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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

RAJIVE CHADHA, and PUJA 

CHADHA, 

Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

PARAMJIT CHOPRA, 

Defendant.

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No. 12 C 4204 

Judge John J. Tharp, Jr. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Rajive and Puja Chadha (the “Chadhas”) bring a three-count cause of 

action against defendant Paramjit Chopra alleging that Chopra violated the Stored 

Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (the “SCA”), and committed defamation 

per se in two separate instances. Chopra moves to dismiss only the SCA claim, which is 

Count I of the Chadhas’ complaint. For the reasons stated below, Count I states a 

plausible claim for violation of the SCA, and Chopra’s motion to dismiss is denied. 

FACTS1

The Chadhas allege that Chopra, covertly and without authorization, obtained the 

username and password to Puja Chadha’s email account at hotmail.com (“Puja’s Hotmail 

Account”). He used the username and password to log in to Puja’s Hotmail Account, and 

after logging in he accessed emails stored within the account to obtain the identity and 

email addresses of several of the Chadhas’ close friends, family members, social 

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 The Court accepts the Chadhas’ factual allegations as true for the purposes of Chopra’s 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Virnich v. Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 2011).
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acquaintances, and professional contacts. The Chadhas further allege that Chopra opened 

an email account at yahoo.com using the fake name “Anjali Gupta” (the “Anjali 

Account”). On June 1, 2011, Chopra sent from the Anjali Account an email to two of the 

Chadhas’ friends making false statements accusing Rajive Chadha of, among other 

things, fornication, adultery, and illicit and immoral sexual practices. On June 9, 2011, 

Chopra “blind-copied” the previously-sent email to at least twenty more of the Chadhas’ 

close friends, family members, social acquaintances, and professional contacts. The 

Chadhas allege that Chopra obtained the email address of each individual to whom he 

sent the emails by his unauthorized access to Puja’s Hotmail Account email inbox. 

Chopra attempted to mask his identity as the sender of the allegedly defamatory 

emails by creating a web of anonymous email accounts on several different computers 

registered to Midwest Institute for Minimally Invasive Therapies, P.C. (“Midwest”), a 

company that Chopra owns. The Chadhas were only able to determine that Chopra was 

the individual sending the allegedly defamatory emails by filing a series of petitions for 

pretrial discovery in Illinois state court, and they incurred substantial cost in conducting 

their investigation.

DISCUSSION 

The SCA states that “whoever—(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a 

facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; . . . and thereby 

obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while 

it is in electronic storage in such system shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) 

of this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). 

Chopra raises four arguments for why the Chopras’ SCA claim should be 

dismissed. First, Chopra argues that the Chadhas failed to adequately allege that he acted 
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intentionally. Second, he argues that the complaint does not adequately allege that 

Chopra personally accessed Puja’s Hotmail Account. Third, he argues that the Chadhas 

have not alleged that he obtained, altered, or prevented access to electronically stored 

communications. Fourth and finally, he argues that the Chadhas failed to allege actual 

damages. The Court rejects each of Chopra’s arguments and finds that the complaint 

“contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

I. The Chadhas Adequately Allege that Chopra Acted Intentionally. 

Chopra argues that the Chadhas failed to adequately allege that Chopra acted 

intentionally in obtaining emails from Puja’s Hotmail Account. This argument is patently 

frivolous.2

 As an initial matter, the Chadhas directly allege that Chopra acted 

intentionally, Cmplt. ¶ 33 (“Chopra intentionally obtained access [to Puja’s Hotmail 

Account] and opened and read emails stored in its inbox”), and also allege specific facts 

which, if true, clearly show that Chopra’s actions were intentional, Cmplt. ¶¶ 13-15. 

