Another Crossroads? Professional Military 

Education Two Decades After the GoldwaterNichols Act and the Skelton Panel 

Committee Print 111-4 

 

                                                                                 

                                                                                 

U.S. House of Representatives • Committee on Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations 

April 2010 
(National Defense University) 

(Military Academy) (Command & General Staff College) (Army War College) 

(Naval Academy) (Marine Corps University) (Naval War College) 

(Air Force Academy) (Air University) 
ANOTHER CROSSROADS? PROFESSIONAL MILITARY 

EDUCATION TWO DECADES AFTER THE GOLDWATERNICHOLS ACT AND THE SKELTON PANEL

 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES • COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

APRIL 2010 

Committee Print 111-4 
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Nothing to see here
HASC OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS STAFF

O&I STAFF LEAD: LORRY M. FENNER, PH.D. 

O&I STAFF ASSISTANT: LEE F. HOWARD III 

JOHN E. KRUSE

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON

THOMAS E. HAWLEY

RYAN P. CRUMPLER

With assistance from 

Sean McDonald, Drew Walter, Peter Kavanewsky, Ashley Alley, Anne Daugherty Miles, 

Nate Allen, and Abraham Kanter. 

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PREFACE

“The society that separates its scholars from its warriors will have its thinking 

done by cowards and its fighting done by fools.” 

Thucydides 

This report examines officer in-residence professional military education (PME) as a critical 

investment in the most important element of our military – people. The primary purpose of PME is 

to develop military officers, throughout their careers, for the rigorous intellectual demands of 

complex contingencies and major conflicts. The United States cannot afford to be complacent 

when it comes to producing leaders capable of meeting significant challenges, whether at the tactical, 

operational, or strategic levels of warfare. Military officers must think critically, communicate well, 

conduct themselves with integrity, and lead others to perform strenuous tasks in difficult and often 

dangerous situations. As a matter of national security, the country’s continuing investment in the 

PME system must be wisely made. 

In supporting the military, the Congress is responsible for providing funds, setting associated 

policy, and providing oversight to ensure that all military and Department of Defense civilian 

personnel are properly prepared to perform their missions. The House Armed Services Committee 

has long supported the members of the armed forces by providing oversight, guidance, and 

resources with respect to PME. The most notable effort was the landmark review conducted by 

Chairman Ike Skelton’s panel twenty years ago, which recommended comprehensive reform of the 

PME system.1

 That Panel’s report stated: “Although many of its individual courses, programs, and 

faculties are excellent, the existing PME system must be improved to meet the needs of the modern 

profession at arms.” 

While this Subcommittee will not propose revolutionary changes as the Skelton Panel did, 

the current PME system should be improved to meet the country’s needs of today and tomorrow. 

Twenty years ago, the U.S. military was educating officers to engage Cold War adversaries. Clearly, 

much about our military and our world has changed since then, and we know that much will 

continue to change as we look to the future. PME, therefore, must remain dynamic. It must 

respond to present needs and consistently anticipate those of the future. It must continuously 

evolve in order to imbue service members with the intellectual agility to assume expanded roles and 

to perform new missions in an ever dynamic and increasingly complicated security environment. 

Other requirements are enduring and must be preserved. 

With respect to PME, Congress should regularly pose and assess these questions: How well 

is the nation educating its officers presently? And, what should be done to educate them more 

effectively in the future? 

                                                           

1 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on Military Education of the 

One Hundredth Congress, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989, No. 4, (The Skelton Report). 

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We want to thank our fellow Subcommittee Members and the Subcommittee staff. We 

would also like to thank all of the Members of the House Armed Services Committee, particularly 

Chairman Ike Skelton and Ranking Member Buck McKeon. Congressman Steve Israel of the 

Appropriations Committee deserves special mention for his interest in this important subject. We 

wish to express our gratitude to current and former HASC staff including Erin Conaton, Paul 

Arcangeli, Robert Simmons, Paul Oostburg Sanz, Paul Lewis, Debra Wada, Suzanne McKenna, 

Vickie Plunkett, Craig Greene, John Chapla, Lara Battles, Jennifer Kohl, Mary Kate Cunningham, 

Joshua Holly, Mary Goldstein, M. Cathy Devinney, Nancy Warner, Rebecca Ross, Cyndi Howard, 

Everett Coleman, Derek Scott, and J.J. Johnson for their support. Finally, we want to thank our own 

military legislative assistants (MLAs), fellows, and schedulers: Julie Zelnick, Shannon Green, Hector 

Soto-Rodriguez, Toby Watkins, Melissa Tuttle, David Bann, Sean Welch, Damon Loveless, and 

Whitney Stockett, as well as the rest of the Subcommittee MLAs for their assistance. 

We also appreciate the hard work of those outside the committee who assisted in this effort, 

including those with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Services, the 

Combatant Commanders, and the leaders, faculty, staff, and students of the PME institutions we 

visited. In particular, we thank the Joint Chiefs of Staff/DJ-7 staff and service staffs, who responded 

to our many requests for hearing witnesses, briefings, and documents, as we examined this issue. 

We would also like to thank the U.S. Southern Command, Central Command, Special Operations 

Command, Africa Command, Northern Command, Transportation Command, Strategic Command, 

Joint Forces Command, Joint Task Force-Bravo, Army Training and Doctrine Command, National 

Defense University, National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Joint Forces 

Staff College, Army War College, Naval War College, Air University, Marine Corps University, 

Army Command and General Staff College, United States Naval Academy, United States Military 

Academy, and United States Air Force Academy for hosting our visits. In addition, we would like to 

recognize the Congressional Research Service for their invaluable assistance. We are particularly 

indebted to the men and women in the legislative affairs and legislative liaison offices in all of these 

organizations, whose work with us is greatly appreciated. 

We also need to acknowledge many experts, including those from several nongovernmental 

organizations. We thank the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Heritage Foundation, 

the American Enterprise Institute, the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, the InterUniversity Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, and the Institute for Defense Analyses for their 

support of our hearings. We would also like to thank the government witnesses who participated in 

our efforts. We especially thank the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant 

Commanders, and the Service Chiefs of Staff who met with Subcommittee Members to discuss their 

views on professional military education. 

Our greatest expression of thanks goes to the students and educators, both military and 

civilian professors, who take part in this ongoing effort to develop officers so that they possess the 

knowledge and intellectual agility to confront the challenges that lie ahead. Their efforts are essential 

if our military officers are to be known for both their strategic thinking abilities and the skill with 

which they operate in the national security environment. 

VIC SNYDER ROB WITTMAN 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (the Subcommittee) reviewed the state 

of the officer in-residence professional military education (PME) system to determine what can, and 

should, be done to improve PME amid complex and evolving national security challenges. Military 

officers of every grade are expected to demonstrate intellectual agility, think critically, communicate 

well, conduct themselves with integrity, and lead others to perform strenuous tasks in difficult and 

often dangerous situations. The principal purpose of PME is to educate officers throughout their 

careers in preparation for this unique public trust. The Subcommittee endeavored to: evaluate 

PME’s effectiveness relative to its purpose; assess whether it is sufficiently responsive to military 

needs; and appraise its component schools in their pursuits of well-resourced and qualitativelyrigorous programs. As a result, the Subcommittee identified specific areas for departmental action 

and further congressional oversight to promote continuing improvement of the system. 

In 1987, the year following the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act2 (Goldwater-Nichols), 

the House Armed Services Committee (the Committee) established a panel on PME led by 

Representative Ike Skelton (the Skelton Panel). The Skelton Panel undertook the last 

comprehensive congressional review of PME. The Skelton Panel assessed the PME system’s ability 

to develop officers in both strategy and joint matters and the overall quality of PME, as well as the 

Department of Defense’s (the Department’s) plans to implement the joint PME requirements 

created by Goldwater-Nichols. The Panel published its findings and recommendations in a report, 

dated April 21, 1989 (the Skelton Report). 

This Subcommittee did not attempt to reproduce either the scope or the depth of the 

Skelton Panel’s historic review. Instead, the Subcommittee focused on those developments since 

the Skelton Panel’s review that influence the mission effectiveness of the PME system and used the 

Skelton Report as a baseline. Since the Skelton Report, Congress has passed numerous pieces of 

legislation which affect the PME system both directly and indirectly. Congress has not 

comprehensively studied the accumulated effects on PME of 20 years of legislative changes. This 

report is only able to highlight a few areas that may deserve further examination. The Subcommittee 

finds that PME deserves more constant and frequent congressional oversight. 

The Subcommittee’s examination of PME was conducted mindful of PME’s contributions 

to the wider purposes of officer development. PME is a component of the developmental process 

that includes training, experience, and self-development. The Subcommittee considers PME to be 

critical because it empowers individual improvement through thinking and learning, which 

collectively ensures institutional growth. 

PME encompasses a diversity of subject matter. Each service is responsible for educating 

officers in their core competencies according to service needs. Air Force schools, for example, 

primarily teach air and space warfare. Similarly, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps schools focus on 

land, maritime, and expeditionary warfare, respectively. The Department depends on the services’ 

PME to develop officers with these service-specific proficiencies. 

                                                           

2 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, P.L. 99-433. 

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Goldwater-Nichols recognized that, in addition to service-competent officers, the Armed 

Forces need high-quality officers competent in joint matters. In drafting the Act, Congress 

envisioned the development of this latter group of officers through a combination of joint 

professional military education (JPME) and joint duty assignments. At first, the distinction between, 

and the delivery of, PME and JPME were more clearly defined. Originally, an officer needed to 

complete JPME to become a joint specialist. That JPME was only available at three joint schools 

and only a small group of specialists was believed to be needed. Now, JPME is taught outside the 

original three joint schools and is included within the curricula of the services’ war colleges. Where 

it had been more distinct from service-specific PME in the past, JPME now permeates the services’ 

traditional PME. PME and JPME, together, prepare officers in successive stages throughout their 

careers to engage intellectual challenges appropriate to increases in their ranks and responsibilities. 

However, as an officer advances, he or she must elevate his or her service-specific proficiencies, 

while accumulating increasing amounts of expertise in joint matters. As a result, the proportion of 

JPME in an officer’s professional education increases with seniority. In the past, JPME seemed to be 

more of a bridge from service competency to joint specialty for a select cadre. Today, traditional 

PME curricula would be considered incomplete without the inclusion of joint curricula. 

Consequently, this report uses the term PME to include JPME, unless otherwise specifically noted. 

Like the Skelton Panel, the Subcommittee agrees that the Department’s PME system is still 

basically sound. However, there are areas of PME that need improving. As a means for facilitating 

improvement, the Subcommittee offers two sets of findings and recommendations: those that 

concentrate on systemic issues; and those that are specifically intended for individual schools, and 

their leaders, faculty members, and students. The latter are termed “institutional issues” for the 

purposes of this report. 

The first set of findings and recommendations, system issues, are described in this summary in 

the first four paragraphs below, while those in the second set, institutional issues, are described in the 

final three. In the list of major findings, the first eight are covered in the systems section and the last 

three address institutional issues. 

First, the Subcommittee found that the PME system has been significantly modified over the 

past 20 years both in practice and in legislation, the results of which raise issues with the timing, 

purpose, and effectiveness of not only PME but also JPME. For example, two recent studies have 

indicated that officers are serving in joint and service staff assignments without adequate educational 

preparation. These studies have pointed to specific deficiencies in areas such as critical thinking that 

can and should be addressed throughout an officer’s professional military education. 

With regard to JPME specifically, the Department’s implementation of recent legislative 

changes has weakened the connection between JPME and joint duty assignments. Yet, JPME 

completion is needed to be eligible for appointment to general or flag officer. The combination of 

these changes suggests that JPME completion may be more relevant to ensuring an officer’s 

competitiveness for selection to flag rank than it is to enhancing job performance in the joint arena. 

The Subcommittee questions this approach and believes it warrants further examination. There is a 

tension between the officer’s assignments necessary for career development, the needs of the joint 

force, and professional military education, whether it is at a military institution or a civilian 

institution. 

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Second, the Subcommittee found mixed results with respect to one of the most important 

areas that the Skelton Panel addressed – the cultivating of military strategists. Joint and service 

efforts are relatively disassociated from one another. Although PME is a factor in these efforts, it is 

not the primary means for shaping strategists. The Subcommittee recommends that the Joint Staff 

and each of the services carefully review and coordinate their PME efforts with the goal of 

educating qualified strategic decision-makers (in addition to strategic analysts and advisors) for 

service in positions of senior command authority. As part of that review, the Subcommittee 

recommends that the Joint Staff and services consider, in addition to PME, sponsoring additional 

junior officers for civilian masters’ and doctoral degrees in strategy-related disciplines (e.g., history, 

political science, economics, international relations) at top-tier civilian universities. These officers 

should be provided command and staff assignments as well as positions on PME faculties, as 

appropriate. 

Third, regarding the qualitative content and delivery of PME, the Subcommittee found that 

joint and service-specific PME curricula have evolved and rigor has improved since the Skelton 

Panel made its recommendations. It is a constant challenge for the Joint Staff and the services to 

balance enduring professional educational requirements with emerging operational needs. This 

challenge highlights the system’s ability to adapt. PME curricula have adapted at differing, but 

generally appropriate, levels to new demands for instruction in language and culture; irregular 

warfare; and joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations. Again, in differing 

but adequate measures the PME system retained suitable emphases on the enduring subjects of 

history and strategy. While recognizing that the services have organizations dedicated to looking 

ahead to doctrine that may be needed in the future, the Subcommittee found that many curricular 

developments were appropriately responsive to changing demands, but few, if any, of these 

developments were effected in anticipation of emerging opportunities and challenges. The 

Subcommittee believes that a more balanced approach to curriculum development throughout the 

PME system may succeed in fostering the sort of forward thinking associated with the Naval War 

College in the years preceding World War II, when the staff and students at the Naval War College 

were renowned for their wargaming. They successfully planned for the major Pacific War battles 

except Pearl Harbor and use of kamikaze pilots.3

 

Fourth, the Subcommittee surveyed many of the organizational, human, and material factors 

that contribute to the effective practice of PME. While the separate schools have improved 

considerably due to the Skelton Panel’s recommendations, there are still some areas where greater 

improvement can be made. At the top level, organization matters. The Subcommittee found the 

following: (1) on both the joint and service levels, and even at the various schools, organizational 

structure should be examined for possible improvements that could enhance effectiveness; and (2) 

senior leaders should remain aware of the need to maintain “ownership” of professional military 

education and to support those involved in the PME enterprise. 

As with any educational enterprise, there are also a number of human resource issues 

requiring attention. The Subcommittee found that: (1) more defined criteria for selection and longer 

tour lengths should be considered for the senior leaders of the schools to optimize their ability to 

contribute to the PME mission; (2) faculty can be better supported in a number of ways; (3) the 

                                                           

3 Judith Hicks Stiehm, The U.S. Army War College: Military Education in a Democracy (Temple University Press: Philadelphia, 

PA, 2002), 11. Admiral Chester Nimitz in a speech to students at the Naval War College in 1960. See also Michael 

Vlahos, The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, (The Naval War College Press: Newport, R.I., 

1980). 

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composition of PME institution student bodies (military, interagency, international, and private 

sector) should be constantly reviewed to ensure that their characteristics support the schools’ 

educational missions. The services and Department must improve the selection process by more 

carefully correlating prospective students’ experience, qualifications, and likely subsequent 

assignments with selection to specific schools. Similar planning must be exercised in choosing the 

appropriate follow-on assignments for graduates. Finally, adequate material support is also necessary 

for success. While PME is not poorly resourced, some material challenges are apparent. These 

challenges include needs for reliable funding streams for the joint schools, renewed infrastructure 

for the older schools, and appropriate information and educational technology for many schools. 

MAJOR FINDINGS

• Today’s PME system is basically sound; there are areas, however, that need improvement. 

The system operates within a dynamic national security environment. Consequently, it must 

be more prepared to anticipate and adapt to current and future challenges. 

• PME’s overall conceptual design has changed significantly since 1989, particularly with 

respect to the educational content needed and offered to the most junior officers and at the 

war colleges. There is an increasing need for additional joint and service-specific subject 

matter to be taught earlier in officers’ careers. PME has also broadened with respect to the 

teaching of strategy. Law and policy now require that national security strategy be taught at 

each of the senior PME schools. 

• Competing demands make it difficult to accommodate the need for the requisite PME, 

training, and experience. Officers are finding it increasingly challenging to complete their 

required PME, which is only compounded by current operational requirements. This strain 

has contributed to the services seeking flexibility in managing PME and assignments. 

• With limited exceptions, nothing in law now precludes officers from being assigned to joint 

billets without having received JPME credit. As a result, many officers are assigned to joint 

billets without having completed appropriate joint education. This disconnect between 

JPME and joint duty assignments has become a common practice, disregarding a 

fundamental purpose of JPME, which by law and policy, is preparation for those 

assignments. 

• Some operational commanders, including the Combatant Commanders, reportedly consider 

their staff officers lacking in certain critical abilities necessary to perform their jobs 

effectively.   Significant numbers of officers are serving in staff positions without having 

appropriate levels of PME prior to assignment. Furthermore, many officers reportedly 

consider the PME they receive to be inadequate preparation for these assignments. 

• Joint and service efforts to identify and cultivate strategists are disassociated from one 

another. Although officer in-residence PME is a factor in these efforts, it is not the primary 

means for developing future strategic decision-makers. All of the services should cultivate 

strategists to assume positions of senior command authority 

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• The balancing of enduring PME requirements with emerging needs presents continual 

challenges. The schools’ curricula have adapted at differing, but generally appropriate, paces. 

However, these developments appear to have been in reaction to changing demands rather 

than in anticipation of them. 

• PME institutions have generally implemented the Skelton Panel recommendations on 

improving teaching practices and have adopted more demanding standards. Studentcentered seminar discussion groups are the core means of instruction at the in-residence 

schools. Although PME institutions have adopted a variety of practices with regard to 

grading, these practices do not necessarily detract from the rigor of the academic programs. 

• Coordinated direction of PME is important: (1) leaders at every level (e.g. the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, service, and school) must build and maintain 

a comprehensive awareness of PME matters and facilitate decision-making processes to 

promote PME mission effectiveness; and (2) senior leaders must continually reaffirm their 

support for PME and those involved in the PME enterprise. 

• The Skelton Report focused attention on PME leaders, faculty, and students. People remain 

the most important element of PME. PME leaders, faculty, and students must be carefully 

selected for their responsibilities. The Subcommittee’s findings include: (1) senior leaders’ 

tour lengths do not necessarily recognize the complexity of PME institutions and allow for 

stability in the management of those institutions; (2) PME faculties could be better 

supported in a number of ways; and (3) the services use differing processes for selecting 

their own students and varying approaches for attracting international, interagency, other 

service, and industry students, producing disparate results with respect to the composition 

and the quality of PME student bodies. 

• Adequate material support is also necessary for PME success. While PME is not poorly 

resourced, some material challenges are apparent. These challenges include needs for 

reliable funding for the joint schools, renovation for schools with older infrastructure, and 

appropriate information and educational technology for many schools. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

HASC Oversight & Investigations Members..........................................................iii 

HASC Oversight & Investigations Staff..................................................................v 

Preface.........................................................................................................vii 

Acknowledgements..........................................................................................ix 

Executive Summary.........................................................................................xi 

Table of Contents..........................................................................................xvii 

Introduction....................................................................................................1 

Background.....................................................................................................7 

System Issues.................................................................................................29 

Institutional Issues..........................................................................................95 

Issues for Further Study..................................................................................159 

Conclusion...................................................................................................167 

Appendix A: Glossary of Acronyms.....................................................................169 

Appendix B: Air University Organizational Charts..................................................173 

Appendix C: Amendment on Copyright...............................................................175 

Appendix D: Hearings, Briefings, Travel.............................................................179 

Appendix E: Bibliography.................................................................................193 

Additional Views of Representative Todd R. Platts.................................................217 

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INTRODUCTION

“Professional attainment, based upon prolonged study, and collective study at 

colleges, rank by rank, age by age—those are the title reeds of the commanders 

of future armies, and the secret of future victories.” 1

Winston Churchill, 1946 

 It is Congress’ responsibility, through its authorization of funds and statements of policy, 

along with the leaders of the Department of Defense (the Department), to ensure that military 

personnel who are asked to support the national security of the United States are properly prepared 

and equipped for their missions. 

 A program for development leading to commissioning and continuing through the length of 

a career supports the preparation of military officers who lead the armed forces. For the most 

senior, those with the most responsibility, careers stretch from 20 to 40 years. Officer development 

programs include providing the right officers the right training, experience, and education at the 

right time. The principal purpose of professional military education (PME) is to educate officers 

throughout their careers in preparation for this unique public trust. 

The U.S. Armed Forces generally recognize the value of education separate from training, 

and they place special emphasis on the importance of in-residence officer education. PME 

contributes to an officer being able to take on responsibilities and challenges commensurate with 

increases in rank. The services seek to instill competence in core service functions and specific 

weapon systems in their officer candidates and junior officers. This knowledge is to be broadened to 

the operational level (combined arms and joint campaigns) for majors and lieutenant colonels (Navy 

lieutenant commanders and commanders, O-4s and O-5s). Finally, the military requires policy and 

strategic-level thinking from its colonels and flag officers (O-6 through O-10). Generally, training 

programs are highly utilitarian while the education system, particularly at the senior level, is intended 

to develop habits of mind and modes of analysis. As many military leaders have said, “we train for 

certainty and we educate for uncertainty.” Still, all of the PME courses have elements of both 

training and education. By and large, the more junior the officers, the heavier the component of 

training in the courses they take. The more senior the officers, the heavier the education component 

in their courses. 

The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (the Subcommittee) examination of 

PME was conducted mindful of PME’s contributions to the wider purposes of officer development. 

PME is a component of that developmental process. The Subcommittee considers PME to be 

critical because it empowers individual improvement through thinking and learning, which 

collectively ensures and increases institutional effectiveness. 

1
PME encompasses a diversity of subject matter. Each service is responsible for educating 

officers in their core competencies according to service needs. Air Force schools, for example, 

primarily teach air and space warfare. Similarly, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps schools focus on 

land, maritime, and expeditionary warfare, respectively. The Department depends on the services’ 

PME to develop officers with these service-specific proficiencies. 

As this report will describe, service-specific PME existed before joint education. And joint 

education existed before formal joint PME (JPME), which was established as a result of 

congressional action in the late 1980s. The Subcommittee acknowledges one assumption at the 

outset: Each of the components should maintain service PME institutions that are the centers of 

excellence in their respective warfare domains. In the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 1994 Congress specified that the primary mission of service PME schools is to provide 

expertise in particular warfare specialties, while the primary mission of JPME is to provide expertise 

in the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces and that both PME and JPME programs 

are necessary in the education of military officers.2

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS) policy guidance for officer PME 

acknowledges that officer professional development is a service responsibility. The services are 

responsible for their academies and their primary courses (captains and Navy lieutenants, O-3s), 

intermediate-level education, and senior-level education, as well as component flag officer courses.

The CJCS guidance describes JPME as “embedded” within the PME system and emphasizes that 

the Joint Staff is tasked with overseeing the JPME program. Consequently, the service PME schools 

at the intermediate-level award JPME I and are accredited for the JPME component of their 

curricula through a process known as the Program for the Assessment of Joint Education (PAJE). 

The service schools at the senior-level are subjected to accreditation through PAJE for delivery of 

JPME II. 

Over the years, service and joint PME have become intertwined to some measure, which 

should become evident in the system described in the pages that follow. This is in part due to the 

services embracing joint operations to the point where multi-service cooperation has become the 

norm. Joint doctrine in many cases also serves as service doctrine. This assimilation has even 

extended down to the level of joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. This overlap also gives rise 

to confusion in discussing, and sometimes equating, PME and JPME. 

This report, in its treatment of current issues, necessarily gives significant exposure to those 

issues related to JPME. In no small measure, this is a consequence of adjustments to the JPME 

system being the focus of legislation over the preceding two decades, while PME has seen less 

change. Additionally, it also reflects the growth of content of joint curricula which now 

encompasses subject matter on topics such as cyberwarfare, information operations, and strategic 

communications. The content of this report reflects both of these trends. 

The CJCS is responsible for joint education at the National Defense University including 

JPME I and II (“single-phase”) at National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed 

Forces; JPME II at the two schools under the Joint Forces Staff College – the Joint and Combined 

Warfighting School and the Joint Advanced Warfighting School; and, the Capstone course for flag 

officers (now JPME III).3

 Although the Capstone course and service pre-commissioning and 

primary PME courses are charged by the CJCS with delivering joint education, those programs 

currently do not receive accreditation through the PAJE process. 

2
PURPOSE

Professional military education is the backbone in the development of the nation’s armed 

forces, and the quality of that military education distinguishes U.S. forces around the world. The 

House Armed Services Committee (the Committee) remains committed to ensuring that the quality 

and availability of PME programs remain a priority for the services and the Department, even during 

times of high operational tempo when they may be tempted to shortchange investment in 

educational opportunities to provide manpower and resources to other efforts. 

As part of its oversight responsibilities, the Subcommittee engaged in a review of the rigor 

and relevance of the curricula being offered at all levels of in-residence officer PME. We also 

sought to comprehend how well the PME system and institutions have adjusted to realities 

associated with 21st century geopolitical and technological change in four key areas of the curricula: 

joint and interagency integration; language skills and cultural awareness; irregular warfare and 

stability operations; and history. At the same time, the Subcommittee examined the context for the 

PME system. In other words, this report describes what PME contributes to the larger system of 

officer development and how the personnel system intersects with the PME system. Finally, we 

reviewed the organization of the system and institutions as well as the human and material resources 

dedicated to them. 

The findings and recommendations of the 1988 House Armed Services Committee Panel on 

Professional Military Education (the Skelton Panel, named for Representative Ike Skelton) were this 

project’s starting point.4

 The Skelton Panel made specific recommendations on how the GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) “joint” reforms 

should be institutionalized among the services through officer in-residence education. This 

Subcommittee did not attempt to reproduce either the scope or the depth of the Skelton Panel’s 

historic review. Instead, the Subcommittee focused on those developments since the Skelton 

Panel’s review that influence the mission effectiveness of the PME system. Since the Skelton 

Report, Congress has passed numerous pieces of legislation that affect the PME system both directly 

and indirectly. The Subcommittee wanted to understand the extent to which the recommendations 

and legislative provisions of past Congresses have been implemented. 

Despite those numerous pieces of legislation, Congress has not comprehensively studied the 

accumulated effects on PME of 20 years of legislative changes, and this report is only able to 

highlight a limited number of areas that may deserve further examination. This Subcommittee has 

identified specific areas for departmental action and further congressional oversight to promote 

continuing improvement of the system. This report discusses a number of issues in significant detail 

as part of Congress’ oversight responsibility. However, the Subcommittee does not think it 

appropriate to legislate on most of these matters. Readers will find few legislative proposals among 

our recommendations. The Subcommittee recommends, at the very least, that PME is important 

enough to warrant more constant and frequent congressional oversight. 

3
SCOPE

Although this study may spark interest in a top-to-bottom review of military training and 

education, it was beyond the Subcommittee’s intent to address the ways in which military education 

institutions and training venues teach all of the competencies officers need to do their jobs 

effectively. For instance, this report does not delve deeply into all of the aspects of the service 

academies or occupational specialty schools. The extensive training systems of the services, 

combatant commands, and the Department are also beyond the scope of this project. In addition, 

military education in and for the Coast Guard and Merchant Marine, Reserve Officer Training 

Corps programs, Officer Candidate or Training Schools, the regional centers such as the Marshall 

Center, non-resident programs, enlisted PME, and comparisons to foreign PME systems are beyond 

the scope of this study. There are also many ways in which military members (officers and enlisted) 

and civilians seek professionalization from technical and operational training (individual and unit) 

and education that this study does not address. Also beyond the scope of this study are the 

Department’s very important civilian professional education and development programs and 

programs for the military’s reserve component, except as they bear on this report’s larger focus on 

officer in-residence PME. Finally, this report touches on interagency students and faculty 

participation in and contributions to PME. However, the report does not discuss the larger issue of 

interagency professional education such as proposals for a national security university or the 

National Security Professional Development program. Although important, these are separate and 

distinct from PME. 

 While just addressing the schools that constitute the bulk of officer in-residence PME would 

be challenging enough, the Subcommittee realized that one could not look at the schools in a 

vacuum. The study would also have to review the Department, Joint Staff, and service systems for 

the administration and direction of both PME and JPME. Beyond this context, the Subcommittee 

sought to explore the larger purpose the PME system serves. In other words, the Subcommittee 

examined the legal and policy contexts of officer development within which the PME system exists. 

The Subcommittee had to look to some degree at where and how officers come to PME and to 

which assignments they go after they complete each program. Do the joint and service officer 

management and personnel systems capitalize on the investment the nation makes in these officers’ 

education? The one certainty in this construct, as the Subcommittee discovered and this report 

explains, is the tension between service and joint education and assignment requirements. 

 As much as the Subcommittee would like to have addressed each of the myriad complexities 

surrounding the PME and the joint and service officer management and personnel systems, many 

questions remain. In some cases, people interviewed and those who testified found remarkable 

agreement on how to resolve challenges. In other cases, there was no consensus. The 

Subcommittee introduces some of them without analysis or judgment in a separate section at the 

end of this report under “Issues for Further Study.”5

4
5

APPROACH

This report is divided into five sections of varying length. The first gives the background or 

context within which the PME institutions operate, including a brief history, estimates of the current 

and future security environment, and the Department’s, CJCS’, and the services’ PME policies. The 

next two are the longest sections, which discuss the practical issues the Subcommittee focused on as 

well as observations, findings, and recommendations. Like the Skelton Panel, the Subcommittee 

agrees that the Department’s PME system is still basically sound. However, there are areas that 

need improvement. As a means for facilitating improvement, the Subcommittee offers two sets of 

findings and recommendations: first, those that concentrate on systemic issues and, second, 

institutional issues or those related to organization and those specifically intended for individual 

schools, and their leaders, faculty, staff, and students. In this section, leadership and faculty are dealt 

with at some length. Like the Skelton Panel, this Subcommittee finds that leaders and instructors 

are the bedrock of the PME system. The fourth section briefly identifies a number of challenging 

areas of study that remain as well as some individuals whose broader proposals arose in the course 

of testimony, interviews, current debates, and recent writings. These bear further and more in-depth 

consideration than could be provided at this time. Finally, a short conclusion provides a nascent 

vision of the essential attributes of future officers. Professional military education must contribute 

to developing those attributes. 

                                                           

1 Churchill as cited in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Panel on 

Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989, No. 4., (The Skelton Report), 12. 2 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, P.L. 103-160, Sec. 921, 30 November 1993. 3 This list does not include other joint courses for enlisted members or those for even more senior flag officers, nor does 

it include other service non-resident officer courses. 

4 The Skelton Report. 5 The Subcommittee’s study was not the only one addressing PME to be commissioned in 2009. Last year, the Secretary 

of Defense asked the Defense Science Board to review PME. That effort has not yet begun. (Defense Science Board 

PME Study Terms of Reference, 16 January 2009). Two broader, but related, outside studies addressed joint officer 

management policy and the competencies required for the future officer corps. Both the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies (CSIS) and Center for a New American Security (CNAS) studies were funded by the SmithRichardson Foundation established in 1935 to support a wide range of projects that inform important public policy 

debates http://www.srf.org/. These were led by Dr. Maren Leed and Dr. John Nagl, respectively. HASC O&I Meeting, 

CSIS, 13 May 2009. CSIS released The Ingenuity Gap: Officer Management for the 21st Century in January 2010. The CNAS 

released Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps in February 2010. 
6

                                                                                                                                                                                               
BACKGROUND

“...it falls to Congress to ensure our military strength is adequate to defend the 

nation and national interests. Indeed, there is no more important duty for 

Congress than to provide for the common defense.”1

 

 Representative Ike Skelton 

Whispers of Warriors, 2004 

 This section of the report starts with a brief history of professional military education (PME) 

in the United States before the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 

1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) and the immediate effects of that law and the resulting House Armed 

Services Committee Panel on Professional Military Education (the Skelton Panel). It then outlines 

the current and projected security environment, as well as this study’s context – joint and service 

PME and personnel policy. 

PME BEFORE THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT2

The United States, like most other nations, has reformed its professional military schools 

after conflicts inevitably revealed shortcomings in the performance of its armed forces. Lessons 

learned in wars generally have been preserved, refined, and inculcated throughout the services in an 

academic environment. The modern PME system had its beginnings in the early 19th century when 

major European states realized that they needed better educated militaries for large-scale, 

ideologically-motivated, industrialized wars. Officers had to study the essential dynamics of the art 

and science of war more formally. European pre-commissioning schools came first, and the United 

States joined this movement by establishing the United States Military Academy in 1802 and the 

United States Naval Academy in 1845. Although there was an almost universal belief that war is an 

intensely human endeavor and is bound up in social, cultural, economic, and political interactions, 

these academies were focused heavily on technical and engineering courses.3

 Post-graduate officers’ 

courses started to be developed, modeled on the Prussian example, in this country after the Civil 

War. 

By the beginning of the 20th century the basic PME framework had been established. The 

intermediate study of the art of war was conducted at the Army’s Command and General Staff 

College (CGSC), evolving after 1881 from the Infantry and Cavalry School, and after 1884 at the 

Naval War College. Senior sea-service officers also studied at the Naval War College, while the 

Army established its war college in 1901 after the Spanish-American War. 

7
The most extensive changes to PME in the United States occurred in and following World 

War II. Serious consideration was given to including more joint education for officers and 

synchronizing it with service PME. In 1943 the Army-Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) was 

established to provide a four-month course for select officers assigned to unified command and staff 

duties. In January 1946, the War Department commissioned a major study of officer education 

under the direction of Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow, Commandant of the CGSC. The 

February 1946 report of the “Gerow Board” recommended five joint colleges that would collectively 

form the “National Security University” located in Washington under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) already existed (established in 1924) to educate 

officers from all services in mobilization, supply, and industrial support. The Board proposed 

adding a national war college; a joint administrative (personnel and manpower) college; a joint 

intelligence college (today, the National Defense Intelligence College); and a Department of State 

college (today’s Foreign Service Institute conducts short training courses but does not grant 

degrees). Some of the Gerow proposals were rejected because of resource limits. However, ICAF 

remained open and the Army War College which had suspended operations during World War II, 

reopened and moved to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. National War College (National) was 

established and took up residence in the former Army War College facilities in Roosevelt Hall on 

Fort Leslie J. McNair in southwest Washington, D.C. The Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC), 

which evolved from ANSCOL, moved to Norfolk, Virginia, in 1946 to provide joint operational 

instruction to mid-grade officers. The Navy retained its highly-regarded college in Newport, Rhode 

Island,4

 and the newly-established Air Force (1947) grew its war college from the former Army Air 

Corps Tactical School in Montgomery, Alabama. After the Vietnam War, the National Defense 

University (NDU) was established to consolidate management of the three joint schools (ICAF, 

National, and AFSC). 

 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt (front center) at

the Naval War College, c. 1897.

8
THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

“Unity of Command and effort has been a cardinal principle of successful 

military organizations throughout history. Coaxing that coordinated effort out 

of the separate armed services with different cultures and command structures 

always has been a challenge for U.S. [government and] military leaders.” 5

Richard Cheney and Bill Taylor 

Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress 

Attempts to coordinate service efforts are not new. In recent times, the most significant of 

these has been the Goldwater-Nichols Act.6 At that time, the Armed Services Committee (the 

Committee) broke the standard pattern of major military reforms being initiated by the White 

House. The Committee held hearings on flawed operations in the early 1980s including the attempt 

to rescue Americans held hostage in Iran and the invasion of Grenada. Goldwater-Nichols 

established clearer lines of command and control and improved the ability of the services to work 

with each other in truly joint, rather than simply multi-service, operations. It reduced the influence 

of the Service Chiefs operationally, even as they retained the responsibility to organize, train, and 

equip their forces. At the same time, Goldwater-Nichols increased the power of the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs). In order to 

strengthen interoperability and a commitment to joint operations, Congress mandated that positions 

on joint staffs and in joint commands would generally be filled by qualified joint specialty officers 

(JSOs) or those officers who were on track to become JSOs. JSOs had to complete a two-phased 

Program for Joint Education consisting of joint PME I (JPME I) and JPME II. To improve the 

quality of officers assigned to joint duty, once considered a career dead end, Congress also made 

joint duty a prerequisite for advancement to flag (general or admiral) rank. 

Goldwater-Nichols recognized that, in addition to service-competent officers, the Armed 

Forces need high-quality officers competent in joint matters. In drafting the Act, Congress 

envisioned the development of this latter group of officers through a combination of JPME and 

joint assignments. At first, the distinction between, and the delivery of, PME and JPME were more 

clearly defined. Originally, an officer needed to complete JPME to become a joint specialist. JPME 

was available only at three joint schools, and only a small group of specialists was believed to be 

needed. Now, JPME is taught outside the original three joint schools and is included within the 

curricula of the services’ command and staff and war colleges. Where it had been more distinct 

from service PME in the past, JPME is now integrated into the services’ PME. PME and JPME, 

together, prepare officers in successive stages, throughout their careers, to engage intellectual 

challenges appropriate to increases in their ranks and responsibilities. However, as an officer 

advances, he or she must elevate his or her service-specific proficiencies, while accumulating 

increasing amounts of expertise in joint matters. As a result, the proportion of JPME in an officer’s 

education increases with seniority. In the past, JPME seemed to be more of a bridge from service 

competency to a joint specialty in a select cadre. Today, service PME curricula would be considered 

incomplete without the inclusion of joint curricula. Consequently, this report uses the term PME to 

include JPME, unless otherwise noted. 

9
THE SKELTON PANEL – RECOMMENDATIONS AND STATUS

The Skelton Panel was formed in the wake of Goldwater-Nichols, and it undertook a 

comprehensive review of PME. Its charter, signed by then Committee Chairman Les Aspin, called 

on the Panel to review joint education requirements under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and 

assess the military’s ability to develop military strategists, joint warfighters, and tacticians.7 The 

Skelton Panel conducted an exhaustive review of the joint and service PME schools as well as 

several foreign military education institutions. The Panel’s primary purpose was to review DOD 

plans for implementing Goldwater-Nichols JPME requirements, because a change was required in 

the service-centric mindset of military officers, and the Committee understood that a key way to 

change attitudes was through education. 

The Panel’s findings appeared in the 1989 Report of the Panel on Military Education of the 100th

Congress of the Committee on Armed Services (the Skelton Report) and fell into two broad categories: the 

first established a conceptual model in which each level of education built on previous levels and 

each college or institution had a clear, fundamental teaching focus. The other urged restoring two 

joint colleges – National at the senior level and the Armed Forces Staff College, now the Joint 

Forces Staff College (JFSC), at the intermediate level – as centers of excellence and to the 

prominence they enjoyed in the early post-World War II period.8

 While recognizing that the 

successful officer first had to be an expert on his or her service’s capabilities, the Panel envisioned 

the introduction of new joint concepts at the intermediate level (staff college) and the expansion on 

these concepts at the senior level (war college).9 

The Skelton Panel recommended a two-phased joint education process that would be a 

subset of existing service PME. The intermediate service schools still had the primary function of 

educating officers in their respective warfare specialties, but they were also given a role in promoting 

joint education. The Skelton Panel saw a joint officer as having, “a thorough knowledge of his or 

her own service, some knowledge of the other services, experience operating with the other services, 

and the perspective to see the ‘joint picture.’”10 The Skelton Panel suggested that this was best 

accomplished at long, in-residence schools.11 JPME I required familiarity with each service’s 

doctrine, organizational concepts, and command and control.12 In addition, students would be 

introduced to joint planning processes, joint systems, and the role played by service component 

commands in the unified command structure. For JPME I, the Skelton Panel recommended that 

the mix of students should be two officers per each seminar from each of the other two services. 

For faculty, the mix was 70 percent host and 15 percent each from the other services (instead CJCS 

policy established the mix for students as one non-host officer per service per seminar and for 

faculty as 90:5:5).13

 The second phase of joint PME (JPME II) was to be delivered at the AFSC and would be an 

in-depth course of study in the integrated deployment and employment of multi-service forces. This 

course was to build on JPME I, be delivered when an officer was en route to a joint assignment, and 

classes would be only in-residence, multi-service, and on neutral ground in order to achieve joint 

acculturation or “socialization.”14 It would remain a 12-week course (more recently it was reduced 

to 10 weeks to increase “throughput”). CJCS policy empowered the two joint senior-level schools 

(National and ICAF) to deliver both the first and second phases of joint education in one 10-month 

period, along with their educational mission on operational art and strategy (and ICAF’s mission of 

education on mobilization and resources).15 

10
The services each retained their own senior school. Starting in 1989, these schools also 

awarded JPME I. They focused primarily on elements of joint warfare including component 

capabilities, operational art, and national military strategy. In response to service and DOD requests 

to increase throughput, Congress gave the Department the flexibility to award JPME I via 

intermediate-level distance education and to deliver JPME II at the service senior-level schools.16 

The latter are required to maintain at least a minimal mix of other service students and faculty 

(originally recommended by the Skelton Panel to be 50:25:25, but established by CJCS policy as no 

more than 60% host service).17 In addition, the principle of “neutral ground” was abandoned, and 

the legal and policy mechanisms for assigning officers to JPME and joint assignments came to be 

perceived more as a path to promotion than as a requirement for conducting effective operations as 

a joint force. 

Although PME is intended to serve a number of purposes, the study of strategy is critical to 

any discussion of officer education. The Skelton Panel was focused on developing strategists. 

Representative Ike Skelton has written that strategists are developed over a career and a lifetime, 

rather than only at senior-level PME. He cited General John R. Galvin as having written in 1989, 

“We need senior generals and admirals who can provide solid military advice to our political 

leadership...and we need young officers who can provide solid military advice, options, details, the 

results of analysis to the generals and admirals.” Representative Skelton has also long believed that 

the study of history, particularly military history, is the key to developing leaders and strategists. He 

echoed others in writing, “It is a process of education, study, reading, and thinking that should 

continue throughout an entire military career. Yes, tactical proficiency is very important, but so too 

is strategic vision. That can only come after years of careful reading, study, reflection, and 

experience.”18

Overall, the Skelton Panel made recommendations to the Department in nine areas: 

• Establish a framework that specifies primary educational objectives at each level of 

PME – tactical level for pre-commissioning and primary (grades O-1–O-3), 

operational level for intermediate (O-4), and strategic level for senior (O-5–O-6) and 

flag officer levels (O-7–O-9). 

• Establish a two-phase JPME program with JPME I at service colleges (intermediate 

and senior) and Phase II at AFSC. 

• Focus senior service colleges on national military strategy and increase the otherservice (non-host) faculty and student percentages at these schools (to 50:25:25). 

Focus National on national security strategy. 

• Require intermediate and senior colleges to employ frequent graded essay exams and 

student reports. 

• Determine whether the Navy should create more distinct curricula for its 

intermediate and senior schools. 

• Convert National to a National Center for Strategic Studies and elevate the College 

to a level above the service colleges and ICAF (this was not implemented, but 

portions of the plan have become components of the current NDU). 

• Require the then-optional joint, strategic-level Capstone course for promotion to flag 

officer. 

• Improve civilian and military faculty quality. 

• Establish a Director of Military Education on the Joint Staff. 

11
The Joint Staff implemented a number of the Panel’s recommendations and published the thentitled Program for Joint Education, now the Officer PME Policy (OPMEP).19 This CJCS policy, 

which is continually revised, does several things: 

• Lays out a general educational philosophy. 

• Defines and describes the PME continuum (levels of education or the Skelton 

“framework”). 

• Specifies the learning objectives for each level of PME. 

• Establishes broad educational standards for all PME institutions. 

• Establishes specific standards for military faculty and student body mixes, studentto-faculty ratios, and military faculty quality. 

• Establishes a regular and rigorous accreditation process (the Program for the 

Assessment of Joint Education) for ensuring intermediate- and senior-level PME 

schools are meeting OPMEP requirements. 

• Establishes the Director JCS/DJ-7 as the Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for 

Military Education (dual-hatted). 

According to the Program for Joint Education, 10-month service intermediate- and seniorlevel education awarded JPME I credit. The then 12-week Armed Forces Staff College (now the 10-

week Joint and Combined Warfare School course at Joint Forces Staff College) awarded JPME II 

credit. The two senior joint schools (ICAF and National) awarded both JPME I and II credit in 

“single-phase PJE.” Now, almost all of these schools are also accredited to award master’s degrees 

to, at least, U.S. students. Since the 1989 Skelton Panel, the PME system has continued to expand 

and has become more complex with new institutions and schools. In particular, NDU and Air 

University have added levels of management, levels of education, and additional education and 

training programs. Marine Corps University (MCU) has also grown much larger. The CJCS also 

mandated an increasing emphasis on non-resident programs and created a JPME II-like course for 

reserve component officers (Advanced Joint Professional Military Education).20 

In 2005, the Department sought, and the Congress granted, authority for the service senior 

colleges to award JPME II credit. The Department’s rationale was that the services needed more 

“JPME II complete” officers to create a larger quality pool from which to select general and flag 

officers, particularly for senior joint duty. In other words, the Department sought to increase 

throughput. One other change is particularly relevant to this study. Under the direction of the 

CJCS General Richard Myers, JFSC recently rearranged its school structure. As a result, JFSC now 

has two schools that award JPME II credit: the 10-week Joint and Combined Warfare School 

established in 2005; and the 10-month senior-level Joint Advanced Warfighting School established 

in 2004, which offers credit for both JPME I and II and a master’s degree.21 

The Skelton Panel’s recommendations, which have largely been acted upon,22 were made 

shortly before the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and more than a decade before the 

events of September 11, 2001. Today the military is half the size it was in 1989. The military has 

fought in two wars for nine years. Arguably, it costs more to achieve less and the joint environment 

has changed. Acknowledging the variety of national security challenges that have emerged in the 

intervening years since the Skelton Panel, the Subcommittee examined the officer in-residence PME 

system in light of the demands posed by a dynamic security environment, and to evaluate whether 

the system is educating agile and adaptable leaders and thinkers who can meet these demands. 

12
THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

“There is, first of all, a compelling need to develop new ways of creating 

military advantage in the face of current geopolitical and technological trends. 

...In recent years, whether it be 9/11, Afghanistan or Iraq, we have found 

ourselves reacting to emerging challenges rather than anticipating them. 

Ignoring growing challenges to our security will not make those challenges go 

away. Sooner or later, they will have to be confronted.” 23

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich 

 PME exists to prepare officers to perform effectively within a changing security 

environment. While certain elements of PME will remain timeless, others must continuously adapt 

to evolving strategic conditions. In recent years, the security environment has been characterized in 

government documents as one of increasing complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. It is fraught 

with foreseeable and wide-ranging strategic challenges, yet it presents unprecedented strategic 

opportunities.24 Strategic challenges include threats posed by: “violent extremist movements, the 

spread of weapons of mass destruction, rising powers with sophisticated weapons, failed or failing 

states, and increasing encroachment across the global commons (air, sea, space, cyberspace).”25 

Strategic opportunities may include international capacity and partnership building, cooperative 

management of the global commons, concerted nonproliferation efforts, and equitable resource 

management. All facets of the emerging security environment will place demands on military 

officers that will need to be addressed through professional education, training, and development. 

The Skelton Panel cited combat effectiveness as the principal reason for PME. It noted: 

“The panel believes that the major subject of professional military education should be the 

employment of combat forces, the conduct of war. Other subjects such as leadership, management, 

and executive fitness are useful, but should be secondary.”26 Arguably, the task of producing 

military effectiveness within the officer corps has expanded and become more demanding since the 

Skelton Report was published. Because the security environment has evolved considerably since 

1989 and promises to continue evolving at increasingly accelerated rates,27 future strategic 

opportunities may need to be realized through the performance of roles outside of the military’s 

traditional conduct of combat and combat-related operations. In fact, the Department now stresses 

that officers “must be strategically minded, critical thinkers, and skilled joint warfighters,” wherein “the term 

‘warfighter’ is not limited to officers serving in the combat arms.”28 Rather, the term denotes any 

individual who possesses “‘capabilities specific to joint operations’ whether in the conduct of war or 

operations other than war.”29 Military leaders need to possess the intellectual capacities, the mental 

agility, and the military expertise to operate with diverse partners across a broad range of operations, 

including those reflective of conventional, irregular, and hybrid warfare, within a continuum 

embracing pre- and post-conflict considerations.30

13
CAPSTONE CONCEPT FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

As a consequence of the demand for the military to perform diverse functions with agility, 

adaptation to challenges within the evolving security environment has become an enabling principle 

for educating the men and women who are part of the future joint force. In recent years, the CJCS 

has provided broad guidance on force development and experimentation that responds to the 

perceived spectrum of security challenges through the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). 

According to the most recent CCJO: 

The foreseeable future promises to be an era of persistent conflict – a period of 

protracted confrontation among states, nonstate entities, and individual actors 

increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political ends. The future is 

unlikely to unfold as steady state peace punctuated by distinct surges of intense 

conflict. Rather, the major initiatives of U.S. foreign policy – major war, strategic 

deterrence, foreign humanitarian assistance, security cooperation, and so on – are all 

likely to unfold against a global backdrop of chronic conflict. Such protracted 

struggles will not lend themselves to decisive military victory, but often at best will be 

amenable to being managed continuously over time. Many of these conflicts may cut 

across national, regional, cultural, and combatant command boundaries, complicating 

the responses to them.31 

The CCJO not only cautions that the future security environment will require perpetual conflict 

management among countless pressures, such as religious and ethnic passions, dysfunctional 

borders, societal collapses, corruption, and natural resource scarcity; it further warns that the threats 

within the changing security environment are likely to continue growing more pervasive, more 

diverse, and increasingly dangerous.   

At the same time, the means of waging conflict are becoming more lethal, 

ubiquitous, and easy to employ. Advanced weaponry, once the monopoly of 

industrialized states – including anti-access and area-denial capabilities – increasingly 

is becoming available to both less-developed states and nonstate [actors]. The 

potential proliferation among a growing roster of states and nonstate actors of 

weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, is particularly dangerous, 

and could significantly complicate any future U.S. use of military force.32

The CCJO further asserts that an effective force posture, sufficiently responsive to the challenges 

posed by the security environment, will require a preparedness to regularly execute military activities 

well beyond the conduct of war by test of combat alone.33

The CCJO advises that the reality of the complex security environment will require generalpurpose forces to perform distinct military tasks apart from, and in addition to, their primary 

combat roles. Defeating armed enemies, whether regular or irregular, in combat only represents the 

first of the CCJO’s four categories of joint military activity. The joint force will also be required to 

conduct security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction efforts.34 Security activities, unlike 

combat, “seek ultimately to reassure rather than compel.”35 Engagement activities provide 

cooperative security, but they may have entirely diplomatic or economic contexts of widely varying 

scope and duration and are subject and sensitive to national and international law, regulation, and 

standards of comity.36 Relief and reconstruction activities responsive to events such as combat, civil 

disorder, or natural disaster are military activities akin to, but distinguishable from, stabilization and 

reconstruction operations, which are coordinated operations led by the State Department.37 

14
 According to the CCJO, these four types of military activity encompass “virtually every 

mission the joint force will be called upon to accomplish” in the security environment.38 Particulars 

will vary with context, but the CCJO summarizes its discussion of these military activities by stating: 

Combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction must all be 

competencies of the joint force. While some special-purpose forces will specialize in 

particular aspects of one or more, general-purpose forces must be able to operate in 

all four types of activity in one way or another. Currently, U.S. joint forces possess 

codified doctrine for the conduct of combat, but doctrine and capabilities with 

respect to the other activities are less robust. That imbalance must change.39

These signals of a doctrinal movement to embrace new, expanded, and rapidly interchangeable roles 

for general-purpose military forces clearly endorse a broader association of the term “joint” than the 

Skelton Panel contemplated more than 20 years ago. 

Informed by Goldwater-Nichols, the Skelton Report considered joint activities to comprise 

coordination among the services and integration of their capabilities. However, as described in the 

CCJO, each of the combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction activities rely heavily 

on close cooperation and coordination with those of international organizations, coalitions, foreign 

governments, federal agencies, and state and local authorities.40 These activities support significant 

military contributions to joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) operations.

 An additional implication for joint force development encapsulated in the CCJO is the need 

for the joint force to “markedly increase language and cultural capabilities and capacities.”41

The idea of understanding each operational situation in its unique political and 

strategic context will require a higher level of cultural attunement than joint forces 

currently possess. Similarly, increased emphasis on security, engagement, and relief 

and reconstruction activities implies even more extensive contact and interaction 

with indigenous agencies and populations than does combat.42

The task of realizing this idea and its associated role requirements is, and will continue to be, heavily 

reliant on the educational aspect of officer development.

THE JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

 The CCJO describes The Joint Operating Environment (JOE), periodically issued by U.S. Joint 

Forces Command (JFCOM) as a companion to the CCJO, which offers detailed observations with 

respect to the shifting security environment.43 The JOE divides its perspective into three areas of 

analysis: influential security-related trends, the contextual bases for potential conflict that are 

supported by these trends, and the implications for the joint force over the next 25 years.44 Like the 

CCJO, the JOE describes challenges that joint forces will potentially face in the future, but many of 

the conditions it describes exist now. The most recent National Defense Strategy concedes: “An 

underlying assumption in our understanding of the strategic environment is that the predominant 

near-term challenges to the United States will come from state and non-state actors using irregular 

and catastrophic capabilities.”45 The JOE considers geopolitical trends in demographics, 

globalization, comparative economics, energy supply and demand, food production and distribution, 

water scarcity, climate change and natural disasters, pandemics, cyber connectivity, and the utility of 

15
space.46 It relates these trends to their potential contexts for conflict, including: competition and 

cooperation among conventional powers (i.e., nation states); challenges and threats to the United 

States from near-peer competitors (i.e., Russia and China) and regional influences (e.g., NATO, Iran, 

India, Pakistan); weak and failing states; threats of unconventional power (e.g., non-state and transnational actors); radical ideologies; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; technological 

advances; rampant urbanization; and, opposing narratives (i.e., strategic communications).47 Finally, 

the JOE discusses the implications of these trends and their possible contextual effects on preparing 

for war, conducting war and other military operations (e.g., activities supporting intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance; or deterrence), and, aptly, the opportunities for future growth 

offered through PME.48 

Both the CCJO and the JOE recognize PME as a fundamental mechanism for cultivating 

future military effectiveness. General James Mattis, the current JFCOM commander, stated: “We 

need an educated, adaptable officer corps, not married to any single preclusive view of war.”49 He 

also noted that: “we will have to educate better and reward learning in our officer corps, so our 

leaders can adapt more swiftly than our enemies.”50 This priority is echoed in the JOE, which 

identifies PME as “the critical key to the future.”51 It suggests that: “All military leaders must be 

equipped with the confidence to decide and act in ambiguous situations and under conditions where 

clear direction from above may be lacking or overcome by changing conditions.”52 The CCJO 

reinforces the call for officers (from the lowest echelons to the highest) with the same attributes, 

adding, “The Services must recruit, develop, and reward leaders who acquire and demonstrate these 

skills. Leader development, professional military education in particular, must specifically provide 

training and education that facilitates flexible and creative problem solving.”53 As to the educational 

requirement, the JOE further asserts: “This is the fundamental challenge the U.S. military will 

confront: providing the education so that future leaders can understand the political, strategic, 

historical, and cultural framework for a more complex world, as well as possess a thorough 

grounding in the nature of war, past, present, and future.”54

PME AND OFFICER DEVELOPMENT POLICY

“Service Leader competencies will vary by Service but they are developed in a 

joint context and are the foundation for joint officer development.” 55

The CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development 

PME is a fundamental component of an officer’s development as a leader and to the 

development of the armed forces overall. PME’s principal purpose is to educate and prepare 

military leaders, throughout their careers, for the rigorous intellectual demands of employing military 

forces or other instruments of national power in a complex and uncertain security environment. 

Military officers at every grade must lead others to perform strenuous tasks in difficult and often 

dangerous situations. To meet that challenge, the Department and the services created officer 

development systems, with PME at their core, that endeavor to produce skilled warfighters, who are 

“strategically minded, critical thinkers.”56 The officer corps must possess the needed competencies 

specific to the services’ primary warfare domains (i.e., the air, land, sea, and space aspects of 

warfare). The Department and the services must also produce sufficient numbers of officers who 

can contribute to joint, international, intergovernmental, and multinational operations. 

16
The CJCS and the Service Chiefs have overlapping and complementary responsibilities and 

authorities with respect to the PME system and officer development. The services bear the legal 

responsibility of organizing, training, and equipping their respective forces.57 At the same time, the 

CJCS serves as the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense on JPME matters and is 

responsible for “formulating policies for the joint training of the armed forces” and for “formulating 

policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the Armed Forces.”58 

Moreover, the CJCS promulgated a “Vision for Joint Officer Development” (the CJCS Vision for 

JOD), in which PME is a central pillar of the “joint learning continuum,” which includes: education, 

training, experience, and self-development.59 The CJCS Vision for JOD is to produce “the largest 

possible body of fully qualified and inherently joint officers suitable for joint command and staff 

responsibilities.”60 Ultimately, however, the services control officer management. Each has its own 

needs for highly qualified officers to serve as commanders within that service and on service-specific 

headquarters staffs. The services exercise this authority, because they “recruit, commission, educate, 

and train junior officers in various occupational specialties, and assign, promote, and manage their 

development from junior to senior officers.”61 The CJCS does not possess the same authority, and, 

therefore, the CJCS relies on the services to educate officers as joint officers as well as capable 

service officers.62 The CJCS Vision for the JOD acknowledges this relationship and establishes, as a 

key principle, that “joint officers are built on Service officers.”63 

While each service is different, their officer development models largely parallel the CJCS 

model. The services recognize the value of an education that is distinct from, but complementary 

to, training, and they place special emphases on the importance of PME. Self-development, 

experience, and mentorship typically comprise the other key components of the services’ learning 

continua for professional development.64 

The services are responsible for developing officers “with expertise and knowledge 

appropriate to their grade, branch, and occupational specialty”65 who can demonstrate the 

competencies “to meet their own Service-specific roles, missions, and capabilities.”66 The services 

develop competencies in company-grade and junior officers in core service functions, specific 

weapons systems, and tactical doctrine. This knowledge is subsequently broadened in field and midgrade officers to support functions at the operational level (e.g., combined arms and joint campaigns 

for Army majors and lieutenant colonels and battle group or task force operations for Navy 

lieutenant commanders and commanders). Finally, the military educates to foster capable strategiclevel thinking among its senior officers (lieutenant colonels and colonels, Navy commanders and 

captains, and flag officers). As the services train and educate their officers in service-specific 

competencies, their PME also includes instruction in joint matters set by the CJCS in the OPMEP. 

As officers advance in seniority, the emphasis on joint matters within PME progressively expands 

from providing basic knowledge of the roles and mission of other services and the military 

command structures, for example, to graduate education that incorporates more sophisticated 

analysis of the formulation and evaluation of national security strategy and the development of 

strategic leadership skills.67 

Although they differ from one another, each service has a process for ensuring officers’ 

performance effectiveness and tying PME content to their leadership development programs. The 

commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) oversees the Army’s 

efforts and uses a “Common Core” process to ensure that PME supports the goals set for officers 

in the Army Leader Development Strategy.

68 TRADOC also serves as the Army’s executive agent for its 

“Human Capital Enterprise,” which makes it responsible for leader development and allows it to 

17
“influence, establish, and change policies that directly affect [Army] leader development and 

professional military education objectives.”69 The Vice Chief of Naval Operations heads the Navy’s 

Advanced Education Review Board, which is tasked with ensuring that the Navy’s education 

strategy is properly resourced and that education policy is integrated across the Navy.70 The 

President of MCU serves as the Marine Corps’ central PME proponent and uses a Curriculum 

Review Board to “manage and link leader development content at each level of PME.”71 The Joint 

Staff has identified the Marines’ Curriculum Review Board process as a “best practice” model for 

other PME institutions to emulate.72 In the Air Force, the Officer Force Development Panel, the 

members of which are “seven three-star general officers, a senior statesman, and several advisors,” 

reviews educational policies and is “focused on how to deliberately develop officers for deep and 

broad leadership roles, especially those in the joint environment.”73 The Officer Force 

Development Panel reports to the Force Management and Development Council, headed by the Air 

Force’s Vice Chief of Staff. 

