SC IEN

CE

United States

Environmental Protection

Agency

EPA/600/R-09/035 | September 2009 | www.epa.gov/ord

Report on the 2008 Workshop 

on Decontamination Research 

and Associated Issues for Sites 

Contaminated with Chemical, 

Biological, or Radiological Materials

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center
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EPA/600/R-09/035 | September 2009 | www.epa.gov/ord

Report on the 2008 Workshop 

on Decontamination Research 

and Associated Issues for Sites 

Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, 

or Radiological Materials

By

Sarah Dun

Eastern Research Group, Inc.

Lexington, MA 02421

Joseph Wood

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Research Triangle Park, NC

Contract No. EP-C-07-015

Office of Research and Development

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Cincinnati, OH 45268
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Note

This report was prepared by Eastern Research Group, Inc., a contractor for the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as a general record of discussions for the 

“2008 Workshop on Decontamination and Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated 

with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials.” This report captures the main 

points of scheduled presentations, but it does not contain a verbatim transcript of all 

issues discussed. EPA will use the information presented during the workshop to address 

decontamination and cleanup challenges faced at sites contaminated with chemical, 

biological, or radiological materials.

The gathering of information in this document has been funded wholly by EPA under 

Contract No. EP-C-07-015.

This document does not represent the official views of EPA and, as such, no product or 

technology endorsement should be inferred.
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Table of Contents

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................vii

Executive Summary.....................................................................................................................................................xi

I Introduction..........................................................................................................................................................1

II Keynote Address ..................................................................................................................................................3

III Session 1: Decontamination–General Aspects...................................................................................................5

The Role of a Technical Working Group in Fumigation of a Large Building.....................................................5

Medical Aspects of Natural Anthrax: Implications for Decontamination...........................................................5

United Kingdom’s Government Decontamination Service: An Update for 2008...............................................6

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Regulation of Sterilants/Sporicides

and Sporicidal Decontaminants...........................................................................................................................7

Toward a System-of-Systems Approach to Hazard Mitigation...........................................................................8

Wide-area Restoration Following Biological Contamination: Systems Analysis

for Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration Program........................................................................9

IV Session 2: Biological Agents–Field Experience And Laboratory Testing .....................................................11

Danbury Anthrax Response, September 2007...................................................................................................11

Expedited Fumigation of a Large Hospital as Related to Biological Contamination Scenarios.......................12

Utilizing a Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer Triple Quadrupole Mass Spectrometer Technology

Mounted on a Movable Platform to Provide Indoor Air Concentrations Throughout a Structure Before and 

After a Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation ...............................................................................................................13

Decontamination of Surfaces Contaminated with Biological Agents Using Fumigant Technologies..............13

Assessment of the Impact of Chlorine Dioxide Gas on Electronic Equipment ................................................14

Laboratory-scale Decontamination Testing in Support of the Interagency Biological 

Restoration Demonstration Program.................................................................................................................15

Field Evaluation of Gaseous Chlorine Dioxide Treatment for Microbial Contamination ................................15

Decontamination Family of Systems ...............................................................................................................16

Decontamination of a Railcar Using a Portable and Economical System ........................................................16

Economical Facility Decontamination with Gaseous and Liquid Chlorine Dioxide ........................................17

Assessment of Biological Indicators for Building Interior Decontamination...................................................18

Reduction and Elimination of Biological Contamination Using Bacteriophages.............................................19

Wet Scrubbing and Adsorption for the Capture of Chlorine Dioxide Gas During Fumigation Events............20

Material Demand for Hydrogen Peroxide of Building Materials......................................................................20

Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki Agent Fate Characterization .....................................................................21

Comparing and Contrasting Fumigations of Very Large Facilities for Biothreat Agents and Other 

Microorganisms.................................................................................................................................................21

V Session 3: Foreign Animal Disease Agents.......................................................................................................23

Animal Disease Outbreak Response–Tools, Status, and Trends.......................................................................23

Inactivation of Avian Influenza Virus Using Common Chemicals and Detergents ..........................................23

Persistence Testing of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus on Outdoor Materials..................................24
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VI Session 4: Chemical Agents...............................................................................................................................25

Understanding Chemical Warfare Agent Interactions with Surfaces and the 

Implications for Decontamination.....................................................................................................................25

Restoration of Major Transportation Facilities Following Chemical Agent Release: 

The Facility Restoration Operational Technology Demonstration ...................................................................25

Systematic Decontamination of Chemical Warfare Agents and Toxic Industrial Chemicals ..........................26

Small-Item Vapor Hazard Determinations in Interior Spaces: 

What, Where, When, Why and How Many?.....................................................................................................27

The Development of Safe and Highly Effective Chemical and Radiological Agent Simulants.......................27

Mercury Vapor Emission and Measurement Studies and Evaluation of Cleanup Technologies.......................28

Development of Standards for Decontamination of Structures Affected by Chemical

and Biological Terrorism...................................................................................................................................29

VII Session 5: Radiological Agents..........................................................................................................................31

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental 

Collection Technology Gamma Emergency Mapper Project............................................................................31

Evaluation of Commercially-Available Radiological Decontamination Technologies

on Concrete Surfaces.........................................................................................................................................31

VIII Session 6: Disposal, Sampling, and Other Related Topics ............................................................................33

Thermomicrobiological Techniques for Incinerator Performance Assessment While 

BurningContaminated Debris............................................................................................................................33

Survivability of Several Years of Recalcitrant Biological and Chemical Agents in Landfill Leachates...........34

An Assessment of the Performance of Portable Instruments to Monitor Air Quality 

During Structural Decontamination Operations................................................................................................34

Evaluation of Sampling Methods and Strategies in an Operational Environment............................................35

The Use of a Sampling Design Strategy to Direct Decontamination Activities

Following a Weapon of Mass Destruction Event..............................................................................................35

National Homeland Security Research Center’s Aerosol Test Facility and the Study of the Measurement 

and Mechanisms of Exposure to Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents...........................................36

Collective Protection Technology Testing of Bioaerosol Air Purification Devices ..........................................37

Appendix A: Agenda...................................................................................................................................................39

Appendix B: List of Participants...............................................................................................................................45

Appendix C: Presentation Slides...............................................................................................................................53
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AOAC AOAC International (formerly the Association of Analytical Chemists)

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

APL Applied Physics Laboratory

ASPECT Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection Technology

ASTM ASTM International (formerly the American Society for Testing and Materials)

BI biological indicator

Btk Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki

BROOM Building Restoration Operations Optimization Model

°C degrees Celsius

CAM chemical agent monitor

CARC chemical agent resistant coating

CBDP Chemical and Biological Defense Program

CBR chemical, biological, and radiological

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

Clean Earth Clean Earth Technologies, LLC

ClorDiSys ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

CT Fumigant concentration multiplied by exposure time 

CWA chemical warfare agent 

DCMD Decontamination and Consequence Management Division 

DDAP Domestic Demonstration and Application Program

DEM diethyl malonate

DFoS Decontamination Family of Systems

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DoD U.S. Department of Defense 

DOE U.S. Department of Energy 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

ECBC Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (Aberdeen Proving Ground, M.D.) 

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

ERT Environmental Response Team

°F degrees Fahrenheit

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FIFRA Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 

G agents Nerve agents: soman, sarin, and tabun

GB sarin

GDS Government Decontamination Service (United Kingdom)

GEM Gamma Emergency Mapper

HD mustard agent

HEPA	 high efficiency particulate air

HHA hand-held assay

HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

HPA Health Protection Agency

HPAI	 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
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HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning

IBRD Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration

IMS ion mobility spectrometer

INL Idaho National Laboratory (Idaho Falls, Idaho)

IPC industrial printed circuit

JHU Johns Hopkins University

JPEO Joint Program Executive Office

JSTO Joint Science and Technology Office

Kd distribution coefficient

LAX Los Angeles International Airport

LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore, Calif.)

LRN laboratory response network

mg/L milligrams/liter

mVHP modified vaporized hydrogen peroxide

NDT National Decontamination Team 

NHSRC National Homeland Security Research Center 

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OPP Office of Pesticide Programs

ORD Office of Research and Development 

OSC on-scene coordinator 

OTD Operational Technology Demonstration 

PCR polymerase chain reaction 

PDA personal data assistant (also known as personal digital assistant)

PEL Permissible Exposure Level

PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (Richland, Wash.)

ppb parts per billion

PPE personal protective equipment

ppm parts per million 

ppm/hr parts per million/hour

ppmv parts per million by volume

PR Pesticide Registration

QA/QC quality assurance and quality control

RDD radiological dispersal device

RV-PCR rapid viability polymerase chain reaction

Sabre Sabre Technical Services, LLC 

SAIC Science Applications International Corporation

SEM scanning electron microscope

SJRMC St. John’s Regional Medical Center

SNL Sandia National Laboratory (Albuquerque, N.M.)

STERIS STERIS Corporation 

SUMMA Used with “Canister,” now a genericized trademark

TAGA Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer

TIC toxic industrial chemical

TSM Three Step Method 

TWA time-weighted average

TWG Technical Working Group 

TSWG Technical Support Working Group
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TTEP Technology Testing and Evaluation Program 

ug/m3 micrograms/cubic meter

U.K. United Kingdom

U.S. United States

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 

US EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

UV ultraviolet

VHP vapor or vaporized hydrogen peroxide 

VOC volatile organic compound

VPHP vapor phase hydrogen peroxide

VSP Visual Sample Plan

WMD weapon of mass destruction
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Executive Summary

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

held the “2008 Workshop on Decontamination Research and 

Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical, 

Biological, or Radiological Materials” to enable participants 

from throughout the world to discuss decontamination issues. 

The meeting addressed six topic areas:

Keynote Address and Decontamination–General Aspects

These seven presentations focused mostly on policy, 

planning, and general aspects of decontamination and 

restoration issues facing EPA, the United States Department 

of Defense, and the United Kingdom Government 

Decontamination Service (GDS). The keynote speaker 

(Thomas Dunne, EPA) emphasized the need to focus and 

prioritize collective efforts and limited resources to close 

significant gaps and better prepare to respond to and recover 

from a terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, or 

radiological agents. He expressed his view that, at present, 

the United States (U.S.) is not prepared to respond to and 

recover from a terrorist attack involving a wide-area release 

of a chemical, biological or radiological agent. Other EPA 

presentations considered how best to manage the technical 

aspects of a fumigation; medical and historical perspectives 

of natural anthrax and implications for decontamination; 

and the regulation of sterilants, including the new EPA 

sporicidal decontaminant antimicrobial product designation 

for anthrax. Robert Bettley-Smith provided an update of 

GDS activities and reviewed lessons learned from the 2006 

to 2007 anthrax cases in Scotland and England. The Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency representative described a number 

of decontamination technologies that the agency is currently 

investigating and developing. The final presentation of the 

session described the Interagency Biological Restoration 

Demonstration Program and a systems analysis underway to 

identify data/capability gaps and chokepoints for restoring an 

urban area following an anthrax release.

Biological Agents–Field Experience and Laboratory Testing

Researchers and practitioners from the U.S. government and 

private industry gave 16 presentations regarding the research, 

development, and demonstration of technologies to inactivate 

biological threat agents in indoor and outdoor environments. 

These presentations provided lessons learned from actual 

decontamination response events and field demonstrations, 

and results from assessing various technologies in the 

laboratory. A number of presentations discussed the use of 

chlorine dioxide gas, which provides evidence of the growing 

acceptance and maturing of this sporicidal technology. 

Other decontamination technologies were also discussed, 

such as some “low tech” procedures used in the Danbury 

anthrax incident, vaporized hydrogen peroxide, and a 

bacteriophage method, which is still under development. 

Bacillus anthracis and its bacterial spore surrogates were the 

predominant biological agent of concern addressed, although 

a few presentations discussed other biological agents, such 

as mold, Brucella suis, Yersinia pestis, and Francisella 

tularensis. Other related topics included engineering aspects 

of fumigation (e.g., interactions with materials, capture on 

sorbents), detection/measurement issues, and agent fate and 

persistence.

Foreign Animal Disease Agents

Three speakers provided information and data about ongoing 

research projects to address foreign animal disease agents. 

Lori Miller, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service, described Web-based tools 

designed to assist decision-makers in quickly responding 

to a disease outbreak, such as foot and mouth disease. The 

other two speakers discussed results from research on the 

environmental persistence and inactivation (using generic 

chemicals) of avian influenza virus strains, including the 

H5N1 highly pathogenic virus, and low pathogenic strains. 

EPA/Battelle tests demonstrated that the H5N1 virus 

remained viable in soil at low temperatures for at least 

13 days.

Chemical Agents

Six presentations covered topics related to chemical agents 

and toxic industrial chemicals. Tucker provided an update of 

activities associated with the ongoing Facility Restoration 

Operational Technology Demonstration (OTD). This is an 

overarching U.S. Department of Homeland Security-funded 

project to address the restoration of an airport following a 

chemical agent attack. One specific research project, which 

deals with determining the interactions between building 

materials and chemical agents conducted under the OTD, 

was discussed. Emily Snyder presented an overview of 

chemical agent decontamination research projects that EPA 

is conducting or has completed. These projects primarily 

involve determining the efficacy of a number of technologies 

in decontaminating various materials/agents. Campagna 

outlined concerns associated with intentional or unintentional 

mercury releases, and proposed research to investigate 

associated issues, such as vapor release from materials and 

decontamination. Other speakers presented research related 

to the off-gassing of chemical agents from materials and the 

development of chemical agent simulants for training.

Radiological Agents

The four presentations in this session addressed concerns 

related to the measurement, fate, and decontamination of 

materials containing radiological agents. Cardarelli described 

an aircraft that enables EPA to rapidly respond to threat 

events throughout the U.S. and contains instrumentation 

capable of rapidly detecting and mapping radiological 

contamination. Drake presented efficacy test results from the 

evaluation of two decontamination technologies that remove 

radiological agents (cesium was the test agent) from building 

materials via strippable coatings. 
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Disposal, Sampling, and Other Related Topics

Paul Lemieux began this session of seven speakers with 

a discussion of general waste disposal issues and noted 

that waste disposal is often overlooked when developing 

recovery plans for an incident involving threat or foreign 

animal disease agents. He then described a study to 

evaluate the conditions under which bacterial spores, such 

as anthrax embedded on building materials, may remain 

active following treatment in an incinerator. Paul Lemieux 

also discussed results from a field study to demonstrate 

a prototype gasifier that could be used for animal carcass 

disposal following a foreign animal disease outbreak. 

Wendy Davis-Hoover presented results from studies to 

determine how long certain bacterial agents would survive 

in landfill leachate (over a year for Bacillus anthracis and 

Clostridium botulinum) and how long various chemical 

agents persisted in the leachate . Patrick Lambert provided 

results from testing the performance of air monitoring 

devices. Lance Brooks provided an overview of a field 

study conducted at Idaho National Laboratory to evaluate 

biological agent (e.g., bacterial spore) sampling techniques 

and strategies. Sego presented additional details on some of 

the available tools for, and statistics involved with, designing 

an agent sampling strategy. Russell Wiener described EPA’s 

National Homeland Security Research Center Aerosol 

Test Facility and some of its ongoing projects. Karin 

Foarde closed with a description of a study to evaluate 

bioaerosol air purification devices used by warfighters.
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I

Introduction

This report summarizes presentations and discussions from 

the United States Environemtal Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) 

“2008 Workshop on Decontamination and Associated 

Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or 

Radiological Materials,” which was held September 24–26, 

2008, in Chapel Hill, N.C. The technical content of this 

report is based entirely on information and discussions from 

the workshop.

The workshop consisted of 44 speaker presentations, 

which were organized in six sessions, followed by brief 

question and answer periods. Mr. Thomas P. Dunne, the 

Associate Administrator for EPA’s Office of Homeland 

Security, served as the keynote speaker. Although 

Dunne gave the keynote address on the second day of 

the workshop due to last minute scheduling conflicts, 

a summary of his presentation is provided first (per the 

original schedule) in this summary report. One hundred 

seventy workshop participants represented federal, 

state, and local government agencies and laboratories; 

the United States (U.S.) and international organizations 

from five countries; academia; and the private sector.

This summary report provides an overview and highlights 

of each presentation. The speakers’ presentation 

slides, which include additional detailed information, 

are found in Appendix C of this report. The reader is 

encouraged to refer to the presentation slides when 

reviewing this report. The presentation summaries 

primarily provide a synopsis of the presentation but also 

include additional information—beyond that found on 

the presentation slides—discussed by the speaker.

This report is organized by topic session and supporting 

information as follows:

• Section II includes a summary of the Keynote Address.

• Sections III–VIII contain the presentation and question 

and answer period summaries for each of the six topic 

areas/sessions: Decontamination–General Aspects; 

Biological Agents–Field Experience and Laboratory 

Testing; Foreign Animal Disease Agents; Chemical 

Agents; Radiological Agents; and Disposal, Sampling, and 

Other Related Topics.

• Appendix A provides the meeting agenda.

• Appendix B lists the workshop participants.

• Appendix C includes presentation slides. 
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Keynote Address

Thomas P. Dunne, Associate Administrator for the

Office of Homeland Security, U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency

Dunne welcomed participants and explained that the goal 

of his remarks was to identify the critical need to focus and 

prioritize collective efforts and limited resources to close the 

significant gaps and to be better prepared to respond to and 

recover from a terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, 

or radiological agents. He expressed his view that, at present, 

the U.S. is not prepared to respond to and recover from a 

terrorist attack involving a wide-area release of a chemical, 

biological, or radiological agent. An event like this would 

make the issues surrounding Hurricane Katrina look like 

child’s play. If a terrorist attack involving a wide-area release 

of a chemical, biological or radiological agent happened 

today, the U.S. would fail—and fail miserably.

Looking back, Dunne pointed out that EPA was 

understandably unprepared for the anthrax attacks of 2001. 

In the fall of 2001, no one was prepared for the technical and 

scientific issues that confronted the nation when responding 

to anthrax contamination of a relatively small number of 

buildings. EPA emergency responders leveraged their 30+ 

years of experience in hazardous waste response. EPA 

scientists provided insights into the scientific and technical 

questions concerning anthrax decontamination that arose at 

the time.

Since the attacks in 2001, EPA has invested significantly in 

decontamination preparedness. Dunne stated with confidence 

that we have improved our ability to respond to and recover 

from a small attack based on the collective experience gained 

during the 2001 anthrax events; recent naturally occurring 

anthrax events in Scotland and the U.S.; significant planning 

workshops; and guidance document efforts.

Dunne cautioned that despite these efforts, we have no 

experience or comprehension of the challenges we would 

face after a wide-area terrorist attack using chemical, 

biological or radiological agents. In May 2008 in Portland, 

Oregon, Dunne convened a group of EPA response personnel, 

scientists, and engineers ─ Top Officials 4, also known as 

TOPOFF 4 ─ to further examine the response and recovery 

aspects of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty 

bomb” as presented in a national exercise. The meeting 

results pointed to many unanswered technical and scientific 

questions. Dunne stated that we simply do not know a lot, 

and we are a long way away from being prepared for such

an incident.

Over the past year, Dunne has told various audiences that the 

U.S. has significant gaps in three areas: 1) decontamination 

capability and capacity; 2) laboratory analysis capability 

and capacity, and 3) disposal capability and capacity. The 

federal government has limited decontamination capacity 

and would need to rely on private companies to complete the 

majority of the actual cleanup, as done in 2001. Given the 

currently limited decontamination capability available, the 

decontamination of building interior areas alone, following a 

wide-area urban anthrax attack, might require over 15 years, 

based on estimates from a U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) scenario. Dunne noted that researchers 

are still working on technical approaches to outdoor 

decontamination, so we do not know how long outdoor 

decontamination will require.

Dunne has pointed out these three major gaps to senior 

officials at the White House Homeland Security Council, 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Congress. 

He stressed that decontamination is absolutely critical to 

recovery from an urban area attacked with a chemical, 

biological or radiological agent. A successful recovery is 

impossible without adequate decontamination capability

and capacity.

These gaps become magnified when considering the 

possibility of wide-area attacks occurring at the same

time in multiple cities. Recent events around the world

(e.g., Madrid, London, Mumbai) have shown that 

terrorists use multiple, simultaneous attacks to maximize 

physical damage and economic loss, as well as, increase 

their psychological impact. The likelihood of multiple, 

simultaneous events is a very reasonable planning 

assumption. EPA planning aims to enable us to respond 

to five simultaneous chemical, biological or radiological 

attacks—each similar in scope to the attack on the World 

Trade Center towers.

Dunne also cautioned that EPA’s ability to continue to make 

the necessary investments to fill these critical gaps will 

become increasingly difficult for two reasons: 1) fading 

public concern and 2) increasing competition for scarce 

resources to address other national issues. The nation is 

becoming complacent with respect to terrorism. As the nation 

transitions to a new administration, many high profile issues, 

such as our sagging economy, will compete with homeland 

security for resource investments.

What is the solution? Dunne explained that now, more than 

ever, researchers need to prioritize resource investments, 

leverage existing efforts in order to increase our level of 

preparedness for the most significant events, and hold 

ourselves accountable for making progress and closing the 

critical gaps.

EPA has a number of initiatives to prioritize investments of 

limited resources. Dunne led an effort to develop an EPA 

work plan that identifies decontamination, with a focus on a 

wide-area anthrax release and a dirty bomb attack, as one of 

the four EPA priorities. Why focus on these two scenarios? 
4

First, Dunne, as well as many others at the Homeland 

Security Council and DHS, believes that these two scenarios 

carry significant risks to the nation. Second, trying to work 

on everything leaves you ill prepared for anything.

Investments need to be operationally focused. Dunne stressed 

that, given the limited resources and the tremendous gaps 

in our knowledge and capability, EPA cannot afford to work 

on everything. EPA must focus on specific scenarios and 

have an operational focus. At EPA, On-Scene Coordinators 

(OSCs) provide our researchers with direction and guidance 

that focuses efforts on the science and technology that has the 

most immediate field application. Dunne stated that we need 

to focus research and development on operational readiness.

Investments must be based on solid analyses of gaps and 

priorities. EPA has undertaken several analyses to identify 

and prioritize gaps in the area of decontamination. Several 

years ago, we initiated a cross agency effort to identify the 

scientific and technical information, as well as the policies 

and procedures, necessary to perform decontamination. Last 

summer, EPA, along with DHS, the U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services (HHS), and the U.S. Department 

of Defense (DoD), participated in a White House Homeland 

Security Council effort to identify gaps in our ability to 

address a wide-area anthrax attack.

Now EPA is leveraging existing efforts in order to increase 

our level of preparedness for the most significant events. EPA 

is pleased to be working collaboratively with DHS and others 

on projects working towards improving our preparedness 

for decontamination. For example, EPA is participating in 

the joint DoD and DHS Interagency Biological Restoration 

Demonstration (IBRD) Program.

Finally, we must hold ourselves accountable for making 

progress and closing critical gaps. As other high priority 

issues compete with funding for homeland security, we must 

effectively demonstrate to our departments and agencies, 

OMB, and Capitol Hill that we are investing resources wisely 

and achieving real progress. At EPA, we established a goal 

for our decontamination preparedness within the EPA work 

plan. This “desired end state” for decontamination clearly 

articulates what needs to be achieved and estimates our 

achievements toward that goal to date.

Dunne wished he could say that we were ready to respond 

and recover from a wide-area chemical, biological or 

radiological attack, but we are not. In fact, at the current 

rate of progress, it will be a long time until we achieve our 

“desired end state” for decontamination. In Dunne’s view, 

this is unacceptable: we cannot fail. We must make every 

effort to maximize our return on investment of the precious 

resources we have been given.

Given the magnitude of the problem and significance of 

the gap in our preparedness, we cannot afford a shotgun 

approach to filling these gaps. We need a rifle shot. We need 

to focus our collective efforts, prioritize our investments, 

leverage each other’s work, and hold ourselves accountable 

for making significant progress towards addressing the most 

important gaps. We cannot afford to do anything less.

Question and Answer Period

• A workshop participant commented that the most 

important research questions sought to identify cleanup 

standards. This participant thought that establishing set 

standards would drive all other research.

Dunne responded that no single cleanup standard could 

be established for an agent before an event occurs. More 

likely, political, economic, and scientific factors would 

contribute to the derivation of a cleanup range for a 

particular incident. 
5

III

Session 1: Decontamination–General Aspects

The Role of a Technical Working Group in Fumigation

of a Large Building

Blair Martin, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

National Risk Management Research Laboratory

Using St. John’s Regional Medical Center (SJRMC) in 

Oxnard, California, as an example, Martin discussed 

the Technical Working Group’s (TWG’s) role during a 

fumigation event. Hospital management decided to treat a 

chronic, nuisance mold problem at the hospital with chlorine 

dioxide gas. Martin noted that, although the mold was not the 

result of a terror event in this instance, the role of a TWG in 

responding to a terror event would be similar.

Martin noted that SJRMC is slightly smaller, but much more 

complex, than the 2003 Trenton N.J. U.S. Processing and 

Distribution Center fumigation, which he has discussed 

in previous EPA decontamination workshops. SJRMC 

management outlined unique goals for this fumigation, 

such as minimizing down time and material damage. To 

address all their goals, hospital management convened a 

TWG consisting of individuals who provided expertise in 

decontamination, sampling, disposal, and communications. 

The group also included: private sector decontamination 

technology experts; EPA representatives from the Office 

of Research and Development (ORD), the National 

Decontamination Team (NDT), the Environmental Response 

Team (ERT), and an OSC; and hospital representatives. Sabre 

Technical Services, LLC (Sabre) conducted the fumigation 

and also participated in the TWG.

The TWG provided overall advice, attended meetings, 

reviewed and commented on documents, recommended 

and provided input on various studies conducted prior 

to the fumigation, and was on site for technical support 

during the fumigation event. The presentation slides detail 

the documents reviewed and the special studies that were 

recommended.

The document review process required substantial 

coordination between TWG members because members were 

not on site throughout the process. Martin suggested that 

convening a TWG on site could shorten review cycles by 

reducing coordination and scheduling needs. He also noted 

that the TWG presence on site during the fumigation allowed 

for real-time responses to issues that arose.

The TWG also worked to ensure regulatory compliance. The 

group recommended fumigation conditions (i.e., temperature, 

chlorine dioxide concentration, relative humidity), sampling 

during and after fumigation, and clearance concentrations 

for chorine dioxide. The group then worked with California 

regulators to agree upon acceptable treatment and clearance 

conditions.

Based on his experience at SJRMC and other fumigation 

events, Martin concluded that a TWG could serve a valuable 

function during decontamination. Individuals in a TWG 

are more valuable when working together versus alone 

because they encourage innovative thinking and forge 

working solutions together. An on-site TWG could expedite 

decontamination by providing rapid document reviews and 

real-time responses. Ideally, a TWG would be present on 

site throughout the decontamination event, or during critical 

periods, at a minimum.

Question and Answer Period

• Can you comment on the differences between fumigations 

for mold, which may be present on and within materials, 

versus anthrax, which may be present only on surfaces?

The fundamental fumigation process is the same for both 

mold and anthrax, although there would be different 

contact concentrations and time values used. Anthrax 

fumigation, however, requires additional preparation and 

clearance activities. Martin noted that mold treatments 

are considered successful as long as the fumigation 

conditions meet the conditions listed on the fumigant 

label. No clearance sampling is required. Ideally, he hoped 

that some day anthrax fumigation would have a similar 

clearance requirement.

• What skill set should a TWG bring to a decontamination 

event?

Martin thought that the skill set should match the 

decontamination activities. Overall, the TWG members 

should bring together response capabilities, research 

knowledge, and fumigation experience. The skill set of 

the group involved in the SJRMC fumigation would likely 

work well in other similar decontamination situations.

• Does a regulatory requirement (e.g., Federal Insecticide, 

Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act [FIFRA]) exist for 

convening a TWG for decontamination events?

Currently, the incident commander decides whether or not 

to convene a TWG. No regulatory requirement for a TWG 

exists.

Medical Aspects of Natural Anthrax: Implications for 

Decontamination

Curtis Snook, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

National Decontamination Team

Prior to 2001, anthrax was known as an agricultural disease, 

primarily in animals and secondarily in humans. Vaccines and 

improved hygiene have minimized the number of cases in the 

U.S. Other countries, which experience more cases of natural 

anthrax, were surprised by the extreme reaction to the recent 

natural anthrax events in New York City and Connecticut.
6

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 

investigated 40 natural anthrax cases between 1950 and 

2001. Most cases occurred in agricultural settings or 

textile mills that process animal hides. These cases largely 

involved cutaneous anthrax cases with a smaller number of 

inhalation anthrax cases investigated. No gastrointestinal 

or oropharyngeal cases were investigated. Snook noted that 

large outbreaks of gastrointestinal anthrax have occurred 

in other parts of the world, likely from food contamination. 

Snook reviewed the findings from the CDC investigations 

and showed CDC photographs of cutaneous anthrax.

The cutaneous anthrax cases were associated with direct 

contact with infected animals or commercial products. The 

inhalation cases were associated with presence near activities 

that could aerosolize anthrax spores and with underlying 

illness that increased susceptibility. A high percentage of 

the inhalation cases were fatal. Snook noted that the fatality 

rates after the Capitol Hill incident in 2001 were much lower 

than the noted “natural” occurrences because during this 

incident CDC sought out people showing symptoms and 

treated people early. He also noted that the number of cases 

decreased between 1950 and 2001 due to vaccines, better 

working conditions, process controls, and worker safety and 

education. CDC recommends this approach for reducing 

anthrax in agricultural settings or associated industries 

because recontamination is inevitable and eliminating 

anthrax completely would be impossible. One case Snook 

reviewed involved inhalation anthrax resulting from the use 

of contaminated yarn from Pakistan, which resulted in the 

Consumer Product Safety Commission issuing a warning 

about imported yarn. Snook wondered if a similar approach 

could be taken with imported animal hides.

Snook reviewed three recent cases of natural anthrax (New 

York City, Scotland, and Connecticut), each of which 

involved making or using drums with anthrax-contaminated 

hides. The two inhalation cases resulted in fatalities. In each 

case, surface decontamination methods and/or fumigation 

successfully remediated indoor areas contaminated with 

naturally occurring anthrax.

Question and Answer Period

• What could have been done differently during the New 

York City and Connecticut responses, and what are the 

implications of these responses?

An event with natural anthrax may not need the same level 

of decontamination as an event with weaponized anthrax. 

At the time of the New York City event, Snook thought 

that additional clearance sampling should have been done. 

Considering the overly conservative response to natural 

anthrax, however, he now feels that the level of clearance 

sampling was appropriate.

• Considering the past responses at postal facilities 

with anthrax contamination versus the New York 

City anthrax contamination, and whether or not the 

anthrax was cutaneous, would you recommend surface 

decontamination or fumigation?

Snook thought that the postal facilities contaminated with 

anthrax were different from the residences contaminated 

with natural anthrax, and that decontamination decisions 

are not necessarily an issue of cutaneous infection or not. 

Snook said that decontamination decisions are situational. 

Rather than prescribing a single decontamination method, 

he thought that a range of decontamination methods is 

necessary and responders need to develop a process for 

selecting the best method based on the situation.

•	Do decontamination methods exist specifically for heating,

ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) and exhaust 

systems? Will spores caught in filters eventually be

deactivated?

Snook indicated that he is not an expert on 

decontamination methods for HVAC and would defer 

to others on this topic. He did believe that filters 

with captured spores would have to be disposed of as 

contaminated materials.

United Kingdom’s Government Decontamination 

Service: An Update for 2008

Robert Bettley-Smith, Government Decontamination 

Service, United Kingdom

Bettley-Smith provided an update on the United Kingdom’s 

(U.K.’s) Government Decontamination Service (GDS) 

activities associated with the specialist supplier framework, 

recent GDS operations, and general decontamination issues.

GDS developed the specialist supplier framework to allow for 

immediate access to resources during an incident response. 

The framework allows GDS to evaluate technologies 

and create proactive partnerships before an event.

Initially, GDS certified suppliers for one year knowing that 

the decontamination field was rapidly evolving. GDS is 

currently reevaluating and certifying suppliers for a five 

year term. The evaluation involves a five-stage process: 

1) technical assessment, 2) case study responses within 

supplier experience, 3) case study responses beyond 

supplier experience, 4) exercises and tests, and 5) evaluation 

during or after an actual event. Suppliers are undergoing 

stage 3 evaluations. This stage requires sophisticated 

review and realistic case studies involving an actual release 

venue. Bettley-Smith noted that information shared by 

suppliers during this stage and throughout the evaluation 

process remained confidential to ensure open and honest 

communication between GDS and suppliers.

The 2006 to 2007 anthrax cases in Scotland and England 

illustrated a successful test of the GDS framework during an 

actual release and response action. The response began after 

pathology tests revealed inhalation anthrax as the cause of 

death for an individual using natural hide drums. Case details 

were included in the presentation slides and during the 2007 

workshop. Four different strains of anthrax were found at 

the Scottish sites. The response activities included chlorine 

dioxide fumigation of a community hall in Smailholm, 

Scotland. The decontamination of a home in England was 

less publicized and involved the use of several methods, 

including high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) vacuuming, 

surface disinfection, and vapor hydrogen peroxide (VHP) 
7

fumigation. The response actions highlighted not only 

technological issues but also the emotional, social, logistical, 

and political issues associated with decontamination.

Since 2007, GDS has become involved in large-scale 

hazardous material responses. Bettley-Smith discussed a 

situation in which the local responders contacted the Health 

Protection Agency (HPA), which in turn requested GDS 

assistance at a home containing a large number of unusual 

chemical and radiological substances. The necessary 

sampling and characterization exceeded the local responder 

capacity. As such, GDS called on its contractors and 

suppliers for assistance. The home contained asbestos, three 

radiological substances, and 120 chemicals. Excavation and 

disposal of contaminated soil occurred; radiological source 

testing was ongoing.

In conclusion, these instances illustrate how planning could 

ensure success. Certain issues arise at every decontamination 

event, such as funding sources, waste management, 

interagency communication, media interactions, clearance 

standards, logistics, and staffing resources. A scenario-based 

approach, using real venues and real information, helped in 

identifying and analyzing solutions during planning. BettleySmith emphasized that thinking carefully about issues before 

an event will precipitate better answers and solutions for a 

response.

Question and Answer Period

•	Have GDS and specialty suppliers explored partnerships

with the health care industry?

GDS does not get involved in that area and, thus, has 

not explored a partnership with the health care industry. 

Health issues are a matter for the HPA.

• When considering the differences between natural and 

weaponized anthrax, how does the U.K. decide when 

GDS becomes involved or when private responses are 

appropriate?

Bettley-Smith indicated that GDS makes this decision on 

a case-by-case basis. For the community hall in Scotland, 

a public facility, GDS clearly had a responsibility to 

respond. In principle, decontamination of a private 

residence would most likely be the responsibility of the 

owner. Many issues, however, must be considered, such as 

insurance coverage and public health concerns. Often the 

line between government and private responses becomes 

blurred.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Regulation of 

Sterilants/Sporicides and Sporicidal Decontaminants

Jeff Kempter, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

Office of Pesticide Programs

Kempter provided a brief overview of FIFRA product 

registration requirements, exemptions, and efficacy testing 

requirements for sanitizers, disinfectants, virucides, and 

sterilants/sporicides. He noted that in the Danbury and New 

York City anthrax cases, the state granted FIFRA crisis 

exemptions (with EPA’s Office of Pesticide Programs [OPP] 

oversight) because these cases did not involve intentional 

releases of anthrax. Kempter also provided details regarding 

a new antimicrobial product designation—sporicidal 

decontaminant—and discussed OPP’s test method research.

Previously, to receive a product claim as a sterilant/sporicide 

specifically for Bacillus anthracis, manufacturers needed 

to conduct and pass the AOAC International Sporicidal 

Activity of Disinfectants Test (Official Method 966.04) using 

a virulent strain of Bacillus anthracis. No manufacturer 

has done so to date. OPP, however, wants to encourage 

registration of products for use against Bacillus anthracis

on hard, non-porous surfaces. In 2007, OPP proposed the 

antimicrobial product category “sporicidal decontaminant.” 

Less stringent efficacy testing is associated with this 

category, allowing possible use of acceptable surrogates. 

Kempter noted that OPP was working toward, but had not yet 

identified, an acceptable surrogate. The use of quantitative 

efficacy test methods, requiring a 6-log reduction, would also 

be acceptable.

After meeting these efficacy-testing requirements and 

if the product is a gas, the product must also undergo a 

simulated use test. For example, products claiming effective 

decontamination of a large enclosed space must undergo 

simulated use testing in a room or large chamber to ensure 

that key fumigant process parameters (e.g., concentration, 

relative humidity, and temperature) for effective 

decontamination are met. This testing would also establish 

required product generation rates (e.g., pounds/hour per 

volume).

In August 2008, OPP released the final Pesticide Registration 

(PR) notice outlining the terms and conditions for sale and 

distribution of products with the sporicidal decontaminant 

claim. Kempter noted that manufacturers must develop 

competency examination and training materials as part of the 

application submission. Currently, OPP is developing generic 

templates (e.g., training and competency exams) to assist 

manufacturers in completing their applications. In 2009, OPP 

also aims to release for public comment a draft guidance 

document addressing efficacy test methods supporting 

anthrax-related claims.

Kempter also discussed completed research, which was 

conducted by OPP’s Microbiology Laboratory, related to 

sporicidal efficacy test methods. These efforts have involved 

improvements to the AOAC Official Method 966.04 

(qualitative method); selection and validation of quantitative 

test methods, for example the Three Step Method (TSM) 

[ASTM E2414 – 05]; and efficacy tests to compare Bacillus 

subtilis to two Bacillus anthracis strains and surrogates using 

different test methods (both quantitative and qualitative) 

and decontaminants. Kempter then described a host of 

ongoing research initiatives involving further investigation of 

quantitative test methods, surrogates, carrier materials, and 

other pathogens in addition to Bacillus anthracis.
8

Question and Answer Period

• What is the rationale for the requirement for no growth in 

qualitative tests versus a 6 log reduction in quantitative 

tests?

For regulatory purposes, OPP considers no growth 

in qualitative tests equivalent to a 6 log reduction in 

quantitative tests. Overall, OPP would like to move toward 

quantitative tests.

• What is the role of surface cleaning in a situation with a 

wide-area release and hundreds of buildings impacted? 

Fumigating each building would require hundreds or 

thousands of responders.

Kempter indicated that the unified command will be 

responsible for selecting specific decontamination 

methodologies during an event. OPP’s role will be 

to determine if products will be effective when used 

according to the label and/or as planned by the unified 

command and to ensure that any requests for crisis 

exemptions are rapidly reviewed if registered products are 

not available.

• Has OPP seen much interest from companies seeking a 

sporicidal decontaminant claim for products?

Yes, several companies are interested in and working 

toward submitting applications for sporicidal 

decontaminant product registrations.

Toward a System-of-Systems Approach 

to Hazard Mitigation

Charles Bass, Defense Threat Reduction Agency

During this workshop, Bass was struck by the differing 

approach of EPA decontamination versus DoD 

decontamination. DoD focuses on tactical decontamination 

technologies that reduce risks to a tolerable level.

Bass provided an overview of the Chemical and Biological 

Defense Program (CBDP) of the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA). Once a technology reaches a certain level 

of maturity under the development of the Joint Science and 

Technology Office (JSTO), JSTO passes the technology on to 

the Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) for development 

and application for use by the warfighter. Bass also discussed 

the elements of the program that he manages, which includes 

the decontamination and protection areas.

Unlike the Cold War era of large-scale, ongoing attacks,

DoD now expects chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear (CBRN) events to consist of small target incidents 

that result in intense and local releases. As such, DoD now 

investigates hazard mitigation measures that a warfighter 

could carry at all times. Out of necessity, these measures 

must have a low burden on the warfighter (e.g., lightweight, 

easy to use, compact). Otherwise, the warfighter may 

perceive the measures as unnecessary and discard or resent 

carrying the item.

In developing effective decontamination or hazard mitigation 

technologies, DoD seeks to balance hazard reduction, 

effectiveness, suitability, and life-cycle management. Hazard 

reduction needs change based on specific situations, but 

immediate decontamination generally focuses on life-saving 

measures implemented by warfighters in combat areas.

DoD has shifted from seeking a single, all-purpose 

decontamination technology to researching a number of 

dual-purpose technologies, which could be used in concert 

to create a system-of-systems decontamination approach. 

These technologies, which were detailed in the presentation 

slides, included a surfactant wash for removal of chemical 

agents from chemical agent resistant coatings (CARCs); 

an aqueous chlorine dioxide surfactant solution produced 

electrochemically from chlorite; and decontamination 

solutions for VX and G-agents produced through the use

of enzymes.

Bass discussed the system-of-systems approach

(i.e., technologies combined or used together) and presented 

a scenario of this approach. Technologies under investigation 

in this category include antimicrobial surfaces, agent 

disclosure solutions, and strippable coatings. By combining 

these technologies, DoD aims to reduce or eliminate hazards 

as quickly as possible in order to eliminate operational and 

thorough decontamination needs to the extent feasible.

Question and Answer Period

•	What are the benefits of enzyme-based decontaminants?

Enzyme-based decontaminants require lower quantities 

for use and are, therefore, easy to store and ship, which is 

often a concern in combat situations. Enzymes also have 

high material compatibility. Bass noted that no immediate 

solutions existed for toxic degradation products from 

chemical warfare agents (CWAs).

• What temperature range must the enzyme decontaminant 

stay within to remain effective?

Storage temperatures can reach up to 170 degrees 

Fahrenheit (°F). Initial research indicated that 

decontaminants could withstand temperatures this high 

during short-term storage. Long-term storage at high 

temperatures has not been as successful.

• How does DoD identify decontamination technology 

research needs?

Decontamination technology users reviewed the functional 

needs assessment and functional solution assessment, 

which was a large document describing decontamination 

needs. The modernization plan outlined DoD’s general 

goals for decontamination technologies in the future and 

was another document used to direct research. Groups met 

to discuss information in these documents and worked 

together to develop research objectives based on the 

information provided.
9

Wide-area Restoration Following Biological 

Contamination: Systems Analysis for Interagency 

Biological Restoration Demonstration Program

Lynn Yang, Sandia National Laboratory

Under the IBRD Program, which is a joint program of the 

DoD and DHS, a strategy for addressing a wide-area, urban 

release of a biological agent is being developed. Agencies 

have established a process for addressing indoor releases. 

Although many of the issues with indoor events are also 

relevant to outdoor events, many technology, science, policy 

and other capability gaps exist for addressing wide-area, 

biological restoration. IBRD Program participants include 

civilian and military personnel working together to address 

these issues using a hypothetical release of Bacillus anthracis 

in Seattle, Washington.

This IBRD Program is divided into four tasks: 1) systems 

analysis, 2) consequence management plan development,

3) technology development and demonstration, and

4) workshop and exercise completion. Yang presented 

activities and findings resulting from Task 1—systems 

analysis.

The four steps of the systems analysis process included: 

creating an as-is decision framework, developing a baseline 

example, identifying critical parameters, and prioritizing data 

gaps and chokepoints in the wide-area restoration process. 

Creating the as-is decision framework required extensive 

expert interviews, workshop discussion, technical advisor 

consultation, and document review. Yang noted that if an 

incident occurred today, responders would have a basic 

understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Supporting 

plans, policies, procedures, and technologies, however, are 

insufficient and many decisions would occur in real time. 

Significant knowledge gaps exist.

In the next step, the group established a base-line 

contamination scenario with a hot zone, which would 

require decontamination, and a less contaminated 

“warm zone,” which would require only monitoring. 

Yang noted that local officials would likely prioritize 

response areas and facilities, but these officials would 

need to balance local needs with federal and state 

needs. Yang outlined a potential remediation strategy: 

decontaminate outdoor areas to minimize contaminant 

spread, and then address buildings based on priorities.

Using the as-is framework and the baseline example, Yang 

conducted a series of analyses to evaluate the impact of 

each action and decision on the decontamination process 

to identify gaps and chokepoints. Yang outlined the 

assumptions and detailed the analysis methodologies. 

These methodologies identified 80 gaps and a number of 

chokepoints. For example, results identified laboratory 

analysis capacity and throughput and high-density indoor 

characterization sampling as chokepoints in the restoration 

process. Analyses also found that the suspected area of 

contamination impacted all subsequent decontamination 

activities and phases. High-priority gaps needing attention 

included the lack of a risk-based approach for determining 

cleanup goals; lack of validated outdoor characterization 

methods; and lack of validated outdoor decontamination 

strategies, methods, and technologies.

Yang discussed issues identified through their qualitative 

analysis, such as methodologies for prioritizing infrastructure 

for restoration, waste disposal concerns, and the role of 

“self-remediation” (i.e., citizens would decontaminate their 

own homes). Yang concluded that the systems analysis tool 

could be used for additional analyses; however, the initial 

analyses identified clear gaps. Results from these analyses 

are now supporting the next IBRD Program tasks to develop 

a consequence management plan and to develop and 

demonstrate technologies.

Question and Answer Period

•	What level of available resources did you assume for

laboratory facilities and did these resources stem from 

federal, state, and/or local agencies?

Yang assumed that recovery would be a multi-year effort 

and that the laboratory response network (LRN) would be 

used initially. Additional resources and capabilities would 

increase over time.

• When considering the fate and transport of contaminants 

after the event, did you assume fixed concentrations or

agent mobilization through weathering, degradation, 

and other actions that would drastically change the 

contaminant footprint?

To simplify this assessment task, Yang assumed a static 

hot zone. She agreed that discounting fate and transport 

actions resulted in a substantial data gap; however, a fluid 

system would be substantially more complex to model.

• The scalability of fumigation is illustrated by the actions 

completed in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. Time 

and cost to fumigate were reduced when working at a 

large-scale event versus a single building event. This 

participant suggested that Yang review data generated 

from New Orleans and reconsider some of the baseline 

assumptions.

Yang agreed with this statement and suggestion.

• Why did you select fumigation versus surface 

decontamination for addressing contamination?

At the time, Yang selected fumigation because this 

method was well known and validated. Yang considered 

some level of surface decontamination for addressing 

contaminant tracking and secondary contamination. 

Yang indicated that she could run the models again with 

a greater percentage of surface decontamination. For 

this particular scenario, with hundreds of buildings to 

decontaminate, she indicated that surface decontamination 

techniques are less likely to be critical to restoration. 

These methods would need to be validated as a substitute 

for fumigation.
10

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11

IV

Session 2: Biological Agents–Field Experience 

And Laboratory Testing

Danbury Anthrax Response, September 2007

Mike Nalipinski, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

Region 1

Approximately 200 OSCs operate throughout the U.S. 

and coordinate emergency response efforts, including 

decontamination. Nalipinski recommended that everyone 

take the Incident Command Structure course offered on the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Web 

site to better understand emergency response procedures. 

Although they appreciate information about large-scale 

events, more frequently OSCs respond to much smallerscale events. As an example of OSC activities, Nalipinski 

presented information about a recent anthrax response in 

Danbury, Connecticut.

In August 2007, doctors diagnosed a drum maker and his 

son with cutaneous anthrax. Per protocol, doctors notified 

the Connecticut Department of Public Health, which in turn 

notified CDC and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

When law enforcement determined that the anthrax did not 

originate from terrorist activities, these agencies demobilized 

from the site. The Connecticut Department of Environmental 

Protection remained involved and requested assistance from 

EPA, which led to OSC involvement.

EPA, state, and local agencies established a unified 

command to address characterization and decontamination 

issues. These issues included setting clearance standards 

for reoccupancy of the home and work shed, reopening a 

major city road, selecting an appropriate decontamination 

method(s), addressing structure contents, and integrating 

different agency regulations and needs. Decisions from the 

unified command were potentially precedent setting, and 

they wanted to keep responses simple. Additionally, the drum 

maker’s spouse was a local school teacher, so the unified 

command needed to address concerns about possible anthrax 

transport to the public school.

Characterization sampling (with polymerase chain reaction 

[PCR] analysis) found anthrax in the work shed, which 

contained natural hide drums, and in the home. Samples 

collected between the work shed and home detected no 

anthrax spores. No sampling was conducted at the school. 

The unified command reviewed available information 

and, for the work shed, selected a host of decontamination 

procedures, including HEPA vacuuming, followed by power 

washing, scrubbing with soap and water, and bleach surface 

treatment. Nalipinski noted that, based on laboratory testing 

results, CDC and the National Institute for Occupational 

Safety and Health (NIOSH) did not support these 

decontamination methods for porous surfaces.

After soaking materials from the shed in a bleach solution 

for 1 hour, sampling and culturing detected no anthrax spores 

in 34 of 37 batches of treated materials. HEPA vacuum 

sampling of approximately 2.5% to 3% of the work shed 

surface area after treatment also found no anthrax spores. 

Resampling of additional areas in the home, however, 

detected anthrax spores. As such, the state epidemiologist 

decided to approve home reoccupancy only after fumigation, 

which occurred in December 2007.

Nalipinski concluded with a discussion of lessons 

learned and recommendations stemming from this event. 

Coordination and communication between agencies and 

experts had a large impact. An on-site presence during an 

event, as suggested during Martin’s earlier presentation, 

improved communication and the overall success of the 

decontamination event. Nalipinski recommended that 

potentially involved agencies formalize a communication 

strategy and follow the incident command system. He 

also suggested that agencies work to research and validate 

HEPA vacuuming and bleach washing as a potential 

decontamination approach for porous surfaces.

This event also raised policy issues. EPA funded activities in 

the event, but should EPA really be responsible for responses 

to natural anthrax events? In the past, doctors simply treated 

natural anthrax cases with antibiotics. Nalipinski, however, 

thought that the government response was appropriate in this 

case because the family’s connection to the public school 

presented a potentially larger public health concern. He 

also noted that doctors do not understand why some people 

develop anthrax and others do not. Only two of the four 

family members developed anthrax even though all were 

exposed to the spores. The event also raised questions about 

EPA’s role in coordinating with other agencies during a 

response and identified a need to evaluate decontamination 

methods beyond fumigation.

Question and Answer Period

• Did you conduct a cost analysis for the work shed versus 

the home decontamination?

Nalipinski indicated that the action report was finalized 

recently but did not include a cost analysis. The report 

simply identified how much each component of the 

decontamination cost. He noted that the different 

decontamination methods required different levels of 

characterization and clearance sampling. Waste disposal 

was another factor and could be extremely costly; it cost 

about $1 million to dispose of the waste, which required 

autoclaving, incineration and landfilling, following the 

New York City anthrax restoration. He noted that this 

response generated no waste.
12

• Was any sampling conducted on the ground between the 

work shed and the house? Was sampling conducted at the 

school?

Yes, sampling was conducted between the work shed and 

house, but no anthrax was detected. No sampling was 

conducted at the school.

• Who pays for responses to chemical releases in homes?

Chemical releases are response specific. An OSC would 

respond to a mercury release in a school but not an 

asbestos or lead paint situation. In cases with multiple 

chemicals in a single location, OSCs may conduct an 

emergency response and then seek cost recovery from a 

responsible party.

• How are recommendations related to practical research 

and development needs communicated to the research 

community?

Nalipinski noted that this workshop and similar gatherings 

were a way to communicate needs. He also encouraged 

researchers, OSCs, and other responders to develop 

ongoing relationships. OSCs and responders were the 

ultimate customers of research and development findings, 

so open communication helped relate research to needs. 

Another participant noted that a task force exists to 

optimize research and identify OSC needs.

• Has the family returned to the home and how was their 

safety addressed?

During the response, the family was relocated and given 

a daily living stipend. After the local and state health 

agencies, in consultation with CDC, declared the home 

free for reoccupancy, the family returned.

Expedited Fumigation of a Large Hospital as Related to 

Biological Contamination Scenarios

Darrell Dechant, Sabre Technical Services, LLC

Sabre representative Dechant discussed the fumigation 

technology applied to the SJRMC. In addition to addressing 

the hospital’s mold problem, this fumigation also 

demonstrated the feasibility of conducting a rapid, largescale fumigation with one application. Dechant noted that 

the capacity loss of a major medical center for an extended 

period could have serious consequences.

Representatives from several EPA offices, state and local 

agencies, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), 

and hospital management collaborated on this project. This 

group selected chlorine dioxide fumigation by Sabre to 

address a persistent mold problem. Sabre sought to assess the 

feasibility of completing mobilization and preparation within 

weeks, fumigation within hours, and reoccupation within 

hours of finishing fumigation.

Dechant provided details and photographs of the chlorine 

dioxide generation, delivery, and monitoring systems. The 

target dose was 2,000 parts per million by volume (ppmv)-

hours of exposure. Assuming 12 hours of exposure time, 

this dose would result in an average target concentration of 

approximately 167 ppmv. Sabre monitored concentrations 

via air sampling in impingers, which were then later 

analyzed with wet chemistry methods. Sabre also monitored 

temperature and relative humidity throughout the process. 

Sabre used paired biological indicators (BIs) inoculated with 

Bacillus atrophaeus, which Dechant asserted was the most 

difficult bacterial spore to inactivate with chlorine dioxide, 

to assess efficacy. Tenting combined with slight negative 

air pressure in the building contained the chlorine dioxide 

within the building. Negative pressure was achieved by 

drawing some air out of the building, passing the air through 

carbon beds to remove the chlorine dioxide, then emitting 

the air to the atmosphere. The EPA’s Trace Atmospheric Gas 

Analyzer (TAGA) van circled SJRMC and the surrounding 

neighborhoods to monitor for possible chlorine dioxide leaks.

Sabre began fumigating SJRMC at midnight on a Friday to 

minimize possible interferences or exposures. At noon the 

following day, crews entered the building with the TAGA 

mounted to a handcart for manual maneuvering. Chlorine 

dioxide concentrations were below exposure standards for 

reoccupation. Sabre completed the fumigation, from building 

conditioning to final clearance, in less than 48 hours. SJRMC 

was closed to the public for five days.

Dechant noted that this project demonstrated that a largescale fumigation could be completed in a very short time 

frame. Several difficulties, however, arose during the 

process. Predictably, the HVAC system needed extensive 

maintenance. Reaching and maintaining a 75% relative 

humidity was challenging. Unexpectedly, Sabre experienced 

difficulties in clearing personnel from the facilities. Guards 

were needed at entrances and exits to ensure that people did 

not reenter the building.

Although a total of 200 people were involved in this project, 

many were only peripherally involved, and only 50 or so 

were involved at any one time. Caution should be used when 

extrapolating these numbers to a wide-area scenario; the 

economies of scale should be considered. In comparison, 

many more personnel would be needed to complete a surface 

decontamination in a similar large facility. The cost of this 

labor force would likely make surface decontamination the 

more expensive option.

Question and Answer Period

• Another workshop participant involved in this project 

explained the approach used to quantify spore reduction. 

Each BI location included two BIs. Initially, one BI from 

each location was collected and analyzed. At the four 

locations with a positive finding on the first BI, the second 

BI was collected and analyzed to quantify the degree of 

spore inactivation.

• What is the maximum building height appropriate for 

tenting?

Mason noted that Sabre has fumigated buildings up to 

12 stories high. With higher tensile strength materials, 

he believed that buildings 25 to 30 stories high could 

be amenable to tenting. He noted, however, that only 

continued attempts to tent larger and taller buildings 

would identify limitations.
13

• What was the half-life of chlorine dioxide from natural 

decay? After fumigation, did Sabre allow the chlorine 

dioxide to decay naturally?

Natural decay rates vary based on site-specific conditions. 

The decay rate in a facility with few porous materials 

may be 100 parts per million/hour (ppm/hr), whereas the 

decay rate in a large facility with many porous materials, 

like a hotel, may be 1,000 ppm/hr. At SJRMC, the decay 

rate was rapid and the need for air scrubbers was minimal. 

Martin noted that the TWG estimated a clearance time of 

18 to 24 hours for concentrations to drop to the 3 parts 

per billion (ppb) clearance concentration. Concentrations 

actually dropped below 3 ppb within nine hours.

• Did you analyze or account for chlorine dioxide loss in the 

sampling manifold?

Sabre recognized that decay could occur in the sampling 

tubes, so researchers modeled the decay rate and 

accounted for this decay in the sample analysis.

• Was the HVAC system needed to maintain the desired 

building temperature? 

The Sabre system specified a building temperature of 

70 °F. Ambient temperatures met the minimum without 

additional heat; the fumigation occurred in southern 

California during the summer. For colder climates, the 

HVAC system could be used to heat a building.

Utilizing a Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer Triple 

Quadrupole Mass Spectrometer Technology Mounted on 

a Movable Platform to Provide Indoor Air Concentrations 

Throughout a Structure Before and After a Chlorine 

Dioxide Fumigation

David Mickunas, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

Emergency Response Team 

The purpose of using the TAGA at the SJRMC was to ensure 

that tenting would successfully contain the fumigant; this 

was especially important with homes nearby. Consistent with 

other fumigation events, regulators set the chlorine dioxide 

action level at 25 ppb in ambient air. If detected at 100 ppb, 

which was the eight-hour time-weighted average (TWA), 

fumigation operations would cease.

Initially, Mickunas was tasked to move throughout the 

surrounding neighborhoods with the TAGA van to ensure 

compliance with the action level. The TAGA van operated 

by moving slowly, continuously pulling a gas sample from 

the ambient air, and obtaining a signal for chlorine gas and 

chlorine dioxide each second. The TAGA system is a triple 

quadrupole mass spectrometer (with no gas chromatograph) 

that utilizes an atmospheric pressure chemical ionization 

source. The TAGA ionizes the samples and separates 

different compounds and daughter compounds using a series 

of quadrupoles set to different molecular weights.

In addition, Mickunas tested a prototype cart-mounted 

TAGA to ensure that the chlorine dioxide concentrations 

within the building decreased to below the 3 ppb clearance 

concentration. Personnel manually maneuvered the cartmounted TAGA throughout SJRMC before fumigation to 

establish a baseline and after fumigation to assess clearance. 

Mickunas provided photographs of the TAGA van and 

TAGA cart, as well as diagrams of the SJRMC floor plan, 

sampling route, and sampling results. Each run through 

SJRMC required only 15 minutes. Sampling indicated that 

chlorine dioxide concentrations had fallen below 3 ppb, 

with the exception of one location. A bucket with water 

remained in place during the fumigation. Chlorine dioxide 

had dissolved in the water during the fumigation and the 

TAGA cart detected subsequent chlorine dioxide off-gassing. 

After removing the bucket, ambient chlorine dioxide levels 

dropped below 3 ppb.

Mickunas noted that maneuvering the TAGA cart through 

SJRMC required several personnel. If used during a 

remediation event requiring personal protective equipment 

(PPE), maneuvering the TAGA cart with fewer personnel 

and less exertion would be beneficial. As such, Mickunas has 

added a battery operated cart puller to the TAGA cart.

In conclusion, Mickunas noted the TAGA cart’s success in 

clearing SJRMC. He also mentioned that separate tests with 

CWAs have been conducted and have demonstrated that 

the TAGA could detect low-levels of CWAs. Although not 

appropriate for identifying high concentrations or hot spots, 

the TAGA cart could be used to detect clearance levels of 

CWAs for critical facilities, such as airports and train stations.

Question and Answer Period

• Could EPA use the cart-mounted TAGA for detecting toxic 

industrial compounds (TICs) (e.g., materials released in 

an airport)?

Mickunas stated that EPA calibrated the TAGA to detect 

chlorinated, brominated, and halogenated compounds 

during soil vapor intrusion studies in homes. As such, he 

thought using the TAGA to detect TICs was possible.

• Could a handheld ion mobility spectrometer (IMS) 

monitor chlorine dioxide during fumigation?

Mickunas had not used handheld IMS devices for chlorine 

dioxide monitoring. He had heard anecdotal information 

that these monitors are easily overloaded and recover 

slowly.

• Have you evaluated other proton sources?

In the positive ion mode, proton transfer did occur. In the 

negative ion mode, a hydride may form. A high relative 

humidity, however, was sufficient for proper operation of 

the TAGA.

Decontamination of Surfaces Contaminated with 

Biological Agents Using Fumigant Technologies

Shawn Ryan, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

National Homeland Security Research Center

Ryan presented results from a series of efficacy studies using 

vapor phase hydrogen peroxide (VPHP), methyl bromide, 

and chlorine dioxide. His presentation provided a detailed 

description of the test methodology, parameters, coupon 

materials, and threat agents tested with each fumigant. Ryan 

emphasized that the coupon materials impacted results 

substantially.
14

Results from efficacy tests with Bacillus anthracis on six 

different building material coupons indicated that material 

demand impacted VPHP efficacy. For example, VPHP 

fumigation was ineffective in decontaminating concrete 

(essentially no log reduction). Interestingly, this material also 

exhibits a high demand for VPHP. Tests also showed that BIs 

were much easier to inactivate than the Bacillus anthracis

spores on coupon materials.

Ryan also tested inactivation of Bacillus anthracis and 

Bacillus subtilis on eight materials using methyl bromide. 

Again, results indicated that the coupon material substantially 

impacted the fumigant efficacy. The concentration and 

contact time required for complete inactivation of the 

Bacillus anthracis Ames spores were highly dependent upon 

the material. Testing also indicated that Bacillus subtilis was 

significantly more resistant to methyl bromide than Bacillus 

anthracis.

Chlorine dioxide results for inactivation of five different 

agents (Brucella suis, Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularensis,

vaccinia virus, and Bacillus anthracis) on four materials also 

showed that the material and agent affected the concentration 

and contact time required for complete inactivation. Ryan 

noted that the non-spore forming agents were inactivated 

at lower concentrations and contact times than the spore 

forming agents. Relative humidity also affected chlorine 

dioxide efficacy; a higher relative humidity generally 

improves efficacy.

Results from each test found that the material being 

decontaminated greatly affected fumigant efficacy. As such, 

efficacy results generated for one material should not be 

generalized to predict the efficacy for other materials.

Ongoing National Homeland Security Research Center 

(NHSRC), Decontamination and Consequence Management 

Division (DCMD) research efforts include evaluating 

additional fumigants and technologies, assessing coupon 

inoculation methods, comparing efficacy test methods, and 

developing a chamber facility for additional decontamination 

studies.

Question and Answer Period

• For the three fumigants evaluated, does each have a role 

in a real-world decontamination or were the limitations 

such that real-world applications would be impractical?

All three of these fumigants have a possible role in a 

decontamination event. Fumigant selection must consider 

site-specific conditions (e.g., materials).

• What was the fate of methyl bromide?

Methyl bromide is extremely persistent, which allowed 

for long contact times and material penetration, but also 

required procedures to clear the fumigant from structure.

• Do you have any data comparing the mode of distribution 

of the contaminant (e.g., liquid inoculation versus aerosol 

or powder deposition)?

Ryan indicated that ongoing efforts were evaluating 

differences. Initial results indicated that coupon material 

affects the results.

• What form of vaccinia virus did you use?

Was it freeze-dried?

Ryan used a liquid inoculation of the vaccinia virus. 

Anecdotal evidence indicated that a freeze-dried 

form of the virus might be more persistent.

• What was the impact of soiling (i.e., bioburden)?

Bioburden impacts were specific to the fumigant. For 

example, Ryan found that VPHP was impacted by 

bioburden, whereas chlorine dioxide was not.

Assessment of the Impact of Chlorine Dioxide Gas on 

Electronic Equipment

Mary Mandich, Alcatel-Lucent

Mandich provided a detailed discussion of the methodology 

and findings from a collaborative study to assess the impact 

of fumigation chemicals on electronic equipment. The 

Alcatel-Lucent team studied the effects of chlorine dioxide 

because of its use in real-world situations and proven efficacy 

against threat agents. Dell computers served as the test 

vehicle to represent possible impacts not only to computers 

but also other electronic devices and systems. The computers 

consisted of a wide range of materials—plastics, aluminum, 

copper, silver, and sheet metal. Additional assessment of 

material impacts was conducted using pure copper, silver, 

and aluminum coupons and industrial printed circuit (IPC) 

boards. Effects of short-term chlorine dioxide exposure were 

studied for months after exposure, and significant timedelayed impacts on system reliability were observed.

To initially assess impacts, the team used PC-Doctor®

(PC-Doctor, Inc. Reno, N.V.), which is an industry standard 

program for assessing computer failures. PC-Doctor®

reported results as pass or fail, which removed any subjective 

pass/fail designations assigned by researchers. Results were 

reported as cumulative failures over time. Some of the 

results indicated that intermittent failures occurred. Visual 

inspection of the computers found corrosion on all tested 

materials, and color changes on the plastic coated cables. 

Measures of the pure metal coupon weight gain, which 

is an indication of corrosion, correlated with exposure 

conditions (e.g., concentration, temperature, time).

After identifying failures, Mandich examined the exposed 

systems to determine the failure causes. Hygroscopic 

corrosion product (i.e., dust) formation and transfer caused 

reliability problems. Optics damage caused CD-DVD drive 

failures. Gold plated connectors failed if the gold layer 

thickness was less than or equal to 0.5 microns.

