IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

LETRICIA DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

OFFICER MORGAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 12 C 5352

Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider. For the

reasons stated herein, the Motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

All of Plaintiff’s claims arise from an arrest that took place

on July 7, 2010. Plaintiff submitted her Complaint along with a

Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on July 8,

2012, the last day within the period of limitations. On

September 28, 2012, the Court denied the IFP Motion and, under

Local Rule 3.3, instructed Plaintiff to pay the requisite filing

fee within thirty (30) days, or the case would be dismissed with

prejudice. 

On October 30, 2012, Plaintiff, who is represented by counsel,

requested a seven-day extension of time to pay the filing fee. 

Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 5.3(b), which requires

presentment of all motions. Plaintiff paid the filing fee on
November 6, 2012, after the deadline set by the Court’s previous

Order, and one day after the date requested in the Motion Plaintiff

failed to present to the Court for ruling.

Defendants moved to dismiss and argued that the suit was timebarred. On May 29, 2013, the Court granted that Motion and noted

that, when it ruled on Plaintiff’s IFP Motion, it had given

Plaintiff additional time to pay the filing fee and commence the

case properly. Under Local Rule 3.3, Plaintiff’s failure to pay

the filing fee timely meant that her Complaint was not timely. The

Court also explained that while Plaintiff filed a Motion for an

Extension of Time to Pay the Filing Fee, she still failed to pay

within the time frame the extension requested. Plaintiff’s Motion

to Reconsider asks this Court to amend that ruling. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to reconsider “is not a vehicle for rearguing

previously rejected motions.” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224

F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000). To prevail, a movant must present

newly discovered evidence or show manifest errors of law or fact. 

Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 2004). “Manifest

error” is the “wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to

recognize controlling precedent.” Oto, 224 F.3d at 606.

III. ANALYSIS

In a suit based on federal law, the statute of limitations

stops running when the complaint is filed, though it may resume

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running later. Robinson v. Doe, 272 F.3d 921, 922 (7th Cir. 2001). 

The Seventh Circuit has explained that, for statute of limitations

purposes, a complaint is “filed” when the court clerk receives the

complaint, “not when it is formally filed in compliance with all

applicable rules involving filing fees and the like.” Id. at 922-

23. 

In support of her Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiff directs this

Court to Gilardi v. Schroeder, 833 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1987). In

that case, the Clerk of the District Court returned the plaintiff’s

complaint and IFP application because the plaintiff failed to

comply with various local rules. Id. at 1233. The court later

granted the IFP application and deemed the complaint filed as of

the date when the complaint was first received by court clerk. Id.

Even though the complaint, when first filed, was rejected for

failure to comply with local rules, the original filing was

adequate to satisfy the statute of limitations because the

Plaintiff had done all that was required under the statute and the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Gilardi thus holds that, in

cases where the district court permits the plaintiff to proceed

IFP, the complaint may be deemed filed when lodged with the clerk. 

Id. at 1233. 

Gilardi is consistent with the principle, articulated later in

Robinson, that a complaint is “filed” for statute of limitations

purposes when it is received by the court clerk, even if it does

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not then comply with local rules. Robinson, 272 F.3d at 922. This

Court abided by that precedent when it recognized that the period

of limitations was tolled while the IFP application was pending. 

Gilardi, however, does not address whether and when the clock on a

statute of limitations resumes running, a scenario that Robinson

contemplates expressly as a possibility. Robinson, 272 F.3d at

922. Gilardi does not govern the outcome in this case because it

does not address what happens when, as in this case, the district

court denies the IFP motion. Thus, Gilardi cannot justify relief

under Rule 59(e), because it is not an example of controlling

precedent disregarded by this Court.

In addition, Circuit precedent fully justifies this Court’s

previous order. Since Gilardi was decided, the Seventh Circuit

considered “[w]hat happens if the district judge denies the

application to proceed IFP and the plaintiff does not pay promptly”

– precisely the scenario presented here. Williams-Guice v. Bd. of

Educ. of the City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 161, 162 (7th Cir. 1995). 

When a plaintiff files and IFP application with the complaint, the

period of limitations is tolled while the application is pending. 

Id. at 164. But if the application is denied, “the clock resumes

ticking on the date of denial.” Id. At that point, “the plaintiff

must pay the docket fee within the remainder of the period of

limitations.” Id. at 165. The Court explained that “to suspend a

period of limitations is not to deem it satisfied.” Id. 

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Plaintiff submitted her Complaint and her IFP Application on

July 8, 2012, the last day within the statutory period for her

federal claims. This filing was in compliance with all Local

Rules, particularly Local Rule 3.3(b), and did not need to be saved

by Gilardi. The period of limitations was tolled while the IFP

application was pending, but resumed running on September 28, 2012,

when the application was denied. The Court was generous enough to

grant Plaintiff thirty (30) additional days to pay the filing fee. 

Plaintiff failed to pay the filing fee in that time, or even in the

time requested in the Motion for an Extension that was not properly

presented and thus never ruled on. The period of limitations

continued to run, and lapsed before Plaintiff paid the fee. The

dismissal, based on the statute of limitations, was proper. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff is not entitled to

relief under Rule 59(e), and the Motion to Reconsider [ECF No. 24]

is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge

United States District Court

Date: 11/7/2013

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