IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sheila Lapotsky White, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 672 C.D. 2021

: Submitted: February 11, 2022

Johnson Matthey Holdings, Inc. :

(Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE DUMAS FILED: July 5, 2022

Sheila Lapotsky White (Claimant) has petitioned this Court to review 

an adjudication of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), affirming as 

amended the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ). The WCJ 

granted in part Claimant’s Claim Petition for Workers’ Compensation Benefits 

(Claim Petition) and Petition for Review of Workers’ Compensation Benefits 

(Review Petition).1 Upon review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Claimant was employed as a sales coordinator by Johnson Matthey 

Holdings, Inc. (Employer).

2

 Concurrently, Claimant maintained secondary 

1 The WCJ also denied and dismissed a Penalty Petition filed by Claimant. Claimant does 

not appeal that decision.

2 Unless stated otherwise, we adopt the factual background for this case from the Decision 

of the WCJ, entered June 8, 2020, which is supported by substantial evidence of record. See WCJ 

Decision, 6/8/20, at 3-16.
2

employment as a waitress. On October 9, 2018, Claimant was injured when she

slipped and fell in Employer’s breakroom. Claimant ceased working as a waitress 

immediately but continued to work for Employer for several months.3 

Following the incident, Employer acknowledged that Claimant suffered

“multiple injuries including both physical and psychological.” Notice of Comp.

Payable (NCP), 1/12/19. Shortly thereafter, Employer amended the NCP, accepting 

a right knee contusion, a right ankle sprain, and unspecified injuries to the neck, 

lumbar, and left knee. Amended NCP, 1/18/19.4 Employer also issued a Notice of 

Temp. Comp. Payable (NTCP), authorizing weekly payments of $759.71 

commencing January 15, 2019. NTCP, 1/19/19.5

On March 27, 2019, Dr. Robert Mauthe conducted an independent 

medical examination (IME) of Claimant. Dr. Mauthe concluded that Claimant had 

recovered from her work injuries, except the injury to her right knee, and that 

Claimant could return to sedentary work with restrictions. See Dep. of Dr. Mauthe, 

11/5/19, Ex. 2 (including Employer’s Letter Offer, 4/12/19; Notice of Ability to 

Return to Work, 4/10/19; IME, 4/10/19). 

On April 12, 2019, Employer officially notified Claimant of its 

determination that she was able to return to work and offered Claimant a modified 

position at the same hourly rate, including an opportunity to work from home. See

id.; see also Dep. of Joseph Torre, 12/19/19, at 15. Claimant did not respond to this 

3 Claimant last worked for Employer on or about January 15, 2019. However, as of 

December 19, 2019, Claimant remained an employee entitled to benefits. See Dep. of Joseph 

Torre, 12/19/19, at 15.

4 Both the NCP and Amended NCP authorized compensation only for medical treatment.

5 Claimant had arthroscopic surgery performed on her right knee on January 15, 2019. See

Dep. of Claimant, 6/8/19, at 29-31; Dep. of Dr. Murphy, 9/27/19, at 11; Dep. of Dr. Schwartz, 

9/27/19, at 8, 15; Dep. of Dr. Mauthe, 11/5/19, at 18.
3

offer. Subsequently, Employer notified Claimant that temporary compensation 

would cease as of April 12, 2019. Notice Stopping Temp. Comp. (NSTC), 4/19/19. 

Employer also notified Claimant that it had denied “[i]ndemnity in whole, but not 

[m]edical.” Notice of Workers’ Comp. Denial (NWCD), 4/19/19. 

Claimant filed a Claim Petition, alleging that she had sustained injuries 

to her cervical, lumbar and thoracic spine, left hip, right ankle, right and left knees, 

and that she suffered chronic pain as a result of her work injury. Claim Pet., 5/2/19. 

She sought partial disability benefits as of October 9, 2018, and full disability 

benefits as of January 12, 2019. Id.

