1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to

the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and all Rule references

are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

T.C. Memo. 2003-56

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES TRUST, ROBERT HOGUE, TRUSTEE,

Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 2210-02. Filed March 3, 2003.

Robert Hogue, pro se.

Jeremy L. McPherson, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAWSON, Judge: This case was assigned to Special Trial

Judge Robert N. Armen, Jr., pursuant to the provisions of section

7443A(b)(5) and Rules 180, 181, and 183.1 The Court agrees with

and adopts the opinion of the Special Trial Judge, which is set

forth below.
- 2 -

2 This case was consolidated for hearing with three related

cases in which Robert Hogue also filed petitions purportedly as

“trustee” on behalf of various so-called trusts. See Rancho

Residential Servs. Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-57;

Home Health Servs. Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-58;

Sunshine Residential Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-59.

3 Use of the terms “trust” and “trustee” (and their

derivatives) is intended for narrative convenience only. Thus,

no inference should be drawn from our use of such terms regarding

any legal status or relationship.

OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE

ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court

on respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.2 

Respondent maintains that the petition was not filed by a trustee

authorized to bring suit on behalf of Residential Management

Services Trust (Residential Management).3 As discussed in detail

below, we shall grant respondent’s motion and dismiss this case

for lack of jurisdiction.

Background

A. Notice of Deficiency

Respondent issued a notice of deficiency to Residential

Management determining a deficiency in, an addition to, and a

penalty on its Federal income tax as follows:

 Accuracy-Related

Addition To Tax Penalty

Year Deficiency Sec. 6651(a)(1) Sec. 6662(a)

1997 $131,400 $26,280 $26,280

The deficiency in income tax is based on the disallowance of

deductions claimed by Residential Management on Schedule C,
- 3 -

4 Residential Management’s principal place of business was

in California at the time that the petition was filed with the

Court. 

Profit or Loss from Business. In this regard, respondent

determined that the deductions:

are disallowed because you failed to establish the

amount, if any, that was paid during the taxable year

for ordinary and necessary business expenses, and you

failed to establish the cost or other basis of the

property claimed to have been used in business.

B. Petition

The Court subsequently received and filed a petition for

redetermination challenging the notice of deficiency.4 The

petition was signed by Robert Hogue as Residential Management’s

purported “trustee”.

Paragraph 4 of the petition, which sets forth the bases on

which the notice of deficiency is challenged, alleges as follows:

(1) The Statutory Notice of Deficiency was issued to

petitioner claiming petitioner had unreported income. 

Petitioner denies having any unreported income. (2)

Attached to the Notice of Deficiency, IRS Form 4549-A,

income tax examination changes, line 9 states, “Total

Corrected Tax Liability.” Petitioner denies having a

tax liability. (3) Respondent has failed to provide

the petitioners [sic] with the USC Title 26 taxing

statute that applies. (4) Respondent has failed to

provide the petitioners [sic] with certified assessment

information as per Internal Revenue Regulation

301.6203-1. (5) Respondent has failed to identify the

individual who will certify to the tax adjustments the

determination was based on. (6) Petitioner claims, the

Notice of Deficiency, the claimed tax liability, and

the claimed unreported income, are all based on

unfounded and hearsay evidence[;] no examination of

books and records has been done so we are presuming

this is a naked assessment. (7) There can be no
- 4 -

5 Respondent represents that the 1994 trust instrument was

provided to him by Robert Hogue, a representation that Robert

Hogue does not deny. We also note that the 1994 trust instrument

is a copy of the trust instrument submitted by Robert Hogue in

his first case before this Court involving Residential Management

that was dismissed on the ground that Robert Hogue was not a

proper person authorized to petition the Court on behalf of the

trust. See Residential Mgmt. Servs. Trust v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2001-297 (involving the 1995 tax year); see also

Residential Mgmt. Servs. Trust v. Commissioner, docket No. 9119-

00 (involving the 1996 tax year and dismissed on the same basis).

6 With the exception of the name of the so-called trust,

the appointment document is identical to the appointment document

submitted to the Court by Robert Hogue in numerous cases before

this Court that were dismissed on the ground that Robert Hogue

(continued...)

meaningful administrative hearing until respondent

provides petitioner with certified evidence to support

the Notice of Deficiency and the claimed tax liability.

