Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 63A05-1507-CR-1019| January 29, 2016 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Steven E. Ripstra

Ripstra Law Office

Jasper, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Katherine Modesitt Cooper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jayson S. Roberts,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

January 29, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

63A05-1507-CR-1019

Appeal from the Pike Circuit Court

The Honorable Jeffrey L. 

Biesterveld, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

63C01-1408-F3-361

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Appellant/defendant, Jayson S. Roberts (“Roberts”), appeals the trial court’s 

revocation of his probation and order that he serve the remainder of his 
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suspended sentence for Level 3 felony child molesting1in the Indiana 

Department of Correction (“DOC”). He argues that: (1) the trial court abused 

its discretion in revoking his probation because, even though he violated the 

conditions of his probation and work release, there were extenuating 

circumstances to his violations; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in 

ordering him to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence in the DOC 

because he had taken steps to remedy the violations prior to the revocation 

hearing. Because we find that Roberts violated the conditions of his probation 

and because he had previously been granted leniency through less restrictive 

placements and had continued to violate the terms of those placements, we 

affirm the trial court’s decision in both respects.

We affirm.

Issues

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked 

Roberts’ probation.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered 

Roberts to serve his entire suspended sentence in the DOC. 

Facts

[2] On September 16, 2014, Roberts pled guilty to Level 3 felony child molesting. 

Subsequently, on January 14, 2015, the trial court held a sentencing hearing 

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-42-4-3(a)(1).
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and sentenced Roberts to twelve (12) years, with six (6) years executed in 

community corrections on work release and the balance suspended to 

probation. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that it had not yet 

approved the terms of probation because the terms had been updated with 

special conditions recommended for adult sex offenders. The trial court asked 

Roberts’ counsel whether he had gone over those terms with Roberts, and both 

Roberts and his counsel responded that he had. As a result, the trial court and 

Roberts signed the special conditions of probation, and Roberts initialed each 

individual condition. 

[3] Among other provisions, Roberts’ term number 26 of probation provided:

You shall not access the internet or any other on-line service 

through use of a computer, cell phone, iPod, Xbox, Blackberry, 

personal digital assistant (PDA), pagers[,] Palm Pilots, televisions 

or any other electronic device at any location (including your 

place of employment) without prior approval of your probation 

officer. This includes any Internet service provider, bulletin 

board system, e-mail system or any other public or private 

computer network. . . . 

(State’s Ex. 1). In addition, Roberts was required to “remain employed” and to 

pay weekly fees of a minimum of $14.00 per day.

[4] On February 27, 2015, Roberts’ work release coordinator filed a notice of 

community corrections violation alleging that Roberts had been terminated 

from his employment with Perdue Farms in Washington, Indiana. The notice 

stated that Roberts had “walked off the production line before the work was 
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done” even though he had been warned that doing so would be considered 

voluntary termination. (App. 59). The notice also alleged that Roberts had 

violated term number 26 of his probation by accessing the internet—to use 

Facebook—and that he owed work release fees in the amount $536.25.

[5] On March 2, 2015, the State moved to revoke Roberts’ probation. The State

also alleged that Roberts had violated term number 26 of his probation and that 

he had violated the terms and conditions of the work release program by failing 

to maintain employment and pay work release fees.

[6] On April 23, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to revoke 

Roberts’ probation. At the hearing, Chris Yon (“Yon”), the Chief Probation 

Officer in Pike County, testified. He said that he was friends with Roberts’ 

father on Facebook and had seen one day that people were posting condolences 

on his Facebook page because his father had just died. Yon had become 

suspicious that Roberts was still using the internet because, in response to those 

condolences, Roberts’ father had written: “[P]lease don’t post this. My, my 

son doesn’t know just yet. He doesn’t want to find out through the internet that 

his grandfather [] passed away.” (Tr. 19). Yon testified that he had then found 

Roberts’ public Facebook profile, which documented that Roberts had changed 

his profile picture on January 25 and February 14, 2015. Roberts had also 

responded, on January 25, 2015, to a friend’s comment and had written, “I’m 

good[.] I have a deit [sic] its call [sic] workrelease and work for four more 

years.” (State’s Ex. 1) (grammar in original).
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[7] Scott Brown (“Brown”), the Director of the Wabash Valley Regional 

Community Corrections, testified that Roberts had lost his job at Perdue 

because Perdue had wanted him to work overtime, and he had left work in spite 

of that fact. Brown said that Roberts had been unemployed for about a month

before he had found new employment. He also confirmed that Roberts was 

behind on paying his work release fees. According to Brown, Roberts “rarely” 

paid his rent. (Tr. 37). 

