor Issue 

Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System 

(TTWCS).

Lockheed Martin ........... Production line closed. Requires new competitive award. 

The costs to restart DDG–51 production will be determined upon the conclusion 

of negotiations for a detail design and construction contract for DDG–113 and fellow 

ships. The completion of those negotiations is subject to negotiations that would 

shift DDG workload between General Dynamics—Bath Iron Works (BIW) and Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB). 

This plan is in keeping with Secretary Gates’ statement during April 6, 2009 

press conference where he stated that the Department’s FY 2010 plans depend on 

being able to work out contracts to allow Navy to efficiently build all three DDG– 

1000 class ships at BIW in Maine and to smoothly restart the DDG–51 class construction at NGSB Ingalls shipyard in Mississippi. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, what is your estimate for how much the next DDG– 

51 ship would cost, considering the fact that there has been a break in production? 

Response. The total estimate for the next DDG (DDG–113) is $2.24 billion and 

is reflected in the FY 2010 President’s Budget. This estimate includes associated 

production and start up costs, and reflects Navy transfer/reprogramming of $129 

million SCN, currently in process. 

Question. Admiral McCullough, has the Navy finalized its strategy for how many 

‘‘cookie cutter’’ DDG–51s it plans to procure? Is the Navy planning on moving to upgraded DDG–51 ships once the production line becomes active again? What type of 

upgrades will be placed on the ships? 

Response. The DDG–51 class of destroyer has been built with the incorporation 

of improvements into the design of the class that have resulted in three different 

groups or ‘‘Flights’’ within the class. These groups are Flight I, Flight II, and Flight 

IIA. The Flight IIA ships incorporate a helicopter hangar, for example, while the 

previous flights do not. The FY10 budget request includes the restart of the DDG– 

51 class with the procurement of one ship. With the re-start of the DDG–51 production line, greater commonality with the last ships produced will reduce redesign 

costs and aid in mitigating re-start costs. Currently, upgrades are only being considered to enhance Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) and Anti-Submarine 

Warfare. 

FUTURE SURFACE COMBATANT

Question. In the wake of last year’s announcement by the Navy to curtail the 

DDG–1000 procurement at three ships and restart DDG–51 production, the media 

has reported that a ship called the ‘‘future surface combatant’’ has entered the Navy 

budget. There has been little definition regarding this program. 

Secretary Stiller, the media has reported the Navy is considering funding a platform called the ‘‘future surface combatant’’ in future years. Can you briefly explain 

the concept behind this ship? 

Response. The Navy is building three DDG–1000’s and the FY 2010 President’s 

budget request includes the re-start of the DDG–51 class with the procurement of 

one ship in FY10. The Navy plans to continue to modernize and build guided missile 

destroyers with the best available Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capability. The technologies that are in the DDG–1000 and the DDG–51 classes will help 

us inform and better approach future combatant designs. The Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review will drive the Future Years Defense Program 

and the Annual Long-range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels which are currently pre-decisional and planned to be discussed upon release of PB11. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, do you envision this platform as a hybrid between the 

DDG–1000 and DDG–51 programs? 

Response. The Navy is planning on building more guided missile destroyers that 

will be capable of supporting the best available Integrated Air and Missile Defense 

(IAMD) and ASW capabilities. The Navy is considering options to equip DDG–51 

ships with advanced radar with increased capability against advanced air and ballistic missile threats. Concepts under consideration include changes to the DDG–51’s 

engineering plant and hull required to support this advanced radar. The Navy is 

also considering how to leverage technology inherent in DDG–1000. The technologies that are in the DDG–1000 and improvements to the DDG–51 class will help 

us inform and better approach future combatant designs. The Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review will drive the Navy Future Years Defense Plan 


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and the Annual Long-range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels which is being 

developed now for submission with the President’s FY11 Budget Submission. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, what is the basis of cost for the future surface combatant? 

Response. In April 2009, the Navy announced that it arrived at a plan that most 

affordably meets the requirements for Navy surface combatants, commences the 

transition to improved missile defense capability in new construction, and provides 

significant stability for the industrial base. 

The basis of cost for the future surface combatant has not yet been determined, 

pending a decision on the capabilities that will be added to future guided missile 

destroyers for improved Integrated Air and Missile Defense. 

USD AT&L directed a baseline study that will compare capabilities, cost and technical feasibility of a range of radar systems for DDGs. This study will be completed 

in time to inform the President’s Budget for 2011. 

Question. Admiral McCullough, what requirement is the future surface combatant 

expected to fill? 

Response. When the Navy submitted the plan to truncate DDG–1000 at three 

ships and re-start the DDG–51 line to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we 

called all the ships in the re-start profile DDG–51s. The plan was to restart the 

DDG 51 line in FY 2010, and study what future capability to put in the ships from 

FY 2012 and out before we made a decision on what those ships were going to be. 

The re-start of the DDG–51 line will fill increasing Combatant Commander demand for Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capability and capacity. Navy 

plans to continue to modernize and build guided missile destroyers with the best 

available IAMD capability to incrementally fill the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council (JROC) approved IAMD capability gaps identified in the Maritime Air and 

Missile Defense of the Joint Force (MAMDJF) Initial Capability Document (ICD). 

The plan includes the introduction of advanced radar which will have increased capability over the current SPY–1 radar. This will enable Navy to better address 

IAMD capability gaps well into the 21st Century. 

SURFACE COMBATANT OPEN ARCHITECTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Question. The combat system of the Virginia Class submarine has been extremely 

successful in that it is built on open architecture concepts that can be quickly upgraded to take advantage of technology advancement as the ship ages. The Navy 

calls this concept ‘‘Acoustic Rapid COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf) Insertion 

(ARCI)’’. This philosophy has several advantages including cost, capability, and ease 

of modernizing. 

Secretary Stiller, the combat system of the Virginia Class submarine program has 

been successful largely due to the concept of Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion. Does 

the Navy have a similar open architecture concept for the combat systems on surface combatants? 

Response. The Surface Navy does have an open architecture strategy similar to 

the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI). The Surface Navy is modernizing the 

in-service Fleet while developing the componentized combat system through incorporation of Advanced Capability Builds (ACB)/Technology Insertion (TI). Similar to the 

submarine ARCI approach, the Surface Navy modernization efforts uses commercial 

computer hardware refreshed on a defined TI cycle while the ACB software upgrade 

introduces maintenance updates and new war fighting capability improvements to 

pace the threat. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Report 110–77 of 

June 5, 2007, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Page 272–273 

requires quarterly reporting of the Navy’s approach to developing open architecture 

concepts for surface combat systems. The sixth report was signed and provided to 

the appropriate Senate offices on May 11, 2009. 

The Navy accomplished two significant Open Architecture milestones: the fielding 

of the Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) OA with USS NIMITZ (CVN 68) in October 

2008 and the modernization of an Aegis combat system on USS BUNKER HILL (CG 

52), in February 2009. The NIMITZ’s installation extends openness by implementing 

an open-standard middleware, and adds Information Assurance controls. After a 

successful electronics light-off in October 2008, NIMITZ completed Combat Systems 

Ships Qualification Trials (CSSQT) in February 2009. SSDS MK2 fulfills combat 

management functions across multiple ship types with existing combat system elements while providing added flexibility to accommodate future changes through a 

modular design approach. The BUNKER HILL achieved successful combat systems 

light-off with a decoupled (hardware from software) Combat Management System 

(CMS) and is currently conducting its CSSQT. 


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The Surface Navy will continue to modularize and componentize its combat systems software as it transitions to an objective architecture-based combat system 

with a government-defined architecture and government validated interfaces. The 

ACB process allows capability development to proceed without impacting ship 

schedules until the capability is sufficiently mature for transition to Fleet use in a 

methodical integration, test, certification, and fielding approach. The plan is to install ACB software builds every two years and hardware TIs every four years. By 

2016, all 22 CGs will modernized using OA principles and 62 DDGs will modernized 

by 2025. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, the Navy’s largest surface combatant ship class today 

is the DDG–51 class which is currently operating the AEGIS combat system which 

is proprietary to the contractor. Does the Navy plan on backfitting the DDG–51 

class with a non-proprietary open architecture combat system? 

Response. Aegis Advanced Capability Build FY12 (ACB–12) and Technology Insertion FY12 (TI–12) will be executed as part of the Aegis Modernization program and 

initially targets the oldest DDG–51 Class ships with modernization availabilities beginning in FY12. ACB–12/TI–12 is the first step in providing the entire DDG–51 

Class with a non-proprietary open architecture combat system. In addition, ACB– 

12 will be introduced on DDG–113 in forward fit to ensure all backfit and new construction ships are aligned. 

ACB–12/TI–12 will provide enhanced warfighting improvements including Air Defense and Undersea Warfare (USW) capabilities. Significant capabilities include the 

integration of Naval Integrated Fire Control—Counter Air (WC–CA), Standard Missile-6 (SM–6), AN/SQQ89A(V)15 USW Suite, Joint Track Management (JTM) Alignment, Common Display System (CDS), Common Processor System (CPS), Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and the Multi-Mission Signal Processor (MMSP). In addition, the open architecture AN/SQQ–89A(V)15 Under Sea Warfare (USW) Suite is 

already being installed on the DDG–51 Flight IIA ships. 

Follow-on ACBs, starting with ACB–14, will be developed on a two-year cycle and 

TIs on a four-year cycle. These follow-on ACBs will provide additional warfighting 

capability and enable us to achieve a fully non-proprietary open architecture combat 

system for the DDG–51 Class. By 2025, all 62 DDG–51 class will be modernized 

using OA principles. 

NEXT GENERATION CRUISER

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act contained a provision that requires all new ship classes of submarines, aircraft carriers and cruisers be nuclear 

powered. The first opportunity to apply this direction will be on the next generation 

cruiser program, currently designated CG(X). The outyear budget submitted with 

the fiscal year 2029 request showed the first ship of the CG(X) class will be procured 

in fiscal year 2011, however since no nuclear components for that ship have been 

procured and the design effort is very immature, it is highly unlikely that this ship 

will begin procurement in fiscal year 2011. 

Admiral McCullough, in your opinion, when will the next generation cruiser, the 

CG(X), begin procurement? 

Response. Secretary Gates announced on 06 April 2009 that ‘‘we will delay the 

Navy CG(X) Next Generation Cruiser program to revisit both the requirements and 

acquisition strategy.’’ The results of the Navy’s Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for 

the Maritime Air and Missile Defense of Joint Forces (MAMDJF) capability are currently within the Navy staffing process. 

Question. Admiral McCullough, I am sure you are aware of the Authorization language directing nuclear propulsion for future ships. As a nuclear trained officer, 

what are the advantages and disadvantages of using nuclear propulsion for the 

CG(X) class of ships? 

Response. The advantages and disadvantages of nuclear power are discussed in 

the Report to Congress on Alternative Propulsion Methods for Surface Combatants 

and Amphibious Warfare Ships. 

Nuclear propulsion offers both operational advantages and cost advantages for the 

surface combatants. As noted in the Report to Congress, nuclear propulsion provides 

the ability to operate at high power for sustained periods of time which would provide better surge to theater and time on station compared to its fossil fueled counterparts. In addition, nuclear propulsion may reduce ship vulnerability because of 

its markedly reduced tether to the logistics chain as well as its ability to conduct 

high speed maneuvers without regard for propulsion fuel capacities. For the Ballistic Missile Defense mission, nuclear propulsion provides sufficient energy to maintain high power radar demands for extended periods of time. 


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The main disadvantage of nuclear propulsion is acquisition and disposal costs are 

higher than fossil fuel variants. The higher acquisition cost is due to the need to 

procure the nuclear reactor core upfront which provides the energy requirements for 

the 35 year life of the ship. This cost, known as the nuclear premium, is mitigated 

when compared to fossil fuel variants when life cycle costs, such as expected increases in fossil fuel costs, are realized over the life of the ship and the class. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, if the Navy makes the decision to utilize nuclear propulsion for this ship class, when is the earliest that the ship could be procured? 

Response. If CG(X) is determined to be nuclear powered, the Navy plans to leverage the CVN–78 Propulsion Plant design for a nuclear version of CG(X) due to the 

investment and resulting capabilities and maturity of that propulsion plant. Funding would be needed approximately 4 years prior to ship construction to support 

long-lead time reactor components and minor redesign. The Air and Missile Defense 

Radar (AMDR) development schedule and technology maturation directly impacts 

the ship design and procurement schedules. Historically, a new radar design requires 8–9 years, and a ship design (with leveraging of major components such as 

the propulsion plant) requires 5–7 years. Current acquisition requirements indicate 

critical technologies must achieve a technology readiness level (TRL) of 6 (System/ 

subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant environment) prior to 

procurement (i.e., MS–B). The AMDR TRL level is approx level 4/5 and would require approximately 6–7 years to support ship procurement. Ship design efforts supporting ship procurement should mature sufficiently within the radar maturity 

schedule. 

Question. Admiral McCullough, the Navy has operated nuclear powered cruisers 

in the past. Can you explain the difference, if any, in the concept of operations between these previous nuclear powered cruisers and the future cruisers? 

Response. The concept of operations for CG(X) is under development and will not 

be completed until after a Navy preferred alternative is decided. That said, Navy 

surface combatants, past and present, nuclear or conventional, are multi-mission 

platforms that can operate with a Carrier Strike Group, Surface Action Group, Amphibious Ready Group, or independently. From a warfighting aspect, if CG(X) is nuclear powered, I anticipate that the primary difference in its operating concept compared to past nuclear cruisers will be based on its advanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense Capability. 

Over 40 years of experience and operations, in addition to major technological advances, have improved performance and reduced life cycle and acquisition costs of 

naval nuclear propulsion plants. Compared to the earlier classes of nuclear surface 

combatants, a modern nuclear cruiser would have more power, fewer people, and 

require less maintenance. 

CVN–78 AIRCRAFT CARRIER

The newest aircraft carrier will implement several new technologies (launching 

system, enhanced flight deck, ordnance handling systems, etc.) and have a brand 

new nuclear propulsion plant. With the ship just having started construction and 

already bumping up against the cost cap imposed by the Armed Services Committee, 

it is highly likely that this ship will experience some sort of cost growth. 

Secretary Stiller, the Committee understands that the Electromagnetic Aircraft 

Launching System (EMALS) contract is overrunning and initial estimates show 

$250 million growth from the fiscal year 2008 estimate. This is more than double 

the cost of $225 million used as the original estimate for this system. What is the 

current status of the EMALS program and do you concur with the magnitude of this 

cost increase? What impact will this growth have on the EMALS schedule with respect to delivery of the system to the carrier for installation? 

Response. EMALS is currently in the System Design and Development (SDD) and 

procurement of long lead time shipset production components has begun. The SDD 

phase currently extends through 4th qtr FY11. Near term events such as successful 

completion of High Cycle Test (HCT) Phase I, positive progress on High Cycle Test 

(HCT) Phase II and Highly Accelerated Life Testing (HALT), as well as start of commissioning testing for System Functional Demonstration (SFD), are expected to validate the system design and enable smooth transition into production. Production 

Readiness Reviews (PRRs) are being conducted in 3rd qtr FY09 to support release 

of EMALS subsystem components for production. Baseline drawing packages are 

projected to complete by end of FY09. 

As with any developmental system, the initial test and integration of the EMALS 

technology had some schedule and cost risk. Delays that resulted in concurrency in 

SDD and production have resulted in additional risk. Through a very detailed review process, the Navy has identified the EMALS technical, cost and schedule risks, 


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developed mitigation strategies, and is executing the approved program baseline. 

The Navy has, however requested budget adjustments through the PB 10 development process to further mitigate risk. Further actions will likely be needed in the 

outyears to ensure this program provides the needed capability consistent with the 

ship’s construction schedule. The results of upcoming testing will be used to determine the final shipset production costs. The current EMALS SDD and production 

planning efforts support the scheduled delivery date for CVN–78. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, at what point does the Navy need to decide to continue with the EMALS effort or revert to a steam catapult system for the CVN– 

78 program? How likely is it that the Navy will walk away from EMALS and return 

to a steam catapult for CVN–78? What will the cost be to incorporate the use of 

a steam catapult into the design of the ship? 

Response. Senior Navy leadership recently concluded a detailed assessment of the 

viability of both EMALS and steam catapults on the CVN–78 Class and determined 

that EMALS would continue as the CVN–78 Class aircraft launching system. The 

current EMALS System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase and production schedules continue to support the CVN–78 construction schedule; however, due 

to the overlap of system level testing and shipset production hardware procurement 

decision, cost and schedule risks exist. The management focus, review processes and 

oversight that the Navy has employed continue to mitigate these risks. While steam 

catapults were deemed at the conclusion of the assessment to be a technically viable 

alternative to EMALS, reverting to steam would have incurred a 12–18 month delay 

in CVN–78 ship delivery, along with associated costs for redesign and delay. Any 

decision made now or in the future to revert to steam would significantly increase 

the cost and schedule impact to CVN–78 ship design and construction. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, is the CVN–78 program experiencing problems with 

any of the other new technologies being introduced on this ship? 

Response. The development of key CVN–78 technologies continues to progress at 

a rate consistent with that needed to support the ship construction schedule. The 

Major critical technologies/capabilities maturing for integration into lead ship include: Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), Advanced Arresting Gear 

(AAG), Dual Band Radar (DBR), Joint Precision Aircraft Landing System (JPALS), 

Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) P3I Data link, Improved Survivability, Enhanced Flight Deck, and Improved Weapon and Material Handling. To provide additional technical oversight in this area, OSD established a CVN 21 Program Critical 

Technologies Integrated Product Team (IPT) that monitors the maturation of those 

new technologies identified as critical to the successful execution of the program. In 

April 2007, this IPT completed a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) Assessment 

that validated the maturation plans of each critical technology. Since that time, all 

critical developmental systems, with the exception of the AAG, ESSM P3I Data link, 

and DBR, have achieved TRL 6 maturity, in that a system model or prototype has 

been demonstrated in a relevant environment. Each of the remaining four technologies is being tracked by the IPT and is projected to be on track to accomplish 

the testing requirement to achieve TRL 6 by FY 2011, well in advance of their construction need dates. The IPT is chartered to meet semi-annually until all critical 

technologies have achieved this readiness level. Additionally, ship construction efforts have started well with activities being on or ahead of schedule. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, with the budget for the new aircraft carrier already 

bumping up against the cost cap, and with the trouble the Navy has historically had 

in estimating ship costs (especially lead ship costs), how confident are you that the 

new carrier will deliver within the cost cap? 

Response. The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2010 reflects an end cost of 

$10,846M for CVN–78 which is $581M below the congressionally mandated cost cap 

for CVN–78. As the lead ship of the next carrier class ships, there are inherent cost 

risks to the program. However, the program is executing to the approved acquisition 

program baseline. The Navy is employing considerable management attention and 

oversight to ensure the new carrier performs within the budget allocations and congressional cost cap. The Navy will continue to track program cost relative to the cost 

cap and adhere to the reporting requirement as outlined in Section 122 of the 2007 

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). 

VIRGINIA CLASS SUBMARINE PROGRAM

Question. Last year, the Navy signed a multi-year procurement contract for the 

procurement of eight submarines over the time period from fiscal year 2009 through 

fiscal year 2013. The Navy is set to begin procurement of two Virginia Class submarines per year in fiscal year 2011. The Committee was instrumental in the Navy 

accelerating the two ships per year procurement as a result of adding advance proVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00318 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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curement funding above the budget request for the program in the fiscal year 2008 

bill. 

Secretary Stiller, is the Virginia class submarine program ready to move to the 

procurement of two submarines per year beginning in fiscal year 2011? 

Response. Yes. The Navy and the shipbuilders have been planning to increase 

production to two submarines per year starting in fiscal year 2011. Therefore, most 

of the infrastructure is already in place to support two per year production. Furthermore, the Block II and Block III multi-year procurement contracts allowed shipbuilders to level workload and procure material in Economic Order Quantity, providing stability to the shipbuilding industrial base and supporting the transition to 

an increased production rate. In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2009 provided the Navy with the authority and funding ($79 million) 

for advance procurement and construction activities to provide a more efficient 

ramp-up to two submarines per year. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, are both contractors positioned to ramp up production 

efforts to the point that two submarines per year can be built without impacting 

delivery schedules? 

Response. Yes, both shipyards are positioned to ramp up production to build two 

submarines per year without adversely impacting delivery schedules. The Block III 

contract includes an incentive for investment in construction facilities and fixtures 

required at the shipbuilders in support of two per year production similar to the incentive, known as CAPEX, in the Block II contract. Additionally, the shipbuilders 

have put together comprehensive hiring and manning plans to ensure that they 

have enough qualified tradespeople and engineers to support the production increase. 

As a result of these efforts and the continued push to reduce overall cost and 

schedule, both shipyards are meeting and exceeding delivery schedule goals. Block 

II ships are currently projected to deliver 7 to 12 months ahead of contract delivery 

dates, and the shipbuilders are targeting a 60-month build span for Block III 

ships—better than the contracted 66-month build span. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, the cost goal of the Navy prior to moving to two submarines per year was $2 billion each (expressed in fiscal year 2005 dollars). Now 

that you have achieved this goal, is the program continuing with cost reduction 

measures? 

Response. Yes. The Navy achieved the CNO goal for reducing procurement cost 

through a combination of multi-year procurement contracts, construction performance, and design for cost reduction. These strategies will continue to be used in the 

future to reduce ship procurement costs, and the Navy will apply these same principles to reduce the lifecycle cost of VIRGINIA Class, through Reduction of Total 

Ownership Cost (RTOC). Reduction in Total Ownership Cost will expand the Design 

for Cost Reduction methodology by including construction, operation & support 

(O&S) and other lifecycle costs. 

LPD–17 AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORT DOCK

Question. To reach a fleet size of 313 ships, ten LPD–17 San Antonio Class amphibious transport dock ships are required. The Congress appropriated funds for the 

tenth ship of this class last year. However, there has been talk of the Marine Corps 

desiring an eleventh LPD–17 class ship to better satisfy amphibious requirements. 

Admiral McCullough, the 30 year shipbuilding plan states that the Navy requires 

ten LPD–17 class ships to reach its stated fleet size of 313 ships. However, there 

has been discussion of the Marines requiring an additional LPD–17 ship to satisfy 

amphibious requirements. Has the Navy been in active discussions with the Marine 

Corps to determine how many LPD–17 ships are really required? 

Response. The President’s Budget for FY 2010 includes $185 million of Advance 

Procurement for an 11th LPD. The Navy is in constant communication with the Marine Corps to determine how many LPD–17 ships are required. On a broader scale, 

the Quadrennial Defense Review is looking to determine the amphibious force structure required for our National Defense Strategy. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, the first three LPD–17 class ships experienced some 

well-publicized construction problems that delayed delivery and increased the cost. 

A partial explanation for these problems is hurricane-related, but the contractor and 

Navy also share a good portion of the blame. In your opinion, are the quality problems with the LPD–17 class program behind us? If so, what evidence can you point 

to that makes you think this? If not, what steps is the Navy taking to incentivize 

the contractor to deliver a higher quality ship? 

Response. Similar to other shipbuilding programs, the LPD–17 class continues to 

improve and mature as lessons learned on early ships are rolled into follow-on ships 


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and each successive hull completes the building process. The level of completeness 

and quality continues to improve with each ship delivery; and the build plans for 

follow-ships are becoming more stable. LPD–19 was more complete at delivery than 

LPD–18; LPD–20 was more complete than LPD–19; and future LPDs will continue 

this trend. 

All four commissioned ships of the LPD–17 class, as well as the ships currently 

under construction, have been thoroughly inspected by the Navy; and corrective actions have been taken, as necessary. Each ship has received fewer trial cards than 

its predecessor indicating lessons learned are being incorporated. NGSB has 

changed the leadership of their Quality Assurance Department and has instituted 

a number of process improvement teams to improve their system design specifications/standards, craft training programs, and Quality Assurance program to ensure 

the remaining ships of the class are delivered at the highest quality. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, what is the status of contract negotiations for the 

tenth LPD–17 ship? When do you expect this contract to award? Do you expect to 

award this contract as a fixed price contract? 

Response. $10M of long lead time material has been put under contract to date. 

The Navy is working closely with Northrop Grumman Ship Building (NGSB) to determine when additional material, including raw materials, can be bought in support of the ship construction schedule in order to best leverage the LPD–17 class 

vendor base and ship’s material requirements. The follow-on long lead time material 

list with procurement need dates has been received and a contract modification is 

being negotiated between NGSB and the Navy. Once under contract, long lead time 

material will be purchased throughout FY09 in accordance with the program material ordering schedule. The full Request for Proposal for the design and construction 

of LPD–26 was issued in May 09 with a fixed price incentive contract award targeted for first quarter of FY10. 

313 SHIP FLEET

Question. The Navy has reported the size of the fleet required to satisfy the Nation’s maritime security requirements at 313 ships. The Chief of Naval Operations, 

Admiral Gary Roughead, has validated this number and has gone so far to say it 

is a floor, implying the fleet size should even be larger. Assigning a nominal 30 year 

life to a ship means that ten ships per year would need to be produced to reach 

and maintain a fleet size of 300. Over the last ten years, the requested ship quantities have averaged less than 7 ships per year. The last time the Navy built at least 

9 ships was in 1992 when 11 ships were constructed. Building 7 ships per year (assuming the same 30–35 year ship life) will sustain a fleet size of 210 to 245 ships. 

Admiral McCullough, with the low shipbuilding rate that the Navy has requested 

in the recent past, how do you envision reaching and maintaining a fleet of 313 

ships? 

Response. In keeping with the Secretary of Defense’s April 2009 budget statement, the Navy is reviewing many of its recapitalization programs and its force 

structure requirements to ensure that the 313 force still represents an alignment 

between the Navy and the expectations for future force capability. As a result of the 

ongoing QDR and changes in defense priorities, there is a possibility that there will 

be some changes in the overall total number of ships required by the Navy and the 

mix of ships within that total. It would be premature to speculate on what the final 

force required by these reviews will be. 

Therefore, as part of President’s Budget 2010, the Navy is exploring approaches 

whose objective is to stabilize the shipbuilding investment accounts and provide a 

predictable and reliable demand signal with respect to requirements to the industrial base while these fundamental force structure requirements reviews occur. 

The National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Reviews, currently in 

progress, will determine the shape of the Navy’s future. While the demands placed 

on the Navy for forces by the Combatant Commanders and by our presence, Security Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance missions continue to be significant; 

we have been largely able to meet these demands with the force we have in commission today. The 313 force construct is both a total inventory of ships and a specific 

mix of ships in that total and is focused on the threats that were envisioned for the 

2020 timeframe. 

Since completing the Force Structure Assessment that led to the 313 requirement, 

myriad changes have been realized in the strategic security environment around the 

globe. There has been a burgeoning proliferation of advanced cruise missiles, submarine technology is getting ever more difficult to counter and ballistic missile capabilities are becoming more precise and lethal. All of these challenges have required 


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the Navy to reassess its force structure and mission capabilities. It is in this sense 

that the CNO stated 313 was a floor vice a ceiling in his previous testimony. 

Question. Admiral McCullough, the Chief of Naval Operations has stated that a 

Fleet size 313 ships is really a floor, implying that the true requirement is somewhat larger. Do you have a sense for how large a fleet the CNO thinks the Navy 

requires? Do you have a sense of whether the Navy will make any type of formal 

change in the fiscal year 2010 request to the stated objective of 313 ships in an effort to reach whatever quantity the CNO deems more appropriate? 

Response. The National Security Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Reviews, currently in progress, will determine the shape of the Navy’s future. While the demands placed on the Navy for forces by the Combatant Commanders and by our 

presence, Security Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance missions continue to 

be significant; we have been largely able to meet these demands with the force we 

have in commission today. The 313 force construct is both a total inventory of ships 

and a specific mix of ships in that total and is focused on the threats that were envisioned for the 2020 timeframe. 

Since completing the Force Structure Assessment that led to the 313 requirement, 

myriad changes have been realized in the strategic security environment around the 

globe. There has been a burgeoning proliferation of advanced cruise missiles, submarine technology is getting ever more difficult to counter and ballistic missile capabilities are becoming more precise and lethal. All of these challenges have required 

the Navy to reassess its force structure and mission capabilities. It is in this sense 

that the CNO stated 313 was a floor vice a ceiling in his previous testimony. 

LEASING OF FOREIGN-BUILT SHIPS

Question. By statute, the Navy is permitted to lease foreign-built ships to augment its sealift capability. These leases are limited to five years. Essentially the 

Navy enters into these leases on a recurring basis which individually meet the intent of the leasing restrictions, but when considered cumulatively would violate the 

spirit and intent of the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act, since the ships end up being 

leased in excess of five years, spread over different leasing arrangements. 

Secretary Stiller, last year you told the Committee that the Navy leased 17 foreign built, U.S. flagged vessels. How many foreign built ships are currently being 

leased? 

Response. MSC currently has 26 ocean-going, U.S.-flag vessels under time charter 

for periods exceeding six months. Of those 26 vessels, 14 are foreign-built. Since 

2002, the number of U.S-flag, foreign-built ships under charter has declined from 

22 to 14. All of these vessels are crewed by U.S. citizen mariners. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, what is the Navy’s plan for reducing the number of 

foreign-built ships that are leased? 

Response. Since 2002, the number of U.S-flag, foreign-built ships under charter 

has declined from 22 to 14. Furthermore, the number of chartered vessels that are 

foreign-built is projected to decrease in the near future—from 14 in FY09 to 10 in 

FY14 and then remain stable, representing approximately 9% of the total ships 

under MSC operation. 

The Navy and USMC worked together to reduce the amount of foreign-built ships 

on long-term lease in the Maritime Prepositioning Force restructuring. In this restructuring, five foreign-built ships have been replaced by three U.S.-built Large 

Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships (LMSRs), one U.S.-built T–5 tanker, and a 

self-sustaining containership which will be chartered. Since there are insufficient 

numbers of self-sustaining U.S.-built containerships, it is expected that only a foreign-built ship will meet this requirement. 

Two of the long-term foreign-built vessels have been the HSV SWIFT and the 

HSV WESTPAC EXPRESS. These HSVs provided valuable experience before DoD 

invested in the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) program. As the JHSV production 

line starts delivering in 2012, these foreign-built HSV leases will be terminated as 

they are replaced by JHSVs. 

Of the remaining foreign-built charters, only 6 have been on charter for more than 

five years and 4 of those have been to support Army and Air Force afloat 

prepositioning requirements. If these Services could establish a firm requirement 

and commit to funding the charters for a sufficient period of time, then it would 

be possible to construct ships in the United States to meet those requirements. 

However, the Navy would need a commitment of at least 10–15 years if the ships 

were built from a cold production line because of building time and lease duration 

required to support commercial financing. This is far longer than the Army and 

Airforce have been willing to commit to a requirement. History has shown that the 

number and types of ships required to meet the Army and Airforce needs has 


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changed within a 10-year period. However, if there were a hot production line of 

ships being built for the Jones Act trade similar to those needed to meet their requirements, then a shorter commitment (5–7) years would be required and might 

be achievable. This was the case when MSC chartered two T–5 tanker replacements 

for a five-year period on behalf of Defense Energy Support Center. Taking advantage of an ongoing production line also would allow for efficient production and reduce the costs for both the Navy and the U.S. shipping companies in the Jones Act 

trade. A larger production line will also ensure replacement parts are available, 

since the original equipment manufacturers (OEM) will be more inclined to build/ 

carry spares for multiple ships versus a one ship production line. 

Navy will continue dialogue with the U.S. maritime industry on the size and capabilities of containerships to meet potential charter requirements. Navy has been 

pursuing the National Defense Features program to partner with the American 

shipping companies so that their future U.S.-built ships have military utility and/ 

or the Navy can build ships on the same hull with the required features. 

Question. Admiral McCullough, what would be the impact to the Navy’s mission 

if the Congress were to prohibit the Navy’s ability to enter into these leases on foreign-built ships? 

Response. Restricting the Navy’s ability to charter foreign-built ships would cause 

certain DOD sealift requirements to be unmet because of the unavailability of suitable U.S.-built ships to meet short-term and emergent sealift missions. 

MSC’s ability to meet DOD sealift transportation and other requirements would 

be severely impaired due to the lack of U.S.-built ships in commercial service and 

available for DOD charter. Such restrictions would likely force a greater use of 

MSC’s Surge Fleet and MARAD’s Ready Reserve Force ships, missed commitments, 

and potentially significantly higher costs. 

In addition, the requirement to charter only U.S.-built ships would impact the 

Navy’s ability to rapidly experiment with new technologies—e.g. High Speed Vessels—before deciding whether to embark on a capital investment and shipbuilding 

program. 

The Department of Defense charters, vice owns, ships to respond efficiently when 

a military requirement is immediate, subject to change, or of uncertain duration. 

