UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

BIKRAMJIT SINGH KALRA,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

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Case No. 12-cv-3154

Judge John W. Darrah

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner Bikramjit Singh Kalra has filed a Petition to quash, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 

§ 7609(b), two Internal Revenue Service summonses that seek his financial information from 

two third-party banks. For the reasons stated below, Kalra’s Petition [33] is denied. 

BACKGROUND

Kalra is the subject of an investigation by the Competent Authority for India (the “ICA”) 

concerning his tax liability in that country. (Gov’t’s Resp. to Pet. to Quash Summonses

(“Gov’t’s Resp.”) Ex. 1, ¶ 3.) Pursuant to a treaty between the United States and India, the ICA 

has requested that the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) obtain information about Kalra’s 

bank accounts held by Bank of America (“BOA”) and HSBC Bank, USA NA (“HSBC”) for the 

period April 1, 2000 through December 31, 2011. (Pet. ¶ 5; see also Gov’t’s Resp., Exs. A, B.)1

 

 1 Specifically, Article 28 of the Tax Convention with the Republic of India provides that 

the Governments for the United States and the Republic of India “shall exchange such 

information (including documents) as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of the 

Convention or the domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes covered by the 

Convention . . . [and] for the prevention of fraud or evasion of such taxes.” (Available online at 

http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/india.pdf, last visited December 18, 2013.) 
2

On April 27, 2012, Kalra filed his original Petition to Quash Summons in this case. On 

April 23, 2013, this Court denied the Government’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition based on 

inadequate notice but retained jurisdiction over the matter. (Pet. ¶¶ 3-4.) On June 25, 2013, the 

IRS reissued the summonses to BOA and HSBC for the information requested by the ICA and

served Kalra and his attorney with copies by registered mail. 

Kalra has now filed the instant Petition, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b), arguing that the 

IRS summonses were not issued pursuant to a legitimate purpose and do not seek relevant 

information. In his reply brief, however, Kalra concedes the validity of the two summonses to 

the extent they seek information and documents for 2010 and 2011 but continues to resist 

production of bank records for 2000 through 2009. (Pet’r’s Reply 2.)

LEGAL STANDARD

To establish a prima facie case that an IRS summons is valid, the government must 

satisfy the four factors set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 

(1964): (1) the summons was issued for a legitimate purpose; (2) the summoned data may be 

relevant to that purpose; (3) the data is not already in the IRS’s hands; and (4) the IRS has 

followed the administrative steps for issuing and serving the summons. Id. at 57-58; see also

Khan v. United States, 548 F.3d 549, 554 (7th Cir. 2008). Additionally, the government must 

not violate the Internal Revenue Code provision that “the summons is issued in good faith.” 

Khan, 548 F.3d at 554. These requirements “impose only a minimal burden” on the government. 

Miller v. United States, 150 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 1998). The government typically

demonstrates its prima facie case through affidavits of the agents involved in the investigation. 

Id.; see also 2121 Arlington Heights Corp. v. IRS, 109 F.3d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1991)

(“Arlington Hts.”); Sugarloaf Funding, LLC v. US Dep’t of the Treasury, 584 F.3d 340, 345 (1st 
3

Cir. 2009) (“An affidavit of the investigating agent that the Powell requirements are satisfied is 

sufficient to make the prima facie case.”).2

 The Powell factors are applicable even where, as 

here, the IRS has issued the summons pursuant to a treaty with a foreign country. See United 

States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 356 (1989).

Once the government makes a prima facie showing of a valid summons, the burden shifts 

to the petitioner to either “disprove one of the Powell factors, or to show that the IRS issued the 

summons in bad faith.” Miller, 150 F.3d at 772. The petitioner “faces a ‘heavy burden’” in 

refuting the government’s prima facie case. Id. He “must do more than just produce evidence 

that would call into question the Government’s prima facie case”; rather, he carries the burdens

of production and proof. United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526, 538-39 (7th Cir. 1981). 

ANALYSIS

The Government’s Prima Facie Case that the IRS Summonses Are Valid

In response to Kalra’s Petition, the Government has submitted declarations from 

Douglas W. O’Donnell, the Assistant Deputy Commissioner, International, Large Business and 

International Division (the “LB&I Division”) of the IRS; and Timothy H. Burke, Tax Law 

Specialist for the LB&I Division of the IRS. (Gov’t.’s Resp., Exs. 1 & 2.) Through these 

declarations, the Government has met its “slight” burden and demonstrated its prima facie case 

that the IRS summonses at issue are valid. See 2121 Arlington Hts., 109 F.3d at 1224. 

 2 Some courts have held that where the Government moves to dismiss the petition, 

instead of moving to compel compliance with the subpoena, the Government does not need to 

establish a prima facie case, and therefore, the burden immediately shifts to the petitioner to 

establish a valid defense. See O’Doherty v. United States, 05 C 3639, 2005 WL 3527271, at *5

(N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2005) (citing Jungles v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 585, 586 (N.D. Ill. 