[8] Finally, Roberts testified. He admitted that he had used the internet and 

Facebook to talk to his relatives and “a couple of good friends” while he was on 

probation. (Tr. 50). He said that he had forgotten he was not allowed to use 

the internet and that when he had signed that probation condition in court, he 

had been “in a hurry” because he was “happy” and “just ready to get out of 

jail.” (Tr. 49). He also said that he might have “skipped pas[t]” a couple of the 

conditions, and he alluded to the fact that he had a learning disability and 

“AHD.” (Tr. 49). 

[9] With respect to his employment, Roberts offered the following explanation for 

losing his job at Perdue: 

I told . . . my head team leader at the time, that I needed a 

replacement. That I could get, I could possibly get sick on line. 

And I was already feeling lightheaded. And they would not 

listen to me. And I told ‘em [sic] several times. And eventually I 

just . . . got annoyed after about forty-five (45) minutes. Actually 

it was probably longer than that. To be honest. But I just got 

ignored. And I took off. And I told them. I’m like, I’m sick of 
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it. I need to get something in my stomach now before I do get 

sick.

(Tr. 42). With respect to his arrearage in fees, Roberts testified that he had 

planned to use part of his work checks to pay work release, but work release 

had not let him leave to get money orders for the payments.

[10] At the end of the hearing, the trial court concluded that Roberts had violated 

the terms of his placement in community corrections by failing to maintain 

employment and pay his fees and that Roberts had violated the terms of his 

probation by accessing the internet. Subsequently, the trial court held another 

hearing on May 21, 2015. At that hearing, the trial court revoked Roberts’ 

probation and ordered that he serve the balance of his previously suspended 

sentence in the DOC. In support of this decision, the court explained:

The reason the Court ordered a Pre[s]entence Investigation 

update in this matter was so that the Court could make an 

informed decision as to how best to handle this case. And what 

we have before the Court is a pattern of violations of less 

restrictive placements. Community Corrections has been tried 

on more than one occasion. The local jail has been tried. And 

unfortunately, Mr. Roberts continues to violate the rules of 

community corrections. Even with a filing after the defendant 

was found to have violated his placement in community 

corrections in this matter. So the Court is left with no alternative 

here but to order that the defendant serve the balance of his

sentence in the Indiana Department of Corrections.

(Tr. 72-73). Roberts now appeals.
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Decision

[11] On appeal, Roberts argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking 

his probation and by ordering him to serve his previously suspended sentence in 

the DOC. We will address each argument in turn.

1. Revocation of Probation

[12] First, Roberts argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his 

probation. He asserts that, even though the trial court found he had violated 

the conditions of his probation and work release on three occasions, there were 

extenuating factors that led to those violations. Specifically, he notes that when 

he lost his job at Perdue, he was fired for refusing to work overtime even though 

he had already completed his shift and was not feeling well. He also points out

that he gained new employment after he was fired and was employed at the 

time of the probation revocation hearing. As for his internet usage, Roberts 

reasserts that he did not remember that he was not allowed to use the internet. 

He also argues that the purpose of prohibiting him from using the internet was 

to protect children, and he contends that the trial court should have been lenient 

because there was no evidence he used the internet to contact or harm children. 

Finally, Roberts notes that his failure to pay his fees was caused by economic 

hardship and that his failure could not, according to law, serve as the sole basis 

for the revocation of his probation. 

[13] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which 

a criminal defendant is entitled.” Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind. Ct. 
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App. 2014) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The trial 

court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the 

conditions are violated. Id. We review a trial court’s probation revocation for 

an abuse of discretion. Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2005), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or 

when the trial court misinterprets the law. Jackson, 6 N.E.3d at 1042. In 

determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, we look only to the 

evidence which supports the judgment and any reasonable inferences flowing 

therefrom. Jenkins v. State, 956 N.E.2d 146, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting 

Richardson v. State, 890 N.E.2d 766, 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)), trans. denied. “In 

a sense, all probation requires ‘strict compliance’ because probation is a matter 

of grace, and once the trial court extends this grace and sets its terms and 

conditions, the probationer is expected to comply with them strictly.” Cain v. 