Question and Answer Period

• Could you explain more about how the chlorine dioxide 

exposure experiments were conducted?

These experiments were conducted in the NHSRC 

laboratories.
15

• Did you examine damage to CDs, DVDs, or the hard drive 

as part of the forensic data retrieval?

Ryan responded that CDs and DVDs were placed in 

the chamber during fumigation. After fumigation, data 

from these media were retrieved successfully. Mandich 

indicated that attempts to retrieve data from the exposed 

hard drives were successful.

• How do these findings extrapolate to whole buildings

and structures?

Mandich indicated that many extrapolations were possible, 

but the study team needed to catalog exposed items and 

consider impacts before extrapolating findings.

• Did you monitor other co-gases (e.g., hydrogen chloride, 

chlorine gas) in addition to chlorine dioxide during the 

exposure?

The study included only chlorine dioxide monitoring; 

however, future monitoring for hydrochloric acid gas 

would be useful.

• A workshop participant commented that, anecdotally, 

electronic equipment has remained operational after 

fumigation.

Laboratory-scale Decontamination Testing in Support of 

the Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration 

Program

Major James G. Rohrbough, Defense Threat

Reduction Agency

Rohrbough reviewed projects that the DTRA is doing in 

support of the IBRD Program. (Data from laboratory-scale 

decontamination testing were not yet available.) DTRA’s 

mission is to mitigate potential releases and impacts of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (e.g., threat agents). 

The Test-Support Division, in particular, specifically 

conducts research that assists with end-to-end threat event 

planning and execution. The IBRD Program aims to develop 

the policies, plans, and technologies needed for responding to 

a large, urban area release of a biological agent.

In support of the IBRD Program, DTRA was conducting 

laboratory tests of decontamination products using Bacillus 

anthracis surrogates and the quantitative TSM protocol. 

Laboratory testing will include a porous and non-porous 

surface, Bacillus atrophaeus as a surrogate, and six 

commercially available decontaminants.

Planning for field testing—scheduled for 2009—was 

currently underway. The field test would likely be a mediumscale test with multiple surfaces. A simulated, wide-area 

decontamination event was scheduled for 2010. Rohrbough 

noted that, ideally, results from laboratory and field tests 

would help identify which decontaminants had the best 

efficacy for different materials. He welcomed workshop 

participant feedback and advice about these planned projects.

Question and Answer Period

• How would data from this effort transfer from the 

laboratory to operational use?

A panel reviewed many decontamination agents and 

selected the six decontaminants used for the laboratory 

evaluations. The panel deemed these decontaminants as 

most likely to successfully address a wide-area, outdoor 

contamination event. Results from the laboratory-scale 

tests would be used in decisions about how the field and 

then the demonstration tests would be conducted.

Field Evaluation of Gaseous Chlorine Dioxide Treatment 

for Microbial Contamination

Nancy Clark Burton, Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Health 

and Safety

Burton presented the details of decontamination activities 

resulting from a requested evaluation of a serious mold issue 

at a home proposed for use as a women’s shelter. Chlorine 

dioxide fumigation was selected as the decontamination 

technology for this home. Burton briefly discussed chlorine 

dioxide use as a fumigant and the various occupational 

exposure limits.

Burton presented detailed information about the treatment 

conditions and sampling strategy. She noted that the home 

needed heating to reach required treatment conditions. 

Sampling locations were established on each floor and in 

the basement of the home. A number of different microbial 

sampling methods were used because no good correlation 

exists between microbial sampling analytes and health 

effects. Burton provided photographs illustrating the 

sampling locations and fumigation process. She noted that 

ants quickly reentered the home after fumigation, probably 

because of incomplete sealing of the basement.

For some, but not all of the analytes, statistically significant 

differences were observed between the levels before and after 

fumigation. Microscopic analysis of tape samples indicated 

that fungi structures remained after fumigation. Burton’s 

presentation slides provided detailed results.

For future study, Burton recommended additional monitoring 

to evaluate the impact of chlorine dioxide exposure on 

PCR analysis. The team had thought the chlorine dioxide 

gas would not impact DNA and RNA samples, but it did. 

She also recommended that HEPA vacuuming and other 

air filtration devices be used to remove the bioaerosols 

remaining after chlorine dioxide fumigation until the health 

effects of these bioaerosols are better understood.

Question and Answer Period

• Normally areas contained for fumigation are held under 

negative pressure. Why was the area fumigated during this 

field evaluation kept under positive pressure?

Burton agreed that most fumigations occurred under 

negative pressure. Because this situation addressed 

microbial contamination, a positive pressure condition 

helped to ensure that microbes outside of the home did not 

enter the containment area.

• A workshop participant clarified that chlorine dioxide 

was not flammable, unless present at high concentrations 

(e.g., 10,000 parts per million [ppm] and 275 °F).
16

Decontamination Family of Systems 

Mark Zimmerman, Joint Program Executive Office for 

Chemical and Biological Defense

(Presentation is unavailable)

Under JPEO, Zimmerman works within the materials 

development program. The development program fulfills 

requirements from three different entities, which consider 

warfighter, documentation, and testing needs. Unlike other 

agencies, DoD had substantial oversight for determining 

capability gaps and research needs. The development 

program also ties into other programs (e.g., CBDP, IBRD 

Program), other agencies, and industry to gather information 

and data about technologies. Zimmerman noted that open 

and consistent communication with other organization was 

important for ongoing research and development activities.

Zimmerman discussed capability gaps and research 

approaches toward addressing these gaps. Although 

capability gaps related to sampling and early warning 

systems existed, Zimmerman focused his presentation on 

the gaps related to decontamination. Initial decontamination 

research has targeted decontamination efforts and 

application methods. DoD, however, recently broadened the 

decontamination research scope. Zimmerman noted that, 

unlike other agencies, JPEO is addressing decontamination of 

human remains.

In evaluating field capabilities, most available 

decontaminants had some issues associated with their use. 

No all-purpose decontamination agent existed (although 

Zimmerman noted one successful technology: reactive 

skin decontaminant lotion.) As such, DoD research 

began to evaluate a Decontamination Family of Systems 

(DFoS) approach, which was the same as the systemof-systems approach discussed by Bass. Zimmerman 

provided a schematic depiction of the operational view of 

decontamination. Within this view, DoD balanced immediate, 

operational, and thorough decontamination needs with 

clearance needs. The standards for clearance have historically 

presented problems.

The DFoS approach combines decontamination agents and 

methods to speed the decontamination process. From the 

operational side, this approach aims to reduce the manpower, 

logistics, time, and cost of decontamination. For example, 

many personnel and a large volume of water are necessary 

to decontaminate a single vehicle. A DFoS approach would 

identify the technologies that would reduce the personnel 

and water requirements. Materials supporting a DFoS 

approach included agent identification technologies, dualuse decontaminants, coatings, and automated application 

systems.

In recognizing that no one decontaminant technology exists 

to cover all possible situations, DoD accepts that research 

must follow an incremental approach, with short-, mid-, and 

long-term goals for addressing capability gaps. Zimmerman 

briefly mentioned the warfighters’ need for tools and 

technologies that tailor responses to specific threats, increase 

hazard mitigation, and decrease resource requirements.

Question and Answer Period

• A meeting participant noted parallels between military 

and other government agency research. Specifically,

DoD research regarding large vehicle decontamination 

strategies had implications for civilian decontamination 

of large vehicles. This participant encouraged 

ongoing communication and resource sharing across 

organizations.

Zimmerman agreed and noted that these shared interests 

emphasized the importance of open communication.

Decontamination of a Railcar Using a Portable and 

Economical System

Tony Contino, Biokinetics, Inc.

Paul Manske, Metropolitan Transportation AuthorityLong Island Railroad

Contino became involved in decontamination, and 

specifically chlorine dioxide fumigation, after learning about 

a chlorine dioxide micro-reactor technology. This technology, 

developed by Selective Micro® Technologies, LLC (Beverly, 

Mass.) consists of submerging a sachet filled with dry 

reactants in water to generate chlorine dioxide, similar to 

steeping a tea bag. The sachet, or micro-reactor, consists of 

a gas permeable membrane that allows water vapor to enter 

and react with the dry material to form chlorine dioxide gas.

Contino and Manske partnered to demonstrate the microreactor technology as a viable option for addressing interior 

and exterior contamination of a passenger railcar. In addition 

to inactivating anthrax spores, they sought to demonstrate 

that this technology could meet environmental and safety 

standards, accommodate changing site conditions, and 

minimize damage to materials, including electronic and 

safety equipment. Contino presented details of the chlorine 

dioxide generation system used for the test, BI sampling, 

test methodologies, and site conditions. The generation 

system produced chlorine dioxide in the aqueous phase with 

numerous large sachets, then sparged the gas into an air 

stream.

Chlorine dioxide generation began during the tent 

erection around the railcar. Strong winds at the end of the 

demonstration tore the tenting material, which released 

chlorine dioxide gas and ended the test. The chlorine dioxide 

generation in water started about seven hours before the 

initiation of gas injection into the railcar. The gas injection 

and hold period lasted for 14 hours. For the future, Contino 

recommended tenting with a stronger (i.e., heavier) material. 

For safety reasons, personnel conducted monitoring adjacent 

to the railcar tenting; concentrations did not exceed the action 

level of five ppm. Minimizing personnel in the operation 

areas or requiring PPE in operation areas also minimized 

exposures. Contino noted that only seven personnel from 

Biokinetics, Inc. were present during the test.

Results from Long Island Railway’s laboratory indicated that 

96 out of 98 BIs were inactivated. Successful achievement 

of fumigation parameters was also obtained; the relative 

humidity, temperature, and the target chlorine dioxide dosage 

(concentration x contact time) requirements were met. 
17

Contino estimated that a chlorine concentration multiplied 

by exposure time (CT) of 12,000 to 15,000 ppm/hr was 

obtained. The project also demonstrated that the microreactor technology was easily portable and quickly deployed. 

The technology also accommodated a range of site conditions 

and remained successful. The materials compatibility 

results found no apparent physical damage to the railcar six 

months after fumigation. Notebook computers and railcar 

electronics operated throughout the decontamination process 

had no visible damage and could be restarted one year after 

fumigation.

Contino concluded that this project demonstrated the 

feasibility of the micro-reactor technology and noted that 

Long Island Railroad was planning to conduct another test 

with three railcars. Because this technology was easily 

transported and could be scaled to various fumigation 

volumes, it could be carried by warfighters and could be 

valuable for the military. Contino recommended additional 

technology development and demonstration projects.

Question and Answer Period

• A notebook computer generates a lot of heat when 

running. What were the local conditions proximate to 

the running notebook computers, and how would these 

conditions affect relative humidity, temperature, and 

decontamination effectiveness?

The relative humidity ranged from 70% to 80% and 

the temperature ranged from the 70s to low-80s °F. 

Monitoring tracked only gross conditions in the railcar, so 

data local to the notebook computers were not available.

• After introducing the micro-reactor to water, did you seal 

the container and monitor the liquid chlorine dioxide 

concentrations in the storage tank?

Yes, Contino conducted detailed mass balance calculations 

to double check levels measured with their OPTEK 

(OPTEK Technology, Carrollton, Tex.) instrument. 

Contino indicated that the micro-reactor’s gas permeable 

membrane allows only water vapor (and not liquid water) 

to pass into the sachet, where the water vapor is adsorbed 

by the solid, reacts, and produces chlorine dioxide. Since 

chlorine dioxide is the only gaseous product formed, it is 

the only chemical entity that can leave the micro-reactor, 

resulting in little or no toxic or corrosive by-products 

entering the liquid water.

• Were you concerned about chlorine dioxide gas 

accumulating in the tank headspace at an explosive 

concentration? A concentration of 6000 ppm chlorine 

dioxide in the liquid at 75 °F, or 3000 ppm at 100 °F, can 

result in explosive levels in the headspace.

Liquid chlorine dioxide concentrations reached 1,500 

ppm. Headspace concentrations were up to 1,000 ppm.

• Could homeowners use this technology to conduct their 

own decontamination?

Contino indicated that the micro-reactors have been 

developed in various sizes and could be appropriate 

for use at a wide range (i.e., from small to large scale) 

of situations. He personally has used the technology. 

Although health concerns are associated with chlorine 

dioxide exposure, laboratory testing has shown that 

inexpensive, disposable, activated carbon-filled 

respirators, when used by experienced technicians, 

provide more than adequate protection. He would not 

recommend that the average homeowner take on this role 

without some training.

• How did you measure the liquid chlorine dioxide 

concentration with the OPTEK sensor?

The paper and drinking water industries use OPTEK 

sensors to monitor chemical concentrations in both the 

gas and liquid phase. These sensors, which are placed 

in a pumped recirculation loop for liquid measurements, 

provided real-time measurements for chlorine dioxide in 

the gas and liquid phases for this project.

Economical Facility Decontamination with Gaseous and 

Liquid Chlorine Dioxide

Mark Czarneski, ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

Czarneski described a decontamination event at a 

pharmaceutical facility. This event illustrated how combining 

fumigation and surface methods provided for effective and 

economical decontamination.

Czarneski quickly reviewed OPP’s antimicrobial pesticide 

registration requirements and classifications. He noted that 

only 41 products met the criteria for registration as sterilants. 

Each of these products includes either ethylene oxide, 

hydrogen peroxide, or chlorine dioxide. Czarneski noted that 

ethylene oxide was carcinogenic and explosive. Excluding 

ethylene oxide, only two companies have gas or vapor 

sterilant technologies registered with OPP.

No anthrax was present in the facility. The pharmaceutical 

company, however, had four laboratory areas with possible 

biological (i.e., virus) contamination and additional areas 

with a negligible chance of biological contamination.

Levels 1 and 3 of the facility housed the four possibly 

contaminated laboratories. Two decontamination approaches 

were considered: fumigating all of Levels 1 and 3, or 

fumigating the four laboratories and fogging remaining areas 

of possible contamination.

Czarneski provided detailed schematics of Levels 1 and 3, 

reviewed the on-site equipment, discussed the selected 

chlorine dioxide generation technology, and presented 

diagrams of the equipment locations and fumigation areas 

(Areas A, B, C, and D). He noted that one location (Area D) 

had a dropped ceiling. Leakage from Area D to a surrounding 

area due to the dropped ceiling accounted for the difference 

in the expected versus actual number of chlorine dioxide 

cylinders required.

Areas B, C, and D presented unique concerns for the 

fumigation. Rather than tenting the entire facility, ClorDiSys 

Solutions, Inc. (ClorDiSys) sealed only the doors and the 

HVAC system. Windows in Areas B, C, and D presented 

a concern because sunlight would breakdown the chlorine 

dioxide and window leaks were possible. Beginning 

the fumigation after sunset eliminated possible sunlight 
18

degradation of chlorine dioxide. Human activity in the 

area also decreased after sunset, which minimized possible 

exposures from leaks. Chlorine dioxide concentration 

readings during the fumigation indicated that target 

concentrations were difficult to achieve in Areas C and D. 

Czarneski presented detailed results for each of the 

fumigation areas at the conclusion of his presentation.

Czarneski also presented photographs of the fogging 

approach, which occurred in areas that were not fumigated. 

ClorDiSys placed commercial foggers on carts and personnel 

walked through the facility spraying the surfaces.

After decontamination, no material effects to either facility 

equipment or electronics were visibly observed. No physical 

residues were identified, and BIs indicated complete kill in 

fumigation areas.

Question and Answer Period

• Did the humidity generators run throughout the 

decontamination process?

The humidity generators ran during equipment set up 

to precondition the facility. The humidity generators 

ceased operating during fumigation. Relative humidity 

monitoring occurred only during operation of the humidity 

generators.

• What was the spore loading on the BIs used in

this project?

The BIs, which were from SGM Biotech, Inc. (Bozeman, 

Mont.), had a spore count of 106 Bacillus atrophaeus.

• Did you use window coverings?

ClorDiSys used no window coverings because the facility 

was decontaminated after dark. The facility was located 

in an industrial park with the next closest building 

approximately 0.25 miles away.

• Were fumigations conducted simultaneously?

ClorDiSys fumigated Areas A and B on Level 1 

simultaneously, and Areas C and D on Level 3 

simultaneously.

• Your reported CTs ranged from 1,100 to 1,800 ppm/hr. 

Other fumigation events reported CTs as high as

9,000 ppm/hr. Why were the CTs for this fumigation 

substantially lower?

Other fumigation events addressed buildings containing a 

host of materials with a higher chlorine dioxide demand, 

such as treated wood, carpet, and ceiling tiles. This 

facility consisted of painted and sealed surfaces, typical of 

pharmaceutical research laboratories. As such, the material 

demand was much lower.

• What was the maximum concentration and time listed on 

the chlorine dioxide generation system’s label?

The generation system operated at a rate of 30 milligrams/

liter (mg/L) for 30 minutes.

Assessment of Biological Indicators for Building Interior 

Decontamination

Vipin Rastogi, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

Bioloigical indicators are standardized spore preparations 

on a carrier material and are most commonly used in 

pharmaceutical and biomedical industries to validate 

sterilization or sporicidal processes. Since the 2001 anthrax 

fumigation events, BIs have also been used to indicate that 

target fumigation concentrations are reached throughout 

a building. Ongoing debate exists, however, about the 

use of BIs during fumigations, the appropriate spore type 

and backing materials for this application, and associated 

clearance requirements.

To inform this debate, Rastogi compared the decontamination 

efficacy of chlorine dioxide fumigation for spores on building 

materials coupons versus standard BIs, estimated the 

D-values for these materials, and evaluated surrogate spores 

and backings appropriate for building fumigations. Rastogi 

used the term CT to refer to the dose (i.e., concentration in 

ppmv multiplied by the exposure time in hours) and the term 

D-value to refer to the time in minutes to reduce the viable 

spore number by one order of magnitude (i.e., a factor of 10).

The study involved inoculating coupons made of six 

different building materials with avirulent Bacillus anthracis. 

Rastogi exposed coupons and BIs to chlorine dioxide at 

varying concentrations for different durations. Temperature 

and relative humidity were held constant as specified by 

the manufacturer. Rastogi’s presentation slides provided 

methodology details.

Rastogi presented results from assessing the CTs required 

to achieve no growth on the building material coupons and 

BIs and correlating spore kills on BIs versus wood coupons. 

Overall, results indicated that some materials require lower 

CTs and were easier to decontaminate than others. Wood 

was one of the most difficult surfaces to decontaminate. BIs 

were generally inactivated at CTs lower than other materials, 

regardless of the chlorine dioxide generation method.

Using a series of specially prepared BIs, Rastogi evaluated 

different coupon materials and spore surrogates to develop 

BIs appropriate for interior building decontamination. Results 

identified the surrogate and coupon material combinations 

with the highest and lowest sensitivities to chlorine dioxide 

gas. The results indicated that BIs made from stainless 

steel were more difficult to inactivate compared to those 

made from nitrocellulose and a loading of 107

 spores was 

appropriate. Geobacillus stearothermophilus appeared to be 

the most resistant spore for interior building decontamination 

with chlorine dioxide gas.

Question and Answer Period

• Did the BI population, which is usually 106 spores,

affect results?

Spore loading did affect results. Rastogi recommended a 

spore loading of 107 for future BIs.
19

• Did you take scanning electron microscope (SEM) 

photographs of coupons with 107 and 108 spore loadings 

to assess spore distribution?

Rastogi did not assess spore loading as part of this 

study; however, another research program examined 

spore distribution and migration on pine wood and steel 

surfaces.

• A workshop attendee noted that other research found 

that clumping and non-uniform spore distribution at 

concentrations of 107 spores and higher was a concern 

and could affect results. This attendee also noted that 

biomedical studies found Geobacillus stearothermophilus 

to be the most resistant spore to vaporized hydrogen 

peroxide, and Bacillus atrophaeus was most resistant to 

ethylene dioxide and chlorine dioxide. Additional review 

of the biomedical literature was suggested.

Rastogi noted this concern and indicated that he had 

conducted a literature review.

• Did you use steel or nitrocellulose membrane discs?

This study included stainless steel disc (Apex 

Laboratories, Inc., Apex, N.C.) BIs. Rastogi had run 

studies with nitrocellulose membrane and steel BIs 

and found that steel-based BIs were more difficult to 

decontaminate.

• Would hydration of spores prior to fumigation make them 

more susceptible to decontamination agents? If so, would 

hydration prior to decontamination produce a greater 

response?

Rastogi noted that chlorine dioxide efficacy depended 

on relative humidity. At a relative humidity of 40%, kill 

kinetics were flat. At a relative humidity of 90%, rapid kill 

occurred. As such, relative humidity was carefully tracked 

during fumigation.

• What controls did you include to ensure that the results 

were from spore inactivation versus low recovery rates?

Each experiment in the study included five positive and 

five negative controls. Recovery rates ranged from 30% to 

80%, and each study included controls to assess recovery. 

Rastogi simply excluded the control results from the 

presentation slides.

Reduction and Elimination of Biological Contamination 

Using Bacteriophages

Timothy Dean, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

National Risk Management Research Laboratory

Dean provided a brief background and overview of 

bacteriophages. Bacteriophages are viruses that infect a 

bacteria host. They are highly specific to individual bacteria 

strains and, when sought, have been found for every 

bacterium. Historically, bacteriophages have been used to 

treat human infections, such as those in the gastrointestinal 

tract or skin infections from burns. With the advent of 

penicillin, research with bacteriophages nearly ended, 

except in Russia and the Republic of Georgia. In the future, 

bacteriophages may become important again as bacteria 

continue to increase their resistance to antibiotics. Although 

bacteria may develop resistance to bacteriophages, the 

bacteriaphages may in turn develop mechanisms to overcome 

the bacterial resistance.

Dean began researching the potential for taking lytic 

bacteriophages from their normal environment in 

biological systems and applying them to surface materials 

(e.g., wallboard, glass) for decontamination purposes. In 

addition to being highly specific to a host, other benefits of 

bacteriophages, include their ability to self-replicate until 

the host bacteria are infected and then self-limit further 

reproduction.

Phase I of Dean’s research sought to develop and characterize 

a bacteriophage “cocktail” for Escherichia coli. Dean worked 

with Intralytix, Inc. (Baltimore, M.D.), a company that 

primarily develops phages used in patient treatment. Phase 

II examined the efficacy of bacteriophage preparations in 

reducing E. coli on hard, inanimate surfaces. Dean selected 

E. coli because these bacteria cause $700 million in damages 

in U.S. each year, were highly studied, required only a 

biosafety level-2 laboratory, and were typically absent from 

building materials.

Dean listed the various E. coli bacteriophages and 

combinations considered and tested during Phase I. He 

selected bacteriophages that infected 70% to 80% of E. coli, 

but no other bacteria, and mixed these together to develop 

treatment preparations. Dean noted that challenging bacteria 

to several bacteriophages during treatment minimized 

development of bacterial resistance. Two preparations 

were tested in Phase I; both had similar efficacy in 

suspension tests.

In Phase II, Dean carried forward one of the preparations 

identified in Phase I and treated glass and gypsum wallboard 

surfaces inoculated with 105 E. coli. He presented results for 

controls and treatments after a five-minute contact time. Dean 

suggested that higher concentrations of phage per surface 

area may increase the decontamination efficacy.

Using the results of the initial research, Dean is moving 

forward with research involving bacteriophage treatment 

preparations for Yersinia pestis, a biosafety level-3 organism. 

His research also involves assessing the applicability 

of phage on various building materials and evaluating 

application, storage, and use parameters.

Question and Answer Period

• How would this approach work for a spore-forming 

organism?

Phages do not infect spores, so treatment must include a 

component that causes the spore to germinate. Currently, 

researchers are examining phage enzymes, specifically 

those that cause cell rupture, for inactivating spores. 

Initial research found that organisms could not develop 

resistance when exposed to an enzyme alone.
20

Wet Scrubbing and Adsorption for the Capture of 

Chlorine Dioxide Gas During Fumigation Events

Joseph Wood, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

National Homeland Security Research Center

Chlorine dioxide has been proven to be efficacious in 

inactivating anthrax spores, ricin, molds, and other agents. 

Chlorine dioxide, however, is highly hazardous; it is a severe 

respiratory and eye irritant and has a very low Permissible 

Exposure Level (PEL). As such, fumigation is typically 

performed with a facility under negative pressure to prevent 

chlorine dioxide leaks. The air withdrawn from the facility 

to maintain negative pressure must be treated to remove the 

chlorine dioxide before release to the atmosphere.

Wood described tests to evaluate two different techniques

to remove chlorine dioxide from air—wet scrubbing and 

carbon adsorption. Although both technologies have been 

used, no data were available to evaluate the performance of 

either method.

The wet scrubber evaluation occurred as part of a field test 

to demonstrate a mobile chlorine dioxide generation and 

scrubbing system. Wood presented detailed information about 

the field test conditions, results, and conclusions. Of the two 

scrubbers involved in the demonstration, one performed 

adequately. The other malfunctioned during preliminary tests 

and was not tested during the final exercise. Drawbacks to the 

wet scrubbing technique include the extra equipment needed, 

spill containment requirements, handling of hazardous 

materials, and hazardous waste disposal.

The sorbent tests occurred at a laboratory scale; five sorbent 

materials were evaluated to determine their adsorption 

capacity. Three of the sorbents evaluated were impregnated 

with various chemicals. Wood presented a diagram of the 

test bed system and details of the test methods and results. 

The evaluation tests included three replicates and extensive 

monitoring and quality control sampling. Each test replicate 

was run until monitoring identified that chlorine dioxide 

breakthrough had stabilized.

Results indicated that the simple carbon formulations 

performed better (i.e., provided higher adsorption capacity) 

than the impregnated carbon formulations. Preliminary 

desorption tests showed that chlorine gas was the 

predominant chemical species measured. Temperature 

increases in the sorbent bed were a potential concern that the 

study also considered. Wood did not observe any substantial 

increase in temperature, but suggested that further research 

could or should be conducted.

Question and Answer Period

• For the wet scrubbing demonstration, how did you select 

an acceptable outlet concentration (i.e., <0.5 ppmv 

chlorine dioxide)? This workshop participant noted that 

standard field practice included ceasing operations and

switching to another chlorine dioxide removal system

if monitoring detected any chlorine dioxide at the 

scrubber outlet.

The involved parties, which included EPA, selected 

an acceptable outlet concentration based on internal 

discussions, existing standards, and current exposure 

limits.

• Could you provide information about the scrubbing 

solution and effluent characteristics?

The wet scrubbing solutions, which consisted of

the hazardous materials sodium thiosulfate and 

sodium hydroxide, reacted with chlorine dioxide to 

form hazardous by-products that required disposal as 

hazardous waste.

• Did you wet the sorbent material prior to introducing 

chlorine dioxide? From field experience, channeling

sometimes occurred in dry carbon beds and resulted in 

faster breakthrough. Wetting the carbon beds minimized 

channeling and increased the time to breakthrough.

After measuring the moisture content of the carbon, 

the sorbents were sealed to prevent additional moisture 

capture. But no additional moisture was added.

Material Demand for Hydrogen Peroxide of

Building Materials

Brian Attwood, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

National Homeland Security Research Center

Attwood noted that experience with vaporized hydrogen 

peroxide (VHP) in the pharmaceutical industry provided 

some material demand data about the technology, but 

these data did not directly translate to a large-scale 

decontamination of an office building or similar facility. 

As such, Attwood evaluated demand by various building 

materials. He noted that results from this research might 

support vendors seeking product registration under FIFRA.

Many processes (e.g., homogeneous decomposition, 

reversible adsorption) contribute to material demand. Some 

of these sinks are subsequently sources of VHP release.

The project objectives included examining material demand 

and developing a tool to estimate VHP requirements 

for specific fumigation events. Attwood evaluated the 

BIOQUELL, Inc. (Horsham, Penn.) and STERIS Corporation 

(STERIS) (Mentor, Ohio) technologies. Each technology 

has different characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages. 

The BIOQUELL, Inc. unit relies on micro-condensation 

for decontamination, rather than a specific vapor phase 

concentration, thus complicating the material demand studies. 

In contrast, the STERIS unit decontaminates by keeping the 

hydrogen peroxide in the gas phase.

In addition to presenting details about each VHP technology, 

Attwood also presented information about the five material 

coupons, the test chamber, and the test methods employed 

for this study. The coupon materials were selected as 

representative of those found in office spaces. About four 

square feet of coupon material is used for each test.
21

Testing with the BIOQUELL, Inc. unit is underway and 

involves introducing a known amount of hydrogen peroxide 

(determined based on achieving micro-condensation) 

for approximately 20 minutes, and then measuring VHP 

concentration changes over time.

Attwood presented preliminary results for the control 

condition (i.e., an empty chamber) and the coupon materials 

at two different VHP injection concentrations and relative 

humidities. Variations in the initial peak concentration of 

hydrogen peroxide for the materials indicated variations 

in initial VHP absorption, with the lower peaks indicating 

greater initial absorption. Attwood noted that the carpet 

appeared to have a greater affinity for water vapor, which 

resulted in VHP condensation. Results indicated that chamber 

conditions did not occur as a steady state.

Attwood briefly presented the material demand or flux 

equation under consideration. This equation would be the 

basis for a tool to estimate VHP requirements. To further 

support fumigation efficacy and tool development, Attwood 

suggested further studies to examine VHP impacts on other 

materials and studies to evaluate other potential fumigants.

Question and Answer Period

• What do you think about using a simple hydrogen 

peroxide liquid solution applied to a surface, rather than 

fumigation with VHP?

Attwood thought that a hydrogen peroxide solution could 

decontaminate a surface if surface contamination were 

the only concern. Ryan noted that the project simply 

focused on material demand impacts and did not assess 

decontamination efficacy. Another workshop participant 

noted that EasyDECONTM DF200 (Intelagard, Inc., 

Burbank, Calif.) served as a hydrogen peroxide-based 

surface decontaminant.

Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki Agent

Fate Characterization

Kristin Omberg, Los Alamos National Laboratory

Gypsy moth caterpillars annually deforest millions of 

acres. To control the caterpillars, forest managers and 

others have release thousands of kilograms per year of 

Bacillus thuringiensis var. kurstaki (Btk), which produces 

a gypsy moth caterpillar toxin. Btk shares many similar 

physical and biological properties with Bacillus anthracis. 

As such, Omberg is studying the long-term persistence, 

resuspension, fate, and transport of Btk as a surrogate for 

Bacillus anthracis. Omberg focused this presentation on her 

evaluation of the persistence of Btk at known, controlled 

spray areas in Seattle, Washington, and Fairfax, Virginia.

Literature regarding Btk persistence in the environment 

reported spore viability ranging from a half-life of 100 

days in a cabbage plot to 60 years in a laboratory held 

soil sample. Omberg reviewed Btk spraying records for 

the Seattle area, where spraying typically occurred every 

year. She identified several sampling locations to represent 

a control area (i.e., areas never sprayed), areas with 

repeated spraying, and areas with two years of Btk spores 

detected. Omberg presented photographs of the sampling 

locations and discussed the sampling plan design. A flow 

chart illustrated the sampling location selection process.

The sampling approach, which combined probabilistic, close, 

and targeted sampling schemes, focused on determining 

the presence of spores. Omberg provided a schematic of 

the laboratory analysis process. In general, Omberg pooled 

samples for analysis. She pooled only similar sample types 

(e.g., swipe samples with swipe samples) and no more than 

three samples together. These pooled samples were analyzed 

for Btk DNA, and positive samples (over 1000 target copies 

per reaction) were then cultured and analyzed by PCR again 

for confirmation. Samples were collected from both vegetated 

and non-vegetated areas. Sampling grids (e.g., 10x10 yard 

grids, or 3x3 yard grids) for non-vegetated areas were sized 

based on the sampling location characteristics.

Sample analysis results indicated that Btk remained viable 

in the Seattle environment for more than two years. (Since 

communities did not spray Btk in Seattle in 2008, samples 

were collected in Fairfax for a short term study. Samples 

were collected two weeks before spraying in Fairfax and then 

at various intervals during the year following spraying.) Soil 

samples tended to have a much higher percentage of viable 

Btk spores, compared to the swipe or water samples. In 

addition, analysis of probabilistic and close samples indicated 

non-uniform spore distribution.

Question and Answer Period

• What was your detection limit?

The analyses have approximately a 10 organism per 

sample detection limit. Omberg stated that organism loss 

would occur during transport and sample preparation. Soil 

samples of 20 milliliters allowed for initial analysis and 

later reanalysis, if necessary.

• Can you comment on the low extraction efficiency for

soil samples?

Omberg agreed that the extraction efficiency in soil was 

very low, but the high collection efficiency balanced this 

concern. Conversely, swipe sample collection efficiency 

was low and extraction was high. Swipe samples from 

the parking lots had the worst recovery rates. As such, 

Omberg targeted non-porous surfaces (e.g., manhole 

covers) for sampling, if possible.

Comparing and Contrasting Fumigations of Very Large 

Facilities for Biothreat Agents and Other Microorganisms

Dorothy Canter, Johns Hopkins University, Applied 

Physics Laboratory

Canter has been involved with responding to and preparing 

for biothreat agent release events since the 2001 anthrax 

releases. Most recently, she observed the mold fumigation 

effort at SJRMC. To identify lessons learned, Canter 

compared the fumigation conducted at the U.S. Postal 

Service’s Processing and Distribution Center on Brentwood 

Road (now the Curseen-Morris facility), Washington, D.C. to 

address Bacillus anthracis contamination and the fumigation 

at SJRMC to address mold contamination.
22

Since 2001, structural fumigations have addressed biological 

contamination ranging from Bacillus anthracis released as 

a threat agent to “natural” Bacillus anthracis occurrences 

and mold outbreaks. Canter provided a brief summary of 

each type of fumigation event (e.g., Hart Senate Office, 

the New York City drummer’s apartment, and SJRMC). 

Other fumigations have been conducted to decontaminate 

pharmaceutical and research laboratories.

To compare fumigation activities at the Brentwood postal 

facility and SJRMC, Canter focused on the remediation 

phase of a response and recovery matrix. The remediation 

process consists of three phases: site characterization, 

decontamination, and clearance. Canter compared the 

Brentwood and SJRMC facility characteristics. She 

noted that the Brentwood facility was the first very large 

facility (>14 million cubic feet) to undergo chlorine 

dioxide fumigation. Canter also compared the site 

characterization activities, decontamination planning 

steps, site preparation needs, source reduction, fumigation 

components, waste disposal, and clearance activities. 

Canter presented photographs of both facilities to illustrate 

different components of the decontamination process. The 

photographs highlighted how the chlorine dioxide generation 

equipment changed (i.e., decreased in size) over time. Canter 

also noted the differences in waste disposal handling at the 

two facilities. At the Brentwood facility, disposal of waste 

contaminated with infectious substances presented many 

difficulties. At SJRMC, no such waste was present, so waste 

disposal was not a significant issue.

Other key differences included the time criticality of 

responding to a biothreat event, the extent of required 

site security, target fumigation concentrations for 

achieving effective decontamination, PPE levels, and 

environmental characterization and clearance sampling 

requirements. Similarities also existed and included 

the need for effective containment of chlorine dioxide 

during fumigation, potential HVAC system modification, 

an extensive staging area for equipment and chemicals, 

removal of essential items before fumigation, ongoing 

risk communication, input from a TWG, and utilization of 

a systems engineering approach. The overall fumigation 

process also remained the same at both facilities.

Canter concluded that despite the advancements occurring 

since the 2001 Brentwood postal facility fumigation, 

large-scale fumigations still required substantial planning. 

Substantially more resources would be required to address 

multiple, simultaneous events. Canter recommended 

additional research to improve real-time chlorine dioxide 

monitoring, to conduct in-depth materials compatibility 

tests with chlorine dioxide, and to evaluate chlorine dioxide 

distribution through HVAC systems.

Question and Answer Period

• Was the problem that caused the mold problem at 

SJRMC corrected?

The hospital fixed leaks identified as causing the mold 

contamination before the fumigation.

• Was clearance sampling conducted for the mold 

fumigation and were clearance sampling data available 

for review and analysis?

Canter understood that BIs were used to measured 

fumigation efficacy, and no environmental clearance 

sampling was conducted. Data collected as part of the 

clearance process were considered confidential. 
23

V

Session 3: Foreign Animal Disease Agents

Animal Disease Outbreak Response–Tools, Status,

and Trends

Lori Miller, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service

The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) serves as the lead 

agency when responding to animal or plant disease and pest 

outbreaks of substantial economic impact. Miller noted that 

animal and environmental health were inter-related with 

human health.

Outbreaks often follow a cyclical pattern from disease 

confirmation to quarantine, depopulation, decontamination, 

disposal, and repopulation, which eventually could lead 

to new or recurring disease. After providing background 

information about animal disease, Miller primarily focused 

on disposal issues, decontamination concerns, bio-security 

issues, and response tools available from APHIS.

The impact of disease outbreaks on animal and 

environmental (e.g., plant) health is staggering and affects 

a range of facilities from feedlots to pet stores. A feedlot 

outbreak could require depopulating tens of thousands of 

cattle or pigs or hundreds of thousands of chickens. Disposal 

of the resulting biomass is a tremendous undertaking. As a 

complicating factor, the response—from disease confirmation 

to disposal—must occur within a 24- to 48-hour period for 

successful disease containment.

Researchers at APHIS are developing a number of on-line 

tools to help responders wade through the complexity of 

outbreak response technologies and identify appropriate 

actions. Miller illustrated the decision-making process during 

an outbreak response by walking through the Disposal 

Options Decision Tool, which was one of the APHIS 

Emergency Management Animal Disease Tools. This tool 

helps responders evaluate various carcass disposal options, 

such as composting (requires a large carbon source), burial 

(potential for pathogens to remain viable in ground water), 

incineration, microwave sterilization, alkaline hydrolysis 

(requires high temperature, high pressure, and high pH), and 

landfilling. A disposal decision tree is available on the APHIS 

Web site to guide the responder through the various disposal 

options.

Miller also presented EPA’s disposal decision support tool, 

which is linked from the APHIS Web site and includes 

information about disposal facilities throughout the U.S.. 

Miller discussed several other available tools, such as 

a Cleaning and Disinfecting training tool, the Canadian 

Pathogen Safety Data Sheets, and Health and Safety Plan 

templates. Miller provided a case study for decontaminating 

a quail facility contaminated with low-pathogenic avian 

influenza.

In addition to developing tools, Miller noted the need 

for the following: research on agent fate and transport in 

carcass disposal methods, new and/or improved disposal 

technologies, and an analysis of disposal costs and benefits.

In collaboration with EPA, USDA (at the Plum Island, New 

York laboratory facility) was researching the efficacy of 

common household products (e.g., bleach) as disinfectants for 

various agents under various conditions. In collaboration with 

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 

APHIS is also developing and deploying biosecurity 

information and response tools to developing nations.

Question and Answer Period

• A workshop participant noted that disease outbreak 

responses occurred in many settings beyond threat event 

responses (e.g., hospital outbreaks, cruise ship Norwalk 

virus occurrences, agricultural pest infestations). This 

participant suggested that Miller communicate with these 

industries to identify relevant response protocols and 

gather information about their response actions.

Miller agreed that ongoing communication with various 

industries would be useful.

• Was security required for anthrax and other bio-threat 

agent outbreaks?

Outbreaks involving select bio-threat agents require biosecurity measures. Responders were bound to regulatory 

requirements for decontaminating these agents.

• What role does sampling serve in an outbreak response?

Sampling results from an outbreak response were difficult 

to interpret. A positive sample indicates the presence 

of a pathogen, although no cleanup standards exists for 

comparison to determine what action to take. In addition, 

risks to host animals depended on many factors

(e.g., health, age). As such, responders often used 

sampling simply to determine if a pathogen was present. 

In some cases (e.g., poultry outbreaks), responders placed 

sentinel animals in a facility as a means of confirming 

decontamination prior to fully repopulating the facility.

Inactivation of Avian Influenza Virus Using Common 

Chemicals and Detergents

Brian Ladman, University of Delaware

In 2007, the poultry industry in the U.S. was a $21.5 

billion industry. Disease outbreaks, therefore, could have 

substantial economic impact. The avian influenza virus has 

both a low- and high- pathology strain. The low pathology 

strain, which causes respiratory effects, is common in wild 

birds. Outbreaks in poultry houses sometimes mutate to 

a high-pathology strain, which causes systemic illness. In 

response to low- or high- pathology strain outbreaks, farmers 

depopulate, clean, and disinfect poultry houses, which are 
24

often simple structures made from porous (e.g., concrete, 

wood) and non-porous (e.g., plastic, galvanized steel) 

materials. If no contamination or other issues are present, a 

poultry house may get cleaned only once every three years.

Many currently approved disinfecting agents have 

limited availability, are expensive and corrosive, and 

present environmental concerns. An ideal economical and 

environmentally sound disinfecting agent would effectively 

treat the avian influenza virus, biodegrade, and be widely 

available at a low cost.

Ladman evaluated common, commercially available 

disinfectants and chemicals to assess their efficacy against 

the avian influenza virus. He detailed the control conditions, 

test methodologies, and results from two experiments. 

Experiment 1 included three coupon materials and ten 

disinfecting agents tested against a low-pathology strain. 

Ladman reported results as a neutralization index; a value of 

2.8 or higher indicated successful virus inactivation assuming 

no virus remained (i.e., no hemmaglutination activity).

The porous materials results were inconsistent and Ladman 

noted that virus recovery from porous coupon materials was 

difficult. Non-porous material results indicated consistent 

virus inactivation. In Experiment 1, Group B results reported 

a number of tests with neutralization indices greater than 

2.8, but the tested disinfecting agents were still considered 

ineffective because the virus remained. Experiment 2 used 

only galvanized steel coupons, four disinfecting agents, and 

three different avian influenza type A viruses (both high- and 

low-pathology). Results from Experiment 2 were consistent 

with the galvanized steel coupon results achieved in 

Experiment 1. Results indicated that the three avian influenza 

strains reacted similarly to the different disinfecting agents.

Question and Answer Period

• The 1% citric acid solution was an effective disinfecting 

agent, but is citric acid environmentally sound?

Kempter indicated that OPP would consider a 1% citric 

acid solution environmentally sound.

Persistence Testing of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 

Virus on Outdoor Materials

Harry Stone, Battelle1

The highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAI) is highly 

contagious and lethal to birds. Close contact with infected 

birds has resulted in some human infection cases, of which 

60% were lethal. Human-to-human transmission is limited, 

but virus mutation to a form more readily transmissible could 

result in a pandemic.

The purpose of this research project is to assess HPAI 

persistence and viability under various environmental 

conditions (including using ultraviolet [UV] radiation-A 

and B to simulate sunlight). Another phase of the research 

project will investigate the efficacy of generic chemicals 

in inactivating HPAI on outdoor surfaces. Stone noted that 

little information was available regarding decontaminant 

efficacy using generic chemical disinfectants. Data from this 

research would also complement the University of Delaware 

decontaminant efficacy research.

Stone detailed the project materials and methods used for 

the persistence and decontamination tests. In general, test 

methods included inoculating test coupons with HPAI, 

exposing the coupons to the environmental condition for a set 

amount of time (or for the decontamination testing, treating 

the coupons with the disinfectant), and then extracting and 

quantifying the HPAI from the coupons. Low virus recovery 

from three materials (i.e., basswood, bare concrete, and pine 

wood) precluded their use for further testing. Due to time and 

cost considerations, issues with obtaining consistently high 

titers and appropriate assays precluded further work with the 

low-pathogenic virus.

A summary of all the persistence tests was presented and 

indicated that the virus remains the most active in cold 

conditions. For example, the virus survived in soil up to 

(and possibly beyond) 13 days at low temperatures with no 

exposure to UV radiation, and up to (and possibly beyond) 

4 days at low temperatures with UV radiation exposure to 

simulate sunlight.

Question and Answer Period

• Would it have been possible to culture the virus directly 

with the porous materials that had insufficient recovery?

Stone noted that the small amount of HPAI recovered 

from the porous materials was insufficient to calculate a 

quantitative decrease. He also noted that culturing bacteria 

on the material is possible, but for an obligate parasite, 

like HPAI, culturing using that approach is difficult.

• Why were you concerned about the lack of HPAI 

recovery? Would the low or non-detect recovery levels 

indicate minimal persistence?

Stone agreed that the low or non-detect levels found 

during virus recovery would be a positive result if 

researchers could confirm that the virus was no longer 

viable.

1

Young Choi, the scheduled speaker, was unable to present. Harry Stone presented Choi’s research findings. 
25

VI

Session 4: Chemical Agents

Understanding Chemical Warfare Agent Interactions with 

Surfaces and the Implications for Decontamination

Adam Love, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Love provided information about one segment of the Facility 

Restoration Operational Technology Demonstration (OTD)—

improving the understanding of CWA persistence and fate 

on indoor surfaces. The project considers three CWAs and 

eleven surfaces.

Understanding CWA persistence and fate on indoor surfaces 

enables responders to make smarter decisions and to 

react to events more quickly. This information may help 

responders mitigate CWA transport, target possible hot spots 

for characterization, and focus decontamination and waste 

disposal efforts. Love stated that source control was critical 

to preventing impacts to larger areas and, thus, increased 

decontamination needs. Very little information and data are 

available for these agents’ interactions at low concentrations 

with materials.

During a CWA event, the agent may deposit on surfaces 

from either a liquid or vapor phase. A liquid release would 

likely involve a small area at a high agent concentration, 

whereas a gas release would likely involve a large area with 

contamination at a low concentration. Love remarked that 

the vapor pressures of the agents in his research are all less 

than the vapor pressure of water. Love also noted that the 

overall agent persistence involved many mechanisms acting 

simultaneously to affect agent fate and transport.

Love presented results from vapor affinity tests, in which 

surfaces were exposed to the agents as saturated vapor, 

and found that the porous and plastic/polymeric surfaces 

accumulated substantial amounts of sarin (GB) and mustard 

agent (HD), but not VX (due to its low vapor pressure). 

Love noted that this study did not consider dirt, dust, or 

other particles that might be present on surfaces. Each 

surface material was clean and un-used prior to testing. 

The oil residue remaining on galvanized steel from the 

manufacturing processes increased agent affinity.

Persistence tests with agents in liquid form (i.e., one 

microliter droplets deposited on coupons) found varying 

persistence between HD, GB, and VX. HD and GB 

completely volatilized from impermeable surfaces in as short 

a time as eight and two hours, respectively. But for some 

porous surfaces, a portion of the HD or GB agents remained 

after one week. VX on some materials remained after one 

week, and on polymeric surfaces in particular, showed no 

reduction in mass after one week.

Tests examined agent persistence on materials that were 

loaded with the agent during exposure to the agent in the 

vapor phase. Love found that HD and GB remained on some 

polymeric surfaces after a week of exposure to clean air.

Question and Answer Period

• Have you coordinated with military efforts that researched 

agent interactions with fabric?

Love had not specifically partnered with the military, 

but has communicated with others conducting similar 

research. The military typically uses different CWA 

concentrations.

• When examining porous versus non-porous materials, did 

you consider materials with similar compositions? If so, 

what were the differences?

The project did not include matched porous versus nonporous materials. Concrete was the only inorganic, porous 

material studied and was reactive for all three agents. 

The degree to which a porous, but non-reactive, material 

impacted persistence depended on permeability and 

porosity. Longer persistence was expected in porous and 

permeable materials as a result of slower evaporation.

• What were the experimental conditions?

The vapor exposure tests were conducted with the 

coupons in sealed glass jars at agent saturation levels. 

Desorption tests occurred in a stainless steel chamber with 

laminar flow (five to six air volumes exchanged per hour) 

across the coupons at ambient temperature and relative 

humidity. Love noted that agent saturation levels were not 

achieved in the desorption chamber atmosphere during 

desorption. Blanks and controls placed in the desorption 

chamber confirmed that no cross-contamination from one 

coupon to another occurred in the chamber.

Restoration of Major Transportation Facilities Following 

Chemical Agent Release: The Facility Restoration 

Operational Technology Demonstration 

Mark Tucker, Sandia National Laboratory

Tucker indicated that this project focused on the rapid 

restoration of a major transportation hub to minimize 

economic damage. These types of facilities are highly 

vulnerable to chemical releases, and facility functions 

cannot be transferred easily to other locations. The Facility 

Restoration OTD involves a systematic review of event 

response and recovery processes to identify technology 

gaps and address those gaps in order to minimize response 

and recovery times. This project builds on similar concepts 

from the completed Biological Restoration Domestic 

Demonstration and Application Program (DDAP).

The Facility Restoration OTD addresses four tasks: 

preplanning, technology evaluation and development, 

experimental studies, and exercises and demonstrations. For 

preplanning, a remediation guidance document has been 

drafted for the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and 

will serve as a template for other facilities. Document review 
26

is currently underway. The section related to developing 

cleanup guidelines remains a major unfinished piece of the 

document.

To address technology evaluation and development, 

Tucker described efforts to adapt and enhance the Building 

Restoration Operations Optimization Model (BROOM) 

decision support tool for chemical use. This tool assists 

in data collection, tracking, management, visualization, 

and analysis. Another experimental task under the Facility 

Restoration OTD involves evaluating a rapid surface 

sampling and analysis technology developed by Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennesssee. This 

technology uses a heated sampling head to “lift” chemical 

agents off materials for real-time analysis with an ion trap 

mass spectrometer. Results to date indicate the technology 

may have some applicability during the characterization 

phase of the recovery process.

Tucker provided some details on other OTD experimental 

projects to address data and capability gaps. These projects 

include an evaluation of traditional surface sampling methods 

at low-level contamination, decontamination method 

evaluation, and statistical sampling method validation. For 

the decontamination experimental studies in particular, the 

focus is on investigating the efficacy of hot and humid air. No 

experimental data are available at this time.

A tabletop exercise using the remediation guidance document 

developed for LAX was scheduled for November 2008. 

During this exercise, participants from various response 

agencies will follow two response and recovery scenarios 

to demonstrate the operation and utility of the document. A 

final field demonstration is tentatively planned for September 

2009.

Question and Answer Period

• Did you review information from the Tokyo subway sarin 

gas release?

Tucker extensively reviewed information about the 

Tokyo subway sarin gas release. Researchers learned 

from this information; however, the Japanese approach 

to decontamination and restoration was different from 

the U.S. approach. No cleanup levels were implemented. 

Decontamination occurred very quickly due to the agent’s 

lack of persistence.

Systematic Decontamination of Chemical Warfare 

Agents and Toxic Industrial Chemicals 

Emily Snyder, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

National Homeland Security Research Center

Snyder presented available results from three studies. These 

studies investigated the neutralization of CWAs and TICs on 

surfaces using chlorine-based decontaminants (a draft report 

is undergoing clearance); neutralization of CWAs using 

steam and modified vaporized hydrogen peroxide (mVHP); 

and neutralization of TICs using fumigants. Agent persistence 

studies were also conducted in conjunction with some of the 

decontamination research; these results were also presented. 

Snyder provided a brief overview of the experimental 

procedures for the projects.

Chlorine dioxide fumigation testing achieved greater than 

99% efficacy for VX under all tested conditions. Snyder 

speculated that the high relative humidity, and resulting 

hydrolysis, may have contributed to the VX degradation. 

By-product analysis of the coupon was not completed, so it 

is unclear if the toxic by-product EA 2192 formed. Chlorine 

dioxide was ineffective or only partially effective for 

thickened soman and sarin on the materials tested.

Decontamination tests with bleach were presented; bleach 

proved to be highly effective for most of the short contact 

times and materials tested.

Tests of liquid chlorine dioxide decontamination of G agents 

(nerve agents: soman, sarin, and tabun) in solution showed 

this approach to be ineffective, so no further testing of this 

approach with G agents occurred. Snyder presented results 

for liquid chlorine dioxide and VX, using acidified water as a 

control. Because the acidified water had a much higher than 

expected efficacy in neutralizing the VX, the results of tests 

with liquid chlorine dioxide and VX should be viewed with 

caution.

Snyder then discussed the project to examine the efficacy of 

steam and mVHP fumigation for CWAs and TICs. During the 

method development work for this project, Snyder evaluated 

several solvents for extracting VX or mustard agents from 

ceiling tile coupons. Snyder presented results from testing 

the persistence of mustard agents on four materials. Method 

development activities were completed, and decontamination 

efficacy tests were commencing.

For the TIC neutralization project, Snyder detailed the test 

methods and provided preliminary results for the methyl 

parathion studies. Although the U.S. banned methyl parathion 

use as a pesticide, illegal use still occurs. Decontamination 

of porous surfaces with chlorine dioxide was somewhat 

effective; however, methyl paraoxon (a toxic by-product) 

formed. Decontamination tests with another TIC, the 

rodenticide tetramethylene disulfotetramine, are beginning.

Question and Answer Period

• Did you identify the decontamination by-products 

produced by fumigating VX with chlorine dioxide?

Project limitations prevented an evaluation of VX 

fumigation by-products. Snyder agreed that VX 

degradation by-products (e.g., EA 2192, which is 

very toxic) would be expected.

• For the coupon extractions, did you use an aqueousbased solvent?

Extractions were conducted with only organic solvents.

• How realistic was the one milligram challenge?

This amount was chosen based on the military’s indoor 

challenge levels.
27

• How did you choose to evaluate chlorine dioxide and 

mVHP fumigants?

The chlorine-based decontaminants were selected prior 

to Snyder’s involvement in the project. Snyder included 

mVHP to compare and fill gaps from the DoD efficacy 

studies conducted with mVHP. Steam decontamination 

was chosen to complement the hot air studies conducted 

by LLNL.

• Did you consult with demilitarization organizations that 

handle CWAs regularly?

A stakeholder group has provided input in support of this 

project. Consultation with this group continues as research 

efforts moved forward.

Small-Item Vapor Hazard Determinations in Interior 

Spaces: What, Where, When, Why and How Many?

Brent Mantooth, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

Mantooth described efforts to better understand small item 

decontamination requirements in terms of the resulting 

vapor hazards that may occur from residual agent on an 

item. For example, warfighters may individually encounter 

small individual hazard sources that are harmless alone. 

When grouped together in an enclosed area, such as during 

transport, those small sources can combine and pose a hazard 

to the warfighter.

Overall, understanding vapor hazards requires understanding 

mass transport processes. Mantooth’s presentation slides 

detailed the steps, methodologies, and calculations used 

to assess vapor hazards. Generally, the research process 

involved placing a known amount of agent on a material in a 

dynamic vapor chamber, conducting scheduled air sampling, 

and developing a vapor emission factor model based on the 

data. After developing the emission factor model, Mantooth 

applied the model to calculate a vapor concentration for 

various scenarios. Changes to the scenario substantially 

impacted the predicted vapor concentrations.

To determine if any health effects may occur from the 

predicted vapor concentration, a toxic load model was used 

in lieu of TWA concentrations. Mantooth presented a case 

study with soman (GD) that predicted that no health effects 

(e.g., miosis) would be observed using the TWA approach. 

However, health effects were predicted using the toxic load 

method. Based on these results, most of the toxic loading 

occurred during the first few hours as a result of the initially 

high vapor concentration.

Mantooth discussed the fact that, although one item 

with residual agent following decontamination may not 

necessarily present a vapor hazard, multiple items in the same 

enclosed area (e.g., vehicle) may do so.

Question and Answer Period

• Was the toxicity level in the test chamber evaluated based 

on the air changes per hour?

The air changes per hour directly impacted the vapor 

concentration. A greater number of air changes will result 

in greater dilution and lower vapor concentrations. The 

calculations presented considered the source and the test 

chamber conditions, so the vapor concentration could be 

determined for any environment given information about 

the air change rate and scenario volume.

 •Were TICs examined? Is a report available?

Mantooth indicated that the study focused on CWAs, but 

the test method should apply to all volatile chemicals. The 

clearance and release of the report is uncertain.

• Were chemical mixtures considered?

This project focused on identifying a method for 

estimating releases of a single chemical. Future

research is needed to evaluate chemical mixtures.

• Were reversible or irreversible toxicity endpoints 

evaluated?

As a first generation study, researchers focused on short 

term toxicity endpoints that were easy to measure and 

assess.

• Could the model account for the effect of sinks

(e.g., carpet liner)?

Mantooth stated that calculation adjustments to the model 

could account for sinks. The adjusted calculations would 

be much more complex than the equations described in 

this presentation.

The Development of Safe and Highly Effective Chemical 

and Radiological Agent Simulants

Bruce Clements, Clean Earth Technologies, LLC

Clements provided information about the evolution of 

simulants and ongoing research efforts to improve and/or 

develop simulants.

Clements listed several characteristics for an ideal simulant: 

mimicks an agent’s physical properties, appears readily 

visible to trainers and trainees, meets criteria for use in 

unrestricted areas, poses no hazard to users, appears in the 

International Cosmetic Ingredient Dictionary (Personal Care 

Products Council), and causes no skin or mucous irritation in 

humans. Clements warned that newly developed simulants 

must have no potential long-term effects.

Clean Earth Technologies, LLC (Clean Earth) identified two 

compounds that met these criteria—triacetin and salicylate 

ester. Triacetin was the more promising compound, but Clean 

Earth tested both in case one exhibited problems with use as 

a simulant.

Clements then detailed the methods for, and results from, 

comparing the physical properties of some simulants to 

mustard agents, VX, soman, sarin, and tabun. Physical 

properties tested included viscosity, surface tension, density 

and relative density, solubility, and fluorescence. In the 

fluorescence tests, the fluorescence of uncontaminated 

surfaces (e.g., wallboard, construction materials, firefighter 

turnout gear, civilian clothing) was compared to the 

fluorescence from the surface after the simulant was applied. 

Clean Earth also compared simulant and threat agent vapor 

pressures.
28

In addition, Clean Earth assessed the simulants as potential 

skin and eye irritants. These tests followed standardized 

procedures and used human subjects. Based on the 

aforementioned test results, Clean Earth developed TrainSafTM

Simulants.

Question and Answer Period

• Were other physical properties (e.g., hydrolysis, Henry’s 

Law Constant) considered?

Clean Earth has not evaluated these chemical properties 

and does not have plans for doing so.

• In the pharmaceutical industry, a study group of 20 is 

considered too small to determine if a product is safe. Did 

Clean Earth plan post-market research to further evaluate 

possible sensitivities?

Clements agreed that post-market research would 

be beneficial. He noted that the simulant ingredients 

were known cosmetics; therefore, premarket testing 

requirements per U.S. Food and Drug Administration 

(FDA) regulations were minimal.

• What were the radiological simulant ingredients?

The radiological simulant is a non-respirable granular 

silica that mimics fallout or residue from a dirty bomb. 

Granular silica did not dissolve in water and, therefore, 

was easy to detect.

• Was triacetin the active ingredient in the simulants for 

mustard agents, sarin, and VX?

Yes, triacetin was the simulant for mustard agents, sarin, 

and VX.

• What are you trying to simulate with the product? 

Detection, decontamination, or fate and transport of the 

agent?

The product is used to simulate agent contamination of 

the skin, so that skin decontamination can be practiced 

and efficacy can be determined in training exercises. The 

simulant helps trainees understand and practice washing 

an agent off the skin using various methods.

Mercury Vapor Emission and Measurement Studies and 

Evaluation of Cleanup Technologies

Philip Campagna, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, Emergency Response Team

Decontamination research has primarily focused on responses 

and recoveries after a threat event involving a WMD, CWA, 

or TIC. Remediation of mercury releases has received very 

little attention. Yet mercury is readily available, highly toxic, 

and difficult to remediate; it is frequently released, both 

intentionally and unintentionally. A mercury release in a 

transportation hub or public place would cause substantial 

disruption. Campagna noted that every EPA region has 

addressed mercury releases at one point or another. In some 

cases, the remediation process extended for weeks or months.

Little information is available to assess mercury emission 

rates from contaminated materials so that air concentrations 

after a release could be predicted. Filling these data gaps 

would allow responders to make more informed decisions 

during an event response and recovery. EPA’s ERT proposed 

a two-phase research project to fill these data gaps. Phase 1 

would involve determining mercury vapor emission rates in 

changing conditions (e.g., impacted surface area, temperature, 

air flow). Campagna described the hypotheses and test 

methods for four experiments that would be conducted under 

Phase 1. Phase 2 experiments would evaluate four existing 

mercury decontamination products for effectiveness, cost, 

ease of use, and impacts. Campagna noted that results from 

the Phase 2 experiments would also inform recommendations 

for safely disposing of broken compact fluorescent light 

bulbs, which contain small amounts of mercury.

Question and Answer Period

• Is mercury adsorption onto materials a concern, and if so, 

what remediation is required?

No, adsorption is not an issue, although mercury does 

sometimes become entrenched in brooms, mops, and 

dust, which complicates remediation. The main problem 

in a response has been trying to locate all of the mercury, 

which can break up into small or fine beads.

• A workshop participant requested more information about 

the remediation of a Washington, D.C. public school. 

This incident involved a high school student who 

intentionally released mercury, obtained from a school 

laboratory, throughout the school. Remediation occurred 

in multiple rounds because additional mercury beads 

were found after initial remediation. The school remained 

closed for one and a half months and the remediation 

effort cost approximately $200,000 to $300,000. Another 

school in the area, which was previously contaminated 

with mercury, cost about $500,000 to clean. Campagna 

noted that EPA Region 5 receives, on average, about one 

call per week related to a mercury release.

• What methods were used to remediate the contaminated 

Washington, D.C. public school?

Remediation consisted of a combination of existing 

technologies followed by heating over time to vaporize 

the mercury. Campagna noted that their cleanup goal was 

a mercury vapor concentration less than 0.3 micrograms/

cubic meter (ug/m3

), which is based on a health effects 

level set by the CDC. Removal or remediation efforts are 

initiated if vapor levels are 1 ug/m3 or higher; analytical 

methods usually reported a detection limit no lower that 

2 ug/m3 for mercury. Campagna noted that the outer layer 

of a mercury bead oxidizes and prevents further vapor 

release until the bead is disturbed.

• How much mercury is in a thermostat?

A building thermostat contains approximately two to three 

grams of mercury. Campagna noted that ERT was called 

to respond when the mercury vials in three thermostats 

were intentionally broken.
29

Development of Standards for Decontamination 

of Structures Affected by Chemical and Biological 

Terrorism

Robert Focht, Science Applications International 

Corporation Canada

Focht began with an overview of the many international 

project participants. For many chemicals, cleanup standards 

exist. Without similar standards for threat agents, responders 

and regulators have minimal information to support their 

decisions about decontamination and safe reoccupation.

Focht noted that political, economic, and scientific factors 

contributed to standard setting. His presentation focused on 

scientific factors. This project aimed to generate relevant 

data for some threat agents and to develop a method for 

establishing decontamination standards. The approach 

included establishing a relationship between the magnitude 

of exposure and expected health effects, assessing real and 

potential exposures, and characterizing risks to determine 

potential toxicity.

Studies underway sought to establish a link between surface 

concentrations of several threat agents, the resulting air 

concentrations, and human health impacts. Focht provided an 

example model illustrating the many factors that influence an 

agent’s behavior on surfaces.

Biological agent studies focused on decontamination 

methods and efficacy, sampling procedures, and surrogate 

identification. Researchers first need to develop effective 

sampling procedures that accurately identify the presence 

of a biological agent, with a sufficiently low detection 

limit, so they can establish a decontamination standard. 

Focht provided results from a project to determine bacteria 

recovery from sampling swabs. He also described a project to 

determine virucidal efficacy of VHP using hepatitis A virus as 

a surrogate.

Chemical agent studies focused on understanding agent 

desorption from material coupons. Focht briefly described 

the desorption test methods and provided results for lindane, 

which was one of many chemicals tested. Tests were 

conducted on various materials, at varying temperatures, 

and with various amounts of the chemical inoculated onto 

the coupons. Analyses of the vapor phase included the 

parent compound and breakdown products. Overall, the 

concentrations of lindane in the air were similar for all 

surfaces tested. Focht noted that the test chamber quickly 

reached a saturation point.

Inhalational and dermal toxicity studies were also conducted 

using animal models. Focht detailed the calculation steps 

and described experiments in which doses were determined 

based on skin exposure to the test agent. The next step in 

these experiments was linking the determined doses to health 

effects and risk-based cleanup levels.

Focht concluded with a review of the additional next steps in 

this project, such as improving economic models, identifying 

data gaps, and compiling findings in a final report.

Question and Answer Period

• This study combined many factors, which was a difficult

task. Will uncertainties be addressed in determining the 

risk-based standards?

Focht only recently became involved in this project 

and was not involved in developing test methods or 

conducting analyses. 
30

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31

VII

Session 5: Radiological Agents

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Airborne 

Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection 

Technology Gamma Emergency Mapper Project

John Cardarelli, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

National Decontamination Team

In March 2008, EPA initiated the Airborne Spectral 

Photometric Environmental Collection Technology 

(ASPECT) Gamma Emergency Mapper (GEM) Project, 

which aims to provide first responders with timely and useful 

data about radiological releases by integrating monitoring 

equipment onto an airborne platform.