Ships are initially contracted for a lease of 12 months or less, often with options 

to extend use up to 59 months total to provide flexibility. Currently, there are 26 

ocean-going vessels under time-charter for periods that fall in the mid (less than 5 

years) to long-term category; 14 of these are U.S.-flagged foreign-built ships. Of the 

14, three have been chartered since the 1980s, as authorized by law, but will be terminated in July 2009. 

Since 2002, the number of foreign-built ships under charter has declined from 22 

to 14. Despite the fact that few commercial ships with military utility have been 

constructed in United States shipyards in the past 25+ years. When a foreign-built 

ship is used for these charters, the ship is required to be converted to U.S.-flag, and 

crewed by United States citizen mariners prior to the beginning of the charter. Conversion work must be accomplished in a United States shipyard. 

COMMON HULL FORMS

Question. The Navy and industry have stated for several years that reducing the 

number of ship hull forms would help stabilize the shipbuilding program and have 

the added benefit of reducing cost. Candidate programs for using an existing hull 

form would be the Command Ship and Hospital Ship programs. Additionally, all 

amphibious ship types could theoretically utilize the LPD–17 hull design. 

Secretary Stiller, the Committee understands there are several programs that 

could benefit from using an existing hull design. Could you outline the benefits of 

using a common hull form in the Navy’s shipbuilding program? 

Response. There are several motivations that drive us to common hull forms (and 

other common design elements) whenever possible in shipbuilding programs. First, 

in the design stage, the use of an existing hull form and the corresponding parts 

of the product model removes hull design work-hours from the project scope. This 

could save not only cost but also program lead time. Subsequently, in production, 

the use of a common hull form has productivity advantages resulting from both facilities and labor considerations. In terms of facilities, continuing with the same hull 

design allows the shipyard to make additional use of infrastructure and tooling already in place. For example, certain material flow arrangements and fabrication setups can be left as is, thereby avoiding change-overs to suit a new design with a different interim product stream. On the labor side, the use of an existing hull form 

design enables repeated use of certain existing work packages and exploits pre-existing learning efficiencies; the degree of re-set of the learning curve is lessened as 


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some interim products are familiar. The reduction in these physical and human resource discontinuities could result in a smoother and more predictable production 

process. 

The repeat use of common hull forms has been adopted in the past. For example, 

the DD–963 hull form was used for the DD–993 and CG–47 classes. The ability of 

a given, currently-in-production hull form to be adapted for use in a new shipbuilding program depends on the degree to which the hull design parameters (configuration, displacement, design speed, seakeeping characteristics, structure, subdivision, etc.) are able to support the capabilities of the new program (payload 

weight and volume, mobility, port access, electrical power generation and distribution, information infrastructure, signatures, etc.). When the match is close enough, 

there is a potentially viable case for the common hull approach. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, what are some of the candidate programs that could 

benefit from this concept? 

Response. The Navy is proposing that variants which leverage existing production 

lines be explored. LCC(R) will replace the afloat command and control capability 

provided by the current LCC class. The AoA is exploring T–AKE and LPD–17 as 

common hull ship variants. 

The potential requirement for a LSD/LPD(X) is being explored through an ongoing 

Capability Based Assessment and will examine the opportunity for common hull reuse. The next generation surface combatant could potentially use either the DDG– 

51 or DDG–1000 hull form. 

Question. Admiral McCullough, why does the Navy not make using an existing 

hull form a requirement of the analysis of alternatives for these programs instead 

of just paying lip service to the concept? 

Response. The Navy’s long range vision reduces the types and models of ships, 

maximizes the reuse of ship designs and components, and implements open architecture for software and hardware systems and mission systems modularity. Specifically, the Navy is proposing that variants which leverage existing production lines 

be explored. 

The potential requirement for a LSD/LPD(X) is being explored through an ongoing 

Capability Based Assessment and will examine the opportunity for common hull reuse. While we are committed to maximum re-use of the hull forms, there are limits 

to which this principle can be effectively applied. Since the missions for which future ships are designed will necessarily determine the size, shape and capabilities 

required by future hulls, we cannot commit to a specific hull for a specific ship until 

we know what needs to be accomplished in these missions and capabilities. Even 

if we do not reuse a hull form, it is still possible to standardize the common internal 

components. We are working to reduce the various numbers and types of valves, 

pump and motor components and systems internal to our ships so that we can realize the benefits of economic order quantity and supply chain efficiencies in the future. 

Ultimately, the Navy’s shipbuilding plan recognizes the need for careful management of requirements and aggressive cost control measures that include: 

—Evaluating each ship class and identifying cost reduction opportunities while 

balancing warfighting requirements, cost and industrial base realities. 

—Emphasizing repeat builds of ships. 

SHIPBUILDING BEST PRACTICES

Question. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has released a draft report 

comparing commercial shipbuilding best practices to Navy shipbuilding practices. 

The GAO reports that the biggest difference between the two is that commercial 

shipbuilders and buyers do not move forward with a construction contract until a 

full understanding of the effort required to design and construct the ship is reached 

which enables the shipbuilder to sign a contract that fixes the price, delivery date, 

and ship performance parameters. 

Secretary Stiller, the Government Accountability Office has released a draft report that compares the Navy’s shipbuilding practices to the commercial shipbuilding 

sector. Essentially, the report states that the commercial shipbuilder and buyer 

agree on all aspects of the ship (price, schedule, and performance parameters) before 

a contract is signed. Do you agree that this practice would lead to a more stable 

and less risky shipbuilding program? 

Answer. The Federal Acquisition Regulations applicable in Navy shipbuilding 

limit the extent and effectiveness of pre-contract communications and resulting risk 

reduction before contract award. While much has been done to improve the FAR 

with regard to pre-contract communications with industry, Navy practices simply do 


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not approach the level of communication and risk reduction that exists in the private sector prior to contract signing. 

To illustrate, a commercial owner will typically engage multiple shipbuilders in 

independent, detailed discussions regarding budgetary constraints and requirements 

trade-offs, before requirements are solidified and in advance of entering into a contract; in that way, a commercial owner can explore the most affordable solutions, 

exploit different shipbuilder capabilities, and effectively pre-select a shipbuilder 

while both parties are assured that major design and construction risks have been 

identified and removed prior to entering a contract. 

In a sole source situation, the Navy does use methods such as Alpha Contracting 

which emphasizes conducting actions concurrently and cooperatively, with a close 

relationship between an integrated Government team and contractor team. Under 

Alpha contracting, the Government and contractor personnel work hand-in-hand to 

define scope and cost as opposed to the traditional bargaining approach, while also 

eliminating contractor questions or concerns. Similarly, as the contractors complete 

development of portions of their technical and cost proposals, an integrated Government team, including representatives of the program office, the contracting office, 

and the contract administration office, may review the proposal and attempt to resolve issues the team identifies. When the completed proposals are then formally 

submitted to the contracting officer, much if not all of it may have already been negotiated. 

Managing, mitigating and retiring major risk items prior to contract award for detail ship design and construction is always a goal. The difference between commercial and Navy practices may be in the assessment of that risk, including the Navy 

shipbuilder’s ability to understand how accepting that risk will influence cost and 

schedule performance. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, the report further states that before construction begins, commercial shipbuilders complete key design phases that correspond with the 

completion of a three dimensional product model. Is the design process associated 

with the DDG–1000 program and the new aircraft carrier an attempt to mimic this 

practice? 

Answer. The completion of Design Phases and 3D Product Models before construction begins on a given construction zone of a ship is a practice that is common 

across both commercial and military shipbuilding. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, the report also states that key technologies are known, 

and final information on the systems that will be installed on the ship is required, 

to allow this design work to finish prior to construction. Additionally, once construction begins in the commercial sector, no change orders are typically allowed. Although the Navy has learned these lessons time and again, why is it that you cannot abide by these practices? 

Answer. SECNAV is required to certify to Congress that the program’s readiness 

to commence construction after completion of a production readiness review. At the 

Production Readiness Review, the Navy reviews the technical soundness of the production design, construction approach, and the associated resource plan. Once approval is granted by SECNAV, the start of construction can commence. The Navy 

subsequently monitors contract performance and quality to assure that the shipbuilder meets stipulated contract terms (performance, quality, etc.) and that the 

products meet the Navy’s technical requirements. In October 2008, SECNAVINST 

5000.2D institutionalized the Two-Pass, Six-Gate DON Requirements and Acquisition Governance process that ensures the various stakeholders from the resources, 

requirements and acquisition communities address and revisit at defined intervals; 

technical maturity, affordability and program health of each of the Department’s 

major defense acquisition programs. The Navy will continue to focus on affordability 

of programs by ensuring designs are mature prior to the start of construction and 

emphasizing design for affordability concepts in both initial design and follow-on 

procurement. 

In 2001, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy instituted a shipbuilding cost growth 

configuration control policy intended to minimize contract change orders. Program 

change order budgets were reserved for safety, contractual defects, unavailable contractor furnished equipment, testing and trial deficiencies, and statutory and regulatory changes accompanied by funding. A Program Manager cannot approve any 

change that does not fall into one of the five categories. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, do you envision incorporating any of these commercial 

practices [from the GAO report on commercial shipbuilding best practices] into the 

Navy shipbuilding program? 

Response. The Navy acknowledges the GAO’s efforts to identify commercial shipbuilding best practices and is reviewing its recommendations. In general, when attributes or missions of our ships are commercial in nature, the recommended best 


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practices have been and will be applied, as appropriate. Further, as recommended 

by the GAO, the Navy acknowledges and concurs with having a significant level of 

design completion before initiating construction, and having critical technologies 

successfully prototyped and demonstrated prior to implementation in the design. In 

addition, the Department routinely works with shipbuilders to discuss technical requirements and specifications, and cost savings opportunities and trade-offs. 

The Navy leverages commercial practices on ship acquisitions that are based on 

commercial design such as the T–AKE and the JHSV programs. In the case of the 

later T–AKEs, the Navy was the beneficiary from General Dynamics NASSCO partnership with the Daewoo Ship Engineering Company (DSEC), a wholly owned subsidiary of Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering of Okpo, Korea. DSEC is 

producing designs and providing other services for NASSCO in its efforts to deliver 

on the $1 billion contract from U.S. Shipping Partners L.P. for construction of double hulled product tankers for use along the U.S. coasts. NASSCO has taken the 

benchmarking recommendations and is investing in their facility and implementing 

process improvements which has resulted in production efficiencies to the T–AKE 

class. The T–AKEs are delivering ahead of the contract schedule and within the target cost. JHSV, a competitive award to AUSTAL, USA, is based on a parent commercial design, the Hawaiian Super Ferry. JHSV is leveraging commercial best 

practices. 

SHIPBUILDING CHANGE ORDERS

Question. The Navy has long been guilty of ordering changes to their ships after 

the design and construction contracts were awarded. While some of these changes 

are safety related and certainly required, a lot of them are discretionary in nature. 

These changes contribute to cost growth on the ship due to the disruption and 

delays that they tend to cause. The shipbuilders have stated on numerous occasions 

that these change orders are a major contributor to cost growth. Last year, Secretary Stiller testified that the Navy was instituting procedures to get the discretionary portion of the change orders under control. 

Secretary Stiller, the Navy has historically been guilty of directing change orders 

to the shipbuilders after the design and construction contracts were awarded. There 

is no doubt that this practice results in higher costs. Last year you stated to this 

Committee that you had instituted procedures to ensure that only necessary 

changes were being made, and removing the discretionary changes. Have you seen 

a decrease in the number (and associated cost) of discretionary change orders? 

Response. In 2001, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy instituted a shipbuilding 

cost growth configuration control policy intended to minimize contract change orders. Change order budgets would only be reserved for safety, contractual defects, 

unavailable contractor furnished equipment, testing and trial deficiencies, and statutory and regulatory changes accompanied by funding. The memo directed further 

that program managers may not approve change proposals outside of these categories which increase acquisition cost. In October 2008, SECNAVINST 5000.2D institutionalized the Two-Pass, Six-Gate DON Requirements and Acquisition Governance process that ensures the various stakeholders from the resources, requirements 

and acquisition communities address and revisit at defined intervals; technical maturity, affordability and program health of each of the Department’s major defense 

acquisition programs. The Navy will continue to focus on affordability of programs 

by ensuring designs are mature prior to the start of construction and emphasizing 

design for affordability concepts in both initial design and follow-on procurement. 

The procedures and processes currently in place will ensure that the Navy remains 

vigilant on minimizing contract change orders. Further, ship programs such as the 

LPD–17 and VA Class have demonstrated a reduction in change orders at delivery 

as compared to what was budgeted and an overall downward trend on the follow 

ships of the class. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, if change orders are in fact on the decline, why do the 

Navy budgets continue to contain the same amount of funding for change orders 

(five percent of the basic construction contract cost) as has been historically provided for the change order effort? 

Response. In 2001, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy instituted a shipbuilding 

cost growth configuration control policy intended to minimize contract change orders. Change order budgets were reserved for safety, contractual defects, unavailable contractor furnished equipment, testing and trial deficiencies, and statutory 

and regulatory changes accompanied by funding. Change order budgets are dependent on the level of technical risk for a particular acquisition strategy. Programs that 

are considered clean sheet designs would inherently have more risk than ship program which leverages a common hull design. In the meantime, the Navy continues 


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to focus on affordability of programs by ensuring designs are mature prior to the 

start of construction and emphasizing design for affordability concepts in both initial 

design and follow-on procurement. The procedures and processes currently in place 

will ensure that the Navy remains vigilant on minimizing contract change orders. 

Ship programs such as the LPD–17 and VA Class have demonstrated a reduction 

in change orders at delivery as compared to what was budgeted and an overall 

downward trend on the follow ships of the class. 

SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE

Question. The shipbuilding industrial base in the United States has shrunk considerably in recent years, largely due to the reduction in the number of Navy ships 

being constructed. The industrial base essentially consists of six shipyards (three 

owned by General Dynamics and three owned by Northrop Grumman) that build the 

great majority of the fleet. There is no question that the low rate of ship construction has contributed to the higher cost of ships. The shipbuilders have said on numerous occasions that a higher volume of ships would go a long way towards stabilizing the industrial base and reducing cost. 

Secretary Stiller, your shipbuilding contractors have stated frequently that increased volume would help stabilize the industrial base and control costs. Yet the 

Navy continues to build ships at historically low levels. Do you agree that this low 

building rate is causing problems for the industrial base? 

Response. The Department recognizes that low levels of shipbuilding activity introduce challenges and inefficiencies at the shipyard. The Navy has developed a long 

term shipbuilding procurement plan that provides the foundation for future planning within the shipbuilding industry. The Navy continues to work with Congress 

to enact this strategy and where appropriate, has proposed multi-year procurements 

which provide further stability and result in cost savings. Reducing volatility, 

through multi-year procurements and a stable shipbuilding procurement profile, enables industry leaders to make informed decisions regarding current operations, employment, infrastructure, and future capital investments. The Navy continues to 

work with shipbuilders to strive for level loading of facilities and facilitization to improve efficiency. The Department believes that future stability in the shipbuilding 

program is a cornerstone in sustaining a cost effective and affordable future maritime capability supporting the National Security Strategy. Toward that end, the Department of the Navy will continue to work with the Congress to ensure a stable 

shipbuilding strategy that is aligned with the FY 2010 President’s Budget. 

Question. From the customer viewpoint, is the state of the industrial base affecting the quality of the ships that are being delivered to the Navy? 

Response. The Department recognizes that low levels of shipbuilding activity introduce challenges and inefficiencies at shipyards. The Navy has developed a long 

term shipbuilding procurement plan that provides the foundation for future planning within the shipbuilding industry. The Navy continues to work with Congress 

to enact this strategy and where appropriate, have proposed multi-year procurements which provide further stability and result in cost savings. Reducing volatility, 

through multi-year procurements and a stable shipbuilding procurement profile, enables industry leaders to make informed decisions regarding current operations, employment, infrastructure, and future capital investments. 

Further, ensuring quality processes are instituted is a top concern of Navy leadership. The Secretary of the Navy commissioned a Navy Advisory Panel to perform 

an independent evaluation of the culture of quality in the Department of the Navy 

(DON). The evaluation is to provide the Secretary with recommendations to improve 

policies, design standards, contractual requirements, performance benchmarks, industry practices, and oversight that define and govern the effective delivery of quality product, platforms, and system to the war fighter. 

Question. Admiral McCullough, a dismissive answer is to say that the Navy needs 

to buy additional ships. Since you are in charge of all the Navy’s resources, you realize it is not an easily solved problem. What do you see as a possible solution for 

restoring and stabilizing the shipbuilding industrial base? 

Response. The Department recognizes that low levels of shipbuilding activity introduce challenges and inefficiencies at the shipyards. The Navy’s acquisition and 

requirements community has developed a long term shipbuilding procurement plan 

that provides the foundation for future planning within the shipbuilding industry. 

The Navy continues to work with Congress to enact this strategy and where appropriate, has proposed multi-year procurements which provide further stability and result in cost savings. Reducing volatility, through multi-year procurements and a stable shipbuilding procurement profile, enables industry leaders to make informed deVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00326 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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cisions regarding current operations, employment, infrastructure, and future capital 

investments. 

SHIPBUILDING COST ESTIMATES

Question. Although the Department of Defense is required by statute to conduct 

an independent cost estimate on major acquisition programs, these programs can be 

funded to lower confidence levels of the estimates, presumably to fit more program 

within a given year’s request. Recent examples of programs that have not been 

funded to the full Independent Cost Estimate include the DDG–1000 program, the 

Joint Strike Fighter, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite program, 

the CVN–21 aircraft carrier, and the VH–71 Presidential Helicopter. When the inevitable cost growth is realized, it creates ripples throughout the Department as funding is shifted to pay for the growth. Funding these major acquisition programs to 

their full cost estimate from their inception would go a long way towards creating 

stability in the budget. 

Secretary Stiller, by statute major acquisition programs are required to have an 

independent cost estimate conducted as part of the acquisition process. However, 

there is no statute that directs the Navy to actually fund to that independent estimate. In fact, several programs are not funded to this estimate, but to a lower confidence estimate. What factors are considered in funding a program to a lower confidence level than that provided by the independent cost estimate? 

Response. The Navy uses quantitative cost risk analysis techniques, such as 

Monte Carlo simulations, in developing risk based cost estimates to assist in formulating the shipbuilding budget. Risk analysis is performed for each ship. This includes the use of risk parameters for areas of historical shipbuilding cost growth 

such as labor, contractor furnished material, Government Furnished Material, economic/market conditions (shipyard labor and overhead rates, inflation), unique programmatic or technical conditions, and potential schedule issues. However, this is 

one of several tools and considerations that are used to create the PB 10 shipbuilding budget. The Navy is required to address full funding at MS A and prior 

to the technology design phase. At MS A, an independent cost estimate is developed 

and the CAIG performs an assessment. During the technology development phase 

there is still opportunity to trade off cost versus requirements before the Acquisition 

Program Baseline is established. Program initiation for ships occurs at MS B and 

the CAIG performs an independent cost estimate at that time. The Milestone Decision Authority typically directs the service to fund to a specific estimate. Confidence 

level is only one factor considered in budgeting. Program maturity, program complexity, and program risk are also factors in the budgeting process. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, in shipbuilding more than in any other area, do you 

not find the disruption caused by faulty estimates in your budgets to be much more 

severe than funding the major acquisition programs correctly in the first place? 

Response. The quality of a cost estimate and the corresponding budgeted amount 

are the key to success in a program. The Navy is assessing cost estimating techniques and tools across product lines to ensure improvement in our cost estimating 

ability. As programs mature through the acquisition process, the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) within OSD will help to refine the program’s cost estimate. The Milestone Decision Authority, informed by the Navy and CAIG estimates, 

will determine the estimate for the program. 

Question. Secretary Stiller, the Navy and Air Force acquisition deputies testified 

last week regarding combat aircraft acquisition. They stated that they had a policy 

of funding programs to the eighty percent confidence level, implying that programs 

were funded to a level beyond the CAIG estimate. Since the majority of shipbuilding 

programs are major acquisition programs, could you provide a list of ship programs 

that are funded to a level greater than the CAIG estimate? 

Response. At Milestone A (MS A), the Navy develops an independent cost estimate and the CAIG assesses it. During the technology development phase which occurs between MS A and MS B, cost-requirement trade-off opportunities are considered. At MS B, the CAIG develops an independent cost estimate for the program. 

The Milestone Decision Authority determines which estimate to adopt for the program. 

Today, the only shipbuilding program funded to a level greater than the CAIG estimate is the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) program. The Milestone Decision Authority approved funding to the service’s cost position, which is higher than the 

CAIG estimate, during the November 2008 MS B decision meeting. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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THURSDAY, APRIL 2, 2009. 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 

WITNESS 

LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK J. O’REILLY, DIRECTOR 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. DICKS. The Committee will come to order. 

Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the 

hearing today which involve classified material be held in executive 

session because of the classification of the material to be discussed. 

Mr. DICKS. All those in favor of the motion, signify by saying aye. 

Opposed? 

The motion carries. The Committee will come to order. 

Today, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee will focus its 

attention on missile defense systems. We welcome Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly, Director of the Missile Defense Agency. 

I want to call on Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I want to join you in welcoming General O’Reilly for a very, very important matter that we are going 

to discuss today, and I am going to put my opening statement in 

the record. 

General, you might be interested in knowing we have a schedule 

of votes that is probably going to interrupt a lot of our hearing 

today. 

Mr. DICKS. We want to get started, and why don’t you go ahead 

with your statement. We want to hear your statement, and we 

want you to proceed as you need to. 

General O’REILLY. Thank you, sir. 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the 

committee, it is an honor and a greatly appreciated opportunity to 

testify before you today on the Department of Defense’s missile defense program. 

During fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 to date, the Missile 

Defense Agency achieved many accomplishments, including the 

execution of a successful Aegis Standard Missile-3 Block IA and 

Standard Missile-2 Block IV interceptor salvo flight tests, the delivery of 30 additional SM–3 Block IA interceptors, including four deliveries to the country of Japan, a Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

intercept test utilizing the entire sensor and command and control 

suite deployed in the Pacific; emplacement of two and refurbishment of two additional Ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, 

Alaska; the deployment of AN/TPY–2 radar to Israel; the execution 

of an experiment involving the closest data collection to date of a 

boosting missile from satellite on orbit; the safe destruction of a 

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pheric laser beam compensation during Airborne Laser flights; delivery of the first Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, 

unit for testing. We have had three THAAD intercept flights, including a recent salvo launch of two THAAD interceptors. 

However, we also face challenges, including 8 of 22 flight test 

delays in 2008; four target failures out of 18 launches; one interceptor failure; a cost growth of $264 million. We have had significant production time lost due to quality problems in our factories, 

over 50 days in GMD, over 40 days of lost production on the STSS 

program and over 20 days—— 

Mr. DICKS. Would you suspend? Are we supposed to have phones 

out of the room—turned off. 

Okay, you may proceed. 

General O’REILLY. But we have lost a significant amount of time 

due to quality programs. We have had a replanning of $252 million 

in costs and 25 weeks of schedule delays due to unanticipated operational deployments of our developmental systems. 

In response to those challenges, we have worked with our 6 

stakeholders and leadership to enhance the management oversight, 

strengthen our relationship with the warfighting community and 

improve our acquisition, execution and test planning of the Ballistic Missile Defense, or BMDS, System. 

We have initiated four areas of improvement. First, we have 

adopted a series of initiatives to improve acquisition and oversight 

of contracts we will award over the next 18 months, which is the 

majority of our contracts. 

Second, we are institutionalizing Missile Defense Agency and 

service roles and responsibilities for the element systems of the 

BMDS. 

Third, we have recently initiated a systematic review of BMDS 

test planning, in partnership with the Army, Navy and Air Force 

operational test agencies, with the support of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. 

And, finally, we continue to enhance our regional defenses 

against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, 

while maintaining our midcourse defense against intercontinental 

ballistic missiles, while ensuring we are prepared to leverage the 

tremendous advantage of emerging technologies to more economically intercept threat missiles of all ranges in their ascent phase. 

Meanwhile, the proliferation of ballistic missiles of all ranges 

continue. I defer to the Intelligence Community for their detailed 

estimates, but current trends indicate that the 7 proliferation of 

ballistic missile systems using advanced liquid- or solid-propellant 

propulsion technologies are becoming more mobile, survivable, reliable, accurate and capable of striking targets over longer distances. 

Iran has grown its short-range and medium-range missile inventories, and with its recent successful launch of the Safir Space 

Launch Vehicle on 2 February 2009, Iran has demonstrated their 

intercontinental ballistic missile class technologies. 

Meanwhile, North Korea deploys No Dong ballistic missiles capable of reaching Japan and South Korea and U.S. bases throughout 

the region, and has announced its intent to launch its own space 

vehicle as early as tomorrow night. 


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Likewise, Syria continues to field updated short-range missile 

ballistic systems and acquire Scud-related equipment and materials from North Korea and Iran. 

In sum, there has been an increase of over 1,100 additional ballistic missiles in the past 5 years, bringing the total number of ballistic missiles outside of the United 

States, Russia or China to over 5,600. 

With your permission, I would like to submit the remainder of 

my remarks and written testimony and look forward to answering 

your questions. 

[The statement of General O’Reilly follows:] 


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NK LAUNCH

Mr. DICKS. Without objection, your complete statement will be 

placed in the record. 

How is the Agency supporting the response to the pending North 

Korean missile launch? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, first of all, I can respond to that from an 

acquisition developer perspective, since we developed the system 

that will be used. The actual deployment tactics are developed by 

PACOM, STRATCOM and NORTHCOM. ———. 

Mr. DICKS. One of the articles says that they might, parts of the 

missile, one would drop on one side of Japan and the other would 

drop on the other side of Japan. Can you explain that? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Would that be a space launch? 

General O’REILLY. Either one, either space launch or ICBM. It is 

a three-stage missile, and the first stage would fall in the Sea of 

Japan, the second stage would most likely fall in the Sea of Japan, 

but the upper stage would fall on the other side of Japan, east of 

Japan. 

We have three Aegis ships on station, two in the Sea of Japan 

and one east of Japan for that reason, so that we can get an early 

assessment. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, at what point would the United States make a determination to intercept this vehicle? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, if it is an ICBM, the Secretary of Defense 

has that authority to release the weapon, the weapons up at Fort 

Greely, Alaska, or at Vandenberg Air Force Base. ———. 

They have a command and control system for their ballistic missile defense that is integrated with ours. 

So not only are we aware of what they do, we actually share data 

between both of our systems and we have a forward-based radar, 

similar to the one we just placed in Israel, in Shiriki, Japan. The 

Japanese have access to that data. So we do share data, and our 

command and control is integrated. 

Mr. YOUNG. So despite some of their pretty definite statements 

about how they would react, you don’t think—they are not going 

to be trigger happy, they will coordinate and do whatever is agreeable to the U.S.? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, our discussions in the past have been 

around policies of self-defense. So the way our missile defense systems—and they use ours, and we work with them on theirs—our 

missile defense systems operate based on defended areas. ———. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, just one last comment, as the technology grows 

from countries that are not particularly friends of ours, I think it 

establishes over and over again the importance of our own missile 

defense capability. 

Thank you very much for keeping us as robust as you can. 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Moran. 


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IRANIAN CAPABILITY

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let’s bring up the other 

hot topic at this point you are on—and it is actual capability of 

militarizing their nuclear capability—and get your latest assessment of the timing and our capability of defending and the extent 

to which the location of missile defense batteries in Eastern Europe 

affects our defense posture vis-a-vis Iran. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, in terms of—I can’t speak, I am not a subject matter expert in the area of their payloads, their nuclear capability that they are working on; but I can talk about their delivery 

system, the missile delivery systems. ———. 

PROTECTION OF EUROPE

Getting back to protecting Europe, though, these missile systems, 

as I said, they can hit southern Europe, the Shahab-3, they can hit 

Turkey, they can hit Greece, they can hit southern Italy. ———. 

From a long-range threat, if they are beyond 2,000 kilometers, at 

that point, you need our long-range system today, which would be 

the GMD program. And we have proposed 10 in the country of Poland, northern Poland; and it also would be with a—it needs a firecontrol radar, and that would be the one we would propose for the 

Czech Republic. 

Short of that, we don’t have capability to protect against a longrange threat today in Europe. 

Mr. MORAN. But since the only real threat of all of those that you 

mentioned, if there was only a minimum level—you can assume we 

have a minimum level of intellect on the part of the Iranians—it 

would be the Iranian threat to Israel, not to Europe or anyplace 

else, and Iran far more than Syria. 

PROTECTION OF ISRAEL FROM IRANIAN MISSILES

Could you just address briefly—you don’t have to be as comprehensive, although it was very informative, the response to my 

first question. But we have been funding Arrow missile defense 

system, and we have our own missile defense systems that would 

work in collaboration with Israel’s. 

Could you just address our ability to thwart any possibility of a 

missile attack from Iran to Israel, since that is the only real threat 

that you mentioned in your list? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. I would defer to Admiral Blair and 

the Director of National Intelligence. ———. 

Mr. MORAN. Are we in progress of funding that program? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, last year 30 million was appropriated for 

the Arrow-3 program. We have reviewed that with them last year. 

Based on their data, that is the most economic solution for the 

state of Israel. We have not had the opportunity to do an independent assessment. 

Previous developments have cost twice their initial assessment 

and the original Arrow cost twice of what they are said it would 

take. So we have some concern with the cost estimate. 

However, my main concern about that system is, it is a very 

technically complex design, more complex than we have ever—more 

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timates and independent estimates I have asked for indicate that 

it would be available 5 years or more later than what they say it 

would be. They are on a very fast track. I do not believe it is a 

credible schedule. 

And so what we have discussed with the Israelis is to give them 

capabilities sooner while they continue to develop. 

But to directly answer your question, sir. Yes, we are committed 

to fund the Arrow-3. However, I would recommend that we have 

a program agreement ahead of time to protect U.S. intellectual 

property rights and use rights for the results of that program. 

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman’s time—— 

Mr. MORAN. That was very informative. Thank you, General. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

CHINESE MISSILE THREAT

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you very much. 

General, I made note of your comment relative to the North Koreans and the Iranians that what they are working on, and you 

said it, reflects a very sophisticated design. There is sort of a view 

out there in the public that what we are sort of dealing with here 

is a backward people, and what they are working on is crude and 

would be unlikely to represent a threat. 

I think you are sort of giving us a little bit of a wake-up call that, 

indeed, they are working on some fairly sophisticated devices. 

I would like to turn my question to stories that are circulating 

in the media that China is working to modify their land-based DF– 

21 ballistic missiles for use against our carrier assets. I am sure 

you have seen some of those articles. It was quite alarming. 

Tell me if I am correct: The idea is to have a satellite or overthe-horizon radar, or maybe a UAV, guide these heavy missiles towards a carrier battle group at a very high speed. 

And from the article, and let me quote, because the missile employs a complex guidance system, low-radar signature and maneuverability that makes its flight path unpredictable, the odds that 

it can evade tracking systems to reach its target are increased. It 

is estimated the missile can travel at Mach 10 and reach the maximum range of 2,000 kilometers in less than 12 minutes. 

That is pretty scary, you know. Can you comment on that. ———. General O’REILLY. Thank you, sir. It is actually more scarier 

than that. 

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentleman yield for just a second. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Please, Mr. Chairman. 

DEFENSE OF MARITIME FLEET

Mr. DICKS. Well, the defense would be—Aegis would be only defense? Or is there no defense? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, what we would propose—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. There is a view that there is no defense. 

———. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Wow. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. Rothman. 


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Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good to see you again. Thank you, General. Thank you, Chairman. 

GROUND/BOOST PHASE INTERCEPT

What would a defensive system that would either get the missile 

on the ground or in the boost phase, what would it look like? 

General O’REILLY. There are actually multiple architectures that 

could do that. The first thing you have to do is see these missiles 

soon, as soon as they have been launched, the earlier the better. 

It just so happens, last Thursday, we had the first time where 

we used the Predator, working with the Navy—we had two Predators off of Los Angeles. And we had a test of an intercept of a 

Lance missile using Aegis, but the Predators were out there, and 

they actually watched the missiles being launched, which is the 

first demonstration that UAVs actually can be used in a missile defense mode. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. But what would our kill vehicle be? 

General O’REILLY. ———. Mr. ROTHMAN. And when do you expect that to be ready? 

General O’REILLY. We will flight test it next week, as a fully configured airborne laser. It flew last year and had great success with 

the three lower-level lasers. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. The Chinese, if you know, General, are they up 

to our level of progress on lasers? 

General O’REILLY. ———. Mr. ROTHMAN. And the North Koreans, to get back to them, my 

guess is that we could take out those rockets on the pad. We certainly had enough notice, we watched them be carried up to the 

pad and sit there and be fueled, that—unless you tell me we don’t 

have that capability. 

