UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

 ) 

Darnell Cooper, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) No. 12 C 05625 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) Judge Edmond E. Chang 

Karyn Morgan, Angelique Matuzas, ) 

Kent Ocupe, and Stacey Headlee, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Darnell Cooper, an inmate at Stateville Correctional Center in Illinois, 

brought this civil-rights lawsuit against four nurses who work at the prison.1

Cooper alleges that Karyn Morgan, Angelique Matuzas, Kent Ocupe, and Stacey 

Headlee were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth 

and Fourteenth Amendments. R. 72, Am. Compl.2 Now the Defendants move for 

summary judgment, asserting that Cooper did not suffer from an objectively serious 

medical condition and that the Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to 

Cooper’s medical needs. R. 167, Defs.’ Br. The Defendants also assert that Cooper’s 

 1The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Cooper’s Section 1983 claim under 

28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

2Citations to the record are noted as “R.” followed by the docket number and the page 

or paragraph number. Citations to the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements of Fact are 

“DSOF” (for Defendants’ Statement of Facts) [R. 168]; “PSOF” (for Cooper’s Statement of 

Additional Facts) [R. 175]; “Pl.’s Resp. DSOF” (for Cooper’s Response to Defendants’ 

Statement of Facts) [R. 176]; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF (for Defendants’ Response to Cooper’s 

Statement of Additional Facts) [R. 180]. 
2 

failure to exhaust all administrative remedies bars his § 1983 claim. Id. For the 

reasons discussed below, the motion is denied. 

I. Background 

For purposes of the Defendants’ motion, the following facts are viewed in the 

light most favorable to Cooper (because he is the non-movant), and all reasonable 

inferences are drawn in his favor. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Darnell Cooper has been incarcerated at Stateville 

Correctional Center, a facility run by the Illinois Department of Corrections, since 

May 2011. R. 168, DSOF ¶ 1. On the night of June 16, 2011, Cooper took a shower, 

but the water was so hot that he suffered burns to the right side of his back and 

neck. Id. ¶ 38; R. 168 at Exh. A, Cooper Dep. 29:17-21. Cooper was in pain from the 

burns, but did not see any medical personnel that night. DSOF ¶ 39; R. 176, Pl.’s 

Resp. DSOF ¶ 39; Cooper Dep. 137:16-22. The following morning, Cooper noticed 

that his shirt was stained with some type of discharge from the burns. R. 175, PSOF 

¶ 2; R. 180, Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 2; Cooper Dep. 40:13-20. His skin was disfigured, 

discolored, and blistered as a result of the burns. PSOF ¶ 2; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 2; 

Cooper Dep. 40:24-41:14. Cooper did not see any medical personnel that day about 

his burns. DSOF ¶ 41; Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 41; Cooper Dep. 41:24-43:15. 

On June 18, 2011 (two days after suffering the burns), Cooper told Karyn 

Morgan, a Wexford Health Sources, Inc. nurse who worked at Stateville (Wexford is 

the private contractor that provides health services at the prison), about his burns. 

PSOF ¶ 3; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 3; Cooper Dep. 44:8-19; R. 168 at Exh. B, Morgan 
3 

Dep. 12:2-12. At the time, Morgan was conducting a medication “pass,” meaning 

that she was administering medication to inmates in their cells. PSOF ¶ 3; Defs.’ 

Resp. PSOF ¶ 3; Cooper Dep. 44:8-19. Cooper showed her the burns and asked for 

medical attention, pain medication, and a doctor. PSOF ¶ 3; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 3; 

Cooper Dep. 45:10-11, 46:16-18, 47:20-48:1; R. 175-1, Exh. 1, Cooper Decl. ¶ 1. 

Morgan did not provide any medical attention in response to Cooper’s requests. 

PSOF ¶ 3; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 3; Cooper Decl. ¶ 1. Later that day, however, a 

certified medical technician examined Cooper and applied burn cream and 

bandages to the burns. Cooper Dep. 46:24-47:16; R. 168 at Exh. G, Cooper Med. Rec. 

at 6. 