The aircraft will enable EPA to rapidly respond to events 

throughout the U.S., to integrate with local responders, and 

to collect and communicate data findings. ASPECT can 

deploy within one hour, no matter the time of day or night. 

EPA has also integrated aerial photography capabilities into 

the aircraft. ASPECT uses a stand-off detection approach, 

meaning that the aircraft will not fly into a chemical

or radiological plume. The team averages about one sortie 

per month.

ASPECT employs three primary sensors: an infrared line 

scanner, a high speed infrared spectrometer, and a gamma-ray 

spectrometer. Cardarelli provided photographs to illustrate 

equipment arrangement in the airplane. He also provided 

details about the gamma-ray detector and showed gamma 

contour results from a flyover of a nuclear power plant that 

was undergoing a steam separator replacement.

Under the GEM Project, EPA is working to improve ground 

based gamma-screening and mapping capabilities to improve 

EPA’s overall capacity to respond to an RDD event. This 

project involves numerous stakeholders. EPA continues to 

expand interagency interactions, strengthen relationships, and 

increase awareness about ASPECT.

Once at the site, the aircraft would fly multiple passes over 

the areas of concern to gather real-time data that would be 

combined with data gathered from ground-based monitoring. 

As an example, Cardarelli showed a Chernobyl fallout map 

that required many months to develop. ASPECT GEM could 

produce a similar map within hours.

As a next step, EPA plans to purchase and install more 

advanced gamma radiation detection technologies, based 

on advanced digital spectrometry. Installation of multiple 

detectors was scheduled for completion prior to March 2009. 

Other future actions include working with U.S. Department 

of Energy (DOE) to compare results with their aircraft 

detection technology, accelerating real-time data mapping 

capabilities, automating on-board quality assurance and 

quality control (QA/QC), and improving communications 

with ground-based systems. Cardarelli noted that the GEM 

would be a screening tool, and not used for clearance of an 

area following decontamination.

Question and Answer Period

• Were you planning on integrating the real-time data with 

predictive models to assess modeling capabilities?

Yes, EPA plans on having the capability to do this.

• Does the ASPECT aircraft include monitoring devices 

capable of measuring particulate size?

Particulate monitoring would require other instruments. 

EPA is considering this technology, but the aircraft is 

not currently equipped with the capability to measure 

particulate size.

Evaluation of Commercially-Available Radiological 

Decontamination Technologies on Concrete Surfaces

John Drake, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

National Homeland Security Research Center

For this project, Drake is evaluating commercially available 

RDD decontamination technologies. The focus is on 

concrete, which is one of the more difficult materials to 

decontaminate.

In the project, cesium-137 was applied as an aqueous mist 

to concrete coupons at an activity level representative of 

what might be encountered in the field, but not necessarily 

at ground zero. Dry deposition of the agent produced 

unpredictable distribution; wet deposition allowed for better 

reproducibility and simulated weathering better.

The coupons were sized to allow use of full-scale 

technologies and arranged vertically and horizontally in 

a radiological laboratory hood. Gaps remained between 

coupons and the arrangement created uneven surfaces to 

represent real-world situations with cracks and crevices.

Seven and 30 days after the cesium-137 deposition, Drake 

followed vendor specifications and applied the two strippable 

coatings under evaluation. The first coating (manufactured by 

Bartlett Services, Inc., Plymouth, Mass.) uses a mechanical 

type of removal process, and the second one (Isotron Corp., 

Seattle, Wash.) employs a chelating-based technology. Each 

vendor recommended that the coating be applied and stripped 

from the coupons three times for testing.

Drake presented detailed results for the two coatings as the 

average from three applications and six replicates. Neither 

technology adequately decontaminated the test coupons 

(~ 32% removal using the first coating and ~76% removal 

using the second coating). For both technologies, the highest 

percentage of cesium-137 removal occurred after the first 

application. Results were similar for coating applications 
32

that were applied seven or 30 days after coupon inoculation. 

Analyses to understand these results were ongoing.

Drake also presented other performance factors, such as 

cost and labor requirements. A cost analysis found that the 

first coating had a lower cost per square meter because this 

coating was easier to apply and easier to remove.

As this project moves forward, Drake plans to evaluate other, 

large-scale, physical decontamination technologies.

Question and Answer Period

• What were the test temperatures and humidity?

Tests were conducted at room temperature and the 

ambient relative humidity, which was approximately 17%. 

Researchers thought that more humid environments would 

pose problems, but more humid conditions have yet to be 

tested.

• Did you measure the depth of the application and 

afterwards, the depth of removal?

No, the testing evaluated only the technology 

performance.

• Did you consider including earlier time points (e.g., one 

day) to assess differences in decontamination ability?

Drake agreed that earlier information would be interesting, 

but this scenario considered a realistic time frame for EPA 

involvement at a release.

• Many different concrete grades exist. Could researchers 

extrapolate results from this type of concrete to other 

concrete grades?

The concrete formulation selected for this project was 

typical of concrete found in buildings. Insufficient 

information was available to determine the effect of the 

concrete formulation on decontamination.

• Did the decontamination technology vendors recommend 

pretreatment?

EPA involved vendors in the testing to allow for feedback 

and comments on the testing methods. No vendor 

recommended pretreatment.
33

VIII

Session 6: Disposal, Sampling,

and Other Related Topics 

Thermomicrobiological Techniques for Incinerator 

Performance Assessment While Burning

Contaminated Debris

Paul Lemieux, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

National Homeland Security Research Center

Decontamination and restoration activities following a WMD 

event could generate a substantial amount of waste, which 

would then require proper disposal. As an example of this 

often overlooked problem, Lemieux noted that a tabletop 

exercise simulating a large-scale RDD event predicted waste 

streams that would quickly overwhelm the current U.S. 

radiological waste capacity. In general, restoration-related 

waste streams could contain materials ranging from office 

furnishings and building materials to aqueous residues and 

agricultural biomass. EPA typically delegates waste disposal 

responsibility to state and local regulators, who must consider 

environmental laws and impacts when selecting a disposal 

option. Waste disposal facilities have a host of concerns when 

accepting such wastes, such as contamination of equipment, 

long-term indemnity, and permit restrictions.

Lemieux discussed thermal treatment as a waste disposal 

option and described two studies. The first study evaluated 

incineration as a means to inactivate bacterial spores

(e.g., surrogates for anthrax) on building materials, and 

the second evaluated animal carcass gasification under a 

foreign animal disease outbreak scenario.

In the early 1990s, EPA assessed the ability of medical 

waste incinerators to inactivate spores by introducing a 

known quantity of Geobacillus stearothermophilus spores 

to incinerators and measuring spores in the stack and ash to 

estimate the log reduction. EPA found a greater than six log 

reduction for most incinerators, but a few achieved a less 

than three log reduction.

Lemieux conducted pilot-scale thermal destruction studies 

to identify optimal operating conditions and to provide 

assurance that an incinerator could consistently process 

materials to inactivate spores. The studies consisted of 

placing BIs (e.g., Geobacillus stearothermophilus, Bacillus 

atropheus, or Bacillus anthracis [Sterne]) in an enclosed 

pipe, encasing the pipe in a substrate material (e.g., carpet, 

ceiling tiles, or wallboard), and placing the bundle in a 

pilot-scale rotary kiln incinerator. After a period of time, the 

bundle was removed, and the remaining spores on the BIs 

were quantified to determine the log reduction. Lemieux 

noted that although an incinerator operates as a dry heat 

(i.e., with a relative humidity less than 100%) the actual 

humidity is quite high because of the high temperature. 

Conversely, an autoclave environment is saturated with 

water vapor.

Lemieux adapted an existing model to predict the time 

required to completely destroy a microbial population when 

heated in an incinerator. He then compared the predicted 

results to the experimental results. Per the experimental 

results, some spores remained active after up to 35 minutes 

in the incinerator and with bundle temperatures up to about 

300 degrees Celsius (°C). In general, the experimental 

results showed that spores are more thermally resistant than 

predicted by the model. The incinerator results also indicate 

that Geobacillus stearothermophilus is more resistant than 

Bacillus anthracis (Sterne).

 Lemieux also presented results from testing a transportable 

animal carcass gasifier prototype. The gasifier may serve as 

another tool to assist with carcass disposal in the event of a 

major foreign animal disease outbreak. As compared to an 

incinerator, gasification requires a lower air flow rate, smaller 

equipment, simpler design, and potentially lower auxiliary 

fuel needs. A gasifier, therefore, is easier to transport to a site. 

Lemieux outlined the gasifier specifications and presented 

a diagram. Photographs illustrated the gasifier components, 

including the macerator that homogenized the feed stream 

and the telescoping stack that allowed for easy transport. 

Lemieux presented the emissions test matrix and results.

Preliminary findings support the use of this gasifier as 

a transportable and rapidly deployed system. The feed 

preparation and transport system worked well. Data also 

suggest that emissions were low and ash quality was 

acceptable. The throughput, however, was lower than 

planned and a few other problems existed (e.g., ash removal, 

feed system cleanout, feed system biosecurity). Overall, 

the gasifier could become a valuable tool with additional 

testing and refining. A report with preliminary results was 

undergoing clearance review.

Question and Answer Period

• Could existing incinerators used for chemical weapon 

demilitarization be used for decontamination waste 

disposal?

The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) designed 

a transportable rotary kiln incinerator that was modeled 

on demilitarization incinerators. But the high construction 

and operation costs rendered this incinerator impractical. 

Some CWA demilitarization incinerators operate in the 

western U.S. under an international treaty until CWA 

stockpile is gone. The potential for U.S. government 

use of these incinerators after stockpile depletion was 

unknown.
34

Survivability of Several Years of Recalcitrant Biological 

and Chemical Agents in Landfill Leachates

Wendy J. Davis-Hoover, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, National Risk Management Research Laboratory

Davis-Hoover is exploring potential concerns associated 

with landfilling decontamination wastes, which could include 

large volumes of solid wastes, liquid wastes, and steel drums. 

Landfills have evolved to include sophisticated designs and 

liners intended to prevent leachate releases. Leaking landfills 

may pose a risk if their cells allow releases and exposures. 

A photograph of an operating landfill, with the open cells 

highlighted, illustrated the magnitude and scale of an 

example landfill.

The overall purpose of the project was to determine whether 

or not a municipal solid waste landfill could safely store or 

detoxify previously contaminated building debris and to 

determine agent survival durations in leachate, which is the 

most likely mode of escape. Davis-Hoover used triplicate 

microcosms to simulate real-world conditions (mimicking 

aerobic, then anaerobic conditions) and incubated the 

microcosms at 12 °C and at body temperature. These would 

be worst case incubation temperatures. She also assumed

that agents would always encounter undiluted leachate

before release.

Bacterial agent tests included four agents: Bacillus anthracis, 

Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularensis, and Clostridium 

botulinum. Agent sampling occurred at regularly scheduled 

intervals over the course of 12 months. Davis-Hoover 

hypothesized that the bacterial spore formers would survive 

in the landfills and facultative anaerobic bacteria would 

survive longer than aerobic bacteria. Results indicated that 

the Yersinia pestis and Francisella tularensis bacteria died in 

less than 20 days; Bacillus anthracis spores and Clostridium 

botulinum bacteria persisted for more than 368 days. 

Temperature did not affect survival greatly.

Davis-Hoover outlined the target chemicals (i.e., CWAs), the 

associated analytical methods, and detection limits. Results 

found varying persistence between the chemicals tested. 

For example, tabun and mustard gas dissipated in less than 

one day, whereas VX and a lewisite derivative persisted 

for greater than 168 days. In the case of mustard gas, the 

hypothesized persistence was absent.

Question and Answer Period

Workshop participants posed no questions.

An Assessment of the Performance of Portable 

Instruments to Monitor Air Quality During Structural 

Decontamination Operations

Patrick Lambert, Environment Canada

In summer 2006, Environment Canada researchers conducted 

a demonstration project that evaluated decontamination 

technologies. An overview of the results from this 

project were presented during EPA’s 2007 Workshop on 

Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for Sites 

Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological 

Materials. In conjunction with this project, Lambert 

conducted air monitoring to evaluate portable instrumentation 

performance.

The technology demonstration project involved disseminating 

diethyl malonate (DEM) and malathion in a three-room test 

structure and applying decontamination agents. DEM and 

malathion served as reactive simulants for CWAs. The test 

structure included four sampling ports—one in each room 

and one on the ceiling. Perimeter monitors were placed

10 meters from the exterior of the structure on all four sides. 

Lambert listed the selected instruments for both the structure 

and perimeter stations. These instruments represented a 

combination of real-time monitoring devices and sample 

collection devices for laboratory analysis. The instruments 

also represented a range of target analytes. Lambert noted 

that the chemical agent monitor (CAM) IMS located inside 

the structure and used to detect CWA failed shortly after the 

simulant was disseminated.

Real-time volatile organic compound (VOC) monitoring 

provided nearly instantaneous readings during DEM and 

malathion application. Lambert noted that the applied 

malathion consisted of a commercial grade product that 

contained 50% petroleum distillate and 50% malathion. 

Whether the monitoring devices responded to the petroleum 

distillate or the malathion was unclear. A small VOC peak 

occurred at the onset of decontamination. Lambert speculated 

that the chlorine-based decontaminant triggered an additional 

VOC release. He also noted that the VOC readings never 

returned to baseline levels. Monitoring found no unexpected 

chlorine or sulfur compounds. Perimeter monitoring detected 

minimal VOCs, and these detections correlated well with the 

structure door opening and closing.

Lambert also reviewed results from sample collection 

devices, specifically the SUMMA Canisters, and laboratory 

analyses. SUMMA Canister analyses provided results for 

approximately 150 standard VOCs. Benzene concentrations 

exceeded other VOC concentrations, with indoor air 

concentrations exceeding short-term risk factors for health 

and safety. Lambert thought that one of the indoor building 

materials was off-gassing benzene. Low levels of chlorinated 

VOCs, likely resulting from the building materials and the 

decontamination agent, were also detected. VOC partitioning 

within the structure was also observed. Perimeter sampling 

results were consistent with wind direction. Downwind 

samples contained the highest VOC concentrations.

Overall, the real-time monitoring devices provided useful 

information about contaminant fate and transport, helped 

maintain personnel health and safety, and proved suitable 

for on-site operations. The sampling devices provided 

credible and scientifically defensible analytical results, 

as well as information about specific VOC detections 

and concentrations. These methods, however, required 

modifications to meet unique decontamination circumstances.

Question and Answer Period

Workshop participants posed no questions.
35

Evaluation of Sampling Methods and Strategies in an 

Operational Environment

Lance Brooks, Department of Homeland Security on 

behalf of Dr. Michael Walter, Joint Program Executive 

Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

Brooks began by noting that the primary impetus for this 

project was a U.S. Government Accountability Office report 

that critiqued the sampling and analytical procedures used 

following the 2001 anthrax attacks. This project is led by 

DHS and involves the Validated Sampling Plan workgroup 

comprised of a number of other U.S. government agencies. 

The goal of the project is to validate (using the International 

Standardization Organization definition) anthrax sampling 

procedures.

Multiple sampling methods (e.g., wipes, vacuums) are 

available to characterize contamination following a biological 

threat agent release. A laboratory-scale study was conducted 

by Johns Hopkins University (JHU) Applied Physics 

Laboratory (APL) for DoD to evaluate existing and new

(e.g., micro-vacuum) sampling methods.

Following the laboratory study, a field-scale test facility at 

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in Idaho Falls, Idaho, was 

used to simulate an operational setting. The test facility has 

two levels containing multiple rooms along a central hallway 

and was furnished with office equipment. The workgroup 

developed test objectives that included comparing sampling 

strategies (probabilistic versus judgmental), applying 

sampling and analytical methods, and using the data to 

validate dispersal and sampling tools. The test plan involved 

sampling (characterization), fumigating, and resampling 

(clearance).

For the test, one gram of Bacillus globigii was released in 

one confined area of the facility. Brooks noted that the release 

made establishing a concentration gradient difficult. Future 

tests would use smaller releases. After agent dissemination, 

the team completed characterization, fumigation, and 

clearance activities. Sabre conducted the chlorine dioxide 

fumigations between tests and installed a two-layer tenting 

system with one layer on the building and a second layer on a 

metal frame over the building.

The project participants used Visual Sample Plan (VSP), 

which is a data quality objective-based statistical tool, to 

design a sampling plan that indicated the number of samples 

required and the sampling locations needed to achieve 

confidence in the sampling data. BROOM was used to track 

sample collection and analysis results. Brooks presented 

a diagram of sampling results following the release of 

fluorescent particles (performed prior to the Bacillus globigii

release) in the test building. This diagram illustrated the 

distribution gradient within the test facility. Brooks noted 

that creating the agent gradient required HVAC system 

manipulations. Photographs illustrated sampling activities 

and analysis equipment.

Results were provided for the number of spores/square 

centimeter recovered as a function of sampling method 

(HEPA vacuum sock samples). The hand-held assay (HHA) 

method reported approximately 60% of the samples as 

positive for Bacillus globigii, compared to the approximately 

90% positive samples reported by culture. The rapid viability 

polymerase chain reaction (RV-PCR) and culture results were 

statistically equal.

Brooks noted that some clearance samples collected after 

fumigation were positive, possibly due to the use of a 

more robust sampling method (filter plating) or crosscontamination from personnel entering and exiting the 

facility through one entry point.

Question and Answer Period

• What was the detection limit for the HHAs?

Past studies examining residual powders on hard 

surfaces found a detection limit of 106 to 107 spores/

square centimeter. With this high detection limit, DHS 

recommended HHAs for bulk sampling only.

• Did you place BIs during fumigation?

No BIs were used during the fumigation.

• The results from the three sampling methods appeared 

statistically equal. Was one method preferred based on 

ease of use?

The preferred method depended on the sampling surface. 

Swabs were most useful in vents, which have hard, nonporous surfaces. HEPA technologies were most useful 

for carpets. Overall, responders need a range of sampling 

options.

• Was reasonableness considered? For example, the study 

considered recovery from ceiling tiles. In an actual event, 

responders would likely remove and dispose of ceiling 

tiles because these tiles are inexpensive. In addition, 

people do not often contact ceiling tiles.

This study focused on creating an agent concentration 

gradient in the test facility and comparing sampling 

methods. The study was not meant to provide a strategy 

for characterization sampling. Brooks noted that a 

sampling strategy and sampling methods must be 

event-specific.

• Why was chlorine dioxide selected for the fumigation and 

how did it perform?

Many real-world fumigations with chlorine dioxide 

(i.e., not experimental testing) have been completed 

successfully. So, this is a proven decontamination 

technology. Generating data regarding the 

decontamination efficacy was not a purpose of the project.

The Use of a Sampling Design Strategy to Direct 

Decontamination Activities Following a Weapon of

Mass Destruction Event

Landon Sego, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Sampling occurs throughout the response and recovery 

process, including forensic investigation, agent nature and 

extent characterization, area clearance, and long-term reuse 

monitoring. Decision makers often describe site conditions 

through a conceptual site model, which is an iterative 

process that evolves as knowledge is gained about the site 
36

contamination. Statistical methods are needed to be able 

to quantify the confidence level that a building is free of 

contamination when sampling results are all negative.

The sampling plan should define the sampling objectives and 

identify sampling locations, based on the sampling strategy 

(e.g., targeted, statistical, geostatistical). Sego noted that each 

sampling strategy had potential benefits, and selection of the 

appropriate strategy depended on site-specific conditions. 

A new trend involves combining targeted and statistical 

sampling strategies, although some form of statistical 

sampling is required to be able to quantify uncertainty. The 

sampling plan should also identify the level of confidence 

required to support decisions. Being able to predict that 100% 

of the area is uncontaminated would require a prohibitive 

number of samples.

VSP developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

(PNNL) and BROOM developed by Sandia National 

Laboratory (SNL) are two available sampling support tools. 

VSP generates a statistical sampling design based on data 

quality objectives, and is undergoing validation. VSP can be 

used for outdoor sites, although it contains many features 

related for use within buildings. BROOM, which has been 

successfully deployed, serves as a tool to collect, manage, 

and analyze sample data using a series of personal data 

assistant (PDA) devices and readers. Data in BROOM can 

be transferred wirelessly, which maintains the sample chain 

of custody. PNNL and SNL were collaborating to integrate 

VSP and BROOM in order to create a tool that shared data 

and provided real-time sampling strategy updates based on 

sampling results. The combined technology was scheduled 

for completion in autumn 2009.

To illustrate the importance of selecting the proper sampling 

strategy, Sego presented an example release of a gaseous 

CWA in a transportation hub. This example scenario excluded 

air sampling and focused on surface sampling. Sego assigned 

contamination zone classifications to describe conditions. 

In Zone 1, targeted sampling simply sought to determine 

contaminant magnitude to direct decontamination. Targeted 

sampling in Zone 2 sought to identify either contaminated 

areas for reclassification as Zone 1 or areas lacking 

contamination. If sampling in Zone 2 found no contaminants, 

applying a hotspot sampling approach would improve data 

confidence. In Zones 3 and 4, statistical sampling, possibly 

combined with targeted sampling, improved the confidence 

level that an area was free of contamination. Achieving 

a greater confidence level required additional sample 

collection.

Traditional sample designs only accounted coarsely for 

spatial variations. Geostatistical sampling methods account 

for spatial correlation (i.e., if a sample is positive, a higher 

probability exists that a sample in its vicinity will also be 

positive). This method could potentially decrease the number 

of samples needed to characterize or clear an area and lends 

itself to an adaptive sampling approach.

Question and Answer Period

• What was the benefit of combining VSP and BROOM?

Some of the individual tool functions overlapped, but 

many others were complementary. The combined tool 

enabled users to increase their confidence level in 

sampling results.

• Was BROOM tied to a specific hardware?

Other hardware could likely operate BROOM software. 

However, the existing hardware, which facilitated data 

communication (e.g., wireless transmission), and served as 

a key BROOM function and benefit.

• Did VSP exist for outdoor events?

Initially, VSP addressed outdoor sample design strategies 

and included broad outdoor capabilities. More recently, 

users have applied VSP to indoor areas.

• Another program, CONTAM (multizone airflow and

contaminant transport analysis software), also exists. 

Would this program also have applications if combined 

with VSP and BROOM?

Sego is involved in a project that examined combining 

CONTAM with VSP. Combining all three tools would 

enable responders and decision makers to use predictions 

about contamination to guide the sampling strategy and 

track sampling results.

National Homeland Security Research Center’s Aerosol 

Test Facility and the Study of the Measurement and 

Mechanisms of Exposure to Chemical, Biological, and 

Radiological Agents

Russ Wiener, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

National Homeland Security Research Center

Research laboratories at EPA’s Research Triangle Park 

location include the Aerosol Test Facility (ATF). The ATF 

includes two wind tunnels, aerosol research chambers, and 

bench scale testing laboratories. The larger wind tunnel 

includes a four meter by three meter cross section to 

accommodate human-size studies and a two meter by two 

meter cross-section to accommodate ambient air sampling 

analysis studies. The smaller wind tunnel is used for studies 

requiring non-invasive sampling technologies. In general, 

the ATF supports research related to aerosol monitoring 

techniques, fluid dynamics, and human exposure. Wiener 

stated that partnering opportunities existed with EPA to 

conduct research with the ATF.

Wiener continued with a discussion of some of the field 

studies and aerosol-related research his group has recently 

conducted. He briefly described the Brooklyn, New York, 

field study, in which they evaluated and modeled the canyon 

effect in an urban environment and the impact on aerosol 

dispersal.

Wiener then described a study conducted in the ATF to 

examine the resuspension of particles from floors, which may 

contribute significantly to movement of particles inside a 

building. This study was prompted by the 2004 ricin incident 
37

on Capitol Hill. EPA used a mechanical foot and a heated 

manikin to assess particle transport from the floor into the 

breathing zone. Measurements of ricin simulant (ovalbumin) 

aerosol levels led to estimates of possible exposures.

Wiener concluded with a discussion of a project to evaluate 

EPA’s RadNet samplers (a network of samplers that would 

be used to measure atmospheric radiological contamination). 

Sampler testing involved releasing particles in the wind 

tunnel and measuring the mass concentrations and collection 

efficiency as a function of particle size and wind speed. 

The testing has identified design concerns associated with 

this sampler; at higher wind speeds, the sampling efficiency 

declined. Turbulence at the sampling head caused by the 

sampler design impacted results.

Question and Answer Period

• Did you test multiple orientations of the RadNet sampler?

Tests of a second orientation were underway. Current 

funding allowed for evaluation of only two orientations.

• Were particles released during the Brooklyn, New York, 

study?

The field study conducted in Brooklyn, New York, used 

auto exhaust—including particulates—as a tracer and 

followed trace constituent movement in the street canyon 

and infiltration into a building. This study included renting 

a three-story apartment building to evaluate infiltration.

• With regard to the particle resuspension study, do you 

think particles of a similar size, but different material, 

act in the same manner as was tested? Or do different 

material characteristics affect material actions?

An aerosol material’s natural properties (e.g., size, 

electrostatics, other surface properties) greatly affect 

how the particle is transported. The appropriate surrogate 

properties must be selected depending on the experiment. 

Egg albumin (ovalbumin) was used as the surrogate for 

ricin in the study. In general, finding suitable surrogates 

was difficult.

Collective Protection Technology Testing of Bioaerosol 

Air Purification Devices

Karin Foarde, Research Triangle Institute International

In collaboration with the Edgewood Chemical Biological 

Center (ECBC), and with funding from DTRA, Foarde 

evaluated air purification devices that protect a warfighter by 

either removing or inactivating biological agents in air.

This study was part of a test program evaluating air 

purification for various agents, including chemical, 

biological, and particulate agents. Foarde focused on the 

biological agent evaluation. The test method followed 

protocols previously developed under EPA’s Technology 

Testing and Verification Program (TTEP) and DoD, and was 

reviewed by stakeholders. The study, which included a smalland large-scale test, sought to identify the design-limiting 

conditions for a device and considered worst-case scenarios. 

Foarde listed the types of devices and technologies that this 

study included.

Evaluations considered bioaerosol inactivation or collection 

efficiency, as well as device power consumption, and other 

factors relevant to a warfighter (e.g., weight, size, noise). 

Foarde noted that each device could be compared to a HEPA 

filter, which was considered an effective technology, but was 

not appropriate for all situations.

To account for both the protective factors naturally occurring 

in bacteria (e.g., atmospheric aerosol components), as well as 

protective factors engineered for bacteria weaponization, the 

study included organisms as both singlets and agglomerates, 

several relative humidity levels, and proteins in nebulizing 

fluids as a representation of dirt and other materials in the 

environment. Biological simulants were used in testing and 

needed to mimic actual agent physiological (e.g., spore coat) 

and physical (e.g., particle size) characteristics. The simulants 

also needed to meet the laboratory biosafety level limits. 

Foarde presented a list of the simulants used in testing.

Diagrams and photographs of the large- and small-scale test 

apparatus illustrated the test systems. These systems were 

adapted from particulate tests and included an injection 

point, a sampling point before the air purification device, the 

device, a sampling point after the device, and an outlet. Both 

the large- and small-scale test apparatus met quality control 

parameters for a variety of conditions (e.g., uniform air 

velocity, temperature, relative humidity).

The test series for a single device included a number of 

control tests. The transmission test, however, was critical and 

examined bioaerosol loss in the test apparatus without the 

air purification device. The subsequent test results were then 

corrected for this loss. Stringent QA/QC requirements were 

also followed. Foarde provided example data for an effective 

and an ineffective device. Although the ineffective device 

was unable to inactivate several Bacillus strains, this device 

was effective for a vegetative bacteria and a virus.

Test method verification consisted of evaluating the method 

usability, testing devices using the method, and comparing 

verification data against existing data. Overall usability was 

good; however, some recommendations for improvement 

were identified. The method was robust and both the largeand small-scale tests produced high-quality data. Ongoing 

efforts would address the unresolved issues regarding 

neutralizer use and nebulizing fluid composition.

Question and Answer Period

• Would results remain classified?

Results would likely remain classified (likely “for official 

use only” at a minimum) based on the specific devices 

tested and results found.
38

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39

Appendix A

Agenda

United States

Environmental Protection Agency

Decontamination and Consequence Management Division and 

National Decontamination Team

2008 Workshop on Decontamination and

Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with

Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials

Sheraton Chapel Hill Hotel

Chapel Hill, NC

September 24–26, 2008

Agenda

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2008

Session 1: Decontamination – General Aspects

The Role of a Technical Working Group (TWG) in Fumigation of a Large Building ....................................Blair Martin

US EPA, National Risk Management Research Laboratory

Medical Aspects of Natural Anthrax: Implications for Decontamination .................................................Curtis Snook

US EPA, National Decontamination Team

Government Decontamination Service (GDS): An Update for 2008 ...........................................Robert Bettley-Smith

Government Decontamination Service, United Kingdom

EPA’s Regulation of Sterilants/Sporicides and Sporicidal Decontaminants ............................................ Jeff Kempter

US EPA, Office of Pesticide Programs

Toward a Systems-of-Systems Approach to Hazard Mitigation.............................................................. Charles Bass

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Wide-area Restoration Following Biological Contamination: Systems Analysis for 

Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration (IBRD) Program .......................................................... Lynn Yang

Sandia National Laboratory
40

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2008 (continued)

Session 2: Biological Agents – Field Experience and Laboratory Testing

Danbury Anthrax Response, September 2007................................................................................ Mike Nalipinski

US EPA, Region 1

Expedited Fumigation of a Large Hospital as Related to

Biological Contamination Scenarios.............................................................................................. Darrell Dechant

Sabre Technical Services, LLC

Utilizing a Tracer Atmospheric Gas Analyzer (TAGA) Triple Quadrupole Mass Spectrometer 

Technology Mounted on a Movable Platform to Provide Indoor Air Concentrations 

throughout a Structure before and after a Chlorine Dioxide Fumigation ............................................David Mickunas

US EPA, Emergency Response Team

Decontamination of Surfaces Contaminated with Biological Agents

Using Fumigant Technologies............................................................................................................ Shawn Ryan

 US EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center

Assessment of the Impact of Chlorine Dioxide Gas on Electronic Equipment ...................................... Mary Mandich

Alcatel-Lucent

Laboratory-scale Decontamination Testing in Support of the Interagency Biological

Restoration Demonstration (IBRD) Program................................................................... Major James G. Rohrbough

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Field Evaluation of Gaseous Chlorine Dioxide Treatment for 

Microbial Contamination ........................................................................................................Nancy Clark Burton

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety

The Decontamination Family of Systems (DFoS) ..........................................................................Mark Zimmerman

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

Decontamination of a Railcar Using a Portable and Economical System ..............................Tony Contino, Biokinetics

Biokinetics, Inc.

Paul Manske

Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA)-Long Island Railroad

Economical Facility Decontamination with Gaseous and Liquid Chlorine Dioxide................................Mark Czarneski

ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
41

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2008

Keynote Address...............................................................................................................................Tom Dunne,

Director of the Office of Homeland Security, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA)

Session 2: Biological Agents – Field Experience and Laboratory Testing (continued)

Assessment of Biological Indicators for Building Interior Cleanup........................................................Vipin Rastogi

Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

Reduction and Elimination of Biological Contamination Using Bacteriophage ...................................... Timothy Dean

US EPA, National Risk Management Research Laboratory

Wet Scrubbing and Adsorption for the Capture of Chlorine Dioxide Gas

during Fumigation Events ................................................................................................................ Joseph Wood

US EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center

Material Demand for Hydrogen Peroxide of Building Materials............................................................Brian Attwood

US EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center

Bacillus Thuringiensis var. kurstaki (Btk) Agent Fate Characterization................................................. Kristin Omberg

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Comparing and Contrasting Fumigations of Very Large Facilities for Biothreat Agents

and Other Microorganisms .............................................................................................................Dorothy Canter

Johns Hopkins University, Applied Physics Laboratory

Session 3: Foreign Animal Disease Agents

Animal Disease Outbreak Response–Tools, Status, and Trends ................................................................ Lori Miller

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Inactivation of Avian Influenza Virus Using Common Chemicals and Detergents ...................................Brian Ladman

University of Delaware

Persistence Testing of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus (HPAI) 

on Outdoor Materials.........................................................................................................................Harry Stone

Battelle

Session 4: Chemical Agents

Understanding Chemical Warfare Agency (CWA) Interactions with Surfaces and 

the Implications for Decontamination ..................................................................................................Adam Love

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Restoration of Major Transportation Facilities Following Chemical Agent Release:

The Facility Restoration OTD ............................................................................................................ Mark Tucker

Sandia National Laboratory

Systematic Decontamination of Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs)

and Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs)...............................................................................................Emily Snyder

US EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center
42

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2008 (continued)

Session 4: Chemical Agents (continued)

Small Item Vapor Hazard Determinations in Interior Spaces:

What, Where, When, Why and How Many?..................................................................................... Brent Mantooth

Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

The Development of Safe and Highly Effective Chemical and

Radiological Agent Simulants ......................................................................................................Bruce Clements

Clean Earth Technologies, LLC

Mercury Vapor Emission and Measurement Studies and 

Evaluation of Cleanup Technologies ........................................................................................... Philip Campagna

US EPA, Emergency Response Team

FRIDAY, September 26, 2008

Session 4: Chemical Agents (continued)

Development of Standards for Decontamination of Structures

Affected by Chemical and Biological Terrorism .................................................................................. Robert Focht

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Canada

Session 5: Radiological Agents

EPA Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection Technology 

Gamma Emergency Mapper Project ............................................................................................... John Cardarelli

US EPA, National Decontamination Team

Evaluation of Commercially-Available Radiological

Decontamination Technologies on Concrete Surfaces.............................................................................John Drake

US EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center
43

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2008 (continued)

Session 6: Disposal, Sampling, and Other Related Topics

Thermomicrobiological Techniques for Incinerator Performance 

Assessment While Burning Contaminated Debris............................................................................... Paul Lemieux 

US EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center

Survivability of Several Years of Recalcitrant Biological and 

Chemical Agents in Landfill Leachates................................................................................ Wendy J. Davis-Hoover

US EPA, National Risk Management Research Laboratory

An Assessment of the Performance of Portable Instruments to

Monitor Air Quality During Structural Decontamination Operations ..................................................Patrick Lambert

Environment Canada

Evaluation of Sampling Methods and Strategies in an Operational Environment....................................Lance Brooks

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

The Use of a Sampling Design Strategy to Direct Decontamination Activities 

Following a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Event....................................................................... Landon Sego

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

NHSRC Aerosol Test Facility (ATF) and the Study of the Measurement and Mechanisms 

of Exposure to Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Agents.....................................................Russ Wiener

US EPA, National Homeland Security Research Center

Collective Protection Technology Testing of Bioaerosol Air Purification Devices ..................................... Karin Foarde

Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International

Notes: 

All speakers given 20 minutes for talk, plus 5 minutes for questions, unless noted.
44

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45

Appendix B

List of Participants

United States 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Decontamination and Consequence Management Division and 

National Decontamination Team

2008 Workshop on Decontamination and

Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with

Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials

Sheraton Chapel Hill Hotel

Chapel Hill, NC

September 24–26, 2008

Attendee List

Nancy Adams

NHSRC/DCMD

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive (E-343-06)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

Steve Alvarez

U.S. Department of Defense

1636 Regulus Avenue 

Virginia Beach, VA 23461

*Brian Attwood

Environmental Engineer

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

*Julia Barzyk

Postdoctoral Fellow

National Homeland Security Research 

Center/Decontamination and Consequence 

Management Branch

ORISE

109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

*Charles Bass

Physical Science and Technology

Chemical and Biological

Technologies Directorate

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

8725 John J. Kingman Roas (Stop 6201)

Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

Jennifer Becker

U.S. Army Research Office

PO Box 12211

Research Triangle Park, NC 27709

Doris Betancourt

Microbiologist

Indoor Environment Management Branch

Air Pollution,Prevention and Control Division

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive (E 305-03)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

*Robert Bettley-Smith 

Chief Executive

Government Decontamination Service

Building 14 - MOD Stafford 

Beacon Barracks, Beaconside

Stafford, Staffs ST18 0AQ

United Kingdom

Rita Betty

Member of Technical Staff

Chemical & Biological Systems

Sandia National Laboratories

PO Box 5800 (MS 0734)

Albuquerque, NM 87185

Nathan Birnbaum

Senior Staff Veterinarian

APHIS

Veterinary Services Emergency Management

U.S. Department of Agriculture

APHIS VS NCAHEM 

4700 River Road - Unit 41

Riverdale, MD 20737-1231

Rebecca Blackmon

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 

Nuclear Countermeasures

Technical Support Working Group

PO Box 16224 - CTTSO/TSWG

Arlington, VA 22215

Deborah Boling

Health Assessor

Site and Radiological Assessment

Health Assessment and Consultation

Agency for Toxic Substances and 

Disease Registry

4770 Buford Highway -DHAC/SRAB (F-59)

Atlanta, GA 30341

*Lance Brooks 

Program Manager

Department of Homeland Security

S&T/8-015

Washington, DC 20528

Carl Brown

Chief, ESTD

Science and Technology Branch

Environmental Science & Technology Division

Environment Canada

335 River Road

Ottawa, ON K1A 0H3

Canada

Jay Burcik

Chemist

Department of Homeland Security

950 H Street, NW

Washington, DC 20223

*Speaker
46

Timothy Burgin

Scientist

Asymetric Defence

Naval Surface Warfare Center

4045 Higley Road - Suite 345 

Building 1480 - Room 237

Dahlgren, VA 22448

Joan Bursey 

Scientist

DCMD/NCBA/NHSRC

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

(E343-06)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

*Nancy Burton

Industrial Hygienist

HETAB/DSHEFS

CDC/NIOSH

4676 Columbia Parkway (MS R-11)

Cincinnati, OH 45226

M. Worth Calfee

National Homeland Security Research Center

Office of Research and Development

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

*Philip Campagna

Chemist

ERT

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

2890 Woodbridge Avenue (MS 101)

Edison, NJ 08527

*Dorothy Canter

Senior Professional Biophysicist

Johns Hopkins University Applied

Physics Laboratory

11100 Johns Hopkins Road (17N-664)

Laurel, MD 20723

Erica Canzler

National BioWatch Coordinator

Office of Emergency Management

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (6450M)

Ariel Rios Building

Washington, DC 20460

Joseph Cappello

Research Scientist

CUBRC

4455 Genesee Street

Buffalo, NY 14221

Gerald Capraro

Microbiologist

Life Sciences

Clean Earth Technologies, LLC

101 North Chestnut Street - Suite 101

Winston-Salem, NC 27101

*John Cardarelli II

Health Physicist

National Decontamination Team

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

26 West Martin Luther King Drive

 - Room 271

Cincinnati, OH 45268

Karen Cavanagh

COO, Chief Counsel

Sabre Technical Services, LLC

1891 New Scotland Road

Slingerlands, NY 12159

Kimberly Chapman

VP Sales and Marketing

Morphix Technologes

2557 Production Road

VIrginia Beach, VA 23454

Shih-Yew Chen

Strategic Area Manager

Risk & Waste

Environmental Science

Argonne National Laboratory

9700 South Cass Avenue

Argonne, IL 60439

John Chiefari

PM&C

1 National Cicuit

Barton, ACT 2600

Australia

*Young Choi

Master Technician

Biomedical Research Center

Molecular Toxicology

Battelle

505 King Avenue (JM-7)

Columbus, OH 43201

Adrian Clark

DSTL Porton

Ministry of Defence

Porton Down

Salisbury, Wiltshire SP4 0JQ

United Kingdom

*Bruce Clements

Senior Scientist

Life Sciences

Clean Earth Technologies, LLC

13378 Lakefront Drive

Earth City, MO 63045-1513

Gordon Cleveland

Program Analyst/RAD Advisory Team

Veterinary Services

NCAHEM

U.S. Department of Agriculture - APHIS

4700 River Road - Unit 41

Riverdale, MD 20737

*Anthony Contino

Sr. Vice President

Biokinetics, Inc.

1635 Market Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Carmen Costable

Senior Development Specialist

Genencor International

1700 Lexington Avenue

Rochester, NY 14514

Katie Crockett

Senior Analyst

Defense Threat Reduction Agency A&AS

6363 Walker Lane - Suite 300

Alexandria, VA 22310

*Mark Czarneski

Director of Technology

ClorDiSys Solutions Inc.

PO Box 549

Lebanon, NJ 08833

*Wendy Davis-Hoover

NHSRC/DCMD

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

26 West Martin Luther King Drive (421)

Cincinnati, OH 45268

*Timothy Dean

Microbiologist

Indoor Environment Management Branch

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

129 TW Alexander Drive (E305-03)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

*Darrell Dechant

Director of Regulatory Affairs and Technology 

Development

Sabre Technical Services, LLC

1891 New Scotland Road

Slingerlands, NY 12159

Robert Dellinger

Director

Generator and Characterization Branch

Hazardous Waste Identification Division

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (5304P)

Washington, DC 20460

Betsy Devlin

Associate Director

Office of Solid Waste

Hazardous Waste Identification Division

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (5304-P)

Washington, DC 20460

*John Drake

NHSRC/DCMD/ORD

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

26 West Martin Luther King Drive

Cincinnati, OH 45268

*Thomas P. Dunne

Associate Administrator

Office of Homeland Security

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (MC-1109A)

Washington, DC 20460

Mark Durno

Section Chief

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

25089 Center Ridge Road (ME-W)

Westlake, OH 44145

Wayne Einfeld

Project Manager

Sandia National Laboratories

PO Box 5800 (MS-0734)

Albuquerque, NM 87185-0734

Jay Ellenberger

Associate Director

FEAD

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (7506P)

Washington, DC 20460-0001

*Speaker
47

Victor Engleman

President

EAI

3129 Carnegie Place

San Diego, CA 92122-3241

Hiba Ernst

Associate Director

WIPD/NHSRC

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

26 West Martin Luther King Drive (NG-16)

Cincinnati, OH 45268

Othon Estrada

Mechanical Engineer

Mechanical Engineering

Design Engineering

U.S. Department of State

OBO-PE-DE-MEB

Washington, DC 20522-0611

Scott Faller

Chemist

Center for Indoor Environments

Radiation and Indoor Environments

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

PO Box 98517

Las Vegas, NV 89193-8517

Richard Fitzpatrick

Senior Research Scientist

CUBRC

4455 Genesee Street

Buffalo, NY 14221

*Karin Foarde

Director, Microbial and Molecular Biology

Research Triangle Institute

3040 Cornwallis Road

Research Triangle Park, NC 27709

*Robert Focht

Program Manager

Science Applications International

Corporation

60 Queen Street - Suite 1516

Ottawa, ON K1P 5Y7

Canada

Julie Fruetel

Sandia National Laboratories

PO Box 969 (MS 9292)

Livermore, CA 94551-0969

Michel Gagne

Department of Chemistry

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Chapel Hill, NC 27599

Michael Gemelli

System Safety Specialist

Security

WMD Detection & Countermeasures

MTA New York City Transit

130 Livingston Avenue - Room 5004D

Brooklyn, NY 11201

Susan Elizabeth George

Director, Science and Technology Directorate

Chemical and Biological

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

245 Murray Lane, SW (MS 2100)

Washington, DC 20528

Nicole Griffin

Microbiologist

ARCADIS

4915 Prospectus Drive - Suite F

Durham, NC 27713

Barbara Grimm-Crawford

Special Assistant

Office of Homeland Security

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (MC-1109A)

Washington, DC 20460

Matthew Hankins

Sandia National Laboratories

PO Box 5800 (MS 0734)

Albuquerque, NM 87185

Donell Harvin

Radiation IH

Evironmental Emergency

Preparedness and Response

All-Hazards Unit

NYC Department of Health

2 Lafayette Street - 11th Floor

New York, NY 10007

Jonathan Herrmann

Director

National Homeland Security Research Center

26 West Martin Luther King Drive (NG31)

Cincinnati, OH 45268

Dudley Hewlett

Government Decontamination Service

MOD Stafford, Beacon Barracks

Beaconside

Stafford, Staffs ST18 0AQ

United Kingdom

Lynnann Hitchens

Chemical Engineer

NHSRC

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

26 West Martin Luther King Drive (NG-16)

Cincinnati, OH 45268

Daniel Holcomb

Environmental Health Scientist

CDC - NCEH/ATSDR

4770 Buford Highway - Building 106

Room 02112.2

Atlanta, GA 30341

Chuck Hosn

Senior Mechanical Engineer

MEB/DE

U.S. Department of State - OBO

1701 North Fort Myer Drive

(OBO/PE/DE/MEB)

4th Floor-405.A

Rosslyn, VA 20522

Mario Ierardi

Homeland Security Team Leader

Hazardous Waste Generator and 

Characterization

Hazardous Waste Identification

Office of Solid Waste

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (5304P)

Washington, DC 20460

Peter Jutro

Deputy Director

NHSRC

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (8801R)

Washington, DC 20460

Tetsuro Kagao

LTC

Bureau of Defense

Defense Policy Division

Ministory of Defense

5-1 Ichigaya Honmuracho

Shinjuku, Tokyo 162-8805

Japan

*Carlton (Jeff) Kempter

Senior Advisor

Antimicrobials Division

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (7510P)

Washington, DC 20460

Eric Koglin

TTEP Program Manager

NHSRC

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

PO Box 93478

Las Vegas, NV 89193-3478

Diane Kotras

Director, Biodefense Policy

Homeland Defense

Defense Support to Civil Authorities

U.S. Department of Defense

2600 Defense Pentagon

Washington, DC 20301-2600

Paula Krauter

Environmental Engineer

Chemical and Biological Technologies

Sandia National Laboratories

P.O. Box 969 (9406)

Livermore, CA 94551

Jay Krishnan

Biologist

Infectious Disease and Emergency 

Preparedness

National Microbiology Laboratory

Public Health Agency of Canada

Canadian Science Center

1015-Arlington Street

Winnipeg, MB R3E 3P6

Canada

Lindsey Kurnath

Presidential Management Fellow

Office of Homeland Security

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (MC-1109A)

Washington, DC 20460

*Brian Ladman

Associate Scientist

Department of Animal and Food Sciences

Avian Biosciences Center

University of Delaware

531 South College Avenue

44 Townsend Hall

Newark, DE 19711

*Speaker
48

*Teri Lalain

Decontamination Sciences Team

Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

5183 Blackhawk Road

Attn: AMSRD-ECB-RT-PD (Dr. Teri Lalain)

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5424

*Patrick Lambert

Manager, Field and Response Section

Science and Technology

Emergencies Science and Technology

Environment Canada

335 River Road

Ottawa, ON K1A 0H3

Canada

David Langfitt

Mechanical Engineer

U.S. Department of State

125 Henrico Road

Front Royal, VA 22630

*Sang Don Lee

NHSRC/DCMD

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

Stephen Lee

Chief Scientist

U.S. Army Research Office

PO Box 12211

4300 South Miami Boulevard

Research Triangle Park, NC 27709

Johannes Lee

Group Leader

ARCADIS-US

424 Brookcliff Lane - Suite F

Cary, NC 27511

Nancy Lee

Senior Member of Technical Staff

DSO National Laboratories

20 Science Park Drive

Singapore 118230

*Paul Lemieux

Chemical Engineer

Decontamination and Consequence

Management Division

National Homeland Security Research Center

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive - E343-06

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

Kwai Yin Leong

Senior Engineer

Pollution Control Department

National Environment Agency - Singapore

40 Scotts Road #12-00

Environment Building

Singapore 228231

Shee Yin Leow

Defence Science & Technology Agency

71 Science Park Drive

#02-05 Singapore 118253

Singapore 118253

Alan Lindquist

Microbiologist

WIPD/NHSRC

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

26 West Martin Luther King Drive

Cincinnati, OH 45268

Paul Lorcheim

Director of Operations

ClorDiSys Solutions Inc.

PO Box 549

Lebanon, NJ 08833

*Adam Love

Forensic Science Center

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

PO Box 808, L-097

Livermore, CA 94550

Ryan Madden

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

U.S. Department of Defense

8725 John J. Kingman Road (Stop 6201)

Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

Kunapuli T. Madhusudhan

Clean Earth Technologies, LLC

101 North Chestnut Street - Suite 101

Winston-Salem, NC 27101

*Mary Mandich

CTO Reliability Engineering

Alcatel-Lucent

600-700 Mountain Avenue - Room 1E-347

Murray Hill, NJ 07974

Brent Mantooth

Research Chemist

U.S. Army - Edgewood Chemical

Biological Center

5183 Blackhawk Road (MSRD-ECB-RT-PD)

E3400 - Room 104

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010

Marsha Marsh

Health Scientist

NHSRC - Homeland Security

Office of Research and Development

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

24 Martin Luther King Boulevard

Cincinnati, OH 45268

*G. Blair Martin

Associate Director

ORD/NRMRL/APPCD

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive (E340-04)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

John Mason

President, CEO

Sabre Technical Services, LLC

1891 New Scotland Road

Slingerlands, NY 12159

Katrina McConkey

Scientist

Cubic Applications, Inc.

5695 King Centre Drive – Suite 300

Alexandria, VA 22315

Michael Metz

Manager

Security

WMD Detection & Countermeasures

MTA New York City Transit

130 Livingston Avenue - Room 5003E

Brooklyn, NY 11201

James Michael

Environmental Protection Specialist

Generator and Characterization

Hazardous Waste Identification

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (5304P)

Washington, DC 20460

Leroy Mickelsen

Engineer

Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response

NDT

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)

Durham, NC 27711

*David Mickunas

Chemist

OSRTI

Environmental Response Team

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-04)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

*Lori Miller

Senior Staff Officer

Interagency Coordination

National Center for Animal Health & 

Emergency Management

U.S. Department of Agriculture - APHIS VS

4700 River Road - Unit 41 - Room 5D-03.3

Riverdale, MD 21108

Scott Minamyer

Environmental Scientist

NHSRC/Water Infrastructure

Protection Division

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

26 West Martin Luther King Drive (NG-15)

Cincinnati, OH 45268

Stephen Morse

Associate Director for

Environmental Microbiology

Centers for Disease Control

1600 Clifton Road (MS C-18)

Atlanta, GA 30333

Jennifer Mosser

Environmental Engineer

Radiation Protection Division

Center for Radiological Emergency 

Management/OAR/ORIA

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (6608J)

Washington, DC 20460

Deborah Motz

Director of Logistics/Life Cycle Management

JPM Decon

JPEO CBD

50 Tech Parkway - Suite 301

Stafford, VA 22556

Andreas Mueller

Optek

N118 W18748 Bunsen Drive

Germantown, WI 53022

*Speaker
49

Cynthia Mullin

Division Director

Immediate Office

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

26 West Martin Luther King Drive (NG-32)

Cincinnati, OH 45268

David Musick

Director

ORIA/R&IE/OAR

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

944 East Harmon Avenue (CRQA)

Las Vegas, NV 89119

*Michael Nalipinski

Federal OSC

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

One Congress Street (HBR)

Boston, MA 02203

Sean Nolan

DTRA (Bull and Associates)

9006 Stratford Lane

Alexandria, VA 22308

Laurel O'Connor

Associate Manager

Battelle

1204 Technology Drive

Aberdeen Proving Groun, MD 21001

*Kristin Omberg

Group Leader

Systems Engineering & Integration

Decision Applications

Los Alamos National Laboratory

PO Box 1663 (MS K551)

Los Alamos, NM 87545

Sadaharu Ono

Bureau of Personnel and Education

Health and Medical Division

Ministry of Defense

5-1 Ichigaya Honmuracho

Shinjuku, Tokyo 162-8805

Japan

Michael Ottlinger

Toxicologist

OEM/NDT

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

4900 Olympic Boulevard - Building A

Cincinnati, OH 41018

Lukas Oudejans

ARCADIS

4915 Prospectus Drive - Suite F

Durham, NC 27713

Bruno Pagnani

HVAC Engineer

Dynamac

1445 Heritage Links Drive

Wake Forest, NC 27587

Cayce Parrish

Senior Advisor

Office of the Administrator

Office of Homeland Security

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue (1109A)

Washington, DC 20460

Brooke Pearson

Threat Technologies Division

Cubic Applications, Inc.

5695 King Centre Drive - Suite 300

Alexandria, VA 22315

Kate Perry

Senior Policy Advisor, Homeland Security

Office of Homeland Security

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (1109A)

Washington, DC 20460

*Vipin Rastogi

Research & Technology Director

Biosciences

U.S. Army - ECBC

E-3150 Kingscreek Street, N

(AMSRD-ECB-RT-BD)

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010

Matthew Redinbo

Professor

University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill

Department of Chemistry - CB#3290

Chapel Hill, NC 27599

William Reents

Manager, Reliability Physics

CTO Reliability Engineering

Alcatel-Lucent

600 Mountain Avenue - Room 1F-206

Murray Hill, NJ 07974

David Rees

On Scene Coordinator

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Sixth Avenue - Suite 900 (ECL-116)

Seattle, WA 98101

Katie Reid

CBRN Analyst

J-8

Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Pentagon

Washington, DC 20318-8000

Melissa Rodriguez

Health and Safety Coordinator

Department of Citywide

Administrative Services

One Centre Street - 17th Floor South

New York City, NY 10007

*Major James Rohrbough

U.S. Air Force

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

1680 Texas Street, SE

Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5669

Jacky Rosati

Environmental Scientist

Decontamination and Consequence

Management Division

National Homeland Security Research Center

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

Richard Rupert

On Scene Coordinator

OEM

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

701 Mapes Road

Ft. Meade, MD 20755-5350

*Shawn Ryan

Associate Division Director

National Homeland Security Research Center

Decontamination and Consequence 

Management Division

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive (E-343-06)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

Ramanathan Sakhubai

AD Certification and Enforcement

Certification and Enforcement Branch

Fire Safety and Shelter Department

Singapore Civil Defence Force

91 UBI Avenue 4 408827

Singapore 408827

James Salkeld

BIOQUELL

101 Witmer Road - Suite 400

Horsham, PA 19044

Catherine Salsman

Advisory Scientist

ARO/SA

4075 Wilson Boulevard - Suite 200

Arlington, VA 22042

Gregory Sayles

Associate Director

National Homeland Security Research Center

Office of Research and Development

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

26 West Martin Luther King Drive (NG-16)

Cincinnati, OH 45268

*Landon Sego

Scientist

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

PO Box 999 (MSIN K6-08)

Richland, WA 99352

Jimmy Seidel

Senior Science Advisor

OCEFT/Homeland Security Division

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Building 25 - P.O. Box 25227

Denver Federal Center

Denver, CO 80401

Shannon Serre

TTEP/NHSRC

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

Susan Shahin

Capability and Operational Coordination

Emergency Management Australia

PO Box 1020

Dickson, ACT 2602

Australia

*Speaker
50

Eunice Sim

DMERI

DSO National Laboratories

20 Science Park Drive

Singapore, SG 118230

Raj Singhvi

Chemist

ERT/OSRTI

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

2890 Woodbridge Avenue (MS101)

Edison, NJ 08820

Markham Smith

Joint Science & Technology Office for 

Chemical Biological Defense

Chemical-Biological Technologies

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

8725 John J. Kingman Road (6201)

Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060

*Curtis Snook

Medical Officer

OEM/NDT

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

4900 Olympic Boulevard – Building A

Erlanger, KY 41018

*Emily Snyder

Research Chemist

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)

Research Triangle Park, NC 27613

Robert Spencer

South West Regional Laboratory

Health Protection Agency

Floor 8 - Bristol Royal Infirmary

Marlborough Street

Bristol, BS2 8HW

United Kingdom

Joan Stader

Director of Life Sciences

Clean Earth Technologies, LLC

13378 Lakefront Drive

Earth City, MO 63045

Sharron Stewart

Director,Emergency Programs Division

North Carolina Department of Agriculture & 

Consumer Services

2 West Edenton Street

1035 Mail Service Center

Raleigh, NC 27699

Terry Stilman

OSC/HS Lead Region Coordinator

ERRB

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

61 Forsyth Street

Atlanta, GA 30303

Harry Stone

Project Manager

Battelle

10300 Alliance Road - Suite 155

Cincinnati, OH 45242

Terry Sullivan

Deputy Division Head

Environmental Sciences

Environmental Research and

Technology Division

Brookhaven National Laboratory

34 North Railroad Avenue - Building 830

Upton, NY 11973

Mark Sullivan

Capability & Operational Coordination

Capability Development

Emergency Management Australia

PO Box 1020

Dickson, ACT 2602

Australia

Yoke Cheng Tan

Human Sciences

Directorata of Research & Development

Defense Science & Technology Agency

71 Science Park Drive - #02-05

Singapore 118253

Stephen Treado

Project Leader

National Institute of Standards and 

Technology

226, B114

Gaithersburg, MD 20899

*Mark Tucker

Chemical and Biological Technologies

Sandia National Laboratories

1515 Eubank, SE (MS0734)

Albuquerque, NM 87123

Joseph Vescio

Environmental Scientist

Office of Emergency Management

National Planning and Preparedness

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (5104A)

Washington, DC 20460

Claire Wells

Chemical Engineer

Naval Surface Warfare Center

4045 Higley Road - Suite 345

Dahlgren, VA 22448

*Russ Wiener

Physical Scientist

NHSRC

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

(D205-03)

Durham, NC 27711

Steven Wilkinson

Emergency Response & Environmental 

Health

Chemistry Centre WA

125 Hay Street

East Perth, WA 6004

Australia

Dana Williams

NHSRC/DCMD

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

413 West Cameron Avenue

Chapel Hill, NC 27516

*Joseph Wood

Environmental Engineer

Decontamination & Consequence 

Management Division

National Homeland Security Research Center

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

109 TW Alexander Drive

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

Scott Wright

Senior Emergency Response Coordinator

Prevention Response & Medical

Support Branch

Division of Toxicology &

Environmental Medicine

CDC - HHS/ATSDR

4770 Buford Highway, NE (MS F32)

Room 3217

Atlanta, GA 30341-3717

*Lynn Yang

Systems Analyst

Sandia National Laboratories

PO Box 969 (MS9406)

Livermore, CA 94551

Norman Yanofsky

CSS Portfolio Manager Chemistry,

Biology Defence R&D Canada Centre

for Security Science

222 Nepean Street

Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2

Canada

*Mark Zimmerman

Deputy Joint Project Managment

Joint Program Management - 

Decontamination

50 Tech Parkway - Suite 301

Stafford, VA 22556

Julie Zobel

Executive Director of Environmental

Health and Safety

George Mason Unviersity

4400 University Drive (MS 4E7)

Fairfax, VA 22030

Donn Zuroski

OSC/Emergency Response - Superfund

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

75 Hawthorne (SFD 9-2)

San Francisco, CA 94105

*Speaker
51

Support Provided by

Sarah Dun

Technical Writer

ERG

110 Hartwell Avenue

Lexington, MA 02421

Mark Grady

Conference Coordinator (Onsite)

ERG

110 Hartwell Avenue

Lexington, MA 02421

Katelyn Huminick

Junior Conference Coordinator

ERG

110 Hartwell Avenue

Lexington, MA 02421

Laurie Stamatatos

Workshop Coordinator

ERG

110 Hartwell Avenue

Lexington, MA 02421

*Speaker
52

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53

Appendix C

Presentation Slides

Martin

By: G. Blair Martin 

U.S. EPA, Office of Research and Development

National Risk Management Research Laboratory

Air Pollution Prevention and Control Division 

Presented at: Decontamination Workshop 2008

Research Triangle Park, NC

September 24 -26, 2008

The Role of a Technical Working Group in 

Fumigation of a Large Building

INTRODUCTION

• St Johns Regional Medical Center (SJRMC), Oxnard, CA

 Chronic mold issues over 15 year period

 Extensive retrofit, reconstruction and remediation

 Sections of the hospital out of service on a rolling basis

 Potential for another 5 years of reconstruction

• SJRMC management decided to fumigate with chlorine dioxide

• The project was intended to form the basis for a NIMS response plan 

• A Technical Working Group (TWG) has assisted the Incident 

Commander in several of the 2001 B.a. responses

• The hospital invited participation in a Technical Working Group 

 Individuals with previous experience with ClO2 fumigation

 Provide technical advice 

 Review documents

 Monitor fumigation 

 Provide consultation to hospital on critical issues

INTRODUCTION

Membership of the TWG

 G. Blair Martin, U.S. EPA, NRMRL

 Shawn Ryan and Paul Lemieux, U.S. EPA, NHSRC

 Dino Mattorano and Tony Zimmer, U.S. EPA, NDT

 Donn Zuroski, U.S. EPA , Region 9 OSC

 Scott Fredericks and Dave Mickunas, U.S. EPA, ERT

 Terrance Leighton, Children’s Hospital Oakland Research 

Institute

 John Kowalski, Microgamma, LLC

 Lance Brooks, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

 Tony Intrepido, LLNL

 John Mason, Karen Cavanagh and Darrell Dechant, Sabre 

Technical Services LLC

 Maureen Malone, SJRMC

INTRODUCTION

• St Johns Regional Medical Center (SJRMC), Oxnard, CA

 265 bed hospital

 344,000 square feet over 5 floors

 5,000,000 cubic feet 

• Project Goals

 SJRMC scheduled to minimize down time

 5 - day period for fumigation

 Minimize material damage

 Effective remediation of the entire facility

 Necessary regulatory approvals

 Minimize need for further reconstruction

 Minimum closure of attached Medical Office Building (MOB)

St. Johns Regional Medical Center ROLE OF THE TWG

The TWG provided advice in four ways

 Periodic meetings and teleconferences 

 Document review

 Special studies

 On site observation of the fumigation

Meetings and teleconferences

 April 27 – Oxnard, CA for hospital tour and meeting

 June 11 - RTP, NC for initial document review

 July 23 – Washington, DC for final plan review 

 August 16 to 21 – Oxnard, CA for fumigation

 October 19 – Erlanger, KY for lessons learned
54

Martin

ROLE OF THE TWG

Document review

 Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)

• Remediation Action Plan (RAP)

• Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP)

• Ambient Air Monitoring Plan (AAMP)

 RAP describes process and treatment conditions

• Mold contamination was relatively light

• Process conditions to minimize materials impacts

• TWG recommended conditions

– Minimum CT of 600 ppm-hrs (50 ppm for 12 hours)

– Maximum CT of 1200 ppm-hrs (100 ppm for 12 hours)

– 70o

F and 70%RH

 Special study recommended

• Mold was inaccessible for sampling

• Wall cavity penetration study

ROLE OF THE TWG

Document review (continued)

 Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP)

• Point sampling for ClO2, T and RH at 38 points

• Using indirect indicators for efficacy at 880 points

– Biological indicators

– Concentration time dosimeter strips (CTDS)

 Special studies recommended

• Validate biological indicators as a surrogate for mold

– Sabre fume trailer test

– Representative samples of contaminated and clean 

materials

– Efficacy as a function of CT

– Photographic documentation

• Calibration of CDTS versus titration

– EPA chamber test

CTDS ROLE OF THE TWG

Document review (continued)

 AAMP

• Ambient ClO2 to ensure community safety – TAGA van

• Building ClO2 level for worker reentry – 100 ppb

 Special studies recommended

• TAGA Cart to clear building 

 Comment on Department of Pesticides Registration (DPR) review

• Fumigation process conditions - RAP

– Concentration - time (CT) of 2000 ppm-hrs

– 167 ppm for 12 hours

– 70% Relative Humidity (RH)

– 70o

F

• Establish ClO2 level for worker re-entry - SAP

– 3 ppb required

– Clearance time was an issue

ROLE OF THE TWG

On site support during fumigation

 Pre-fumigation assessment of facility

 Observation of process installation

 Evaluation of California DPR comments on RAP and SAP

 Establish routes for TAGA cart for clearance

 Monitored progress of fumigation

 Provided advice to hospital on issue resolution

• Humidification

• CT for problem zones

 Consultation with the on site DPR representative

 TAGA cart clearance monitoring

 Post-fumigation assessment of facility

PROCESS MONITORING CENTER
55

Martin

TAGA CART TWG OBSERVATIONS

Role of the TWG

• Whole is greater than the parts

 Diverse backgrounds provide innovative thinking

 However, challenge to forge a working solution

 Compromise and creativity necessary

 But don’t try to think too far outside the box

• Communication is a key

 Face to Face meetings are ideal, but present challenges

 Direct orientation on building characteristics is essential

 Teleconferences can resolve some issues

 Onsite document review would expedite communications

• On site TWG provides many benefits

 Understanding of process implementation

 Ability to advise Incident Commander on technical issues

 Advice on response to regulatory issues

 Direct interface with regulators

TWG OBSERVATIONS 

Process improvements for response

• Fumigation is labor intensive (over 200 people)

• The HVAC system is a key component 

• Alternative arrangements are desirable

• T and RH study with HOBOs to determine distribution 

• External system to provide flow, T and RH control

• Titration for ClO2 monitoring is a limiting step

• Labor intensive – installation and execution

• Limits ability to react to distribution issues

• Real time monitoring with remote access would enhance process

• JPL Sensor Web prototype has potential

• With preplanning, even a complex building can be tented quickly

• Aeration and ClO2 decomposition can expedite clearance

• TAGA cart can expedite clearance for reentry

CONCLUSIONS

• TWG Role

• Provide relevant expertise in 8 to 12 members

• Prior TWG experience desirable

• Evaluation of documents

• Provide expertise and advice

• Scientific and technical support for clients

• Response expertise essential

• Onsite TWG could expedite remediation

• Provide rapid review of documents

• Respond to issues raised by regulatory authorities

• Ability to adjust actions when process conditions difficult

• For an Incident of National Significance a permanent TWG could provide valuable assistance

• DHS MOA with Australian to convene bilateral TWG

• May expand to Quadrilateral Consequence Management Group

• Ideally TWG should be on site for the duration of the event – or at critical periods 
56

Snook

Medical Aspects of Natural Anthrax:

Implications for Decontamination

Curtis P. Snook, MD, FACEP, FACMT

Medical Officer

National Decontamination Team, US EPA

Objectives

• 1. Discuss medical experience with illness 

caused by naturally occurring B. anthracis

• 2. Consider the implications of this 

information with respect to 

decontamination decision-making

Anthrax, the disease (pre-2001)

• Zoonosis in agricultural settings– i.e. primarily in 

animals and secondarily in humans

– Endemic in many parts of the world, rare in the U.S., 

since the advent of animal vaccinations and improved 

industrial hygiene in processing animal hides

– Outbreaks still occur in animals in Midwest and 

Western U.S.