C. Respondent’s Motion

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction. In the motion, respondent asserts that this case

should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction “on the ground that

the petition was not filed by a trustee authorized to bring suit

on behalf of the trust”.

Respondent attached to the motion to dismiss, inter alia, a 

five-page purported trust instrument dated May 24, 1994 (1994

trust instrument),5 and a document entitled “Trustee Resignation/

Appointment of Successor-Trustee” dated July 15, 1997, wherein

one Douglas J. Carpa, “trustee”, purportedly appoints Robert

Hogue the successor trustee for Residential Management

(appointment document).6
- 5 -

6(...continued)

was not a proper person authorized to petition the Court on

behalf of the “trust”. See Rancho Residential Facility Trust v.

Commissioner, docket No. 9120-00; Residential Mgmt. Servs. Trust

v. Commissioner, docket No. 9119-00 (involving the 1996 tax

year); Home Health Servs. Trust v. Commissioner, docket No. 9118-

00; Sunshine Trust v. Commissioner, docket No. 9117-00;

Residential Mgmt. Servs. Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-

297 (involving the 1995 tax year); cases cited supra n.2.

7 The record indicates that Residential Management Services

and Residential Management Services Trust are one and the same.

The 1994 trust instrument provides, in pertinent part, as

follows:

[Begin unnumbered cover page]

* * * * * * *

THIS DOCUMENT IS CREATED UNDER COMMON LAW

RIGHT OF CONTRACT IN WASHINGTON D.C.

RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES[7]

A Trust Organization and/or Pure Trust executed Under

The Constitutional Laws of the United States of America

Dated: MAY 24, 1994

[End unnumbered cover page]

DECLARATION OF IRREVOCABLE TRUST

This Declaration of Irrevocable Trust is created this

24TH DAY OF MAY 1994, between CONTRACT ADMINISTRATORS

TRUST, of Washington, D.C., hereinafter called the

SETTLOR and AMERICAN COMMON TRUST, Washington, D.C.,

with mailing address of Tempe, Arizona, Douglas J.

Carpa, Trust Officer, hereinafter called the TRUSTEE,

who are legal entities holding full title, not as

individuals, but collectively as the Board under the

name of RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES * * *.
- 6 -

FIRST

The SETTLOR hereby irrevocable [sic] assigns, conveys

and gives to the Trustee, in trust, the following

property:

Cash: $100.00;

SECOND

The Trustee shall open and maintain such bank accounts

as necessary to receive and hold said financial

property, together with any additions thereto in trust

for the use and benefit of the Trust Certificate

Holders. Certificate 001 for 100 Trust Certificate

Units issued as indicated below:

 SHASTA ENTERPRISES TRUST CERTIFICATE UNITS 100

THIRD

This trust shall be irrevocable and amenable as

described herein by appropriate Minute and hereby

affirmed that the trust created by this agreement shall

be irrevocable by the SETTLOR or by any other person or

entity. * * *

FOURTH

This agreement and trust created hereby shall be

administered, managed, governed and regulated in all

respects according to the applicable statutes of the

Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act and The Constitution of

the United States. This trust shall be domiciled in

the City of Washington, District of Columbia. This

Trust Organization shall enjoy the benefits of the

Uniform Commercial Code adopted by the City of

Washington, District of Columbia in the following

citations: section 28:1-105, TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF

THIS SUBTITLE; PARTIES’ POWER TO CHOOSE APPLICABLE LAW,

and section 28:1-207, PERFORMANCE OR ACCEPTANCE UNDER

RESERVATION OF RIGHTS.

* * * * * * *
- 7 -

8 Enrique Almodovar and Douglas J. Carpa both purportedly

appeared before a notary public in Maricopa County, Arizona, and

purportedly executed the trust instrument on May 24, 1994.

9 We note that the recordation information in the present

case is in numerical order with the recordation information on

the trust instrument submitted to the Court by Robert Hogue on

behalf of a related trust, Home Health Services Trust, to wit:

Official Records of Maricopa County [AZ] Recorder, Helen Purcell,

94-0416998, 05/25/94, 10:25, LILIAN 3 of 3. See Home Health

Servs. Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-58; Home Health

Servs. Trust v. Commissioner, docket No. 9118-00.

