[Cite as State v. Cameron, 2024-Ohio-2427.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 23AP-635

(C.P.C. No. 21CR-1486)

v. :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

Bruce Cameron, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on June 25, 2024

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Sheryl L. 

Prichard, for appellee. 

On brief: Wolfe & Mote Law Group, LLC, and Stephen T. 

Wolfe, for appellant. 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

EDELSTEIN, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Bruce Cameron, appeals from the October 5, 2023

judgment of conviction entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas after a jury 

found him guilty of murder and the trial court convicted him of aggravated robbery 

following a bench trial. Regarding the murder trial proceedings, Mr. Cameron attributes 

error to the trial court’s finding that he was not entitled to a self-defense jury instruction 

and its admission of evidence concerning an expert ballistics report provided by plaintiffappellee, the State of Ohio, after the Crim.R. 16(K) disclosure deadline expired. Mr. 

Cameron also argues his aggravated robbery conviction was not supported by sufficient 

evidence or, in the alternative, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 2} Because Mr. Cameron’s three assignments of error are not well-taken, we 

affirm the judgment below. 
No. 23AP-635 2

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

{¶ 3} On April 15, 2021, a Franklin County Grand Jury returned a five-count 

indictment charging Mr. Cameron with purposeful murder (Count 1), felony murder 

(Count 2), aggravated robbery (Count 3), and two counts of having a weapon while under 

disability (Counts 4 and 5). Three-year firearm specifications were included with the

murder and aggravated robbery counts. These offenses pertained to the shooting death of 

Dion Skipper in a hotel parking lot and subsequent theft of J.F.’s truck to flee the scene on 

April 4, 2021.

{¶ 4} In advance of trial, the state notified the court of its intention to dismiss the 

felony murder count and its firearm specification (Count 2) and one of the weapon under 

disability counts (Count 5). (See Sept. 25, 2023 Tr. Vol. I at 3.) Mr. Cameron waived his 

right to a jury on the aggravated robbery and remaining weapon under disability counts. 

Thus, a jury was charged with determining Mr. Cameron’s guilt on the purposeful murder 

with firearm specification count, while the trial court was tasked with rendering a bench 

verdict on the aggravated robbery with firearm specification and weapon under disability 

offenses.

{¶ 5} A jury trial on the murder with specification charge commenced

September 25, 2023. Evidence and testimony presented at trial established that Mr. 

Cameron, his girlfriend LaQuinta Howard-Smith, and her four children traveled to 

Columbus from Dayton on April 2, 2021 for a family weekend with Mr. Skipper (Ms. 

Howard-Smith’s half-brother) and Mr. Skipper’s son. (See Sept. 26, 2023 Tr. Vol. II at 226-

28, 251-52.) The group stayed at the Norwood Inn Hotel. Mr. Skipper, his son, and Mr. 

Cameron shared one room, while Ms. Howard-Smith and her daughters shared another. 

{¶ 6} Prior to the April 4, 2021 shooting, the group’s interactions with each other 

were generally pleasant and unremarkable. However, when Mr. Skipper intervened in a 

verbal disagreement between Mr. Cameron and Ms. Howard-Smith in the hotel’s parking 

lot and punched Mr. Cameron in the face, Mr. Cameron responded by pulling out his 

firearm and shooting Mr. Skipper, thus resulting in his death. 

{¶ 7} At trial, Ms. Howard-Smith testified that on the night of April 4, 2021, around 

10:00 p.m., she and Mr. Skipper walked out to the parking lot to pick up pizza for their 

children when they encountered Mr. Cameron leaning against her Trailblazer SUV. (See Tr. 
No. 23AP-635 3

Vol. II at 229-30; Ex. D2.) According to Ms. Howard-Smith, Mr. Cameron disagreed with 

her decision to get the children more food since they had already eaten dinner and Ms. 

Howard-Smith was tired. (See Tr. Vol. II at 228-30, 246.) Mr. Skipper intervened in the 

conversation between Mr. Cameron and Ms. Howard-Smith, telling Mr. Cameron: “[D]on’t 

talk to my sister like that, she can do what she wants to do, who are you.” (Tr. Vol. II at 230.

See also Tr. Vol. II at 247-48.) 

{¶ 8} Ms. Howard-Smith attempted to push Mr. Skipper back from Mr. Cameron

several times, but Mr. Skipper pushed her away each time. (See Tr. Vol. II at 247-48. See 

also Ex. D2.) Suddenly, Mr. Skipper lunged at Mr. Cameron and punched him in the face. 

(See Tr. Vol. II at 231, 248; Ex. D2.) Although Ms. Howard-Smith indicated she was 

uncertain whether Mr. Skipper actually made contact with Mr. Cameron (Tr. Vol. II at 231),

the detectives who interviewed Mr. Cameron the next day remarked on noticeable swelling 

and puffiness under his right eye and Mr. Cameron told them he was struck during the 

encounter. (See Ex. N at 5:30, 19:20, 31:10, 33:20.) 