• Occupational: “woolsorter’s” or “ragpicker’s”

disease

Anthrax as Zoonosis

• Herbivores ingest spores which germinate 

into the vegetative form in the spleen and 

lymph nodes

• Spores can survive months or even 

decades in soil depending on pH, 

temperature and nutrients

• Vegetative organisms are deposited in the 

soil and sporulation occurs, completing the 

cycle

Bales ME, Dannenberg AL, Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Klatsky PC, and Ashford DA. Epidemiologic Response to 

Anthrax Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950–2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8:1163-1174, 2002

Anthrax from Natural Sources 

Pre-2001

• Summary of CDC investigations 1950-

2001

40 investigations over 50 years

24 in agricultural settings

11 at textile mills

4 involved contaminated consumer products

Bales ME, Dannenberg AL, Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Klatsky PC, and Ashford DA. Epidemiologic Response to 

Anthrax Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950–2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8:1163-1174, 2002

Four forms of human disease:

1. Cutaneous

• 81% of cases in the CDC investigations

• 2. Inhalational

• 19% of cases in the CDC investigations (9/48, 8/9 or 

89% of cases fatal)

• 3. Gastrointestinal 

• no U.S. cases

• 4. Oropharyngeal

• no U.S. cases
57

Snook

Cutaneous Anthrax 

Day 2 – Vesicle Formation

Cutaneous Anthrax 

Edema and Eschar Formation

Cutaneous Anthrax 

Day 7 – Necrotic Lesion

Cutaneous Anthrax 

Day 14 – Ulcer with Eschar

Chest X-ray for Inhalational 

Anthrax

Bales ME, Dannenberg AL, Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Klatsky PC, and Ashford DA. Epidemiologic Response to 

Anthrax Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950–2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8:1163-1174, 2002

CDC Anthrax Investigations 1950-2001

• Salient Points

– All agricultural cases were cutaneous

• Associated with handling, performing necropsy on, or 

disposing of dead, contaminated animals

– Typical responses to agricultural cases included:

• Immunization of animals at risk

• Education of farm workers on anthrax diagnosis and control

• Thorough destruction by burning of infected animals

• Prevention of infected livestock from reaching the market 

• Improved supervision of slaughter and meat inspection

• In some situations, farm quarantine 
58

Snook

Bales ME, Dannenberg AL, Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Klatsky PC, and Ashford DA. Epidemiologic Response to 

Anthrax Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950–2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8:1163-1174, 2002

CDC Anthrax Investigations 1950-2001

• Salient Points (cont.)

– Of the 27 human cases which occurred at 

textile mills:

• 21 (78%) were cutaneous

– People working with raw, unprocessed contaminated 

materials at greatest risk

• 6 (22%) were inhalational, 5/6 were fatal

• 3 inhalational deaths in non-textile workers

Bales ME, Dannenberg AL, Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Klatsky PC, and Ashford DA. Epidemiologic Response to 

Anthrax Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950–2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8:1163-1174, 2002

Inhalational Cases at Textile Mills

• 1957, Manchester, NH  5 cases of inhalational 

anthrax, 4/5 or 80% fatal, and 4 cases of 

cutaneous anthrax among 600 workers in a 

textile mill. 

– Employees noted increased dust in air after initiating 

a new scouring technique

• 1961, Philadelphia, PA  50 year-old female, a 

secretary in a textile mill who had little direct 

contact with goat hair in her routine duties, 

developed fatal inhalational anthrax

Bales ME, Dannenberg AL, Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Klatsky PC, and Ashford DA. Epidemiologic Response to 

Anthrax Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950–2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8:1163-1174, 2002

Decontamination Decision-Making

Textile Mills

– Decontamination of the source not held to be 

“practical”

– Vaccination with annual scheduled boosters 

for workers at risk

– Personal Protective Equipment (PPE):

– Specific work clothing and respirators

– Shower facilities

– Separate lockers for work and street clothing

– Antibiotics – Used for 4 cutaneous cases

Bales ME, Dannenberg AL, Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Klatsky PC, and Ashford DA. Epidemiologic Response to 

Anthrax Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950–2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8:1163-1174, 2002

Decontamination Decision-Making

Textile Mills (cont.)

• Improved Industrial Hygiene Measures:

– Physical separation of raw and finished materials to 

prevent cross-contamination

– Work areas designed for easy cleaning

– Air-exhaust systems designed to prevent the spread 

of spores

• One report recommended “thorough 

indoctrination” on the cause, nature and control 

of anthrax (Epi-Aid 1953-14)

• Secondary Contamination – spores found in 

vacuum cleaner at worker’s home – not deemed 

clinically significant

Bales ME, Dannenberg AL, Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Klatsky PC, and Ashford DA. Epidemiologic Response to 

Anthrax Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950–2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8:1163-1174, 2002

Inhalational Anthrax in Other Settings

• 1957, Philadelphia  fatal inhalation anthrax in 

a 29 year-old man with sarcoidosis

– exposed to glue made from animal hides

– walked daily past a goatskin tannery contaminated 

with B. anthracis spores 

• Another fatal inhalational case was reported in a 

person near this same tannery making a total of 

2 over an 8-year period.

Bales ME, Dannenberg AL, Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Klatsky PC, and Ashford DA. Epidemiologic Response to 

Anthrax Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950–2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8:1163-1174, 2002

Inhalational Anthrax in Other Settings

• 1966, Manchester, NH  metal shop employee 

with “smoker’s cough” diabetes, alcoholism, and 

chronic pancreatitis developed inhalation 

anthrax after working for 4-5 hours opposite a 

goat hair-processing mill

• Dust from neighboring goat hair mill identified as 

source

• Incidence of anthrax at plant decreased with 

mandatory vaccination 
59

Snook

Bales ME, Dannenberg AL, Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Klatsky PC, and Ashford DA. Epidemiologic Response to 

Anthrax Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950–2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8:1163-1174, 2002

Inhalational Anthrax in Other Settings

• 1976, Morro Bay, CA  32 year-old man, 

a self-employed weaver, developed fatal 

inhalational anthrax due to B. anthraciscontaminated yarn imported from 

Pakistan. 

• Multiple samples of yarn tested positive for 

B. anthracis

• Subsequent CPSC warning on imported 

yarn.

Bales ME, Dannenberg AL, Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Klatsky PC, and Ashford DA. Epidemiologic Response to 

Anthrax Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950–2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8:1163-1174, 2002

Risks for Natural Anthrax

• Cutaneous

– Direct physical contact with infected animals 

or commercial products 

• Includes in one case contact with finished goatskin 

drums from Haiti

Bales ME, Dannenberg AL, Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Klatsky PC, and Ashford DA. Epidemiologic Response to 

Anthrax Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950–2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8:1163-1174, 2002

Risks for Natural Anthrax

• Inhalational

1. Presence during activities which can aerosol 

particles in a location where spores are 

present 

2. Underlying illness which increases 

susceptibility

Bales ME, Dannenberg AL, Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Klatsky PC, and Ashford DA. Epidemiologic Response to 

Anthrax Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950–2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8:1163-1174, 2002

Risk Management in Textile Mills

– Decontamination of the source not practical

– Vaccination with boosters for workers at risk

– Personal Protective Equipment (PPE):

– Specific work clothing and respirators

– Shower facilities

– Separate lockers for work and street clothing

– Antibiotics

Bales ME, Dannenberg AL, Brachman PS, Kaufmann AF, Klatsky PC, and Ashford DA. Epidemiologic Response to 

Anthrax Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950–2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 8:1163-1174, 2002

Improved Industrial Hygiene

• Physical separation of raw and finished 

materials to prevent cross-contamination

• Work areas designed for easy cleaning

• Air-exhaust systems designed to prevent 

the spread of spores

• Worker education

Drum Making With Imported Hides

• Recent fad  How do these cases compare to this previous experience?

– New York City, NY, 2/06  Inhalation case in a man 

who scrapes hair off imported, contaminated hides in 

an enclosed space  

– Scotland, 7/06  Inhalation case in a man with acute 

myeloid leukemia in remission who plays finished 

drums with imported, contaminated hide heads  

– Danbury, CT, 7/07  Cutaneous case in a drum 

maker who works with contaminated hides to make 

drums – fails on day of symptom onset to wear proper 

PPE   Son gets cutaneous disease on scapula  unclear what source  from direct contact with index 

case?
60

Snook

Medical History of Natural Anthrax

• Implications for Decontamination

– Cutaneous disease requires direct contact 

with spores

– Inhalational disease is uncommon 

• Risks for inhalational disease are:

– Generation of an aerosol where spores are present

– Lung disease or other immunocompromise

Medical History of Natural Anthrax

• Implications for Decontamination

– In areas (e.g. textile mill, agricultural) where 

ongoing contamination is expected, proper 

work practices can be used with worker 

education and vaccination of workers at risk

– Both surface methods and fumigation have 

successfully been used to remediate indoor 

areas contaminated with naturally occurring 

B. anthracis spores
61

Bettley-Smith

GDS: An Update for 2008

USEPA 2008 Workshop

Decontamination and Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with 

Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials

Robert Bettley-Smith FRICS

Chief Executive

Structure of Presentation

• Specialist Supplier Framework Overview

• Supplier Development and Evaluation

• Update on recent Operations 

• Anthrax Decon – Communal Facility (Scotland)

• Anthrax Decon – Domestic Premises (England)

• Chem/Rad Contamination – Domestic Premises (England)

• General Decontamination issues

Specialist Supplier Framework : Overview

• Established under EU procurement regulations

• Gives immediate access to known suppliers (who respond routinely to 

hazardous situations – HAZMAT)

• Framework speeds up decontamination process 

• Agreed Prices, terms and conditions (model contracts)

• Suppliers regularly evaluated and exercised by GDS

• Facilitates testing and evaluation of decontamination methodologies 

and decontaminants

Supplier Development and Evaluation

Challenge

To move contractors from their normal civilian working environments and 

HAZMAT to CBRN environment

Method

To assess effectiveness of existing techniques, capabilities and capacity 

against scientific threat assessments, intelligence reports, planning 

assumptions and planning scenarios.

Identify

•Existing viable technologies

•Existing technologies requiring limited adaptation

•Useful technologies requiring major adaptation/development

Residual Issue

Approach identifies capability gaps but does not always fill them.

Approach to Supplier Evaluation

Five stage process:-

1. Scientific and technical assessment of Specialist Suppliers during 

tendering process (to join framework)

2. Response to case studies based on a scenario/case study 

within the experience of the supplier (within 12 months)

3. Response to case studies outside the experience of the supplier 

based on briefing provided by GDS at venue

4. Participation in exercises and tests

5. Evaluation during and after an actual CBRN event.

Stage 3 Evaluation Approach

Approach

• Develop a viable scenario at an actual venue for the release

• Plot likely consequences (fatalities, contamination zone, waste, materials for

disposal)

• Set a case study based on the scenario for specialist suppliers

Method

• Suppliers visit actual venue

• Briefing (logistical, technical, scientific) provided on scenario by GDS

• Standard report template (provided by GDS)

• Suppliers produce report on recommended decontamination strategy
62

Bettley-Smith

Stage 3 Evaluation Approach 

Development Strategy

Suppliers report assessed by GDS and others.

[Reports produced are commercially confidential and for these reasons they are not shared outside GDS or between suppliers.]

Identify issues, strengths and weaknesses

Dialogue between GDS and supplier to resolve issues, 

identify capability gaps and agree future work.

Develop improvement plans (backed with exercises)

GDS identifies significant critical unresolved (or irresolvable)

residual issues for consideration elsewhere.

Anthrax (Scotland, July 2006 – April 2007)

(Contamination in remote rural area)

Black Lodge (sampled)

Communal Hall, Smailholm 

(decontaminated)

Timeline - Scotland

• 08/07/06 Death of individual

• 10/08/06 Confirmation of anthrax as cause of death

• Sept 2006 Sampling completed at Black Lodge

• Nov 2006 Sampling completed at Smailholm Hall

• 17/11/2006 Black Lodge test results are negative

Smailholm test results are positive

• 02/02/07 Decontamination method agreed and GDS 

specialist supplier selected

• 01/03/07 Equipment shipped in from USA

• 10 - 13/03/07 Smailholm sites successfully decontaminated

• 12/04/07 Smailholm sites cleared (by clearance committee) 

as fit to be returned to owners

Decontamination Method

• Chlorine Dioxide (Clo2) used as a gaseous fumigant

• Optimal temperature (75degrees F) and humidity (RH 75%)

• CT of 9000 was used on 2 sites where structures were tented and 

subject to internal fumigation. A time count of 6 hours was 

maintained on village hall and 4 hours on private outbuilding.

• All contents left in hall, apart from a tapestry (which was autoclaved)

• All contents left in private out building apart from some tools

• Biological indicators (spore strips) used

• A kill efficiency of Zero detectable spores was achieved

[ Some blue chairs turned orange and some rusting on steel tools]

Anthrax (Scotland, 2006): Key points

• Successful test of - GDS Specialist Supplier Framework 

- GDS Specialist Supplier

• Successful support mechanisms and advisors (GDS, USEPA etc)

• Communications (lack of mobile phone coverage)

• Early consideration of decontamination issues

• Decontamination Issues

- emotive and social aspects

- logistics and timeframes

- transport and storage of decontamination equipment

- compatibility of equipment

- weather conditions!

Anthrax (England Sept 2006 – Nov 2007)

(Contaminated cottage in remote rural area)
63

Bettley-Smith

Timeline - Belford

• Sept 2006 Further sites suspected in England

• Then... A long period of consultation, discussions on 

responsibility agreement on the way forward

[A problem that is familiar in the US !?!]

• 31/08/07 Decontamination Strategy agreed

• 06/09/07 GDS Supplier engaged

• 2 – 5/10/07 Decontamination undertaken 25/10/07

Analysis of samples show no detectible spores

• Nov 2007 Clearance Committee meet and clear building 

for return to owners

Decontamination Method

• HEPA vacuum and wet dry clean of the premises

• Soft fabrics bagged and removed for incineration

• Each room was pre-cleaned with disinfectant to remove dirt and dust 

in order to reduce the bio-burden level

• VHP chemical and biological indicators placed in specific locations

• Biological indicators (106 population of geobacillus stearothermophilus 

spores)

• Relative humidity in both rooms ranged during the decontamination 

cycles from 45-45% and the temperature between 18-25c

• Vapourised hydrogen peroxide used 250ppm during the

decontamination phase cycle

Other Operations

The GDS was set up to deal with CBRN (extended

to major HAZMAT incidents)..... has utility in other situations!

Assisting responsible authorities to deal with:

- Crystal Meths laboratories

- Other clandestine laboratories

- Unusual substances in vehicles

- Premises containing unusual substances

- Remediation and/or advise in unusual situations

Premises containing unusual substances!

Chem/Rad Contamination (March 2008 – July 2008)

Premises containing unusual substances!

Chem/Rad Contamination (March 2008 – July 2008) Chem/Rad Contamination - Back ground

• Domestic property owned by retired scientist

• Concern from executor (immediately after scientist’s death) over a 

‘number of experiments’ (at the property) and material found on site

• Experiments, thought to be chemical and radiation related

• Chemicals and radioactive materials present

• Local Council unable to resolve – requested GDS assistance

• Scope of work (sampling then decontamination) submitted by GDS 

specialist supplier and agreed with Council
64

Bettley-Smith

Chem/Rad Contamination - Materials found:

• Total of 120 different chemicals in various conditions including:-

- sodium metal

- potassium permanganate, sodium chlorate, chloral hydrate, 

potassium cyanide, mercuric chloride

- Plus nitric acid and residues

• Total of 3 radiological substances

- radium 

- thorium 

- uranium

Chem/Rad Contamination - Findings

• Extensive contamination following sampling internally and externally 

(garden and shed area).

• Known areas of soil contamination excavated (principally under 

collapsed shed)

• 17 radiological sources found, 11 to be subjected to further lab

analysis – then be disposed of as lab samples.

• 10 radiological sources taken to Winfrith (low level waste disposal 

site)

• Asbestos sheets and materials also found on site

General Decontamination Issues

Irrespective, the following issues always come up:-

• Who will pay?

• Lack of (adequate) insurance cover

• Waste management, ownership, consignment and final disposal

• Multi-agency information sharing

• Media handling

• Tolerability of residual hazards (clearance standards)

• Management of expectations (cost and timescale)

• Logistics including communications

• Staffing resources

General Decontamination Issues

Requirements for Success –before an event!

• Base plans on known events (and realistic scenarios)

[Hypothetical questions guaranteed to give hypothetical answers!]

• Agreed Policy framework with defined responsibilities 

• Agreed remediation arrangements

• Agreed process to define clean-up standards

• Identified capability and capacity

General Recovery Issues

Requirements for Success –after an event!

• Early planning of remediation phase

• Early definition of clean-up standards

• Separate clean up and regulatory responsibility

• Partnership working and regular co-ordination

• Flexibility, pragmatism and realism

• Good communications

Government Decontamination Service

MOD Stafford

Beaconside

Stafford

Staffordshire

ST18 0AQ

England

For Information

08458 501323 

www.gds.gov.uk
65

Kempter

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PPresented to resented to

2008 Workshop on Decontamination and 2008 Workshop on Decontamination and 

Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with 

Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials



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

  

 

  

 

  

 

 



4

 

  

 

 

  

 

 



 

 

5



  

 

   

   

   

 



   

 



6



  

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

  

  

 

 
66

Kempter

7



  

 

 

  



  

 

   

 

 

8

 

  

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

9

 

  

 

 

  

 

  



 

 

 

  

10

 

  

    

 

  

 

 

 

 





 





 





 



11

  

 

  

  

 

 

 

 

  



  

 

    



12

 



  



 

  

  

 

 

  

    

 

  

   


67

Kempter

13



 











 



 



 





Efficacy Testing Options for Anthrax-Related Claims







 



 



 







 



























14

 

 

  

 

 



  

  

 



  

 



15

 

  

  



  

 

  

 

 

     

     



  

16

 

  

  

 



   

   

  

 

  

 

 

17

 



  

 

 

   





   

  

  

   

 



 18

 

  

  

  

  



 

 

 



 

 

 

  



 

  

 

 

 

  

  
68

Kempter

19

 

 

 

  



 

 

  



  



 

 

  



 

 

   



  

 

 



 

 

20















21

 

  



 



 

 

   

  

   

   

   

    

  

22



 

   

 

 

 

23

   

 

    

   

   



 

 

  

 

   

      



 

24

 





3. B. anthracis - ? Sterne 7.2 (0.17) 

2. B. anthracis – Ames 7.1 (0.18)

Microbe 1 to Microbe 2 (0.96)

Microbe 2 to Microbe 3 (0.32)

Microbe 1 to Microbe 3 (0.045)*

1. B. subtilis 7.1 (0.13)







 

     

     

  ?    

    

 















 

   






69

Kempter

25

 

    

    

  

   

 

    

  

   

   

    



26



 

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

  

  



27



 

 

Pine wood

Steel

Glass

Ceramic wall tile

10 μL spore suspension inoculated on each coupon

Coupon in 0.4 mL Water

Ceramic

Wall Tile

28

 

 

  

  

   



  



  

  

 

   

29

 

    

 



  

 

  



  

 



30

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

   

 

 
70

Bass

Toward a Systems-of-Systems 

Approach to Hazard Mitigation

EPA Decontamination Workshop

Chapel Hill, North Carolina

September 24, 2008

Charles A. Bass, Jr., Ph.D., P.E.

Agenda

• Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) 

overview

• Hazard Mitigation Needs and Challenges

– Near-Term

– System-of-Systems

– Far-Term

• General technology development approach

Delivering Joint Warfighting Capabilities

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CBDP Overview

Sense

CBRN Detection

– Point

– Stand-off

– Reconnaissance

– Medical Diagnostics

Shape

Shield

Sustain

Individual Protection

– Percutaneous

– Respiratory

– Ocular

Collective Protection

– Mobile

– Transportable

– Fixed

Prophylaxis

– Biological

– Chemical

– Radiological

Decontamination

– Individual

– Equipment

– Fixed Site

Medical Treatments

– Chemical

– Biological

– Radiological

Battle Analysis

Battle Management

Modeling

Simulation - Training

Integrated Early Warning 

Medical Surveillance

C4ISR C4ISR

C4ISR

Therapeutics Therapeutics

Pretreatments Pretreatments

Diagnostics Diagnostics

Mod-Sim & 

Battlespace 

Awareness

Mod-Sim & 

Battlespace 

Awareness

Detection Detection

CBRN Doctrinal Elements

Hazard 

Mitigation

Hazard 

Mitigation

Protection Protection

The Low-Burden Imperative 

Sources of burden: 

• Physiological

• Cognitive

• Logistical

• Operational

Like Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), future threat 

use of CB weapons will probably be immediate, intense, 

and local. Thus, to have their greatest impact, protective 

and hazard mitigation measures must be constantly 

available. This necessitates low-burden equipment. 

“I see Comp’ny E got th’ new-style gas masks”

Bill Mauldin, © United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 1944

The Self-Leveling Effect
71

Bass

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 7

Needs and Challenges

• Endstate Goals:

Procure

• Balancing Effectiveness and Suitability:

• Rethinking Life-Cycle Management (Early in Development):

Material Compatibility

Hazard Reduction Lower MOPP Level

Hazardous Materials

2

43

ox

Store Deteriorate Dispose

Shipping/Storage

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 8

Immediate

• Individual and operator

• Skin decon; Operator spray-down

• Minimize causalities; save lives

• Limits spread of contamination 

Operational

• Crew and unit

• MOPP gear exchange; Operator wash-down

• Limits contamination spread and exposure

• Temporary relief from MOPP

Thorough

• Specialized units 

• Detailed personnel, equipment decon

• Reduces MOPP level

• Reconstitutes combat power

Increase early effectiveness

Increase early effectiveness; decrease required process time later 

More time needed

Less assets available

Decontamination DoD Joint Doctrine

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 9

Near-Term Challenge

Challenge: Transition general purpose formulations

Objective: Effective, broad-spectrum, environmentally safe, 

formulations that are dual-use and logistically sustainable

Approaches:

Oxidative 

formulations

Nano-materials

Shelf-stable 

enzymes

“Green”

surfactant/ solvent 

systems

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 10

Balancing Needs 

• Oxidizers that are stable for shipping 

and storage

• Reactive/ catalytic materials with 

sufficient shelf-life and pot-life

• Formulations with dual-use potential

• Reactants/ solvents that are “green”

and do not harm military materials

• Effective over a broad 

range of agents

• Effective on all military 

materials 

• Effective over a broad 

range of environmental 

conditions 

Suitability

Effectiveness

Unreasonable to expect this achievable with a single approach! 

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 11

% Remaining on CARC after Surfactant Wash - DBBP and CEPS

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1 hr

DBBP

24 hr 1 hr

CEPS

24 hr

% R e m a in in g

100% Mud 50% Mud 0 Mud

Technology Benefits:

• Effective and complete 

surface removal of 

contamination

• Compatible with 

commercial application 

equipment

• Consumed during dayto-day operations

Challenges:

• Run-off containment

• Achieving MIL-PRF87937D standards

Surfactant Wash – “Super Soap”

% Remaining on CARC after Surfactant Wash

DBBP and CEPS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 12

Electrochemical Chlorine Dioxide

Technology Benefits:

• Decon device is 

lightweight and manportable

• Stable chemical 

precursors are easily 

shipped and stored 

• Weight reduction and 

reduced logistics burden

Challenge:

• Developing Data Set for 

TRA panel

Polycarb + eClO2 (Br) Solution 15 minute contract time

B. Anthracis Delta Sterne
72

Bass

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 13

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

0

20

40

60

80

Buffer

OPAA

OPAA + DHG

Buffer

OPAA + DHG

vial plate

99.990

99.992

99.993

99.995

99.997

99.999

Time (min)

% detoxification

DVOPA

DVOPA + DHG

DVOPA + DHG

GD decon with 

hydrolases

0 10 20 30 40

0

20

40

60

80

Buffer

NaClO2

CPO

Buffer

NaClO2

CPO

vial 1% plate 10g/m2

99.80

99.84

99.87

99.91

99.94

99.98

Time (min)

% detoxification

VX decon with 

oxidases

Enzymatic Decontamination

Approach:

• Single enzyme-based 

formulation to detoxify V 

and G-series nerve 

agents, HD, and 

biological weapons

Technology Benefits:

• Reduced logistical 

burden 

• Formulation material 

compatibility

• Weight reduction and 

reduced logistics 

burden

Challenge:

• Chemical Efficacy (HD)

Negative 

controls

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Self-Detoxifying/ AntiMicrobial Surfaces

Strippable Coatings

A

C10% B B

40% A

50% C

A

C10% B B

40% A

50% C

Dial-a-Decon

Agent Disclosure

Directed Energy 

Approaches

Decon System-of-Systems

(DSoS)

Combination of synergistic processes to: (1) more rapidly reduce hazard closer 

to the point of contamination; (2) enable a more rapid reduction of MOPP

Hazard Mitigation Systems-ofSystems (HMSoS)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Possible Operational Vignette

02 4 68 10 12

time (hours) 

Agent 

release

Immediate Operational Thorough

Reduce MOPP

Reduce MOPP

Reduce MOPP

Self-detox

surface

Entrance agent

disclosure 

Exit agent

disclosure 

Dial-a-Decon

Strippable encapsulant

GP Formulation 

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Agent Disclosure Spray

• Spot Test

• VX in 50 μL IPA in single spot on 

ceramic tiles

• Detection limit: 0.05 μg VX

• Area Test

• VX in 1 mL IPA in 10 cm x 10 cm 

area on ceramic tiles

• Detection limit: 0.5 μg VX

• Represents amount left on a 10 g/m2 contaminated surface after > 

99.999% efficient decon process

• Surface Compatibility

• VX in 1 mL IPA on plastic, aluminum, glass, stainless steel

• Detected 2.5 μg VX/100 cm2 on glass, stainless steel, acrylic plastic, and 

aluminum

• Surface had no discernable impact on spray performance

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 17

Far-Term Challenge

Challenge: “Smart” Hazard Mitigation

Objective: Develop Technologies that Activate in 

Specific Response to a Targeted Agent and Signal 

Activation/ Completion – Sense, Respond and Signal

Approaches:

Self-Amplifying 

Molecular Switches

Encapsulate and 

Delivery

Self-Amplifying Active 

Sites

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Microwave Decon

Dial-a-Decon Study

A

C10% B B

40% A

50% C

A

C10% B B

40% A

50% C

Decon Assurance Spray

Technology Assessment

HMSoS Technology Development

Strippable Coating

Self-Decon Coating
73

Bass

Basic Research

Applied Research

Advanced Development Advanced Development

Integration/ SD&D

Procurement Procurement

Technical Readiness Levels (TRL)

A B C FRP

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Program Milestones

Increasing fidelity with respect to an operational environment Increasing fidelity with respect to an operational environment

Technology Development Process

Feasibility

Component 

integration

“Brassboard”

“Breadboard”

Effectiveness (agent & simulant work) Effectiveness (agent & simulant work)

Operational 

environment

Scalability factors Scalability factors

Materials compatibility Materials compatibility

Environmental safety / occupational health Environmental safety / occupational health

Relevant environment

Increasing fidelity

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Technology Development Process

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Surface Chemistry Analysis Tools

21

FTIR Source X-ray 

Photoelectron 

Spectrometer

Residual Gas 

Analyzer

Vaporous

Dosing System Sample

Mount

IR Detector

Mass 

Spectrometer:

Vapor Analysis

Nanoparticle

Preparation

and

Transfer 

Chambers

 



UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



 

22

  



  



DMMP(g)

Au/TiO2

O

P CH3

O

CH3

O CH3

3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

∆ A

Wavenumbers (cm-1)

ν(C=O)

Ti-OCH3

δa(C H3P)

OH(surf)

P=O---OH(s)

Au/TiO22

Pure-TiO22

Au-CO(a)

IR spectra of surface adsorbates IR spectra of surface adsorbates

100 nm

Au particles

TEM Image of Au/TiO2 particles

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Summary

• Synergy achieved by a combination 

of treatments applied together 

• Some treatments achieve value 

only as a part system-of-systems

• Goal is to enable reduction of 

MOPP earlier

Delivering Best Technology to the Warfighter!
74

Yang

1

Wide Area Restoration Following Biological 

Contamination

Systems Analysis for Interagency Biological Restoration 

Demonstration (IBRD) Program

September 24, 2008

Wilthea Hibbard

Bob Greenwalt 

Robin Miles

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Lynn Yang

Julie Fruetel

Dave Franco

Donna Edwards

Ben Wu

Sandia National Laboratories 2

Restoration Plan 

Development and 

Approval

Characterization

Decon Clearance 

Sampling

Decon 

Verification Monitoring

PreIncident 

Planning

Re-Open

Area

Biological

Release

The restoration process for an indoor biorelease has been established...

...what has not been established is the restoration 

strategy for a wide area urban bio-release

For example:

Given limited resources, what should be restored first? 

What are appropriate methods for large-scale outdoor venues?

What technologies would reduce timelines and cost?

Reference: DHS/USEPA Remediation Guidance for Major Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack, 2007

3

IBRD Program Overview

• Objective: to develop technologies, 

methods, plans and policies necessary to 

restore a wide area, including military 

installations and critical infrastructures, in 

the event of a large outdoor aerosol release 

of anthrax 

• IBRD partner and pilot city is the Seattle 

Urban Area to include Fort Lewis, WA and 

McChord Air Force Base

Four-year program, started in 2007, collaboratively sponsored and managed by 

the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense.

4

IBRD Tasks

• Task 1: Front-end systems analysis to: 

– Assess existing technologies and processes for wide area 

restoration– the “as-is” state; 

– Develop an as-is decision framework for wide area restoration;

– Identify and prioritize capability gaps

• Task 2: Development of Consequence Management 

Plan

• Task 3: Technology Development and Demonstration

• Task 4: Workshops and Exercises

5

Scenario for Systems Analysis

Problem:

• Two surreptitious releases of Bacillus anthracis spores in downtown Seattle and at Fort Lewis (based on National Planning 

Scenario Number 2)

Initial conditions:

• BioWatch positives for Bacillus anthracis

• Confirmatory tests have been made

• Emergency response has been activated and is underway

• Mass prophylaxis distribution has begun

• Hospitals are in surge mode and overwhelmed with sick and worried well

• People who were contaminated live in other communities as well

• Some contaminant has been tracked into surrounding areas

Area for restoration is on the order of tens of square miles. 6

Systems Analysis Process

As-Is Decision 

Framework

Data Gathering Federal 

Decision 

Framework

Step 2: Walk through Decision Framework 

to develop a plausible Baseline Example

Baseline 

Example

As-Is Decision Framework

Baseline 

Scenario

Step 3: Parameterize baseline scenario in 

spreadsheet and expand decision framework 

layers to identify Critical Parameters

Critical 

Parameters

Step 4: Conduct qualitative and quantitative 

analyses to prioritize Gaps, Chokepoints

Analysis

Spreadsheet Critical 

Parameters

Critical Path Analysis

Gaps and Chokepoints Many unknowns and uncertainties: 

methodology must be flexible!

Decision

Framework

Decision 

Framework

Layers 

Decision

Framework

Analysis

Step 1: Create As-Is Decision Framework
75

Yang

7

Data was gathered from interviews and workshops with 

decision makers, technical advisors, resource providers, 

and restoration experts

Local

• City of Seattle Emergency 

Management

• King County Office of Emergency 

Management

• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency- Region 10

• FEMA- Region 10

• Pierce County Department of Emergency Management

• Seattle & King County Public Health

• Pierce County Public Health

• Port of Seattle

• Pierce County Executive

• Fort Lewis Emergency Management

• Madigan Army Medical Center

• Law enforcement

• Fire

• Washington Mutual

• West Point Waste Treatment Center

State

• Washington National Guard 10th Civil 

Support Team (WMD)

• Washington State Department of Health

• Washington Department of Transportation

• Pacific Northwest Economic Region

Federal

• EPA National Decon Team

• US EPA-HQ

• Center for Disease Control, NIOSH

• USNORTHCOM

• USARNORTH

• Air Staff and Army Staff

• Army Corps of Engineers

• CHPPM

• Coast Guard

• U.S. Postal Service

Other

• Subject Matter Experts

• Sabre and Steris

8

Document Categories

• Plans and Protocols

• Policy and Legislation

• Other Studies, Reports, Lessons 

Learned

... complementary to Subject

Matter Expert areas

Data was also gathered through 

Literature Reviews

GOAL: Find references that apply to or provide guidance for 

wide-area remediation, and that can provide basis or justification 

for IBRD plans.

One-Page Summaries

• Abstract

• Citation information

• Sections relevant to IBRD

Over 300 documents were reviewed.

9

Bottom Line for As-Is State

• If incident happened today, the organizations and individuals 

involved would basically understand their roles and responsibilities

• However, plans, policies, procedures and technologies are 

insufficient

• Significant knowledge gaps exist; for example:

– Health risk levels

– Outdoor environmental fate and transport

– Outdoor characterization and cleanup

• This scenario would be “overwhelming”; processes would be “ad 

hoc” and developed in real time

• High-level framework and strategic guidance exists, but not tactical

• Therefore, to be able to analyze gaps, we developed a plausible 

decision framework– this underlies our baseline scenario example 

and gaps analysis

– This framework builds on an existing Federal decision framework

10

Developed Expanded Decision 

Framework for Wide-Area Restoration

As-Is Decision Framework

– Started with and Interagency Draft Clean-up Decision Framework*

– Expanded in areas where many decisions needed for wide-area restoration

– Color-coded based on issues 

– Doubled the number of tasks in framework





























 





































  























  



 





















































































 

 

  









 





(OSTP Draft Guidance)









* Developed by a Federal Interagency working group and will be exercised 

at a local level tabletop for vetting and input.

Used in Baseline Example

11

Systems Analysis Process

As-Is Decision 

Framework

Data Gathering Federal 

Decision 

Framework

Step 2: Walk through Decision Framework 

to develop a plausible Baseline Example

Baseline 

Example

As-Is Decision Framework

Baseline 

Scenario

Step 3: Parameterize baseline scenario in 

spreadsheet and expand decision framework 

layers to identify Critical Parameters

Critical 

Parameters

Step 4: Conduct qualitative and quantitative 

analyses to prioritize Gaps, Chokepoints

Analysis

Spreadsheet Critical 

Parameters

Critical Path Analysis

Gaps and Chokepoints Many unknowns and uncertainties: 

methodology must be flexible!

Decision

Framework

Decision 

Framework

Layers 

Decision

Framework

Analysis

Step 1: Create As-Is Decision Framework

12

First step is characterization: 

Establish contamination zones

• Strategy to establish Hot Zone and 

contaminated buildings

• Low-density sampling

• Grid surface sampling outdoors 

• Targeted indoor sampling: HVAC 

inlets and building entrances

• High-density sampling

• Directed surface sampling outdoors

• Surface sampling in buildings 

identified by low-density sampling

• Air samplers measure level of resuspension 

• Strategy to establish Warm Zone

• IMAAC plume, possible 

epidemiological data (human and 

animal)

• Air sampling outdoors and in 

critical infrastructure finds hot spots
76

Yang

13

Areas for restoration must be prioritized

1. National/regional Minimal Essential Infrastructure (restore socio-economics)

• “Critical organizations, personnel, systems and facilities essential to national economic success 

and national security”

• Substantial impact of local infrastructure on region/nation 

• Scenario includes regional MEI: 

• I-5 : 200,000 vehicles/day 

• Port of Seattle: 60% of goods transported to regions outside of Seattle area; 1 million 

transportainers/year

• Port of Tacoma: 2 million tranportainers/year 

• Fort Lewis

2. Hot zone: outdoor areas with unacceptable contamination levels (human safety, stabilize 

situation): becomes Priority 1 if area is not evacuated

3. Warm zone: outdoor areas with unacceptable contamination levels (hot spots) (human 

safety)

4. Facilities: indoor (restore socio-economics)

A. Key lifeline critical infrastructure (hospitals, police headquarters, power stations, etc.) 

B. Key economic critical infrastructure (military assets, key industry, etc.)

C. Other critical infrastructure

D. Other business

E. Residences

Local officials set priorities. For example: 

14 = Contamination

Interior Contamination 

Only

Interior Contamination 

Only in Non-Critical 

Facilities Decontaminated Urban 

Area

Interior and Exterior 

Contamination

Remediate 

Outdoor

Remediate Critical 

Infrastructure Remediate Rest of 

Contaminated 

Facilities

Remediation strategy: Critical outdoor 

areas first

Identify 

Contaminated 

Areas (Outdoors & 

Indoors)

• Eliminates potential source: minimize health risk

• Provides flexibility to prioritize buildings for remediation

• Enables parallel restoration of buildings (private and public funding)

15

Assumptions: Outdoor/indoor remediation

• Outdoors: Wash down building exterior surfaces to 

ground and decon ground

• Spray: > 1/8” of water on surfaces

• Seattle produces 187 million gal/day water

• Sewage Treatment up to 440 million gal/day

• Bleach on asphalt, Virkon S on soil

• Firemen perform decon, supertanker on highways

• Potential contaminated waste (vehicles, etc.)

• Indoors: Decon with chlorine dioxide or vaporous 

hydrogen peroxide – limited units available

• Downtown Seattle buildings

• 3800 buildings total

• 200 high and low rise buildings (>240K sq ft)

• Assume 15% buildings will be contaminated

• Limited vapor generators available (<10 for ClO2)

• Sensitive equipment decon separately (computers, etc.)

• Potentially significant waste products (carpet etc.)

St John’s Hospital: Oxnard,CA

• Mold

• 350,000 sq ft

• $24 million

16

Clearance sampling should be done before 

reoccupation

• Clearance strategy

• Establish clearance methods for outdoor and indoor areas that are 

consistent with the establishment of hot and warm zones

• Clearance criteria

• Indoor: zero growth on any sample taken (culture samples)

• Outdoor: no standard; risk-based approach is needed

• Above natural background

• Health risk-based

• Baseline example assumptions for indoor clearance:

• 120 samples/floor

• 4 samples/hour/team (1200 samples/day)

• Culture analysis for all samples

• Rapid viability method in development

• 200 samples analyzed/day

• 15%-20% of building interiors may not pass clearance

17

Systems Analysis Process

As-Is Decision 

Framework

Data Gathering Federal 

Decision 

Framework

Step 2: Walk through Decision Framework 

to develop a plausible Baseline Example

Baseline 

Example

As-Is Decision Framework

Baseline 

Scenario

Step 3: Parameterize baseline scenario in 

spreadsheet and expand decision framework 

layers to identify Critical Parameters

Critical 

Parameters

Step 4: Conduct qualitative and quantitative 

analyses to prioritize Gaps, Chokepoints

Analysis

Spreadsheet Critical 

Parameters

Critical Path Analysis

Gaps and Chokepoints Many unknowns and uncertainties: 

methodology must be flexible!

Decision

Framework

Decision 

Framework

Layers 

Decision

Framework

Analysis

Step 1: Create As-Is Decision Framework

18

Methodology for Prioritizing Gaps

Analysis was done in two parts, with two approaches, for robustness:

Part 1: Qualitative analysis of decision framework to determine gaps 

and their priority

– Analyzed each action/decision in decision framework (layers)

– Ranked each task according to current ability to accomplish it

– Prioritized resulting gaps

Part 2: Quantitative analysis of critical path using timeline, Monte Carlo 

and case study analyses to determine priority of gaps based on:

– Impact on timeline (chokepoints)

– Uncertainty

– Impact on restoration effectiveness and public health

Results from these analyses were cross-checked, then merged into 

a single priority list.
77

Yang

19

Qualitative Analysis of Decision Framework

No. Action Decision Who is involved What tools used Information required

100 Incident identified

City emergency management center, 

BRAT Biowatch, hospital emergency rooms LRN data, patient data

101 Release site identified Local EPA, HAZMAT team, FBI

BioWatch, surface sampling, LRN, intelligence, law 

enforcement techniques, IMAAC

Eyewitness data, LRN data weather 

data, detection locations

LLNL

102 Agencies notified City emergency management center

200 What is agent? LRN

201 Emergency HAZMAT actions required City emergency management center

HAZMAT, local EPA

202 No threat, allow reentry, resume opns City emergency management center

HAZMAT

203

Isolate and deny entry, contain area, 

identify and prioritize 

contaminated/affected areas and 

operations

2031 Conduct gross characterization What areas are contaminated/affected?

Public Health, EPA, HAZMAT, CST, 

LRN

Surface samples, intelligence data, plume reachback, 

epidemological and syndromic surveillance tools, 

aggressive air samples

Rapidly available data on potential 

extent of hazardous/contaminated area 

2032

Determine which areas should be 

quarantined; quarantine What areas should be quarantined?

Public Health, EPA, Law 

enforcement, PA, National Guard, 

media Media announcements, roadblocks to execute quarantine

Risk-based policy on what area should 

be quarantined

204

Emergency action following 

HAZMAT plan City emergency management center

HAZMAT

205 Identify agent and concentration LRN, local EPA, HAZMAT air samples, surface samples limits of area

206

Determine if agent is a pathogen; if 

act of terrorism Conduct forensics investigation?

Public Health, LRN, FBI, Law 

enforcement

Surface samples, intell data plume reachback, epi and 

syndromic surveillance tools LRN sample identification data

207

Epidemiology investigations 

sampling, analysis public health, local EPA, HAZMAT surface sampling, epidemiology techniques locations where exposed







Analyzed each action and decision

– Who’s involved

– Tools used

– Information required

– Resulting gaps

– Color coded tasks: Can it be done? How hard is it to do?

Color coding results: – 124 tasks & decisions overall – 41 green

– 39 yellow

– 44 red

80 gaps were identified and prioritized.

20

Spreadsheet model was developed to conduct 

Quantitative Analyses

Outdoor Characterization

Area of suspected contamination 1,500 blocks

Phase 1 outdoor sampling density 10 samples/block

Percent Red Zone 80 %

Percent Yellow Zone 0 %

Phase 2 outdoor sampling density 20 samples/block

Contaminated street area 4,320,000 sq meters

Indoor Characterization

Average no. buildings per block 4 buildings

Average no. floors per building 10 floors

Avg block coverage by buildings 60 %

Phase 1 Indoor sampling density 5 samples/building

Percent of buildings contaminated 10.58 %

Phase 2 Indoor sampling density 0.05 samples/sq meter

No of contaminated buildings 508 buildings

Sampling/Analysis

No. outdoor sampling teams 75 teams

No. individuals per outdoor team 3 indiv/team

Outdoor sampling rate 4 samples/hour

No. indoor sampling teams 75 teams

No. individuals per indoor team 3 indiv/team

Indoor sampling rate 4 samples/hour

Lab analysis rate--culture 200 samples/day

Lab analysis rate--PCR 40 samples/day

Lab analysis rate--HTP PCR 1000 samples/day

Decontamination

Waste per city block--Red zone 200 tons/blk

Waste per city block--Yellow zone 10 tons/blk

Sensitive equip per city block -- Red zone 50,000 cu ft

Sensitive equip per city block -- Yellow zone 12,000 cu ft

Clearance

Outdoor clearance sample density 0.01 samples/sq meter

Indoor clearance sample density 0.1 samples/sq meter

Decontamination

Small facility decon time 28 days

Small facility decon cost 500 $/sq ft

Medium facility decon time 28 days

Medium facility decon cost 20 $/sq ft

Large facility decon time 28 days

Large facility decon cost 5 $/sq ft

Biological Indicators 0.01 per 100 sq ft

Cost of BI analysis 200 $/anal

Cost per environmental sample 350 $/anal

Sm facil fumigation systems 2 generators

Med facil fumigation systems 4 generators

Lg facil fumigation systems 1 generators

Sensitve equip--sm facility 400 cu ft/facil

Sensitve equip--med facility 4,000 cu ft/facil

Sensitive equip--lg facility 20,000 cu ft/facil

Waste per sm facility 72 tons

Waste per med facility 720 tons

Waste per lg facility 3,600 tons

Grayed parameters are not explicitly modeled in this analysis

21

Timeline Analysis identified chokepoints

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

Time

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Tasks

Low D outdoor sampling

Lab analysis

Low D indoor sampling

Lab analysis

Data interpretation

High D outdoor sampling

Lab analysis

High D indoor sampling

Lab analysis

Sample pickup, air monitors

Lab analysis

Epidemiological data gathering

Data interpretation

ID of Hot Zone

Consult epi data

Data interpretation

Data interpretation

Request NARAC plume model

ID of Warm Zone

ID "Hot Spots"

Air monitors

Lab analysis

Characterization 

time is dominated 

by lab analysis and 

high density indoor 

sampling time.

LAB 

ANALYSIS

(PCR)

CHARACTERIZATION

SAMPLING

DECISION MAKING

TIME

High density indoor

Low density indoor

High density 

outdoor

Low density 

outdoor 22

Monte Carlo Analysis identified critical 

parameters across a range of assumptions

Area of suspected

contamination has 

downstream effects 

on all phases of 

restoration.

Characterize 

Hot and Warm 

zones

Outdoor and 

MEI remediation

Critical facilities 

remediation

Non-Critical 

facility 

remediation

Total area 

restoration

Area of suspected 

contamination

Area of suspected 

contamination

Area of suspected 

contamination

Area of suspected 

contramination

Area of suspected 

contamination

High density 

indoor 

characterization 

sampling density

Time required to 

decon 1 outdoor 

city block

% of buildings that 

are contaminated

% of buildings 

that are 

contaminated

% contaminated 

buildings that 

require fumigation

% of buildings 

that undergo high 

density sampling

Outdoor 

clearance sample 

density

% suspected 

contaminated area 

classified as "Hot"

% contaminated 

buildings that 

require fumigation

Time required to 

decon 1 outdoor 

city block

# characterization 

samples per 

building

% suspected 

contaminated 

area classified as 

"Hot"

% suspected 

contaminated 

area classified as 

"Hot"

High density 

indoor 

characterization 

sampling density

% suspected 

contaminated 

area classified as 

"Hot"

Outdoor 

clearance sample 

density

Higher

Lower

Rank Correlation 

Factor

• Monte Carlo identifies parameters with greatest impact on outcomes

• Takes into account uncertainty by varying all parameters across defined ranges and 

distributions.

23

Case Studies were analyzed to prioritize gaps 

identified in Timeline and Monte Carlo Analyses

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

Clearance sample lab throughput (#/day)

Total time of restoration (years)

Baseline

3x more fumigators

On 

Critical 

Path

Off Critical Path

Example: Minimize 

impact of the highest 

priority gap, and then 

rerun cases to identify 

the next highest 

priority gap

24

Results from all analyses approaches were 

combined to generate the gap priority list

TOP: These scope the restoration effort and have downstream effects

• Lack of risk-based approach for determination of inhalation hazard 

(indoor and outdoor)

• Lack of validated methods for outdoor characterization 

• Lack of validated outdoor decontamination strategy, methods, 

materials and technologies

SECOND: These reflect high multiplier or uncertainty effects

• Current indoor clearance standard may be impractical for wide area

• Lack of validated methods and standards for outdoor clearance

THIRD: Some experience, but need to apply to wide area

• Limited resources for indoor decontamination

• Lack of validated method to identify building decontamination 

requirements
78

Yang

25

Additional Issues Identified in 

Qualitative Analysis

• Prioritization of areas for restoration 

– Important to all phases of restoration

• Solid waste issue

• Self Remediation

– People will do something 

– Will reduce subsequent exposure

– Need to have guidance

– Significantly reduces decontamination load

• Knowledge

– The overarching deficiency is lack of knowledge in many areas 

• Affects every major area of restoration

26

Gaps most effectively addressed 

through multi-tiered approach

• Lack of risk-based approach for determination of inhalation hazard 

(indoor and outdoor) 

– Technology: means to measure reaerosolization; health risk assessment tools; rapid agent viability test; long-term monitoring 

technology

– Science: particle-surface interactions and reaerosolization rates; 

correlation between surface contamination, reaerosolization and 

health risk; infectivity of agent

– Policy: risk-based health standards

• Lack of validated methods for outdoor characterization

– Technology: characterization database tool, smart sampling tools, 

alternate sampling technologies that are better correlated to health 

risk

– Methods: validated methods (e.g., overall strategy, where to sample?, how many? air monitors + surface sampling?)

– Science: agent fate and transport models

– Policy: risk-based standards on how clean is safe

– Capacity: lab throughput

27

Conclusion/Next Steps

• The IBRD front end systems analysis guides the strategy for 

addressing wide area bio-restoration

– Developed and applied a systematic, robust methodology for

evaluating wide area restoration capabilities and processes

– Prioritized gaps

• Results from the systems analysis are supporting the next IBRD 

tasks: development of consequence management plans and 

restoration technologies 
79

Nalipinski

USEPA Region 01

 

 USEPA Region 01



 

 



 

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 



 





USEPA Region 01



USEPA Region 01



 



 





 

 





USEPA Region 01



 

 

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 

 

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USEPA Region 01



 

 



 



 

 



 

  
80

Nalipinski

USEPA Region 01



 



 



 



USEPA Region 01

 

  

 

  



  

 



  



  



  



  



 

 

USEPA Region 01



 







 





USEPA Region 01

 

USEPA Region 01

 

USEPA Region 01


81

Nalipinski

USEPA Region 01



USEPA Region 01



USEPA Region 01



 





  



 





 



USEPA Region 01



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

USEPA Region 01



  

 

 



  

 

 

  

 

USEPA Region 01



    

  

  

 

 

 
82

Nalipinski

USEPA Region 01



USEPA Region 01

  

  

 

  

  

  

USEPA Region 01



USEPA Region 01



  

 

  

 

 

  



USEPA Region 01

 

  

  

 

  

  

  

 

 

     USEPA Region 01

 

  

 

  

 

 



  

 
83

Nalipinski

USEPA Region 01

 

 

 

  

 

  
84

Dechant

Sabre Technical Services, LLC

Project Objective

 Determine feasibility of rapidly decontaminating a large 

healthcare facility with ClO2 gas in the event a biological 

agent is released within and disseminated throughout the 

facility:

 Logistical feasibility: Can it be done safely in a timely 

manner? 

 Technical feasibility: Can it be done successfully with 

a single ClO2 gas application?

Project Rationale

 Capacity of US hospital system is such that the loss of a 

major medical center for an extended period of time due 

to contamination by a biological agent could have very 

serious consequences.

 It is therefore imperative that:

 a viable decontamination technology be demonstrated 

in such an environment.

 a plan be developed to deploy this technology quickly 

should a contamination event result in a facility 

closure. 

Cooperating Agencies 

 United States Environmental Protection Agency

 Office of Research and Development

 Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response

 Office of Pesticide Programs 

 Environmental Response Team

 National Decontamination Team

 Various state and local regulatory authorities

History of ClO2 Fumigation Process

 Developed in response to the 2001 Bacillus anthracis 

(anthrax) attacks because of properties of ClO2 gas:

 True gas at standard conditions

 Free radical molecule that decays rapidly

 Decay products are harmless salts

 Powerful antimicrobial agent

 Highly penetrating into porous materials

 Used successfully to decontaminate the Hart Senate Office 

Building and large-scale postal centers in Washington, DC 

and Trenton, NJ. 

 Large projects took more than one year each to complete 
85

Dechant

History (continued)

 Following completion of the anthrax cleanup projects, ClO2

technology was named the “standard” for bio-weapon 

decontamination by the National Academy of Sciences.

 This technology has since been transformed into a mobile 

system that can be deployed quickly to any location.

 This transformation has allowed the technology to be

tested in a variety of applications:

 Pharmaceutical manufacturing

 Large-scale animal husbandry

 Mold and mildew treatment

 Bio-terrorism response preparedness

Project Facility 

 Five-story regional medical center with 345,000 square 

feet (ft2

) of floor space, 5.2 million cubic feet of volume, and hundreds of rooms and spaces.

 Garden Level – 68,000 ft2

 Mall Level – 140,000 ft2

 Second Level – 71,000 ft2

 Third Level – 33,000 ft2

 Fourth Level – 33,000 ft2

 Eighteen air handling units (AHUs) serving 22 functional 

zones within the building. 
86

Dechant

Project Challenge

 Conduct entire project as if being done in response to 

widespread biological contamination in a large hospital 

facility:

 Complete mobilization and site preparations in a matter of weeks

rather than months or years as has been the case for other large-scale 

projects .

 Perform fumigation within a matter of hours following completion of 

site preparation activities. 

 Re-open facility for public use within a matter of hours following 

completion of fumigation. 

Fumigation Component Systems 

 ClO2 generation system

 ClO2 delivery system 

 Process monitoring system

 Efficacy monitoring system

 ClO2 containment system

ClO2 Generation System

 ClO2 may not be transported in commerce because of its 

potential explosivity. It must be generated at the point of 

use.

 Reported LEL for ClO2 gas is 100,000 ppm

 ClO2 for this project was generated using a portable threechemical generation system :

 Sodium hypochlorite

 Hydrochloric acid

 Sodium chlorite

ClO2 Generation System

 Generation process utilizes a two-stage reaction in a series 

of columns:

 NaOCl + 2HCl + 2NaClO2  2ClO2 + 3NaCl + H2O

 Sodium hypochlorite and hydrochloric acid are reacted to form Cl2 gas

 Cl2 gas is then reacted with sodium chlorite to form high purity ClO2 gas

 Once formed, the ClO2 gas is immediately educted into a 

flowing water stream at a safe dissolved concentration 

level and sent to a nearby storage tank.
87

Dechant

ClO2 Delivery System

 When the fumigation process begins, generated liquid

ClO2 solution is pumped from the storage tank to a series 

of gas “emitters” that strip the gas back out of solution.

 The ClO2 gas is then directed into the intakes for each 

building AHU via external ducting. 

 18 separate rooftop AHU intakes

 AHUs are operational throughout the fumigation process 

and are controlled externally to maintain proper 

distribution of ClO2 throughout the facility.
88

Dechant

ClO2 Delivery System

 ClO2 is added to building intermittently throughout the 

fumigation process to maintain the desired concentration 

level within the facility.

 Must continually overcome natural “decay rate” of the structure 

and its contents due to free radical nature of ClO2. 

 After it passes through the emitters, depleted solution 

returns to a second storage tank to become feed-water for 

the generator in a 100% recycling process flow loop.

Process Monitoring System

 Process monitoring devices were placed at 38 locations 

throughout all five levels of the facility in order to monitor:

 Temperature

 Relative humidity

 ClO2 Concentration

 ClO2 CT (concentration x time) dose

 At least two process monitoring points were located in 

each AHU zone. 
89

Dechant

Process Monitoring System

 Fumigation process monitoring is conducted in a 

series of mobile laboratories:

 Data Laboratory: Collection and management of electronic 

data from temperature/RH sensors throughout building.

 Air Sampling Laboratory: Collection of ClO2 gas samples 

from remote locations throughout building.

 Analytical Laboratory: Analysis of ClO2 gas samples from 

remote locations throughout building and liquid samples 

from ClO2 generation system.

Efficacy Monitoring System

 Paired BIs were placed within occupied spaces and above 

false ceilings throughout the five level facility:

 660 pairs placed on a computer-generated random-stratified basis

 200 pairs placed on a “hard-to-reach” basis 

 Each BI contained a 1.9 x 106 titer of Bacillus atrophaeus 

spores (formerly known as B. subtilis, var. niger).

 B. atrophaeus spores are known to be the most difficult life 

form to inactive with ClO2 gas.
90

Dechant

ClO2 Containment System

 A tenting system was constructed of polyethylene 

sheeting, a material known to be impervious to ClO2

gas. 

 Polyethylene sheets were sealed together with clamps 

and affixed to the ground with sand “snakes.”

 A slight negative pressure was maintained on the 

inside of the tent to improve the seal and prevent gas 

leakage. 
91

Dechant

ClO2 Containment System

 Tent system performance was monitored throughout the

fumigation by USEPA’s Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer 

(TAGA) bus to ensure compliance with applicable ambient 

ClO2 exposure standards.

 Bus moves throughout the surrounding neighborhood monitoring 

ambient ClO2 levels.

 Positioning of the bus is guided by on-board weather monitoring 

station.

 TAGA has part-per-trillion measurement sensitivity for ClO2 gas. 
92

Dechant

Fumigation Operation

 The actual fumigation operation was conducted on a 

weekend, starting shortly after midnight, for several 

reasons:

 Smallest number of people “out and about” in community:

 Minimizes public “curiosity” factor.

 Minimizes potential for ambient ClO2 exposures. 

 Minimizes traffic interference for USEPA TAGA bus.

 Best possible coverage time for emergency response agency 

personnel in the event of a ClO2 release. 

Results - Logistical

 All site preparations including mobilization, equipment setup, HVAC system assessment, monitor installation, tenting 

and testing were completed in a period of only five weeks.

 Actual fumigation operation including RH conditioning, 

ClO2 introduction, ClO2 maintenance and ClO2 removal was 

completed in a period of less than 48 hours. 

 Facility was re-opened to the public within five days of 

initial closure. 

Results - Technical 

 All fumigation systems functioned precisely as designed.

 Pervasive sporicidal conditions were achieved throughout 

the facility during treatment: 

 856 of 860 BI pairs placed throughout facility showed sterility

 Remaining four BIs showed < 100 spores left out of initial 1.9 x 106

 Ambient ClO2 exposure standards not exceeded at any 

time. 

 ClO2 levels inside the building were near background 

within 12 hours of completing the fumigation.

Difficulties Encountered

 Extensive maintenance work was required to bring the

HVAC system into conformance with its design 

specifications. 

 The desired RH level was difficult to achieve and maintain 

throughout the facility during fumigation. 

 Target level of 75 percent RH proved very challenging in a hospital 

environment in a dry climate.

 Difficulties were encountered in clearing personnel from the 

building so the fumigation process could begin. 
93

Dechant
94

Mickunas

2008 Workshop on Decontamination and Associated Issues 

for Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or 

Radiological Materials

Utilizing a Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer (TAGA) Triple 

Quadrupole Mass Spectrometer Technology Mounted on a 

Moveable Platform to Provide Indoor Air Concentrations 

throughout a Structure before and after a Chlorine Dioxide 

Fumigation

September 2008

David B. Mickunas

US EPA/ERT

St. John’s Regional Medical Center (SJRMC)

Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer (TAGA) Mobile Laboratory Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer (TAGA)

TAGA Fitted with APCI Source TAGA Operational Process
95

Mickunas

TAGA on the Cart Used at the SJRMC Fumigation

Pre-Fumigation Survey One – Mall Level and Garden Level Path

A B C D EFG H

I

J K

L

M N OP Q R S T U V W X

Y

Z A1 B1

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

0.09

0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0

QL

DL

Chlorine Dioxide (SJ-PRE003)

Units in ppbv

Time in minutes

A B C D EFG H

I

J K

L

M N OP Q R S T U V W X

Y

Z A1 B1

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

0.09

0.10

0.11

0.12

0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0

QL

DL

Chlorine (SJ-PRE003)

Units in ppbv

Time in minutes

Pre-Fumigation Survey One – Mall Level and Garden Level 

Concentrations

Pre-Fumigation Survey Two – Mall Level Path 

A

B

CD E F G

H

I J LM

N

O

P

Q R

S

T UV W

X

Y Z A1 B1 C1

D1

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

0.09

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

QL

DL

Chlorine Dioxide (SJ-PRE004)

Units in ppbv

Time in minutes

A

B

CD E F G

H

I J LM

N

O

P

Q R

S

T UV W

X

Y Z A1 B1 C1

D1

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

0.08

0.09

0.10

0.11

0.12

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

QL

DL

Chlorine (SJ-PRE004)

Units in ppbv

Time in minutes

Pre-Fumigation Survey Two – Mall Level Concentrations
96

Mickunas

Post-Fumigation Survey One – Mall Level Path 

A BC D E

F

G

H

IJ K

L

M

N O

P Q

R

S

T

U

V

W

X

Y Z A1

B1 C1

D1

E1

F1

G1

H1 J1

K1

L1

M1

N1

O1

P1

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5

QL

DL

Chlorine Dioxide (SJMC-POST004)

Units in ppbv

Time in minutes

A BC D E

F

G

H

IJ K

L

M

N O

P Q

R

S

T

U

V

W

X

Y Z A1

B1 C1

D1

E1

F1

G1

H1 J1

K1

L1

M1

N1

O1

P1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5

QL

DL

Chlorine (SJMC-POST004)

Units in ppbv

Time in minutes

Post-Fumigation Survey One – Mall Level Concentrations

Post-Fumigation Survey Two – Second Floor Path

A B CD E FGH I J K

L

M

N

O

P

QR S T UV

W

X Y Z A1 B1

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

1.25

1.50

0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0

QL

DL

Chlorine Dioxide (SJMC-POST005)

Units in ppbv

Time in minutes

A B CD E FGH I J K

L

M

N

O

P

QR S T UV

W

X Y Z A1 B1

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

1.25

1.50

1.75

2.00

0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0

QL

DL

Chlorine (SJMC-POST005)

Units in ppbv

Time in minutes

Post-Fumigation Survey Two – Second Floor Concentrations
97

Mickunas

Post-Fumigation Survey Three – Garden Level Path

A B CD

E

F F G H I J KL

M

N OP Q R

S

T

U

V

W

X Y Z A1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5

QL

DL

Chlorine Dioxide (SJMC-POST006)

Units in ppbv

Time in minutes

A B CD

E

F F G H I J KL

M

N OP Q R

S

T

U

V

W

X Y Z A1

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5

QL

DL

Chlorine (SJMC-POST006)

Units in ppbv

Time in minutes

Post-Fumigation Survey Three – Garden Level Concentrations

Improved TAGA on the Cart Designed

Acknowledgements

Lockheed-Martin REAC

Stephen Blaze

John Wood

Bill Weeks
98

Ryan

January 8, 

2009September 24, 

2008 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Shawn P. Ryan and Joseph P. Wood

EPA/National Homeland Security Research Center

Vipin Rastogi, Lalena Wallace, and Lisa Smith

US Army – Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

Harry Stone, James V. Rogers, William Richter, Young Choi, Andrew Phipps, Morgan Shaw, and Kim Weber Battelle Memorial Institute

Decontamination of Surfaces Contaminated 

with Biological Agents using Fumigant 

Technologies 

1 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

NHSRC Decontamination 

Research Program

• Provide information on technologies to support remediation and restoration

strategy development and implementation

–Technology efficacy as a function of practical application conditions 

(e.g., temperature, RH) and scenarios (e.g., agents, materials)

–Application and generation considerations (e.g., does the technology have 

the generation capacity or application procedures to achieve effective 

conditions at the scale or geometry required)

– Material/equipment compatibility

–Optimize the in situ decontamination

vs. disposal paradigm

2 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Outline

• Purpose: provide information on potential fumigant options for biological 

agent contamination of complex surfaces

• Bacillus anthracis spores

– Vapor-phase hydrogen peroxide

– Methyl bromide gas

– Chlorine dioxide gas

• Non-spore forming pathogens 

(Brucella suis; Francisella tularensis; Yersinia pestis; vaccinia virus)

– Chlorine dioxide gas

3 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Vapor-phase Hydrogen Peroxide (VPHP)

• STERIS VHP® : M-100S

– <35% RH at start of run

– (1) 300 ppmv H2O2 up to 7 hours; or

– (2) 500 ppmv H2O2 up to 9 hours

• Agents:

– B. anthracis NNR1Δ1 spores

• Materials:

– Carpet; wood; ceiling tile; concrete block

– Latex-painted wallboard

– Painted I-beam steel

• Biological indicators/spore strips

– ~1E6 Geobacillus stearothermophilus

on stainless steel in breathable Tyvek

New Dräger VHP sensor

SS Exposure 

Chamber

Mini-Chamber

VHP inlet

2” glass bubbler port

Insulated pipes

ECBC/EPA Fumigation Chamber

4 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

VPHP: Sample Analysis

• Test Coupons (TC): samples of materials inoculated with ~1E7 B. anthracis NNR1Δ1 treated at 

specified fumigation conditions (concentration, temperature, RH, time); coupons dried overnight 

after inoculation, before fumigation

• Positive Control Coupons (PC): samples of materials inoculated with ~1E7 B. anthracis NNR1Δ1 

not exposed to fumigant; coupons inoculated at the same time as test coupons, dried overnight, 

stored in the BSC, and analyzed at the same time as the test/blank coupons

• Negative Control (Blank) Coupons: samples of materials not inoculated; treated as Test Coupons 

(QC)

• Extraction procedure:

– Coupons put in 50 mL conical vials

– 10 mL BPW with 0.01% Tween-80

– Sonicated (10 min) and vortexed (2 min)

– Dilution plating (spread and pour plating)

5 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Inactivation of B. anthracis spores on 

Complex surfaces with VPHP

0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 300 ppmv

 500 ppmv

Log10 CFU

CT (ppmv-hrs)

B. anthracis NNR1∆1 on Carpet

6LR

Carpet

Log10 CFU Recovered

CT (ppmv-hrs) 0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 300 ppmv

 500 ppmv

Log10 CFU

CT (ppmv-hrs)

VHP 

B. anthracis NNR1∆1 on Unpainted Concrete

Log of the number of colony forming units recovered from the materials 

(Log10 CFU Recovered) after treatment for a specified time at a constant 

H2O2 concentration (concentration x time = CT)

Concrete

CT (ppmv-hrs)

Log10 CFU Recovered

6-LR

• CT to achieve a six log reduction (6-LR) reduction in CFUs observed to be a 

strong function of material type

– Painted wallboard >4500 ppmv-hrs; wood >3000 ppmv-hrs; 

painted I-beam steel >2500 ppmv-hrs; ceiling tile >1000 ppmv-hrs
99

Ryan

6 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Inactivation of Bacillus spores with VPHP:

Summary of Results

• Substrate material significantly impacts the kill kinetics; effectiveness needs to be 

discussed in terms of materials to be decontaminated

– Inactivation of B. anthracis Ames on carpet at ~1000 ppmv-hours

– All other materials (sealed or porous) required significantly higher CTs than 

past-use requirement (1000 ppmv-hrs)

– No effectiveness on concrete, a material exhibiting extremely high demand for 

the fumigant

• Equivalent CT values seems to yield consistent results for the two concentrations 

(300 and 500 ppmv) included in the test matrix

• [Results not shown here] Inactivation of BIs (~1E6 G. stearothermophilus on 

stainless steel in breathable Tyvek®) did not correlate to inactivation of 

B. anthracis spores on building surfaces

– BIs show no growth well before success condition is met for environmental 

contamination

7 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Methyl Bromide

• Methyl bromide (99.5%; 0.5% chloropicrin)

– Concentrations: 53, 105, 211 mg/L

– Times out to 36 hours

– RH =75%; T= 37 oC

• Agents:

– B. anthracis Ames spores

– B. subtilis ATCC 19659

• Materials (1.6x7.5 cm):

– Decorative laminate; Ceiling tile; 

Galvanized metal ductwork;

Industrial carpet; Latex-painted concrete 

– Cellulose insulation (13 mm dia.)

