### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Ma y 8, 200 7 S es sio n ROSS PRODUCTS DI VISI ON ABBO TT LAB ORATORI ES v
.

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE App e al f r om th e Te nne sse e Cl aim s C om mi ssi on No. 20050189

No. M2006- 01113-COA-R 3-CV - Filed Dece mber 5, 2007

A manufa cture r of infant formula enter ed into a contra ct with the State of Tenne ssee to furnish large quantities of its products to reta ilers for the fede rally-f unded WI C program. The contra ct included a c a sh re bate wh ic h the ma nu fa c tur e r ag re e d to pay the State fo r ea c h ca n furnis he d, to of fs e t the c os t of administering the progr am. After operating unde r the contra ct for four year s, the manufa cture r unilatera lly decided to re duce the size of the cans it wa s providing, and i t asked the state to reduc e the re bate pr op ortio na lly

. Th e State re fu se d, c iti ng a pr ov isi on in the c on tr a c t th a t pr e c lud e d r e bate reduc tions. The manufa cture r then filed an administrative claim, asking for a $1.2 million refund of its a lle ge d o ve rp a yme nt o f r e bate s. Th e Clai ms Commis sio ne r g rante d Su mma ry Ju dg me nt t o the State . W e a ff

ir m th e Com mis sio ne r’ s ju dg me nt. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Tennessee C laims Commission Affirm ed
P AT R I C I A J. C OTTRE LL , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J., M.S., joi ned. W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J. not participating.
Pe te r H . Cu rry, Nas hv il le, Ten nes see, forth e app ell ant , R os s P rod uct s D iv is io n Ab bo tt Lab orat orie s. Robert E. Cooper, Jr ., Attorney Ge nera l and Reporter ; Ja n ie C. Porter, Senior Counsel, for the appellee , State of Tenne ssee. OP IN ION
I. B ACKG ROUND
The c ontrac t whose interpr etation is at the ce nter of this di spute was a war ded through a competitive bidding proce ss. On M ay 6, 1999, the S tate of Tenne ssee publis hed a de tailed Invitation to Bid (ITB) for a

contra ct to furnish re tailers with ca ns of infant formula that would t h en be purcha sed by vouche rs issued to individuals enrolled in the Special Supplemental Nutrition P rogra m“The W I C pr ogr am i s de s i gned to pr ovi de s uppl em ent al f oods ( i ncl udi ng i nf ant f or m ul a) a nd nut r i t i on 1 educat i on t o w om en, i nfant s an d chi l dren (up t o t hei r fi ft h bi r t hd ay) w ho h ave i ncom e l evel s s o l ow as t o pu t t hem at nut r i t i onal r i s k. 42 U

. S. C. §§ 1786- 1788 ( 1988)

. W I C i s funded by t he f ede r al gover nm ent , but t he i m pl em ent at i on of th e p ro g ra m is le ft to th e sta te s.” F .T.C

. v. A b b o t t L a b o ra t o ri es, 8 5 3 F.Su p p
. 52 6 , 52 7 (D

. D

. C

. , 1 9 9 4 ). S e e a ls o V a le sk y 's M a rk e t v. D e p a rtm e n t o f H e a lth , 77 9 A

. 2 d 12 5 1 , 12 5 3 (Pa. C o m m o n w eal t h 20 0 1 ).

T h e S ta te d e c la re d in th e IT B th a t i t c o u ld n o t d e te rm in e w ith p re c isio n th e e x a c t n u m b e r o f u n its t h a t w o u ld 2 be pur cha s ed under t he pr ogr am , but i t e s t i m at ed on t he bas i s of t he pr ogr am ’ s pa s t hi s t or y t hat t he de m and f or va r i ous ki nds of i nf ant f or m ul a under t he cont r ac t ( conc ent r at e, pow der ed and r ea dy- t o- f ee d) w oul d a m ount t o 962, 500 c ans p e r m o n th

.

