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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

GREGORY WEEDON, :

:

Appellant : No. 2430 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 20, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division No(s).: CP-51-CR-0004036-2009

 CP-51-CR-0004037-2009

 CP-51-CR-0013881-2010

 CP-51-CR-0004033-2009

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JULY 21, 2015

Appellant, Gregory Weedon, appeals from the order entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing for lack of merit his 

petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act1(“PCRA”). 

Appellant argues his plea counsel was ineffective for inducing his involuntary 

guilty plea and the PCRA court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing. 

We affirm. 

On December 13, 2010, Appellant appeared before the trial court on 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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four cases, entered a negotiated guilty plea, and immediately received 

sentence. At docket CP-51-CR-0004033-2009 (“4033-2009”), Appellant 

pleaded guilty to attempted murder2and persons not to possess firearms.3 

N.T., 12/13/10, at 22. The charges arose on September 2, 2008. As 

Anthony Reed ran from the sound of gunshots, a bullet struck him in the 

back. While Reed did not see his assailant, the police obtained two casings 

from the scene and submitted them to the police crime lab for analysis. 

PCRA Ct. Op., 9/22/14, at 1. Appellant received a sentence of ten to twenty 

years’ imprisonment for attempted murder and a consecutive ten years’ 

probation for the firearm charge. N.T. at 28. 

At dockets CP-51-CR-0004034 (“4034-2009”), CP-51-CR-0004035 

(“4035-2009”), and CP-51-CR-0004036-2009 (“4036-2009”), Appellant 

pleaded guilty to one charge of persons not to possess a firearm and four 

counts of simple assault.4 N.T. at 23. Appellant’s brother was in an 

argument with three neighbors outside a row home on October 1, 2008. 

Appellant arrived and threatened the neighbors while waving a black 

handgun. The neighbors retreated to their home and called the police, 

reporting Appellant; they knew Appellant “by face from the neighborhood.” 

PCRA Ct. Op. at 1-2. Appellant received ten years’ probation for the firearm 

 

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2502.

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a).
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charge, to be served concurrently with the above probationary sentence.5 

N.T. at 29.

At docket CP-51-CR-0004037-2009, Appellant pleaded guilty to 

persons not to possess a firearm and two counts of aggravated assault.6 Id.

at 23. Two police officers bearing an arrest warrant went to a bar searching 

for Appellant on October 9, 2008. When the officers asked him to step 

outside, Appellant attempted to rush past the officers, striking one in the 

chest. During the confrontation, Appellant pulled out a black, loaded .40 

caliber handgun from his own waistband. The officers knocked the weapon 

from Appellant’s hand, but he grabbed it once more before he was subdued. 

One of the officers suffered a strained meniscus and a fractured bone in his 

right wrist and missed three months of work. The police crime lab later 

matched the casings found on September 2 with the gun taken from 

Appellant. Id. at 2. Appellant received ten to twenty years’ imprisonment 

and ten years’ probation, both to be served concurrently with the sentences 

at 4033-2009. N.T. at 29-30.

At docket CP-51-CR-0013881-2010 (“13881-2010”), Appellant pleaded 

guilty to aggravated assault. N.T. at 23-24. Incarcerated and awaiting trial, 

Appellant had intervened in a fight between two other inmates on August 

21, 2010. As a corrections officer was attempting to place one of the 

 

5 There was no penalty on the simple assault charges.

6 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a).
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original instigators in a holding cell, Appellant pushed the officer to the 

ground from behind. Appellant and the two other inmates then fell on top of 

her, causing the officer back pain and a swollen knee. Id. at 2-3. Appellant 

was sentenced to ten to twenty years’ incarceration, to be served 

concurrently with his first incarceration sentence. Court Commitment, 

12/13/10. 