– Silk suture loops (Presque Isle Cultures)

– Glass (5x5 mm)

• Biological indicators/spore strips

– ~1E6 Bacillus atrophaeus ATCC on stainless steel in breathable Tyvek

ENDOSPORES SPORES

8 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Methyl Bromide: Sample Analysis

Qualitative 

assessment 

performed using 

biological indicator

Quantitative 

assessment 

performed using 

supernatant

Shaker Extraction

Phosphate Buffered Saline

with 0 .1% Triton X-100

15 min @ 200 rpm

• Test Coupons (TC): samples of materials inoculated with ~1E8 B. anthracis or B. subtilus

treated at specified fumigation conditions (concentration, temperature, RH, time); coupons 

dried overnight after inoculation, before fumigation

• Positive Control Coupons (PC): samples of materials inoculated with ~1E8 B. anthracis or 

B. subtilus not exposed to fumigant; coupons inoculated at the same time as test coupons, 

dried overnight, stored in the BSC, and analyzed at the same time as the test/blank coupons

• Negative Control (Blank) Coupons: samples of materials not inoculated; treated as Test 

Coupons (QC)

9 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Methyl Bromide: Experimental Set-up

Test set-up at Battelle (West Jefferson ,OH)

10 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Methyl Bromide: Parameter Control

Methyl Bromide Trial #15

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

17:00:0017:01:0118:00:0019:00:0020:00:0021:00:0022:00:0023:00:00

0:00:001:00:002:00:003:00:004:00:005:00:006:00:00

7:00:00

8:00:00

8:07:00

Time

Temperature (C)

MeBr mg/L

% Relative Humidity

11 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis

spores with MeBr

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000

CT, mg/L-hr

Log Reduction

Painted Concrete

Cellulose

Laminate

Galvanized Metal

Carpet

Glass

Ceiling Tile

j

TCjLog

i

PCiLog

LR j i

  = −

)( )( 10 10

@ C = [MeBr] = 105 mg/L; except last data point (211 mg/L)

(LR)
100

Ryan

12 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis

spores with MeBr

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910

CT, mg/L-hr

Log Reduction

Painted Concrete

Cellulose

Laminate

Galvanized Metal

Carpet

Glass

Ceiling Tile

105 mg/L, 18 hrs

211 mg/L, 9 hrs

13 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis

spores with MeBr

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000

CT, mg/L-hr

Log Reduction

Painted Concrete

Cellulose

Laminate

Galvanized Metal

Carpet

Glass

Ceiling Tile

Methyl Bromide Concentration 211 mg/L

Contact Time 12 hr 15 hr 18 hr 9 hr

Silk Suture Loop Positive Control (n=5) ++++

Silk Suture Loop Test Coupon (n=5) Control + - - -

Biological Indicator Positive Control ++++

Biological Indicator Test Strip ++++

105 mg/L

14 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Inactivation of Bacillus spores with MeBr

0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

8.00

1260 1575 1890 1899

CT, mg/L-Hr

Log Reduction

B. anthracis

B. subtilis

Glass (5 x 5 mm)

105 mg/L 211 mg/L

15 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Inactivation of Bacillus spores 

with MeBr: Summary of Results

• MeBr efficacious (>6 LR) for the decontamination of B. anthracis Ames from a 

broad range of materials

• Substrate material significantly impacts the kill kinetics; effectiveness should be 

discussed in terms of materials to be decontaminated

– Inactivation of B. anthracis Ames on silk suture loops was easier than on any 

other materials tested except galvanized metal

• Equivalent CT values seem to yield consistent results for the highest two 

concentrations (105 and 211 mg/L) included in the test matrix; results may not be 

generalized to other concentration – time combinations (53 mg/L seems less 

effective as equivalent CT values)

• B. subtilis was very resistant compared to B. anthracis Ames, significantly 

underestimating the log reduction if used as a surrogate 

• A small, but significant, difference observed at 40% (less effective) compared to 

75% RH; the difference was too small to have a practical significance. 

16 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

• Agents:

– Bacillus anthracis Ames

– Brucella suis

– Yersinia pestis

– Franscicella tularensis

– Vaccinia virus

• Materials:

– Matte-finish aluminum

– Plastic (keyboard keys)

– Carpet

– Latex-painted wallboard (joint tape)

• Attenuation:

– “Natural”

– ClO2 (testing completed – this presentation) [Sabre Technologies]

– BIOQUELL HPV (testing underway)

– STERIS VHP® (planning)

Inactivation of Biological Agents

on Contaminated Materials with ClO2

17 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Inactivation of Biological Agents

on Contaminated Materials with ClO2

• Inoculation:

– 100μL added to each coupon as 10-10μL droplets; except keyboard keys (100μL droplet)

– ~1x108 CFUs or PFUs per coupon

• Drying:

– Spores: overnight

– Non-spores: 2 hours; except 4 hours on keyboard keys

• Time zero

– Recovered CFUs or PFUs after the drying time

• Treatment:

– Control: at temperature (~22 oC) and RH of the decon; no fumigant

– Decon: at target temperature (~22 oC), RH, and fumigant concentration 
101

Ryan

18 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

0 20 40 60 90 180 100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min)

 75% RH

 40% RH

Bacillus anthracis Ames/Wallboard

Sabre ClO2

 (3000 ppmv)

0 20 40 60 90 180 100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min)

 75% RH

 40% RH

Bacillus anthracis Ames/Carpet

Sabre ClO2

 (3000 ppmv)

Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis Ames:

Impact of Materials and RH (3000 ppmv ClO2)

Latex-primed/painted Wallboard Industrial Carpet

19 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

0 30 60 120 100

101

102

103

104

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control75

 Decon75

Brucella Suis/Wallboard

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 75% RH)

0 30 60 120 100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

1010

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control75 Decon75

Brucella Suis/Aluminum

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 75% RH)

0 30 60 120 100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control75

 Decon75

Brucella Suis/Carpet

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 75% RH)

0 30 60 120 100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control75

 Decon75

Brucella Suis/Keyboard

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 75% RH)

Inactivation of Brucella suis: Effect of 

Material Type (75 ppmv ClO2 at 75% RH)

Aluminum (10x10uL)

Keyboard Keys (100uL)

Painted Wallboard (10x10uL)

Carpet (10x10uL)

20 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

0 30 60 120 100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control60

 Decon60

Brucella Suis/Aluminum

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 60% RH)

0 30 60 120 100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control40

 Decon40

Brucella Suis/Aluminum

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 40% RH)

0 30 60 120 100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

1010

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control75 Decon75

Brucella Suis/Aluminum

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 75% RH)

Inactivation of Brucella suis:

Impact of RH (75 ppmv ClO2)

Aluminum (75% RH)

Aluminum (60% RH) Aluminum (40% RH)

21 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

0 30 60 120 100

101

102

103

104

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control40

 Decon40

Yersinia pestis/Keyboard

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 40% RH)

0 30 60 120 100

101

102

103

104

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control75

 Decon75

Yersinia pestis/Keyboard

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 75% RH)

0 30 60 120 100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control40

 Decon40

Yersinia pestis/Carpet

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 40% RH)

0 30 60 120 100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control75

 Decon75

Yersinia pestis/Carpet

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 75% RH)

Inactivation of Yersinia pestis:

Impact of Material and RH (75 ppmv ClO2)

Keyboard (40% RH)

Carpet (75% RH) Carpet (40% RH)

Keyboard (75% RH)

22 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

0 30 60 120 100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control75

 Decon75

Franciscella tularensis/Carpet

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 75% RH)

0 30 60 120 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control75

 Decon75

Franciscella tularensis/Aluminum

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 75% RH)

0 30 60 120 100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control40

 Decon40

Franciscella tularensis/Carpet

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 40% RH)

0 30 60 120 100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

Recovered CFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control40

 Decon40

Franciscella tularensis/Aluminum

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 40% RH)

Inactivation of Francisella tularensis:

Impact of Material and RH (75 ppmv ClO2)

Aluminum (75% RH) Aluminum (40% RH)

Carpet (75% RH) Carpet (40% RH)

23 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

0 30 60 100 101 102

103 104 105 106

107 108

Recovered PFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control75

 Decon75

Vaccinia virus/Carpet

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 75% RH)

0 30 60 100 101 102

103 104 105 106

107 108

Recovered PFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control75

 Decon75

Vaccinia virus/Wallboard

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 75% RH)

0 30 60 120 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109

Recovered PFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control40

 Decon40

Vaccinia virus/Wallboard

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 40% RH)

0 30 60 120 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109

Recovered PFUs

Fumigation Time (min) Control40

 Decon40

Vaccinia virus/Carpet

Sabre ClO2

 (75 ppmv @ 40% RH)

Inactivation of Vaccinia virus: 

Impact of Material and RH (75 ppmv ClO2)

Carpet (75% RH) Carpet (40% RH)

Wallboard (75% RH) Wallboard (40% RH)
102

Ryan

24 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Inactivation of Biological Agents

with ClO2: Summary of Results

• ClO2 was effective at reducing contamination against all agent/material 

combinations used in this study

– Low concentration (~75ppmv) for short contact time (<2 hours) at 75% RH was 

effective for complete inactivation of all non-spore agents/material combinations 

tested (except B. suis and vaccinia virus on keyboard keys)

– B. suis and vaccinia virus on plastic keyboard keys required longer contact 

times; perhaps effect of inoculation method (single 100 uL droplet vs. 

10 x 10 uL droplets for other materials)

• Relative humidity is a critical parameter for effectiveness for all agents tested 

except Y. pestis.

– Effectiveness dropped off very significantly at 60% and 40% RH for all other 

agent/material combinations

• Persistence of agents (or natural attenuation) is a function of material and 

conditions

25 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Summary of Results

• Effectiveness of a decontaminant is critically dependent upon the contaminated 

material type

– High efficacy on one surface type does not equate to high efficacy on a 

different surface type

– Decontaminant – material interactions are a critical factor affecting efficacy

• Measurement of process parameters during fumigation is essential to ensure 

effectiveness of the decontamination (i.e., confirmation that effectiveness 

conditions are achieved and maintained for the required duration) 

• Selection of decontamination methods should consider:

– Efficacy for the agent on the contaminated materials

– Ability to achieve effective conditions in the field (e.g., can the target 

concentration or relative humidity be achieved at the scale/env. required?)

– Impact of the decontamination procedure on equipment/materials at the target 

use conditions

– Waste generation (i.e., incompatible materials)

26 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

EPA On-going Efforts

• Completion of study on multiple agents with BIOQUELL HPV and STERIS VHP®

• Comparison of decontamination of Bacillus spores on materials as a function of 

inoculation method

1. Loading and droplet concentration (titer) (w/ECBC)

2. Aerosol vs. liquid (EPA, RTP, NC)

– Concentration – time (CT) study to clarify CT requirements as a function of time at 

low (100 ppmv) to high (3000 ppmv) concentrations

• Comparison of efficacy test methods

(1) AOAC Official Method 966.04: Sporicidal Activity of Disinfectants Test 

(2) AOAC Official Method 2008.05: Determining the Efficacy of Liquid Sporicides against 

Spores of Bacillus subtilis on a Hard Nonporous Surface Using the Quantitative Three 

Step Method

(3) Methods used in these studies with building materials

• Development of a chamber facility at EPA (RTP,NC) for decontamination studies

– Initial studies include low-tech, liquid methods
103

Mandich

 

 

  





  

















  



Bill 

Reents

Debbie 

Fleming

Mary 

Mandich

Gus 

Derkits

Rose 

Kopf

Chen 

Xu

Tom Wiecek

John Franey

  



  





 



  



  

  

 

  



 

 

  

 

  

  


104

Mandich

  

 

 

Aluminum fins on CPU

and video chip heat sinks 

Copper heat pipes and base 

of CPU Cooler

Copper Planes and 

Transmission Lines 

Immersion Silver Board Finish

Plastics used for cables, chip packages, connector bodies, printed 

circuit board laminates and CPU cooler housing 

Copper metal in all connectors 

even when gold-plated

Sheet metal chassis

 

  



Front Face Showing

Cu

Ag

Al

  

  

 



 

  



  







        

     

  

     

  

      

      

      

      



    



 













  





  

 



 

  







  





• Some failures intermittent. Overall, number of failures increases over time

• High failure rates seen for both 3000 ppm and 75 ppm ClO2

• High humidity promotes failure at both 3000 ppm and 75 ppm ClO2

• Power Off condition promotes failure relative to same exposure, Power On

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

-30 0 30 60 90 120 150 180

Days Elapsed After Exposure

Cumulative Number of Test Failed

3000 ppm, 90% RH, ON

3000 ppm, 75% RH, OFF

3000 ppm, 75% RH, ON

75 ppm, 75% RH, ON

75 ppm, 40% RH, ON

0 ppm, 90% RH, ON

0 ppm, ambient, ON 

PC DoctorTM Failures
105

Mandich

  



 





 

 



 

 

 

 

CPU heat sink 

Cables from Power Supply

  





  

   

  

   

  





Average Weight Gain and RH-Adjusted Exposure

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

1234567

DECON Test Condition (per Test Matrix #s)

Average Weight Gain [ug/cm2]

0.00

1000.00

2000.00

3000.00

4000.00

5000.00

6000.00

7000.00

8000.00

9000.00

Exposure [ppmv x hrs] x RH

Ave Copper

Ave Silver

Ave Alum

Exposure x RH

Ave all 3 metals

 

 



  





 

 

 

  



Fe-Cl, Zn-Cl from 

sheet metal

Al-Cl and Al-Ni 

particles from 

CPU heat sink 









  



μ

 







Contact Plating 

Structure

    



    

    

    

















 

  























μ 





μ 

 

 
106

Mandich

  





DVD

650 nm

Objective Lens

Focusing Lens

900 Turning mirror

Beamsplitter

780 nm

CD laser DVD laser

Beamsplitter Photodetector

1/4-Wave Plate

CD   







   





Damage to 

1/4-Wave Plate

  



 



 

 

 

 

  



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 





  





   

 

 

  

 

 

  





 

 

 



CPU Heat Sink 

Particles

Ni-P

Al-O-Cly



 

 



 





  

  



Before After

  



 



 

 



 

 



 

 

 



All exposed computers and associated test equipment 

cables/connectors need to be quarantined to prevent corrosion 

transfer to unexposed computers and components.
107

Mandich

  





  

 

 

  

  

  

  



 

 

 

 





  

Impact of these large-scale material replacements on electronics 

robustness in harsh environments needs evaluation—particularly for 

specialized fumigations used in bioremediation 

  



 

  



 

  

 









 



 



Au plated Ni Ni only

Hard Drive Cable Connector Pin 

Exposed to ClO2

  



 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 







Damage to 

Optical Plastic 

1⁄4-Wave Plate 

Exposed to ClO2

  



  





  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

  

 

  

 
108

Mandich

  





  

 

 

 

  

  

 

 



  

 

    

   



 

 

 



  

 
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UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Major James G. Rohrbough, USAF, PhD

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

2008 Decontamination Workshop

Laboratory-Scale Decontamination 

Testing in Support of the 

Interagency Biological Restoration 

Demonstration (IBRD) Program

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 2

Overview

• DTRA Testing

• The IBRD Program

• Lab-Scale Surface Decon Testing

• Future Testing

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 3

DTRA Mission:

To safeguard the United States and its allies from weapons of 

mass destruction, (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear 

and high-yield explosives) by providing capabilities to reduce, 

eliminate and counter the threat and mitigate its effects.

Test Support Division (DTRA/CXT) Mission:

To provide end-to-end test event planning, management, safe 

execution and results analysis supporting DoD, Federal 

Agencies, and friendly nations' programs to counter 

proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 4

CXT: DTRA’s T&E Arm of RDT&E

• CXT provides a rigorous, repeatable test 

process, including end-to-end test planning, 

execution, analysis and reporting

• Types of tests: Test and Evaluation, 

Demonstration, Experimentation, and Field 

Test

• Structural Survivability & Forensics

• Scaled Testing

• Weapons effects

• Chem/Bio agent defeat demonstrations

• Radionuclide defense/detection technologies

• Underground test readiness

• Technical support to IC and CTR

• Phenomenology

• Nuclear weapons effects simulations

• Materials penetrations

• Conventional munitions explosive effects

• Advanced energetics weapons fills

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Interagency Biological Restoration 

Demonstration (IBRD) Program

DHS/DOD Program

Aimed at developing policies, methods, plans and applied 

technologies to remediate and restore large urban areas, military 

installations, and critical infrastructure that have been 

contaminated as a result of the release of a biological agent. 

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DTRA Testing in Support of IBRD

Laboratory testing (Currently underway)

• Crisis exemption determination using FIFRA (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, Rodenticide Act) guidelines. (EPA NHSRC TTEP)

• Laboratory testing of decon product to B. anthracis surrogate on 

porous and non-porous surfaces using Three Step Method

Field testing (FY 2009)

• Identify and challenge multiple surfaces

Panels/swatches of predetermined size/characteristics

Surface porosity, permeability, reactivity, weathering, 

oxidation, UV exposure, etc.

Final test location- TBD.

Wide area Decontamination event (FY 2010)

• Investigate simulated urban area test sites for demonstrating 

decon technology/application on wide area. 
110

Rohrbough

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Laboratory Testing Overview

• Study performed under EPA GLP guidelines 

• (40 CFR Part 160)

• Protocol based on Quantitative Three Step Method

• (ASTM E 2414-05 and AOAC method 2008.05)

• Analysis details

• B. atrophaeus (FKA B. globigii, B. subtilis var. Niger) spores

• ATCC #9372

• >95% spore/vegetative cells

• Spore viability: 0-3 Log Reduction after 2 min in 2.5N HCl

• Positive control

• pH adjusted (7.0) bleach (6000 ppm)

• Negative control

• water

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Laboratory Testing Overview

• Two surfaces tested

• Porous – Porcelain Tile (0.5 cm cube)

• Non-porous – Stainless Steel (0.5 cm square)

• Six commercially-available decon agents

• CASCAD (Allen-Vanguard): dichloroisocyanurate

• Decon Green (ECBC): H2O2

• Peridox (Clean Earth Technologies): H2O2

• Sporklenz (Steris): H2O2

• EasyDECON 200 (Envirofoam Technologies): H2O2

• MDF-200 (Modec): H2O2

• Each surface/decon agent combination tested in triplicate

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

A B

Three Step Method

• Quantitative Method to Determine Sporicidal Efficacy 

on Contaminated Carrier Surfaces

Surface coupon

(0.5 cm cube)

1-5 107 spores

Add 

Neutralizer 

Centrifuge

Spores

Sample A

Water

6 min

Sonication Add 

LB Broth

LB Broth

30 min

37 °C

Agitation

Transfer coupon to 

Tube B

Transfer coupon to 

Tube C

Centrifuge

Spores

Sample B

Adapted from: ASTM E 2414-05

Disinfectant

30 min

20°C

Centrifuge C Spores

Sample C

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DTRA Field Testing

• Field testing (FY 2009) 

• Medium scale, multiple surfaces, utilizing manufacturer’s 

dissemination devices (1-2 decon agents)

• Wide area Decontamination event (FY 2010) 

• Full scale, fewer surfaces, explosive release

• Utilizing dissemination devices

• Environmental impact considerations

• Stucco 

• Wood – treated 

• Asphalt paving 

• Shingles –roof 

• Steel 

• Aluminum window frames

• Steel 

• Painted surface

• Concrete

• Aluminum Panel

• Composite panel

• Glass

• Coated Glass (Safety glass)

• Brick

• Limestone

• Granite

• Concrete block 

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Acknowledgements

• DTRA

• Bruce Hinds, CXT

• Ryan Madden, CBT

• EPA

• Dr. Stephen Tomasino

• Joe Wood

• Jeff Kempter

• Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute

• Hammad Irshad

• Dr. Yung Sung Cheng
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















  









 

 



 



 



 





 

 



 



 



 



 

 

 





 





 



 



 

  

 


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

 



 





 





 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

  



 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 



  
113

Burton

 





 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 
114

Burton



 



 

  

  

 



 

7.6 x 101 3.75 x 10 PCR fungi 2

(SE/m3)

4.4 x 102 3.6 x 10 Total fungi 3

(S/m3)

1.44 x 102

(94–188)

5.48 x 102

(380–710)

Culturable fungi

(CFU/m3)

Before After

Analyte Geometric Mean (Range)





7.4 x 102

(580–1,100)

(1-3)--D-glucan < 125 (LOD)

(pg/m3)

3.3 x 102*

(118–706)

5.5 x 103

(943–23,598)

PCR fungi

(SE/m3)

1.6 x 103*

(978–2,267)

7.3 x 104

(16,311–195,289)

Total fungi

(S/m3)

2.5 x 102*

(129–435)

 10 Culturable fungi 6

(CFU/m3)

Before After

Analyte Geometric Mean (Range)



Endotoxin 0.74 21.92 

(EU/m3)

7 x 101

(35–94)

1.2 x 103

(1,119–1,319)

Culturable bacteria

(CFU/m3)

Before After

Analyte Geometric Mean (Range)
115

Burton

 



18.59 

(4.45–41.4)

10.32 

(1.31–34.19)

Endotoxin

(EU/m3)

1.6 x 102*

(82–353)

1.1 x 103

(718–1,319)

Culturable bacteria

(CFU/m3)

Before After

Analyte Geometric Mean (Range)

 



18.59 

(4.45–41.4)

10.32 

(1.31–34.19)

Endotoxin

(EU/m3)

1.6 x 102*

(82–353)

1.1 x 103

(718–1,319)

Culturable bacteria

(CFU/m3)

Before After

Analyte Geometric Mean (Range)













Before After

Analyte Geometric Mean (Range)

 



 

 

 

 





 

 



 

 

 
116

Burton

 

   

 
117

Burton



 









 



 

 







 



 

 





 



 



 







 





 




118

Contino



Presentation

US EPA Decon Conference, Sept 14, 2008

Decontamination of a Railcar Using a Portable and Economical System

Tony Contino, Biokinetics, Inc.

Paul Manske, MTA-Long Island Railroad 





 Funding: Funds from Department of Homeland Security via the 

Federal Rail Administration (FRA). William Fagan, Director of Security 

 Program Management: The Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) and 

Long Island Railroad (LIRR) 

 Facility: The Nassau County Fire Service Academy 

 System Design, On-Site Erection, Contract Management:

Biokinetics, Inc., a Foster Wheeler Company 

 Chlorine Dioxide Micro-Reactor Technology: Selective Micro 

Technologies, LLC 

 Chlorine Dioxide Sensors: Optek-Danulat, Inc.





 Demonstrate 

• Ability to kill a bioterrorism agent

• Mobility and portability

• Short deployment time

 Meet environmental and safety standards

 Accommodate wide ranging site conditions

 Minimize damage to railcar, electronics, infrastructure





 Considered highly effective 

agent for addressing robust 

biological hazards (e.g. anthrax)

 Successful at Kensington Post 

Office and Hart Senate Bldg.

 Can be evacuated quickly

 Success parameters established 

 Gaseous and aqueous 

capabilities





 Must support project objectives

• Easily transported

• Short deployment

• Minimally corrosive

• Safety and environmental

 Economical

 Require minimal support resources

 Personnel

• Power 

• Water

• Environmental monitoring

• Technical expertise

• Logistics (storage, shipment, start-up)





 Anthrax surrogate, at least as hard to kill 

as anthrax spores

• G. stearothermphilus

 Safe for humans 

 Several types used
119

Contino





 Tented enclosure erected around car

 BI installation 

• In stringed matrix format inside car

• Attached to exterior surface

 Leased box truck

• Chlorine Dioxide generation/distribution system

- PVC tank and circulation pump

- Sparge air injection subsystem

- Distribution tubing

- CD concentration/humidity monitoring/recording

systems

- Environmental monitoring

- Internal gas distribution fans





 Begin tent erection around “contaminated” railcar

 Drive box truck to any source of water

 Fill PVC tank with water

 Load tank with CD generating sachets

 Install PVC line within space to be 

decontaminated

 Start air sparge flow through aqueous CD 

 Continuously monitor CD concentration and 

humidity within space

 Frequent monitoring for safety and environmental 

purposes

 Evacuate tented space through a carbon absorber 

after decon criteria (9000 ppm-hr) are met.

 Disassemble tent

 Demobilize





 Nassau County Fire Service

Academy: Optimal situation

for test

• Real railcar(s)

• Somewhat confined space

• Outdoors

 Weather

• Day 1: Moderate wind

• Day 2: Temperatures in mid-90s

• Day 3: 40 MPH gusts; 2.5” of rain in 4 hrs

(2007 Brooklyn tornado)





 Successful kill

• 98% of BIs tested positive (100% of 

spores killed)

• Met and exceeded target of 9,000+ ppmhr for CD concentration-time

• Generally met temperature (above 70 F) 

and relative humidity (>70%) targets

 Environmental/Safety

• CD concentrations adjacent to tent never 

exceeded the safety plan action level of 5 

ppm.

• Controlled TWA exposure levels by 

minimizing personnel presence in the 

operating areas. 





 Equipment condition

• No physical damage apparent in car, 

neither immediately following test nor 

after six months following test.

• Electronics equipment

- Laptop computers ran successfully 

throughout and immediately following 

test, and were re-started successfully 

after a year.

- Typical railcar electronics modules, left 

exposed for the duration of the test, had 

no visible damage. Microscopic 

investigation after a year showed no 

damage significant enough to preclude 

from functioning correctly.





 Mobility and portability

• Entire generation/distribution/testing capability contained in a standard box truck

• Tenting arrived in a separate truck

• Mobile power and lighting resources used

 Deployment time

• On-site mobilization, set-up and total decon accomplished in less than 48 hours

• Estimate: additional 24 hours required to safely vent and scrub tent contents and demobilize.

 Accommodate wide ranging conditions

• Successfully adapted to temperature range from chilly to mid-90s temperatures

• Successful early in heavy rains and 40 MPH gusts; weight of rain water eventually resulted in failure
120

Contino





 Economical

• Cost for test program: less than $100,000

- Process development and engineering

- Consulting support

- CD sachets

- Generation-distribution system

- Tent rental and erection

- Tenting material

- On-site team 

- Travel and lodging

- Vehicle rental

 Simultaneous internal/external decontamination





 We have a working methodology

 Lessons learned analyses provide significant future 

improvement potential

 Systems and tenting can be “kitted-up” for delivery 

anywhere in world (i.e. deliver in a single overseas 

shipping container)

 Technology can accommodate larger scale/additional 

decon applications
121

Czarneski

1

Economical Facility 

Decontamination with Gaseous 

and Liquid Chlorine Dioxide

Mark A. Czarneski

Director of Technology

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

EPA 2008 Workshop on Decontamination 

and Associated Issues for Sites 

Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or 

Radiological Materials 

Sheraton Chapel Hill Hotel 

Chapel Hill, NC 

September 24, 2008 

2

Overview

1. Registration Background

2. Requirements – Decontamination Options

3. Equipment Setup

4. Concerns

5. Pictures – Results

6. Conclusions

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

3

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

CFR - Code of Federal Regulation

EPA regulates sale and use of pesticides and antimicrobial pesticides 

under the statutory authority of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 

and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 

 Regulation 40CFR Subchapter E - Pesticide Programs (Parts 

150-189)

 40CFR Part 152 & Part 156 Antimicrobial Registration

Requirements

http://www.epa.gov/oppad001/

Why is Antimicrobial Sterilant Registration 

Important?

4

Types Antimicrobial Pesticides

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

Sterilizers (Sporicides): Used to destroy or eliminate all forms of microbial 

life including fungi, viruses, and all forms of bacteria and their spores.

Spores are considered to be the most difficult form of microorganism to 

destroy. Therefore, EPA considers the term Sporicide to be synonymous 

with "Sterilizer."

Disinfectants: Used on hard inanimate surfaces and objects to destroy or 

irreversibly inactivate infectious fungi and bacteria but NOT necessarily 

their spores. Disinfectant products are divided into two major types: 

hospital and general use.

Sanitizers: Used to reduce, but not necessarily eliminate, microorganisms 

from the inanimate environment to levels considered safe as determined 

by public health codes or regulations.

Antiseptics and Germicides: Used to prevent infection and decay by 

inhibiting the growth of microorganisms. Because these products are 

used in or on living humans or animals, they are considered drugs and 

are thus approved and regulated by the Food and Drug Administration 

(FDA). 

http://www.epa.gov/oppad001/ad_info.htm

5

Current Sterilizer (Sporicides) Registration with US-EPA as of January 2008

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

http://www.epa.gov/oppad001/chemregindex.htm

Total 41

Hydrogen Peroxide Based 9

Sodium Chlorite (chlorine dioxide) 5

Ethylene Oxide 27

Agent Quantity

More than 5000 antimicrobial products are 

currently registered with the US-EPA.

Only 41 agents are registered as a Sterilant.

6

Current Sodium Chlorite 

(Chlorine Dioxide) Sterilizer Registration

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

For Anthrax cleanup Under Section 18 of FIFRA, EPA exempted Sabre Technologies 

from any provision of EPA registration requirement for sale or use. 

http://www.epa.gov/oppad001/chemregindex.htm

Immerse or soak in 1000 ppm 

solution for min 1 hour Aseptrol S10- 70060-19 20.8% Tab Englehard Corp

1:3:1 Dilution for 5 hours @ 

25 deg C CLIDOX-S 8714-8 0.85% BASE Pharmacal Research 

Laboratories Inc

Follow System Operations 

Guide Chlorine Dioxide 

gas @ 10 mg/L for 15 min

CSI CD 80802-1 72.8% CartridgeClorDiSys Solutions, 

Inc.

Immerse in 2000ppm solution 

for min 2 hours @ 65-80 deg F 2.0% chlorine dioxide

Biocide International Oxine 9804-1 Inc.

Immerse in solution for 10 

hours @ 20 deg C Alcide Exspor 1677-216 1.520% 4:1:1 – Base Alcide Corp

Ingredient Sterilization Use % Registration # Company Produce Name
122

Czarneski

7

Current Hydrogen Peroxide Based 

Sterilizer Registration

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

http://www.epa.gov/oppad001/chemregindex.htm

Hold in sterilizing solution for minimum 

of 8 hrs Steris Corp GW002 Tertiary Blend 1043-121 35% none

see equipment manual (Dec 2002) (May 

2000 said same as above)

Vaprox Hydrogen 58779-4 35% none Peroxide Sterilant Steris Corp

Hold in sterilizing solution for minimum 

of 5.5 hrs

0.08% Peroxyacetic

acid Spor-Klenz RTU Cold 1043-119 1.0% Sterilant Steris Corp

Arkema Inc Peroxal 70 Bio 335-233 70% None Not listed on label

For sterilization of empty, pre-cleaned, 

sealed enclosures up to 40 ft3 apply 2.2 

grams of product per minute for 90 

minutes

Steris-Hydrogen 58779-3 31% none Peroxide Sterilant Steris Corp

Immerse in 100X dilution solution for 11 

hours @ 20 deg C 

4.5% Peroxyacetic

acid Minncare Cold 52252-4 22% Sterilant Minntech

Corp

Immerse in solution for 5.5 hours @ 20 

deg C

0.06% Peroxyacetic

acid Minntech Actril Cold Sterilant 52252-7 0.8%

Corp

Circulate, coarse spray or flood 

solution for 30 min @ 20 deg C followed 

by sterile or potable water rinse

4.4% Peroxyacetic

acid and 3.3% 

Octanoic acid 

Ecolab Inc Vortexx 1677-158 6.9%

Circulate, coarse spray or flood 5 % 

solution for 6 hours @ 20 deg C, 20 

min @ 50 deg C or 5 min @ 80 deg C

5.8% Peroxyacetic

acid Ecolab Inc Oxonia Active 1677-129 27.5%

1.2% Peroxyacetic Immerse in 4% solution for 45 minutes acid Clean Earth Peridox 81073-1 24%

Technologie

s

Company Produce Name Registration # HP % Other Use

8

Reason for Decontamination

 Vacate Leased Building and turning back over to landlord

 4 Labs with possible contamination

 HIV - Human Immunodeficiency Virus 

 HEP - Hepatitis 

 CMV - cytomegalovirus (aka HCMV or Human Herpes virus 5 

(HHV-5))

 VZV - Varicella Zoster Virus (aka - chickenpox virus, varicella

virus, zoster virus, and human herpes virus type 3 (HHV-3)) 

 Other Areas possible contamination - Negligible

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

9

Scenario 1 (Gas Level 1 & 3)

 800,000 cu ft

 25 generators

 80 chlorine cylinders

 200 fans

 $147,602

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

Gas Entire Floor

 Decide NOT to gas Entire Floor

 Gassing whole floors too costly

 Not Necessary

Total Cost $ 238,624

Entire Floor Gassing

Level 1 Level 3

 370,000 cu ft

 12 generators

 39 chlorine cylinders

 120 fans

 $91,022

10

Scenario 2 (Gas 4 areas + Fogging)

 2 Areas A & B

 A = 10,800

 B = 43,200 cu ft

 Total 54,000 cu ft

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

 Balance of Area

 Total 316,000 cu ft

Less than 1⁄2 the Entire Gassing Cost 

Total Cost $116,500

Gassing & Fogging

Level 1 Gassing Fogging

Level 3 Gassing Fogging

 2 Areas C & D

 C = 60,000 cu ft

 D = 112,520 cu ft

 Total 172,520 cu ft

 Gassing Cost $89,000

 Fogging Cost $27,500

 Balance of Area

 Total 627,480 cu ft

11

Level 3 Area  ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

ClO2 Gas Decon

ClO2 Surface Fogging Decon

Standard Cleaning – General Public and Support Spaces

A

B

12

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc. Level 1 Area

ClO2 Gas Decon

ClO2 Surface Fogging Decon

Standard Cleaning – General Public and Support Spaces

C

D
123

Czarneski

13

Total Equipment on Site

 8 Chlorine Dioxide Generators

 45 Chlorine cylinders shipped 

26 theoretical required

29 actual used (leakage)

16 not used

 2 EMS Chlorine Dioxide Gas Sensor Modules

 27 Steam Fast Humidity Generators

 33 12” Distribution Fans

 Extension Cords

 Duct Tape

 3/8” gas inject tubing

 1⁄4” gas sample tubing

 5 Foggers

 Exterm Liquid Chlorine Dioxide Tablets

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

14

CD Gas Generation Technology

Cl2(g) + 2NaClO2(s) 2ClO2(g)+ 2NaCl(s)

 Performed in solid phase (no liquids)

 Gas generated on demand

 Self-Contained reagents 

 Simple to replace consumables

 Small portable generators

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

 Photometric measurement of 

concentration 

 Real Time

 Repeatable

 Accurate

 Validated

15

1 Generator

Injection

1

Injection

2 Photometric

Sensor

Sensor

2

Sensor

1

X

X

X

Equipment Locations Area A

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

 5 Rooms

 Volume -

10,800 cu ft

2

2

Fans

Sample Points

Gas Injection Points

BI Locations

5

1

4

2

3

3 5

1 Generator for every 10,800 cu ft

16

Generator

1

Injection

1

Injection

2

Photometric

Sensor

Sensor

2

Sensor

1

Sensor

3

Sensor

4

Injection

4

Injection

3

Generator

2

X

X

X

X

X

Equipment Locations Area B

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

 10 Rooms

 Volume43,200 cu ft

4

4 Injection Points

Sample Points

Fans

BI Locations

8

1

2

3 4

5

7

6

8

5

1 Generator for every 21,600 cu ft

17

1

3

2

Sensor

7

6

4

5

6

1

4 5 6 7 8

2 3

9

8

X

X

X

X

Equipment Locations Area C

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

 9 Rooms

 Volume60,000 cu ft

4

6 Injection Points

Sample Points

Fans

BI Locations

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

4

1 Generator for every 20,000 cu ft

18 14

1

6

2

Sensor

1

4

5

3

4 5 6 7 8

2 3

1

2

7

8

9

10

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

X

X

X

X

X

Equipment Locations Area D

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

120 ft

(36m)

46 ft

(14m)

 16 Rooms

 Volume112,520 cu ft

5

10 Injection Points

Sample Points

Fans

BI Locations

24

169 ft (52 m)

40 ft

(12 m)

5

1 Generator for every 22,504 cu ft
124

Czarneski

19

Concerns

 NO Concerns

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

Area A

 Windows on outside walls - Decon Performed Evening (5pm Start)

Area B

 Windows on outside walls - Decon performed Evening (5pm Start)

 Distance of Generators to Area D Target Decon Space (375ft)

 Safety (Leakage)

 Drop Ceilings

 Many unsealed penetration

 Solution for Leakage and Drop Ceilings

 Contain Leakage through segregation and air flow

Area C & D

20

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc. Create Air Flow

C

D

Personnel & 

Generator 

Location

X

Air Flow 

Direction

 Setup Air Flow away from personnel

 Setup Equipment remote from target area

Low 

Pressure

High 

Pressure

Low 

Pressure

21

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc. Fogging

22

NO Material Effects

Post Exposure 

Copper piping & 

Brass Regulator

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

23

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc. Area D

24

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

Concentration Readings (mg/L)

Area A&B
125

Czarneski

25

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

Concentration Readings (mg/L)

Area C&D

26

Readings Result

 10,800 cu ft

 1 generators

 Calculated Charge 75 min

 Actual Charge 30 min

 Room smaller than 

estimated (lower ceiling 

height)

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

Level 3 Area A Level 3 Area B

 43,200 cu ft

 2 generators

 Calculated Charge 150 min

 Actual Charge 130 min

 Good

 60,000 cu ft

 3 generators

 Calculated Charge 140 min

 Actual Charge 120 min

 Good

Level 1 Area C Level 1 Area D

 112,520 cu ft

 5 generators

 Calculated Charge 155 min

 Actual Charge 240 min

 Leakage - Gas loss through 

drop ceilings

27

Conclusions

 Complete kill of all Biological Indicators

 No physical residue observed 

 No visible indication of material degradation on any of the metal 

containing equipment left within the building

 No visible indication of material degradation on any electronics

 Low Chlorine Dioxide Concentrations (Less than 468 ppm)

 1188 Lowest PPM-Hrs 

 1872 Highest PPM-Hrs

 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.

28

For more information contact:

Mark A. Czarneski

PO Box 549 

Lebanon, NJ 08833

Phone: 908-236-4100

Fax: 908-236-2222

e-mail: 

markczarneski@cloridsys.com



 ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
126

Rastogi

Assessment of 

Biological Indicators for 

Building Interior Decon

Assessment of 

Biological Indicators for 

Building Interior Decon

Vipin K. Rastogi1, Shawn Ryan2

, Lalena Wallace1, 

Lisa S. Smith1, and Amber Prugh3

1. BioDefense Branch, R&T Directorate, US Army – ECBC

2. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development/NHSRC 

3. Science & Technology Corp., Edgewood, MD

vipin.rastogi@us.army.mil; 410-436-4856

Vipin K. Rastogi1, Shawn Ryan2

, Lalena Wallace1, 

Lisa S. Smith1, and Amber Prugh3

1. BioDefense Branch, R&T Directorate, US Army – ECBC

2. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development/NHSRC 

3. Science & Technology Corp., Edgewood, MD

vipin.rastogi@us.army.mil; 410-436-4856

Presented at the 2008 Decon Workshop on September 25, 2008 Presented at the 2008 Decon Workshop on September 25, 2008 2

Outline Outline

• Biological Indicators - Background 

• Rationale and Objectives

• Experimental Methodologies

• Results

- Efficacy of CD Gas for Spore Kill on Different Surfaces

- CT Required depends on the Type of Surface – BI vs. Wood/Carpet

- D-values on BI vs. Wood 

• Designing BI Appropriate for Building Interior Decontamination

- Backing Material

- Spore Type

• Conclusions

3

Background Background

• Biological Indicators (BIs) are defined as “A standardized preparation of 

bacterial spores on or in a carrier serving to demonstrate whether sterilizing 

conditions have been met. Spores of different organisms are used for 

different methods of sterilization” (Fifth Edition "Disinfection, Sterilization, and 

Preservation – The Essential, by Seymor S. Block)

• Most commonly, BIs are used for validating sporicidal gassing cycles and/or 

steam-sterilization processes in pharmaceutical or medical device industry

• In the fall of 2001, a number of buildings were contaminated

with spores of Bacillus anthracis

• Three buildings, ranging from 700,000 – 14,000,000 cubic feet, were 

decontaminated via chlorine dioxide (CD) fumigation

• Building clearance was based on “no growth” of any 

environmental samples

- Over 10,000 clearance samples taken (no positive results)

4

Background Background

• In all fumigation decontamination events for B. anthracis to date, 

biological indicator/spore strips (BIs) have been used extensively to indicate 

that target fumigant concentrations were reached “throughout” the building

• Sampling plan designed to locate placement of BI

- Random/stratified locations

- Biased in locations of known contamination

- “Hard to reach places”

• Criterion was one per 100 square feet, but up to three per

100 square feet were required to cover sampling plan

Few positive BI returns from some locations (spot cleaning performed)

• On-going debate regarding sampling strategies

- Number and intended use of BI

- Appropriateness of spore type (B. atrophaeus) and steel-backing 

- Risk-based clearance vs. “zero” positives from sampling

5

Background Background

SEM Pictures of Four BIs (courtesy PDA BI Task Force

6

Objectives Objectives

1. Determine and compare the efficacy of CD gas on six building interior 

surfaces and BIs as a function of CT values (conc. in ppmv x time in hours) 

Spore suspension inoculated and dried on carpet, ceiling tile, cinder block,

I-beam steel, wallboard, and pine wood materials (107 spores/coupon)

Coupons (1.3x1.3-cm) of non-uniform porosity

2. Estimation of D (decimal reduction) value comparison for spore kill on BIs 

vs building interior 

106 (6 log) spores/BI with steel backing

Evenly dispersed

3. Evaluation of surrogate spore type and BI backing for developing 

appropriate BIs for use in building fumigation efforts 
127

Rastogi

7

Experimental Methodologies Experimental Methodologies

Biological Indicator spores strips 

B. atrophaeus (>1x106) on stainless steel backing 

in Tyvek pouches (APEX lab Inc.) 

13 x 13 mm coupons (5 reps per dish)

- raw wood, unpainted cinder block, 

carpet, painted I-beam steel, 

ceiling tile, painted wallboard

Inoculated with ~107 spores of avirulent B. anthracis

(NNR1∆1) in 7 x 7.1 L drops

Inclusion of 0.5 % fetal bovine serum

as organic bioburden

8

Experimental Methodologies Experimental Methodologies

5 plates, each containing:

- 1 BI + 30 test coupons + 6 control 

(blanks) in the chamber 

- one plate withdrawn per time point

ClO2 generation by:

ClorDiSys GMP generator

Cl2 + 2NaClO2  2NaCl + 2ClO2

Sabre Technologies 

stripping CD from solution

Constant ClO2 concentrations maintained 

@ 500, 1000, 1500 or 3000 ppm

Temperature and RH maintained at

~75oF and ~75% RH throughout the 

fumigation

Sampling Ports

8 cubic-ft Fumigation 

Chamber

9

Results Results

0 3000 6000 9000

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 Sabre Technical Serives, LLC

 ClorDiSys Solutions Incorporated

 BIs (1 = growth/ 0 = no growth)

Log CFU

CT (ppm-hrs)

Carpet

1. CT Required for Building Materials

0 3000 6000 9000

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 Sabre Technical Serives, LLC

 ClorDiSys Solutions Incorporated

 BIs (1 = growth/ 0 = no growth)

Log CFU

CT (ppm-hrs)

Unpainted Pine Wood

• “No growth” achieved with 6000 - 9000 ppm-hr dose on acoustic ceiling tile, 

painted wallboard, or unpainted pine wood

• “No growth” on carpet achieved with a dose of 3000 – 5000 ppm-hr

10

Results Results

2. CT Required for BI (Qualitative)

• ZERO positive BI with a dose of 5000 ppm-hr (variability is evident)

- not consistent with results of B. anthracis on materials, except carpet

- Conventional BIs can not be used to indicate a CT of 9000 ppm-hr

• BI results are independent of CD generation method

0

2000400060008000

0

1

 500 ppm runs

 1000 ppm runs

 1500 ppm runs

Growth (1)/No-Growth (0)

CT (ppm-hr)

BIs - ChlorDiSys ClO2

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

0

1

 500 ppm runs

 1000 ppm runs

 1500 ppm runs

 3000 ppm runs

Growth (1)/No-Growth (0)

CT (ppm-hr)

BIs - Sabre ClO2

11

Results Results

3. Correlation of Spore Kill on BIs with that on Wood? • Kill kinetics were 

performed; time for a 1-

LR was determined from 

the slope (D-value)

• D-value for BIs 7-8 min, 

compared to 21-24 min 

for wood

• Extrapolated time for six 

log reduction (D6) less 

than observed values

• No agreement between 

kinetics of spore kill on 

BIs vs. on wood 

• CT required for all spore 

kill on BIs < than on wood

• Why? 

- Coupon material

- Spore type

Sporicidal Efficacy of CD Gas (500 and 1500 ppmv) on BIs and 

Wood Coupons 

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

BI (500 ppm) Wood (500 ppm) BI (1500 ppm) Wood (1500 ppm)

Samples

D-Value (Min for 1-log Redcution)

D

D6 (Est.)

D6 (Obs.)

12

Results Results

4a. BI Development for Building Interior Decon

• BIs developed (by APEX Lab) with B. atrophaeus spores at three loading 

levels, 1E6, 1E7, and 1E8 on steel and nitrocellulose membrane backing

- Qualitative results indicated that steel backed BIs appeared to be ‘hardto-kill’

- A spore loading of 1E7 was selected based on the qualitative results on 

CT required for ‘zero growth’

• BIs prepared with 1E7 spores of B. atrophaeus, B. subtilis, B. cereus, and G. 

stearothermophilus were used in fumigation runs along with two building 

materials, ceiling tile and pine wood, inoculated with B. anthracis spores
128

Rastogi

13

Results Results

4b. Kill Profile of Surrogates Spores on Stainless Steel Backing

Relative Sensitivity of Surrogate Spore Types to CD Gas

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0 1500 3000 4500

CT = ppmv.hr

Log reduction

B. atrophaeus

B. cereus

B. subtilis

G. stearothermophilus

B. anthracis on Ceiling Tile

B. anthracis on Wood

• While B. cereus spores 

appears to be most 

sensitive, G. 

stearothermophilus

spores appears to be 

the least sensitive to 

CD gas

• G.s. spore type most 

closely parallels the B. 

anthracis spore kill on 

wood surface

• Both spore type and 

backing material 

important for predicting 

the behavior of BIs

14

Results Results

5. Spore and Surface Type Interaction for CD Efficacy

• B. anthracis spores on 

carpet, ceiling tile, and I 

beam steel require a CT 

of 3000-5000 ppmv-hr for 

complete kill 

• B. anthracis spores on 

wood require a CT value 

of 7000-9000 ppmv- hr for 

complete kill 

• G. stearothermophilus

spores on steel require a 

CT value of 7000 ppmv-hr 

for complete kill 

Role of Surface and Spore type on Decontamination Efficacy of CD Gas

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

B. anthracis on

Carpet

B. anthracis on

Ceiling Tile

B. anthracis on

Steel

B. anthracis on

Wood

G.

stearothermophilus

BI (Steel)

Spore Type

Log Reduction

1000 3000 5000 7000 9000

15

Conclusions Conclusions

• Decontamination of conventional BIs (e.g., stainless steel 

backing) require significantly less CT values (3000 – 5000 

ppmv-hr) than those (7000 - 9000 ppmv-hr) required for 

decontamination of building interior surfaces

- Gold standard

• Both, the spore type and the material surface, are 

important in predicting the behavior of BIs

- Wood is one of the most difficult surfaces to decon

• G. stearothermophilus spores appear to be the most 

appropriate surrogate in the context of building interior 

decontamination with CD gas

16

Ricin Toxin

Acknowledgements Acknowledgements

• FUNDING

• US EPA – NHSRC

• Personnel

•Saumil Shah and Jonathan 

Sabol for CD measurements

•Becky Wiza for laboratory 

prep work 

•Dr. Joe Delmasso, APEX Lab 

Inc. for BI The Crazy, Happy, and 

Productive Bunch

Thanks

Questions
129

Dean

1/8/2009 Office of Research and Development

Full Name of Lab, Center, Office, Division or Staff goes here. <Go to View, Master, Title Master to change>

Photo image area measures 2” H x 6.93” W and can be masked by a 

collage strip of one, two or three images.

The photo image area is located 3.19” from left and 3.81” from top of page.

Each image used in collage should be reduced or cropped to a maximum of 

2” high, stroked with a 1.5 pt white frame and positioned edge-to-edge with 

accompanying images.

Timothy Dean

USEPA/ORD/NRMRL/APPCD/IEMB

September 25, 2008

Reduction and Elimination of Biological 

Contamination Using Bacteriophage

1

What is a phage?

Simply put a phage is a virus that infects bacteria

-highly specific for host (no cross infectivity)

-phage for every bacteria searched to date

Divided into those with RNA genomes, small DNA genomes,

and those with medium to large DNA genomes

Highly diverse in shape and size

Lytic phage kill their host upon infection

2

Φ P2

Lambda Phage

Φ P22

3

Phage Facts....

There are probably more individual bacteriophages in the 

biosphere than there are of any other group of organisms

In coastal sea water there are typically as many as 10 7 (ten 

million) tailed phages per milliliter

In some fresh water sources there are up to 10 9 (a billion) per 

milliliter

There may be as many as 10 30 tailed phage globally

-They would outweigh the world population of elephants 

by a thousand-fold or more

4

Future Importance of Phage

Antibiotic resistance is an increasing threat in hospitals and both 

morbidity and mortality from infections are greater when caused 

by drug-resistant organisms. 

Caused in part by the unchecked use of antibiotics

Resistant organisms include:

1. methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus

2. vancomycin-resistant enterococci

3. multi-drug resistance in Mycobacterium tuberculosis

4. multi-drug-resistant (MDR) gram-negative bacteria

5

Why Phage?

• Phage are highly specific

• Phage are non-toxic to animals and plants

• Phage increase in titre as they infect

• Phage kill their target microbes 

• Phage are self limiting

Objective: Utilize bacteriophage to decontaminate 

bacterially contaminated building materials
130

Dean

6

Lytic Life Cycle

7

ATTACK!!

8

Phage and the Bio-Contaminant Lab

Approach: The goal of the Phase I activities was to 

prepare E. coli O157:H7 phage preparation with strong lytic

potency against E. coli O157:H7 strains, and to rigorously 

characterize each component monophage included in the 

candidate phage cocktail.

Work with Intralytix to develop proof in principle 

bacteriophage decontamination

Phase II studies included tasks to examine the efficacy of 

the ECP-100TM preparation in reducing the numbers of 

E. coli 0157:H7 on hard, inanimate surfaces 

(glass and gypsum board).

9

Host Range

E. coli 0157:H7 

strains 

 Nine E. coli monophages used for screening  

Original # ID# ECML4 ECML117 ECML134 ECML119 ECML122 ECML2 ECML123/2 ECML124 ECML127 

Unknown O157 + + + + + + - - - 

86-24 119 + + + + + - - - - 

EDL-933 120 - + + + + - - - - 

KSU1 121 - + + + - - - - - 

KSU2 122 + + + + + + - - - 

KSU3 123 - - - - - - + - - 

KSU4 124 - - - - - - - + - 

KSU5 125 - + - + - - - - - 

KSU6 126 - + + + - - - - - 

KSU7 127 - - - - - - - - + 

KSU933 128 - + - + + - - - - 

EHEC1 129 - + + + + - - - - 

EHEC2 130 + + + + + - - - - 

EHEC3 131 - + + + + - - - - 

EHEC4 132 + + + - - - - - - 

EHEC5 133 + + + + + - - - - 

EHEC6 134 + + + - + - - - - 

EHEC7 135 + + + + + - - - - 

EHEC8 136 + + + - + - - - - 

USDA 141 + + - + + - - - - 

U.H.87-23 149 + + - + + - - - - 

ATCC700728 150 + + - + + - - - - 

Susceptibility 54.50% 86.40% 63.60% 77.20% 68% 9% 4.50% 4.50% 4.50% 

10

Cocktail 1 Monophages

 1 ECML-4 

2 ECML-117 

3 ECML -134 

Cocktail 2 Monophages 

1 ECML -4 

2 ECML- 117 

3 ECML -134 

4 ECML- 119 

5 ECML- 122 

E. coli 0157:H7 Candidate phage cocktails 

Original # ID# Cocktail 1 Cocktail 2 

unknown O157 + + 

86-24 119 + + 

EDL-933 120 + + 

KSU1 121 + + 

KSU2 122 + + 

KSU3 123 - - 

KSU4 124 - - 

KSU5 125 + + 

KSU6 126 + + 

KSU7 127 - - 

KSU933 128 + + 

EHEC1 129 + + 

EHEC2 130 + + 

EHEC3 131 + + 

EHEC4 132 + + 

EHEC5 133 + + 

EHEC6 134 + + 

EHEC7 135 + + 

EHEC8 136 + + 

USDA 141 + + 

U.H.87-23 149 + + 

ATCC700728 150 + + 

Susceptibility 86.40% 86.40% 

Cocktail Comparison

11

Phase I Conclusions

• ECML-134, ECML-117, and ECML-4 were subjected to 

molecular analysis to confirm that they were three separate 

bacteriophage and not duplicate organisms. Pulse Field Gel 

Electrophoresis (PFGE), Restriction Fragment Length 

Polymorphism (RFLP) and SDS-PAGE 

• In addition, three “Indicator Strains” or “Challenge Strains”

were chosen for Phase II studies, based on their susceptibility 

to E. coli monophages included in ECP-100. 
131

Dean

12

Decon Trials

Reduction in E. coli counts on glass surfaces (based on 

triplicate samples)

13

Reduction in E. coli counts on gypsum board surfaces 

(based on triplicate samples)

Decon Trials

14

Data Summary

1010 PFU/ml: ca. 8,333-fold reduction or 99.99% reduction 

109 PFU/ml: ca. 52-fold reduction or 98% reduction 

108 PFU/ml: ca. 16-fold reduction or 94% reduction 

Glass Cover Slides

Gypsum Wallboard

1010 PFU/ml: ca. 3567-fold reduction or 100% reduction 

109 PFU/ml: ca. 20-fold reduction or 95% reduction 

108 PFU/ml: ca. 7-fold reduction or 85% reduction 

** Note: 5 Minute Contact Time 15

Future Direction

• Develop phage cocktail active against Yersinia pestis

• Show activity on various building materials

• Application studies (particle size, pressure, etc.)

• Storage and Use

16

Collaborators

Intralytix

Alexander Sulakvelidze

Tamar Abuladze

World authority on applied bacteriophage technology
132

Wood

January 8, 2009 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Wet Scrubbing and Adsorption for the 

Capture of Chlorine Dioxide Gas During 

Fumigation Events

Joseph Wood, USEPA

Presented to:

US EPA Decontamination Workshop

Chapel Hill, NC

September 25, 2008 

1 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Outline of Talk 

• Background

• Purpose 

• Mobile Decontamination Trailer (MDT) test description

• MDT test results

• Sorbent adsorption experiments

• Sorbent results

• Conclusions

• Contact info

2 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Background – ClO2 efficacy

• ClO2 is one of the fumigants of choice to inactivate B. 

anthracis spores in structures. 

• ClO2 has been found to be effective in inactivating other 

BWA, ricin, and mold as well

• Used for decon of agricultural products 

• In laboratory tests, found to be effective for VX, somewhat 

effective on TGD.

3 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Background – ClO2 hazards

• However, ClO2 is a severe respiratory and eye irritant

• Unstable at concentrations > 10% (decomposes, may be 

explosive)

–Must be generated at point of use

• Occupational Safety and Health Administration permissible

exposure limit 0.1 ppmv over 8 hours

• Due to hazards, ClO2 must be tightly controlled and 

monitored

• Keeping building under negative air pressure during decon

helps to minimize risk of leakage to atmosphere

4 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Other Chlorine Dioxide 

Exposure Limits

Time Weighted Average 0.1 ppm

Exposure Limit (8-hour)

Short term exposure limit (15 0.3 ppm

minutes)

Immediately Dangerous to 5 ppm

Life and Health (IDLH)

Odor threshold 0.1 to 0.3 ppm

Limit Value

From NIOSH and OSHA

5 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Background – ClO2 control

• During a fumigation event, ClO2-laden air may be withdrawn 

from the building to maintain negative pressure, and routed to 

a scrubbing unit to remove the ClO2 prior to emission to the 

atmosphere.

–Activated carbon used by one vendor

–In a demonstration test of the MDT, a wet scrubber was 

used 

–Wet scrubbing and carbon adsorption were used in decon

of buildings from 2001 anthrax attacks

–However, some small fumigations conducted with facility at 

atmospheric pressure and sealed, and ClO2 is not 

scrubbed
133

Wood

6 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Purpose of Research

• There are no data available to quantify and compare the 

performance of scrubbing technologies for the removal of ClO2

from gas streams

• A field test was conducted to demonstrate a mobile chlorine 

dioxide generation and scrubbing system (aka MDT). A 

description of this technology and data on the performance of 

the wet scrubbing system will be presented.

• In a separate project, controlled laboratory experiments were 

conducted to determine the adsorption capacity of various 

sorbents, and the impact adsorption operating parameters 

have on performance. A description of this technology and test 

results will be presented.

7 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Wet Scrubber Field Test Description

• A mobile ClO2 generation and scrubbing system was field 

tested in June 2006. 

• 12-hour demonstration test conducted with the oversight and 

funding of EPA, DHS, DoD

• Scrubber description

–Packed adsorption tower, countercurrent flow, with mist 

elimination system

–Liquid scrubbing solution:

• 15 % sodium thiosulfate, 15% NaOH

• Recirculation flow rate = 55 gpm

• 5 tanks, each 550 gallons

8 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Back View of MDT

9 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Wet Scrubber Field Test Description 

(cont.)

• Scrubber inlet conditions:

– ClO2 generation gas diluted, routed directly to scrubber

• Expected flow ~ 3000 acfm, 2300 ppmv, 73 lbs/hr

• Scrubber outlet required to be less than 0.5 ppmv ClO2

– 99.98 % removal efficiency

• ClO2 gas measured by wet chemistry (titration) and 

electrochemical sensors (outlet only)

10 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Wet Scrubber Field Test Results

• Actual average scrubber inlet ClO2 level 900 – 1600 ppm

• Scrubber air flow was measured to be 2600 – 3300 ACFM, 

with 2.5 inches pressure drop across scrubber.

• A little over 4 tanks scrubber solution used during 12 hr test

• Average outlet level was ~ 0.3 ppmv

• Outlet level was below 0.5 ppmv for whole test, except 

toward end of test, outlet level was measured at 0.7 ppmv

–Switched to new tank of scrubber solution, and level 

dropped to 0.1 ppmv

• MDT was to have 2 scrubbers functioning, but only 1 working 

at time of test 

11 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Wet Scrubber Field Test Conclusions

• Performance adequate for the one scrubber that was demonstrated

• Caveats: 

– Inlet ClO2 levels lower than expected/required

– One scrubber did not perform during preliminary tests, was not used during 

demo test

– A pump failed, but another pump was rapidly brought online 

• Drawbacks to wet scrubbing

– Extra equipment

• Pumps, demisters, tanks

– Spill containment

– Hazardous materials 

– Hazardous waste disposal
134

Wood

12 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Sorbent Tests - Background

• Determine adsorption capacity as a function of sorbent type 

and ClO2 concentration and other parameters

• Also determine sorbent bed temp. increase, spent sorbent 

characteristics

• Sorbents tested

–Activated carbon, coal based, 4 mm pellet

–Granular Activated carbon, coconut shell based

–Activated alumina and carbon mixture, impregnated with

KOH

–Activated carbon impregnated with KOH

–Activated carbon impregnated with KI

13 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Sorbent Bed Test Diagram

Source Chamber

4500E Sampling 

every 2 hours

Thermocouple

EMS

Sample 

console(with

Pump) Hood

ClO2 Flow (heated lines)

Data Acquisition 

System

Static Pressure Lines

Data Flow

RH control with humid air 

injection, temperature control 

with IR bulb

RH 

Sensor

MSM-4500-E 

before and after By- test

pass 

Blan

k

14 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Sorbent Test Methods

• Measurement methods

–Photometric instruments (Clordisys EMS® and GMP) for 

inlet and outlet levels

–Checked/verified with titration method 

–Inlet RH and T measured with Vaisala thermistor

15 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Sorbent Test Methods

• Experimental set up and test procedures

–GMP® generator, mixing chamber

–750, 1500, and 3000 ppm ClO2

–Temperature ~ 23 °C, RH ~ 75%, flow 5 liter/minute

–3 replicates per test condition

–Sorbent moisture content – measured, tested as received

• Adsorption capacity isotherms

–Mass ClO2 adsorbed/mass sorbent

–Mass adsorbed based on the difference in inlet and outlet

ClO2 levels, integrated over time.