In addition to providing oversight for PME in the officer development context, the services 

coordinate their PME and JPME efforts with the CJCS by several means, including the periodic 

reviews and revisions of PME curricula that are required by law.74 The OPMEP establishes 

feedback and updating mechanisms to examine “PME curricula currency, quality, and validity.”75 

Feedback mechanisms include: (1) a requirement that each PME institution has a well-defined 

curricular review program; (2) periodic joint education conferences for the warfighting community; 

and, (3) feedback provided by the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) and its 

subordinate MECC Working Group. The MECC serves as an advisory body to the Director of the 

Joint Staff. The principal members of the MECC include: the presidents, commandants, and 

directors of the joint and service universities and colleges; the heads of any other JPME accredited 

institution; the Joint Staff’s Deputy Director for Military Education (DJ-7); and, the Director of the 

Joint Warfighting Center at JFCOM.76 Curricular updating mechanisms “involve all levels of the 

PME system and the using communities (i.e., Services, combatant commands, and DOD 

agencies).”77 Specific updates and mechanisms include: (1) periodic revisions of the OPMEP every 

five years; (2) regular curricular reviews by each service and joint institution; and, (3) joint faculty 

education conferences. The CJCS annually recommends “special areas of emphasis” for 

incorporation into JPME curricula. Special areas of emphasis are based on advice from the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, the services, the Joint Staff, and the COCOMs.78 Topics from the 

most recent CJCS special areas of emphasis list include: building partnership capacity, countering 

ideological support for terrorism, defense support for civil authorities, net-centric information 

sharing, strategic communications, irregular warfare, operational contract support, space as a 

contested environment, and psychological health awareness.79 The CJCS also conducts periodic 

assessments of JPME curricula.80 

18
THE JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST

Historically, JPME has factored in preparing officers to lead in the joint operating 

environment. Goldwater-Nichols created the joint specialty and Joint Staff Officers (JSOs) who 

were to serve fluidly in both joint and service-specific assignments. These officers, now referred to 

as Joint Qualified Officers (JQOs), are “particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters.”81

“Joint matters” are statutorily defined as: 

... matters related to the achievement of unified action by multiple military forces in 

operations conducted across domains such as land, sea, or air, in space, or in the 

information environment, including matters relating to - 

 (A) national military strategy; 

 (B) strategic planning and contingency planning; 

 (C) command and control of operations under unified command; 

 (D) national security planning with other departments and agencies of the 

United States; and 

 (E) combined operations with military forces of allied nations.82

“Multiple military forces” may include: other departments and agencies, other countries’ military 

forces or agencies, or non-governmental persons or organizations.83 

 The law also requires the Secretary of Defense to establish “policies, procedures, and 

practices for the effective management” of JQOs.84 The Department refers to these policies, 

procedures, and practices collectively as Joint Officer Management.85 Goldwater-Nichols directed 

the Secretary of Defense to publish a list of “joint duty assignments,” called the Joint Duty 

Assignment List (JDAL).86 JDAL assignments are limited to those assignments in which officers 

gain “significant experience” in joint matters.87 An “appropriate number” of JDAL positions must 

be designated “critical” billets, but “only if the duties and responsibilities make it important that the 

occupant be” a JQO.88 The Secretary sets the number of assignments and critical assignments on 

the JDAL.89 Before the Joint Qualification System (JQS) was established in 2007, the law required 

the JDAL to include 800 critical billets and to be of sufficient size to ensure that approximately 50 

percent of the JDAL positions were filled by JSOs or JSO nominees.90 Presently, under the JQS, the 

JDAL must be large enough to accommodate roughly 50 percent of the officers serving in JDAL 

billets for the grades of O-5 and above to “have the appropriate level of joint qualification.”91 

 Upon passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986, the Department began the practice of 

automatically including all billets for officers in the grade of O-4 and above at the COCOM 

headquarters, the Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense on the JDAL. 92 According to 

the congressionally mandated “Independent Study of Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military 

Education” conducted by Booz Allen Hamilton in 2003: 

19
Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., then Chairman, JCS, believed it important to get a 

JDAL established as soon as possible to avoid any appearance of foot-dragging in 

setting up [Joint Officer Management]. ... Admiral Crowe thought that the size of 

the first JDAL of slightly more than 8,200 positions could satisfy all arguments. “We 

knew some positions wouldn’t qualify, but we were afraid of setting up an elite that 

really wasn’t justified.” He expected that the list would be further refined to identify 

the operational positions, but service objections to protect career paths and political 

fears of creating a de facto general staff prevented it.93 

 In 1989, the Skelton Report suggested that the JDAL “should be both improved and 

reduced significantly” and suggested a “position-by-position review.”94 The Booz Allen Hamilton 

study highlighted some of the consequences of the automatic inclusion approach and the 

Department’s failure to apply a meaningful “joint matters” test: 

However necessary for organizational reasons, these decisions went beyond the 

definitions of joint matters in law and the definition of a [joint duty assignment] in 

DoD policy. They set the precedent of extending to all staff officers, without regard 

to their specialty or duties, the strategy, planning, [command and control], and 

integrated employment functions of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, JCS, and 

[combatant commanders]. They equated all staff duties with “joint matters” and 

thus diluted the understanding and purpose of that term. 

A few examples illustrate how current practice strays from the definition in Title 10. 

The current JDAL includes positions for a deputy comptroller, a morale/welfare/ 

recreation staff officer, an assistant director of advertising, public affairs officers, 

directors of military equal opportunity policy, budget analysts, cost analysts, directors 

of military compensation, and other officers in positions far removed from strategy, 

planning, integrated employment of forces and command and control. Service in 

these positions qualifies officers as JSOs and for promotion to general or flag 

officer.95

 The JDAL continues to automatically include all O-4 and higher grade officers from the 

organizations mentioned above, and it now includes all of the Defense Agencies’ headquarters.96 

Despite the Skelton Panel’s observation that the JDAL should be significantly reduced, the JDAL 

has increased. There are 11,730 positions on the current JDAL.97 However, the Joint Staff reports 

that a JDAL validation board convened by the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness has begun a five-year process of reviewing the current JDAL to determine 

whether specific positions should be retained on, removed from, or added to, the JDAL.98 The 

validation board is using a two-part validation test. A reviewed position must: (1) reside in a “joint” 

organization; and (2) entail a preponderance of duties involving significant experience in “joint 

matters,” using the statutory definition cited above.99 

 The COCOMs, collectively, control more than one-half of the joint duty assignments on the 

current JDAL. Out of 11,730 total JDAL positions, COCOM positions account for 6,695 positions, 

or 57 percent.100 The Defense Intelligence Agency has 910 JDAL positions or the rough equivalent 

of a larger COCOM headquarters staff.101 The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, 

and the Defense Agencies also have sizeable numbers of JDAL billets. Below is a breakdown of the 

2008 JDAL by grade, on which the majority of billets are filled by O-4s and O-5s.102 

20
2008 JDAL POSITIONS BY GRADE 

O-4 4858 

O-5 4614 

O-6 1992 

O-7 130 

O-8 80 

O-9 41 

O-10 15 

TOTAL 11730 

THE JOINT QUALIFICATION SYSTEM

 The Department sought “to change significant aspects of joint officer management and 

joint military professional education enacted as a result” of the Skelton Report.103 In 2004, the 

Committee expressed concern over the Department’s lack of a “coherent, comprehensive context” 

and an “overall vision for joint officer management and education,” and it directed the Department 

to draft a strategic plan that would provide “the framework within which to consider, what, if any, 

future changes to joint officer management and joint professional military education, are 

required.”104 

 The Department submitted its plan, entitled the Department of Defense Strategic Plan for Joint 

Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education (the Strategic Plan), in 2006. It heavily 

emphasized the importance of maximizing joint experience within an officer’s career, but it did not 

reinforce or emphasize a connection between JPME and joint duty assignments, and it offered 

limited guidance as to the specific roles JPME should play in preparing officers for joint duty. It 

stated: “Nominally, JPME I should be completed prior to promotion to lieutenant colonel or 

commander; JPME II should be completed prior to promotion to colonel or captain.”105 The 

Strategic Plan did not tie that education to joint duty assignments or joint matters, whether they are 

reflected on the JDAL or not. According to the Strategic Plan, “[j]oint experience accrues where 

jointness is applied,” not through a “static list of joint duty assignment positions.”106

Congress then amended portions of Goldwater-Nichols, significantly revising many of the 

personnel provisions contained in Title IV of the Act. Amendments included removal of the 

requirement that officers seeking the joint specialty complete JPME I and II prior to a joint duty 

assignment. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (FY 2007 NDAA) gave 

the Department the authority to replace the original JSO system with a new system incorporating 

different levels of “joint qualification” within JQS.107 The Department began to implement the JQS 

on October 1, 2007.108 Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols sought to “establish policies, procedures, and 

practices for the effective management of officers...who are particularly trained in, and oriented 

toward, joint matters” as members of “the joint specialty.”109 The JQS seeks to “transition from a 

system where the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) designation is the only recognized level of joint 

capability to one that offers various levels of qualification based on joint experience.”110 One 

notable policy change allows officers to apply to receive joint credit for experience with joint matters 

garnered in non-JDAL assignments, such as joint or interagency deployments, in addition to 

receiving joint credit for completing 24- to 36-month JDAL assignments.111 

21
112

The JQS establishes four distinct qualification levels, with each level specifying essential joint 

experience and joint educational criteria. Title 10 states, “The purpose of establishing such 

qualification levels is to ensure a systematic, progressive, career-long development of officers in joint 

matters and to ensure that officers serving as general and flag officers have the requisite experience 

and education to be highly proficient in joint matters.”113 While standard JDAL assignments are 

“still the primary means of achieving joint experience and joint duty credit,” the JQS recognizes that 

“attaining expertise in joint matters is a career long accumulation of experiences that may be gained 

via various duties and assignments or [sic] to joint organizations for extended periods of time or 

through the performance of temporary duties of shorter duration.”114 

 Under the JQS, a commissioned officer achieves Joint Qualification Level I (JQL I) when he 

or she completes an officer basic course that introduces joint concepts and joint awareness.115 An 

officer may then begin accumulating joint qualification points, which may be gained through “joint 

experiences, joint training, as well as other education determined by the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff.”116 Achieving Joint Qualification Level II (JQL II) requires: (1) the completion of 

JPME I; and, (2) the completion of a JDAL assignment or accumulation of 18 joint qualification 

points. 

 The term “JQO” is synonymous with Joint Qualification Level III, and it supersedes the 

previous JSO designation. Officers must complete JPME I and II prior to becoming JQOs, but 

unlike JSOs, they are not required to do so prior to serving in a joint duty assignment. Joint 

Qualification Level IV, is attained by flag officers who have completed the Capstone course (JPME 

III) and either completed a joint-duty assignment or accumulated at least 24 joint qualification 

points.117 

22
23

The Department is in the process of incorporating the new joint qualification levels required 

for JDAL positions. The Department indicated that a “preliminary assessment” suggests that the 

majority of JDAL billets will be filled by officers at either JQL I or JQL II. Consequently, officers at 

JQL I will not be required to complete any JPME prior to serving in a joint duty assignment, while 

officers at JQL II will only be required to complete JPME I.118 The amendments to GoldwaterNichols contained in the FY 2007 NDAA eliminated the requirement for the Secretary of Defense 

to designate 800 critical JDAL positions. In its place, the legislation granted the Secretary the 

discretion to “designate an appropriate number of joint duty assignment positions as critical.”119 

The Department continues to support roughly 800 critical billets on the JDAL. Those billets will be 

filled with JQOs.120 

 
24

                                                           

1 Ike Skelton, Whispers of Warriors: Essays on the New Joint Era, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 

2004, 49. 

2 This background is borrowed heavily from Dr. David A. Tretler, “Background and Basics: U.S. Professional Military 

Education,” Member Briefing, 24 March 2009; Dr. John W. Yaeger’s “Developing National Security Professionals,” Joint 

Forces Quarterly, Issue 49, 2nd Quarter 2008, 114-120; Charles A. Henning’s, “Legislative History of Joint Professional 

Military Education,” Congressional Research Service, 13 March 2009; and Cynthia Watson, Military Education: A Reference 

Handbook, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007). 3 John Noonan, “The Thayer System: After two centuries of success, it might be time to make some changes,” The 

Weekly Standard (on line edition), 1 August 2007. Sylvanus Thayer, the superintendent of HWest PointH from 1817 to 

1833, was not the U.S. Military Academy’s first chief, but he so thoroughly reorganized it that he is known as the "Father 

of the Military Academy." 

4 The staff and students at the Naval War College were renowned for their studies and war gaming before World War II 

which successfully predicted all of the major Pacific events except the use of kamikaze pilots, according to Admiral 

Chester Nimitz in a speech to students at the Naval War College in 1960. See also, Michael Vlahos, The Blue Sword: The 

Naval War College and the American Mission, (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1980). See also, Judith Hicks 

Stiehm, The U.S. Army War College: Military Education in a Democracy, (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2002). 5 Richard Cheney and Bill Taylor, Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress, A Report of the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies Study Group on Professional Military Education, Washington D.C., March 1997, 51. 6 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, P.L. 99-433, Sec. 401., 100 Stat. 992, 1 October 1986. 7 The Skelton Report, v. 8 Ibid., 9-10. 9 Ibid., 7-8. 

10 Ike Skelton, “Joint Professional Education: Are We There Yet?” Whispers of Warriors, 3. See also The Skelton Report, 55. 11 The Skelton Report, 4 and 127. 12 Ibid., 58-59 and 105. 13 Ike Skelton, “Joint Professional Education: Are We There Yet?” Whispers of Warriors, 5. See also The Skelton Report, 64, 

and 127-128. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01D, 15 July 2009. The current OPMEP only requires one officer from 

each non-host service be assigned to each seminar (B-2). 14 The Skelton Report, 4, 64, and 127. 15 This is a CJCS policy (with “OSD Concurrence for Publication on 7 June 1990”) rather than a statutory designation. 

The earliest reference the Subcommittee found to “single-phase JPME” was in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff CM 344-90, Military Education Policy Document, 1 May 1990, II-3, II-11, and III-1 and 2. 16 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, P.L. 108-375, Sec 532, 28 October 2004. Section 532 precludes 

JPME II by being offered by distance learning but is silent on JPME I via this method. This treatment inherently gave 

the Department the flexibility to deliver JPME I via distance. 

17 The Skelton Report, 64 and 67. OPMEP, B-1 and B-2. 18 Ike Skelton, “Joint Professional Education: Are We There Yet?” Whispers of Warriors, 8-9. 19 OPMEP.

20 OPMEP, B-5 – B-7 and A-A-5. 21 OPMEP. Also, Chief, Joint Education & Doctrine Division, JCS/DJ7, HASC O&I Interview, 1 October 2009. Joint 

Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) used to award credit for both intermediate- and senior-level PME. As of the new 

OPMEP, 1800.01D, JAWS will only offer SLE. 22 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Department of Defense: Professional Military Education at Three Senior Service 

Schools, GAO/NSIAD-91-202, June 1991. GAO, Department of Defense: Professional Military Education at the Four Intermediate 

Service Schools, GAO/NSIAD-91-182, June 1991. GAO, Air Force: Status of Recommendations on Officers’ Professional Military 

Education, GAO/NSIAD-91-122BR, March 1991. GAO, Navy: Status of Recommendations on Officers’ Professional Military 

Education, GAO/NSIAD-91-124BR, March 1991. GAO, Army: Status of Recommendations on Officers’ Professional Military 

Education, GAO/NSIAD-91-121BR, March 1991. GAO, Marine Corps: Status of Recommendations on Officers’ Professional 

Military Education, GAO/NSIAD-91-88FS, February 1991. GAO, Military Education: Curriculum Changes at the Armed 

Forces Staff College, GAO/NSIAD-91-288, September 1991. GAO, Military Education: Implementation of Recommendations at 

the Armed Forces Staff College, GAO/NSIAD-92-30, October 1991. GAO, Military Education: Implementation of 

Recommendations at the National War College, GAO/NSIAD-92-202, June 1992. GAO, Military Education: Implementation of 

Recommendations at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, GAO/NSIAD-92-221, June 1992. GAO, Military Education: 

Actions on Recommendations Involving Institute for Strategic Studies and Capstone, GAO/NSIAD-92-280, September 1992. GAO, 
25

                                                                                                                                                                                               

Military Education: DOD Needs to Enhance Performance Goals and Measures to Improve Oversight of Military Academies, GAO-03-

1000, September 1993. 

23 Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Written Testimony, Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 

Services, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Afghanistan and Iraq: Perspectives on U.S. 

Strategy, Part III, 17 November 2009, 8. 24 See e.g., 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010; National Defense Strategy, June 2008; The National Security 

Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006; and The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004. 25 U.S. Department of Defense, “Terms of Reference Fact Sheet,” 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, 27 April 2009, 1; see 

also 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, 6-9. 26 The Skelton Report, 7. 27 See 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 5. 28 Department of Defense Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education, 3 April 2006, 11, note 

24. 

29 Ibid.

30 See Dr. John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton “The Future of the U.S. Military Officer Corps: Strategic Context,” Keeping 

the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps, February 2010; see also Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and 

Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 52, 1st Quarter, 2009. 31 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), Version 3.0, 15 January 2009, 4. 32 Ibid., 4. 33 Ibid., 12-21 and 28-35. 34 Ibid., 21. 35 Ibid., 16. 36 Ibid., 16-18. 37 Ibid., 18-20, and note 19. 38 Ibid., 20. 39 Ibid., 21. 40 Ibid., 12-21. 41 Ibid., 32. 42 Ibid. 43 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), Version 3.0, 15 January 2009, 2. 44 Ibid., 5. 45 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008, 22. 46 The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010, 12-37. 47 Ibid., 38-59. 48 Ibid., 60-70. 49 Remarks by General James Mattis, USMC, to the Center for a New American Security, 18 February 2010, 3. 50 Ibid., 5. 51 The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010, 69. 52 Ibid., 70. 53 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0, 34. 54 The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010, 70. 55 CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, November 2005, 3. 56 Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education, 11. See also CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, 

November 2005, 4. 

57 See 10 U.S.C. §§3013, 3032, 3033, 5013, 5032, 5033, 5042, 8013, 8032, and 8033. 58 10 U.S.C. §153(a)(5)(B) and (C), and OPMEP, 15 July 2009, 2. 59 CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, November 2005, 5. 60 Ibid., 3. 61 Ibid., 9. 62 See Chairman OPMEP, A-A-6. 63 CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, 9 (emphasis in the original). 64 Ibid., 9, and OPMEP, 1 and A-1 - A-2. 65 OPMEP, A-1. 66 CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, November 2005, 9. 67 See OPMEP, Enclosure E. 
26

                                                                                                                                                                                               

68 Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, Response to Questions for the Record, Congress, U.S. House of 

Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 

Investing in Our Military Leaders: The Role of Professional Military Education in Officer Development, 28 July 2009, CHARRTS No. 

HASCOI-07-009. 

69 Caldwell, HASC O&I Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders, Written Testimony, 3. 70 Scott Lutterloh, HASC O&I Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders, Written Testimony, 11, and Response to 

Question for the Record, CHARRTS No. HASCOI-07-019. 71 Major General (select) Melvin Spiese, HASC O&I Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders, Response to Question for 

the Record, CHARRTS No. HASCOI-07-028. 

72 Spiese, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders, 16. 73 Dan Sitterly, HASC O&I Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders Response to Question for the Record, CHARRTS 

No. HASCOI-07-036. 

74 See 10 U.S.C. §2152. 

75 OPMEP, C-1. 76 Ibid.

77 Ibid., C-2. 78 Ibid., C-3. 79 CJCS Memorandum to the Service Chiefs and NDU-P on 2009 Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Special 

Areas of Emphasis (SAEs), (CM-0697-09), 23 April 2009, Enclosures 1-16. 80 See 10 U.S.C. §153; 10 U.S.C. §§2151-2157; and, OPMEP, C-4. 81 10 U.S.C. §661(a). 

82 10 U.S.C. §668(a)(1). 

83 See 10 U.S.C. §668(a)(2). 

84 10 U.S.C. §661(a). 

85 See Department of Defense Instruction Number 1300.19, “DoD Joint Officer Management Program,” 31 October 2007 

(incorporating changes through 16 February 2010). See also Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1300.05, “Joint 

Officer Management Program Procedures,” 1 May 2008. 86 See Goldwater-Nichols, Sec. 401 and 10 U.S.C. §668. 87 10 U.S.C. §668(b)(1)(A). 

88 10 U.S.C. §661(d)(2). 

89 See 10 U.S.C. §661(d). 

90 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, P.L. 100-180, Sec. 1302(a)(1), 4 December 1987 

(amending 10 U.S.C. §661(d)(1)). See also Goldwater-Nichols, Sec. 401; The Skelton Report, 4; and, National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, P.L. 104-106, Sec. 501(a), 10 February 1996 (amending 10 U.S.C. §661 to substitute 

800 for the original 1,000 critical positions required by Goldwater-Nichols Sec. 401(d)). 91 10 U.S.C. §661(d)(1). 

92 Booz Allen Hamilton, Independent Study of Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education, 17 March 2003, 

29-30. 

93 Ibid. 94 The Skelton Report, 17. 95 Independent Study of Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education, 30. 96 See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1330.05, “Joint Officer Management Program Procedures,” 1 

May 2008, Enclosure D. 

97 Joint Staff Legislative Liaison, Written Response to HASC O&I Subcommittee Request for Information, 25 February 

2010, Attachment 7, “2008 JDAL Positions by Paygrade,” 1-2. 98 Joint Staff, Briefing to HASC Staff, 6 November 2009, and Department of Defense Instruction Number 1300.19, “DoD 

Joint Officer Management,” 31 October 2007 (incorporating changes through 16 February 2010), 14-15 and 24-25. 99 Joint Staff, Briefing to HASC Staff, 6 November 2009. 100 Joint Staff Legislative Liaison, Written Response to HASC O&I Subcommittee Request for Information, 25 February 

2010, Attachment 1, “JDAL Positions by Category,” 1. 

101 Ibid., Attachment 2, “JDAL Positions by Organizations and Service,” 1-2. 102 Ibid., Attachment 7, “2008 JDAL Positions by Paygrade,” 1-2. 103 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 House Report 108-491, 318. 104 Ibid., 318; see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 Conference Report 108-767, 671. 105 Department of Defense Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education, 12-13. 106 Ibid., 17 and 36. 
27

                                                                                                                                                                                               

107 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 Conference Report 109-702, (amending 10 U.S.C. §661), 106-108. 108 Report to Congress on Joint Officer Management, 30 April 2009, 3. 109 Goldwater-Nichols, Sec. 401. 110 Department of Defense Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education, 16. 111 Joint Staff, Briefing to HASC Staff, 6 November 2009; and CJCSI 1330.05, “Joint Officer Management Program 

Procedures,” 1 May 2008, Enclosures E (E-1 – E-6) and H (H-1 – H-5). See also Department of Defense Instruction Number 

(DODI) 1300.19, “DoD Joint Officer Management,” 31 October 2007 (incorporating changes through 16 February 

2010), Enclosures 5, 6, and 7, 26-37. 

112 Joint Staff, Briefing to HASC Staff, “Joint Officer Management, Joint Duty Assignment List, and Joint Qualification 

System,” 6 November 2009, slide 12.

113 10 U.S.C. §661(b)(1)(A). 114 DODI 1300.19, 16. 115 See Ibid., 16. According to the OPMEP, the joint material at that level should include (1) national military capabilities 

and organization, the foundation of joint warfare, joint warfare fundamentals, and joint campaigning, E-B-1 – E-B-3. 116 DODI 1300.19, 16. 117 Ibid., 17. 118 Joint Staff, Briefing to HASC Staff, 6 November 2009. 119 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, P.L. 109-364, Sec. 516, 17 October 2006 (codified as 10 U.S.C. 

§661(d)). 

120 Joint Staff Legislative Liaison, Joint Duty Assignment List Briefing, 6 November 2009. 

SYSTEM ISSUES

“Almost 80 percent of today’s U.S. military officers were accessed after the 

[Goldwater-Nichols Act] was implemented. One could argue they have 

‘grown-up’ in the joint environment. This first generation of jointly immersed 

officers are coming of age and rising to the senior ranks. Make no mistake; this 

did not occur naturally or randomly. DOD, in concert with CJCS, has focused 

on ‘continuously improving joint readiness by aligning joint education and 

training capabilities and resources with combatant command needs....’”1

Department of Defense Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management 

and Joint Professional Military Education 

This section of the report looks at significant issues within the larger PME system. These 

issues center on whether the system is achieving its objectives. The section begins by examining the 

diminished relationship between JPME and joint duty assignments and the effectiveness of PME as 

preparation for staff duty assignments. The report also describes tensions that the Subcommittee 

found within the PME system, most notably, among the competing demands in officers’ careers. 

The report also evaluates current efforts to develop strategists within the officer corps. Finally, the 

report looks at the delivery of PME curricula in terms of pedagogical practices and rigor, and it 

examines PME content in relation to how PME curricula balance emerging and enduring subject 

matter. 

THE DIMINISHED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JPME AND 

JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS 

 The 1988 House Armed Services Committee Panel on Professional Military Education 

(Skelton Panel) described “education on joint matters” as “a basic link between a service competent 

officer and a joint competent officer.”2 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 

Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) required the establishment of joint officer 

management policies and addressed educational requirements for both service and joint officer 

competencies to strengthen contributions to joint cooperation and prepare officers for duty in the 

joint arena.3

 Over the years, Congress amended Goldwater-Nichols numerous times to give the 

Department greater flexibility in conducting joint officer management. The policies, procedures, 

and practices that have been implemented as a result of this increase in Departmental discretion and 

expansion of the joint duty assignment list (JDAL) have contributed to the estrangement of joint 

professional military education (JPME) from its statutory purpose of preparing officers for joint 

duty assignments. 

29
JOINT EDUCATION FOR JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS

 Goldwater-Nichols connected a joint specialty officer’s (JSO’s) joint duty assignments to his 

or her completion of joint education, JPME I and II, in several ways. Goldwater-Nichols 

established a general sequencing requirement in which JPME and joint duty assignments were to be 

completed for those officers who sought to become JSOs.4

 The Skelton Report described this 

sequence as follows: “Officers first go to joint education; they then serve in a joint assignment as a 

JSO nominee. After successfully completing a full joint tour, they can then be selected as a JSO.”5

 

At the time, a joint education for JSOs was understood to consist of JPME I and II.6 

 Goldwater-Nichols also established “post-education duty assignments.”7

 Unless waived by 

the Secretary of Defense, the law required every JSO graduating from a JPME school to be 

immediately assigned to joint duty for his or her next assignment, and it required greater than 50 

percent of all other officers (non-JSOs who became eligible to be JSO nominees by virtue of 

completing the educational program at a JPME school) graduating from those schools to be 

similarly assigned (“the 50 percent plus one” requirement).8

 Congress later amended the law to 

allow the Department greater flexibility in meeting that requirement. Non-JSOs were permitted to 

complete joint duty either in their first or second post-education assignment if the Secretary 

determined it necessary for “efficient management of officer personnel.”9 The “50 percent plus 

one” requirement was not extended to the senior service schools when Congress granted them the 

authority to award JPME II credit in 2005. Consequently, the requirement only applies to those 

schools within the National Defense University (NDU).10 The legislation did not apply the 

requirement beyond the NDU schools because the services sought the flexibility “to fill all joint and 

internal billets, particularly those in warfighting specialties, with appropriately qualified officers.”11 

The “50 percent plus one” requirement, however, continues to provide a link between joint 

education and joint duty assignments for many NDU graduates. 

  

JOINT EDUCATION FOR ALL OFFICERS

 The Skelton Panel also described the challenge of providing “education in joint matters for 

all students, whether or not those students will become JSOs.”12 The Skelton Report explained: 

Establishment of the joint specialty to support the Chairman, [Joint Chiefs of Staff], 

and the unified and specified commanders does not obviate the need for improving 

joint education in service schools for officers throughout the armed forces. Even 

with the emergence of the joint specialist, joint staffs will continue to be manned 

primarily by non-joint specialists (including inexperienced nominees for the joint 

specialty). Consequently, non-JSOs need training in joint staff procedures and 

systems, and broad education in the capabilities, limitations, and doctrines of the 

other services. In fact, non-JSOs are essential to the proper functioning of the joint system 

because they bring current service expertise and credibility to bear in considering the solutions to joint 

problems. The Chairman, JCS and the unified and specified commanders – and the 

joint specialists – will rely upon service experts to elaborate force options and to 

implement decisions.13

30
The Skelton Panel envisioned the intermediate-level PME schools as “the principal schools for 

learning jointness.”14 The Skelton Panel suggested: “Everyone who attends service intermediate 

schools should learn the mechanics of joint matters that all officers should know: other service 

capabilities, limitations and doctrines, and the relevant joint procedures and processes.”15

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates takes questions at Air War College. 

Congress subsequently legislated requirements for PME curricula at the services’ 

intermediate- and senior-level schools and the curricula specifically associated with JPME II to have 

structured foci on preparing officers for joint duty assignments.16 Goldwater-Nichols required 

periodic review and revision of the services’ intermediate- and senior-level schools’ curricula “to 

strengthen the focus on – (1) joint matters; and (2) preparing officers for joint duty assignments.”17 

Congress also included the policy in the FY 1990 and 1991 NDAA, which described the way in 

which JPME II should focus on joint matters: 

The curriculum should emphasize multiple “hands on” exercises and must 

adequately prepare students to perform effectively from the outset in what will 

probably be their first exposure to a totally new environment, an assignment to a 

joint, multiservice organization. Phase II instruction should be structured so that 

students progress from a basic knowledge of joint matters learned in Phase I to the 

level of expertise necessary for successful performance in the joint arena.18 

31
Similar language was codified in the FY 2005 NDAA: “The committee believes these provisions 

[among others] have a permanence and continuing importance that warrant codification.”19 The law 

states, in part: 

(b) Phase II Requirements – The Secretary shall require that the curriculum for 

Phase II joint professional military education at any school – 

(1) focus on developing joint operational expertise and perspectives and 

honing joint warfighting skills; and 

(2) be structured – 

(A) so as to adequately prepare students to perform effectively in an 

assignment to a joint, multiservice organization; and 

(B) so that students progress from a basic knowledge of joint matters 

learned in Phase I instruction to the level of expertise necessary for 

successful performance in the joint arena.20

Observation: An express purpose of intermediate- and senior-level PME is the preparation of 

officers for joint duty assignments. 

Congress changed the law significantly when it replaced the JSO system with the Joint 

Qualification System, which governs the process of producing joint qualified officers (JQOs).21 In 

2006, Congress removed the requirement for officers to complete JPME I and II prior to serving in 

joint duty assignments while in the process of becoming a JQO.22 By granting the Secretary of 

Defense the discretion to prescribe and administer the various joint qualification levels within the 

Joint Qualification System, Congress gave the Department the flexibility to conduct joint officer 

management to a large degree through departmental policy and oversight.23 However, Congress did 

not alter the statutory requirement that JPME provide a mechanism for preparing officers for joint 

duty assignments. 

 The Department has exercised its discretion in a manner that has distanced JPME, and, in 

particular, JPME II, from joint duty assignments. This is a striking development, considering the 

central role JPME previously played in joint officer development. In 1989, the Skelton Panel 

estimated that the JDAL consisted of 8,300 positions.24 Prior to implementation of the Joint 

Qualification System, completion of JPME had distinguished JSOs and JSO nominees from other 

officers. Congress considered JPME II to be essential preparation for effective performance in a 

significant number of joint duty assignments, since, with certain limited exceptions, one-half of the 

JDAL billets had to be filled with officers having completed JPME I and II as JSOs or JSO 

nominees.25 Rather than reducing the JDAL, as the Skelton Panel recommended, the Department 

has expanded it by over 41 percent to approximately 11,730 positions.26 This expansion is reflective 

of continual growth in the overall joint force, despite comparative reductions in the services’ 

individual and collective personnel end strengths from those of twenty years ago. Under the Joint 

Qualification System, the requisite joint education and joint experience requirements for the various 

joint qualification levels are applied to this broader joint community via departmental policy, while 

the law requires that approximately 50 percent of the officers serving in JDAL billets designated for 

O-5s and above “have the appropriate level of joint qualification.”27 

32
As a result of these changes, it is no longer clear what relationship JPME has with joint duty 

assignments. Although the Joint Qualification System extends its requirements (including JPME) to 

a broader officer population than the joint officer management system that preceded it, the law, as 

amended since Goldwater-Nichols, corresponding departmental policy, and more extensive JDAL 

demands have combined to allow the Department to satisfy those greater JDAL demands with lesser 

qualified personnel. The law requires PME and JPME curricula to prepare officers for joint duty 

assignments, but outside of the limited context of critical billets, it no longer requires officers to 

attend JPME prior to their joint duty assignments. The Department indicated that it is reevaluating 

the correlation between joint qualification levels and JDAL assignments, and the Joint Staff offered 

a preliminary assessment. The Joint Staff indicated that the services will continue to develop officers 

to the educational and experiential specifications of the differing joint qualification levels, but it 

expects most JDAL billets will not require successful completion of JPME II. The Joint Staff 

reported that over a five-year period through September 2008, 1,041 officers completed JPME II 

following their JDAL tour, and it specifically noted that JPME II is not “a prerequisite for a JDAL 

assignment.”28 The Joint Staff also indicated that many JDAL billets will not require completion of 

either JPME I or JPME II. Under the Joint Qualification System, it is likely that only critical JDAL 

billets will require officers to have completed JPME I and II.29 As a consequence, departmental 

policies, procedures, and practices do not appear to consider JPME as vital preparation for all joint 

duty assignments, notwithstanding the purposes of PME and JPME expressed in law. 

Moreover, another significant change in law has also helped to compound the situation and 

to further displace the link between JPME and joint duty assignments. In 2001, Congress amended 

Goldwater-Nichols to require officers to be designated as JSOs, and now JQOs, before they can be 

appointed to become a flag officer.30 Congress gave the services several years to prepare for this 

change, and the amendment ultimately became effective in October 2008.31 This change, combined 

with those changes eliminating the requirement for completion of JPME I and II prior to serving in 

a joint duty assignment, support the observation that JPME is regarded as more relevant to 

promotion than to preparing officers to perform effectively in joint duty assignments. The marked 

disassociation between JPME and joint duty assignments should be examined closely because it calls 

the very purpose of JPME into question.

Finding: Due to changes in law and policy, JPME, and especially JPME II, appears to be 

more relevant to enabling officers to compete for promotion into the flag officer ranks than 

for preparing officers for joint duty assignments. 

Finding: Former connections supporting JPME I and II as preparation for joint duty 

assignments have been substantially weakened. Aside from the limited requirement to fill 

critical JDAL billets with JQOs, law and policy do not require officers to receive JPME prior 

to serving in a joint duty assignment. 

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (CJCS), and the Service Chiefs must either implement policies, procedures, and 

practices for reinforcing the relationship between JPME and preparation for joint 

duty assignments or show justifiable cause as to why they cannot. In doing so, they 

should evaluate how a sequential linkage between prerequisite JPME (at each 

successive phase) and appropriately corresponding joint duty assignments could be 

established. They should also evaluate how JPME content, and especially JPME II 

content, should be structured to better fulfill its statutory purpose as preparation for 

effective performance in joint duty assignments. The Secretary of Defense should 

report to Congress on the findings and recommendations of this departmental effort. 

33
PME AS PREPARATION FOR STAFF DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

PME has been evaluated with respect to preparing officers for joint and service-specific staff 

duty assignments. Joint staff officers may not be receiving sufficient PME. Furthermore, PME may 

have a less than desired qualitative impact on joint and service-specific staff officer proficiencies. 

During the course of the Subcommittee’s review, various Combatant Command (COCOM) 

headquarters’ staffs drew attention to a study that the Joint Staff commissioned in 2006 to 

“determine the competencies joint staff officers need for successful job performance.”32 This study 

was published in April 2008, and it is often referred to as the “Fenty Study” after its author Dr. 

Linda Fenty. The Joint Staff initiated the Fenty Study “due to continuing requests from the 

Combatant Commands for targeted training to properly prepare officers to work at the proficiency 

levels needed within an executive level joint environment.”33 The Fenty Study reported: 

“Consistently, leaders remarked that most staff officers are arriving at Combatant Command 

Headquarters (HQ) without the knowledge, skills and abilities needed to perform their tasks in a 

strategically focused work environment.”34 The Fenty Study further observed: “After analyzing the 

data, it is clear that targeted training and education for becoming a successful staff officer appears to 

be virtually non-existent – or fragmented at best – prior to arriving at a Combatant Command 

headquarters.”35 

TIMING AND CONTENT 

 The legal requirement for JSOs to complete JPME I and II prior to a joint duty assignment 

was eliminated in 2006 when Congress authorized the Department to create the Joint Qualification 

System.36 More than 80 percent of JDAL billets are designated for officers in the grades of O-4 and 

O-5.37 The Joint Staff reported that departmental policy and practice support the filling of billets 

with officers who are one grade below the designated grade. As a result, significant numbers of 

JDAL billets can be filled by O-3s and junior O-4s.38 For example, approximately 49 percent of the 

joint staffing billets at the COCOMs are authorized at the grades of O-4 and below.39 This practice 

may be due to the services having to meet increased joint and service-specific personnel 

requirements in a prolonged era of high operational tempo. Amid these pressures, the services often 

opt to fill billets intended for senior officers with junior officers. These junior officers may have 

only completed pre-commissioning- and primary-level education. Officers in the grade of O-3, 

typically, would not have attended intermediate-level education (ILE), which includes JPME I. 

Depending on their seniority, the O-4s in question could have completed JPME I and possibly 

JPME II, but they are unlikely to have completed both and may not have completed either. With 

regard to JPME, the Fenty Study made the following observation: 

Staff officers and leadership, like their peers in the other commands, are concerned 

about the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) process. Participants did not 

differentiate education from training when they discussed what needed to be learned, 

but almost all were of the opinion that JPME should be the critical venue for 

providing staff officers with the appropriate joint knowledge with a solid foundation 

in strategic thinking and writing skills. Almost all participants believe staff officers 

should attend JPME before arriving at a Combatant Command, instead of after. 

34
Currently, according to the survey participants, officers feel the system is broken 

because it is the exception instead of the rule that a staff officer gets to attend JPME 

prior to a Combatant Command assignment.40

The Fenty Study also characterized staff officers and senior leaders as “adamant” that the 

service-specific aspects of ILE, at a minimum, are needed “since one of the areas of expertise a staff 

officer is supposed to bring to the job is knowledge of his or her Service. Without the ILE program 

experience a staff officer lacks some of the deeper understanding of the capabilities, tools, processes, 

and culture of his or her respective Service.”41 However, 75 percent of the O-4s participating in the 

study, and, presumably, an even higher percentage of officers above the grade of O-4 had completed 

ILE, which begs the question as to whether ILE (with JPME I) is sufficient preparation for joint 

duty assignments at the COCOMs.42

Finding: Amid increasing joint and service-specific staff duty requirements, significant 

numbers of officers serving in JDAL billets are too junior to have attended ILE (with JPME 

I) prior to serving in their joint duty assignments. 

 The services also send officers to joint duty assignments who, while senior enough to have 

attended JPME II, have not completed the course.43 In what appears to be a tug of war with the 

services, COCOMs are increasingly reluctant to leave a position vacant while an officer attends 

JPME II for 10 weeks. Moreover, they are increasingly unwilling to allow officers to attend the 10-

week JPME II course while they are assigned to those COCOMs. They contend that these officers 

should arrive at their assignments having completed JPME II. 

Officers who had attended JPME II prior to a joint duty assignment gave some indication 

that the course did not prepare them adequately for those assignments. The relatively few officers 

who had attended JPME II gave it a mixed review: “Assessments from those who had attended 

JPME II were equally divided; one third said the course was extremely helpful, one third said that 

some parts were helpful, and one third said it was little or no help at all.”44 On a scale of zero to 

five, with zero being “No Help” and five being “Exceptional,” officers who had attended JPME II 

at the 10- or 12-week course or at the war college-level 10-month courses, ranked its helpfulness at 

2.7 and 2.8, respectively.45 Interestingly, ILE with JPME I ranked higher in usefulness at 3.2, 

possibly due to its curricular focus on planning.46 

The Fenty Study did not identify the number of junior officers who served in billets 

designated for more senior officers and who had not received ILE or JPME I. The Study suggested, 

however, that this situation was probable in a sizeable number of positions.47 

Finding: One-third of officers surveyed by the Fenty Study who had completed JPME II 

prior to their joint duty assignment considered the course to be without preparatory value. 

Finding: Officers surveyed by the Fenty Study who had completed JPME II prior to their 

joint duty assignment at a 10- or 12-week course rated the usefulness of their education as 

preparation for joint duty assignments on a par with that rated by officers who had 

completed JPME II at a 10-month course. 

35
Finding: Officers surveyed by the Fenty Study who had completed ILE (with JPME I) prior 

to their joint duty assignments rated JPME I’s usefulness higher than officers surveyed who 

had completed ILE (with JPME I) and JPME II prior to their joint duty assignments rated 

the usefulness of JPME II. 

As previously established, there is no legal requirement that JPME be completed prior to 

assignment as a joint staff officer, unless the billet in question is designated as a “critical” JDAL 

billet.48 In the past, if an officer was pursuing the joint specialty, the standard sequence was to 

complete JPME I and II and then a joint duty assignment.49 Although the law no longer requires 

JPME prior to a “non-critical” joint duty assignment, it does require that JPME II curricula be 

structured “to adequately prepare students to perform effectively in an assignment to a joint, 

multiservice organization.”50 

The law also requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the intermediate- and seniorlevel service schools periodically review and revise their curricula, which includes JPME I and II 

respectively, “to strengthen the focus on (1) joint matters; and (2) preparing officers for joint duty 

assignments.”51 The Subcommittee heard repeatedly that JPME is not intended to prepare officers 

for their job as a staff officer.52 However, the PME and JPME curricula are intended, in part, to 

prepare officers for joint duty assignments. Most JDAL positions are joint staff officer positions.53 

It is logical to expect that, given the law, PME and JPME would provide some degree of preparation 

for joint staff assignments. Remedies to certain shortcomings identified by the Fenty Study may be 

administered through education. 

While the Subcommittee recognizes that the Fenty Study is not necessarily definitive, aspects 

of it are relevant to an examination of the timing and efficacy of PME. The Subcommittee received 

no indication that the Joint Staff or the services disagree with the issues raised by the study. The 

Joint Staff cautioned, however, that the study’s significance should not be misinterpreted or 

overstated as its purpose was to identify needed training outcomes as opposed to addressing issues 

involving PME. The Joint Staff also expressed its concern that the study did not consult educators. 

Rather, the Joint Staff asserted that it relied on the critiques of joint staff officers, who may not be in 

the best position to distinguish whether the challenges they faced would be better addressed through 

training or education.54 Furthermore, the combatant commanders themselves did not express 

similar concerns about the preparation of their joint staff officers when they met with Subcommittee 

members. The PME schools also survey graduates and their supervisors. The Subcommittee did 

not review these surveys, but their results should be included in the full context of evaluating the 

effectiveness of PME as preparation for joint duty assignments. The Subcommittee notes that the 

Fenty Study, at the very least, raises the question of whether PME, joint or otherwise, can play a role 

in alleviating the issues that it identified. 

Thus far, the Joint Staff has responded to the Fenty Study by developing tools and materials 

to better train joint staff officers and by attempting to standardize elements of staff processes across 

the COCOMs. For example, the Joint Staff developed the Joint Officer Handbook, Staffing and Action 

Guide, which contains important and helpful reference materials.55 The efforts made by the Joint 

Staff in response to the Fenty Report are necessary, but insufficient. 

36
NEEDED COMPETENCIES

 The Fenty Study focused on joint staff officer competencies. “One of the most important 

skills sets for joint staff officers, according to leadership, is the ability to accurately assess a task, 

research appropriate background information, concisely provide optional courses of actions, make 

recommendations to senior leaders, and factually support recommendations.”56 While senior leaders 

expressed their respect for “their staff officers’ commitment and energy,” they voiced concern that 

“currently some O-4s and O-5s appear to not understand the basics/fundamentals of staff work, 

and that even O-6s who have not had prior joint assignments are having difficulties.”57 More 

specifically, among the particular areas highlighted for improvement, the most relevant to the 

Department’s education system appears to be the need for staff officers to: 

Develop a Better Understanding of the Role and Work Requirements of a Joint Staff Officer. 

They need the ability to think in terms of broader objectives, without always focusing 

on their own specific areas. They need to be able to develop and foster strong 

interpersonal relationships with other COCOM counterparts. They need a solid 

understanding of what questions a staff officer needs to ask, and be capable of 

responding to taskers rapidly with an all-encompassing approach. They need to 

understand that their function is to identify a problem, analyze it, identify [courses of 

action] and make recommendations suitable for a [general or flag officer].58 

Surveyed staff officers shared a similar concern. They recognized the “need to analyze and 

synthesize large amounts of information into a concise, brief format for senior level review.”59 

 Another part of the Fenty Study used senior leadership feedback to identify 15 competencies 

that joint staff officers should possess in order to succeed. The purpose of the list was to provide “a 

baseline for which education and training solutions can be targeted.”60 Some of the competencies 

can be achieved through training alone. Others, however, are more suited to being strengthened 

through education, rather than solely through training. Those competencies include the following: 

Competency #1: Understands the role of a joint staff officer, and performs work 

requirements consistently at a high level of proficiency.61

Competency #4: Is highly knowledgeable of his/her Service organization, 

capabilities, and business practices.62

 Competency #7: Able to write, read, and conduct research at an advanced level 

appropriate for work performance at an executive level.63

Competency #8: Uses well-developed strategic and higher order critical thinking 

skills for task assignments and problem solving.64

Competency #10: Able to communicate effectively at executive levels and across a 

diverse workforce.65

Competency #14: Able to effectively participate in exercise preparation/planning.66

Most of the joint staff officers that participated in the Fenty Study had already completed ILE, 

which includes JPME I.67 This would suggest that ILE and JPME I are insufficient preparation for 

joint duty assignments at the COCOMs. The Fenty Study would also suggest that the content 

37
delivered at ILE needs to be modified to better develop staff officer competencies. In addition, 

because significant numbers of O-3s serve on COCOM staffs, consideration should be given to 

developing needed competencies at the primary and, perhaps, even the pre-commissioning 

educational levels. The Subcommittee recognizes that PME at the O-3 level properly focuses on 

developing needed competencies in an officer’s primary military occupational specialty. However, if 

O-3s are being assigned to joint billets, additional preparation may be necessary. 

 The deficiencies identified in the Fenty Study are not necessarily exclusive to JPME and joint 

duty assignments. For example, the Fenty Study indicates that joint staff officers may not possess 

the appropriate level of critical thinking and strategic writing skills needed to perform their jobs 

effectively.68 In the Subcommittee’s view, development of these competencies should not be 

exclusive to JPME. Rather, these abilities should be progressively developed and honed throughout 

an officer’s education (i.e., throughout service-specific PME, joint PME, and undergraduate and 

graduate studies) and over the course of a career. 

 

 Another study deserves mention in this regard. A 2008 study performed by the Center for 

Naval Analyses (CNA), entitled Developing and Education Strategy for URL [Unrestricted Line] Officers, 

examined the “requirements for assignments on [Navy] staffs of operational commanders.”69 It 

produced findings on naval officer competencies similar to those of the Fenty Study. For example, 

the CNA study was undertaken due to the “widely held belief that the Navy does a good job 

developing officers within their warfare communities but a less effective job of preparing them for 

the later stages of careers, when assignments require a variety of expertise beyond primary warfare 

areas.”70 The CNA study identified eight areas of expertise needed for the Navy’s operational staff 

officers, in which “they were deficient.”71 Those areas echoed many of the competencies identified 

as deficient in the Fenty Study. These areas included “critical thinking,” “written and oral 

communication,” “knowledge of other services,” “knowledge of joint operations,” “broad 

knowledge of the Navy,” “expertise in operational planning,” “cultural awareness,” and “expertise in 

fiscal issues.”72 The Subcommittee cites the CNA study because it suggests that the issue of 

ineffective preparation of staff officers may also apply to service-specific staff officers and to PME 

across the board. 

Finding: ILE and JPME I are insufficient preparation for joint duty assignments. 

Finding: Although the Joint Staff has initiated a training-based response to the findings of 

the Fenty Study, many of the competencies highlighted in both the Fenty and CNA studies 

should be addressed through professional military education. 

Finding: PME and JPME may require more emphases on competencies needed by staff 

officers if they are to contribute to effective staff officer performance in service-specific and 

joint staff assignments. 

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, the Service Chiefs, and the 

Joint Staff should develop remedies for the shortcomings identified by the Fenty and 

CNA studies that targeted education, training, and modifications to relevant 

personnel processes. Officers should complete appropriate education before they are 

assigned to a joint or senior service staff. 

38
AVAILABILITY AND THROUGHPUT

 The services are assigning officers to joint billets who are senior enough to have attended 

JPME II but have not yet done so.73 Three of the services contend that their policy or priority is to 

send officers who have completed JPME II to joint duty assignments, but they are constrained by 

the limited availability of seats at the 10-week JPME II course, which they refer to as a “JPME II 

throughput issue.”74 The Navy has an alternative view, underscoring that “[t]here are no 

prerequisites to fill non-critical [Navy Joint] billets.”75 The Navy reports that it makes “every effort” 

for officers “targeted for joint critical billets” to either be JQOs or to have their officers schedule 

and complete JPME II prior to reporting. The Navy also works to get officers JPME II en route to 

the [non-critical joint] billets as well, but it acknowledges that competing demands can prevent 

JPME II completion prior to joint duty assignments. The director of the Navy’s training and 

education division noted that: “the need for our front-running officers, our future leaders, to 

maintain tactical and operational proficiency, gain leadership and command experience, and pass war 

fighting skills to our junior members compete with JPME II and, in limited cases, preclude this 

education en route.”76 The Navy’s position illustrates that competing operational needs may be 

more pervasive than availability constraints in limiting JPME II throughput for the purposes of 

preparing officers for joint duty assignments. 

 However, demand at the COCOMs for JPME II-qualified officers appears to be 

pronounced. The COCOMs’ have registered varied responses to the arrival of officers who have 

not completed JPME II prior to reporting for duty. A number of COCOMs have issued policies 

limiting JPME II attendance while assigned, namely, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), U.S. 

Central Command (CENTCOM), and the North American Aerospace Defense Command 

(NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). For example, NORAD and 

NORTHCOM issued a policy memorandum asserting that officers should attain JPME II credit 

either “via successful completion of a Service War College or equivalent” or at the 10-week Joint 

and Combined Warfare School (JCWS), “en route to a joint assignment.”77 Attending JPME II 

while serving a joint tour with NORAD and NORTHCOM “should be kept to an absolute 

minimum.”78 CENTCOM’s policy prefers that officers needing JPME II attend en route. Officers 

who have not attended may attend in their first year of a CENTCOM assignment with the approval 

of their staff directors. Officers who are beyond their first year of assignment require the approval 

of CENTCOM’s Chief of Staff (i.e., a two-star flag officer).79 Raising the level at which approval 

may be granted serves to limit policy exceptions. On the other hand, CENTCOM’s Chief of Staff 

saw the policy as progressive in granting directors the discretion to approve temporary duty to the 

10-week course for officers in the first year of their assignment.80 SOUTHCOM also instituted a 

policy limiting JPME II attendance during an assignment in SOUTHCOM.81 

This situation may be further complicated by the requirement for officers to have the JQO 

designation prior to becoming eligible for appointment to flag officer. Although JPME II credit is 

widely available at the senior service schools, a talented pool of promotable officers either does not 

attend a senior war college in-residence or receives senior-level education through a variety of 

fellowship programs that do not confer JPME II credit. The law requires that JPME II be taught in 

residence, but the 2005 CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development stated that hybrid learning 

techniques, blending resident and non-resident delivery methods, would eventually be implemented 

“to extend the benefits of JPME [II] to the largest possible number of officers.”82 The Department 

has reported that it may request that Congress extend it the authority to provide JPME II instruction 

via these hybrid learning methods through the Joint Forces Staff College.83 These promotion 

39
requirements and competing career demands have reportedly caused a temporary influx of O-6s in 

need of attending the 10-week JPME II course, which has the potential to displace more junior 

officers en route to joint duty assignments.84

Finding: Although the demand for officers who have attained JPME II credit via the 10-

week course at Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) appears to be greater than the throughput 

that institution can support, it is unclear whether this demand is more closely associated 

with preparing officers for joint duty assignments or with enabling them to compete for 

promotion to general or flag rank. 

SYSTEM TENSIONS

COMPETING DEMANDS

 There is tension between the officer’s assignments necessary for career development, the 

needs of the joint force, and professional military education, whether it is at a military institution or a 

civilian institution. The competing demands over the course of a 20- to 30-year career make it 

difficult under normal conditions to accommodate the need for the requisite education, training, and 

experience; the prolonged contingency operations has exacerbated the tension. The expansion of 

the number of joint billets on the JDAL and the tightening of the requirement of joint qualification 

status in order to be eligible for flag rank are among the factors that have put pressure on an 

increasing number of officers to complete JPME and to gain the requisite joint experience. 

 

 For the most part, the officer career development or progression system for the services is 

based on their year of commissioning. Officers commissioned in the same year normally progress 

through assignments and promotions with their peers. There are exceptions for a small few who 

will be promoted earlier than their peers or later than their peers and each of services may have 

slightly different lengths of service for each rank, but the systems are similar enough. Most officers 

are focused on what assignment or specific job is required for advancement to the next rank or 

position of higher responsibility. PME is a part of this focus if it is seen as a requirement for 

promotion. Each of the services view attendance at the levels of schools differently and may put a 

slightly different emphasis on each. For example, the Navy generally prefers to send its officers to 

either intermediate or senior PME in-residence instead of both, in part because of a service culture 

that values extensive experience in naval operations in the fleet. The Army by contrast has selection 

boards for those who will attend senior schools. This was previously the case for intermediate-level 

education, until the Army changed its system and expanded the opportunity to all officers at the 

rank of major. One could argue that the majority of officers in all the services perceive that in order 

to remain competitive for promotion, they should spend as much time as possible in operational, 

preferably deployed, billets, and subsequently less time on high-level staffs or in school. 

A study of the military 10 years after the Skelton Panel described the pressures on officers to 

fulfill both joint and service requirements: 

An Army officer has approximately twelve years from the time he can begin the 

process of becoming a JSO until the time that he either makes brigadier general or 

retires, and these twelve years are filled with the types of assignments likely to win 

40
promotion to general such as command, service headquarters staff, and service 

school rotations. Officers would thus lose one quarter of their within-service 

assignments in order to fulfill their joint duty rotation and JSOs would lose one 

third.85 

The fact that the observation was made a decade ago does not diminish its merits given that the 12-

year window has likely shrunk. Not only has this compression occurred but some command tours 

have increased in length. General Martin Dempsey, commander of the Army’s Training and 

Doctrine Command and recently appointed as the Army’s executive agent for the Army’s Human 

Capital Enterprise,86 noted that tour lengths of up to 40 months for brigade commanders were 

having ripple effects resulting in squeezing out leader development opportunities. He recommended 

that they be cut back to two years.87 These system pressures stand apart from the innate value and 

necessity of joint competency in an environment described as one in which “(e)very officer is likely 

to be affected to some degree by joint considerations.”88 This strain has worsened, in many cases, 

due to a decrease in “dwell time” at home stations between deployments overseas, which reduces 

the available window for in-residence joint education or even distance learning. 

 As a result of these demands, the services have sought flexibility through modifications to 

the PME system since the Skelton Report. One example is the establishment of multiple paths for 

accruing joint duty credit. Previously, the only means of completing the joint experience 

requirement was by serving 36 months in a JDAL billet, waivable under certain conditions to 22 

months. Officers in newly created headquarters and units in Iraq and Afghanistan found themselves 

in “temporary” positions dealing with “joint matters,” but these positions were not listed on the 

JDAL and thus did not receive joint credit. The Joint Qualification System now governs the 

accumulation of joint qualification points for joint experience in non-JDAL billets that entail duties 

involving joint matters.89 In fact, in as little as a year, it is possible for officers performing duties in 

Iraq and Afghanistan to acquire joint qualification points sufficient to be the equivalent of a full 

three-year tour of duty in a standard JDAL billet.90 

 One area in which the services are seeking additional relief is in the creation of a distancelearning avenue for JPME II credit. Although the Department’s strategic plan for PME suggests 

that delivery approaches that use hybrid or blended techniques may at some time be implemented 

for JPME II and goes as far to say that “(c)urrent [joint officer management] and [joint officer 

development] needs cannot be met with existing practices,”91 it remains to be seen whether a strong 

enough case can be made for proceeding with this option. 

 

These service efforts to seek flexibility in managing all the requirements of an officer’s career 

are necessary and understandable. The fact remains, there is only so much that can be done in a 

fixed amount of time – say 20-30 years. In the Subcommittee’s view, different approaches must be 

explored to effectively expand the time available to provide an opportunity for an officer to be 

proficient and competent in both a service-specific and joint operational environment. To 

accomplish this will require innovation. For example, the Subcommittee notes that Congress 

recently provided authority to all the services for career flexibility. Specifically, the Navy is in the 

initial stages of executing a pilot program to allow officers a break in service to pursue other life 

events and then return and pick up where the officer left off. The need for such career flexibility 

reflected a potential future challenge of retaining highly qualified officers seeking to balance career 

and family needs. The Subcommittee observes that this approach could be equally applied to the 

officer development system to give officers an opportunity to pursue PME, JPME, or civilian 

41
advanced degrees, without concern over missing other critical career gates. Such an approach is but 

one idea that could be evaluated in a holistic examination of officer development and career 

progression. 

Observation: There are multiple tensions among the officer’s assignments necessary for 

service career development, the development of joint officers, the needs of the joint force, and 

professional military education. 

Finding: The competing demands over the course of a 20- to 30-year career make it difficult 

to accommodate competing needs for the requisite education, training, and experience. 

The services have been seeking more flexible approaches, as exemplified by the joint 

qualification point system, for awarding joint duty credit and earning joint qualification. 

Recommendation: The services should review their officer development timelines 

from a holistic perspective to explore innovative avenues to develop their respective 

officer corps through education, training, and assignments or experience. 

 Not only is there a tension between service and joint requirements in an officer’s career, 

there are competing demands on the JPME system itself for producing different levels and types of 

expertise in joint matters. U.S. Joint Forces Command’s 2010 Joint Operating Environment explores 

trends in warfare and their implications,92 and, in doing so, provides the context for the Capstone

Concept of Joint Operations (CCJO).93 In examining these trends, the study forecasts the persistence of 

irregular warfare in addition to the possibility of major conventional conflicts, “over the next quarter 

century, U.S. military forces will be continually engaged in some dynamic combination of combat, 

security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction.”94 This complex future calls for military leaders 

who possess masteries of specific forms of joint expertise as well as those with a broad PME 

background. The CCJO establishes a number of requirements for officers with consequences for 

JPME.95 These include: 

• Improve knowledge of and capabilities for waging irregular warfare. 

• Improve knowledge of and capabilities for security, engagement, and relief and 

reconstruction activities. 

• Develop innovative and adaptive leaders down to the lowest levels. 

• Develop joint commanders who are masters of operational art. 

• Develop senior leaders who are experts not only in the operational employment of the joint 

force, but also in the development and execution of national strategy.96

 The most recent version (2005) of the CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, which predates 

the CCJO, expresses its objectives for joint officer development. The CJCS vision consciously 

moved away from the specialist model of the joint staff officer envisioned by Goldwater-Nichols 

and the Skelton Panel and advocated educating “the largest possible body of joint officers suited for 

joint command and staff responsibilities.”97 Rather than viewing JPME I and II as preparation for 

an officer’s first joint duty assignment, it describes a model where officers gain these joint 

qualifications by the colonel or Navy captain point in a career through various tracks, as opposed to 

an established sequential path. 

42
 In describing the new joint qualification system, it goes as far to say, “the JOD [Joint Officer 

Development] approach is fundamentally not building specialists, but inculcating jointness in all

colonels and captains – a generalist approach.”98 Notwithstanding, the CCJO appears to call for 

competencies that may not necessarily be met by a model whose focus is producing generalists by 

the end of what would be a successful career for most officers. It is not clear, for example, how the 

generalist approach will satisfy the need for “senior leaders who are experts in the employment of the 

joint force” or “joint commanders who are masters of the operational art.”99

 

Observation: There are competing demands on the JPME system for producing: joint 

“operators,” joint staff officers, strategists, and senior leaders, among others. 

Finding: Recognizing that the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations is the most recent 

guidance, the current CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development does not adequately 

reconcile its generalist model with the requirement for specific joint competencies.

Recommendation: In the subsequent revision of the CJCS Vision for Joint Officer 

Development, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should identify how the joint 

qualification system will fulfill the requirements established in the CCJO for various 

specific and specialized joint officer competencies. 

