Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois

Name of Assigned Judge

or Magistrate Judge Edmond E. Chang Sitting Judge if Otherthan Assigned Judge

CASE NUMBER 12 C 4862 DATE 12/27/2012

CASE

TITLE

Lamont D. Haggard (R62161) vs. Tom Dart, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

The plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 4) is granted. The Court orders the

trust fund officer at the plaintiff’s place of incarceration to deduct $4.54 from the plaintiff’s account for

payment to the Clerk of Court as an initial partial filing fee, and to continue making monthly deductions in

accordance with this order. The clerk shall send a copy of this order to the trust fund officer at the Shawnee

Correctional Center. The clerk shall issue a summons for service on defendant Dart only and send the

plaintiff a Magistrate Judge Consent Form and Instructions for Submitting Documents along with a copy of

this order. Summons shall not issue at this time for defendant Carnes. Defendant Godinez is dismissed. The

United States Marshals Service is appointed to serve all defendants. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of

counsel (Dkt. No. 3), is denied without prejudice. To track the case, a status hearing is set for 02/11/13 at

9:00 a.m.

O[ For further details see text below.] Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT

Pro se plaintiff Lamont D. Haggard, an Illinois Department of Corrections inmate, has brought a civil

rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding his treatment while previously detained at the Cook

County Jail. Pending before the Court are plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No.

4), complaint for an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, (Dkt. No. 1), and motion for appointment

of counsel. (Dkt. No. 3).

The plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 4), is granted. Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $4.54. The trust fund officer at the

plaintiff’s place of incarceration is authorized and ordered to collect the partial filing fee from the plaintiff’s

trust fund account and pay it directly to the Clerk of Court. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the

plaintiff’s trust fund officer is directed to collect monthly payments from the plaintiff’s trust fund account in

an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the account. Monthly payments shall

be forwarded to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the full $350 filing

fee is paid. All payments shall be sent to the Clerk, United States District Court, 219 S. Dearborn St.,

Chicago, Illinois 60604, attn: Cashier’s Desk, 20th Floor, and shall clearly identify the plaintiff’s name and

this case number. This payment obligation will follow the plaintiff wherever he may be transferred. 

Turning to the initial review of the complaint, the Court must accept as true all well-pled facts in

plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to him. Parish v. City of

Elkhart, 614 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 2001)). 

The Court also “construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than formal

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STATEMENT

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Obriecht v. Raemisch, 417 F.3d 489, 492 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008)). 

“To satisfy the notice-pleading standard, a complaint must provide a ‘short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ which is sufficient to provide defendant with ‘fair notice’ of the

claim and its basis.” Bridges, 557 F.3d at 545 (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S at 89). “‘A complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The complaint must actually

suggest that plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations that raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bridges, 557 F.3d at 546 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). 

Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted and stabbed by a group of detainees at the Cook County Jail on

January 30, 2011. Defendant correctional officer Carnes was the assigned officer on duty when the incident

occurred. Carnes was not at his post when plaintiff was assaulted. Plaintiff blames Carnes’s absence for

allowing the assault.

Other correctional officers stopped the assault. Plaintiff claims that he was held for questioning for

fifteen to thirty minutes following the incident instead of receiving immediate medical assistance. It was

clear that he needed immediate treatment due to the fact that he was then taken to the hospital where he

received major surgery. 

Plaintiff has named Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart, the Jail’s former director Salvador Gordinez, and

officer Carnes as defendants. He does not name the officers who alleged delayed his medical care following

the assault as defendants. 

The complaint fails to allege a claim against officer Carnes regarding the assault. “The Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pre-trial detainees from punishment and places a duty upon jail

officials to protect pre-trial detainees from violence.” Fisher v. Lovejoy, 414 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 2005)

(citing Swofford v. Mandrell, 969 F.2d 547, 549 (7th Cir. 1992)); see also Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 549,

552-53 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 831-33 (1994); Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d

1235, 1237 (7th Cir. 1996)). However, not every act of inmate-on-inmate violence results in a constitutional

violation. Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2006). 

 

Although the claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment because plaintiff was a pretrial detainee,

the Court applies the deliberate indifference standard that governs Eighth Amendment claims. Minix v.

Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 831 (7th Cir. 2010). The standard contains both an objective prong, requiring a

grave risk, and a subjective prong, requiring actual knowledge of the risk. Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569

(7th Cir. 2008) (citing Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)). As to the objective requirement,

plaintiff must show that “(1) he suffered an objectively sufficient serious injury; and (2) he was incarcerated

under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). A

condition that poses a substantial risk of harm is one where the “risks [are] so great that they are almost

certain to materialize if nothing is done.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 911 (7th Cir. 2005). This standard

has been analogized to the threat posed by inherently danger situations such as placing a detainee in a cell

with a cobra. Id. at 911 (citing Billman v. Indiana Dep.’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995)). 

On the subjective side, the official is deliberately indifferent resulting in a constitutional violation

only if he “‘effectively condones the attack by allowing it to happen.’” Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 756

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(7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lewis, 107 F.3d at 553). “[D]efendants [must have] actual knowledge of an

impending harm easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred

from defendants’ failure to prevent it.” Santiago, 599 F.3d at 756 (quoting Lewis, 107 F.3d at 553). “Mere

negligence or even gross negligence does not constitute deliberate indifference.” Borello, 446 F.3d at 749. 

However, “[a] prison official cannot escape liability by showing that he did not know that a plaintiff was

especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the assault.” Dale, 548

F.3d at 569 (citations omitted). “The ultimate measure of the adequacy of the response is therefore

reasonableness in light of the surrounding circumstances.” Id.

There is no question that plaintiff alleges that he suffered an objectively serious injury, Lee v. Young,

533 F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 2008), and so the Court shall consider the subjective prong. 

A common fact pattern for liability is when a correctional officer ignores repeated detainee

complaints that the detainee is under the threat of violence and there is a subsequent assault. Borello, 446

F.3d at 749 (citing Velez v. Johnson, 395 F.3d 732, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2005); Haley, 86 F.3d 642); see also

Brown, 398 F.3d at 914. Plaintiff does not allege that he complained to Carnes. An alternative permissible

theory is that a correctional officers may not knowingly take actions that would expose a detainee to a serious

injury. See Case v. Ahitowi, 301 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a correctional official would

be liable for deliberate indifference if he knowingly unleashed a hungry lion on a prisoner); Billman, 56 F.3d

at 788 (providing example that it is deliberate indifference to knowingly placing a prisoner in a cell with a

cobra or placing prisoner in cell when there is a high risk that there is a cobra in the cell). Plaintiff’s fails to

plausibly allege a claim for relief under this second model for liability as well. There is no indication that

Carnes knew of the risk of harm to plaintiff. 

Plaintiff cannot proceed against officer Carnes at this time because he fails to allege that Carnes

possessed the request deliberate indifferent mindset regarding the assault. Carnes’s absence from his post, by

itself, without any discussion of Carnes deliberately ignoring a known risk of assault, suggests nothing more

than negligence. 

The Court will allow plaintiff to submit a proposed amended complaint to correct the deficiencies

identified by the Court as to the claim against Carnes. Plaintiff must submit a proposed amended complaint

that states a claim against Carnes consistent with the law set forth above within 30 days of the entry of this

order. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of Carnes from this action.

Plaintiff’s claims against Dart and Godinez are dismissed because he fails to plausibly allege that they

were involved in the incident at issue. Plaintiff appears to have named these defendants simply because they

are supervisors. Their supervisory status is insufficient to state a claim under §1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676;

Monell v. New York City Dep’t Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692

(7th Cir. 2008) (cases hold that a defendant must be personally involved with an alleged constitutional

violation to be liable under §1983). 

Plaintiff has stated a claim regarding the alleged delay in providing medical treatment following the

assault. An unnecessary delay in treatment that unnecessarily prolongs pain without proper justification

violates the constitution. Smith v. Knox County Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). The

Court recognizes that plaintiff claims the unnecessary delay was allegedly fifteen to thirty minutes. 

However, he was also alleging suffering from significant injuries resulting from the stabbing. Id. (instructing

that the Court must consider the “seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing treatment” when

evaluating the appropriateness of the delay) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The

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STATEMENT

reasonableness of the alleged delay cannot be resolved at the present pleading stage.

Plaintiff has not named a defendant who was involved in the alleged delay in providing medical care. 

He should be aware that he cannot obtain damages from any defendant unless he serves them (or obtains

waivers of service) in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. He cannot obtain service (and relief) from a John

Doe defendants, he must determine their names. 