16 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Breakthrough Curves 

for Coal-Based Carbon

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

Run Time (minutes)

ClO2 Breakthrough Concentration (mg/L)

100107

091907A

'091207A

091407A

092107A

092407A

092507A

092607A

092707A

Run time (minutes)

Sorbent bed outlet ClO2 level, mg/l

8.5 mg/l (3000 ppm) inlet ClO2 level Test Runs

4.25 mg/l (1500 ppm) inlet ClO2 level

2.1 mg/l (750 ppm) inlet ClO2 level

17 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Isotherm for Coal-based Carbon

ClO2 concentration mg/l

0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

120.0

140.0

0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0

ClO2 Concentration

Adsorption capacity mg ClO2/g sorbent

Blue diamonds are mean of

3 replicates (pink squares)
135

Wood

18 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Sorbent Test Program - Conclusions

• Some chemical breakdown of ClO2 may be occurring in 

sorbent bed, since outlet concentration of ClO2 plateaued but 

never reached inlet level 

• Coal-based carbon performed best (highest adsorption 

capacity, and lowest cost), followed by coconut-shell based 

carbon

–Alumina-based sorbent and impregnated carbons 

performed worse

19 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Sorbent Test Program - Conclusions

• Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure for coal based 

carbon – passed for organics (i.e., not a hazardous waste for 

this criterion)

• Desorption

–Warm air (60 oC) passed over bed, then sampled/analyzed

–Chlorine and chlorine dioxide gas detected using OSHA 

method ID-202

• chlorine was predominant

–Effect of adsorption on carbon bed temperature

• Minimal rise in temperature

20 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Acknowledgements

• Mobile Decon Trailer team

– NSWC, HSARPA, JPEO, DARPA

– SAIC, CDG

• ARCADIS

–Dahman Touati, Matt Clayton, Craig Williams, Stella Payne 
136

Attwood

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Photo image area measures 2” H x 6.93” W and can be masked by a 

collage strip of one, two or three images.

The photo image area is located 3.19” from left and 3.81” from top of page. 

Each image used in collage should be reduced or cropped to a maximum of 

2” high, stroked with a 1.5 pt white frame and positioned edge-to-edge with 

accompanying images.

Brian C. Attwood, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency

Material Demand for Hydrogen 

Peroxide of Building Materials

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Background

• This research is being conducted as part of the NHSRC’s 

systematic decontamination technology evaluation program

• Under the program, several fumigation technologies are 

evaluated for:

–Decontamination efficacy

–Impact on building materials and contents

–Impact of building materials and contents on efficacy

• In this particular project, the effect of two different hydrogen

peroxide vapor technologies on several building materials is 

being evaluated

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Background

• Since there currently are no technologies registered for use in 

decontaminating anthrax under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 

and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) the specific requirements for a sterilization 

process in any future event are unclear

• The vendor of any technology would be required to reach and 

maintain a particular vapor phase concentration for a specified 

length of time

• The building materials and contents of the space to be 

decontaminated would influence how easily this can be 

accomplished

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Objective

• Determine the material demand of several common building 

materials using the hydrogen peroxide vapor decontamination 

technologies of two vendors: BIOQUELL, Inc. and STERIS Corp.

• Develop a tool to help on scene coordinators, building owners, 

and other responsible parties estimate the capacity needed for a

particular application and evaluate vendor bids for feasibility of a 

proposed decontamination approach

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Material Demand

• Hydrogen peroxide gas phase concentration can be reduced by 

several different processes:

– Homogeneous decomposition

– Catalytic decomposition

– Reactive decomposition

– Reversible adsorption

– Irreversible adsorption

• Determining the degree to which each of these processes acts is 

beyond the scope of this work

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Hydrogen peroxide decontamination technologies

• BIOQUELL, Inc.

– Clarus L

– Increases the concentration of 

hydrogen peroxide vapor until 

“micro-condensation” is reached

– BIs are used to confirm conditions 

sufficient to achieve kill

– Presence of hydrogen peroxide rich 

condensate is believed to enhance 

kill

– High relative humidity limits the 

vapor phase peroxide concentration 

at condensation
137

Attwood

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Hydrogen peroxide decontamination technologies

• STERIS, Corp.

– VHP 1000ED

– Maintains a steady peroxide 

concentration at non-condensing 

conditions

– Under their registration as a sterilant, 

may be used in non-validated cycles 

of 250 ppm/90 min or 400 ppm/30 

min under certain conditions

– Relies on gas phase hydrogen 

peroxide to effect a kill

– Also limited in achievable gas phase 

peroxide concentration at high 

relative humidity

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Materials Tested

• Commercial floor tile

• Nylon carpet

• Galvanized metal 

ductwork

• Ceiling tile

• Latex painted wallboard

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Test chamber

• 317 liter glove box

• Lined with aluminum foil to reduce 

adsorption

• Test materials placed on four 

shelves

• An electrochemical HP sensor and 

a VAISALA temperature/humidity 

sensor log experimental conditions

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Test Method

• Clarus L (testing underway)

– Introduce sufficient hydrogen peroxide at one time to induce “microcondensation” within the test chamber

– Monitor the peak concentration as well as the rate of hydrogen 

peroxide concentration decline to determine material demand

• VHP 1000 ED (testing to start soon)

– Introduce sufficient hydrogen peroxide at a continuous rate to maintain 

the desired concentration within the test chamber

– Monitor the difference between the VHP concentration introduced and 

that within the chamber to determine the material demand 

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Preliminary Results - BIOQUELL

5 mL of Hydrogen Peroxide Injected at Initial RH of 35%

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600

Time (s)

HP Concentration (ppm)

Blank

Galvanized Metal

Floor Tile

Wallboard

Carpet

Ceiling Tile

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Preliminary Results - BIOQUELL

5 mL of Hydrogen Peroxide Injected at Initial RH of 35%

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600

Time (s)

Relative Humidity (%)

Blank

Floor Tile

Wallboard

Ceiling Tile

Galvanized Metal

Carpet
138

Attwood

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Preliminary Results - BIOQUELL

1.5 mL of Hydrogen Peroxide Injected at Initial RH of 70%

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600

Time (s)

HP Concentration (ppm)

Blank

Floor Tile

Galvanized Metal

Carpet

Ceiling Tile

Wallboard

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Preliminary Results - BIOQUELL

1.5 mL of Hydrogen Peroxide Injected at Initial RH of 70%

65

70

75

80

85

90

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600

Time (s)

Relative Humidity (%)

Blank

Floor Tile

Galvanized Metal

Wallboard

Ceiling Tile

Carpet

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Data Analysis

• Determine the flux of hydrogen peroxide to the surface of the 

materials as follows:

[ ] [ ]

material

material blank

OH area

t

OH

t

OH

flux ∂

∂ − ∂∂

−=

22 22

22

• Develop a tool to calculate the total rate of 

adsorption/decomposition expected in a given space based on 

the surface area of each material within that space

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Future Work

• Evaluate and refine the tool based on trials in a more realistic setting, i.e., 

larger scale, greater volume to surface ratio

• Examine hydrogen peroxide vapor efficacy on different materials

– Material demand should reduce local concentration of hydrogen 

peroxide → less efficacious

– BIs on steel discs or paper strips may not adequately represent spores 

deposited onto fibrous or porous materials

• Determine material demand of other potential fumigants, such as methyl 

bromide
139

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for DOE/NNSA

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Bacillus Thuringiensis

var. kurstaki (Btk) Agent Fate 

Characterization

Bacillus Thuringiensis

var. kurstaki (Btk) Agent Fate 

Characterization

Kristin M. Omberg, PhD

Systems Engineering and Integration Group

Los Alamos National Laboratory

komberg@lanl.gov

September 12, 2008

Systems Engineering and Integration Group

Los Alamos National Laboratory

komberg@lanl.gov

September 12, 2008

Slide 3

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Gypsy Moths

The culprit ...

... looks pretty harmless.

Images from www.acgov.org and www.forestryimages.org

Slide 4

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Consequences of gypsy moths

Slide 5

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Biological warfare ( ... on gypsy moths)

Bacillus thuringiensis

var. kurstaki (Btk)

Bt toxin crystals

1 �m

www.magma.ca

www.gmo-compass.org

Slide 6

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Btk spraying provides a unique opportunity to study 

environmental fate following a biological release

� Btk shares many physical and biological properties with 

Bacillus anthracis

� Bounding scenario—other agents likely less persistent

� May not be an ideal release scenario. . .

• Droplets are very large

• Droplet size distribution estimated (log-normal assumed)

• Clumping is desirable

• Wind speed, direction only known at regional scale; conditions 

unstable; local wind fields and turbulence not known 

� . . . but adequate for evaluating environmental fate

Slide 7

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

LANL is using spraying in Seattle, WA and Fairfax, VA to 

characterize long-term fate of Btk in urban environments

� Questions

• How long does the agent remain viable at detectable levels?

• What is the approximate magnitude and duration of resuspension?

• Does the agent transport into buildings?

� Methods

• Surface (swipes), bulk (soil, water, vegetation), air sampling

• Culture, DNA-based analysis (PCR)

• Urban transport and dispersion modeling
140

Slide 8

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Previous studies: Fairfax County, VA

� LANL and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory used 

gypsy moth spraying in 2006 and 2007 to answer 

questions relevant to the BioWatch program

• No background Btk detected

• Viable agent detected at least two weeks after spraying

• Weather events (e.g., wind, rain) had little effect on viability results

� Fairfax blocks studied heavily canopied; not “urban”

� Experiment duration: two weeks

• Literature indicates Btk may persist several years

Slide 9

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Washington State gypsy moth eradication efforts

� Most years since 1981, the 

Washington Department of 

Agriculture has sprayed 

Btk

� Spraying typically April, 

May

� Spray blocks ranged in 

size from 0.5 to 116,000 

acres

� Smaller blocks sprayed 

from ground; larger blocks 

sprayed aerially 2002 Crown Hill (Seattle) 16.5

2002 Vader (Lewis County) 560

2004 Port Ludlow (Jefferson County) 12

2004 Bellevue 11

2004 Mayfield (Lewis County) 7.5

2005 Eastlake (Seattle) 12

2005 Evergreen Ridge (Kitsap County) 160

2006 Madison (Seattle) 100

2006 Rosemont (Bellevue) 5.5

2007 Kent (King County) 25

Size

(acres)

Year Area

agr.wa.gov/PlantsInsects/InsectPests/GypsyMoth/default.htm

Slide 10

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Sample & analyze 2007, 

2006 spray areas and 

control site

Sample & analyze 

2005 spray areas

Sample & analyze 2004 

spray areas; reduce 2008 

sampling effort

Sample & analyze 

2008 spray area

Viable agent 

detected

Viable agent 

not detected

Sample & analyze 2003 

spray areas; reduce 2008 

sampling effort

Viable agent detected 

in 2004 spray area

Etc.

Viable agent not detected

Viable agent detected 

in 2005 spray area

Viable agent not detected

Viable agent not detected

Slide 11

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Sample locations in Seattle area

� Kent 2007

• 25 acres

� Madison 2006

• 100 acres

� Rosemont 2006

• 5.5 acres

� Eastlake 2005

• 12 acres

� Bellevue 2004

• 11 acres

� Control area

• 12 acres

10 miles

Slide 12

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Sampling plan design (I)

� Impossible to design a plan to statistically determine 

that viable Btk does not exist in a large area

� Plans designed to produce a 99% confidence that at 

least 95% of the area is without detectable spores 

• 99% confidence ensures that multiple years’ data can be 

aggregated while still retaining greater than 95% confidence

— i.e. “Data from 2007 AND 2006 indicate. . .”

� Three sampling schemes*

• Probabilistic

• Close

• Targeted

* Gilbert, RO, 1987: Statistical Methods for Environmental 

Pollution Monitoring. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. Slide 13

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Sampling plan design (II)

� Probabilistic: assumes uniform distribution 

• Grid or transect technique will be employed

• Spray areas are not uniform in land use; vegetation tends to be less 

homogeneous than parking lots or roads

• Areas will be divided into vegetative and non-vegetative areas, with more 

samples collected in vegetative areas 

� Uniform distribution assumption may be incorrect

• “Close” samples will be collected for 10% of the probabilistic samples 

— 10% of the probabilistic samples will have a second sample taken

within one foot of the first

• If close samples give a different result than probabilistic, assumption is 

incorrect

� Targeted samples will be collected in locations where Btk is likely to 

persist

• Based on literature data, previous sampling results
141

Slide 14

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Kent, 2007, 25 acres

K-Mart

agr.wa.gov

� ~20 miles from Pike Place Market

� Zoned commercial; ~30 businesses

� Canopy coverage less than 10%

Slide 15

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Kent 2007 sampling plan

Slide 16

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Kent 2007 non-vegetative area sampling plan

Slide 17

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Kent 2007 vegetative area sampling plan

Slide 18

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Eastlake, 2005, 12 acres

seattlecondocompany.com

� ~2.5 miles from Pike Place Market

� Zoned commercial and residential

� Canopy coverage less than 15%

Slide 19

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Eastlake 2005 sampling plan
142

Slide 20

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Control site, 25 acres

� 1.5 miles from Pike Place Market

� Zoned residential

� Canopy coverage less than 10%

Slide 21

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Control site sampling plan

Slide 22

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Sample analysis

� Initial analysis via PCR

� PCR-pass samples are cultured

• 10 percent of PCR-fail samples also cultured

� Colonies are analyzed by PCR to confirm Btk

Slide 23

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Analysis results to date

� All field blanks negative

� Results of lab duplicates are comparable

� Lab control sample results as expected

Slide 24

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

2007, 2006, Control Site PCR results

Control

Kent 2007

Madison 2006

Rosemont 2006

Slide 25

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

PCR Results: Seattle Kent 2007, Madison 2006, 

Rosemont 2006 and control area swipes

Percent PCR "pass" (BTK2 or BTK6)

0

5

10

15

20

25

Kent 2007 Madison 2006 Rosemont 2006 Control

Swipe

n=43

n=44

n=42 n=43
143

Slide 26

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Viable Samples- Swipe

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Kent 2007 Madison 2006 Rosemont 2006 Control

Percent Viable (all samples)

Percent Viable (PCR "pass")

Culture Results: Seattle Kent 2007, Madison 2006, 

Rosemont 2006 and control area swipes

n=43

n=44 n=42 n=43

n=9

n=2 n=0 n=0

Slide 27

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

PCR Results: Seattle Kent 2007, Madison 2006, 

Rosemont 2006 and control area soils

Percent PCR "pass" (BTK2 or BTK6)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Kent 2007 Madison 2006 Rosemont 2006 Control

Soil

n=44

n=38

n=42

n=41

Slide 28

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Viable Samples- Soil

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Kent 2007 Madison 2006 Rosemont 2006 Control

Percent Viable (all

samples)

Percent Viable

(PCR "pass")

Culture Results: Seattle Kent 2007, Madison 2006, 

Rosemont 2006 and control area soils

n=44

n=28

n=42

n=41

n=38

n=25

n=14

n=3

Slide 29

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

U N C L A S S I F I E D

N

Culture

positive

location

.

Slide 30

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Culture

positive (soil) 

location

. Slide 31

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

U N C L A S S I F I E D

Culture

positive (soil) 

location

.
144

Slide 32

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Fairfax Block 35, 2008, 182 acres

� ~2 miles from Tyson’s Corner

� Largely residential Slide 33

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Fairfax 2008 sampling plan

Slide 34

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Fairfax 2008 preliminary results (I)

42

2

# pools 

PCR-pass

52.4

0

% viable of 

PCR-pass

pools

21.4

0

% viable 

of all 

pools

Outdoor T0 140 55 22

137 14 0

Outdoor

background

# pools 

viable

# pools 

cultured

# pools 

tested by 

PCR

Slide 35

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Fairfax 2008 preliminary results (II)

Slide 36

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Ongoing analyses of results

� Comparing results from different sample types, locations

� Comparing results from “close” samples

• Preliminary results indicate distribution is probably not uniform

� Comparing PCR results (number of genome copies) with viability 

results

Fairfax T0 85 2.5 15

0

0

0

2

% swipe viable

Control 0 0

Rosemont 2006 12 --

Madison 2006 21 --

Kent 2007 65 0

% soil viable % water viable

Slide 37

Operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC for NNSA

Acknowledgments

� Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Chemical and 

Biological Defense Applied Technologies Division

� LANL Team

• W. Brent Daniel

• Alina Deshpande

• LaVerne Gallegos-Graves

• Beverley Simpson

• Larry Ticknor

• Sheila Van Cuyk

• Lee Ann Veal

• P. Scott White
145

Canter

Comparing and Contrasting 

Fumigations of Very Large 

Facilities for Biothreat Agents 

and Other Microorganisms

EPA CBR Decontamination Workshop Chapel Hill, NC

September 25, 2008

Dorothy A. Canter, Ph.D.

2 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Presentation

 Fumigations of facilities since 2001 anthrax 

attacks

 Remediation process for biological agents

 Comparing remediation processes of two 

large-scale, complex facilities fumigated with 

ClO2 gas

 Key similarities and differences

 Research needs

3 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Contamination of Facilities Following 2001 

Anthrax Attacks

 Contaminated facilities

 Postal facilities

 Office buildings (e.g., Hart Senate Office building, 

NBC offices, AMI Building)

 Residences

 Cleanups

 Surface cleanups only at most facilities

 Fumigation of certain portions of buildings/surface 

cleanup in remaining portions (3 facilities)

 Fumigation of entire building (4 facilities)

4 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Seven Remediations with Fumigations 

Tent and fumigate >4 months $464K

equipment in one step

DOJ mail room pHCHO 8.3K

Subdivide facility and ~3 years ~$6 M

fumigate each portion 

separately

GSA Bldg 410 VHP 1.6M

DOS Annex-32 VHP 1.4M >3 years ~$9 M

AMI Bldg ClO2 675K >4 years <$5 M

Trenton P&DC ClO2 ~6M >2 years

~$200M for 

both 

cleanups

>2 years

Fumigate entire facility 

in one step

Brentwood P&DC ClO2 >14M

~90K

Volume 

fumigated 

(ft3)

Fumigate office suite 

in one step

Fumigation Approach

ClO2

Fumigant*

Hart Senate Office >3 months ~$28M

Building (Daschle 

suite)**

Duration of Cost

closure of 

facility

Site

* ClO2 = gaseous chlorine dioxide. HCHO; pHCHO = paraformaldehyde; VHP = vaporized hydrogen peroxide

** Separate fumigations in Daschle Suite and two air handling units

5 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Subsequent Fumigations with ClO2 for 

Bacillus anthracis (B.a.) Contamination

 All associated with persons who contracted some 

form of naturally-occurring anthrax from drummaking/using activities with imported skins

 New York City, February 2006

 Fumigation of van and personal effects of man who 

contracted inhalational anthrax

 Scotland, February 2007 

 Fumigation of village hall and garage used by man who died 

of inhalational anthrax

 Buildings tented for fumigation

 Danbury, CT, December 2007 

 Fumigation of home of man and his son who developed 

cutaneous anthrax

 House tented for fumigation

All fumigations performed by Sabre Technical Services

6 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Fumigations with ClO2 for Mold

 Big box department store in Kingsbury, NY, 

June 2005

 Post-Katrina Hurricane (Fall 2005 onward)

 Popular restaurant

 Post office

 Large school

 Multiple homes 

 St John’s Hospital, Oxnard, CA, August 2007

All fumigations performed by Sabre
146

Canter

7 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Other ClO2 Fumigations

 Large animal hospital in New Bolton Center, PA

 Performed in Summer 2004 after surface treatments 

were shown not to be effective at eliminating multistrain resistant Salmonella contamination

 Conducted by ClorDiSys

 Pharmaceutical labs

 Performed by ClorDiSys/Sabre

 Research fumigations

 Performed by ClorDiSys/Sabre

8 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Response and Recovery Activities At Site 

Following Biological Attack

Remediation

-Clearance 

environmental 

sampling

-Clearance 

decision

-Final report

-Decontamination 

strategy

Preparation of needed 

restoration plans

-Final site containment / 

control 

-Site preparation

Equipment Staging

-Source reduction

Essential/non-essential 

item removal 

Hot spot treatment

-Main decontamination 

process

-Waste disposal

-Incident Specific 

Health and Safety 

Plan (HASP) 

preparation / 

worker training

-Characterization 

environmental 

sampling

-Site 

Refurbishment

-Upgrading of 

equipment

-Site Control

-Notification of 

relevant parties

-Public health 

activities

-Initial site 

sampling and 

assessment

-Forensic 

investigation

Restoration Decontamination Clearance Full 

Characterization

Notification/

First 

Response 

Activities

Site Owner 

Direction Incident Command/Unified Command Direction

Recovery Response

9 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Comparing and Contrasting Remediations of 

Two Very Large Facilities Fumigated with ClO2

Brentwood Processing and 

Distribution Center (P&DC) 

Washington, DC

St. John’s Hospital 

Catholic HealthCare West 

Oxnard, CA

10 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Background on Facilities

Dates of fumigation December 12 - 16, 2002 August 17 – 20, 2007

Residential areas on two sides / 

commercial elsewhere

Commercial; subway stop about 1+ 

block away

Area surrounding 

site

Hospital hired Sabre to conduct all 

aspects of remediation process 

Incident Command System; Sabre was 

subcontractor to primary contractor

Management of 

cleanup

Previous experience in fumigating 

entire buildings for B.a. spores and 

mold 

Employed previously for fumigations 

in Hart Senate Office Building; only 

company that could fumigate entire 

building at one time

Reason for using 

ClO2/Sabre Technical 

Services

Continuation of traditional decontamination methods would have 

been more costly and taken much 

longer

4 postal workers contracted inhalation 

anthrax, with 2 deaths; high levels of 

re-aerosolizable spores throughout 

facility 

Reason for 

fumigating entire 

building

Longstanding mold contamination 

from previous leaks

Two source letters containing B.a.

spores passed through facility in 

October 2001

Nature of 

contamination

265 bed community hospital with 4 

story patient tower; adjoining medical 

office building; very large parking lot

Two story, mostly open work area with 

catwalks; limited office space; very 

large parking lot

Physical layout

Interior volume (ft3) >14M >4M

Factor Brentwood P&DC St. John’s Hospital

11 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Remediation Process

Remediation

-Clearance environmental 

sampling

-Clearance decision

-Final report

-Decontamination strategy

Preparation of needed remedial 

plans

-Final site containment / 

control 

-Site preparation

Equipment Staging

-Source reduction

Essential item removal for 

treatment

Non-essential removal for 

disposal

Hot spot treatment

-Main decontamination 

process

-Waste disposal

-Incident Specific Health 

and Safety Plan (HASP) 

preparation / worker 

training

-Characterization 

environmental sampling

Characterization Decontamination Clearance

12 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Remediation of the Two Facilities

Characterization

None – longstanding 

mold problem

Multiple rounds of 

surface sampling 

(wipes, swabs, HEPA 

vacuum samples)

Characterization 

environmental 

sampling

Yes; required under Yes

OSHA regulations

HASP/worker training

Activity Brentwood P&DC* St John’s Hospital

* Currently remediations of facilities contaminated with specific biothreat agents must 

be in compliance with federal select agent reporting requirements
147

Canter

13 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Remediation of the Two Facilities

Decontamination

Access to entire site 

controlled after closure of 

hospital 2+ days prior to 

start of fumigation until 

completion of fumigation 

process

Badging of workers and 

approved visitors / 

increased security day for 

fumigation process

Access to entire site 

controlled from confirmation of 

attack through clearance for reuse

Increased security of entire 

site and surrounding area in 

advance of fumigation

Final site 

containment/control

Multiple trips to hospital to 

assess variables

Assessment of HVAC 

system for gas distribution

Tenting material/design 

needs

Off-site materials 

compatibility testing

Preparation of plans 

required by California

Preliminary testing 

-Fumigation of 3 most 

contaminated sorting machines 

enclosed in tent

-Tracer gas study

-Low level performance test 

Preparation of Remediation 

Action Plan, Sampling & 

Analysis Plan, Ambient Air 

Monitoring Plan

Decontamination strategy

Activity Brentwood P&DC St John’s Hospital

14 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Remediation of the Two Facilities

Decontamination – Site Preparation

Yes: EPA formed Technical Yes; formed TWG

Working Group (TWG) to advise 

Office of Pesticides Programs; 

Postal Service had its own 

advisors

Utilization of experts

Gas generation equipment / 

precursor chemicals / hot oiler 

staged in parking lot – arrived 

days before/left shortly after 

fumigation

Constructed two large ClO2 gas 

generation plants and air 

pollution control systems in 

parking lot – at site for months

Deployment of 

equipment and 

precursor chemicals 

to site / Equipment 

staging

Tenting of entire hospital in 3+ 

days

Sealing of all openings –

resealing at various intervals 

due to long time frame between 

building closure and fumigation

Facility containment

Activity Brentwood P&DC St. John’s Hospital

15 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Facility Containment – Brentwood P&DC

16 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Facility Containment – St John’s Hospital

17 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Facility Containment – St John’s Hospital

18 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Facility Containment – St John’s Hospital
148

Canter

19 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Deployment of Equipment/Chemicals -

Brentwood

ClO2 generation

ClO2 scrubber system

20 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Deployment of Equipment/Chemicals –

St. John’s Hospital

21 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Remediation of the Two Facilities

Decontamination – Source Reduction

-High value mobile medical equipment 

shrink wrapped, removed from hospital 

and stored on-site in refrigerated trucks

-Sterilized medical products packaged 

in Tyvek® also removed / stored on site

-Non-mobile high-value equipment 

wrapped in tenting material; CT scan 

suite isolated / placed under positive 

pressure

Mail sent off-site for gamma 

irradiation

Handling of essential 

items

Multiple treatments of highly Not relevant

contaminated surfaces with pHadjusted bleach

Treatment of hot 

spots

Worker protection In Level C PPE during all activities Normal working attire

Surface treatment / packaging in Not relevant

accordance with DOT / State / local 

regulations for off-site disposal – on 

site storage for various time periods

Removal of nonessential items

Activity Brentwood P&DC St. John’s Hospital

22 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Source Reduction – St. John’s Hospital

Essential item 

removal

Essential item 

protection

23 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Remediation of the Two Facilities

Decontamination – Fumigation

Special local needs registration for use 

of ClO2 to treat mold under FIFRA 

Section 24(c) required by CA

Crisis exemption for use of ClO2 to 

treat B.a. spores required under 

Federal Insecticide Fungicide and 

Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)

Regulatory 

requirements

-167 ppm ClO2 for 12 hours exposure 

(2,000 ppm-hrs CxT)

-Temperature 70oF

-Relative humidity70%

-750 ppm ClO2 for 12 hours 

exposure (9,000 ppm-hrs CxT)

-Temperature 75oF

-Relative humidity75%

Fumigation process 

goals

-Coupling of emitter with HVAC system 

for distribution of ClO2 through air 

handling units

-Opening of room and cabinet doors, 

drawers, etc.

-Pre-positioning of fans, temperature 

and relative humidity monitors, and 

biological indicators

-Set up of mobile chemistry lab to 

monitor [ClO2] in building 

-Coupling of emitter with HVAC 

system for distribution of ClO2 

through air handling units

-Opening of room and cabinet 

doors, drawers, etc.

-Pre-positioning of fans, 

temperature and relative humidity 

monitors, and biological indicators

-Set up of mobile chemistry lab to 

monitor [ClO2] in building 

Building preparation 

for fumigation

Activity Brentwood P&DC St. John’s Hospital

24 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Remediation of the Two Facilities

Decontamination – Fumigation

EPA TAGA van monitored for ClO2 / 

Cl2; mobile version deployed to site 

for interior readings post-fumigation

EPA Trace Atmospheric Gas 

Analyzer (TAGA) mobile van 

monitored ambient environment 

for ClO2 / Cl2 

Ambient air monitoring

Problems attaining / maintaining 

relative humidity at certain locations

Introduction of ClO2 into building delayed 

24 hour

CxT ranged from 303 to 5,446 ppm-hr

CxT less than 2,000 ppm-hrs at a number 

of sampling locations

CxT  16,000 ppm-hrs at all 

sampling points

Process outcome

2 BIs pre-positioned at 860 separate 

locations

4 positives

3 co-located BIs enumerated, each grew 

100 colony forming units

Of 3,772 BIs positioned prior to 

fumigation

73 positive

Most positives in locations where 

relative humidity low

Biological indicator (BI) 

results

Activity Brentwood P&DC St. John’s Hospital
149

Canter

25 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Monitoring the St. Johns Fumigation 

Process

[ClO2] monitoring

BIs, temperature 

and relative 

humidity monitors

Fans

26 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Remediation of the Two Facilities

Decontamination – Waste Disposal

Designated as infectious RCRA* solid waste

substances under DOT

Nature of regulation

Scrubber liquids

Materials affected by fumigation 

Disposable PPE

Decontamination liquids

Site debris 

Types of waste

Various Solid waste facility

Medical waste incinerator

Steam sterilization

Waste disposal facilities

Activity Brentwood P&DC St. John’s Hospital

* Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

27 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

On-Site Waste Processing after Anthrax 

Attacks

28 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Remediation of the Two Facilities

Clearance

-No ECC formed

-Approval to re-open hospital 

granted by State of California

-Postal Service formed 

Environmental Clearance 

Committee (ECC) which reviewed 

data and recommended reopening facility

-DC Department of Health granted 

approval to re-open

Clearance decision

Most extensive round of None

environmental sampling

Both surface and air sampling

4833 samples collected, including 601 

air samples

All negative

Clearance environmental 

sampling

Activity Brentwood P&DC St. John’s Hospital

29 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Differences between Cleanups for B.a.

Spores and Mold at Very Large Facilities

 Time criticality

 Remediation of critical infrastructure following B.a.

attack will probably be performed on 24 / 7 basis

 Extent of overall security at site

 Degree of treatment needed for effective 

decontamination

 Level of PPE for remediation workers / use of 

decontamination units

 Environmental sampling

 Characterization and clearance sampling

 Waste generation / processing /disposal

30 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Similarities between Cleanups for B.a.

Spores and Mold at Very Large Facilities

 Need to implement effective containment of 

facility prior to fumigation

 Tenting is current preferred means, whenever possible

 Need to assess / modify(?) HVAC system prior to 

fumigation

 Need for large staging area for equipment / 

chemicals

 Need to remove mobile essential items from 

facility / protect non-mobile essential items 

 Fumigation process is the same, except 

(perhaps) for CxT goal 

 Value added from TWG

 Need for ongoing risk communication with 

regulatory agencies / stakeholders / media

 Systems approach needed for both types of 

cleanups
150

Canter

31 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Potential Deleterious Effects from 

Exposure to Fumigants

 Deleterious effects on sensitive electronic 

equipment / high value items is an issue 

 At Brentwood and Trenton P&DCs, corrosive effects 

observed on certain metals similar to effects seen 

after exposure to salt air

 Bleach used for pre-treatment of surfaces at Brentwood –

a confounder

 At St John’s Hospital, some effects on 

 Operating room lights, sterilizers, washer / disinfector 

replaced on expedited basis so that hospital could reopen as scheduled

 Patient TVs, moving parts of hospital beds also affected 

to some extent 

 EPA sponsoring research on effects of ClO2 on 

electronic equipment 

32 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Conclusions

 In spite of improvements since 2001, 

significant time frame will be needed to plan for 

and implement fumigations of large-scale 

complex facilities

 Time critical fumigations will still take weeks to 

months to perform even if being conducted on 24 / 7 

basis

 Significantly more resources needed to be able 

to respond in timely manner to multiple, 

simultaneous high level bioattacks on critical 

infrastructure

33 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Research Needs

 Reliable real-time monitoring of ClO2

concentration throughout facility

 In-depth research into materials compatibility 

effects of ClO2 gas and other fumigants on 

multiple materials at multiple CxTs

 More work on gas distribution through HVAC 

systems

34 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Contact Information

Dorothy A. Canter

1-240-228-2616

The Johns Hopkins University

Applied Physics Laboratory

dorothy.canter@jhuapl.edu

35 Heritage Style Viewgraphs

Questions
151

Miller

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Animal Disease Outbreak Response -

Tools, Status and Trends 

Lori P. Miller, PE

USDA APHIS

September 25, 2008

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Contact Information

Lori P. Miller, PE

USDA APHIS VS NCAHEM

Senior Staff Officer, Environmental Engineer

4700 River Road, Unit 41, Room 5D-03.3

Riverdale, Maryland 20737

Lori.p.miller@aphis.usda.gov

301-734-4917

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Context

In accordance with the National Response Framework 

Emergency Support Function Annex 11 (ESF #11), 

USDA/APHIS provides for an integrated Federal, 

State, tribal, and local response to an outbreak of a 

highly contagious or economically devastating 

animal/zoonotic disease, or an outbreak of a harmful 

or economically significant plant pest or disease 

deemed of Federal regulatory significance. 

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

One World, One Health

Human Health

Animal Health Environmental

Health

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Disease 

Confirmed

Quarantine

Dispose Depopulate

Decontaminate

Repopulate

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Magnitude of Problem
152

Miller

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Many Facility Types

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service













      

Response Process Components





  



































United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Response Solutions Must:

1. Be protective of animal, human, and environmental 

health

• Minimize disease spread

• Minimize adverse environmental impacts

2. Be the right size for the job

• Applicable to specific location

3. Be cost effective

• Minimize need for resources (funding, labor, 

chemicals, utilities, fuel)

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Status

• Tools for HPAI

• Chairing Quads 3D group

• Co-chairing Foreign Animal Disease Threats Subcommittee 

Decon and Disposal Working Group

• On USAHA Committee for Animal Emergency Management

• APHIS Carcass Disposal Working Group/listserv

• 2009 Disposal Symposium

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Treatment/Disposal - Composting

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Treatment/Disposal - Burial
153

Miller

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Treatment/Disposal - Burial

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Treatment/Disposal - Incineration

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Treatment/Disposal - Microwave Sterilization

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Treatment/Disposal – Alkaline Hydrolysis

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Treatment/Disposal - Landfill

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Comparison of Treatment/ Disposal Options

Quickly implemented + /-++/-++/- -+

Regulatory acceptance +/- -+/-+/-+/--+/-

Public acceptance + +/-+++/--+

Low public health risk +/- ++/-+/-+/-+/-+

Biosecure +/- +/--+/-+-+

Large capacity +/- -+/-+/--+/-+

+ --+/--++/- Requires few consumable 

inputs

+ +/-++/--+ +/- No harmful releases to 

environment

Low cost + --+/--++/-

Beneficial product + -----+

Controls pathogen +/- +/- +/-++++/-

Fixed 

alkaline 

hydrolysis

Fixed 

facility 

Incineration

Biosecure 

landfill

Onsite 

treatmentOn-site 

burial

On-site 

compostingBiosecure 

rendering
154

Miller

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Use for intended 

purpose?

If so, send to 

slaughter or 

other processing

If not, use for 

other beneficial

purpose?

If so, send to rendering 

(link to list of renderers)

If not, see disposal

Options decision tree

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Is site suitable for 

on-site composting?

If so, see composting 

training modules

If not, is site suitable 

For onsite burial?

If so, see onsite treatment/

Burial training module

If not, are mobile treatment

Technologies available?

If so, see onsite treatment/

Burial training module

If not, see secure transport

Training module

See offsite treatment/

Burial training module

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Is site suitable for composting?

– Located away from neighbors and/or out of sight 

– Located downwind from neighbors and/or houses 

– Located away from environmentally-sensitive areas 

– Located close to the livestock facility or have clear 

access for transport

– Clear of overhead utility lines 

– Void of excess water 

– Located on a gentle slope so there will be no water 

ponding

– Sufficient supply of carbon source such as wood 

chips (3 pounds carbon source per pound of meat)

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Is site suitable for 

on-site composting?

If so, see composting 

training modules

If not, is site suitable 

For onsite burial?

If so, see onsite treatment/

Burial training module

If not, are mobile treatment

Technologies available?

If so, see onsite treatment/

Burial training module

If not, see secure transport

Training module

See offsite treatment/

Burial training module
155

Miller

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Is site suitable for 

on-site composting?

If so, see composting 

training modules

If not, is site suitable 

For onsite burial?

If so, see onsite treatment/

Burial training module

If not, are mobile treatment

Technologies available?

If so, see onsite treatment/

Burial training module

If not, see secure transport

Training module

See offsite treatment/

Burial training module

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Is site suitable for onsite burial?

– Are soils suitable? (link to Web Soil Survey)

– Is the burial site at least 10 feet from the groundwater 

table? If not, consider a lined excavation.

– Evaluate the potential for the carcasses to rise to the 

ground surface after burial due to fluctuating 

groundwater levels.

– Is adequate land available for on-site burial? (link to 

Excavation Chart).

– Is burial permitted by applicable regulatory 

authorities? Can permit requirements be met? 

– Will land owner allow on-site burial?

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Is site suitable for 

on-site composting?

If so, see composting 

training modules

If not, is site suitable 

For onsite burial?

If so, see onsite treatment/

Burial training module

If not, are mobile treatment

Technologies available?

If so, see onsite treatment/

Burial training module

If not, see secure transport

Training module

See offsite treatment/

Burial training module

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Are mobile treatment technologies available for your area?

– Contact all appropriate mobile treatment technology vendors 

– Verify the units are available for deployment to your site. 

– Verify your ability to meet all site/utility requirements. 

– Verify the units can be fully disinfected after use. 

– Verify the units have adequate capacity to meet your needs. 

– If the capacity is less than needed, can the carcasses be 

stored/refrigerated? 

– Verify the availability of skilled operators and spare parts to 

keep the units operational.

– Is the technology permitted by the applicable regulatory 

authorities? 

• State Department of Agriculture, Animal Health 

• State Department of Environment or Natural Resources 

• USDA-APHIS 

• USEPA

– Can the technology process byproducts be readily disposed?
156

Miller

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Is site suitable for 

on-site composting?

If so, see composting 

training modules

If not, is site suitable 

For onsite burial?

If so, see onsite treatment/

Burial training module

If not, are mobile treatment

Technologies available?

If so, see onsite treatment/

Burial training module

If not, see secure transport

Training module

See offsite treatment/

Burial training module

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Disposal Trends

• Research on disease agent fate, transport and 

persistence in various disposal technologies

• Identification and risks of potentially contaminated air 

emissions and leachate from disposal processes

• Research and development of new/improved 

disposal processes

• Analysis of costs and benefits of disposal 

technologies, including potential long-term societal 

costs
157

Miller

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Cleaning and Disinfection Status

• C&D online training module deploying this month

• Online tools on public web in near future

• Recent response experience through NVS 3D 

contractors

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
158

Miller

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Dry Cleaning

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Wet Cleaning

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Disinfecting

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Disinfection Trends

• In collaboration with EPA, researching efficacy of 

unregistered, common household products such as 

bleach solution, citric acid, and household detergents 

on several pathogens of concern under various 

environmental conditions

• Assessing risk of releasing used disinfectant 

solutions to the environment

• Investigating methods of applying disinfectants, such 

as foam, fumigation, spray, and electrostatic

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Biosecurity/Health and Safety Status

• Working with USAID to develop/deploy response kits 

to developing countries with HPAI outbreaks

• Recent response experience through NVS 

contractors

• Health and Safety Plan Template

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Biosecurity
159

Miller

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Biosecurity

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Biosecurity

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Biosecurity

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Biosecurity

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
160

Miller

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Biosecurity/Health and Safety Trends

• Training APHIS personnel to OSHA standards

• Working to customize Health and Safety Plan 

Template for specific situations

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Tools Available or Being Developed

• In-House Composting training module (available)

• Outdoor Composting training module (available)

• Secure Transport training module (available)

• Off-site Treatment/Disposal training module (available)

• On-site Treatment/Disposal training module (available)

• Cleaning and Disinfection training module (available) 

• Depopulation training module (future)

• On-line Disposal Support Tool (Oct 08)

• Health and Safety Plan Template (available)

• HPAI Worker Protection Guidance (available)

Coming Soon:

Access tools online at www.aphis.usda.gov

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

More Tools Available

• Table-top board game exercise

• Field guide

• Job aids

For information, contact:

Lori Miller at lori.p.miller@aphis.usda.gov

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Questions?
161

Ladman



Inactivation of Avian Influenza 

Virus Using Common Chemicals 

and Detergents

R.L. Alphin, K.J. Johnson, B.S. Ladman, and

E.R. Benson

Brian Ladman

Associate Scientist



“Meat” Chicken Industry Statistics

2007

Number Value

US Delmarva US Delmarva

8.9 billion 566 million $21.5 

billion

$2.0 billion

Introduction



Introduction

• Poultry houses are 

constructed of 

porous and nonporous surfaces

• Porous

– Concrete

– Wood

• Nonporous

– Galvanized steel

– Plastics



Introduction

• Avian influenza virus (AIV) 

– Viruses are characterized as either low 

path (LP) or high path (HP)

– LPAIV’s are commonly found in wild 

birds

– In commercial poultry, outbreaks of 

LPAIV (currently only H5 and H7 

viruses) have the potential to become 

HPAIV outbreaks

– HPAIV have “jumped” species barrier 

• Destroy flocks and clean up



Introduction

• Approved disinfecting agents in the 

United States have many limitations

• Approximately 90 approved agents

– Limited availability

– Expensive

– Corrosive

– Environmental concerns



Introduction

• Approval is needed for more 

economical and environmentally 

friendly disinfecting agents against 

AIV

– Criteria for the ideal agent

• Effective inactivation of AIV

• Highly available

• Biodegradable

• Inexpensive

• Antimicrobial
162

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

Objective

Evaluate the effectiveness of commercially 

available disinfectants and common 

chemicals to inactivate avian influenza 

virus (AIV)



Experimental Method

• 0.1 ml per coupon

– H7N2 LPAIV 

• Titer of 107.8 EID50/mL 

• 6-well plate test

– Coupons (2.2 x 2.2x 0.2 cm)

– Hard water (400 ppm CaCO3)

– 5% Organic matter (bovine serum) 

• Coupons with dried virus were 

placed into 6-well plates

– 6 wells= 1 sample

– Run in duplicate

• 2.0 mL of prepared disinfecting 

chemical applied to each well

• Plates agitated for 10 minutes

• Fluid from each plate collected 

and pooled

– 0.2 ml inoculated into four, 9-11 

day old SPF eggs per sample

Test Plate with Metal Coupons



Experimental Controls

• Dried virus on coupons

• Drop in titer during drying

• Rehydrated with sterile 

saline

• Wet virus

• Drop in titer during room 

temperature incubation 

• Liquid left in tube at room 

temperature

• Cytotoxic control

• Test to insure chemicals 

not killing embryos or 

responsible for false 

positive result 

Control Plate with Coupons

Experimental Method



Experimental Method

Eggs incubated for 5 

days post inoculation

– Fluid collected from 

each egg 

– Examined for 

hemmaglutination

activity (HA) of 25% 

chicken red blood cells Positive* Negative

*Positive HA is indicative of 

disinfectant failure

Evaluation of Viral Inactivation



Chemicals & Detergents Tested 

Experiment 1

Group A Group B

Materials Tested

Plastic, Wood, Galvanized Steel Galvanized Steel 

Compounds Tested

Acetic acid (C2H4O2) 5%

Citric acid (C6H8O7) 1% & 3%

Calcium hypochlorite (Ca(ClO)2) 750ppm

Sodium hypochlorite (NaOCl) 750ppm

Laundry detergent w/ peroxygen bleach 

(powdered) 2 g/L, 4 g/L, and 6 g/L

USDA HIGH PRIORITY CHEMICALS 

Acetic acid (C2H4O2) 1% & 3%

Calcium hydroxide (Ca(OH)2) 1%

Sodium carbonate (Na2CO3) 4%

Sodium hydroxide (NaOH) 1% & 2%

Laundry detergent w/o bleach

(powdered) 2 g/L, 4 g/L, and 6 g/L



Experimental Method

Inactivation of AIV was considered effective when: 

• Titer of dried positive control virus recovered 

≥ 104.0EID50/mL (via Reed & Müench)

• No HA activity = no virus detected

– virus titer recovered from coupon is <101.2EID50/mL 

Putting it all together...Calculating a Neutralizing 

Index

Titer of positive control virus recovered ≥ 4.0 minus the 

titer of virus recovery from tested coupon <1.2

- Neutralizing Index ≥ 2.8 
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Ladman

Low Path Avian Influenza Virus

Group A

Solid Colors 

Effective

Group B

Solid Colors 

Effective

Low Path Avian Influenza Virus

Laundry Detergent with Bleach

Solid Colors 

Effective

Low Path Avian Influenza Virus

Laundry Detergent w/o Bleach

Transparent 

Colors 

Ineffective

Low Path Avian Influenza Virus

Porous versus Nonporous

Solid Colors 

Effective

Low Path Avian Influenza Virus



Chemicals & Detergents Tested 

• One material

– Galvanized steel (aka Metal)

• Four chemical disinfectants

– Citric Acid 1%

– Sodium Hypochlorite 350 ppm

– Commercial peroxygen disinfectant

– Commercial quaternary disinfectant

• Three different influenza type A viruses

– LPAIV- A/H7N2/Chick/MinhMa/04

– HPAIV- A/H5N2/Chick/PA/1983

– Human like- A/H1N1/Puerto Rico/8/34

Experiment 2
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Ladman

Avian Influenza Viruses

Comparing 3 Different Influenza Viruses



• Acetic acid (1%, 3% and 5%), citric 

acid (1% and 3%), sodium hydroxide 

(2%), calcium hydroxide (1%), 

calcium hypochlorite (750 ppm), and 

sodium hypochlorite (750 ppm) 

inactivated LPAIV on hard, nonporous surface.

• Laundry detergent with bleach was 

only effective at 6 g/L.

Conclusions

Experiment 1



• In general all 3 influenza viruses 

reacted similar to the chemicals and 

disinfectants

• Citric Acid and the commercial 

peroxygen disinfectant were effective 

inactivating the 3 influenza viruses

• Sodium hypochlorite 350 ppm was 

ineffective at inactivating the 3 

viruses

Conclusions

Experiment 2



Acknowledgements

This experiment was supported by:

USDA-APHIS Cooperative Agreement Award 06-

9100-1044-CA



Questions?

Brian Ladman, MS, MBA

Associate Scientist

Allen Laboratory

University of Delaware

Newark, DE 19716 USA

(302) 831-8734

bladman@udel.edu
165

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1

   

  

  

US EPA Decontamination Workshop, September 24-26, 2008, Chapel 

Hill, NC

Young Choi, James Rogers, Dan Chappie

Battelle, Columbus, OH

Joseph Wood

US EPA Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Decontamination and Consequence Management Division, Research Triangle Park, NC

2

   

 

• Background

• Motive

• Purpose

• Methods

• Results

• Conclusions

3

• H5N1 HPAI, influenza A sub-type.

• Highly contagious and lethal to birds.

• Human infections with H5N1 have occurred, 

but most cases were from people having close 

contact with infected poultry or contaminated 

surfaces (CDC). 

– Of the human H5N1 cases world-wide, 60% have 

resulted in death (WHO).

• Human-to-human transmission of H5N1 has 

been limited, but flu virus mutation a concern. 

– If the H5N1 becomes easily transmitted from personto person, a world-wide pandemic could result (CDC).



4

• Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-9) 

– Defense of US Agriculture and Food: Directs EPA to work 

with DHS and other agencies to enhance response 

capability, including decontamination following a terrorist 

attack that affects the agriculture and food infrastructure.

• National Response Plan: Directs EPA to provide 

technical expertise and assistance to US Department 

of Agriculture when an agricultural facility is 

contaminated with CBR.

• In its Agricultural Bioterrorism Select Agent and Toxin 

List, APHIS (Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service) has included the HPAI virus among its list of 

select agents and toxins that have the potential to 

pose a severe threat to animal or plant health or to 

animal or plant products.



5

• Assess how long HPAI virus remains infective under various 

environmental conditions and on different types of materials.

• Very few data available on persistence of HPAI on environmental 

surfaces.

– Role of environment in spread of virus 

has not been adequately documented.

• These tests will provide information 

about which conditions and materials 

decontamination may be warranted. 

• Following persistence tests, generic, low cost chemicals will be

tested to determine efficacy in inactivating virus. 

• In event of outbreak of H5N1 virus in poultry, large quantities of 

liquid decontaminants may be needed and applied.

– Effective, less-costly decontaminants that have minimal impact on 

environment are desired.



Source: CDC

6

• Many decon chemicals already registered with EPA under FIFRA 

(Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act) for bird flu, 

but these are for clean, hard, non-porous surfaces.

– Efficacy unknown on porous or outdoor surfaces; may be costly and 

potentially have an environmental impact if used in large quantities 

outdoors.

• Few data available on decon efficacy of generic chemicals.

– Overlap APHIS/Univ. Delaware studies.

– Some generic chemicals have been approved for use by APHIS or 

states under FIFRA, although efficacy data are unavailable.

• Effective decontamination will help to limit the available reservoir of 

the virus and lower the risk of human infection.

• Compare low path to high path strains.


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7

• Testing conducted at Battelle’s Biomedical Research Center.

• Coupon Materials:

– Chicken Feces – Basswood*

– Galvanized Metal – Bare Concrete*

– Glass – Pine Wood*

– Soil

* These materials not tested further due to 

low virus recovery.

– Coupons generally 1.9 cm x 7.5 cm.

– Chicken Feces and Soil “coupons”

placed in 3.5 cm diameter Petri dish 

lined with Parafilm® and filled with 

uncompacted material.

 

8

• Assessment of Cytotoxicity

– Virus quantified using cytopathic effects on MDCK (Madin-Darby 

Canine Kidney) cells to determine TCID50 (Tissue Culture Infectious 

Dose 50).

- Must also assess whether material extracts or neutralized decon liquids 

cause cytotoxicity. 

– MTT Assay (3-[4,5-dimethylthiazol-2-y1]-2, 5,-diphenyltetrazolium 

bromide):

- MDCK cells exposed to diluted extracts 

(from materials) or neutralized decon 

liquids in the presence of MTT.

- Viable cells convert the yellow MTT to a 

purple formazan salt.

- Absorbance (optical density) of the

purple reaction is used to determine 

the percentage of control cell viability.

PURPLE

Cells Alive

YELLOW 

Cells Dead

Increasing

Dilution

 

9

• Viruses

– Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, H5N1 virus, A/Vietnam/1203/04.

– Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza, H7N2 virus, 

A/H7N2/chick/MinhMah/04.

• Spiking the Coupons

– 1 x 106 TCID50 of virus spiked per coupon.

– Allowed to dry 1 hour before treatment.

• Extraction of Coupons

– Coupons transferred into vials with PBS.

– Vials agitated on orbital shaker.

– Virus extracts serially diluted.

- Chicken Feces and Soil underwent special processing.

 

10

• Quantification of Virus

– From each 10-fold serial dilution of material extract, 0.1 mL aliquots 

transferred to MDCK cells in each of 5 wells.

– MDCK cells incubated then microscopically evaluated for the presence 

or absence of cytopathic effects (CPE).

– TCID50 is calculated using the Spearman-Karber method.

– The assay’s limit of quantitation is 131 TCID50/mL.

 

11

• Log Reduction of Virus

– Log reductions of virus will be determined by comparing the TCID50 of 

test coupons and positive controls, as follows:

where: 

R = log reduction for an individual test coupon

= mean TCID50 for the 5 associated positive controls

= TCID50 recovered from the individual test coupon

– The mean log reduction ( ) is calculated as the sum of the associated 

R values for each of the 5 individual test coupons divided by 5.

N















 = ' log10 N

N R

N'

R

 

12

• Environmental Test Conditions

– Room temp (~ 23°C), low RH (~ 30%), UV lamps-off *

– Room temp, high RH (~ 90%), UV lamps-off

– Cold temp (~ 5°

C), low RH, UV lamps-off *

– Cold temp, high RH, UV lamps-off

– Cold temp, low RH, UV lamps-on (~ 70 μW/cm2)

* Environmental conditions for decon testing

 
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13

• Environmental Test Conditions

– Testing conducted in a glove-box 

(room temp), refrigerated plastic 

containers with positive seals 

(cold temp without UV), and a 

modified mini-refrigerator with 

UV lamps (cold temp with UV).

– RH controlled with Drierite 

desiccant (low RH) and an 

ultrasonic fogger (high RH) as 

necessary.

 

Condensation on 

faceplate

Condensation on 

faceplate

UVA-B lamps (Qty. 3) UVA-B lamps (Qty. 3)

UVB monitor UVB monitor

14

• Decontamination Testing

– Decon Liquids (all prepared with 400 ppm hard-water):

- 1% Citric Acid

- 8% Sodium Carbonate

- pH-Amended Bleach (undiluted)

- Quat 256 from Essential Industries, Inc. (732 ppm active quat)

 

15

• Decontamination Testing 

– Spiked coupons (Only galvanized metal and soil used for decon tests) 

inverted and placed in troughs with decon liquid (vials are used for 

Soil).

– 10 min contact.

– Neutralized (stop decon activity) by diluting with cell culture media or 

Dey/Engley broth.

– Extracted for virus recovery and quantification.

 

16

• H5N1 Initial Assessments

– Cytotoxicity:

- Acceptable MTT assay results for all materials.

- > 90% cell viability observed with minimal dilution (1:16).

– H5N1 virus recovery (time-zero):

- Acceptable recovery (> 5%) for...

Chicken Feces, Galvanized Metal, Glass, Soil.

- Unacceptable recovery (< 0.5%) for...

Basswood, Bare Concrete, Bare Pine Wood.



17



• Demonstration of porous materials and their affects on 

inoculated, colored liquid:

18

* Detected but at a level  the procedural blank (CPE may be attributed 

to endogenous sources of the test material rather than H5N1)



• H5N1 at low temp (6°C), low RH (30%), UV lamps-OFF

Soil 13 Days NA

Glass 13 Days NA

Galvanized Metal 13 Days NA

Chicken Feces 8 Days* 13 Days

Shortest duration with 

non-detected virus

Longest duration with 

detected virus

Material

• H5N1 at low temp (1°C), low RH (28%), UV lamps-ON (71 μW/cm2)

Soil 4 Days NA

Glass 1 Day 2 Days

Galvanized Metal 1 Day 2 Days

Chicken Feces 4 Days* NA

Shortest duration with 

non-detected virus

Longest duration with 

detected virus

Material
168

Stone-Choi

19

• H7N2 (Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza)

– H7N2 propagated in eggs yielded low titers as compared to H5N1.

– H7N2 virus was not amenable to quantification with MDCK cells. 

– Preliminary attempts to determine the TCID50 using another cellbased assay (Chicken Embryo Kidney [CEK] cells); additional work

is needed to develop a CEK assay for H7N2.

- An egg-based assay excluded from consideration.



20

• H5N1 virus can remain viable on environmental surfaces 

for several days, especially under cold environmental 

conditions in the absence of UV radiation.

– However, on soil, in the presence of UV-A and UV-B, the virus 

remains viable after 4 days

• Efforts are underway to study the efficacy of liquid 

decontamination technologies under warm and cold 

environmental conditions.



21

• Battelle conducted this work under the direction of the EPA 

National Homeland Security Center (NHSRC) through the 

Technology Testing and Evaluation Program (TTEP) via 

GSA contract number GS-23F-0011L.

• All testing was conducted at the Battelle Biomedical 

Research Center (BBRC) located in West Jefferson, Ohio.


169

Love

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameGlobal Security Principal 

Directorate

Understanding CWA Interactions with Surfaces 

and the Implications for Decontamination



Adam H. Love, M. Leslie Hanna, Carolyn J. Koester, 

Armando Alcaraz, John G. Reynolds, Dennis Reutter, Ellen Raber

This work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.

Performance Measures x.x, x.x, and x.x



PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory

CWA Fate on Indoor Surfaces

Objective: Improve current understanding of CWA 

interactions with indoor surfaces to enable a more 

rapid and economical facility remediation after 

CWA dissemination

3 Agents: HD, GB, VX

9 Surfaces:

1. Glass 

2. Stainless Steel 

3. Vinyl Floor Tile 

4. Latex Painted Wallboard 

5. Concrete 

6. Rubber Handrail

7. Thermoplastic Urethane Handrail

8. Polyester Flexible Duct

9. Galvanized Steel HVAC Duct

10. Bakelite Paneling

11. Siliconized Acrylic Caulk



PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory

Enabling Better Decisions

 First responders phase: 

• mitigate any subsequent spread of contamination

 Characterization phase:

• more quickly determine the extent of contamination

 Decontamination phase:

• identifying materials that are easily decontaminated

• identify materials that should be removed

• understand what is necessary for waste disposal

Understanding contamination distribution and 

magnitude focuses remediation efforts



PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory

Contamination Spread

Vapor Deposition 

Greater spread

Reduced magnitude

Liquid Deposition

Reduced spread

Greater magnitude

0.01

0.1

1

10

100

1000

VX HD GB Water Gasoline

Vapor pressure

20oC (mm Hg)

Volatility impacts the dominant form of contaminant deposition 



PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory

Overall Contamination Persistence Agent Concentration on Surface

Time

Evaporation

Atm. Reactivity

Imbibition

Hydrolysis

Surface Reactivity

Absorption

Diffusion

Adsorption

Amount of CWA contamination impacts the persistence and 

potential for surface self-decontamination

Bulk properties of agents 

dominate when surface 

coverage is high

Limited number of 

parameters to characterize

Surface interactions 

dominate when surface 

coverage is low

Complex array of 

parameters to characterize



PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory

Agent Interactions

Evaporation

Surface 

Wetting

Imbibition

Absorption

SURFACE

LIQUID 

AGENT

Surface Reactivity

Liquid Adsorption

Atmospheric Reactivity

Vapor 

Adsorption

Vapor 

Diffusion

Diffusion

Persistence:

Liquid - Driving force high, but exposure 

time likely shorter

Vapor – Driving force low, but exposure 

time likely greater

If surface penetration > evaporation: Significant residual

If evaporation > surface penetration: Low residual
170

Love



PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory

Vapor Affinity Results

1 Week CWA Vapor Exposures

Notes: 

1. Oils, grease, and grime on surfaces also have affinity for GB and HD

2. Vapor accumulates at a constant rate over 1 week on polymeric surfaces

3. Observed affinity with broad classes of organic surfaces indicate non-specific interactions

Siliconized Acrylic Caulk X X 

Bakelite Paneling X X 

Galvanized Steel HVAC Duct 

Polyester Flexible Duct X X 

Thermoplastic Urethane Handrail X X 

Rubber Handrail X X 

Concrete 

Latex Painted Wallboard X X

Vinyl Floor Tile XX

Stainless Steel

Glass 

GB HD VX 



PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory

Liquid HD Persistence

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Hours 

% Remaining

Stainless Steel

Glass

Galvanized Steel

Polyester

~0.1 μL Evaporation/Hour

 HD droplets volatilize 

within 10 hours on 

impermeable surfaces

 HD droplets persists for 

over 1 week on some of 

the polymeric surfaces

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0 50 100 150

Hours, 150 mL/min air flow

% Remaining

vinyl

latex

polyester

rubber

urethane

aged concrete

bakelite



PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory

Liquid GB Persistence

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0 5 10 15 20

Hours at 150 mL/min

% Remaining

glass

silanized glass

ss

hvac

flex duct

vinyl tile

w all board

hand rail (dull)

hand rail (shiny)

 GB droplets volatilize with 2 hours on impermeable 

surfaces

 GB droplets persist for over 1 week on some of the 

polymeric surfaces



PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory

Liquid VX Persistence

 VX can decline slowly over 

time on some surfaces –

but significant residual 

after 1 week

 No observed reduction in 

persistence on some 

polymeric surfaces

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Hours

VX Recovered, μg

vinyl tile

wall board

hand rail (dull)

hand rail (shiny)

Bakelite

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Hours

VX recovered, g

glass

sil glass

ss

hvac

flex duct

aged concrete



PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory

HD Vapor Persistence

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0 50 100 150 200

Hours, 150 mL/min

% Remaining

polyester

rubber

urethane

latex

vinyl

acrylic

 HD vapor loaded for 

1 week

 Initial contamination 

was ~ 1000 μg/cm2

 Significant 

persistence for over 

1 week on 

polymeric surfaces



PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory

GB Vapor Persistence

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

0 50 100 150 200

Hours, 150 mL/min

GB recovered, g

vinyl

latex

rubber

urethane

caulk

 GB vapor loaded for 48 

hours

 Significant persistence 

for over 1 week on 

some of the polymeric 

surfaces – especially 

latex paint
171

Love



PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory

Next Steps

 Hot air impact on HD and GB persistence

 Hot humid air impact on GB and HD persistence

 Longer term persistence in polymeric materials

 Potentially “steaming” of residual CWA from concrete 

hotspots

 Identifying degradation products 

 Characterization of materials in order to create a 

method to group similar agents/material interaction 

properties



PAD Name - Directorate/Department NameLawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory

Enacting Better Decisions

1. Rapid CWA source control is critical for minimizing secondary 

contamination from volatile agents

2. Some polymeric surfaces will be useful for characterization 

sampling

3. Persistence will be determined by understanding interplay of agent 

properties, agent surface interaction properties, and exposure 

type/duration – no one-size-fits-all CONOPS

4. Heavily contaminated permeable polymeric surfaces will be 

challenging to decontaminate without destroying the material and

thus may require removal

Understanding CWA fate improves the efficiency of the 

time and effort spent on remediation

Implementing this understanding will result in more rapid and 

less expensive facility restoration
172

Tucker

1

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin 

Company, for the United States Department of Energy under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.

Restoration of Major Transportation 

Facilities Following a Chemical Agent 

Release: The Facility Restoration OTD

Mark D. Tucker, Ph.D.

Sandia National Laboratories

Ellen Raber

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Presentation Outline

 Background and Project Overview

 Project Activities

– Remediation Guidance Development

– Technology Development

– Experimental Studies to Address Data 

and Capability Gaps

– Workshops, Exercises and 

Demonstrations

 Summary

A chemical or biological agent release may result in...

 High Casualties

– Office Buildings

– Indoor Stadiums

– Transportation Hubs

 Loss of National Prestige

– National Monuments

– Government Buildings

 Large Economic Impact

– Transportation Hubs

– Wide Area Releases

– Agricultural Diseases

 

 

These challenges will make it difficult to re-open a transportation facility 

quickly which may result in a large economic impact to the nation.

A chemical agent release in a key transportation 

facility would present many challenges

 Highly vulnerable to chemical terrorism

 Easily accessible to the public

 Wide range of decontamination and 

remediation challenges

 Lack of understanding among stakeholders 

on the time, cost, and process to restore 

facility

 Fundamental technology and capability 

gaps will make efficient recovery difficult

 



 

Requirements to 

successfully 

implement a 

systems approach 

to recovery

The objective is to recover as quickly and safely as possible to minimize economic damage.

 Roles and 

responsibilities

 Remediation 

guidance 

documents

 Tools to aid 

decision makers

 Technologies

 Resources

 Information 

and data

 Threat agents

 Dissemination methods

 Likely contamination levels

 Clean-up guidelines

The project is utilizing a systems approach with the 

objective of minimizing the time required for recovery

The Facility Restoration OTD builds on the previously 

completed Biological Restoration DDAP

 

 

 

 

 

 

   










173

Tucker

Project Performers

Sandia National Laboratories - PI

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory – PI

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

DHS Program Manager

Don Bansleben

External Advisory Panel

Larry Kaelin, US EPA

Oba Vincent, US EPA

Emily Snyder, US EPA

Veronique Hauschild, US DoD

William Billotte, US DHS (FEMA)

Partner Airport

Los Angeles International (LAX)

The Facility Restoration OTD is utilizing experts from the 

National Laboratories and other federal agencies Presentation Outline

 Background and Project Overview

 Project Activities

– Remediation Guidance Development

– Technology Development

– Experimental Studies to Address Data 

and Capability Gaps

– Workshops, Exercises and 

Demonstrations

 Summary

The Facility Restoration OTD is focusing on four tasks

Pre-Planning

Integrate appropriate 

technologies and methods 

into a system for chemical 

remediation of critical 

facilities. Demonstrate the 

operation and potential 

utility of this system.

Address Data/Capability Gaps

Focused efforts to fill 

critical data and 

capability gaps needed 

to effectively 

implement the 

remediation plan to 

minimize economic 

damage due to the 

closure of a facility.

Exercises and Demonstrations

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



Technology 

Evaluation and 

Development

Pre-planning restoration and recovery 

operations is essential

 Key issues can be addressed 

before an incident occurs

 Roles and responsibilities can 

be determined

 Technologies and capabilities 

can be identified 

 Planning templates can speed 

the process and help all 

stakeholders better understand 

the issues

– Identify necessary resources 

(personnel, equipment, and 

consumables)

– Make key decisions (e.g., decon

versus replacement)

– Determine sampling protocols 

and methods

Pre-planning to 

enhance the 

rapid recovery 

of critical 

infrastructure

A primary deliverable from this project is a remediation 

guidance document for LAX and a generic remediation 

guidance template for other facilities to follow.