SHIFTING COMPETENCIES

In Subcommittee research on transition teams and provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, relatively junior officers were observed serving in positions requiring not only an 

understanding of some joint matters but interagency and multinational operations as well.100 The 

question thus arose: “How soon is too soon to expose and introduce junior officers to joint 

concepts.” Research showed that the Joint Staff levied substantial requirements at the precommissioning (e.g., service academy) and primary (e.g., branch, warfare, and staff specialty schools) levels. At 

the pre-commissioning level, the Learning Areas emphasize “knowledge of the basic U.S. defense 

structure, roles and missions of the other military services, the combatant command structure and 

the nature of American military power and joint warfare.”101 At the primary level, the CJCS 

Instruction on Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) Learning Areas cover joint 

warfare fundamentals and joint campaigning to “prepare officers for service in joint task forces 

where a thorough introduction to joint warfare is required.102 However, as service programs, the 

Joint Staff does not accredit pre-commissioning or primary schools. 

 Although not formally accredited by the Joint Staff, there was a requirement in the OPMEP 

for the Service Chiefs to report to the CJCS on their programs every three years.103 However, this 

requirement was removed in the most recent edition of the OPMEP. The Joint Staff gave the 

rationale that this self-reporting method was not producing useful evaluations of the joint 

instruction. The Joint Staff reported to the Subcommittee that it is in the process of developing a 

more suitable assessment tool.104 

 During visits to the institutions, the Subcommittee found that the service academies, 

Squadron Officers College, and Expeditionary Warfare School were all aware of the OPMEP 

requirements and could identify where they were being addressed in their curricula. Apart from the 

service academies and the two primary-level schools, the process of assessing the other pre43
commissioning programs becomes more complicated. Given the number of institutions involved, 

which includes Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs and officer direct-entry (officer 

training school/officer candidate school) locations for all three departments, it may not be practical 

to conduct the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) or even PAJE-like evaluations 

of the joint instruction at each one. What appears feasible is a PAJE review for joint content of the 

services’ guidance for Reserve Officer Training Corps and officer direct-entry programs. 

Finding: With the elimination of self-assessment reporting, there is no evaluation process to 

monitor compliance of pre-commissioning- and primary-level PME schools with the JPME 

requirement in the OPMEP. 

Recommendation: The Department and CJCS should expedite development of an 

evaluation process to ensure that the services are effectively teaching precommissioning and primary joint education. Additionally, the Department and 

CJCS should consider that this process include a review of the joint curricular 

guidance that the services give to their pre-commissioning and primary-level schools 

to include ROTC and officer direct entry programs. 

 Beyond the most junior levels, many intermediate-level school students said that they needed 

earlier exposure to operational planning. This was especially true for Navy, and in some cases Air 

Force students, who felt that their Army and Marine Corps counterparts were better prepared.105 

This may have been due, to some extent, to the fact that some intermediate-level students were 

uncomfortable with the operational planning process that they were seeing for the first time. One 

rationale for mandating an earlier introduction to operational planning is the previously-mentioned 

number of O-4 (major and Navy lieutenant commander) billets on combatant command and joint 

task force staffs being filled by O-3s (captains and Navy lieutenants). 

Finding: There is an increasing need for additional joint subject matter to be taught at the 

primary PME level, especially joint planning and execution processes.

Recommendation: The Department and CJCS should review both the OPMEP 

requirements at the primary level and joint content requirements for junior officers in 

the current operating environment. They should consider adding familiarity with 

joint planning and execution processes. 

 In addition to the need for ensuring that joint subject matter is being taught at the precommissioning and primary levels, which represents a shift of some joint competencies to earlier in 

an officer’s career, there has also been some homogenization of subject matter among the senior 

colleges brought about largely as a result of common requirements in the OPMEP. This is 

particularly evident in the teaching of the levels of strategy. 

 The Skelton Panel envisioned that “the National War College [National] should decrease the 

amount of time devoted to national military strategy and become a center for the study of national 

security strategy.”106 The Panel also recommended that the service war colleges focus on national 

military strategy and theater-level campaigns or operations. The rationale for this was based on the 

Panel’s observation that there was a lack of depth to the curricula at the senior PME schools, a 

deficiency that was characterized by Professor Williamson Murray as “the Pecos River approach – a 

mile wide and an inch deep.”107 

44
 The concentration on different levels by National and the service war colleges was to allow a 

sharpening of focus, allowing their respective curricula to be treated in greater depth.108 In the 

intervening years however, this division of labor among the schools appears to have been overtaken 

by both a more complex security environment and by law. The original rationale for it may no 

longer exist. 

 The distinction between military power and other instruments of national power is not as 

sharp as it was in 1989 as the Cold War was drawing to a close. In irregular warfare, for example, 

the military acts in many capacities usually associated with other departments, agencies, industry, and 

non-governmental organizations. Additionally, since the Congress granted the senior service 

schools JPME II status, they are required by law109 and the OPMEP110 to teach national security 

strategy. 

 In the Subcommittee’s review of the PAJE team reports and in visits to the colleges, no 

demonstrable problem with the senior schools teaching both national security strategy and national 

military strategy was evident. The senior schools assign the appropriate weight among the curricula 

areas set out in law which include, among others, national security strategy, national military strategy, 

and theater strategy and campaigning.111

Finding: A major purpose of this study was to understand the extent to which the 

recommendations of the Skelton Panel have been implemented. The Subcommittee 

observed that the Panel’s recommendation, that National focus its curriculum on national 

security strategy, is still explicitly provided for in the OPMEP and continues to be practiced. 

It also found, however, that the rationale for the senior service schools focusing only on 

national military strategy is no longer as convincing as it once was. 

CIVILIAN GRADUATE SCHOOLS

 All the services have programs to send officers to civilian graduate schools, apart from those 

who are preparing for military faculty positions at various schools. Typically, these are select officers 

chosen to study one to two years at top-tier schools in place of attending the PME institutions 

associated with their rank. Although reconcilable, the Subcommittee observed tension between the 

point of view that civilian graduate education is better suited for imparting critical thinking skills and 

the view which holds that there are unique benefits to studying in the multiservice, and increasingly 

interagency, environments at the PME institutions. 

 The Skelton Panel considered international relations, political science, economics, and 

history as the “core components” of national security strategy, and by extension of PME. Potential 

strategists developing competence in these disciplines, in the Panel’s view, could not wait until an 

officer would be eligible to attend a war college. The Panel recognized that earlier study in 

“prestigious” civilian graduate schools was the most practical means to continue acquiring 

knowledge in these fields. At that time, fewer of the service and joint intermediate, or senior 

schools granted master’s degrees, but the Panel accepted that the Naval Postgraduate School and the 

Air Force Institute of Technology also might be able to contribute to this graduate-level education 

in that at least the former offered degrees in national security affairs.112 

 

45
The Skelton Panel cited Admiral William Crowe, CJCS at the time, and retired General 

Andrew Goodpaster, both of whom earned doctorates from Princeton while in the military, as 

proponents of civilian graduate programs in these national security affairs-related fields.113 Some of 

today’s senior officers expressed similar views regarding this experience. General George Casey, the 

current Chief of Staff of the Army, who has a master’s degree in international relations from the 

University of Denver, spoke highly of the formative nature of his studies there.114 He mentioned his 

initiative, aimed in part at retention, which offered the incentive of funded civilian graduate 

education for up to 400 West Point and ROTC graduates as an inducement to serve past their initial 

obligation.115 General David Petraeus, commander of CENTCOM and a Princeton University 

Ph.D., referred to the advantages of future leaders and commanders getting out of their “intellectual 

comfort zones,” stating that “few if any experiences we can provide within our military communities 

are as intellectually stimulating, challenging, or mind-opening as a year or two at a civilian graduate 

school.”116 He recalled from his own experience that “[d]ebates we imagined to be two-sided turn 

out to be three-, four- or more sided.”117 Retired Lieutenant General David Barno commanded U.S. 

and coalition forces in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2004. Looking back at his PME experience he 

recalled: 

There is no substitute for a civilian graduate degree to sharpen the thinking of our 

officers as they move up through the ranks and they become senior officers. That 

helped me more—my graduate schooling at Georgetown University as a captain 

helped me more—than perhaps any other developmental experience at the strategic 

level.118 

Professor Williamson Murray noted to the Subcommittee that, in terms of intellectual development, 

captain (Navy lieutenant) was the right point in an officer’s career for this experience. He stated 

that, “the crucial point, I think, is the captain level. If you look at people like [Lieutenant General] 

Don Holder and Petraeus and various other individuals who have gotten the mark as first rate 

strategists, they have gotten that mark really in terms of beginning to fill their gas tank at the captain 

level.”119 

Finding: The intellectual development of officers, especially in critical thinking skills, is 

facilitated by assignment to civilian graduate education programs at top-tier universities 

relatively early in their careers.

 While the Skelton Panel recognized that officers must look outside the PME system to 

develop certain competencies and saw the role of education outside the system as necessary, it 

emphasized that it was not a substitute or replacement for PME.120 Some experts who testified to 

the Subcommittee echoed this view that civilian education and PME for officers is not an “eitheror” proposition.121 In response to a question on the existential value of PME, and in reference to a 

suggestion that the war colleges be closed down, Dr. Janet Breslin-Smith, retired professor and 

former department head at National, spoke of the distinctive character of the in-residence 

experience at her former institution and other PME schools: 

But at least in the case of the War College, and I think a number of the other schools 

here, the type of interaction that happens in the classroom—again, going back to 

Eisenhower’s image of this—is exactly what we talk about these days. How do we 

get a total national security team, [U.S. Agency for International Development], 

State, and military officers to be able to work together, understand each other’s 

46
culture, before they are in the field together? So the type of education that goes on 

wouldn’t be accomplished if you have everybody going to a university taking poli sci 

or international relations classes.122

Finding: There are unique benefits of PME relative to civilian education programs. 

Civilian education programs at the top-tier schools, however, complement PME. 

 Commentators emphasized the mutual benefit in sending military officers to civilian 

graduate programs. Professor John Williams of Loyola University in Chicago testified specifically in 

terms of civil-military relations: 

I want our elite military officers meeting the brightest, most elite civilians, and I want 

them interacting with each other. I want them to put a human face on one another. I 

want the military to get how civilians think, and I want the civilians to get how the 

military thinks and not be lured into stereotypes. I think it would be beneficial for 

civil-military relations, especially since they don’t really have to come together on 

many occasions.123 

Observation: More military officers’ interaction in civilian academic environments benefits 

both groups of people and institutions. 

 In addition to the enhanced broadening experience of graduate school, there is a degree of 

mastery of a discipline and a development of higher-order thinking skills that come from the 

requisite examinations, focused research, and writing requirements associated with earning a 

doctorate in a field that go beyond that attained in gaining a master’s degree. This raises the 

question of the costs and benefits to the services of developing small cadres of officers with 

doctorates in fields related to national security. General Petraeus and Admiral James Stavridis are 

two who have been mentioned in this regard as preeminent military strategic thinkers who were 

aided in their intellectual development by doctoral study at top universities. 

 

All of the services, with the exception of the Marine Corps, have established programs for 

sending officers for doctoral study. This service-sponsored advanced education largely supports 

faculty positions at the service academies and military graduate schools with a small number 

specializing in security studies-related disciplines. Accordingly, this graduate work is typically in 

preparation for subsequent teaching in these fields as opposed to assignment to strategy-related 

billets on high-level staffs or to strategic leader positions. The Marine Corps, which largely relies on 

the Navy to support teaching positions for officers and civilian professors at the Naval Academy 

and Naval Postgraduate School, reported that they do not have the same requirement in this regard 

as the other services.124 

 There is still the question of whether the services would benefit from small number of 

officers more deeply steeped in academic disciplines related to security studies, apart from those in 

academic positions. Although witnesses in Subcommittee PME hearings stated that the additional 

numbers within each service would be few,125 Admiral Michael Mullen, the current CJCS, suggested 

the number might be more substantial than currently exists.126 Professor Murray suggested to 

General James Mattis, who at the time was the commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat 

47
Development Center, which oversees the Marine Corps University, that his service should 

experiment with a trial program for six or seven captains a year to pursue a doctorate in strategic 

studies at “elite” civilian universities.127 

Finding: The services primarily send officers to graduate school in security-related fields to 

prepare them for teaching assignments. 

Recommendation: The services should sponsor a number of junior/company grade 

officers for Ph.D.s in strategic studies including history, political science, 

international relations, and economics at top-tier civilian institutions, beyond that 

needed for faculty positions at academic institutions, in order to build a cadre of 

strategic thinkers for the operating forces and higher-level staffs. 

 Apart from civilian doctoral programs, some PME institutions are proposing to fill some of 

this need on their own. Prior to the passage of the FY 2009 NDAA, only the Naval Postgraduate 

School was specifically authorized to award doctoral degrees. Language in the bill that year 

standardized the degree-granting power of the in-residence PME institutions and invested them with 

the very broadly-written authority to “confer appropriate degrees upon graduates who meet the 

degree requirements.”128 

 As a result of this change, the Air University is moving forward with plans for developing a 

Ph.D. for airpower strategists.129 The Air Force does not envision this as a faculty development 

source, but rather preparation for senior staffs and command positions.130 Some Industrial College 

of the Armed Forces (ICAF) faculty also have a concept for instituting a doctoral program. This 

proposal envisions a follow-on year for selected candidates, military and civilian, from all the seniorlevel schools at a newly established NDU School for Advanced Strategic Planning and Strategy.131 

 While both of these proposals would have civilian elements, neither replicates the setting 

described by General Barno and others, with military officers being placed outside of their comfort 

zones, having civilian peers challenge their perspectives, who may have no particular familiarity or 

experience with the military, at a top-tier graduate school. The students participating in the ICAF 

and School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) programs would have had shared formative 

military experiences and would be predominately senior lieutenant colonels (Navy commanders) and 

colonels (Navy captains). As a result, these studies would not occur at the captain (Navy lieutenant) 

point, or at approximately 25-30 years of age, the point in intellectual development when some think 

an officer is most open to developing critical thinking skills. 

Observation: There are at least two proposals to create military doctoral programs at PME 

institutions including ICAF and SAASS. This is currently allowed in legislation. 

Finding: Although these doctoral program proposals are not sufficiently advanced to 

evaluate with regard to the extent that they fulfill service-specific needs, neither has a 

sufficient civilian academic component to create the type of strategic thinkers that the 

military needs or the Skelton Panel envisioned. 

Recommendation: That the services do not view internally-administered doctoral 

programs as substitutes or replacements for existing civilian graduate-education 

programs. 

48
DEVELOPING STRATEGISTS

“[B]y its nature strategy is more demanding of the intellect and perhaps 

imagination than any structurally more simple activity – policy, operations, 

tactics, or logistics for prominent examples. Excellence in strategy requires the 

strategist to transcend simple categories of thought.” 132

Dr. Colin S. Gray 

In reviewing the PME system, the Subcommittee made an effort to assess: how the military 

identifies and cultivates strategists and the degree to which PME develops strategic thinkers and 

decision makers. The Skelton Panel established a valuable precedent in its landmark report on 

PME. The Subcommittee considered the Skelton Panel’s approach to teaching strategy and many of 

its recommendations for developing strategists as appropriate bases for evaluation. 

The Skelton Panel recognized that talent, experience, and education are the key elements for 

cultivating strategists.133 As to the educational aspect, it declared: “Original and independent 

strategic thinkers can be shaped and molded by a variety of educational experiences, but PME must 

be an important part of these diverse experiences.”134 The Skelton Panel also emphasized that: “A 

defense establishment that seeks to encourage the development of strategists must ensure that this 

scarce national resource is used in the most effective manner possible.”135 The Skelton Panel urged 

the military to identify promising strategists as early in their careers as possible, and, in order to 

develop them efficiently thereafter, it recommended synergizing the systems for officer selection, 

assignment, and education.136 It concluded that “each service should have a personnel management 

system to develop, monitor, and assign officers to service and joint billets that would benefit from 

an officer with expertise in strategy.”137 The Skelton Panel also recommended that the CJCS should 

“ensure that the need of joint, departmental, and national-level organizations for strategists is met,” 

and that billets “requiring strategists should be so designated on the joint duty assignment list – 

including some critical joint duty assignment positions.”138 Finally, the Skelton Report asserted that 

a “conscious effort” should be made to develop and designate certain joint specialty officers (now 

joint qualified officers) as strategists.139

The Subcommittee conducted its assessment with an appreciation for strategists as a scarce, 

yet vital, human resource and for PME as an irreplaceable part of their educational development. 

THE DEMAND FOR DEVELOPING STRATEGISTS

Prior to assessing how the military identifies and cultivates strategists, the Subcommittee 

considered why, and for what purposes, the Department develops them. Strategy has been defined 

in numerous ways, and the exercise of defining strategy has often been signified by vigorous debate 

and lack of consensus. Modern views tend to regard strategy as a purposeful combination of ends 

(or objectives), ways (or courses of action), and means (or instruments for achievement).140 

Strategizing involves balancing priorities, evaluating options, and making calculated choices with 

respect to each of these interrelated variables to produce an acceptable effect.141 The Department 

49
currently defines strategy as: “A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of 

national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or 

multinational objectives.”142 Strategists are expected to carefully formulate broad, goal-oriented 

theories for military action and, whenever necessary, put them into practice.143 The Skelton Panel 

took a similarly pragmatic view in 1989 when it defined strategy as “the link that translates power 

into the achievement of objectives.”144 

Because American national objectives, and the laws, policies, and executive decisions that 

govern their pursuit, are ordained by the political process, military strategists must translate options 

for military action, in coordination with those associated with various other forms of statecraft, into 

demonstrable results.145 Professor Colin Gray describes the relationship as follows: 

Strategy, after all, is the bridge connecting the threat and use of force with policy or 

politics. The strategist needs to understand what is tactically and operationally 

possible in all geographical environments, what success or failure in each 

environment (or functional dimension) contributes to performance in the other 

environments, what that means for military performance writ large, and what general 

military performance means for policy (and vice versa).146

The functional dimensions of strategy are often broken down according to scope. The 

Skelton Panel categorized strategy into three nested and mutually influential subsets: national 

security strategy, national military strategy, and operational art.147 National security strategy was 

defined as: “The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological 

powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national 

objectives.”148 Military strategists contribute to the national security strategy through the exercise of 

national military strategy. It was defined as: “The art and science of employing the armed forces of a 

nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.” 

Operational art was defined as: “The employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a 

theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns 

and major operations.”149 Although operational art is frequently considered to be a separate and 

intermediate level of warfare, between the strategic and tactical levels, it has also traditionally been 

considered the level at which strategic objectives can be realized by large, joint formations.150

Joint and interagency activities are increasingly regarded from a strategic perspective. The 

current Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) stresses that joint force commanders must think 

strategically. The CCJO explains:

While operational expertise is essential, it is not enough. In a future requiring 

integrated national effort, joint force commanders cannot afford to focus narrowly 

on achieving assigned operational objectives, but must contribute to the 

development of strategic objectives as well. They must be knowledgeable about the 

use not only of the military instrument, but also all the other elements of national 

power, how those elements interact with military force, and how they ultimately 

might supplant the need for military force. Development of that broader strategic 

understanding must begin early in the military education process and continue 

throughout every military officer’s professional development.151

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As for enabling strategic success within a complex security environment, the Joint Operating 

Environment enunciates the demand for strategic agility amid uncertainty.152 The Joint Operating 

Environment counsels American strategists that they will confront “the conundrum of preparing for 

wars that remain uncertain as to their form, location, level of commitment, the contribution of 

potential allies, and the nature of the enemy” and that these “strategists will have to prepare to work 

in an environment where the global economic picture can change suddenly, and where even minor 

events can cause a cascading series of unforeseen consequences.”153 Strategists must develop 

discerning and adaptive capacities for understanding conflict, in its various forms, as it continues to 

evolve amid the innumerable complexities and volatilities of the security environment. Strategic 

understanding must also account for the motivations and objectives of other actors, whether they 

are allied with or opposed to those of the United States, and it must facilitate the translation of 

practicable strategic objectives into effective operational and tactical performance.154 Perhaps most 

importantly, strategic understanding should be developed in a manner that heeds lessons learned and 

that can anticipate significant change, so that costly errors can be minimized in the unfortunate 

event of actual conflict. Strategists should avoid being too predictive.155 The Joint Operating 

Environment guardedly notes: “We will likely not call the future exactly right, but we must think 

through the nature of continuity and change in strategic trends to discern their military implications 

to avoid being completely wrong.”156 Nevertheless, the demand for military strategists requires 

talented individuals who have been cultivated through their education, training, and experience to 

recognize and address difficult strategic issues as they emerge and develop. Strategists must be able 

to approach strategic issues with prudential foresight, rather than with disabled or misapplied 

notions as to the nature of a given conflict. 

Therefore, a concerted developmental effort for producing strategists is still required. The 

Joint Operating Environment asserts, “If we expect to develop and sustain a military that operates at a 

higher level of strategic and operational understanding, the time has come to address the recruiting, 

education, training, incentive, and promotion systems so that they are consistent with the intellectual 

requirements for the future Joint Force.”157 Williamson Murray argues that the military should 

promote intellectual agility by rewarding outstanding academic performance with command and 

expanded educational opportunities in the areas of strategy, military history, and regional studies. 

He testified: “Such changes would demand a fundamental shift in the cultural patterns of the 

services, particularly in their personnel systems as well as their career patterns.”158

Observation: The security environment demands that cultivation of a broad strategic 

understanding and the promotion of intellectual agility amid strategic change begin early in 

an officer’s military education and continue throughout his or her professional development. 

THE ATTRIBUTES OF A STRATEGIST

The Skelton Panel distilled the attributes of a strategist to four. It asserted that strategists 

must be analytical, pragmatic, innovative, and broadly educated in domestic and international 

political, technological, economic, scientific, and social trends.159 The Skelton Panel acknowledged 

that few officers possess all four attributes, noting: “It is rare to find individuals capable of a high 

degree of conceptualization and innovation – the attributes that most distinguish the theoretical 

from the applied strategist.”160 The Skelton Panel concluded that few theoretical strategists are 

needed to be effective, and that the PME system should endeavor to develop a small number of 

51
them. Yet, the Skelton Panel also perceived that numerous applied strategists equipped with 

practical problem-solving skills (as distinguished from those for conceptualization and innovation) 

are needed. The Panel further reasoned that this larger grouping is easier to cultivate. The Skelton 

Report proposed that “the goals of the PME system with respect to strategists should be two-fold: 

(1) to improve the quality of strategic thinking among senior military officers and (2) to encourage 

the development of a more limited number of bona fide theoretical strategists.”161

Strategists at the Naval War College

Today, the requirement for both theoretical and applied strategists persists. Ideally, 

individuals possessing all of the attributes lauded by the Skelton Panel would succeed to positions of 

senior leadership and command authority.162 This goal places a heavy premium on combining the 

rare innovative attribute (as enhanced by extensive education) with that for pragmatic and 

resourceful military performance.163 Professor Gray argues that national security “requires of its 

creative strategist(s) the ability to turn brilliant insights into effective command performance.”164 He 

continues, “In other words, it is not sufficient to educate strategists who know what should be done, 

or at least what might with great boldness be attempted. Also, there is an absolute requirement for a 

few, fortunately probably only a very few, strategists who are people of action as well as creative 

thought.”165 Rare strategic ability is best invested in the unique combination of authority, 

responsibility, and accountability that constitutes command at the strategic level of warfare. 

Undoubtedly, a well-educated cohort of strategically-minded analysts and implementers will 

continue to be needed to support myriad strategic applications. However, the military should 

identify and cultivate the most creative and innovative of its strategic thinkers for the significant 

intellectual and leadership challenges of command decision-making at the strategic level.

Observation: The military requires a small number of creative and innovative theoretical 

strategic decision-makers and a larger number of strategic analysts and implementers.

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JOINT PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPING STRATEGISTS

The CJCS and the Joint Staff influence the development of strategists through JPME, 

management of the joint PME schools, and joint experience. The services contribute to the 

identifying and cultivating of strategists by other means, including through service-specific PME. 

The Joint Staff does not identify or monitor strategists or potential strategists, unless an officer has 

either: 1) attended a joint PME institution (i.e., the Joint Advanced Warfighting School); or 2) 

completed a tour in a “joint strategist-annotated” position. The Joint Staff can track these officers 

through the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS) and the Electronic 

Joint Manpower and Personnel System (eJMAPS). No formal strategic sub-specialty is identified in 

the Joint Qualification System, which currently governs the qualification levels and advancement of 

joint qualified officers. The Joint Staff does not monitor the progress of strategists educated at the 

services’ PME institutions (unless they subsequently complete joint strategist-annotated 

assignments) or strategists who only serve in service-specific strategy billets. These personnel 

tracking functions are reserved for the services.166 

The OPMEP recognizes that identifying and developing “officers with the capacity for 

strategic thought” is an educational responsibility of military leaders at all levels.167 It notes: “PME 

provides the education needed to complement training, experience, and self-improvement to 

produce the most professionally competent (strategic-minded, critical-thinking) individual 

possible.”168 The OPMEP specifically states that the PME system should produce: 

1) Strategically minded officers educated in the profession of arms who possess an 

intuitive approach to joint warfighting built upon individual Service competencies. 

Its aim is to produce graduates prepared to lead the Capstone Concept of Joint 

Operations [CCJO] envisioned force within a multi-Service, multi-agency, multinational environment and able to participate in and contribute to informed decisionmaking on the application of all instruments of national power. 

2) Critical thinkers who view military affairs in the broadest context and are capable 

of identifying and evaluating likely changes and associated responses affecting the 

employment of U.S. military forces. Graduates should possess acuity of mind at the 

highest level; gained as a result of a continuum of learning across a lifetime.

3) Senior officers who, as skilled joint warfighters, can develop and execute national 

military strategies that effectively employ the Armed Forces in concert with other 

instruments of national power to achieve the goals of national security strategy and 

policy in the air, land, maritime, and space physical domains and the information 

environment (which includes cyberspace).169 

These OPMEP assertions appear responsive to relevant demand signals for strategists. They 

stress the fundamental role education plays in developing strategic thinkers and decision makers, and 

they accept strategy as a creative and pragmatic activity that must adapt to opposition, change, and 

uncertainty.170 

The OPMEP supports early emphasis on the importance of strategic perspective. It states: 

“PME needs to continue to build an officer that understands the strategic implications of tactical 

actions and the consequences that strategic actions have on the tactical environment.”171 The Joint 

53
Staff also supports nurturing strategists throughout their careers, as they become more educated, 

trained, and experienced in strategic matters. It especially advocates identifying and cultivating 

strategists through senior-subordinate mentorships.172 The Joint Staff regards these mentorships as 

vehicles for continued learning, advantageous assignments, and career viability.173 

Finding: The Joint Staff identifies or monitors strategists only if they have either: (1) 

attended a joint PME institution; or (2) completed a tour in a joint strategist-annotated 

position. The Joint Staff can track these officers through the Joint Duty Assignment 

Management Information System (JDAMIS) and the Electronic Joint Manpower and 

Personnel System (eJMAPS). No strategic specialty is formally identified in the Joint 

Qualification System, which currently governs the qualifications and advancement of JQOs. 

Recommendation: The Joint Staff should evaluate the demand for joint strategistannotated billets during its JDAL validation process. The Joint Staff should also 

develop and maintain a centralized registry of all designated military strategists 

regardless of the manner in which they may have earned JPME credit or whether 

they have previously served in a joint strategist-annotated billet. 

SERVICE PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPING STRATEGISTS

The Skelton Panel reported that only the Army and the Navy possessed personnel systems 

to identify officers with educational credentials in strategy and that only the Navy utilized a system 

for monitoring and assigning officers to strategy-related billets. At that time, neither the Air Force 

nor the Marine Corps tracked or monitored strategists on the basis of strategy-related education or 

experience.174

THE ARMY 

The Skelton Report observed that the Army recognized strategic expertise by assigning a 

skill identifier to qualified officers in addition to their primary (i.e., combat arms) and secondary 

(e.g., personnel or operations) specialties. This skill identifier was awarded on the basis of: 1) having 

achieved a master’s degree in a social science; and, 2) having received requisite intermediate PME at 

the Army Command and Staff College (Army CGSC) with a concentration in strategy; or having 

received intermediate PME at another joint or service school and having served for at least 12 

months in a strategy-designated billet. However, the Skelton Report also noted that the Army had 

no formal program for monitoring the careers of those officers with a strategy skill identifier for 

purposes of assignment.175

 The Army continues to assign a strategy-related skill identifier to qualified field-grade 

officers. The 6Z (Army Strategist) additional skill identifier may be earned by completing either: (1) 

the Defense Strategy Course, which is a six-month U.S. Army War College (USAWC) distance 

learning program focused on national security strategy; or (2) the 6Z elective offered at the Army 

CGSC’s 10-month Advanced Operations Warfighting Course. However, the 6Z designation is now 

considered to be a primer for the Army’s broader effort to cultivate strategists, the Strategic Plans 

and Policy Functional Area 59 (FA 59) program.176 According to the Army pamphlet on 

Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, FA 59 officers are:

54
...warfighters who provide the Army with a highly trained cadre specializing in the 

development and implementation of national strategic plans and policies; theater 

strategy and campaign planning; and the evolution of concepts and doctrine for 

employing military forces at the operational and strategic levels of warfare.177

The Army relies on FA 59 officers to: 1) conduct strategic appraisals that are responsive to 

“adaptive adversaries, shifting ends, and complex situations;” 2) develop strategic plans or 

recommendations that can translate operational means into agreeable ends; 3) integrate inter-service 

and interagency capabilities and contributions; and, 4) teach curricula to support education in 

“military theory, the strategic arts, and national security strategies and policies.”178 These 

descriptions support the observation that FA 59 officers are limited to analytical and advisory 

functions in support of separate command authorities. FA 59 officers are not eligible for command 

at the battalion level or above.179 The Army maintains that career timing restraints combined with 

extensive educational requirements effectively preclude FA 59 officers from higher command 

opportunities. Consequently, promotion beyond the rank of colonel is extremely unusual. Only one 

officer has been selected for promotion to brigadier general in the history of the FA 59 program.180 

Approximately 350 Army officers are currently designated as FA 59 officers. Roughly 65 

percent of these officers serve in billets reserved for FA 59 officers. About 20 percent of them 

serve in billets that are open to other specialties, and the remaining 15 percent are serving in 

education billets as either students or trainees. Approximately 10 to 15 officers enter the FA 59 

program each year.181 Officers typically enter the program as Army senior captains or junior majors 

with “history, policy, business, and economics academic backgrounds.” 182 Officers with graduate 

degrees in these disciplines and those with experience in plans and policy assignments are preferred 

applicants.183

 Specialized PME contributes significantly to FA 59 officer development. All FA 59 officers 

may enroll in the Defense Strategy Course, all are expected to earn the 6Z additional skill identifier 

before rising to senior major, and all must attend a 14-week ILE course in Army-specific 

assignments and operations in joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) 

environments. Select FA 59 officers attend the College of Naval Command and Staff (CNCS) to 

earn masters’ degrees in strategic studies. PME for some FA 59 officers includes the Army’s Basic 

Strategic Arts Program at Carlisle Barracks, which helps junior majors “bridge the gap between their 

tactical/operational background and the challenges of operating at the grand-strategic and theaterstrategic levels of war and policy.”184 Some FA 59 officers may attend the Advanced Military 

Studies Program (AMSP) at Fort Leavenworth or an equivalent program at another service or joint 

PME school. The AMSP curriculum supports “integrated study of military history, military theory, 

and execution-based practical exercises” to confer a master’s degree in Military Arts and Sciences. 

These students may also choose to pursue a master’s degree in security studies from a civilian 

institution partnered with the Army CGSC.185 

FA 59 officers are urged to attend the Joint Advanced Warfighting School as senior-level 

education, because its curriculum underscores strategic planning, strategic appraisal, and joint and 

interagency integration. Colonels and lieutenant colonels attending the USAWC are also encouraged 

to apply to its Advanced Strategic Arts Program, and exchange officers attending joint and other 

senior service schools are encouraged to pursue those institutions’ similar strategic study programs. 

FA 59 officers are also invited to pursue certain civilian graduate programs. Junior FA 59 officers 

may attend the Army Harvard Strategist Program or pursue a master’s degree in public policy, 

55
history, political science, or international relations at another civilian school. Senior FA 59 officers 

may attend Seminar XXI at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with governmental and nongovernmental civilians. The seminar examines policy issues through case-study exercises that feature 

competing national and international perspectives. FA 59 officers are also encouraged to earn 

civilian doctorates in policy-related fields.186

FA 59 assignments are predominately Army-centric, but FA 59 officers also serve in joint 

duty assignments. Approximately 18 percent of all FA 59 officers currently serve in COCOM 

billets.187 An FA 59 career manager at the Army Human Resources Command evaluates each FA 59 

assignment candidate for unique combinations of operational experience and education.188 FA 59 

officers serve in: plans and policy staff billets within Army divisions, corps, or theater armies; Army 

commands; COCOMs; multi-national headquarters; joint task forces; and, staff and faculty positions 

at PME institutions.189 Only FA 59 colonels who have experience at a major Army or joint 

command may be recommended for interagency positions.190 

Finding: The Army developed the FA 59 program, which supports strategic field-grade 

specialists in performing advisory services in Army, joint, and interagency billets at theater 

and national strategic levels. This program affords ample opportunities for educational 

development, but it precludes command opportunities. Because participation in the FA 59 

program severely restricts viability for promotion beyond the rank of colonel, the Army has 

limited ability to add educated and experienced strategists to its general officer ranks. 

THE NAVY

 The Skelton Report observed that the Navy also recognizes strategic expertise by awarding 

subspecialty codes to line officers in addition to their primary warfare specialty (e.g., surface warfare, 

aviation, or subsurface warfare). These subspecialty codes were awarded on the basis of having: (1) 

earned a graduate degree in a strategy-related discipline; (2) acquired experience in a strategy-related 

billet (e.g., the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations); or 

(3) a combination of board-approved education and experience. Designated naval officers were 

eligible for assignment to strategic-level positions at major commands (e.g., the National Security 

Council, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations), and a multitude of joint and fleet commands), and all 

strategy-related assignments were managed by a subspecialty coordinator.191

 The Navy continues to manage strategists and potential strategists in this manner. The 

Bureau of Naval Personnel manages the Navy Subspecialty System (NSS), which monitors officers 

with strategy-related education and experiences. The NSS tracks officers’ education and experience 

credentials and matches them with specific requirements for strategy-related billets in the assignment 

process.192 As of March 2010, the NSS tracked 5,170 subspecialty codes among naval officers 

(including 127 subspecialty codes awarded to 105 flag officers) in support of 687 billets reserved for 

the following strategy-related subspecialty codes: 193

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194

These subspecialty codes are conferred only on the basis of demonstrable education and experience. 

For example, subspecialty code 2000 (National Security Studies, General) requires officers adept in:

• Formulating and/or evaluating national/international policy and/or strategy. This 

includes but is not limited to naval doctrine, joint strategy and operational planning.

• Theoretical and practical understanding of national military capabilities, command 

structure, joint doctrine, intelligence sources, multi-national sources at the operational 

and tactical levels of war, joint planning and execution.

• Use of analytical tools, threat analysis and research methods to evaluate the effect of 

local and/or regional political, cultural, and security aspects of DOD programs and 

objectives. This includes a working knowledge of state of the art analytical tools (e.g., 

assessment, forecasting, gaming, and/or simulation) and/or the intelligence cycle and 

research methodologies.195

Subspecialty code 2000 may be “earned through successful completion of an experience tour in a 

political science/security affairs or joint/operational intelligence billet, or graduate level 

education.”196 The Navy leverages opportunities within and beyond PME. Graduate degree 

programs must be properly accredited in a relevant field (e.g., strategy, national security affairs, 

international relations, political science, intelligence).197 The Naval War College offers a master’s 

degree in national security and strategic studies.198 Approved civilian institutions include: 

Georgetown University, Harvard University, the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns 

Hopkins University, Stanford University, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts 

University.199 Naval officers may also earn a qualification designator by researching a strategic issue 

through the Naval War College’s selective Advanced Research Program or either of its Mahan or 

Halsey scholarship programs.200

 The Navy’s reliance on subspecialty designations supports the primacy of an officer’s 

qualifications in an established naval warfare community. This is consistent with the Navy’s culture 

of seagoing command. The Navy identifies preparation for “strategic leadership” as a core function 

57
of the Naval War College curriculum.201 Therefore, a designated Navy strategist is eligible for 

command in his or her community, which allows for productive mergers of strategic expertise and 

command authority. The challenge in this approach lies in synchronizing the education and 

experiences necessary for developing a strategic perspective with those necessary for successful 

command at every level. Both objectives are demanding, and they are not easily joined within the 

time constraints of a single career. In the Navy, competing operational and technical proficiency 

requirements can take precedence over educational opportunities, including those in strategic 

studies, when timing is constrained.202

 

Finding: The Navy continues to assign strategy-related subspecialty designations to line 

officers in addition to their primary warfare designations on the basis of: (1) having earned a 

graduate degree in a strategy-related discipline; (2) having served in a strategy-related billet; 

or (3) having an approved combination thereof. Designated naval officers are assigned to 

strategy-related billets at major fleet, joint, and interagency commands. The Navy’s 

reliance on subspecialty designators supports primacy of an officer’s warfare qualifications. 

As a result, Navy strategists are eligible for command and are afforded opportunities to 

merge strategic expertise with the authority to make command decisions. The challenge in 

this approach lies in synchronizing the education and experiences necessary for developing 

a strategic perspective with those necessary for successful command at every level. In the 

Navy, competing demands can take precedence over educational opportunities in strategy. 

 Naval War Gaming Today

THE AIR FORCE

The Air Force does not maintain a distinct system for cultivating strategists. Instead, the Air 

Force assigns a Development Team for each of its occupational communities. Each Development 

Team assesses the education, training, and experience of officers within its assigned community and 

helps to guide members in gathering credentials appropriate to the service’s needs. Development 

Teams may identify potential strategists and recommend them for further training and educational 

opportunities (e.g., in-residence PME, advanced functional training, and graduate education 

degrees), position types (e.g., flight commander, division chief, instructor, special duty), or 

assignments to strategic-level organizations (e.g., the Joint Staff, Air Staff, Air Force Major 

Commands). The Air Force monitors graduates of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

as having received a professional education in strategy.203

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Finding: The Air Force screens its officers for applicable credentials across each of its 

functional communities, but it does not specifically identify or cultivate strategists 

independently. 

THE MARINE CORPS

 The Marine Corps does not employ a formal identification or tracking mechanism for 

strategists within its personnel system. Rather, it broadly assesses officers for “requisite skills and/or 

potential to serve properly” in matching qualified Marines with suitable assignments.204 The Marine 

Corps maintains: “Taken in context, the goal is that all Marines evolve into ‘strategists’ over the 

course of their careers and as appropriate to their training, education and assignments.”205 

Finding: The Marine Corps does not employ a formal identification or tracking mechanism 

for strategists within its personnel system. 

Finding: The Army and Navy have relatively advanced systems for cultivating strategists, 

while the Air Force and Marine Corps systems remain relatively underdeveloped. 

Recommendation: Each of the services should carefully review and further develop 

relevant processes for identifying and cultivating strategists. In doing so, they 

should optimize the development of qualified strategic decision-makers, in addition 

to strategic analysts or advisors, and they should endeavor to balance academic 

achievement in a strategy-related discipline with command experience. 

STRATEGIC STUDIES PROGRAMS WITHIN THE PME SYSTEM

The Skelton Panel observed, “Innate talent probably is the most fundamental component 

for the development of a strategist.”206 However, it further declared, “Talent alone is insufficient; it 

must be reinforced by both appropriate experience and relevant education.”207 The Skelton Panel 

took a methodical view in maintaining that the PME system, as a whole, “should emphasize analysis, 

foster critical examination, encourage creativity, and provide a progressively broader educational 

experience with each level of schooling building on the previous level.”208 It asserted that all 

officers, whether or not they have the potential to think strategically or become strategists, would 

benefit from a broad three-tiered approach. At the first level, a strategist should develop “a firm 

grasp of an officer’s own service, sister services, and joint commands.”209 At the second, he or she 

should develop a clear understanding of tactics and operational art – or knowledge of the 

employment of combat forces.210 The Skelton Panel reasoned that lessons at these first two tiers 

could only be conveyed through PME.211 At the third level, strategists should develop an 

“understanding of the relationship between the disciplines of history, international relations, political 

science, and economics,” because each is “critical to the formulation of strategy.”212 As previously 

discussed, in promoting this final step, the Skelton Panel lauded the benefits of a supplemental 

civilian graduate education. It carefully noted: “Education outside the PME system may be 

necessary for the development of strategists, but it should not be viewed as a substitute for 

professional military education.”213 The services allow small numbers of officers to earn civilian 

degrees in strategy-related disciplines,214 and constructive critics argue that the PME system is 

59
disproportionately devoted to achieving learning objectives at the first two levels (i.e., regarding 

service competencies, and the tactical and operational aspects of warfare) at noticeable expense to 

PME efforts at the third and culminating level.215 

AN EXPANDED APPROACH TO STRATEGIC STUDIES

The framework for teaching strategy at PME institutions has expanded since 1989. This 

expansion has resulted in a broader approach to teaching strategy to mid-grade officers. The 

Skelton Panel recommended that national security strategy be taught solely at National and ICAF 

and that national military strategy be taught at each of the senior service schools.216 Current law and 

policy support both a wider and deeper distribution of strategic studies. Law and policy now require 

those senior PME schools accredited to teach JPME II (i.e., National, ICAF, each of the senior 

service schools, and the Joint Advanced Warfighting School) to teach national security strategy and 

national military strategy.217 Current law also requires national military strategy to be introduced 

earlier, at ILE schools, as a function of JPME I.218 Policy further permits those schools to offer 

introductory courses in national security strategy to reinforce perspectives on national military 

strategy, theater strategy, and operational planning.219 A degree of standardization helps align 

various strategy-related curricula among the senior PME schools and foster continuity between the 

senior and intermediate levels of instruction. It does not appear to limit the flexibility afforded the 

services’ PME institutions to emphasize air, land, sea, and space components of strategy and joint 

warfighting.220

Recently established joint content requirements and advanced operational learning centers 

also help to build greater familiarity with strategic concepts at the intermediate level. JPME must 

include, at a minimum, thorough coverage of: 1) national military strategy; 2) joint planning at all 

levels of war; 3) joint doctrine; 4) joint command and control; and, 5) joint force and joint 

requirements development.221 Consequently, the OPMEP incorporates introductory treatments of 

theater strategy and planning, national military strategy, and national security strategy within the joint 

learning areas of JPME I offered to in-residence students at ILE institutions.222 The JPME I 

programs offered to non-resident students by the senior service PME schools contain more 

extensive treatments of OPMEP-prescribed learning areas in national security strategy, national 

planning systems and processes, national military strategy and organization, theater strategy, and 

joint strategic leadership.223 Each of the services also operates a highly selective one-year graduate 

degree program at the intermediate level.224 The Army, Navy, and Air Force programs blend 

advanced study in operational arts with strategic studies to accelerate the involvement of a select few 

in planning on high-level staffs.225 The services monitor graduates of these programs to support a 

small cadre of joint operational planners within the middle ranks of the officer corps. 

Observation: The services have developed selective one-year graduate degree programs at 

the intermediate level. The Army, Navy, and Air Force programs combine advanced study 

in operational arts with strategic studies to facilitate planning on high-level staffs. The 

services monitor the graduates of these programs to support joint operational planning 

functions. 

60
STRATEGIC STUDIES AT THE SENIOR PME SCHOOLS 

Despite these developments, strategy is still primarily taught at the senior PME schools to 

O-5s and O-6s.226 The law requires that JPME II curricula cover national security strategy, theater 

strategy and campaigning, joint planning processes and systems, and integrated joint, interagency, 

and multinational capabilities, in addition to the subject matter areas covered by JPME I.227 The 

OPMEP further requires that institutions offering JPME II credit address key concepts in joint 

warfare, theater strategy, and campaigning in a JIIM environment, the integration of JIIM 

capabilities, and joint strategic leadership.228 The OPMEP also offers guidance for designating and 

apportioning appropriate emphases among the senior schools.229 The senior service schools 

emphasize strategic leadership, national military strategy, and theater strategies, while National and 

ICAF focus on national security strategy (with the focus at ICAF centering on strategic resources).230 

The senior service schools are also at liberty to emphasize service-specific aspects of strategy. The 

Joint Advanced Warfighting School is a senior school within NDU offering a single-phase JPME 

curriculum for prospective JQOs who expect to be assigned to planning positions on the Joint Staff 

at a COCOM, or on joint task forces.231 Its curriculum emphasizes the integrated strategic 

employment of joint forces through “exercises and case studies in a joint seminar environment.”232 

All of the senior PME schools teach strategy to some degree through detailed analyses of 

historical case studies. The case-study method was proven effective in exploring strategy as an 

evolving and adaptable discipline at the Naval War College under Admiral Stansfield Turner’s 

leadership in the early 1970s. He reportedly stated: “Studying historical examples should enable us 

to view current issues and trends through a broader perspective of the basic elements of strategy. 

Approaching today’s problems through a study of the past is one way to ensure that we do not 

become trapped within the limits of our own experience.”233 Professor Murray testified that the 

Naval War College’s strategic studies program continues to be the “gold standard” by which other 

senior PME schools’ efforts should be measured.234 Other senior-level schools continue to innovate 

with respect to strategic studies. USAWC elevated its program in 1998 when it established the 

Advanced Strategic Art Program to broach difficult case studies with exceptional second-year 

students, and some ICAF faculty members have proposed establishing an Advanced School for 

Strategic Planning and Strategy, again for select second-year students, to examine national strategic 

resources and capabilities.235 

PME FOR FLAG OFFICERS 

The PME system offers little formal instruction to flag officers. The six-week Capstone 

course for newly selected general and flag officers offers a rare opportunity to enhance strategic 

thinking among senior officers. The Capstone course offers its participants JPME III credit and a 

timely orientation among the higher decision-making levels of the services, the COCOMs, the Joint 

Staff and other joint commands, other governmental organizations, and those of the United States’ 

international partners. It also promotes the building of relationships among participants from each 

of the services and other governmental agencies, which flag officers may carry forward into 

positions of high authority. The Capstone course attempts to synthesize a familiarity with 

geostrategic concepts and the functional aspects of various strategic-level authorities.236 Critics 

contest that the Capstone course’s brief duration, its lack of accreditation, and its executive learning 

approach limit its value in developing strategic thinkers; that it does not meet the required reading or 

peer discussion standards of civilian executive learning models; and, that its requirements should be 

revisited.237

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The Capstone course is currently undergoing an internal review. In a memorandum, dated 

23 June 2009, the CJCS advised the NDU President that:

CAPSTONE must maintain focus on resourcing and authorities at the 

strategic level without sacrificing the essentials of executive command. 

Prioritize engagement with principal leaders at the combatant commands 

and Services, with more time spent in command centers and joint 

intelligence operations centers, and fewer command overviews in 

conference rooms.238 

Although this direction encourages interactions with strategic decision-makers, it does not prescribe 

significant change with respect to the Capstone course’s treatment of strategy as a subject. The 

Subcommittee expects that a response to the CJCS from the NDU President will be forthcoming. 

 Further educational opportunities for flag officers are limited. The Service Chiefs are 

responsible for administering brief supplemental seminar programs for flag officers to provide 

“broad perspective of the operational and strategic levels of war.”239 The Combined/Joint Force 

Functional Component Commander Courses (air, land, and maritime) are one-week programs that 

prepare prospective theater-level combat leaders from every service at the one-, two-, and three-star 

levels. The Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course is a two-week program for preparing potential 

theater combat commanders, COCOM service component commanders, and joint task force 

commanders. The Service Chiefs are also responsible for administering the Senior Joint 

Information Applications Course at their respective war colleges to reinforce flag officer leadership 

capacities with respect to information and cyberspace operations. The Combined/Joint Force 

Special Operations Component Commander Course is a more specialized one-week program for 

flag officers that is sponsored by the U.S. Special Operations Command. Each of these courses is 

limited to 18 attendees and is offered on a semi-annual basis. The services may also designate select 

one- and two-star officers who are “concerned with strategic planning and the economic, efficient, 

and effective allocation and use of scarce defense resources in today’s complex and uncertain 

security environment” to attend the Senior International Defense Management Course.240

Educational opportunities for senior flag officers are also limited. The two-week Pinnacle 

course assists “prospective joint/combined force commanders” (i.e., three- and four-star flag 

officers) in developing an “understanding of national policy and objectives with attendant 

international applications and the ability to translate those objectives and policies into integrated 

campaign plans” for use in a “complex global environment.”241 The Army and the Navy also offer 

abbreviated executive education programs. These courses emphasize strategic business perspectives, 

force management, and international relations, especially for service-specific O-9 and O-10 billets.242 

Lieutenant General Barno contends that limited educational opportunities for flag officers may 

create an inverse relationship between intellectual development and strategic responsibility. As 

senior leaders ascend, they grow more distant from their educational groundings, and they must 

increasingly rely on experience, self-study, and personal relationships to develop their strategic 

acumen. This discontinuity may undermine efforts to meet demands for strategic leadership in a 

complex and uncertain security environment.243

Observation: PME is a factor in cultivating strategists, but it is not currently the primary 

means for shaping future strategic decision-makers. Outside educational opportunities, 

training, experience, and mentorship also contribute to joint and service-specific efforts for 

doing so. 

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Observation: The PME framework for teaching strategy has expanded since 1989. Law and 

policy require national security strategy to be taught at all senior PME schools offering JPME 

II credit. Strategy is still primarily taught at senior levels, but law and policy also require 

that the intermediate PME schools offer introductory coursework in national security 

strategy, national military strategy, and theater strategy and planning. 

Finding: PME for flag officers is limited. The complex and rapidly changing security 

environment may require greater educational continuity for senior strategists. 

Recommendation: The CJCS and the Service Chiefs should evaluate whether 

additional or more rigorous requirements for educating senior strategists should be 

established. 

 The requirement for military strategists is dependent on systematic identification and 

cultivation of rare talent. This requirement is even more pronounced by an increasingly complex 

and ever-changing security environment. There are numerous demands for strategic analysis at 

various levels of organization. However, the military should identify and cultivate the most creative 

and innovative of its strategic thinkers for the significant intellectual and leadership challenges of 

command decision-making at the strategic level. Joint and service efforts for developing strategists 

involve PME, outside educational opportunities, experience, training, and mentorship. The Army 

and the Navy have the most advanced systems for cultivating strategists, but each of the services 

should review and further develop their processes for identifying and cultivating strategists to 

optimize the development of qualified strategic decision-makers. Each should endeavor to balance 

academic achievement in a strategy-related discipline with actual command experience. PME is an 

integral factor in developing strategists, but it is not the exclusive, or primary, means for doing so; 

nor, should it be. Despite welcome efforts to broaden and deepen educational exposure to strategic 

studies within the PME system, PME’s most significant contributions to the shaping of strategists 

are broadly offered to mid-grade officers at the senior PME schools. The CJCS and the Service 

Chiefs should revisit whether more rigorous education is warranted for senior leadership. 

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DELIVERY AND CONTENT

Apart from underscoring the specific need to identify and cultivate strategists, the Skelton 

Panel also evaluated the teaching practices—pedagogy—and rigor as well as the curricular content 

of PME courses. In addition to focusing on developing strategists, which the Panel viewed as a 

scarce national resource, the Panel made significant recommendations for raising educational 

standards at the schools that were more broadly aimed at improving PME for the entire officer 

corps. In light of the Panel’s criteria for teaching excellence, this Subcommittee applied the Skelton 

norms to current practices at the schools to assess the degree to which they had made progress in 

advancing pedagogy and increasing rigor. Finally, the Subcommittee looked generally at four areas 

of PME curricula to evaluate how the schools balance emerging and enduring subject matter. 

PEDAGOGY

“How an institution teaches its curriculum can be as important as what is 

taught.” 244

The Skelton Report, 1989 

 The Skelton Panel defined pedagogy as “the art, science, and profession of teaching.”245 In 

examining pedagogy, the Panel primarily focused on what it described as “active versus passive 

learning,” with a decided preference for the former.246 Participating in small seminar discussion 

groups typified active learning, while passive methods included observing lectures, symposiums, 

panels, and films. The panel favored other pedagogical practices including student engagement in 

independent research projects and greater involvement in elective coursework. The increased use of 

simulations and war games, at that time, was viewed as a positive development.247 

ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE LEARNING

 In the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), the CJCS has articulated 

the intent and even the language of the Skelton Panel and its standard for evaluating instruction 

methods. Schools are assessed on the degree to which they “employ predominately active” 

instructional methods and active student learning.248 The Skelton Panel did not explicitly identify a 

target ratio of active to passive hours. Nevertheless, it considered 49 percent passive hours at one 

school excessive, and it praised another for its “commendably low 10-percent passive education” 

and regarded this measure as a “goal for the other schools.”249 

 The Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), like the Skelton Panel, does 

not mandate a numerical standard for active learning.250 This study did not undertake a detailed 

hour-by-hour analysis of instruction conducted through active learning. The PAJE teams do this 

routinely during their assessments of each of the 12 PME institutions that receive them, but they do 

not publish figures in every case. 

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 Of the 12 most recent PAJE assessments, reports cited numerical data for four of the 

schools. In 2008 among the four, percentages for active learning, which included “student-centered 

seminar discussion, case study, simulation exercises, and field research,” ranged from 90 percent for 

the Joint Advanced Warfighting School to 65 percent for the Air Command and Staff College 

(ACSC).251 The latter case was the only one of the 12 PAJE reports that highlighted a shortcoming 

in this area. The PAJE report suggested the school should examine its JPME curriculum “in order 

to improve the active learning ratio.”252

Observation: The PME schools promote more active student participation in the learning 

process. Active learning criteria are evaluated by the PAJE teams and all 12 PME 

institutions reportedly “employ predominately active” instructional methods. 

SEMINAR DISCUSSION GROUPS

 Student-centered seminar discussions are the core means of instruction at the in-residence 

intermediate and senior PME institutions and exemplify the active approach to learning. Even 

though all 12 schools were found by the respective PAJE teams to meet the standard of “employing 

predominately active” instructional methods, these assessments were based primarily, if not solely, 

on a paper curricular review, so they are not necessarily qualitative measures of the active 

components of the curricula. In some instances, the PAJE reports do, however, comment on 

seminar size. 

 The ideal seminar size is an oft-discussed topic in the PME institutions. For example, the 

Subcommittee heard from the senior leaders at National that a seminar size of 13 students was 

considered ideal for pedagogical purposes and was the goal at that school.253 The Chicago Handbook 

for Teachers, A Practical Guide to the College Classroom reached a similar conclusion, stating that seminar 

discussion “works best with a group of eight to fifteen."254 

 Recent initiatives for more international, interagency, and, in some cases, industry 

participation, are creating pressure to expand seminar size. At the service schools especially, there is 

tension between maintaining their distinctive character and facilitating joint acculturation by adding 

interagency and international students to the seminars. During its visits, the Subcommittee found 

that all of the schools divide students into seminar discussion groups of between 9 and 17 

tudents.255

s 

Although the OPMEP does not explicitly establish an ideal range, the most recent PAJE 

reports specifically mentioned seminar size in four cases. In the January 2009 evaluation of the 

Marine Corps War College, the PAJE study reported that the small seminar size of 9-10 students 

“lends itself to excellent student interaction.”256 The October 2007 assessment of Air Command 

and Staff College described the seminar size of 12-13 students as facilitating “a dynamic learning 

environment.”257 In the case of the College of Naval Warfare, its most recent PAJE evaluation 

observed that its “(s)eminar size of 14-15 students is well-designed for small group instruction and 

active learning methods.”258 In a disapproving note, the most recent PAJE for Army War College 

recognized that “the core curriculum emphasizes seminar discussions as an active learning method,” 

however, it pointed out that “with 17 students per seminar, the College is operating above the 

optimal size (10-12 students) for Socratic seminar instruction.”259

 

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Another important pedagogical factor is student body composition within the seminars since 

the OPMEP establishes standards for class and seminar mix. Senior service schools have a cap of 

60 percent for students representing the host service or department in the entire student body. The 

student body for this purpose includes international officers and civilians. Each seminar, according 

to the OPMEP, must have at least one student from each non-host service or department. While 

the intermediate-level service schools do not have a percentage limit for their student bodies, their 

seminars must also have at least one student from the non-host services or departments. In the case 

of National, ICAF, and the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, there must be “approximately equal 

representation from each of the three military departments in their military student bodies.”260 

Student quotas for Joint and Combined Warfighting School are allocated on the basis of service 

representation on the JDAL.261

 Recent PAJE reports reflect closer attention to student body composition by service than in 

the past. Since January 2009, all four reports made observations on non-host service participation, 

where previously, going back to 2003, there was only one mention. While all the schools met the 

OPMEP minimum requirements, it is likely that this signals concern that the strains of the current 

operational environment could affect the ability of the services to meet their commitments. 

 The January 2009 PAJE report for Marine Corps War College noted that in each of its 9-10 

student seminars, there were two or three students from each non-host service and that each had 

one or two civilian students, which is approximately the same representation as at the joint 

schools.262 In the subsequent two reports at the senior-level for the College of Naval Warfare and 

Army War College, there was specific notation that there was no more than 60 percent host military 

department representation in the student body.263 For the Navy’s intermediate-level College of 

Naval Command and Staff, the PAJE observed that there was at least one officer from the non-host 

departments in each seminar group.264

 What the OPMEP does not specify and PAJE studies do not necessarily capture, however, is 

the degree to which the background and specialties of the students contribute qualitatively to an 

effective seminar. A Marine student, for example, meets the OPMEP requirement for a Navy 

Department student, but that student may not bring a breadth of perspective on the naval 

contribution to joint warfare. The Subcommittee heard from a Marine major at the Command and 

General Staff College that the students in his seminar expected him to provide expertise in general 

maritime matters and that he was challenged to do so. In other seminars, a non-host student might, 

by virtue of his specialty, have very little background in the overall or other specialized capabilities of 

his or her own service. The Subcommittee encountered medical corps officers and chaplains in 

seminars who ostensibly met the OPMEP requirement for service representation. They admitted 

that their ability to contribute to the seminar professionally was limited when engaged in operational 

planning. 

 Although the OPMEP is primarily concerned with joint (as opposed to interagency) 

acculturation in this regard, and does not set standards for numbers of interagency or other civilian 

students, there is an increasing demand by the service schools for more State Department and 

USAID students in particular. The Subcommittee also encountered, in some instances, State 

Department students who were not Foreign Service Officers, but were from that department’s 

diplomatic security bureau. Although these students benefited from the in-residence PME, they 

were not usually able to provide the diplomatic or development insights that would be of optimal 

benefit to the seminar. 

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Finding: While all the PME institutions meet the OPMEP numerical requirements for nonhost service and departmental representation in seminar composition, the PAJE process 

does not evaluate the important qualitative impact that students and their career specialties 

have on seminar dynamics. 

THE CASE STUDY METHOD

 The “case study method” is often broadly applied to the analysis of hypothetical or realworld issues, situations, and problems in which students place themselves in the roles of decisionmakers. The well-known Harvard Business School case method is frequently cited as a model of 

this approach. Frequently, the case in question is illustrative of a cautionary or exemplary principle. 

This is sometimes confused with the “case method” used to study the law by examining judicial 

opinions. What the two methods often share, however, is the active involvement of students who 

are generally guided by a faculty member teaching through the use of hypotheticals and incisive 

questions. 

 The Skelton Panel did not precisely define the term, but it is clear from its numerous 

references what the Panel had in mind. In discussing the use of case studies in developing the ability 

to formulate strategy, the Skelton Report suggested presenting students with what it called “modern 

problems in strategic choice.”265 In analyzing recent historical cases, students were to rely, to the 

maximum extent possible, on the: 

. . . original documents and evidence that were actually available to contemporary 

decision makers as they faced national security problems and tried to develop 

adequate responses, so that the real intellectual difficulties and limits facing the 

makers of strategies are recreated.266

Students may determine whether or not the policy makers, decisions were well-founded or whether 

alternatives should have been chosen. The Panel also saw a relevant application of this method for 

educating officers in the employment of multi-service forces, drawing on the precedent of its 

application for this purpose at the World War II-era Army-Navy School, where it was “designed to 

give the students an understanding of the capabilities and methods of each service.”267 The Skelton 

Panel endorsed the case study methodology because it saw value in the careful study of military 

history, the classroom interaction inherent in thoughtfully discussing both lessons learned from past 

problems and their application to current issues, and the development of creative solutions to joint 

warfighting challenges. 