Accordingly, Sheriff Tom Dart, in his official capacity, remains as a defendant solely so that plaintiff

may discovery the identity of the officers who alleged unnecessarily delayed in providing him medical

treatment following the assault. Once an attorney has entered an appearance on Dart’s behalf, the plaintiff

may send defense counsel interrogatories (that is, a list of questions) eliciting information regarding the

identity of the presently unnamed officers who allegedly violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 33. After the plaintiff learns their identities, he may submit a proposed amended complaint that

names them under their actual names. Summonses will then issue for service on these defendants and Sheriff

Dart will be dismissed as a defendant. Plaintiff is advised that there is a two year statute of limitations for his

claims. Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 623 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff must submit a proposed

amended complaint naming these defendants within the statute of limitations period if he wishes to proceed

against them. Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2008); Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633,

639 (7th Cir. 2008); Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1257 (7th Cir. 1993). 

If the plaintiff decides to submit a proposed amended complaint, he must write both the 

case number and the Judge’s name on the proposed amended complaint, sign it, and return it to the Prisoner

Correspondent. As with every document filed with the Court, the plaintiff must provide an extra copy for the

Judge; he must also submit a service copy for each defendant named in the proposed amended complaint. 

The plaintiff is cautioned that an amended pleading supersedes the original complaint and must stand

complete on its own. Therefore, all allegations against all defendants must be set forth in the proposed

amended complaint, without reference to the original complaint. Any exhibits the plaintiff wants the Court to

consider in its threshold review of the proposed amended complaint must be attached, and each copy of the

proposed amended complaint must include complete copies of any and all exhibits. The plaintiff is advised

to keep a copy for his files. The clerk will provide the plaintiff with an amended civil rights complaint form

and instructions along with a copy of this order.

The clerk shall issue a summons for service on defendant Dart only and send the plaintiff a Magistrate

Judge Consent Form and Instructions for Submitting Documents along with a copy of this order. Summons

shall not issue at this time for defendant Carnes. The United States Marshals Service is appointed to serve all

defendants. Any service forms necessary for the plaintiff to complete will be sent by the Marshal as

appropriate to serve the defendants with process. The U.S. Marshal is directed to make all reasonable efforts

to serve the defendants. With respect to any former employees who no longer can be found at the work

address provided by the plaintiff, the Cook County Jail shall furnish the Marshal with the defendant’s lastknown address. The information shall be used only for purposes of effectuating service [or for proof of

service, should a dispute arise] and any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Marshal. 

Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Marshal. Plaintiff is to

provide the U.S. Marshals Service with a copy of the complaint and a proper form for request of waiver

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1). The U.S. Marshals Service is requested to mail the

complaint and appropriate papers for waiver of service by first-class mail to the named Defendants pursuant

to Rule 4(d)(1)(G).

Plaintiff is instructed to file all future papers concerning this action with the Clerk of Court in care of

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STATEMENT

the Prisoner Correspondent. Plaintiff must provide the Court with the original plus a complete Judge’s copy,

including any exhibits, of every document filed. In addition, plaintiff must send an exact copy of any court

filing to defendants [or to defense counsel, once an attorney has entered an appearance on behalf of

defendants]. Every document filed with the Court must include a certificate of service stating to whom exact

copies were mailed and the date of mailing. Any paper that is sent directly to the Judge or that otherwise

fails to comply with these instructions may be disregarded by the Court or returned to plaintiff. 

Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 3), is denied without prejudice. “There is no

constitutional or statutory right to counsel in federal civil cases,” but this Court does have “discretion under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) to request counsel for an indigent litigant.” Romanelli v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851

(7th Cir. 2010) (citing Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Johnson v. Doughty, 433

F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2006); Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 1993)). In determining

whether to request counsel to represent plaintiff, this Court considers whether: (1) plaintiff “has made

reasonable attempts to secure counsel on his own;” and, if so, (2) “the complexity of the case and whether the

plaintiff appears competent to litigate it on his own.” Romanelli, 615 F.3d at 851-52 (citing Pruett, 503 F.3d

at 654-55). This Court has discretion in determining whether to recruit counsel for a pro se plaintiff. 

Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d at 700 (quoting Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655).

Plaintiff has failed to make his own effort to secure counsel. He must take this first step before

seeking counsel from the Court. Plaintiff should contact legal assistance organizations and law firms and

request that they take his case pro bono. He should attach letters he receives in response from these

organizations to any renewed motion for counsel. After Plaintiff has done this, and if he is unsuccessful, then

Plaintiff may renew his motion for appointed counsel (the Court will likely appoint counsel in light of the

complexity of the issues and the need to identify the proper defendants). 

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