A draft of the Remediation Guidance Document has 

been completed and is undergoing review

General 

Remediation Plan Appendices (continued) LAX Data Supplements

1. Introduction

2. Characterization

3. Remediation

4. Clearance

5. Recommendations 

for pre-planning

D. Annex. Review of available 

instruments

E.. Statistical Sampling 

Approaches

F. Decon Technologies

G. Exposure Estimates

G1. Restoration Guidelines

H. Sample Unit Forms

I. Characterization Template

J. Remediation Action Plan 

Template

K. Clearance Sampling and 

Analysis Plan Template

L. Restoration Contact List

M. Waste Management

A. Facility Command 

Structure

B. Facility Description

C. Facility Ventilation

D. Sampling Units

E. Sampling Zones

F. Remediation Preplanning

Draft completed in FY07 - reviewed and revised in FY08

Appendices

A. Notification Phase

B. First Responder 

Phase

C. Sampling Design

D. Collection and 

analysis of samples 

for chemical agents

Draft to be completed in FY08

Peer review by USEPA, state and local regulatory agencies, and other subject matter experts.

The Clean-up Guidelines Working Group is using historic data and 

methodologies from interagency working groups (i.e., OSTP SDST) to 

develop recommended clean-up guidelines for specific scenarios

>8 24 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.000024 0.003

hr

(See 8-hr AEGL- (See 8-hr AEGL-1) (See 8-hr AEGL-1)

1)

(See 8-hr AEGL1) 8 hr (See 8-hr AEGL-1)

Derivation

Protective Estimate 

(calculated)

Level 1 8 hr 0.0010 0.0010 0.00050 0.000071 0.008

mild-no 

effects

AEGLs (Acute 

Exposure Guideline 

Levels) 

Transit passengers AEGL

4 × 10–4 1 × 10–6 3 × 10–5 3 × 10–5 3 × 10 Worker–chronic 8-hr, –5 

daily/30-yr timeweighted average

TLV© or WPL 

(Worker Population 

Limit)

3 × 10–3 1 × 10–5 5 × 10–5 1 × 10–4 1 × 10 Worker–acute- –4

intermittent 

15-min exposure (<4 ×

day)

STEL 

(Short-Term

Exposure Limit)

Occupational

Sulfur Mustard 

(H/HD)

(CAS 505-60-2)

VX 

(CAS 50782-69-9)

Soman (GD) 

(96-64-0) and 

Cyclosarin (GF) 

(329-99-7)

Sarin (GB) 

(CAS 107-44-8)

Tabun 

(GA)

(CAS 77-81-6)

Exposure 

Scenario

Type of Standard or 

Guideline 

Example civilian airborne (inhalation, ocular) exposure guidelines (mg/m3) for selected CWAs in an airport 

release scenario.

The major unfinished portion of the Remediation Guidance 

document is the section related to the development of 

clean-up guidelines for a critical transportation facility
174

Tucker

The Facility Restoration OTD is focusing on four tasks

Pre-Planning

Integrate appropriate 

technologies and methods 

into a system for chemical 

remediation of critical 

facilities. Demonstrate the 

operation and potential 

utility of this system.

Address Data/Capability Gaps

Focused efforts to fill 

critical data and 

capability gaps needed 

to effectively 

implement the 

remediation plan to 

minimize economic 

damage due to the 

closure of a facility.

Exercises and Demonstrations

 

 

 

 

 



Technology 

Evaluation and 

Development

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 



` `

`

Command Center

BROOM Database

Laboratory A

Analyst

`

Laboratory B

PDA



    







BROOM is undergoing a number of enhancements 

as part of the OTD and other projects

 Chemical sampling and analysis

 Laboratory tracking module

 Enhanced sampling hardware

 Geo-statistical analysis capabilities

 Enhanced GIS engine (for mapping)

 Capability to handle real-time analysis

Lab Computer

Wireless

PDAs

PDA’s used to record data at each step in the 

analysis process

Integrate the PDA data and 

input final lab results

Sample receipt into lab Extraction etc.

Within the Mobile Laboratory

Lab results wirelessly 

transmitted to the 

BROOM server for 

immediate display

BROOM Server

Trimble Nomad 800LE

• Dust proof and submersible

• Better screen resolution

• Better barcode scanner

• GPS 

Evaluation and Enhancement of the 

CBMS-II Surface Sampler

 Porous metal (SS) sample membrane

 Sulfinert® treated stainless steel 

sample line

 Rapid (30-120 second) in situ sample 

analysis

 On site analysis, no sample collection, 

no Chain-Of-Custody, etc.

 Sensitive and selective, using ion trap 

MS

CBMS-II Membrane Sampling Head

System Description System Testing

 Detected 100 ng/cm2 HD on all 

surfaces

 Detected 300 ng/cm2 VX on SS

 Detected 800–2000 ng/cm2 GB on all 

surfaces

Analysis of surface 

concentration of 

VX, GB, and HD on 

various materials

The Facility Restoration OTD is focusing on four tasks

Pre-Planning

Integrate appropriate 

technologies and methods 

into a system for chemical 

remediation of critical 

facilities. Demonstrate the 

operation and potential 

utility of this system.

Address Data/Capability Gaps

Focused efforts to fill 

critical data and 

capability gaps needed 

to effectively 

implement the 

remediation plan to 

minimize economic 

damage due to the 

closure of a facility.

Exercises and Demonstrations

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



Technology 

Evaluation and 

Development

The Project is also addressing critical data and 

capability gaps

 Surface Sample Collection Efficiency and Detection Limits for CW Agents 

(Koester, LLNL and Hankins, SNL)

– Objective: To determine the collection efficiency and detection limits of the surface sampling 

methods on porous and non-porous surfaces that would be typically found in the interior of a 

transportation facility. Experimental work is being conducted using relatively low concentrations 

relevant to civilian terrorist release scenarios.

 Interaction of Chemical Agents on Interior Surfaces and Natural 

Attenuation/Decay Rates (Love, LLNL and Hankins, SNL)

– Objective: To determine adsorption/desorption and decay rates for chemical agents on interior 

surfaces. Experimental work is being conducted using low concentrations relevant to civilian 

terrorist release scenarios since there is data available for very high concentrations. 

 Gas/Vapor Decontamination Method Evaluation (Tucker, SNL and Smith, 

LLNL)

– Objective: To evaluate the potential to utilize hot air plus high humidity to rapidly decontaminate 

transportation facilities contaminated with chemical agents with high volatility and low 

persistency properties. 

 Statistical Sampling Algorithm Validation (Knowlton, SNL, MacQueen, LLNL, 

and Pulsipher, PNNL)

– Objective: To validate potential statistical sampling algorithms against data from actual release 

sites. In addition, we are integrating the validated methods into BROOM and VSP.
175

Tucker

The objective of the OTD project is to quickly verify 

that, after CWA exposure, facility is safe to use

Sampling and analysis during characterization and clearance phases provide 

data for decision making 

Where is the contamination? 

What items are contaminated?

Is it safe for the general public 

to return to the facility? 

 Speed of analysis is 

important

 Explore new, rapid 

detection techniques 

(CBMS-II)

 Optimal detection limits & 

legally-defensible data is 

important

 Demonstrate that existing 

technology & methods can 

be used to detect CWAs, at 

concentrations of interest, 

on relevant materials

Clearance 

Phase

Decontamination 

Phase

Characterization 

Phase

Restoration 

Phase

First Remediation/Clean-up

Response 

Phase

Notification 

Phase

Crisis Management Consequence Management

Response and Recovery Activities

The project is investigating if existing and emerging methods 

can detect CWAs at concentrations protective of human health

Real-time mass spectrometric 

techniques, such as the CBMS II, 

show promise for rapid detection 

of CWAs at low concentrations

Conventional sampling and gas 

chromatographic/mass spectrometric 

analysis can easily detect CWA on 

certain surfaces at levels relevant to the 

protection of public health (300 ng/cm2)

Extraction of GB from surfaces

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

glass gauze

wipes

stainless

steel

vinyl tile painted

drywall

concrete

Percent recovery

Direct ext'n, 10 ug/cm2

Gauze wipe ext'n, 10 ug/cm2

Direct ext'n, 0.1 ug/cm2

Gauze wipe ext'n, 0.1 ug/cm2

The persistency and interaction of chemical 

agents on interior surfaces is being investigated

Evaporation

Surface 

Wetting

Imbibition

Absorption

SURFACE

LIQUID 

AGENT

Surface Reactivity

Liquid Adsorption

Atmospheric Reactivity

Vapor 

Adsorption

Vapor 

Diffusion

Diffusion

If surface penetration > evaporation:

Significant residual 

(Rubber Handrail, Vinyl Tile, Latex)

If evaporation > surface penetration:

Low residual 

(Glass, SS, Liquid Exposed Flex Duct)

1 μμμL Droplet Desorption

5-6 Exchange Volumes per Hour

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Hours 

% Remaining

Stainless Steel

Glass

Galvanized Steel

Polyester

~0.1 μL Evaporation/Hour

Non-porous Surfaces

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0 50 100 150 200

Hours

% Remaining

Vinyl Tile

Latex Paint

Rubber

Thermoplastic Urethane

1 μμμL Droplet Desorption

5-6 Exchange Volumes per Hour

20% - 40% 

Remaining

Porous and Permeable Surfaces

Results of Persistency Experiments

Decontamination of complex infrastructure 

will require a set of technologies 

Potential decontamination technologies exist for each of these areas.

Surface or ‘Hot Spot’ Decon

(Liquid, foam, or gel)

Volumetric Decon (Gas, vapor, or aerosol to reach 

all surfaces in a contaminated space)

Sensitive Equipment Decon

(Gas, vapor, or aerosol)

Waste Decon

(Liquid, foam, or gel)

Remove

Remove

Contaminated 

Space

Agent Persistency (Less Volatile, More Persistent)

G agents (Sarin, 

Soman, etc.) Mustard VX

Hot Humid Air mVHP

This approach has not 

been evaluated for 

volumetric decon of 

facilities with low 

persistency agents

Volumetric decontamination technologies can be selected 

based on the persistency of the agent 

Objective: Reduce the time for decontamination and eliminate the need to 

use more time-consuming processes (i.e., mVHP) for low persistency agents.

Considerable work 

has been conducted 

by the DoD to 

evaluate the mVHP

technology

Time, 

Resources

Agent 

Persistency

Decon

Technology

Technology 

Status

 



 Stainless Steel

 Vinyl Tile

 Painted Wallboard

 Flex-Duct (Plastic)

 LAX Plastic Paneling

 Silicon Sealant

 Fire-retardant Insulation

 Fiberglass Insulation

 Unsealed Concrete

 Sealed Concrete

 Ceramic Tile

 Galvanized Steel

 Rubberized Railing

 Urethane Railing

 Porous Wall Paper

 Coated Glass

 Simulant Desorption at 30 C and 60 C from Wallboard

(22 Hrs with 6 Air Exchanges/Hr)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

PM1 PM2 CEES1 CEES2 DMMP1 DMMP2

Simulant Type and Run

Simulant Desorption from Coupon (%)

30 C

60 C

  

 

  

Simulant Desorption at 30 C and 60 C from Vinyl Tile

(22 Hrs with 6 Air Exchanges/Hr)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

PM1 PM2 CEES1 CEES2 DMMP1 DMMP2

Simulant Type and Run

Simulant Desorption from Coupon (%)

30 C

60 C



  

 
176

Tucker

This work is addressing the sampling validation issues raised by the GAO (2005).

A need exists to validate probability-based sampling design 

methods to assure they provide the confidence prescribed for 

characterization and/or clearance metrics

Synthetic data sets 

were generated as 

baseline data from 

existing simulated 

release tests and 

modeling results. Statistical methods for hot-spot delineation, 

acceptance sampling, and UTL confidence 

methods are being validated.

Non-Parametric UTL

84.00%

86.00%

88.00%

90.00%

92.00%

94.00%

96.00%

98.00%

100.00%

102.00%

90% 95% 99%

Goal Confidence

Achieved Confidence

90% clean

95% clean

99% clean

Goal Confidence

Comparison of the Percentage of False Positives-2000 Realizations

Concentration Threshold: 500

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 1 6 18 20

Percentage of False Positives

Probability of Exceedance

Random-200pts

Random-500pts

Random-1000pts

Random-2000pts

Random-5000pts

Gridded-(10,20)

Gridded-(16,31)

Gridded-(22,45)

Gridded-(32,63)

Gridded-(50,100)

Geostatistical techniques 

for adaptive sampling 

methods are being 

validated.

The Facility Restoration OTD is focusing on four tasks

Pre-Planning

Integrate appropriate 

technologies and methods 

into a system for chemical 

remediation of critical 

facilities. Demonstrate the 

operation and potential 

utility of this system.

Address Data/Capability Gaps

Focused efforts to fill 

critical data and 

capability gaps needed 

to effectively 

implement the 

remediation plan to 

minimize economic 

damage due to the 

closure of a facility.

Exercises and Demonstrations

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



Technology 

Evaluation and 

Development

The Remediation Guidance Document will be 

utilized in a Table Top Exercise (TTX) 

 Date: November 3-4, 2008

 Location: Los Angeles Area Hotel - near LAX

 Format: TTX will use plenary sessions and breakout sessions. 

– Players will be grouped by ICS function: Unified Command, Operation 

Section, and Planning Section

– The plenary session will be used to brief all participants on the purpose, 

scope and objectives of the TTX, present scenario information, allow players 

to report back on results from break out sessions. 

– The breakout sessions will be used to allow each of the ICS Sections and 

Groups to develop a Sample Action Plan and Remediation Action Plan to 

address the scenario. 

 Scenario: Use two scenarios - Sarin (nonpersistent agent) and 

Mustard (persistent agent)

 Players: EPA (OSC, NDT), FBI, Public Health Dept., Fire Dept., 

Los Angeles World Airports, National Guard CST, Cal. DTSC

  

   

The project will conclude with a final demonstration tentatively

scheduled at the Ontario, CA airport in September 2009 

Presentation Outline

 Background and Project Overview

 Project Activities

– Remediation Guidance Development

– Technology Development

– Experimental Studies to Address Data 

and Capability Gaps

– Workshops, Exercises and 

Demonstrations

 Summary

The OTD is part of a larger strategy to enhance our ability to rapidly 

recover from the release of a CBW agent in critical facilities or areas

2001

 No pre-planning for 

recovery

 Lack of knowledge in 

many areas of the 

recovery process

 Large capability gaps

Present (DHS funded Restoration Demonstration 

Projects, Work in other Agencies)

Future

 Development of Site-specific 

recovery plans for SFO, LAX and 

template for other facilities

 Improved knowledge of the recovery 

process

 Specific capabilities (BROOM, 

sample collection efficiency, rapid 

viability analysis, decon)

 Workshops and exercises to 

transfer processes to other facilities

 Remediation plans for 

other airports and facilities 

based on DHS templates

 Recovery process 

improvements and 

enabling technologies 

provided to other agencies

 Other applications 

(additional contaminants, 

other types of facilities, 

wide area releases)

 

 
177

Snyder

1/12/200909-25-08 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division. 

EPA Decontamination Workshop 2008

Chapel Hill, NC 

Shawn Ryan, Emily Snyder 

Harry Stone, Ian MacGregor, Donald Kenny, Tim 

Hayes, James Rogers

Joe Cappello, Rich Fitzpatrick, Meg Stapleton

Lukas Oudejans, Bill Preston, Matt Clayton 

Systematic Decontamination of 

CWAs and TICs

1 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Outline of Presentation

• Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA) Systematic Decontamination 

Studies - Chlorine Based Decontaminants (Liquid and Fumigant)

–Persistence 

– Decontamination

• CWA Systematic Decontamination Studies Using Fumigants 

(mVHP and Steam)

– Method Development 

–Persistence 

• Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TIC) Decontamination Studies 

– Decontamination Studies

–By-product Determinations

2 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Systematic Decontamination Studies

• Promising technologies are investigated to determine efficacy and 

decontamination kinetics as a function of:

– Technology operating conditions (concentration, time, temperature, RH)

– Materials (actual building materials)

– Agents 

• Chemical agents and TICs

• Two-phased approach:

1. Environmental persistence

2. Decontamination kinetics

3 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Decontamination of Materials for CWAs and 

TICs Using Chlorine Based Decontaminants

• Investigation of persistence of chemical warfare agents (CWAs) 

on building material surfaces

– CWAs: sarin (GB), thickened soman (TGD), VX

– Materials: galvanized metal, decorative laminate, carpet, ceiling 

tile

• Decontamination of materials contaminated

with CWAs using Sabre ClO2 fumigation, liquid ClO2, 

or bleach

4 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Prior Testing at Battelle 

(BBRC, West Jefferson, OH)

Experimental Approach

• Coupons are dosed with 1 mg of the 

TIC or CWA

• Positive controls and one 

procedural blank coupon are placed 

in hood

• Test coupons are placed in test 

chamber (relative humidity, 

temperature, and air exchange rate 

controlled)

• Decontamination technology is 

applied (coupons soak in liquid 

decontaminant)

• Air monitoring is conducted inside 

the test chamber throughout the 

decontamination (off gassing of 

CWA, TIC, or by-product)

• Coupons are analyzed for remaining 

CWA or TIC

• Coupons are analyzed for byproducts**

Current Testing at ERG 

(CUBRIC, Buffalo ,NY)

** funding did not permit completion of by-product analysis for CWAs

5 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Persistence on Materials: VX (22 oC and 40%RH)

Persistence of VX on Carpet

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180

Time since spiking - hours

Remainder of VX spike on surface - %

Persistence of VX on Laminate

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180

Time since spiking - hours

Remainder of VX spike on surface - %

Persistence of VX on Galvanized Metal

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180

Time since spiking - hours

Remainder of VX spike on surface - %
178

Snyder

6 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Persistence on Materials: Sarin (GB) (22 oC and 40%RH)

Persistence of Sarin on Carpet

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

0 1 4 24 72 168

Time since spiking - hours

Remainder of GB spike on surface - %

Persistence of Sarin on Laminate

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Time since spiking - minutes

Remainder of GB spike on surface - %

Persistence of Sarin on Galvanized Metal Ductwork

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Time since spiking - minutes

Remainder of GB spike on surface - %

7 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Persistence on Materials: Thickened Soman 

(GD) (22 oC and 40%RH)

Persistence of Thickened GD on Carpet

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 1 4 24 72 168

Time since spiking - hours

Remainder of GD spike on surface - %

Persistence of Thickened GD on Galvanized Metal

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 1 4 24 72 168

Time since spiking - hours

Remainder of GD spike on surface - %

Persistence of Thickened GD on Laminate

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 1 4 24 72 168

Time since spiking - hours

Remainder of GD spike on surface - %

8 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Decontamination of Materials: CWAs Sabre ClO2 (~3000 ppmv, 75oF, 79% RH)

VX on Industrial Carpet

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

Treatment time - minutes

Percent Recovery - %

control

decon

9 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Decontamination of Materials: CWAs Sabre ClO2 (~3000 ppmv, 75oF, 79% RH)

VX on Galvanized Metal

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

Treatment time - minutes

Percent Recovery - %

control

decon

10 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Decontamination of Materials: CWAs Sabre ClO2 (~3000 ppmv, 75oF, 79% RH)

VX on Laminate

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

Treatment time - minutes

Percent Recovery - %

control

decon

11 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Summary of Chlorine Dioxide Fumigant Results:

NA = Not determined

0 h (n=1) 87 NA

1 h (n=5) 5.1 ± 0.9 3.6 ± 1.8

4 h (n=5) 4.9 ± 0.2 2.8 ± 0.9

0 h (n=1) 52 NA

1 h (n=5) 40 ± 8.7 15 ± 2.7

2 h (n=5) 30 ± 3.2 19 ± 8.8

0 h (n=1) 89 NA

1 h (n=5) 1.3 5.4 ± 6.1 

2 h (n=5) 0.4 < 0.1

0 h (n=1) 73 NA

1 h (n=5) 16 ± 5.5 10 ± 7.9

2 h (n=5) 4.3 ± 1.9 5.4 ± 6.5

CWA Material Mean Recovery in Percent ± SD

Combination

Exposure 

Time

GB Carpet 

TGD Carpet

TGD Laminate

TGD Ductwork

Positive Control 

Coupons 

Decontaminated 

Test Coupons

Indicates a non-detect in set of replicates
179

Snyder

12 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Summary of Chlorine Dioxide Fumigant Results 

Continued:

NA = Not determined

0 h (n=1) 74 NA

1 h (n=5) 77 ± 23 <0.7

4 h (n=5) 72 ± 7.1 <0.7

0 h (n=1) 94 NA

1 h (n=5) 81 ± 7.6 <0.7

4 h (n=5) 88 ± 5.1 <0.7

0 h (n=1) 84 NA

1 h (n=5) 84 ± 2.6 <0.7

4 h (n=5) 85 ± 7.6 <0.7

CWA Material Mean Recovery in Percent ± SD

Combination

Exposure 

Time

VX Carpet

VX Laminate

VX Ductwork

Positive Control 

Coupons 

Decontaminated 

Test Coupons

13 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Bleach Decontamination Results

Ductwork 30 min 95 ± 11 ND, <0.7

Laminate 30 min 102 ± 6 ND, <0.7

VX Carpet 30 min 107 ± 7 ND, <0.7

Ductwork 10 min 130 ± 39 3.2 ± 1.9

Laminate 10 min 90 ± 10 3.7 ± 1.9

TGD Carpet 10 min 121 ± 33 ND, <0.1

GB Carpet 10 min 93 ± 7 ND, <0.1

With Bleach 

Decontamination

Without Decontamination

(in air in a sealed vial)

Mean Recovery, % of Mass Recovered at Time 0 

± SD

CWA Material Time

ND = not detected

14 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Chlorine Dioxide Liquid Decontamination Results

Mean Recovery, % of Mass Recovered

Ductwork 10 min ND, <0.7 ND, <0.7

Laminate 10 min 1.9 ND, <0.7

VX Carpet 10 min 5.0 ND, <0.7

With ClO2 (Liquid) 

Decontamination

Without 

Decontamination

(in acidified water)

CWA Material Time

ND = not detected

15 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Decontamination of Materials for CWAs and TICs

Using Fumigants

• Investigation of persistence of toxic industrial 

chemicals (TICs) and chemical warfare agents 

(CWAs) on building material surfaces

–TICs: methyl parathion

– CWAs: sarin (GB), thickened soman (TGD), 

VX, mustard (HD)

– Materials: galvanized metal, decorative 

laminate, carpet, ceiling tile

• Decontamination of materials contaminated

with CWAs using Steam and Steris modified 

Vaporous Hydrogen Peroxide (mVHP)

steam generator

mVHP generator

16 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Extraction Efficiency on Ceiling Tile - Agent 

Comparison:

mean % recovery

 VX - Ceiling Tile 79 (CoV - 8.4 %) 99 (CoV - 7.5 %) 75 (CoV - 8.5 %) 99 (CoV - 7.1 %)

HD - Ceiling Tile 108 (CoV - 1.3 %) 109 (CoV - 0.7%) 109 (CoV - 3.5%) 109 (CoV - 6.6 %)

Agent Material 

Combination

mean % recovery mean % recovery mean % recovery

Hexane Ethyl Acetate Methylene Chloride 1:1 Hexane:Acetone

CoV = coefficient of variance

17 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Method Detection Limit Studies – Hexane 

Extraction:

Initial Amount Applied: 2.54 mg HD, 2.04 mg TGD, 2.02 mg VX

Material

GB TGD HD

Decorative Laminate 2.8 4.8 1.8

Galvanized Steel 4.4 1.0 2.5

Industrial Carpet 2.8 1.1 2.7

Ceiling Tile 5.9 4.9 14.6

Method Detection Limits, g (10 ml extract)
180

Snyder

18 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Persistence of Mustard (22oC, 40 %RH):

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Elapsed Time Since Spiking Agent - hr

Mean Recovery - %

Decorative Laminate

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Elapsed Time Since Spiking Agent - hr

Mean Recovery - %

Galvanized Metal

Method Detection Limit 

(translates to <0.22 % 

recovery)

19 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Persistence of Mustard (22oC, 40 %RH):

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180

Elapsed Time Since Spiking Agent - hr

Mean Recovery - %

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180

Elapsed Time Since Spiking Agent - hr

Mean Recovery - %

Industrial Grade Carpet

Ceiling Tile

20 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Experiments Underway:

• Fumigant chamber 

constructed - steam and 

mVHP generators installed

• Steam and modified 

Vaporous Hydrogen Peroxide 

(mVHP):

–Test each fumigant at 2 

different conditions

–Determine decontamination 

efficacy and identify 

decontamination byproducts

Setup for mVHP

Setup for steam 21 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Decontamination of Methyl Parathion by Chlorine 

Dioxide Experimental Details:

• 10 mL of 100 mg/mL methyl 

parathion MP in dichloromethane 

was spiked onto coupons (98% 

purity, 980 mg is deposited onto 

each 2x5 cm coupon)

• Fumigation was done at 21o C and 

75 %RH

• Positive controls were also held at 

same conditions

• Procedural blanks were taken 

through the same process as test 

coupons

• Two fumigation conditions were 

tested: 2000 ppmv ClO2 and 3000 

ppmv ClO2 (Chlorodysis)

• Three different exposure times were 

studies (1,4,7 hrs)

7h 4h 1h

22 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Methyl Parathion Decontamination Results:

01234567

0

20

40

60

80

100

Efficacy ξ

Fumigation time (h)

 Ceiling Tile, 2000 ppmv ClO2

 Ceiling Tile, 3000 ppmv ClO2

 Drywall, 3000 ppmv ClO2

 Drywall, 2000 ppmv ClO2

23 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Formation of Methyl Paraoxon

0h 1h 4h 7h

0

200

400

600

800

1000

 Methyl parathion

 Methyl paraoxon

Ceiling tile, 2000 ppm

0h 1h 4h 7h

0

200

400

600

800

1000

Ceiling tile, 3000 ppm

0h 1h 4h 7h

0

200

400

600

800

1000

Dry Wall, 3000 ppm

Amount on coupon (μg)

Fumigation time

0h 1h 4h 7h

0

200

400

600

800

1000

Dry Wall, 2000 ppm
181

Snyder

24 Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division.

Experiments Underway:

• Systematic decontamination 

studies for Tetramethylene

Disulfotetramine (TETS) 

• Determination of reaction 

kinetics of half mustard with 

chlorine dioxide fumigant 

using Single Photon Ionization 

Time of Flight Mass 

Spectrometry (SPI-TOFMS) 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

Ion Signal (arb units)

Mod M4500 Concentration (ppm)

Day 1

Day 2

Day 3 (Positive controls)

Day 4

Day 5

 Linear fit to all data

R2

 = 0.954

Measurement of ClO2 Concentration with the 

SPI-TOFMS during fumigation
182

Mantooth

Small Item Vapor Hazard 

Determinations in Interior 

Spaces:

What, Where, When, Why 

and How Many.

Dr. Teri Lalain and Dr. Brent Mantooth

September 2008

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Introduction Introduction

Most fundamental question does this technology fulfill 

a need as identified by my requirement?

A with most questions, there is a process that 

enables generating the answer.

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Decontamination Technology 

Performance Testing

Decontamination Technology 

Performance Testing

All emerging Hazard 

Mitigation technologies are 

required to demonstrate 

the ability to meet a 

specified set of key 

performance parameters 

(KPPs) per the intended 

acquisition program 

requirements. 

Data generated from S&T 

and DT testing must be 

defensible and comparable 

in order to identify the next 

generation technologies 

and support acquisition 

transition tasks such as 

TRAs, milestone reviews, 

and third party data 

evaluations. 

Method needs to be robust 

to evaluate the technology 

not the test method.

Representation of panel test process.

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

More Specifically, the Outputs from Laboratory Testing 

Need Documented Process for Requirement Comparison

More Specifically, the Outputs from Laboratory Testing 

Need Documented Process for Requirement Comparison

Requirement 

in mg/m3

Mass on PROCESS TO

tubes (ng)

Test data provides a measure of mass. A mathematical approach is 

needed to go from the measured mass to a requirement value.

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Vapor Testing and Calculation Method

Vapor source (coupon / item) effect in the environment (scenario)

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Mass Transport is Fundamental 

Basis of Decon Testing

Mass Transport is Fundamental 

Basis of Decon Testing

Agent – Material – Decontaminant Interactions

• Mass transport processes control how much agent is absorbed.

• Penetration rate (mass transport) of decon and reaction kinetics determine how much agent 

is removed or neutralized. 

• Post-decon hazards result from agent mass transport out of the material that was not 

removed or neutralized by the decon.
183

Mantooth

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

1: Vapor Sampling Requires a Dynamic 

Vapor Chamber

1: Vapor Sampling Requires a Dynamic 

Vapor Chamber

System is described by mass balance equation using an 

emission source and resulting vapor concentration.

C(t) = time dependent chamber vapor concentration (mg/m3)

V = chamber volume (m3)

Q = chamber air flow rate (m3/min)

A = contaminated surface area of test article (m2)

E(t) = time dependent emission factor (mg m-2 min-1)

V

QtC

V

A tE

dt

dC −= )()(

Dynamic Vapor 

Chamber

Well-mixed chamber enabling 

the measurement of vapor 

concentration over a period of 

time (i.e., 6 – 12 hours) for the 

calculation of emission factors. 

Mixing can be evaluated by 

techniques specified in ASTM 

D 5116-06 (tracer gas decay).

Emission factors are 

calculated and then ‘scaled’ to 

a scenario to determine the 

vapor concentration to which 

unprotected personnel may be 

exposed 

POOR MIX WELL MIXED

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

2. Execute a Vapor Test

3. Calculate Vapor Chamber Concentration as a 

Function of Time

2. Execute a Vapor Test

3. Calculate Vapor Chamber Concentration as a 

Function of Time

Vapor Test

The vapor test requires a significant 

amount of planning, calculations, 

and verification of sampling 

procedures including break through 

testing and establishing sampling 

schedules AND sample analysis 

procedures. 

The Chamber Vapor Concentration 

(mg/m3) is calculated from the 

contaminant mass on the solid 

sorbent tube (determined by a 

validated analytical technique such as 

TD-GC-MSD), the sampling air flow 

rate through the tube, and the 

sampling time. All three values must 

be accurately measured to ensure 

accurate calculation of the chamber 

vapor concentration. 

The term chamber vapor 

concentration applies specifically to 

experimental data. This 

concentration does not correspond to 

the concentration to which unexposed 

personnel would be exposed.

Example Sampling Schedule

Sample over period of interest

C = vapor 

concentration (mg/m3)

m = analyte mass on 

tube (ng)

V = sampled air 

volume (m3)

t = total tube pull time 

(min)

F = sampling air flow 

(mL/min)

tF 000,000,1/

m

V

m C ==

Calculate Chamber 

Concentration

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

4. Calculate the Emission Factor and Model 4. Calculate the Emission Factor and Model

Emission Factor, E(t), (mg m2 min-1): the agent mass per 

unit of contaminated surface 

area per minute that is emitted 

into the vapor chamber.

Determined from mass 

balance equation solving for 

E(t):

Air change Rate, n, (min-1): 

the ratio of air flow into the 

chamber to the chamber 

volume, Q / V.

Loading Factor, l, (m2/m3): 

the ratio of surface area of the 

emitting item to the volume of 

the chamber, A / V. Only the 

contaminated portion of the 

coupon is emitting vapors.

Calculating the 

Emission Factor

l

tnC

dt

dC

tE

)(

)(

+

=

Emission Factor Equation

V

Q n =

V

A l contam =

Air Change Rate, n

Loading Factor, l

where

Q = chamber air flow rate (m3 min-1)

V = free air volume (m3)

where

Acontam = contaminated surface area of test article (m2),

V = chamber volume – test item volume (m3).

The emission factor model is the best fit equation that represents the 

data (i.e. an empirical model). 

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

5. Place the Emission Source in a Scenario to 

Determine if a Hazard is Present

5. Place the Emission Source in a Scenario to 

Determine if a Hazard is Present

The following scenarios will illustrate the impact that 

the scenario has on determining if a hazard is present. 

The test data can be scaled to a scenario if the scenario 

volume and air change rates are known.

The scenarios used to evaluate vapor test results should be agreed upon by the 

test sponsor to address the scenarios or interest to the sponsor or as specified in 

the requirement document for a specific acquisition program. 

Scenario Calculations

Parameters and 

Conditions

The calculations provide a first 

approx. to the vapor concentration in 

an environment, more complex 

models can be used if needed.

• The enclosed volume is perfectly 

mixed. There are models that 

address poor mixing (CONTAM).

• Air flow into the scenario is ‘clean’.

• The following calculations apply to 

enclosed volumes (‘indoor’

environments), modeling outdoor 

environments requires dispersion 

models (e.g., SCIPUFF, CFD, 

VLSTRACK).

• The presented model does not 

account for ‘sinks’ that will exist in 

real world scenarios. 

• Evaporative mass transport 

mechanisms may require 

additional testing requirements 

(i.e. air velocity specifications) to 

determine emission rate for 

specific scenario calculations.

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

6. Calculate Scenario 6. Calculate Scenario Vapor Concentration Vapor Concentration

The same approach used to calculate the scenario vapor 

conc. using scenario loading factor and air change rates.

Previous steps were executed 

for multiple scenarios each 

generating a vapor conc. 

profile. These profiles 

correspond to placing a 1 m2

panel with RSC of 15% into 

each scenario. Relative 

Surface Coverage (RSC) is 

defined as the ratio of the 

contaminated surface area to 

the total surface area of the 

coupon.

Calculation has flexibility to 

address as tested and other 

contam. coverages.

The scenario has a 

significant impact on 

concentration!

Scenario Concentration 

Calculation

ttCtnttCtltEtC )()()()( S ∆−+∆∆−−∆=

Coupon

Contam

A

A RSC =

Starting from mass on tube – now have scenario based 

vapor concentration. So is there a vapor hazard?

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Req.

in 

mg/m3

Process to get to Vapor Hazard Determination Process to get to Vapor Hazard Determination

Starting from mass on tube – now have lab and scenario based vapor 

concentration profiles.

Note for this particular case, the vapor chamber produces a concentration 

profile greater than scenarios. This is not always the case.

PROCESS TO

Mass on 

tubes (ng)
184

Mantooth

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Vapor Requirements Vapor Requirements

Vapor requirements are specified in concentration with exposure duration.

Vapor concentration requirements are determined using toxic load models (ten 

Berge equation).

Toxic load modeling is used because vapor concentration, and fluctuations in vapor 

concentrations may have nonlinear effect on toxicological response.

Time weighted average (TWA) vapor concentrations do not capture this affect 

(example later).

Using methods presented here, the experimental toxic load is compared to the 

toxic load used to generate the requirements.

JPID ’05 KPPs

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

DoD Guidance: Use Toxic Load DoD Guidance: Use Toxic Load

DoD accepted method to calculate vapor exposure: Toxic Load 

• Used to by USACHPPM to calculate requirements (47-EM-5863-04)

• Specified in FM 3-11.9

• Accounts for fluctuations in concentration and exposure time

dttCTL

n

 = )(

TL = toxic load (mgn min/m3n)

C(t) = the concentration as a 

function of time (mg/m3)

n = toxic load exponent 

(unitless, agent specific)

GD VX HD 

Route of 

Exposure Effect 

FM 3-11.9 

CHPPM 

FM 3-11.9 

CHPPM 

FM 3-11.9 

CHPPM 

IH/OC Lethal 1.25 2 1 2 1.5 1 

IH/OC Severe 1.25 2 1 2 1 1 

IH/OC Mild 1.4 2 1 2 1 1 

PC Lethal 1 N/A 1 N/A 1 N/A 

PC Severe 1 N/A 1 N/A 1 N/A 

PC Mild 1 N/A 1 N/A 1 N/A 

IH/OC – inhalation/ocular exposure 

PC – percutaneous (through the skin) 

yellow highlighter indicates the value that should be used for toxic load calculations in this report.

Toxic Load is determined using the ten Berge equation:

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Case Study: GD Exposure Evaluated Using Toxic 

Load and TWA – Would Miosis be Observed?

Case Study: GD Exposure Evaluated Using Toxic 

Load and TWA – Would Miosis be Observed?

GD Case Study Facts

Item: GD contamination that 

was decontaminated and 

moved to a garage. The 

vapor concentration decayed 

as a function of time. 

The FM 3.11-9 toxic load exp. 

for GD is n = 1.4. (Note, 

CHPPM n = 2 for this calc.)

TWA best suited for constant 

emission monitoring, such as 

demil operations; TWA not 

recommended when n ≠ 1.

(3) High concentration early in the scenario presents most 

of the ‘hazard.’ Allowing the item 2 hours to off-gas, 

reduces the Toxic load (for 2-12 hr) to below TL01.

dttCTL

n

 = )(

Would Miosis be Observed - Yes

(2) Calculated Toxic Load is between the TL16 and TL50, 

miosis would be observed in >16% of the military pop.

(1) Calculated TWA and average concentration are less 

than requirement (for 12 hr EC01) -- HOWEVER

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

7. Methodology Update uses Concentration and

Toxic Load to Improve Data Scientific Value and 

Hazard Determination

7. Methodology Update uses Concentration and

Toxic Load to Improve Data Scientific Value and 

Hazard Determination

Historically laboratory data was compared 

to requirements based on the vapor 

concentration measured in the vapor 

chamber (light blue line). 

This does not correspond to the vapor 

concentration to which unprotected 

personnel would be exposed in an actual 

scenario. 

If decontaminant formulations were ‘tuned’

until vapor chamber results met 

requirements, then the decontaminant could 

potentially have greater material degradation

and logistical burden than necessary.

The vapor concentration profile can 

provide guidance regarding decontaminant 

performance for reducing vapor emission.

The toxic load values must be considered 

to determine if a hazard is present when n ≠

1. Unlike EC% values, the TL value is time 

independent. As soon as the TL profile 

exceeds the TL% value the toxic response 

will be observed for the specified population 

percentage.

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Consideration: Item Movement and 

Secondary Hazards

Consideration: Item Movement and 

Secondary Hazards

The multiple item concept 

shown here is an 

educational concept for 

determining risk.

Concepts such as rinsing 

relocating and presenting a 

secondary hazard are fairly 

understood. Are there 

cases and situations where 

data extrapolation to a 

scenario may require further 

consideration?

A single item may test 

below a hazard, am I 

worried about multiple 

item hazard?

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Methodology approach for calculating emission factors (rates) for test materials (items) to determine 

vapor emission factors that can be scaled to scenarios and enable scenario based vapor 

concentration and toxic load calculations. Methods also accommodate for vapor test chamber 

differences in the calculations. 

Vapor Testing Methodology

Where we were and where we are

Vapor Testing Methodology

Where we were and where we are

Vapor test at start of program Vapor test where we are

Emission 

Factor 

Calc. Scenario 

& Tox. Detailed

Methods

Test Method Updates: 

• Identification and management of key variables. What needs to be measured including 

chamber volume, V; contaminated area, AContam; chamber flow rate, Q; sampling parameters, 

experiment duration (new).

Enhanced calculation power

• Updated data analysis methods for determining material (item) emission factors (rates) (new)

• Ability to calculate and report laboratory data and data scaled to scenarios for vapor 

concentration and toxic load (new).

• If new scenarios are identified, vapor concentrations may be calculated from the existing data 

without new testing provided certain key parameters are met. (new)
185

Mantooth

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

When you are conducting a test to support 

R&D / test objectives – encourage 

everyone to ask “what question am I trying 

to answer?” and “how does the selected 

test support or limit ability to achieve that 

answer?”

Any single piece of data can provide a 

very different perception and potentially

misleading conclusion when taken out of 

context from the entire evaluation and 

even the specific test capabilities.

In the end, the goal is to determine risk. A single piece of information 

may indicate “safe” scenario

Full data context may indicate 

the scenario is hazardous

Approach Emphasizes Data Scientific Value: 

Context, Interpretation and Utilization

UNCLASSIFIED – APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Acknowledgements Acknowledgements

DTRA Support, Fred Crowson, Dr. 

Charles Bass, Dr. John Weimaster, 

Mark Mueller, Mark Morgan, Dr. 

Glenn Lawson

Decon Sciences: Dr. Teri Lalain, Dr. 

Brent Mantooth, Tom Lynn, Larry 

Procell, Zoe Hess, Dave Gehring. 

Engineering: Corey Piepenburg

ECBC Experimental Fabrication Shop 

Toxicology: Dr. Sharon ReutterChristy

MS&A: Doug Sommerville

Dr. Stephen Channel

Zach Zander, Matt Shue, Pam 

Humphreys, Missy Waller, 

Joe Myers, Michelle Hover, 

Morgan Hall, Michelle Sheahy

Bill Davis

JPEO-CBD JPM Decon Support, 

Mike Diederen, Kevin Gray

The over 60+ references used 

to generate this brief, and the 

150+ references used to build 

this program.
186

Clements

CET Proprietary 1





















This briefing contains material, which is provided solely for 

informational purposes. Its dissemination, use or reproduction 

is prohibited without express written permission by Clean 

Earth Technologies, LLC, as provided for by statute. 





CET Proprietary 2

–Improvised simulants

Simulants 

CET Proprietary 3

–Fluorescing simulants 

• GloGerm

• Glitterbug

• Germ Juice

Simulants 

CET Proprietary 4

–Fluorescing + Physical Properties 

including adjusting viscosity and color 

Simulants 







 

CET Proprietary 5

• Identification, demarcation, characterization, 

monitoring and decontamination requires 

training with the tools used in a real event.

• Dispersion of the simulants agents in a 

manner that mimics the actual agent 

dispersion.

• Simulants be applied by trainers and trainees 

will use their detection equipment and/or a 

UV light to determine where the simulant 

agents are located before and after 

decontamination.

CONOPS

Instrument Detection

UV Detection

CET Proprietary 6

• Mimic the physical properties of agents

• Readily visible by the individuals being 

trained in their use

• Safe for use in unrestricted areas by 

individuals in training

• GRASE

• Listed in the International Dictionary of 

Cosmetic Ingredients

• Non-irritating to human skin and mucous 

membranes. 

Criteria
187

Clements

CET Proprietary 7

• Two chemical classes of compounds 

considered:

– Salicylate ester series

– Triacetin series 

• Both met the criteria, but Triacetin is less 

irritating to human skin and mucous 

membranes

• Considerable amount of characterization was 

performed on the salicylate ester series for the 

purpose of having a ‘backup’ to minimize the 

risk to the project. No such deficiency was 

found.

Chemical Simulant 

Selection

Salicylate ester

Triacetin

CET Proprietary 8

• A triglyceride, 1,2,3-triacetoxypropane 

• Artificial chemical compound

• Common food and cosmetic additive

– A solvent in flavorings 

– Humectant function 

• Retains moisture in food and cosmetics

– Component of casting liquor with TG

• A “simple fat”

– Considered a possible source of food energy in artificial food 

regeneration systems on long space missions 

• Fuel additive that improves cold weather and biodiesel viscosity

• A plasticizer in cigarette filters

Triacetin

Methods and Procedures

CET Proprietary 9

 

  

 

 

 

 

 



 

CET Proprietary 10

Viscosity

PROPERTY SIMULANTS AGENTS 

Gs HD VX GB HD VX

Kinematic Viscosity (cST) 4.65 14.45 16.74 1.28 650 12.26

 

 

 

 



 





 

 

 

CET Proprietary 11

Surface Tension

PROPERTY SIMULANTS AGENTS 

Gs HD VX GB HD VX 

Surface Tension (dynes/cm) 29.2 32.8 33.2 26.5 43.2 32.01

 

 

 

 

 



 

 





  

CET Proprietary 12

Relative Density

PROPERTY SIMULANTS AGENTS 

G-s HD VX GB HD VX 

Density (g/cm3) 1.102 1.159 1.163 1.102 1.270 1.012 
188

Clements

 

 

 



 

 

 





 



CET Proprietary 13

Water Solubility

PROPERTY SIMULANTS AGENTS 

Gs HD VX GB HD VX 

Solubility (ml/100 ml DIW) 15.0 6.70 6.50 100 0.092 5.0

CET Proprietary 14

CHEMICAL 

AGENT / 

SIMULANT 

MOL. 

WEIGHT

(amu) 

VAPOR

PRESSURE 

(mm Hg) 

Vapor Concentration

(mg/m3) 

Vapor Concentration

ppmv 

Sarin (GB) 140 1.48 22,000 1,947 

Soman (GD) 182 0.87 3,900 1,155 

S Mustard (HD) 159 0.072 610 95 

Tabun (GA) 162 0.154 600 92 

VX 267 0.0007 10.5 0.9 

Methyl salicylate 152 1.40 11,468 1,842 

Ethyl salicylate 166 0.55 4,923 723 

Benzyl salicylate 228 0.050 608 65 

Octyl salicylate 246 0.001 14 1.3 

(TAEL 50/50) 153.37* 1.10 8,284 1,318 

(TAEL 95/5) 212.76* 0.063 723 83 

(TA-100) 218.20 0.0035 34.8 3.9 

Property 

Comparisons

  

















 

CET Proprietary 15

Surface 

Fluorescence

 

 

 









 



CET Proprietary 16

Surface 

Fluorescence

 

 



 





 

 



 





CET Proprietary 17

Surface 

Fluorescence

 

 

 

 

  

 



 



 





 

CET Proprietary 18

Surface 

Fluorescence
189

Clements

Surface 

Fluorescence

Firefighter Turnout Suit

Background = 6 mV 

Simulant % of Background = 

233 to 883%

Painted Drywall (White)

Background = 8 mV 

Simulant % of Background = 

750 to 1700%



 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

Surface 

Fluorescence

-Surface

·Background Fluorescence in mV (Range of 3 simulants as the percent of Background Fluorescence)

- 100

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

0 10 20 30 40 50

Temperature Deg F

Vapor c oncentr ation ppm v

G-S

H-S

V-S

Vapor Response of the Chemical Simulants 

using a MiniRae PID

Vapor Characteristics of Chemical Simulants Detectable by PID

VX 218.20 0.0035 34.8 3.9

HD 212.76* 0.063 723 83

G-s 153.37* 1.10 8284 1318

(mg/ m (ppmv) 3)

Vapor Pressure Volatility

(mm Hg @ 20 ̊C)

Molecular 

Weight

Simulant

*apparent molecular weight

Vapor 

Response

CET Proprietary 22

 

 

 

 



 





 

 





  

 

Skin & Eye 

Sensitivity

Summary of Ocular Irritection® Results Simulant Dose IDE Score Predicted Ocular

Irritancy 

Classification

V-s 25 l 16.8 Mild 

50 l 18.4 Mild 

75 l 20.7 Mild 

100 l 22.9 Mild 

125 l 23.8 a Mild 

G-s 25 l 17.0 Mild 

50 l 18.8 Mild 

75 l 25.6 Mild 

100 l 28.4 Mild/Moderate 

125 l 31.0 a Mild/Moderate 

a Maximum Qualified Score 

Summary of the Dermal Irritection® Results Simulant Dose HIE Score Predicted Dermal 

Irritancy 

Classification

V-s 25 l 0.68 Non-Irritant

50 l 0.91 Non-Irritant/Irritant 

75 l 1.01 Non-Irritant/Irritant 

100 l 1.16 Non-Irritant/Irritant 

125 l 1.27 a Irritant

G-s 25 l 1.03 Non-Irritant/Irritant 

50 l 1.10 Non-Irritant/Irritant 

75 l 1.69 Irritant

100 l 1.98 Irritant

125 l 2.17 a Irritant

a Maximum Qualified Score 

Skin & Eye 

Sensitivity

 

 

 

 

  

 



 





 





 

Human Subjects 

Testing
190

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Final Products

www.TrainSaf.com
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MERCURY VAPOR EMISSION MEASUREMENT STUDIES 

AND EVALUATION OF CLEANUP TECHNOLOGIES

 





HOMELAND SECURITY FOCUS

  

 

 

 

MERCURY AS A WMD

 

 



  

 



 

RESEARCH NEEDS: Hg RESEARCH NEEDS: Hg 

EMISSIONS RATES

  

 

  

 

  

 

 

PROPOSED ERT/REAC PROPOSED ERT/REAC 

RESEARCH STUDY

  











 



PROPOSED ERT/REAC PROPOSED ERT/REAC 

RESEARCH STUDY

  









 

 
192

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RESEARCH PROTOCOLS: RESEARCH PROTOCOLS: 

PHASE 1

 

  

 

 



 

 

 



 



RESEARCH PROTOCOLS: RESEARCH PROTOCOLS: 

PHASE 1

 

  

 



 





 

RESEARCH PROTOCOLS: RESEARCH PROTOCOLS: 

PHASE 1

 

  

 

 

 

 

 



 

 



RESEARCH PROTOCOLS: RESEARCH PROTOCOLS: 

PHASE 1

 

  

 

 



 



 

 

Hg SPILL CONTROL PRODUCTS

  



  



  



  



RESEARCH PROTOCOLS: RESEARCH PROTOCOLS: 

PHASE 2

  



 


193

Campagna

Conclusion

  

 



  



  



 

 

QUESTIONS?
194

Focht

Development of Standards for 

Decontamination of Structures Affected by 

Chemical and Biological Terrorism

Robert Focht

Science Applications International Corporation 

(SAIC Canada)

2008 Decontamination and Restoration of Sites Contaminated with 

Biological, Chemical, or Radiological Agents

Chapel Hill, NC, USA

September 24-26, 2008

This document may contain technical data, the export of which is restricted by the

US Arms Export Control Act (AECA -- Title 22 U.S.C Sect 2751)

2

Presentation Overview

 Introduction

 Objectives

 Relevance

 Overview

 Testing Results and Discussion

 Biological Agents

 Chemical Agents

 Next Steps

 Acknowledgements 

3

Participants

 Project Program

 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) 

Research and Technology Initiative (CRTI)

 Project Lead

 Environment Canada (EC)

 Participants

 Research Institute of Hygiene, Toxicology, and Occupational Pathology 

(RIHTOP), Russia

 Public Health Agency Canada (PHAC) 

 University of Ottawa (CREM)

 Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC Canada) 

 Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)

 University of Leeds

 United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) 

4

Introduction to the Standards Project

 Decontamination of facilities following acts of 

biological or chemical terrorism is designed to 

reduce health hazards to the extent that the 

facilities can be reoccupied. 

 No suitable standards currently exist for 

determining “safe” surface contamination levels.

5

Introduction to the Standards Project

 What is a decontamination standard?

 For the purpose of building decontamination following a 

CBRN terrorist event, a standard is:

An agent-specific level that must be achieved 

before a building or facility can be repopulated.

6

Standards should be:

 Useful on all levels, from first response to 

remediation decision matrices, with the focus on 

later stages

 Useful as an heuristic tool in determining 

building/facility fate, i.e., repopulation or 

destruction (some decon still required, but how 

much?)

 Useful as target levels where repopulation of a 

building/facility has been predetermined and/or 

destruction is not possible (e.g., sensitive 

buildings)
195

Focht

7

Steps in developing decon standards:

 Assess threat potential for a number of identified 

agents;

 Assess the toxicity and likely exposure pathways; 

and,

 Develop a method for determining “safe” levels of 

contaminants or “how clean is clean”

8

Objectives of the Standards Project

 To develop methods to establish decon standards:

 Establishing the relationship between magnitude of 

exposure and expected health effects;

 Assessing real and potential exposure risks through the 

identification of individuals at risk of exposure and 

consideration of all routes of exposure (dermal contact, 

inhalation, and ingestion); and,

 Characterizing the risk to determine potential for toxicity 

or infectivity.

9

Relevance

 Pertinent laboratory data, derived from 

experiments performed by project partners, is 

being used to generate models which will help set 

clean-up standards and to determine:

 Whether levels necessary for rehabilitation are 

practically attainable;

 The likely cost of decontaminating buildings to 

acceptable levels, and whether the cost is justifiable;

 Whether use restrictions will need to be in place based 

on expected facility use; and,

 The predicted associated toxicological/pathogenic risk.

10

Overview

 Experiments are currently underway in Canada 

and abroad to establish the link between surface 

concentrations of selected compounds on building 

materials and their ultimate impact on human 

health. 

 Physical behaviours of compounds of concern and 

toxicological profiles are being established. 

11

Overview



Walls

Floor

Windows

Furniture

Air Desorption

Respiratory

tract

S i 

12

Test Results and Discussion - Biological

 Experiments on the biological side have focussed 

on determining the effectiveness of 

decontamination methods and the use of 

surrogates for distinct threats. 

 Work continues on optimizing sampling 

procedures to provide a more accurate 

determination of contaminated surface 

concentration.
196

Focht

13

Biological Experiments - Sampling

 Experiments were performed to investigate sampling 

methodologies with the goal of determining practical limits 

of detection of bacterial pathogens.

 Greater than 106 CFU was inoculated into 5 control tubes 

and onto 10 test swabs for each trial (results of E. coli 

ATCC 25404 inoculated onto polyester swabs) 

 Three elutions in PBS + Tween 80 from each swab were 

combined to determine the total recovery for each swab. 

The mean recovery relative to the mean control was 

calculated.

14

Biological Experiments - Sampling

Mean % Recovery of E.coli (High Concentration) 

from Polyester Swabs After 3 Elutions

29.7 27.7 37

67.2 70 60.4

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3

Mean % Recovery

Unrecovered

Elution 3

Elution 2

Elution 1

 The mean recovery of Escherichia coli on the first elution 

varied from 27.7% to 37.0%. The second elution added 

approximately 2.5% to the recovery, and the third elution a 

further 0.6% to 1%. After three elutions, 60% to 70% 

remained.

15

Biological Experiments - Results

Agarose (1%) gel electrophoresis 

analysis of the timed VHP-exposed 

DNA (shown at left) revealed a 

typical dose vs. response of 

degradation of DNA. VHP 

treatment for a period of 45 

minutes almost completely 

degraded the DNA.

Hepatitis A virus is a good 

surrogate for testing the virucidal 

activity of chemicals. This nonenveloped virus is relatively 

resistant to many microbicides.

16

Testing Results and Discussion - Chemical

 Experiments on the chemical side have focussed 

on two areas: desorption and toxicity. 

 Desorption studies are building on previous work 

to determine the relationship between 

contamination levels on building materials and 

contamination levels detected in the air.

17

Testing Results and Discussion - Chemical

Desorption study schematic

18

Chemical Desorption Experiments - Lindane

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

0 10 20 30 40

Surf ace Concent rat ion ( mg/ cm2 )

Lindane from glass a-BHC from glass

Total HCCH from glass Lindane from carpet

a-BHC from carpet Total HCCH from carpet

PCCH from glass PCCH from carpet

Concentration in Nitrogen (ng/L)

Concentration at 20°C
197

Focht

19

Chemical Desorption Experiments - Lindane

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

0 10 20 30 40

Sur f ace Co ncent rat io n ( mg / cm2 )

Lindane from glass a-BHC from glass

Total HCCH from glass Lindane from carpet

a-BHC from carpet Total HCCH from carpet

PCCH from glass PCCH from carpet

Concentration in Nitrogen (ng/L)

Concentration at 40°C

20

Chemical Desorption Experiments - Lindane

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

650

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Time ( days)

Lindane from glass a-BHC from glass

Total HCCH from glass Lindane from carpet

a-BHC from carpet Total HCCH from carpet

PCCH from glass PCCH from carpet

Concentration at 20°C

Concentration in Nitrogen (ng/L)

21

Chemical Desorption Experiments - Lindane

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

glass carpet ceiling dryw all ceramic vinyl

Surface Material

Lindane a-HBC PCCH

Headspace Concentration (ng/L)

Concentration at 20°C

22

Toxicological Experiments

 Toxicity studies using animal models determine 

levels of concern for residual contaminants 

following decontamination of building materials.

 Reiterate: Ultimate goal of determining 

permissible concentrations of the substance on 

surfaces and in various materials

23

Toxicological Experiments

a

cut

D a

inh D atot

D +=

− oute-multiat dose total exposure r a

tot

D

− (mg/kg) inhalation dose, a

inh D

− percutaneo dose, s(mg/kg) u a

cut D

24

Toxicological Experiments 

 Safe Exposure Levels

PDtot (Permissible total dose) – is a dose of a substance 

(mg/kg) that does not cause any noticeable discomfort, 

or produce irritant effects in the mucous membranes of 

eyes or skin, or incapacitate human beings after single 

or repeated multi-route exposure (inhalation and 

through skin) during an 8-h working day
198

Focht

25

Toxicological Experiments

 Calculation steps

 Determine experimentally the values of “decrease coefficients” of 

the toxic substance in the air and on the surface of a construction 

material

 Predict the air and surface concentration of the agent for a period 

of several days

 Calculate the values of Relative Value Units (RVUinh and RVUcut for 

acute and chronic exposure) to quantify inhalation and 

percutaneous constituents of a complex human dose

 Determine inhalation and percutaneous constituents of the 

complex dose (Uinh and Ucut) for each day

 Sum up Uinh and Ucut values for each day

 Decide if further decontamination is required 

26

Toxicological Experiments

 Actual testing is performed:

 Eight rats are used per test, including controls and replicates

 A portion of the back is shaved exposing skin surface

 Test animals are retained in a test cell, contaminated surface 

material mounted on a moulded bracket is strapped to the 

exposed skin surface

 Subjects are exposed to the contaminant for a range of 

predetermined durations

 Small sublingual blood specimens are extracted and 

analysed for 18 parameters including the contaminant, red 

and white blood cells, and liver enzymes to determine if 

there are any short term physiological effects

27

Toxicological Experiments

Mounting subjects in test cells Test subjects during dermal 

exposure testing

28

Next Steps

 Link desorption test results to theoretical values 

from RIHTOP’s toxicity formulas

 Enhance a costing model to determine the breakeven point for decontamination versus tear/down 

and rebuild

 Identify further areas of study to support first 

responders in decontaminating buildings 

 Compile and document all experimental findings 

into a report for distribution

29

Acknowledgements - Participants

Acknowledgement

 Supported by the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 

Explosives (CBRNE) Research and Technology Initiative (CRTI), 

under project # CRTI-04-0018RD.

Participants

 Environment Canada – K. Volchek, K. Li, and C.E. Brown

 Public Health Agency Canada – J. Krishnan and J. Peeke

 Defence Research and Development Canada – G. Purdon, A. 

Burczyk, and M. Meyer

 Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC Canada) – R. 

Focht, D. Cooper, S. Harrison, G. Thouin, W. Kuang, and D. 

Velicogna

 University of Ottawa – S. Sattar, S. Springthorpe, and S. Sabbah

 University of Leeds – A. Hay

 United States Environmental Protection Agency – D. Mickunas

 Research Institute of Hygiene, Toxicology, and Occupational 

Pathology – B. Filatov and N. Britanov
199

Cardarelli

 



  









    



 

  

 

 



 





 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

  

 

 

  

 

 

 



   







 

 







 



 



 

 

 

 



 



 



 



 

 



 

 

















  









 


200

Cardarelli



LEGEND

Responses

Deployments

Special Projects

ASPECT Statistics

41 Emergency 

Responses

6 DHS SEAR 

Deployments

9 DHS NSSE 

Deployments

4 FEMA Activations

12 Special Projects Plume Identification and Classification

ICI Acrylics

30.013890 N

-94.02917 W

IR Spectral

Image

EPA ASPECT – Hurricane RITA Response 9/24/2005

Wavenumbers

% Transmittance

FILE: 24905X21 1083 FTIR Spectrum

640 720 800 880 960 1040 1120 1200 1280 1360 1440

97.5

98

98.5

99

99.5

100

100.5

101

AMMONIA

Ammonia

Release

Point

IR

Spectrum

9/24 ASPECT 

Flight Passes

Over Targets

Visible Image

N N





  

 

 



 

 





 

 























 









   







 



 























 





 







 

 


201

Cardarelli

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 







 





























 









EPA airborne and ground-based 

radiation detection technologies will 

provide long-term environmental 

measurement data.

 

 



300 km
202

Cardarelli

 



Radiation Solutions RS-500

•3 2”x4”x16” Sodium Iodide

•1 3”x3” Lanthanum Bromide









GPS

Antenna



TCP/IP

TCP/IP



 

 

 



 

 

 



 








203

Drake

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

  





John Drake, U.S. EPA National Homeland Security Research Center

Ryan James, Battelle Memorial Lab

2008 Decontamination Workshop

Sept 24-26, 2008

Chapel Hill, NC

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center





• Purpose is to test, evaluate, and 

report on the performance of 

homeland security-related 

technologies

• Specializes in testing with live agents 

and simulated field conditions

• Applied R&D testing

• Technology information source for 

emergency responders 

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center



• Background: U.S. EPA responsible 

for decontamination of accidental and 

intentional releases of radiological 

material

• NHSRC is conducting technology 

evaluations for decontamination 

of urban building materials 

• Objective: Develop approach and 

then evaluate commercially available 

radiological decontamination 

technologies applicable to urban 

building materials

– This evaluation was conducted at Idaho 

National Laboratory (Robert V. Fox) Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center



• Strippable Coating #1

– Radionuclide bound physically in cured 

material

– Wet coating provided “ready to apply”

– Applied as paint

• Strippable Coating #2

– Affinity shifting and binding chemistries 

extract and bind radionuclide

– Radionuclide also bound physically in 

cured material

– Two-part concentrate that requires 

mixing with water 

– Applied as paint

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center



• Type II Portland cement 

(structural concrete)

– Single batch of Redi-mix poured 

into 0.9 m2 forms and cured for 21 

days

– 15 cm × 15 cm × 4 cm unpainted 

concrete coupons cut from forms 

with laser saw

• Concrete shown to be typical of 

concrete from around U.S.

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center



• Applied as mist of 2.5 mL of 

aqueous solution

– Coupon edges taped so only 

surfaces contaminated

• Target activity of 53 Ci ± 5 Ci 

• Perfect homogeneity not critical 

because total surface activity 

measured

• Activity measured with intrinsic 

germanium detectors

Nitrogen
204

Drake

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center



• Each strippable coating tested 

on separate test stands

• Coupons placed vertically and 

horizontally in 60 cm x 90 cm 

arrays within radiological hood

– Coupons placed throughout test 

stand (marked by “x”)

• Surface was uneven with 

millimeters gaps between 

coupons x

x

x

x

x

x

x x x x x x

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center



• Strippable coatings applied 7 

days and 30 days after Cs-137 

application

– Tested importance of the timing of 

decontamination response

• Vendors suggested three 

successive application and 

removal cycles

– Day 1: application, cure overnight

– Day 2: removal, application, cure

– Day 3: removal, application, cure

– Day 4: removal, activity measurement

• Measured activity of several 

coupons after each application 

and removal cycle

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center



• Calculated Percent Removal (%R) and 

Decontamination Factor (DF)

%R = (1-Af

/Ao) × 100% and DF = Ao/Af

Af - activity after application of strippable coatings 

aAo - activity before

• 7 day and 30 day results for both strippable coating 

technologies

• Progressive decontamination results with each 

application and removal cycle

• Results at various surface locations

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center



Avg. ± SD 54.6 ± 1.7 11.7 ± 2.3 78.6 ± 4.6 4.9 ± 0.9

Vertical 53.6 ± 1.5 12.0 ± 2.6 77.5 ± 5.2 4.6 ± 0.9

Horizontal 55.7 ± 1.3 11.3 ± 2.3 79.7 ± 4.1 5.1 ± 0.9

#2

Avg. ± SD 55.2 ± 2.4 38.4 ± 4.7 30.3 ± 9.0 1.5 ± 0.2

Vertical 53.5 ± 1.7 38.5 ± 5.3 28.0 ± 9.8 1.4 ± 1.2

Horizontal 56.8 ± 1.7 38.3 ± 4.5 32.5 ± 8.5 1.5 ± 1.2

#1

%R DF

Post-Decon

Activity 

Ci/Coupon

Pre-Decon 

Activity 

SC Orientation Ci/Coupon

0

20

40

60

80

100

Horizontal Vertical Average

%R

SC #1

SC #2

• No significant difference between 

vertical and horizontal %Rs for either SC

• Significant difference between %R for 

SC #1 and #2

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center



• No significant difference between 

vertical and horizontal %Rs for either SC

• Significant difference between %R for 

SC #1 and #2 0

20

40

60

80

100

Horizontal Vertical Average

%R

SC #1

SC #2

Avg. ± SD 53.5 ± 1.8 14.1 ± 5.2 73.8 ± 9.0 4.2 ± 1.4

Vertical 53.3 ± 1.9 15.3 ± 3.8 71.5 ± 6.3 3.7 ± 0.8

Horizontal 53.6 ± 1.8 12.9 ± 6.5 76.2 ± 11.2 4.8 ± 1.6

#2

Avg. ± SD 54.4 ± 2.6 36.0 ± 6.4 33.8 ± 10.7 1.5 ± 0.2

Vertical 55.6 ± 1.4 37.8 ± 7.0 31.9 ± 13.0 1.5 ± 0.3

Horizontal 53.2 ± 3.0 34.3 ± 5.8 35.8 ± 8.7 1.6 ± 0.2

#1

%R DF

Post-Decon

Activity 

Ci/Coupon

Pre-Decon 

Activity 

SC Orientation Ci/Coupon

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center



Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Third 22% 12% 34% 27% 18% 23% ± 8%

Second 17% 26% 12% 22% 16% 19% ± 5%

First 61% 62% 54% 51% 66% 59% ± 6%

Coupon 1 Coupon 2 Coupon 1 Coupon 2 Coupon 3 Average

7 Day Results 30 Day Results

Application

Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Third 5% 2% 6% 7% 5% 5% ± 2%

Second 12% 6% 13% 20% 14% 13% ± 5%

First 83% 92% 81% 73% 81% 82% ± 7%

Coupon 1 Coupon 2 Coupon 1 Coupon 2 Coupon 3 Average

7 Day Results 30 Day Results

Application

Strippable Coating #1

Strippable Coating #2

• Across both strippable coatings, most removal of Cs-137 was during first application
205

Drake

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center



$58.84/m2 Cost of material $16.66/m2 for one application for one application

Surface damage Minimal, only loose particles removed Minimal, only loose particles removed

Solid waste production: ~0.5 kg/m2

Solid waste volume: ~0.188 g/cm3

Solid waste production: ~0.26 kg/m2

Solid waste volume: ~0.145 g/cm3 Secondary waste 

Portability portable portable

Power If sprayer used, 110 v; otherwise none If sprayer used, 110 v; otherwise none

Skilled labor No specialized training No specialized training

Irregular surfaces Very conducive May extend removal time

Application: 4.6 m2/hr Removal: 1.6 m2 Application: 12 m /hr 2/hr Removal: 4.9 m2 Decon. Rate /hr 

Strippable Coating #1 Strippable Coating #2

• Strippable Coating #1 solidified in sprayer following incomplete cleaning

– mineral spirit cleaning required

• Strippable Coating #2 solidified in sprayer following freezing during shipment

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center



• Strippable coating #1 removed ~32% 

Cs-137 from unpainted concrete

• Strippable coating #2 removed ~76% 

Cs-137 from unpainted concrete

• For both coatings, days following 

contaminant application and 

orientation did not significantly impact 

results

• Material cost $17/m2 and $59/m2; labor 

and equipment would increase the 

cost of decontamination

• Next step...larger scale physical 

removal technologies
206

Lemieux

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Thermomicrobiological Techniques for 

Incinerator Performance Assessment 

while Burning Contaminated Debris

Paul Lemieux and Joe Wood

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

It’s called fire... It recycles wood.