{¶ 9} Surveillance video of the hotel parking lot played during trial depicted the

encounter and generally supported Ms. Howard-Smith’s account, though none of the hotel 

surveillance videos presented at trial had audio. (See Ex. D2. See also Tr. Vol. II at 238-46; 

Ex. D3.) On review, we note the considerable size difference between Mr. Skipper, who 

weighed 356 pounds and was 6 feet tall (Ex. I), and Mr. Cameron, who was appreciably 

smaller. (See Ex. D1; Ex. D2. See also Tr. Vol. II at 248.) 

{¶ 10} After Mr. Skipper struck Mr. Cameron, the surveillance video showed Mr. 

Cameron run to the far side of a car parked just two spots away from Ms. Howard-Smith’s 

SUV. (See Ex. D2. See also Tr. Vol. II at 249.) Ms. Howard-Smith testified she stood 

between the two men in the empty parking space and told them “we don’t live here, why 

are you guys doing this, you need to stop, [Mr. Skipper] go back in or get in the car.” (Tr. 

Vol. II at 231-32. See also Tr. Vol. II at 240-41.) Surveillance video then showed Mr. Skipper

walk past Ms. Howard-Smith toward Mr. Cameron while Mr. Cameron moved away to 

grass surrounding the parking lot. (See Ex. D2. See also Tr. Vol. II at 248-49.) Essentially, 

Mr. Cameron stood in the grass between the parked car and the bordering fence while Mr. 

Skipper, standing in the parking lot, moved back and forth near the opposite end of the 

same car. (See Ex. D2. See also Tr. Vol. II at 248-49.) 
No. 23AP-635 4

{¶ 11} The surveillance video then showed Mr. Cameron walk past the driver’s side 

of the car toward Mr. Skipper, pull out a firearm, and shoot Mr. Skipper five times. (See 

Ex. D2. See also Tr. Vol. II at 249-50.) Mr. Skipper did not survive, and the stipulated 

“cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds to [Mr. Skipper’s] head and torso.” (Ex. O. 

See also Ex. I.)

{¶ 12} Following the shooting, Mr. Cameron walked to the other side of the hotel’s 

parking lot and approached J.F., a stranger who was seated in the driver’s seat of his parked 

truck. (Tr. Vol. II at 261-62. See also Ex. D2; Ex. D3; Ex. D5.) At trial, J.F. testified that a 

man opened the passenger door of his truck, pointed a gun at him, and threatened to blow 

his head off if he did not get out. (Tr. Vol. II at 261-62.) His account was supported by 

surveillance video played at trial depicting this encounter. (See Ex. D5.) J.F. testified he 

acquiesced, and the man got in his truck and drove off. (Tr. Vol. II at 262.) 

{¶ 13} Shortly after the incident, police recovered J.F.’s truck at Ms. HowardSmith’s residence in Dayton. (See Tr. Vol. II at 262-63, 267-69; Tr. Vol. III at 337-40. See 

also Tr. Vol. II at 304-05; Ex. N at 35:48.) Although J.F. testified he did not know the 

person who took his truck (Tr. Vol. II at 262) and did not identify the perpetrator in the 

courtroom during trial, Mr. Cameron admitted to brandishing a firearm and taking a man’s 

truck in the hotel parking lot after the shooting when he was interviewed by the police. (See 

Ex. N at 35:00, 38:30.)

{¶ 14} On April 5, 2021, law enforcement arrested Mr. Cameron in Dayton at his 

friend’s Hillcrest Drive residence. (See Ex. N at 37:10; Tr. Vol. III at 340-41.) Police 

obtained and executed a search warrant on the Hillcrest Drive residence, recovering two 

firearms—including the one used in the shooting, a Taurus 9mm Luger pistol—during the 

search. (See Tr. Vol. III at 340-46; Ex. F. See also Ex. L1; Ex. L2.) That same day, after 

waiving his constitutional rights, Mr. Cameron voluntarily submitted to questioning by 

detectives from the Columbus Police Department while in custody. (See Tr. Vol. II at 305.) 

At trial, that video-recorded interview was played for the jury, over defense counsel’s 

objection. (See Tr. Vol. II at 306-07.)

{¶ 15} Because Mr. Cameron attributes error to several trial matters, additional

evidence and testimony presented at trial are further summarized within our analysis of 

each assignment of error.
No. 23AP-635 5

{¶ 16} Following deliberations, the jury found Mr. Cameron guilty of purposeful 

murder and its corresponding three-year firearm specification. (Tr. Vol. IV at 452-53.) 

After the remaining two counts were tried to the bench, the trial court found Mr. Cameron

guilty of aggravated robbery with its firearm specification and having a weapon while under 

disability. (Tr. Vol. IV at 454-55.) 

{¶ 17} At the October 5, 2023 sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Mr. 

Cameron to an aggregate prison term of 24 years to life. His convictions and sentence were 

memorialized in the trial court’s October 5, 2023 judgment entry. 