Two days later, on June 20, Cooper went to the emergency room for his burns 

and saw Angelique Matuzas, another Wexford nurse who worked at Stateville. 

PSOF ¶ 4; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 4; Cooper Dep. 49:23-50:4; R. 168 at Exh. C, 

Matuzas Dep. 12:15-20. Matuzas changed Cooper’s bandages while Cooper told her 

about the burns. PSOF ¶ 4; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 4; Cooper Dep. 51:1-10. Cooper also 

asked the nurse for pain medication and to see a doctor. PSOF ¶ 4; Defs.’ Resp. 

PSOF ¶ 4; Cooper Dep. 51:1-10. Matuzas only replied that the doctor was not in.3 

PSOF ¶ 4; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 4; Cooper Dep. 51:1-10. 

 3The parties dispute whether this visit occurred on June 20 or June 21. Compare 

PSOF ¶ 4, with Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 4. Cooper maintains that he saw Matuzas on June 20. 

Cooper Dep. 49:23-50:4. Cooper’s medical record, however, states that he only saw Nurse 

Matuzas on June 21. Cooper Med. Rec. at 8. Given that the facts must be viewed in the 

light most favorable to Cooper for purposes of deciding this motion, the Court will assume 

that Cooper saw Matuzas on June 20. 
4 

That same day, Cooper filed an emergency grievance with Stateville’s 

Warden about the lack of medical attention he had received for his burns. PSOF ¶ 

5; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 5; R. 175-2, Exh. 2, 6/20/11 Grievance; Cooper Dep. 53:14-24. 

Cooper did not identify Nurse Morgan (whom Cooper saw on June 18) by name in 

the grievance, but described her as a “light skinned” woman with “brown eyes” and 

“blonde hair,” who was wearing a “2-piece green nurses outfit.” 6/20/11 Grievance. 

The next day, on June 21, Cooper saw Nurse Matuzas again for his burns. 

PSOF ¶ 6; Cooper Dep. 55:23-56:8; Cooper Med. Rec. at 8. As the nurse re-dressed 

his bandages, Cooper told Matuzas that he was still in pain from the burns. PSOF ¶ 

6; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 6; Cooper Dep. 56:9-22; Matuzas Dep. 64:6-12, 66:8-15. 

Cooper’s medical record states that the nurse cleaned and sterilized Cooper’s “scald 

burn [on the] back of [his] neck [and] right shoulder ... .” Cooper Med. Rec. at 8. 

Once again, Cooper asked for pain medication and to see a doctor. PSOF ¶ 6; Defs.’ 

Resp. PSOF ¶ 6; Cooper Dep. 56:9-22. In response, Matuzas told a security officer 

that Cooper was “making trouble” and had Cooper escorted from the hospital. PSOF 

¶ 6; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 6; Cooper Dep. 56:9-22. 

On June 22, Stacey Headlee, another Wexford nurse who worked at 

Stateville, removed the bandages covering Cooper’s burns. Cooper Dep. 58:21-59:13; 

R. 168 at Exh. E, Headlee Dep. 24:8-16. The parties dispute whether Headlee 

applied new bandages to Cooper’s burns at this time. Compare DSOF ¶ 50, with Pl. 

Resp. DSOF ¶ 50; see also Cooper Dep. 59:21-60:2; Cooper Med. Rec. at 5. Cooper 
5 

again asked to see a doctor and for pain medication, but Headlee refused.4 Pl.’s 

Resp. DSOF ¶ 51; Cooper Dep. 59:21-60:10; Cooper Decl. ¶ 2. Cooper’s medical 

record states that Headlee did not observe any redness or blisters where Cooper had 

been burned. Cooper Med. Rec. at 5. 

Around one week later, on June 30, Cooper suffered another burn—this time 

to his head—while taking a shower. PSOF ¶ 8; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 8; Cooper Dep. 