Further, Chopra does not suggest, and the Court cannot conceive of, any possible way 

that Chopra might have unintentionally (1) obtained the username and password for 

Puja’s Hotmail Account; (2) used that information to log into the account; and (3) 

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 Counsel for Chopra are reminded of their responsibility to certify that their “legal 

contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, 

modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

11(b)(2). Chopra’s first two arguments for dismissal (discussed in Sections I and II of this 

Order) are clearly not warranted by existing law, and it is difficult to divine any 

nonfrivolous argument for modifying the law in order to accept them. Though the 

arguments at least border on sanctionable, the Court will not impose sanctions at this 

time. 
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accessed emails in the account’s inbox to obtain email addresses. The complaint 

describes conduct that is almost certainly the product of intentional conduct, so Chopra’s 

claim that the Chadhas’ allegation of intent is not an “unsupported factual conclusion” 

lacks any merit whatsoever. 

II. The Chadhas Adequately Allege that Chopra Personally Accessed Puja’s 

Hotmail Account. 

Chopra next argues that “there are no factual allegations that would show that Dr. 

Chopra, himself, accessed Puja’s email account.” MTD at 5. Again, not so. The Chadhas 

allege that “Chopra obtained the username and password for Puja’s Hotmail Account,” 

“Chopra then used the username and password to log in to Puja’s Hotmail Account,” and 

“Chopra accessed emails in the inbox.” Cmplt. ¶¶13-15 (emphasis added); see also id. at

¶¶ 32-34. These allegations are easily sufficient state a claim that Chopra personally 

accessed Puja’s Hotmail Account. 

Perhaps Chopra means to argue that the allegations are simply not true. If so, that 

argument is unavailable to him at this stage because of the well-known rule that a 

complaint’s allegations are accepted as true for purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss. 

Virnich, 664 F.3d at 212. The Chadhas were not required, in their complaint, to prove that 

Chopra must have accessed Puja’s Hotmail Account. Rather, they were only required to 

allege that he did access the account without authorization. Their allegations are 

sufficient. 

III.The Chadhas Allege that Chopra Obtained Puja’s Emails. 

Chopra further argues that “mere access” to Puja’s Hotmail Account, even if 

intentional, is insufficient to state a claim under the SCA. According to Chopra, merely 

accessing Puja’s Hotmail Account does not establish that he “obtain[ed], alter[ed], or 
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prevent[ed] authorized access to a wire or electronic communication,” as required by the 

SCA. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a); see also Fischer v. Mount Olive Lutheran Church, 207 F. 

Supp. 2d 914, 926 (“accessing plaintiff’s Hotmail account intentionally is not enough in 

and of itself to violate the act”). Chopra is correct that the statute appears to require more 

than mere intentional unauthorized access to an email account, assuming that it is 

possible to access an email account without obtaining any of the account’s electronic 

communications. But if a defendant, after accessing the account, “obtains . . . a wire or 

electronic communication” a violation occurs. See Fischer, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 926 

(“obtain[ing] plaintiff’s email” constitutes a “violation of the act”). 

The Chadhas, in addition to alleging that Chopra accessed Puja’s Hotmail 

Account, also allege that he “opened and read emails stored in its inbox.” Cmplt. ¶ 33. 

Chadha acknowledges as much by claiming that he is not alleged to have done “anything 

other than ‘access’ Puja’s emails.” MTD Br. at 7 (emphasis added). The SCA does not 

require anything more. By alleging that Chopra opened and read (i.e., obtained) the 

emails, the Chadhas satisfy the second clause of the statute, which requires that a 

defendant “obtain[] . . . a wire or electronic communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). 

Therefore, Chopra’s third argument fails. 

IV. The SCA Count States a Plausible Claim Regardless of Whether the Chadhas 

Can Show Actual Damages. 

Finally, Chopra argues that the Chadhas failed to plead any actual damages 

incurred as a result of his actions with respect to Puja’s Hotmail Account, and he claims 

that the Chadhas cannot, therefore, obtain statutory damages for his violation. The 

Chadhas’ response to this argument is threefold. First, they assert that the complaint 

alleges actual damages in the form of the forensic costs the Chadhas incurred in 
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determining that it was Chopra who was sending the offensive emails. Second, they argue 

that they are not required to plead actual damages in order to recover statutory damages 

under the SCA. And third, they note that even if they were required to plead actual 

damages in order to recover the statutory damage amounts, actual damages are not 

required in order to recover punitive damages and attorneys’ fees. 