 The schools’ curricula include, and the PAJE reports confirm, an appreciation for the value 

of case studies in coursework. The three most recent reports make special note, citing the use of 

case studies in support of the blocks of instruction. At the College of Naval Warfare the PAJE 

report observed, among other numerous instances, that the “[c]ase studies in the [Strategy and 

Policy] course provide linkage between strategy and policy development and the national and joint 

planning systems and processes across a wide range of joint military operations.”268 

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RIGOR 

“The question of rigor is best answered individually, especially when you are at 

war.”269

General Martin Dempsey, USA 

Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Education Command 

 Although the Skelton Panel defined academic rigor in terms of a threefold combination of a 

challenging curriculum, established standards of performance, and student accountability to those 

standards, it focused primarily on the aspect of student accountability. Specifically, it devoted 

considerable discussion to the question of whether students should be tested and graded on their 

coursework.270 Although the Panel reported that all of the intermediate-level schools at the time had 

graded exams, the same was not true for their senior-level counterparts. The Panel singled out the 

College of Naval Warfare as the only senior school to administer them. The Panel unambiguously 

noted that none of the other senior schools administered tests whatsoever. While the Panel 

reported that some of the intermediate schools provided examination scores solely for student 

reference, it did not describe the information that appeared on the student transcripts, which renders 

it difficult to compare current grading systems with the Panel’s recommendations.271 

 In observing these varying student evaluation practices at the time, the Panel expressed some 

decidedly firm views on the subjects of frequent essay examinations and graded coursework. While 

acknowledging that students, especially those at the senior level, were self-motivated individuals who 

were already the product of a rigorous selection process, the Panel did not consider this a 

compelling rationale for not grading student work. The Panel adamantly argued that “although an 

individual student may impose rigorous standards on himself regardless of a school requirement, the 

sine qua non of a PME school’s rigor is graded activities.”272 

 Nevertheless, considerable leeway was left to the schools. The Panel did not mandate letter 

grades corresponding to a numerical range, e.g., an “A” for 90-100 percent, or even letter grades 

based on a subjective judgment. It characterized the Marine Command and Staff College’s (Marine 

C&SC’s) system at the time of using the grading terms “non-mastery,” “mastery,” and “high 

mastery” as “intriguing.”273 The Panel was silent on whether a “pass/fail” was sufficiently stringent. 

 Like the Skelton Panel, the Subcommittee observed a wide variety of practices for student 

assessment across the 12 senior and intermediate in-residence PME institutions. All of the 

intermediate and senior schools now have graded examinations and some form of final grades. A 

number of institutions record letter grades while others use a pass/fail system. In the latter case, the 

absence of letter grades on official transcripts does not necessarily mean that the faculty does not 

provide students with assessment of their performance. While an official transcript may only record 

a grade of “pass,” in most cases the students receive a more comprehensive evaluation in the form 

of directed specific comments on their work. 

68
 The USAWC, for example, only enters pass/fail marks on student transcripts. Students 

receive numerical scores of 1 through 5 on their work, however, in accordance with the degree to 

which they achieve course learning objectives.274 On the other hand, the College of Naval Warfare 

and the Navy’s CNCS award letter grades with plusses and minuses for core courses based on a 

numeric score.275 Electives are graded on a three-tier scale of high pass/pass/fail.276 These grades 

are recorded on the official transcripts.277

 Even within NDU there are differing approaches. National uses a similar system to that of 

the USAWC. All courses are graded on a pass/fail basis.278 Similarly, the faculty at National 

augments this with ratings for student use on the constituent requirements, in this case whether 

student performance is “above standards,” “meets standards,” or “below standards,” along with 

narrative evaluations in a number of categories for each core course, elective, paper, presentation, 

and oral exam. Within the same university, ICAF assigns letter grades with plusses and minuses on 

overall course evaluations.279 The Subcommittee heard from some students at National that the 

faculty appraisals of written assignments and examinations were generally more useful and reflected 

more demanding standards than letter grades lacking a more comprehensive critique.280 Dr. BreslinSmith, a retired professor and former department head from National, spoke highly of what she 

called the “challenge of the scenario analysis” posed by her former college’s two annual oral 

examinations. Dr. Breslin-Smith testified: “If a student can analyze the components of a given 

scenario, its strategic implications, and thoroughly respond to the in-depth questions prompted by 

the discipline of the framework, we can assess the rigor of the student’s thought and preparation.”281

 Overall, the PME institutions have addressed the Skelton Panel recommendations for raising 

academic standards. At the Subcommittee’s final PME hearing, Dr. Williamson Murray commented 

that, although the Naval War College still maintains its position as the leader in this regard, “the 

improvement in academic rigor in the staff and war colleges has been considerable since the late 

1980s.”282 Professor John Williams cautioned against much conformity when measuring student 

performance. He supports “a great deal of discretion to the educators and administrators at the 

various PME institutions, subject to a common understanding on the importance of academic 

rigor.”283

Finding: PME institutions have generally implemented the Skelton Panel 

recommendations for more demanding standards. All of the schools have writing 

requirements, and all of the senior-level schools now have graded exams. Although PME 

institutions have retained or adopted a variety of approaches with regard to grading, the 

Subcommittee found that pass/fail systems based upon objective learning standards and 

supported by comprehensive and timely feedback, even if provided only for student use, do 

not necessarily detract from the rigor of the academic programs. 

 The OPMEP also speaks to the grading process itself, asserting that the PME institutions’ 

“(e)ducational goals and objectives should be clearly stated and that students’ performance should 

be measured against defined standards.”284 Accordingly, all of the PME institutions have published 

grading standards that are reviewed by the PAJE process. The Army CGSC, however, has 

developed detailed grading templates, referred to as “rubrics,” for each academic lesson.285 

While the most recent PAJE report viewed the rubrics favorably for creating clear 

expectations for performance, a number of students did not share this perspective.286 The 

Subcommittee heard comments that some faculty applied the rubric to writing assignments in a 

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mechanistic fashion, promoting conformity to set criteria and discouraging more complex or 

creative approaches to the topic. One student spoke of having to “dumb down” his writing to fit 

the rubric which he referred to as a “checklist.”287 One faculty member remarked that “the rubric 

tells you what to think, not how to think. This makes it easier for the faculty to grade, but it’s not 

good for the students.”288

Observation: Scoring tools such as the Army CGSC rubric allow for a standardized 

evaluation according to specified criteria, making grading simpler and more transparent. 

Caution is warranted, however, if rubrics are applied in a manner that would limit original 

or more creative approaches by students to the subject matter. 

The Subcommittee also came across a number of issues related to academic rigor that the 

Skelton Panel did not necessarily assess. One relatively recent trend encountered was the move of 

PME institutions to award master’s degrees and the attendant civilian accreditation process. The 

Subcommittee considered the introduction of the added scrutiny of the civilian accreditation process 

to positively influence the rigor associated with those PME institutions awarding advanced degrees. 

The Subcommittee did hear some views, however, that the requirements for master’s degrees were a 

distraction from attention to PME. 

During visits to the PME institutions, the Subcommittee heard a number of views on the 

effect of master’s degree programs on the rest of the curricula. One student at ACSC spoke of 

“academic mission creep” resulting from the master’s program, implying that the additional 

requirements tip the focus toward academic instead of professional education.289 Additionally, the 

Subcommittee heard from a student at the Army CGSC that the supplemental work, centered 

around a thesis paper, for earning the Masters of Military Arts and Science (MMAS) degree, proved 

onerous for many students.290 Although optional, many students viewed the MMAS program as the 

only opportunity that they were likely to have to earn a master’s degree in the foreseeable future, 

especially under the current operational tempo. Moreover, an advanced degree was, at least in the 

students’ minds, a positive discriminator for future promotion or a second career. One faculty 

member at that institution referred to the regular curriculum as the “bill payer” for the master’s 

program, observing that the MMAS candidates tended to prioritize their efforts toward the thesis at 

the expense of preparation for daily classes.291 The commandant of the USAWC noted that some of 

his students, when confronted with more rigorous academic challenges, found it “convenient to 

blame the master’s degree and academics.”292 He went on to say that “while professional topics, 

demands and standards have increased, no new major, purely academic requirements have been 

added.”293 

 When the leaders of the senior schools were asked if their master’s degree programs 

diminished the PME mission, most viewed them as enhancing and reinforcing it, rather than 

detracting from it. More than one school leader mentioned that offering the opportunity to teach at 

an accredited graduate-degree program helped the schools attract higher-quality faculty members 

thereby improving the PME curricula and quality of teaching. Assuming that the PME schools 

recruit from the same limited pool of candidates with expertise and credentials in national securityrelated fields, it is conceivable that the schools with master’s programs would be more attractive. 

Some school leaders also cited the positive impact that the accreditation process had in importing 

best practices to the military schools, especially in the areas of course development and curricular 

review. The commandant of National was the only leader to take an agnostic position on the value 

of civilian accreditation of graduate degrees, disavowing any increase in rigor as a result.294

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Observation: Although the Subcommittee heard some concerns voiced over master’s degree 

programs detracting from the PME mission, there was no clear evidence to this effect. There 

was general agreement among school leaders that the civilian accreditation process has a 

positive influence on rigor and that schools’ graduate-degree granting status has a beneficial 

effect on faculty recruiting. 

 The Subcommittee did not originally intend to devote a great degree of attention to the 

Capstone course for newly selected flag officers, but its research coincided with a re-examination by 

the Joint Staff and the NDU president into the program’s rigor. The Skelton Panel had previously 

identified a number of shortcomings with the Capstone course including a lack of a full-time faculty 

and what the panel considered an insufficient six-week course length.295 Additionally, the Report 

assessed that the course failed to live up to its potential, in large part due to the lack of substantive 

academic work in joint matters and strategy. While it made no recommendation for graded exams 

or writing assignments, the Panel proposed an overhaul of the program and recommended that the 

“(c)ourses should be as rigorous and demanding as the students’ future responsibilities will be.”296 

 A previous version of the OPMEP incorporated learning objectives in line with the Skelton 

Panel’s recommendations for the Capstone curriculum in the areas of national security strategy and 

joint operational art.297 It was not until 2009, however, that the OPMEP added a PAJE requirement 

for Capstone.298 This formal requirement was preceded by a PAJE-like independent review for the 

CJCS.299 The review concluded that the Capstone course was “generally meeting the established 

requirements for joint service education” and proposed no marked changes to the curriculum. At 

the same time, it found that there was no effective tool or method to determine how well the newly 

selected flag officers were mastering the learning objectives.300 

 The CJCS recently instructed the NDU president to develop a “course assessment 

mechanism” to evaluate the effectiveness of the instruction. Discussions on the best way to achieve 

this revealed a tension between competing educational models: the executive learning model, which 

assumes a large measure of self-motivation on the part of the adult students, and a program with 

demonstrable educational objectives. At the time of this report, an internal review was still being 

conducted, although the forthcoming evaluation mechanism may involve measurable performance 

in a short (1-2 day) classroom exercise301 and possibly writing requirements on strategic perspectives 

gained from the U.S. and overseas trips.302

Observation: There is tension with the Capstone course between the OPMEP’s academic 

model with its PAJE accreditation requirement, and with the current executive education 

model. The CJCS has given the NDU President direction to revise the course. 

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CURRICULA 

“The panel believes that the primary subject matter for PME schools and, 

consequently, the underlying theme of the PME framework, should be the 

employment of combat forces, the conduct of war.”303

The Skelton Report, 1989 

 In examining curricula, the Skelton Panel concentrated mainly on the extent to which the 

service PME institutions were meeting the requirement, new at the time, of integrating joint content 

into their coursework required by the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. The Panel conducted a detailed 

review of each school’s attention to joint subject matter and went as far as determining the 

percentage of each school’s curriculum that it considered “joint.” While the Report confirmed the 

services were devoting a sufficient quantity of their core curricula hours to joint subjects, it 

concluded that the “(d)iscussion of joint material focused almost entirely on the role of the parent 

service in the joint operation or activity.”304 It recommended a more “well rounded approach to 

joint education in the service schools.”305

 In this study, it was not the Subcommittee’s intent to replicate the hour-by-hour curriculum 

analysis of the Skelton Panel. The Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) has regularly 

performed that accounting for each of the PME institutions as part of the PAJE process. The 

MECC systematically assesses the curricula of the schools looking at the extent to which they 

“prepare graduates to operate in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national 

environment and bring a joint perspective to bear in their tactical, operational, strategic, and critical 

thinking as well as professional actions.”306

 The Subcommittee endeavored to evaluate how the PME institutions balance the traditional 

or enduring subjects in their curricula with new content and thinking emerging in response to the 

changing security environment, lessons learned from current conflicts, and what some see as 

anticipating the changing character of war.307 They each have to decide, for instance, whether to 

change emphasis from teaching traditional texts like those by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz to covering 

the works of the experts on topics such as terrorism, counterinsurgency, and cyber warfare. 

 

 Apart from the constraints of covering the subject matter required by the OPMEP, the 

schools are given considerable latitude in deciding how to manage their curricula. Each service and 

its PME institutions formally review their curricula on a regular basis, to incorporate any new 

guidance as well as lessons learned from current operations, strategies, and policies. The Marine 

Corps and Air Force have processes that are illustrative of those in the other services. As 

introduced previously, the Marine Corps has a Curriculum Review Board at Marine Corps University 

which reviews the service’s PME curricula every two years and makes recommendations for 

substantive changes based on service needs, Joint Staff, and combatant command input. On an 

annual basis, the individual Marine Corps schools conduct Course Content Review Boards 

evaluating each block of instruction incorporating instructor and student feedback.308 To assist the 

schools in mediating with senior commanders making recommendations for new curricular matter, 

the Air Force, has established the Air Force Learning Committee to evaluate these kinds of 

suggestions.309 

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 The Subcommittee examined four curricular areas to illustrate the balancing process: 

irregular warfare and stability operations; language, culture, and regional expertise; joint, interagency, 

intergovernmental, and multinational operations; and history. The first three deal with newer 

subject matter or that which is of growing importance in the current security environment. The last 

was chosen because history has traditionally formed the foundation of PME curricula, and the 

Subcommittee heard from faculty on more than one occasion that a reduction in history was being 

used as the “bill payer” for the addition of new subject matter into the curricula.310 

 In their testimony before the Subcommittee, school leaders often spoke of this challenge. 

The deputy commandant of the Army CGSC alluded to this dynamic, “We realize that friction will 

always exist where the current curriculum competes with the many emerging topics.”311 There is 

constant pressure from field commanders, according to the commandant of National, to include 

tactical and operational lessons learned. He underscored the need to protect what he called the 

“core elements” in the school’s educational requirements and keep the focus of the curriculum 

centered on the strategic level of warfare.312

IRREGULAR WARFARE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

 The Skelton Panel now appears prescient in its discussion of military participation in 

strategic thinking. In 1989, it cited critics of U.S. strategy as having “[t]he concern that U.S. military 

capabilities are inappropriately skewed toward unlikely contingencies and as a result, are inadequate 

for more probable low-intensity conflict.”313 That is not to say, however, that the lessons of 

guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency had completely disappeared from the PME curricula.

 Even before the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the PME institutions were, to 

some extent, teaching irregular warfare (IW), using case-study examples such as occurred in the 

American Revolution, Algeria’s war for independence, America’s involvement in the Vietnam War, 

and others.314 Irregular warfare, a term that has replaced “low-intensity conflict,” involves 

insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism,315 and refers to the: 

[V]iolent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over 

the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric 

approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in 

order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.316 

 A more serious consideration of irregular warfare has emerged as a result of the military’s 

experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 2008 National Defense Strategy identified improving 

proficiency in irregular warfare as the Department’s “top priority.” In discussing “modes of 

warfare,” the document calls for a displaying “a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that 

which we possess in conventional combat.”317 Given this degree of prominence, one might expect 

to see a corresponding shift in the PME system and its institutions’ core curricula and electives. 

 The most recent version of the OPMEP adopts this new emphasis and directs the 

intermediate and senior PME institutions to devote attention to irregular warfare. The Chairman’s 

Vision section of the instruction has been updated, adding language on improving the military’s 

capability to “wage, as necessary, traditional and irregular warfare.”318 Moreover, the OPMEP 

acknowledges the equal importance of the two forms of conflict.319 

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 The associated change to the Joint Learning Areas and Objectives section of the OPMEP,320

however, does not echo the “top priority” urgency expressed in the high-level policy guidance. It 

was amended with a new requirement for students to simply “(c)omprehend the fundamentals of 

traditional and irregular warfare” at both the intermediate and senior level colleges.321 While the 

language in the requirement does not ignore or marginalize irregular warfare, asking students to 

merely comprehend “fundamentals” does not seem to fully capture the force of the National Defense 

Strategy or even the Chairman’s Vision, for that matter. 

Observation: The Joint Learning Areas and Objectives section of the 2009 OPMEP does not 

impart the same level of importance to irregular warfare as the National Security Strategy 

and Chairman’s Vision statement on PME. 

 As the PAJE cycle is just beginning to assess the schools’ responses to the new guidance, it is 

too early to determine, in a systematic way, whether irregular warfare is being treated on par with 

traditional warfare. Still, the Subcommittee received enough testimony from the school leaders to 

make some preliminary observations. 

 School leaders offered the Subcommittee their descriptions of core courses with irregular 

warfare content, electives specifically devoted to irregular warfare (IW), and other relevant activities, 

such as special seminars. Illustrating the rationale for the integration of IW-related topics and other 

subjects into the core courses at the Army CGSC, its Deputy Commandant pointed out that the 

curricula there “is not organized into discrete blocks such as individual classes in counterinsurgency, 

stability operations, threats, culture, major combat operations, etc.”322 Instead, an “integrated 

curriculum approach,” he explained, “...allows [the CGSC] to address multiple learning outcomes in 

common lesson blocks.”323 The Director of the Marine C&SC highlighted the school’s electives 

which are representative of the other career-level schools. Those directly related to irregular 

warfare include:324

 Insurgency from the Insurgent Perspective 

 Airpower and Asymmetrical Warfare 

 The American Indian Wars: Irregular Warfare Relevant to the 21st Century 

 Counterinsurgency Theory and Practice 

 The Vietnam War 

The same year that the National Defense Strategy elevated irregular warfare as the top priority, the 

Naval War College established a Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups which hosts 

conferences and promotes research and teaching on this field.325

Observation: Although the Military Education Coordination Council has only recently 

begun assessing the incorporation of irregular warfare into the curricula of the PME 

institutions, the schools’ began integrating irregular warfare subject matter into core courses 

and offering electives directly related to irregular warfare prior to the formal requirement in 

the 2009 OPMEP. 

74
Observation: Given the PME institutions’ pre-existing irregular warfare treatment, most 

schools will likely satisfy the new Joint Learning Area and Objectives within the OPMEP 

with their existing course offerings. 

 Stability operations are often associated with counterinsurgency, and, at times, with irregular 

warfare, but they can also be conducted apart from irregular warfare in cases such as foreign disaster 

relief or foreign humanitarian assistance.326 Stability operations may also support major 

conventional operations, especially during the last two phases of the military’s six-phase model, 

Phase V (Stabilize) and Phase VI (Enable Civilian Authority).327 

U.S. Army Captain, assigned to the 414th Civil Affairs Battalion, goes door to door to meet the women of 

Assyria, Iraq, in 2006, and invite them to the new women's center on the day of its grand opening. 

 

 The Subcommittee began an examination of stability operations in September 2007 from the 

perspective of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 

Subcommittee also treated this examination as a case study in the larger context of interagency 

cooperation and a “whole-of-government” approach to complex security challenges.328 While it did 

not specifically look at educational preparation in the PME institutions for military service in 

stability operations, the Subcommittee did recognize that the mission is likely to continue into the 

future, and it identified the need to develop an enduring capability for PRT-like missions.329 

 Originally defined simply as “[m]ilitary and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum 

from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions,” stability operations now 

encompass “various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside of the United States in 

coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure 

environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and 

75
humanitarian relief.”330 The definition clarifies that stability operations occur on foreign soil and not 

domestically. In addition to work by PRTs and Human Terrain Teams deployed to Iraq and 

Afghanistan, stability operations also include relief efforts like those recently conducted in Haiti in 

response to natural disaster. 

 As part of “rebalancing” the armed forces to be able to address a wider range of 

contingencies, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR) calls for increasing the capacity of the 

general-purpose forces to conduct, among several other tasks, stability operations.331 The 

significance of stability operations is not only reflected in programmatic decisions, such as the Army 

procuring more Stryker vehicles and the Navy bolstering its riverine craft fleet, but it adds a 

dimension to policy and doctrine as well.332 In a significant shift, the Department promulgated a 

policy in 2005, which was reissued in 2009, elevating stability operations to the level of a “core U.S. 

military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency 

equivalent to combat operations.”333 In its discussion of developing future military leaders, the 

QDR specifically calls for continuing to place special emphasis on stability operations in PME.334 

 In light of this increased emphasis, one could reasonably expect to see more developed 

studies of stability operations enhancing the curricula of the PME institutions, including in 

simulation exercises. One might also expect to see the mandated Learning Areas in the OPMEP 

revised to incorporate this change. The OPMEP does not include stability operations as a learning 

area emphasis at the operational level. Rather, stability operations material is obscured as a 

component of “stability, security, transition, and reconstruction” in an enumeration of functional 

warfare specialties to be covered such as logistics, intelligence, and strategic communications.335 

 

 For this reason, it is difficult to gauge the attention the PME institutions pay to stability 

operations on the basis of the two most recent PAJE reports, which were completed following the 

publication of the current OPMEP. The September 2009 PAJE report for the USAWC did not 

utilize the July 2009 version of the OPMEP but instead that published in 2005 which does not 

mention stability operations.336 The October 2009 PAJE study of the Navy’s CNCS used the 

Learning Areas in the new OPMEP, commenting on the incorporation of cyberspace operations and 

weapons of mass destruction effects, but there is no reference to the integration of stability 

operations into the curriculum.337

Finding: The OPMEP has no distinct Learning Area for stability operations, despite those 

operations being recognized as a core military mission comparable to combat operations 

since 1995 by Departmental policy, which directed that stability operations be “explicitly 

addressed and integrated across all DOD activities,” including those involved in 

education.338

Recommendation: The Director of the Joint Staff should review the OPMEP to 

determine whether it adequately conforms to DOD Directive 3000.05, Stability 

Operations. If it does not, the OPMEP should be revised. 

The Subcommittee asked intermediate PME school leaders to describe the extent their 

simulation exercises and war games incorporated stability operations concepts. They all reported 

progress in this area and gave detailed accounts of their programs. If there was a common trend, it 

was the introduction of stability operations as a factor in scenarios involving adversaries employing 

traditional methods of warfare. For example, the commandant of the JFSC described exercises that 

76
included a five-day event at Joint and Combined Warfighting School which, although based on a 

traditional warfare scenario, called for the writing of a detailed operations plan with Phase V 

(Stabilize) and Phase VI (Enable Civil Authority) components.339 

 Most of the schools also run exercises exclusively devoted to stability operations. The 

Deputy Commandant of the Army CGSC, for instance, cited a 24-hour exercise at his school that 

focused on planning for a post-conflict scenario “where there are remnants of conventional forces 

operating as well as insurgent activities and large displaced populations.”340 Students are required to 

develop a “whole-of-government” approach with plans for working with local authorities “to restore 

rule of law, provide essential services and train and prepare host nation forces to work without 

significant outside support.”341 The president of the Naval War College described an exercise at the 

College of Naval Command and Staff that centered on providing humanitarian assistance in North 

Korea after a severe famine caused the breakdown of order and government capacity there.342 

 The “Nine Innings” exercise at the Marine C&SC appears to take a somewhat original 

approach. The task for students is to develop a four-year “Phase 0” or pre-conflict interagency plan 

that is designed to prevent future instability in a country with potential for disintegration, such as the 

Philippines. Additionally, instead of using a prepared scenario or classified information, the exercise 

draws completely on open source material related to the existing conditions and embraces any realworld events occurring in the country during the period and the exercise immediately leading up to 

it.343 On the whole, the schools appear to be ahead of the formal requirements in incorporating 

stability operations into their curricula. While the PME institutions may be adapting readily to these 

new demands, their response has been in reaction to, rather in anticipation of, the new security 

environment. 

 

Observation: Despite the OPMEP lacking any distinct learning area for stability operations, 

the services and joint schools are incorporating stability operations into their simulations 

and planning exercises at an appropriate level of emphasis, consistent with their status as 

core military missions. 

LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND REGIONAL EXPERTISE

 Although they are not new problems, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored 

the importance of foreign language and cultural competency for the armed forces. Only in recent 

years has the Department explicitly identified foreign language skills and regional expertise as 

“critical warfighting skills.”344 In its 2008 report on the development of language skills and cultural 

competency in the military, the Subcommittee found that despite departmental aspirational goals for 

creating foundational language skills for the general-purpose forces, the services were focused more 

on developing a culturally aware force than a linguistically capable one.345 The PME institutions’ 

efforts are similarly targeted. This, in part, reflects the lack of a requirement for language study in 

the OPMEP.346

 The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) places equal if not greater weight on foreign 

language skills than on regional expertise and cultural skills. Under the major mission area of 

“Succeed in Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism Operations,” the QDR calls for 

building expertise in the three areas of foreign language, regional expertise, and cultural skills, 

77
however, improving the foreign language capacity of the force receives particular emphasis. In 

discussing what key enabling capabilities U.S. forces need to perform more effectively, foreign 

language skills are singled out after improvements in rotary-wing aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, 

and intelligence analysis.347

 The PME institutions take varying approaches with regard to language instruction. Foreign 

language instruction is concentrated at the intermediate level, although there is some study in the 

war colleges. Only the Air Force and the Marine Corps have foreign language requirements for 

graduation. All of the schools struggle with the important demand for language expertise in irregular 

warfare. Their efforts, however, must grapple with the reality that measurable proficiency in a new 

foreign language, especially those commonly used in Iraq and Afghanistan, is difficult to achieve in 

10 months of study dedicated totally to language, much less as a single component of a larger 

curriculum and only 30 to 50 hours of classroom instruction, at most. 

 Since academic year 2007-2008, the Air Command and Staff College has had a mandatory 

foreign language requirement with familiarization or “enhancement” as the goal. Until the current 

academic year, the school primarily used the Rosetta Stone software augmented by periodic assistance 

from visiting Defense Language Institute (DLI) instructors. Based upon student feedback, the 

school has shifted to 30 hours of classroom time with DLI instructors and has placed the language 

software module in a supplemental role. Students can choose from Spanish, French, Mandarin 

Chinese, or Arabic.348 At Air War College, students take a non-credit elective in one of five 

languages (French, Spanish, Russian, Mandarin Chinese, or Arabic), also taught by DLI 

instructors.349 While the Air Force has observed that due to limited exposure, it is very difficult for 

students to gain any more than a very basic proficiency, in the school’s view, it still sends the signal 

to the students that this is an important skill.350 

 Like the Air Force, the Marine Corps has been adjusting its approach to foreign language 

teaching. Beginning in 2004, the Marine C&SC moved toward an ambitious 120-hour program in 

Modern Standard (formal) Arabic taught by contract instructors. Based on student and faculty 

feedback, the school transitioned in academic year 2008-2009 to 47 hours in the classroom with DLI 

instructors in Arabic, French, Korean, or Chinese, followed by a negotiation exercise in the target 

language.351 In describing the exercise, the director of the school explained that “students must 

communicate in a rudimentary fashion to a non-English speaker in the chosen language and 

eventually turn over the negotiation to an interpreter.”352 Again, in response to student feedback 

and the changing national security environment, the school is replacing Korean with one of the 

languages spoken in Afghanistan.353 

 The Naval War College does not offer any language courses at either the College of Naval 

Command Staff or the College of Naval Warfare.354 The rationale behind this decision, according to 

the school’s leadership, is based on the amount of time required to achieve even a basic familiarity 

with a foreign language, especially those spoken in the current theater of operations.355 

 The Command and General Staff College has plotted a middle course, offering elective 

language classes in Arabic, Chinese, and French. After a week of what the school’s deputy 

commandant described as “intensive classes” with DLI instructors, the students spend five months 

in an on-line program where they communicate with their DLI instructors by video teleconference. 

At the conclusion of the distance learning period, the DLI instructors return to the school for a final 

month with the students.356

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Observation: Given the difficulty in imparting more than a rudimentary knowledge of a 

foreign language to students in 10 months of classes, the PME institutions have taken varying 

approaches to foreign language instruction as they balance the importance of language skills 

in irregular warfare and stability operations, where the objective is often the population, 

with the curricular trade-offs that have to be made within the core curriculum. 

 To a more consistent degree than language studies, the services and their PME institutions 

are focused on developing culturally aware forces. The Joint Learning Areas and Objectives in both 

the current OPMEP and its predecessor contain requirements to address “society, religion, and 

culture” at both the intermediate-level and senior-level institutions.357 It is not unusual for the PAJE 

reports to make comments on the cultural and regional material in the curricula. However, the 

observations are selective, rendering it difficult to assess from them; it is necessary to rely heavily on 

the statements and testimony of the school’s leadership. Although the schools’ curricula were 

available for Subcommittee review, it was difficult to discern whether cultural material has simply 

been “relabeled” in the existing core courses or whether it has been more thoughtfully integrated 

into the subject matter. 

 All but one of the six war college-level institutions have a core course or a mandatory 

elective covering regional and cultural studies. National, ICAF, the Air War College, and the Marine 

Corps War College all address this subject area in a dedicated core course. They are variously named 

“Regional Security Studies,” “Regional and Cultural Studies,” or simply “Regional Studies.” 

National’s students are all required to take one regional studies elective related to their travel, as 

discussed below. None of the six core courses at USAWC are specifically devoted to this discipline, 

but students there must take one of their five electives in regional studies.358 The College of Naval 

Warfare has neither a core course nor a required elective in regional studies but offers five regional 

area studies electives. While not mandatory, the school reports that a significant number of students 

per year enroll in these electives.359

 There are international travel programs associated with regional study courses at the Air War 

College, National, and the Marine Corps War College. Although ICAF’s Regional Security Studies 

course does not have a travel component, students can concentrate on a region and usually visit it in 

the international field studies trip connected with their Industry Studies core course.360 Students at 

the Marine Corps War College are able to travel to several strategic regions in part because of their 

school’s small size.361

 At the intermediate level, the Marine Corps is the only service with a core course with the 

express purpose of addressing regional and cultural studies. According to the school catalog, its 

Culture and Interagency Operations course “is designed to improve students’ abilities to understand 

and analyze regional cultures and the interagency components of national and international 

governments at the operational level of war.”362 Students at the Army CGSC, like their war college 

counterparts, are required to take one regional studies elective.363 The Navy’s CNCS does not have 

a required regional studies course in the core curriculum or mandatory elective, but the school does 

assign each seminar group one of five geographic combatant command areas of operations in the 

National Security and Decision Making course.364 

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 This is not to say that the other schools’ curricula are devoid of content in regional and 

cultural studies. There is an inherent cultural component in schools with language studies such as at 

ACSC. Additionally, there is a regional studies element intrinsic to the simulation exercises at all the 

schools which are routinely set in different parts of the world. 

JOINT, INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

 In the past decade, curricular standards in succeeding versions of the OPMEP have moved 

beyond “joint,” in the limited sense of multiservice operations. They now encompass the JIIM 

aspects of operating in the present security environment.365 The development of, and increase in, 

curricular standards for this subject area has been a feature of succeeding versions of the OPMEP. 

 The 2000 version of the OPMEP made no mention of JIIM.366 By comparison, the 2005 

OPMEP devoted a single Learning Objective to “joint, unified, and multinational campaign and 

operations” within the Learning Area of “Theater Strategy and Campaigning” to be taught at senior 

schools. The 2009 OPMEP, however, added two new Learning Areas: “Joint Warfare, Theater 

Strategy, and Campaigning in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational 

Environment” and “Integration of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational 

Capabilities.” These two Learning Areas now include 10 separate Learning Objectives. As the 

PAJE has not yet evaluated a senior school pursuant to the 2009 OPMEP requirements, it is too 

early to assess how well the senior schools are implementing these new curricular standards.367

 For the intermediate schools, the 2005 version of the OPMEP devotes a Learning Area 

consisting of six Learning Objectives pertaining to “Joint and Multinational Forces at the 

Operational Level of War,” but these objectives did not contemplate the interagency or 

intergovernmental aspects.368 The title of this Learning Area remains unchanged in the 2009 

version, but the Learning Objectives reflect greater attention to, among other factors, society, 

culture, and religion.369 Although there are fewer curricular standards in the OPMEP for 

intermediate schools than for their senior counterparts, this may be appropriate as the services each 

approach JIIM considerations differently at the tactical and operational levels based on their servicespecific needs. 

 If there are future candidates for inclusion to add to the holistic approach reflected in the 

JIIM acronym, both industry and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) merit consideration. In 

his 2010 written testimony for Congress, the commander of U.S. European Command underscored 

the necessity of military-private sector cooperation in countering piracy.370 In his previous role as 

commander of U.S. Southern Command, he established a staff section for public-private 

cooperation. U.S. Southern Command established a number of initiatives, including goodwill 

activities on the part of NGOs and industry in support of U.S. engagement in the region.371 

80
 U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant and Ugandan Captains, troubleshoot a tactical chat program that allows radio 

operators to send data over high-frequency radios. 

 In his 2010 posture statement, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command recognized the 

challenge of information sharing outside the limits of its subordinate military elements and higher 

headquarters. He stated that “[t]he ability to exchange information among DoD components, all 

levels of the U.S. Government, coalition partners, and the private sector is becoming increasingly 

important to regional operations.”372 Additionally, he highlighted efforts to create information 

technology infrastructure that would allow the command to communicate with industry partners.373 

Although private-sector collaboration is becoming progressively more important to combatant 

commanders, practice may not be at the point yet where it can be institutionalized in the PME 

system through adoption of dedicated OPMEP Learning Area(s) and/or Learning Objective(s) 

which would cover cooperative operations with private entities. 

Finding: As interagency and intergovernmental dimensions increasingly factor in the 

different levels of war, the Military Education Coordinating Council has added curricular 

standards related to joint, international, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) 

considerations in joint operations. Since each service approaches JIIM differently based on 

how they operate within the joint environment, there may only be a need for a base line 

curricular standard. 

Recommendation: The Joint Staff should continue incorporating a base curricular 

standard with respect to JIIM and at the same time allow flexibility for the services to 

tailor the instruction best suited to their requirements. 

Finding: There is a necessity for combatant commanders to cooperate with the private 

sector in some operations such as combating piracy. There is potential for the combatant 

commands to engage in private sector partnerships with NGOs and industry to support U.S. 

engagement activities. 

81
Recommendation: The Joint Staff should consider incorporating OPMEP Learning 

Area(s) and/or Learning Objective(s), regarding cooperative operations with private 

entities. 

HISTORY

 As mentioned previously, the study of history, and military history in particular, has 

traditionally formed the basis of the curricula at PME institutions. The Skelton Report’s discussion 

of the importance of teaching history and its relationship to developing officers with an 

understanding of strategy, is worth quoting in its entirety: 

History, or more specifically the lessons of history, provides insights into how 

nations have adapted their military and security strategies over time to deal with 

changing domestic and international environments. Strategy is, after all, dynamic. It 

must take into account changing realities and circumstances. Military history is 

especially important. The history of combat operations, including an understanding 

of why a commander chose a given alternative, is at the heart of an education in 

strategy.374

This is not to say that military history should dominate the core curricula, but that it should have a 

prominent place, especially at the intermediate schools. In fact, the Panel operated under the 

assumption that students would arrive at the senior schools already well-grounded in history.375

First Class National War College (1946)

82
83

 Strangely, there is no real mention of history in the OPMEP. There are no Joint Learning 

Areas and Objectives for military history, even for joint operations. It is arguable that the inclusion 

of military history as a specific curricular area for evaluation by the PAJE would provide insulation 

from consideration for cutbacks to accommodate new material. Still, there are no established 

criteria for measuring student understanding or appreciation for what many deem to be the 

foundation of PME. 

 While history courses are primarily elective, the schools integrate military history throughout 

their core curricula and underscore special history-related activities such as staff rides to historical 

battlefields. School leaders consistently emphasized history’s importance as the underpinning of 

their curricula.376 The Marine C&SC goes as far as including the study of history in its mission 

statement with the preamble, “Informed by the study of history and culture. . . .”377

 The Subcommittee heard complaints from faculty in more than one location that the 

classroom hours needed for adding emerging topics, such as irregular warfare or science and 

engineering, had come largely out of the previous treatment of history.378 Given the dispersion 

throughout the coursework, it is difficult to gauge the total number of curriculum hours spent 

teaching military history. Nonetheless, there appears to be sensitivity among history faculty in some 

schools over a shrinking portion of the curriculum being spent on the study of history. 

Observation: There is no military history requirement in the OPMEP. There is a perception 

among some faculty that the trade-offs between enduring and emerging subject matter are 

coming at the expense of providing an adequate foundation in history for the students. 
84

                                                           

1 Department of Defense Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education, 11 April 2006, 11 

(citing the CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, November 2005). 2 The Skelton Report, 11-12. 3 See Goldwater-Nichols, Sec. 401. 4 See Goldwater-Nichols, Sec. 401. See also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, P.L. 100-180, 

Sec. 1301(b), Sec. 1302(a), 4 December 1987, and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989, P.L. 100-456, Sec. 

511, Sec. 512(a), 29 September 1988. Congress also granted the Department authority to issue waivers and make 

exceptions for JPME completion as well as authority to designate a limited number of officers as JSOs even if they 

completed their JPME and joint duty assignments out of sequence. 

5 The Skelton Report, 52. 6 Ibid., 102. 7 Goldwater-Nichols, Sec. 401. 8 Ibid.

9 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Conference Report 103-357, Sec. 933, 195; see also 10 U.S.C. 

§663(b)(2). 

10 See 10 U.S.C. §663. 

11 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Senate Report 109-254, 317. 12 The Skelton Report, 57 (emphasis in the original). 13 Ibid. (emphasis added). 14 Ibid., 58. 15 Ibid. 16 See 10 U.S.C. §§2152(c) and 2155(b). See also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Sec. 

1123. 

17 10 U.S.C. §2152(c) (originally 10 U.S.C. §663(c) pursuant to Goldwater-Nichols, Sec. 401). 18 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, P.L. 101-189, Sec. 1123, 29 November 1989. 19 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, House Report 108-491, 319-320. 20 10 U.S.C. §2155(b). 

21 See 10 U.S.C. §§661-668. 

22 See 10 U.S.C. §661, and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Conference Report 109-702, 107-111 and 

711-712. 

23 See 10 U.S.C. §§661-663 and §668. See also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Conference Report 109-

702, 107-111 and 711-712. 24 The Skelton Report, 16. 25 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Sec. 1302(a)(1), (amending 10 U.S.C. §661(d)(1)). 

See also Goldwater-Nichols, Sec. 401, and The Skelton Report, 4. 26 The Skelton Report, 17, and Joint Staff Legislative Liaison, Written Response to HASC O&I Subcommittee Request for 

Information, 27 February 2010, Attachment 7, “2008 JDAL Positions by Paygrade,” 1-2. 27 10 U.S.C. §661(d)(1). See also 10 U.S.C. §661(b)-(c). 28 Joint Staff, Briefing to HASC Staff, 6 November 2009. 29 Ibid.

30 See 10 U.S.C. §619a. 

31 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Conference Report 108-767, 91-92. 32Joint Staff DJ-7/Joint Training Division, “The Joint Staff Officer Project” Final Report, April 2008, 5; HASC O&I 

Subcommittee Staff Visit to U.S. Southern Command, 6 May 2009; HASC O&I Subcommittee Staff Visit to U.S. 

Transportation Command and U.S. Strategic Command, 27-28 May 2009; and, HASC Staff Visit to U.S. Northern 

Command, 30 June 2009. 

33 “The Joint Staff Officer Project,” 5. 

34 Ibid., 15. 35 Ibid., 10 (emphasis added). 36 See 10 U.S.C. §§661-668. 

37 Joint Staff Legislative Liaison, Written Response to HASC O&I Subcommittee Request for Information, 25 February 

2010, Attachment 7, “2008 JDAL Positions by Paygrade,” 1-2. 38 Ibid., 1. See also “The Joint Staff Officer Project,” 22-23, and Department of Defense Instruction Number 1300.19, “DoD 

Joint Officer Management,” 31 October 2007 (incorporating changes through 16 February 2010). 39 Joint Staff DJ-7, Briefing to HASC Staff on “The Joint Staff Officer Project,” 24 September 2009, slide 4. 40 “The Joint Staff Officer Project,” 10 (emphasis in the original). 
85

                                                                                                                                                                                               

41 Ibid., 57. 42 See Joint Staff Information Paper, 21 September 2009. 43 See “The Joint Staff Officer Project,” 6, 57, and 59-61. (The Fenty Study reported that “a very small percentage of 

those arriving for duty who were eligible to attend JPME II had actually attended.” Only approximately 19 percent of 

the O-4s surveyed by the study had completed it, but almost 23 percent of all participants had attended JPME II. In 

addition report, “Officers and senior leaders also felt JPME II (or some version of it) should be part of mandatory 

preparation—regardless of the rank of incoming personnel—immediately prior to or en route to a Combatant 

Command assignment.”) 

44 “The Joint Staff Officer Project,” 57. 

45 Ibid., 58. 46 See Ibid. 47 See Ibid., 23. 48 See 10 U.S.C. §661(d)(2). 

49 See Goldwater-Nichols, Sec. 401. 50 10 U.S.C. §2155(b)(2)(A). 

51 10 U.S.C. §2152(c). 

52 Joint Staff, Briefing to HASC Staff, 6 November 2009. See also the “Joint Staff Officer Project,” 59. 53 Joint Staff Legislative Liaison, Written Response to HASC O&I Subcommittee Request for Information, 25 February 

2010, Attachment 1, “2008 JDAL Positions by Category,” 1. 

54 Joint Staff, Briefing to HASC Staff, 17 September 2009. 55 Ibid.

56 “The Joint Staff Officer Project,” 7. 

57 Ibid., 76. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid., 37. 60 “Joint Staff Officer Project,” 80. 

61 Ibid., 80. 62 Ibid., 84. 63 Ibid., 85. 64 Ibid., 86. 65 Ibid., 87. 66 Ibid., 91. 67 “The Joint Staff Officer Project,” 16-17, 19-20, and 58. 68 Ibid., 85-87. 69 David M. Rodney, Christine H. Fox, Samuel D. Kleinman, Michael J. Moskowitz, and Mary E. Lauer, “Developing an 

Education Strategy for URL Officers,” Center for Naval Analysis, March 2008, 1. 70 Ibid., 1. 71 Ibid.

72 Ibid. Judith Hicks Stiehm also discusses Army War College graduate and supervisors surveys in her 2002 The U.S. 

Army War College: Military Education in a Democracy (Temple University Press: Philadelphia, PA), 79-81, finding similarly 

troubling results. 

73 “The Joint Staff Officer Project,” 59. 

74 Dan Sitterly, Response to Question for the Record, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 

Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders: The Role of Professional 

Military Education in Officer Development, 28 July 2009, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-07-038; MajGen (sel) Spiese, Response to 

Question for the Record, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-07-029; and LTG William B. Caldwell IV, Response to Question 

for the Record, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-07-010. 

75 Scott Lutterloh, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military 

Leaders, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-07-020. 76 Ibid.

77 Memorandum for NORAD and USNORTHCOM Directors, Policy Memorandum, “Joint Professional Military 

Education (JPME) Phase II,” August 27, 2008. 78 Ibid.

79 U.S Central Command, “Command Policy Letter Number 40,” 9 April 2009. 80 HASC O&I Subcommittee Staff Visit to U.S. Central Command, 4-7 May 2009. 81 HASC O&I Subcommittee Staff Visit to U.S. Southern Command, 4-7 May 2009. 
86

                                                                                                                                                                                               

82 CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, November 2005, 6. See also 10 U.S.C. §2154. 83 Department of Defense Legislative Proposal to the HASC (draft), submitted April 2010. 84 HASC O&I Subcommittee Staff Visit to Joint Forces Staff College, 1 May 2009. 

85 Gordon Nathaniel Lederman, Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, (Westport, CT: 

Greenwood Press, 1999), 107. 

86 LTG Caldwell, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders. 87 General Martin Dempsey, USA, Commanding General, Army Training and Doctrine Command, Meeting with HASC 

O&I Subcommittee Staff, 30 April 2009. 

88 Paxton, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders, Response to Questions for the Record,

CHARRTS No: HASCOI-07-001. 

89 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1300.05, Joint Officer Management Program Procedures, 1 May 2008. 90 Paxton, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders, Response to Questions for the Record, 

CHARRTS No: HASCOI-07-001. An explanation of the “intensity factor” multiplier in the point accrual formula for 

joint experience points is contained in DODI 1300.19, DOD Joint Officer Management Program, 21 August 2008, 18. 91 Department of Defense Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education, 3 April 2006, 13 and 

18. 

92 U.S. Joint Forces Command, The 2010 Joint Operating Environment (JOE), 5. 93 RADM Daniel Davenport and RDML John Richardson, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Briefing to HASC Staff, 20 

March 2009, and The 2010 Joint Operating Environment. 94 The 2010 Joint Operating Environment, 4. 95 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (Version 3.0), 28. 96 Ibid., 28 and 30-35. 97 “Service Responsibilities Regarding Joint Officer Development,” CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development, November 

2005, 2. 

98 Ibid., 8 (emphasis in the original). 99 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (Version 3.0), 28 (emphasis added). 100 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & 

Investigations, Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, April 2008, No. 8, and Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces, June 

2007, 131-133. 

101 OPMEP, E-B-1 through 3. 102 Ibid., E-C-1 through 4. 103 OPMEP (22 December 2005), E-B-3. 104 Joint Doctrine and Education Division, Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate (DJ-7), HASC 

O&I Subcommittee Staff Briefing, 1 October 2009. 

105 Student Panel, HASC Staff Visit, College of Naval Command and Staff, 7 April 2009. 106 The Skelton Report, 35. 107 Ibid., 33. 108 Ibid., 33-34. 109 10 U.S.C. §2155 (c)(1). 110 OPMEP, E-E-1. 111 10 U.S.C. §2155 (c)(1), 10 U.S.C. §2151 (a)(1). 112 The Skelton Report, 30-32. 113 Ibid., 31. 114 General George Casey, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, HASC O&I Subcommittee Members Meeting, 21 October 2009. 115 Ibid. See also, Army OCLL email to HASC staff, 8 April 2010. 116 David H. Petraeus, “Beyond the Cloister,” The National Interest, July/August 2007. Accessed online at 

http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=290&MId=1 (12 November 2009), 2. 117 Ibid. 118 Lieutenant General (Ret.) David Barno, Written Testimony, Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 

Armed Services, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Charting the Course for Effective 

Professional Military Education, 10 September 2009. 119 Professor Williamson Murray, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course. 120 The Skelton Report, 31. 
87

                                                                                                                                                                                               

121 Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigations, Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education 20 Years After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and 

the Skelton Panel, 20 May 2009. 122 Dr. Janet Breslin-Smith, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? 123 Dr. John Williams, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course. 124 General James Conway, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, HASC O&I Subcommittee Members Meeting, 24 

September 2009. 

125 HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course. 126 HASC O&I Members Meeting, Admiral Michael Mullen, 27 October 2009. 127 Murray, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course. 128 10 U.S.C. §§2161, 2163, 4314, 4321, 7048, 7101, 7102, 9314, and 9317. 129 Dan Sitterly, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders. 130 Dr. Stephen Chiabotti, Dean, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Telephone Interview, 18 August 2009. 131 Col. Mace Carpenter and Dr. Sorin Lungu, HASC O&I Subcommittee Staff Briefing, “School of Advanced Strategic 

Planning and Strategy (ASPS),” 12 August 2009. 132 Colin S. Gray, “On Strategic Performance,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 1995-1996, 34. 133 The Skelton Report, 28. 134 Ibid., 31. 135 Ibid., 39. 136 Ibid., 29 and 39-41. 137 Ibid., 40. 138 Ibid. 139 Ibid. 140 See Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Chapter 13: Toward and Understanding of Military Strategy,” U.S. Army War College Guide to 

Strategy, February 2001, 179. See also Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 69, 75, and 177 (defining strategy as “the use of the engagement for 

the purpose of the war,” wherein Clausewitz recognized the term “war” both as “an act of force to compel our enemy to 

do our will,” and “nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.”); Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime 

Strategy, (New York, NY: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911), 308 (“Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in 

view.”); B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, (London: Faber and Faber, 1954), 335 (defining strategy as “the 

art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil [sic] the ends of policy”); Gabriel Marcella and Stephen O. 

Fought, “Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 52, 1st Quarter 2009, 57 (“Strategy is the art 

of applying power to achieve objectives within the limits imposed by policy”); and, Colin S. Gray, “Schools for Strategy: 

Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict,” Strategic Studies Institute, 28 October 2009, 7 (“I choose to define (military) 

strategy as the direction and use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.”). 141 See Michael J. Mazar and Colonel Nelson Cabot, USAF, Introduction to Strategy, Core Course 6100 Academic Year 2008-

2009, The National War College, 24. 142 “Strategy,” Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 143 See Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1973), 452. 144 The Skelton Report, 25. 145 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard University Press, 1957), 262-263, 307-309, and 418-423; The Skelton Report, 23; Introduction to Strategy, The 

National War College, 14; and, HASC O&I Hearing, Investing in our Military Leaders. 146 Gray, “On Strategic Performance,” 34. 147 The Skelton Report, 26. 148 Ibid., 149 Ibid., (citing the 1982 Army Field Manual (FM 100-5) definition of ‘Operational Art’). 150 Ibid.. 151 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, 34. 152 U.S. Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010, 18 February 2010, 70. 153 Ibid., 62 and 18. 154 See Colin S. Gray, Schools for Teaching Strategy, 8. See also Marcella and Fought, “Teaching Strategy in the 21st

Century,” 57. 

155 See U.S. Joint Forces Command, The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010, 18 February 2010, 4. 156 Ibid., 2. 157 Ibid., 71.
88

                                                                                                                                                                                               

158 Murray, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course, Response to Question for the Record, 1-2. 159 The Skelton Report, 27-28. 160 Ibid., 28 161 Ibid. 162 HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in our Military Leaders. See also RADM James P. Wisecup, Response to 

Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course, CHARRTS No.:HASCOI-06-008, 3, 

and Professor Milan Vego, “There’s No Place Like Newport,” Proceedings, February 2010, 40. 163 See, e.g., HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearings, Investing in our Military Leaders and Charting the Course. 164 Colin S. Gray, Schools for Teaching Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict, November 2009, 31. 165 Ibid. 166 Joint Staff Legislative Liaison, Written Response to HASC O&I Subcommittee Request for Information, 13 

November 2009, Attachment 6.

167 OPMEP, D-1. 168 Ibid., A-1 (emphasis added). 169 Ibid., A-A-1 - A-A-2 (emphasis added). 170 See Gray, Schools for Teaching Strategy, v. 171 OPMEP, 2. 172 HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in our Military Leaders. 173 Ibid. 174 The Skelton Report, 39. 175 Ibid., 39-40. 176 Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, (DA PAM 600-3), 1 February 2010, 266-267; Army 

Legislative Liaison, Written Response to a HASC O&I Subcommittee Request for Information, 3 February 2010. 177 Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, 263. 178 Ibid., 264. 179 BG Edward P. Donnelly, HASC O&I Staff Briefing, 7 October 2009; Army Legislative Liaison, Written Response to 

a HASC O&I Subcommittee Request for Information, 3 February 2010; and, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, 

Charting the Course. 180 Donnelly, HASC O&I Staff Briefing, 7 October 2009. 181 Ibid. 182 Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, 266. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid., 266-267. 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid., 266-268. 187 Donnelly, HASC O&I Staff Briefing, 7 October 2009. 188 Ibid. and Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, 266, 267, and 269. 189 Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, 264-265 and 269. 191 Ibid., 269. 192 Navy Legislative Liaison, Written Response to a HASC O&I Subcommittee Request for Information, 20 November 

2009, 1.

193 Navy Legislative Liaison, Written Response to a HASC O&I Subcommittee Request for Information, 10 March 2010. 

Some naval officers hold more than one strategic subspecialty designation. 194 Ibid. 195 Navy Legislative Liaison, “National Security Studies (2000) Core Skill Requirements,” Response to a HASC O&I 

Subcommittee Request for Information, 25 November 2009, 1. 196 Ibid.,1. 197 Ibid. 198 HASC O&I Staff Visit to NWC, 7 April 2009. 199 “National Security Studies (2000) Core Skill Requirements,” 1. 200 RADM Wisecup, Response to Question for the Record, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on 

Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations Hearing, Raising Thinking from the Tactical to the Operational 

Level: JPME I and II at the Services’ and Joint Command & Staff Colleges, 25 June 2009, CHARRTS No.:HASCOI-06-010, 1-2. 201 RADM Wisecup, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking,

CHARRTS No.:HASCOI-06-008, 3; See also, Professor Milan Vego, “There’s No Place Like Newport,” 40. 
89

                                                                                                                                                                                               

202 See Admiral James Stavridis and Captain Mark Hagerott, “The Heart of an Officer: Joint Interagency, and 

International Operations and Navy Career Development,” Naval War College Review, Volume 62, Number 2, Spring 2009, 

30 and 33-34.

203 Air Force Legislative Liaison, Written Response to a HASC O&I Subcommittee Request for Information, 30 

October 2009, 2.

204 Marine Corps Legislative Liaison, Written response to a HASC O&I Subcommittee Request for Information, 17 

November 2009, 4.

205 Ibid. 206 The Skelton Report, 29. 207 Ibid., 30 (emphasis in the original). 208 Ibid. 209 Ibid. 210 Ibid., 30. 211 Ibid., 31. 212 Ibid., 30. 213 Ibid., 31. 214 Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Legislative Liaisons, Written Responses to a HASC O&I Subcommittee 

Requests for Information, 3 November 2009 (USA), 13 and 16 November 2009 (USN), 30 October 2009 (USAF), and 

17 November 2009 (USMC).

215 Barno, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course; See also, Dr. John A. Nagl and Brian M. 

Burton “Revitalizing America’s Officer Core,” Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer Corps, Center for a 

New American Security, February 2010, 69-70. 216 The Skelton Report, 34-35. 217 See 10 U.S.C. §2155, and OPMEP, A-A-7 - A-A-8 and A-A-A-1. 218 See 10 U.S.C. §§2151(a) and 2154. 219 OPMEP, A-A-7 and E-C-1 - E-C-3. 220 See e.g., HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders. 221 See 10 U.S.C. §2151(a). 222 OPMEP, A-A-7 and E-C-1 - E-C-3. 223 Ibid., A-A-7; A-A-A-1; and, E-D-1 - E-D-3. 224 These programs include the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the Navy’s Maritime Advanced 

Warfighting School (MAWS), the Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), and the Marine 

Corps’ School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW). Graduates of MAWS receive a master’s degree in national security and 

strategic studies from the Naval War College; graduates of SAMS earn a master’s degree in military arts and sciences; 

SAASS graduates are awarded a master’s degree in airpower arts and sciences from the Air University; and graduates of 

SAW may elect to earn a master’s degree in operational studies.

225 The Marine Corps limits the focus of SAW to the operational level of warfare. 226 Barno, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course, 6. 227 See 10 U.S.C. §2155(c). 228 OPMEP, A-A-7 - A-A-8 and A-A-A-1. 229 OPMEP, A-A-8 and A-A-A-1. 230 Ibid, A-A-7 - A-A-8, and A-A-A-1. 231 Ibid., A-A-8 and E-H-1 - E-H-3. 232 Ibid., E-H-1. 233 RADM Wisecup, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, 

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-06-008, 3 (quoting Admiral Stansfield Turner). 234 HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course. 235 See MG Robert Scales, USA (Ret.), “Too Busy to Learn,” Proceedings, February 2010, 33; Colonel Mace Carpenter, 

“School of Advanced Strategic Planning and Strategy (ASPS) Proposal,” Slide 10. 236 OPMEP, A-A-8; E-K-1 - E-K-2. 237 See HASC O&I Hearing, Charting the Course. See also Paula G. Thornhill, “Flag Officer Education: It’s Time to 

Improve the Capstone Course,” Armed Forces Journal (online edition), 9 April 2010, 4. 238 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “CAPSTONE Course Guidance,” Memorandum for the President, National Defense 

University, 23 June 2009. 239 OPMEP, E-L-1 and E-L-3 240 OPMEP, E-L-1 - E-L-4. 
90

                                                                                                                                                                                               

241 Ibid., A-A-8 and E-M-1. 242 General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, HASC O&I Members Meeting, 21 October 2009; and 

Admiral Gary Roughead, HASC O&I Members Meeting, Chief of Naval Operations, 29 September 2009. 243 Barno, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course, 6-7. 244 The Skelton Report, 158. 245 Ibid. 246 Ibid. 247 Ibid., 158-161. 248 OPMEP, E-1. 249 The Skelton Report, 160. 250 OPMEP, E-1. 251 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS), 21-

25 April 2008, 4, and DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), U.S. Air Force Command 

and Staff College (ACSC), 25-29 February 2008, 6. 252 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), U.S. Air Force Command and Staff College 

(ACSC), 25-29 February 2008, 6. 253 National Leaders, Faculty and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visit, 3 April 2009. 254 Alan Brinkley, Betty Dessants, Michael Flamm, Cynthia Fleming, Charles Forcey and Eric Rothschild, The Chicago 

Handbook for Teachers, A Practical Guide to the College Classroom, (Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 255 CODELs Snyder and HASC Staff Visits to PME Institutions, March – July 2009. 256 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), Marine Corps War College (MCWAR), 12-14 

January 2009, 5. 

257 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), U.S. Air Force Command and Staff College 

(ACSC), 25-29 February 2008, 6. 258 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), College of Naval Warfare (CNW), 14-18 May 

2007, 6. 

259 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), U.S. Army War College (USAWC), 21-15 

September 2009, 6. 

260 OPMEP, B-1 and B-2. 261 Ibid. 262 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), Marine Corps War College (MCWAR), 12-14 

January 2009, 5. 

263 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), College of Naval Warfare (CNW), 4-7 May, 

2009, 4, and DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), U.S. Army War College (USAWC), 

21-25 September 2009, 5. 

264 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), College of Naval Command and Staff (CNCS), 

25-30 October, 2009, 5. 

265 Skelton Report, 37. 266 Ibid., 37. 267 Ibid., 44. 268 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process or Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), College of Naval Command and Staff, 25-30 

October 2009, 1, 5, 11, and 14-16. 

269 General Martin Dempsey, HASC O&I Staff Meeting, 30 April 2009. 270 Skelton Report, 162. 271 Ibid., 165-166. 272 Ibid., 162-163. 273 Ibid., 166. 274 “USAWC Student Academic Assessment and Evaluation Resident and Distance Education Programs,” Carlisle 

Barracks Memorandum 623-1, (Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 11 January 2007), 3. 275 “Naval War College Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM),” NWC Instruction 1520.2 (Newport, 

RI), Annex A-2 - C-3. 

276 Ibid., Annex A-2 - C-5. 277 CDR Thomas Sliski, NWC, Email to HASC O&I Subcommittee Staff, 26 January 2010. 278 National War College Student Handbook 2008-2009, 30. 279 ICAF Policy Paper, “Student Evaluations/Grading Policy: Academic Year 2008-2009,” undated. 280 Student Panel, HASC O&I Staff Visit, CGSC, 27 May 2009. 
91

                                                                                                                                                                                               

281 Breslin-Smith, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? 282 Murray, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course. 283 Williams, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course,. 284 OPMEP, E-1. 285 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), USA Command and General Staff College 

(CGSC), 25-29 February 2008, 5. 286 Student Panel, HASC O&I Staff Visit, CGSC, 27 May 2009. 287 Ibid. 288 Faculty Panel, HASC O&I Staff Visit, CGSC, 27 May 2009. 289 Student Panel, HASC Staff Visit, ACSC, 9 April 2009. 290 Student Panel, HASC O&I Staff Visit, CGSC, 27 May 2009. 291 Faculty Panel, HASC O&I Staff Visit, CGSC, 27 May 2009. 292 Major General Robert M. Williams, Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 

Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Response to a Question for the Record, HASC O&I 

Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners: Do Senior Professional Military Education Schools Produce Strategists? 4 June 2009, 

CHARRTS No: HASCOI-05-003. 

