UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JAMES RUDNICK, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

RICK RAEMISCH; JOHN 

CHAPDELAINE; JENNIFER 

ANDERSON; NICOLE WILSON; ERIC 

HOFFMAN; SAMORA; BROWN; 

DAVID CUSTER; DARREN COREY; 

WILLIAM SHERWOOD, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 17-1262 

(D.C. No. 1:16-CV-02071-RM-KLM) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before MORITZ, McKAY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

James Rudnick, a Colorado prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s denial of his motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary 

injunction. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and affirm. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 10, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

I. Background 

 Mr. Rudnick sued various prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 

that they violated his constitutional rights by placing restrictions on his access to the 

prison’s law library and on his printing of legal materials; by viewing, sharing, and 

threatening to delete his legal files; and by confiscating his personal eyeglasses and 

replacing them with state-issued eyeglasses. Mr. Rudnick relied on the same 

essential allegations to support his motion for a temporary restraining order or 

preliminary injunction. 

A magistrate judge issued a report and recommended denying the motion 

because Mr. Rudnick failed to show he would suffer irreparable harm if the motion 

was not granted. Mr. Rudnick objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, 

but the district court overruled the objection and adopted the magistrate judge’s 

report in its entirety, stating, “Plaintiff’s objection is long with detailed recitations of 

the law and restatements as to the merits of his claims [but] at no point does he cite to 

any specific errors in [the magistrate judge’s] factual findings or legal analysis.” 

R., Vol. 3 at 137. 

II. Analysis 

 We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a request for 

a preliminary injunction. Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2010). We 

liberally construe Mr. Rudnick’s pro se pleadings. See Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 

1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 2013). 
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To prevail on his motion, Mr. Rudnick needed to show “(1) a likelihood of 

success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that [he] will suffer irreparable harm in the 

absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in [his] favor; and 

(4) that the injunction is in the public interest.” Little, 607 F.3d at 1251 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary 

remedy, the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.” Greater Yellowstone 

Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2003). 

Further, because the purpose of preliminary injunctions is to preserve the 

relative positions of the parties until trial, they are specifically disfavored if they alter 

the status quo, are mandatory (as opposed to prohibitory), or afford the movant all the 

relief that could be recovered after a full trial. See Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 

1253, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 2005). “Such disfavored injunctions must be more closely 

scrutinized to assure that the exigencies of the case support the granting of a remedy 

that is extraordinary even in the normal course.” Id. at 1259 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In addition, “prison officials’ exercises of discretion should 

generally be respected, as federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and 

flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment.” Wilson v. 

Jones, 430 F.3d 1113, 1123 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A. Legal Access 

As noted by the magistrate judge, Mr. Rudnick did not allege that he was being 

denied all access to the prison’s law library and his legal files. Rather, he was merely 

seeking improved access to both. For example, Mr. Rudnick sought access to his 
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legal files at least three times per week and unfettered access to photocopy and print 

documents. The magistrate judge determined that such allegations were inadequate 

to show irreparable injury supporting injunctive relief on this claim, and we agree. 

“[T]he constitutional obligation to provide inmates access to courts does not 

require states to give inmates unlimited access to a law library, and inmates do not 

have the right to select the method by which access will be provided.” Penrod v. 

Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citation omitted). 

Mr. Rudnick has not challenged the magistrate judge’s finding that he has some 

access to the law library’s resources, nor has he shown an irreparable injury resulting 

from prison regulations limiting prisoners’ computer access to one 

two-and-a-half-hour session per week and requiring them to pay for photocopies and 

printouts. His ample filings in the district court belie any argument that he is being 

denied meaningful access to the courts. Moreover, Mr. Rudnick has not shown that 

“the denial of legal resources hindered [his] efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim,” 

id., in part because he has not identified or described the legal action he seeks to 

pursue. 

Mr. Rudnick also wants to be able to use the prison’s legal access program 

without having to accept the prison’s terms and conditions, which he contends are 

unconscionable because they allow prison officials to view prisoners’ files to monitor 

compliance with the terms and conditions. He further contends that prison officials 

have shared the contents of his files with other individuals, including prisoners and 

the state attorney general, and threatened to delete those files. But the record does 
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not support the conclusion that he is likely to succeed on the merits on these issues. 

Even “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the 

regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 

Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Mr. Rudnick has not shown that the terms 

and conditions are not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, such as 

ensuring all prisoners have access to the prison’s limited resources while protecting 

against the misuse of those resources. And his allegations that his files were shared 

and could be deleted “contain insufficient factual information to conclude that a 

constitutional violation is plausible, rather than possible.” Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 

1178, 1192 (10th Cir. 2010). 

Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

concluding that Mr. Rudnick had not met his burden to show a clear and unequivocal 

right to relief on his legal-access claim. 

B. Eyeglasses 

The magistrate judge acknowledged that Mr. Rudnick’s allegations about his 

state-issued eyeglasses may rise to the level of serious or substantial harm. 

Nonetheless, she concluded that he had not shown that the alleged harm was 

irreparable. The magistrate judge found that Mr. Rudnick had been issued glasses 

that matched his prescription and was eligible for an optometry appointment within 

two months of the court’s order. Thus, he was not being denied eyeglasses entirely. 

He did not support his contention that the state-issued glasses were inadequate with 

any evidence other than his own self-serving statements. And his contention that 
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future prescriptions and lens types provided would be inadequate was speculative. 

Again, the magistrate judge cited the docket as evidence that Mr. Rudnick had not 

been significantly hindered in his ability to prepare and submit numerous filings 

despite the limitations he complained of both with respect to his eyeglasses and his 

access to the prison’s legal services. 

As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that 

Mr. Rudnick’s allegations do not satisfy the demanding standard required for a 

preliminary injunction on this claim. 

III. Conclusion 

We affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Rudnick’s motion for a temporary 

restraining order or a preliminary injunction. We grant Mr. Rudnick’s motion to 

proceed in forma pauperis and remind him of his obligation to continue making 

partial payments until his filing fee has been paid in full. 

Entered for the Court 

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 

Circuit Judge