At the plea hearing, the Commonwealth stated that it “would have 

contended” the “shooting of Anthony Reed” and “the aggravated assault 

charges on the police officers” were “second strike case[s7] based upon the 

adjudication for aggravated assault, F-1, that [Appellant] already has.”8 

N.T. at 24. The Commonwealth further contended Appellant “wanted to take 

a package deal[.]” Id. at 24-25. No direct appeal was filed.9

 

7 At various points of the plea hearing, the Commonwealth stated that 

Appellant had “a prior record score of four,” “an aggravated assault . . . and 

possession of an instrument of crime adjudication as a juvenile,” as well as a 

“prior record conviction [that] made [him] ineligible to have a firearm.” N.T. 

at 4, 16, 19. However, the certified record does not provide any more 

information about a prior adjudication or conviction. 

8 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1) (“Any person who is convicted . . . of a crime of 

violence shall, if at the time of the commission of the current offense the 

person had previously been convicted of a crime of violence, be sentenced to 

a minimum sentence of at least ten years of total confinement . . . .”).

9 There is reference within the trial court opinion, Appellant’s brief, and the 

trial court criminal docket that Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of 

sentence in docket 4033-2009. However, there is no such motion within the 

certified record. 
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Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on May 17, 2011. Current 

counsel was appointed on January 1, 2012, and submitted an amended 

PCRA petition on November 14, 2012. The Commonwealth filed a motion to 

dismiss the PCRA petition on May 8, 2013.10 On February 20, 2014, the 

PCRA court issued a twenty-day notice of intent to dismiss without a hearing 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. One month later, on March 20th, the court 

formally dismissed the amended PCRA petition. Appellant filed a timely 

notice of appeal on April 4th and a timely court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement11 on June 11th.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review, reproduced 

verbatim:

I. Whether the Judge was in error in denying the 

Appellant’s PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing 

on the issues raised in the amended PCRA petition 

regarding trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.

II. Whether the Judge was in error in not granting relief on 

the PCRA petition alleging counsel was ineffective. 

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

Appellant contends that he maintained his innocence to his plea 

counsel. Id. at 18. He avers, “However, due to the inducing acts and 

 

10 “During the pending of the PCRA court proceedings, Judge [Thomas] 

Dempsey passed and the case was” assigned to Judge Ramy Djerassi. PCRA 

Ct. Op. at 3. 

11 We note the PCRA court states the 1925(b) statement was ordered on 

June 2, 2014. However, the filing stamp on the order reflects it was issued 

on May 21, 2014. 
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coercive acts of counsel upon . . . Appellant, he was unlawfully induced to 

plead guilty to a charge based upon facts to which he did not consent.” Id. 

at 18-19. Appellant alleges counsel had no reasonable basis to coerce him 

to plead guilty “especially when there was an excellent defense available.” 

Id. at 20-21. Appellant further

contends he was promised by his attorney that on Bill CP51-CR[-]0013881-2010, aggravated assault, felony of the 

second degree, that the sentence would be [two to four] 

years to run concurrently with his other cases he was 

pleading guilty to. He later found out from the prison that 

the sentence was running consecutively and thus his guilty 

plea was not valid. 

Id. at 17. Appellant also asserts the PCRA court erred in not conducting “an 

evidentiary hearing to provide the forum to demonstrate such manifest 

injustice.” Id. at 16. We find no relief is due. 

Under [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s] standard of 

review for an appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, we 

must determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is 

supported by the record and is free of legal error. The 

PCRA court’s credibility determinations are binding on [the 

Supreme Court] when they are supported by the record. 

However, this Court applies a de novo standard of review 

to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions. 

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (Pa. 2011) (citations 

omitted). 

To succeed on an ineffectiveness of counsel claim, a petitioner must 

show: “(1) the underlying legal claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no 

reasonable basis for his . . . action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner 

suffered prejudice because of counsel’s ineffectiveness.” Id. A failure to 
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satisfy one or all of the requirements will result in the rejection of his 

ineffectiveness of counsel claim. Id. at 1128. There is a presumption that 

counsel is effective and the burden is upon the petitioner to show otherwise. 

Id. at 1127. 

The PCRA provides relief when “[a] plea of guilty [is] unlawfully 

induced [and] where the circumstances make it likely that the inducement 

caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is innocent.” 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(iii). “[A]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection with 

the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the 

ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary and unknowing 

plea.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Pa. Super. 