293 Ibid. 294 Ibid. 295 Skelton Report, 79 and 120. 296 Ibid., 120 and 122. 297 OPMEP (22 December 2005), E-K-1. 298 Ibid., 4. 299 Joint Staff DJ-7 Joint Education and Doctrine Division, HASC O&I Staff Briefing, 19 August 2009. 300 Catapult Consultants, CAPSTONE Program Independent Review Final Report, January 2009. 301 CJCS Memorandum for the President, National Defense University (CM-0764-09), 23 June 2009. 302 Joint Staff DJ-7 Joint Education and Doctrine Division, HASC O&I Staff Briefing, 19 August 2009. 303 Skelton Report, 162. 304 Ibid., 68-69. 305 Ibid., 68. 306 OPMEP, E-1. 307 Major General Robert Steel, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. 308 HASC Staff Visit to Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, 23 March 2009. 309 Brigadier General Jimmie Jackson, Written Testimony, Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 

Armed Services, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Hearing, Raising Thinking from the 

Tactical to the Operational Level: JPME I and II at the Services’ and Joint Command & Staff Colleges, 25 June 2009. 310 Faculty Panel, HASC O&I Staff Visit, CGSC, 26 May 2009, and Faculty Panel, HASC O&I Staff Visit, National, 3 

April 2009. 

311 Cardon, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, Written Testimony, 16. 312 MajGen Steel.Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. 313 The Skelton Report, 24. 314 RADM Wisecup, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. 315 Irregular Warfare (IW): Joint Operating Concept, 11September 2007, 6. 316 Ibid., 1, and DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (current as of 31 October 2009). 317 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008., 4 and 13. 318 OPMEP, A-2 (emphasis added). 319 Ibid., A-2, 3. 320 The OPMEP prescribes Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for the levels of service PME and for individual joint 

schools. Within the Joint Learning Areas and Objectives are numbered Learning Areas for specific requirements. 321 Ibid., E-C-2. 322 Brigadier General Edward Cardon, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking. 323 Ibid. 324 Damm, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, Written Testimony, 14-15. 325 RADM Wisecup, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. 326 Irregular Warfare (IW): Joint Operating Concept, 11September 2007, 10. 327 Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (with change 1 of 12 February 2008), iv. The six phases are: shape, deter, seize 

the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civilian authority. 
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328 Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigations, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, 5 September 2007. 329 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & 

Investigations, Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, April 2008, 51. 330 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, and Transition and Reconstruction,” 

(Washington, DC: 28 November 2005), 2, and Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” 

(Washington, DC: 16 September 2009), 15. 

331 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, DC: February 2010), viii. 332 Ibid., 24. 333 DODI 3000.05, “Stability Operations,” 2. 334 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, xiii. 335 OPMEP, E-C-3. The OPMEP makes no mention of stability operations but does use the SSTR acronym with 

encompasses stability operations. 

336 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), U.S. Army War College, 21-25 

September 2009, 12-19. 

337 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), College of Naval Command and 

Staff, 25-30 October 2009, 16-17. 338 DODD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, and Transition and Reconstruction,” 2. 339 Brigadier General Katherine P. Kasun, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, 

Raising Thinking, CHARRTS No: HASCOI-06-005. 340 Brigadier General Edward Cardon, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, 

Raising Thinking, CHARRTS No: HASCOI-06-005. 341 Ibid. 342 HASC RADM Wisecup, Response to Questions for the Record, O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, 

CHARRTS No: HASCOI-06-005 

343 Colonel Raymond Damm, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising 

Thinking, CHARRTS No: HASCOI-06-005. 344 Language and Regional Expertise Planning, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3126.01 (current as of 11 

February 2008), A-1. 

345 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & 

Investigations, Building Language Skills and Cultural Competency in the Military: DOD’s Challenge in Today’s Educational 

Environment, November 2008. 346 OPMEP, Enclosure E. 347 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 18 and 25. 348 ACSC Staff, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No: HASCOI-06-023. 

349 Major General Maurice Forsyth, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. 350 ACSC Staff, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No: HASCOI-06-023, and HASC Staff Visit, AU, 9 April 2009. 

351 CODEL Snyder to MCU, Quantico, VA, 29 May, 2009. 352 Col Damm, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No: HASCOI-06-023. 

353 CODEL Snyder to MCU, Quantico, VA, 29 March, 2009. 354 RADM Wisecup, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. 355 O&I Subcommittee staff discussions with Naval War College Staff and Faculty, Newport, RI, 6 April 2009. 356 BG Cardon, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking. 357 OPMEP, E-C-2 and E-D-2. 358 Rear Admiral Garry Hall, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. 359 RADM Wisecup, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. 360 RADM Hall, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. 361 Colonel Michael Belcher, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. 362 “Marine Corps University Catalog,” Academic Year 2008-2009, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, 42. 363 BG Cardon, Email to HASC O&I Subcommittee, 19 June 2009. 364 William Spain, Email to HASC O&I Subcommittee, 19 June 2009. 
93

                                                                                                                                                                                               

365 The definitions of the terms describing the JIIM environment are contained in Joint Publication 3-16, Joint Doctrine for 

Multinational Operations, 7 March 2007 and further developed in “Turning Ideas into Action,” Project on National Security 

Reform, September 2009, accessed online on 23 March 2010 at 

http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr_turning_ideas_into_action.pdf. 366 OMPEP (1 December 2000), E-B-1, 2, 3. 367 OPMEP (22 December 2005), E-D-2. 368 Ibid., E-C-2. 369 Ibid., E-D-2. 370 Testimony of Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN, Commander, United States European Command before the House 

Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2010. 

371 Posture Statement of Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN, Commander, U.S. Southern Command before the House 

Armed Services Committee, 18 March 2009 and Posture Statement of General Douglas M. Fraser, USAF, Commander, 

United States Southern Command, 12 March 2010. 372 Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, USN, Commander, United States Pacific Command before the House 

Armed Services Committee, 25 March 2010 (emphasis added). 373 Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, USN, Commander, United States Pacific Command before the House 

Armed Services Committee, 25 March 2010. 

374 Skelton Report, 30. 375 Ibid., 131. 376 Major General Robert Williams, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. 377 “Marine Corps University Catalog,” Academic Year 2008-2009, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, 39. 378 Faculty Panel, HASC O&I Staff Visit, CGSC, 26 May 2009, and Faculty Panel, HASC Staff Visit, 3 April 2009. 
94
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

 This section of the report begins with a review of professional military education (PME) 

organizational structures starting with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and moving to the joint institutions. The report then briefly reviews service PME 

structures and issues with service PME institutions. Next, the report highlights human resources 

with brief portions on diversity and quality in general before discussing senior leaders, faculty, staff, 

and students. Finally, this section of the report briefly reviews several issues related to material 

resources. The faculty portion of this report is significant. The Subcommittee notes, as did the 

Skelton Panel, that faculty is the bedrock of the PME enterprise. Faculty issues, therefore, 

warranted most of the Subcommittee’s attention in this section of the report. 

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

“What is the appropriate [PME] organizational framework to provide control 

and oversight?” 1

Jeffrey D. McCausland 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ROLES IN PME 

The Secretary of Defense (the Secretary) has largely delegated direction of professional 

military education to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who is said to “own” the 

joint aspects of PME at each institution.2 During the course of this study, some experts questioned 

whether the Secretary of Defense’s staff should take a more active role. Many other experts, staff, 

and faculty members whom the Subcommittee interviewed questioned whether the CJCS, given his 

demanding responsibilities, had the time to give more attention to the joint PME (JPME) system in 

general and the joint schools in particular. Still others questioned whether the Service Chiefs gave 

enough attention to their PME institutions.3

THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Secretary is legally directed to “implement a comprehensive framework for the joint 

professional military education of officers.” More specifically, the Secretary: 

...with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall 

periodically review and revise the curriculum of each school of the National Defense 

University (and of any other joint professional military education school) to enhance 

education and training of officers in joint matters. The Secretary shall require such 

schools to maintain rigorous standards for military education of officers within the 

joint specialty....4

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The Secretary of Defense shall require that each Department of Defense school 

concerned with professional military education periodically review and revise its 

curriculum for senior and intermediate grade officers in order to strengthen the 

focus on – 

(1) joint matters; and 

(2) preparing officers for joint duty assignments.5

The Secretary is also statutorily required to “implement a three-phase approach to joint professional 

military education” to include: 

...a course of instruction, designated and certified by the Secretary of Defense with 

the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Phase I 

instruction, consisting of all the elements of a joint professional military 

education...in addition to the principal curriculum taught to all officers at an 

intermediate level service school.6

JPME II instruction is required to be “taught in-residence” at Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) or 

senior-level service schools, and JPME III must be offered via the Capstone course.7

 Officers must 

complete JPME I before proceeding to JPME II.8 The law also specifies that the Secretary will 

define the curriculum for JPME II to focus on joint operational expertise and perspectives and joint 

warfighting skills “to adequately prepare students to perform effectively in an assignment to a joint, 

multiservice organization” and “so that students progress from a basic knowledge of joint matters 

learned in JPME I instruction to the level of expertise necessary for successful performance in the 

joint arena.”9

The law also requires the Secretary to submit an annual PME report to Congress with 

information on the Department as a whole, each of the services, and each reserve component. The 

report must include the number of officers who completed a JPME II course, but who were not 

selected for promotion, and the number of officer students and faculty members that each service 

assigns either to the schools of the other services or to the joint schools.10 

Finally, the Secretary funds the activities of the JPME schools, while funding for their 

infrastructure is programmed by the service that hosts them (the Army at Ft. McNair for the 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), National War College (National), and Capstone; the 

Navy at Norfolk for JFSC).11

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) has played a 

limited role in the direction of PME and JPME; however, it is the one office within the OSD that 

has the largest role. The small USD(P&R) staff under the Director of Officer and Enlisted 

Personnel attends the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) as observers and supports 

the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) visits to the intermediate- and senior-level 

schools. Otherwise, USD(P&R) provides oversight of three specific programs that educate military 

professionals: officer graduate education, training with industry, and fellowships.12 OSD oversees 

the Joint Staff work on the Joint Qualification System and policy. USD(P&R) works with the Joint 

Staff directorates for Personnel (DJ-1) and Training and Education (DJ-7) to ensure compliance 

with the law and OSD policy.13 

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Although OSD’s practical role has been relatively unpronounced, the April 2008 Secretary of 

Defense Guidance for the Development of the Force (GDF) calls on USD(P&R) to: lead an effort to revise 

JPME content to address the full range of domestic and overseas operations; to include civilian 

education; and, to prepare officers and DOD civilian personnel for joint, combined, and interagency 

operations.14 The GDF has replaced the Strategic Planning Guidance, Transformation Planning Guidance, 

the Posture Guidance, the Science and Technology Posture Guidance, and several other DOD guidance 

documents. 

Historically, OSD had the option to play a larger role for in PME. In the 1960s the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Education, in addition to other responsibilities, had 

specific responsibility for PME.15 A Ph.D. Principal Assistant for Education Programs and 

Management Training was subordinate to this DASD. In the late 1990s, the Secretary established 

the office of the Chancellor of Civilian Education and Professional Development, which was made 

up of three senior civilian educators (Ph.D.s) and a senior civilian with a doctorate (Senior Executive 

Service 3). This office did not have statutory or policy-based responsibility for PME. However, the 

chancellor’s office was located at National Defense University (NDU), and the chancellor attended 

MECC meetings and participated in PAJE visits on his own initiative.16 The office was eliminated in 

2004.17 Although some experts believe that an OSD chancellor’s office should be re-established to 

direct PME efforts, all five senior PME school leaders disagreed with that proposal, to some 

extent.18

Finding: The Guidance for the Development of the Force gives the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) a role in PME. Specifically P&R, with 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is to revise JPME content to reflect new guidance in the Capstone 

Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) and Joint Operating Environment (JOE). While the 

Subcommittee does not attribute any specific shortcomings to current efforts, the PME 

system could benefit from stronger civilian leadership, particularly in developing plans, 

policies, and programs. 

Recommendation: USD(P&R) and the Joint Staff should brief the House Armed 

Services Committee on the curricular revision of joint content as called for in the 

Guidance for the Development of the Force. 

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

By law, the CJCS formulates policies for coordinating military education and training.19 The 

Director of the Joint Staff is the CJCS’ designee to manage the higher-level responsibilities for 

JPME by using the MECC, while the staff under the JCS/DJ-7, who in his role as the Deputy 

Director of the Joint Staff for Military Education (DDJS-ME) has responsibility for training and 

education, manages the daily business of military education policy.20 The CJCS’ Officer Professional 

Military Education Policy (OPMEP) also describes the roles of DJ-1 Director for Manpower and 

Personnel, DJ-5 Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, U.S. Joint Forces Command J-7, and the 

president of NDU.21 The DJ-7 training and education staff is also responsible for doctrine and 

other programs. 

Although the Education Division of the DJ-7 is charged with managing PME academic 

policy, it does not manage personnel billets designated for educators or academics.22 In addition, 

the one-star DDJS-ME and his staff do not direct the JPME system or institutions as they are only 

97
in a position to “suggest” and “recommend.”23 On the other hand, the DDJS-ME can recommend 

to the Director of the Joint Staff and the CJCS that JPME accreditation should be withheld if an 

institution does not fulfill its OPMEP responsibilities. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Education Division staff largely comes from a doctrinal background, and, while this background is 

important, most doctrine focuses on what works now, rather than looking ahead.24 While PME 

covers both doctrine and anticipates the future, PME should be weighted to provide the education 

officers require for confronting uncertainties in the future. 

Finally, the DJ-7 does not appear to be in a position to take a comprehensive view of this 

very complex system that links training, education, and assignments both to the individual schools 

and to positions officers are sent to after they graduate from these schools. The Subcommittee has 

attempted to do this and realizes just how large a task it is. The JCS/DJ-7 staff implements the 

OPMEP, manages the MECC, and solicits and mediates decisions on special areas of emphasis.25

Finding: USD(P&R) and JCS/DJ-7 do not have educators or academics involved in 

directing the JPME enterprise. 

Recommendation: The staff that administers JPME and PME for the Secretary and 

CJCS should be balanced between those who have academic credentials or 

educational experience and those who have operational backgrounds. 

The processes that the DJ-7 is responsible for largely occur in a closed system conducted 

primarily by the leaders of the schools. Faculty members from several schools inspect a school, and 

in turn, their institutions are inspected by faculty from their counterpart institutions. In other 

words, the “operators,” or those who employ PME graduates, the Combatant Commands 

(COCOMs), are not directly represented. Possible issues that arise were highlighted in the 

previously mentioned Fenty Study. The Subcommittee would contrast the Military Education 

Coordination Council’s closed system with the Air Force’s Learning Committee, which includes the 

vice commanders of all its major commands, as an example of a relatively open system.26 In this 

case, the employers of the graduates can bring their requirements to the educational forum where 

additions to the curriculum are debated and balanced. For instance, a vice commander may ask that 

the strategic implications of cyber war be studied in relation to “just war” theory. This goes beyond 

the annual call for special areas of emphasis that the Joint Staff puts out to the services and 

COCOMs. 

Finding: The Military Education Coordinating Council could be more effective as a more 

open system. 

Recommendation: The Department and CJCS should strengthen the MECC and 

MECC working group with the formal inclusion of COCOM representatives at the 

level of the other participants. 

The Subcommittee did not examine alternative possibilities for senior-level management of 

PME in detail and has every confidence that the CJCS has great concern for the educational 

enterprise. However, while this issue arose during interviews, briefings, and hearings, there was no 

consensus on where the various top-level and daily management responsibilities should be placed. 

During the Subcommittee’s first PME hearing, witnesses argued that the system needs better toplevel management. Dr. Alexander Cochran proposed that a Chancellor of Military Education Office 

be established within the OSD to provide a higher level of oversight of and support for PME.27 Dr. 

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Janet Breslin-Smith called for the CJCS to “reclaim ownership,” particularly of the joint schools. 

She views the joint schools as “orphaned” by senior leadership that is “too detached,” particularly in 

the budget season but also as to content and stature.28 Other experts and practitioners have asked 

why Joint Forces Command does not direct the JPME courses or control NDU or, at least, Joint 

Forces Staff College.29 Still others take the position that the president of NDU is better equipped to 

direct the joint PME schools and courses for the CJCS, and possibly joint education, more generally 

since the focus of that position is exclusively on education.30 In other words, some experts are 

looking for a three- or four-star officer (other than the Director of the Joint Staff) or a civilianequivalent JPME leader, who can manage the system comprehensively and is focused solely on the 

operations of the joint educational enterprise on a daily basis.31

The Skelton Panel went even further to include all PME. The 1989 report observed that the 

DJ-7: 

...who currently has this policy responsibility, also has other responsibilities—war 

plans, interoperability, and joint doctrine—that are so large that he has limited time 

to focus on important educational issues. In fact, the senior Joint Staff position with 

full-time education responsibility is at the colonel/Navy captain branch chief level.32

In the intervening 20 years, little has changed in this regard. It may be time to reconsider the 

Skelton Panel’s recommendation for a full-time Director of Military Education apart from being an 

additional set of responsibilities for the Director of the Joint Staff and the DJ-7 as currently 

assigned. The Panel called for this senior officer to have responsibility beyond developing, 

accrediting, and monitoring joint education in service and joint PME schools. The Report called for 

this officer to have strong academic credentials and to be charged with establishing a coherent 

framework for all intermediate and senior PME schools as well as coordinating military education 

overall.33 Such a change could also engender reconsideration of the organizational location for the 

daily management of JPME where the constant operational focus could be on academic programs. 

A comparison can be made to the four-star Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) commander and the four-star Air Force commander of Air Education and Training 

Command (AETC) who, despite differences in their portfolios, are both charged with directing their 

services’ education systems. The current organizational system, which calls on the CJCS and the 

Director of the Joint Staff (who have other significant daily concerns) to manage JPME, has led to a 

mechanistic implementation of the OPMEP and approach to special areas of emphasis. The 

organizational system has also led to a piecemeal approach to requests for changes to the larger 

system. Sometimes these requests for changes exclude consideration of the other linkages such as 

those to the Joint Officer Management system referred to earlier. Only very rarely, if ever, can the 

Joint Staff try to conduct a comprehensive review and analysis of PME. 

Finding: Twenty years later, there is no dedicated full-time director of military education 

that could respond in a comprehensive way to the spirit of the Skelton Panel’s 

recommendation. 

JOINT PME INSTITUTIONS

All of the PME institutions now present some form and level of joint education. The 

Subcommittee notes, as some witnesses suggested, that the leaders of the PME institutions at 

different levels have no regularly scheduled, formal fora for coordination and communication.34 

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The leaders of the senior PME schools do see each other at various fora informally several times a 

year, according to the commandant of the Army War College.35 The Military Education 

Coordination Council has a specific purpose that does not lend itself to these kinds of interactions. 

Finding: The PME enterprise does not have regularly-scheduled, formal fora for 

coordination and communication outside specific OPMEP discussions in the Military 

Education Coordination Council. 

Recommendation: A regular, formal forum for PME school leaders should be 

established to share common concerns and best practices. 

In addition to how the JPME enterprise is organized, each JPME and PME institution is 

internally organized very differently. The joint schools report to the CJCS through a three-star 

NDU president. In addition, NDU established a new civilian provost/vice president for academic 

affairs position. The recently departed provost had an extensive academic administrative 

background but no military background. The person next hired will hold only the title of vice 

president for academic affairs. 

NDU, founded in 1976 to centralize oversight of joint education institutions, has since 

become home to what one informed observer referred to as a “dizzying proliferation” of schools, 

institutes, and centers.36 What started as a three-college university now has command of 14 

organizational entities as well as administrative control over a number of regional centers.37 This 

study focused on the three institutions within NDU that grant JPME credit; however, it is important 

to ask whether the focus and the “span of control” of the university are appropriate. Some experts 

and current faculty and staff at the three JPME institutions under NDU have, over time, begun to 

feel that their schools are “orphans” within the larger university system.38 According to some 

professors and staff, the three original colleges believe that they do not receive adequate attention 

and support from the university because the NDU staff is preoccupied with many other entities and 

activities.39 

President Harry S. Truman presented diplomas to the National War College 

Class of 1949 

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The three colleges and the Capstone course under NDU are each organized differently. 

ICAF has a two-star commandant, a retired colonel as dean of students (until very recently this 

position was filled by an active-duty colonel), and a civilian Ph.D. dean of faculty. National has a 

two-star commandant, a military colonel Ph.D. as dean of faculty, and a retired colonel as chief of 

staff and dean of students. The latter position was placed above the dean of faculty in the chain of 

command in the role of chief of staff.40 The JFSC has a two-star billet for the commandant, a senior 

civilian Ph.D. as dean of academic affairs, and 0-6 directors of Joint and Combined Warfare School 

(JCWS) and Joint Advanced Warfighting School. These two JFSC schools do not have their own 

deans.41 Capstone’s new director is a retired rear admiral who has a small administrative staff rather 

than full-time faculty. A standing group of senior mentors (retired three- and four-star flag officers) 

helps the staff with each session of this flag-level course. The Capstone director reports directly to 

the president of NDU.42 Some of the senior mentors have been with the program for a long period 

of time.43

When ICAF’s and National’s dean of academics positions have been filled by military 

officers, there has been rapid turnover. Sometimes the incumbent does not have the best academic 

credentials for service at NDU. For example, some have had a Ph.D. in the sciences rather than in 

political science, history, or national security studies. According to Subcommittee witnesses and 

interviews, more continuity and the right credentials are the key to success for these institutions.44 A 

civilian academic of appropriate stature, in the right field, instills confidence in the faculty as their 

dean and advocate to the administration. A military officer on rotational assignment, as dean of 

students, enhances the balance between military and civilian perspectives among the senior leaders. 

Interjecting a non-academic in the academic chain of command between the senior academic leader, 

the dean, and the commandant is potentially problematic.

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Finding: The dean of academics and dean of student positions at ICAF and National are 

not optimally situated within those organizations. The dean of students, dual-hatted as the 

chief of staff, should not have academic responsibilities in the chain between the 

commandant and the faculty. 

Recommendation: For continuity purposes and experience reasons, it is the right 

time to review the dean of students and academic dean positions at ICAF and 

National to set the appropriate general credentials and tour length. 

SERVICE PME ORGANIZATION

The service schools, the Service Secretaries, and the Service Chiefs have a variety of 

relationships with the CJCS relative to PME, and they have various degrees of personal involvement 

in their senior service schools.45 The reporting chain for the presidents and commandants of the 

PME institutions is significant in that it can show how highly education and educational leadership 

assignments are valued in the organization. It also can help ensure that education retains a distinct 

and complementary value in relation to training. Finally, it is important because of resourcing issues. 

The more senior the attention, the better chance there is that any function will be well-resourced. 

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The Army Chief of Staff has appointed the TRADOC commanding general to direct the 

Human Resources Enterprise. This four-star general coordinates with the Department of the Army 

and Army Staff G1 (Personnel) and G3/5/7 (Operations, Plans, and Strategy) at Headquarters, 

Department of the Army. In addition, he coordinates with the Human Resources Command, the 

U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the commanding generals of the Army National Guard and the 

National Guard Bureau among others. For instance, the commanding general of TRADOC has led 

the development of the officer education continuum including the connection between various 

phases of training and education and their alignment with the officer personnel system. The 

TRADOC commanding general has direct command over the Combined Arms Center, including 

the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), as well as the Army War College.46 

The United States Air Force Thunderbirds help the cadets 

celebrate their graduation with a flyover and a post 

graduation airshow during the 2009 United States Air Force 

Academy graduation ceremony. 

A four-star general commands the Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command 

(AETC). While he has command over the Air University and, therefore, Air War College, Air 

Command and Staff College, and Squadron Officers College, he does not have the charter to bring 

together PME and the personnel system which is directed by the respective commanding generals of 

the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) and the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC, which directs 

both Reserve and Air National Guard personnel affairs). AETC, AFPC, and ARPC all coordinate 

their policies and activities related to personnel, education, and training with the Headquarters, Air 

Force’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (A-1).47 

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The Navy’s Naval Education and Training Command is commanded by a four-star admiral 

separate from the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Neither has a direct role in PME. The president of 

Naval War College (NWC) reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations.48 The Marine Corps 

manages its personnel through Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The Marine Corps appoints an 

active duty two-star general or a retired senior officer as president of Marine Corps University 

(MCU). He reports through the two-star commander of the Training and Education Command and 

the three-star commander of Marine Corps Combat Development Center to the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps.49

Observation: Although the Subcommittee found a disconnect between the personnel (selection and 

assignment) system and PME, the Army is trying to remedy this disconnect by making TRADOC the 

executive agent for a new Human Capital Enterprise that includes both. That said, the Subcommittee 

finds that it is too soon to evaluate the effectiveness of this approach. 

Dr. James Carafano testified to the Subcommittee that he thought it a “travesty” for the 

Army that the Army War College commandant has been subordinated under the commander of 

TRADOC.50 Dr. Richard Kohn, in agreement, indicated in his testimony that TRADOC does not 

have “education” in its name.51 Carafano said, “[Congress has] to legislate that the Service school 

belongs to the Chief or the Commandant....It is your college. You have to keep it.”52 The existing 

arrangement does not allow the Army War College commandant or commander of the Combined 

Arms Center to directly petition the Chief of Staff of the Army with concerns. For some, this does 

not connote the level of value they think the position, the school, and PME warrant. 

General Martin Dempsey and General George Casey, on the other hand, have sought a 

consolidated and a comprehensive approach to Army Leader Development that has its own 

advantages.53 For instance, the TRADOC commander can take an integrated approach to various 

phases of education and experience. Others agree with Carafano that all the joint PME school 

commandants should report to the CJCS, in the case of the joint schools, or to their respective 

Service Chief if they command a service PME school.54 

Jeffrey McCausland, in his study of the war colleges in 2005, said the issue of directly 

reporting to the Service Chief is “of critical importance” and education should be separated from 

the training function. 

This importance derives from the rapid rotation of commandants at all the 

schools—which tends to erode the spirit of educational autonomy over time—and 

whether the college focus on education can be successfully accommodated in a 

structure that is deeply and zealously imbued with the philosophy and culture of 

training. ...[A]nd giving oversight to service training headquarters also has the 

potential to impart excessive service biases in curriculums.55 

Resources will be addressed later, but McCausland believes that the “locus of control and oversight 

also has an immediate impact on budget allocations and external taskings.”56

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SERVICE INDIVIDUAL INSTITUTION ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

At the Service individual institution level, some organizational arrangements may be less than 

optimal for the PME mission or for best use of resources. The Subcommittee does not find any 

shortcomings directly linked to organization, and will not dictate any “ideal” structure, but some 

arrangements may warrant reconsideration by the institutions themselves. Air Force schools stand 

out among service schools. 

The Air Force PME institutions have a complicated structure, according to faculty members 

and leaders of those schools. As explained above, the three-star Air University commander reports 

to the four-star commander of Air Education and Training Command and has a broad portfolio of 

professional and graduate education institutions under his purview. Included are the three colleges 

under the Spaatz Center for Officer Professional Education in Alabama. The Spaatz Center is 

commanded by a major general assisted by a civilian chief academic officer. The Spaatz Center 

commander and chief academic officer are also dual-hatted as the leaders of Air War College 

(AWC), but the AWC commandant also has an academic dean for the in-residence AWC course. 

Air Command and Staff College has a one-star commander (dual-hatted as the vice commander of 

the Spaatz Center) with both a chief academic officer and dean. Finally, there is a colonel who 

commands Squadron Officer College (SOC) who also has a chief academic officer and dean. SOC 

includes the Air and Space Basic Course (ASBC) (for second lieutenants) and Squadron Officers 

School (for captains).57 

Several Air University organizational issues came up in the course of the Subcommittee’s 

study. First, Dr. Richard Kohn recommended in his testimony to the Subcommittee that the Air 

Force consider merging the faculties of the staff college, the war college, and the School of 

Advanced Air and Space School so that subject-matter expertise could be shared and leveraged to 

strengthen instruction in all three schools, using the example of civilian universities and the Naval 

War College.58 The Subcommittee also observed that the wargaming and research arms of the 

university could be better integrated with the colleges to enhance educational synergy for the 

students there.59 

Second, the Joint Staff’s report on the 2008 accreditation of the AWC cautioned that 

although the AWC’s joining of Air University’s Spaatz Center brings some benefit, AWC “should 

maintain its uniqueness and identity as a Senior Level College....The AWC should make a deliberate 

effort to keep members of the Education Support Squadron (ESS) of the Spaatz Center thoroughly 

indoctrinated into the individual mission of the AWC.”60 It was also noted that AWC has had hiring 

delays by having to go through two levels of authority for these decisions, which is addressed in the 

faculty section of this report.61 (The Spaatz Center organizational chart is below and charts for the 

three component schools discussed here are at Appendix C.) 

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Finally, the McCausland Study, reinforced by the Subcommittee’s observations, pointed out 

the problem with having both deans and CAOs: “each college should also have a single senior 

officer or civilian educator serving as both Dean and Provost to underscore the point that 

education, not training for the issue du jour, is the fundamental imperative of its institutional 

mission.”62 Without a specific rationale and delineation of roles and responsibilities for each, the 

faculty, staff, and students, as well as outsiders, are confused by this organizational structure, not 

knowing who is empowered to make what decisions.63 In addition, it may not be resource-effective. 

If the problem is the continuity of military deans, then perhaps a better solution is a controlled 

assignment of three or more years, or the hiring of a civilian academic as dean. 

Finding: While some of the larger schools or universities have an academic vice president 

or provost, Air University (AU) has six academic leaders for three schools. The Chief 

Academic Officer (CAO) of AU, who seems to act as university provost, is also dual-hatted 

as the CAO of Air War College and serves there with a civilian academic dean. Air 

Command and Staff College and Squadron Officer College also each have a CAO and dean. 

The CAOs tend to be civilian academics while the deans are either military or civilian 

academics. Without a clear delineation of responsibilities, the organizational structure 

seems confusing and resource intensive. 

Recommendation: Air University should clearly delineate the responsibilities of both 

CAOs and deans and consider whether a civilian dean with credentials in a discipline 

related to national security might be most appropriate as the academic leader of the 

in-resident PME courses. 

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HUMAN RESOURCES

“Fundamental to the development of the U.S. officer corps is quality 

professional military education (PME). ...Because education is an investment in 

our nation’s future, the services must be willing to sacrifice some near-term 

readiness for the long-term intellectual development of their officers. Only by 

accepting these sacrifices will our officers have the intellectual talents to 

respond to the demands of their profession, especially in major crises and 

wars.”64

 

The Skelton Report, 1989

People are critical to the PME enterprise. Together with pedagogy, the Skelton Panel 

considered the senior staff, faculty, and student bodies of the various PME institutions to constitute 

the “bedrock” of quality for PME.65 At the same time, perhaps the most difficult challenge to the 

PME institutions is measuring the quality of the people involved in the PME enterprise. 

The Subcommittee found that the persons involved in the PME enterprise generally meet 

high qualitative standards. However, challenges to standards should be addressed either to avert or 

correct qualitative decline. This section of the report will discuss diversity as an essential element of 

quality as well as examine the categories of people involved in the PME system including senior 

leaders, military and civilian faculty, and support personnel. Students are addressed in a succeeding 

section. Before addressing these groups that play important roles at the PME institutions and the 

issues they face, the report discusses the other two issues: the role of diversity and quality in general. 

DIVERSITY

Military leaders at all levels must understand their diverse work force, the balance of civilmilitary relations in the United States, the partners and allies with which their forces operate, and the 

adversaries they face. The leaders at each PME school, as well as the CJCS and the Service Chiefs, 

emphasize how important diversity is to education. Therefore, the specific mission of the PME 

institutions demands that leaders pay attention to the diversity of senior staff, faculty, and students. 

Because diversity matters in terms of the importance of a variety of perspectives on national 

security, schools must search for more diversity among qualified senior leaders and faculty for PME 

institutions. Human resource professionals have learned that diversity does not automatically follow 

from traditional means of advertising or recruiting for openings.66 These traditional recruiting 

methods do not always reach or attract diverse candidates. Non-traditional, more creative methods 

at more locations are required. 67 

The Subcommittee is encouraged by the commitment to diversity voiced at every level of 

education and among the ranks of senior leaders. However, PME institutions’ efforts to recruit 

both diverse military faculty and civilian professors often lag behind their aspirations.68 At the 

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primary-PME level most faculty are military and therefore reflect service demographics. At the 

intermediate and senior levels, while the institutions all want more diversity, most of the senior staffs 

and faculties still include few women and fewer people of color or varied ethnic backgrounds. 

A diverse military force must be grown from the bottom up. The three service academies 

seem to have the greatest expertise with student diversity issues, as they recruit students from 

demographic pools outside the military. They acknowledge doing best both with diversity and 

quality when their outreach efforts to minority communities, including hosting summer camps, are 

fully funded.69 Military students at intermediate- and senior-level schools will reflect the 

composition of personnel recruited 10 and 20 years earlier. 

Civilian faculty can be recruited from more varied sources. For instance, in addition to 

advertising in The Chronicle of Higher Education, schools might also reach out to historically black 

colleges and universities, tribal colleges, or the American Association of University Women. The 

Naval War College has issued a new civilian faculty recruiting policy focusing on non-traditional 

candidate sources that will help in this regard.70 

Finding: The PME institutions agree on the importance of promoting diversity among 

qualified personnel. However, leaders of these institutions admitted they did not always 

undertake the recruiting efforts that might yield greater diversity. The Subcommittee 

understands that the faculty and senior staffs are partially a reflection of both the recruiting 

population of current and retired senior military officers and the population of professional 

educators who focus on military and national security matters. 

Recommendation: The Subcommittee encourages PME institutions to take further 

imaginative and creative steps to contact and attract qualified, diverse senior leaders 

and faculty members such as recruiting at non-traditional and diverse institutions 

and advertising in periodicals aimed at women and minorities. Other PME 

institutions could use the new Naval War College civilian faculty recruiting policy as 

a benchmark. 

QUALITY IN GENERAL

The Subcommittee considered the central question of how PME institutions attract, 

develop, and retain the highest quality senior staff and faculty. The Subcommittee found that some 

issues were associated with civilians, others with military personnel, and still others pertained to 

both. Many faculty issues are interrelated and complex. Senior staff issues at the primary, 

intermediate, and senior schools, both joint and service, focus on qualifications and the lengths of 

leaders’ PME assignments as matters affecting the stability of institutions. Civilian staff and 

professors were most concerned about tenure. To military faculty, balancing stability against 

promotability was very important. For civilian professors at some institutions, there were similar 

concerns about promotability within institutions and marketability when they leave government 

employ.71 Issues that concerned both military and civilian faculty include balancing requirements for 

teaching and curriculum development; research and publishing; and service and outreach. The 

specific balance of these three areas sets some schools apart. In general, PME institutions, if they 

are pressed for resources, focus most on teaching and service. However, this balance can also be 

altered by what is expected of different kinds of faculty (military and civilian, junior and senior) in an 

academic and military division of labor. Two other issues common to military and civilian faculty 

members related to publishing and intellectual property (copyright) and standards of academic 

freedom.72 Common issues are addressed at the end of the faculty section of this report. 

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SENIOR STAFFS

PRESIDENTS, COMMANDERS, COMMANDANTS, AND DIRECTORS 

Quality leadership at PME institutions starts at the highest levels. The Skelton Panel 

reported that commandants and presidents were second only to faculty in importance for 

maintaining quality PME and that they “should play a significant role in guiding the curricula and 

mentoring the faculty and student body.”73 The Subcommittee found that, while there is no 

question that the current senior leaders of the PME institutions are quality officers, there is 

continuing debate about how school presidents, commanders, commandants, and directors should 

be selected and how long they should remain in their positions. 

The Skelton Panel maintained that the flag officers selected for these positions should have 

“operational credibility, academic credentials, a superb intellect, and must be seen by the student 

body as having the highest standard of integrity....[and] the billet must be viewed by the service 

chiefs as an assignment of major importance.”74 The Skelton Panel also asserted that only the CJCS 

for a joint school, or a Service Chief for a service school, should make the selection.75 The Panel 

suggested five selection criteria: (1) a strong academic inclination; (2) upward career potential; (3) 

willingness to devote a minimum of three years to the institution; (4) current operational knowledge; 

and, (5) the ability to establish sound rapport with the student body. The Panel also suggested that 

these senior leaders should have some type of educational (as distinct from training) background and 

should teach “at least one or two courses.”76 The witnesses at the Subcommittee’s first PME 

hearing agreed with the Skelton Report, specifically noting that running a hybrid academic and 

military institution has very unique challenges.77 Dr. Janet Breslin-Smith, Dr. Alexander Cochran, 

and Dr. Richard Kohn were unanimous in supporting the position that the commandants should 

have a longer tenure and that they should have an educational background in addition to operational 

experience. Breslin-Smith argued that the CJCS should review the criteria for senior billets and that 

the person selected needs to be committed to, and intellectually involved in, teaching and engaging 

the students in strategic dilemmas. Kohn suggested that if a suitable military leader could not be 

found, a retired officer or a civilian would be better than a less qualified, active-duty officer.78 Other 

current and former faculty members also questioned the qualifications of senior military PME 

leaders, particularly if he or she remained aloof from daily educational activities but exercised a 

heavy hand in controlling the academic aspects of the school.79 Dr. Williamson Murray suggested 

that the selection of leaders without academic expertise indicates that service leaders do not regard 

PME as sufficiently important.80 However, persons holding these positions have sometimes earned 

promotion to the next higher rank.81 Accordingly, these PME leadership assignments are not 

necessarily perceived to be “dead end” or retirement positions. 

Leaders of the senior PME institutions argued that academic expertise is less important than 

recent operational experience and leadership skills.82 As a result the services generally treat these 

assignments as two-year O-6 or flag-officer command positions. The majority of these leaders do 

not see an overriding requirement for experience in or talent for education for what they see as a 

military command.83 While the ACSC commandant maintained that “there is no academic 

qualification for the commandant position,” the other intermediate PME school leaders voiced the 

opinion that a balance of academic and operational background should be weighed in the selection. 

The CGSC deputy commandant opined that his position, “requires less focus on academic 

experience and more on operational leadership skills and experience,” and added that recent 

operational experience was necessary for his role in reviewing the contents of the curricula.84

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The Joint Staff’s position is clear, 

Regarding Senior Schoolhouse Leadership, each selection is carefully weighed. 

Service chiefs bear responsibility for the choices made at their schools. The 

Chairman selects the General/Flag Officer leadership for the NDU Schools and 

makes a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense regarding the officer to be the 

NDU President. NDU assignments rely on quality nominations from the Services.85 

However, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the CJCS, nor the service secretaries or their chiefs 

promulgate specific criteria for selection to senior PME leadership.86

Finding: No qualifications have been promulgated for senior PME leadership positions. 

Some of the services do look for academic or educational backgrounds; others consider 

these positions to be simply the equivalent of other flag-officer command or leadership 

positions. Although operational experience is important, even in times of war a “strong 

academic inclination” is still an important qualification for PME senior leadership. 

Recommendation: The CJCS and Service Chiefs should establish general criteria or 

credential requirements, such as demonstrated educational and academic interest, 

for selecting PME directors, commandants, commanders, and presidents to be 

applied at the Chairman’s and Service Chiefs’ discretion. 

 Senior staff tour lengths are also an issue of debate. Appropriate tenure is critical for 

continuity. As discussed above, if the services view these senior leadership positions as simply 

another assignment for flag officers, their tenure will generally be two years or less. The Skelton 

Panel recommended senior leaders serve at least three years in their posts, except during times of 

great transition when four to five years would be preferable.87 Witnesses at the Subcommittee’s first 

PME hearing, interviews with current and former faculty members and commandants, and Dr. 

Jeffrey McCausland’s 2005 PME study warned that short and unstable tour lengths for senior 

leaders have an adverse effect on PME institutions.88 Although he favors three- to five-year 

assignments, Dr. Cochran goes so far as to suggest 10-year tour lengths. If commandants serve for 

longer than three to five years, he proposed they be given “tombstone” promotions to the next 

higher rank upon retirement as is done at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) and U.S. Air Force 

Academy (USAFA) for department heads.89

Observation: Senior staff tour lengths and longevity issues may be in tension with 

promotability. Some schools or services choose to compromise between upward mobility for 

the right candidate, while some candidates choose not to maintain their promotability to 

stay in their positions longer. The Subcommittee finds no reason to disagree with the Skelton 

Report recommendation that tour lengths of three to five years are “about right” for PME 

leadership positions. 

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PROVOSTS, DEANS, AND SENIOR OR CHIEF ACADEMIC OFFICERS

While the Skelton Report was silent on academic leadership, some variations on the 

foregoing debate also occur over the qualifications for civilian provosts, chief academic officers, and 

deans. Each of the services and schools takes a different approach to hiring academic leaders. 

Qualification issues include academic management experience, teaching expertise, credibility in one’s 

field as it relates to PME subject matter, and experience in (or at least exposure to) the military. 

Some schools prefer to hire military officers with Ph.D.s but not necessarily in a discipline related to 

PME. For instance, deans might have a degree in physics rather than a national security-related field 

such as international relations. Other schools prefer to hire civilians with academic management 

experience. Some experts suggest that the best way to maintain high-quality, rigorous academic 

programs and to attract outstanding civilian faculty is to hire as dean an academic who is world 

renowned in the areas of strategy and national security. Civilian academics offer longevity and 

continuity, and they can have an exceptional understanding of faculty issues. They bring a different 

perspective from that of the military leader at the top of the institution. If civilians are hired into 

leadership positions at PME schools, however, they must also have an appreciation for the 

combined military and academic environment. 

 Outside experts and the leaders of the schools weighed in on the issue of the senior 

academic officers’ credentials. Most agreed that the academic dean should have excellent academic 

credentials and teaching experience. Dr. Breslin-Smith testified, “the Dean of Faculty should have a 

Ph.D., prior teaching experience, and a commitment to the mission of the College.”90 Dr. Cochran 

suggested that deans, definitely civilians, should be chosen for their academic background in a PMErelevant field and stay in the position at least twice as long as the military head.91 Dr. Kohn 

disagreed, saying the deans should be military officers with proper academic credentials chosen from 

the faculty after “demonstrated accomplishment as teachers, leaders, and scholars in their discipline 

or field.”92 The senior leaders at the schools take a variety of approaches. The ICAF commandant 

believes academic deans “should have extensive teaching and supervisory experience together with 

policy experience in the military or an executive branch agency.”93 The JFSC commandant wrote, 

“the Academic Dean should have a doctorate in a relevant field such as education or national 

security studies, have attained the rank of full professor, have had exposure to the military 

environment, have experience in higher education and administration, and have an extensive 

background in managing and supervision of large dynamic organizations.” Marine Command and 

Staff College (Marine C&SC) recently named a civilian dean to preclude rapid turnover that the 

school experienced with military deans.94

Finding: The several PME institutions take a variety of approaches to hiring their most 

senior academic leaders. 

Recommendation: Whether military or civilian, deans should possess a Ph.D. or 

terminal degree (typically a law degree is considered “terminal”) in a subject area 

relevant to national security and be well respected by their peers; should be at least 

familiar with the military, even if they have not served themselves; and should 

anticipate at least a three- to five-year tenure. 

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FACULTY

The Skelton Panel considered faculty “the determinant factor in quality education.”95 The 

Panel reported, “The importance of a competent, credible, and dedicated faculty to both the fabric 

and the reputations of our PME institutions cannot be overstated.”96 Today, all of the PME schools 

report having difficulty recruiting a sufficient number of the highest quality military faculty.97 Some 

schools also report challenges recruiting civilian faculty.98 Recruiting issues include increasing 

diversity, type and level of qualifying degrees held, opportunities for command or leadership 

positions, and competition with civilian schools. 

Experts have suggested that there is a need for even greater diversity among the faculty, 

including professors from different backgrounds and an increase in faculty with social science 

degrees.99 For military officers, the schools have to compete for the best candidates with command, 

key field or operational assignments, and joint staff assignments. For civilian academics, the schools 

have to compete with the nation’s most prestigious universities to build a highly respected faculty. 

The Skelton Report divided military faculty into three categories.100 First, military operators 

are those who have recent and relevant operational experience and are leaders who may or may not 

have advanced academic credentials or a talent for teaching. Second, there are military specialists 

such as foreign area experts or strategists who may have advanced degrees but no teaching 

experience. Their area of expertise directly relates to their teaching assignment. And, third, military 

academics or educators are those who have risen through the military ranks but who also have 

advanced degrees, subject-matter expertise, and teaching experience.101 The Panel believed that 

military faculty should have at least a master’s or professional degree and that at the senior school 

level a doctorate was desirable.102 

Civilian instructors (hired under the authorities provided to the Secretary of Defense under 

Title 5 or Title 10, U.S. Code) also have various backgrounds. When referring to civilian employees 

or faculty, Title 5 refers to employees hired under the General Schedule or GS system. Title 10 

refers to those civilians hired under special authority given to the Secretary of Defense and the 

Service Secretaries to hire “professors, instructors, and lecturers” in the numbers they consider 

necessary for the JPME schools, the service officer in-residence PME courses of at least 10-month 

duration, and the three service academies.103

The Skelton Report stated that all civilian instructors, at least at senior schools, should have 

doctorates and should include a mix of types.104 First, some civilian faculty members are retired 

military officers who have advanced degrees as well as leadership and operational experience. 

However, their operational currency diminishes over time. Second, some civilian government 

employees (interagency) are detailed by their departments and agencies to teach for several years. As 

with military officers, they may have relevant operational experience and leadership skills but they 

may or may not be educators or have relevant advanced degrees. Third, the schools hire civilian 

academics who may have no military experience or exposure. Some may have teaching experience 

but may be more oriented to theory and research than curriculum development and mentoring. 

Finally, there are some retired government civilians who are valuable members of the faculty and 

staff for the interagency perspective that they bring to the institution. However, it is difficult to 

recruit some retired government civilians like Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) because in most 

cases, unlike military retirees, they must give up their government annuities in order to accept a 

government salary. Retired FSOs are in high demand on PME faculties, but have been unable to 

obtain waivers from the State Department.105

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One quality issue that government civilians and military faculty members have in common is 

whether they were selected for PME in-residence or promotion. The Skelton Report suggested that 

it was generally inappropriate to hire military officers as faculty who were not competitively selected 

for attendance at in-residence PME or selected for promotion. The Panel also thought it 

inappropriate for faculty to teach the very next year following PME graduation without an 

intervening operational assignment during which officers could put their education into practice. 

Twenty years later both of these situations still occur.106 The PME schools report that all military 

faculty members have completed the appropriate level of PME, but they may have done so by 

distance learning.107 Those who attend PME through distance learning are not usually regarded as 

highly as those who are selected for in-residence education, except perhaps in the Navy. The Navy, 

unlike the other services, does not use competitive boards to select officers for senior school 

attendance.108 

Beyond the appropriate level of PME completion, it may be particularly important for 

military faculty teaching at Joint Forces Staff College to be Joint Qualified Officers (JQOs) because 

of that school’s singular focus on operational art and campaign planning.109 All JQOs have 

completed JPME I and II and held a previous joint assignment. Joint and Combined Warfighting 

School military faculty is 68 percent JQOs (almost all the others will be JQOs by the time they finish 

their assignment) and the Joint Advanced Warfighting School has 100 percent JQOs as military 

faculty.110

Observation: It is generally not a good practice for those who were not selected for PME inresidence or promotion to teach those who have been selected. However, there are cases in 

which the specific expertise of the individual is appropriate for the teaching assignment. 

MILITARY FACULTY – OPERATORS, SPECIALISTS, AND ACADEMICS 

How do PME institutions attract top military officers as faculty? On the one hand, 

attracting top “performers” is difficult because these officers generally want to serve in leadership 

and command positions and are sought after by their services and the joint community. On the 

other hand, some schools have a reputation for attracting top officers for their faculties despite these 

considerations. 

The service academies screen candidate faculty members quite rigorously for service as role 

models. In addition, these schools sponsor many of their military faculty members to obtain 

master’s or doctoral degrees at top universities with a “payback” teaching assignment either 

immediately after graduate school or after an intervening operational assignment. Those who 

choose to return to operations after teaching tend to do quite well in command selection and 

promotions to O-4 and O-5 and those who choose to remain in academe can usually have full 

military careers of 20 or more years.111 

The higher-level PME institutions offer mixed reviews of military faculty. Some are top 

leaders and teachers. Others are top leaders but have little teaching talent. Finally, some are great 

teachers and tops in their academic fields but would not be selected for in-residence PME (as top 

officers in their promotion year groups) and likely will not be promoted with their peers to O-6. Of 

all the primary-, intermediate-, and senior-level PME schools, MCU stood out. MCU has been 

114
willing to trade short faculty assignments for high-quality officers. The University selects highly 

competitive Marine officers but often loses them to promotion and command before a three-year 

tour is complete.112 Student and leader feedback indicated MCU’s teaching quality does not suffer 

under this approach.113

The services each set criteria for quality military faculty differently. Command and graduate 

degrees are the basic discriminators. According to Army policy-makers, “It is to the benefit of our 

Army, the services, and the officer students to provide the best quality officers as our instructors.”114 

Air University works closely with the Air Force Personnel Center and those who manage colonels’ 

assignments to “ensure highly qualified faculty members are assigned.” In 2007, the Air Force 

started programs to competitively select officers to instruct at Squadron Officer School for two 

years and then attend Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), or to teach at ACSC for two years 

and then attend Air War College.115 Naval War College seeks military faculty with current and 

relevant experience. Navy faculty billets are filled 46 percent by post-command commanders and 

captains or post-major-command captains. According to Navy testimony, “these are the Navy’s best 

and brightest.”116 Intermediate schools want their instructors to have previously held O-5 level 

command, and the Command and General Staff College used to be able to boast that it had former 

brigade commanders as department directors. Operational tempo makes this much less likely today. 

The senior schools would like their military faculty members to have held O-6 command. 

As for graduate degrees, PME schools report it is not always possible to find candidates who 

have in-residence degrees from high-quality civilian schools. Faculty at the service academies 

typically have a minimum of a master’s degree and those without can be sponsored to go to graduate 

school full-time. The academies must have a certain number of Ph.D.s to maintain their Bachelor of 

Science degree accreditation. The Naval Academy (USNA) is slightly different in that it will allow 

officers who do not yet have a master’s to work on their degree and teach at the same time. While 

the academies sponsor officers to graduate school, among the intermediate and senior schools Air 

University is the only institution that sponsors faculty candidates for relevant graduate degrees to 

keep new military faculty rotating into assignments there.117 

For those military faculty members who are not yet JQOs, a career incentive for senior-level 

PME faculty is the potential for joint duty credit, which may benefit them in competing for future 

key assignments and promotions.118 For those senior faculty and staff who choose to remain 

competitive, joint duty is key, and they might be less likely to volunteer for a faculty assignment if it 

did not carry the possibility of granting joint credit. By law, all of the joint school faculty positions 

(except the dean’s at National even though the dean does teach) are eligible to be on the joint duty 

assignment list (JDAL).119 Joint schools have faculty comprised of one third from each military 

department, while the service senior-level education (SLE) schools are required to maintain 60 

percent of faculty from the host service and 20 percent from each of the others. Even though 

faculty members at service war colleges are also eligible by law because they teach JPME II, 

departmental policy does not grant JDAL eligibility to host service faculty on the premise that they 

do not gain enough joint acculturation. Non-host faculty members, by virtue of working in another 

service’s environment while teaching joint matters, are eligible for “joint credit.” This legal and 

policy framework ensures that high quality officers who want to be competitive for flag rank are 

more likely to seek out joint and non-host faculty opportunities, or at least not be opposed to taking 

them, than would be the case if these positions did not offer joint credit. 

115
Although it is not the role of the PME institutions to award JDAL credit for the sake of 

recruiting and retaining quality uniformed faculty, most of the services and schools testified that, 

with stiff competition for every services’ best officers, having JDAL credit could contribute to 

higher quality non-host faculty. The senior schools have signed a memorandum of understanding 

(MOU) that delineates the types and quality of officers the schools require for non-host faculty.120 

However, the school leaders reported that they often only receive one nominee who the schools can 

either take or accept a gap in the position.121

In contrast to JPME II faculty, intermediate-level education (ILE) non-host faculty members 

are precluded by law from JDAL eligibility.122 The same issues apply as discussed above, except that 

even more of the intermediate faculty, because these officers are usually more junior in rank and 

therefore have the prospect of staying in the military longer, would hope to stay competitive for 

promotion and command selection. The goal of the Joint Officer Management system should 

remain to grant joint credit only for positions that truly relate to “joint matters” as defined in law. 

However, the Subcommittee recognizes that if these positions gain JDAL recognition, it is easier to 

recruit the highest quality officers for faculty duty. Similarly, if the non-host services cannot meet 

their obligation to send the highest quality officers to PME faculty duty, the institutions are faced 

with the choice of taking an officer of lesser quality or being short of non-host service faculty 

members. In addition, non-host service positions are filled, by policy, at a lower percentage than 

JDAL positions.123 The inability to fill the non-host faculty billets could have the effect of causing 

the school to be out of compliance with the OPMEP, which would result in losing JPME 

accreditation. Although loss of OPMEP accreditation for this reason may only be an issue at 

Command and General Staff College right now because of the Army’s decision to expand that 

course to 50 percent of all Army majors, this situation warrants continuing oversight. PAJE reports 

have already cited several other schools for a lack of non-host faculty. A memorandum of 

understanding among the intermediate-level schools is also being discussed, but it may not change 

the fact that the services likely will offer only a limited number of non-host service officers to the 

schools to choose as faculty.124 Joint eligibility could be a tipping factor for attracting higher quality 

faculty. 

As a result of the Subcommittee’s preliminary PME work, including interviews with faculty 

and the testimony of leaders of the PME institutions, the House Report for the FY 2010 NDAA 

included an item of special interest on this subject. 125 

The committee is encouraged to find that many military officers 

serving on the faculties of joint professional military education 

(JPME) phase II institutions are being appropriately recognized for 

their joint experience on the joint duty assignment list (JDAL). 

However, the committee finds that some of these officers, who 

should have this assignment designation, still do not. The committee 

encourages these institutions to be proactive in ensuring that military 

faculty at the senior level institutions receive the appropriate joint 

credit, and that those positions are included on the JDAL through 

the validation process. As part of its comprehensive review of 

professional military education, the committee is reviewing the 

faculty positions at JPME I level institutions. The Department of 

Defense should also review the faculty positions at the JPME I level 

institutions for JDAL suitability and provide the committee the 

results of its review.126

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This position was also reflected in the FY 2010 NDAA Conference Report, 

The conferees believe that the limitation contained in section 

668(b)(1)(B) of title 10, United States Code, that excludes 

assignments as instructor at joint professional military education 

Phase I courses from the joint duty assignment list may be 

inappropriate and could negatively impact the quality of instructors. 

The conferees intend to address this issue in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 with the goal of improving 

instructor quality.127

Finding: Current law allows the services to advocate for host faculty billets at senior service 

schools to be included on the joint duty assignment list (JDAL). DOD and CJCS policy 

would subject those service requests to the usual two-part test for JDAL validation including 

involvement in joint matters (teaching joint subject matter) and acculturation. Before 2007, 

the service intermediate-level education (ILE) institutions were submitting their non-host 

faculty billets for JDAL validation. The services and CJCS routinely validated them. 

Changes in legislation in 2007 and implemented in 2009 resulted in ILE military non-host 

faculty billets being precluded from inclusion on, or going through the validation process to 

be on, the JDAL. This change can impact a school’s faculty recruiting, its ability to meet 

ILE OPMEP accreditation standards, and the quality of its military faculty. Additionally, if 

faculty positions can qualify for JDAL status, this can assist faculty members in their career 

progression. 

Recommendation: Congress should amend the 2007 legislation so as not to preclude 

the possibility of JDAL credit being validated for non-host faculty at JPME Igranting institutions through the joint staff process as stated in U.S.C. Title 10 sec. 

668 (b)(1)(B). 

In the discussion of joint assignment credit related to the quality of military faculty, the 

Subcommittee recognizes that through their own actions, the services’ leaders can work to persuade 

officers that faculty assignments can offer viable paths to promotion and a full career. For instance, 

during the Subcommittee’s hearing with the academy and primary PME school leaders, the 

Chairman had an exchange with the commander of the Air Force’s Squadron Officer College. The 

Subcommittee learned that many Squadron Officer College faculty members were selected as nonvolunteers because they perceived that a teaching assignment would not be beneficial.128 This 

speaks to the esteem in which the services and joint community hold educational and professional 

development assignments. Joint and service leaders must be convinced of the positive value, as well 

as the real-world impact, of these assignments in order for their officers to be convinced. 

Additionally, the Service Secretaries can give direction to promotion boards and create other 

incentives for outstanding officers to volunteer for faculty duty.129 The Subcommittee has an 

interest in civilian and military leaders of all ranks taking such a stance and taking action to increase 

the standing of faculty positions at all PME institutions for enhancing the quality of the faculty and 

promotion opportunities as well as key assignment and command selection for these officers. 

The general question of the promotability of military PME faculty has at least two sides. 

Obviously, the higher the quality of faculty officers, the greater their chances of promotion. 

Competitiveness for promotion, in some cases, means officers will spend less time in their teaching 

assignments as they are selected for promotion or key assignments. On the other hand, maintaining 

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continuity often dictates longer assignments. In fact, senior staff at USMA said they would prefer 

not to have an officer if he or she will not spend at least three years on faculty.130 The Marine Corps 

has opted for accepting the most competitive officers for faculty duty, knowing that they may have 

to settle for shorter teaching assignments. While some officers want to stay competitive with their 

peers, others may “opt” to concentrate on an academic or educational path with repeated or lengthy 

faculty assignments. These officers know that the longer they stay away from operational 

assignments, the less competitive for command and promotion they may become. 

As a result of these assignment dynamics, almost everyone the Subcommittee interviewed 

could name the few officers who have earned senior rank despite pursuing non-traditional career 

paths, gaining operational expertise, command assignments, attending PME in-residence, gaining 

advanced civilian degrees (even Ph.D.s), or serving as faculty members including General David 

Petraeus, Admiral James Stavridis, Admiral Patrick Walsh, and Brigadier General H.R. McMaster.131 

Finding: Rather than being products of deliberate personnel, joint officer management, and 

JPME systems, some well-known officers reportedly took personal initiative and risks with 

their careers. The Subcommittee finds that there should be a greater possibility for a few 

officers to follow a similar path, if qualified, which would include both intellectual and 

operational opportunities on the way to senior command. 

CIVILIAN FACULTY – AGENCIES, ACADEMICS, CONTRACTORS, AND FORMER 

MILITARY OFFICERS132

U.S. Code Title 10 is now the predominant means of hiring civilian faculty for PME 

institutions. This section of the report addresses how the quality of civilian faculty is defined in the 

PME environment; how PME institutions seek to attract high-quality civilians; how a quality faculty 

is sustained; and, how quality is measured through faculty appraisal. Three other issues relate to the 

civilian faculties including the expansion of Title 10 authority to additional courses, the hiring of 

civilians considered “pure” academicians, and the hiring of contract instructors. In general, the 

Subcommittee found a wide variety in the application of Title 10 hiring authority in the PME 

enterprise. In fact, the differences are so vast that one former NDU president suggested that at least 

some standardization would be helpful to the various school and service leaders to reduce 

perceptions of arbitrariness so that no institution would suffer by comparison to its peers.133

Defining Quality 

The PME institutions report variations on ways to judge the quality of their civilian faculty. 