Do we have the capability to take them out on the pad now? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I am not the subject matter expert for 

ground attacks, honestly, for the forward offensive operations. 

But what we currently have right now is a choice. When you 

know that an ICBM is being stacked and you can observe it, it is 

either preemption, as you are questioning, sir, or it is retaliation 

after a launch has occurred. 

We are trying to offer a third—— 

NK MISSLE TEST

Mr. ROTHMAN. No, I agree. I just want to get a couple more questions before my time—what do you speculate or know to be the 

North Koreans’ intention in this flight and why have they given us 

advance notice? 

General O’Reilly. Sir, they are behaving as if it is required because of a space treaty. If you are going to launch, you are required—by a certain point of time you are required to notify of a 

peaceful launch—and especially booster drop zones for warnings to 

mariners or aircraft; and that is international convention. So they 

are following international convention. 

However, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718, prevents them 

from participating in this type of activity. So even though they are 

doing it, it is in violation of a U.N. Security Council resolution. 


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Also, the South Koreans have publicly announced that they are 

working with putting a satellite into orbit with the Russians. And 

the Russians offer that service; they have been doing it for decades, 

putting others—and so it might be that they, in fact, are trying to 

compete with South Korea in this area. 

But what we have noticed about the North Koreans is not so 

much that they are going to have the capability to attack the 

United States, or that would be rational for them; it is their arms 

sales, and they do make a significant amount of profit by selling 

these weapons around the world. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Tiahrt. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

WORLD BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT

General O’Reilly, you said earlier, I think, that outside of China 

and Russia there are 5,600 ballistic missiles? 

General O’REILLY. Outside of United States, China and Russia, 

yes, sir, today. 

Mr. TIAHRT. We had heard 3,000 before, but I think 5,600 really 

emphasizes the risk that is involved here. 

Now, I think—Iran, have they put a satellite in orbit yet or are 

they attempting to do that? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, they did, on the 2nd of February. 

Mr. TIAHRT. And China—or excuse me, North Korea is attempting to put a satellite into orbit now, they say? 

General O’REILLY. That is their claim, yes, sir. 

Mr. TIAHRT. So if you can put a satellite into space, how much 

more difficult is it to put a warhead at a certain point on the 

ground? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the only other technology you need is reentry technology. And Iran has demonstrated, and North Korea, 

that they have perfected that ability, to withstand the reentry. 

Mr. TIAHRT. They have the algorithms, and so that capability is 

there? 

General O’REILLY. Their technical capability is there. They have 

shown on every—the most difficult in all of it is staging, and they 

have shown they can do controlled staging now. 

Mr. TIAHRT. ———. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the issue with missile defense is that each 

of our missile systems has been developed against a particular 

class of target, because each of these targets has different physics 

characteristics. 

So we have—PAC–3 that works very good in the atmosphere 

against not only ballistic missiles, but also against cruise missiles. 

The THAAD and Aegis are best for 1,000- to 3,000-kilometer 

threats. And beyond that it is GMD. 

However, boost-phase intercept or early-ascent intercept, as I 

was referring to before, it doesn’t matter which class, it is most 

versatile because it would destroy the target, no matter what its 

range was. 


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DEFENSE AGAINST MULTIPLE LAUNCHES

Mr. TIAHRT. So you think the ABL is the most versatile? 

General O’REILLY. It can handle the largest raid size. 

And I apologize, sir, I have not talked about raid size. That is 

another issue. We have talked about certain threats. But when you 

get into raid size, countries have shown they have practiced 

launching 8 or 10 at a time. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Multiple launches? 

General O’REILLY. Multiple launches simultaneously, and ABL 

would be in the best position to take on multiple launch. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Is our test program—you just pointed out an individual launch versus a multiple launch. Is our test program for the 

ABL including this more versatile capability, or are we just focused 

on a single launch so far in our test requirements? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we have set up knowledge points that are 

technical milestones. The first technical milestone is against the 

single launch. 

However, we are going through a replan of our test program, and 

that is one of the capabilities we need to demonstrate with the ABL 

a multiple launch scenario. We have done it now with the Aegis 

program, two different types of Aegis missiles. We have launched 

two interceptors against one target with Aegis. 

So in all of our missile programs, we are planning for multiple 

intercepts in the future. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Is it in the current plan for ABL to test against multiple targets? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, our planning up till now is just the first 

intercept, and we haven’t developed—we are developing now the 

plans that—— 

ABL TESTING

Mr. TIAHRT. So, if I understand this right, we know we have— 

Iran and North Korea have done multiple launches, and so we 

know what the threat is. And you have explained how they can 

bring munitions up, and China can do that, as well. But our test 

program is only against an individual target. 

Do you think we should have a more robust, test program for the 

ABL than what we currently have authorized and funded? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. We are planning—as we speak, we 

are working with the operational test agencies, AFOTEC (Air Force 

Operational Test and Evaluation Center) for the Air Force and the 

Director of Operational Test A and Evaluation, and the Army and 

Navy, in order to develop that very test plan that you are talking 

about. 

We expect to deliver this plan in May, and it will be a comprehensive plan for all of our systems, including ABL. 

Mr. TIAHRT. But it hasn’t been authorized yet? 

General O’REILLY. We have not requested that level of funding 

for multiple intercepts. 

Mr. TIAHRT. But the threat is real? 

General O’REILLY. The threat is real, yes, sir. And that is being 

taken into consideration with this test plan. 

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 


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Mr. Bishop—now, we are going to keep this going because we are 

going to have a motion to recommit at some point. So we will have 

another 15 to 20 minutes. 

Mr. KINGSTON. One vote, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. DICKS. A whole series of votes, but I think we should try to 

keep this going. People who can go up, go up and vote and come 

back, and then we will keep moving through this. 

Mr. Bishop. 

NK AND IRANIAN MISSILE TECHNOLOGY

Mr. BISHOP. General, I have served on the Intelligence Committee and actually traveled to North Korea toward the end of the 

Clinton administration and engaged in talks with the high-level 

North Korean leaders with regard to their missile systems and the 

sale of arms to Iran and Syria and some other places where they 

were selling them. 

And, basically, their position was that they weren’t able to feed 

their people because they just couldn’t provide adequate food, and 

so they had to raise funds in the best way that they could. And the 

only thing they had to export was missile systems, and that is 

what they are doing, because they were proud and they wanted to 

be self-sufficient. 

Self-reliance is their motto. And they didn’t really care who they 

sold them to; they just needed to get revenue to take care of their 

people. And if we wanted to buy their missiles, they would sell 

them to us instead of selling them to the Iranians. 

But I noticed in your testimony that the Iranians basically have 

performed the same kinds of tests that the North Koreans are performing. 

WORLD BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT

General O’REILLY. ———. 

And as these missile systems proliferate, there are over 20 countries beyond just Iran and North Korea now that have them, but 

they are the major suppliers. 

Mr. BISHOP. That is in the 5,600 that you referred to? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Who are they? 

General O’REILLY. I can provide that for the record the number, 

the names of all the countries. But Libya is another one, for example, Syria, Pakistan, Vietnam. These are all countries, and there 

are over 20—I believe it is 23 today—outside of the United States, 

Russia and China. 

So it does stress our systems, sir, and the quantities, when you 

look at raid sizes, even if we have a Patriot system at a location, 

the number of launchers today is over 500. So 5,600 missiles, but 

there are over 500 launchers. ———. 

COST OF MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS

So it is not only stressing, sir, in terms of the sheer inventory, 

but also, even if we have missile defenses in a location, we need 

to have enough capability to take on a large raid size. 


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Mr. BISHOP. Is that a function of resources on your part, to be 

able to develop that as well as the time that it will take to develop 

it? 

Do you have the fiscal resources? Do you have the human resources with the technical skills to do that at a rate that would be 

necessary for us to be adequately protected? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, today, we do not have the the capability 

to counter all of the threats I mentioned, so it does take diplomacy, 

nonproliferation and other aspects of it. 

But to directly answer your question, this is part of my input 

into the new administration, and it is under consideration now on 

the budget next year. And those decisions have not been completed 

yet, but they are being taken into consideration by the administration on what it would take, over what period of time. ———. 

Mr. BISHOP. How much does that cost? 

General O’REILLY. A THAAD missile is $10 million apiece, approximately, and an Aegis is approximately the same. But, sir, that 

is what is being taken into account as we speak. 

HUMAN RESOURCES FOR MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. BISHOP. What about the human resources? Do we have the 

scientists, the engineers, the people, the HUMINT personnel that 

will have to develop that architecture? Do we have those people in 

place? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I believe we have it in place, but it is very 

stressing. One of the benefits of the Missile Defense Agency, frankly, is that the national level of resources in science and engineering 

who must all be U.S. citizens to work on this for classification reasons. 

I spend a lot of time in the schools today for this very reason. 

With respect to U.S. engineering students, I have been at Auburn, 

Tuskegee, Alabama A&M, Georgia Tech and others. We are looking 

in the South because the BRAC is moving a lot of jobs to the South. 

But, sir, I am very concerned about this. And I do spend time in 

schools talking to deans of engineering for this very reason. We 

need to husband what capabilities we have today, and central development is about the best way to do it. 

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Kingston. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, Ms. Granger was here first, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. All right. We will go right to Ms. Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

I want to return to Mr. Moran’s questions concerning the Israeli 

development of the Arrow-3 missile, and you talked about your concerns. What I understood was, the proposed cost, Israel’s projected 

cost, timeframe, I want to know if you would expand on that. And 

also the idea of using the ground-based SM–3 requirements at the 

time, could you address that? 

General O’REILLY. Thank you, ma’am. 

The design concept that the Israelis are proposing for the Arrow– 

3 takes all of the most sophisticated technical aspects of our current interceptor system and goes beyond that. THAAD, for example, was a 9-year development. 


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They are proposing to do it in 3, so even at the very high level, 

you can see they are proposing extremely rapid development of this 

that we have never been able to do, and with more sophisticated 

technology. I have asked MIT Lincoln Labs and Johns Hopkins 

APL to do independent assessments, and they have had the same 

results, they concurred that this is a very high-risk schedule. The 

concern is, there is need today or soon to have an upper-tier capability. 

We have an existing missile, the Aegis missile system, that is 

proven on board ships. But we actually test our standard missiles 

(SM–3) on the land anyway. So it is not a very high risk to deploy 

them, to develop land-based launchers for this. 

We are continuing to do a concept development of this land based 

SM–3, to be used for the Israelis, if they need this capability sooner, which we believe they will; also there are significant applications for the United States and remote sites such as Guam, 

Shemya, Alaska, Thule, Greenland and so forth where this would 

give you that capability also. 

U.S. STRATCOM has asked me, independent of the Israelis, to 

look at the land-based SM–3 application, and we are doing that 

now, ma’am. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

I yield back my time. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hinchey. 

ISRAEL MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General, thank you for all of this information. It is really very 

fascinating, and it makes it a lot clearer to us the kinds of things 

we have to do in order to strengthen our security here and the security of our naval operations and other places around the world. 

I am wondering if you can tell us what the missile capability of 

Israel is right now. 

General O’REILLY. ———. 

ALLIED MISSILE CAPABILITY

Mr. HINCHEY. What is their capability for missile action, not just 

defense, but for launching missiles? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I know they have the Jericho and other 

systems, but I am not a subject matter expert on that. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Why is that? 

General O’REILLY. Because they are not in our threat list, and 

we don’t study them, honestly, sir, as far as how to counter—— 

Mr. HINCHEY. Who does study them? 

General O’REILLY. The Intel Community can provide that in detail, sir. 

Mr. HINCHEY. But you don’t have the ability to tell us what 

their—— 

General O’REILLY. No, sir. I have not studied their offensive capability for the purpose that we are focused on, defensive capabilities in MDA. 

Mr. HINCHEY. What about the missile capability of some European countries, France, say, for example? 

General O’REILLY. Missile defense capability, sir—— 


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Mr. HINCHEY. Not missile defense capability but missile launching capability. 

General O’REILLY. Against our allies, sir, we have not studied 

their capability. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Not studied them. Why is that? 

General O’REILLY. Again, sir, we are focused against near-term 

threats, and our allies are not near-term threats, sir. But I will tell 

you that—— 

ALLIED MISSILE CAPABILITY

Mr. HINCHEY. I can’t help but be amused by that. I mean, it just 

is amazing. 

Mr. DICKS. But the Intelligence Community does look at this 

very seriously. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. This is kind of a division of responsibility. 

Mr. HINCHEY. I understand that, and that is a question that we 

can ask them. But this is a situation that ought to be—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. HINCHEY. It ought to be of equal concern, you know, to you, 

I would think. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Will the gentleman yield for one question? Do we 

have the missile defense scenario—— 

Mr. HINCHEY. Yes, I will yield. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Maurice. 

A missile defense scenario against Great Britain? 

General O’REILLY. No. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman’s time has expired. I don’t want the 

gentleman to miss this vote. 

You haven’t voted yet, have you? 

Mr. HINCHEY. No, I have not. 

Mr. DICKS. I would love for you to go vote and come back. 

Mr. Kingston. 

DEFENSE OF U.S. AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I think you have covered this in bits and pieces, but I 

just wanted to get this in, so I apologize if you have to repeat yourself. But if a ballistic missile was launched towards the United 

States, what system do we have to defend ourselves? And what is 

the probability of success? ———. 

Mr. KINGSTON. But we don’t have that on China. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we are not aimed at China. 

EVOLVING THREAT TECHNOLOGY

Mr. KINGSTON. I think a major takeaway, though, here is that in 

the world of technology, evolving almost on a daily basis, that we 

absolutely have to stay in the game and that, if we are safe, say, 

today, April 2009, April 2010 could be a totally different scenario 

because of the technology that is changing. Is that accurate? 

———. 


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Mr. KINGSTON. Do I have time for another question, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes, one quick one. 

WHAT PRIORITY MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. KINGSTON. Let me ask you a philosophical question. I am not 

necessarily in this school of thought, but in terms of global warming, I have great respect for those who believe in it because, if global warming is true, then it is maybe the only issue that is out 

there, because it is certainly a threat to everything. 

So just sort of using that analogy, in terms of this missile race, 

if it is accurately called that, that we are in, what kind of priority 

should Members of Congress and this committee, particularly, consider it? The top number-one priority, even before the economy? Or 

is it just something we need to be aware of and support? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I would believe terrorism is the concern, 

and the use of missiles as part of a terrorist act is a very high probability. Whether a nation-state would strike us I believe is a much 

lower probability. 

The concern with the proliferation is actually the security of all 

of these systems out there. How many people does it take? It takes 

a squad of less than 20 people to launch one of these—so extremist 

parts of organizations or militaries or failed states could launch 

these system. 

So, to fully answer your question, sir, I talked about the longrange threats; we are also responsible for short-range threats. 

When we test THAAD, for example, we always test it on a barge 

off of Kauai to simulate a launch, an asymmetric-type attack where 

a small group off a container ship or something could launch a 

Scud or a shorter-range system, a more available system, towards 

the United States. 

We do not have a defense in place today against that. We have 

been developing the architectures. This committee has funded our 

studies for that. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, let me just get a one-word answer. On a 

scale of one to 10—unlike global warming, which we can discuss 

publicly, this is a classified briefing, and so much of this information is classified, and we can’t discuss it in the ordinary public 

forum—but where should this be rated in terms of—right now, 

polls show over and over again the economy is the number-one 

issue. Where should this be, in your world, from your point of view? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, from my point of view—— 

Mr. KINGSTON. On a scale of one to 10. 

General O’REILLY. The odds, over the next decade, that our deployed forces or a U.S. area of interest is going to be vulnerable to 

an attack by ballistic missiles is extremely high. But that is my 

point of view from what I see. I am not an intel person, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Now, this is what we are going to try to do here. We have two 

votes coming right up and then a motion to recommit. So let’s go 

up, all of us, and we will come back with Ms. Kilpatrick. We will 

make this vote and the next vote and then come back, because we 

are going to have a motion to recommit, and that will take 25 minutes, and we can pretty much wrap this up. Okay? 


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[Recess.] 

Mr. DICKS. The committee will come back to order. 

Ms. Kilpatrick, we recognize you, for 5 minutes. 

NORTH KOREA MISSILE LAUNCH

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, General. How are you? 

I have a few things, I think. North Korea is where I want to go 

first. ———. 

General O’REILLY. ———. That is what I am used to seeing. However, if you had a globe 

and you launched it over the Pole, I would have to get back to you, 

ma’am, if it could actually hit Israel, but it would hit a large part 

of—— 

[The information follows:] 

Based upon the intelligence assessed range of the North Korean TD–2 2-Stage 

and 3-Stage variants, the TD–2 could reach Israel and either portions or all of Europe depending on the threat variant. 

Mr. KILPATRICK. South America, U.S. and other territory. 

You also said earlier, or they said in this testimony, the private, 

confidential testimony, that they are prepared to shoot down any 

U.S. reconnaissance asset interfering with the launch. 

Two things—the launch is permissible or meets a standard in the 

international realm, but I think you also said in the U.N. treaty 

it is against the law, it is in violation. 

General O’REILLY. Yes. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Two things, then. Will the U.N., if anything, 

take action, number one? 

And if they are bold enough to say North Korea will shoot down 

any U.S. reconnaissance—and the back of my mind is ringing Iran 

and others—they feel like they have the capability, the permission, 

and the know-how to do just that, don’t they? ———. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Oh, that is China. Okay. That is a good thing. 

I have been wrestling with that. 

Are we ready to, as they said, shoot down any North Korea missile that comes our way and South America’s way and anything in 

this part of the hemisphere? 

General O’REILLY. The actual answer to that, ma’am, is the way 

the system is set up, our ground-based midcourse defense and our 

ballistic missile defense system, is the system—we define the defended area, and our defended area is the United States. If there 

is an object coming into that defended area, regardless of what it 

is, we will shoot at it. That gives us defense against something 

coming in. 

If it is outside our defended area, like Mexico or some other 

place, we will not engage it. The system only engages—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. If it is coming towards us. 

General O’REILLY [continuing]. If it is coming towards us. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. But will you have to hit it over South America 

or in airspace? I mean, do you know that? Can the technology tell 

you how precisely where to hit it to avoid the other countries? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, ma’am. Yes, we do know what the debris 

damage would be. Two things; one is that, when you intercept a 

missile like that, the debris goes in the direction of the original 


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missile, where it was heading. It just falls about 10 percent short. 

So if it was heading towards Seattle and we intercepted it, the debris would fall in the ocean short of—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Don’t use Seattle—— 

General O’REILLY. Probably a very bad choice of—— 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Right, bad choice. 

General O’REILLY. So, Portland. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Anywhere in the U.S. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, ma’am. In the case of North Korea, our 

intercept zones are over the Pacific Ocean. But, again, if it was 

going into an area outside the defended area of the United States, 

we would not engage it. The system watches it, but it doesn’t engage. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General. 

ABL/KEI PROGRAMS

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

What specific criteria—affordability, operational, effectiveness, et 

cetera—will the Department use to make the down-select decision 

between ABL and KEI? And why don’t you tell us a little bit about 

the KEI program? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the strategy is that, after we have met 

successful technical milestones for both programs, there would be 

an evaluation of the most advantageous program to proceed with. 

However, unfortunately, for the KEI program, there are some early 

milestones that still have not been achieved, and ABL is closing in 

on its final milestone, which would be a shoot-down. So, between 

the two programs, they are several years apart in maturity, at this 

point. 

KEI, over the past year, has suffered—as I was saying in my 

opening remarks, it is one of the programs that I am concerned 

about with quality control. When they were testing their first and 

second stage on the ground, their booster, they, in fact, had failures, where the rocket motors themselves burst under pressure, 

which we then had to go back. We have repaired it, we have determined what the failure was, the defect, and we have now successfully tested it. However, then we had problems with their thrust 

vector controller that controls the nozzle at the end of the KEI 

booster. We have had a series of failures there. And in our most 

recent test, new failure mechanisms also emerged. 

So we are still struggling with the very first milestone, which 

would be a launch of the KEI without an intercept or a kill vehicle 

on the front end. So, from a maturity point of view, ABL is several 

years ahead of KEI. 

Mr. DICKS. ———. 

General O’REILLY. ———. 

However, when we looked at the program, we found that we were 

testing this high-powered laser against some instrumentation missiles; yet we weren’t going forward and shooting a target, even 

though we were paying for everything except a target, leading up— 

these were several tests that lead up to a final shoot-down. 

So what we are looking at doing, what I would like to do, is to 

fly targets even on those earlier tests, so that, in fact, we can learn 


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even more. If we are not successful on shooting down, we gain more 

data from that. So what I have introduced is a minimum of two 

more targets on earlier tests that were going to lead up to the previous target. ———. 

Mr. DICKS. We are still not sure about the budget, though, for 

2010? 

General O’REILLY. As for 2010, sir, most of the activities I have 

just described are in 2009. 

Mr. DICKS. So, really, it is going to be, in some ways, how well 

this thing does on these tests that will kind of determine the future 

of this program. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. All right. 

Ms. Kaptur. 

EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General, we apologize for all these votes. You can tell we 

don’t control the schedule here. 

My questions largely concern the European missile defense system and the status of various agreements. 

And one of my first questions really is, why was the decision 

made to move forward on a bilateral, rather than a multilateral, 

NATO-based set of decisions, for Poland and Czechoslovakia relating to missile defense? 

General O’REILLY. Ma’am, there are two answers there. One is 

that we do have a NATO missile defense activity that has been 

going on for over a decade. In two particular areas, the command 

and control system, the air command and control system, the U.S. 

has had a representative on that program to build a command and 

control system for anti-aircraft, but also it works with missile defense. So we have been doing that for over 10 years. 

Second of all, they have the Active Layered Theatre Missile Defense Program, which is also underway—it is at least 5 years old. 

I would have to get the exact data on when it started. However, 

the deputy program manager of that NATO program works for me, 

is a member of the Missile Defense Agency. We fully support those 

activities. Those activities are aimed at NATO command and control over different assets and to study different missile defense the 

architectures, to select the best one. 

Also, the Committee of North Atlantic Armaments Directors, the 

CNAD part of NATO, has been doing studies at the direction of the 

NATO ministers to study missile defense architectures and determine their feasibility. And the different study panels—there are 

several which my personnel not only participate on but actually 

lead the panels. 

So we are very engaged with working with NATO. Our entire 

system is designed with NATO protocols from the ground up so 

that we can interface effectively. We use the NATO standards, so 

we can work directly with NATO. 

In the area of the Czech Republic and Poland, many of the weapons systems that NATO has today were done just that way. The 

countries will come forth and contribute what technologies and 


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what capabilities they have. That is a fairly standard way to contribute military capability to NATO. 

So this was more of a standard path that we were using where 

we were going to—the previous administration’s proposal, was that 

the countries involved in the upper-tier defense of NATO would be 

the United States; Denmark, which works with us on the radar up 

in Thule, Greenland; and the U.K. currently are all involved. And 

they have the Fylingdales radar in the U.K., which is a missile defense. And then the Poles and the Czechs were offering their land 

and their security and the contributions they were making. 

And so we would contribute the upper tier. But that is an incomplete defense system. You still need a lower-tier system, which the 

other programs I was telling you about are looking at. So this was 

a contribution to NATO, but it does need other contributions from 

other countries to make it whole. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, several of our European allies have expressed 

concern about the way the decisions and negotiations were conducted with Poland and the Czech Republic, as not having gone 

through NATO. Are you saying that the decisions relating to placement and so forth came through NATO? 

General O’REILLY. No, ma’am, they did not. But it is similar to 

the MEADS program and some of the other programs we have with 

other countries. They also did not come through NATO? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Do you think this could potentially be a point of 

conjecture within the alliance, a divisive point within the alliance? 

General O’REILLY. Ma’am, last year at the Bucharest summit in 

April, all 26 countries announced support for the U.S.-proposed 

upper-tier system. So we have not seen that it is divisive. I have 

been at NATO many times and talked to the Secretary-General, 

and he has said the opposite, that it is a unifying—because the 

threat is to all the countries, and it is a unifying issue. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, there is conjecture within both Poland, for 

sure, and I can’t speak as much for the Czech Republic, on this 

whole system right now. And public opinion is shifting within the 

nations themselves. 

My question is, what formal requirements does NATO have for 

missile defense in Europe? And is it true that the U.S. taxpayers 

are going to, if it happens, foot the entire bill for this? 

General O’REILLY. Ma’am, from the point of the view on the U.S. 

taxpayers, it has been our proposal to—we would not pay for all 

of it. There is a substantial operations and support cost that the 

host nations have agreed to—the security of the systems, the land 

itself, and so forth. There is a lot in those agreements, that they 

contribute. 

One aspect of this, though, is the fact that the current proposal 

for the ground-based interceptors in Poland, provide a substantial 

coverage of the United States also. So there is a benefit directly to 

our defense by having it there, and that is part of the justification 

for why the U.S. would pay a large part of that, the majority of it. 

One, we have the technology, but, two, it is directly beneficial to 

the United States. 

What you would like to do for a launch from Iran would be to 

have an early intercept attempt and, if it is not successful, then use 

our system in Alaska for a second attempt. So this gives us a very 


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good first shot at anything coming out of Iran, which was the 

threat they were concerned about. 

Mr. DICKS. Would you yield on that point? 

Ms. KAPTUR. I would be pleased to. 

Mr. DICKS. There are some people who don’t agree with that, 

right? Aren’t there some people who say we picked the wrong missile for a defensive missile for Poland? 

General O’REILLY. ———. The concern there was, when IDA did an independent assessment, what would it cost for 30 years of defending Europe, using 

Aegis ships the cost is $28 billion or greater. From the proposed 

Polish and Czech land-based system, it would be $14 billion. So, 

from a cost point of view, it is substantially less expensive to have 

this fixed site. However, there are other alternatives we have seen, 

including a land-based SM–3. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I just wanted to say, with the politics in that region, this issue is—the Czech Parliament hasn’t been able to clear 

it now, as I understand it, and there is changing public opinion in 

Poland. We have the issue with Russian relations and a new administration trying to embrace that whole situation there. 

I just want to be clear. What has NATO agreed to with regard 

to missile defense in Europe? And what formal requirements does 

NATO have—formal, underline ‘‘formal’’—for missile defense in Europe? 

General O’REILLY. Formally, ma’am, in their joint statement last 

year at the Bucharest summit, they stated they recognized there is 

a missile defense threat, which is part of a requirement. They also 

stated that they recognize the benefits from a U.S. system to 

counter that threat. 

They also established, to your point, studies to report at this 

summit, which is meeting as we speak, to look at what the formal 

requirements are for lower-tier capability that has to go underneath the system that we were proposing. 

So, to answer your question, they have acknowledged the threat 

in a formal way, and they have also formally studied or are formally studying what the requirements should be. They have established that the command and control for a missile defense system 

in NATO—this is a formal requirement—needs to be in place by 

2012 so we have a design. And then they have a second command 

and control phase to look at a more advanced command and control 

for upper-tier systems, which is still under study at this time. And 

I have personnel on those panels—— 

Ms. KAPTUR. General, to what do you attribute the declining popularity of this within the Eastern European community? 

General O’REILLY. Ma’am, I can’t directly account for that. I acknowledge I have spent a lot of time there personally addressing 

with mayors and their members of parliament and such, and there 

is a substantial opposition to that. And my direct contacts have 

been at the government level. 

But we are restricted from using any funding until those matters 

or at least the ratifications are complete. Our latest understanding 

is that the Czech Government has deferred the vote in the lower 

parliament. Their upper parliament has approved going forward 

with the radar in the Czech Republic. They have deferred the vote 


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in the lower house until after their elections in the fall. So this will 

be a substantial delay to the current plans, as a minimum. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I would just state, in closing, that I would hate to 

see where technology led the way versus geostrategic interests. 

And I hope that our State Department, I am sure with our Ambassadors and so forth, will help us to iron this out. I just think it is 

very sensitive. 

And I thank you very much, General. 

Mr. DICKS. The time has expired. 

Ms. Granger. 

Ms. GRANGER. I don’t have any questions. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Kingston. 

LTG O’REILLY’S MAJOR POINTS

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, in a few hours we will all be voting on a budget, and 

it will be, I don’t know, a thousand pages; I am not even sure how 

long. But most of us will get 30 seconds to explain why we voted 

‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no,’’ maybe 2 minutes if we are lucky, and we will have 

three points that we can make in support or against the budget. 

What are your three points that you can walk away from here 

with? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, number one is the threat is growing, and 

the approach to the threat needs to be a multidimensional use of 

our power. As you were saying, ma’am, it is a combination of diplomacy, policy, and the technology that I bring forward. 

And the third point is, we need to invest in staying in front of 

the type of threats we have heard about this morning. The reason 

we have capability today was research and development work occurring 10 or 15 years ago. And there is a need for us to have the 

alternatives so an administration has various options in how to 

react to these different types of situations. 

Mr. KINGSTON. What is that investment level, the dollar amount? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, my budget in fiscal year 2009 was $9.3 

billion. The budget in 2010 is under deliberation at this time. 

Mr. KINGSTON. What do you hope it will be? 

General O’REILLY. You know, sir, to be straightforward—— 

Mr. KINGSTON. You didn’t get your four stars by speaking needlessly, did you? 

General O’REILLY. No, no. To be honest, this administration has 

asked me very pointed, very good questions along the lines of 

which we have discussed this morning. Specifically—and so, from 

that, it depends on the policy that you are going to move forward 

with. ———. 

Mr. KINGSTON. You know, this is a numbers and a dollars committee. And it would be useful to us, as this process goes, if you 

circled back and say, ‘‘okay, it was $9.3 billion last year; the proposal is $11 billion, whatever, we are comfortable,’’ and maybe communicate that beyond the chairman and ranking member so the 

rest of us know, if that is possible, when the time is appropriate. 

The other thing, getting back to Ms. Kaptur’s and your description of multidimensional defense, it would be nice to know, also, is 

there an appropriate ramp-up or adjustment in the diplomacy—do 

you talk to the State Department, for example, and are they comVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00394 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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fortable? Because if you are going around talking to European 

NATO mayors and allies and so forth and we are losing ground on 

the need for this for them, maybe the State Department budget has 

to reflect that we have to do a better job. And so it would be nice 

to know that, on the three levels, that there was consideration with 

the others. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, thank you for bringing up that point. I 

work very closely with the State Department, both under the past 

administration and the current administration. 

Our activities in the Missile Defense Agency are technological 

only, but when I talk to those mayors and so forth, there is always 

an Ambassador right next to me, and I am under his guidance, or 

an Under Secretary of State. 

So we have had in the previous administration and we continue 

to have in this administration very close coordination on this, so 

that it is, in fact, the U.S. Government and not just one agency 

within the government that is interfacing with our allies on the 

international scene. 

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Rothman. 

FUNDING ISRAEL MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, in the 2009 fiscal year budget, this committee, as you indicated earlier, appropriated $30 million for the Arrow-3. And I 

understand that you are working to enter into an agreement with 

the Israelis, among other things, to protect U.S. intellectual property rights to whatever is developed in that program. 

I know it takes two to tango, meaning the level of cooperation 

you get from the other side is important, but do you have any notion as to when you think that agreement will be completed so that 

the money can be appropriated, as was the intention of our committee? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I was in Israel 5 weeks ago to begin that 

negotiation, but I couldn’t move forward in good-faith negotiation 

without knowing what the budget and the policy of the new administration was. They are formulating it now. I am prepared and I 

have notified as recently as yesterday the Israelis that we want to 

begin this work as soon as possible. 

Typically, after I have negotiated with my counterpart, at that 

point it typically takes about 4 months of review and approval 

above my level with the Secretary of Defense and the interagencies, 

State Department and so forth. So that is the timeline I am looking 

at, sir, about 4 months after we have come to an agreement. 

We believe we are very close. We have had a lot of preliminary 

discussion. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So that 4-month clock has not yet started? 

General O’REILLY. It has not yet started. And, sir, it is not unprecedented. We just signed one about a month ago. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Right. And it won’t start until two things happen: 

you come to an agreement on terms, and you know what this administration’s predilections are with regards—— 

General O’REILLY. Well, I need approval, sir, up to the Secretary 

of Defense level. 


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Mr. ROTHMAN. Well, didn’t they already approve the $30 million? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir, but what they are approving is the 

terms of the agreement. Not are we going to do it or not, it is the 

actual terms of the agreement that are in place. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So maybe I misunderstood you. I thought you saying that you were looking to the next budget to give you an indication of how this administration feels about the Arrow-3 and our 

missile system before you could engage completely in those negotiations. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, our program agreements contain an entire 

funding line, and I don’t have insight into what those out-years 

would be, so that we can come to an agreement of—and that is 

what we have always done with other programs. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So you are waiting for the budget, then. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. But this is a 1-year budget, right? 