EIGHTH

* * * A Successor-Trustee may be appointed by a court

of competent jurisdiction or by consensus with the

Trust Managers and Beneficiaries if the First Trustee

resigns with 30 days notice.

* * * * * * *

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed

this agreement the day and year first above written.

 /s/ /s/ 

CONTRACT ADMINISTRATORS AMERICAN COMMON TRUST

TRUST, SETTLOR, Enrique FIRST TRUSTEE, Douglas J.

Almodovar Carpa, Trust Officer

[Emphasis added.8]

The recordation information stamped on the unnumbered cover

page of the 1994 trust instrument states as follows:

OFFICIAL RECORDS OF

MARICOPA COUNTY [AZ] RECORDER

HELEN PURCELL

 94-0416997 05/25/94 10:25

LILIAN 2 of 3[9]

Upon the filing of respondent’s motion to dismiss, the Court

issued an order directing Residential Management to file an

objection, if any, to respondent’s motion, taking into account
- 8 -

Rule 60, and to attach to the objection a copy of the trust

instrument or other documentation showing that the petition was

filed by a fiduciary legally entitled to institute a case on

behalf of Residential Management. The Court subsequently

extended the time within which the objection was to be filed.

D. Robert Hogue’s Objection

Ultimately, the Court received an objection, which was

signed by Robert Hogue, to respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

Paragraph 5 of the objection states:

ROBERT HOGUE presented a Trust instrument for the court

which is a Contractual Contract Trust based on common

law & the United States Constitution, Article One,

Section 10., MR. HOGUE also presented notarized

documentation to the court to show his acceptance of

Trusteeship. As well as further documentation such as

form 56, Fiduciary Signature card showing Robert Hogue

as wet signature on bank account. At best this site is

frivolous and without merit. The court is trying to

mislead the petitioner in this court action. ROBERT

HOGUE is the only person who can represent the trust. 

His description as Trustee for Residential Management

is well established in his everyday work as Trustee. 

Attached to the objection are copies of, inter alia, another

five-page purported trust instrument dated May 24, 1994 (the

altered trust instrument) and documents entitled “Monthly

Management Meeting” (purported minutes).

The altered trust instrument, including the unnumbered cover

page and recordation information, is essentially identical to the

1994 trust instrument with the exception of the following:
- 9 -

10 All six of these purported minutes are identical copies

of the same six purported minutes submitted to the Court by

Robert Hogue in numerous cases before this Court that were

dismissed on the ground that Robert Hogue was not a proper person

authorized to petition the Court on behalf of the trust. See

cases cited supra n.2.

SECOND

The Trustee shall open and maintain such bank accounts

as necessary to receive and hold said financial

property, together with any additions thereto in trust

for the use and benefit of the Trust Certificate

Holders. Certificate 001 for 100 Trust Certificate

Units issued as indicated below:

John Carey 25 CU [certificate units] * * *

George Carey 25 CU * * *

Malia Carey 25 CU * * *

Byron Carey 25 CU * * *

* * * * * * *

EIGHTH

* * * A Successor-Trustee may be appointed by the

current Trustee or Trustees, a court of competent

jurisdiction, or by consensus with the and [sic]

Beneficiaries if the First Trustee resigns with 30 days

notice. [Emphasis added.]

The purported minutes, which are dated July 28, August 25,

September 27, October 27, November 24, and December 29, 1997, are

each one page long and contain a “Sign in Log” with various

signatures, including Robert Hogue’s purported signature.10

However, the purported minutes do not state the organization that

the minutes pertain to, nor do the purported minutes document

Douglas J. Carpa’s alleged notice of resignation, nor Robert

Hogue’s alleged appointment as the successor trustee for
- 10 -

11 James G. Gaynor is not otherwise identified or mentioned

in the record. 

12 Specifically, Robert Hogue attached Nova Scotia’s

“Trustee Act, Chapter 479 of the Revised Statutes, 1989 amended

1992, c. 8, s. 37; 1994-95, c. 19", which has no relevance to the

present case. See Residential Mgmt. Servs. Trust v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-297.

Residential Management, nor Robert Hogue’s or any trustee’s

alleged authority to alter the 1994 trust instrument.