Some want civilians who are nationally recognized in a relevant field.134 Others want teaching 

experience and a record of publishing in peer-reviewed journals.135 At the intermediate-level a 

general knowledge of adult education methodology and a passion for teaching was cited as being 

important.136 Others defined quality by position. For tactics instructors, a master’s degree might 

suffice, but for others a Ph.D. is required.137 Finally, some schools highlighted that they judge 

quality, in part, by the potential a faculty member has for making significant contributions to the 

school.138 At the senior level, Ph.D.s or terminal degrees (J.D.) were valued even more. Some 

schools are more apt to hire retired military officers who are Ph.D. candidates but have not 

completed their dissertations.139

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Attracting Quality 

Some of the PME schools, particularly those (other than the service academies) outside of 

the National Capital area, report challenges in attracting top-tier civilian faculty when competing for 

the same talent as prestigious civilian universities.140 In this regard, money matters. Dr. Williamson 

Murray testified to the Subcommittee that the PME system is “seriously underfunded” and that the 

schools need increases in funding to ensure the quality of the faculty.141 

At the pre-commissioning-level, salary was only one consideration. The USAFA dean 

testified that other attractions include an outstanding student body, undergraduate research, an 

important mission, and a desirable location. She mentioned short “contract length” as a detractor.142

Naval Academy leaders cited as their greatest incentives a balance of teaching with scholarship 

opportunities, funding for professional development, outstanding students, tenure after six years of 

outstanding performance, and competitive starting salaries. The commandant reported that 

detractors include lack of long-term pay parity, faculty housing, and tuition assistance for family 

members. 143 

All the intermediate schools cited pay and benefits as incentives. Many also consider their 

outstanding students as an attraction. In addition, some cited degree-granting authority and regional 

accreditation, along with support for research travel. ACSC leaders consider detractors to be their 

location in Montgomery, Alabama and lack of tenure combined with the “vagaries of faculty 

management policy changes” because of rapid turnover of senior leaders and issues of “academic 

freedom.”144 CGSC reported detractors such as lack of tenure and copyright as well as high 

classroom teaching loads that negatively impact time for research.145 Marine C&SC leaders consider 

their location near the national Capital and quality of other faculty as incentives for new faculty, 

while the lack of tenure is a detractor.146 Joint Forces Staff College cited academic freedom and 

rewards for exceptional performers on the positive side. On the negative side, the small number of 

faculty members and gaps in military faculty positions do not allow civilian faculty sufficient time for 

research and publishing.147 NWC seconded many others’ significant incentives but also reported 

that senior faculty pay is not competitive, teaching and curriculum development leaves little time for 

research, and retired State Department personnel forfeit their annuity.148

The absence of tenure is one of the most often cited impediments to attracting highly 

qualified civilian faculty. The Naval Academy is the sole PME institution with a civilian tenure 

system.149 In fact, when asked “what’s the most important element to hiring quality faculty,” the 

dean responded in no uncertain terms that a school cannot have a quality faculty without a tenure 

system.150 Other exceptions to the rule include the NWC’s several positions that are “without 

term,” which are civilian positions of indefinite length, and there are a number of Title 5, or General 

Schedule (GS), faculty members remaining at some schools.151 Title 5 employees inherently have 

more job security.152 

Tenure is not an absolute necessity as long as other conditions of employment balance any 

perceived disadvantage. As a former president of NDU observed, conditions of employment are 

not standardized among PME schools.153 PME schools hire civilian academics under authorities 

granted under Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Title 10 simply allows the Secretary of Defense and the 

Service Secretaries to hire the number of civilian faculty required as “professors, instructors, and 

lecturers” for 10-month PME courses and the 10-week Joint and Combined Warfighting School 

course.154 The service academies are treated separately. The Department has used this flexibility to 

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hire high-quality faculty with appropriate credentials at a higher pay rate than the GS system and, at 

the same time, offer the schools flexibility to not retain faculty members on a more permanent basis 

in case of program changes. Generally, Title 10 faculty can be hired quickly through a traditional 

academic search committee procedure, or as reported to the Subcommittee, “by word of mouth.”155

Although not dictated by law, the PME institutions usually offer new faculty a one- or two-year 

appointment and then renewal for three years for satisfactory performance. By policy, PME schools 

can offer five- to six-year renewals if they choose to do so. While most civilian faculty members 

seem to be renewed as long as they perform satisfactorily, appointments can be non-renewed if a 

program is terminated or if the school’s curriculum moves in a direction that the employees’ 

specialty will not support.156 Transparency in this process is important to faculty members.157

The Subcommittee learned that the various PME schools do not use written “contracts.” 

Instead, the schools typically issue appointment letters to their Title 10 faculty. Some schools, 

including the Naval War College, issue very detailed appointment letters in which expectations for 

faculty members are well-defined, while others issue very brief letters.158 

Observation: Naval War College (NWC) uses detailed appointment letters and the 

Subcommittee suggests that other schools could use the NWC example as an instructive 

model. 

In addition to appointment letters, all of the schools rely on their faculty handbooks as well 

as directives, policy letters, regulations, service instructions, and faculty operating instructions to 

communicate expectations. According to these documents, any appointment can be terminated for 

cause or loss of a required security clearance. 

 

Maintaining Quality 

For renewal, most faculty directives say staff will be judged on performance in the areas of 

teaching, research, and service. However, some school policies make it clear that there is no 

requirement for the administration to give reasons for non-renewal, even in the face of documented 

outstanding performance. This is particularly true for NDU’s faculty policies.159 On the other hand, 

NDU leaders stated that despite reports of confusion or unfairness in renewal policy and practice, 

faculty members are treated well. Morale and sustainment of an outstanding faculty, however, may 

depend on even one incident in which any administration is perceived to be arbitrary. 

The renewal process for civilian faculty appointments was also characterized by a lack of 

timeliness at two institutions, National and Air War College. At National renewals must be 

processed through the University’s Human Resources Directorate (HRD), then the NDU chain of 

command, and then the Defense Financial and Accounting Service. Although ICAF faculty and 

staff had no complaints, National’s leaders admitted that significant personnel turnover and 

vacancies in HRD caused delays.160 As stated previously, the Air War College reported that their 

renewal process is not timely because of the multiple layers required for approval at the college, the 

Spaatz Center, and Air University.161

The renewal process, like all other Title 10 activities, varies by service and school except that 

regardless of the length of the first appointment, the first year for new faculty is generally 

probationary. Some leaders and faculty members suggested that, to be effective, a two-year 

probation period is really more reasonable. Reappointment is usually for one to five years based on 

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performance with three being the standard.162 The service PME institutions believe that their 

processes are well-documented and very transparent.163 The Subcommittee heard no complaints 

from NWC or MCU faculty on renewal policies. On the other hand, AWC reported that some 

faculty members find it disconcerting that the final approval for renewal rests with the AU 

commander instead of their school commandant who knows their work best.164 

JFSC reports that NDU’s president has the sole authority for renewal decisions, based on 

commandants’ recommendations according to NDU Regulation 690-4. NDU policy specifies that no 

faculty member is entitled to renewal and that non-renewal does not constitute involuntary 

termination. However, renewal is based on “demonstrated exceptional professional experience and 

competence.” Faculty members are expected to remain current in their field and sustain their 

performance. They are notified in writing as early as possible if they will not be renewed.165 

At the NDU senior school level, policy is internally inconsistent as to when faculty will be 

notified of non-renewal decisions. NDU Regulation 690-4 states “employees should receive final 

official notification at least eight months before their current employment term ends.” But a nonrenewal recommendation only needs to be forwarded to the president of NDU with six months 

remaining on an appointment. HRD notifies the school of approval of renewal only 30 days prior 

to the effective date. In addition to confusing timelines, the policy regulation for a college peer 

review panel, after which the commandant’s and the NDU provost’s recommendations are 

forwarded to the NDU president. NDU faculty reported that a peer review is not always formally 

included in the process and renewal recommendations are often based instead on advice from the 

department head, dean, or chief of staff to the commandant. While National’s commandant 

reportedly does not cite reasons for non-renewal in counseling terminated employees, ICAF leaders 

reported that performance is definitely a factor and is discussed with employees.166 

Other appointment variations include one-year limited appointments and adjuncts. West 

Point and USAFA are using one year appointments to fill gaps for uniformed members who are 

deployed. These are non-renewable, but civilians hired for these positions can compete for 

permanent openings if they become available.167 ICAF and other schools hire adjunct faculty for the 

potential savings and to hire specialists to teach electives.168 The Subcommittee understands this 

may be appropriate for some specialized courses such as language classes, but acknowledges that 

many faculty members believe that one-year appointees and adjunct faculty may not have a 

continuing commitment or attachment to the institution, other faculty, and the unique PME 

mission. Adjuncts and single-year hires usually do not perform the same service and mentoring 

responsibilities, leaving more duties to the longer-term faculty and staff. The PAJE team has also 

called attention to the fact that “full time equivalents” are problematic when it comes to assessing 

faculty ratios and student-to-faculty ratios for accreditation purposes.169 

Observation: The Subcommittee recognizes that no institution has an unlimited budget, but 

continued reliance on short-term faculty should not be used as a regular tool without an 

assessment of the long-term impact on the institution and other faculty. 

Measuring Quality and Title 10 

PME school leaders cite their faculty handbooks as setting out fair and transparent appraisal 

and renewal policies. These include student evaluations and, in some cases, peer evaluations. The 

handbooks also show that they have appeal processes for non-renewal or problematic appraisals. In 

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fact, school leaders suggest that because very few faculty members are non-renewed, they have de 

facto tenure systems. However, it only takes one perceived arbitrary non-renewal to have a chilling 

effect on faculty morale and quality recruitment and retention.170 

The Subcommittee heard a variety of perspectives on the issues of appraisals and renewals. 

Many Army War College faculty members said they like their renewal system because they can 

renegotiate their salaries more often.171 USAFA has reported trying a new rotating appointment 

system to improve faculty members’ sense of employment stability; the results of this change are not 

yet available.172 West Point leaders and faculty have stated that their system of renewal might be as 

good as tenure, if not better, because civilian university tenure systems use the same criteria and time 

lines for renewal decisions.173 The Naval Academy, by comparison, has a tenure system under 

which they award new faculty an initial appointment of not more than three-years. New faculty 

members in possession of an earned doctorate enter as assistant professors. They then have five 

years before they can be considered for promotion to associate professor. Tenure normally comes 

with promotion to associate professor. Civilian faculty members normally have a maximum of six 

years to be promoted to associate professor and earn tenure.174 The 2004 Larson Report (by retired 

Admiral Charles Larson) on permanent-military professors at USAFA, tasked by Congress in 2003, 

stated that while the Naval Academy tenure model did not have to be a “one-size-fits-all” for the 

academies, the absence of a tenure system would place limits on civilian faculty as time went on. 

Limiting factors include temporary employment status, lack of department head or other leadership 

positions, lack of a role in high-level curriculum decisions, limits on professional development, and 

holding the percentage of civilian faculty down.175

Faculty members at a number of schools reported discomfort with the Title 10 system in 

general. Some think the policies and practices governing the balance of power between 

administrations and individual faculty members tilt too much toward the former. Faculty at ICAF 

and National cited concerns about arbitrariness if no reason for non-renewal or lengths of 

reappointments must be given in the face of otherwise outstanding measures of performance.176 

Faculty at Army War College, ICAF, National, USMA, and USAFA cited concerns about a level of 

trust if power is perceived to be one-sided.177 This challenge is compounded by the fact that most 

PME schools do not have independent faculty senates or other representative bodies that can take 

faculty concerns to the superintendent without first being screened by the dean or commandant.178 

Complaints about various schools’ systems that reportedly would have been voiced through 

faculty senates included concerns about job security and competitiveness after PME employment, 

appraisal transparency and consistency, stated policies not being followed, and academic freedom. 

Some faculty members at National, ICAF, USAFA, and USMA cited concerns about competing in 

the civilian university system after working in a non-tenured position, particularly if they are let go 

without explanation.179 Some National and ICAF faculty members claimed that their appraisal 

system lacks transparency and consistency and that the procedures in the faculty handbook and 

school policies are only loosely followed, if at all. 180 Finally, USMA, USAFA, ICAF, National, and 

Air University faculty members cited concerns about academic freedom; since they can be denied 

renewal without being told why, faculty members fear retribution if their scholarship is 

controversial.181 At civilian universities, those who have tenure are thought to have the most 

academic freedom. 

   Some PME leaders and faculty members said that they would prefer tenure systems for 

almost the opposite reason as others embrace it. Instead of believing that tenure tilts the balance of 

power between the administration and individual faculty members more to faculty, they say it holds 

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the faculty to higher standards and guarantees better performance. These faculty members and 

leaders think that if faculty members had to go through major, university-wide, tenure reviews at set 

intervals there would be greater incentive for better performance.182 Other faculty members do not 

like tenure systems because they see them as discriminatory against those who focus on teaching 

rather than publishing and against faculty members with family obligations that would compete with 

a rigid tenure schedule.183

Finding: Some civilian PME faculty members think that they do not have timely, fair, and 

transparent renewal and appraisal systems. Perceptions on these issues matter for 

recruiting and sustaining quality faculty. The Naval War College and Marine Corps 

University provide positive examples. While allowing for some flexibility among the 

services’ unique programs, more consistent DOD policy in this area is needed. 

Recommendation: The Department and the services should reexamine the nature of 

the employment relationship with civilian faculty hired under Title 10 authority and 

consider adding to or enhancing existing policies that would address transparency 

and stability issues while retaining institutional flexibility to hire quality civilian 

instructors without unnecessary delays. 

Another issue that arose regarding to civilian faculty was the requirement to balance stability 

with requirements for “new thinking” or new areas of emphasis. All of the PME institutions require 

that civilian professors keep current in their discipline while emphasizing teaching. Operational or 

policy currency is sought from agency and military faculty through continual one- to three-year 

rotations. At the more senior levels of PME, the balance between stability and new thinking brings 

another requirement. The schools must balance the need for seasoning and experience among 

professionals who can hold their own with mature professional students with the need for the 

energy and innovation usually associated with younger faculty. For instance, the Marine Corps War 

College (MCWAR) cited younger professors as having “academic vitality” that keeps the curriculum 

“current and vibrant” and brings in new teaching methodology and technology.184 Dr. Andrew 

Krepinevich went further, asking whether changes in PME curriculum had engendered turnover in 

faculties or “plainly speaking, has the ‘legacy’ faculty been shoehorned into a very different 

curriculum?”185 The Army and Air War Colleges agreed that faculty experience and seasoning were 

helpful with their unique student bodies, but that younger professors who could hold their own in 

seminars were desired as well. They pointed out, though, that with few positions and low attrition, 

turnover occurs slowly. None of these institutions intended to push out older professors, but NWC 

did cite a concern about the “graying” of their faculty if younger faculty were not brought in.186 The 

Subcommittee heard several allegations of “ageism,” including the example of the non-renewal of, 

or creating a hostile work environment for, senior faculty who kept current in their discipline and 

received outstanding performance reviews and student and peer critiques.187

Some experts, including retired Major General Robert Scales, also believe that foreign 

nationals should not be restricted from the faculty at the senior colleges because of security 

clearance requirements.188 Scales and others noted that current law restricts foreign participation, 

but that foreign faculty are often “experts in service school areas of study and can bring helpful, 

international perspectives to student learning.”189 Many North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) partners actually hold sufficient security clearances, but they are barred from faculty duty. 

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Finally and perhaps most importantly, commanders, commandants, and presidents of some 

PME institutions cited concerns that they could not easily recruit retired Foreign Service Officers 

and former ambassadors (as well as several other categories of civilian employees) as instructors 

because these individuals have to obtain Office of Personnel Management or State Department 

waivers or give up their federal annuities in order to take a PME position.190 The FY 2010 NDAA 

encourages agencies, including the Department of State, to use existing authorities to allow the PME 

institutions to hire qualified annuitants under similar conditions to those for retired military 

officers.191 

Finding: The quality of civilian faculty could be increased with regard to the interagency 

perspective by allowing retired Foreign Service Officers and Ambassadors to join PME 

faculties without giving up their federal retirement pay. These civilians may join the 

faculties now only by giving up their annuity or with a waiver. The State Department, in 

particular, has not granted waivers. 

Recommendation: The State Department and other government agencies with 

employees not under one of the excepted retirement systems (Civil Service 

Retirement System and Federal Employees Retirement System) should grant waivers 

based on FY 2010 NDAA, sec. 1102.

Three other significant civilian faculty issues beyond defining, attracting, maintaining, and 

measuring quality surfaced during this study: the expansion of Title 10 authority to more staff at 

PME institutions, the definition of “pure” civilian academics and civilians in leadership positions at 

the academies, and contractors as military faculty substitutes at CGSC. 

Title 10 Expansion 

Title 10 of the U.S. Code gives the Service Secretaries the authority to hire “as many civilians 

as professors, instructors, and lecturers” as they consider necessary. However it also states that “this 

section shall not apply with respect to professors, instructors, and lecturers. ...if the duration of the 

principal course of instruction offered at that school is less than 10 months.”192 Although FY 2010 

NDAA section 1113(d) allows the Department broad hiring flexibility, Marine Corps University 

(MCU), Command and General Staff College, and Air University have requested expanded Title 10 

hiring authority.193 

The Marine Corps wants to use Title 10 authority to hire faculty for courses that last less 

than 10 months. Specifically, this would be used for hiring enlisted PME course faculty.194 MCU 

equates the kind of civilian faculty necessary for these courses to Ph.D. professors hired for the 

intermediate and senior officer courses with salaries and flexibility as the two key reasons for the 

authority. In addition, Title 10 allows for rapid adaptation of curricular content to reflect changes 

mandated from lessons learned in ongoing conflicts. These courses include six Staff NonCommissioned Officer (NCO) Academies and the School of Marine Air Ground Task Force 

Logistics. MCU states “expansion of Title 10 authority to hire qualified, professional educators as 

faculty with specialized skills and disciplines is essential to foster the implementation of adult 

learning theory and educational technology in delivery and student assessment.”195 MCU argues 

staff NCO academies rely primarily on active-duty Marines who are fulfilling positions outside of 

their primary military specialty area. They are not professional educators and do not possess the 

pedagogical expertise to implement current adult learning theory using the newest educational 

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technology. Within Title 5, there is no specialty series identified as “professional educator.” Title 10 

would allow MCU to hire through faculty searches rather than the Title 5 process which requires 

selection from a list of minimally qualified employees from an applicable GS series, which again, 

does not exist. Contractors, similarly, are not an optimal solution as the Department has mandated 

significant reductions in their use.196

The Air Force asked the Subcommittee to amend Title 10 to: (1) hire “faculty” rather than 

the more the specific “professors, instructors, and lecturers” to include researchers; and, (2) allow 

for courses of shorter length. The Air Force has not yet addressed the specifics of why those 

employed by “the Barnes Center, the Spaatz Center, the Holms Center, Air Force Research Institute, 

the Muir S. Fairchild Research Institute, or the Eaker College for Professional Development” should 

not be hired under existing authorities.197

 Civilian hiring authorities extend to a wider group of military education centers beyond the 

intermediate and senior PME institutions including Defense Acquisition University, Naval 

Postgraduate School, the Air Force Institute of Technology, and the service academies. The same 

description of those covered, “professors, instructors, and lecturers,” is included for all, which is 

relatively standard under Title 5 of the U.S. Code in describing the population exempt from normal 

civil service hiring procedures. The Subcommittee did not study all of the institutions covered by 

these statutes. Jurisdiction remains with the House Government Oversight and Reform Committee 

for DOD schools for military family members. For these schools, Title 5 includes the exempted 

category of “teacher” (as defined under 20 U.S.C., section 901). Title 5 allows the Secretary of 

Defense to define teaching positions by regulation. However, Title 10 does not allow the Secretary 

to define what is meant by “professors, instructors, and lecturers” by regulation.198 

Finding: Title 10 sections 1595, 4021, 7478, and 9021 restrict the hiring of civilians both by 

course length (10 months) and position description (“professors, instructors, and lecturers”) 

at some PME institutions. 

Recommendation: If FY 2010 NDAA section 1113(d) is insufficient to attract quality 

faculty, Title 10 sections should be amended to allow flexibility to hire civilian 

academics for PME institutions at a competitive salary and with flexible terms of 

service, while allowing for the reasonable ability to hire the appropriate personnel. 

Civilians in Service Academy Governance and “Pure” Civilian Faculty at the USAFA 

The Naval Academy has a long history of employing an evenly balanced civilian and military 

faculty. In contrast, USMA and USAFA had almost exclusively military faculty until Congress 

provided Title 10 hiring authority to the Air Force and Army to “extend to the Air Force Academy 

and the U.S. Military Academy the same flexibility for hiring civilian faculty that exists for the Naval 

Academy.”199 The legislation, as amended in 1993, gives the Secretary of the Air Force the 

discretion to hire as many civilians for USAFA as the Secretary considers necessary.200 Faculty 

members raised the issue of whether USAFA hires enough “pure” civilian academics with the 

Subcommittee. This issue was previously described in the 2004 Larson Report. 201 

A related issue is whether civilians have a voice in the governance of PME institutions. 

Faculty members at USMA and USAFA, among other PME institutions, stated that they did not 

believe civilian faculty had enough of a voice in school governance.202 Part of the issue at the two 

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academies, in addition to not having faculty senates, is barring civilian faculty members from 

competing for department head and dean’s office senior positions.203 The 2004 Larson Report 

concluded that “A Maturing Civilian Faculty Will Increase Pressure on the [Air Force] Academy to 

Provide them a Greater Role,” stating “as the civilian faculty has matured and gotten more senior in 

academic rank, it is inevitable that pressures will increase for tenure, an expanded leadership role and 

a greater role in curriculum development outside individual departments.”204 In response to the 

Subcommittee’s questions, both schools’ leaders pointed to a number of civilians who serve on the 

deans’ staffs.205 Civilian faculty members, in response, pointed out that almost every one of these 

senior civilians is a retired military officer, almost all were graduates of the institution, and almost all 

had spent a considerable amount of time as uniformed faculty members at those two schools.206 

The Larson Report highlighted several problems that could arise, and the Subcommittee found them 

to be still relevant at USAFA in 2009. These included: desire for department and administrative 

leadership positions; “contingent employment” under contracts versus tenure; participation in 

academy curricula decision-making; limits on professional development particularly in research and 

publication; and minority representation as civilians among a majority military faculty.207 

The governance issue indicated an even more specific concern that emerged both during the 

Larson study and the Subcommittee’s review of PME. At USAFA, a significant number of civilian 

faculty members cannot be described as “pure civilians,” as they can at the Naval Academy and 

West Point. The USAFA dean reported 30 percent of civilian faculty members are retired military, 

including some who do not have Ph.D.s.208 The concern here rests on the benefits of employing 

civilian faculty at the academies, rather than on the optimal percentage of civilians.209 Hiring 

civilians can bring in highly-qualified professional educators and academics in order to increase the 

number of faculty with Ph.D.s who have more standard academic credentials; to increase the 

diversity of faculty to which the students would be exposed; to provide students, military faculty, 

and staff an outside perspective; to enhance civil-military relations; and to improve students’ critical 

thinking abilities.210 According to the Larson Report, civilian professors add “a fresh and often 

provocative world view not bounded by military culture,” “doctoral-level currency and depth in their 

academic disciplines,” “access to powerful educational, professional, alumni and research networks,” 

and “opportunities for cadets and midshipmen to build awareness of the increasingly large and 

critical roles played by civilians throughout the Department of Defense and their parent service.”211 

The Larson Report’s recommendation on “Hiring Civilian Faculty” said, “to ensure the maximum 

strength of the civilian element of the faculty, future civilian hires should be ‘pure academicians’ 

from civilian higher education.”212

The dean’s testimony to the Subcommittee indicated that USAFA does not believe the 

question of “pure” civilians is an issue.213 The dean reported that “...about one third of civilian 

faculty are retired military. ...And we try not to, in our processes, advantage military or disadvantage 

military, retired military.”214 The Air Force Academy, in response to questions after the hearing, 

cited a civil case, under which the institution was sued by a former military member who was not 

allowed to compete fairly for a civilian faculty position.215

 However, specific application of this recommendation is constrained 

by other legislation such as the Uniformed Services Employment and 

Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4301-

4335). USERRA is a federal law intended to ensure that persons who 

serve or have served in the Armed Forces, Reserves, National Guard 

or other “uniformed services:” (1) are not disadvantaged in their 

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civilian careers because of their service; (2) are promptly reemployed 

in their civilian jobs upon return from duty; and (3) are not discriminated 

against in employment based on past, present, or future military service (emphasis 

added). ...Such a person shall not be denied initial employment, 

reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit 

of employment by an employer on the basis of that...performance of 

service. 

 

Previous USAFA attempts to hire “pure academicians” instead of 

equally or more qualified military retirees resulted in a complaint to 

and an investigation by the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). As a 

result of the investigation, OSC informed USAFA that they would 

bring an action before the Merit Systems Protection Board unless 

USAFA strictly complied with the anti-discrimination provisions of 

USERRA. After a discussion with OSC and a review of the law, 

USAFA thereafter hired the soon-to-be retired military applicant for 

a civilian faculty position at USAFA.216

The resolution of the issue of hiring pure civilian academics may actually hinge on 

requirements specified for any particular faculty position, not on whether military retirees are “more 

qualified” for positions as USAFA asserts and was found in this case. Instead, hiring entails fine 

lines drawn between those who are “equally qualified.” The Subcommittee does not expect a more 

qualified applicant to be disadvantaged. Nonetheless, USMA and USNA do not seem to have the 

same challenges complying with the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights 

Act of 1994, Office of Special Counsel, or the Merit Systems Protection Board and supporting 

“pure” civilian representation on the faculty. 217 

Despite the lack of specific ratios of civilian to military faculty directed in law, the reported 

assumption at the time of the Larson Report and from a number of current civilian faculty 

members, was and is that constructive change and transformation seldom comes from within an 

organization or from those invested in a system that they lived within for 20-30 years. This situation 

is exacerbated at USAFA by the fact that civilian faculty cannot effectively hold senior positions and 

some feel that they do not have an effective voice in governance.218

Finding: USAFA has not done enough to hire pure civilian faculty. USAFA could consult 

the Larson Report recommendations in this regard. 

Recommendation: USAFA should endeavor to hire a greater number of “pure 

civilians” as faculty members. 

Finding: Some civilians at USAFA and USMA would like to compete for more senior 

academic leadership positions. There is value in having civilian academics in senior 

positions to ensure that all voices are heard in academic governance. 

Recommendation: USAFA should allow “pure civilians” to compete to serve in 

positions that have a more significant role in academic governance. 

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Contractors with Operational Experience as Military Faculty Substitutes 

Command General Staff College (CGSC) seems, at first, to have the opposite challenge from 

USAFA. Because of operational tempo and the increased requirement for faculty due to the 

universal ILE policy, CGSC has hired more civilians, particularly contractors, to replace unavailable 

military instructors. The balance is now about 70:30 in favor of civilians. Contract civilians rather 

than Title 10 appointees comprise the majority of those civilians. The Army would seek to bring 

this ratio back into better balance with a higher number of military faculty members who have 

recent operational experience.219 Hiring contractors, who are recently retired military officers, seems 

to be an appropriate expedient, but unfortunately, they have a short-lived operational currency. 

After their first two to four years, they no longer fit the appropriate military faculty substitute 

profile. Army CGSC students reported to the Subcommittee on a lack of instructor currency. 

Students also identified quality problems with some of the contract faculty who are not hired 

individually by the school but as subcontractors by a private company. Some of these retired 

officers had not been selected for ILE in-residence, nor had they been promoted with their peers, 

giving the impression that they had not “made the grade” while their students had or would.220 

Observation: Until the Army is able to correct the balance between military and civilian 

faculty, Command and General Staff College should better screen contract faculty members 

for quality and operational currency. 

CIVILIAN AND MILITARY FACULTY ISSUES

ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Academic freedom is a key element in meeting degree accreditation requirements and in 

attracting quality civilian faculty. Although academic freedom relates mostly to discussions of 

civilian faculty without a tenure system, it also has wider application to all faculty members and the 

PME mission to foster critical thinking and oral and written communication. All the PME 

institutions subscribe to the principle of academic freedom even within a military context. The only 

differences countenanced in this distinct context are compliance with the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice and other laws, protection of classified information, and prevention of sensitive technology 

transfer. Academic Freedom is not a carte blanche for faculty members or students to say or write 

anything they desire without a related responsibility to their academic community. Their 

presentations and writing must be objective, professional, and within the scope of their expertise. 

Academic Freedom is defined by the American Association of University Professors 

(AAUP) statement issued in 1940 with the interpretations of 1970. NDU accepts this construct in 

concert with Title 10 and DOD Directive 5230.09, Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release, in its 

policy statements and regulations. NDU defines academic freedom as: 

Freedom to pursue and express ideas, opinions, and issues germane to the 

University’s stated mission, free of limitations, restraints, or coercion by the 

University or external environment. Academic freedom is the hallmark of an 

academic institution. We expect all members of the University community to 

understand the importance of and to practice responsible academic freedom.221 

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The question is not whether the PME institutions endorse academic freedom. They do. 

The issue is whether it exists in practice and in the perceptions of their faculty. For instance, NDU 

faculty members brought the DOD Directive to the Subcommittee’s attention as a possible 

problem. Although papers written by faculty and students that are not intended for outside 

publication are exempt, the directive encompasses all academic papers meant for public presentation 

or publication. 

To ensure a climate of academic freedom and to encourage intellectual expression. 

...Information intended for public release or made available in libraries to which the 

public has access shall be submitted for review. Clearance shall be granted if 

classified information is not disclosed, DoD interests are not jeopardized, and the author 

accurately portrays official policy, even if the author takes issue with that policy.222

Interpreting whether “DOD interests are jeopardized” can be problematic if a scholar takes issue 

with an official policy and does a credible job of doing so. 

It was brought to the Subcommittee’s attention by the leader of one of the PME institutions 

that recent controversies in civilian academe have led to a new AAUP Report, which points in the 

opposite direction from the DOD Directive: 

Response to help faculty with what they can and can’t say in the classroom... 

especially on controversial or political issues. “We ought to learn from history that 

the vitality of institutions of higher learning has been damaged far more by efforts to 

correct abuses of freedom than by those alleged abuses. ...The essence of higher 

education does not lie in the passive transmission of knowledge but in the 

inculcation of a mature independence of mind.”223

Bachelor’s and master’s degree accreditation at the PME institutions depends on 

endorsement of academic freedom policies and the fair implementation of them. For example, 

Middle States Accreditation Standards require “providing support for academic and intellectual 

freedom.”224 The question posed during its review was, “To what extent does [the school’s] 

mission, values, goals and strategic planning process reflect a commitment to the principles of 

academic freedom and what evidence validates this conclusion?”225 The Higher Learning 

Commission of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools includes in its Assurance 

Section core component 4b under fulfillment of criteria, criterion four, assessing academic freedom 

under, “the exercise of intellectual inquiry” as integral to its educational programs.226 

At PME institutions, experts recognize that there must be an appropriate balance between 

military and civilian academic cultures. In response to the Subcommittee’s questions after the first 

PME hearing, Dr. Alexander Cochran answered, “The expectation (indeed the obligation) within the 

military culture to offer alternative views, particularly in the decision-making process, is strong.” Dr. 

Janet Breslin-Smith added that atmosphere is as important as stated policy; 

When a leader in an academic institution suggests that certain speakers should not be 

invited, that administration policy should not be questioned, that certain schools 

focus too much on history and policy criticism, great harm is done to military 

officers. ...The goal of senior officer education is critical analysis and strategic 

thought. ...Faculty and students need to be free to question, to reconsider, to 

challenge.227 

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In practice, open inquiry and challenging authoritative views are weighed against ensuring 

classified information is not divulged and that the Uniform Code of Military Justice is not violated. 

The faculty’s modeling of the ability to question intellectual authorities must be balanced by 

professionalism and good judgment. Jackson Niday and Kathleen Harrington, professors at USAFA, 

contend that academic freedom is linked to the development of critical thinking and that this is not 

only desired but imperative at service academies: 

In the end, the strongest argument for why military academies must acknowledge the 

importance of academic freedom lies in perhaps the most hallowed of military rites 

of passage. ...In short, officers’ oaths hold them more responsible to think as 

leaders—to think more critically, more accurately, and more independently. 

Preparing officers to think critically, accurately, and independently requires a certain 

kind of reflective space—space to challenge the status quo, space to make honest 

mistakes, space to learn from one’s errors. Academic freedom provides that space.228

Army War College and Marine Corps University leaders recognize that academic freedom is 

ultimately important.229 Air Command and Staff College leaders agree “Academic freedom is 

fundamental in producing students who are agile, critical thinkers capable of leveraging new ideas in 

the complex and fast-paced environment of military operations.”230 Nonetheless, the Subcommittee 

heard allegations that academic freedom has been violated at several schools.231 Faculty members 

reported that some censorship was external or imposed by the institution, and some consisted of 

self-censorship. The publication and speaking review process was cited as a specific concern at Air 

University and at USAFA.232

Air University (AU) policy is based on the AAUP definition, however, some AU faculty 

members claimed they were prevented from responding to press interviews in a timely manner and 

that writing on controversial issues is a problem.233 One AU faculty member reported, “We have 

academic freedom, except when we need it.” Other faculty members agreed that it took so long for 

the University to approve their invitation to speak to radio and television reporters, that they often 

lost the chance to do so for lack of timeliness. Many of these individuals reported that they decline 

invitations without even asking for permission or that reporters stopped inviting them to 

comment.234 The situation at AU can be contrasted with the Naval War College (NWC) position. 

NWC allows its faculty to notify the school before or after press inquiries, interviews, or giving 

expert advice. Faculty members know they can respond but must provide a written or verbal 

disclaimer.235 Despite faculty criticism of the practice, AU similarly states in policy documents that 

their faculty should respond to the press in a timely manner.236 

Within the Air Force, Air University and USAFA have different regulations and instructions. 

However, USAFA professors had similar concerns to those at AU with respect to a slow clearance 

process.237 According to the 2008 USAFA Faculty Operating Instruction (FOI) 35-101, the 

clearance process and academic freedom are treated together; there is no mention of the AAUP 

guidelines in the FOI.238 The process is often too slow to support faculty conference presentations, 

much less time sensitive press interviews.239 Manuscripts and presentations go through the Director 

of Research to try to prevent classified material and technology transfer compromises for the 

sciences and engineering, but the process also catches literature and history manuscripts (but not 

fiction) in its sweep as well.240

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As for USAFA’s intellectual environment of inquiry and presentation, current and former 

faculty members reported a number of instances of slow clearance and lack of academic freedom 

verified by reporting and documentation. The Higher Learning Commission also recently 

documented this situation in USAFA’s latest accreditation report. Faculty cited the refusal to give 

timely clearance for publication and presentation as a problem to both the Subcommittee and to the 

accreditation body. 241 Less public, but also of concern are USAFA faculty members’ claims of selfcensorship. 242 Together these instances foster perceptions of limited support for open inquiry and 

for academic freedom at USAFA. According to faculty interviews and the 2009 accreditation report, 

these episodes have had the effect of chilling the intellectual environment.243 

Nonetheless, the Subcommittee is optimistic that USAFA’s leaders will address these 

challenges having learned that the dean has convened two committees – one on faculty speakers and 

one on publications and speaking. The committees are chartered to look at the Air Force 

regulations and the current USAFA operating instructions and to make recommendations on how 

each should be revised.244

Finding: For publication and press interviews, USAFA policy diverges from those of other 

academies and PME institutions. Although FOI 35-101 supports academic freedom and 

“maximum clearance in minimum time,” USAFA practices have created at least a 

perception of an environment that is not conducive to open inquiry in some subject areas. 

Recommendation: USAFA should continue to address the faculty’s perception that 

USAFA does not fully support academic freedom. 

 The situation at USAFA contrasted starkly with that at USMA. The few faculty members 

the Subcommittee met with did not seem to have concerns about the school’s academic freedom 

policy or practice. On the other hand, a May 2009 USMA Academic Freedom Advisory Committee 

paper reported concerns and made four recommendations including that USMA reaffirm the 1940 

Statement on Principles on Academic Freedom; strengthen due process and peer review of adverse 

action against professors; ensure faculty members have access to all websites and information; 

ensure faculty member schedule flexibility; ensure equal sabbaticals and independent selection of 

sabbatical work; and, ensure that offices outside the academic program (like the Judge Advocate 

General and public affairs officer) understand and support the mission of faculty members.245 

USMA reports having addressed these issues appropriately by revising the faculty manual in 2005 

and offering “substantial protection” to associate professors and full professors including those 

protections related to academic freedom. The dean also reported looking into revising the language 

in faculty appointment letters to comport with the revisions to the manual. Finally, the dean noted 

that, given his actions, faculty members raised no concerns on these issues with the Middle States 

Accreditation team in September 2009.246

If PME institutions want to attract quality civilian faculty and allow military faculty to excel 

while modeling professional critical thinking for students, commitment to academic freedom will be 

the measure. Clearance for publication, presentation, or press interviews should be a timely process 

and recognize that social science and humanities work, while less likely to be classified, may be more 

likely to make people uncomfortable. Any limits on academic freedom should be clear in 

appointment letters. It might be time for all the PME schools to review their policies and practices. 

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Finding: The policies at the PME institutions on academic freedom vary. Some faculty 

members at several of the PME schools have been critical of their institutions’ policies or 

the implementation of those policies. This is one of a number of factors that can impact the 

recruiting and retention of a high-quality civilian faculty. 

Recommendation: While the Department should review its policy on academic 

presentations and publishing, all of the PME schools should review their policies and 

practices on academic freedom. Institutions should recognize the AAUP 1940 

Statement of Principles and the 1970 Interpretive Comments as the “gold standard” 

for academic institutions with appropriate variation for unique military requirements 

in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and on classified material and technologies. 

 

COPYRIGHT247

In addition to teaching and service, published research is a traditional mainstay of the 

academic profession. For faculty performance appraisals, all of the PME schools agree that while 

excellence in and dedication to teaching is the most important element of performance, they also 

expect research (publication) and service from the faculty. The PME institutions want to attract 

quality faculty, and faculty publication reflects positively on the PME institutions.248 

Each PME school is using different copyright policies and practices. Some faculty reported 

not being able to publish materials in peer-reviewed journals or through academic presses because, 

as federal employees, they are barred by law from holding copyright of materials produced “as part 

of [their] official duties.”249 Federal law does not allow copyright protection for works of the United 

States Government, which are defined as “prepared by an officer or employee of the United States 

Government as part of that person’s official duties.”250 Some PME institutions have issued policies 

on the circumstances in which professors at those schools may obtain copyright for the works they 

produce. Professors can copyright their work, if they do it at home, on their own time, with their 

own resources.251 A separate but related consideration to the availability of copyright is whether 

outside sources can compensate government employees for works they produce. Ethics regulations 

promulgated by the Office of Government Ethics prohibit federal employees from receiving outside 

compensation for writing that relates to the employee’s official duties; regulations define when this is 

operative.252 The copyright policies at some PME institutions cross-reference or incorporate these 

regulations. The regulations, however, are specific only to determining outside compensation, not to 

determining copyright eligibility. 

In other words, faculty members have to do something required for their jobs “off-duty.” 

Faculty members may not be able to publish their work in the most reputable journals without 

copyright; most peer-reviewed journals require the author to turn over copyright in order to accept 

the material for publication. Some professors and institutions believe that if a professor is on 

sabbatical, and gains grant funds from outside sources, a copyright could be obtained. If the 

professor is on salary while on sabbatical, though, this interpretation could also be called into 

question. With sabbaticals at a premium, not everyone who needs to publish can be afforded 

sabbaticals, and sabbaticals can be garnered only once every five or six years, if at all. When asked 

about the impact of copyright laws on professors at CGSC, the school’s official response was: 

The inability to hold copyright has in some instances acted as a constraint on faculty 

publication. For example, a faculty member who intends to publish with an academic 

press must do the writing on his or her own time. Alternatively, work done on duty 

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time must be offered to a government press for first right of publication. Whether or 

not a government press chooses to publish the work in question, the inability to 

copyright is an impediment to outside publication since all academic and commercial 

publishers expect to copyright the works they publish. ...Needless to say, many 

civilian faculty chafe under this restriction and consider it a deterrent both to 

research and publication.253 

USAWC professors also expressed concern over “the lack of copyright protection for 

government employees engaged in professional education and official research and publication.” 

And, at National some professors stated that copyright issues are a problem affecting the school’s 

ability to attract quality faculty.254 

Having heard similar complaints, Representatives Platts and Skelton tried to address this 

issue through legislation in the 109th Congress in 2005 (See Appendix C.). They intended to 

encourage scholars to teach at PME institutions and to support their ability to publish. The 

legislation would have enabled PME faculty to assign copyright for their research to publishers as 

long as the faculty agreed to forego remuneration for work they did as official duty or with 

government resources.255 The legislative effort was unsuccessful given the issue of wider application 

across the government.

This Subcommittee requested that the Congressional Research Service (CRS) examine the 

current copyright laws and suggest ways to approach these challenges. The following was submitted 

by CRS: 

A publisher of an academic paper would usually want to ensure that 

the paper is protected under the Copyright Act against unauthorized 

reproduction or distribution...a U.S. government work lacks such 

legal protection. Therefore, a publisher may not wish to publish an 

academic paper authored by faculty of military service academies or 

DOD professional schools due to the absence of legal remedies 

available to the publisher in the event of unauthorized reproduction 

or distribution of the published article. As a consequence, military 

service academies and DOD professional schools may encounter 

some difficulty recruiting or retaining faculty members who wish to 

establish or enhance their academic credentials through publication 

of their research papers in prestigious scholarly journals.256 

To address any perceived disadvantages according to CRS, Congress could amend federal 

law in several ways: (1) To allow professors to hold an “unlimited” copyright (full copyright 

protection); (2) To allow professors to retain royalties or to assign royalties to a charitable 

foundation; or (3) To allow professors to have a limited copyright of their work for the sole purpose 

of transferring them to a scholarly journal that requires copyright as a condition of publication 

without professors gaining royalties or compensation.257 However, any action on this must be 

recognized as a preferential regime for PME professors.

Finding: PME institutions have various copyright policies for their faculty members. Most 

faculty members are expected to publish scholarly works as a condition of employment and 

promotion. Allowing for at least limited copyright would contribute to PME institutions’ 

ability to attract quality civilian faculty. 

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Recommendation: The Subcommittee supports the reintroduction of H.R. 962 from 

the 109th Congress (“Platts-Skelton Amendment”) or some appropriate variation of it 

in the 111th Congress. 

FACULTY DEVELOPMENT, RESEARCH AND SABBATICALS, DIVISIONS OF LABOR, AND 

GUEST SPEAKERS

All of the PME institutions offer faculty development programs that are evaluated by the 

PAJE under OPMEP guidance.258 Teachers and researchers are required to keep up with advances 

in their discipline and to network with other scholars in their field. This is particularly important to 

military and agency master’s degree holders, but also to Ph.D.s who have not taught, have only 

taught undergraduates, or who have not taught in a seminar setting. To compound the challenge for 

instructors, some PME subject matter is unique, and most students are very accomplished 

professionals. 

 Each of the PME institutions has its own faculty development strategies and programs; there 

is no standardized approach. All have at least an orientation to the school and involve their faculty 

in beginning and/or end-of-year off-site sessions to explore lessons learned from the previous year, 

new curricula, and other issues. Most schools then allow individual departments to plan and manage 

their own introductory and continual faculty development. Schools also pair new instructors with 

experienced teachers for their first year if they have enough faculty. 259

Because faculty development is left to the departments, instructors at a number of PME 

institutions look across departments and feel that they are not receiving as much benefit from 

faculty development efforts as some of their colleagues and peers.260 While it is understandable that 

different departments and institutions have their own plans and processes for faculty development, 

this is an area that might benefit from comparison of best practices and common pitfalls both 

among departments and among schools. 

Other faculty development is conducted on faculty members’ own time. Professors and 

instructors undertake a wide variety of service and outreach activities for their institutions. All the 

schools direct that research not take priority over teaching but expect it to be done nonetheless. 

The reality is that most research and writing is generally done after duty hours. More significant 

research requires time away from the daily requirements of teaching such as during a sabbatical. 

Each of the PME institutions has different policies on sabbaticals as to years of teaching required 

before being considered and the length of a sabbatical. Again, while there is no need to standardize 

among schools, some faculty members voiced concern that application and selection criteria were 

not standardized and processes were not transparent within each institution. There were some 

allegations of favoritism.261

Finding: There are at least perceptions that the sabbatical processes at some PME 

institutions are not fair or transparent. This is particularly important because research and 

publishing are included in appraisals and recommendations for renewals, not to mention 

future employability. 

Recommendation: All institutions should review their policies and practices for 

sponsored research and ensure that faculty has access to documentation specifying 

criteria for application and selection procedures. 

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 In addition to research sabbaticals, both military and civilian faculty can compete for what 

are considered operational sabbaticals. For instance, instructors may take on research for the 

Secretary of Defense or the CJCS on a particular strategic or military problem. In addition, 

professors may deploy to study operational issues, or to maintain operational currency. In 

particular, permanent military professors, who would not be taking any future assignments in the 

operational force, were directed or decided to take “sabbaticals.”262 The Larson Report also 

suggested that permanent professors could fill fellowship positions at either their service’s war 

college or National to enhance their professional development.263 

Recent PAJE reports cover faculty development measures and recommendations for the 

intermediate and senior PME schools in some detail.264 Institutions must program resources to 

support faculty service and research. These resources may come in the form of additional faculty to 

support the absence of those on sabbaticals and in the form of funds to sponsor travel and 

administrative costs. 

 In the education profession as in others, there is the dilemma of not having enough time for 

everything. PME faculty members are at various stages of their career, and as previously discussed, 

they vary from military operators and military academics to civilian agency representatives and 

civilian academics. The one thing that is common and constant at all PME institutions is that the 

first and most important task of a faculty member is teaching. But other factors come into play. 

Besides deployments and contributing to one’s military service, there are “additional duties” 

expected of civilian and military faculty at PME institutions such as mandatory events that require 

faculty-to-faculty and faculty-to-student interactions that comprise an important part of the PME 

experience.265 

Service is expected of all faculty members, but it may come in different forms depending on 

the person’s rank, experience, and status. Military master’s degree-level faculty are expected to focus 

on teaching excellence and mentoring students while also acting as uniformed role models at the 

lower-level schools. Military Ph.D. faculty members will spend more time on research and writing 

and on outreach and service. Civilian Ph.D.s concentrate on research, service, and outreach. 

Students sometimes play a role, too, in this constellation of activities. In the sciences, and perhaps 

the social sciences, students can participate in faculty research. In the humanities, however, that is 

much less likely. This is a factor in determining how much time and energy faculty members are 

able to expend on research. Students in the sciences essentially can act as research assistants. 

For academics (Ph.D.s and terminal degree holders), whether military or civilian, teaching 

requires keeping current within their discipline. Master’s level instructors will depend on senior 

academics for the newest discoveries, theories, and ideas. In order for academics to keep current, 

they must research, write, attend conferences, and network with their peers in the wider academic 

community. They must add to the knowledge in their field and create new knowledge. Research is 

not ancillary to the mission, but part of it. For recruiting and retaining civilian faculty, this emphasis 

and support is absolutely fundamental; it cannot be posed as an “either teaching or research” 

dilemma. Schools must have enough faculty members that all requirements, including research and 

writing, can be met. This takes institutional support – time and funding. Therefore, PME 

institutions must include this support requirement when managing their plans, personnel, and 

budgets. 

135
 Finally, PME institutions tend to entertain a large number of guest speakers to contribute to 

learning. Some are focused on illuminating particular lessons, but others are practitioners (senior 

officers or policy-makers). Some course directors told the Subcommittee that the budget for 

honoraria for speakers is severely limited.266 Even the schools within the Capital region are not 

always able to bring in speakers they believe would enhance their mission. Speakers who “drop in” 

on schools engender the opposite problem. They are “free” but may not fit with the particular 

subject matter being covered; often the institution is not able to screen what the speaker will discuss. 

Many instructors and leaders of PME institutions observed that the number of these speakers 

should be limited to those who can really add to the student experience rather than be disruptive to 

the course of study. Unsolicited speakers simply add to the student and faculty contact hours 

reducing “contemplative” and research time. Some actually impart counterproductive messages. 

Students and faculty repeatedly cited examples of speakers suggesting the school year would be a 

great time to improve student golf scores.267 Finally, the opposite issue also arose. Persons having 

special insight into course material or current events, might be on campus, but the students and 

faculty were not included on that visitor’s agenda. A chance to capitalize on the person’s presence 

was not realized. 

 The PAJE acknowledged that the Marine Command and Staff College’s proximity to the 

Capital allowed for a robust guest speaker program and that this lent itself to increasing the students’ 

interagency exposure. In fact, the PAJE report cited that guest speaker program as a “model for the 

other colleges.”268 The PAJE also commended Air War College for its speaker program, including 

the new Commandant’s Lecture Series for providing “a wide variety” of speakers who discussed 

leadership issues from a “joint and interagency perspective.”269 Marine Corps War College’s speaker 

program was similarly commended.270 On the other hand, the situation at National and ICAF was 

problematic. While the PAJE recognized that the individual schools’ course lectures along with the 

Commandant’s Lecture Series and NDU Distinguished Lecture Program all added value, the 

“sequencing and deconflicting of multiple guest lecture programs is problematic” and “the 

combined volume of speakers detracts from the overall programs and creates scheduling 

uncertainty.”271 The PAJE suggested that the schools and NDU establish a coordinated guest 

lecture policy that “limits lectures; disciplines the scheduling process; and allows for planning, 

scheduling and deconflicting guest lectures.”272

Observation: A delicate balance must be maintained by course directors and school leaders 

as guest speakers’ participation in PME should not be uncritically accepted because of 

availability, nor uncritically ruled out because of funding issues. 

SUPPORT STAFF

Leaders and faculty members at several of the intermediate- and senior-level institutions 

expressed concerns about being able to fit in requirements for research and outreach in addition to 

teaching and service. Some high-quality civilian faculty members were concerned that they would 

not have research assistants to help enable the work that would keep them current both in their 

subject matter and teaching.273 Course directors, specifically, cited the lack of staff assistants to help 

with course administration, in addition to their faculty development and teaching load, not to 

mention requirements for them to do research and writing.274 The Marine Corps War College stood 

out in this regard, being positively cited by the PAJE for adding an administrative program manager 

and other administrative and support personnel to reduce faculty workload in these ancillary areas.275 

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This is another relevant area for investing in human resources. If the smaller investment is made at 

the lower levels of assistance, higher paid faculty and leaders can concentrate on the tasks that only 

they can perform, and are required to perform for their appointment, retention, and promotion. 

Finding: The mid-1990s saw, along with a total reduction in forces by almost half and an 

increase in PME students, a reduction of lower-ranking military and civilian administrative 

staff at many PME institutions as a cost-savings measure. Faculty and higher-ranking staff 

now perform administrative work that can detract from their focus on teaching, research, 

and service. 

Recommendation: Faculty requirements for administrative work (such as course 

direction), research and writing, and service and outreach should be matched with 

appropriate resources (time and money). Time can be gained not only by hiring the 

appropriate number of instructors but also by providing assistance for administrative 

work, if not also for research. 

STUDENTS

The Skelton Panel recognized the student body as another part of the “bedrock” foundation 

of the PME schools.276 In previous portions of this report the students have been mentioned 

numerous times either as participants whom the Subcommittee interviewed or as the beneficiaries of 

this educational enterprise. Graduates will in turn make their contribution to their profession and 

the military as an institution. This section addresses U.S. military and civilian students. The former 

includes active-duty and reserve-component officers, and the latter includes DOD civilians, other 

U.S. Government or interagency civilians, and private industry students. PME schools also host a 

number of international military officers and foreign government civilian students. 

MILITARY STUDENTS

The Skelton Panel studied the PME student selection processes in detail. The Panel found 

that “there was a wide variance among the services’ processes,” and noted some issues concerning 

student quality. The Navy, for example, was noted for its process of identifying a pool of officers 

eligible for in-residence PME, relatively few of whom actually attended, rather than using a quality 

selection board. Overall, however, the Panel found that by and large, “the services select very 

capable officers for in-residence PME.”277 Nevertheless, some of the current quality concerns reflect 

the same issues that the Skelton Panel addressed more than 20 years ago. 278 

At the pre-commissioning level, students at the service academies are competitively selected 

from among the population and are chosen using a composite of qualifications ranging from 

academic potential to leadership. At the primary level for the Air Force, virtually all officers attend 

the Air and Space Basic Course (six weeks) for second lieutenants and Squadron Officers School 

(five weeks) for captains. Officers can complete the latter through distance education if their base 

commander does not select them, or if they do not have time to attend in-residence.279 All Marine 

junior officers are required to complete Expeditionary Warfare School either in-residence or through 

distance learning.280

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At the intermediate- and senior-levels, there are a number of variations as to how students 

are selected for the resident courses. The Army competitively selects officers for senior schools and 

fellowships, but in 2005 it implemented a policy of sending all majors to some form of in-residence 

intermediate PME, either for 10 months at Command and General Staff School (Leavenworth) or a 

shorter duration course at a satellite campus. In part, the Army’s rationale was that as the security 

environment has become more complex, there is an increasing need for all officers to experience the 

benefit of some in-residence intermediate PME. Practically, however, the Army is only able to send 

about 75 percent of its majors to the course at Leavenworth. Combat arms majors generally attend 

the 10-month course, while their functional community counterparts study the “Common Core” at 

one of four satellite campuses. These students complete the remainder of the curriculum through 

distance education off-duty. 

A number of Army students stated that they thought the lack of a selection board process 

for intermediate-level school resulted in the 10-month in-residence course at Leavenworth not being 

as rigorous or as challenging as what they perceived it used to be or what they thought it should be. 

Students pejoratively referred to the Army’s commitment to universal intermediate PME as “no 

major left behind.”281 Faculty and current and former Army leaders at both the ILE and SLE levels 

noted concerns about whether combat arms officers were either being promoted so fast that they 

missed an opportunity to attend the course or were deployed so often that operational tempo did 

not allow for their attendance either at Leavenworth or other schools. Across the board, 

commentators expressed concern that this meant that some of the highest quality Army officers 

could reach senior rank without operational- or senior-level PME and, possibly, without JPME.282

Senior leaders at Command and General Staff College told the Subcommittee that the Army is 

rethinking the viability of universal intermediate PME. 

Air Force and Marine Corps students are competitively selected either with, or separate 

from, their promotion boards for both intermediate- and senior-level PME schools. However, the 

Navy lacks a board-selection process for these schools. Navy promotion boards designate the top 

50 percent of the lieutenant commanders (O-4s) and commanders (O-5s) as “school assignment 

eligible.”283 On occasion, officers falling below the 50 percent line may be selected for in-residence 

school. In his testimony before the Subcommittee, the President of the Naval War College 

highlighted a recent Navy policy that requires all O-5’s taking command to have completed ILE 

(which includes JPME I) either in-residence or by distance education.284 The Navy therefore, 

intends to encourage all officers who want to compete for command to complete some form of 

intermediate PME, whether through in-residence PME, at graduate school, or in distance learning 

courses.285 

All of the schools reported that Air Force and Marine Corps students are top performers. 

The consensus among faculty and students at all of the ILE and SLE schools is that Navy students 

vary more widely in terms of quality and may either be far too junior (intermediate schools) or far 

too senior (senior schools) relative to their peers.286 Faculty and students reported to the 

Subcommittee a number of times that Navy students were on the verge of retirement when they 

were sent to SLE.287 Army students were seen as top performers at joint and other service schools; 

however, combat arms soldiers are being given fewer opportunities to attend in-residence PME, 

which has begun to affect this view.288 

In order to have a standard and higher caliber of students across the services, some faculty 

members and experts believe the services should screen officers for SLE attendance, selecting only 

those officers who are academically talented. As a corollary, they believe that courses should be 

138
extremely rigorous and, like top-tier graduate or law schools, demand more from these officers 

during their academic assignments.289 Other faculty and experts believe that officers who have 

proven themselves as outstanding operational leaders should be afforded the opportunity to attend 

senior schools in-residence. They assert that each student, whether academically inclined or not, 

should be brought to their individual best level of performance during their PME experience.290

This last issue centers on whether in-residence PME is desirable and feasible for all officers, 

or whether only those who are thought to have potential to reach the highest grades and positions 

should have this opportunity. The Army has decided to send all majors to ILE in-residence so that 

all O-4s have this baseline of education. The other services say they lack the capacity, or operational 

demands are too high, to do this. Even allowing for the recent initiative requiring intermediate PME 

in order to be competitive for command, Navy service culture still emphasizes the operational and 

technical demands of a naval career over PME.291 The Skelton Panel took the position 20 years ago 

that this is not only a problem for the Navy, but that it also impacts the other intermediate and, in 

some instances, senior schools because of the varying quality and number of Navy students and 

faculty at these schools. All of these schools require at least some sea service representation in order 

to grant JPME credit.292

Finally, Subcommittee members were initially concerned that students were being pulled out 

of class early to meet operational requirements. While this did occur in some cases in the 2003-2004 

timeframe, the services and schools have worked hard to keep these occurrences to a minimum. All 

of the schools have tried to frontload the most important requirements at the in-residence courses, 

so that if one or two students, on a case-by-case basis and approved at the highest levels, must be 

released, they can still gain the most important content and get credit for completing the course.293

Observation: Since 2003, very few students have been removed from PME courses early. 

PME leaders have argued strenuously against early release, and the schools have tried to 

minimize the impact of even the few early releases by ensuring that all JPME requirements 

are front-loaded in their curricula. 

Finding: The Army’s commitment to universal intermediate in-residence education since 

2005 has had the unintended consequence of excluding many highly-competitive combat 

arms officers serving multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan from attending because of their 

limited windows of time to attend and because the Army has to push larger numbers of 

officers through school without a large increase in infrastructure and resources. 

Finding: The Navy remains alone among the services in not using a quality selection board 

process for in-residence PME students. 

 Recommendation: The Navy should consider instituting a quality board process for 

student selection. 

Reserve Component 

The Subcommittee heard that there are very few in-residence PME billets available to Army 

Reserve Component (RC) officers notwithstanding their significant contribution to current 

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.294 While reserve component officers should be afforded more 

opportunities to attend the shorter courses, RC officers cannot always afford to attend 10-month in 

residence courses because of their civilian employment, particularly if they have taken one or more 

long deployments.

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CIVILIAN STUDENTS

Interagency and DOD civilians do not have educational systems analogous to PME. The 

PME schools at the intermediate level, and more so at the senior level, offer select civilians a chance 

(usually just one) to attend courses with their military counterparts. The Subcommittee learned from 

faculty and students that the caliber of civilians attending officer PME institutions is uneven.295

 

 Faculty and civilian students noted that agencies and services did not have a utilization plan 

for their graduates to capitalize on their PME experience. They often returned to the same position 

they left, or they found that they had to find a new position themselves after they completed PME 

because someone had either been hired into their former position or it had been deleted.296 The 

Army and the Air Force have developed alternative approaches. The Army established a Graduate 

Placement Program in 2003 to ensure that its civilians were placed in “new positions requiring PME 

knowledge and skills” following completion of PME.297 In 2009, 92 percent of graduates were 

placed in these new positions.298 The Air Force requires civilian participants in PME to sign 

“mobility agreements,” which require that they be willing to move upon completion of their PME. 

This, along with the Air Force’s policy of centrally funding civilian PME billets (allowing a civilian’s 

former office to hire a replacement), helps to ensure that civilian graduates are actively placed in new 

positions that utilize their new skills. The Air Force has also just begun a study into civilian followon assignments, and their Civilian Force Development Panel (made up of senior Air Force officers 

and members of the Senior Executive Service) will review that assignment information and consider 

improvements in finding suitable follow-on positions for civilian PME graduates.299 In general, 

however, the services should have a clearer and more systematic approach to civilian attendance in 

PME and placement after PME graduation. 

Finding: With some exceptions, government civilian PME graduates are not given followon assignments that recognize the value of their in-residence experience. 

Recommendation: The Department and the services should consider the Army and 

Air Force programs as models for enhancing civilian professional development 

through PME. 

DOD Civilians 

In terms of quality, DOD civilian students were considered to be a very “mixed bag,” with 

the best reputations being among OSD students but the worst reputations for quality being among 

the Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP) students.300 That program will close 

at the end of FY 2010, and a successor program, the Defense Senior Leadership Development 

Program (DSLDP), will take its place in order to improve student quality and contributions through 

competitive selection processes. The new DSLDP will “provide structured learning opportunities to 

enable the deliberate development of a diverse cadre of senior civilian leaders with...competencies 

needed to lead organizations...and achieve results in the joint, interagency, and multi-national 

environments.”301 Similarly, the FY 2010 NDAA established the Defense Civilian Leadership 

Program (DCLP) which was designed “to recruit individuals with academic merit, work experience, 

and demonstrated leadership skills” who would be eligible for rapid advancement and groomed for 

leadership positions within the Department. They would be given educational and training 

opportunities and placed in positions for which there is a definite need for their qualifications and 

abilities. Again, a competitive selection process is meant to ensure that only the most qualified 

140
participate in this program. While the emphasis of this program is placing the most qualified 

personnel in important and career-enhancing positions, the participants’ access to educational 

opportunities could potentially raise the quality level of civilians that the Department sends to PME 

schools.302 The impact of the DSLDP and DCLP cannot be analyzed yet. 

Observation: Defense Leadership and Management Program (DLAMP) students attending 

PME, in general, did not have the same breadth of experience and were not of the same 

quality as their military counterparts. The old DLAMP program is set to close, and the new 

program is reportedly utilizing a quality board selection process. The Congress had such 

significant concerns about civilian personnel development that it included a requirement for 

the Department to develop the DCLP in FY 2010 NDAA.

