UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

LASHAWN NICOLE LOFTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

STANDARD PARKING CORPORATION and

TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 727,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 12-cv-5716

Judge John W. Darrah

ORDER

Plaintiff LaShawn Nicole Lofton has brought this action against her former employer, 

Standard Parking Corporation, and her union, Teamsters Local Union No. 727. Lofton moved to 

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), which was granted; and counsel was appointed. Defendants 

have jointly moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, based on misrepresentations on

Lofton’s IFP application, or, in the alternative, for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons 

discussed below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss based on Lofton’s IFP application [58] is 

granted; and the Motion for alternative relief is denied as moot. Furthermore, Teamsters Local 

Union 727’s Motion to Dismiss [53] and Standard Parking Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss 

Counts 4 and 5 [55] are denied as moot. The Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with 

prejudice. Civil case is terminated. 

STATEMENT

With regard to cases filed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides that “the court 

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the allegation of poverty is 

untrue.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Whether the dismissal of the case is with 

or without prejudice is within the discretion of the district court. Mathis v. New York Life Ins.

Co., 133 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 1998). As the purpose of the IFP application is to encourage 

forthrightness and discourage fraud on the court, dismissal with prejudice has been viewed as an 

appropriate sanction for lying on the IFP. See, e.g., Thomas v. GMAC, 288 F.3d 305, 306 (7th 

Cir. 2002); McRoyal v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 263 F. App’x 500, 502 (7th Cir. 2008).

In this case, Defendants have submitted information about Lofton’s bankruptcy 

proceedings that directly contradict the representations that Lofton made on her IFP filed in this 

case. Specifically, Defendants have shown that Lofton failed to disclose the following on her 

IFP application: (1) that she owned a house; (2) that she received gifts in the amount of more 

than $200 in the twelve months prior to filing her IFP application; (3) that she owned a car worth 

more than $1,000; and (4) that she owned personal property with a current market value of more 

than $1,000 in the form of a fur coat that she had purchased for $2,600. Lofton concedes that she 
2

failed to disclose those assets but contends that she misunderstood the questions and that, in any 

event, the errors are harmless because she is actually impoverished. 

In completing her IFP application, Lofton verified that its information was correct and 

that false statements would lead to dismissal of her lawsuit when she signed under the following 

statement: 

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above information is true and correct. I 

understand that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2)(A), the court shall dismiss this 

case at any time if the court determines that my allegation of poverty is untrue.

(See Dkt. No. 4.) The IFP application asked specific questions about real estate and vehicles, 

including the current value and equity held in such items. (See id., Questions 7 & 8.) As shown 

by Defendants, Lofton previously disclosed these assets when filing for bankruptcy. 

Lofton has made misrepresentations about her financial status and committed a fraud on 

the Court. Lofton’s argument that she misunderstood the IFP application’s request for 

information about her assets is not well-taken in light of her bankruptcy filings disclosing those 

very assets. Furthermore, any inadvertent errors Lofton might have made does not excuse her 

deception. See Mathis, 133 F.3d at 547-48 (affirming dismissal with prejudice although plaintiff 

averred that errors in IFP application were inadvertent errors). Lofton has benefited from her 

fraudulent misrepresentations by avoiding paying the filing fee and having counsel appointed, 

pro bono, to represent her in her federal lawsuit. Dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate 

sanction. 

Consequently, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [58] is granted with respect to Lofton’s 

IFP misrepresentations and is denied as moot with respect to judgment on the pleadings. 

Accordingly, Teamsters Local Union 727’s Motion to Dismiss [53] and Standard Parking 

Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 4 and 5 [55] are denied as moot. The case is dismissed 

with prejudice and is terminated. 

Date: October 8, 2013 ______________________________

JOHN W. DARRAH

United States District Court Judge