General O’REILLY. There is also a POM—associate with it, a 5- 

year Program Objective Memorandum that goes with that. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And when is that POM due, General? 

General O’REILLY. The actual delivery date of the POM, I would 

have to—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Approximately—— 

General O’REILLY. It is within the budget or—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Before June? 

General O’REILLY [continuing]. Inside the Pentagon processes. 

But, yes, sir, it is typically done by this time. And, again, it is 

being delayed because of the budget delay. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. So you should know what the 5-year plan is by 

June and hopefully finish your negotiations by then. And then 4 

months after that, there should be an appropriation. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, that is a typical timeline. Unless there is 

something unusual, that is what we have done. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, General. 

Ms. KAPTUR [presiding]. I thank the gentleman. 

Ms. Granger, do you have any questions at this point? 

Ms. Granger yields at this point. You have no questions? 

All right, then Ms. Kilpatrick. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I will pass. 

Mr. KAPTUR. You will pass. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I have one quick one. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Yes, Mr. Kingston. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Madam Chair, thank you. 

General, a minute ago, Mr. Bishop and I were talking to you 

about communicating this, and you spoke of an unclassified article. 

I just wanted to let the committee know that there is a good 

takeaway here on things that we can talk about that are unclassified that would help educate our constituents on the importance of 

this—— 

Mr. BISHOP. And our colleagues. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And committee members. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Absolutely. And it might be something that we, 

as a committee, might want to send out to the 435 Members and 

sign it on a bipartisan basis and say, ‘‘Just to remind you that this 


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is out there.’’ Because I am just very concerned about the education 

level, both internally and externally. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Which one was that? 

Mr. KINGSTON. The General mentioned an article. He doesn’t 

have it with him, but he is going to get it to us. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, ma’am. We have a booklet for this very 

reason, when I talk publicly, and to be able to address your point, 

sir. It is about 20 pages, and it describes the threat in an unclassified fashion to the greatest extent we can, and it has been approved by all of the Intel Community approvals needed. In fact, I 

use it at universities when I visit schools—Georgia Tech has it, 

Tuskegee has it. So it was produced in November. We can submit 

it for the record, sir, to the committee—— 

[The information follows:] 

Unclassified and approved for public release copy of ‘‘MDA Foreign Ballistic Missile Capabilities’’, dtd. April 2009 will be hand carried for submission. 

Mr. DICKS [presiding]. We would like to have that. 

General O’REILLY. And I can provide the electrons for that. But 

it does describe the threat very comprehensively, in an unclassified 

fashion, but it does make the points to a great extent what we have 

discussed here today. 

Mr. BISHOP. Can you just give it to the members also? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes, we have a lot of new members—— 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. We will make it available. 

MISSILE TESTING STRATEGY AND TARGETS

Mr. DICKS. The Department has spent billions on anti-defense 

missile systems, and there have been questions about testing and 

delayed tests. You mentioned some of this in your opening statement. You also talked about the targets. You have had a problem 

with targets. 

Why don’t you tell us generally what your strategy is on testing? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, for testing, this system is obviously extremely complex, and to test the full system at any one time literally would take more than the national range assets that we 

have in our Nation. A test can stretch easily from Colorado to Alaska to the Marshall Islands off of Australia. And we have done a 

lot of testing up till now that is short-range. The type of capability 

that we have talked about this morning requires these long-range 

tests. 

So I offered to the director of operational test and evaluation and 

each of the three services, their test organizations, to work collaboratively with them, starting last November, on reassessing the testing of the ballistic missile defense program, including short-range, 

long-range, and integrated, including our target needs and so forth. 

We are aimed at doing two things: One, determining what information do we need to validate our models in simulation so we have 

confidence in them. Because, obviously, with these big tests, they 

cost as much as a quarter of a billion a test and about 40 minutes 

to execute. So that is a very expensive way to go. 

So we want to be very careful and come to an agreement, which 

we have today, over what data we need. There are 95 variables 


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that we all agree with, including Dr. McQueary, the director of 

operational test and evaluation. 

Today, we now that we know the data we need, we are determining what test scenarios need to execute. We are completing that 

work this month. Once we have determined that, the final stage is 

to determine what resources do we need in order to execute that 

test program. 

My predecessors, in the approach over the last few years for the 

Missile Defense Agency, is to plan testing 2 years at a time. That 

leaves you at a disadvantage. With a very comprehensive test program like I just described, you really need to lay out 5, 6 years’ 

worth of testing. So that is what I propose to do with Dr. 

McQueary at the end of May and lay out the plans and requirements. 

In the area of targets, we spend a tremendous amount of time, 

money, and resources on targets, and we do have a lot of failure. 

This is part of the reason we do use actual targets—we use a lot 

of actual targets that we buy off the arms market that are the actual missiles that we are concerned about, and they sometimes 

have failures. 

But there has been a disturbing rate of failures in the development of our newest class of targets. The production qualification of 

that target is 2 years late, and it is extensively overrun. It is an 

ICBM-class target, intermediate-range and ICBM class. It will fly 

for the first time this summer, and it will have a second flight in 

the fall. 

At this point in time, I have made the decision that the development costs and the productivity of the contractor has had such concerns that I have gone to industry and asked them, what could you 

offer as an alternative? The period for that closes at the end of the 

week, then I will have that input. And we have finished the market 

survey, and this summer we will make a determination of whether 

or not we are going to compete this target program and give it to 

another contractor. 

That is my position, my intent, at this time, sir, to look at a better way to acquire targets more effectively and also buy them in 

large quantities, which are much cheaper than the way we are 

doing now, where we are buying them one at a time. 

MISSILE DEFENSE FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. I am going to do one more question here, and then 

I will come to you, Mr. Bishop. 

What effort has the Department undertaken to assess missile defense force structure requirements? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we have entered into a very effective program with the Strategic Command, STRATCOM, as the lead, representing all the co-coms and the three services, in order to determine a prioritized capabilities list, is the title of it. It is a list produced every 2 years, and it says this is their prioritized missile defense capabilities which they believe they need. 

They submit it to a new board that was started last year that 

is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, but 

it has representation of all of the Under Secretaries of Defense and 


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the State Department, the co-com commanders, and the Joint 

Chiefs. In that process, they approve this prioritized capabilities 

list. 

The Missile Defense Agency responds back to what we believe we 

can achieve from an affordability and from a technology point of 

view. The they produce a final report to us, which is the basis of 

our budget submissions and our POMs. We have just received one 

about a month ago, and we are using that input in the budget deliberations today. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay, good. 

Mr. Bishop. 

ACQUIRING THREAT TARGETS

Mr. BISHOP. ———. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. ———. 

But some of our failures—if we buy a Scud, it is a very, very robust Scud; never had a failure on that. It is when they try to take 

these missiles and they try to extend the range of them or they do 

something to affect the design, they get into trouble sometimes. 

———. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. One final thing. In this discussion we had previously 

about force structure, are the combatant commanders brought into 

this? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. They work—as a continual process, 

STRATCOM has the lead, but all the combatant commanders are 

represented. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay, good. This committee will adjourn and reconvene at 2:00 p.m. today for an unclassified briefing on BlackBerry 

security issues. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

EUROPEAN SITES AND THREATS

Question. Iran does not currently have the capability to reach the United States 

with a ballistic missile, although they continue to show interest in acquiring longerrange missiles. On the other hand, North Korea is developing a long-range missile 

(i.e., the Taepo-Dong II) that has the potential to reach the United States. Although 

North Korea’s July 2006 flight test of the Taepo-Dong II failed, it is reasonable to 

believe that North Korea may plan tests in the future and could successfully test 

that missile. 

What’s the rationale for deploying our limited GBI interceptor inventory against 

a potential long-range threat (i.e., Iran) at the expense of the current and growing 

threat from North Korea? 

Answer. A total of 30 GBIs will be emplaced at FGA and Vandenberg, where they 

will be in a position to defend the United States against both the North Korean and 

Iranian ICBM threats. Ft. Greely, Alaska, was selected as a location for the primary 

GMD missile field for its ability to protect the U.S. from ICBMs launched from 

North Korea and Iran due to the velocity and timelines for GBIs to intercept ICBMs 

from either launch point prior to their entering U.S. airspace. 

Question. Do you believe you will have sufficient numbers of missile defense assets to defend our deployed forces and allies in the CENTCOM AOR against the current Iranian missile threat? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. Do we have the capability to support Aegis BMD operations in the 

CENTCOM AOR? 

Answer. ———. 


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U.S. PROVIDING FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

Question. Based on the current plan, it seems that the U.S. taxpayers will be picking up the costs of defending Europe from ballistic missile threats. 

Have you discussed this issue with the Europeans? 

Answer. The U.S. has proposed to contribute to the defense of Europe and provide 

redundant coverage of the Eastern U.S. by providing most of the funding for the 

upper tier European Missile Defense. The U.S. would not benefit from redundant 

U.S. coverage without the contribution of land and Host Nation support of Poland, 

the Czech Republic and Denmark (allowing the use of the Upgraded Early Warning 

Radar (UEWR) at Thule, Greenland) as well as use and operation of the UEWR by 

the British Royal Air Force located at Fylingdales, UK. Finally, the U.S. has proposed only to contribute to the upper tier of Europe’s defense. We are proposing 

other NATO nations contribute to the lower tier missile defense of Europe and our 

deployed forces in that theater. 

Question. If so, what type of contribution are they likely to make? 

Answer. The United Kingdom is contributing by hosting a U.S. Upgraded EWR 

(UEWR) at Fylingdales. Likewise, Denmark is contributing by hosting a UEWR 

(U.S. BMDS asset) in Thule, Greenland. NATO nations may elect to contribute 

lower tier missile defense systems to be integrated through the Active Layer Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program. Currently these systems are for 

the protection of deployed forces; however, at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in April 

2009, Heads of State and Government tasked NATO to ‘‘identify and undertake the 

policy, military and technical work related to a possible expanded role of the 

ALTBMD program beyond the protection of deployed forces to include territorial 

missile defense’’. 

Question. Are any European nations planning on procuring missile defense assets? 

Answer. Some European nations (Germany, Netherlands, Greece) have or are procuring Patriot systems. France is procuring a lower tier missile defense system, 

SAMP–T and Italy and Germany are procuring MEADS. The Netherlands is investigating the feasibility of putting missile defense capability on their destroyers and 

have committed FMS funding for this effort. Other nations like Germany, Denmark, 

France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom have invested in new air defense frigates/destroyers which may have the potential for being upgraded to an LRST capability in the future. 

Question. What has NATO agreed to do with regard to missile defense in Europe? 

Answer. The United Kingdom is contributing by hosting a U.S. Upgraded EWR 

(UEWR) at Fylingdales. Likewise, Denmark is contributing by hosting a UEWR 

(U.S. BMDS asset) in Thule, Greenland. NATO nations may elect to contribute 

lower tier missile defense systems to be integrated through the Active Layer Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program. Currently these systems are for 

the protection of deployed forces; however, at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in April 

2009, Heads of State and Government tasked NATO to ‘‘identify and undertake the 

policy, military and technical work related to a possible expanded role of the 

ALTBMD program beyond the protection of deployed forces to include territorial 

missile defense’’. 

Question. What infrastructure or other support for U.S. troops and our allies has 

been requested to be funded within the Services’ budgets? When? 

Answer. As the lead service for the European Interceptor Site, the Army developed requirements for garrison facilities in Poland. The Army budget for the European Interceptor Site will be $35M/year of O&S. Service O&S funding will begin 3 

years after construction starts. 

The Air Force has lead service responsibility for the European Midcourse Radar 

Site. Air Force will be meeting with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 

Europe District in June 2009 to discuss requirements for Air Force facilities in the 

Czech Republic. The Air Force budget for the European Midcourse Radar will be 

$3M/year of O&S. Service O&S funding will begin 2 years after construction starts. 

The mission facilities in the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) MILCON requests include the interceptor field, radar facility, power plants, communications facilities, 

and associated mission and mission support facilities and infrastructure. None of 

the MDA funding is programmed for service or garrison support infrastructure. 

However, the MDA has incorporated the Army and the Air Force in its requirements development, planning and design activities with the USACE to ensure that 

the Services are able to beneficially leverage and interface to the facilities and infrastructure that the MDA builds. 


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EUROPEAN SITE AND POLISH AND CZECH RELATIONS

Question. Originally there was strong public support in Poland and the Czech Republic for deploying U.S. missile defense capabilities in their respective territories. 

However, over the past several months, public support for the potential deployment 

has decreased. 

What have been the key reasons contributing to the change in public opinion in 

Poland or the Czech Republic? 

Answer. Public support for Missile Defense in the Czech Republic has traditionally been more tenuous than in Poland, where public support remains stronger. In 

both the Czech Republic and Poland, there are deeply held historical concerns about 

foreign troop presence on foreign soil which contributes to public concerns about the 

planned Missile Defense capabilities. However, as the recent fall of the Czech Republic government has shown, political trends in Prague are fluid and it is difficult 

to understand the trends of public support for Missile Defense. 

Question. Have the different political parties in Poland or the Czech Republic had 

an influence over the negotiations? 

Answer. During the negotiations on missile defense basing agreements and supplemental Status of Forces Agreements, both the Polish and Czech negotiating 

teams took the views of the major political parties into consideration in order to ensure the final documents would be acceptable to their parliaments. 

Question. What impact will this have on the U.S. decision to move forward? 

Answer. The FY09 Authorization and Appropriation law restricts the construction 

of the U.S. missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic until their parliaments ratify their respective Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements and associated 

Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA). Thus the political support for the missile defense sites is critical to the deployment of the current missile defense proposal for 

Europe. 

Question. What impact do the local entities have over the negotiations (i.e. mayors 

and local political leaders). 

Answer. U.S. negotiating teams have dealt with or are dealing directly with the 

Czech and Polish federal governments. At the same time, U.S. officials and teams 

have met with, briefed, and taken questions from local officials in both potential 

host nations. Finalization of the Implementing Agreements in both countries will be 

influenced by the local governments. 

Question. What effect does the Czech Parliamentary vote have on U.S. relations? 

Answer. The U.S. and the Czech Republic will continue to enjoy good relations 

on a broad range of topics regardless of the outcome of the vote on U.S. BMD deployments. 

USE OF THAAD AND AEGIS TO DEFEND EUROPE

One of the key rationales for deploying a GMD site in Europe is to protect our 

forward deployed radars in Europe. That said, if Iran decided to attack our European radars they would use medium and intermediate-range missiles, the type of 

missiles that THAAD and the SM–3 are designed to counter. 

Question. Why can’t we use THAAD and the SM–3 missile to protect Europe, especially the radars, from medium and intermediate range missile threats? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. The US is currently co-developing a system with Japan that would protect most European population centers from medium and intermediate range missile 

threats. Why do we need a duplicative missile defense system? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. What are the implications for the Navy’s or the Army’s force structure 

requirements if an SM–3 or THAAD alternative were to be pursued in Europe? 

Answer. ———. 

INCREMENTALLY FUNDING MDA PROGRAMS WITH R&D FUNDS

Question. MDA has approval to acquire assets with research and development 

(R&D) funds, which allows MDA to incrementally fund procurements. This is unlike 

any other program at DOD. The Department is conducting a review of the way the 

Agency does business. 

Has it been determined whether incremental funding will result in a short term 

reduction in costs for MDA programs? Future years? 

Answer. In the PB10 budget request, MDA is using Procurement funding for the 

THAAD batteries and SM–3 Block I interceptors in accordance with Sec. 233 of the 

FY08 National Defense Authorization Act and the Agency stopped the practice of 

incrementally funding procurement. 


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Question. How is this type of budgeting beneficial to the Department? 

Answer. In the PB10 budget request, MDA is using Procurement funding for the 

THAAD batteries and SM–3 Block I interceptors in accordance with Sec. 233 of the 

FY08 National Defense Authorization Act and the Agency stopped the practice of 

incrementally funding procurement. 

Question. Has MDA determined when the Agency’s programs should transition 

from research and development to the operation and maintenance and procurement 

accounts? 

Answer. In accordance with Section 233 of the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act, MDA has made the transition to Procurement funding and is now using 

Procurement appropriations for THAAD batteries and interceptors, AN/TPY–2 radars and Aegis SM–3 Block I interceptors. The transition to operation and maintenance accounts begins with the THAAD program in FY12. 

GMD FLIGHT TEST DELAYS

Question. GMD has planned many flight tests in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. 

Many previous tests have been delayed or cancelled. 

What happens that would drive a delay in the test program? 

Answer. (1) BMDS complexity and capability development time. In order to maximize the contribution of every ground and flight test to the assessment of the BMDS 

at the system level, each test is highly integrated, tightly coupled, multi-element, 

and multi-Service. This complexity has increased the time it takes to develop both 

the systems under test (sensors, interceptors and fire control) and to integrate all 

elements and test capability into a realistic test provides data required to validate 

models and simulations and assess performance. Development delays of individual 

elements can affect the readiness to test and their integration with other elements. 

(2) Test preparation time. Test case/scenario development is a process that includes the build up, integration and pre-mission testing of the specific capabilities 

to be tested. Test preparation time includes requirements management and test objectives flow down, test case/scenario development, integration of test configuration 

into the test ranges (lab and field) and analysis in preparation for test. Should element or component development software or hardware delay occur, this may result 

in re-work or test reconfiguration and may require additional analysis. 

(3) Test target availability. It takes between 24 and 36 months to produce an 

operationally realistic target for GMD flight testing. Any problems encountered during build-up and test can equate to a test delay. 

(4) Competition for shared test and operational assets. BMDS flight tests often 

use already fielded operational assets, and the shared use of operational assets as 

test assets can cause test schedule perturbations based on warfighter operational 

priorities. Range conflicts and real-world events can perturb the test schedule on a 

weekly basis, generating a nearly constant level of re-scheduling and deconfliction 

which adds to the complexity of MDA’s test program management. Warfighter requests to meet emerging real world contingencies can impact asset availability to 

support tests. Recent requests required assets to model system behavior in response 

to potential rogue nation launches, as well as exercises to examine system behavior 

against potential near-term threats. 

(5) National test range infrastructure capacity. There are multiple acquisition programs within and outside of the MDA competing to utilize the limited capacity of 

our national test range infrastructure. The major range and test facilities base activities, such as the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, the 30th 

Space Wing at Vandenberg Air Force Base, the Pacific Missile Range Facility, and 

numerous others, all use the same launch services, test instrumentation collection 

platforms, and test control centers. MDA must compete with other Air Force, Navy, 

DoD, NASA, and commercial space customers for dedicated range time. Scheduling 

of test resources and perturbations in any acquisition program using common range 

services can contribute to delays through the rescheduling across all programs. 

(6) Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) readiness for test. The GBI has incurred development and manufacturing quality issues resulting in delays in recent flight 

tests. 

Question. Can you explain primary reasons behind the rescheduling of tests? 

Answer. As discussed in the previous response, there are a number of factors that 

can contribute to rescheduling BMDS flight tests: (1) BMDS complexity and capability development time, (2) test preparation time including requirements management and test objectives flow down, test case/scenario development, integration of 

test configuration into the test ranges (lab and field) and analysis in preparation 

for test, (3) test target availability, (4) competition between shared operational and 

test assets, (5) available capacity across the national test range infrastructure given 


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multiple competing acquisition programs within and outside of the MDA, and (6) 

Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) readiness for test. 

Recent GMD flight test rescheduling is attributed to development and manufacturing quality issues with the GBI and test target availability. 

Specifically, telemetry component problems in the GBI’s Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), discovered prior to FTG–04, were due to manufacturing quality issues 

in a critical flight test component needed for flight testing. Theses issues delayed 

and subsequently led to FTG–04 being restructured as FTX–03. Because these manufacturing quality issues affected a critical non-tactical flight test component in all 

GBIs, the next planned test in the series, FTG–05, was delayed one quarter until 

a qualified replacement telemetry component became available. FTG–05 was conducted on December 5, 2008 and resulted in a successful intercept. 

The FTX–03 and FTG–05 flight tests, with STARS/GROW targets, both experienced failures with the deployment of the target countermeasures. GMD’s next 

flight test, FTG–06, previously scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 2009, 

was to use a Launch Vehicle–2 (LV–2), a new class of target, because the inventory 

of the STARS/GROW targets was exhausted. Test objectives for this engagement, 

with the required target scene including countermeasures, necessitated additional 

time needed to conduct detailed analyses causing the FTG–06 flight test to be rescheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009. 

Question. What issues remain to be resolved? 

Answer. While unforeseen issues may arise, GMD initiated a 10–point Mission 

Assurance Improvement Plan (MAIP) in early May 2008 in response to interceptor 

supplier quality issues experienced on the GMD Program, primarily the quality 

issues discovered prior to FTG–04. The GMD Program identified the need to implement additional product acceptance control processes. The following points address 

key areas where the GMD program is instituting corrective actions or where it expects opportunities for improvement: 

(1) GMD now has a back-up GBI for every flight test. 

(2) GMD has conducted a quality stand down across the GMD program supply 

base. A second quality stand down was completed to share progress and provide 

feedback on inputs from suppliers, and supplier actions were taken on recommendations. Another GMD program quality stand-down is planned for May 2009 to provide status of actions and quality improvements. 

(3) The GMD program has instituted more comprehensive product and process 

change control, providing more robust review of impacts of supplier changes. 

(4) GMD has conducted detailed Mission Assurance Product & Process Reviews 

(MAPPRs) at critical suppliers currently in manufacturing. The GMD program is in 

the process of performing follow-on MAPPRs where required and will also conduct 

MAPPRs for other suppliers pending manufacturing restart at those suppliers. 

(5) GMD has reviewed and verified training and certification of the manufacturing 

workforce. 

(6) The GMD program has implemented Quality Product and Process Verification 

(QPPV) to enhance the standard supplier product acceptance process. QPPV adds 

additional criteria and requirements, as well as random process audits, to the hardware acceptance review process. 

(7) GMD has implemented a proactive Issue Identification Program which empowers over 3000 Prime Contractor employees, most subcontractors, and several critical 

suppliers to identify issues and halt work if quality or safety issues require immediate attention. The GMD Program Office and the Prime Contractor are also investigating and pursuing opportunities to incentivize supplier quality. The Prime contractor and subcontractors have also developed and provided employee awards for 

quality performance. 

(8) The GMD program is pursuing full MDA Assurance Provisions (MAP) and 

MDA Parts, Materials, and Processes Assurance Plan (PMAP) compliance through 

the development of Mission Assurance Implementation Plans (MAIPs) and PMAP 

Implementation Plans for all critical suppliers under the GMD Core Completion 

Contract (CCC). 

(9) GMD is implementing a hardware/software pedigree review process as part of 

Ship Readiness Review and Hardware Acceptance Reviews. Pedigree reviews have 

been completed for FTG–05, operationally configured GBIs, and is in progress for 

FTG–06. 

(10) The GMD program conducted hardware pedigree inspections of ‘‘In Stock’’ 

product at suppliers where product is currently out of production. 

(11) GMD is conducting a baseline review across the interceptor supply chain of 

product acceptance and screening. The GMD Prime Contractor and Aerospace Corporation are currently reviewing the initial engineering assessment results prior to 

submission to the Government for review. 


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Question. How will this impact the current test plan for GMD? 

Answer. The GMD test plan is under review as part of the ongoing BMDS comprehensive test program review. Since early 2009, MDA has been working on a systematic review of BMDS test planning in partnership with the Army, Navy, and Air 

Force Operational Test Agencies (OTA), with the support of the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation and the warfighter community. This review is intended 

to revitalize the missile defense test program and make it more affordable. Using 

criteria supplied by the OTA, the warfighter, and MDA’s system engineers, we are 

undertaking a comprehensive test review to ensure our ground and flight testing is 

designed to provide data that MDA and the operational test community use to anchor models and simulations and verify system functionality and operational effectiveness. Unlike MDA’s previous convention of limiting test planning to a two-year 

period, the results of this review will be an event-oriented plan that extends until 

the collection of all identified data is complete. 

The BMDS performance evaluation strategy is to develop models and simulations 

of the BMDS and compare their predictions to empirical data collected through comprehensive flight and ground testing to validate their accuracy, since physically testing all combinations of BMDS configurations, engagement conditions, and target 

phenomena is economically prohibitive. We are changing from an architecture-based 

approach to a parameters-based approach. The focus of the on-going BMDS test review is to determine how to validate our models and simulations so that our 

warfighting commanders have confidence in the predicted performance of the 

BMDS, especially when those commanders consider employing the BMDS in ways 

other than originally planned or against threats unknown at this time. Despite this 

desire to rely on models, the complex phenomena associated with missile launches 

and associated environments mandates that some performance measurements can 

only be investigated through flight and ground testing of the operational BMDS. 

The ongoing BMDS comprehensive test program review is being conducted in 

three phases. In Phase One, MDA and the Army, Navy, and Air Force Operational 

Test Agencies studied the models and simulations and determined the data needed 

to accredit them using a comprehensive verification, validation, and accreditation 

process. Despite our desire to rely on models, they cannot provide all operational 

performance measurements required to assess the system. Much of the data needed 

to understand system survivability, reliability, performance in extreme natural environments, and supportability can only be measured through ground and flight tests. 

In Phase Two, test objectives and scenarios for a campaign of flight and ground 

tests are under development. Test personnel are prioritizing test designs based on 

requirements to determine the system’s capabilities and limitations and the need of 

the Combatant Commanders to field a specific block of missile defense capability. 

Data from these tests are fed back into the models and simulations in order to make 

them credibly reflect system performance. These tests will not only address data 

necessary to validate the models of individual missile defense interceptor systems 

but will also demonstrate the performance of the BMDS working as an integrated 

system. 

During Phase Three of the review, to be completed by the end of June 2009, the 

funding and infrastructure needed to implement the test campaigns will be addressed. A key cost driver will be the ability to establish an inventory of reliable 

targets to satisfy test requirements over a variety of flight test regimes. 

At the end of this test review, we intend to report to Congress on needed changes 

in our test plans and implications for future funding needs. 

Question. How will the test plan review change the way MDA tests? 

Answer. MDA is changing from an architecture-based approach to a models and 

simulation Verification, Validation, and Accreditation parameters-based test approach. The new BMDS performance evaluation strategy is to develop models and 

simulations of the BMDS and compare their predictions to empirical data collected 

through comprehensive flight and ground testing. Once accurate, the models and 

simulations can predict system performance over a vast set of operating conditions. 

The current architecture-based approach physically tests all combinations of BMDS 

configurations, engagement conditions, and target phenomena. This became awkward and slow as the BMDS matured, as well as demanded unique and costly target 

development. 

The new test strategy is designed to validate the models and simulations so that 

the war fighting commanders have confidence in the predicted performance of the 

BMDS, especially when those commanders consider employing the BMDS in ways 

other than originally planned or against threats unknown at this time. 

Moreover, unlike the MDA’s previous convention of limiting test planning to a 

two-year period, the results of this three-phase test plan review will be an eventoriented plan that extends until the collection of all identified data is completed. AdVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00404 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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ditionally, MDA is engaging with war fighters to ensure MDA is testing the BMDS 

using operational doctrine and real-world constraints, so that, as much as possible, 

MDA is testing the system in a manner similar to how the war fighters will employ 

it in combat. 

TEST REVIEW

Question. The Department has spent billions on an anti-missile defense system 

without adequate testing due to failed and delayed tests. The Services often complain that MDA does not test how the Services test. As the Administration is reviewing MDA for its future budgets: How is the Agency rectifying these issues? 

Answer. First, simplify and refocus the test strategy. MDA is focused on conducting meaningful ballistic missile testing that rigorously demonstrates the capabilities of the BMDS. Our three-phase test strategy, with full involvement by 

DOT&E and the multi-Service Operational Test Agency (OTA) Team, will produce 

an Integrated Master Test Plan that is event-oriented and extends until the collection of all identified data is completed. MDA is engaging with war fighters to ensure 

that MDA is testing the BMDS using operational doctrine and real-world constraints, so that, as much as possible, MDA is testing the system in a manner similar to how the war fighters will employ it in combat. 

Unlike Service testing, MDA is inherently joint and tests to provide an integrated 

war fighting product on delivery. MDA is working in partnership with the multiService Operational Test Agency (OTA) Team and the war fighter community to revitalize the missile defense test program and make it more robust and affordable. 

Using criteria supplied by the OTA, the war fighter, and MDA’s system engineers, 

ground and flight tests are designed to provide data that MDA and the operational 

test community use to anchor models and simulations and verify system 

functionality and operational effectiveness. To provide better oversight, the Test and 

Evaluation Standing Committee of the Missile Defense Executive Board was established and meets regularly to oversee the test and evaluation (T&E) planning and 

resource roadmap as it relates to MDA test requirements and test program, and to 

provide technical recommendations and oversight for the conduct of an integrated 

T&E program and investment strategy. 

Like Service testing, the new test program will have several Operational Tests 

(OT) to verify doctrine, tactics and procedures that will be operated by the OT and 

warfighting communities of the services. 

Question. How are you reorganizing the current test plan to ensure adequate test 

are completed? 

Answer. The focus of the on-going BMDS three-phase test review has been to determine how to validate our models and simulations so that our war fighting commanders have confidence in the predicted performance of the BMDS. 

In Phase 1, MDA and the multi-Service Operational Test Agency (OTA) Team 

studied the BMDS models and simulations and determined the variables (key factors) most sensitive to the predicted results. MDA then combined sets of key factors 

with test conditions that provide the greatest insight into the BMDS models’ predictive capability, when compared to test results, and called them Critical Engagement Conditions (CECs). There are many cases where the only practical way to 

measure performance is by ground or flight testing under operationally realistic conditions. MDA calls these tests Empirical Measurement Events (EMEs). Much of the 

data needed for the OTA Critical Operational Issues (COIs), such as survivability, 

reliability, performance in extreme natural environments, and supportability, can 

only be collected through the conduct of EMEs. 

In Phase 2, MDA combined CECs, EMEs, and COIs into test objectives and developing scenarios to accomplish those objectives over a campaign of flight and ground 

tests. These test objectives would not only address data necessary to validate the 

models of individual missile defense interceptor systems, but would also demonstrate the performance of the BMDS working as an integrated system. MDA will 

prioritize the resulting test scenarios according to the need to determine BMDS capabilities and limitations and the Combatant Commanders’ urgency of need for a 

specific missile defense capability. 

In Phase 3, MDA will determine the funding and infrastructure necessary to implement the test campaigns identified in the second phase. A key cost driver will 

be the ability to establish an inventory of reliable target configurations that will satisfy the CECs, EMEs, and COIs over a variety of BMDS flight tests. 

At the conclusion of the three-phase test plan review, MDA will produce, with full 

involvement by DOT&E and the multi-Service Operational Test Agency (OTA) 

Team, an Integrated Master Test Plan that is event-oriented and extends until the 

collection of all identified data is completed to ensure adequate test investments. 


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MULTIPLE KILL VEHICLES

Question. MDA is developing the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) to allow a single 

interceptor to engage a number of credible objects that an enemy missile might deploy. The Agency expects to deploy an operational capability in the 2017 timeframe. 

In January 2004, MDA awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin to develop a carrier 

vehicle that directs multiple kill vehicles with planned deliveries in 2014. This concept, if successful, would benefit GMD and KEI. MDA also proposed in the FY08 

budget to have Raytheon develop an alternate concept in which a lead kill vehicle 

would direct other kill vehicles. This concept, if successful, would primarily benefit 

SM–3. In the third quarter of fiscal year 2010, MDA will determine whether a carrier vehicle with multiple kill vehicles is feasible or whether the program will move 

forward with a unitary carrier vehicle. 

If MDA finds that multiple kill vehicles are not feasible, how will this impact the 

GMD? 

Answer. In his April 6, 2009 briefing to the press on Fiscal Year 2010 budget recommendations, the Secretary of Defense announced that ‘‘. . . we will terminate the 

Multiple Kill Vehicle Program because of its significant technical challenges and the 

need to task a fresh look at the requirement.’’ 

Question. How will the Aegis BMD programs and the kill vehicle planned by the 

KEI program be affected since you plan to stop all work on unitary kill vehicle work 

this year? 

Answer. We do not plan to stop work on unitary kill vehicles this year. The MDA 

intends to continue development of a unitary kill vehicle for integration in the SM– 

3 BLK IIA as agreed to with Japan. MDA programmatic leadership of the development effort is being reviewed during MDA PB10 discussions. 

KINETIC ENERGY INTERCEPTOR (KEI) COMPARED TO AIRBORNE LASER (ABL) FOR

BOOST PHASE DEFENSE

Question. MDA awarded a contract in December 2003, which was to continue 

through January 2012, to develop and test the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI). At 

that time, MDA stated that KEI was being designed as a mobile capability to destroy intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles during the boost/ascent phase 

of their flight. In 2005, MDA selected the Airborne Laser (ABL) as its primary boost 

phase capability, but continued development of KEI. Most recently an independent 

assessment was done that recommended a second booster in order to test two boosters simultaneously. 