The Court notes that there is a split of authority as to whether actual damages are 

required in order to recover statutory damages under the SCA.3

 The SCA contains a 

damages provision, which states: 

The court may assess as damages in a civil action under this section the 

sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made 

by the violator as a result of the violation, but in no case shall a person 

entitled to recover receive less than the sum of $1,000. If the violation is 

willful or intentional, the court may assess punitive damages. In the case 

of a successful action to enforce liability under this section, the court may 

assess the costs of the action, together with reasonable attorney fees 

determined by the court. 

18 U.S.C. § 2707(c). Many district courts interpreting this statutory language have not 

required a showing of actual damages in order to recover statutory damages. See Pure 

Power Boot Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, 759 F. Supp. 2d 417, 428 

(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (plaintiffs “need not allege actual damages”); In re Hawaiian Airlines, 

Inc., 355 B.R. 225, 231 (D. Haw. 2006) (plaintiff “does not need to prove actual damages 

or profits”); Freedman v. Town of Fairfield, NO. 3-1048, 2006 WL 2684347, *3 (D. 

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 The disagreement stems from differing applications of Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 

(2004), a Supreme Court case in which the Court held that statutory damages were 

available under the Privacy Act, a statute with language similar to the SCA, where the 

plaintiff could not show that he suffered actual damages. Id. at 620. Though the Supreme 

Court held that the Privacy Act’s virtually identical language did require actual damages, 

it also arguably assumed that the SCA did not require actual damages in order to recover 

statutory damages. Id. at 626-27; see also id. at 639-40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Conn. Sep. 19, 2006) (allowing statutory damages without any actual damages); Cedar 

Hill Assocs., Inc. v. Paget, No. 04-557, 2005 WL 3430562, *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2005) 

(plaintiffs “are not required to [plead actual damages] under a plain reading of the statute 

or its statutory text”). But the Fourth Circuit, the only federal court of appeals to address 

the issue, has ruled that actual damages are a prerequisite to recovery of statutory 

damages. Van Alstyne v. Electronic Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2009); 

see also Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group, Ltd., No. 10-7811, 2011 WL 

6101949, *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011) (stating in dicta that “proof of ‘actual damages’ is a 

prerequisite to recover any such statutory damages”). 

But for purposes of this motion, the Court does not need to resolve the question 

whether the Chadhas must allege actual damages in order to recover statutory damages. 

The federal courts are in agreement that a party can recover punitive damages and 

attorneys’ fees even without proving actual damages. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, 560 F.3d at 

209 (“proof of actual damages is not required before an award of either punitive damages 

or attorney’s fees”). Because the Chadhas seek both punitive damages4

 and attorneys’ 

fees, Count I survives regardless of whether they can prove actual damages. 

Further, the Chadhas’ complaint sets forth a plausible basis to believe that they 

will be able to show actual damages. The Chadhas allege that as a result of Chopra’s 

SCA violation, they incurred actual damages in the form of forensic and computer 

security expenses to discover that Chopra was the individual who accessed Puja’s 

Hotmail Account and sent the offending emails. Cmplt. ¶ 29; MTD Resp. Br. at 11. They 

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 Chopra argues that the Chadhas fail to state a valid claim for punitive damages because 

they have not established that his conduct was “intentional,” but the Court has already 

rejected that argument in Section I, supra.
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also argue that they suffered actual damages to their reputations due to Chopra’s emails, 

and that the very purpose of Chopra accessing Puja’s Hotmail Account was to damage 

their reputations. Although the Court need not decide at this time whether the Chadhas 

can prove actual damages caused by Chopra’s SCA violation, they have at this point 

stated a plausible claim for actual damages. 

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For all of these reasons, the Court denies Chopra’s motion to dismiss. 

Date: December 5, 2012 

John J. Tharp, Jr. 

United States District Judge