{¶ 18} Mr. Cameron timely appealed from that judgment of conviction and raises 

the following three assignments of error for our review: 

[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DECLINED TO 

GIVE A SELF-DEFENSE INSTRUCTION.

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED A 

REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF AN EXPERT WITNESS IN 

VIOLATION OF CRIM.R. 16(K).

[III.] THE VERDICT ON COUNT THREE WAS SUPPORTED 

BY INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

II. ANALYSIS

A. First Assignment of Error: Refusal to Instruct Jury on Self-Defense

{¶ 19} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Cameron contends he was entitled to a 

self-defense jury instruction, as requested by his counsel during trial. Thus, he argues the 

trial court abused its discretion by refusing to give the instruction. Because we find Mr. 

Cameron failed to satisfy his burden of production by presenting legally sufficient evidence 

for every element of self-defense, we disagree. 

1. Legal Standard and Standard of Review

{¶ 20} Trial courts have a responsibility to give all jury instructions that are relevant 

and necessary for the jury to properly weigh the evidence and perform its duty as the 

factfinder. See, e.g., State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 206 (1990), paragraph two of the 

syllabus. Ordinarily, a requested jury instruction should be given if it is a correct statement 

of law and applicable to the facts of the case, and if reasonable minds might reach the 
No. 23AP-635 6

conclusion sought from the requested instruction. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 

429, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 240. 

{¶ 21} In this case, Mr. Cameron requested a jury instruction on the affirmative 

defense of self-defense, pursuant to R.C. 2901.05(B)(1), which provides, in relevant part:

A person is allowed to act in self-defense * * * of that person’s 

residence. If, at the trial of a person who is accused of an offense that 

involved the person’s use of force against another, there is evidence 

presented that tends to support that the accused person used the force 

in self-defense, * * * the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the accused person did not use the force in self-defense, 

* * * as the case may be.

{¶ 22} In cases involving claims of self-defense, two distinct burdens are 

contemplated by R.C. 2901.05(B). See State v. Palmer, ___Ohio St.3d ___, 2024-Ohio539, ¶ 17-19. 

{¶ 23} First, the defendant must satisfy his burden of production, meaning the trial 

evidence must “ ‘tend[] to support’ ”—or be legally sufficient to establish—defendant’s 

contention that he used the force in self-defense. Palmer at ¶ 15, quoting R.C. 

2901.05(B)(1). The standard for evaluating whether a defendant has presented legally 

sufficient evidence is “ ‘[s]imilar[] to the standard for judging the sufficiency of the state’s 

evidence.’ ” Palmer at ¶ 20, quoting State v. Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio4562, ¶ 25. “ ‘[I]f the defendant’s evidence and any reasonable inferences about that 

evidence would allow a rational trier of fact to find all the elements of a self-defense claim 

when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, then the defendant has satisfied 

the burden.’ ” Id., quoting Messenger at ¶ 25. The Supreme Court of Ohio recently

reiterated that “[t]his burden of production is ‘not a heavy one and * * * might even be 

satisfied through the state’s own evidence.’ ” Palmer at ¶ 20, quoting Messenger at ¶ 22, 

and citing State v. Giglio, 8th Dist. No. 112001, 2023-Ohio-2178 (self-defense jury 

instruction given on minimally sufficient evidence of self-defense).

{¶ 24} If a trial court finds the defendant has satisfied his burden of production, the 

burden then shifts to the state to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did 

not use the force in self-defense. See, e.g., Palmer at ¶ 17-19; Messenger at ¶ 18-24; State 

v. Knuff, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2024-Ohio-902, ¶ 191; State v. Carney, 10th Dist. No. 19AP402, 2020-Ohio-2691, ¶ 31. To satisfy its burden of persuasion, the state must disprove at 
No. 23AP-635 7

least one of the elements of self-defense. See id. However, the state’s burden is not 

triggered until the defendant produces “legally sufficient evidence” for every self-defense 

element. See Messenger at ¶ 19, 25.

{¶ 25} At issue in this case is the trial court’s determination that Mr. Cameron failed 

to meet his burden of production and, thus, was not entitled to the self-defense instruction.

{¶ 26} When considering whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to 

warrant a self-defense instruction, the trial court must view the evidence in favor of the 

defendant, may only consider the adequacy of the evidence presented, and cannot question 

its credibility. See Palmer at ¶ 21. If there is conflicting evidence, the instruction must be 

given to the jury. In other words, “[t]he question is not whether the evidence should be 

believed but whether the evidence, if believed, could convince a trier of fact, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that the defendant was acting in self-defense.” (Emphasis sic and added.) 

Palmer at ¶ 21, citing Messenger at ¶ 25-26. 

{¶ 27} We are mindful that a trial court “ ‘is in the best position to gauge the evidence 

before the jury and * * * determine whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to 

require an instruction.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Fulmer, 117 Ohio St.3d 319, 2008-Ohio-936, 

¶ 72. Accordingly, we review a trial court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction for 

an abuse of discretion under the facts and circumstances of the case. See id. at ¶ 16, citing 

State v. Wolons, 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 68 (1989).