Interagency Civilians

All of the intermediate and senior PME schools, except ICAF, National, and Marine C&SC, 

decried the lack of interagency students in their seminars. These students are highly valued for their 

alternative perspectives on national security and differing operational approaches and insights, 

particularly since all graduates will likely be operating in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, 

and multinational (JIIM) environment. In fact, most PME leaders, faculty, and students desire that 

interagency participation be expanded beyond the “traditional national security” few of State, U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), and the intelligence community. The leaders of 

the PME institutions understand the lack of a “personnel float” (or additional personnel who can be 

assigned to training) in these agencies and departments, but PME students largely believe greater 

numbers would improve their school experience and contribution to mission success later in the 

field and on staff.303 

In this regard, the Subcommittee applauds the Army’s approach to attracting interagency 

students to GCSS at Fort Leavenworth. Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV began 

implementation of a program through which the Army would offer a military CGSC graduate a 

fellowship to fill a desk at the State Department or USAID if the Foreign Service Officer (FSO) in 

that position were selected to attend CGSS. Further, the Army would provide priority for on-post 

housing for these FSOs so they would not have excessive out-of-pocket expenses for their move. 

This was all to be done on a non-reimbursable basis. Known as the “Casey Initiative” (after Army 

Chief of Staff General George Casey), this is seen as a win-win-win accomplishment. The Army 

officer benefits from a year-long interagency fellowship in which to put his or her education to 

work. The Foreign Service Officer completes PME in-residence with his or her military 

counterparts. And, the class has a larger component of interagency representation, which benefits 

all of the military students.304 LTG Caldwell reported thinking about how to manage a similar 

program with students from non-governmental organizations in the future.305 The Air Force sends 

officers to fellowships for interagency exposure but does not ask for interagency faculty or students 

in return.306

Two complaints emerged that should be addressed at the departmental level. Particularly at 

ILE, there have been instances when the Department of State has sent diplomatic security officers 

to PME. While they may be outstanding professionals and benefit from the curricula and 

association with their military classmates, their classmates do not gain perspectives on diplomacy 

and development that a Foreign Service officer would bring.307 Coast Guard officers are also being 

141
counted as either interagency participants or sea service participants, depending on what the school 

needs most. This flexibility in counting students for OPMEP purposes does not reflect the 

contribution these sea service officers make; they are instead asked to represent the Department of 

Homeland Security. 

Finding: Service schools (other than the USMC, which has sufficient participation due to 

proximity to Washington, D.C.) see a need for more interagency faculty and students. 

Recommendation: The services may want to consider the “Casey Initiative” being 

implemented at CGSC as a model to enroll more interagency students. Military 

officers would be sent post-PME to a one-year fellowship to a State Department, 

USAID, or other agency position. This, in effect, creates a de facto personnel float, 

enabling that department or agency to send a faculty member or student to the 

school in exchange for a year or more. 

INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS: MILITARY AND CIVILIAN

Faculty and staff at most schools report that their International Fellows (IFs) bring a much 

needed perspective to the educational experience of U.S. officers and government civilians, but they, 

too, are a very mixed group. Those with the best English language skills contribute and gain the 

most.308 While security assistance program contributions to allies and relationships with 

international partners should be a consideration, PME faculty indicated that there is a limit to the 

number of IFs who can be integrated into a seminar if teaching and learning for others were to be 

effective.309 For that reason, adding more IFs does not necessarily improve the education for a JIIM 

environment. The Joint Staff also indicated that as more international students are added, the 

OPMEP-required representation of host service and non-host U.S. military students may be 

affected, ultimately affecting JPME accreditation.310 Those who run the international officer 

programs noted that sometimes there is tension between the institutions’ PME mission for U.S. 

students and the goals of the security cooperation mission under which the IFs are included.311 

These issues are being worked among the leaders of the schools, JCS/DJ-5, and the Military 

Education Coordinating Council.312

While all schools have a minimum Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) 

requirement to enroll foreign students, the schools do not all have the same requirement. Some 

school leaders and faculty thought this should be standardized.313 In addition, International Fellows 

also miss a number of class sessions in order to participate in separate programs such as domestic 

travel but, except for the Naval War College where they have their own school, IFs earn the same 

PME certificates and master’s degrees as their U.S. counterparts. At some schools, the IFs are 

subject to the same academic requirements and evaluations. At others, the PME leaders are 

sensitive to grading, evaluating, or “failing” a future minister of defense or chief of military from an 

allied or partner nation. 

Finally, although most core courses are completely unclassified, security issues are raised in 

relation to international students. Some schools do not honor NATO officers’ clearances even if 

they will be going to assignments where they will work with U.S. forces and utilize those same 

clearances.314 In these situations, international students could clearly benefit from participation in 

those courses and activities that would help them in their next posting. U.S. students would also 

benefit from their presence and perspectives, just as they do during participation in the unclassified 

courses and events. Army War College faculty reported that they thought international students 

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were not allowed to hold their clearances because of State Department policy.315 Naval War College 

faculty said their institutional policy allowed them to receive waivers when this type of situation 

occurred in electives. They did not believe the State Department controlled this issue.316 And at 

NDU, the IF management office policy is to treat all IFs the same – none will have access to 

classified material whether they have the appropriate clearances or not – so as not to separate the 

NATO students and other close partners from those who have not yet received that status. The 

Subcommittee heard complaints on this issue from international and U.S. students at the Army War 

College and at NDU.317

While adding more foreign military and government students should be considered, there is 

a limit to the numbers that make sense if the mission focus remains on U.S. military students’ 

professional education, and if resources and infrastructure do not increase significantly. The 

implementation of the IF program does not have to be standardized necessarily among the services, 

but JCS/DJ-5 and DJ-7 should be included in coordination, and the school leaders and Military 

Education Coordinating Council should discuss where standardization might enhance both the 

educational opportunities of the U.S. and foreign students and the U.S. security cooperation 

function. 

INDUSTRY STUDENTS 

Because of ICAF’s unique curricular focus on resourcing the national security and military 

strategies, the country’s industrial base, and individual industries, ICAF includes students from the 

private-sector whose companies pay their tuition. However, as of 2009, only half the 20 seminars 

had private-sector students because the law limited NDU to a total of 10.318 Staff, faculty, and 

students were unanimous in praising the contributions these students make to their military and 

civilian government peers’ development and called for an increase in the number set by law to allow 

for one private sector student per seminar.319 

Finding: Although they have tried to mitigate the negative implications of too few industry 

students, ICAF argued that they could not provide the same quality of education on the 

industrial base and industries across the entire student body since only half the seminars 

included such private industry students. The FY 2010 NDAA included a measure to 

increase the number of private industry students allowed for ICAF by an additional 10. 

The theme that remains throughout this discussion on students is quality. If these schools 

are to produce future military leaders, attention must be paid to the types and mix of students that 

enter the classroom. These students should be upwardly mobile in their careers and should learn 

with fellow officers who share their intellectual curiosity with regard to operational art and strategy. 

The issue of quality does not stop with uniformed students but is also essential for civilian students 

and international and industry fellows. As the military increases its interagency interaction, it 

becomes necessary for military officers to learn from adept diplomats, foreign aid officers, and 

intelligence officers, among others. A student body that is comprehensively made up of quality 

military and civilian personnel becomes self-reinforcing, as the knowledge base and capabilities of all 

students increases due to their interaction with each other. To ignore the quality of students from 

any one military branch or sector of the civilian student body is to do all the others a disservice. 

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Material Resources

 The Skelton Panel did not take a comprehensive look at how well the PME institutions were 

funded to accomplish their mission. The Panel did, however, inquire into the cost per student at 

each school. The Skelton Panel received from the Office of the Secretary of Defense raw data 

produced with different methodologies by service, and sometimes by school, which resulted in 

widely varying costs for roughly similar programs.320 

 For example, the Department submitted the fiscal year cost for a student at National War 

College as $9,387. The figure provided for a student at the Air War College was $121,348, the 

difference accounted for in large measure by the Air Force including student pay and moving costs 

associated with the permanent change of station. The Panel recommended that the Department 

“establish a uniform cost accounting system for the PME schools.”321

 The Subcommittee made its own effort to ascertain whether a uniform cost accounting 

system existed. The Department provided cost-per-student figures with standardized criteria. 

Comparative figures were no longer characterized by such enormous variations, but there were still a 

number of inexplicable differences. 

 The fiscal year 2009 cost per student for the five-week Air Force SOC was $94,711, almost 

as much as the $94,474 that the Marine Corps gave as the cost for the 10-month Marine Corps War 

College program.322 There were as many as seven different variations allowed in computing the 

costs.323 It is obvious that the Department had simply accepted and forwarded the services’ 

numbers without providing and insisting on standardized procedures, or conducting its own 

analysis. 

Finding: The Department does not have a uniform cost accounting method for the PME 

schools, and it has not provided figures that support useful comparisons. 

Recommendation: The Department should report to Congress on PME funding 

using a standardized accounting method for cost per student at each of the PME 

institutions as recommended by the Skelton Panel in 1989. 

 

The OPMEP has a Common Education Standard related to material resources. The standard 

mandates that “[e]ach institution must have a library or learning resource center, informational 

resources, financial resources, and physical resources that meet the needs of all users and support 

the mission and programs of the institution.”324 

 Accordingly, PAJE reports routinely comment on libraries, information resources, and 

physical infrastructure in need of renovation, especially when the quality of the student experience is 

affected.325 A recent report cited seminar rooms at one institution designed for 10-12 students that 

were described as “overcrowded” with 17 students per room, with no plans to renovate or replace 

the facility.326 In another case, the Military Education Coordinating Council (MECC) mentioned the 

limited number of computer workstations available to students. The MECC also noted the potential 

impediment for accessing relevant and necessary academic information that may be imposed by not 

having an “.edu” domain and by having to negotiate “.mil” firewalls.327 The MECC commented 

favorably on the Army’s Lewis and Clark Center for the Command and General Staff College at 

Fort Leavenworth calling it “state of the art.”328 The Marine Corps is building to a similar standard 

in its strategic plan for Marine Corps University.329 This said, the Subcommittee originally identified 

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145

issues at Expeditionary Warfare School with funding for sufficient laptops for the student body 

there. Support for this requirement is now programmed for fiscal year 2011, and the school is 

addressing IT infrastructure issues to ensure that laptops can be utilized effectively.330

 School leaders are often understandably reluctant to mention material resource challenges in 

a formal setting, not wanting to run afoul of decisions by higher headquarters for prioritization of 

funding. The Subcommittee, however, made similar observations to those of the MECC on its 

visits to the PME institutions. Physical infrastructure is limited at some institutions, particularly the 

older ones such as the NWC, National, and Marine Corps University. In addition, faculty at the 

joint schools, which rely on service sponsorship to fund their facilities, reported that they receive 

insufficient advocacy on resources issues.331 

Finding: Adequate material support is necessary for mission effectiveness. While PME is 

not poorly resourced, some material challenges are apparent. Challenges include needs for 

reliable funding for the joint schools, renovated infrastructure for the older schools, and 

appropriate information and educational technology for many schools. 

Recommendation: The Department and the services should appropriately resource 

the mission-specific material needs of the PME institutions. 

                                                           

1 Jeffrey D. McCausland and Neil Weissman, Educating Leaders in an Age of Uncertainty – The Future of Military War Colleges: 

A Research Study for the Smith Richardson Foundation, Dickinson College Leadership in Conflict Initiative, Carlisle, 

Pennsylvania, 15 December 2005, 298-299. 

2 U.S. Department of Defense, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,” Department of 

Defense Directive 5100.01, 21 November 2003. 3 Sam Retherford, Director for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 

and Readiness, Military Personnel Policy, “Professional Military Education: Role of OSD,” Briefing for HASC Staff, 20 

March 2009, and Telephone Interview, 9 November 2009. See also Dr. Janet Breslin-Smith, Written Testimony, 

Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigations, Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education 20 Years After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and 

the Skelton Panel, 20 May 2009, 3. Also, Faculty Panels, CODELs Snyder to ICAF, 31 March 2009, and National, 29 April 

2009. Also HASC Staff Visits to National, 3 April 2009, and JFSC, 1 May 2009. 4 10 U.S.C. §2152. 

5 Ibid. 

6 10 U.S.C. §2154. 

7 Ibid. 

8 10 U.S.C. §2154 and 2155. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs can grant waivers for the sequencing under “exceptional 

circumstances” on a case by case basis. 

9 10 U.S.C. §2155. 

10 10 U.S.C. §2157. 

11 NDU is funded under “Defense-wide Operations and Maintenance” as per NDAA FY 2002. Service hosts provide 

infrastructure for NDU at Fort Leslie J. McNair (Army) and Joint Forces Staff College (Navy). The services pay O&M 

and infrastructure for their own PME schools. Chief, Joint Education and Doctrine Division, JCS/DJ-7, email, 18 

March 2010. 

12 Sam Retherford, Briefing, 20 March 2009, and Telephone Interview, 9 November 2009. 13 DOD Directive 5124.02, USD(P&R), June 23, 2008, 4 and 8. See also 10 U.S.C. §661-668. 14 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Guidance for the Development of the Force, and briefings by USD(P) and USD(P&R), 27 

August 2009. “The GDF considers a 20-year view of the security environment to inform the construction of the 

Pentagon’s fiscal year 2010-2015 spending plan, according to Jason Sherman,” Inside the Pentagon, 15 May 2008, 1. This is 

a classified document but has a short portion related to PME that is unclassified and focuses exclusively on the 

USD(P&R) role. Also, Sam Retherford, Interview, 9 November 2009. Admiral Michael Mullen, HASC O&I Member 

Meeting, 27 October 2009. The Subcommittee requested the GDF, but the Office of the Secretary of Defense turned 

down the request per letter from William Lynn, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 19 October 2009. 15 Sam Retherford, Briefing, 20 March 2009, and Telephone Interview, 9 November 2009. The Office of the Secretary of 

Defense Historian’s Office provided information that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Education existed 
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in the 1960s. In addition to other responsibilities, this office was responsible for PME. A Ph.D. Principal Assistant for 

Education Programs and Management Training was subordinate to the DASD. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 RADM Admiral Garry E. Hall, MajGen Robert P. Steel, RADM James P. Wisecup, and MG Robert M. Williams, 

Responses to Questions for the Record, Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 

Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Thinkers and Practitioners: Do Senior Professional Military 

Education Schools Produce Strategists? 4 June 2009. 19 10 U.S.C. § 153(a)(5)(C). 

20 OPMEP, D-4 - D-6. 21 Ibid., D-5 - D-7. 22 JCS/DJ-7 Staff, Briefing to the HASC Staff, 17 March 2009. See also Dr. Richard Kohn, Testimony and Responses 

to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? 23 Dr. Alexander Cochran, Testimony and Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing,

Another Crossroads?

24 JCS/DJ-7, HASC Staff briefing, 17 March 2009. 

25 OPMEP, Enclosure C. 26 USAF Briefing to HASC Staff, 26 March 2009, and HASC Staff Visit to Air University, 8-9 April 2009. 27 Cochran, HASC Written Testimony, O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads, 3. 28 Breslin-Smith, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? 3. 29 MG Robert Scales (Ret.) and Professor Williamson Murray, as well as serving and retired senior officers in nonattribution interviews. 

30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. and HASC Chairman Ike Skelton has also posed this question. 32 Report of the Panel on Military Education of the 100th Congress of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of 

Representatives, 21 April 1989, (The Skelton Report), 108. 33 Ibid.

34 Cochran, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? See also, HASC O&I Subcommittee 

Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. See for example MG Williams, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, 

Thinkers and Practitioners. Also, interviews with leaders of various JPME and PME institutions, March – October 2009. 35 Ibid. 36 David A. Tretler, “Professional Military Education: Background and Basics,” HASC O&I Subcommittee Members 

Briefing, 24 March 2009. Also CODELs Snyder to ICAF and National, 31 March and 29 April 2009, respectively, and 

HASC Staff Visit to National, 3 April 2009. This sentiment was repeated by other NDU staff and ICAF and National 

faculty during interviews and staff visits. 

37 CODELs Snyder to ICAF and National, 31 March and 29 April 2009, respectively, and HASC Staff Visit to National, 

3 April 2009. Breslin-Smith, Testimony and Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing,

Another Crossroads? See also HASC O&I Staff Interviews with Faculty and Staff, February – December 2009. 38 Breslin-Smith, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? Also, Faculty Panels, CODEL 

Snyder to National, 29 April 2009, and HASC Staff Visit to National, 3 April 2009. See also HASC O&I Staff 

Interviews with Faculty and Staff, February – December 2009. 39 CODELs Snyder to ICAF and National, 31 March and 29 April 2009, respectively, and HASC Staff Visit to National, 

3 April 2009. HASC O&I Staff Interviews with Faculty and Staff, February – December 2009. 40 CODELs Snyder to ICAF and National, 31 March and 29 April 2009, respectively and HASC Staff Visits to National, 

3 April 2009; MCU, 27 March 2009; and, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 5-9 April 2009. Also, JCS/DJ-7, USD (P&R), and 

Defense Language Office, Marine Corps, Air Force, Army, and Navy Staffs, HASC Staff Briefings, 17, 20, 23, 26, 26, 

and 31 March 2009, respectively. 

41 Ibid.

42 Frank Pagano, Capstone Briefing to HASC Staff, 19 August 2009, and RDML Steve Pietropaoli, O&I Staff Interview, 

9 October 2009. 

43 NDU-P Interviews, 7 August and 29 October 2009, and Pietropaoli Interview, 9 October 2010. Also, Frank Pagano, 

Capstone Briefing to HASC Staff, 19 August 2009, and LTG David Barno Interview, 9 March 2010. See also, Paula 

Thornhill, “Improving Capstone: Change Course Focus to Challenge Participants,” Armed Forces Journal (online edition), 

April 2010. One student survey cited the longest serving mentor as “the best one.” Other experts say the length of time 

a senior mentor serves is not important if they stay current in their joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 

multinational knowledge. 
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44 National Faculty Panel, CODEL Snyder, 29 April 2009; Faculty Panel, Staff Visit to National, 3 April 2009; and 

Breslin-Smith, Cochran, Dr. James Carafano, and Kohn, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another 

Crossroads. 45 HASC CODEL to MCU, 20 May 2009; HASC Staff Visit to MCU, 27 March 2009; HASC Staff Visits to USAWC, 

NWC, and AU, 5-9 April 2009. Also, Mullen, HASC O&I Member Meeting, 27 October 2009; GEN George Casey, 21 

October 2009; Gen Norton Schwartz, 1 October 2009; ADM Gary Roughead, 29 September 2009; and Gen James 

Conway, 24 September 2009. 

46 U.S. Army Briefings to HASC Staff, 26 March and 17 July 2009; HASC Staff Visits to USAWC 6-7 April 2009, CGSC 

27-28 May 2009, USMA 30 June – 1 July 2009, and TRADOC 30 April – 1 May 2009; HASC O&I Subcommittee 

Hearing, Raising Thinking from the Tactical to the Operational Level: JPME I and II at the Services’ and Joint Command & Staff 

Colleges, 24 June 2009; Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing Before the 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Thinkers and Practitioners; and, Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, 

Committee on Armed Services, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Beyond Service Core 

Competency: Are Junior Officers Prepared for Today’s Security Environment? 15 July 2009; HASC O&I Member Meetings with 

MG Williams, 3 June 2009; LTG Caldwell, 17 June 2009; and, GEN Casey, 21 October 2009; and, HASC O&I Staff 

Meetings, BG Edward Cardon, 17 July and 17 August 2009, and General Martin Dempsey, 17 September 2009. 47 Air Force Briefing to HASC Staff, 26 March 2009; HASC Staff Visits to AU, 8-9 April 2009 and to USAFA, 28-29 

June 2009; HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking; HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and 

Practitioners; and, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Beyond Service Core Competency; and, HASC O&I Subcommittee 

Member Meetings with LtGen Peck, 12 May 2009; LtGen Gould, 15 September 2009; and, Gen Schwarz, 1 October 

2009. 

48 Navy Briefings to HASC Staff 31 March and 11 May 2009; CODEL Snyder to USNA, 9 June 2009; HASC Staff Visit 

to NWC 7-8 April 2009; HASC O&I Hearings, Thinkers and Practitioners and Beyond Service Core Competency; and , HASC 

O&I Member Meetings with ADM Roughead, 29 September 2009, and RADM Wisecup, 28 April 2009. Also HASC 

O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. 49 USMC Briefing to HASC Staff 23 March 2009, CODEL Snyder to MCU, 20 May 2009; HASC Staff Visit to MCU, 27 

March; HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearings, Thinkers and Practitioners; Raising Thinking, and Beyond Service Core Competency; 

and, HASC O&I Member Meetings with Gen Conway, 24 September 2009, and MajGen Robert Neller, 5 November 

2009. 

50 Carafano, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? 51 Kohn, Testimony, Ibid. 52 Carafano, Testimony, Ibid. 53 U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, A Leader Development Strategy for an Expeditionary Army, Draft 16 June 2009 

(revised). 

54 Breslin-Smith, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? See also, McCausland and 

Weissman, 298-299. Former and current USAWC Board of Visitor Members and USAWC Senior Leaders, HASC Staff 

Interviews, May 2009. 

55 McCausland and Weissman, 298-299. 

56 Ibid., 299. 57 HASC Staff Visit to AU, 8-9 April 2009. 

58 Kohn, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? 12-13. 59 HASC Staff Visit to AU, 8-9 April 2009. 

60 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE): Report of Accreditation of the Air 

War College, 20-23 October 2008, 3. 61 Air War College Dean, Interview with HASC Staff, 9 April 2009. See also, MajGen Maurice Forsyth, Responses to 

Questions for the Record, Thinkers and Practitioners, 4 June 2009, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-006. 62 McCausland and Weissman, 347. 

63 AWC Dean, Interview with HASC Staff, 9 April 2009, and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visit to AU, 9 April 2009. 64 The Skelton Report, 133. 65 Ibid. 

66 Dr. John Yaeger, email, 10 April 2010. Karen DiFulgo, Vice President, Human Resources, Gaylord National Resort 

& Convention Center, Interview, 12 April 2010. Dr. Helen Meisenhelder, Organizational Behavior Specialist and 

Former HQ USAF Personnel Specialist, email to HASC O&I staff, 13 April 2010. See also various sources including, 

Caroline Sotello Viernes Turner, Diversifying the Faculty: A Guidebook for Search Committee, Association of American Colleges 

and Universities, Washington, D.C. 2002 (with an annotated bibliography) and “Diversifying the Faculty: Search 

Committee Going Beyond Business as Usual,” U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and 
148

                                                                                                                                                                                               

Improvement (OERI), National Library of Education. Also, Pamela Bernard, “When Seeking a Diverse Faculty, Watch 

Out for Legal Minefields,” Chronicle of Higher Education, Vol. 53, Issue 6, 29 September 2006, 66; Daryl Smith, “How to 

Diversify the Faculty, Academe, American Association of University Professors, 2 March 2007; Daryl Smith et al, 

“Interrupting the Usual: Successful Strategies for Hiring Diverse Faculty, The Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 75, No. 2, 

April 2004, 133-160; and, Charmaine P. Clowney, J.D., “Best Practices in Recruiting and Retaining Diverse Faculty 

(slides), PA State System of Higher Education. Also, USMA, Institutional Self Study Report, June 2009, 21-45. 67 Yaeger, email, 10 April 2010 and DiFulgo, Interview, 12 April 2010. Also, Leader and Faculty Panels, CODELs 

Snyder to ICAF, 31 March 2009, and National, 29 April 2009. Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visits to USAFA 

and USMA, 29 June – 1 July 2009. Leader, Faculty, and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visits to National, 3 April 2009; 

USAWC, NWC, and AU, 5-9 April 2009; and, CGSC, 26-27 May 2009. See also, Kohn, Testimony, HASC O&I 

Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? Also, CODEL Snyder to USNA, 9 June 2009. See also, NWC, “Statement 

of Academic Policy 09-01, Faculty Diversity,” 22 May 2009. 68 Leader and Faculty Panels, CODELs Snyder to ICAF, 31 March 2009, and National, 29 April 2009. Leader and 

Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visits to USAFA and USMA, 29 June – 1 July 2009. Leader, Faculty, and Student Panels, 

HASC Staff Visits to National, 3 April 2009; USAWC, NWC, and AU, 5-9 April 2009; and, CGSC, 26-27 May 2009. 

Also Kohn, Testimony, HASC O&I Hearing, Another Crossroads? Also, illustrative is The Higher Learning Commission 

(A Commission of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools), Report of a Comprehensive Evaluation Visit to the 

United States Air Force Academy, “Assurance Section,” (USAF Academy, CO: 27-29 April 2009), 11. While 21.5% of 

cadets are women and 21.3% are racial or ethnic minorities, among the faculty only 16.4% are women and 8.8% are 

racial or ethnic minorities. 

69 CODEL Snyder to USNA, 9 June 2009; Leader and Faculty Discussions and Panels, Staff Visit to USAFA and 

USMA, 29 June – 1 July 2009. 

70 NWC, “Statement of Academic Policy 09-01, Faculty Diversity,” 22 May 2009. 71 Faculty Panel, CODEL Snyder, ICAF, 31 March 2009; Faculty Panel, HASC Staff Visit, National, 3 April 2009; and, 

Faculty Panel, HASC Staff Visit, USAFA, 29 June 2010. 72 Interviews with BG Edward Cardon, 17 July and 17 August; Harvey Rishikof, 25 July 2009; and Current and Former 

Faculty Members from Various PME Institutions, March – November 2009. HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearings and 

Responses to Questions for the Record 4 June – 15 July 2009. HASC Staffdels to National, 3 April 2009; USAWC, 

NWC, and AU, 5-9 April 2009; CGSC, 27 May 2009; and, USAFA and USMA 29 June – 1 July 2009. The copyright 

issue was raised at USAWC, NWC, CGSC, USAFA, ACSC, and USMA. Academic freedom was raised specifically at 

AU, USAFA, and USMA. 

73 Skelton Report, 133. 74 Ibid., 147. 75 Ibid., 148. 76 Ibid. 77 HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? 78 Kohn, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? 79 HASC Staff Interviews with Various Current and Former Faculty Members on CODELs and Staff Visits, and 

individually, February-December 2009. 

80 Murray, Written Testimony, Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing Before 

the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Charting the Course for Effective Professional Military Educaiton,10 

September 2009, 23. 

81 RADM Wisecup, BG Cardon, and ACSC, Responses to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee 

Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS No.: HASC OI-06-12. 82 BG Kasun, RADM Wisecup, Col Damm, BG Cardon, and ACSC, Responses to Questions for the Record, HASC 

O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS No.: HASC OI-06-12. See also: MajGen Steel, RADL Hall, 

and MajGen Forsyth, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. 83 HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking and HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners. 84 Ibid. 85 LtGen Paxton, Written Testimony, Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Investing in Our Military Leaders: The Role of Professional Military 

Education in Officer Development, 8. 86 OPMEP. 

87 The Skelton Report, 148-149. 88 McCausland and Weissman, 6. 
149

                                                                                                                                                                                               

89 Cochran, Testimony and Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another 

Crossroads?

90 Breslin-Smith, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? 4-5. 91 Cochran, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? 92 Kohn, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? 12. 93 RADL Hall, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners, 19. 94 BG Kasun and Col Damm, Responses to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No.: HASC OI-06-012. 

95 The Skelton Report, 133. See also, Andrew Krepinevich, Memo to Andrew Marshall, “Rebuilding America’s Intellectual 

Arsenal, 18 December 2005. Krepinevich asked, among other questions, “What is being done to attract top faculty 

members to our key military education centers?” 96 The Skelton Report, 133. 97 Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, CODELs Snyder to ICAF, 31 March 2009; National, 29 April 2009; and MCU, 20 

May 2009; and, National Senior Leader Panel for HASC O&I Members, 9 June 2009. Also, Leader and Faculty Panels, 

HASC Staff Visits to National, 3 April 2009; USAWC, NWC, and AU, 5-9 April 2009; JFSC, 30 April – 1 May 2009; 

and, CGSC, 26-27 May 2009. Discussions concerned the need to gap military positions taking who they are offered so 

they will not have to gap positions. Discussions also covered the issue of not enough operators (combat arms, pilots, or 

line officers) being available to attend or serve as faculty for PME courses. 98 Cochran and Kohn, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? 3 and 10, 

respectively. See also school senior leader and faculty interviews, February-December 2009. 99 Representative Steve Israel, Notes provided from the “Cognitive Transformation Roundtable,” United States Capitol, 

Washington D.C., 16 February 2005. Attendees included Rep. Ike Skelton, MG Robert Scales, and a number of other 

senior military leaders, academics, and policy makers. 100 The Skelton Report, 136. 101 Ibid., 136. 102 Ibid., 146. 103 5 U.S.C. §5101-5115 and 10 U.S.C. §§1595, 4021, 7478, and 9021. For the service academies, 5 U.S.C. §5102(c)(10) 

and 10 U.S.C. Chapters 403, 603, and 903. 

104 The Skelton Report, 32, 41, and 146. 105 HASC Staff Visit to NWC, 6-9 April 2009. As an example, NWC Provost requested a waiver from the State 

Department for retired Ambassador Peters, and was turned down in 2008. See 5 U.S.C. §8344 and Teddy B. Taylor, 

Acting Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources, Letter to RADL Jacob L. Shuford, 

President of the NWC, 20 August 2008. Other PME faculties and senior staffs raised this issue with HASC staff and 

Subcommittee Members in various fora in discussing increasing the number of interagency faculty. 106 The Skelton Report, 135, 142, 146, and 147. Also, HASC Staff visits to NWC, 3 April 2009; USMC University, 27 

March 2009; and, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 5-9 April 2009. Also JCS/DJ-7, Marine Corps, Air Force, Army, Navy and 

Navy (N15), Briefings to the HASC Staff, 17 March, 23 March, 26 March, 26 March, 31 March, and 11 May 2009, 

respectively. 

107 BG Cardon, BG Kasun, RADM Wisecup, Col Damm, and ACSC Staff, Responses to Question for the Record, 

HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS No.: HASC OI-06-002. 108 HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders. Also, Briefings to HASC staff by JCS/DJ-7, 17 

March; USAF, 26 March; Army, 26 March; Navy, 31 March; and, Navy N-15, 11 May 2009. 109 The Skelton Report, 32, 41, 110, and 128. 110 BG Kasun, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No.: HASC OI-06-002. 

111 BrigGen Dana Born and BG Patrick Finnegan, Responses to Question for the Record, Congress, U.S. House of 

Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 

Beyond Service Core Competency,: Are Junior Officers Prepared for Today’s Security Environment? CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-08-034 

and HASCOI-08-009, respectively. 

112 HASC Staff Visit to MCU, 27 March 2009. 113 CODEL Snyder and HASC Staff Visit to MCU, 20 May and 27 March 2009, respectively. 114 Caldwell, Responses to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders, 

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-07-011. 

115 Sitterly, Responses to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders,

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-07-039. 
150

                                                                                                                                                                                               

116 Lutterloh, Responses to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders, 

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-07-021. 

117 AWC Staff, Response to HASC Questions, 22 and 23 June 2009. BG Cardon, BG Kasun, RADM Wisecup, Col 

Damm, and ACSC Staff, Responses to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS No.: 

HASC OI-06-002. 

118 10 U.S.C. §619. 119 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, P.L. 109-364, Section 519, 17 October 2006, amending 10 U.S.C. 

§668. 

120 Memorandum of Agreement: Assignment of Military Faculty at Senior Service Level Colleges, 30 December 2005. 121 LtGen Paxton, LTG Caldwell, Lutterloh, and MajGen Spiese, Testimonies and Written Testimonies, HASC O&I 

Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders, 28 July 2009, 9, 9, 10, and 16-17, respectively. 122 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, PL 109-364, 17 October 2006, 120 STAT. 2190, §519, 108-109. 123 CGSC Information Paper coordinated with the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Elements at Fort Leavenworth, 

“House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Question,” 12 May 2009, 2-3. Also, BG Cardon, Written Testimony and 

Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Hearing, Raising Thinking, 11, and CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-06-007. 

See also BG Caldwell, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders. 124 Reference to the ILE Faculty MOU by BrigGen Melvin Spiese, Responses to Question for the Record, HASC O&I 

Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-07-030. BG Cardon, Response to 

Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-06-007. See 

also LTG Caldwell, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders. 125 LtGen Paxton, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders, 9. See also 

LTG Caldwell, Written Testimony, 9; Lutterloh, Written Testimony, 10; and MajGen Spiese, Written Testimony, 16. 

PAJE Accreditation Reports for Air Command and Staff College (2007), Enclosure A, 3, and Command and General 

Staff College (2008), 2 and 6. RADM Wisecup, Col Damm, BG Cardon, and ACSC Staff, Responses to Question for the 

Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing Raising Thinking, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-06-007 and BG Cardon, 

HASCOI-06-003. MCU, “Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) Billets at JPME I Institutions, Submitted in Response to 

Questions Raised by HASC O&I, 28 July 2009,” 17 August 2009. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center letter to the 

House Armed Services Committee, 20 August 2009. Faculty and Senior Leader Panels and Interviews, Staff visits to 

MCU, 27 March 2009; AU, 8-9 April; and CGSC, 27 May 2009. Cardon, HASC Staff Interview, 17 July 2009. MajGen 

Neller, HASC O&I Member Meeting, 5 November 2009. Dr. Jerre Wilson, Emails, MCU, November 2009. 126 Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Bill, House Report 111-166, 18 June 2009, 315. See also, Snyder-Wittman 

letter to ADM Michael Mullen, 23 July 2009. USD(P&R) and JCS/DJ-1 (Personnel) were to have a draft report in 

coordination on or about 1 April 2010, per emails from JCS/DJ-7, 18 March 2010, and OSD Legislative Liaison, 26 

March 2010. 

127 Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Bill, Conference Report 111-288, 7 October 2009, 726. See also, Joint Staff 

Letter to the Chairman, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 

“Response to Joint Professional Military (JPME) I Faculty on Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL),” 17 September 2009. 128 HASC O&I Subcommittee Chairman Snyder and Col Stephen Tanous exchange during HASC O&I Subcommittee 

Hearing, Beyond Service Core Competency. 129 10 U.S.C. §624. 130 Department Head Panel, HASC Staff Visit, USMA, 1 July 2009. 131 ADM Mullen, (ADM Pat Walsh (Blue Angels pilot, Ph.D., and USNA faculty member) among others), HASC O&I 

Meeting, 27 October 2009. In addition, according to the USAWC Commandant, part of the complicating factor in terms 

of time is that Army command positions that in the past lasted two years, are now lasting three or longer. Having longer 

command tours, and even early promotions due to attrition, reduces time available for PME, faculty duty, joint 

positions, advanced education, and other possible career broadening assignments. 132 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), Department of Defense Instruction 1402.06, 

Civilian Faculty Positions in Department of Defense (DoD) Post-Secondary Educational Institutions, 6 November 2007. 133 LtGen Frances Wilson, NDU President, Telephone Interview, 28 April 2009. 134 BG Kasun, Response to Questions for the Record, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-06-013. 135 ACSC Staff, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No.: HASCOI-06-013. 

136 Col Damm, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No.: HASCOI-06-013. 
151

                                                                                                                                                                                               

137 BG Cardon, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No.: HASCOI-06-013. BrigGen Born, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, 

Beyond Service Core Competency, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-08-038. Faculty Panel, Staff Visit to USAFA, 29 June 2009. 138 RADM Wisecup, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking,

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-06-013. 

139 Col Belcher, MajGen Forsyth, MG Williams, RADM Wisecup, MajGen Steel, and RADM Hall, HASC O&I Hearing, 

Responses Question for the Record, Thinkers and Practitioners, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-005, 4 June 2009. 140 HASC Staff Visits to AWC, NWC, and AU 6-9 April 2009; and to CGSC 27 May 2009. RADM Wisecup and BG 

Cardon, Written Testimony. HASC O&I Hearing, Raising Thinking, 141 Murray, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course, 10 September 2009, 23. 142 BrigGen Born, Response to Question for the Record HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Beyond Service Core 

Competency, , CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-08-038 143 Capt Klunder, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Beyond Service Core 

Competency, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-08-058. 144 ACSC Staff, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No.: HASCOI-06-013. 

145 BG Cardon, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No.: HASCOI-06-013. 

146 Col Damm, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No.: HASCOI-06-013. 

147 BG Kasun, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No.: HASCOI-06-013. 

148 RADM Wisecup, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking,

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-06-013, and Thinkers and Practitioners? CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-017, on “indefinite 

appointments.” 

149 Capt Klunder, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Beyond Service Core 

Competency, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-08-054. 150 Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, CODEL Snyder to USNA, and HASC Staff Visit to USNA, 9 June 2009. 151 Cardon, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee, Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No.: HASCOI-06-009. 

152 HASC Staff Interviews with National Faculty, March 2009. Also, according to Judith Hicks Stiehm, the turn over 

came in 1991 and faculty members were given a choice whether to maintain Title 5 status or to convert to Title 10 

appointments, The U.S. Army War College: Military Education in a Democracy, (Temple University Press: Philadelphia, PA, 

2002), 76. 

153 LtGen Frances Wilson, NDU-P, Telephone Interview, 9 June 2009. 154 10 U.S.C. §§2156, 4021, 7478, and 9021. 155 Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visits to MCU, 27 March 2009, and Naval War College, 7-8 April 

2009. 

156 Faculty handbooks including CGSC, Title 10 Civilian Faculty Manual CGSC Pamphlet 690-1, August 2008, and MCU, 

Title 10 Faculty Handbook, June 2008. National Defense University (NDU) Regulation 690-4, Personnel-Civilian, Employment under 

10 USC §1595, 4 August 2005. 157 Faculty Panels, CODELs Snyder to ICAF, 29 April 2010, and National, 3 April 2009; Staff Visits, USAWC, NWC, 

and AU, 5-9 April 2009; Staff Visit, CGSC, 27-29 May 2009; and, Staff Visits, USAFA and USMA, 29 June – 1 July 

2009. 

158 Appointment letters or memoranda including undated example from NWC, ICAF examples from 21 June 2006 and 

21 May 2008, ACSC example dated 21 July 2009, and an undated example form letter and job announcement from 

AWC. Faculty handbooks including CGSC, Title 10 Civilian Faculty Manual CGSC Pamphlet 690-1, August 2008 and 

MCU, Title 10 Faculty Handbook, June 2008. Some faculty members from National reported that either they did not 

receive a formal appointment letter or could not locate it. 159 National Defense University (NDU) Regulation 690-4, Personnel-Civilian, Employment under 10 U.S.C. §1595, 4 August 2005. 

HASC Staff Visit to National, 3 April 2009. See also Staff Discussion with ICAF Faculty, 2 June 2009. 

160 MajGen Steel, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners,

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-014. 

161 AWC Staff, HASC Staff Interview, 9 April 2009. See also Forsyth, Response to Question for the Record, HASC 

O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners, 6. 
152

                                                                                                                                                                                               

162 BG Cardon, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No.: HASCOI-06-009. 

163 Col Damm and Col Belcher, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising 

Thinking, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-06-009, and Thinkers and Practitioners, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-006, 

respectively. See also MCU, Title 10 Faculty Handbook, June 2008. Although both Col Damm and Col Belcher address this 

issue, the quote is specifically from Col Belcher’s 4 June response. RADM Wisecup, Response to Question for the 

Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-06-009 and -016. Also MG 

Williams, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners,

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-006. See also Carlisle Barracks Memorandum 690-2 “Civilian Personnel: Employment 

Under Title 10 Code Section 4021,” 29 March 2009. 

164 MajGen Forsyth, HASC Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and 

Practitioners, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-006. See also Spaatz Center for Officer Education Operating Instruction 36-3, 

“Faculty Management” and “Air War College Supplement” to AFI 36-804. 165 BG Kasun, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No.: HASCOI-06-009. See also NDU-P Regulation 690-4, paragraphs 8b and 12b (2). 166 MajGen Steel and RADM Hall, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers 

and Practitioners, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-006. NDU-P Regulation 690-4, Appendix C paragraph 7, 4 August 2005. 

Faculty Interviews, March – November 2009. Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, CODEL Snyder to ICAF, 31 March 

2009. Faculty Panels, CODEL Snyder, and HASC Staff Visit to National, 29 and 3 April 2009, respectively. National 

Senior Leader Panel, HASC O&I Members, 9 June 2009. ICAF Faculty Handbook, 2008. 167 Faculty Panel, HASC Visit to USMA, 1 July 2009. 168 Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, CODEL Snyder to ICAF, 31 March 2009, and ICAF Faculty and Senior Leader 

Interviews with HASC Staff, 2 June, 29 July, and 12 August, 2009. 169 CJCS, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education Reaffirmation of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), 6-11 

February 2005, 7-9. 

170 Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, CODELs Snyder, ICAF 31 March 2009, National 29 April 2009, MCU 20 May 

2009, USNA 9 June 2009. LtGen Wilson, LtGen Peck, MajGen Steel, and LTG Caldwell Member Meetings, 24 March 

2009, 25 March 2009, 12 May 2009, 3 June 2009, and 18 June 2009, respectively. HASC Staff Visits and Interviews 

including NDU-P and NDU Senior Staff, 16 March 2009; Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, MCU 27 March 2009; 

Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visits, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 6-9 April 2009; National Senior Leader 

and Faculty Panels 3 April 2009; RADM Wisecup Interview, 28 April 2009; JFSC Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, 

HASC Staff Visits, 30 April – 1 May 2009; ICAF Faculty Interview, 2 June 2009; LTG Caldwell Interview, 17 June 2009; 

Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, USAFA and USMA, 29 June – 1 July 2009; BG Cardon Interview, 17 July 2009; and, 

ICAF Dean and Associate Dean Interview, 29 July 2009. 

171 NWC Faculty Panel, HASC Staff Visit, 6-7 April 2009. 172 USAFA Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visit, 28-29 June 2009. See also BrigGen Born, Response to 

Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Beyond Service Core Competency, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI08-035. See also A Commission of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, “Statement of Affiliation Status: United 

States Air Force Academy,” 28 October 2009. USAFA Faculty Interviews and Correspondence, HASC staff, June – 

December 2009. See also Admiral Charles R. Larson for the Secretary of the Air Force, Study and Report Related to 

Permanent Professors at the United Stated Air Force Academy, April 2004, 2-14 and D-2. 173 USMA Senior Leaders Panel, HASC Staff Visit, 1 July 2009. 174 Larson, 2-14 and D-2. See also USNA, Faculty Handbook, 1998. 175 Ibid., 3-4 and 3-5. 176 Faculty Panels, CODELs Snyder, ICAF 31 March 2009 and National 29 April 2009. Also Senior Leader and Faculty 

Panel HASC Staff Visit, National, 3 April 2009. Tretler, HASC O&I Member Meeting, 24 March 2009. HASC Staff, 

Faculty Interviews, HASC Staff, March – December 2009. 177 Faculty Panels, CODELs Snyder, ICAF 31 March 2009 and National 29 April 2009. Senior Leader and Faculty 

Panels, HASC Staff Visits, National, 3 April 2009; USAWC, 6-7 April 2009; and, USMA and USAFA 29 June – 1 July 

2009. Tretler, HASC O&I Member Meeting, 24 March 2009. Faculty Interviews, HASC Staff, March – December 2009. 178 Faculty Panel, CODEL Snyder, National, 29 April 2009. Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visits, 

National, 3 April 2009; USAWC, 6-7 April 2009; and USMA and USAFA 29 June – 1 July 2009. Tretler, HASC O&I 

Member Meeting, 24 March 2009. Faculty Interviews, HASC Staff, March – December 2009. 179 Faculty Panels, CODELs Snyder, ICAF, 31 March 2009 and National, 29 April 2009. Senior Leader and Faculty 

Panels, HASC Staff Visits, National, 3 April 2009 and USMA and USAFA 29 June – 1 July 2009. Tretler, HASC O&I 

Member Meeting, 24 March 2009. Faculty Interviews, HASC Staff, March – December 2009. 
153

                                                                                                                                                                                               

180 Faculty Panels, CODELs Snyder, ICAF 31 March 2009 and National 29 April 2009. Senior Leader and Faculty 

Panels, HASC Staff Visit, National, 3 April 2009. Tretler, HASC O&I Member Meeting, 24 March 2009. Faculty 

Interviews, March – December 2009. 

181 Faculty Panels, CODELs Snyder, ICAF 31 March 2009 and National 29 April 2009. Senior Leader and Faculty 

Panels, HASC Staff Visits, National, 3 April 2009; AU, 8-9 April 2009; and USMA and USAFA 29 June – 1 July 2009. 

Tretler, HASC O&I Member Meeting, 24 March 2009. Also Faculty Interviews, HASC Staff, March – December 2009. 182 Kohn, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads. USMA, Academic Freedom Advisory 

Committee Report, 22 May 2009. Faculty Panels, CODELs Snyder, ICAF 31 March 2009 and National 29 April 2009. 

Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visits, National, 3 April 2009; USAWC, NWC, and AU, 6-9 April 2009; 

JFSC, 30 April – 1 May 2009; and USMA and USAFA 29 June – 1 July 2009. HASC O&I Member Meeting, 24 March 

2009. Faculty Interviews, HASC Staff, March – December 2009. 183 USMA Faculty Panel, HASC Staff Visit, 1 July 2009. 184 Col Belcher, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners, 

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-007 

185 Dr. Andrew Krepinevich memo to Andrew Marshall, “Rebuilding America’s Intellectual Arsenal,” 18 December 

2005. 

186 RADM Wisecup, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners,

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-007. MajGen Forsyth and MG Williams, Responses to Question for the Record, HASC 

O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-007 187 ICAF and National Faculty, HASC Staff Interviews, March – November 2009. 188 Representative Steve Israel, Notes provided from the “Cognitive Transformation Roundtable,” United States Capitol, 

Washington DC, 16 February 2005. Attendees included Rep. Ike Skelton, MG Robert Scales, and a number of senior 

military leaders, academics, and policy makers. 189 Ibid. 190 Wisecup and Steel, HASC Staff Interviews, May – June 2009. Senior Leader Panels, HASC Staff visit, USAWC, 

NWC, and AU, 5-9 April 2009. NWC requested a waiver for Provost, retired Ambassador Peters, under Section 824(g) 

of the Foreign Service Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 4064(g)), and was turned down in 2008. Teddy B. Taylor, Acting 

Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources, Letter to RADL Jacob L. Shuford, 

President of the Naval War College, 20 August 2008. See 5 U.S.C. §8344. See also DOD Instruction 1400.25, Volume 300, 

“DOD Civilian Personnel Management System: Employment of Federal Civilian Annuitants in the Department of 

Defense,” 10 December 2008. Title 5 U.S.C §2105, 3323, 8336, 8337, 8344, 8345, 8414, 8455, 8465, 8468, and 9902. 

Title 26 USC Subchapter A of chapter 21. Title 5 Code of Federal Regulations Subparts B and G of part 330 and part 

553. Government civilians retired under Civilian Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employee 

Retirement System (FERS) can keep their annuities. 

191 National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2010, P.L. 111-84, sec. 1121 House Report 111-166: Fiscal Year 2010 National 

Defense Authorization Bill, 18 June 2009, sec. 1107, 397. 192 10 U.S.C. §§1595, 4021 [Army War College and Command and General Staff College], 7478 [Navy War College and 

Marine Corps University], and 9021 [Air Force]. National Defense University is included under Section 1595 but is not 

subject to the same time limit; presumably this was to enable the then twelve-week AFSC (now 10-week JCWS) to hire 

under this authority. 

193 MajGen Spiese, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders, 12. See also 

transcript for exchange between Dr. Snyder, and MajGen Spiese, Lutterloh, and LTG Caldwell. In addition, AU 

Commander, Paper on U.S.C. 10, §9021, and LtGen Peck, HASC Staff Visit, AU, 9 April 2009. 194 USMC Information Paper, “Additional Thoughts on PME or JPME Programs,” 15 October 2009. 195 Dr. Jerre Wilson, “Advantages of Title 10 Faculty for Programs under 10 Months in Duration,” MCU, 12 November 

2009. 

196 Ibid. 197 AU Commander, Paper on “Title 10, Sec 9021,” HASC Staff Visit, AU, 9 April 2009. 198 HASC Military Personnel memo on civilian hiring authorities in 10 U.S.C. §§1746, 7043, 7044, 9314, 4338, 6952, and 

903), 5 U.S.C. §5102, and 20 U.S.C., 13 November 2009. 

199 NDAA FY 1994, P.L. 103-160, Sec. 533. 200 NDAA FY 1993, P.L. 102-484, Sec. 523 adding 10 U.S.C §§4331(c) and 9331 (c), and NDAA FY 1994, P.L. 103-160, 

which struck the 1993 language in favor of adding 10 U.S.C. §§4338 and 9338. 201 Faculty Panel, Staff Visit, USAFA, 29 June 2009. P.L. 108-136, NDAA FY 04, Sec. 528 C 2 (c). Larson, 4-1. Dick 

Cheney (Chair) and Bill Taylor (Project Director and Editor), Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress, 
154

                                                                                                                                                                                               

A Report of the CSIS Study Group on Professional Military Education, (The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

Washington D.C.: March 1997), 32 and 36. 

202 The Higher Learning Commission, A Commission of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, 

“Advancement Section,” Report of a Comprehensive Evaluation Visit to United States Air Force Academy, USAF Academy, CO, 

27-29 April 2009, 7. 

203 Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visit, USAFA and USMA, 29 June – 1 July 2009. 204 Larson, ES-1 and ES-3, 3-4 and 3-5, and 5-2. 205 Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visit to USAFA and USMA, 28 June – 1 July 2009; BrigGen Born, 

Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Beyond Service Core Competency, CHARRTS 

No.: HASCOI-08-037. Faculty and Former Faculty Interviews, HASC Staff, March – November 2009. 206 Ibid. 207 Larson, 3-4 and 3-5. 208 Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visit to USAFA and USMA, 28 June – 1 July 2009, and BrigGen Born, 

Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Beyond Service Core Competency, CHARRTS 

No.: HASCOI-08-037. Also Faculty and Former Faculty Interviews, HASC Staff, March – November 2009. 209 P.L. 108-136, NDAA FY 04, sec. 528 C 2 (c). 210 Ibid. See also Larson, 2-18, and Cheney and Taylor, 32 and 36. 211 Larson, 2-18, ES-1, and discussed on 3-4 and 5-1. See also Cheney and Taylor, 32 and 36. 212 Larson, ES-1, and discussed on 3-4 and 6-3. See also Cheney and Taylor, 32 and 36. 213 BrigGen Born, Testimony and Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Beyond 

Service Core Competency, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-08-037. Although BrigGen Born responded to QFRs that civilian 

faculty members have served temporarily as department heads during the permanent professors’ deployments or 

sabbaticals, the Larson Report specifies that USAFA civilian faculty cannot, by USAFA policy, hold Department Head 

and Deputy Department Head positions (Larson, 2-14). Faculty Panel, HASC Staff Visit, USAFA, 29 June 2009. Faculty 

and Former USAFA Faculty Members, HASC Staff Interviews, June – August 2009. 214 BrigGen Born, Testimony and Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Beyond 

Service Core Competency.

215 BrigGen Born, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Beyond Service Core 

Competency, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-08-037. 216 Ibid. 217 Larson, ES-1, see also 3-4 and 6-3. Also Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visit, USAFA, 28-29 June 

2009. Cheney and Taylor, 32 and 36. 

218 Larson, ES-1, see also 3-4, 3-5, and 6-3. Also Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visit, USAFA, 28-29 

June 2009. 

219 CGSC Senior Leaders Panel, HASC Staff Visit, 27 May 2009. 220 CGSC Student Panel, HASC Staff Visit, 27 May 2009. 221 National Defense University website, Academic Affairs, Academic Policies, “5.00 *Non-Attribution/Academic 

Freedom,” 15 April 2003, http://www.ndu.edu/aa/AcademicFreedom, last accessed 20 November 2009. NDU 

Regulation 360-1, Academic Freedom and Public Information. See also http://www.highered.org/resources/AAUP_1940stat.htm. 

222 DoD Directive 5230.09, “Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release,” 22 August 2008, paragraph 4.e., 2, 

(emphasis added). 

223 AAUP, “Freedom in the Classroom,” 2007 at http://www.higher-ed.org/resources/AAUP_1940stat.htm. 224 As quoted by BG Kasun, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking,

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-06-014. See also, USMA, Institutional Self Study Report, June 2009, 32-45, and Middle States 

Commission on Higher Education, “Final Report to the Faculty, Administration, Trustees, Cadets of the United States 

Military Academy,” 13-16 September 2010. 225 National Defense University, “Self-Study Design Plan,” Submitted to Middle States Commission on Higher 

Education, 15 March 2010, 12. 

226 Higher Learning Commission, Report of a Comprehensive Evaluation Visit to United States Air Force Academy, 27-29 April 

2009, 30. 

227 Cochran and Breslin-Smith, Question for the Record Responses, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another 

Crossroads. 228 Jackson A. Niday II and Kathleen Harrington, “Can Academic Freedom Work in Military Academies?” Academe 

Online, American Association of University Professors, 2007, last accessed 28 October 2009. 
155

                                                                                                                                                                                               

229 MG Williams, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners,

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-005. Col Belcher, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee 

Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-005. Also see Damm, Response to Question for the 

Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-06-014. MCU also allows 

faculty to respond to press inquiries as long as they include a disclaimer. “We consider requests for our faculty as part of 

our outreach program, necessary for the academic growth of our faculty as well as a good news story about our 

University.” 

230 ACSC Staff, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No.: HASCOI-06-014. 

231 Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visit, AU, 9 April 2009. AU Faculty Interviews and Communications, April – November 

2009. Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visit, USAFA and USMA, 28 June – 1 July 2009. Also, Faculty and Former Faculty 

and Senior Leader Interviews and Communications, AU and USAFA, April – November 2009. 232 Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visits, AU and USAFA, 8-9 April 2009 and 28-29 June 2009, respectively. Also, USAFA 

Faculty and Former Faculty and Senior Leaders, HASC Staff Interviews and Correspondence, April – December 2009. 233 Air University Instruction 36-2308, Academic Freedom, 22 August 2008. See also MajGen Forsyth, Response to Question 

for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and Practitioners, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-005. 234 Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visit, AU, 8-9 April 2009. See also Jeffrey Record, “The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. 

Force Planning,” Strategic Studies Institute, 19 May 1998 and “Bounding the Global War on Terrorism,” Strategic 

Studies Institute, December 2003. 235 RADM Wisecup, HASC Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking,

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-06-014, and HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing Thinkers and Practitioners, Response to 

Questions for the Record, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-05-005. He also stated, “Faculty members are allowed great scope 

for experimenting with different teaching methods and for expressing different points of view in the classroom.” 236 ACSC Staff, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS 

No.: HASCOI-06-014. 

237 USAFA Faculty Panel, HASC Staff Visit, 29 June 2009. 238 USAFA, FOI 35-101, Clearance of Material for Public Release and Academic Freedom, 24 January 2008. 239 Faculty Panel and Discussion with BrigGen Born, HASC Staff Visit, USAFA, 29 June 2009. Faculty and Former 

USAFA Faculty, HASC Staff Interviews, April – December 2009. 240 USAFA, FOI 35-101, 3 and 6-8. Also Faculty Panel and Discussion with BrigGen Born, HASC Staff Visit, USAFA, 

29 June 2009. Also Faculty and Former USAFA Faculty, HASC Staff Interviews, April – December 2009. 241 The Higher Learning Commission, “Assurance Section” and “Advancement Section,” Report of A Comprehensive 

Evaluation Visit to United States Air Force Academy, 30 and 7, respectively. Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff 

Visit, USAFA, 29 June 2010. See USAFA, FOI 35-101, Clearance of Material for Public Release and Academic Freedom, 24 

January 2008, 1-3. 

242 Faculty Panel, HASC Staff Visit, USAFA, 28-29 June 2009. 243 The Higher Learning Commission, A Commission of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, “Assurance 

Section” and “Advancement Section,” Report of A Comprehensive Evaluation Visit to United States Air Force Academy, USAF 

Academy, CO, 27-29 April 2009, 30 and 7 respectively. Also USAFA Faculty Panel, HASC Staff Visit, 28-29 June 2009. 244 Dr. Fran Pilch email, “Re: PME and Academic Freedom,” USAFA, 2 December 2009. 245 USMA Faculty Panel, HASC Staff Visit, 30 June – 1 July 2009. USMA, Academic Freedom Advisory Committee Report, 22 

May 2009. 

246 BG Patrick Finnegan, email to HASC Staff, 23 October 2009. See also, USMA, Institutional Self Study Report, June 

2009, 32-45, and Middle States Commission on Higher Education, “Final Report to the Faculty, Administration, 

Trustees, Cadets of the United States Military Academy,” 13-16 September 2010. 247 Brian T. Yeh, “Copyright Issues and Department of Defense Personnel,” Congressional Research Service, 25 June 

2009. 

248 Ibid. Also, CRS Briefing to HASC Staff, 23 September 2009. CRS Meeting with HASC O&I Subcommittee 

Chairman, 25 September 2009. CRS Briefing to HASC O&I Subcommittee Chairman October 2009. Request from 

Representative Todd R. Platts, 17 November 2009. See also 17 U.S.C. §§105 and 101. See also Bonnie Klein, “The 

Office of Management and Budget Circular OMB-A 130 established the policy for the Management of Federal Government 

Information Resources,” Vol. 17, No. 4, ISSN 1070-4795, 34. 5 C.F.R. §2635.807. USMA Faculty Handbook, West Point, 

NY, December 2005, 17-18. MCU, Title 10 Faculty Handbook, Quantico, VA, June 2008. CGSC, Title 10 Civilian Faculty 

Manual CGSC Pamphlet 690-1, August 2008. BG Cardon, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I 

Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-06-020. Faculty Panel, Staff Visit, National, 3 April 

2009, and Faculty Interviews (including Harvey Rishikof, Esq., 25 June 2009). Also Faculty Panels, Staff Visits, 
156

                                                                                                                                                                                               

USAWC, NWC, and AU, 5-9 April 2009. Also, Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visits, USAFA and West Point, 28 June – 1 

July 2009. 

249 Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visits, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 6-9 April 2009. Also Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visits, 

USAFA and USMA, 28 June – 1 July 2009. Request from Representative Todd R. Platts, 17 November 2009. See also 

17 U.S.C. §§105 and 101. 

250 17 U.S.C. §§105 and 101. See also Bonnie Klein, “The Office of Management and Budget Circular OMB-A 130 established 

the policy for the Management of Federal Government Information Resources,” Vol. 17, No. 4, ISSN 1070-4795, 34. 251 Yeh, “Copyright Issues.” See 17 U.S.C. § 106 and 501. Also, CRS Briefing to HASC Staff, June 2009, and CRS 

Briefing to HASC, O&I Members, 17 October 2009. See also faculty handbooks. 252 5 C.F.R. §2635.807. 253 Cardon, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, CHARRTS No.: 

HASCOI-06-020. 

254 National Faculty Panel, HASC Staff Visit, 1-3 April 2009, and National Faculty Interviews, HASC Staff, March – 

December 2009. Also Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visit, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 6-9 April 2009. 255 H.R. 962, 109th Congress, 1st Session, 17 February 2005. This bill would have amended Chapter 53 of Title 10 by 

inserting section 1033a for the Department of Defense, Chapter 9 of Title 14 by inserting section 198 for the Coast 

Guard, and Title XIII of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (46 App. U.S.C. 1295 et seq.) by adding section 1308. 256 Yeh, “Possible Approaches to Amending the Copyright Law to Allow faculty of Military Service Academies and 

Department of Defense professional Schools to Secure Copyrights For Their Scholarly Works,” 6 November 2009, 2. 257 Ibid., 2-5. 258 See for example, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) College of Naval 

Warfare, 14-18 May 2007, updated 4-7 May 2009. 259 Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, CODELs Snyder, ICAF and National, 31 March and 29 April 2009, respectively. 

Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visits, National 3 April 2009; USAWC, NWC, and AU, 6-9 April 2009; 

JFSC 30 April – 1 May 2009; and, USAFA, 29-30 June 2009. Senior Leader and Faculty Interviews, HASC Staff, April – 

December 2009. 

260 Ibid. 261 ICAF and NWC Faculty Briefings, HASC Staff, 2 June 2009 and 9 June 2009 and Faculty Interviews, March – 

November 2009. 

262 Larson, 2-9 and 2-10. Air Force Instruction 36-3501, Air Force Academy Operations, 28 April 2008, para. 2.13.16.3. See 

also Born, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Beyond Service Core Competency,

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-08-037. 

263 Larson, ES-3, 2-11 and 2-12. 264 See for example, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) College of Naval 

Warfare, 14-18 May 2007, updated 4-7 May 2009. 265 Judith Hicks Stiehm, The U.S. Army War College: Military Education in a Democracy, (Temple University Press, 

Philadelphia, PA, 2002), 70-77. 