62:5-12. Cooper could feel the burn, but did not know how severe it was. Cooper 

Dep. 65:9-21. The next day, Cooper noticed that this burn had caused his skin to 

peel. PSOF ¶ 9; Cooper Dep. 66:10-21. Later that day, Cooper showed the burn to 

Nurse Morgan while she was on a medication pass. PSOF ¶ 9; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 

9; Cooper Dep. 66:22-24. Again, he asked Morgan for pain medication and a doctor. 

PSOF ¶ 9; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 9; Cooper Dep. 68:5-11. In response, Morgan said 

she could not do anything for him and walked away. PSOF ¶ 9; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 

9; Cooper Dep. 67:9-22, 68:12-15. 

Either later that day (on June 30) or the following day, Cooper showed the 

burn on his head to Kent Ocupe, yet another Wexford nurse who worked at 

Stateville. PSOF ¶ 11; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 11; Cooper Dep. 70:7-21. Ocupe was on a 

medication pass at the time. PSOF ¶ 11; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 11; Cooper Dep. 70:7-

21. Cooper asked the nurse for medical attention, pain medication, and a doctor. 

 4Again, the parties dispute whether this happened on June 21 or June 22. Compare 

PSOF ¶ 7, with Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 7. Cooper says that he saw Nurse Headlee for the first 

time on June 22. Cooper Dep. 59:14-17. Cooper’s medical record, by contrast, states that he 

saw Headlee on June 21. Cooper Med. Rec. at 5. The Court must credit Cooper for purposes 

of deciding the motion, so the Court will assume that Cooper saw Headlee on June 22. 
6 

PSOF ¶ 11; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 11; Cooper Dep. 70:7-21. But Ocupe just walked 

away without responding. PSOF ¶ 11; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶ 11; Cooper Dep. 70:7-21. 

Cooper filed a second grievance on July 5, 2011. PSOF ¶ 33; Defs.’ Resp. 

PSOF ¶ 33; R. 175-8, Exh. 8, 7/5/11 Grievance. Once again, Cooper complained 

about the lack of treatment he received for the burns on his back, neck, and head. 

7/5/11 Grievance. Cooper also noted that this was his second grievance and that he 

had yet to receive pain medication for his burns. Id.

The next relevant medical appointment was on July 20, 2011. The parties 

dispute whether, on that date, Cooper saw Nurse Headlee or someone else. Compare

DSOF ¶ 65, with Pl.’s Resp. DSOF ¶ 65. Cooper admits that he saw a nurse on July 

20, but he does not believe it was Headlee. Cooper Dep. 80:2-6. Whoever it was, the 

nurse who saw Cooper on July 20 noted in his medical record that Cooper’s skin on 

his back and head had healed. Cooper Med. Rec. at 6. Headlee testified at her 

deposition that she wrote this note in Cooper’s medical record. Headlee Dep. 162:17-

20. 

On September 1, 2011, Cooper submitted a third grievance. PSOF ¶ 34; Defs.’ 

Resp. PSOF ¶ 34; R. 175-9, Exh. 9, 9/1/11 Grievance. Cooper noted that this was the 

third grievance he had filed related to his burns. 9/1/11 Grievance. He also repeated 

that he had received inadequate medical attention for his burns and had not 

received any pain medication. Id. 

In December 2011, an IDOC employee reviewed Cooper’s medical file and 

submitted a memo to the IDOC’s Grievance Office summarizing the medical 
7 

attention Cooper received for his burns. PSOF ¶ 35; R. 175-10, Exh. 10, 12/2/11 

Grievance Office Memo. A few weeks later, a Grievance Officer reviewed Cooper’s 

grievances and concluded that Cooper “appear[ed] to be receiving appropriate 

medical care at this time.” R. 175-11, Exh. 11, 12/27/11 Grievance Officer’s Report. 