Also attached to the objection are an Account Summary, dated

November 27, 1996, from the California State Employment

Development Department identifying a James G. Gaynor11 as the

“trustee” of Residential Management, and a provision of the

Revised Statutes of Nova Scotia, Canada.12

E. Respondent’s Response

At the Court’s direction, respondent filed a response to the

foregoing objection challenging the authenticity of the altered

trust instrument. Respondent further contends that the objection

is nearly identical to a previous objection filed by Robert Hogue

in Residential Mgmt. Servs. Trust v. Commissioner, docket No.

9119-00, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

Respondent attached to his response, inter alia, an undated

document, which had been furnished to him by Robert Hogue, 
- 11 -

13 With the exception of the name of the so-called trust,

the resignation letter is an identical copy of the resignation

letter submitted to the Court by Robert Hogue in numerous cases

before this Court that were dismissed on the ground that Robert

Hogue was not a proper person authorized to petition the Court on

behalf of the trust. See cases cited supra n.6.

entitled “Letter of Resignation” (resignation letter)13 that

states:

LETTER OF RESIGNATION

To the TRUSTEES of

RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES

5505 Connecticut Ave., NW, #200

Washington, D.C. 20015

Dear Board of Trustees:

I hereby tender my resignation as Trustee of

RESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, effective at the close

of the [sic] July 15, 1997.

 /s/ 

American Common Trust,

Douglas Carpa, Trust Officer

Notice of Acceptance of Resignation:

 /s/ 

Bob Hogue, Trustee

F. Hearing on Respondent’s Motion

This matter was called for hearing at the Court’s trial 

session in San Francisco, California. Counsel for respondent

appeared at the hearing and offered argument and evidence in

support of respondent’s motion to dismiss. Specifically,

respondent presented to the Court a certified copy of the 1994

trust instrument that was filed with the Maricopa County Recorder
- 12 -

in Arizona on May 25, 1994. In its entirety, the document that

was filed with the Maricopa County Recorder on that date

consisted of only a one-page unnumbered cover sheet that is

identical to the cover sheet of both the 1994 trust instrument

and the altered trust instrument.

Robert Hogue appeared pro se, purportedly on behalf of

Residential Management. The only evidence he offered was his

naked assertion that he is entitled to appear on behalf of

Residential Management because he was appointed trustee on July

15, 1997.

G. Post-Hearing Memorandum Briefs

A memorandum brief, which was signed by Robert Hogue, does

nothing more than repeat the same unsubstantiated and conclusory

allegations made in the petition and in the objection; i.e., that

Robert Hogue is the trustee for Residential Management.

In an answering memorandum brief, respondent contends that

the facts of this case are substantially identical to the facts

in Residential Mgmt. Servs. Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2001-297, holding that Robert Hogue was not properly appointed as

trustee, and that Robert Hogue did not have authority to alter

the 1994 trust instrument.

Discussion

According to respondent, Residential Management failed to

show that Robert Hogue is its duly appointed trustee. Respondent
- 13 -

asserts that as a result, no valid petition has been filed and

the Court must dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction. We

agree.

It is well established that the taxpayer has the burden of

affirmatively establishing all facts giving rise to the Court’s

jurisdiction. See Patz Trust v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 497, 503

(1977); Fehrs v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 346, 348 (1975); Wheeler’s

Peachtree Pharmacy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 177, 180

(1960); Natl. Comm. To Secure Justice v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.

837, 838-839 (1957). Furthermore, unless the petition is filed

by the taxpayer, or by someone lawfully authorized to act on the

taxpayer’s behalf, we are without jurisdiction. See Fehrs v.

Commissioner, supra at 348.

Rule 60(a) requires that a case be brought “by and in the

name of the person against whom the Commissioner determined the

deficiency * * * or by and with the full descriptive name of the

fiduciary entitled to institute a case on behalf of such person.” 

See Rule 23(a)(1). Rule 60(c) states that the capacity of a

fiduciary or other representative to litigate in the Court “shall

be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction from

which such person's authority is derived.”