State, 30 N.E.3d 728, 731-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Woods v. State, 892 

N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ind. 2008)), trans. denied. As such, proof of a single violation 

of the conditions of probation is sufficient to support the decision to revoke 

probation. Bussberg v. State, 827 N.E.2d 37, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), reh’g 

denied, trans. denied. Further, our standard of review for a community 

corrections violation mirrors that for a probation violation. See Holmes v. State, 

923 N.E.2d 479, 482-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[14] Roberts admits that he violated the condition of his probation prohibiting him 

from accessing the internet. As just stated, proof of a single violation of the 
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conditions of probation is sufficient to support the decision to revoke probation. 

Id. Roberts asserts that there were mitigating circumstances justifying his 

violation of probation, but those circumstances do not change the fact that he 

violated his probation and that he was required to comply with the terms of his 

probation “strictly.” See Cain, 30 N.E.3d at 732 (quoting Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 

641). Moreover, although Roberts claims he did not remember that he was not 

allowed to use the internet, the evidence introduced at trial indicated that he 

was informed of the prohibition. He initialed that term and signed the 

document as a whole, acknowledging that he had read it. He also told the trial 

court that he had gone over the terms with his lawyer. In light of these factors, 

we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Roberts’ 

probation, and we need not address Roberts’ other violations. See Bussberg, 827 

N.E.2d at 44. 

2. Suspended Sentence

[15] Next, Roberts argues that, even if the trial court did properly revoke his 

probation, the court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve his entire 

previously suspended sentence in the DOC. He claims that although he 

violated the terms of his probation, he had taken steps to cure the violations by 

the time of the probation revocation hearing. Specifically, he had stopped using 

the internet, he had found a new job, and he was beginning to pay his arrearage 

in fees.
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[16] Under the Indiana Code, once a trial court has found that a person has violated 

a condition of probation within the probationary period, the trial court shall: 

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying 

or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more than 

one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was 

suspended at the time of initial sentencing. 

I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h). 

[17] In support of his argument that the trial court should have considered that he 

was working to remedy his violations, Roberts cites Ripps v. State, 968 N.E.2d 

323, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), where we held that the trial court had abused its 

discretion in revoking Ripps’ probation and ordering his entire sentence 

executed. Ripps had been convicted of child molesting as a Class C felony and 

then had violated the terms of his probation by residing within 1,000 feet of a 

youth program center and failing to informing all people living at his residence 

of his sexual conviction. Id. at 324. Based on this violation, the trial court had 

revoked Ripps’ probation and ordered the balance of his suspended sentence to 

be executed. Id. at 325. On appeal, we held that the trial court had abused its 

discretion because:

Ripps was sixty-nine years old and suffering from serious health 

issues, including terminal cancer; he was attempting to adhere to 

his probation conditions, as evidenced by his going to the 

sheriff’s office to register his new address; although he was 
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initially in violation of the residency restriction, evidence reveals 

he was taking steps to correct the violation by finding a new 

residence; while he did live within 1,000 feet of the public library, 

this was only so by about twenty feet and some ambiguity exists 

in how this distance was measured; and, last, Ripps previously 

served time in prison from a crime that was later vacated as

violative of our constitutional ex post facto provision.

Id. at 328. Roberts argues that we should likewise conclude that the trial court 

abused its discretion here because he had also attempted to cure his probation 

violations.

[18] However, we see significant differences between Ripps and Roberts. Whereas 

Ripps was only found to have violated one condition of his probation, Roberts 

was found to have violated three conditions. Further, as evidenced by the 

excerpt from our opinion in Ripps above, there was some ambiguity about 

whether Ripps had even violated his probation; Ripps’ violation, if it had 

occurred, had been slight; and there was evidence that Ripps had not intended

to violate his probation. That is not the case here.

[19] Instead, there was evidence here that Roberts knew he was violating his 

probation when he accessed the internet and that he was specifically warned he 

would be terminated from his employment if he left work. Despite these facts,

Roberts still used Facebook and left work. Further, as the trial court stated 

when it ordered Roberts to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence in the 

DOC, Roberts had previously been placed in less restrictive placements and had 

continued to violate the rules of those placements. Accordingly, we conclude 
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that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Roberts to serve the 

remainder of his suspended sentence in the DOC.

Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Bradford, J., concur.