{¶ 28} “[A]buse of discretion connotes that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, 

arbitrary or unconscionable.” (Internal quotations omitted.) State v. Weaver, 171 Ohio 

St.3d 429, 2022-Ohio-4371, ¶ 24, quoting State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio6679, ¶ 60, quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980). “A decision is 

unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support the decision.”

(Internal quotations omitted.) Fernando v. Fernando, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-788, 2017-

Ohio-9323, ¶ 7, quoting AAAA Ents.,Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment 

Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). A decision is arbitrary if it is made “without 

consideration of or regard for facts [or] circumstances.” (Internal quotations omitted.)

State v. Hill, 171 Ohio St.3d 524, 2022-Ohio-4544, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Beasley, 152 Ohio 

St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-16, ¶ 12, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 125 (10th Ed.2014). A 

decision may also be arbitrary if it lacks any adequate determining principle and is not 
No. 23AP-635 8

governed by any fixed rules or standards. See Beasley at ¶ 12, citing Dayton ex rel. 

Scandrick v. McGee, 67 Ohio St.2d 356, 359 (1981), citing Black’s Law Dictionary 96 (5th 

Ed.1979). See also State v. Hackett, 164 Ohio St.3d 74, 2020-Ohio-6699, ¶ 19. A decision 

is unconscionable if it “affronts the sense of justice, decency, or reasonableness.” Fernando 

at ¶ 7, citing Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P. v. Frutta Del Mondo, Ltd., 10th Dist. 

No. 08AP-69, 2008-Ohio-3567, ¶ 11. 

{¶ 29} An abuse of discretion may also be found where a trial court “applies the 

wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous 

findings of fact.” Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, ¶ 15 (8th 

Dist.). See also New Asian Super Mkt. v. Weng, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-207, 2018-Ohio-1248, 

¶ 16.

{¶ 30} Accordingly, reversal of a trial court’s decision to deny a defendant’s request 

for a self-defense instruction is only warranted if we find the trial court’s attitude was 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. See Palmer at ¶ 22, citing Wolons at 68.

2. Analysis

{¶ 31} Mr. Cameron was entitled to a self-defense instruction if he produced 

evidence that: “(1) he was not at fault in creating the situation that led to the affray; (2) he 

had a ‘bona fide belief’ that he was ‘in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm’ and 

his only way to escape was by using [deadly] force; and (3) he did not violate a duty to 

retreat.” Palmer at ¶ 23, quoting Messenger at ¶ 14, and State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 

24 (2002). Though, as to the third element, “ ‘a person has no duty to retreat before using 

force in self-defense * * * if that person is in a place in which the person lawfully has a right 

to be.’ ” See Palmer at ¶ 23, quoting R.C. 2901.09(B), and 2020 Am.S.B. No. 175.

{¶ 32} Regarding the first element of self-defense, it is without question that Mr. 

Skipper—not Mr. Cameron—was at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray. 

(See Tr. Vol. III at 355.) The state concedes as much on appeal, though suggests the affray 

ended when Mr. Cameron ran off. (Appellee’s Brief at 7.) However, the surveillance video

footage showed Mr. Skipper punch Mr. Cameron first and then pursue Mr. Cameron after 

he ran a few feet away. (See Ex. D2.) As such, we find the evidence legally sufficient for this 

element. 
No. 23AP-635 9

{¶ 33} The state also agrees that Mr. Cameron did not have a duty to retreat under 

R.C. 2901.09(B) because, as a guest of the hotel, he had a right to be in the hotel’s parking 

lot. (See Appellee Brief’s at 7.) Thus, the evidence at trial was legally sufficient to support 

the third element of self-defense. 

{¶ 34} Ultimately, our analysis of Mr. Cameron’s first assignment of error turns on 

whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the second element 

of self-defense: that Mr. Cameron had an honest (or bona fide) belief he was in imminent 

danger of death or great bodily harm and his only way to escape was to use deadly force. 

For the following reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination 

that it was not.

{¶ 35} To meet the burden of production for the second element of self-defense, Mr. 

Cameron “did not need to present adequate evidence that every reasonable person would 

have believed he was in imminent danger and that deadly force was necessary.” Palmer, 

2024-Ohio-539 at ¶ 25. Rather, Mr. Cameron “only needed to present adequate evidence 

that a reasonable person, under the same circumstances and with [Mr. Cameron’s] same 

subjective beliefs and faculties, would have believed that he was in imminent danger and 

that deadly force was necessary.” Id., citing State v. Thomas, 77 Ohio St.3d 323, 330 (1997). 

To make this assessment, we must put ourselves in Mr. Cameron’s position and consider 

his “ ‘particular characteristics, knowledge, or lack of knowledge, circumstances, history, 

and conditions at the time of the attack,’ ” in order to determine whether the evidence 

presented at trial was adequate to suggest Mr. Cameron “ ‘reasonably believed [he] was in 

imminent danger.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Id., quoting Thomas at 330.