The Chief Administrative Officer concurred. Id. Cooper thereafter appealed to the 

IDOC Administrative Review Board, which concluded that Cooper’s “medical needs 

[were] being addressed by the Stateville Correctional Center Administration, in 

accordance with established policies and procedures.” R. 175-12, Exh. 12, 6/1/12 

Admin. Review Board Decision. Cooper of course disagrees, and has brought this 

deliberate indifference claim against the Defendants. Am. Compl. at 7-9. Cooper 

alleges that the Defendants denied him access to adequate medical care by, among 

other things, refusing his requests to see a doctor and refusing to prescribe pain 

medication. Id. at 8. The Defendants now move for summary judgment. 

II. Standard of Review 

Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating 

summary judgment motions, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 

U.S. 372, 378 (2007). The Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make 
8 

credibility determinations, Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 

704 (7th Cir. 2011), and must consider only evidence that can “be presented in a 

form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The party 

seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that there is no 

genuine dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Carmichael v. Vill. of Palatine, 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th 

Cir. 2008). If this burden is met, the adverse party must then “set forth specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 

III. Analysis 

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

The first issue is whether Cooper properly exhausted administrative 

remedies before bringing this lawsuit. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires 

that inmates exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing a Section 

1983 action for unconstitutional prison conditions. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 

720 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The PLRA provides that ‘[n]o action shall be brought with 

respect to prison conditions under section 1983 ... until such administrative 

remedies as are available are exhausted.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). This 

means that inmates must “file a timely grievance utilizing the procedures and rules 

of the state’s prison grievance process.” Id. Section 504.810(b) of the Illinois 

Administrative Code sets forth the requirements for filing grievances in Illinois 

state prison: 
9 

The grievance shall contain factual details regarding each aspect of the 

offender’s complaint, including what happened, when, were, and the name of 

each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the 

complaint. This provision does not preclude an offender from filing a 

grievance when the names of individuals are not known, but the offender 

must include as much descriptive information about the individual as 

possible. 

20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810(b). 

The Defendants argue that Cooper failed to exhaust all administrative 

remedies because his grievances did not identify the Defendants by name or 

describe their conduct. Defs.’ Br. at 15. The Defendants also argue that Cooper only 

asked that Stateville lower the water temperature in the showers, so he was not 

really complaining about inadequate medical care. Id. Neither argument works. 

Taking the relief-sought argument first, even the IDOC administrators handling 

Cooper’s grievance did not interpret his grievances as targeting the shower’s water 

temperature. The IDOC Administrative Review Board ultimately denied Cooper’s 

grievance on appeal after finding that “[Cooper’s] medical needs are being addressed 

by the Stateville Correctional Center Administration, in accordance with 

established policies and procedures.” 6/1/12 Admin. Review Board Decision 

(emphasis added). Other responses to the grievances also referred to the medical 

condition and medical treatment, and rejected the need for more treatment. See

12/2/11 Grievance Office Memo (IDOC employee’s memo to the Grievance Office 

states that Cooper’s burns were “healing well”); 12/27/11 Grievance Officer’s Report 

(Grievance Officer finds that Cooper “appear[ed] to be receiving appropriate medical 

care”). 
10 

The IDOC’s own responses to the grievances show that Cooper exhausted the 

claim. “Where prison officials address an inmate’s grievance on the merits without 

rejecting it on procedural grounds, the grievance has served its function of alerting 

the state and inviting corrective action, and defendants cannot rely on the failure to 

exhaust defense.” Maddox, 655 F.3d at 722; see also Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 

585 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A] procedural shortcoming ... amounts to a failure to exhaust 

only if prison administrators explicitly relied on that shortcoming.”); Riccardo v. 

Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen a state treats a filing as timely 

and resolves it on the merits, the federal judiciary will not second-guess that action, 

for the grievance has served its function of alerting the state and inviting corrective 

action.”). The IDOC addressed whether Cooper received adequate medical care, so 

his grievances “provid[ed] prison officials a fair opportunity to address his 

complaint.” Maddox, 655 F.3d at 722 (“That Maddox didn’t specifically name the 

defendants in the grievance was a mere technical defect that had no effect on the 

process and didn’t limit the usefulness of the exhaustion requirement.”). 

On the deficient-identification argument, the Defendants’ assertion that 

“grievances must include ‘the name of the person who is the subject of or is 

otherwise involved with the complaint,’” Defs.’ Br. at 15 (emphasis in original), is 

wrong—and is beside the point here. It is wrong because the relevant regulation, 

quoted above, allows an inmate to describe the targeted employee if the name is not 

known. 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810(b).5 And it is beside the point because the 

 5Cooper did that: he described Nurse Morgan as a “light skinned” woman with 

“brown eyes” and “blonde hair,” who was wearing a “2-piece green nurses outfit.” 6/20/11 
11 

IDOC Administrative Review Board did not reject the grievances on the grounds 

that Cooper had inadequately identified or described those who allegedly did not 

provide adequate medical care. That means there is no problem with exhaustion. 

Maddox, 655 F.3d at 722; Conyers, 416 F.3d at 585. 

B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs 

Moving past exhaustion and on to the merits of the deliberate-indifference 

claim, the substantive standard is this: prison officials violate the Eighth 

Amendment when they manifest a “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 

of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The Defendants first 

contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on Cooper’s claim because his 

burns did not amount to a serious medical condition. Defs.’ Br. at 3-6. Second, the 

Defendants argue that the totality of medical care that Cooper received refutes any 

claim that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his burns. Id. at 6-14. 

The record evidence, however, would allow a reasonable jury to find that Cooper has 

proven both the objective element (the medical need was serious) and the subjective 

element (the Defendants consciously disregarded the need). 

i. Serious Medical Need 

A “sufficiently serious” medical condition is “one that has been diagnosed by a 

physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person 

would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.” Foelker v. Outagamie Cnty., 394 

F.3d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). The Defendants argue that 

 

Grievance. In the second and third grievances, Cooper referred back to this initial 

grievance, and thus referred back to the description. See 7/5/11 Grievance; 9/1/11 

Grievance.
12 

Cooper did not suffer from a serious medical condition because he only suffered, in 

the defense’s view, a “minor burn” that caused only “minimal” pain or damage. 

Defs.’ Br. at 3-4. To support this argument, the Defendants point to the June 18, 

2011 (two days after the burn) entry in Cooper’s medical records; in this entry, a 

certified medical technician noted that Cooper’s skin had peeled but that it was not 

blistered.6 Id. at 4; Cooper Med. Rec. at 6. But there is evidence that Cooper 

suffered more than just a “minor burn” and felt just “minimal pain”: Cooper 

testified at his deposition that his skin was blistered the morning after he suffered 

burns to his back and neck from the shower water. Cooper Dep. 40:24-41:14. He also 

testified that his skin was disfigured and discolored as a result of the burns. Id. And 

Cooper has consistently maintained that he complained to each defendant about the 

burns and the serious pain he was feeling. See, e.g., Cooper Dep. 38:18-19, 51:1-10, 

56:9-22, 70:10-21, 99:14-21; Cooper Decl. ¶ 1. Sure, the description of a medical 

condition in medical records is solid evidence for the defense, but medical records 

are not perfect and the jury would be entitled to credit Cooper’s testimony. More 

importantly for the here and now, on a summary judgment evaluation, the Court 

must credit Cooper’s testimony and give him the benefit of reasonable inferences. 

 6The Defendants also cite the testimony of a Wexford doctor, Dr. Arthur Funk, to 

argue that Cooper did not suffer from an objectively serious medical condition. Defs.’ Br. at 

5 (“Going even further, Dr. Funk, the regional medical director at Wexford and licensed 

physician testified that the condition that Mr. Cooper suffered was not one that any 

reasonable person would even go to see a physician.”). But the Defendants did not disclose 

Dr. Funk as an expert; rather, he was designated as a Rule 30(b)(6) witness. Indeed, the 

defense came right out and said that there would be no expert discovery. R. 161. So Dr. 