Have there been any studies that conclude KEI is the better choice for a boost 

phase capability? If so, why has MDA chosen to continue to pursue ABL as its primary boost phase capability? 

Answer. The MDA submitted a Boost Phase Intercept study Report to Congress 

in April 2006 that described in detail the different boost phase capabilities and limitations of the ABL and KEI. There was no finding in this report that KEI was a 

better choice than ABL as a boost phase capability. The development of this Congressional report included significant interaction with PA&E and a detailed review 

of their independent study results. MDA openly shared our technical and programmatic data with the PA&E team, and we conducted several technical interchanges with them to review and discuss findings. These discussions with PA&E led 

to modifications of the MDA Report to Congress. 

The PB10 Budget Request cancels the Kinetic Energy Interceptor program because of incompatibility of the KEI concept with the Secretary of Defense’s guidance 

to develop missile defenses against rogue nation threats and theater missile threats 

and concerns with performance, technical challenges and affordability. The KEI mission grew from a boost phase interceptor to a boost and midcourse phase interceptor. The schedule grew from a 51⁄2-year to a 12- to 14-year development program (depending on currently identified spirals). Program cost grew from $4.6B to $8.9B 

and missile unit cost grew from $25M to over $50M per interceptor. Technical issues 

delayed the first booster flight test date, established in 2007, by over a year (it is 

not on track to be conducted in FY09). Affordability issues and government changing of requirements, not contractor performance, was the main contributor to KEI’s 

execution problems. 

Question. Has KEI been redefined as a midcourse capability instead of a boost/ 

ascent phase capability? 

Answer. KEI was both a boost and midcourse phase capability. The PB10 Budget 

Request cancels the Kinetic Energy Interceptor program because of incompatibility 

of the KEI concept with the Secretary of Defense’s guidance to develop missile defenses against rogue nation threats and theater missile threats and concerns with 

performance, technical challenges and affordability. 


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Question. Will the contract incur increased termination costs should MDA decide 

to terminate KEI’s contract in 2009 or is contract termination not a possibility even 

if ABL remains the primary boost phase capability? 

Answer. The contract will not incur increased termination costs if it is terminated 

in FY09. The PB10 Budget Request cancels the Kinetic Energy Interceptor program 

because of incompatibility of the KEI concept with the Secretary of Defense’s guidance to develop missile defenses against rogue nation threats and theater missile 

threats and concerns with performance, technical challenges and affordability. 

Question. In 2008, the KEI program flight tested the interceptor’s boosters, a critical technology, to determine if they will function as intended. In 2009, MDA will 

use the results of the booster test and the results of ABL’s lethality demonstration 

to decide the future of the KEI and ABL programs. However, in 2005 MDA directed 

the KEI program to incorporate the capability to engage missiles during the midcourse phase of flight and KEI’s contract is being extended until September 2015. 

MDA’s Director previously has said that the mission of KEI has not been redefined. 

KEI is still an alternative for ABL should ABL fail in its lethality demonstration. 

Does the funding provided in FY2009 fulfill the objectives that reflect either the 

advancement of evolution of the KEI program? 

Answer. The booster development funded in FY09 has not fulfilled the objectives 

of either the boost or midcourse missions. The PB10 Budget Request cancels the Kinetic Energy Interceptor program because of incompatibility of the KEI concept with 

the Secretary of Defense’s guidance to develop missile defenses against rogue nation 

threats and theater missile threats and concerns with performance, technical challenges and affordability. Additionally, MDA is pursuing other more near-term ascent 

phase intercept capabilities. 

ABL LETHALITY AGAINST POTENTIAL THREATS

Question. Even if ABL is successful in its lethality demonstration in 2009, there 

are still many questions about how it would be employed. 

What is ABL’s capability against potential threats from China and Iran with respect to ICBMs? What about other nations? 

Answer. ———. 

Question. What about potential over flight of a hostile nation? 

Answer. ABL has considerable stand-off distance against MRBM, IRBM and 

ICBM threats allowing it to engage threats outside the range of most rogue nation 

adversary threats. Current ABL CONOPS dictate over flight can occur after achieving air superiority. The USAF would not achieve air superiority until after hostilities have started and the timeline would be dependent on the capabilities of the 

adversary. In addition, the ABL will be protected identical to other high value assets (i.e. JSTARS & AWACS) with a fighter combat air patrol. 

Question. Are there other programs currently in development at MDA that are 

possible better options for boost phase defense? 

Answer. MDA is assessing more near-term, cost-effective options for early intercepts. We are adding an ascent phase layer that will leverage existing and planned 

Aegis Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) capabilities and use them in new ways to enable 

earlier opportunities for missile intercepts. Ascent phase intercepts extend engagement windows so that the warfighter can shoot one interceptor, evaluate the consequence, and shoot again if necessary, avoiding wasteful interceptor salvos. This 

increases the battlespace to not just the midcourse phase, but moves it forward into 

the ascent phase. These earlier intercepts are enabled by using existing sensors 

such as the Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) sensors, forward-based radars or 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)-based sensors. When integrated with existing midcourse and terminal systems, the resulting multi-tiered Ballistic Missile Defense 

System (BMDS) is better suited to counter complex threats cost effectively. 

We do not plan to completely cease our investments in boost phase. Our plan is 

to refocus our efforts to additionally develop and rapidly field lower risk ascent 

phase capabilities as they are demonstrated. We will continue researching concepts 

such as Airborne Laser (ABL) (including the demonstration of lighter weight, higher 

efficiency lasers that can enable more cost effective directed energy intercept concepts). These concepts will remain in the technology development phase until sufficient knowledge has been gained on technology readiness, operational viability, and 

contribution to the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to warrant a higher 

level of investment. 

Question. Are there other missions for ABL? 

Answer. Yes, analyses have explored the potential utility of the ABL in several 

other classified missile defense missions. 


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AIRBORNE LASER (ABL) COSTS FOR FULL DEPLOYMENT

Question. After a schedule delay, the Airborne Laser is now expected to demonstrate a lethal shoot down in 2009. Based on the demonstration, intends to make 

a decision on development of a second ABL aircraft. 

What requirements determine the number of ABL aircraft needed? 

Answer. The number of ABL aircraft needed to defend against a named area of 

interest is highly dependent on the nature of the threat. Initial estimates for maintaining two simultaneous 24/7 Combat Air Patrols require a fleet of 5 ABLs, with 

a total fleet size of 7 aircraft. Three ABLs should be able to provide a single, 24/ 

7 Combat Air Patrol in a boost phase mission. Less Aircraft are required for other 

classified missile defense missions. 

Question. What type of aircraft will be used for the second ABL? 

Answer. Planning for Tail 2 has been cancelled in the FY10 PB submittal. 

Question. For 24/7 coverage, how many orbits of ABL aircraft are required, and 

how many ABL’s per orbit are required? 

Answer. Depending on the distance to the Forward Operating Base and availability of tanker support, a single 24/7 Combat Air Patrol would require three 

ABL’s. Less aircraft are required in other classified missile defense missions. 

Question. What is the basing concept for ABL? What is the plan for delivering the 

chemicals required for the laser into a forward-based location? 

Answer. The Joint Staff and the Combatant Commanders continually review and 

update ballistic missile threats and capability gaps. This information is, in turn, 

used by The Office of the Secretary of Defense to assess future development and 

employment options. MDA will support their decision making process with technical 

studies and performance analysis of current U.S. BMD assets including the potential basing of a second forward-deployed X-Band radar to Japan. 

Question. Do you have an independent cost estimate for an operational ABL? 

What about the cost of forward basing? 

Answer. No. Due to the maturity of the ABL program compared to other BMDS 

elements, MDA has decided to delay an OSD CAIG cost estimate of operational ABL 

costs and forward basing costs until ABL is part of the MDA block program. 

Question. Can the taxpayer afford to buy the number of ABL’s required? 

Answer. The second aircraft for the ABL program was canceled in the PB 10 

Budget Request. MDA will continue to conduct testing with the prototype ABL aircraft, and has taken steps to ensure critical industrial infrastructure is protected. 

Decisions on the future of the program, including affordability, will depend on successful completion of key knowledge points, including the lethal shootdown of a target during a flight test scheduled for the end of FY09. 

U.S./JAPAN MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION

Question. Over the past several years, the U.S. and Japan have conducted robust 

cooperation in the missile defense area including the deployment of a X-band radar 

in Japan and joint 50/50 cost-share development of the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA 

missile. 

Could you provide an update on the status of our cooperation with Japan on missile defense programs? 

Answer. BMD cooperation with Japan is a success story in the U.S.-Japan Alliance and has resulted in the Japanese fielding both sea and land based missile defense systems. U.S.-Japan bi-lateral cooperation plays an important role in supporting our common strategic interest in defense and enhances Japan’s ability to defend itself Our largest missile defense program with Japan is the SM–3 Block IIA 

Cooperative Development (SCD) Project. This year, we will sign Amendment 1 to 

the SCD Annex, defining costs and workshare for this program. We anticipate initiation of negotiations this summer for Amendment 2 of this program, which will finalize workshare including workshare for at sea test firing operations of SM–3 

Block IIA. We are also pursuing a follow-on joint analysis with Japan to collaboratively review future missile defense requirements. We expect to develop and negotiate an agreement to proceed with the analysis this year. Finally, we are working 

with the Japanese on interoperability and information sharing. To that end, we are 

discussing requirements to facilitate eventual interoperability between their Japan 

Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) command and control system 

with the U.S. BMDS. The AN/TPY–2 U.S. X-Band radar was deployed to Japan’s 

Shariki Air Self Defense Force Base in northern Japan in 2006. Data is currently 

being shared with Japanese forces. 

Question. Are you considering moving the second Forward-Deployed X-Band 

Radar to Japan? 


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Answer. The Joint Staff and the Combatant Commanders continually review and 

update ballistic missile threats and capability gaps. This information is, in turn, 

used by The Office of the Secretary of Defense to assess future development and 

employment options. MDA will support their decision making process with technical 

studies and performance analysis of current U.S. BMD assets including the potential basing of a second forward-deployed X-Band radar to Japan. 

Question. MDA recently decided to incorporate a modular kill vehicle into the 

Block IIA even though Japan has only agreed to use a unitary warhead. Can you 

discuss how this could impact our cooperation with Japan? 

Answer. The U.S.-Japan SM–3 Block IIA Cooperative Development (SCD) Project 

calls for incorporation of a unitary kill vehicle only. The FY10 President’s Budget 

terminates the MKV program. 

TESTING INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. The Committee has been told that one of the key elements limiting the 

current missile defense test program is the lack of infrastructure. 

What specific actions can be taken to improve MDA’s testing infrastructure? 

Answer. As we complete the development of the Integrated Master Test Plan 

(IMTP) we are working key enablers to support more robust testing. The enablers 

fall into the two categories of supporting ground or flight test. 

In the ground test category we have identified the need for a second Hardwarein-the-Loop (HWIL) facility that allows us to simultaneously exercise the fielded 

BMDS with operations in the loop while we are simultaneously testing the next system upgrades with our government/industry development team. This second facility 

will leverage the Integrated System Test Capability(ISTC) laboratories already in 

place under our GMD program and expand to include other element representations. The following infrastructure will be required to support this concept: 

• Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense representations 

• Command, Control, Battle Management & Communications (C2BMC) suite 

dedicated to Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Integration/Development 

Testing 

• Additional Upgraded Early Warning Radar processes (adds Thule to BMDS) 

• Radar Data Signal Injection System for two TPY–2 and SBX and EMR radars 

• Equipment to link Cobra Dane radar directly into the ground test architecture 

• Integration of digital models of Patriot for integration tests 

• Integration of Patriot Drive Up System Test Facilities for distributed tests 

• TBD Additional HWIL or digital representations of Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense (THAAD) 

In addition, a number of infrastructure enhancements are required to increase the 

capacity and/or the fidelity of the current element representations, which will improve the quality & quantity of the testing: 

• To better test ‘‘end game’’ capabilities 7V/10V Arnold Engineering space 

chamber upgrades are necessary for advanced scene projectors 

• Improvement to service test range communications and operational communications emulations 

• Dedicated test control infrastructure to support testing with international 

partners 

• Portable equipment to support increased data handling requirements when 

we test in Europe or Japan 

• VAFB Salvo Launch capability under Flight test 

In the flight test area we will expand our test operating area by adding more integrated system flight tests to the Reagan Test Site (RTS) to allow more complex, 

operationally realistic testing and explore East Coast range options. Our vision includes developing a regional/theater range architecture that leverages existing capability at RTS and target launch capability at Wake Island leveraging MDA’s mobile 

test infrastructure. To support this vision we will need more reliable communications at RTS (which is in work) and Wake Island. Additional investments are listed 

below: 

• Sea-mobile ship-based telemetry and range safety capability to support offrange testing 

• Spare tracking sensor system for the common primary sensors on the airmobile HALO–II and WASP airborne sensor platforms 

• Need to add an East Coast range item (either feasibility study or Wallops 

Island expansion for MDA) 

Question. What are the costs associated with those steps? 


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Answer. • Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense representations ($0.6M) • Command, Control, Battle Management & Communications (C2BMC) suite 

dedicated to Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Integration/Development 

Testing ($6.5M) • Additional Upgraded Early Warning Radar processes (adds Thule to BMDS) ($1 M) • Radar Data Signal Injection System for two TPY–2 and SBX and EMR ra- dars ($4.8M) • Equipment to link Cobra Dane radar directly into the ground test architec- ture ($2M) 

• Integration of digital models of Patriot for integration tests ($1.6M) 

• Integration of Patriot Drive Up System Test Facilities for distributed tests 

($1.4M each, max 3) 

• TBD Additional HWIL or digital representations of Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense (THAAD) ($TBD M) 

• To better test ‘‘end game’’ capabilities 7V/10V Arnold Engineering space 

chamber upgrades are necessary for advanced scene projectors ($4M) 

• Improvement to service test range communications and operational communications emulations ($2M) 

• Dedicated test control infrastructure to support testing with international 

partners ($4.6M) 

• Portable equipment to support increased data handling requirements when 

we test in Europe or Japan ($1M) 

• VAFB Salvo Launch capability under Flight test ($5M) 

• Sea-mobile ship-based telemetry and range safety capability to support offrange testing ($15M) 

• Spare tracking sensor system for the common primary sensors on the airmobile HALO–II and WASP airborne sensor platforms ($5M) 

• Need to add an East Coast range item (either feasibility study or Wallops 

Island expansion for MDA) ($TBD M) 

TESTING AND LACK OF SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF TARGETS

Question. One of the key limiting factors of MDA’s test program has been the lack 

of sufficient number of missile defense targets and the inventory of foreign assets. 

Do you currently have a sufficient amount of targets to execute your testing program? 

Answer. All of our FY09 planned target missions are under contract and all but 

one of the target FY10 missions (FTG–08) are on contract. Barring unforeseen increases to the number of tests, target failures or requirements that mandate mission 

tailoring, we have sufficient targets to execute the current test program. The FTG– 

08 targets mission is in negotiation under the existing Lockheed Martin Prime Contract and is expected to be definitized by end of 4th Qtr FY09. Because our increased investment in backup targets was only started to a very limited extent in 

FY09, we do not have backup targets for all FY10 and FY11 missions. We will be 

re-evaluating our allocations of targets, to include backup targets, to flight tests as 

part of the Agency’s on-going three phase test program review and the development 

of the Integrated Master Test Plan. 

Question. If not, what can we do to improve the number of targets? 

Answer. We have sufficient targets to support the PB09 program but the Targets 

and Countermeasures Program has limited flexibility to meet short-term, emergent, 

or contingency planning requirements. Improving opportunities for contingency 

planning and backup targets was addressed in the FY09 Congressional add of $32M 

that provided for the procurement of the LV–2 and an E–LRALT spare. Additionally, we are currently evaluating industry responses to our recent request for information to complete a business case analysis and consider an alternative acquisition 

strategy for targets due to the significant quality problems and high costs of our 

current targets program. 

Question. Would additional funds in this area be helpful? 

Answer. Yes, additional funding and maintaining a backup inventory of target 

hardware components would minimize target cycle time and mitigate risk of critical 

path schedules. As part of the future acquisition strategy development activities the 

Agency is developing a Business Case Analysis (BCA) of multiple acquisition 

Courses of Action against the responses to the January 2009 Request for Information. This BCA will include the impacts to the Targets and Countermeasures program resulting from the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) replan and the Agency’s Modeling and Simulation verification activities. The BCA results may indicate 


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an opportunity to procure fewer target configurations in larger quantities, reducing 

costs, cycle times and improving opportunities for reliability enhancements. The Agency received a Congressional add of $32M to support the procurement of 

backup/spare targets in FY09, which was utilized to acquire an LV–2 and an E– 

LRALT spare. With completion of the BCA, an optimized procurement strategy may 

require additional funding in the near term to reduce unit costs, establish competitive base, and deliver sufficient backup targets to support the revised IMTP through 

increased quantity procurement. A final determination cannot be made until BCA, 

IMTP, and resulting acquisition strategy development in early 4th qtr FY09. 

Question. Would having a procurement account be beneficial? 

Answer. No. A procurement account does not offer the flexibility required to support providing numerous targets configurations in a dynamic environment for the 

BMDS flight test program. The RDT&E appropriation allows the Targets and Countermeasures Program Office the degree of flexibility necessary in the testing of the 

Ballistic Missile Defense System. 

MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND TRANSITION TO THE WARFIGHTER

Question. Ballistic missiles and technology continue to proliferate throughout the 

world. Some nations are using their developing ballistic missile capabilities to 

threaten their neighbors. Deployed U.S. forces have a missile defense capability 

with PATRIOT and fielding the of Standard Missile-3 as the intercept or on the 

Aegis system. Additionally, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) has 

successfully returned to flight testing and should soon be a deployed missile defense 

asset. 

Looking to the future, how are you working to transition these missile defense capabilities to the warfighters and to determine the appropriate asset mix of PATRIOTS, Standard Missile-3s, and THAAD interceptors. 

Answer. Transition: The Patriot Program was transferred to the Army in 2003 by 

direction of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Transfer and Medium Extended Air 

Defense Systems (MEADS) Realignment Plan. 

In 2006, MDA, DOT&E, and the Navy agreed on the plan for transitioning Aegis 

BMD ‘‘Block 04’’ capability. In 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L) approved the Block 04 capability for entry 

into the transition phase. Operations and Sustainment (O&S) responsibilities for the 

18 Aegis BMD ships and up to 90 Standard Missile 3 (SM–3) Block lA missiles were 

transitioned to the Navy in FY08. 

The BMD 3.6/SM–3 Block lA system was transferred to the Navy in October 2008 

after the Navy’s operational test director recommended transfer, having found the 

system to be operationally suitable and effective. Future Standard Missile variants 

planned for transfer to the Navy will be addressed separately as they become technologically mature. 

The U.S. Army and MDA signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on January 

23, 2009 for the transition of THAAD, AN/TPY–2 radar, and Ground Based Interceptors and Ground Systems to the Army. MDA and the Army are currently developing the THAAD annex to the MOA which will define the event based criteria for 

the transition of operations, support and physical accountability of THAAD firing 

units to the Army. In addition the THAAD annex, will document the roles, responsibilities, resources, and schedules as agreed to by MDA and the U.S. Army, is expected to be completed by the end of 4th quarter, FY09. 

Asset mix: The Army and Combatant Commanders work together to determine 

the required number of lower-tier PATRIOT interceptors. 

The Joint Capability Mix Study II (JCM II), sponsored by U.S. Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) Joint Functional Component Commander-Integrated Missile Defense and the Joint Staff, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate, J–8, and endorsed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in 

March 2008, determined the appropriate mix for the upper-tier THAAD and SM– 

3 interceptors. The JCM II recommended the acquisition of additional THAAD and 

SM–3 interceptors to achieve the appropriate mix. The Missile Defense Executive 

Board and the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group approved resources for the acquisition. The Department is programming these procurement quantities thru FY 2015. 

In addition to questions of inventory, MDA addresses warfighter-desired capabilities through the Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP). The Combatant Commanders, coordinated by USSTRATCOM, document their desired capabilities in the 

Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL). MDA reviews each PCL entry in terms of affordability, technical difficulty, performance versus threat, and schedule, and informs 

the warfighter of its findings via the Achievable Capabilities List (ACL). 

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sessment Report (CAR). This process to prioritize MDA’s development efforts is 

overseen by the Missile Defense Executive Board (chaired by USD (AT&L) and provides key inputs to MDA POM and acquisition strategy. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


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WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009. 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET 

OVERVIEW HEARING 

WITNESSES 

HON. ROBERT GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF 

STAFF 

HON. ROBERT HALE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, (COMPTROLLER) 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. MURTHA

Mr. MURTHA. The committee will come to order. 

We will hold an open hearing on Fiscal Year 2010 Department 

of Defense budget request. 

As the members of the committee are aware, they have held a 

very robust hearing schedule, this is the 32nd of 35 hearings this 

year, and it includes Defense Subcommittee hearings as well as 

those of the Select Intelligence Oversight Committee. 

I would also note this is a historic day, the first time that this 

room has been used for a hearing. 

So, Mr. Secretary, Chairman, you are the first to use this room. 

We are pleased to welcome all three of you to the committee. We 

intend to work with you on your very vigorous schedule that you 

have set up. 

Stop-loss is a very interesting thing, stop-loss. Had to fight with 

the Army. They didn’t want it. They argued with me. You stepped 

in, and we got stop-loss started, and we intend to continue stoploss. We got a glowing letter from the White House, saying they 

supported what we are trying to do. 

This committee feels very strongly that if a person was extended—and the first thing you said when you became Secretary 

and you came before the committee, you said you wanted to stop 

stop-loss. Well, you weren’t able to stop it, but at least we are going 

to be able to give money to the people who were extended in what 

I consider a draft. 

Outsourcing, the committee understands outsourced positions cost $44,000 more than comparable civilian positions. Last year we 

put $5 billion in the budget to cut contracting out. We put $1 billion for direct hiring. We know you are moving in that direction, 

and we appreciate what is happening. 

Acquisition reform is going to be much more difficult. The Congress itself cut a lot of money out of the numbers of people in acquisition. We know that has hurt, and we know it is a real problem 

for you; and we want to work with you, trying to get as much as 

we can and get it up to speed as quick as we can. 


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Now, I met just yesterday with a contractor who was handling 

tires. This is Michelin hiring all of—they decide who gets the tire 

contracts. It looked very fair; I can’t argue with the way they were 

doing it. But it costs us a lot more than we hoped, and next time 

you will be able to do this in-house. You won’t have to go to a contractor in order to do that. 

Since last year we have had significant change in the national 

security focus in the United States, and we have a new President, 

and we look forward to working with the administration on Iraq 

and Afghanistan and the rest of the world. 

So we appreciate your coming before the committee, Mr. Gates, 

chief and the controller, and turn to Mr. Young for any comments 

he may have. 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I want to add 

my welcome to Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen and Secretary 

Hale. 

We appreciate your being here today, realizing you have an 

awful lot of work to do. But I think meeting with this committee 

is a very important part of your work, because as you know by 

now, you have no better friends on Capitol Hill than the members 

of this committee on both sides of the aisle. 

We remain committed to ensuring that our military men and 

women have the equipment they need, funding and support for 

training, and whatever is needed to carry out their mission and to 

do so safely. 

Mr. Secretary, you and your staff have described this budget as 

a reform budget. And as we look at some of the major decisions, 

it is easy to see why. The termination of many troubled programs, 

such as the Presidential helicopter, major parts of the Army’s future combat system and the advanced communications satellite, 

TSAT, just to name a few, shows that you are dedicated and committed to reform. 

However, with only 2 percent real growth, even less if you consider the shift of funds from the supplemental to the base budget, 

I am not sure how much real progress we are going to be able to 

make, especially as we look at other agencies and see double-digit 

percentage increases. 

Further, the lack of a 5-year plan hampers our ability to review 

this request for the reformed budget it is supposed to be. 

While we understand the importance of the QDR, the combination of a late-budget submission and no-outyear data, while not unusual for the first year of a new administration, makes our job a 

little more difficult. 

Despite these challenges, the subcommittee will continue to work 

with you in a true bipartisan fashion to make sure that we have 

the necessary resources available to you to accomplish your mission. 

Further, I appreciate your commitment to our men and women 

in uniform and your willingness to make the difficult decisions included in this request, something that is not always easy in this 

environment. 


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So, welcome, and I look forward to your comments and your testimony, and commit to continuing to work with you in a support 

role as we work through your fiscal year 2010 budget. 

Thank you very much for being here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

REMARKS OF MR. OBEY

Mr. OBEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I don’t have any comments on the year’s coming 

budget. 

I do just want to make one observation about the supplemental, 

and I hope that you and the administration understand that the 

number of votes that were cast against the supplemental last week, 

I think, significantly understate the concern that a lot of people 

have in Congress about events in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

I think that virtually all of us understand the desirability of trying to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, and 

my comments should not be seen in any way as questioning the, 

quote, ‘‘policy decisions’’ that the administration is making in that 

arena. 

What I do have substantial doubt about is the capacity of the Afghan Government and the Pakistani Government to demonstrate 

that they are useful tools in leading to the stabilization of those 

two countries. 

I do not, in any way, want to see the Congress impose deadlines 

or timelines or conditions on the use of the money that we have 

appropriated for the last year; but I do think we have a right, as 

the legislation does as it left the House, to lay out certain standards of conduct or, rather, standards of performance that both governments should be meeting in order to justify continued support. 

It just seems to me that the American taxpayers have a right— 

when they are pumping this much money in and when so many of 

their sons and daughters are being committed in the area, I think 

they have a right to expect that over the next year we will see 

some significant progress in the focus, determination, coherence 

and sense of purpose of both of those governments. 

So I hope that—I don’t want to—I don’t think it is wise for us 

to be in a position of lecturing either government, but I also believe 

that they need to understand that the patience of the American 

public is not inexhaustible, and if they expect us to continue this 

effort, they need to show a sense of purpose and a sense of unity, 

which, heretofore, they have not demonstrated. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Lewis. 

REMARKS OF MR. LEWIS

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, Comptroller Hale, welcome to 

what is a very, very important beginning of your season. 

To say the least, the pressure within the Congress, from my perspective, to raise significant appropriations budgets in every other 

piece of government and to put the lid on your funding is a challenge that is very real. Frankly, I feel that Secretary Gates’ apVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00415 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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pointment should be encouraging to all of us who care about really 

impacting that future and maintaining this priority. 

In the meantime, as we go to questions, Mr. Chairman, when we 

get to it, I have a major program I would like to discuss, but I will 

wait until then. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Secretary, if you will summarize your statement—and, Admiral and Comptroller, we will—without objection, 

we will put your full statements in the record. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY GATES

Secretary GATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Representative Young, Chairman Obey, members 

of the committee, thank you for inviting us to discuss the details 

of the President’s fiscal year 2010 defense budget. There is a lot of 

material here, and I know you have a lot of questions, so I will 

keep my opening remarks brief and focus on the strategy and 

thinking behind many of these recommendations. 

As you suggested, my submitted testimony has more detailed information on specific programmatic decisions. 

First and foremost, as Mr. Young indicated, this is a reform 

budget reflecting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also 

addresses the range of potential threats around the world now and 

in the future. 

I was recently in Afghanistan. As we increase our presence there 

and refocus our efforts with a new strategy, I wanted to get a sense 

from the ground level of the challenges and needs, so we can give 

our troops the equipment and support to be successful and to come 

home safely. Indeed, listening to our troops and commanders, unvarnished and unscripted, has, from the moment I took this job, 

been the greatest single source of ideas on what the Department 

needs to do both operationally and institutionally. As I told a group 

of soldiers in Afghanistan, they have done their job. Now it is time 

for us in Washington to do ours. 

In many respects, this budget builds on all the meetings I have 

had with troops and commanders and all that I have learned over 

the past 21⁄2 years, all underpinning this budget’s three principal 

objectives: 

First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force which, in my view, represents America’s greatest strategic asset. As Admiral Mullen says, If we don’t get the people part 

of this business right, none of the other decisions will matter. 

Second, to rebalance the Department’s programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are 

in and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, 

while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and 

contingencies. 

And, third, in order to do this, we must reform how and what 

we buy, making a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition and contracting. 

From these priorities flow a number of strategic considerations, 

more of which are included in my submitted testimony. 

The base budget request is for $533.8 billion for fiscal year 2010, 

a 4 percent increase over the fiscal year 2009 enacted level. After 

inflation, that is 2.1 percent real growth. In addition, the DepartVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00416 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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ment’s budget request includes $130 billion to support overseas 

contingent operations, principally in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

I know that there has been discussion about whether this is, in 

fact, sufficient to maintain our defense posture, especially during a 

time of war. I believe that it is. Indeed, I have warned in the past 

that our nation must not do what we have done after previous 

times of conflict on so many occasions and slash defense spending. 

I can assure you that I will do everything in my power to prevent 

that from happening on my watch. 

This budget is intended to help steer the Department of Defense 

towards an acquisition and procurement strategy that is sustainable over the long term, that matches real requirements to needed 

and feasible capabilities. 

As you know, this year we have funded the costs of the war 

through the regular budgeting process, as opposed to emergency 

supplementals. By presenting this budget, together, we hope to 

give a more accurate picture of the cost of the wars and also to create a more unified budget process to decrease some of the churn 

usually associated with funding for this Department. 

This budget aims to alter many programs and many of the fundamental ways that the Department of Defense runs its budgeting 

acquisition and procurement processes. In this respect, three key 

points come to mind about the strategic thinking behind the decisions: 

First, sustainability. By that I mean sustainability in light of 

current and potential fiscal constraints. It is simply not reasonable 

to expect the defense budget to continue increasing at the same 

rate it has over the last number of years. We should be able to secure our Nation with a base budget of more than a half a trillion 

dollars, and I believe this budget focuses money where it can more 

effectively do that. 

I also mean sustainability of individual programs. Acquisition 

priorities have changed from Defense Secretary to Defense Secretary, administration to administration, and Congress to Congress. Eliminating waste, ending requirements creep, terminating 

programs that go too far outside the line and bringing annual costs 

for individual programs down to more reasonable levels will reduce 

this friction. 

Second, balance. We have to be prepared for the wars we are 

most likely to fight, not just the ones we have traditionally been 

best suited to fight or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries who in the real world also have finite resources. 

As I said before, even when considering challenges from nationstates with modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying 

more technologically advanced versions of what we built on land, 

sea and in the air to stop the Soviets during the Cold War. 

And finally there are the lessons learned from the last 8 years 

on the battlefield and perhaps, just as importantly, institutionally 

at the Pentagon. The responsibility of this Department, first and 

foremost, is to fight the Nation’s and win the Nation’s wars, not 

just constantly prepare for them. We have to do both. In that respect, the conflicts we are in have revealed numerous problems 

that I am working to improve, and this budget makes headway in 

that respect. 


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At the end of the day, this budget is less about numbers than 

it is about how the military thinks about the nature of war and 

prepares for the future, about how we take care of our people and 

institutionalize support for the warfighter in the long term, about 

the role of the services and how we can buy weapons as jointly as 

we fight, about reforming our requirements and acquisition processes. 

I know that some of you will take issue with individual decisions. 

I would ask, however, that you look beyond specific programs and, 

instead, at the full range of what we are trying to do, at the totality of the decisions and how they will change the way we prepare 

for and fight wars in the future. 

As you consider this budget and specific programs, I would caution that each program decision is zero sum, a dollar spent for capabilities excess to our real needs is a dollar taken from capability 

that we do need, often to sustain our men and women in combat 

and bring them home safely. 

Once again, I thank you for your ongoing support of our men and 

women in uniform, and we look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Secretary Gates follows:] 


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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MULLEN

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Young, Mr. Obey, Mr. 

Lewis, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you here today. 

Let me start off by saying. I not only support the President’s fiscal year 2010 budget submission for this Department, but more 

specifically, the manner in which Secretary Gates developed it. He 

presided over a comprehensive and collaborative process, the likes 

of which, quite frankly, I have not seen in more than a decade of 

doing this sort of work in the Pentagon. Over the course of several 

months and a long series of meetings and debates, every service 

chief and every combatant commander had a voice and every single 

one of them used it. 

Now, normally, budget proposals are worked from the bottom up 

with each service making the case for specific programs and then 

fighting it out at the end to preserve those that are most important 

to them. This proposal was done from the top down. Secretary 

Gates gave us broad guidance, his overall vision, and then he gave 

us the opportunity to meet it. 

Everything was given a fresh look and everything had to be justified. Decisions to curtail or eliminate a program are based solely 

on its relevance and on its execution. The same can be said for 

those we decided to keep, and I can tell you this: None of the final 

decisions were easy, but all of them are vital to our future. 