Robert Hogue contends that he was appointed the trustee for

Residential Management in accordance with paragraph Eighth of the

altered trust instrument. That paragraph provides, in pertinent
- 14 -

part, that “A Successor-Trustee may be appointed by the current

Trustee or Trustees, a court of competent jurisdiction, or by

consensus with the and [sic] Beneficiaries if the First Trustee

resigns with 30 days notice.” (Emphasis added.) However, Robert

Hogue has failed to establish that the altered trust instrument

supersedes the 1994 trust instrument in which paragraph Eighth

provides, in pertinent part, that “A Successor-Trustee may be

appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction or by consensus

with the Trust Managers and Beneficiaries if the First Trustee

resigns with 30 days notice”. As it pertains to the question of

whether Robert Hogue is Residential Management’s trustee, we

conclude that the 1994 trust instrument controls our disposition

of this case.

According to the 1994 trust instrument, Residential

Management was purportedly created on May 24, 1994, and Douglas

J. Carpa was purportedly appointed “trustee”. Douglas J. Carpa

then resigned and purportedly appointed Robert Hogue successor

trustee on July 15, 1997. However, the 1994 trust instrument did

not grant Douglas J. Carpa the authority to appoint a successor

trustee. As a result, Robert Hogue would have this Court rely,

not on the 1994 trust instrument, but on the altered trust

instrument to find that Douglas J. Carpa had unilateral authority

to appoint Robert Hogue successor trustee.

In support of his contention, Robert Hogue testified that he
- 15 -

personally altered the 1994 trust instrument to allow the

resigning trustee to appoint the successor trustee. At trial,

the following colloquy ensued: 

ROBERT HOGUE: A trust is capable of amending any

and all parts of a trust, irrevocable or revokable. It

was amended that Robert Hogue be appointed by the

successor trustee. It’s Section 8 in this trust, the

evidentiary trust, that are being challenged today,

that the trustee for the prior years and the trustee,

which is Robert Hogue today, agreed on these facts, by

the moment of the minutes.

* * * * * * *

ROBERT HOGUE: Okay. A complex trust, Black’s Law

Dictionary, has full control, full discretion of the

minutes. So the two trustees got together, or the

original trustee, for these trusts got together and

appointed Robert Hogue as trustee.

It’s been brought into the trust through the

minutes from that period of time.

* * * * * * *

We changed the articles of the trust to read that

that trustee could appoint me as trustee.

* * * * * * *

RESPONDENT: The Tax Court’s opinion in, Judge

Halpern’s opinion in the 1995 case, * * * the second

article of that trust instrument * * * listed the sole

certificate holder as being Shasta Enterprises. Can

you explain to me how this document that you

represented to the Court is the trust instrument [the

altered trust instrument], contains a different

provision than the document [the 1994 trust instrument]

that was introduced into evidence [in Judge Halpern’s

case]?

ROBERT HOGUE: Absolutely. A trustee that has full

discretion can change any article of a trust at any

time. I placed them in there.
- 16 -

RESPONDENT: How did you do that?

ROBERT HOGUE: By my own wishes.

RESPONDENT: Do you have the trust instrument on a

computer?

ROBERT HOGUE: Do I have it on a computer?

RESPONDENT: How did you, physically, how did you

make the change to the trust instrument?

ROBERT HOGUE: I had the documents to do it. The

little disk.

RESPONDENT: A computer disk?

ROBERT HOGUE: Sure.

RESPONDENT: So you put the computer disk into a

computer and you typed over the earlier terms of the

trust?

ROBERT HOGUE: I didn’t type over. I just modified

it.

* * * * * * *

RESPONDENT: * * * I direct your attention to the

eighth article, where it states how a successor trustee

is appointed.

* * * * * * *

RESPONDENT: Okay. In the version of the trust

instrument that was presented into evidence in the

earlier case, it stated as Judge Halpern quoted in his

opinion, that a successor trustee could be appointed

either by a court or by concurrence between the trust

beneficiaries.

So again, is it your testimony that you * * * replaced

this provision with what was in the earlier version of

the trust instrument?

ROBERT HOGUE: Absolutely.
- 17 -

14 At the hearing, Robert Hogue testified indignantly that

he could not recall when he created the altered trust instrument. 

However, the record suggests that the altered trust instrument

may have been created after this Court’s trial session in

Residential Mgmt. Servs. Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-

297, held on June 5, 2000, wherein the Court rested its decision

on the fact that paragraph Eighth of the 1994 trust instrument

did not authorize the resigning trustee to appoint a successor

trustee.