6

 Claimant also filed a Review Petition, alleging 

an incorrect description of her work injuries, an incorrect average weekly wage 

(AWW), and that her injuries had caused decreased earning power. Rev. Pet.,

5/2/19. Employer responded to these petitions, specifically denying any expanded 

or additional injuries as alleged by Claimant, asserting that it had offered Claimant 

alternative employment but that she had not returned to work, and further asserting

that it had paid Claimant’s medical bills and indemnity while Claimant was unable 

to work due to her knee surgery. See Answer to Rev. Pet., 5/2/19.

The WCJ held hearings at which both parties presented evidence. For 

her part, Claimant testified live and via trial deposition to the circumstances of her 

injury, to her various treatments and therapies, and that she continues to experience 

back pain throughout her spine, as well as right knee and right ankle pain. Claimant 

asserted that she was unable to return to her position with Employer because she is 

no longer capable of sedentary work. Further, according to Claimant, she takes 

6 Claimant sought partial disability because she was unable to maintain her secondary 

employment as a waitress and full disability following her knee surgery. 
4

prescribed pain medications, including Flexeril, which makes her “loopy.” Dep. of 

Claimant, 6/8/19, at 39.7

Claimant introduced deposition testimony from Dr. Todd Schwartz, 

D.O., a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, who examined Claimant on September 

19, 2019, nearly a year after her injuries. Dr. Schwartz opined that Claimant had 

suffered work-related injuries to the cervical and lumbar areas of her spine, a 

meniscal tear of her right knee, aggravated arthritis of her left knee, and a sprain of 

her right ankle with a tear of the peroneus brevis tendon. According to Dr. Schwartz, 

Claimant could not resume her position as a waitress and would have difficulty 

returning to Employer due to her pain and medications.8

Claimant also introduced deposition testimony from Dr. William 

Murphy, D.O., a board-certified specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation. 

Dr. Murphy agreed with the diagnoses of Dr. Schwartz. Regarding Claimant’s 

medications, Dr. Murphy acknowledged that he had re-filled a prescription for 

Flexeril on one occasion, February 14, 2019, which would have provided Claimant 

with 60 pills, enough for no more than one month.

In response, Employer introduced deposition testimony from Dr.

Mauthe, a physician board-certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation. 

Following his examination of Claimant on March 27, 2019, as well as a review of 

Claimant’s medical history and diagnostic testing, Dr. Mauthe concluded that

7 Claimant testified that she takes Flexeril, a muscle relaxer, primarily in the evening but 

sometimes during the day if she is “swollen or in extreme pain.” Dep. of Claimant, 6/18/19, at 46.

8 On cross-examination, Dr. Schwartz conceded that he did not prescribe Flexeril for 

Claimant; that a patient should use Flexeril for three to six months; and that there are alternate 

medications that do not cause the same side effects. See Dep. of Dr. Schwartz at 45-46.
5

Claimant had not recovered from her right knee injury.9 However, Dr. Mauthe 

opined that Claimant had fully recovered from the soft-tissue injuries to her spine, 

right wrist, and right ankle. According to Dr. Mauthe, Claimant could return to 

sedentary work. 

Dr. Mauthe specifically refuted the testimony of Dr. Schwartz and Dr. 

Murphy, characterizing it as “medically absurd and non-physiologic.” Dep. of Dr. 

Mauthe at 31.10 Dr. Mauthe also rejected Claimant’s use of Flexeril to remedy knee 

swelling or pain, testifying that it is “a medication to relax muscles . . . and should 

only be used at night to help assist with sleep, but it’s not indicated for her right knee 

meniscal tear.” Id. at 33.

Employer also introduced deposition testimony from Joseph Torre, 

who works for Employer’s human resources department. Mr. Torre described the 

accommodations Employer was willing to make to ensure that Claimant could return 

to her pre-injury position. For example, Employer offered Claimant a flexible,

work-from-home schedule. If Claimant chose to return to the office, Mr. Torre 

suggested that Claimant could consult with an on-site, occupational health nurse and 

9 Claimant’s medical history is extensive. Notes transcribed by her primary care doctor in 

2017 listed right knee degenerative joint disease, morbid obesity, pain in the right foot, chronic 

meniscus tear, sciatica, swelling, seasonable allergies, history of alcoholism, and obstructive sleep 

apnea. See Dep. Dr. Schwartz at 34-35; see also Dep. of Dr. Mauthe at 35-36. In April and 

November of 2015, Claimant had surgical procedures to repair damage to her right knee. See Dep. 