It has been said that we are what we buy. I really believe that. 

And I also believe that the force we are asking you to help us buy 

today is the right one, both for the world we are living in and the 

world we may find ourselves living in 20 to 30 years down the 

road. 

This submission before you is just as much a strategy as it is a 

budget. And let me tell you why I believe that. First, it makes people our top strategic priority. I have said many times and remain 

convinced the best way to guarantee our future security is to support our troops and their needs and the needs of their families. 

It is the recruit-and-retain choices of our members and their families and, quite frankly, the American citizens writ large that will 

make or break the all-volunteer force. They will be less inclined to 

make those decisions should we not be able to offer them viable career options, adequate health care, suitable housing, advanced education and the promise of a prosperous life long after they have 

taken off the uniform. 

This budget devotes more than a third of the total request to 

what I would call the people account, with the great majority of 

that figure, nearly $164 billion, going to military pay and health 

care. When combined with what we plan to devote to upgrading 

and modernizing family housing and facilities, the total comes to 

$187 billion, $11 billion more than we asked for last year, and almost all of that increase will go to family support programs. 

I am particularly proud of the funds we have dedicated to caring 

for our wounded. There is, in my view, no higher duty for this Nation or for those of us in leadership positions than to care for those 

who sacrifice so much and who must now face lives forever changed 

by wounds both seen and unseen. I know you share that feeling, 


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and I thank you for the work you have done in this committee and 

throughout the Congress to pay attention and support these needs. 

And I would add to that the families of the fallen. Our commitment to them must be for the remainder of those lives. That is why 

this budget allocates funds to complete the construction of additional wounded warrior complexes, expands a pilot program designed to expedite the processing of injured troops through the disability evaluation system, increases the number of mental health 

professionals assigned to deployed units and devotes more resources to the study and treatment of post-traumatic stress and 

traumatic brain injuries. 

After nearly 8 years of war we are in the most capable and combat-experienced military we have ever been, certainly, without 

question, the world’s best counterinsurgency force. Yet for all this 

success, we are pressed and still lack a proper balance between op 

tempo and home tempo, between coin capabilities and conventional 

capabilities, between readiness today and readiness tomorrow. 

And that, Mr. Chairman, is the second reason this budget of ours 

acts as a strategy for the future. It seeks balance by investing more 

heavily in critical enablers such as aviation, special forces, cyber 

operations, civil affairs and language skills. It rightly makes winning the wars we are in our top operational priority. By adjusting 

active Army BCT growth to 45 it helps ensure our ability to help 

impact the fight sooner, increase dwell time and reduce overall demand on equipment. And by authorizing Secretary Gates to transfer money to the Secretary of State for reconstruction, security or 

stabilization, it puts more civilian professionals alongside 

warfighters in more places like Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Having just returned from a trip to Afghanistan, I can attest to 

the critical need for more civilian capacity. I was shocked to learn 

there are only 13 U.S. civilian development experts in all of southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban movement is strongest and the 

local economy is almost entirely dependent on opium production. 

We have twice that many working in the relatively peaceful Kurdish region of northern Iraq. 

I have said it before, but it bears repeating, more boots on the 

ground are important, but they are not the complete answer. We 

need people with slide rules and shovels and teaching degrees, 

bankers and farmers and law enforcement experts. As we draw 

down responsibly in Iraq and shift the main effort to Afghanistan, 

we need a more concerted effort to build up the capacity of our 

partners. 

The same can be said of Pakistan where boots on the ground 

aren’t even an option, where helping the Pakistani forces help 

themselves is truly our best and only recourse. 

Some will argue this budget devotes too much money to these 

sorts of low-intensity needs, that it tilts dangerously away from 

conventional capabilities. It does not. A full 35 percent of the submission is set aside for modernization, and much of that will go to 

what we typically consider conventional requirements. We know 

there are global risks and threats out there not tied directly to the 

fight against al Qaeda and other extremist groups, and we are 

going to be ready for them. 


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In all this, Mr. Chairman, we are also working hard to fix a 

flawed procurement process. More critically, in my view, the Nation 

is getting the military it needs for the challenges we face today and 

the ones we will likely face tomorrow. 

Thank you and this committee for your continued support of that 

important work and for all you do to support the men and women 

of the United States military and their families. 

[The statement of Admiral Mullen follows:] 


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PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Hale. 

Mr. HALE. I don’t have a prepared statement. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, let me tell the committee, we only have until 

1,500, according to Admiral Mullen, 3 o’clock. 

But—I am not going to ask any questions, but I just want to say 

about this Presidential helicopter, if it is true it is going to cost us 

$555 million, which is 5,000 man-hours at $100,000 a year, I think 

we have to relook at the first phase of that. And I hope we can 

work together in some form to come up with a helicopter to not 

only take care of the President, but to take care of that very vital 

need. 

Mr. Obey. 

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I will pass. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young. 

MISSILE DEFENSE

Mr. YOUNG. On the Presidential helicopter, I have spent quite a 

bit of time reviewing the options, and I think there are some good 

options that should be available to the President and the President’s party, and I am hopeful that we can work out something 

that will accommodate the needs and the financial requirements. 

And Mr. Murtha and I have spent a lot of time talking with each 

other on this subject, and it is an important subject. 

But I want to ask you today specifically about missile defense. 

And the reason I do is because of the latest firing of the longerrange missile by Iran and Ahmadinejad’s continuing rhetoric about 

threats to our friends and allies in the region. 

I note that the missile defense budget would be reduced somewhat, which I think maybe doesn’t put us in as strong a case for 

the booster-phase launches, but that is something we will work on. 

But I want to go to the issue of our radar sites and our interceptor sites in Europe, specifically in the Czech Republic and in Poland. 

I understand now, based on some of the comments from the administration, that the parliaments of both countries are considering 

whether or not to proceed with the agreement that we thought we 

had, in view of maybe they have a question about what our intentions really are. So talk to us a little bit about the missile defense 

sites, the radar and the interceptors in Europe that would be very, 

very important not only to our friends and allies, but to American 

troops deployed in that region. 

Secretary GATES. I would be happy to, Mr. Young. 

We took the money out for the third site in the fiscal year 2010 

budget because we have enough money left over for this purpose 

in the 2009 budget to be able to cover any potential costs, to go 

ahead and begin construction on both the radars and the interceptors, the radars in the Czech Republic and the interceptors in Poland. 

As I am sure you know, the Czech Government that agreed to 

the radars has fallen, and they are going to have an election, I 

guess this summer or this fall. 


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They have to, under the statutes passed by the Congress—both 

the Czech Republic and Poland have to pass both a status of forces 

agreement and the agreements on the sites before any money can 

be sent on construction. And so, depending on how the Czech election comes out, we will see how that goes. 

There is considerable interest, I would say, in the administration 

in pursuing the third site, but I would say also there is great interest—which, frankly, I have been working on for 2 years—to see if 

we can partner with the Russians and see if we can make this, in 

effect, a quadripartite effort of Poland, the Czech Republic, the 

Russians and ourselves. The reality is that the radar located in 

Russia supplementing those in the Czech Republic would give additional capability to the sites in Europe. 

So we have the money, we need to see what the Czech Republic 

does in their elections. And I might add that, in parallel with the 

Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department of Defense is carrying out a Missile Defense Review that will address the role of the 

third site in the overall program. 

So I think we have got the money and we just need to see how 

the politics in Eastern Europe go. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Secretary, I understand those issues, and I 

think that you are approaching them in the proper way. 

In the statement by Ahmadinejad on their missile fire, he said 

it was a very successful flight and that it hit the target exactly as 

they intended. Can you comment whether that is accurate, whether 

there was a successful flight? 

Secretary GATES. The information that I have read indicates that 

it was a successful flight test. The missile will have a range of approximately 2,000 to 2,500 kilometers. Because of some of the problems they have had with their engines, we think at least at this 

stage of the testing, it is probably closer to the lower end of that 

range. 

Whether it hit the target that it was intended for, I have not 

seen any information on that. I don’t know if the Admiral has any. 

Admiral MULLEN. No, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much. 

In view of our limited time available, a lot of questions on shipbuilding, aircraft production, tankers, a lot of important issues, but 

I know a lot of other members want to talk about those issues. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I would yield back. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, good to see you again. Washington State is still 

out there, I want you to know. 

Admiral, good to see you and Mr. Hale. 

On the Presidential helicopter, you know, this decision, I hadn’t 

been involved in this program and hadn’t followed it, but the only 

question I have is, it appears that there was a certain amount of 

money that has been spent, around $3 billion; and we developed a 

number of helicopters that didn’t have the full capability that the 

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Is there any way to salvage those first four or five helicopters 

and use them for some purpose? 

Secretary GATES. Those helicopters, if we completed them, first 

of all, they have a relatively limited life span—10 years, something 

like that. The current helicopters have a useful life span of about 

30 to 40 years. 

There is minimum capacity on the Increment 1 helicopters to add 

capabilities. So even if you bought those helicopters, you would almost immediately have to begin a new helicopter program to begin 

addressing the requirements that the White House has had, that 

were posited under the previous administration. 

Now, I would just tell you that, first of all, those helicopters amortized would be about a billion dollars apiece. And I just—you 

have heard the President speak on this. The reality is, in some respects, those new Increment 1 helicopters have less capability than 

the current helicopter. With 10 passengers, the VH–71 has only 55 

percent of the range of the VH–3, the existing helicopter. 

Mr. MURTHA. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. DICKS. I yield. 

Mr. MURTHA. How could we get this far? How could we spend all 

this taxpayer money and now finally decide it has less capability 

than the other helicopter? 

Secretary GATES. Well, the first increment of five or six were intended as an increment leading to the second increment, which 

would have all the new capabilities. 

The second—to complete the program through the second increment, first of all, it is already 6 years overdue—but it would cost 

$13 billion to finish it out. 

So the first increment was never intended to have the capabilities and meet the full requirements that the second increment 

would. But the truth of the matter, Mr. Chairman, is that this program is a poster child for an acquisition process gone seriously 

wrong. 

Mr. DICKS. So what do we do? Are we just going to use the existing helicopters? 

Secretary GATES. No. First of all, we have programs under way 

to extend the life of the President’s—the current Presidential helicopters. And the termination cost of the VH–71 plus the cost of additional life extension, which would actually take these helicopters 

for another decade or more, is $1.2 billion. And our intent is immediately to sit down with the White House and look at the requirements and come up with a new program that will be reasonable 

and meet the requirements. 

And I will tell you, one of the ideas that I heard this morning 

that I think is worth pursuing. What we may have tried to do in 

this VH–71 is put too many requirements, too high requirements 

on a single kind of aircraft in terms of protections and the number 

of passengers and so on and so forth. 

So one idea is that you look at two different helicopters, that you 

look at one that the President basically uses here in town to go to 

Andrews and on regular trips here in the United States and things 

like that; and an escape helicopter that has different kinds of capabilities and that could perhaps be a modified kind of helicopter that 

we use now in combat. 


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So we are going to be looking at a lot of different ideas on how 

we can get this program back on track, get a Presidential helicopter program back into the budget, and get the President and his 

successors’ helicopters within a reasonable period of time. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have limited time so 

I want to make sure everybody gets a chance. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Secretary, I lined up 13 people, two from the 

White House, telling them: Why does this cost this much? It is the 

White House that put these requirements on, from the former administration. They said, Well, we will push it over to the Obama 

administration. 

But it is going to cost more than $1.3 billion, you can be assured, 

because I have never seen an estimate yet that didn’t cost a lot 

more. So I wish you would really look at the present money we 

have spent to see if we can’t adapt something to that. 

Mr. Lewis. 

PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY FUND

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Mullen, you and I have communicated a bit about the 

priority that this committee feels relative to our challenges in Pakistan. Our initial communications suggested that the administration 

was on the right track, that is, they are asking for redirection of 

funding to Pakistan to help stabilize that government. The administration’s direction, I thought, was appropriate. 

The 2010 decisions made by this committee would take us off 

that course; that is, for 2010, they would have money to go into 

Pakistan handled through the State Department. I would like to 

have both the Secretary and Admiral Mullen give us the administration view on this for the record in this committee here. 

Secretary GATES. The proposal that we have put forward for this, 

if you are speaking about the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund— 

which was $400 million in the 2009 supplemental, and our request 

is for $700 million in the 2010 budget—what we have proposed is 

that it be voted in the 2009 supplemental as a Department of Defense fund, but obviously with a dual key for the Secretary of State. 

For 2010, the basic problem is that State lacks the authorities 

and the capacities to implement this program. So what we have 

suggested, because of concern in the House Foreign Affairs Committee and elsewhere, is that for fiscal year 2010, the money be directed to the State Department as a pass-through to the Department of Defense, but at least the money would come through the 

State Department. And our hope would be that it would come 

through without restriction, so we have maximum flexibility and 

agility, as we do when we implement these programs, and that it 

doesn’t become subject to all the restrictions and so on of the Foreign Assistance Act and so on and so forth. 

Then, in 2011, we would hope that during 2010, the Congress 

and the State Department could work together to make sure the 

State Department had the authorities and the capacity to implement this program; but the idea would be that beyond 2010 this 

program would be increasingly run through the State Department 

in partnership with us. And we still anticipate that a substantial 

part of the money would come to us just because of the nature of 


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the projects, but this would allow for the State Department to basically receive the money. 

Mr. LEWIS. Admiral Mullen. 

Admiral MULLEN. If I could just add, I think one of the most important parts of this, in a bridge strategy to get to that point, is 

speed of execution. 

And I think, Mr. Obey, to your point earlier about both visibility 

and understanding the American people, we have in DOD mechanisms to put this money to work right away. 

And, in Pakistan, there is, I believe, a requirement for patience 

on the part of us in dealing with them. And yet I know there are, 

in many places, strong feelings that we have got to get moving 

quickly. 

So what we asked for, no, not what the Secretary laid out, is a 

strategy to be able to execute as quickly as possible on the ground, 

and the vast majority of this money is military money. And keeping 

that in mind is what makes me think that this strategy that Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates had worked out is the right 

strategy. 

Mr. LEWIS. But it occurs to me, as we go forward towards conference, following regular order, we are going to really want to 

have your help paying careful attention to the language that actually ends up being in conference regarding this matter. 

I personally believe it is a defense matter, and State Department, as of this moment at least, doesn’t have the capacity to follow through. So I appreciate your statement. 

KEI TERMINATION

Moving to one other question, the kinetic energy interceptor, as 

you know, KEI, the program has been terminated in the fiscal year 

2010 budget and the Missile Defense Agency is moving fast to shut 

it down. In fact, a stop-work order was issued on May 11, 2009, for 

the program. I am told that they will immediately begin the termination process, and the program will be destaffed by July 1. 

In partnership with the Department of Defense, Congress has 

supported the requested budgets for KEI. In past years, Congress 

went beyond that and requested and provided the Department with 

additional dollars to accelerate this critical boost-phase capability. 

In total, the Department has expended more than $1 billion towards this effort to date in providing the Nation with a technically 

viable solution to boost an ascent engagement of a ballistic missile 

targeted at our country or at our troops. 

Six years of development and testing, with most of the more than 

$1 billion in funding spent to date, was to culminate in the first 

booster flight of 2009, less than 5 months from now. With the 

issuance of the stop-work order, the Department is walking away 

from this development without the benefit of knowing what the 

technology has to offer. 

Why would the Department kill the program 4 months before its 

booster flight? Why not allow the program to execute the fiscal year 

2009 funds? 

Secretary GATES. Actually, this is one decision that I can’t take 

credit for. The Missile Defense Agency itself, last fall during the 


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Bush administration, essentially eliminated the kinetic energy interceptor from its fiscal year 2010 POM. 

And the reasons for that are as follows: First of all, this was to 

have been a 5-year development program, and it now looks like it 

is about a 16-year development program. As you suggest, there has 

not been a single flight test. There are a couple more static tests, 

as I understand it, that have to take place before a test of the 

booster. There has been little work on the third stage or the kill 

vehicle, which are obviously critical. 

But a big part of the problem with this program is that it needs 

to be close to the launch site to be able to be effective. And so the 

only potential country where it could have a role with some confidence would be North Korea. It has poor capability against Iran 

and virtually no capability against either Russia or Chinese launch 

facilities. And so you have a very limited capability here at considerable cost. 

The other problem we have is that we don’t know what to put 

it on. The missile is 38 or 39 feet long. It weighs 12 tons. There 

is no extant ship that we could put it on; we would have to design 

a new ship to put it on. And as I say, it would have to operate in 

close proximity to the territorial waters of these countries. 

So for all these reasons, the decision has been made that this is 

not a productive way to look at the booster problem. 

General Cartwright and I were here on the Hill this morning, 

talking to several Senators about this program; and the fact is, we 

have a very strong and very capable terminal phase missile defense. And it is getting better, and this budget devotes a lot of 

money to that program, to make it even more robust. 

We have a strong ground-based interceptor program in Alaska 

and California, mid-course intercept program. And we are going to 

keep funding the development of that to keep improving that capability. 

The boost phase is really the hardest, and that is because you 

either have to have an extremely powerful beam or you have to be 

fairly close to the source of the launch. And, frankly, the airborne 

laser is another example where the technology is lagging very far 

behind what were decisions to go ahead with an operational concept and a procurement program. On the boost phase, we got way 

out in front of our headlights in terms of going forward with a procurement program before we really had mastered the technology. 

And so we have a number of programs. One of the reasons I am 

keeping the first, the prototype airborne laser, is to keep working 

the directed energy kind of solution to the boost-phase program. 

But overall, all these things considered, I think that is why the 

Missile Defense Agency made this decision actually last fall. 

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Secretary, the chairman has already expressed 

the reality that $1 billion here, $1 billion there, sometimes it gets 

very expensive. In this program area, we have seen the Department go in several directions over a reasonably short period of time 

and the taxpayers’ moneys have been spent in the meantime. 

So I would hope that you would recognize the committee does 

have some priority in this item and want to hear more from you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky. 


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INDEPENDENT COST ESTIMATES

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much. And as Mr. Young indicated, 

I have a number of areas of concern that, as questions are answered for the record, I would be focused on. One is the Joint 

Strike Fighter alternative engine; the others are your shipbuilding 

programs. 

But for this afternoon, I have two questions for you, Mr. Secretary. The first is on acquisition program costs. 

Although the Department of Defense is required by law to conduct an independent cost estimate on major acquisition programs; 

these programs can be funded to lower confidence levels of the estimates, presumably to fit more program within a given year’s request. 

Recent examples of programs that have not been funded to full 

independent cost estimates include the DDG–1000 program, the 

Joint Strike Fighter, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite program, the CVN–21 aircraft carrier, the VH–71 helicopter 

that has been spoken about. 

When the inevitable cost growth is realized, it creates ripples 

throughout the rest of the budget, and somewhere moneys have to 

be shifted to pay for the growth. Funding these major acquisition 

programs to their full cost estimates from their inception might, as 

the alternative, go a long way toward creating more stability in the 

budget. 

In the manager’s statement for the fiscal year 2009 bill, this committee asked for a report and the Department was forthcoming. 

The Department indicated that in 2004 only 13 of 29 major acquisition programs were funded to the independent cost estimate level. 

My question is, do you not find the disruption caused by these 

faulty estimates—and there has been a protracted conversation 

this afternoon on one of those—to be much more severe than the 

constraints you would face if you had, hopefully, more accurate cost 

estimates going forward, even though they might be higher? 

Secretary GATES. Let me respond, and then the Admiral, who 

probably has more direct experience with this sort of thing than I 

do. 

I think this is really one of the focuses of the acquisition reform, 

both the bills here in the Congress and our efforts in the Department itself. And I think one of the innovations in the legislation 

that is moving is to get at the question of better cost estimates and 

more reliable cost estimates, along the lines that you are describing. 

Admiral MULLEN. I have been on both ends of this problem, 

both—if you talk about the 13 or 24 programs, and I don’t know 

what that list is right now. But I have seen programs that have 

been, I think, funded to the full estimate and, in fact, sometimes 

that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, because it was—because 

that estimate was out there, we figure out a way to spend that 

money. I have also seen programs that were underfunded, below 

the full cost estimate, in order to put pressure on them. 

And so that is to say, for me, there is no magic bullet here about 

just getting the cost estimate right. I think it is the totality of the 


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acquisition approach that has got to be taken into effect, taken into 

consideration, which includes accurate cost estimates; holding people accountable, once we get to a point where we agree, this is 

what the cost should be; holding requirements down, which has a 

tendency to make cost estimates, whatever they are, whether they 

are underestimated or fully estimated, explode; and it speaks to the 

need of the entire requirements process, as well as getting at all 

of acquisition. 

There are examples on every end of the spectrum here, but the 

need to get good cost estimates and properly assess risk in programs at the right time is absolutely critical. 

Mr. HALE. May I add one thought to that. 

I can assure you that we see that cost analysis improvement 

group numbers in the intended group you are referring to, in all 

the cases. So they do enter the debate and they are fully considered. And as the comptroller, I will continue to ensure that happens in the future. 

NUCLEAR WEAPON STRATEGY

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you. 

My final question relates to my service on another subcommittee 

and that is the Energy Subcommittee along with Mr. Frelinghuysen. As you know, we have jurisdiction over the NNSA and the 

nuclear weapons program. That budget for the weapons program is 

about $6.3 billion and obviously we have nonproliferation. 

For fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009, we have been adamant 

that before the Department of Energy, that does not have a stellar 

track record as far as managing major construction projects, goes 

down the road as far as reconfiguring the complex, we would want 

to have a strategy in place formulated by yourselves, the Intelligence Community, the Department of Energy, as far as the proposed use of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, non-kinetic 

means to protect ourselves going forward, realizing that the world 

changes every day. 

The point of that is, before we would provide moneys for the Department of Energy, we would want to know a strategy and then 

the types and numbers of nuclear weapons that fit the strategy you 

determine, which would then lead us to make sounder financial decisions for the Department of Energy. 

The concern I have is Defense doesn’t pay for that complex over 

at Energy, and I am just wondering where you are with that strategy. I know you have the Nuclear Posture Review coming, but I 

must tell you, Mr. Secretary, I am not just looking for that annual 

report, if you would, but some confidence before we start down that 

road with the Department of Energy that there is a sense of a 

strategy in the world we exist in today. And you have made some 

very difficult decisions on programs already at Defense—as to what 

are those weapons types, what are their numbers? Then we would 

be happy to proceed with Department of Energy. 

Secretary GATES. Well, I think that, as you suggest, the key here 

in terms of the administration having an overall and longer-term 

strategy—— 


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Mr. VISCLOSKY. And just parenthetically, not for the Obama administration any more than we asked for it for the Bush administration, but one that as a government we would proceed with. 

Secretary GATES. I understand. And I think that the basis for an 

administration review of these policies and development of a strategy will be the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review. These are being compressed in time because I want 

the conclusions available to be able to help shape the fiscal year 

2011 budget. 

So I am hoping that by the end of the summer or very early in 

the fall, we would have the information available, the analysis 

available to us not only to help shape a longer-range administration strategy in this area, but to inform the kind of decisions you 

are talking about. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I appreciate that and would encourage you in 

that good work. The strategy is obviously important and critical for 

the Department of Energy. So I thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

ACQUISITION PROGRAM COSTS

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Secretary, I think it goes beyond even the cost 

estimates. LCS is a perfect example of that. The Navy said we 

could build it for $188 million; it went way beyond it. I remember 

saying at the time, you will never build that ship for $188 million. 

And there are all kinds of examples where the F–22 they said we 

are going to build 600 of them so that gets the cost down per unit. 

I think we have to have the departments be more honest when 

they are putting forward these projections. And then industry 

counts on the requirements changing, and so they can up the price. 

I mean, it is not simple, but I think that is the complicated part 

of this problem. 

Secretary GATES. It is, as Admiral Mullen said, a combination of 

several things; it is more realistic cost estimating, it is better control of the requirements anybody who ever added a room onto their 

house knows what happens when you change the specs. And that 

is what happens with these big weapons systems; people keep adding requirements and it keeps driving the cost up. We need better 

execution in the Department of Defense, and we need to negotiate 

better contracts. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, the taxpayer has to pay the bill, and that is 

our problem. And so we wish you well and we want to work with 

you in trying to get this thing under control. 

Mr. Lewis was deeply involved in the F–22, and the Department 

fought him tooth and nail because he wanted to make sure that the 

research was done before we put the thing out there in the field 

for production. And we had one hell of a fight with the Senate and 

other people. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

NEW AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentleman, 

thank you for your service. 

Now that the President has made his decision and outlined a 

new strategy for Afghanistan and directing more troops we need to 


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support those troops—I worry about the drumbeat that accompanied our efforts in Iraq, the drumbeat for 6 years that we should 

withdraw from Iraq; sort of the issue of timetables or benchmarks. 

I am afraid we are going to—and maybe this is what Chairman 

Obey was alluding to—we are going to get the same sort of refrain 

in Afghanistan. 

I would like to know where you think our involvement in Afghanistan is going. Obviously we are going to be supportive of our 

troops, the President’s mission, but how is this going to turn out? 

And do we have the resources, do we have enough soldiers to do 

the job? And do they have the capacity, with enough equipment, to 

be successful in their mission? 

Secretary GATES. This is one we should both take a crack at. 

It actually was a view of mine, as we were putting together the 

Afghan/Pakistan strategy, that the administration needed to develop its own measures of effectiveness so that we could evaluate 

over a period of time whether we were actually making progress or 

not, and so we weren’t rolling our goals in front of us and pretending we were making progress when maybe we weren’t. So part 

of this process has been an interagency development of measures 

of effectiveness—benchmarks, whatever you want to call them—to 

see how we can measure progress. 

My own view, sir, is that I think that there needs to be, on the 

part of the administration at least, an evaluation of where we are 

about next March or April, to see if we have begun to change the 

momentum in some respects, to see if we are making progress. And 

I think future decisions in terms of troops and things like that 

should depend on that. 

I think that even if this goes well, it is a multiyear undertaking. 

The way we would see it evolving is, in many respects, the way it 

has evolved in Iraq, which is Iraqis increasingly taking more and 

more responsibility for security, and our taking a narrower and 

narrower view until finally we leave; and that the same thing 

would happen in Afghanistan, which is one of the reasons there is 

money in this budget for supporting the expansion of the Afghan 

Army. 

I will tell you that I think our troops have the equipment that 

they need. In terms of the numbers of the troops, my experience 

on this is shaped very much by my experience in CIA and fighting 

the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, where the Soviets, with 

110,000, 120,000 troops, didn’t care about civilian casualties and 

they still lost. And so in a country like Afghanistan—I think each 

of these countries has to be taken one at a time in terms of what 

the traffic will bear and at what level of foreign troops do we become, instead of partners and allies, do we become seen as occupiers by the Afghan people? 

So, personally, I am going to take some convincing in terms of 

going significantly beyond the troop levels the President has already approved. But I think that these troops are flowing in now. 

I think we will see them make a difference. And I am confident 

that they are going to do a great job. 

Admiral. 

Admiral MULLEN. I have confidence in the strategy. I think we 

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sess where we are and adjust. And doing that towards the end of 

this year and the first part of next year, I think is absolutely critical. 

We do have enough people. I think the strategy is about right. 

It also offers, I think, great potential for success in terms of what 

we have learned in Iraq, rolling those lessons in, whether they are 

how to move through this, recognize it is not all about military, 

that we can’t forfeit the security of the same people that we are 

trying to protect, and that we have got to have a development program and we have got to have a rule of law governance program 

that is delivering capability to the Afghan people. 

I think we have got to work rapidly this year and next to stem 

the violence and to start to turn this around. And I think that is 

doable with the troops the President has supported so far. 

AFGHANISTAN SUPPLY ROUTES

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is ironic that we are depending on the 

Russians for two supply routes, the other route being the Khyber 

Pass. The Russians lost in Afghanistan and have made life so difficult for us in Kyrgyzstan, that we would rely on the people who 

lost to Afghanistan earlier. And I hope that we have a greater degree of reliability because, obviously, to supply our troops, those 

overland routes are pretty vital to us. 

Secretary GATES. And we have developed some alternatives to 

those as well. 

I think one should not underestimate Russia’s concern about Afghanistan being taken over again by the Taliban and being a refuge for violent extremists, and especially religious extremists. And 

also the Russians are seeing firsthand the consequences of the drug 

flow out of Afghanistan, and that is a big concern to them. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, both. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

All of the subject matter that has been addressed today is of 

great interest and importance. 

I want to bring you back home a bit though, if I could, Mr. Secretary, to the BRAC decisions. I had voted against the 2005 BRAC 

realignment because I thought that the operational benefits were 

grossly overstated and the costs understated. And this budget 

shows that that turned out to be the case. 

The cost to implement BRAC increased to over $32 billion, up 

from the original estimate of about $20 billion, and the savings decreased to only $4 billion annually. The GAO calculates that the 

long-term savings for BRAC will save less than half of the $36 billion that was originally estimated. 

There are 230 locations scheduled to be completed only within 

the last 2 weeks of the statutory deadline. It is not going to happen, and yet we continue to budget under the assumption that it 

will. This includes—and this is why I am particularly sensitive to 

this—more than 6,000 Washington headquarters service employees 

who are to move to Alexandria—again they say it is going to be 


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completed in the last 2 weeks of 2011—8,500 employees to the new 

NGA facility at Fort Belvoir and the realignment at Walter Reed. 

These decisions relocated 20,000 workers away from transit-accessible locations to sites where there is no public transportation. 

And as a result, the Army Corps of Engineers estimates that the 

traffic around these new facilities—primarily at the Fort Belvoir395 Beltway area—is going to result in an extra 3 to 4 hours of 

delay in each direction when these employees are trying to get to 

work and leave work. 

So, given the estimates that we now know are far more accurate 

than the rosy projections back 4 years ago, do you have any intent 

to reconsider the September 15, 2011 deadline? And I guess that 

goes to the Comptroller. My guess is you are going to buck that to 

the Comptroller, Mr. Secretary, so go ahead. 

Mr. HALE. I think I will be glad to try this. 

We are committed to BRAC. And I understand your concerns, 

but we feel we have fully funded it in a way that will allow us to 

meet the September 15, 2011 deadline. 

Mr. MURTHA. Would the gentleman yield? 

Are these figures accurate, in your estimation, of what Mr. 

Moran just explained? 

Mr. HALE. Yes. 

Mr. MURTHA. In other words, there is going to be very little savings and a big cost, and who pays it? 

Mr. HALE. Well, when you say ‘‘very little savings,’’ we still be- lieve it will be on the order of $4 billion a year. That is our best 

estimate. And these are in perpetuity once they occur. So when you 

look at it on a net present value basis, Mr. Chairman and Mr. 

Moran, I think they will be more impressive than they appear now. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, if I could suggest, Mr. Hale, the decision was 

made on the basis of information that proved to be wrong. And the 

$4 billion savings is much less than we were told when we made 

the decision to go forward with BRAC. 

Mr. MURTHA. If the gentleman would yield again, Bethesda 

alone, when I sat in the hearing, was $200 million; it is already 

well over $1 billion. How do we get these kind of estimates? How 

can you say you are going to reform acquisition and we can have 

these kinds of estimates from the Department? 

Mr. MORAN. Of course it wasn’t these guys, in all fairness, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. HALE. I was going to offer that defense. 

Part of the growth is because we grew the force and increased 

it. But I think you are right, I know you are right; part of this is 

we did not estimate these clearly or well at the beginning. We used 

a rough model called the COBRA model, and it doesn’t have a great 

deal of ongoing attention because we do BRAC so episodically. 

Right now, I think if we were going to do BRAC every year, we 

would be hard at work revising the model, and yet who knows 

when or if there will be another BRAC round. So I don’t offer that 

as an excuse, but you are right, costs have gone up significantly. 

I would just repeat my point. Once you start saving—let’s say it is 2- or 3- or hopefully $4 billion a year, you are going to save it 

forever unless you have to reverse the decisions. So it does start 

to add up. I think BRAC is one of the few areas where we really 


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have achieved some substantial long-term savings in the Department of Defense. 

Mr. MORAN. In the Washington area, you didn’t. And to create 

a 4-hour traffic jam every single day has even national security implications. You have got tens of thousands of people trying to get 

to Fort Belvoir, trying to get into work in Washington. And it is 

because you moved 20,000 people from Metro to a fort that has no 

public transit. It was a dumb decision to make. You didn’t make 

it. But I don’t think it would be responsible for you not to reconsider it. 

Mr. HALE. We will certainly consider it. It is the law. 

Mr. MORAN. I understand it is the law, but it is a law that was 

made because the Pentagon gave us estimates that turned out not 

to be accurate. And I am talking about one area where I know this 

was not a thoughtful decision. It can still be rectified, and that is 

what should happen. And I am going to tell you right now, we are 

going to be here next year and these numbers are going to be worse 

than they are today. 

