Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1863| March 29, 2019 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Donald E.C. Leicht

Kokomo, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ian McLean

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Brooke Meeks,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

March 29, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-1863

Appeal from the Howard Superior 

Court

The Honorable William C. 

Menges, Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

34D01-1707-F4-812

34D01-1712-F6-1395

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1863| March 29, 2019 Page 2 of 8

Statement of the Case

[1] Brooke Meeks (“Meeks”) appeals her termination from the Howard County 

Drug Court Program. Meeks claims the trial court denied her due process 

during her drug court termination hearing. Concluding that there was no due 

process violation, we affirm Meeks’ termination from the Drug Court Program. 

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether Meeks was deprived of due process during her drug court

termination hearing. 

Facts

[3] In July 2017, the State charged Meeks with Level 4 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine and Level 5 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in 

methamphetamine in cause number 34D01-1707-F4-00812 (“F4-812”). In 

December 2017, in cause number 34D01-1712-F6-01395 (“F6-1395”), the State 

charged Meeks with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 

felony possession of a narcotic drug, Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a 

syringe, and Level 6 felony unlawful possession or use of a legend drug.

[4] In April 2018, Meeks pled guilty to Level 5 felony conspiracy to commit 

dealing in methamphetamine under F4-821 and Level 6 felony possession of 

methamphetamine under F6-1395. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the 

State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges, and Meeks’ sentence would be 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1863| March 29, 2019 Page 3 of 8

deferred so long as she participated in the Howard County Drug Court 

Program.1 If Meeks failed to successfully complete drug court, the matter 

would be set for sentencing, with the sentence length left to the trial court’s 

discretion. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and referred Meeks to 

Drug Court. 

[5] The following month, in May 2018, Laura Rood (“Rood”), a Drug Court case 

manager, filed a “Notice of Termination” from the Drug Court Program. 

(App. Vol. 2 at 31). This notice alleged that Meeks had failed to follow the 

rules of the Drug Court Program. Thereafter, the trial court held a drug court 

termination hearing. The only witness called by the State was Rood. She

testified that Meeks had previously been sanctioned for missing a drug screen 

and for having contact with an individual she was explicitly ordered not to

contact. Rood then testified that the notice of termination was filed because 

Meeks was “going to [the drug testing facility] instead of calling, when she 

should have been calling.” (Tr. 26). 

[6] Meeks also testified at the termination hearing and admitted that she had

violated program rules. On direct examination, the following exchanges took 

place: 

[Defense Counsel]: Did you miss a drug screen?

 

1

“‘[D]rug court’ means a problem solving court focused on addressing the substance abuse issues of 

defendants or juveniles in the criminal justice system[.]” IND. CODE § 33-23-16-5.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1863| March 29, 2019 Page 4 of 8

[Meeks]: Yes, sir.

* * *

[Defense Counsel]: Ok. And did you have contact with 

somebody that you were not supposed to?

[Meeks]: Yes, sir, I did. 

* * *

[Defense Counsel]: Ok, so you went [to the drug testing facility]

rather than call in because you didn’t have your card to call in?

[Meeks]: Yes, sir. 

(Tr. 33, 36). At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated Meeks’ 

participation in the Drug Court Program. The trial court then held a sentencing 

hearing and sentenced Meeks to consecutive terms of six (6) years under F4-812 

and two and a half (21⁄2) years under F6-1395. Meeks now appeals. Our 

discussion of the issue includes additional facts. 

Decision

[7] At the outset, we note that our Appellate Rules provide that each contention 

made in the argument section of an appellant’s brief “must contain the 

contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent 

reasoning.” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). This means that an appellant’s 

argument section “must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, 

and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on.” Id. Meeks, 

however, has failed to satisfy Indiana Appellate Rule 46’s requirement of 

providing a cogent argument supported by citation to authority. This failure 
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hinders our review and results in waiver of appellate review of this issue. See

Foutch v. State, 53 N.E.3d 577, 581 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (waiving a 

defendant’s argument where he failed to provide a cogent argument).2

[8] Waiver notwithstanding, Meeks’ due process rights were not violated when she 

was terminated from the Drug Court program. The drug court program is a 

forensic diversion program akin to community corrections, and we will review 

the termination of placement in a drug court program as we do a revocation of 

placement in community corrections. Withers v. State, 15 N.E.3d 660, 663 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2014). Our Court has stated that:

For purposes of appellate review, we treat a hearing on a petition 

to revoke a placement in a community corrections program the 

same as we do a hearing on a petition to revoke probation. The 

similarities between the two dictate this approach. Both 

probation and community corrections programs serve as 

alternatives to commitment to the [Department of Correction] 

and both are made at the sole discretion of the trial court. A 

defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence in either probation or 

a community correction program. Rather, placement in either is 

a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a 

right.