Dr. Schwartz at 40-42. In addition, although Claimant had denied any ankle problems prior to her 

work injury, she had complained of swelling and pain in her right foot dating back to August 2015,

and a surgical repair of her right ankle occurred in 2017. See Dep. of Dr. Murphy at 50-52.

10 Upon considering the multiple diagnoses of Dr. Murphy, Dr. Mauthe testified, “Frankly, 

I find it medically absurd and non-physiologic to describe 11 injuries as a result of a simple slip 

and fall with a clear longstanding history of knee arthritis, cervical and lumbar arthritis, history of 

obesity, to describe 11 separate injuries as a result of a simple slip and fall to me is just -- it’s not 

physiologically possible. I mean, this is not a high velocity motor vehicle accident. This is a slip 

and fall.” Dep. of Dr. Mauthe at 31.
6

safety coordinator and that transportation arrangements could be made if Claimant 

was unable to drive. According to Mr. Torre, the job offer remains open to Claimant. 

After considering the evidence, the WCJ determined that Claimant had 

sustained work-related injuries to her right knee, the cervical and lumbar areas of 

her spine, right wrist and right ankle. However, the WCJ further determined that 

Claimant had recovered from all injuries except the injury to her right knee. The 

WCJ specifically found the testimony of Claimant to be neither credible nor

persuasive regarding her ability to return to work and her ongoing physical 

complaints. In particular, the WCJ found it significant that Employer had offered 

her flexible accommodations, “[y]et Claimant did not attempt the job.” WCJ 

Decision, 6/8/20, at 14 (basing her credibility determination on “Claimant’s affect 

and demeanor”). The WCJ also credited the testimony of Dr. Mauthe over that of 

Dr. Schwartz and Dr. Murphy. According to the WCJ, the testimony of Claimant’s 

doctors lacked credibility because they had both alleged that Claimant could not 

perform her pre-injury work duties because of her medications, “yet both admitted 

that . . . they had no idea exactly how often Claimant was taking the medications.” 

Id. Furthermore, the WCJ rejected their opinions because they were “based, in part, 

on Claimant’s complaints[,] and this [WCJ] has not found Claimant to be credible.” 

Id.

For these reasons, the WCJ granted Claimant’s Claim Petition and 

Review Petition in part. The WCJ concluded that Claimant was able to return to her 

position with Employer, considering the accommodations offered, but remained 

entitled to partial disability benefits because she could not return to her secondary 

employment as a waitress. See id. at 14-17.11

11 Employer also remains liable for the medical treatment of Claimant’s right knee.
7

Claimant appealed to the Board, asserting that (1) substantial, 

competent evidence did not support the WCJ’s finding that Claimant had fully 

recovered from her right ankle injury and (2) the WCJ miscalculated Claimant’s 

secondary income. Appeal Filed by Claimant, 6/24/20. Upon review, the Board 

affirmed but corrected a mathematical error made by the WCJ in calculating the 

average weekly wage. Bd.’s Op. & Order, 5/18/21. Claimant then sought further 

review in this Court.

ISSUES12

In her first issue, Claimant asserts that there is not substantial, 

competent evidence that she has fully recovered from her right ankle injury. 

Claimant’s Br. at 20. In support of this assertion, Claimant points to the expert 

testimony of Dr. Mauthe. See id. at 21-26. According to Claimant, Dr. Mauthe’s 

opinion regarding Claimant’s recovery was based upon false and/or inaccurate 

information and, therefore, could not support the partial termination of her benefits. 

Id. at 26.

Second, Claimant asserts that the WCJ erred when it partially 

terminated her indemnity benefits. Id. at 13. Third, Claimant asserts that the WCJ

erred in sua sponte modifying her total disability benefits. Id. at 26. Finally, in her 

fourth issue, Claimant asserts that the WCJ failed to issue a reasoned decision. Id. 

at 28.