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Outline of Presentation

• Background

• Characterization of Behavior of Spore-Containing Material in Thermal 

Incinerators

• Use of Thermomicrobiological Techniques to Assess Incinerator 

Performance

• Agricultural Biomass Gasifier

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Disposal Roles and Responsibilities

• As per NRF, EPA is lead agency for consequence management following 

CBRN event of national significance

– Decontamination

– Disposal

• Assumption is made that disposal will be performed under spirit of existing 

environmental regulations, if not under the letter of the law

• Several key stakeholders for disposal

– EPA (OSW, ERT, NDT, OSCs)

– State/local regulators

– Waste disposal industry

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Potential Waste Composition

• Porous building materials and furnishings (possibly wet)

• Office equipment (computers, desks, file cabinets, etc.)

• Indirect residue from cleanup activities (e.g., rags, PPE, decontamination 

agents)

• Contaminated HVAC system residues (e.g., spent filter cartridges, 

contaminated HEPA filters)

• Aqueous residues

• Residues from cleanup of contaminated water systems

• Outdoor materials

• Agricultural residues/biomass

• Animal Carcasses

• Construction/Demolition Debris

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Incinerators: Roles and Issues

• Large amount of potentially contaminated building materials may need to be 

disposed of by incineration after a bioterrorist attack occurring in a public 

building/space

• Issues for Incinerators

– Prevention of further contamination

– Compliance with permits

– Operational issues

– Sizing of material prior to shipment to disposal facility

– Residue management

– Selection of appropriate facilities

– Minimization of failure modes

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Source: Wood et al., 2004

MWI Spore Survivability Tests

• Commercial hospital waste incinerators tested in early 1990s by EPA

• Doped with large quantities of Geobacillus stearothermophilus spores

• Spore survival measured in stack and ash

• > 6 Log reduction in most cases

• < 3 Log reduction in a few cases

• Primary chamber T and secondary chamber RT were most significant

variables
207

Lemieux

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Pilot-Scale Thermal Destruction Studies

• Investigate thermal destruction issues

– Time / temperature / material size requirements for destruction

– Emissions of conventional pollutants from combustion of building decontamination waste

– Effects of decon methods on disposal (e.g., dioxin emissions due to chlorinated decon 

solutions)

– Incinerator performance assessment

• BWA simulants

– Geobacillus stearothermophilus

– Bacillus atropheus

– Bacillus anthracis (Sterne)

• Substrate materials

– Carpet

– Ceiling tile

– Wallboard

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Main

Burner 

Afterburner Secondary Combustion Chamber

Continuous

Emissions

Monitors 

CEMs TC TC

TC

Ram

Feed 

EPA Rotary Kiln Incinerator Simulator (RKIS)

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Spore Feed System

Source: Lemieux, 2005

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Thermomicrobiological Approach

• The D-value = “decimal reduction time”

– Time required at a given T to reduce a microbial population to one tenth of its 

original population, i.e., to achieve a 90% reduction, or a LR of 1

• The F-value = “thermal death time”

– Time required to completely destroy the microbial population at a given T

• The Z-value = temperature change required for the D or F value to change 

by a factor of 10 

• At a given T

F1 = F0

T1 −T0

Z





 





10

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Ceiling Tile: Time vs Spore Count 

















        







Source: Wood et al., 2006 Spore Count

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

















       







Ceiling Tile: Spores vs Max T

Source: Wood et al., 2006

Spore Count
208

Lemieux

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

LR of G. stearothermophilus BI vs. Max. T in 

material bundle 

Source: Wood, et al., Eviron. Sci. Technol. 2008, 42, 5712-5717

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

G. stearothermophilus BI survival vs. equivalent 

exposure time (model-calculated F1 value) in RKIS.

Source: Wood, et al., Eviron. Sci. Technol. 2008, 42, 5712-5717

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

% of BIs showing growth at the maximum internal T 

reached inside a wallboard bundle 

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Conclusions

• Spores survive longer in incineration environments than is expected based 

on classical thermomicrobiological theory

• The use of thermomicrobiological concepts to assess incinerator 

performance while processing building materials containing embedded 

spores identifies necessary conditions to achieve spore destruction, as 

opposed to proving sufficient conditions to assure spore destruction

• G. stearothermophilus or B. atropheus may be suitably conservative 

indicator organisms for confirming complete inactivation of B. anthracis

spores via incineration of building decontamination residue.

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Update on Prototype Transportable 

Animal Carcass Gasifier Tests

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Background

• In the event of a foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak, large quantities of animal 

carcasses will need to be disposed

– HSPD 9, Defense of US Agriculture and Food, directs EPA to work with DHS and other 

agencies to enhance response capability, including decontamination following a terrorist 

attack affecting the agriculture and food infrastructure

– National Response Plan directs EPA to provide technical expertise and assistance to US 

Department of Agriculture when an agricultural facility is contaminated with CBR.

– In its Agricultural Bioterrorism Select Agent and Toxin List, APHIS has included the highly 

pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus, FMD, and other FAD agents among its list of 

select agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to animal or plant 

health, or to animal or plant products.

• “Toolbox” approach – no single technology is seen as the “silver bullet”

• On-site disposal is preferred for extremely contagious FADs

– Foot and Mouth Disease

– Avian Influenza

– Exotic Newcastle Disease
209

Lemieux

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Gasification as Transportable Technology

• Lower flue gas flow rates

• Smaller equipment for same throughput

• High water content feed may improve efficiency

• Simpler design compared to incineration

• Potential for energy recovery (maybe)

• Potentially lower auxiliary fuel usage than incineration (maybe)

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Gasifier Specifications

• 25 tons/day throughput in prototype gasifier (scaleable to 150 tons/day with 

multiple gasifiers)

• 150 tons/day throughput in macerator

• Operate on all primary and secondary roads in US

• Deploy within 24 hours after arrival on site

• Batch fed

• Nominal 850 °C operating temperature

• Operates under natural draft

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Gasifier Concept

 











Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Macerator

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Telescoping Stack

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
210

Lemieux

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Feed Material

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Feeding the Unit

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Gasifying Carcasses

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Test Description

• Feed Materials

– Swine and poultry

– Wheat Straw

• Stack gas target analytes

– Fixed gases: O2, CO2, CO, THC, NOx, SO2

– Metals

– PM

– Acid gases

– Dioxins/furans

• Ash analysis

– TCLP

– Amino acids (surrogate for prions)

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Overall Estimated 

Emissions

Average lb/hr

Average lb/ton 

of carcass

Total Filterable Particulate 0.297 0.93

PM10 0.297 0.93

Organic Condensable Particulate 0.022 0.07

Inorganic Condensable Particulate 0.120 0.37

Total Particulate 0.439 1.37

Hydrogen Chloride 0.27 0.84

Chlorine as Cl2 0.173 0.54

Antimony ND ND

Arsenic 1.04E-05 3.25E-05

Barium 5.16E-05 1.61E-04

Beryllium ND ND

Cadmium 1.08E-04 3.38E-04

Chromium 6.11E-05 1.91E-04

Cobalt ND ND

Lead 5.50E-05 1.72E-04

Manganese 4.69E-05 1.47E-04

Mercury ND ND

Nickel 1.00E-04 3.13E-04

Selenium 4.11E-05 1.28E-04

Silver 7.23E-06 2.26E-05

PCDD/F Total 1.24E-09 3.88E-09

PCDD/F TEQ 1.75E-11 5.47E-11

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division

Conclusions

• Successful test of transportable gasifier in spite of truncated schedule

• Positives

– Transported over roads without damage

– Rapidly deployed

– Feed prep/transport system worked well

– Preliminary data suggest low emissions and good ash quality

– Redundant burners overcame burner damage during startup due to bad generator

– Simple design

• Negatives

– Throughput lower than planned

• Distribution of material on hearth not efficient

• Doors needed to be opened too many times to push ash back

– Ash removal system failure during startup

– Unable to repair or replace burners while operating

– Feed system cleanout problematic

– Need to address feed system biosecurity
211

Davis-Hoover

Survivability of Several Years 

of Recalcitrant Biological and 

Chemical Agents in Landfill 

Leachates

Sheraton Chapel Hill, NC

September 24-26, 2008

Wendy Davis-Hoover, Ph. D.

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear c

Homeland Security Research h

Contaminated Building Debris

Example: 2001 Anthrax Letters

 5 letters mailed

 23 confirmed cases of anthrax

• 11 inhalation, 5 fatal

• 12 cutaneous

 Contaminated 56 buildings in 10 

States and Washington DC

Figure Courtesy of Thea McManus, US EPA

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear ch

Hart Senate Office Building 

Cleanup

Micro-Med

(Autoclave)

Steel drums 600

Ft. Detrick

(Sterilization) Liquid waste 15000 gallons

Ft. Detrick

(Incineration)

Solid waste 166 tons

Figure Courtesy of Thea McManus, US EPA

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear ch

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear c

GCL Use in Covers h

Figure Courtesy of Naue Fasertechnik

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear ch
212

Davis-Hoover

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear c

Project Purpose h

 Can Agent contaminated building debris 

be safely stored or detoxified in Municipal 

Solid Waste Landfill?

• Will Agents survive in leachate?

• How long?

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear c

Planned Sampling of Agents h

8-12 Every 30 Days

3-7 Every 14 Days

1-2 Every 7 Days

Month Frequency

. Sampling will be altered if statistical analysis of the data show 

merit in more or less frequency.

. Sampling is terminated when two consecutive sampling periods 

result in no detects in all replicates.

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear c

Bacterial Methods h

37 48 hours Phenylethanol 0C

Anaerobically

Clostridium 

botulinum

35 3-5 days Francisella Chocolate 0C

tularensis

28 48 hours Yersinia pestis Yersinia Selective 0C

37 24 hours Polymyxin Lysozyme EDTA 0C

Thallous-Acetate

Bacillus 

anthracis

Spores

Incubation Incubation Time

Temperature

Bacteria Culture Media

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear c

Assumptions Made h

 Triplicate microcosms will allow us to understand the 

world. 

 3 ml microcosms will mimic anaerobic conditions of 

landfills.

 Incubate at 12 degrees C with bacteria also run at body 

temperature. 

 Agents will always encounter undiluted leachate before 

release.

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear c

Hypotheses h

 Bacterial Spore formers will survive.

 Facultative Anaerobic Bacteria will 

survive longer than Aerobic Bacteria.

 Viruses will survive.

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear ch

Biological Agents

Bacteria
213

Davis-Hoover

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear ch

Bacterial Weapons Summary

Little Effect between 12 and 370 C

Bacillus anthracis Persist Persist > 368 Days

Clostridium Persist Persist >368 Days

botulinum

Yersinia pestis Persist Die < 20 Days

Francisella Persist Die < 20 Days

tularensis

Hypothesis Data

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear ch

Viruses in Landfills ?

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear ch

Planned Sampling 

of Agents

8-12 Every 30 Days

3-7 Every 14 Days

1-2 Every 7 Days

Month Frequency

. Sampling will be altered if statistical analysis of the data show 

merit in more or less frequency.

. Sampling is terminated when two consecutive sampling periods 

result in no detects in all replicates.

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear ch

Chemical Agents

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear ch

Chemical Analytical Methods

All extracted by USEPA 3500 series method

VX USEPA 8270D* ATT 101* / ATT-004 **

Tabun (GA) USEPA 8270D* ATT 101* / ATT-006 **

Soman (GD) USEPA 8270D* ATT 101* / ATT-002 **

Sarin (GB) USEPA 8270D* ATT 101* / ATT-001 **

Mustard (HD) USEPA 8270D* ATT 101* / ATT-003 **

Lewisite (L) ATT-005 (HPLC) USEPA 200.8 (ICP-MS)

Analyte Primary Secondary 

*GC-MS ** GC-FID

*

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear ch

VX 0.010

Derivative CVAA 

5.3 ug/mL

L

HD 0.004

GD 0.005

GB 0.005

GA 0.004

Minimum Detection 

Limit

in MSW Leachate 

(ppm)

Name of Chemical 

Agent
214

Davis-Hoover

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear ch

Hypotheses

Chemicals will mostly dissipate 

before arrival or hydrolyze in 

landfill except for Mustard Gas 

and VX.

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear c

Chemical Weapons Summary h

VX Persist Persists >182 Days

Not Persist, Derivative Persists >168 Days

Derivative 

Unknown

Lewisite

Mustard Gas Persist Not Persist < 7 Days

(HD)

Moderate Low but Persist >168 Days

Persistence

Soman (GD)

Moderate Low but Persist >182 Days

Persistence

Sarin (GB)

Tabun (GA) Not Persist Not Persist <14 Days

Hypothesis Data

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Ho m eland Security Resear ch

Thank you.

Questions ?
215

Lambert

An Assessment of the Performance of Portable Instrum An Assessment of the Performance of Portable Instruments 

to Monitor Air Quality During Structural Decontamination 

Operations

2008 Workshop on Decontamination and Associated Issues for Sites

Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials

U.S. EPA

Research Triangle Park, NC

P. Lambert, M. Goldthorp, K. Volchek and C.E. Brown 

Environment Canada

September 2008

Participants

• Project lead: Environment Canada

• Federal Partners: DRDC Ottawa, 

Counter-Terrorism Technology Centre, 

DRDC Suffield, Public Health Agency 

of Canada

• Industry Partners: Allen-Vanguard 

Corporation, SAIC Canada

• Other Participants: US Environmental 

Protection Agency

Objective and Presentation Outline

... to critique the selection and performance of a wide range of air monitoring 

and sampling equipment and methodologies used in the field trial. 

• Introduction

• Project overview

• Instrument selection

• Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs 

• Case study 2: Sampling and laboratory analysis of VOCs

• Instrument performance and critique

• Summary

Introduction

• EC and our partners have been involved in many meso-scale R&D projects

• This set the groundwork for the selection and use of portable instruments in the 

subsequent air monitoring plans

• During the 80’s 

and 90’s more 

than 60 in-situ oil 

burning trials 

were conducted

• Mobile, AB, trials in 91, 92, 94, 97, 98

• 19 individual sampling stations

• Various air monitoring and sampling 

equipment

• 10 transects lines of instrumentation extending 

out from test tank

• 3-dimensional profiling 

Project Overview: aerial view of trial site 
216

Lambert

Project Overview

Chemical trial: agents and simulants

• Mixture of diethyl malonate (DEM) and malathion to be sprayed using a 

commercial air sprayer

• DEM was selected since it is a simulant for the “G” series nerve agents and the Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) reacts to it and identifies it as a nerve agent.

• Malathion was selected since it is very persistent, techniques for sampling and analysis are well known and previous laboratory studies were carried out (CRTI-02-

0067RD).

• DEM and malathion react with decontaminants used to destroy chemical warfare 

agents. They are “reactive simulants” for CW agents.

Project Overview: test structures for chemical decontamination trials

Project Overview: building sampling ports Instrument Selection

Instrument Selection

XAD-2 tube and personal pump

Anasorb CSC tube and personal pump

Silica gel tube and personal pump

tenax tube and personal pump

Summa Canister

PS-1 HiVol with PUF and GF filter

HNu DL101 PID

DataRam

Instrument

Perimeter Station

Organophosphate, organonitrate sampling

Semi-VOC sampling (organic acids, carbonyls, ethers)

Inorganic acid sampling

Semi-VOC sampling

VOC sampler

Semi-VOC and particulate sampler

VOC real-time

Particulate real-time

Parameter

Instrument Selection

CAM IMS CW

CO, H2S, LEL/O2 AreaRAE toxic gas meter real-time

BW toxic gas meter

Test strips or paper

MCE filters and mid-volume pump

XAD-2 tube and personal pump

Anasorb CSC and 747 tube and personal pump

Silica gel tube and personal pump

Tenax tube and personal pump

Summa Canister

Sabre 2000 IMS

AP4C FP

Tape meter

AreaRAE PID

TVA1000 PID/FID

Instrument

Building Station

pH paper, oxidizer paper, chemical agent

Heavy metals

Organophosphate, organonitrate sampling

Semi-VOC sampling (organic acids, carbonyls, ethers)

Inorganic acid sampling

Semi-VOC sampling

VOC sampler

CW, TICs real-time

H2O2, ClOx real-time

VOCs, Cl real-time

Parameter
217

Lambert

Instrument Selection Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs

• PID mostly, with some FID

• At all building stations, all perimeter stations, and mobile with teams

• Good response to DEM, limited response to commercial malathion

Multi-Component Data from AreaRAE

Multi-component Air Analysis - AreaRAE 3B - Aug 15

VOC, 12:40:30, 12.7

CL2, 12:44:40, 21

0

5

10

15

20

25

9:009:159:309:45

10:0010:1510:3010:4511:0011:1511:3011:4512:0012:1512:3012:4513:0013:1513:3013:4514:0014:1514:3014:4515:0015:1515:3015:4516:00

Time

Concentration (ppm)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Concentration (%)

SO2

VOC

CL2

%LEL

%O2

Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs

Remote Monitoring 

• Wireless transmission of some 

instrument data streaming to 

command table

• Oxygen, LEL, VOC, Chlorine, 

SO2

Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs

PID vs. FID

Total VOC - TVA2B - Aug15

13:09:51, 17.48

12:42:31, 51.28

12:02:21, 35.68

11:00:11, 26.08

0.00

10.00

20.00

30.00

40.00

50.00

60.00

10:3010:4511:0011:1511:3011:4512:0012:1512:3012:4513:0013:1513:3013:4514:0014:1514:3014:4515:0015:15

Time

Concentration (ppm)

TVA2B PID

TVA2B FID

Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs

Mobile Monitoring

VOC from Mobile ppbRAE - 08/15/06

11:43:10, 37576

12:06:50, 139975

10:45:50, 166216

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

160000

180000

9:009:159:309:45

10:0010:1510:3010:4511:0011:1511:3011:4512:0012:1512:3012:4513:0013:1513:3013:4514:0014:1514:3014:4515:0015:1515:3015:4516:00

Time

Total VOC (ppb)

VOC from Mobile ppbRAE

Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs
218

Lambert

VOC at Perimeter

• Only station to register response was downwind station – when door blew 

open during trial

• More relevant fugitive emission monitoring from EPA TAGA unit

Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs

Instrumentation and VOCs

• 10 summa canister samples collected

• 2 background samples collected prior to trial 

– 1 inside structure, 1 outside

• 8 trials samples collected

– 4 at building, 1 per sampling port

– 4 around building, 1 per sampling 

station

• Tygon tubing used to connect summas to 

building ports

• Sampling rate of 20 mL/min to obtain 

approximately 4.5 L over 4 hours

• Laboratory analysis for >150 VOCs

Case study 2: Sampling and laboratory analysis of VOCs

General Observations Related to Summa Canister Data

• Concentration of four 

perimeter samples less than 

indoor air sample

• Perimeter samples, the 

concentration Station 1 << 2 

< 4 <3 

• Wind was 11- 22 km/h, 350 

to 1 degrees from N

• Background indoor air 

sample showed clear 

presence of most VOCs

• Background indoor air about 

1 x O of M greater than 

perimeter trial samples

• Background and trial indoor 

air VOCs same O of M

Case study 2: Sampling and laboratory analysis of VOCs

Examination of Individual or Small Groups of VOC Compounds

• Benzene stands out above all other VOCs

• Concentration of the indoor air background 

sample was 876 ug/m3

• Much greater then typical literature values 

for North America of 7 ug/m3

• During trial, indoor air benzene conc. 

ranged from 822 to 3136 ug/m3 depending 

on sampling port but consistent with 

prevailing wind direction

• This is a short-term exposure risk!

• Benzene levels at perimeter samples were 

ambient

• Something inside the test structure was 

releasing benzene

Case study 2: Sampling and laboratory analysis of VOCs

Examination of Individual or Small Groups of VOC Compounds

• Chlorinated VOCs were released to air during the trial

• Chloroform, chloroethane, chloromethane, dichloromethane, vinyl chloride

• Detected in indoor background samples but concentrations higher in trial samples

• As expected, no indication of the larger chlorinated compounds – e.g. Freon 

• Concentration distribution 1B<2B<3B and 4B (ceiling) same as 2B

• Source of chlorinated VOCs is construction material and decon solution

• Partitioning of VOCs observed. 

• Light BTEX and alkanes conc. higher at ceiling than wall ports

• Heavier MW compounds conc. higher at lower wall ports

• Perimeter chlorinated VOCs near background with few light BTEX/alkanes detected

Case study 2: Sampling and laboratory analysis of VOCs Instrument performance and critique 

• Real-time monitoring instruments

– 43 data streams from 25 instruments

– 100,000 data points recorded

– Real-time data monitored continuously for health and safety

– Good presumptive vapour patterns

• Air sampling and laboratory analysis

– Summa canister – high value, range of VOC, but suite can’t be adjusted, 

expensive 

– tenax – best of the tube-type samplers, thermal desorption improved feature 

over extraction, 6 to 87 ng DEM and 419 to 2355 ng malathion detected in 

building, 32 to 210 ng DEM and 6 to 19 ng malathion detected at downwind 

perimeter station during trial

– XAD tube – nd to 10 ug DEM and 0.4 to 3.6 ug malathion detected in building, 

0.9 ug DEM and nd malathion at 1 downwind perimeter station

– PS-1 HiVol (PUF) – 6.6 ug DEM, nd malathion at 1 downwind perimeter station

– Anasorb tube – nd for semi-VOC

– MCE filters (metals) and silica tubes (inorganic acids) pending
219

Lambert

Chemical trial: air monitoring results (3B)

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

09:15:0009:30:0009:45:0010:00:0010:15:0010:30:0010:45:0011:00:0011:15:0011:30:0011:45:0012:00:0012:15:0012:30:0012:45:0013:00:0013:15:0013:30:0013:45:0014:00:0014:15:0014:30:0014:45:0015:00:0015:15:00

Time

Concentration(ppm)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

%

Sulfur Dioxide

VOC

Chlorine

LEL (%)

Oxygen (%)

1st dissemination

2nd dissemination

Door closed

Door opened

Decontamination started

Rinse started

Defoaming

Door opened

Door closed

Case study 1: Real-time monitoring of VOCs

CWA Detectors

• Smiths Sabre 2000 IMS

– DEM provokes a “GA agent”

response

• Proengin AP4C

– DEM provokes an 

organophosphate 

response

Instrument performance and critique 

Summary 

• Real-time monitoring instruments, despite well documented limitations, 

provide valuable information in an efficient timeframe

– Continuous data displays real-time trends and insight into fate and 

behaviour

– Useful for health and safety of personnel 

– Robust construction suitable for on-site operations 

• Standardized air sampling and laboratory analysis has both advantages 

and limitations in this type of application

– Provides accepted results to the scientific community and credible 

information for public use

– Non-detectable measurements or comparison to a suite of chemical 

intended for other purposes such as air quality guidelines is valuable

– NIOSH or other methods must be modified to meet the requirements of 

a unique circumstances

• Questions ?
220

Brooks

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group 1

Evaluation of Sampling Methods and 

Strategies in an Operational 

Environment

EPA 2008 Workshop on Decontamination and 

Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with 

Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials 

September 26, 2008

Michael V. Walter, Ph.D.

Senior Staff Scientist

Joint Program Executive Office

for Chemical and Biological Defense

michael.walter@jpeocbd.osd.mil

(703) 681-0844

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

2 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Validated Sampling Plan Work Group

• Memorandum of Understanding for an Interagency Plan for 

Environmental Microbiology Sampling: DHS, DOD, EPA, NIST, 

FBI/DOJ, CDC/HHS

– “validation” consensus definition

• Interagency Strategic Plan for Validation of Environmental Sampling 

Methods Used in Detection of Anthrax Contamination in Facilities

– Evaluate & validate key steps of the end-to-end sampling process

– Define key milestones & track progress against those milestones

– Define, identify, and work with agency partners to provide appropriate 

investments in methods development and empirical validation studies

– Focus initially on Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) spores, but once complete, 

examine additional biological agents of concern

– Working with partners to incorporate the results of these studies into future 

policies and guidelines

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

3 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Laboratory Tests - JHU APL

Swab

Wipe

s Vacuum

MicroBial 

Vacuum

Insects

Swab

Wipe

s Vacuum

MicroBial 

Vacuum

Insects

APL Test Chamber Materials

Aerosolization of Bg

ClO2 Decon

Sample 

Analysis

Swab

Wipe

s Vacuum

MicroBial 

Vacuum Insects

Swab

Wipe

s Vacuum

MicroBial 

Vacuum Insects

Multi-Phased Testing Methodology Established Baseline Understanding of Suitability & Effectiveness of Various Sample Collection Methods

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

4 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Idaho National Laboratory Test Activities

• Managed by JPEO-CBD

• Funded by DHS S&T and JPEO-CBD 

• Experimental design and sample collection plans created by EPA, 

NIST, and PNNL

• Onsite sample analysis conducted by the 9th Area Medical 

Laboratory (AML) using a JPM Guardian mobile laboratory, 

operations managed by JHU APL 

• Sample collection conducted by:

– National Guard Bureau Civil Support Teams (NGB CST) 

– EPA Emergency Response personnel

– HazMat first responders from Miami Dade County, Florida

Cooperative efforts of federal and local agencies

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

5 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Idaho National Laboratory: 

Test Objectives

• Compare sampling strategies (judgmental and 

probabilistic) against concentration gradient to 

characterize and clear a building

• Gather baseline data on efficiency of sample collection 

methods to detect contamination in operational 

environment across concentration gradient

• Gather baseline data on rapid detection methods such 

as Hand Held Assays, Rapid Viability PCR using 

operational samples 

• Apply test data to assist in validation of different 

dispersal and sampling models

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

6 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

INL Test Facility
221

Brooks

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

7 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

INL Site

Tenting Process: Before & After Decontamination Shuffle Pit

EPA TAGA JPM Guardian Lab Admin Trailers

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

8 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Test Conduct

Clearance

Sample 

Analysis

Office 

Building

Dissemination of 

Bg

INL Test 

Building

Decontamination

Civil Support Teams

Characterization

Laboratory Testing Model Successfully Employed in Operational Environment Using First Responders for Sample Collection and Lab Analysis

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

9 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Visual Sample Plan

A DQO-Based Statistical Sampling 

Design and Analysis Toolkit

• How Many Samples Required?

• Where Samples Located?

• Decision Confidence Achieved?

Within Building Modules

• Import Maps and Floor Plans

• 3-D Setup of Rooms/Buildings

• Many Possible Sampling Design 

Approaches

• Realistic Furniture/Shelving 

Overlays

• Surface-Type Stratification (carpets, 

vinyl, wallboard, etc.)

>5000 Users Worldwide

Sponsored by DHS, EPA, DOE, DoD, 

CDC/NIOSH, UK

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

10 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Building Restoration Operations 

Optimization Model - BROOM

• A decision-support tool to 

collect, manage, and analyze 

sample data

– Secure SQL database

– GIS mapping

– Geostatistical analysis tools

– Uncertainty analysis

– Interfaces with VSP for 

statistical sampling design

• Data collection

– Hand-held wireless PDAs with 

barcode readers and laser 

rangefinders

– Paperless data transfer

– Secure transmission of data

– Chain of custody Sandia

National

Laboratories Laboratories Laboratories Laboratories

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

11 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Test Event #2

Cumulative Particle Distribution

Continual Air Monitoring Showing Gradient of Particle Distribution

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

12 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Onsite Analytical FacilitiesJPM Guardian Mobile Laboratory 

HVAC

Electric

Support 

Area

Hood #2

Table 48" x 28"

Cart Cabinets Hood

DNA

Add

Frig

Hood

Mix

Prep

Sta

Frig

Frz

frige

Freezer 10' Analysis Bench Process Table

Computer/Laptop

10' Analysis Bench

Storage

Ante Room

Sample Entry

Coats

Shoes

Hood #1

48" x 28"

4 separate

20 AMP Circuits

120volts

Air Flow

Air Flow

Cabinets for Microwave

Coffee Pot and supplies

Refrigerator/Freezer

Sink (hot/cold water)

Restroom

300 Amp Service Panel

Single Phase

2 x 4 ton HVAC cool/heat

Negative Pressure

Area (- - -)

Positive Pressure

(+)

Doors with

Magnetic Interlocks

Ref/

frz.

Positive Pressure

(+ +)

Positive

Pressure

(++)

Negative Pressure

(- -)

4 separate

20 AMP Circuits

120volts

60' x 12' 

Transportable 

Laboratory

HVAC

Electric

Support 

Area

Hood #2

Table 48" x 28"

Cart Cabinets Hood

DNA

Add

Frig

Hood

Mix

Prep

Sta

Frig

Frz

frige

Freezer 10' Analysis Bench Process Table

Computer/Laptop

10' Analysis Bench

Storage

Ante Room

Sample Entry

Coats

Shoes

Hood #1

48" x 28"

4 separate

20 AMP Circuits

120volts

Air Flow

Air Flow

Cabinets for Microwave

Coffee Pot and supplies

Refrigerator/Freezer

Sink (hot/cold water)

Restroom

300 Amp Service Panel

Single Phase

2 x 4 ton HVAC cool/heat

Negative Pressure

Area (- - -)

Positive Pressure

(+)

Doors with

Magnetic Interlocks

Ref/

frz.

Positive Pressure

(+ +)

Positive

Pressure

(++)

Negative Pressure

(- -)

4 separate

20 AMP Circuits

120volts

HVAC

Electric

Support 

Area

Hood #2

Table 48" x 28"

Cart Cabinets Hood

DNA

Add

Frig

Hood

Mix

Prep

Sta

Frig

Frz

frige

Freezer

Hood

Mix

Prep

Sta

Frig

Frz

frige

Freezer 10' Analysis Bench Process Table

Computer/Laptop

10' Analysis Bench

Storage

Ante Room

Sample Entry

Coats

Shoes

Hood #1

48" x 28"

4 separate

20 AMP Circuits

120volts

Air Flow

Air Flow

Cabinets for Microwave

Coffee Pot and supplies

Refrigerator/Freezer

Sink (hot/cold water)

Restroom

300 Amp Service Panel

Single Phase

2 x 4 ton HVAC cool/heat

Negative Pressure

Area (- - -)

Positive Pressure

(+)

Doors with

Magnetic Interlocks

Ref/

frz.

Positive Pressure

(+ +)

Positive

Pressure

(++)

Negative Pressure

(- -)

4 separate

20 AMP Circuits

120volts

60' x 12' 

Transportable 

Laboratory
222

Brooks

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

13 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Sample Collection Activities 

In Briefing From Incident Command

Prior to Entry Teams In Building Decontamination

Dry Run Practice with Methodology

Broom

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

14 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Sample Collection Map

Maps Detailing Sample Collection Locations Were Provided to First Responders to Aide in Sample Accessioning

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

15 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Test Event #2

Characterization Sampling Results

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

16 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Characterization Results 

(by Sampling Method)

 Wipe Significant (p < 0.05) 

Both laboratory and field studies

Overall Viable Spore Recovery

(CFU/cm2)

SMALL SCALE 

STUDY

RESULTS

Field Study 

Results

Overall Viable Spore Recovery

(CFU/cm2)

Overall Viable Spore Recovery

(CFU/cm2

)

Laboratory 

study results

SOCK SWAB WIPE

SAMPLING METHOD

SOCK SWAB WIPE

SAMPLING METHOD

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

17 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Overall Recovery (Characterization)

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

18 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

HHA vs. Culture 

Positive Results

CHARACTERIZATION CLEARANCE

Characterization: 

Culture: 89% significant (p<0.05)

 HHA: 60% 

Clearance

HHA: 61% significant (p<0.05)

Culture: 24% 
223

Brooks

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

19 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

RV-PCR vs. Culture

Positive Results

Characterization

Culture (63 +/- 1.7%)

RVPCR (73 +/- 2.8%) 

significant (p<0.05) 

Clearance

Culture (33 +/- 12.2 %).

RVPCR (34 +/- 11.2%) 

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

20 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Overall Recovery (Clearance)

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

21 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Data SynopsisKey Findings

• Sampling methods (vacuum, wipe, swab) demonstrated 

equivalent efficiency for recovery of Bacillus atrophaeus

spores in both laboratory and field environments

– Wipe Sampling Methods Demonstrated Highest and most

consistent recovery 

• Rapid Viability PCR successfully demonstrated effective 

detection of Bacillus atrophaeus spores in comparison to 

traditional culture

• Potential application to decrease sample detection time while 

maintaining sensitivity associated with traditional culture. 

• Data Suggest that Hand Held Assays may be of use in 

rapidly mapping high levels of contamination

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

22 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group

Special Thanks To Sample Collection Teams

47th CST (MS)

33rd CST (DC)

94th CST (GU)

15th CST (VT)

101st CST (ID)

32nd CST (MD)

44th CST (FL)

31st CST (DE)

Palm Beach County Hazmat Unit

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

UNCLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release

23 Sampling Methods Overview: IBRD Work Group
224

Sego

The Use of a Sampling Design 

Strategy to Direct Decontamination 

Activities Following a WMD Event 

Brent Pulsipher, PNNL

Landon Sego, PNNL

Robert Knowlton, SNL

Don MacQueen, LLNL

Acknowledgements

• Much of the material in this presentation is a product of 

work on the following two projects:

• Facility Restoration OTD 

– Funded by DHS S&T, Don Bansleban, program 

manager

– Multi-lab effort with SNL, LLNL, PNNL, ORNL, and 

LANL

• U.S. EPA National Decontamination Team document

– “EPA Sampling Strategy for Bacillus anthracis”

– Effort led by Dino Mattorano

– Technical support provided by PNNL and SNL

Sampling facilitates the decon process 

and enables good decision-making

• Appropriate sampling supports good decision-making

– Reduces time and cost

– Protects workers

– Ensures public confidence

• Preplanning can save time

• Software tools are available to

– Develop optimal sampling strategies

– Provide quantitative confidence in decisions

– Manage the collection and statistical analysis of samples

Sampling has a role throughout

Renovation

Reoccupation 

decision

Long-term 

environmental 

and public 

health 

monitoring

Clearance 

sampling 

and 

analysis

Clearance 

decision

Worker health and 

safety

Source reduction

Decontamination 

strategy

Remediation 

Action Plan

Site preparation

Waste disposal

Decontamination 

of sites, items, or 

both

Verification of 

decontamination 

parameters

Detailed 

characterization of 

CWA or TIC

Characterization 

of affected site

Site containment

Continue risk 

communication

Characterization 

environmental 

sampling and 

analysis

Initial risk 

assessment

Clearance goals

HAZMAT and 

emergency 

actions

Forensic 

investigation

Public health 

actions

Screening 

sampling

Determination 

of agent type 

and 

concentration 

Risk 

communication

Receive and 

assess 

information

Identify suspect 

release sites

Relay key 

information and 

potential risks 

to appropriate 

agencies

Characterization Decontamination Clearance

Restoration

(Recovery)

Notification First Response Remediation/Cleanup

Crisis Management Consequence Management

Response and Recovery Activities

Source: Adapted from LLNL 2006 

The Conceptual Site Model is critical

Preliminary 

CSM predicts 

contaminant 

distributions

Data confirms or 

modifies predictions as 

CSM gradually matures

Mature CSM

is the basis for 

decisions & all 

subsequent 

activities

Prediction guides 

development of Sampling 

& Analysis Plan

We iteratively

develop a better and better

understanding of the condition of the facility

Courtesy of Deana Crumbling, U.S. EPA, Office of Superfund Remediation and Technology Innovation

Sampling to improve the CSM

• Is the release location known?

– If “yes”: In what directions has contamination mostly likely 

spread?

– If “no”: How precisely do we need to know the release location 

to plan decon strategy?

• Has agent absorbed into materials from which it will later be 

emitted?

• Has essential equipment that is difficult to remove or replace 

become contaminated?

Sampling is needed most in places where we 

know the least, where uncertainty is greatest

There are many other questions like these, that need 

answers in order to decide how (and where) to 

decontaminate. 
225

Sego

GAO Testimony – April 5, 2005

GAO Finding:

“Agencies need to validate sampling activities in order to Increase 

confidence in negative results.” “Agencies did not use 

probability sampling in their initial sampling strategy. Probability 

sampling would have allowed agencies to determine, with some 

defined level of confidence, when all results are negative, whether 

a building is contaminated.”

GAO Recommendation:

“The DHS Secretary should also ensure that ... appropriate investments 

are made to explore improved sampling strategies;” “DHS said that 

it would coordinate with EPA to ensure that appropriate investments 

are made to explore improved sampling.”

7

Developing a sampling plan

8

• What are my sampling objectives?

– Characterization? 

– Assess effectiveness of decon?

– Plume boundary delineation?

– Clearance?

• Where should samples be located?

• Targeted? Randomly located? Both?

Adaptive locations?

Developing a sampling plan

9

• Do I have prior information that can be 

used in the sampling design?

• How many samples do I need?

• What type (and level) of confidence do I 

need to make defensible conclusions?

– X% confident of detecting hotspots of 

radius R

– X% confident that Y% of the area does not

contain detectable contamination

– Confidence bands for plume boundary

Overview of sampling strategies

Need to make good decisions with confidence

Some decisions require statistical inference

Representative, 

Reproducible,

Improved 

interpolation, based 

on a probability 

model

Representative,

Reproducible, 

based on a

probability model

Info about specific, 

targeted locations 

answers specific 

questions

Uses spatial 

correlation and 

typically some type

of random placement

Some form of 

random placement 

of samples

Professional 

experience and 

judgment

Targeted Statistical Geostatistical

Basis for

strategy

Basis for

confidence

Can combine

Decision Support Tools

Decision Support Tools

• Two decision support tools exist that can aid the 

sampling design, data management, and mapping 

contaminant dispersion

– Visual Sample Plan (VSP) from Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory

– Building Restoration Operations Optimization Model (BROOM) 

from Sandia National Laboratories

BROOM
226

Sego

Visual Sample Plan

A DQO-Based Statistical 

Sampling Design and 

Analysis Toolkit

• How many samples required?

• Where samples located?

• Decision confidence achieved?

Within Building Modules

• Import maps and floorplans

• 3-D setup of rooms/buildings

• many possible sampling design 

approaches

• Realistic furniture/shelving 

overlays

• Surface type stratification 

(carpets, vinyl, wallboard, etc)

>5000 Users Worldwide

Sponsored by DHS, EPA, DOE, 

DoD, CDC/NIOSH, UK. 14

Tier 1

VSP Methods & 

Software QA

• Test all VSP 

methods

• Ensure sample 

size calculations 

are correct

• Check all Math

• Ensure VSP 

outputs are 

correct 

Tier 2

VSP Testing on 

Simulated Site

• 10,000 reps of 

each VSP 

sampling design

• Ensure desired 

confidence 

statements are 

achieved

• Office and Airport 

Scenarios 

Tier 3

VSP Testing on 

Actual Sites

• Demonstrate 

VSP on real sites

• Validate overall 

sampling strategy 

approach

• INL -1 and -2 Biorelease tests 

• NIST Virtual 

CONTAM release

Validated Sampling Strategy and Tools

Response to GAO: 3 Tiered Approach

Building Restoration Operations 

Optimization Model - BROOM

• A decision support tool 

to collect, manage, and 

analyze sample data

– Secure SQL database

– GIS mapping

– Geostatistical analysis 

tools

– Uncertainty analysis

• Data collection

– Hand-held wireless PDAs

with barcode readers and 

laser rangefinders

– Paperless data transfer

– Secure transmission of 

data

– Chain of custody

Sponsored by DHS

Integration of BROOM & VSP

• PNNL and SNL are currently funded by DHS-S&T to integrate 

BROOM and VSP

• Goal:

– Create a software environment where both tools can “talk” to 

one another—passing back and forth floor plans, data, etc.

– Better support the decontamination and recovery process

BROOM-VSP

BROOM

• Data acquisition & 

management

• Geostatistical design & 

analysis

• DQO

• Targeted and/or statistical 

sampling designs

• Statistical analysis

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Acquire site maps, building drawings, 

HVAC schematics, etc.

Import maps into BROOM, configure 

information for planning purposes

Export setup data from BROOM into 

VSP, develop DQOs, sampling 

design plans, include targeted sampling 

as necessary

Import sampling design plans from VSP 

into BROOM, configure handheld data 

acquisition devices for sample collection

Collect sample data with handheld data 

acquisition devices

Send samples to laboratory for analysis

Import laboratory results into BROOM 

from lab or SCRIBE, display data,

and analyze

Have the DQOs been met?

Report results

Is an optimization 

approach to be used to

select additional sampling 

locations?

Employ optimization routines in 

BROOM to design additional 

sampling requirements

Are additional targeted 

sampling locations desired?

Yes

Develop targeted sampling plan

Collect additional sample data with 

handheld data acquisition devices

BROOM Functions

VSP Functions

Export data to VSP and perform 

statistical analyses

Decision Logic for Utilizing VSP and 

BROOM in a Sampling Process 

Sampling Zone Designations 

and Strategies
227

Sego

Example Scenario

• Release location assumed on the ticketing level

• Gaseous dispersion of CWA 

that will likely spread 

throughout the area

• Air handling units will influence the distribution of 

contamination

• Prior knowledge of facility 

layout and air handling units 

can greatly aid conceptual 

model of the release

• Statistical-based sampling 

design concentrates on 

surface sampling

Zone Classifications

• Assess our knowledge of the release and the facility layout, then 

assign zone classifications to guide sampling design

– Class 1 – Zone is definitely contaminated

– Class 2 – Highly likely that the zone is contaminated

– Class 3 – Likely that the zone is uncontaminated, but uncertainty 

exists

– Class 4 – Highly unlikely that the zone is contaminated

Zone Classifications (Example)

Class 1: Definitely Contaminated

Class 2: High Likely Contaminated

Class 3: Unlikely Contaminated

Class 4: High Likely Uncontaminated

X Release

Classify Area 

Into Zones

Use CSM, best 

available 

information, 

and expertise 

to guide zone 

classification

Class 1 Area Sampling Strategy

Class 1: Definitely 

contaminated area. 

• Targeted sampling only to 

determine contaminant 

magnitude for decon 

planning purposes.

• No probabilistic sampling 

recommended unless small 

area “hotspot” is realistic 

and small area decon is 

feasible.

Judgment/Targeted Samples

Class 2 Area Sampling Strategy

Class 2 = Highly likely to be 

contaminated

1. Take targeted samples in most 

likely contaminated locations.

2. If targeted samples detect 

contamination, no further 

samples needed; Classify 

area as Class 1 and Decon.

3. If no contamination detected in 

targeted samples, take more 

samples using hotspot 

sampling design. 

(If unable to do targeted first, may just 

want to do hotspot sampling)

x - Target Sample Locations

Class 2 Area Sampling Strategy

16 Samples needed to detect 50’ diameter circular hotspot

• No contamination 56 Samples needed to detect 25’ diameter circular hotspot

detected in targeted 

samples.

• Augment with hotspot 

sampling. 

• Desire high probability of 

detecting hotspot of given 

size and shape.

• Chem release 

characteristic hotspot 

expected to be quite 

large.

• Detecting smaller hotspot 

requires more samples.
228

Sego

Class 3 Area Sampling Strategy

Class 3: Unlikely to be contaminated.

• Develop sampling scheme to show X% confident that at least 

Y% of the surface area is 

uncontaminated. 

• 95% confident that at least 90% of surface area is 

uncontaminated if all 29 samples 

are not contaminated.

• In this case, equivalent to 44’

hotspot design.

• More confidence or >% surface area clean requires more 

samples (298 for 95/99 vs. 29 for 

95/90)

Clearance Sampling or Class 4 Area 

Strategy

• Use a combined targeted and probabilistic approach; 

15 targeted.

• Assume target samples 1.5 

times more likely to be 

contaminated than 

probabilistic samples.

• Strong prior belief that area is clean.

• Potential for significantly reducing number of samples 

needed (89 vs. 298 

samples).

• 95% confidence that at least 99% of surface area is 

uncontaminated if no 

samples show 

contamination.

Very unlikely to be contaminated = post-decon clearance

Confidence vs Number of Samples

• With statistical sampling designs, greater confidence means more

samples need to be collected

• The number of samples taken may add time to the decon/restoration 

process

• The table below assumes 200 samples can be taken and analyzed 

per day

99 99 457 3

95 95 59 1

90 90 22 1

Number of Days 

for Sample 

Collection

Number of 

Samples 

Required

% Area not 

Contaminated

% Confidence 

Desired

• Note: Based on example from Class 3 sampling strategy; 

• Using prior information and/or combining judgment and 

probabilistic sampling can significantly reduce number of samples 

required.

Accounting for Spatial Variability 

in Sampling Design

Spatial Design Considerations

• Traditional statistical design methods only indirectly 

account for spatial variability on a very coarse scale.

• Geostatistical techniques developed for the 

mineral/oil/gas industries have been used successfully 

in the environmental arena to address the spatial 

distribution of contaminants

• Coupled with optimization routines, these techniques 

offer a potential to decrease the number of samples 

needed to characterize or clear an area compared to 

traditional statistical methods

Spatial Variability

• Geostatistics accounts for spatial variability

Sample locations, color-coded 

for concentration

Lag Distance (m)

γ

Data 

correlated 

over a 14 m 

distance

Data fit to a variogram model, 

which describes the spatial variability
229

Sego

Mapping Contamination

• Geostatistics provides mapping 

capability

– Concentration map

– Uncertainty map

• This approach is well suited to 

an adaptive sampling 

procedure

– multiple rounds of sampling, 

with each round based on 

reducing uncertainty in 

knowledge of the contaminant 

distribution

• This approach may reduce the 

number of samples and 

therefore the time necessary 

develop a decon plan

Summary

• Preplanning can save time if an event occurs

• Conceptual model development is important

• Classification of sampling zones makes it easier to 

create sampling design decisions in a timely manner

• Recommended sampling design methods:

– Targeted sampling

– Probability-based statistical design methods 

– Combined targeted and probability-based approaches

– Geostatistical methods that account for spatial variability, 

and are well suited to adaptive sampling

Provide 

confidence 

statements

Summary

• Validated tools exist for sample design, 

sample collection, and data management

• Goal is to help decision makers arrive at

defensible conclusions and reduce sampling 

time in order to:

– Direct decontamination strategy 

– Assess the effectiveness of decontamination

– Clear facilities for reoccupation

• Landon Sego landon.sego@pnl.gov

• Brent Pulsipher brent.pulsipher@pnl.gov

• Robert Knowlton rgknowl@sandia.gov

• Don MacQueen macq@llnl.gov

Contact Info
230

Wiener

Russell W. Wiener, Ph.D.

National Homeland Security Research Center 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

September 26, 2008

NHSRC Aerosol Test Facility (ATF) and 

the Study of the Measurement and 

Mechanisms of Exposure to CBR Agents

2008 Workshop on Decontamination and Associated Issues for Sites

Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials

US EPA’s Aerosol Test Facility at 

Research Triangle Park

• The Aerosol Test Facility (ATF) is located 

in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. 

The ATF is composed of two large wind 

tunnels, several aerosol research 

chambers, and a number of additional 

laboratories for bench scale aerosol 

testing. 

• Over 10,000 sq. ft. of high bay laboratory 

space.

Aerosol Wind Tunnel

(top view)

SMALL WIND TUNNEL US EPA’s Aerosol Test Facility at 

Research Triangle Park

Aerosol Test Facility Research Areas

• Particle sampler/monitor research and design

• Concept/prototype verification

• Sampling efficiency studies
231

Wiener

US EPA’s Aerosol Test Facility at 

Research Triangle Park

Aerosol Test Facility Research Areas

• Aerosol and Fluid Dynamics

• Velocimetry and Anemometry

• Aerosol and gas dispersion analysis

• CFD, Non-dimensional, and Dispersion Modeling

US EPA’s Aerosol Test Facility at 

Research Triangle Park

Aerosol Test Facility Research Areas

• Human exposure measurement

• Indoor Air Studies

• Ambient Air and Field Studies

• Exposure Simulation 

• Aerosol infiltration and penetration studies

Human Exposure Test 

Dummies

Field Study Site – Brooklyn, NY

Partnership Opportunities

• The ATF allows the study of fluid and aerosol motion under extremely well controlled conditions 

and produces highly accurate data on which to base 

scientific decisions. 

 The EPA wind tunnel is one of the only large aerosol wind 

tunnels in the US. 

 The wind tunnel is scaled for adult human exposure testing. 

Heated-breathing manikins are available.

• Ability to 

 design and test aerosol monitors and sampling 

technologies.

 perform dispersion analysis, modeling, field and laboratory 

studies.

Resuspension of Particles by 

Evacuating Personnel

An ATF project

Alfred Eisner, Alion Science and Technology,

Russell Wiener and Jacky Rosati U.S. EPA, 
232

Wiener

The ricin attack on Capitol Hill on February 2, 2004, 

revealed the need to develop quantitative methods to 

estimate risk from exposure of rapidly evacuating 

occupants to agents resuspended from surfaces in offices. 

Little is understood about the process of resuspension of 

particles from floors during an evacuation, in spite of its 

significant contribution to the movement of materials inside 

an office.

To investigate the process of a foot stepping on a surface 

contaminated with particulate matter, an automated 

prosthetic foot controlled by electric actuators was 

developed. Further, an articulated, heated, breathing 

manikin was used in this study to investigate the potential 

exposure of escaping individuals.

• The mechanical foot (MF) and 

articulated manikin were placed in a 

wind tunnel. Three Aerodynamic 

Particle Sizers (APSs) were used to 

monitor aerosol concentration along 

the manikin’s body in real time, 

following execution of a step motion. 

• Double-pulse particle image 

velocimetry (PIV) was used to study 

particle-laden airflow under the foot. 

Three APSs were used to measure 

aerosol concentration along the 

manikin’s body.

During the uplift stage of the foot step, an aerosol bolus develops that 

moves rapidly toward the toes. 

RESULTS

• Average Particle Size of Ovalbumin Powder

 the average particle size was determined to be 2.7 

microns, which is similar in size to ricin.

• Exposure Assessment

 The concentration found in the respiratory zone following 

a single step agitation of 0.5 g of ricin simulant was found 

to be 5 μg/m3. 

 The typical bolus temporal length was found to be 

approximately 15 s.

 Assuming that the respiratory tidal volume is 500 cm3 and that an individual can execute approximately four 

inhalations during the bolus length of 15 s, it is possible to 

assess pulmonary exposure as 0.01μg. 

 Resulting in the assessed dose of 0.001 μg assuming 

alveolar deposition efficiency of 10%,

Wind Tunnel Performance 

Testing of the Radnet Sampler

An ATF project

Zora Drake and Lydia Brouwer, Alion Science and 

Technology, Russell Wiener, U.S. EPA,
233

Wiener

RadNet Sampler Inside Radnet Sampler

Radnet – filter and 

detectors

0.0000

0.5000

1.0000

1.5000

2.0000

024 6 8 10 12 14 16

Particle diameter (μm)

Mas s Concentration (ng/L)

Inner Top Middle Top Outer Top Inner Bottom Outer Bottom Error Bars

Particle 

Size (μm)

2.5

5

7.5

10

15

Percent

Captured

37.0%

21.9%

6.0%

4.3%

1.4%

ATF Wind Tunnel 

Performance

Wind Speed 2 kph

0.0000

0.5000

1.0000

1.5000

2.0000

2.5000

0246 8 10 12 14 16

Particle Diameter (μm)

Mass Concentration (ng/L)

Inner Top Middle Top Outer Top Inner Bottom Outer Bottom Error Bars

Particle 

Size (μm)

2.5

5

7.5

10

15

Percent

Captured

42.7%

41.0%

29.0%

28.4%

11.2%

ATF Wind Tunnel Performance

Wind Speed 8 kph

0.0000

0.2500

0.5000

0.7500

1.0000

0 2 4 6 810 12 14 16

Particle Diameter (μm)

Mass Conc entration (ng/L)

Inner Top Middle Top Outer Top Inner Bottom Outer Bottom Error Bars

Particle 

Size (μm)

2.5

5

7.5

10

15

Percent

Captured

27.8%

28.1%

20.6%

23.7%

19.7%

ATF Wind Tunnel 

Performance

Wind Speed 24 kph
234

Wiener

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

110%

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5

SQRT Stokes No.

Sampler Efficiency

ATF Wind Tunnel Test

RadNet Sampler Efficiency

ATF Wind Tunnel Test

RadNet Sampler Efficiency

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

100.0%

110.0%

0 2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5 15 17.5 20 22.5 25

Particle Size (μm)

Sampling Efficiency

2 kph 8 kph 24 kph

RadNet Testing

• The Aerosol Wind tunnel has 

been determined to meet PM10 

wind tunnel performance criteria.

 Less than 10% imprecision in wind 

speed across the test area.

 Less than 10% coefficient of 

variation for aerosol concentration in 

the test area.

RadNet Testing

• The RadNet sampler has had a 

preliminary evaluation in the 

tunnel and has shown 

 a significant non-uniformity of 

particle deposition on the filter.

 a decrease in sampling efficiency for 

particles greater than 7.5 microns at 

higher wind speeds.
235

Foarde

www.rti.org

Public Release - Unclassified

RTI International is a trade name of Research Triangle Institute

Collective Protection Technology Testing 

of Bioaerosol Air Purification Devices

Karin Foarde, James Hanley, Douglas VanOsdell, Keith Esch

RTI International

and 

Amy Maxwell and Chris Karwacki

US Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center 

9/26/08

3040 Cornwallis Road  P.O. Box 12194  Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, USA 27709 

e-mail: kkf@rti.org www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 2

Overview

 Framework and background of method

 Brief review of the method, including key issues, QA 

requirements, test battery and apparatuses

 Results of the method verification

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 3

Framework

 Part of an overarching series of Collective Protection 

Air Purification Test and Evaluation Methods

 Assess the efficacy of technologies for protection 

against chemical, nuclear, and biological threats

 Air Purification Test Methodologies

 Chemical

 Single-Pass

 Catox

 Regen

 Biological

 Particulate

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 4

Background

 Method For Evaluating Air Purification Technologies 

For Collective Protection Using Viable Microbial 

Aerosols (T&E Bioaerosol Purification Method)

 Developed in collaboration with ECBC, Dahlgren 

NSWC, Dugway Proving Ground, Air Force Research 

Laboratory and others

 Draft method extensively reviewed by community 

(including users, testers, microbiologists, aerosol 

scientists, etc. from DHS, internal and external DOD)

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 5

Scope of the Method

 Test devices and technologies that eliminate viable 

microorganisms from the airstream

 Active/reactive technologies

 Removal devices

 Combination technologies

 Tests to include design-limiting conditions for the device

 Small-scale test

 TRL 1 - 3

 Large-scale test

 TRL 4 - 6

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 6

Types of Devices and Technologies

 High-intensity UVC

 UVC systems

 Pulsed UV broad spectrum

 Compressive heating

 Hydroxyl radicals – modification of surface decon technology

 Iodine - modification of surface decon technology

 HEPA and ULPA filters

 Standard Ventilation filter

 Photo Catalytic Oxidation

 Combinations
236

Foarde

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 7

Measurements

 Percent bioaerosol inactivation 

Purification Efficiency (%) = 100 ( 1 – P )

Where:

P is the survival (penetration) computed as:

P = D / U

D = Bioaerosol concentration downstream of the device 

(downstream survivors)

U = Bioaerosol concentration upstream of the device

 Power consumption, temperature rise

 Observe and note other relevant operational aspects of the device as 

applicable (e.g., size, weight, and noise)

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 8

Key Issues Addressed in the Method

 Safety

 Environmental Considerations

 Protective Factors

 Simulant Selection

 Particle Size Distribution of Bioaerosol Challenge

 Data Quality Objectives

 Considerations for Agent Testing

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 9

Protective Factors

1. Directly protect the BWA itself from full effect of the 

inactivation method used by the technology or, 

2. Neutralize or interfere with some component of the 

technology making it less available to inactivate BWA.

 Agglomerates

 Relative Humidity

 “Organic Matter”

 Weaponization process

 Atmospheric aerosol components

 Dirt (organic matter)

 Background bioaerosol

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 10

Recommended Types of Protective Factors

1. Generate some of the organisms as both singlets

and as agglomerates

2. Perform some tests at high or low RH, and

3. Include a small amount of protein in the nebulizing 

fluid to mimic, at least partially, a degree of protection 

provided by the dirt in an atmospheric aerosol and 

some type of weaponization process.

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 11

Simulant Selection Criteria

1. Bracket the susceptibilities of the BWA to the 

technologies,

2. Have appropriate physiological characteristics of 

BWA,

3. Have appropriate physical characteristics of the 

BWA, and

4. Permit laboratory containment compatible with 

biohazard level of simulant.

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 12

Inactivation Efficiency

(Overall Susceptibility of Microbe Groups to Some Antimicrobial Agents)
237

Foarde

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 13

Bioaerosol Simulants

Non-enveloped virus Polydispersed micron-sized aerosol. MS2 bacteriophage/ 

bacterial virus Virus BWA

Agglomerates, polydisperse, multiple 

organisms per particle. ~3 μm

Singlets, 0.5 - 0.8 x 1.0 - 3.0 μm. Gram-negative

Slightly less resistant Yersinia rohdei

Singlets, 0.5-1.5 μm spheres. Gram-positive

slightly more resistant

Staphylococcus 

epidermidis

Vegetative 

Bacteria

BWA

B. atrophaeus (Bg)* Historical simulant Singlets, 0.7 - 0.8 x 1 - 1.5 μm.

Agglomerates, polydisperse, multiple 

organisms per particle. ~3 μm 

Singlets, 0.7 to 0.8 by 1.3 to 1.5 μm. Physiological and 

physical 

characteristics

B. thuringiensis (Bt) Bacillus 

anthracis

BWA Category Simulant Justification/Role Size Range as Aerosolized

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 14

Test Apparatus

 Adapted from particulate tests

 Performance based

 Flexible - form and dimensions adapted to fit test 

device

 Apparatus must be capable of meeting quality control 

parameters for air velocity uniformity, inert aerosol 

uniformity, inert downstream mixing, aerosol neutralizer 

activity, temperature, RH, test airflow rate, etc.

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 15

RTI Small Scale TRL 1-3 Test Apparatus

P

T

RH particle

filter

Bioaerosol

Sampler

Bioaerosol

Sampler

Oversize

Particle

Settling

Chamber

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 16

RTI’s Large Scale TRL 4-6 Test Apparatus

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 17

Test Series Including Required Control Tests

Inert particle testing Per device If applicable. 

Confirms singlet and agglomerate 

dissemination of the bioaerosol.

Per device, for each 

bioaerosol challenges. Size check on the bioaerosol.

Main test series with bioaerosol 

challenges. Per device Bioaerosol tests at room temperature and RH( 20-30°C; 30-70% RH)

Downstream count expected to be zero; 

corrective action taken if not, test repeated. 

Once per device after 

installation before test.

Control test on downstream counts with high 

efficiency filter and one bioaerosol challenge.

Downstream count expected to be zero; 

corrective action taken if not, test repeated.

Once per device after 

installation before test.

Control test on downstream background count with 

high efficiency filter and clean air challenge.

Applicable to filters and media and any 

devices that incorporate collection. 

Perform after device 

installed in test apparatus

For HEPA-based devices, leak test of device seal 

to test apparatus

Downstream count expected to be zero; 

corrective action taken if not and test is 

then repeated. 

At start of program.

Control test on downstream counts with high 

efficiency filter installed in test apparatus; 

performed with each of the bioaerosol challenges.

Confirms viability is maintained through 

apparatus; quantifies any die-off or particle 

losses in test apparatus.

At start of program. 

Transmission Test: Control test with bioaerosol 

challenge with empty apparatus test section; 

performed with each of the bioaerosol challenges.

Test Frequency Comment

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 18

Quality Control Parameters for Bioaerosols

CV  0.35 Each test. Statistical 

check of data quality. Upstream PFUs

CV  0.25 Each test. Statistical 

check of data quality. Upstream CFUs

Test Acceptable

Organism Transmission Range

spores 0.85 to 1.15

vegetative bacteria 0.80 to 1.20

bacterial virus 0.75 to 1.25

Performed at least once 

per test sequence per 

organism

100% Transmission

(correlation test)

Maximum of 400 CFU/plate or 400 

PFU/plate Each efficiency test. Maximum counts for 

samplers

Minimum of 10 CFU/plate or 

PFU/plate Each efficiency test. Minimum upstream counts 

for samplers

Control Limits Frequency and 

Description Parameter
238

Foarde

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 19

Typical Data – Example 1

99.99981 > 99.99993 MS2 virus 

(Bacteriophage/ bacterial virus)

99.99974 > 99.99998 Staphylococcus epidermidis

(Vegetative bacteria as singlets)

99.99973 > 99.99995 B. atrophaeus (Bg) 

(Bacterial spore as singlets)

99.99959 99.99996 B. thuringensis (Bt) 

(Bacterial spore as agglomerates)

99.99951 > 99.99997 B. thuringensis (Bt) 

(Bacterial spore as singlets)

Observed 

Value*

95% lower 

confidence limit

Purification Efficiency (%)

Effective Device

“ >” is used when no downstream counts were detected.

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 20

Typical Data – Example 2

99.93 99.98 MS2 virus 

(Bacteriophage/ bacterial virus)

99.991 99.997 Staphylococcus epidermidis

(Vegetative bacteria as singlets)

0 0 B. atrophaeus (Bg) 

(Bacterial spore as singlets)

0 1.0 B. thuringensis (Bt) 

(Bacterial spore as agglomerates)

0 10.5 B. thuringensis (Bt) 

(Bacterial spore as singlets)

Observed 

Value

95% lower 

confidence limit

Purification Efficiency (%)

Ineffective Device

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 21

Method Verification

 Task 1 Evaluate T & E Method Usability

 Staff with all levels of experience served as 

“independent testers” evaluated the document for 

usability and provided feedback

 Task 2 Using the Test Method

 Test devices using the method

 Task 3 Verification of Method

 Compared verification test data to existing data

www.rti.org Public Release - Unclassified 22

Verification Conclusion and Recommendations

 Usability is good; few recommendations

 Method is robust

 Both small scale and large scale tests went well; data 

is high quality

 Unresolved issues

 Specification of chemical neutralizers for residual 

chemical

 Composition of nebulizing fluid - “protective factors”
239

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SCEPA/600/R-09/035 | September 2009 | www.epa.gov/ord

United States

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Agency

Office of Research and Development

National Homeland Security Research Center

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