{¶ 36} It is true Mr. Skipper created the situation by walking up to Mr. Cameron, 

getting in his face, and punching him. And, it is true that Mr. Skipper followed Mr. 

Cameron—albeit, while walking—even after Mr. Cameron was struck and ran a few feet

away. We also note that Ms. Howard-Smith attempted to physically and verbally calm Mr. 

Skipper down multiple times, both before and after he punched Mr. Cameron. 

Furthermore, it is without question that Mr. Skipper was several years younger and 

considerably larger than Mr. Cameron when the incident occurred. But, on review of all 

evidence and testimony presented at trial, and affording due deference to the trial court’s 
No. 23AP-635 10

determination, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it found the 

evidence was insufficient for the jury to receive an instruction on self-defense. 

{¶ 37} In making that finding, the trial court explained as follows:

All right. At this time, it’s the Court’s finding that there isn’t 

sufficient evidence for the jury to consider self-defense at this 

time. While I understand that [Mr. Cameron] may have said 

at one point [during his April 5, 2021 interview with police] 

that he needed to defend himself or had the right to defend, 

the detectives questioned him repeatedly on that, trying to 

give him the chance to say that he feared for his life or for great 

bodily harm and acted in self-defense and he never responded 

to those questions in that way. He said that he didn’t recall 

anything that happened after the point that he went behind 

the other car, and the statements that he made during the 

interview were about how upset he was about what he 

believed was the infidelity of his girlfriend. So at this time, the 

Court finds that there isn’t sufficient evidence for the jury to 

consider self-defense.

(Tr. Vol. III at 362.)

{¶ 38} Mr. Cameron did not testify at trial—as was his right. So, the primary 

evidence relevant to the trial court’s evaluation of whether sufficient evidence tended to 

show Mr. Cameron had a reasonable and honest belief that he was in imminent danger of 

death or great bodily harm was the statements he made during his April 5, 2021 interview 

with police and the surveillance videos from the hotel.

{¶ 39} In his interview with police, Mr. Cameron recalled moving away from the 

SUV to his left after he was struck in the face, seeing bright lights, and Ms. Howard-Smith

appearing in a blur. (See Ex. N at 33:40.) But, Mr. Cameron explicitly denied remembering

anything else that occurred before he stole J.F.’s truck—namely, pulling the gun out from 

his right hip and shooting Mr. Skipper. (See Ex. N at 35:00, 47:00, 51:00, 52:20, 57:00.) 

Though he broadly posited he used the firearm to protect himself (see Ex. N at 48:25, 

49:45), Mr. Cameron never overtly claimed to believe he was in imminent danger of death 

or great bodily harm. Nor did he tell detectives he knew or believed Mr. Skipper had a gun 

or a weapon on him that night, or otherwise knew Mr. Skipper had a history of committing 

violent crimes. Mr. Cameron also did not allege to police that Mr. Skipper had ever 

threatened to harm him—immediately prior to the shooting or at any point before April 4, 

2021—and did not attest to having any physical confrontations, or even negative 
No. 23AP-635 11

encounters, with Mr. Skipper prior to shooting him. Indeed, Mr. Cameron, Mr. Skipper, 

and Mr. Skipper’s son had shared a hotel room the two nights before without issue.

{¶ 40} We emphasize that a defendant’s burden of production for a self-defense 

instruction does not necessarily require a defendant to submit to police questioning or 

testify at his trial. But, it is incumbent upon a defendant claiming self-defense to offer 

evidence legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s entitlement to that instruction. In

some cases, surveillance video footage and eyewitness testimony, for instance, may suffice.

This is not one of those cases, however.

{¶ 41} Although the surveillance video showed Mr. Skipper following Mr. Cameron

after he punched him, Mr. Skipper moved at a slow pace. Additionally, neither the 

surveillance video nor Ms. Howard-Smith’s testimony supports any finding that Mr. 

Skipper brandished or claimed to have a gun or other weapon. Similarly, nothing in Ms. 

Howard-Smith’s account suggests Mr. Skipper threatened to—or had ever previously 

threatened to—harm Mr. Cameron at any point prior to the shooting. On review of the 

surveillance footage, we note that only 13 seconds elapsed from the time Mr. Skipper 

punched Mr. Cameron to when Mr. Cameron rapidly fired multiple shots, causing Mr. 

Skipper to fall to the ground. And, even as Mr. Skipper lay face down on the ground, Mr. 

Cameron shot him twice more.

{¶ 42} In sum, neither the surveillance video footage of the incident, Ms. HowardSmith’s eyewitness testimony, nor Mr. Cameron’s statements to police even remotely 

suggest Mr. Cameron ever actually believed he was in imminent danger of death or serious 

bodily harm—much less support any finding that such belief would have been reasonable. 

Viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to Mr. Cameron, we thus 

conclude the evidence, even if believed, was legally insufficient to show that under the same 

circumstances, a reasonable person of Mr. Cameron’s age and comparative size, with the 

same history and knowledge and in the same environment in which Mr. Cameron found 

himself, could have subjectively believed he was in imminent danger and deadly force was 

necessary. 

{¶ 43} For these reasons, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. Accordingly, Mr. Cameron’s first assignment 

of error is overruled.
No. 23AP-635 12

B. Second Assignment of Error: Admission of Expert Evidence

{¶ 44} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Cameron argues the trial court erred 

in allowing the state to present the testimony and report of the state’s firearms expert, Erica 

Mattie, regarding her analysis of the bullets removed from Mr. Skipper’s body because that 

report was provided to defense counsel the week before trial. Since the state’s untimely 

production of that report (Ex. L2) violated Crim.R. 16(K)’s requirement that expert reports 

be disclosed to opposing counsel “no later than twenty-one days prior to trial,” Mr. 

Cameron contends the trial court erred in allowing such evidence and testimony to be 

presented at trial. For the following reasons, we disagree.

1. Legal Standard and Standard of Review

{¶ 45} Crim.R. 16 governs discovery and inspection in criminal cases. Relatedly, 

here, Crim.R. 16(K) addresses a party’s disclosure of expert witnesses and reports. That 

rule provides as follows: 

An expert witness for either side shall prepare a written report 

summarizing the expert witness’s testimony, findings, 

analysis, conclusions, or opinion, and shall include a 

summary of the expert’s qualifications. The written report 

and summary of qualifications shall be subject to 

disclosure under this rule no later than twenty-one 

days prior to trial, which period may be modified by 

the court for good cause shown, which does not 

prejudice any other party. Failure to disclose the 

written report to opposing counsel shall preclude 

the expert’s testimony at trial.

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 46} The purpose of Crim.R. 16(K) is to prevent “either party from avoiding 

pretrial disclosure of the substance of expert witness’s testimony by not requesting a written 

report from the expert, or not seeking introduction of a report.” Crim.R. 16(K), 2010 Staff 

Notes. In promoting “more open discovery” in criminal cases, Crim.R. 16(K)’s aim is to 

level the lopsided playing field by strengthening a defendant’s right to know the evidence 

the state will present against him or her at trial. See State v. Boaston, 160 Ohio St.3d 46, 

2020-Ohio-1061, ¶ 44.

{¶ 47} Upon discovering that a party has failed to comply with Crim.R. 16 or any 

discovery orders, a trial court may, in a manner “not inconsistent with th[e] rule,” continue 
No. 23AP-635 13

the case, prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not timely disclosed, 

or “make such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.” Crim.R. 16(L)(1). “A 

trial court must inquire into the circumstances surrounding a discovery rule violation and, 

when deciding whether to impose a sanction, must impose the least severe sanction that is 

consistent with the purpose of the rules of discovery.” Lakewood v. Papadelis, 32 Ohio 

St.3d 1 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 48} Violations of Crim.R. 16 by the state constitute reversible error “only when 

there is a showing that: (1) the prosecution’s failure to disclose was a willful violation of the 

rule, (2) foreknowledge of the information would have benefited the accused in the 

preparation of his defense, and (3) the accused suffered some prejudicial effect.” State v. 

Joseph, 73 Ohio St.3d 450, 458 (1995). 

{¶ 49} A trial court has broad discretion over discovery matters, which means we 

review a trial court’s ruling on a claimed discovery violation under Crim.R. 16 for an abuse 

of discretion. State ex rel. Duncan v. Middlefield, 120 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008-Ohio-6200, 

¶ 27. Thus, reversal of a trial court’s decision admitting expert testimony and evidence is 

warranted only if we find the trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable. See Weaver, 2022-Ohio-4371 at ¶ 24, quoting Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d at 

157.

2. Analysis

{¶ 50} At issue in this case is the September 21, 2023 ballistics report prepared by 

the state’s firearms expert comparing the bullets recovered from Mr. Skipper’s body to the 

test fires from the Taurus 9 mm Luger pistol recovered from the Hillcrest Drive home where 

Mr. Cameron was arrested. (See Ex. L2.) On the first day of trial, Mr. Cameron’s counsel 

informed the trial court it received this report just four days before trial. (See Tr. Vol. I at 

3; Ex. L2.) Thus, Mr. Cameron’s trial counsel objected under Crim.R. 16(K) to the 

admission of evidence and testimony concerning the findings contained in that report. (See 

Tr. Vol. I at 3.) 

{¶ 51} It is without question the state’s production of this report was untimely under 

Crim.R. 16(K), as it was provided to defense counsel less than 21 days before trial. 

Nonetheless, the trial court found “that while the evidence was submitted beyond the 21-

day period, * * * there is no prejudice in this matter so the Court will allow [Ms. Pattie’s] 
No. 23AP-635 14

expert testimony to be provided in the case.” (Tr. Vol. I at 6.) On appeal, Mr. Cameron

argues this ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. 