DISCUSSION

In a workers’ compensation appeal, our review is limited to determining 

whether an error of law was committed, whether constitutional rights were violated, 

and whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Bryn 

12 We have reordered Claimant’s issues.
8

Mawr Landscaping Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cruz-Tenorio), 219 A.3d 

1244, 1252 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a 

reasonable person may accept as adequate to support a finding. City of Philadelphia 

v. Workers’ Comp Appeal Bd. (Kriebel), 29 A.3d 762 (Pa. 2011). Further, on appeal, 

the party prevailing before the WCJ is entitled to the benefit of all favorable 

inferences drawn from the evidence. Valenta v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Abington Manor Nursing Home & Rehab & Liberty Ins. Co.), 176 A.3d 374, 382 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

1. Substantial Evidence of Recovery

Claimant asserts that Dr. Mauthe’s testimony concerning Claimant’s 

recovery from an injury to her right ankle was “equivocal, incompetent, and not 

based upon substantial evidence of record.” Claimant’s Br. at 20. According to 

Claimant, Dr. Mauthe’s failure to examine Claimant’s ankle or review records 

related to her ankle suggest that he lacked a complete grasp of her injury, thus 

rendering incompetent his opinion of full recovery. Id. at 21. We disagree.

An employer must prove a recovery with “unequivocal, competent 

medical evidence.” Hall v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Am. Serv. Grp.), 3 A.3d 

734, 740 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Medical evidence of recovery is competent where an 

expert, having reviewed the relevant records, having performed an examination, and 

having taken a history, opines within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that a 

claimant has fully recovered from an injury at the time of the expert’s examination. 

To v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Insaco, Inc.), 819 A.2d 1222, 1225 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2003). Further, a medical expert’s failure to examine a specific body part is not 

necessarily fatal, provided she assumes the presence of an injury and finds it to be 

resolved when she conducts the examination. See Hall, 3 A.3d at 740-43. 
9

Here, Dr. Mauthe took a history and conducted a physical examination 

of Claimant on March 27, 2019. Dep. of Dr. Mauthe at 16. Claimant informed Dr. 

Mauthe that she had sustained injuries to her neck, back, and right knee. According 

to Dr. Mauthe, “[s]he did not express any complaint regarding her ankle.” Id. 

Nevertheless, referring to an incident report from the day following Claimant’s 

accident, Dr. Mauthe noted that Claimant had complained of injuries to “both knees, 

right ankle, right wrist, and low back.” Id. at 18. In addition, Dr. Mauthe reviewed 

an x-ray report that revealed no fracture in Claimant’s ankle. Id. Based upon his 

physical examination, the records available at the time, and Claimant’s description 

of her current ailments, Dr. Mauthe concluded, within a reasonable degree of 

medical certainty, that she had sustained “a soft tissue injury or sprain/strain of her . 

. . right ankle, for which she went on to fully recover and had no objective evidence 

of impairment at the time of [his] evaluation.” Id. at 23. 

In our view, Dr. Mauthe’s testimony was competent medical evidence 

that Claimant had recovered from an injury to her right ankle. See To, 819 A.2d at 

1225. Further, because he was aware that Claimant had initially complained of a 

right ankle injury, because initial diagnostic testing revealed no fracture, and because 

Claimant did not indicate to Dr. Mauthe that she continued to experience right ankle 

pain, Dr. Mauthe’s failure to examine her right ankle specifically does not render his 

opinion incompetent. See Hall, 3 A.3d at 740-43. Accordingly, Claimant’s 

argument is without merit.13

13 Dr. Mauthe also testified that, upon reviewing updated records from her other treating 

physicians, he was surprised to learn that Claimant had previously broken her right ankle, that she 

now complained of ongoing ankle pain, and that she attributed that current pain to her work injury. 