W e not e t hat un der t he W I C program , m ot hers ar e e nt i t l ed t o re cei ve vo uchers f or no m ore t han 1 28 oun ces 3 of f orm ul a per m on t h, w hi ch m eans t hey w ou l d r ece i ve no m ore t han ni ne cans p er m on t h un der t he program w het her t h o se cans co n t ai n ed 14

. 1 , 14

. 0 or 1 2

. 9 ou n ces each

. I f t h e can s co n t ai n ed 1 4

. 1 o u n ces, a m o t h er w h o used t h e v o u ch ers f or t he ful l num b er o f can s for w hi ch her i nf ant w as e l i gi bl e w oul d r ec ei ve 126. 9 ounc es of f or m ul a. I f

t he ca ns cont ai ned 14 ounc es , s uch a m ot her w oul d r ec ei ve 126 ounc es f or he r i nf ant

. But i f t he ca n c ont ai ned 12. 9 ounc es , s he
w o u l d r e c e i v e o n l y 1 1 6

. 1 o u n c e s o f f o r mu l a u n d e r t h e p r o g r a m.

-2- fo r W ome n, In fants a ndChi ldr e n ( W IC ). Re ta ile rs pa rt ic ipatin g in the pr og ram c ou ld the n s ub mit 1 the se vo uc he rs to the State a ndbe re imb ur se d f or the fu ll r e ta il p ri c e of

the pr od uc t.
Th e IT B r e qu e ste d th a t bi dd e rs c ommun ic a te the ir “ be st fu ll tr uck loa d n a tio na l w ho le sa le pric e ” a s w e ll as a n off

e r of a re bate fo r ea c h ca n pur c ha se d th ro ug h th e pr og ram. T he c a sh re bate was to be paid to the State on a monthly basis to of fset the pr ogram’s a dminist rative c ost. The ITB decla red that “an a war d shall be made to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder based on the lowest net monthly wholesale c ost to the s t ate for milk based formula.” The parties a gree that the “lowest ne t monthly wholesale cost” wa s arrived at by considering both the wholesale price and the per c an re bate. 2
Once a bid was a cce pted by the State, the original ITB together with the winning bidder’s response became t he contract be tween the State and the winning bidder . Ross P roducts Division of Abbott Labor a to r ie s ( “ Ro s s ” o r “ th e man u f

a c tu r e r ” ) w a s th e lo w b id d e r , a n d w a s a w ar d e d the c on tr a c t. T he c on tr a c t r a n f or on e ye ar, bu t w a s r e newabl e. Ro ss’s pe rf orma nc e wa s a

pp are ntl y satis fa c tory, a t le a st i nit ia lly , f or the c on tr a c t w a s e xte nd e d a nn ua lly ov e r the ne xt f ou r y e ars
. On June 16, 2003, Ross noti fied the State that it would be replac ing its S imilac 14.1 ounce can and its Isomil powder 14 ounce c an with infant formula packa ged in 12.9 ounce cans, starting 3 in October

. The manufactur er indicated t hat “consistency across all items” was the purpose of the move. R oss notified the State that the re bate would ne ed to be r educe d to refle ct the change and suggested a me thodology to co m p u te the re duced r ebate during the transition period while the discontinued infant formula cans w ere being re place d with cans of the smaller size

. An exc hange of

e-ma ils about Ross’s proposal followed, with t he compa ny’s manage r for go ve rn me nt o pe ratio ns a sk ing the Sta te fo r i ts a sse nt t o th e pr op os e d tr a ns iti on plan an d s e ve ra l State officia ls respond ing that they wer e not ce rtain that any r eduction in the re bate wa s contemplated under the contra ct. Finally, on Dec ember 31, 2003, purcha sing a dminist rator Sondra Howe of the-3-

Tenne ssee De partment of G ener al Service s sent a letter to Ross i nforming it that the State was reje cting the request that it reduce the re bate be cause such a r eduction wa s not consistent with the te rm s o f the c on tr a c t.
II. A D M I N I STRA TI V E P ROCE E DI NGS
On No ve mbe r 3, 20 04 , Ros s La bo ratorie s fi le d a c la im wi th the Di vi si on of C laims Ad min ist ratio n. Th e c omp a ny c onten ded that th e State ha d b re a c he d it s c on tr a c t by re fu sin g to re du c e the re bate the c omp a ny wa s ob lig a te d to pay, a nd it a sk e d to be re imburs ed fo r wh at it de e me d to be its ov e rp a yme nts , inthe a mou nt of $1 .2 mil lio n d oll ars . T he c la im w a s su bs e qu e ntl y transfe rre d to the Claims C ommissi on pursuant to Tenn. Code A nn. § 9-8-402( c).
The State filed an Answer to the manufa cture r’s claim, followed by a motion for summary judgment. The motion was ar gued b ef o re the Claims C ommissi oner on Ja nuary 18, 2006. The Commi ssioner’s orde r, filed on April 24, 2006, included a re citation of t he undis puted facts and a detailed a nalysis of the contra ct at issue. The Commi ssioner noted that Clause 11 of the ITB stated that in the e ve nt o f an in c re a se in the ma nu fa c tur e r’ s pric e , the re wo uldbe a n auto ma tic inc re a se in the re bate by the same amo un t, bu t th a t if the ma nu fa c tur e r r e du c e d it s p ri c e , th e re bate wo uld rema in unchange d. After discussion o f that clause and of the basic princ iples of contra ct construction, t