266 National Faculty Panel, CODEL Snyder, 29 April 2009. Murray, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee 

Hearing, Charting the Course, 23. 267 Senior Leader, Faculty, and Student Panels, CODELs Snyder, ICAF and National, 13 March and 29 April 2009, 

respectively. Senior Leader, Faculty, and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visits, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 6-9 April 2009, 

and JFSC, 30 April – 1 May 2009. Murray, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course,

16. 

268 CJCS, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 22-26 

September 2008, 14, see also 4. 

269 CJCS, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), U.S. Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama, 20-23 

October 2008, 14. 

270 CJCS, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), Marine Corps War College, Marine Base Quantico, VA, 12-14 

January 2009, 5. 

271 CJCS, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), National War College, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D.C., 14-

19 November 2009, 18. 272 Ibid., 18-19. 273 Faculty Panels, CODEL Snyder 29 April 2009, and HASC Staff Visit, National, 3 April 2009. 274 Faculty Panels, CODELs Snyder ICAF and National, 31 March and 29 April 2009, respectively. National Faculty 

Panel, HASC Staff Visit, National, 3 April 2009. Also Faculty Interviews, HASC Staff, March – August 2009. 
157

                                                                                                                                                                                               

275 CJCS, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), Marine Corps War College, Marine Base Quantico, VA, 12-14 

January 2009, 7. 

276 The Skelton Report, 133. 277 Ibid., 150-155. 278 Ibid., 133 and 150-158. And, Faculty and Student Panels, CODELs Snyder, ICAF and National, 31 March, 29 April 

2009, and 4 June 2009, respectively; MCU 20 May 2009. Also Faculty and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visits, MCU, 27 

March 2009; National, 3 April 2009; USAWC, NWC, and AU, 6-9 April 2009; JFSC, 30 April – 1 May 2009; and, CGSC, 

26-29 May 2009. 

279 USAF Briefing, HASC Staff, 26 March 2009. 280 MCU Briefing, HASC Staff, 23 March 2009. 281 CGSC Faculty and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visit, 26-27 May 2009. Also LTG David Ohle (Ret.), HASC Staff 

Interview, 31 July 2009 and January – March 2010. 

282 Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visits, USAWC and CGSC, 6-7 April and 26-27 May 2009, 

respectively. Also, Army Briefing, HASC Staff, 26 March 2009. General George Casey, Member Meeting, 21 October 

2009. General Martin Dempsey and LTG David Barno (retired), HASC Staff Interviews, April – December 2009. 283 Navy Briefing and Navy (N15) Briefings to HASC Staff, 31 March and 11 May 2009, respectively. 284 RADM Wisecup, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Raising Thinking, 2. Also, Navy Briefing 

and Navy (N15) Briefing to HASC Staff, 31 March and 11 May 2009, respectively. Also Lutterloh, Testimony, HASC 

O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders. 285 Navy (N15) Briefing to HASC Staff, 11 May 2009. Also Lutterloh, HASC O&I Hearing, Investing in Our Military 

Leaders, Testimony. 286 Faculty and Student Panels, CODELs Snyder, ICAF and National, 31 March and 29 April 2009, respectively. Student 

Panel, Member Meeting, 5 June 2009. Also Faculty and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visits, National 3 April 2009; 

USAWC, NWC, and AU, 6-9 April; and, CGCS, 26-27 May 2009. 

287 Ibid. 288 National, Faculty Panel, CODEL Snyder, 29 April 2009. Student Panel, HASC O&I Member Meeting, 5 June 2009. 

Faculty and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visit to National, 3 April 2009. Also Faculty and Student Panels, HASC Staff 

Visits, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 6-9 April 2009. 

289 National Faculty Panel, CODEL Snyder, 29 April 2009. National Student Panel, HASC O&I Member Meeting, 5 

June 2009. National Faculty and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visit, 3 April 2009. Faculty and Student Panels, HASC 

Staff Visits, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 6-9 April 2009. Faculty Interviews, HASC Staff, March – December 2009. Kohn, 

Testimony and Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads, 2. John Williams, Testimony 

and Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Charting the Course, 1. 290 Ibid. 291 Lutterloh, Responses to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military 

Leaders. 292 The Skelton Report, 151-154, and OPMEP, Enclosure B. 293 CGSC Senior Leader Panel, HASC Staff Visit, 26-27 May 2009. 294 Caldwell, Sitterly, Lutterloh, and Spiese, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, 

Investing in Our Military Leaders, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-07-016, HASCOI-07-026, HASCOI-07-035, and HASCOI-07-

044, respectively. 

295 HASC Staff Visit to USAWC, NWC, and AU, 5-9 April 2009. 296 Senior Leader, Faculty, and Student Panels, CODELs Snyder, ICAF and National, 31 March 2009 and 29 April 2009, 

respectively. Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visits, National, 3 April, and USAWC, NWC, and AU, 5-9 

April 2009. Also ICAF Senior Leader and Faculty Interviews, HASC Staff, 2 June and 29 July 2009. 297 LTG Caldwell, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military 

Leaders, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-07-015. 298 Ibid. 299 Sitterly, Response to Questions for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders, 

CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-07-043. 

300 Senior Leader and Faculty Panels, HASC Staff Visits, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 5-9 April 2009 and ICAF Senior 

Leader and Faculty Interviews, HASC Staff, 2 June and 29 July 2009. 301 Steve Harris, DSLDP Program Manager, Civilian Personnel Management Service, Briefing Slides, October 2009. 302 NDAA FY 2010, P.L. 111-84 Sec. 1112. 303 Senior Leader, Faculty Panels, and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visit, MCU, 27 March 2009, and Senior Leader, 

Faculty Panels, and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visits, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 5-9 April 2009. 
158

                                                                                                                                                                                               

304 CGSC Senior Leader Panel, HASC Staff Visit, 26-27 May 2009. 305 LTG Caldwell, HASC Staff Interview, CGSC, 26-27 May 2009. 306 Gen Norton Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, HASC O&I Member Meeting, 1 October 2009. 307 Senior Leader, Faculty, and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visits, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 5-9 April 2009; JFSC, 30 

April – 1 May 2009; and CGSC, 26-27 May 2009. 

308 Senior Leader, Faculty, and Student Panels, CODELs Snyder, ICAF, National, and MCU, 31 March, 29 April, and 20 

May 2009, respectively. Senior Leader and Student Meetings, HASC O&I Members, 9 and 4 June 2009, respectively. 

Senior Leader, Faculty, and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visit, MCU, 27 March 2009. Senior Leader, Faculty, and 

Student Panels, HASC Staff Visits, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 5-9 April 2009. 309 Senior Leader, Faculty, and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visit, National, 3 April 2009. Senior Leader, Faculty, and 

Student Panels, HASC Staff Visits, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 6-9 April 2009. Each school uses a different pre-selection 

English assessment for international students. Depending on their English competency (usually measured by the 

TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign Language) tool), some may compete for the PME schools’ or nearby universities’ 

master’s degrees. 

310 JCS/DJ-7, Briefing to HASC Staff, 17 March 2009. Senior Leader, Faculty, and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visit, 

National, 3 April 2009. Senior Leader, Faculty, and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visits, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 6-9 

April 2009. 

311 John Charlton, NDU International Programs Briefing to HASC Staff, 22 May 2209. VADM Ann Rondeau, HASC 

O&I Member Meeting, 23 July 2009. See also, ADM Mullen speech at NDU for Wilson-Rondeau change of presidency 

and direction to NDU, 10 July 2009. 

312 Charlton; Rondeau, 23 July 2009; International Programs Discussion, HASC Staff Visit, NWC, 7-8 April 2009; and, 

JCS/DJ-7, Briefing to HASC Staff, 17 March 2009. 

313 ICAF Senior Leader, Faculty, and Student Panels, CODEL Snyder, 31 March 2009. NWC Senior Staff, Faculty, and 

Student Panels, HASC Staff Visit, 7-8 April 2009. Also, Charlton. 314 Charlton, and ICAF Senior Leader, Faculty, and Student Panels, CODEL Snyder, 31 March 2009. National Faculty 

Panel, CODEL Snyder, 29 April 2009. Senior Leader and Student Meetings, HASC O&I Members, 9 and 4 June 2009, 

respectively. National Senior Leader, Faculty, and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visit, 3 April 2009. Also, Senior Leader, 

Faculty, and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visits, USAWC, NWC, and AU, 5-9 April. 315 USAWC Faculty Panel, HASC Staff Visit, 6-7 April 2009. 316 NWC Faculty Panel, HASC Staff Visit, 7-8 April 2009. 317 Faculty and Student Panels, CODELs Snyder, ICAF and National, 31 March and 29 April 2009, respectively. Faculty 

and Student Panels, HASC Staff Visits, National and NWC, 3 April and 7-8 April 2009, respectively. Also, Charlton. 318 10 U.S.C. §2167(a). See also NDAA FY 2010, P.L. 111-84, Sec. 532. 319 Senior Leaders, Faculty, and Student Panels, CODEL Snyder, ICAF, 31 March 2009. 320 The Skelton Report, 156. 321 Ibid., 156-157. 322 Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert Hale, Letter to O&I Subcommittee Chairman Vic Snyder, 5 

January 2010 

323 Ibid. 324 OPMEP, E-2. 325 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), College of Naval Command and Staff, 25-30 

October 2009, 11-12. 

326 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), U.S. Army War College, 21-25 September 

2009, 9-10. 

327 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 

22-26 September 2008, 8-9. 

328 DDJS-ME Memorandum, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), College of Naval Command and Staff, 25-29 

February 2008, 7-8. 

329 CODELs Snyder, MCU, 20 May 2009 and 4 March 2010. 330 Ibid., and Col Brian D Beaudreault, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Beyond Service Core Competency. 331 CODELs Snyder to ICAF, 31 March 2009, and National War College, 29 April 2009. HASC Staff Visit, National, 3 

April 2009. Also HASC Staff Interviews at ICAF, National, and National Defense University, March-May 2009. See 

also, Breslin-Smith, Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroad? 20 May 2009. 
ISSUES FOR FURTHER STUDY

The Subcommittee conducted this study with a limited scope. In the process, the 

Subcommittee learned of several related issues outside of that scope that may warrant closer 

examination. The Subcommittee also encountered several outside commentators who have recently 

written on the topic of professional military education (PME) or proposed more extensive reform of 

the PME system, schools, or curricula. Without weighing their respective merits, the Subcommittee 

offers the following issues and sources of commentary for their additional and related views on 

PME. 

ISSUES FOR FURTHER STUDY

ENLISTED PME 

 All of the services have developed PME for enlisted personnel, however, enlisted PME is 

not as extensive as PME for officers. The Department has one joint in-residence PME (JPME) 

course for the most senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) called Keystone taught at National 

Defense University (NDU). In his testimony before the Subcommittee, Dr. John Williams 

recommended that the services focus on “the increasing professionalization of the enlisted force and 

consider how enlisted educational opportunities can better meet evolving security challenges.”1 In 

addition, the Subcommittee visited Marine Corps University leaders and spoke to faculty members 

and students from the staff NCO course.2 What is done there is impressive, but a comprehensive 

review of all of the service and joint enlisted PME programs is needed. 

NON-RESIDENT PME 

 As mentioned in this report, the services all have non-resident or “distance-learning” courses 

for their intermediate- and senior-level schools. Officers can satisfy the requirement for JPME I by 

completing the non-resident curricula for their service intermediate-level school. Some schools 

employ blended-learning options in which students mix short periods of in-residence instruction 

with their distance learning programs. While the senior schools all have non-resident courses, 

current legislation does not allow them to award JPME II credit for the distance-learning programs. 

However, technological advances allow students and instructors to interact with each other via audio 

and video links in real-time. They constitute an improvement on the correspondence courses used 

previously. The enhancement suggests that blended-learning programs could be structured to 

facilitate some measure of joint acculturation. Portions of the in-residence courses might be 

presented through distance learning or distributed learning (at more than one campus) to allow for 

students to spend more time on in-depth treatment of subject-matter best addressed in a seminar 

setting. One witness argued, however, that the officers enrolled in non-resident courses often have 

demanding operational duties and that this situation may not provide the opportunity for systematic 

thought and reflection that occurs through the in-resident PME programs.3

 

159
NATIONAL SECURITY PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

 The other departments and agencies of the federal government do not have professional 

education systems comparable to the PME framework. While a few civilians attend PME 

institutions, there is no educational vehicle dedicated to preparing government civilians to work 

across organizational boundaries in the same manner JPME fosters cooperation and teamwork 

among the military services. The National Security Professional Development (NSPD) program 

proposal aims to address the absence of systematic interagency acculturation through education, 

training, and professional experience. A tentative academic framework is being developed, and it 

would consist of a year of education and training in interagency coordination at the strategic level.4 

The proposal envisions that national security professionals would subsequently serve as senior 

advisors to department secretaries and agency heads and as liaisons between these entities and the 

National Security Council.5

 Dr. Janet Breslin-Smith advocates reviving the 1946 concept of a National Security 

Education consortium between National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 

the National Defense Intelligence College, and a new College of Diplomacy and Development.6 

While Dr. James Jay Carafano advocates clearly distinguishing PME from national security education 

for interagency leaders, he also believes Congress should build on the 2007 Presidential Order 13434 

that established the NSPD program by providing a suitable governance structure and oversight. He 

compares such an effort to the Goldwater-Nichols Act and military jointness.7

DOD CIVILIAN EDUCATION

 Civilians in the Department of Defense and its component departments face challenges 

similar to those of other government civilians. Although certain services offer brief management 

courses to their senior civilians in partnership with civilian universities and at the Federal Executive 

Institute, DOD civilian education lacks the equivalent of the primary- and intermediate-level PME 

institutional framework. 

CHANGING RETIREMENT AND PROMOTION POLICIES

 As addressed in this report, more flexibility is needed with respect to career paths and 

retirement and promotion incentives due to longer career possibilities. Changing policies will also 

impact retention. The Department, CJCS, and the services should study the likely impact of these 

changes. Longer careers combined with the need for personnel with low density and high demand 

skill sets including foreign area officers, civil affairs officers, language specialists, and strategists 

could create more time and opportunity for training, education, and developmental assignments. 

More personnel might be sent for foreign language study, doctoral programs at civilian schools, or 

PME faculty duty. 

160
A WORD ABOUT ETHICS

TEACHING ETHICS

 Arguably, no topic is more important and no topic more difficult to teach than ethics. 

Ethics and ethical behavior are fundamental to what our nation expects of its officers. Indeed, the 

three service academies emphasize ethics from the beginning of a cadet’s or midshipman’s 

experience and each makes moral and character development a central part of the academy mission. 

The Air Force Academy vision, illustrative of those at the other academies, is “to be the Air Force’s 

premier institution for developing leaders of character.” 

 Despite the common emphasis on honor and character among the academies, each academy 

honor code is unique to that institution. Notably, the Naval Academy code is the only one which 

does not consider tolerance of an honor code violation an honor violation itself. Both the U.S. 

Military Academy and the Air Force Academy codes state that cadets will not tolerate those who 

violate the code; those who do tolerate are also guilty of an honor violation. Instead, the Naval 

Academy Honor Concept makes a positive statement, that “Midshipmen are persons of integrity. 

They stand for that which is right.” If a midshipman is found guilty of tolerating another’s honor 

violation it constitutes a conduct offense under “failure to follow written orders.”8

 This may seem 

to be a minor point, but in ethics debates it could have significant implications. One or another 

approach is not wrong or right, simply different. 

 Reflecting the distinct honor codes and moral development curricula at the three service 

academies, the services take differing approaches to developing ethical judgment in our military 

officers even at the most basic level. What is clear is that the military services believe that early 

training and continuous reinforcement of ethical leadership remains important. The difficult choices 

facing military leaders only become more difficult as they rise in rank and face more complex 

operational and strategic challenges. 

 While it is important that officers demonstrate ethical behavior in their personal conduct, the 

critical need is that officers understand the importance of setting ethical standards in the units they 

lead. For leaders, ethics involves enforcing standards of conduct at all times, especially under 

stressful conditions. An enduring area of difficulty arises when people violate established standards 

in their interactions with members of the opposite sex. Fraternization, sexual harassment, sexual 

assault, or other abuses of power are no more tolerable in a deployed setting than in garrison, yet 

persist with troubling regularity. 

 Since the integration of women into mainstream military units began in the 1970’s, each of 

the services have experienced challenges and scandals involving the academies, training bases, and 

operational units. Reports of ignored incidents of sexual harassment, or far worse, sexual assault, 

among deployed units can be indicators of a failure in the chain of command at some level to set the 

proper example and creates the perception of condoning improper or criminal behavior. The 

proper enforcement of high standards of conduct is even more important when deployed because of 

the mutual trust necessary to operate in what can be a pressure-filled and dangerous environment. 

When operational pressures are intense, commanders can feel pressure to relax standards or 

rationalize handling serious incidences internally rather than through proper procedures. 

The persistence of these reports, plus other emerging reports of misconduct from the recent 

war experiences involving prisoner abuse, contracting fraud, and other incidents, show that ethics 

161
concerns are relevant and real. The Subcommittee firmly believes that the vast majority of American 

service members conduct themselves honorably. Yet, the disproportionate impact that improper 

behavior has on the overall mission bears renewed emphasis at all levels. 

ETHICS EDUCATION REQUIRES MORE ATTENTION

 Because the Subcommittee did not delve deeply into curriculum topics except as exemplars 

of how dynamic the PME curricula are in responding to a changing security environment, it did not 

examine the subject of the teaching of ethics to military officers in detail. There have been several 

reviews of military ethical lapses that have recommended in-depth studies of how PME institutions 

teach ethics. The 2004 Cheney Report on PME recommended that because of ethical issues at the 

academies there should be a comprehensive review of how ethics is taught at all the PME 

institutions.9 The 2006 Schlesinger Report on Abu Ghraib also recommended a review of how 

ethics is taught in PME courses. 

 The current Officer PME Policy (OPMEP) includes a learning objective for senior-level 

school under “Joint Operational Leadership” to “comprehend the ethical dimension of operational 

leadership and the challenges it may present.”10 There is a similar objective for intermediate 

schools to “comprehend the ethical dimension of operational leadership and the challenges it may 

present.” Every PME school with a joint component must address these objectives in its core 

courses in order to maintain joint accreditation. However, the JCS/DJ-7 maintains that teaching 

ethics is primarily a service and training function.11 

 Nonetheless, the OPMEP recognizes that ethics is part of the PME continuum with each 

level building on another, much as the Cheney Panel recommended.12 At the pre-commissioning 

level, the OPMEP focuses on developing a foundation in “....leadership, management, ethics, and 

other subjects necessary to prepare them to serve as commissioned officers.”13 At the flag officer 

and senior levels, the OPMEP objectives for JPME “go to the skills necessary to build and sustain 

ethical organizations and to further evaluate the ethical ramifications of specific historical and 

contemporary national security decisions.”14 

 The senior joint and service schools told the Subcommittee how their curricula focus on 

ethics.15 Many of the PME institutions treat ethics by making it part of their elective offerings. 

Others include only one or two lessons in the core curriculum. Still others seek to weave the 

discussion and consideration of ethics throughout the core curriculum. While the last of these is 

the most difficult as it calls on all instructors to be well-versed, it is probably the most effective 

means of addressing this critical area.16

 Cheney and Taylor argued that PME should and does reinforce the military ethos. They 

proposed that the treatment of ethics must go beyond what the lawyers, inspectors general, auditors, 

special counsels, and investigators have to know and cited numerous examples of lapses among the 

officer corps outside these arenas. They reported, “[e]ven a number of senior active-duty military 

leaders believe the intermediate and senior levels of the PME system have failed to emphasize an 

officer’s ethical and moral development in an increasingly complex world adequately.17 The Panel 

recommended the establishment of guidelines for a comprehensive, sequential, and progressive 

program because “officers need to refine how they think about important ethical issues, wrestling 

along with their fellow officers with the moral dilemmas presented by real-world case studies. 

...[C]ase studies should be used, and it should be understood that some ‘dirty linen’ may be aired in 

the process.”18 

162
 Finally, the Cheney Report addressed senior-level PME, when “the treatment of ethics 

should include rigorous examination of the ethical content of policies and strategies, not just of the 

values and behaviors of senior officers. Perhaps the most fundamental lesson to be instilled in 

officers is that nothing has greater impact on the ethical behavior of subordinates than the 

command climate that is created by senior leaders.”19

NDU has established one of the newest ethics centers among the PME institutions.20 

General Richard B. Myers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), supports the work 

of the NDU Institute for National Security Ethics and Leadership as the Colin L. Powell Chair for 

National Security, Leadership, Character, and Ethics.21 He agrees that the Cheney Report 

recommendation for a comprehensive review of ethics education in PME should be undertaken. 

One of the outcomes, Myers thinks, should be clear recommendations for improvement including 

legislation that would put the responsibility directly on the CJCS to report back to Congress with a 

plan to implement a comprehensive JPME ethics education program. The next step for Myers 

would be that the CJCS task his joint staff and NDU to implement the JPME ethics program, with 

responsibility for the service PME programs in ethics given to the Service Chiefs. Myers proposes 

that these programs should encompass the pre-commissioning and company-grade courses as well 

as the more senior levels. He adds that while the services and schools can tailor their programs, 

there should be a common curriculum that covers the fundamental issues so that the courses will 

not constitute just a “hodgepodge” of ideas and courses. 

The Military Education Coordination Council (MECC), according to Myers, could 

coordinate the curricula and make revisions through an annual ethics conference. It is not enough 

to do what the PME schools do, asserted Myers, which is generally to have ethics covered in their 

“leadership module” and one elective taught by their “expert.” Each school will still need an expert 

on ethics and electives and special classes, but ethics should also be blended into the entire core 

curriculum. 

While Myers acknowledges that progress has been made over the years, more work is needed 

in this area. Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the current CJCS, reinforced this point in an interview in a 

recent edition of Joint Forces Quarterly dedicated to the subject of military ethics. Mullen states clearly, 

“I would agree that we do need more of a focus on military ethics and civil-military relations in our 

schoolhouses.”22

While initial and reinforcing ethics education and training are necessarily a military service 

responsibility, today’s complex operational environment would seem to call for even more targeted 

training that addresses the challenges faced by joint and deployed units today. The stresses have not 

diminished, and the complexity of situations that officers face has grown ever more daunting. 

Ethics education and training should keep pace with the demands placed upon our military leaders, 

as General Myers, Admiral Mullen, and others suggest.

OUTSIDE COMMENTARY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID BARNO, USA (RET.) 

• “Senior Leader Development – Time for a ‘College for Generals,’” draft manuscript, 25 

February 2009. 

163
JOHN COLLINS

• “The Case for a Grand Strategy College,” an unpublished monograph, 2009.

CAPTAIN MARK R. HAGEROTT, USN 

• “Rebalancing the Naval Officer Corps,” Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer 

Corps, Center for a New American Security, February 2010.

• “The Heart of an Officer: Joint Interagency, and International Operations and Navy Career 

Development,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2009.

FRANK G. HOFFMAN

• “Embracing a Full Spectrum Profession,” Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer 

Corps, Center for a New American Security, February 2010.

DR. MAREN LEED AND DAVID SOKOLOW

• The Ingenuity Gap: Officer Management for the 21st Century, A Report of the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies International Security Program, January 2010.

GENERAL JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC 

• “Developing and Retaining the Officers We Need for the 21st Century,” remarks delivered to 

the Center for a New American Security, 18 February 2010. 

DR. JOHN A. NAGL AND BRIAN M. BURTON

• “Revitalizing America’s Officer Corps,” Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer 

Corps, Center for a New American Security, February 2010.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT H. SCALES, USA (RET.) 

• “Too Busy to Learn,” Proceedings, February 2010.

• “Return of the Jedi,” Armed Forces Journal, October 2009.

DR. DON M. SNIDER

• “Developing a Corps of Professionals,” Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America’s Military Officer 

Corps, Center for a New American Security, February 2010.

ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS

• “The Heart of an Officer: Joint Interagency, and International Operations and Navy Career 

Development,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2009.

164
165

                                                           

COLONEL RODERICK C. ZASTROW, USAF 

• “Strategic Leader Development from an Air Force Perspective,” Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing 

America’s Military Officer Corps, Center for a New American Security, February 2010.

1 Dr. John Jay Williams, Testimony, Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing 

before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Charting the Course for Effective Professional Military Education, 10 

September 2009.

2 CODEL Snyder, Marine Corps University, 4 March 2010. 3 Ibid. 4 William A. Navas, Jr., “Working Paper: National Security Professional Development Program,” 20 March 2009. 5 Ibid. 6 Dr. Janet Breslin-Smith, Written Testimony, Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 

Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education 

Twenty Years after the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel, 20 May 2009, 6. 7 Dr. James Jay Carafano, Written Testimony, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Another Crossroads? 20 May 2009, 2-5. 8 USNAINST 1610.3G, 21 December 2005, 30. 

9 Richard Cheney and Bill Taylor, Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress: A Report of the CSIS Study 

Group on Professional Military Education, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., March 1997. 10 CJCSI 1800.01D, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), 15 July 2009, E-D-3 and E-E-3. 11 LtGen John M. Paxton, Response to Question for the Record, Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee 

on Armed Services, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Investing in Our Military Leaders: 

The Role of Professional Military Education in Officer Development, 28 July 2009, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-07-003. See also 

LtGen Paxton cite from Joint Publication 1, Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States, 2 May 2007, w/Change, 20 

March 2009, and General Peter Pace, “CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development,” November 2005, 1. Also 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE), United States Naval War College, 

College of Naval Command and Staff (Resident), Newport, Rhode Island, 25-30 October 2009, 18. 12 Cheney and Taylor, 47. 

13 OPMEP, A-A-6. 14 LtGen Paxton, Response to Question for the Record, HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Investing in Our Military 

Leaders, 28 July 2009, CHARRTS No.: HASCOI-07-003. See also cite from OPMEP, 15 July 2009, A-A-1, A-A-3, E-E-3, 

E-F-4, E-G-4, E-I-3, and E-K-2. 

15 MajGen Robert P. Steel and RADL Garry E. Hall, Response to Question for the Record, Congress, U.S. House of 

Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 

Thinkers and Practitioners: Do Senior Military Education Schools Produce Strategists? 4 June 2009, CHARRTS No.: HASC-05-012. 

See also, LTG William B. Caldwell IV, Dan Sitterly, MajGen (S) Melvin Spiese, and Scott Lutterloh, Responses to 

Question for the Record for HASC O&I Hearing, Investing in Our Military Leaders, CHARRTS No.s: HASCOI-07-012, -

040, -31, and -022, respectively. RADM James P. Wisecup, MG Robert M. Williams, MajGen Maurice “Maury” Forsyth, 

and Col Michael Belcher, Responses to Question for the Record for HASC O&I Subcommittee Hearing, Thinkers and 

Practitioners, 4 June 2009, CHARRTS No.: HASC-05-012. 16 This was the consensus among the recent literature and in interviews with current chairs of ethics at the PME 

institutions. 

17 Cheney and Taylor, 47-48. 

18 Ibid., 49. 19 Ibid., 50. 20 West Point established the Simon Center for the Professional Military Ethic in 2000. The Naval Academy renamed 

their Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics established in 1998, the Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale 

Center for Ethical Leadership in 2006. The Air Force Academy established the Center for Character Development in 

1993. The Marine Corps University Lejeune Leadership Institute has an Ethics Branch, and the Command and General 

Staff College received a $6.1 million donation from H. Ross Perot in November 2009 to establish an interagency center 

and the new General Hugh Shelton Chair in Ethics. 

21 Interviews with Director Dr. Albert C. Pierce, 28 September 2009, and General (retired) Richard B. Myers, 26 January 

2010. 

22 Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Interview for Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 54, 3d Quarter, 2009, 7-11. 
166
CONCLUSION

 

 After a year of study and careful consideration of the United States’ officer, in-residence 

professional military education (PME) system, the Subcommittee members are heartened by what 

we learned. 

While we undertook this study convinced of the value of our professional military education 

system, we began with a fundamental question. What does PME contribute to officer development? 

The answer to that question goes to the heart of the American military tradition, and what it means 

to serve as a commissioned officer in the United States Armed Forces. From our country’s birth, 

the United States has valued selfless, ethical officers who are adept at leading diverse groups in the 

execution of complex, dangerous missions. True to these beginnings, our professional military 

education system develops military officers along three axes: character, or ethical and moral 

leadership; acculturation, or learning from one’s peers; and intellectual development, critical 

thinking, and mental agility. While we found that our PME system addresses all three of these 

important areas, improvements are needed in each. 

We touch on ethics in the “Issues for Further Study” section of this report, and recommend 

a comprehensive review and renewed emphasis on ethics in PME. Acculturation has become even 

more important with the ascendancy of joint, interagency, and intergovernmental operations, making 

the opportunity to learn with students from State, Justice, and Homeland Security, among other 

agencies, even more important than before. Though ethical education and opportunities for 

acculturation need improvement, we are encouraged by the Department’s plans and progress in 

these two areas. 

As a result of our study, we also reassert the value of in-residence officer PME. The 

Subcommittee finds that the reinforcing nature of in-residence PME has value in inculcating officer 

and leader values in student officers. In addition, we find the opportunity to learn directly from 

others with varied backgrounds invaluable. There is value in getting away from operational 

responsibilities to bond with fellow officers, both from one’s own service and from other services, 

and with civilian and international students. Intermittent breaks for in-residence education provide 

contemplative time to put operational lessons into context. These experiences are especially 

meaningful at the war college level, but are also valuable for more junior officers. 

We find the greatest need for improvement in the third fundamental PME mission area, 

intellectual development. This report explores various means by which critical thinking skills can be 

improved in the officer corps as a whole and how more strategists may be developed. The 

Subcommittee finds that both developing critical thinking skills among all officers and cultivating a 

number of skilled strategists remain important objectives of our PME system. 

Military officers have always been called upon to develop creative solutions to complex 

problems. The Subcommittee heard considerable evidence of the need for officers with strong 

critical thinking skills from the most junior to the most senior levels. If anything, officers are 

confronted with these challenges more often and at more junior ranks than ever before and, at 

times, with strategic implications riding on their decisions and their actions. We are concerned by 

the lack of a coherent, comprehensive, and effective program to improve critical thinking skills 

167
168

among all officers continually throughout their careers. We also found that there is a pronounced 

need for officers with strategic vision. In our view, the most gifted strategists are pragmatic 

innovators with whole-of-government and global perspectives. We found no uniform or 

coordinated plan for elevating well-educated strategists to critical decision-making positions at the 

most senior levels of command. 

In addition to a lack of a comprehensive plan to improve critical thinking among all officers, 

we are also troubled by the gradual loosening of the link between joint education and joint 

assignments. What seems to be fraying in the relentless demands of wartime operations is a 

foundational link between joint education and preparation for joint duty assignments. That tie needs 

to be reexamined and reinforced. We have made several findings and recommendations about this 

issue, and look forward to working with the Department to address these concerns. 

Finally, we examined various issues concerning the important human dimension of our PME 

system and touched on material resource issues as well. Although both affect the quality of the 

Nation’s military institutions, we believe faculty issues deserve the most urgent attention. While we 

continue to benefit from outstanding faculty, students, and facilities, the Department and the 

Committee should address these challenges in order to strengthen the PME system. As the 

committee with oversight responsibility, the House Armed Services Committee will honor the legacy 

of the Skelton Panel by leading this effort in Congress. 

 In the last two centuries, the United States has developed an impressive group of strong 

institutions to ground and educate military officers in the finest traditions of our country. That 

system endures. Beyond maintaining the strength of the essential and enduring aspects of PME, and 

beyond rededicating the system to support the tie between joint education and joint duty 

assignments, we emphasize once more what is new. Professional military officers must not only 

have the highest integrity and be willing and able to lead others in facing danger and adversity, they 

must be agile of mind. They must be broadly educated to face a complex and uncertain 

environment beyond the military and beyond our shores. And, they must be able to communicate 

clearly not only with those they lead but with the citizens they serve, the partners with whom they 

work, and even with the adversaries whom they face. 

While we have made suggestions for improvement, we were inspired by the commitment of 

those engaged in this important enterprise. We were especially impressed with the students and 

faculty we met this year. Our country’s system for educating its officers remains sound. The 

Committee will continue to work with the Department of Defense to maintain that strength and 

improve it where we can.
APPENDIX A : GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AAUP American Association of University Professors

ACSC Air Command and Staff College 

AETC Air Education and Training Command 

AFB Air Force Base 

AFSC Armed Forces Staff College

AMSP Advanced Military Studies Program

ANSCOL Army-Navy Staff College

AOWC Advanced Operations Warfighting Course

ASBC Air and Space Basic Course

AU Air University

C&SC Marine Corps Command and Staff College 

CAC Combined Arms Center 

CAO Chief Academic Officer 

CCJO Capstone Concept for Joint Operations 

CCRB Course Content Review Board 

CENTCOM Central Command

CGSC Command and General Staff College

CGSS Command and General Staff School

CIWAG Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CNA Center for Naval Analyses

CNAS Center for a New American Security

CNCS College of Naval Command and Staff 

CNW College of Naval Warfare

COCOMs Combatant Commands 

 or Combatant Commanders

CRB Curriculum Review Board 

CRS Congressional Research Service

CRWG Curriculum Review Working Group

CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies

DASD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

DCLP Defense Civilian Leadership Program

DDJS-ME Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for Military 

Education 

DG Distinguished Graduate 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DJS Director of the Joint Staff

DLAMP Defense Leadership and Management Program 

169
DOD Department of Defense

DSLDP Defense Senior Leadership and Development 

Program

DT Development Team 

eJMAP electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System 

EPRB Educational Program Review Board

EWS Expeditionary Warfare School 

FA 59 Functional Area 59, Strategist

GDF Guidance for the Development of the Force

GS General Schedule

HASC House Armed Services Committee

HQ Headquarters

HRD Human Resources Directorate

ICAF Industrial College of the Armed Forces

IF International Fellow 

ILE Intermediate Level Education 

IT Information Technology

IW Irregular Warfare 

JAWS Joint Advanced Warfighting School 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCS/DJ-7 Operational Plans and Joint Force Development 

Directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCWS Joint and Combined Warfighting School 

JDAL Joint Duty Assignment List

JDAMIS Joint Duty Assignment Management Information 

System

JFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

JFSC Joint Forces Staff College

JIIM Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and 

Multinational 

JOE Joint Operating Environment

JOM Joint Officer Management

JOMS Joint Officer Management System

JOPES Joint Operational Planning and Execution System 

JPME Joint Professional Military Education 

JQO Joint Qualified Officer

JQS Joint Qualification System

JSO Joint Specialty Officer 

MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force 

MCPP Marine Corps Planning Process 

MCU Marine Corps University

170
MDMP Military Decision Making Process 

MECC Military Education Coordination Council

MMAS Masters of Military Arts and Science 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

National National War College

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NDU National Defense University

NDU-P National Defense University President 

NETC Naval Education and Training Command

NMS National Military Strategy

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 

NORTHCOM Northern Command

NSS National Security Strategy 

NSU National Security University

NWC Naval War College

O&I Oversight and Investigations

OPLANS Operational Plans

OPMEP Officer’s PME Policy, CJCS Instruction 1800.01D

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PAJE Program for the Assessment of Joint Education

PJE Program for Joint Education

PME Professional Military Education

PMP Permanent Military Professor

PP Permanent Professor

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review Report 

RC Reserve Component

SAASS School of Advanced Air and Space Studies 

SAE Special Area of Emphasis

SAW School of Advanced Warfighting

SLE Senior Level Education

SOC Squadron Officer’s College 

SOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

SOS Squadron Officers School

SOUTHCOM United States Southern Command 

SSS Senior Service School

STRATCOM United States Strategic Command

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command 

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice

171
USA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

USAFA United States Air Force Academy 

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USAWC United States Army War College

USD Under Secretary of Defense

USD (P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness

USERRA United Services Employment and Reemployment 

Rights Act of 1994

USMA United States Military Academy 

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

USNA United States Naval Academy 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 

172
APPENDIX B: ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS

173
174
APPENDIX C: AMENDMENT ON COPYRIGHT

175
176
177
178
APPENDIX D: HEARINGS, MEETINGS, BRIEFINGS,

TRAVEL

O&I HEARINGS

Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Twenty Years after the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the 

Skelton Panel, 20 May 2009. 

Witnesses: 

Dr. Janet Breslin-Smith 

Retired Professor and Former Department Head 

The National War College 

Dr. Alexander Cochran 

Historical Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army 

U.S. Department of the Army 

Dr. James Carafano 

Assistant Director, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies 

The Heritage Foundation 

Dr. Richard Kohn 

Professor of History, and Peace, War, and Defense 

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 

Thinkers and Practitioners: Do Senior Professional Military Education Schools Produce Strategists? 4 June 

2009. 

Witnesses: 

Rear Admiral Garry E. Hall, USN 

Commandant 

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces 

Major General Robert P. Steel, USAF 

Commandant 

The National War College 

Rear Admiral James P. Wisecup, USN 

President 

The Naval War College 

Major General Robert M. Williams, USA 

Commandant 

The Army War College 

Major General Maurice “Maury” Forsyth, USAF 

Commander of the Spaatz Center and Commandant 

The Air War College 

Colonel Michael Belcher, USMC 

Director 

The Marine Corps War College 

179
Thinking from the Tactical to the Operational Level: JPME I and II at the Services’ and Joint Command & 

Staff Colleges, 25 June 2009. 

Witnesses: 

Brigadier General Edward C. Cardon, USA 

Deputy Commandant 

Army Command and General Staff College 

Brigadier General Katherine P. Kasun, USA 

Commandant 

Joint Forces Staff College 

Brigadier General Jimmie C. Jackson, USAF 

Commandant 

Air Command and Staff College 

Rear Admiral James P. Wisecup, USN 

President 

Naval War College 

Colonel Raymond C. Damm, USMC 

Director 

U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College 

Beyond Service Core Competency: Are Our Junior Officers Prepared for Today’s Security Environment? 15 

July 2009. 

Witnesses: 

Brigadier General Dana H. Born 

Dean of the Faculty 

U.S. Air Force Academy 

Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan 

Dean of the Academic Board 

U.S. Military Academy 

Captain Matthew L. Klunder 

Commandant of Midshipmen 

U.S. Naval Academy 

Colonel Stephen M. Tanous 

Commandant 

U.S. Air Force Squadron Officer College 

Colonel Brian D. Beaudreault 

Director 

U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare School 

180
Investing in Our Military Leaders: The Role of Professional Military Education in Officer Development, 28 

July 2009. 

Witnesses: 

Lieutenant General John M. Paxton, Jr., USMC 

Director of Operations/Acting Director of the Joint Staff 

Joint Staff 

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, USA 

Commanding General 

Combined Arms Center 

Deputy Commanding General 

Training and Doctrine Command 

Fort Leavenworth 

U.S. Army 

Mr. Dan R. Sitterly 

Director of Force Development 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Manpower and Personnel 

U.S. Air Force 

Mr. Scott W. Lutterloh 

Director 

Training and Education Division 

U.S. Navy 

Brigadier General (MajGen select) Melvin G. Spiese, USMC 

Commanding General 

Training and Education Command 

U.S. Marine Corps 

Charting the Course for Effective Professional Military Education, 10 September 2009. 

Witnesses: 

Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) 

Director 

Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies 

Dr. John Allen Williams, Ph.D. 

Professor of Political Science 

Loyola University Chicago 

President 

Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society 

Dr. Williamson Murray, Ph.D. 

Professor Emeritus 

The Ohio State University 

Senior Fellow 

Institute for Defense Analyses 

181
OTHER HEARINGS

The full committee met to receive testimony on the priorities of the Department of Defense in the new 

Administration, 27 January 2009. 

 

Witness: 

The Honorable Robert M. Gates 

Secretary of Defense 

The full committee: Security developments in the areas of responsibility of the U.S. Southern Command, 

Northern Command, Africa Command, and Joint Forces Command, 18 March 2009. 

 

Witnesses: 

Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN 

Commander 

U. S. Southern Command 

General Victor Eugene "Gene" Renuart, Jr., USAF 

Commander 

U. S. Northern Command and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command 

General James N. Mattis, USMC 

Commander 

U.S. Joint Forces Command and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation for NATO 

General William E. "Kip" Ward, USA 

Commander 

U.S. Africa Command 

The full committee: Security developments in the areas of responsibility of the U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. 

European Command, and U.S. Forces Korea, 24 March 2009. 

Witnesses: 

Admiral Timothy J. Keating, USN 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command 

 

General Bantz J. Craddock, USA 

Commander, U.S. European Command 

NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe 

 

General Walter L. "Skip" Sharp, USA 

Commander, United Nations Command 

Commander, Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command 

Commander, U.S. Forces Korea 

182
The full committee: Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of 

Defense, 13 May 2009. 

 

Witnesses: 

The Honorable Robert M. Gates 

Secretary of Defense 

 

Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN 

Chairman 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

The full committee: Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of 

the Navy, 14 May 2009. 

Witnesses: 

The Honorable B.J. Penn 

Acting Secretary of the Navy 

 

Admiral Gary Roughead, USN 

Chief of Naval Operations 

General James T. Conway, USMC 

Commandant of the Marine Corps 

The full committee: Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of 

the Army, 14 May 2009. 

Witnesses: 

Honorable Pete Geren 

Secretary of the Army 

 

General George W. Casey, Jr., USA 

Chief of Staff 

U. S. Army 

The Full Committee: The Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the 

Department of the Air Force, 19 May 2009. 

Witnesses: 

The Honorable Michael B. Donley 

Secretary of the Air Force 

General Norman A. Schwartz, USAF 

Chief of Staff 

U.S. Air Force 

183
The Military Personnel Subcommittee: The Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Budget Request 

on Military Personnel Overview, 21 May 2009. 

Witnesses: 

Ms. Gail H. McGinn 

Acting Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness 

Department of Defense 

Lieutenant General Michael D. Rochelle, USA 

Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 

Headquarters, U.S. Army 

Vice Admiral Mark E. Ferguson, III, USN 

Chief of Naval Personnel 

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Total Force 

Lieutenant General Ronald S. Coleman, USMC 

Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs 

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps 

Lieutenant General Richard Y. Newton, III, USAF 

Deputy Chief Staff, Manpower & Personnel 

Headquarters, U.S. Air Force 

The Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee: Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense 

Authorization Budget Request for the U.S. Special Operations Command. 4 June 2009. 

Witness: 

Admiral Eric T. Olson, USN 

Commander 

U.S. Special Operations Command 

The full committee met to receive testimony on the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget 

Request from the Department of Defense, 3 February 2010. 

Witnesses: 

The Honorable Robert M. Gates 

Secretary of Defense 

Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN 

Chairman 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

The full committee met to receive testimony on the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget 

Request from the Department of the Air Force, 23 February 2010. 

Witnesses: 

The Honorable Michael B. Donley 

Secretary of the Air Force 

General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF 

Chief of Staff 

U.S. Air Force 

184
The full committee met to receive testimony on the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget 

Request from the Department of the Navy, 24 February 2010. 

Witnesses: 

The Honorable Ray Mabus 

Secretary of the Navy 

Admiral Gary Roughead, USN 

Chief of Naval Operations 

U.S. Navy 

General James T. Conway, USMC 

Commandant 

U.S. Marine Corps 

The full committee met to receive testimony on the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget 

Request from the Department of the Army, 25 February 2010. 

Witnesses: 

The Honorable John McHugh 

Secretary of the Army 

General George W. Casey, Jr., USA 

Chief of Staff 

U.S. Army 

The full committee met to receive testimony on the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget 

Request from the U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Joint Forces Command, 10 

March 2010. 

Witnesses: 

Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN 

Commander 

U.S. European Command 

General William E. “Kip” Ward, USA 

Commander 

U.S. Africa Command 

General James N. Mattis, USMC 

Commander 

U.S. Joint Forces Command 

The Strategic Forces Subcommittee met to receive testimony on the status of United States Strategic Forces, 

16 March 2010. 

Witnesses: 

General Kevin P. Chilton, USAF 

Commander, U.S. Strategic Command 

185
Dr. James N. Miller 

Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

U.S. Department of Defense 

The full committee met to receive testimony on the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget 

Request from the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation 

Command, 17 March 2010.

Witnesses: 

General David H. Petraeus, USA 

Commander 

U.S. Central Command 

Admiral Eric T. Olson, USN 

Commander 

U.S. Special Operations Command 

General Duncan J. McNabb, USAF 

Commander 

U.S. Transportation Command 

The full committee met to receive testimony on the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget 

Request from the U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command, 18 March 2010. 

Witnesses: 

General Douglas Fraser, USAF 

Commander 

U.S. Southern Command 

General Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF 

Commander 

Northern American Aerospace Defense Command 

U.S. Northern Command 

The full committee met to receive testimony on the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget 

Request from the U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea, 25 March 2010. 

Witnesses: 

Admiral Robert F. Willard, USN 

Commander 

U.S. Pacific Command 

General Walter L. “Skip” Sharp, USA 

Commander 

U.S. Forces Korea 

186
The Strategic Forces Subcommittee met to receive testimony on the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense 

Authorization Budget Request for Department of Energy atomic energy defense activities, 25 March 2010. 

Witnesses: 

The Honorable Thomas P. D’Agostino 

Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration 

U.S. Department of Energy 

The Honorable Inés R. Triay, Ph.D. 

Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management 

U.S. Department of Energy 

The Honorable Peter S. Winokur, Ph.D. 

Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Board 

Defense Nuclear Safety Board 

MEMBER MEETINGS

HASC Chairman and Major General Robert M. Williams USAWC, 17 March 2009. 

HASC Chairman and The Honorable William Navas, 18 March 2009. 

“The Background and Basics of Professional Military Education,” Dr. David Tretler, 24 March 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and Lieutenant General Frances C. Wilson, 25 March 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and Rear Admiral James P. Wisecup, 28 April 2009. 

Chairman and Lieutenant General Allen G. Peck, 12 May 2009. 

Chairman and ARNG USAWC Students, 13 May 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and Admiral James Stavridis, 19 May 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and Major General Robert P. Steel, 3 June 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and Major General Robert M. Williams, 3 June 2009. 

National War College Students, 4 June 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and National War College Senior Leaders, 9 June 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and General David Petraeus, 10 June 2009. 

Chairman and Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, 17 June 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and General Kevin Chilton, 8 July 2009. 

Chairman and Secretary of Defense Industry Fellows, 8 July 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and Admiral Eric T. Olson, 14 July 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and Vice Admiral Ann E. Rondeau, 23 July 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and General James N. Mattis, 24 July 2009. 

187
HASC Chairman and Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellows, 28 July 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and Lieutenant General Michael C. Gould, 15 September 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and General Duncan McNabb, 15 September 2009. 

HASC Chairman and General Martin Dempsey, 17 September 2009. 

General James Conway, 24 September 2009. 

Chairman with Congressional Research Service Staff, 25 September 2009. 

Admiral Gary Roughead, 29 September 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and General Victor Renuart, 30 September 2009. 

General Norton Schwartz, 1 October 2009. 

General George Casey, 21 October 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and Admiral Michael Mullen, 27 October 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and Major General Robert B. Neller, 5 November 2009. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, and General William E. Ward, 5 November 2009. 

Chairman and Vice Admiral Ann E. Rondeau, 16 March 2010. 

MEMBER TRAVEL

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 31 March 2009. 

National Defense University and Naval War College, International Fellows Reception, 28 April 2009. 

National War College, 29 April 2009. 

Marine Corps University, 20 May 2009. 

U.S. Naval Academy, 9 June 2009. 

Marine Corps University, 4 March 2010. 

STAFF MEETINGS AND BRIEFINGS

Rep. Solomon Ortiz (1989 Skelton Panel), 11 March 2009. 

JCS/DJ-7, Briefing, 17 March 2009. 

Office of the Secretary of Defense USD(P&R) and Defense Language Office Staffs, 20 March 2009. 

U.S. JFCOM, Joint Operating Environment (JOE) Briefing to HASC Staff, 20 March 2009. 

188
OSD, Briefing on PME, 20 March 2009. 

Admiral Robert Natter (ret.) (1989 Skelton Panel Staff), 20 March 2009. 

U.S. Marine Corps, PME Briefing, 23 March 2009. 

U.S. Air Force, PME Briefing, 26 March 2009 

U.S. Army, PME Briefing, 26 March 2009. 

U.S. Navy, PME Briefing, 31 March 2009. 

OSD and JCS, Quadrennial Defense Review Briefing to HASC Staff, 13 April 2009. 

National Faculty Interviews, 14 April 2009. 

JCS Staff, Joint Qualified Officer Management Briefing, 16 April 2009. 

Dr. John Yaeger and Dr. Kjonnerod, National Security Professional Development Program, 24 April 2009. 

Rear Admiral James P. Wisecup, 28 April 2009. 

National Faculty Interviews, 8 May 2009. 

U.S. Navy (N15), PME Briefing, 11 May 2009. 

Dr. Maren Leed, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 13 May 2009. 

John Charlton, National Defense University International Fellows Briefing, 22 May 2009. 

USAWC and NDU Faculty, On Teaching Strategy, 2 June 2009. 

ICAF Faculty Interviews, 2 June 2009. 

ICAF Faculty Interviews, 8 June 2009. 

JCS/DJ-7, Joint Faculty Education Conference, 18-19 June 2009. 

Former NDU Provost Interview, 22 June 2009. 

NDU Staff, On Teaching Strategy, 22 June 2009. 

Lieutenant General David Ohle (Ret.) and Lieutenant General Joseph E. DeFrancisco (Ret.), 1 July 2009. 

Brigadier General Michael E. Rounds, JCS/DJ-7, 9 July 2009. 

U.S. SOCOM, VTC Briefing on PME, 17 July 2009. 

Brigadier General Edward Cardon, 17 July 2009. 

USAWC Board of Visitors Members, 17 July 2009. 

NDU Staff, 27 July 2009. 

OSD and JCS, Quadrennial Defense Review Briefing to HASC Staff, 28 July 2009. 

189
ICAF Senior Leaders, 29 July 2009. 

Lieutenant General David Ohle (ret.) and Lieutenant General Joseph E. DeFrancisco (Ret.), 31 July 2009. 

Vice Admiral Anne E. Rondeau, 7 August 2009. 

Dr. Steven Randolph, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 7 August 2009. 

Colonel Mace Carpenter, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Draft Strategy Track and Ph.D. Program, 12 August 

2009.

Brigadier General Edward Cardon, 17 August 2009. 

Dr. Charles Stevenson, 17 August 2009. 

Captain Frank Pagano (Ret.), NDU Capstone Briefing, 19 August 2009. 

Services and Joint Staff meeting with HASC Staff on JPME I Faculty, 21 August 2009. 

Dr. John Nagl, Center for a New American Security, 25 August 2009. 

Captain Mark Hagerott, USN, 26 August 2009. 

RAND, Congressional Roundtable on Military Personnel Issues, 27 August 2009. 

Gail McGinn, USD(P&R), 27 August 2009. 

USD (Policy) Briefing on the Guidance for the Development of the Force (Classified), 27 August 2009. 

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, Telephone Interview, 27August 2009. 

NDU Staff Interview, 28 August 2009. 

Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.), 28 August 2009. 

Tom Ricks, 8 September 2009. 

U.S. JFCOM, Briefing, 9 September 2009. 

NDU, Capstone Briefing, 9 September 2009. 

NDU Provost, 14 September 2009. 

Major General Robert Scales (Ret.), 14 September 2009. 

Colonel John Collins (Ret.), 14 September 2009. 

General Martin E. Dempsey, 17 September 2009. 

ICAF Faculty Interview, 17 September 2009. 

JCS Staff, Joint Officer Project (Fenty Study) Briefing, 17 September, 2009. 

Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, 18 September 2009. 

NWC Students, 23 September 2009. 

190
Congressional Research Service Staff, 23 September 2009. 

Dr. Albert Pierce, NDU, 28 September 2009. 

USAFA Board of Visitors Meeting, 1 October 2009. 

U.S. Army Staff FA 59 Briefing, 7 October 2009. 

NDU President, 7 October 2009. 

Rear Admiral Stephen R. Pietropaoli (Ret.), 9 October 2009. 

Former Dean, National, 14 October 2009. 

Former USAFA Faculty, 28 October 2009. 

NDU President, 29 October 2009. 

Representative Steve Israel, 4 November 2009. 

JCS Staff, “JOM, JDAL, and JQS” Briefing, 6 November 2009. 

ICAF Faculty, 24 November 2009. 

NDU Ethics Center, 25 November 2009. 

DUSD(P) Kathleen Hicks, 14 December 2009. 

Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, 6 January 2010. 

National Faculty, 22 January 2010. 

Lieutenant General David Barno (Ret.), 22 January 2010. 

General Richard B. Myers, 26 January 2010. 

National Faculty, 29 January 2010. 

Former Dean, National, 2 March 2010. 

Lieutenant General David Barno (Ret.), 9 March 2010. 

On Teaching Strategy Conference, USAWC and SSI, 9 April 2010. 

STAFF TRAVEL

National Defense University: Lieutenant General Frances C. Wilson, Dr. John Deegan, Jr., and Dr. John W. Yaeger, 16 

March 2009. 

Marine Corps University, 27 March 2009. 

National War College, 3 April 2009. 

U.S. Army War College, Naval War College, and Air University, 5-9 April 2009. 

191
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Joint Forces Staff College, and U.S. Joint Forces Command, 30 April-1 

May 2009. 

Joint Task Force-Bravo, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Central Command, 4-7 May. 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, U.S. Transportation Command, and U.S. Strategic Command, 26-29 

May 2009. 

JCS Joint Faculty Education Conference, National Defense University, 18-19 June 2009. 

U.S. Air Force Academy, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Military Academy, 29 June – 1 July 2009. 

NDU, NDU President Interview, 10 July 2009. 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 23 September 2009. 

NDU Leader Development Symposium, 8-9 October 2009. 

ABA on PME, 27 January 2010. 

192
APPENDIX E: BIBLIOGRAPHY

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 . Air University Faculty Handbook. Maxwell Air Force Base, 2008. 

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193
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 . Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) Joint and Combined Warfighting School. Norfolk, 21-25 April 

2008. 

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194
 . Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) US Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Quantico, 22-26 

September 2008. 

 . Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) US Air War College. Maxwell Air Force Base, 20-23 October 

2008. 

 . Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) College of Naval Warfare. Newport, 14-18 May 2007. 

 

 . Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) College of Naval Warfare. Newport, 4-7 May 2009 

 . Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Washington, D.C., 6-11 

February 2005. 

 . Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) Marine Corps War College. Quantico, 12-14 January 2009. 

 . Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) National War College. Washington, D.C., 14-19 November 

2004. 

 . Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) US Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, 23-28 September 

2007. 

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195
 . “Joint Communications System.” Joint Publication 6-0, 20 March 2006. 

 . “CAPSTONE Course Guidance.” Memorandum for the President, National Defense University, 23 June 2009. 

 _. “Universal Joint Task List.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04C. Washington D.C., 1 July 

2002. 

 . “Language and Regional Expertise Planning.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3126.01. 

Washington, D.C., 23 January 2006, updated 11 February 2008. 

 . “Joint Officer Management Program Procedures.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1330.05, 1 

May 2008. 

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Staff Instruction 1331.01C, 22 July 2005, current as of 31 July 2007. 

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 . “2008 Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs).” Memorandum for 

Chief of Staff US Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff, US Air Force, Commandant of the Marine Corps, by ADM 

Michael G. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, D.C., 10 March 2008. 

 . CM 344-90 Military Education Policy Document, by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. Washington, D.C., 1 May 1990. 

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General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Washington, D.C., 11 May 1990. 

Congressional Research Service. “The DOD Service Academies: Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service 

Report for Congress, by Robert L. Goldich. Washington, D.C., 6 February 1997. 

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Committee, by Charles A. Henning. Washington D.C., 13 March 2009. 

 . “Copyright Issues and Department of Defense Personnel.” Memorandum to House Armed Services Committee, 

Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, by Brian T. Yeh, 25 June 2009. 

 . “Possible Approaches to Amending the Copyright Law to Allow Faculty of Military Service Academies 

and Department of Defense Professional Schools to Secure Copyrights for Their Scholarly Works.” Memorandum to 

House Armed Services Committee, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, by Brian T. Yeh, 6 November 2009. 

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196
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Task Force on Joint Professional Military Education.” Washington, D.C., 16 January 2009. 

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2005. 

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182, June 1991. 

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March 1991. 

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197
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199
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200
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201
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Gen. Jay W. Hood. MacDill Air Force Base, 9 April 2009. 

U.S. Congress. Title 10 U.S.C. Section 1595, “Civilian faculty members at certain Department of Defense schools: 

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 . Title 10 U.S.C. Section 4021, “Army War College and United States Army Command and General Staff 

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202
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2008. 

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203
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U.S. Joint Forces Command. “Chairman’s Statutory Responsibilities and Officer Joint Professional Military Education 

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204
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LEGISLATION

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, P.L. 100-180 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, House Conference Report 103-357 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, P.L. 104-106 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, House Conference Report 108-767, 8 October 2004. 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, House Report 108-491, 14 May 2004. 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Conference Report 109-702 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Senate Report 109-254 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, House Conference Report 111-288, 7 October 2009. 

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BRIEFINGS

Belcher, Col. Michael. “Marine Corps War College Curriculum Review Board (CRB).” Presented to House Armed 

Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Staff, 4 February 2009. 

Bonner, Matthew. ”Military Education Coordination Council 2009 Special Areas of Emphasis Areas Assessment.” 

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Broadwell, Paula (MAJ). “Junior Officer Leadership A “Major Crisis?” Presented at the Marine Corps University 

symposium titled, “Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond.” National Press Club, Washington, 

D.C., 23 September 2009. 

Pagano, Frank. “Capstone Introduction.” Presented to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and 

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214
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“Cognitive Transformation Roundtable.” United States Capitol, Washington, DC. 16 February 2005. 

Defense Language Office. “Regional Area Content in Officer Professional Military Education.” Presented to House 

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Garza, Brigadier General David. “Strategic Planning.” U.S. Southern Command, Marine Corps War College, 8 December 

2008. 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces. “Resourcing the National Strategy.” Presented to House Armed Services 

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Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Active (AC) and Reserve (RC) Component By Comparison,” undated. 

Kjonnerod, Erik L. “‘We Live in Exponential Times’ Interagency to Whole-of-Government.” 2009 

Knarr, William. “Applying Current Wars’ Lessons to Training and Education.” Presented to House Armed Services 

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Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 12 February 2009. 

 . “Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) Analysis of PAJE Trends.” Presented to House 

Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 12 February 2009. 

Lynes, Jerome M. “Professional Military Education.” Presented to House Armed Services Oversight and Investigations 

Subcommittee, 17 March 2009. 

 . “Welcome Military Education Coordination Council.” Presented to House Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 12 February 2009. 

Mahar, Brian. “Update Briefing to the Military Education Coordination Council.” Presented by Joint Special 

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Marine Corps University. “Congressional Delegation Discussion.” Presented to House Armed Services Subcommittee 

on Oversight and Investigations, 20 May 2009. 

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Investigations, 23 March 2009. 

Marine Corps War College. “Leadership Learning Outcomes,” Slide, 2008 

215
216

Military Education Coordination Council. “Military Education Coordination Council Working Group.” Presented to 

House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 17 September 2008. 

“The Navy PME Continuum,” Navy Briefing and JCS/DJ-7 Briefing, undated. 

National Defense University. “House Armed Services Committee Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Review 

of Professional Military Education.” Presented to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations, 29 May 2009. 

Retherford, Sam. “Professional Military Education Role of OSD.” Presented to House Armed Services Subcommittee 

on Oversight and Investigations, 20 March 2009. 

Roesner, Jack. “OPMEP (.01D) Revision Update.” Presented to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, 12 February 2009. 

U.S. Air Force. “Do We Have Enough Warrior-Scholars? Air Force General Officers with Ph.D.s.” Presented to House 

Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 12 May 2009. 

 . “Briefing to HASC O & I.” Presented to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations, 23 March 2009. 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. “Preparing Leaders for the Future.” Presented to House Armed 

Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Staff, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 26-29 May 2009. 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. “TRADOC Command Overview Brief.” Presented to House Armed 

Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 30 April 2009. 

U.S. Army War College. “Briefing to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on 

Professional Military Education.” Presented to House Armed Services Committee Staff, 6 April 2009. 

U.S. Joint Forces Command. “United States Joint Forces Command Overview.” Presented to House Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Staff, Norfolk, VA, 1 May 2009. 

U.S. Joint Forces Staff College. “HASC STAFFDEL Visit.” Presented to House Armed Services Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigations, 1 May 2009. 

U.S. Transportation Command. “Joint PME Review.” Presented to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, Scott Air Force Base, Il, 27-28 May 2009. 

Wisecup, RADM James. “Command and PME Brief Prepared for House Armed Services Professional Staffers.” 

Presented to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 7 April 2009. 
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