See Dep. of Dr. Mauthe at 35. Building upon this testimony, in addition to Dr. Mauthe’s admission 

that he did not examine Claimant’s right ankle specifically, Claimant further argues that magnetic 

resonance imaging performed on her right ankle after the IME, as well as the testimony from Dr. 
10

2. Partial Termination of Indemnity Benefits

Claimant asserts that the WCJ partially terminated her indemnity 

benefits, “a remedy that is not recognized under Pennsylvania law.” Claimant’s Br. 

at 19. However, Claimant did not raise this specific issue in her appeal to the Board, 

nor do we view this issue as reasonably encompassed within the assertions of error 

set forth in Claimant’s appeal to the Board. See Appeal Filed by Claimant (asserting:

(1) a lack of substantial evidence that Claimant had recovered from her ankle injury

and (2) an error in calculating her average weekly wage). Accordingly, we deem 

this issue waived. See Starr Aviation v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Colquitt), 155 

A.3d 1156, 1162 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (noting that a party must specifically identify 

the grounds being appealed to the Board) (citation omitted); Pa.R.A.P. 1551(a); 34 

Pa. Code § 111.11(a)(2). 14

Murphy and Dr. Schwartz, undermine the competency of Dr. Mauthe’s opinion. See Claimant’s 

Br. at 22-25. However, this argument goes to the appropriate weight and credibility of this 

evidence, not its competency. It is well settled that “the WCJ is the fact[-]finder, and ‘it is solely 

for the WCJ . . . to assess credibility and to resolve conflicts in the evidence.’” Hawbaker v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Kriner’s Quality Roofing Servs. & Uninsured Emp. Guar. Fund), 

159 A.3d 61, 69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (quoting Waldameer Park, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal 

Bd. (Morrison), 819 A.2d 164, 168 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)). Thus, Claimant’s argument is misplaced.

14 Absent waiver, we note that Claimant repeatedly mischaracterizes the WCJ decision to 

grant her Claim Petition and Review Petition in part as a “partial termination” of her benefits. See, 

e.g., Claimant’s Br. at 13, 20, 26. We agree that a WCJ may not grant a termination petition in 

part. See Mitoulis v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sunrise Senior Living Mgmt., Inc.) (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 991 C.D. 2018, filed Apr. 27, 2020) (unreported), 2020 WL 1983765, at *3 (observing that 

there is no basis for a partial termination of disability benefits); see also 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a)

(permitting our reliance on unreported cases for their persuasive value). However, that is not what 

occurred here. Notably, Employer did not file a termination petition. Furthermore, in response to 

Employer’s NSTC, which informed Claimant that Employer would cease temporary disability 

payments following the IME and its determination that Claimant could return to work with 

restrictions, Claimant filed a Claim Petition and a Review Petition, which sought to expand the list 

of recognized work injuries, amend her average weekly wage to include her secondary 

employment, and award her partial disability benefits as of October 9, 2018, and full disability

benefits as of January 12, 2019. Claimant bore the burden of proof. See W. Penn Allegheny Health 
11

3. Sua Sponte Modification of Disability Benefits

Claimant asserts that the WCJ reversibly erred when she sua sponte

reduced Claimant’s disability benefits. Claimant’s Br. at 26. In brief remarks, 

Claimant suggests that this error rests upon the WCJ’s finding that Claimant had 

recovered from her right ankle injury. According to Claimant, “[i]t is thus 

abundantly clear that the modification of her judicially adjudicated total disability 

benefits was predicated entirely upon the full recovery from the right ankle injury.” 

Id. at 27. Moreover, according to Claimant, “[t]he WCJ thus found [Claimant] to be 

both fully recovered and not fully recovered,” and this “judicial contradiction itself 

warrants a [r]eversal.” Id.

It is unclear what Claimant means when she references an adjudication 

of total disability. Certainly, the WCJ concluded that Claimant was entitled to 

temporary total disability while she recovered from her knee surgery. Further, 

Claimant does not develop, in any meaningful way, her assertion that the WCJ acted 

sua sponte, nor does she support her arguments with citation to relevant authority. 

See id. at 26-27. Accordingly, this claim is waived. See Am. Rock Mechs., Inc. v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bik & Lehigh Concrete Techs.), 881 A.2d 54, 56 (Pa. 