{¶ 52} In seeking to have evidence and testimony related to this report excluded 

from trial, defense counsel argued that the state’s belated production of this report would 

prejudice Mr. Cameron. (See Tr. Vol. I at 3.) However, defense counsel did not ask for a 

continuance or explain precisely how—given that neither Mr. Cameron’s identity as the 

person who shot Mr. Skipper nor Mr. Skipper’s cause of death was in dispute—it believed 

Mr. Cameron would be prejudiced by the admission of such evidence. (See Tr. Vol. I at 3-

10.) 

{¶ 53} Indeed, long before trial commenced, the state provided defense counsel with

an April 27, 2021 ballistics report indicating the spent shell casings recovered from the hotel 

parking lot were fired from the Taurus 9 mm Luger pistol seized from the Hillcrest Drive 

residence where Mr. Cameron was arrested. (See Ex. L1; Ex. F.) The state had also provided 

defense counsel with the coroner’s report describing Mr. Skipper’s gunshot wound injuries 

and photographs of bullets and bullet fragments recovered from Mr. Skipper’s body during 

the autopsy. (Ex. I; Ex. J7; Ex. J8; Ex. J9; Ex. J10.) And, of course, defense counsel received 

video surveillance footage of Mr. Cameron shooting Mr. Skipper well in advance of trial. 

(Ex. D2; Ex. D3.) Taken together, this evidence is clearly indicative of the ultimate finding 

promulgated in the challenged report: that the bullets recovered from Mr. Skipper’s body 

were fired from the gun Mr. Cameron used to shoot Mr. Skipper. Thus, we cannot see how 

Mr. Cameron could conceivably be prejudiced by evidence that forensically supported a 

foregone conclusion on issues not in dispute. 

{¶ 54} Furthermore, the state provided an unrefuted explanation for its belated 

production of this report. Although the lead detective submitted a request for a comparison 

between the bullets recovered from Mr. Skipper’s body and test fires from the Taurus 9 mm 

Luger pistol on May 20, 2021, the crime lab inexplicably failed to complete it. (See Ex. L2; 

Tr. Vol. I at 4-6.) During trial preparation in September 2023, the state learned about the 

crime lab’s failure to promptly process this request and immediately informed defense 

counsel about the error. (See Tr. Vol. I at 3-6.) Nothing in the record before us suggests 

the delay in testing was anything but an oversight by the crime lab or otherwise refutes the 

representations made by the trial prosecutor to the court below on this matter. 
No. 23AP-635 15

{¶ 55} For these reasons, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

modifying the expert report disclosure deadline mandated by Crim.R. 16(K) for good cause 

shown upon concluding the modification would not prejudice Mr. Cameron.

1 (See Tr. Vol. 

I at 6.) 

{¶ 56} Accordingly, we overrule Mr. Cameron’s second assignment of error. 

C. Third Assignment of Error: Insufficient Evidence and Manifest Weight

{¶ 57} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Cameron contends the evidence at trial 

was insufficient to support his aggravated robbery conviction. He also argues his 

aggravated burglary conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the 

following reasons, neither contention is well-taken. 

1. Legal Standard and Standard of Review

{¶ 58} Whether evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction 

involves a determination of whether the state met its burden of production at trial. See,

e.g., State v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1157, 2004-Ohio-4786, ¶ 16; State v. Frazier, 10th 

Dist. No. 05AP-1323, 2007-Ohio-11, ¶ 7; State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 

(1997). We do not weigh the evidence but instead determine “ ‘whether, after viewing the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. 

Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 77, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 

259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 59} In evaluating a sufficiency challenge, we assume the state’s witnesses testified 

truthfully and determine whether that testimony and any other evidence presented at trial 

satisfied each element of the offense. See State v. Watkins, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-142, 2016-

Ohio-8272, ¶ 31, citing State v. Hill, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-889, 2008-Ohio-4257, ¶ 41. Thus, 

evidence is sufficient to support a conviction where, if believed, that evidence would allow 

any rational trier of fact to conclude that the state proved each element of the offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Frazier at ¶ 7, citing Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus.

1 Even if we were to find the trial court erred by allowing this expert testimony and evidence to reach the jury, 

any such error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since appellant’s identity as the shooter and Mr. 

Skipper’s cause of death were not in dispute. See Crim.R. 52(A) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance 

which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”); State v. Morris, 141 Ohio St.3d 399, 2014-

Ohio-5052, ¶ 24 (explaining that Crim.R. 52(A) requires first a determination that the right affected by the 

error is “substantial” and then whether reversal is warranted because the accused was prejudiced).
No. 23AP-635 16

{¶ 60} In contrast, a manifest weight challenge attacks the credibility of the evidence 

presented and questions whether the state met its burden of persuasion. See, e.g., State v. 

Richey, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-260, 2018-Ohio-3498, ¶ 50, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 132 

Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 11-13, citing Thompkins at 386-87. “Although evidence 

may be sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict, the issue of manifest weight requires a different 

type of analysis.” State v. Walker, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-679, 2003-Ohio-986, ¶ 43. 