2010) (citation omitted). A petitioner is bound by statements he made 

under oath in a plea colloquy, and may not “assert grounds for withdrawing 

the plea which contradict the statements.” Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 

A.3d 997, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2013). “Once the defendant has entered a 

guilty plea, ‘it is presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the 

burden of proving involuntariness is upon him.’” Id. at 1002. 

There is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a PCRA 

petition. Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 819 A.2d 81, 85 (Pa. Super. 2003); 

see also Pa.R.Crim.P 907(1). A court may not summarily dismiss a petition 

“when the facts alleged in the petition, if proven, would entitle the petitioner 

to relief.” Barbosa, 819 A.2d at 85. “The PCRA court has the discretion to 
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dismiss a petition without a hearing when the court is satisfied ‘that there 

are no genuine issues concerning any material fact.’” Commonwealth v. 

Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 604 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 56 (2014). 

Instantly, the PCRA court found no merit to Appellant’s claim that plea 

counsel caused him to enter a guilty plea based on wrong advice. PCRA Ct. 

Op. at 4-5. The court stated, “At the plea hearing, both the Commonwealth 

attorney and the Court were clear that the negotiated guilty plea was a 

‘package deal’ involving ten to twenty years of incarceration followed by ten 

years of probation for each charge, and each sentence would run 

concurrently.” Id. at 5. We agree.

First, we find no merit to Appellant’s claim that plea counsel promised 

a sentence of two to four years at docket 13881-2010. See Appellant’s Brief 

at 17. At the plea hearing, the Commonwealth first stated it had

offered in what in layman’s terms could be called a 

package deal. In exchange for [Appellant’s] acceptance or 

responsibility to all of these cases, we would recommend 

that the Court impose a sentence of ten to 20 years’ 

incarceration with a consecutive ten years’ probation[.]

N.T. at 4. The court addressed Appellant: 

THE COURT: [Appellant], as I think [the 

Commonwealth] has stated, the terms of the incarceration 

is going to be ten to 20 years and that I understand would 

be followed by ten years’ probation?

[The Commonwealth:] That’s correct.

Id. The court then advised Appellant, and Appellant responded, as follows:

THE COURT: In terms of the voluntariness, we know 
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what the basic terms are of your negotiated plea, the ten 

to 20 years followed by ten years’ probation. Other than 

that, have any force or any promises been made to you to 

get you to give up your right to a jury trial and to plead 

guilty today?

[Appellant:] No.

Id. at 8. The foregoing establish that Appellant acknowledged the ten-totwenty-year sentence and stated no other promises were made to him. 

Appellant is bound to these statements and cannot now aver there was 

another promise made by plea counsel. See Willis, 74 A.3d at 202.

Furthermore, the PCRA reasoned, “[Appellant’s] claim is nonsense; he 

was promised a concurrent sentence incorporating all of his consolidated 

cases, and this is exactly what [the court] delivered.” PCRA Ct. Op. at 4. 

We agree. Appellant’s claim that prison officials informed him “that the 

sentence was running consecutively” is meritless. See Appellant’s Brief at 

17.

We further reject Appellant’s claim that plea counsel was ineffective by 

inducing him to enter an involuntary guilty plea despite his claims of 

innocence. In his colloquy at the plea hearing, Appellant averred the 

Commonwealth “went over the guilty plea forms with” him, he spoke with 

his plea counsel, and that he understood he was entitled to a jury trial, 

twelve jurors would have to be unanimous in finding guilt or no guilt, and 

that in pleading guilty, any direct appeal issues would be limited. N.T. at 5-

7. The Commonwealth then stated on the record the alleged facts of each 
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case, and Appellant pleaded guilty. Id. at 9-24. Appellant has failed to 

show plea counsel unlawfully induced his plea. See Anderson, 995 A.2d at 

1192.

Finally, the PCRA court found, “[B]ecause there are no genuine issues 

of material fact [and] there was no need for an evidentiary hearing.” PCRA 

Ct. Op. at 4. We find no error, as Appellant has not alleged any question of 

material fact and no relief is due. See Roney, 79 A.3d at 604.

Accordingly, we affirm the order dismissing the PCRA petition. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/21/2015