Sys., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cochenour), 251 A.3d 467, 478 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)

noting that claimant bears burden to prove elements of claim petition); Colagreco v. Workers’ 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Vanguard Grp., Inc.), 232 A.3d 971, 978-79 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (stating that, 

in filing a review petition, the claimant had the burden to prove that the NCP-acknowledged injury, 

subacromial bursitis of the right arm, should be amended to include chronic regional pain 

syndrome of the right upper extremity). The WCJ granted Claimant’s petitions in part, concluding 

that Claimant had established a partial disability from the date of her injury because she could not 

maintain secondary employment as a waitress and that Claimant was entitled to total temporary 

disability following her knee surgery, until such time as Employer offered her suitable 

employment. Contrary to Claimant’s assertion, the WCJ did not partially terminate Claimant’s 

disability benefits. Rather, the WCJ reduced Claimant’s benefits based on the availability of a job 

within her restrictions. See WCJ Decision at 16-17. Thus, Claimant’s assertion is without merit.
12

Cmwlth. 2005) (holding a substantial evidence claim waived where petitioner failed 

to provide analysis and relevant authority); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

15

4. The Reasoned Decision of the WCJ

Finally, Claimant asserts that the WCJ failed to issue a reasoned 

decision as required by Section 422(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), Act 

of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 834. See Claimant’s Br. at 28. 

Claimant did not raise this specific issue in her appeal to the Board. Accordingly, it 

is waived. See Starr Aviation, 155 A.3d at 1162; Pa.R.A.P. 1551(a); 34 Pa. Code § 

111.11(a)(2); see also, e.g., Jenkins v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Youth Advoc. 

Program, Inc.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2189 C.D. 2008, filed June 4, 2009) (unreported), 

2009 WL 9100373, at *2 (finding claim that WCJ had not rendered a reasoned 

decision was waived for failure to raise before the Board).16, 17

15 Considering the various petitions before the WCJ and the several hearings held in this 

matter, Claimant’s assertion that the WCJ acted sua sponte is devoid of merit, nor does it reflect

the law accurately. See Section 413(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 

1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 771-772.

16 We cite Jenkins for its persuasive value in accordance with Section 414(a) of the 

Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

17 Claimant’s assertion is also without merit. Section 422(a) of the Act provides that a 

reasoned decision is one “containing findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the 

evidence as a whole which clearly and concisely states and explains the rationale for the decisions.” 

77 P.S. § 834. An adjudication must provide for meaningful appellate review. Id. Where, as here, 

the WCJ must evaluate conflicting testimony from medical experts who testified only by 

deposition, a reasoned decision must provide “some articulation of the actual objective basis for 

the credibility determination.” Daniels v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tristate Transp.), 828 A.2d 

1043, 1053 (Pa. 2003). In this case, the WCJ made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of 

law. See WCJ Decision at 3-16. Moreover, for example, the WCJ articulated her reasons for 

crediting the expert testimony of Dr. Mauthe over that of Dr. Schwartz and Dr. Murphy. Compare

id. at 14 (crediting Dr. Mauthe’s clear explanations, consideration of Claimant’s prior medical 

conditions, her medications, and the mechanism of her injury), with id. (noting the inability of Dr. 

Schwartz and Dr. Murphy to testify as to Claimant’s use of medications, their failure to restrict her 

driving despite acknowledging that medications made Claimant “loopy,” and criticizing their 

reliance on Claimant’s description of her ailments where WCJ observed her demeanor and found 

her to be not credible).
13

CONCLUSION

We reject Claimant’s assertion that the medical testimony from Dr. 

Mauthe was incompetent. Claimant’s additional claims on appeal are waived and 

otherwise without merit. Therefore, we affirm the Board’s order.

 

 

 LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sheila Lapotsky White, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 672 C.D. 2021

:

Johnson Matthey Holdings, Inc. :

(Workers’ Compensation Appeal :

Board), :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 5

th day of July, 2022, the order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board, entered May 18, 2021, is AFFIRMED.

 

 LORI A. DUMAS, Judge