Funk’s medical-expert testimony about the severity of Cooper’s burns and the treatment 

Cooper received is not admissible as expert testimony. See Triblle v. Evangelides, 670 F.3d 

753, 758 (7th Cir. 2012). 
13 

There is even more evidence that generates a genuine factual dispute on 

whether Cooper suffered from a sufficiently serious medical condition. For example, 

Nurse Headlee testified at her deposition that Cooper’s skin was indeed discolored 

as a result of the burns. Headlee Dep. 95:15-21, 97:15-18. In January 2012, six 

months after Cooper suffered the burns, a doctor observed that Cooper had a scar 

above his right scapula (that is, his shoulder blade). Cooper Med. Rec. at 26. Even 

the IDOC’s Nursing Treatment Protocols for treating burns—which Wexford has 

adopted for its own employees7—acknowledges that “superficial burns ... are 

painful.” R. 175-7, Exh. 7, IDOC Nursing Treatment Protocols. What’s more, there 

is case law recognizing that pain from a skin burn is a serious medical condition. 

See O’Malley v. Litscher, 465 F.3d 799, 801, 805 (7th Cir. 2006) (assuming, for 

summary judgment purposes, that plaintiff suffered from a serious medical 

condition—despite a prison doctor’s affidavit to the contrary—after the plaintiff 

sustained burns on his back as a result of lying in his own vomit). 

In addition to arguing that Cooper only suffered from a “minor burn” that 

caused “minimal” pain, the Defendants also argue that Cooper’s burns were not 

serious because they “healed without the use of any medication and without the 

need for care by a physician.” Defs.’ Br. at 4. But the issue here is not whether 

Cooper’s burns properly healed in the long run; rather, it is whether Cooper 

 7Dr. Funk, Wexford’s 30(b)(6) witness, admitted as much during his deposition. See 

R. 168 at Exh. F, Wexford 30(b)(6) Dep. 116:5-14 (Q: So you’re saying that there is no 

Wexford protocol for nursing assessment protocols that relate to Stateville that are Wexford 

protocols? A: Wexford has adopted the state. So therefore they are Wexford’s protocols. 

They were formulated by the state, they’ve been adopted, and they’re implemented by 

Wexford, utilized by Wexford as their treatment protocols, although they were actually 

devised by the Department of Corrections.”). 
14 

suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain from the burns and whether this pain 

warranted medication and a doctor’s attention. See Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 

917 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The issue here is not disability. It is whether the plaintiffs 

were in sufficient pain to entitle them to pain medication within the first 48 hours 

after the beating. That was an issue for the jury.”); see also Smith v. Knox Cnty. 

Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[D]eliberate indifference to prolonged, 

unnecessary pain can itself be the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim” (emphasis 

added)). And, as noted above, there is more evidence that Cooper’s burns were 

serious: he has a scar on his right shoulder from the burns. Cooper Dep. 11:1-13. 

Cooper’s medical record corroborates the presence of the scar as late as six months 

after the burns. Cooper Med. Rec. at 26. Viewing all of this evidence in the light 

most favorable to Cooper, a jury could conclude that the burns meet the definition of 

a “serious” medical condition. 

ii. Deliberate Indifference 

The next question is whether Cooper has enough evidence to get to a jury on 

the subjective element of a deliberate-indifference claim, meaning did the 

Defendants have a “‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). In order to 

be deemed deliberately indifferent, the defendant must have “kn[own] of a 

substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.” Greeno v. Daley, 

414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). An inadvertent mistake or negligence is not 

enough. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; see also Baines v. Washington, 1995 WL 330634, at 
15 

*4 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 1995). “But a prisoner also is not required to show that he was 

literally ignored.” Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir. 2010). That is, “a 

doctor’s choice of the ‘easier and less efficacious treatment’ for an objectively serious 

medical condition can still amount to deliberate indifference for purposes of the 

Eighth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 n.10). 