“[W]eight of the evidence” concerns the inclination of the greater amount of credible 

evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. State v. 

Petty, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-950, 2017-Ohio-1062, ¶ 60, citing State v. Boone, 10th Dist. No. 

14AP-87, 2015-Ohio-2648, ¶ 49, citing Thompkins at 387. 

{¶ 61} When considering an appellant’s claim that a conviction is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, this court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and may disagree 

“with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Thompkins at 387, citing 

Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). See also State v. Martin, 170 Ohio St.3d 181, 2022-

Ohio-4175, ¶ 26. In making this determination, we must examine the entire record, weigh 

the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the witnesses’ credibility, and 

determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way 

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and 

a new trial ordered. See, e.g., Sparre v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-381, 

2013-Ohio-4153, ¶ 10; Eastley at ¶ 20; Thompkins at 387; Martin at ¶ 26. 

{¶ 62} Although we review credibility when considering the manifest weight of the 

evidence, we are cognizant that determinations regarding credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of testimony are primarily for the trier of fact. See, e.g., State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio 

St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus; Morris v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 

10th Dist. No. 20AP-131, 2021-Ohio-3803, ¶ 64, citing Watson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & 

Corr., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-606, 2012-Ohio-1017, ¶ 31, citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. 

Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). The trier of fact is best able “to view the witnesses 

and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in 

weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. at 80.

{¶ 63} To reverse a jury verdict as being against the manifest weight of the evidence, 

a unanimous concurrence of all three judges on the court of appeals panel reviewing the 
No. 23AP-635 17

case is required pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(3) of the Ohio Constitution. BryanWollman v. Domonko, 115 Ohio St.3d 291, 2007-Ohio-4918, ¶ 2-4, citing Thompkins at 

paragraph four of the syllabus. 

2. Analysis

{¶ 64} Following a bench trial, Mr. Cameron was convicted of aggravated robbery

under R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), which provides: 

No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as 

defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing 

immediately after the attempt or offense, shall * * * [h]ave a 

deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the 

offender’s control and either display the weapon, brandish it, 

indicate that the offender possesses it, or use it.

{¶ 65} On appeal, Mr. Cameron argues the state’s evidence failed to sufficiently 

establish his identity as the person who took J.F.’s truck. In support, he points out that J.F. 

testified he did not get a good look at the perpetrator (Tr. Vol. II at 262), was never asked 

to view a photo array by police, and did not make an in-court identification. All of these 

claims are true. Although J.F. confirmed the video surveillance footage presented at trial

accurately depicted the robbery incident (see Tr. Vol. II at 265-66, viewing Ex. D5), J.F. did 

not testify Mr. Cameron was the perpetrator depicted in that video. Mr. Cameron also notes 

that while Ms. Howard-Smith identified him in the other hotel surveillance videos (Exs. D1, 

D2, and D3), she was not asked to identify him in the surveillance video depicting the 

robbery (Ex. D5). (See Tr. Vol. II at 239-43.) This is also true. 

{¶ 66} Nonetheless, we still find sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Cameron’s

identity as the perpetrator of the aggravated robbery offense. J.F. testified about his truck 

being stolen on the night of April 4, 2021 while he was in the parking lot of the same hotel 

as Mr. Cameron around the time the shooting occurred. The surveillance video supported 

that testimony. (See Ex. D3; Ex. D5.) Most critically, during his April 5, 2021 interview with 

police, Mr. Cameron admitted to pointing a gun at J.F. in the parking lot after the shooting

and taking J.F.’s truck. (See Ex. N at 35:00, 38:30.) And, later in that same interview, Mr. 

Cameron expressed remorse for scaring J.F. that night. (See Ex. N at 50:15.) Thus, after 

reviewing the record, we find the state’s evidence, if believed, sufficiently established that 

in attempting or committing a theft of J.F.’s truck, Mr. Cameron had a deadly weapon on 
No. 23AP-635 18

or about his person or under his control and either displayed, brandished, or indicated that 

he possessed that weapon, as required to support an aggravated robbery conviction under 

R.C. 2911.01(A)(1). 

{¶ 67} Having found his sufficiency challenge to be without merit, we next turn to 

Mr. Cameron’s contention that his aggravated robbery conviction was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 68} Mr. Cameron’s manifest weight challenge concerns the same identity issue 

raised in his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. However, having reviewed all 

evidence and testimony presented at trial regarding the aggravated robbery incident, as 

previously summarized above, we cannot conclude the trial court clearly lost its way when 

it found the state proved Mr. Cameron’s identity as the person responsible for the theft of 

J.F.’s truck beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we find the trial court’s verdict as to 

Count 3, the aggravated robbery offense, was not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence.

{¶ 69} For these reasons, we overrule Mr. Cameron’s third assignment of error.

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 70} Having overruled each of Mr. Cameron’s three assignments of error, we 

affirm the October 5, 2023 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

LUPER SCHUSTER and LELAND, JJ., concur.