I have one other area, Mr. Chairman. Do we have time to do 

that? 

Mr. MURTHA. No. 

Mr. MORAN. We don’t. Okay, that is fair. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Tiahrt. 

SUSTAINING AFGHANISTAN

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank 

you for your service to the country. 

Mr. Secretary, in your budget the tanker program seems to keep 

lingering on; hopefully we will have a decision in 2010. You also 

shut down the C–17 production. And in light of the uncertainty of 

Russian influence, the instability in Pakistan, and the current situation in Iran, I think there may be a good argument that there is 

some risk that Afghanistan could become landlocked. And if that 

is the situation, how will we sustain our troops and how will we 

maintain the air bridge back and forth into Afghanistan? 

Secretary GATES. Well, when we were contemplating the loss of 

Manas, we looked at a number of different options. First of all, I 

think the loss of all of the land lines simultaneously is probably not 

very likely. But we did look at a number of options, including a lot 

of flights from facilities in the Middle East, in Kuwait and elsewhere. And certainly the cost goes up fairly considerably, but it 

was deemed to be a manageable challenge. 

AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM

Mr. TIAHRT. But it is still something we have as a contingency 

plan. I am glad that you are planning on having some fallback position. 

One other program that concerns me is in the airborne laser. If 

you look at the current situation in Iran with their most recent 

launch, with launches from North Korea, it seems that the greatest 

deterrent would be the ability to knock down an airplane in the initial phase of the launch and leave the debris in the country of origin. The airborne laser is the only tool we have that could do that. 


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And we have reduced the amount of funding, even though they are 

on schedule for a shootdown this coming fall. 

So I am concerned that we are shortchanging this program that 

has a great need today and an even greater need in the future. And 

I would also like to note that, even though the F–35 hasn’t completed its testing, we are moving forward into a production program. 

So I am concerned that we are shortchanging the ABL program 

when we have such a huge need that is very apparent in current 

world events, and we are on track for completion of not only what 

has been proven in the lab and on the ground, now to be completed 

in the air. 

Is there any consideration in how we are going to get this tool 

online more quickly when we have delayed the second aircraft purchase and shortchanged the program? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t know anybody at the Department of Defense, Mr. Tiahrt, who thinks that this program should or would 

ever be operationally deployed. The reality is that you would need 

a laser something like 20 to 30 times more powerful than the 

chemical laser in the plane right now to be able to get any distance 

from the launch site to fire. 

So right now, the ABL would have to orbit inside the borders of 

Iran in order to be able to try and use its laser to shoot down that 

missile in the boost phase. And if you were to operationalize this, 

you would be looking at 10 to 20 747s at $1.5 billion a piece and 

$100 million a year to operate. And there is nobody in uniform that 

I know who believes that this is a workable concept. 

I have kept the prototype because we do need to continue the research on directed energy and on lasers, and that will be robustly 

funded because we do need to continue developing a boost phase 

capability. But operationally this first test, for example, is going to 

be from a range of 85 miles. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Well, thank you for the information. There are a series of comments I would like to leave you with. 

In the competition for the tanker during the last go-around, we 

saw that there were some inequities in the request: there was no 

accounting for subsidies in the bidding process; there was no accounting for cost accounting standards; international traffic in 

arms regulations, and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for our European allies. There was no accounting for the industrial base, there 

was no accounting for the lifecycle cost long term, as required by 

the FAR. 

And as we go forward with this tanker procurement, I hope that 

we will take these things into consideration. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Kaptur. 

DEPENDING ON FOREIGN OIL

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentleman, thank 

you for your service to our country. 

These questions can be answered very quickly. Admiral Mullen, 

how dependent is the United States economy and our military on 

foreign sources of oil and imported petroleum to meet our national 

economic needs and our military needs? Are we 5 percent dependVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00466 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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ent, 20 percent dependent, 50 percent dependent or 80 percent dependent? 

Admiral MULLEN. I don’t know the exact number. I would say 

that from a national security perspective, we are proportionately as 

dependent as the United States is. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I beg your pardon? 

Admiral MULLEN. That the proportional dependence we have in 

terms of foreign oil in the Department of Defense and in the military is consistent with the proportion that we have as a country. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Are you aware that we import about 80 percent of 

our oil? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, I am. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Well, that seems to be a serious vulnerability. 

Let me ask you, how important are Iraq’s oil fields in terms of 

global oil reserves; are they not important, are they somewhat important, or very important? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think they are very important. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Who is guarding our facilities in Iraq at this juncture, the U.S. military or through contractors? 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually, I don’t know the specific answer to 

that. 

Ms. KAPTUR. All right. Is it possible that you or Secretary Gates 

know the answer to that? 

Secretary GATES. I think that the Iraqis are guarding them. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Through some type of contract, or directly through 

their security forces? 

Secretary GATES. I think through their security forces, but we 

will get you an answer to that question. 

Ms. KAPTUR. And if there are private firms involved somehow in 

the guarding of those facilities, could you provide that for the 

record, sir? 

Secretary GATES. Sure. 

[The information follows:] 

Our facilities in Iraq are guarded by both service members and contractors, working in concert to provide unparallel levels of safety and protection for those in harms 

way. There are currently 27 Private Security Contractors (PSCs) consisting of approximately 11,500 armed/unarmed U.S. citizens, third-country nationals, and hostnation personnel assisting U.S. Forces in excess of 130,000 providing security to our 

facilities in Iraq. PSCs augment the security provided by U.S. Forces through static 

security and dynamic security) Convoy operations, personal security details.) 

Examples of ‘‘static security’’ include guards situated ‘‘outside the gate’’ manning 

checkpoints and guard towers, ensuring only authorized personnel have access to 

our bases. Additionally, guards are utilized at key locations on our bases to ensure 

only authorized personnel are accessing our facilities. In terms of dynamic security, 

PSCs provide an additional layer of protection already being provided by U.S. Forces 

(in terms of manning and armament) by assisting in defending high-value assets 

and personnel traveling within theater. 

CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ

Ms. KAPTUR. Secretary Gates or Admiral Mullen, what is the actual number of contracted personnel that the U.S. military anticipates will remain in Iraq this year and next year? 

Secretary GATES. The high number was in the 160,000s. We expect them to be down to about 138,000 by the end of this year, and 

about 90,000 at the end of 2010. 


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Ms. KAPTUR. And could you provide for the record as well, in 

terms of security forces, what happens to those as those numbers 

come down? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, ma’am. 

[The information follows:] 

Private security contractors (PSCs) perform a variety of security functions to include: personal security, convoy security and static security missions. Current trend 

data indicates a three month lag between troop reductions and a corresponding decrease in the number of contractors. PSC data represents an anomaly to that trend. 

In the short term, I expect the number of PSCs in theater to increase slightly for 

two reasons: First, as our forces decrease, the security functions they performed will 

be absorbed by PSCs, and secondly, although our forces are being reduced, the number of facilities initially will remain unchanged. In the long run, as troop departures 

normalize and the military facilities close, I’d expect a decrease in the total number 

of PSCs. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Are you removing cooks or are you removing contract security forces? 

Secretary GATES. I think it is across the board, but we will get 

it for you. 

CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN

Ms. KAPTUR. I thank you very much. In Afghanistan, the bulk of 

the Taliban are Pashtun. Are we fighting the Pashtun, Secretary 

Gates? 

Secretary GATES. I think we are fighting several different enemies. The Taliban are clearly the principal force in Afghanistan, 

but you also have the Haqqani network. You have a variety of different groups, including Pakistani insurgents, al Qaeda, foreign 

fighters, and so on. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Are they under a central command and control 

structure? 

Secretary GATES. I would say loosely. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Who is the commander? 

Secretary GATES. Well, Mullah Omar still is alive. And to the extent that anyone oversees the whole operation, that would be him. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Is Bin Laden an objective of the war? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, but I would say secondary. 

Ms. KAPTUR. What is the platform of the moderate Taliban, and 

is it something we can live with? 

Secretary GATES. Well, I think we have to figure out who the 

moderate Taliban are first. Right now, in terms of potential reconciliation, I think that the odds are against us. I think that as 

long as the Taliban think that they have the upper hand, it is 

going to be difficult to get them to reconcile, at least on the terms 

that are acceptable to the Afghan Government. 

We do believe that a significant number of the Taliban fighters 

are doing it mainly for money. And so if we can help Afghanistan 

rehabilitate their agriculture and find jobs for these people, you 

could get a number of those people who are doing it just for money 

to walk away from that movement. But there will be a certain hard 

core that will be totally irreconcilable. 

Ms. KAPTUR. How will we know when we have won in Afghanistan? 

Secretary GATES. When our troops are out. 

Ms. KAPTUR. After they have achieved what? 


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Secretary GATES. After they have achieved a situation in which 

the Afghan Security Forces, with international help, are able to 

maintain the security of their own country against both the 

Taliban and any external threats. 

ALLIED SUPPORT

Ms. KAPTUR. Finally, let me ask Admiral Mullen, for the record, 

in your testimony at several points you inject the word ‘‘partner’’— 

page 2, page 4, page 6—‘‘networks of partners and allies, expanding the sets of partnerships.’’ Could you, for the record, clarify what 

you mean by ‘‘partnerships’’ as opposed to ‘‘allied support?’’ 

Admiral MULLEN. I would say that in many ways they overlap. 

It would depend specifically on the relationship we had with a 

given country. I think both of them are critical in the world we are 

living in now and the world we are going to be living in the future. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Is it possible for you to provide for the record what 

you mean by—a partnership is not a country? 

Admiral MULLEN. Say that again. 

Ms. KAPTUR. A partnership is, then, not a country? 

Admiral MULLEN. A partnership with a country is exactly what 

I mean. 

Ms. KAPTUR.Then why on page 6 would you say ‘‘steadily expanding the sets of partnerships as opposed to allied engagements available to address future challenges.’’ On page 2, page 4, page 5, page 

6, this word ‘‘partnerships’’ keeps cropping up. I don’t understand 

what that means. Could you clarify that for the record and explain 

how that is distinct from allied support? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, ma’am. 

[The information follows:] 

‘‘All alliances are partnerships of some sort. But not all partnerships are alliances. 

In today’s dynamic security environment, where threats arise not only from nation-states, but also from loosely-knit networks of malcontents and extremists, 

where natural disasters and international crimes alike demand the occasional use 

of military power—we can no longer afford to organize that power solely within the 

confines of traditional alliances. 

Alliances still have their place, to be sure. NATO, for all the criticism it has received in recent years, has without question transformed itself into a much more 

expeditionary force. Some 59,000 service members from 41 nations, all 28 NATO nations and 14 NATO partner nations are supporting the mission in Afghanistan. 

ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations, providing senior leadership in all five regional commands, and are directly involved in the mentoring, 

training and equipping of the Afghan National Army. 

But we cannot rely solely on allied support to succeed in places like Afghanistan 

and Iraq. We need flexible partnerships outside these more formal relationships. 

Consider Afghanistan. After nearly two years as Chairman, it is clear to me that 

we must make the Afghan people our center of gravity—providing them the security 

they need to beat back the Taliban and the stability they need to prosper. 

Allied military might will only get us so far. We need Pakistan—which is not an 

official ally—to partner with us against safe havens on their side of the border. We 

need civilian expertise from the State Department and other federal departments 

to assist in developing good governance all the way down to the district level. And 

we need the support of non-governmental agencies and charitable organizations to 

alleviate shortages of foodstuffs and promote education and development. In short, 

we need partnerships that don’t always come in the tidy packages of alliances. 

Nobody can do it alone anymore, not even the best of alliances.’’ 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Kingston. 


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BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Secretary, in April you announced that there 

would be 45 brigade combat teams and not 48. I have the honor 

of representing Fort Stewart, Georgia in Hinesville, and of course 

they have a lot of pride. Under BRAC, they were going to get another brigade. It is a community that, as you know, does everything they can to support the post, as does Savannah with the 

Hunter part of it. 

Fort Stewart is a four-time winner of the Community of Excellence Awards. And the community, after the BRAC announcement, 

has been spending lots of money in preparation for a new brigade— 

hotels and new roads and putting investment on the post itself. Actually, millions of dollars have been spent on it. But now everything is a little bit on hold, up in the air. Banks won’t lend money 

anymore; the community is not sure if this is going to happen or 

not, definitely, maybe, not another brigade, or maybe more troops 

will come back, filling the existing brigades. Developers and investors are now back on the sideline. And so there is a lot of angst 

down there. 

I was wondering if you could comment, what kind of direction 

can we give the folks there, both the people in uniform and then 

the civilians who support the post? 

Secretary GATES. Well, as you know better than I do, there were 

some significant additional units that were deployed to Fort Stewart last fall. And with respect to where the additional Army brigade combat teams will go, my understanding as of this morning 

is that the Army has not yet made that decision. 

But the one thing that I would explain or hope to make clear is 

that one of the reasons we are doing this is that, had the Army 

gone to 48 brigade combat teams, they were doing so with the same 

number of people that they had, regardless. And so you would have 

had a thinning out in the brigades, and it would have hindered our 

effort to get rid of stop loss. So this is to make these brigades more 

robust, so they are more fully staffed, manned, if you will; and so 

these units will all be filled in, if you will, in a way that we have 

not seen, at least in the last few years. 

But in terms of an additional full brigade moving in there, the 

Army just hasn’t made that decision yet. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, the community does share your vision in 

the caring for our troops—— 

Secretary GATES. Yes, they do. 

Mr. KINGSTON. They are 100 percent behind you on that, and 

also the stop loss and getting everybody up to full strength. So that 

is very important. 

When do you think the Army will make that decision? 

Secretary GATES. I just don’t know. We can try and get something for the record for you. 

[The information follows:] 

On June 2, 2009, the Secretary of the Army announced that in accordance with 

the President’s budget, the Army has halted the plan to build three additional brigade combat teams (BCTs) at Fort Bliss, Texas, Fort Carson, Colorado, and Fort 

Steward, Georgia. This decision will not affect the Army’s authorized end strength 

of 547,400. The army will reach its target of 45 BCTs in FY10 with the activation 

of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division at Fort Bliss. 


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With this announced change, the population at Fort Bliss is projected to grow 

from 13,742 in 2003 to 36,069 in 2013; Fort Carson from 15,199 to 25,033; and at 

Fort Stewart from 20,512 to 24,970. 

This announcement does not involve the restationing of two Heavy BCTs scheduled to return from Europe in FY12 and FY13, which is being examined as part 

of the ongoing Quadrennial Defense review. White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico will no longer receive a BCT from Europe in FY13 as originally planned. 

Halting the three additional BCTs ensures that the Army retains its ability to 

support future requirements and maximizes: • The ability of brigades to deploy for contingency operations and major exercises; • Opportunities and access to training facilities, Battle Command Centers, and 

Training Support Centers to provide ready units to meet Army Campaign Plan missions; and • Quality of life for Soldiers and Families. 

Additionally, this plan allows for the best use of existing funding and current and 

planned FY09 and FY10 military construction projects. These projects play an essential role in supporting the Army’s growth to 547,400 and ensuring Army Soldiers 

and Families have the quality facilities they deserve. 

This announcement allows Congress to make time-sensitive and important authorization and appropriations decisions. The Army will provide Congress shortly a 

detailed, project-by-project list that specifies which facility requirements have 

changed and which remain valid. 

The Army understands the tough economic impact this decision will have on the 

communities that have worked so hard to prepare for the arrival of the three brigades. They are great partners with the Army, and we will need their continued 

support as we work together on the growth that is underway at those locations. 

Mr. KINGSTON. And we actually do have a delegation letter outlining this in more specifics that is going to be coming to you Friday. We have given you an advance copy of that right now. But we 

are totally in support of your vision and Fort Stewart and the soldiers, but it is very difficult when the banks that were starting to 

lend money—during these economic times it was important that 

here was a bright spot, and now all of that is sidelined again. 

Mr. MURTHA. Excuse me, just a minute, Mr. Kingston. I am 

going to go vote. Mr. Dicks is going to take over. 

I am impressed, Mr. Secretary, you have been deeply involved in 

this budget. You answered the questions, you know what the hell 

is going on. That is interesting for a Secretary. 

Mr. DICKS [presiding]. Very unusual. 

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Secretary, on another subject, I want to make 

a comment that when Americans think about IEDs, and I think 

Members of Congress, we think about Iraq and don’t realize that 

there will be, and there already is, an uptick of IED incidents in 

Afghanistan, but that IEDs are not going to be isolated to those 

two countries. They are already around in other nations and people 

are more familiar with them. But IEDs could start taking place on 

domestic soil. 

Your budget has a lot for IED research and training. But I just 

want to say that I think a lot of us would certainly support IED 

continued research beyond 2010. And regardless of what happens 

in Afghanistan, I think we want to support your commitment to 

the IED Task Force. 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Kingston, I think that this is a program we 

have now moved from the supplemental into the base budget, so 

that it will be a sustained effort over an extended period of time; 

because I share your view that the IED, unfortunately, is a very 

cheap weapon that is very effective. And I worry a lot that, as you 


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just said, that Afghanistan and Iraq are not the only two countries 

where we will see this. 

Mr. KINGSTON. I thank the gentleman. 

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Secretary, tell us, you have restructured the 

Army’s Future Combat System. Can you tell us about that? 

Secretary GATES. Sure. We are going forward with the first increment of the Future Combat System, which has the UAVs, unmanned ground vehicles, sensors, and the networking. And instead 

of limiting it to 15 FCS brigade combat teams, we are going to expand it to all 73 brigade combat teams of the Army. So all of this 

networking technology that has been developed and spun off will 

all be filtered into the entire Army. 

The part of the Future Combat System where I said we need to 

start over is the vehicle part. And there are a couple of reasons for 

that. One is, we were applying a lot of Band-Aids trying to figure 

out what this system was going to look like, because we were having trouble absorbing the lessons of war. 

So this program, which began 9 years ago, for example, began 

with an 18.5-ton vehicle, so it would fit into a C–130. Then in 2006 

the weight went to 26 tons. In 2007, it went to 27 tons. It has now 

gone to 30 tons, and is probably headed toward 35 tons. So we were 

putting Band-Aids on as people were trying to figure out how to accommodate these vehicles to the lessons of war. 

For example, they identified a couple of years ago that the Infantry Fighting Vehicle had a flat bottom and was going to be 18 

inches off the ground, so it contained none of the defenses against 

IEDs that we have just been talking about. 

Because MRAPs didn’t exist when the program was first initiated, the program had no place in it for the $26 billion the taxpayers have invested in the MRAPs and for our role there. And 

frankly, we did not negotiate a very good contract. All eight vehicles were allocated to two builders, so there was no competition for 

the vehicles. We were paying a third party a pass-through fee to 

acquire the vehicles for us, instead of the way we bought the 

MRAPs, which was directly with the manufacturers. And 90 percent of industry’s performance fee was guaranteed at critical design 

review, leaving very little incentive when it came to building the 

prototypes or final testing. 

So for all those reasons, we have restructured the program. I 

have told the Army and I have told the authorizing committees, an 

Army vehicle modernization program is a very high priority, and 

I believe—the latest I heard just this morning or yesterday was 

that as early as this fall the Army may have an alternative proposal coming forward in terms of these vehicles. So I think little, 

relatively little, time will be lost, but in a program that will potentially cost $150 billion, it seemed to me important to get it right. 

PAKISTAN

Mr. DICKS. In Pakistan, there has been a lot of discussion about 

trying to get—and Admiral Mullen, I know you have been there 

many times—trying to get the Pakistanis to focus more on the inVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00472 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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surgence and the Taliban and less on their concerns about India. 

Are we making any progress on that direction? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, I think we are. In fact, I will cite two 

examples: the level of activity in the last couple of weeks in Bunair, 

Indirh, and now Swat. And it has been a sustained level of activity. 

Clearly there is a history in Swat and it is a big challenge. So part 

of the future assessment and judgment is, are they going to be able 

to sustain it and have an impact, and can they in fact in classic 

counterinsurgency hold the territory that they cleared the insurgents from. And we are in that phase right now in some places. 

And we just don’t know because it hasn’t been long enough. 

Secondly, when I was there about 3 or 4 weeks ago, General 

Kiani, who is the Chief of Staff of the Army, took me out in the 

field with two of his divisions who were doing counterinsurgency 

training, training that he has put in place over the last 12 to 18 

months for his entire Army. These two battalions that I was observing were actually battalions preparing to go to the West and 

spend upwards of 1 or 2 years up in the West. And when I say they 

were doing training, they built the training ranges, they have 

looked at best practices here and other countries to build these 

training ranges, done it very rapidly, so they are starting to move 

in that direction. 

All of that said, it is my view that they are not going to lose the 

focus on India. And they have got a challenge of literally two fights: 

a conventional challenge and threat, along with a counterinsurgency challenge, which they increasingly recognize. It is just going 

to take some time, and our patience level with them is key to establishing the long-term relationship with them to, one, counter 

this threat, and two, to have a relationship with them in that part 

of the world, which I think is absolutely critical. 

ROLE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you this. We had this debate. I actually 

was at the White House several times when Secretary Rumsfeld 

and Secretary Rice would clash over the role the State Department 

wasn’t playing in Iraq. And you talked about this a little bit earlier. But do you think there needs to be legislation to give more authority to the Secretary of State to get her people into the field? 

At that time they were saying they only could stay for 75 days or 

90 days, some very short period of time. And I believe it is true you 

can’t win this thing militarily, you have got to help this economy 

change, we have got to get rid of these drugs, and we have to develop their agricultural capability. What do you think about that? 

Secretary GATES. I think mainly what the Secretary of State 

needs is resources. She does need some authorities that give her 

more flexibility. For example, she needs to be able to provide the 

kind of benefits and pay to people in combat situations, combat 

zones, that we pay to the military. 

She makes the point that, and I won’t get the numbers right, but 

I am going to be in the right ball park—and maybe you remember 

it—but there is a significantly higher percentage of civilians who 

have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan than military, given the 

number of people who were there. And so she does need the authorities to be able to be more flexible in paying these people in 


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terms of providing benefits and family care, like we have, and so 

on. But above all, she needs more people and more dollars. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Ms. Granger. 

COUNTER DRUG EFFORTS

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

Chairman Mullen, I have two questions for you, please. The first 

question has to do with the Merida Initiative. And we have worked 

closely together to ensure that the key equipment was delivered to 

Mexico as part of that initiative. I was disappointed to discover 

how our bureaucracy led to some significant delays in delivering 

the equipment that was essential to President Calderon as he 

fights these drug cartels, and I thank you for your efforts to get 

this process back on track. 

My question first is, are you aware of steps we are taking to 

make sure that doesn’t happen again and to make our bureaucracy 

more efficient and prevent similar situations from arising in the future? 

Admiral MULLEN. Ma’am, in my recent visit there is when I really got exposed to the delays. Merida, this was its first year. In fact 

the money, which was 2008 money, didn’t start flowing until December. And this is something they don’t understand and is not 

unique to Mexico, I see it all over the world—you said you would 

do this, can we start moving this pretty quickly? And our bureaucracy can be pretty cumbersome at times. 

The areas I was focused on specifically were helicopters, which 

they need. And then when I pulled the string on it, in fact there 

were discussions about we were going to give you five, and now it 

looks like three. And putting pressure, at least looking into it, it 

looks like they are going to get the five helicopters late this year— 

at least that is the last input that I had—and some other equipment that they need to fight these cartels. 

And as many have said, there is dual responsibility here. This 

isn’t just a problem in Mexico, because clearly it has been supported by money, supported by weapons here. It had a big impact, 

obviously, particularly in the border states, although not exclusively within our own country. 

We are into our FMS system, which can be very cumbersome, 

and take a lot of time. The Secretary has actually asked the Department to go look at ways now to make this much more flexible 

because of the world that we are living in. And it was originally 

designed to be slow. The law sort of set in place was we don’t want 

this system to move very quickly. 

But when I have needs like Mexico—and I can talk about Afghanistan and Iraq and Pakistan—we need to move stuff through 

much more quickly than we have. 

Secretary GATES. What I have tried to do in this review—and I 

have told the President about it, because it really does hinder our 

ability to help other countries who are our allies and partners in 

these fights. And so the study really has two pieces to it: What is 

it in the Pentagon bureaucracy and the executive branch bureaucracy that slows this stuff down, and what is there in the law that 


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slows it down? And when we get the answers to those questions, 

we are going to get your help to try and fix this thing. 

PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND

Ms. GRANGER. My second question has to do with the Pakistan 

counterinsurgency capability fund. We have talked about that already today. 

Your staff, Admiral Mullen, have been very helpful in helping me 

understand the details of that, and why it is so critical to our 

warfighting component. And we agree that the situation and the 

strategy demand enhanced capacity from the State Department as 

well. 

Help me understand the military component to the PCCF that 

may endure after we increase state capacity. 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually, for the PCCF, the vast majority of 

the money is focused on the military. It gets at training capabilities 

for the Pakistani military; it gets at requirements like helicopter 

requirements; not just the helicopters themselves, but the Pakistani military, aviation side, has a very, very difficult maintenance 

challenge, and so supporting that as well. The kinds of intelligence, 

surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, night vision goggles, 

training facilities, all of which focuses on counterinsurgency, and 

the vast majority which will be enduring, I believe, in their country 

for a significant period of time. And it breaks down across those 

various kinds of capabilities. And there is not an insignificant 

amount that also goes to the State Department to support the kind 

of developmental needs that also must go hand and glove with the 

military requirements. 

Ms. GRANGER. I happen to sit on State Foreign Operations and 

Defense. But we will continue to look at that. And make sure that 

you continue to keep us apprised of that joint capability and necessity. 

Thank you very much. 

MILITARY UNIFORMS

Mr. MURTHA. Admiral, a lot of older guys like me see in the Pentagon people running around in jumpsuits, running around in utility uniforms. Do we not have enough money for Class A uniforms? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, we have money for Class A uniforms. 

Mr. MURTHA. I remember the day when we were constrained 

from even leaving the base wearing a uniform; you had to wear a 

uniform. You didn’t wear the field uniform; field uniforms are for 

the field. Are we going to get back to that? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, we went to this a few years ago—as I 

know you know, Mr. Chairman—because we are at war. And that 

was really the intent of the change. I can’t remember exactly when 

it happened, I was in the Pentagon at the time. There is no guidance right now to reverse that, although I share your concern that 

some of these uniforms aren’t necessarily the right uniforms for the 

workplace in every kind of situation. 


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SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING

Mr. MURTHA. Well, I appreciate the endorsement of the White 

House for our version of the supplemental. I hope the Senate 

agrees with the amount, because we are going to be constrained— 

I figure we are going to get a lot less money in the allocation for 

our 2010 bill. And so I would hope that we can convince the Senate 

that they need to at least look at the possibility of going a little 

higher in their estimate than where they are right now. And I have 

talked to Senator Inouye; I know he is constrained by a lot of other 

things. 

But Mr. Secretary, do you have all the tools you need? Mr. Obey 

keeps talking about the tools you need in order to fight this war. 

Do you have all those tools in place? I heard the first briefing and 

I liked the briefing, I think you are going in the right direction. I 

think you have the right idea. You are going to train the Afghans, 

you are going to put State Department to work—I mean, you are 

not going to, but the President is. Have you got the tools? Is there 

anything we need to do? 

I know you are constraining the other services coming to us, and 

I agree with that. We told you a couple years ago we would try to 

work through the Comptroller, and we appreciate that. But is there 

anything you need that we are not doing that should be included 

in the supplemental? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t think so, Mr. Chairman. One of the 

projects we are working on right now is an interim solution for 

MRAPs in Afghanistan to give them more off-road capability. And 

until we can get a new vehicle over there—the request for which 

is in the budget, the MRAP all-terrain vehicle—we are looking at 

a program that is working for the Marines, which is changing out 

the suspension on the Cougars. It costs about one-tenth as much 

as a new vehicle and gives you about 80 percent of the capability. 

And we are looking at how we can accelerate that over the period 

of the next months to provide more protection for the troops until 

we can get this ATV. 

But on the whole, the truth is you all have been very generous 

to us. Like when I came up here 18 months ago, 2 years ago, and 

asked for the money for the MRAPs, you all just stepped right up 

to the plate. 

Mr. HALE. Mr. Chairman, could I mention one issue with regard 

to the supplemental I think you are aware of? We have a significant shortfall of military personnel funding in fiscal 2009. Before 

your actions, it started at about $2.5 billion associated with the 

services being over strength, partly because the recruiting environment was good. They were trying to cut back on stop loss for a variety of reasons. That is about half of it; the other half higher than 

expected in the budget for a pay raise. There were a lot of other 

reasons. You were very helpful and solved more than half of that, 

but we are still about $1.1 billion short this fiscal year in military 

personnel. 

Mr. MURTHA. Wait a minute. We put $2.5 billion in. 

Mr. HALE. Well, there were also some cuts that you made in military personnel, principally in bonuses, so the net effect still left us 

short. 


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Mr. MURTHA. You are not talking about the bonuses. 

Mr. HALE. The committee made some cuts, primarily in bonus 

payments in various accounts. 

Mr. MURTHA. With the environment you have, I mean, bonuses 

have never been one of my favorite subjects, and when you get on 

that subject I get worried. I mean, we still have to have bonuses? 

Mr. HALE. Well, actually, some of the cuts there actually went 

to even the anniversary payments for past bonuses. And in some 

cases the cuts are below what we have already obligated for this 

year. I understand your general point—— 

Mr. MURTHA. We will work with your guys and we will try to 

work that out. We have some other people who haven’t asked any 

questions, so I am going to let them ask questions. 

Mr. Rothman. 

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, Mr. Hale. Thank you for being here. 

President Obama reiterated on Monday that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons capability, it would be a grave threat to the 

region, including our number one ally in the region, the State of 

Israel, but also many Arab nations in the region. It probably would 

start a nuclear arms race in the region. Such weapons capability 

would threaten our allies in Europe, and would also threaten the 

national security interests of the United States of America. 

I am glad to see that the President will begin new diplomatic 

conversations with Iran, directly or indirectly, in the coming weeks 

or months, and has said he will give it to the end of the year to 

reassess how Iran is doing with regards to reversing its position on 

acquiring nuclear weapons capability. 

But we are in the business, on this subcommittee, of contingency 

planning. And if, as the President and others have described, a nuclear weapons-capable Iran are accurate—and I believe they are— 

and that it would be an unacceptable threat to U.S. national security, do you feel, Mr. Secretary, that this present budget and our 

present military capabilities can fully accommodate a worst-case 

scenario where Iran would not step down from its efforts to acquire 

a nuclear weapon and military action was necessary? 

Secretary GATES. Let me just say in open session here that I believe we have the resources in the proposed budget that would 

allow us to deal with all possible contingencies. 

Admiral MULLEN. I agree with that. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, gentleman. 

The other issue—and I know others wanted a chance to ask 

questions as well, so I will limit myself to one other additional 

question regarding nuclear weapons now in possession of Pakistan. 

It has been discussed that one threat to U.S. national security 

and the region’s security in and around Pakistan would be if, God 

forbid, the terrorists and those designed on the death of Americans 

and innocents were to get hold of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, are 

you confident that our present capability and the resources you are 

asking for in the 2010 fiscal year Defense budget are adequate to 

guarantee that those nuclear weapons possessed by Pakistan are 

secure and will be safe from interception by terrorists? 


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Admiral MULLEN. I am comfortable that the security measures 

the Pakistani military, in particular, is taking ensures their security. We, the United States, have invested in improving their security program over the last 3 or 4 years—that is not done through 

the Department of Defense, it is done through the Department of 

Energy—and that they have improved dramatically. 

That said, it is a sovereign country, a very sovereign program, 

very well protected from a proprietary standpoint by the Pakistani 

people, the Pakistani Government. And there are limits to what 

our knowledge is. They certainly are aware of the concerns. And at 

the top of my list for threats right now globally would be terrorists 

getting ahold of nuclear weapons. And I have certainly expressed 

that concern both publicly here and privately to the leadership in 

Pakistan. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And beyond the sovereign issues and your expressions of concern—again, we deal in worst-case scenarios—in open 

session, can you comment on our capability to address the worstcase scenarios? 

Admiral MULLEN. I wouldn’t comment on that in open session. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rogers. 

AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome. Mr. Secretary, in the recent change of our leadership 

in Afghanistan, you cited the need for ‘‘a fresh approach in Afghanistan.’’ Tell us what you mean by that. 

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, I wanted to follow the model 

that we followed as we implemented the surge in Iraq which was, 

when the President decided to implement the surge in Iraq, he 

moved forward—by not much, but some—a change of commander 

in Iraq. And General Petraeus took General Casey’s place. So General Petraeus was able to manage that strategy from the moment 

it began to be implemented, through significant success. 