h eCo mmissi oner gr anted summary judgment to the State on the gr ound that its refusal to a d ju s t th e a mo u n t o f it s r e b a te w a s n o t a b r e a c h o f th e c o n tr a c t. Ro s s L ab o r a to r ie s th e n f iled a direc t appea l to this court pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 12.
III
. A N A L Y SIS A. The Stand ard of Re view
Sum mary jud gme nt i s a n a pp ro pria te v ehi c le fo r r e so lvi ng dis pu te s if “ the ple a din gs , depositions, answers to interr ogatories, a nd admissions on file, together with the aff idavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fa ct and that the moving party is entitl ed to a jud gme nt as a ma tte r of la w. ” Te nn . R. Civ. P. 56 .0 4; Bl air v
. We st Town Ma ll , 130 S.W.3d 761, 76 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 4) ; Pero's Steak & Spaghe tti House v. Lee , 90 S.W.3d 614, 620 (Tenn. 2002) ; B y rd
v . H all , 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993)

. In t he present case, t he facts are undisputed, and thus the only issue bef ore this court involves the prope r co n s truction of the c ontrac t betwee n the State and Ross. Questions of contr act interpre tation are gener ally considere d to be questions of law, and thus a re e specia lly well-suited for resolution by summary judgment. See D oe v. H CA Health Servic es of Tennessee , 46 S.W.3d 191, 19 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; Guiliano v. Cleo , 9 95 S.W .2 d 8 8, 95 (T e nn . 1 99 9) ; Hamblen County v . C i t y of Mo rri sto wn , 656 S.W.2d 331, 335-36 (Te nn. 1983).
The c ardina l rule for interpre tation of contra ctions is to ascerta in the intention of the parties fr om the c on tr a c t a s a

wh ole, and to g ive e ff

e c t to that in te nti on c on sis te nt w ith le ga l princ ipl e s. Planters Gin Co. v. Fed. Compress & Ware house Co. , Inc., 78 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tenn. 2002) ; Bob Pe ar sa ll M oto rs I nc ., v . R e ga l Ch ry sle r- Pl

y mo uth , In c ., 52 1 S.W .2 d 57 8, 58 0 ( Te nn . 1 97 5) ; RaineyPr oce edi ngs on t he Cl ai m s Com m i s s i on’ s r egul ar docke t ar e conduc t ed pur s uant t o t he Tenne s s ee Rul es of 4 C iv il P ro c e d u re
. See Te n n
. C o d e A n n
. § 9

- 8

- 4 0 3 ( a ) ( 1 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e “ t r i a l c o u r t ” i n t h i s o p i n i o n i s t h e C l a i ms C o m m i ss io n
. See Turner v. St at e of Tenness ee, 1 8 4 S .W .3 d 7 0 1 , 7 0 4 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 6 ); Le ar ue v. St at e of Tenn es s ee , 7 5 7 S .W .2 d 3 , 6 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 1 9 8 7 ). -4- v . S tan se ll , 836 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). T he intent of the pa rties is presumed to be embodied and e xpresse d in the contra ct as written. Planters Gin Co. , 78 S.W .3 d at 8 90 ; Rainey v

. S ta ns e ll , 8 3 6 S .W.2d at 118. Ac cordingly, the c ourt's role in re solving disput es re garding the int e rp re ta tio n o f a

c on tr a c t is to a sc e rt a in the int e nti on of the pa rt ie s b a se d u po n th e us ua l, n a tur a l, and ordina

ry mea ning of the language used . Mem phis Housing Authorit

y v. Thompson , 38 S.W.3d 50 5, 51 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; Guiliano v. Cleo , 9 9 5 S