1986)); Knauss v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1254 (S.D. Fla. 1998). However, as 

discussed below, this distinction is unimportant, as the Government has successfully established 

its prima facie case with affidavits. 
4

Specifically, with respect to the first Powell factor, O’Donnell attests that he determined 

that the ICA’s requests were proper and appropriate under the treaty with India. (Gov’t’s Resp. 

Ex. 1, ¶¶ 3-4.) Indeed, “[a]ssisting the investigation of a foreign tax authority has been held to 

be a legitimate purpose by itself.” Mazurek v. United States, 271 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2001) 

(finding that “the IRS meets Powell’s first (“legitimate purpose”) requirement because it is 

attempting to fulfill the United States’ obligations under the Treaty efficiently”). O’Donnell 

further attests that his office recently confirmed with the ICA that it continues to need this 

information from Kalra and that there are no statute of limitations issues under India law. 

(Gov’t’s Resp. Ex. 1, ¶ 3.) The first factor is thereby satisfied. 

With respect to the second Powell factor, O’Donnell states that, based on the information 

provided by the ICA, he has determined that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the 

summonses will produce information relevant to the ICA’s determination of Kalra’s tax 

liabilities. (Id. Ex. 1, ¶ 10, & Ex. 2, ¶ 6.) “The Government must show only that the summons 

seeks information with ‘potential relevance.’” United States v. Sidley Austin Brown & 

Wood, LLP, No. 03 C 9355, 2004 WL 905930, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2004) (quoting United 

States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 814 (1984) (emphasis in original). This satisfies the 

second Powell factor. 

Finally, the third and fourth Powell factors are met; neither the IRS nor the ICA already 

has the requested information, and the IRS has taken the necessary administrative steps. 

(Gov’t’s Resp. Ex. 1, ¶ 7, & Ex. 2, ¶¶ 5, 7, 9.) Thus, the Government has established each of the 

four Powell factors. 
5

Kalra’s Burden to Show the Summonses Should be Quashed

Because the Government has established its prima facie case, Kalra must satisfy his 

“heavy burden” of either disproving one of the Powell factors or showing that the IRS acted in 

bad faith in issuing the summonses. Miller, 150 F.3d at 772. As mentioned above, Kalra 

concedes, in his reply brief, the validity of the summonses to the extent that they seek 

information for the time period of 2010-2011 but contests the production of bank records for 

2000 through 2009. Kalra argues that the first and second Powell factors are not met for this 

time period because: (1) the ICA has not commenced an investigation into his tax liabilities for 

the years 2000 through 2005, and (2) the income he earned in the United States for the years 

2005 through 2010 was exempt from taxation under Indian law. 

Kalra’s arguments are misplaced. The Powell factors do not require the IRS to assess the 

adequacy of the Indian tax practices or the scope of its tax investigation before issuing the 

summonses for the requested information. See, e.g., Guglielmi v. United States, No. 12 Civ. 

6007(WHP), 2013 WL 1645718, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2013) (“To enforce a summons, the 

IRS is not required to assess the adequacy of [another country’s] tax law or practices.”). Rather, 

the focus is on whether the IRS acted in good faith in complying with the requests. Id. at *2 

(citing Stuart, 489 U.S. at 369-70 and Mazurek, 271 F.3d at 231 (“As long as the IRS acts in 

good faith, it need not also attest to — much lest prove — the good faith of the requesting 

nation.”). As such, courts have rejected arguments, such as those made by Kalra, that seek to 

attack the good faith or legitimacy of the requesting country’s investigation. See, e.g., Villareal 

v. United States, 524 F. App’x 419, 423 (10th Cir. 2013) (Mexico taxing authorities’ good faith 

in requesting information was irrelevant; “what matters is the IRS’s good faith in issuing the 

summons”); Mazurek, 271 F.3d at 231-32; Net Promotion, Inc. v. United States, No. 12mc36
6

(DSD/TNL), 2012 WL 6015606, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 3, 2012) (adopting magistrate’s report and 

recommendation to deny petition to quash where petitioner argued that there was no proper 

referral from France regarding the petitioner’s potential French income tax liability); Guglielmi, 

2013 WL 1645718, at *2 (denying petition to quash summons issued by the IRS at the request of 

the Italian tax authorities). Kalra has failed to show that the IRS has acted in bad faith in 

complying with the ICA’s requests and issuing the summonses. Consequently, his Petition must 

be denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Kalra’s Petition to Quash Summonses pursuant to 

26 U.S.C. § 7609(b) is denied. 

Date: January 21, 2014 ______________________________

JOHN W. DARRAH

United States District Court Judge