I was very concerned about changing commanders midway 

through a few months, or 7 or 8 months into this strategy and having somebody brand new come in, in effect, in the middle of the 

stream. And so one of the considerations for me was having a commander who was there from the beginning of the implementation 

of this new strategy. 

I also think that with the new forces coming in, I think that with 

the 68,000 troops that the President has approved—and I go back 

to my comments earlier about my concern about a significantly 

higher number of troops in Afghanistan—I wanted fresh eyes in 

terms of are we using the troops that we have there in the most 

effective possible way, and are there other ways in which we can 

make better use of them? 

I think another piece of this is the fact that we are sending a 

team in. Both General Rodriguez and General McChrystal have a 

broad range of experience, not just counterinsurgency. And General 

Rodriguez, when he was the commander in Regional Command 

East, was very successful when he was commander of the 82nd Airborne there. And so it is this combination of talents between 

McChrystal and Rodriguez that I think creates some opportunities 


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for us. And so it is in that context that I was referring to fresh 

eyes. 

Mr. ROGERS. With what you can say in an open session, how will 

what we are doing in Afghanistan now change under this fresh approach? 

Secretary GATES. Well, I think that is really for them to get out 

there and get involved, talk to the commanders, the brigade commanders, talk to the Afghans, and make their own decisions in 

terms of what changes in our campaign strategy do we need to 

make. The Admiral may have some. 

Admiral MULLEN. I would comment, first of all, General 

Rodriguez has spent 15 months in the eastern part of Afghanistan, 

and did exceptionally well and is immersed in their culture and in 

what the requirements are there. In my position as Chairman, I 

spend a lot of time trying to figure out who should go to what jobs. 

And in this case, long before the decision was made or even on the 

table to change leadership in Afghanistan, General McKiernan and 

General Odierno, both due to rotate out of those jobs next year, I 

had done a considerable amount of work contacting and discussing 

with leaders from all services who the best individuals would be for 

the future. And Generals McChrystal and Rodriguez have come out 

at the top of the Army list—and lots of other people as well—for 

the last 18 months that I have been on this job. And, obviously, before that as well. They are the best we have right now. And I am 

greatly dependent on great leadership. They are great leaders. And 

I think they will change the calculus and move us in a way that 

will create potential for success. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, what I am trying to get at is, what will be 

this new strategy? Will it be similar to the surge in Iraq? Or just 

what does it amount to? 

Admiral MULLEN. It will be lessons taken from Iraq. It is counterinsurgency strategy. I was just in RC East, and I was taken by 

how much our troops have absorbed that almost as a way of life. 

So we have enough troops in the east. We just put in an additional 

brigade in January. 

We are putting more troops in the south. But it is not just military, it has got to be the civilian side, it has got to be putting the 

Iraqi Security Forces, Army and police, in a position to provide for 

their people; and, in creating a secure environment, allow for the 

other things that need to be done to get done, including a dramatic 

reduction and elimination, if possible, of the opium problem. 

So there is an agriculture piece here that lays down right over 

where they are growing poppies, and that has got to happen as 

well. 

Admiral MULLEN. The Government of Afghanistan, at every 

level, has to get to a point where it can provide for its people, and 

they are falling short there now, and also it is a terrible amount 

of corruption. So those are all things that have to be addressed not 

just by our government, but by all of the nations that are involved 

there. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. Bishop. 


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OUTSOURCING

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Gates, Admiral 

Mullen, Mr. Hale. Thank you so much for your service. 

For the record, I would like to associate myself with the remarks 

of Mr. Kingston to the extent that we jointly support the 4th Brigade Combat Team at Fort Stewart. I just want to do that for the 

record. 

I would like to talk with you for a moment about outsourcing. I 

am sure that you are aware on March 23, the committee wrote you 

expressing concern about DOD’s outsourcing. Can you remind us or 

refresh our memories on what the response was, if there was a response? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t know about the specific response, but I 

will tell you that this has been a concern to me as well. And part 

of the proposals for the fiscal year 2010 budget is to begin in a fairly dramatic way replacing contractors in management services, 

management support and professional services, to replace contractors in those areas with full-time civil service employees. 

Our goal is to hire 13,000 new civil service employees in fiscal 

year 2010, and overall through the next 5 years to hire 33,000. 

Our goal is to take the percentage of contractors in those areas 

from the current 39 percent of the workforce back to 26 percent, 

which is where it was before 2001. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Secretary, can I ask you then why the Department has not suspended its A–76 outsourcing efforts in 2009? 

Secretary GATES. Well, we can’t get rid of outsourcing altogether, 

and if there is a specific aspect of this, I am happy to take a look 

at it. 

Mr. BISHOP. Well, the A–76 studies, ongoing, presumably to continue the outsourcing while at the same time you are budgeting for 

2010 to reduce the outsourcing. 

Secretary GATES. Well, as I say, in these particular areas we are 

reducing from 39 percent to 26 percent. So there is still 26 percent 

that even at the end of 5 years or so, there are going to be some 

kinds of services outsourced. 

Mr. BISHOP. I appreciate your comment there, but it is a very serious concern for the subcommittee, and we have had this concern 

for some time at the large amounts of outsourcing. And, of course, 

we have expressed it, and we appreciate very much the fact that 

you are responding in 2010. 

And, of course, if you still have a need for it, you have to go forward with that, the remaining outsourcing needs. But I am very 

uncomfortable with the A–76 studies because I really feel like we 

probably need to do as much in house as we can possibly do. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. I just want to reiterate my concern. Last year we 

took 5 billion out of the contracting services. We put 1 billion in 

for direct hire. The Department objected strenuously to what we 

have done. 

But I appreciate the fact you are now going in the right direction 

after a little bit of prodding. 

Mr. Hinchey. 


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PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I would like to return to a subject that was mentioned a few times earlier, and that is the VH–71 helicopter. And 

it seems to me, based upon all the information that I have been 

able to obtain, that it really makes perfect sense for us to continue 

that project for a variety of reasons. 

First of all, for the safety and security of the present President, 

the helicopter that he is using now, that system, was designed 

more than a half century ago, and the helicopter that he is using 

was manufactured about 35 years ago. The effectiveness and the efficiency of that device, based upon its age, is not nearly what it 

ought to be, and the safety and security of it is diminishing. That 

is a vehicle which is becoming weaker and weaker, and in some 

cases it seems to be even falling apart. So the need for a new system is, I think, very, very obvious. 

And the project that was initiated after the attack of September 

11, 2001, and then the contract which was put into place in 2005, 

brought about this VH–71. And the VH–71, frankly, seems to make 

perfect sense. It is much more effective and efficient than the existing helicopter. It can travel further, I think 200 miles, from what 

we have been told. 

And the new information that has come out indicates clearly that 

the structural integrity is stronger than what some evaluation of 

it came out erroneously earlier, and that the service life is much 

longer, service life anticipated to be approximately 30 years. 

So the fact that this system has already experienced approximately $4 billion in expenditure, and the documents themselves, or 

the helicopters themselves, are essentially ready to go. Five of 

them are almost ready to move. They have been all through the 

tests and all through the operations that lead to that final movement. And then there are four behind that, and it would take a 

minimal amount of money to bring this whole system into play. 

And bringing this whole system into play would make the safety 

and security of the President much more sound and secure, would 

enable him to engage in the kinds of thing that he would have to 

do under threats and dangers that may occur and his response to 

that. 

We have to keep in mind that on September 11, that helicopter 

that was crashed down in Pennsylvania as a result of the courage 

of the people who were being transported in that and overcoming 

the hijackers, that that helicopter was likely to slam into the White 

House. So that means that it may be that something like that or 

something similar to that in some way may be a threat to this 

President and the future Presidents. 

So it just seems so obvious, based upon the amount of money 

that has been spent, based upon the improvement in this helicopter 

design, much more so than the existing one, based upon the age 

of the existing one and the fact that it doesn’t function effectively, 

all of these things and more, and much of the more is classified and 

can’t really be talked about in this particular context, all of that 

and more makes it clear that this VH–71, this Marine One helicopter, really is needed. 


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I would just ask you deeply if you would go back and take another look at the facts, particularly the information that has come 

out more recently on the strength, the solidity, the length of the 

life of these helicopters and the ability for them to function effectively. Go back and take another look at this. And I think and hope 

that you would decide on your own, as many of us have, that this 

is something that really needs to take place. So I am just asking 

you, sincerely, to engage in that. We really need this new helicopter. 

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, I would say that there is no 

question about the fact that the current helicopters that the President is flying in are safe and secure. The Navy has confidence in 

that, and I don’t think the Secret Service would allow the President 

to get on it if there wasn’t complete confidence in it. 

And the reality is that it may be that the airframe on some of 

these helicopters is 30 or 35 years old, but virtually everything else 

has been replaced. For example, they are replacing rotors right 

now. So there is life extension. 

If you are talking about going with the whole system, if you are 

going with both increments 1 and 2 for the VH–71 helicopter—— 

Mr. HINCHEY. Only about increment 1. 

Secretary GATES. Okay. The Navy’s estimates would be about a 

$9.4 billion program. 

We currently have spent $3.2 billion on it. It has 55 percent of 

the range of the current helicopter the President is flying in the increment 1. It does not meet a lot of requirements in terms of other 

protections, whether it is chemical, biological, nuclear, communications and some of the other things. 

Even if we bought increment 1, we would have to then initiate 

a new Presidential helicopter program anyway to get to some of the 

capabilities that were going to be in increment 2. 

So whether or not you do increment 1, you are going to end up 

with a new Presidential helicopter program. And we believe that 

the helicopters he is flying in are safe. The Navy believes their 

lives can be extended until we can get a new helicopter. 

Frankly, if we went with increment 1 with 23 aircraft, the cost 

per aircraft would be $485 million apiece, and I think the President 

has a real problem with that. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

I just want to say one thing. One question I asked these 13 people, I had them lined up, saying we are not going to pay that much 

for a helicopter, meaning the two. I said, we all appreciate the 

President. We all appreciate his safety. But what about us? They 

just laughed. I don’t know if they laughed because to hell with you 

or what, but what about Secretary of Defense, what about the 

Chief? 

I mean, you know, the Secret Service went way too far in this 

thing. You have to keep them under control as you go forward with 

this program. I mean, that is all there is to it. 

Secretary GATES. Well, we do have to deal with the requirements, and that is one of the things I said that we are thinking 

about is, in fact, all of the requirements that are being placed on 

this helicopter may not be feasible in a single helicopter. 


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And maybe we look at one for escape and one for regular everyday use, but we will go back and look at them. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Young, any questions? 

Mr. YOUNG. No, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks has one question. 

C–17 AIRCRAFT

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to ask you about the C–17. This is an important program, and, you know, as I understand it, we are coming to the end 

of it. But there are going to be some in the supplemental. But there 

is another issue tied to this, I think, and that is the fact that Congress has kept some C–5s in service that should be shut down. 

And I wanted to give you a chance to talk about that. Our committee has supported you on this. The House committee has supported you, House Armed Services Committee, but we don’t seem 

to be able to get this done. And could you explain why it is so important? 

Secretary GATES. Well, there is a restriction. There are significant restrictions on our ability to retire the old C–5s. We believe 

that the mobility force, that we originally—that we sized a few 

years ago, 2 or 3 years ago, of 292 aircraft, 180 C–17s and 112 C– 

5As would meet the needs for two simultaneous, conventional conflicts, major conventional conflicts, three domestic disaster events 

here in the States, and a number of lesser contingencies. 

We now have 205 C–17s. It looks like we may be headed for a 

few more C–17s, and we have still got 112 C–5s. This is more than 

the Air Force believes they need, and it goes back to what I have 

said in my opening statement. Every dollar we spend on excess capability is a dollar we can’t spend on something that the Air Force 

really does need. 

And so that is what our problem is, and we have worked with 

the Armed Services Committee and the House, and also we are 

working with the Senate to try and get the restrictions lifted that 

would allow us to retire some of the C–5As and save some money 

in that respect. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

We agree with you, Mr. Secretary. 

And the Committee adjourns until tomorrow at 10:00. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Question submitted by Mr. Boyd and the answers thereto follow:] 

Question. Secretary Gates, you have completed the F–22 program at 187 aircraft 

and propose to retire 250 Air Force fighters creating a gap in capability. These decisions will lock in the range of national security options for decades into the future. 

How do you rationalize these decisions? 

Answer. The aircraft retirement target is essential to meet warfighting requirements, maintain readiness, and perform missions safely. With respect to the F–22, 

detailed analysis showed that 187 Raptors, combined with a robust buy of the F– 

35 Joint Strike Fighter, are what we need to deal with future threats. The Department does not foresee a gap in capability as a result of completing the F–22 program of record and the proposed Air Force fighter aircraft retirements. Furthermore, the savings from retiring the legacy fighters are being used to fund high-priority programs relevant to today’s and future threats. Rest assured that the Department will continue to assess the nation’s needs for defense and will pursue procuring the right size and mix for all of our forces. 


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Question. What has changed in the last year to justify your proposals relating to 

tactical aircraft? What studies should this Committee be aware of that substantiate 

these decisions? 

Answer. During the last year the Department continued to wage two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and both of those conflicts have provided valuable lessons 

learned about our personnel, weapons systems, and readiness. A key lesson learned 

from this experience is the importance of unmanned systems such as the MQ–1 and 

MQ–9. Additionally, the Department was guided by the current National Defense 

Strategy, most recent threat projections, and world-wide geopolitical events that 

provide indications of where and how our military forces will be required in the near 

future. Over the past several years the Department has studied in depth the number and mix of tactical aircraft needed. The Joint Air Dominance Study informed 

our view on F–22 and JSF. The Fiscal Year 2010 Defense Budget is a reform budget. The budget request represents the initial step in rebalancing the Department’s 

programs to enhance our ability to fight the wars we are currently engaged in, and 

address the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead. The Department 

will continue that process with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). With respect to tactical aircraft, the QDR will study the appropriate mix and size of the 

future force. Analysis from the QDR will assist the Department in planning for the 

Fiscal Year 2011 budget, and form the basis for tactical aircraft procurement in future budget requests. 

Question. Secretary Gates, the platform that will provide the most relief for the 

tactical fighter shortfall is the F–35 (Joint Strike Fighter). As with the majority of 

complex, new weapons systems, this program has seen its share of problems. In fact, 

the Marine Corps variant has been delayed from its original schedule due to engine 

problems. Do you anticipate the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) becoming operational in 

time to help with the shortfall or continue to make it worse? Does the Department 

have a contingency plan to mitigate the tactical aircraft shortfall should the JSF 

program continue to slip? 

Answer. The Initial Operational Capability (IOC) schedules for the Joint Strike 

Fighter (JSF) are 2012 (USMC), 2013 (USAF), and 2015 (USN). The JSF program 

is managing the development, test, and procurement of the three variants to meet 

the Services IOC requirements. The Department believes the JSF program is making solid progress in addressing earlier issues that created some schedule delays. 

In 2008, the Department chartered a Joint Estimate Team (JET) to provide an independent assessment of the program cost and schedule. The JET identified F–35 development and production risks that could negatively impact schedule. In the FY 

2010 budget request, additional development funding was added as a result of the 

assessment. The additional funding requested in the FY 2010 budget submission 

will help address those risks, and the Department will review the progress again 

in preparation for the FY 2011 budget submission. The Department is committed 

to ensuring the success of the JSF program and providing the three U.S. Services 

the critical tactical aircraft capability that they require. The Department will also 

assess the appropriate mix and size of the tactical aircraft force structure in the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Analysis from the QDR will assist the 

Department in forming the basis for tactical aircraft procurement in future budget 

requests. The analysis will look at all options available to address force structure 

requirements should the JSF program be delayed. 

Question. What are the proposed savings from the early retirement of aircraft like 

the F–15, F–16, and A–10’s? Were infrastructure needs (like Military Construction) 

a part of the Department’s consideration? The Department has previously estimated 

savings from reducing manpower to pay for recapitalization of older systems. The 

savings never materialized. What makes this budget different? 

Answer. The aircraft retirement target is essential to meet warfighting requirements, maintain readiness, and perform missions safely. In FY 2010, the Department plans to retire 384 aircraft across all the Services, both fixed wing and rotary 

wing, with a total estimated savings of $497.5 million to reapply to new aircraft operations. The cost savings associated with retiring these aircraft is already incorporated into the Services’ budgets. If Congress does not support these retirements, 

the Services must continue supporting these aircraft and other planned priority programs will go unfunded. 

The FY 2010 President’s Budget does not adjust infrastructure (like Military Construction) for aircraft retirements. 

To meet the demands of an uncertain and dynamic international security environment, the FY 2010 President’s Budget reflects a broad reallocation of resources 

across diverse mission sets that make strategic sense. This budget does not reduce 

the Services’ manpower, but rather redistributes the positions to higher priority 

missions that directly support the combatant commanders. 


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Question. Some of your decisions rely on making decisions in the Quadrennial Defense Review which is expected out next year, while other decisions have been made 

without strategic guidance from the QDR. What analyses have the Department conducted to ensure you are making the correct strategic decisions to guide the FY10 

budget? 

Answer. The FY10 budget decisions were informed by the 2008 National Defense 

Strategy, lessons learned from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and prior reviews 

and analyses of specific issues associated with the relevant systems. The QDR will 

build on the same strategic guidance that informed the FY10 decisions to further 

address current and future threats and reform the way we do business. This budget 

reflects substantial analysis conducted across the Department over several years, 

culminating in intensive discussions among the Service leadership, the Chairman 

and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and me. Where I felt decisions would 

require further analysis and examination to ensure a complete assessment of capabilities, capacity, requirements and risks, I deferred them to the Quadrennial Defense Review. 

Question. The future development of the LCS ships is important to the national 

defense and my district, however, with such a low shipbuilding rate, how do you 

envision reaching and maintaining a fleet of 313 ships? The 2009 out year budget 

showed an increase in the quantity of ships being requested, but the Committee has 

seen a promise of more ships in the out years before that were never realized. Just 

last year, the 30 year shipbuilding plan showed a fleet size of 313 ships being 

achieved in 2019. The year before that showed it being achieved in 2016. With this 

disturbing trend, can you reassure the Committee to your commitment to ensuring 

the shipbuilding plan stays intact? 

Answer. The National Security strategy and Quadrennial Defense reviews, currently in progress, will determine the shape of the Navy’s future. While the demands placed on the Navy for forces by the Combatant Commanders and by our 

force presence, Security Cooperation, and Humanitarian Assistance missions continue to be significant, we have been able to meet these demands largely with the 

force we have in commission today. The 313 force construct represented both a total 

inventory of ships and a specific mix of ships and was focused on the threats that 

were envisioned for the 2020 timeframe. 

Since completing the Force Structure Assessment that led to the 313 requirement, 

there have been a myriad of changes in the strategic security environment around 

the globe. There has been a burgeoning proliferation of advanced cruise missiles, 

submarine technology is getting ever more difficult to counter, and ballistic missile 

capabilities are becoming more precise and lethal. All of these challenges require the 

Department to reassess its force structure and mission capabilities. 

While we continue to review these challenges, there also is a budgetary reality 

that we must face. As we increase our capacity to conduct 21st century tasks, such 

as Special Operations, Civil Affairs, Irregular Warfare, Humanitarian Assistance, 

and Counterinsurgency, it will cause us to rebalance our conventional capabilities. 

This might present additional challenges to maintaining existing levels of force 

structure for certain ship types. 

Until we complete these ongoing studies and determine the priorities for these 

critical areas, it is difficult to confirm a specific Navy force structure. However, I 

can assure you that the Department is committed to building a force structure that 

does not place our sailors, airmen, and Marines at risk. Whether this is a force of 

313 ships, or one larger, or one smaller, we will ensure they have the tools they 

need to be successful in pursuit of their mission and that they are able to do so 

without undue risk. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Boyd. Questions submitted by Mr. Tiahrt and the answers thereto follows:] 

Question. How would the necessary medical supplies such as bandages, blood supply, and equipment be supplied to theater and funded? 

Answer. Additional costs for medical supplies are included in the Department’s 

supplemental appropriation request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). 

The majority of these requirements are generated by models and planning factors 

based upon the number of personnel, types of units deployed, and the types of contingency operations expected during the deployment. The funding included in the 

OCO supplemental for supplies is allocated to the Military Services or to the Defense Health Program depending where the costs are incurred. 


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ADDITIONAL TROOPS IN IRAQ

Question. As a result of the President’s Afghanistan strategy review, the Secretary 

of Defense has increased forces for Operation Enduring Freedom by 21,000 including 17,000 combat troops and 4,000 trainers. 

How will additional troops deployed to Afghanistan affect the Military Health System (MHS) and its ability to treat the families and dependents? 

Answer. When our medical personnel deploy, we generally lose capability in the 

military treatment facility (MTF) supporting the deployment. However, in advance 

of the deployment, MTF commanders work with the TRICARE Managed Care Support Contractors to either provide physicians and ancillary staff to work in the MTF 

and refine the civilian TRICARE network to ensure that needed care is available, 

either in the MTF or in the network. 

The MHS is structured so that the purchased care subsystem augments MTFs by 

expanding, as necessary, to absorb overflow of workload from the direct care subsystem when the MTFs experience increases in demand for services or reduction in 

capability and/or capacity due to staff deployments. The efficacy of this structure 

has been proven throughout deployments, with data from a number of sources—formal surveys of providers and beneficiaries, monitoring of TRICARE customer service 

logs, regular meetings with the Military Coalition, data showing the capacity of 

TRICARE purchased care to absorb a tremendous increase in mental health workload since 9/11—all indicating that the MHS has been functioning as designed, with 

no systemic problems preventing our beneficiaries from accessing purchased health 

care services. We anticipate this to continue when additional deployments to Afghanistan occur. 

Question. What additional medical personnel will be needed to support the additional troop presence in theater? 

Answer. The number and skills of medical personnel in theater is dependent upon 

the size and missions of the Forces assigned, which require operational decisions not 

medical decisions. Therefore, the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commander determine the need and assign the staffing requirement to the Service components. The 

Services would determine which medical resources were available and assign specific units. 

Question. Secretary Gates, one of the highlights of this budget is the emphasis 

on irregular warfare. As you know, Project Liberty in Afghanistan and Task Force 

Odin in Iraq have been designed to place additional ISR capabilities quickly into 

the battlefield. So far, over $2 billion has been appropriated in FY08–09 for this ISR 

surge capability. What do you see as the future growth of manned ISR combat air 

patrols? 

Answer. ISR Task Force-driven FY08–10 investments will generate over 50 

manned ISR aircraft. The first wave of these platforms has already begun arriving 

on CENTCOM battlefields; deliveries will continue over the next 12-plus months. In 

combination with Service program of record deliveries of unmanned ISR platforms, 

we are rapidly and dramatically expanding the airborne ISR capability set available 

in theater. 

The driving rationale for the ISR Task Force adding ISR capacity in the form of 

manned ISR platforms was rapid fielding demonstrated by the fact that these very 

complex platforms are already delivering, well inside the normal Department of Defense procurement timelines. The ease of integrating multiple, newer emergent sensors, superior speed, and outstanding operational flexibility and responsiveness are 

very appealing characteristics of manned ISR aircraft. When operationally employed 

in combination with unmanned ISR platforms that deliver superior persistence, 

manned ISR provides an invaluable complement for irregular warfare operations. 

As we move forward, the Department and the Services are carefully analyzing 

long-standing and emergent theater ISR requirements and refining plans and programs aimed at satisfying those requirements. It is my expectation that ISR growth 

will continue, in both the manned and unmanned categories, throughout the FYDP. 

However, the details of the balance between manned and unmanned growth are still 

evolving. 

Question. Another aspect of Irregular Warfare is light-attack aircraft, like the AT– 

6B. The Navy has started a program called Imminent Fury that originated from a 

requirement from the Navy Seals in Afghanistan for a light-attack turboprop aircraft. The Air Force is also examining the value of a light-attack aircraft with a new 

program called AO–X. What is your vision for developing a light-attack aircraft like 

the AT–6B? 

Answer. The Department will be looking carefully at light-attack aircraft capabilities in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Light-attack aircraft offer viable 

candidates for Irregular Warfare operations, particularly in providing innovative alVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:39 May 22, 2010 Jkt 056285 PO 00000 Frm 00486 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\B285P2.XXX B285P2

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ternatives for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; mobility; command and 

control; and light strike applications. While our conventional assets are diverse and 

agile enough to execute all of these functions over the threat spectrum, they might 

not always be the most cost effective employment of our forces in an Irregular Warfare scenario. Hence, the QDR will provide a timely forum for assessing light attack 

aircraft in depth, as potentially flexible and affordable options for meeting those requirements. 

Question. As the drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq progresses, the importance 

of ensuring that the Iraqi Armed Forces has the necessary equipment has increased. 

Recently the Iraqi Ministry of Defense signed an agreement to purchase 8 aircraft 

trainers, the T–6As. They have also requested to purchase the AT–6B, a light-attack 

aircraft. What is the equipping plan for the Iraqi Air Force? What is the equipping 

plan for the Afghani Air Force? 

Answer. The Multinational Security Transition Command—Iraq is focused on preparing the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 

operations as U.S. forces withdraw. With this in mind, the Iraqi Air Force added 

to their existing rotary wing inventory of 16 Mi–17s and 16 Huey Its in March– 

April 2009 by ordering 24 Eurocopters, 22 Mi–17s and 24 Bell 407 armed scout helicopters with deliveries expected to begin by late 2009. Other significant Iraqi Air 

Force orders include 15 PT–6A training aircraft and simulators—ointly funded by 

the Iraqis and the U.S. in May 2009—to improve training capabilities for the eventual acquisition of light attack aircraft and a multi-role jet such as the F–16. While 

the Iraqi Air Force initially considered acquiring the armed AT–6B, they are reviewing lower cost alternative light attack aircraft as well. Comprehensive long-term 

plans for equipping the Iraqi Air Force beyond 2012, however, are currently being 

developed. 

Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan is building the Afghan 

Army Air Corps for the counterinsurgency fight. The current aircraft inventory is 

35: 17 Mi–17 helicopters, 9 Mi–35 helicopters, 6 An–32 fixed wing aircraft, 1 An– 

26 fixed wing aircraft, and 2 L–39 fixed wing aircraft. The equipping plan calls for 

the Air Corps to grow to 128 total aircraft by 2016: 60 fixed wing (20 C–27s; 18 

light attack aircraft; 8 intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft; 10 

trainers; and 4 screeners) and 68 rotary wing (61 Mi–17s and 7 trainers). Final procurement decisions have not yet been made. 

Question. Several months ago, I had the opportunity to visit with students studying at Fort Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff College. I met students from 

each branch of the US military in addition to military members of allied nations. 

What is the Department of Defense’s strategic plan to increase foreign student enrollment at the Army Command and General Staff College, the Air Command and 

Staff College, and the Joint Forces Staff College? What steps have the Department 

taken to expand enrollment at these schools forfederal government employees outside of the Department of Defense? 

Answer. Currently international students represent approximately 10 percent of 

resident Staff College classes; federal civilian students represent approximately 2 

percent. The remainder is active and reserve component officers of the Armed 

Forces (to include the Coast Guard) (88%). 

Current percentages of international and federal civilian students are considered 

appropriate. Part of this is an appreciation for how much capacity there is for these 

colleges to increase their attendance. 

Strategic actions have been therefore aimed at getting priority partners into the 

schools. Strategic documents such as the ‘‘Guidance for the Employment of the 

Force’’ (GEF) prioritize nations and Alliances not only to harmonize Combatant 

Commander and Service Chief engagement efforts but also to inform invitations to 

partners to attend the various schools. Therefore, the Department of Defense has 

consciously put priority partners at the head of the line. In 2008, 67 percent of 

school seats were filled by priority partners. 

You have asked specifically about Command and Staff College level programs. Additionally, it is important to highlight international and federal civilian student participation at the senior level War Colleges. 

The Staff College coursework is focused on warfighting at the tactical to operational levels of both traditional and irregular war. It is aimed at a younger student 

body (10 years of service) still developing inside their individual warfighting competencies and is as a result, less applicable to non-DOD—especially civilian-students. 

In comparison, War Colleges operate at the operational and strategic levels and 

have student bodies (15–20 years of service) that are already mature in their individual competencies. This makes a War College education more accessible to nonDOD personnel. 


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War College student bodies have 20 percent less US officers than at the Staff Colleges. This articulates as 68 percent US officers, 14 percent international officers 

and 18 percent Federal civilian. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Tiahrt. 

Questions submitted by Ms. Granger and the answers thereto follow:] 

Question. Mr. Secretary, we have not seen aircraft production rates like what is 

intended for the JSF since the F–16 was built in the early 1980’s. Obviously, we 

are involved in a different style of conflict, but it is undeniable that positive lessonslearned in procurement were obtained and should be used with the taxpayer’s dollar. 

At full rate production for the JSF, we will be producing one aircraft per day. In 

order to achieve full rate production quickly and to meet cost requirements, building 

JSFs must be accelerated now during low-rate production by almost doubling each 

year’s previous rate. Quickly getting to full-rate production on the F–16 years ago 

proved to be KEY in keeping costs down for an affordable US and allied aircraft. 

How does the FY 2010 budget proposal help to accomplish the same affordability 

goals achieved in the early 1980’s during the F–16 program? 

Answer. Carefully managing investments in the JSF production line is critical to 

getting to full-rate production in 2015 and meeting our warfighter commitments 

while minimizing the cost to taxpayers. The Department plans to procure 513 US 

F–35 jets between now and FY 2015, which is an increase of 28 jets from the previous program of record. The primary reason for the change was to smooth the year 

to year ramp rate, including the planned procurements from our 8 JSF international 

partners, and appropriately stress the production system. The FY 2010 President’s 

Budget funds 30 US jets for Low Rate Initial Production Lot 4 and fully funding 

these jets is critical toward achieving that one aircraft per business day rate. 

Question. Mr. Secretary, recent defense budgets show investments in rotorcraft 

science and technology, including demonstrations, ranging from $100 million to $113 

million. Back in the 1980s, the nation was investing in excess of $250 million in 

rotorcraft technology or more than twice the amounts we are allocating today. Given 

our dependence on rotorcraft in wars such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

shouldn’t the nation be investing more in future vertical flight capabilities? Aren’t 

helicopter resources the best suited for our forces remaining mobile in the harsh terrain of Afghanistan in a dynamic counter-insurgency effort? 

Answer. These are the kind of questions we are getting answered in our ongoing 

Quadrennial Defense Review and its follow-on program and budget review. In considering future resource and funding options for helicopters, we need to take into 

full account today’s threats and the capabilities needed to counter these threats, to 

include unmanned aerial vehicle capabilities. 

Question. Also, specific statistics from ‘‘icasualties.org’’ cite helicopter related 

losses as the third largest cause for loss of life in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 

and they are THE largest factor in loss of life in Afghanistan with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This past year, Congress added Section 1043 in the National 

Defense Authorization Act to review the causes of these losses and potential strategies to reduce these losses. That report is due in August of this year. Mr. Secretary, 

is the Department of Defense prepared to make needed investments in vertical 

flight aviation science and technology, with specific focuses on safety, survivability, 

and improved capabilities to reduce helicopter losses in the future and ultimately 

reduce our casualty figures? 

Answer. In response to section 1043, the Department is completing the study on 

rotorcraft survivability to identify the causes of helicopter losses and to make recommendations to reduce them, and a draft report is currently under review. In addition, the Department is developing a science and technology plan for future vertical 

lift aircraft and rotorcraft as part of a larger review of our efforts in response to 

section 255 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2009. The recommendations from the survivability study will be addressed 

within that plan, which is projected to be complete by the third quarter of Fiscal 

Year 2010. The Department will take appropriate measures to address the recommendations from these reviews and continue to improve the safety of helicopters 

for our warfighters while giving them the capability they need. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Ms. Granger.] 


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W I T N E S S E S 

Page 

Architzel, Vice Admiral David ................................................................................ 167 

Barnum, Barney ...................................................................................................... 57 

Coleman, Lieutenant General R. S ........................................................................ 57 

Crosby, Brigadier General W. T ............................................................................. 223 

Davis, Brigadier General W. L ............................................................................... 223 

Ferguson, Vice Admiral M. E., III .......................................................................... 57 

Gates, Hon. Robert .................................................................................................. 413 

Hale, Robert ............................................................................................................. 413 

Lanier, Jerry ............................................................................................................ 1 

McCullough, Vice Admiral B. J .............................................................................. 273 

Mullen, Admiral Michael ........................................................................................ 413 

O’Reilly, Lieutenant General P. J .......................................................................... 329 

Pleffner, Mary .......................................................................................................... 1 

Shackelford, Lieutenant General M. D .................................................................. 167 

Stiller, Allison .......................................................................................................... 273 

Thompson, Lieutenant General N. R., III ............................................................. 223 

Ward, General W. E ................................................................................................ 1 

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