While a community correction placement revocation hearing has 

certain due process requirements, it is not to be equated with an 

adversarial criminal proceeding. Rather, it is a narrow inquiry, 

and its procedures are to be more flexible. This is necessary to 

permit the court to exercise its inherent power to enforce 

obedience to its lawful orders. 

 

2 Meeks’ counsel also cited to a memorandum decision of this Court, in contravention of Indiana Appellate 

Rule 65(D). We remind counsel that memorandum decisions “shall not be cited to any court except by 

parties to the case to establish res judicate, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.” App. R. 65(D).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1863| March 29, 2019 Page 6 of 8

Id. at 663-64. (quoting Monroe v. State, 899 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2009)).

[9] INDIANA CODE § 33-23-16-14.5 governs termination of an individual’s 

participation in a problem solving court program.3 The statute provides:

(c) The problem solving court judge or other hearing officer shall 

conduct a hearing concerning an alleged violation of a condition 

of a problem solving court program as follows:

* * *

(3) The individual who is alleged to have committed the violation is 

entitled to:

(A) receive written notice of the alleged violation;

(B) obtain the disclosure of evidence against the individual;

(C) confront and cross-examine witnesses; and 

(D) be represented by counsel. 

I.C. § 33-23-16-14.5.

[10] First, Meeks argues that her due process rights were violated because she “knew 

neither the ‘claimed violations’ nor the ‘evidence against’ her,” which caused 

her to “hit the fact-finding hearing blind.” (Meeks’ Br. 10). However, we note 

that she does not dispute that she failed to follow program rules nor does she

contend that the violation of program rules is insufficient to justify her 

termination. Rather, she appears to argue that her notice of termination from 

 

3

“‘[P]roblem solving court’ means a court providing a process for immediate and highly structured judicial 

intervention for eligible individuals[.]” I.C. § 33-23-16-8. 
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the Drug Court Program was inadequate. We disagree. The notice provided as 

follows:

Notice is hereby given that the Howard County Drug Court 

Program intends to terminate Brooke Meeks participation in the 

program for her failure to follow the rules of the Drug Court 

Program. 

(App. Vol. 2 at 31). This notice was sufficient to apprise Meeks of the claimed 

violation, i.e., that she had failed to follow the rules of the Drug Court 

Program. We acknowledge that the notice did not specify the exact rules she 

failed to follow. However, it is reasonable to infer that Meeks knew and 

understood what rules she failed to follow because she admitted to violating 

program rules during the hearing. Additionally, Meeks signed a “Drug Court 

Program Participation Agreement[,]” which listed the rules for successful 

participation in the Drug Court Program. (App. Vol. 2 at 26). One of the 

special conditions of Meeks’ participation agreement was that she had to abide 

by all of the rules, regulations, or special conditions ordered by Drug Court. 

We conclude that Meeks received adequate notice of the allegations against her.

[11] Next, Meeks’ contention that she was unaware of the “evidence against her” is 

unsupported by the record. (Meeks’ Br. 10). Meeks’ counsel had the following 

exchange with Rood on cross-examination: 

[Defense Counsel]: So just so I can lay out the timeline, I don’t 

want to just keep rehashing everything, in the first week that she 

was out of jail, she missed a drug screen on a Saturday and she 

had contact with her ex-boyfriend. She was then sanctioned to 

do a night in jail and live in a sober living environment, is that 

correct?
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[Rood]: Yes.

[Defense Counsel]: Then over the next 21 days it would seem, 

she remained in compliance with her sober living environment, 

remained in compliance with her treatment, but walked to one of 

her drug screens rather than calling? 

[Rood]: Yes.

[Defense Counsel]: And that has led to . . . the program seeking 

her termination from the Drug Court Program?

[Rood]: That and the treatment provider said she was done 

working with her. 

(Tr. 27-28). Taken together, Meeks’ cross-examination of Rood and her own 

admission to several violations exhibits a familiarity with the evidence 

underlying the allegation in the notice of termination. 

[12] Based on the foregoing, we are unpersuaded that the trial court violated Meeks’ 

due process rights. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to 

terminate Meeks from the Drug Court Program. 

[13] Affirmed. 

Najam, J., and Altice, J., concur.