. W. 2 d at 95; Bob Pearsall Motors v. Regal Chrysler-Plymouth 521 S.W.2d at 580.
A trial co u rt ' s interpre tation of a c ontrac tual document is not entitled to a presumption of c or rect nes s o n ap pe a l. Ba rn e s v . B ar ne s, 19 3 S. W .3 d 4 95 , 4 98 (T e nn . 2 00 6) ; An gu s v . W e ste rn 4 Heritage Ins. Co. , 48 S.W.3d 728, 730 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). T his c ourt must re view the doc ument de novo , a ndwe mus t ma ke ou r o wn determi natio n r e ga rd ing its me a nin g a ndle ga l impo rt

. Hillsboro Plaza Ent erprises v. M oon , 860 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
B. Th e Ter ms of the C ontract Ross argues that the State br eac hed its contrac t by refusing to re duce the re b at e t h at t he manufa cture r wa s obligated to pay. Ther e is nothing in the contrac t that specifical l y allows for a re du c tio n inthe re bate

. To the c on tr ary , Claus e 11 of the IT B, wh ic h se ts ou t the e ff e c t onthe re bate of two diffe rent kinds of pric e changes, appe ars to p re cl ude such a reduc tion. That clause, w hich is c apti on e d “ Pr ic e Li st A dju stm e nt” re a ds in r e le va nt p art a s f oll ow s: Manufa cture r’s industry-wide price incre ases in the best full tru ck l o ad national wholesale price per c an of milk-base d, iron fortified f ormulas will result in an automatic rebate incre ase on a ce nt for ce nt basis for such f ormulas, taking ef

fec t on or a ft e r the fi rs t day of

the mon th o f any su c h in c re a se in the ma nu fa c tur e r’ s b e st f ull truckload national wholesale price pe r can.
Th e pe r c a n r e bate fo r m ilk -b a se d, ir on -f ortif ie d f ormul a s wil l inc re a se the sa me number of c ents as any incre ase ove r the be st truckload national whole sale pric e per can. A decr ease in the best f ull truckload national wh olesale price shall not r e sult in a de c r e as e in th e pe r c an r e bat e fo r mi lk- bas e d, ir on- fo r ti fi e d f or mu las
. Claus e 11 do e s n ot p ro hib it the ma nu fa c tur e r fr om ra isi ng its wh ole sa le pric e s. No ne the le ss, by incre asing the re bate on a cent f or ce nt basis for any suc h incre ase, it pre vents the manufa cture r fr om m akin g a ny a dd iti on a l pr of it f ro m su ch an act ion. C on ve rs e ly, a re du c tio n in the wh ole sa le pric e le a ve s th e re bate un c ha ng e d. Ho we ve r, Ros s a rg ue s th a t si nc e Claus e 11 re fe rs to the e ff e c ts on the re bate of

the manufa cture r’s industry-wide price change s, it should not apply wher e a c hange in price oc curs solely be cause of a change in the size (or more acc urate ly, the capa city) of the c anT he part i es agr ee t hat t he r educt i on i n can s i ze has r es ul t ed i n a corr es po nd i ng r educt i on i n t he w ho l es al e per 5

c a n p ric e w h ic h re ta iler s m u st n o w p a y fo r th e p ro d u c t. -5- c on ta ini ng its pr od uc t. Ho we ve r, no pr ov isi on in the c on tr act sp eci fic a lly a uth oriz e d Ro ss t o 5 unilatera lly reduce the size of the ca ns it furnished. Regar dless of the cause of the price reduc tion, wh ic h is the re a so n f

or Ros s’ s r e qu e st t o r e du c e the re bate , we fi ndClaus e 11 app lie s a ndpr e ve nts the re quested re duction. Ross suggested at oral argument t hat we should not place muc h weight on Clause 11 bec ause, a s th e pa rty th a t dra ft e d the IT B, the State ga ve bid de rs no op po rtun ity to n e go tiate ov e r i ts t e rm s. Th e ma nu fa c tur e r i mpl ie d th a t we sh ou ld tr e a t th e c on tr a c t a s a c on tr a c t of

a dh e sio n, wh ic h is c on str ue d a ga ins t the dr a ft ing pa rty be c a us e of the dis pa

ri ty i n b arg a ini ng po we r b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. Vargo v. Lincoln Brass Works , 115 S.W.3d 487, 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
We f ind t h at argume nt to be without merit. An adhesion contr act is a “ [s]tanda rdize d con tr act for m off