RESPONDENT: You however in presenting this

opposition to the Court, made no representation

anywhere in this document, that the trust instrument

that you presented, was altered from the, at least,

earlier version. You did not draw the Court’s

attention to the fact that you had altered the

document.

ROBERT HOGUE: Is there any law that says I had to? 

Did the Court demand me to?

RESPONDENT: Can you answer the question?

ROBERT HOGUE: No, I did not.

Robert Hogue thus claims that as the trustee for Residential

Management, he was authorized to alter the 1994 trust instrument,

and that in his capacity as trustee, he added the provision

authorizing the resigning trustee to appoint a successor

trustee.14 By Robert Hogue’s own admission, he created the

altered trust instrument after his purported appointment as

trustee. Therefore, we conclude that the altered trust

instrument is not relevant to the present case.

We have grave doubts about the authenticity of the altered

trust instrument. However, assuming arguendo that it was created

before July 15, 1997, this does not help Robert Hogue. No
- 18 -

15 Even if the altered trust instrument were the product of

Douglas J. Carpa, the purported trustee who “resigned” in favor

of Robert Hogue, we need not and do not address whether Douglas

J. Carpa had such authority under the law of any relevant

jurisdiction because there is no evidence in the record that the

alteration was permitted by paragraph Third of either the 1994

trust instrument or the altered trust instrument.

provision of the 1994 trust instrument authorizes Robert Hogue (a 

third party individual unrelated to Residential Management before

July 15, 1997) to alter the 1994 trust instrument.15

Furthermore, there is no evidence that the resigning trustee

provided 30 days’ notice of his intent to resign as required by

paragraph Eighth of either the 1994 trust instrument or the

altered trust instrument. At best, any notice of Douglas J.

Carpa’s purported resignation occurred on July 15, 1997, as

demonstrated by the appointment document and the resignation

letter. In view of the foregoing, we reiterate our conclusion

that the 1994 trust instrument was the controlling instrument at

all relevant times.

This Court has previously held in Residential Mgmt. Servs.

Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-297, that Robert Hogue was

not properly appointed as trustee under the provisions of the

1994 trust instrument. Because the 1994 trust instrument is also

controlling in the present case and the facts are identical as to

the issue of whether Robert Hogue is the duly appointed trustee,

we need not repeat the analysis here. Accordingly, we hold that

evidence necessary to support the contention that Robert Hogue
- 19 -

16 Robert Hogue is no stranger to this Court and has filed

numerous petitions with the Court on behalf of various so-called

trusts. As is the case here, those petitions were dismissed on

the ground that they were not filed by a proper party. See Bella

Vista Chiropractic Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-8;

Deschutes Rd. Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Sum. Op. 2003-4; Acme

Equip. Trust v. Commissioner, T.C. Sum. Op. 2003-3; Remedios

Chiropractic Clinic Trust, docket No. 11070-01; JREP Trust v.

Commissioner, docket No. 9795-01L; PERJ Trust v. Commissioner,

docket No. 9794-01L; CSM Trust v. Commissioner, docket No. 9796-

01L; Family Chiropractic Trust v. Commissioner, docket No. 7378-

01; R&R Trust v. Commissioner, docket No. 7379-01S; PERJ Trust v.

Commissioner, docket No. 6727-01; JREP Trust v. Commissioner,

docket No. 6726-01; MARFRAN Trust v. Commissioner, docket No.

12427-00S; Remedios Chiropractic Clinic Trust v. Commissioner,

docket No. 12426-00; BLR-SLR Trust v. Commissioner, docket No.

12425-00S; Rancho Residential Facility Trust v. Commissioner,

docket No. 9120-00; Residential Mgmt. Servs. Trust v.

Commissioner, docket No. 9119-00; Home Health Servs. Trust v.

Commissioner, docket No. 9118-00; Sunshine Trust v. Commissioner,

docket No. 9117-00; Residential Mgmt. Servs. Trust v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-297.

was vested with authority to institute this action on behalf of

Residential Management is lacking. Therefore, we shall dismiss

this case for lack of jurisdiction consistent with respondent’s

motion.16

All of the arguments and contentions that have not been

analyzed herein have been considered but do not require any

further discussion.

In order to give effect to the foregoing,

An order of dismissal for

lack of jurisdiction will be

entered.