The crux of the Defendants’ argument here is that the totality of care Cooper 

received for his burns forecloses any claim that the Defendants were deliberately 

indifferent to Cooper’s medical needs. Defs.’ Br. at 6-12 (“Based on the totality of the 

medical care outlined in the Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts, defendants 

never acted with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s medical needs.”). The 

Defendants essentially chalk Cooper’s claim up to a mere disagreement about the 

care that they provided him.8 Id. at 11 (“Mr. Cooper did not agree with the care that 

was provided him and he wanted something else ... .”). 

The overarching problem with the defense’s argument is that it relies on an 

assumption that cannot be made at this summary-judgment stage: that Cooper 

supposedly did not complain about pain from his burns. But a reasonable jury could 

 8The Defendants offer a few other arguments in support of summary judgment, but 

the arguments fail to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Cooper. For example, 

the Defendants point out that “the three healthcare providers that saw Mr. Cooper ... did 

not note that Mr. Cooper complained of pain at the time of their assessments.” Defs.’ Br. at 

9. But Cooper testified that he did complain about his pain to each Defendant. See Cooper 

Dep. 45:3-6, 47:20-48:1, 51:1-10, 56:9-22, 59:21-60:10, 67:9-68:15, 70:7-21. This testimony 

must be credited and it creates a genuine fact dispute on whether the Defendants knew he 

was in pain. The Defendants also argue that Cooper had access to pain medication from the 

commissary. Defs.’ Br. at 9. But again, Cooper’s testimony creates a genuine fact dispute on 

this issue. See Cooper Dep. 48:16-18. Finally, the Defendants argue that Nurses Morgan 

and Ocupe had no duty to assess Cooper’s burns while handing out medication to inmates. 

Defs.’ Br. at 7; DSOF ¶ 25. But Dr. Funk admitted that it would be “totally inappropriate” 

to ignore an inmate’s request for medical help during a medication pass. See Wexford 

30(b)(6) Dep. 197:22-198:3. 
16 

find that the record evidence refutes the Defendants’ position: Cooper testified at 

his deposition that he told each defendant he was in pain and wanted to see a 

doctor, and that each defendant ignored his complaints.9 See Cooper Dep. 45:3-6, 

47:20-48:1 (Nurse Morgan ignores Cooper’s request for pain medication during a 

medication pass); id. at 51:1-10 (when Cooper asked for pain medication and a 

doctor, Nurse Matuzas only responds that the doctor was not in); id. at 56:9-22 

(Matuzas tells Cooper he is “making trouble” in response to Cooper’s request for 

pain medication and a doctor); id. at 59:21-60:10 (Nurse Headlee refuses to give 

pain medication or place Cooper on sick call); id. at 67:9-68:15 (Morgan ignores 

Cooper’s request for pain medication and a doctor after suffering burns to his head); 

id. at 70:7-21 (Nurse Ocupe walks away from Cooper in response to Cooper’s 

request for pain medication and a doctor). Cooper then reaffirmed much of this 

testimony in his declaration. See Cooper Decl. ¶¶ 1, 2. 

This evidence, which must be credited at this stage, is enough for a 

reasonable jury to find that the Defendants were aware that Cooper was in pain 

and refused to take even basic steps to alleviate the pain, such as administering 

 9Both parties agree that at least Nurse Matuzas applied burn cream and bandages 

to Cooper’s burns. See PSOF ¶¶ 4, 6; Defs.’ Resp. PSOF ¶¶ 4, 6. And Cooper even testified 

that his burns felt better (but that the pain remained) after Matuzas applied the cream. 

Cooper Dep. 139:2-14. But the “receipt of some medical care does not automatically defeat a 

claim of deliberate indifference ... .” Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 831 (7th Cir. 2007). 

And as mentioned before, Cooper is not required to show that the Defendants wholly 

ignored him. See Berry, 604 F.3d at 441 (“But a prisoner also is not required to show that he 

was literally ignored ... a doctor’s choice of the ‘easier and less efficacious treatment’ for an 

objectively serious medical condition can still amount to deliberate indifference for purposes 

of the Eighth Amendment.”). Here, there are enough facts (when viewed in the light most 

favorable to Cooper) to infer deliberate indifference given that each defendant ignored 

Cooper’s requests for pain medication and for a doctor assessment. 
17 

pain medication and placing Cooper on sick call to see a doctor. See Berry, 604 F.3d 

at 441 (holding that defendant’s “obdurate refusal” to agree to inmate’s “modest 

request for treatment”—a basic dental examination—was sufficient to defeat 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment); Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 778 

(7th Cir. 2015) (observing that “the ease of providing treatment” may evidence 

deliberate indifference); Smith, 666 F.3d at 1039-40 (noting that “deliberate 

indifference to prolonged, unnecessary pain can itself be the basis for an Eighth 

Amendment claim”). From this point of view, the Defendants’ refusal to permit 

Cooper “such [] basic treatment option[s] could be characterized as a ‘gratuitous 

cruelty’ forbidden by the Eighth amendment.” Berry, 604 F.3d at 441. 

There is more. Viewing the evidence in Cooper’s favor, the Defendants also 

failed to follow the IDOC’s Nursing Treatment Protocols when responding to 

Cooper’s complaints of pain.10 See Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 756 (10th Cir. 2005) 

(health care protocols “provide circumstantial evidence” that prison medical 

personnel “knew of a substantial risk of serious harm”); Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 

Tennessee, 534 F.3d 531, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2008) (failure to follow hospital protocols 

supported finding that defendant disregarded plaintiff’s need for medical attention). 

 10To be sure, the Defendants’ alleged failure to follow the Nursing Treatment 

Protocols does not by itself establish that they violated the Eighth Amendment. Cf. 

Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that Chicago Police 

Department’s General Order pertaining to the use of force “shed[] no light on what may or 

may not be considered ‘objectively reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment”). But the 

Nursing Treatment Protocols can be evidence of what would be a reasonable response to 

complaints of burn pains. See Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 756 (10th Cir. 2005) (“While 

published requirements for health care do not create constitutional rights, such protocols 

certainly provide circumstantial evidence that a prison health care gatekeeper knew of a 

substantial risk of serious harm.”). 
18 

The Nursing Treatment Protocols for treating burns require that a nurse refer a 

patient with any kind of burn to a physician, physician’s assistant, or nurse 

practitioner. IDOC Nursing Treatment Protocols. If a patient has “anything greater 

than a minor burn,” then the nurse must immediately refer the patient to a 

physician. Id. If the patient has “superficial or minor burns,” then the nurse must 

schedule the patient for the next available clinic. Id. Finally, for superficial or minor 

burns, the Nursing Treatment Protocols further require that the nurse administer 

pain medication to the patient, reassess the patient in 2-4 hours, and after that call 

a doctor if the patient is still in pain. Id. Yet despite these Protocols, the Defendants 

never gave Cooper pain medication or placed him on sick call for his burns. In sum, 

based on the summary judgment record, a jury could reasonably find that the 

Defendants were deliberately indifferent by refusing Cooper’s requests for pain 

medication and to see a doctor. 

IV. Conclusion 

When viewed in Cooper’s favor, there is enough evidence for a jury to find 

that the burns he suffered qualified as a serious medical need, and that the 

Defendants consciously disregarded his complaints of pain and the need to see a 

doctor for the burns. The motion for summary judgment, R. 166, is denied. 

 ENTERED: 

 s/Edmond E. Chang 

 Honorable Edmond E. Chang 

 United States District Judge 

DATE: March 28, 2016