e re d to c on su me rs of

go od s a ndse rv ic e s o n e sse nti a lly ‘t ake it o r l e a ve it’ ba sis without affor ding c o n s u mer r e ali stic opportunity to bargain and unde r such c onditions t hat consumer cannot obtain desired product or service s exce pt by acquie scing in f orm contra ct.” B l ac k ’s L aw Dictionary 40 ( 6th Ed. 1990).
Contracts of a dhesion often a rise fr om transac tions betwee n re l at ively uneducated or power less members of t h e public on one side , and knowledge able pr ofessionals or pow erf ul companies o n the other. See, for e xample, Taylor v. Butler , 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. 2004) (a rb itr a tio n c laus e in sa le by us e d c ar d e a le r) ; Alcazar v. Hay es , 982 S.W.2d 845 (Tenn. 1998) (u nin su re d mo torist

c laus e in i ns ur a nc e c on tr a c t) ; R u s s e ll v . Bray, 1 1 6 S .W.3d 1 (Te nn. Ct. App. 20 03 ) ( e xc ulp a tory c laus e in h ome ins pe c tio n c on tr a c t) ; Ho we ll v
. NH C H e althc are -F

ort Sa nd e rs , 109 S.W.3d 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) ( arbitration clause in contra ct betwe en nursing home a nd illit erate and gr avely ill patient). The re w as no such disparity in bargaining power here

. P u t t i n g asi de the que stion of whether Ross or the sophisticated business persons who prepa red the infant formula bid for the manuf actur er should be c onsidered “ consumers of goods and se rv ic e s” un de r the abo ve de fi nit ion , w e no te that a con tr act of a dh e sio n is no t ne c e ssa ri ly un e nf or c e able . I t is on ly une nf or c e able if

“ the te rm s o f the c on tr a c t are be yo ndthe re a so na ble expec tations of an ordina

ry per son, or oppre ssive or unconsc ionable.” Taylor v. Butler , 142 S.W.3d a t 28 6; Ho we ll v . NH C H

e althc are -F

ort Sa nd e rs , 109 S.W.3d at 734 (c iting Buraczynsk i v. Eyring , 919 S.W.2d 313, 320 (Tenn. 1996) ).
W e c a n see no thi ng in the bid din g pro c e ss or in the c on tr a c t terms to in dic a te op pr e ssi ve ne ss or un c on sc iou sa

bil ity . Ro ss c ho se to b id on the c on tr a c t w ith fu ll k no wl e dg e of its re bate pr ov isi on s. We pr esume it would n o t h av e d o n e s o if it did not believe that the advantage to be gained from being the sole supplier of

infant formula to the WIC program i n Tenne ssee outweighed any r eduction in its profit margin resulting from the re bates it had to pay f or the privilege

.-6-

Furthe r, sin c e Ros s u nil a te ra lly c ho se to c ha ng e the siz e of the pr od uc t it wa s fu rn ish ing , it sh ou ld n ot b e he ardto c omp lain th at th e Sta te ’s re fu sa l to re du c e the ma nu fa c tur e r’ s r e bate obligation was beyond its rea sonable expectations. To the contra ry, it appea

rs to us that by demanding that the State r educe the re bate, Ross was at t em pting to change its bid after the fa ct, a move which if successf

ul would have be en unfair both to the other bidder s and to the State, which depends upon the rebate to fund the W IC progra m. Thus, the contra ct is enfor cea ble as written. C. The Question of Ambigu ity Ross’s argument that it is ent i t l ed t o a re bate r eduction re sts entirely on a sec tion of the c on tr a c t w hic h s e ts o ut the du tie s o f the wi nn in g bi dde r i n th e e ve nt o f a c ha ng e in the fo rmula su pp lie d:
In the e vent the contractor introduc es a f ormula designed to r eplac e or be an alternative to formula( s) refer ence d in the contra ct, the contr actor shall provide such fo rmula s at the s a me ne t pe r c a n w ho le sa le c os t a s th e origi na l f ormul a , w ith adjustments made for

packa ging size diff

ere nce. A ny Replace ment formula of fer ed by the c on tr a c tor

fo r a fo rmula that is dis c on tin ue d wo uld ha ve to be fo rmulate d to se rv e the same po pu la tio n th a t w ou ld h a ve be e n serve d by the fo rmula re fe re nc e d in the c on tr a c t. Ross argues that since the State calc ulated the net per can wholesale cost during the bidding proce ss by s u b t ra cti ng the re bate a mount from the price , the above passage impliedly endorses reduc tions in t he re bates a pplicabl e t o n ew formulas. Even if w e ac cepte d the manufa cture r’s contention, Ross did not i ntroduce a new formula, a nd it therefor e conc edes that the above pa ssage is not d ir e c tl y ap p li c a

b le to th e s itu a ti o n b e f

o r e u s
. N o n e th e le s s , Ro s s ar g u e s th a t the above provision, rea d in conjunction with Clause 11, shows that the contra ct is ambiguous, and thus that it s ho uldbe a llo we d to of fe r e vid e nc e a s to wh a t sh ou ld o c c ur if the ma nu facture r reduc e s it s packa ging size. We do not agre e. As we note d ab o v e, t h e court's role in resolving disputes rega rding the interpr etation of a contra ct i s t o ascertain the intention of the pa rties base d upon the usual, natura l, and ordinary me a nin g o f the la ng ua ge us e d. W he re th e lan gu age of the c on tr a c t is c le ar andun a mbi gu ou s, its li te r a l me a n in g c o n tr o ls th e o u tc o me o f c o n tr a c t d is p u tes. P l a n ters Gin Co. , 78 S.W.3d at 890. When the language is ambiguous, however , the courts must resort to other evidenc e to determine the intention of the parties.
Nonethele ss, an ambiguity does not arise in a contra ct mere ly be cause the parties may diffe r as to the interpr etation of c erta in of its provisions. Tr in it y I n d u s tr ie s v
. McKinnon Bridge , 147 S.W.3d 225, 234 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) ( citing Oman Construc t i o n C o
. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 48 6 F. Sup p. 37 5, 38 2 ( M. D. Te nn
. 19 79 ))

. Ne ith e r the pa rt ie s n or the c ou rt s may c re a te an ambiguity wher e none appea rs in the contra ct. Edwards v. Travelers Inde mnity Insurance , 300 S.W.2d 615 (Tenn. 1957)

. A strained c onstruction may not be plac ed on the langua ge used to find an ambiguity wher e none e xists. Mc Ge e v . B e st, 106 S.W.3d 48, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) ( citing Em pre ss H e alth & B e au ty Sp a, In c . v . Tu rn e r, 503 S.W.2d 188, 190-91 (Te nn.1973)).-7-

We must consider

the agr eeme nt as a whole in deter m i n i ng whether the meaning of

the contra ct is c lear or ambiguous. Wa rre n v. Me tro po litan Go v ’t

of N as hv ill e an d D av ids on Cou nty , 96 5 S. W .2 d 6 18 , 6 23 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7) ; Gredig v. Tenne ssee Farmer s Mut ual Ins. Co. , 899 S.W .2 d 9 09 , 9 12 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 4) . Fu rt her, “[u]nd e r T e nn e sse e la w, it i s p re su me d th a t a written contra ct contains t h e en t i re a gree ment betwee n the parties.” Sim on ton v . H uff , 60 S.W.3d 82 0, 82 6 ( Te nn . Ct. App . 200 0)

. Th us , the c on tr a c t at issu e c a n not be c on sid e re d a mbi gu ou s ju st beca use it doesn’t include a

term or a contingency that Ross wishes it contained.
The IT B defines a

rebate as a n “amount paya ble to T ennesse e Depa

rtment of He alth for e ach can of infant formula purcha sed with a negotiable food instrument.” Almost every other mention of the re bate in the c on tr a c t do c ume nts re fe rs to it a s a “ re bate pe r c a n. ” Ros s d oe s n ot a lle ge that it s own bid included a sliding or variable amount of re bate de pending on the size of the c an provide d, or that the IT B allowed for such a bid. The only secti o n o f the IT B which direc tly addresse s the possibili ty of change in the re bate a llows for the possibility of an incre ase, but pre cludes a decr ease
. Thus, even though the c o n t ra ct does not explicitly discuss the ef fec t on the rebate of the ma nu fa c tur e r’ s u nil a te ra l de c isi on , th a t do e s n ot m ake s th e c on tr a c t a mbi gu ou s. W e a c c or din gly aff irm the dec ision of the Claims C ommissi oner. IV.
Th e jud gme nt o f the Cla ims Com mis sio ne r is af fi rm e d. W e re ma ndthi s c a se to the Cla ims Com mis sio n f

or a ny fu rthe r p ro c e e din gs ne c e ssa ry . T a x th e c os ts o n a

pp e a l to the app e lla nt, Ros s Products Division of Abbott Laboratories.

____________________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE