IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

FREDERICK SCHATZEL, ) 

 ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 vs. ) Case No. 12 C 5243 

 ) 

CENTRAL STATES SOUTHEAST AND ) 

SOUTHWEST AREAS PENSION ) 

FUND and WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA ) 

TEAMSTERS AND EMPLOYERS ) 

PENSION FUND, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge: 

 Frederick Schatzel has sued the Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas 

Pension Fund (Central States) and the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and 

Employers Pension Fund (Western Pennsylvania) for pension benefits that he contends 

the defendants owe him. Schatzel alleges that defendants violated the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., by 

wrongfully denying him benefits and by violating their fiduciary duties in their dealings 

with him. Schatzel has also asserted a state law claim that the defendants should be 

estopped from denying him pension benefits under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 

 Western Pennsylvania has moved to dismiss Schatzel’s promissory estoppel and 

fiduciary duty claims. Central States has filed two motions to dismiss, likewise seeking 

dismissal of the promissory estoppel and fiduciary duty claims. Central States has also 
2

moved for summary judgment on Schatzel’s remaining claim against it, for wrongful 

denial of benefits under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B). 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 

Schatzel has moved to strike Western Pennsylvania’s motion to dismiss, Central 

States’s first motion to dismiss, and Central States’s motion for summary judgment. For 

the reasons stated below, the Court denies Schatzel’s motions to strike; grants the three 

motions to dismiss, two of which it construes as motions for judgment on the pleadings; 

and grants Central States’s motion for summary judgment. 

Background 

 Because Schatzel is the nonmoving party, the Court accepts the allegations in 

his complaint as true and draws reasonable inferences in his favor for purposes of any 

motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. For purposes of the motion for 

summary judgment, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to Schatzel and 

draws reasonable inferences in his favor. The Court takes the following facts from 

Schatzel’s complaint, unless otherwise noted. 

 Both defendants are Teamsters Union-related pension plans that are subject to 

ERISA. Schatzel participated in the pension plans from June 1977 until July 1989. 

Although not alleged in the complaint, the Court notes that a union worker’s participation 

in a pension plan typically arises from his employment with a company that has entered 

into a collective bargaining agreement with the union. Under the terms of that 

agreement, the company makes contributions to a pension fund on behalf of its union 

employees. According to Schatzel, he worked for employers that made contributions to 

the Central States Pension Fund on his behalf from June 1977 until September 1981. 

He then became employed with a company that contributed to the Western 
3

Pennsylvania Pension Fund on his behalf. Schatzel participated in the Western 

Pennsylvania fund until July 1989. 

 On February 24, 1986, Central States sent Schatzel a letter stating that he had 

3.85 years of “credit service” and 5 years of “vesting service.” Compl., Ex. 1. The letter 

further stated that: 

You are eligible for a vested pension benefit once you have at least 10 

years of employer contributions. Each of those 10 years must have 20 

weeks of contributions or more. 

If you leave the Fund and don’t return for several years you can lose all of 

your credited service. This is called a break in service. How long you can 

safely stay out of the Fund depends on how many vesting service years 

you have. In your case, you have 5 vesting service years, so you would 

lose your credited service if you left the Fund for 5 or more years. If you 

don’t accumulate 10 weeks or 37 days of employer contributions before 

December 31, 1986, you will have a full break in service. 

Id. Schatzel does not contend that he responded to this letter. 

 Three years later, in 1989, Schatzel contacted Central States, “concerning his 

progress towards a vested pension.” Compl. ¶ 11. According to Schatzel, Central 

States responded by preparing an affidavit (which he attached to his complaint) stating 

that he worked “4 3/12 years under a continuous labor contract negotiated by this 

Union.” Id., Ex. 2. Central States contends that this affidavit was prepared by a union 

representative, not a representative of the Central States fund, but the affidavit itself is 

printed on letterhead bearing Central States’s name. 

 According to Schatzel, when he received the affidavit, he forwarded it to Western 

Pennsylvania. In response, Western Pennsylvania wrote Schatzel a letter on 

September 25, 1989, that read: 

Our records indicate that you worked under this Fund from 10-24-81 to 7-

1-89. Based on your affidavit from the Central States Pension Fund, it 
4

appears you are eligible for a reciprocal pension benefit from this Fund at 

age 60. Please retain this letter to use as documentation as your proof of 

eligibility. 

Id., Ex. 3. According to the complaint, Schatzel moved to Alaska at some point—the 

complaint does not specify when—and has remained there to this day. He currently 

works for the Alaska State Ferry System. Schatzel contends that he moved to Alaska 

and took on non-union employment based on his belief that he had vested pension 

benefits that he would begin receiving upon reaching age sixty. 

 Several years later, in 2010, Schatzel contacted the defendants about his 

upcoming retirement plans. In response, a Central States analyst wrote to Western 

Pennsylvania to advise that Central States would not participate in a “Partial Reciprocal 

Benefit”1

 because Schatzel had left “covered employment”—presumably meaning 

employment where a collective bargaining act obligated his employer to make 

contributions to a Teamsters-related pension fund—before he was fifty years old. As a 

result, the Central States analyst stated, Central States required Schatzel to have thirty 

years of combined service credit to qualify for a partial pension, rather than ten years. 

Id., Ex. 5. Schatzel was copied on the February 2010 letter. Approximately six weeks 

later, Western Pennsylvania wrote Schatzel and informed him that he had earned eight 

years of participation in the Western Pennsylvania plan, which did not meet the plan’s 

ten-year requirement for vested pension benefits. Western Pennsylvania concluded 

that Schatzel was “not vested or eligible for the receipt of reciprocal pension benefits, 

because the Central States Pension Fund will not participate in the reciprocal benefit.” 

 

1

 Although the pleadings do not fully explain the pension plans at issue here, it appears that 

these two funds sometimes provide for a Teamsters member who has participated in different 

Teamsters-related pension funds to pension benefits even if he has not participated in any 

single pension plan long enough to qualify for a pension. 
5

Id., Ex. 6 at 2. Schatzel pursued an administrative appeal with both Central States and 

Western Pennsylvania, but each denied his claim. 

 Because Central States has moved for summary judgment on Schatzel’s denial 

of benefits claim under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), a brief discussion of that fund’s 

decision on Schatzel’s administrative appeal is warranted. According to the evidence 

that Central States has submitted, which Schatzel has not contradicted with his own 

evidence, Schatzel filed an administrative appeal of Central States’s determination 

regarding his claim on July 19, 2010. On September 23, 2010, Central States’s 

Benefits Claim Appeals Committee considered Schatzel’s appeal. The minutes of the 

committee’s meeting reflect that it determined that he had “not established the 

requirements for a Partial Pension from this Fund.” Central States Ex. C at 40. On 

September 27, 2010, Central States sent Schatzel a letter, notifying him of the decision 

and explaining why he was not eligible for a partial pension. Compl., Ex. 7. The letter 

stated that under the Central States plan, which it attached to the letter, a participant or 

former participant must meet the requirements of each fund to be eligible for a partial 

pension from Central States. The letter further stated that because Schatzel had left 

covered service under the Western Pennsylvania plan when he was under fifty years 

old, he had to have thirty years of combined service credit to qualify for a partial 

pension. The letter stated that Schatzel had only 11.683 years of combined service 

credit (3.850 under the Central States plan and 7.833 under the Western Pennsylvania 

plan) and thus did not qualify for a partial pension. 

 Central States’s September 27, 2010 letter further stated that the Central States 

plan does not provide for payment of a “partial vested pension.” The letter stated that a 
6

participant can obtain a vested pension only if he is eligible based on contributions paid 

to Central States (not to some other plan). The letter stated that Schatzel was not 

eligible on this basis because he earned only five of the ten vesting service years 

required to qualify. Finally, the letter informed Schatzel of his right to appeal the denial 

of his claim to the fund’s trustees. 

 On March 9, 2011, Schatzel spoke with representatives of Central States and 

Western Pennsylvania via conference call. Central States staff told Schatzel that the 

Central States plan does not provide for a partial vested pension and that to qualify for a 

vested pension from Central States, a participant must have ten vesting service years 

based on contributions made to Central States, not another fund. 

 On August 31, 2011, Schatzel appealed to the Central States trustees, who held 

a hearing on November 9, 2011. The minutes of that hearing reflect that Schatzel’s 

counsel argued that he had been promised a reciprocal benefit at age sixty. The 

minutes further state that the trustees rejected this contention because they “found no 

evidence that Central States provided Mr. Schatzel with any written misinformation. 

Instead, they concluded that Central States provided Mr. Schatzel with complete, 

accurate, and timely information concerning the Plan’s eligibility rules and his status 

under those rules.” Central States Ex. C at 4. The trustees denied Schatzel’s appeal. 

 Central States’s plan contains a section addressing “partial pensions.” See 

Central States Ex. B at 113. It defines a “partial pension” as one provided to a current 

or former participant who has insufficient service credit to be eligible for any pension 

benefits because his years of employment were divided between different pension plans 

or who, if eligible, would receive less than full benefits because his employment was 
7

divided. Id. The Central States plan says that partial pensions are available regarding 

only eight types of benefits. The only one of these that conceivably applies is an “Early 

Retirement Pension,” which is available to (among others) a participant who left covered 

service before the age of fifty but had earned thirty years of service credit. Id. at 34. 

Discussion 

A. Standard of review

 When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the facts alleged in the 

complaint as true and draws reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Hallinan v. 

Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). A 

plaintiff need not plead particularized facts, but the complaint “must actually suggest 

that the plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations that raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 752 (7th Cir. 2011). 

Rule 12(c) similarly provides that “[a] plaintiff whose allegations show that there is an 

airtight defense has pleaded himself out of court, and the judge may dismiss the suit on 

the pleadings under Rule 12(c).” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 

2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The standard for deciding a Rule 12(c) motion is the same 

as that for deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 

R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., LLC v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local Union 150, 

335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). 

 Summary judgment is proper when “the admissible evidence, construed in favor 

of the non-movant, reveals no genuine issue as to any material facts and establishes 

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Berry v. Chi. Transit Auth., 

618 F.3d 688, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2010). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is 
8

sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the non-movant. 

Swearnigen-El v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2010). 

B. Schatzel’s motions to strike

 Schatzel has moved to strike Central States’s first motion to dismiss and its 

motion for summary judgment as well as Western Pennsylvania’s motion to dismiss. 

Schatzel argues that the defendants’ first two motions to dismiss were improper 

because they were filed after both defendants had answered Schatzel’s first complaint. 

The Court agrees that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that any motion 

alleging a defense under Rule 12(b)(6) “must be made before pleading if a responsive 

pleading is allowed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). For this reason, the Court advised the 

parties on December 4, 2012 that it would consider Western Pennsylvania’s motion and 

Central States’s first motion as motions for judgment on the pleadings. See Forseth v. 

Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 367 n.5 (7th Cir. 2000); cf. Richards, 696 F.3d at 637 

(Rule 12(c) and Rule 12(b)(6) have an equivalent effect, and courts often use the two 

interchangeably). Additionally, the Court stated in an order dated January 10, 2013 that 

Western Pennsylvania’s motion would stand despite the fact that Schatzel amended his 

complaint after the motion was filed. Although the order does not expressly address 

Central States’s first motion, there is no reason to treat it any differently. See docket 

entry 40. The Court therefore denies Schatzel’s motions to strike the first two motions 

to dismiss. 

 Schatzel has also moved to strike or to stay Central States’s motion for summary 

judgment, arguing that discovery is ongoing and that summary judgment is therefore 

inappropriate. Schatzel’s argument is the sort of contention that is appropriately made 
9

via a Rule 56(d) submission. The Court’s January 10, 2013 order expressly invited 

Schatzel to submit a Rule 56(d) request regarding the pending summary judgment 

motion. See docket entry 40. Schatzel chose not to file anything under Rule 56(d) and 

instead responded to the motion on its merits on February 5, 2013. He has offered no 

basis to defer consideration of Central States’s summary judgment motion, so the Court 

denies his request to strike that motion. 

C. Defendants’ motions to dismiss

 Central States has filed two motions to dismiss. The first, which as noted above 

the Court will consider as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, seeks dismissal of 

Schatzel’s state law promissory estoppel claim. Central States filed its second motion 

to dismiss after Schatzel amended his complaint, seeking dismissal of Schatzel’s claim 

that it violated its fiduciary duties in its dealings with him. 

 Western Pennsylvania also filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court also 

construes as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Western Pennsylvania’s motion 

essentially combines Central States’s two motions into one—it seeks dismissal of 

Schatzel’s state law promissory estoppel claim against Western Pennsylvania and the 

claim that Western Pennsylvania violated its fiduciary duties in its dealings with 

Schatzel. Because the three motions deal with overlapping issues, the Court will 

consider them together. 

 1. State law promissory estoppel claims

 Schatzel contends that both defendants promised him that he had earned a 

vested pension; he relied on those promises to his detriment; and defendants now 

should be estopped from denying him the pension benefits they promised. Schatzel 
10

characterizes these as state law claims. Defendants argue that the claims are 

preempted by ERISA and that, in any event, neither defendant made promises that may 

be enforced via promissory estoppel. 

 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the broad preemptive power of 

ERISA, which Congress enacted “to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee 

benefit plans.” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004); see also Metro. 

Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987). The Seventh Circuit has held that 

ERISA preempts state law in two ways: complete preemption under section 502(a), 29 

U.S.C. § 1132(a), and conflict preemption under section 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 

Because the Court finds that section 502(a) completely preempts Schatzel’s state law 

claims, it does not consider whether those claims are subject to a conflict preemption 

defense under section 514(a). Moreover, because Schatzel has also included claims 

against the defendants for his benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B) in his amended 

complaint, the Court can simply dismiss his state law claims without having to 

“recharacterize” them as ones arising under federal law. See Rice v. Panachal, 65 F.3d 

637, 640 (7th Cir. 1995) (“If a state law claim has been ‘displaced,’ and therefore 

completely preempted by § 502(a), then a plaintiff’s state law claim is properly 

‘recharacterized’ as one arising under federal law.” (internal citation omitted)). 

 Complete preemption confers exclusive federal jurisdiction in certain instances 

where Congress intended federal legislation to be so broad as to entirely replace any 

state law claim. Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, Inc. v. Cent. States Joint Bd. Health & 

Welfare Trust Fund, 538 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2008). ERISA is one of those 

instances: “[T]he ERISA civil enforcement mechanism is one of those provisions with 
11

such extraordinary pre-emptive power that it converts an ordinary state common law 

complaint into one stating a federal claim . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(citing Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209). The Supreme Court in Aetna Health articulated 

a two-part analysis to determine whether a state law claim has been completely 

preempted by ERISA: 

[I]f an individual, at some point in time, could have brought his claim under 

ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and where there is no other independent legal duty 

that is implicated by a defendant’s actions, then the individual’s cause of 

action is completely pre-empted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). 

542 U.S. at 210; see also Maatman v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., No. 09 C 5929, 

2010 WL 415384, at *3–5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2010) (state law claims relating to plaintiff’s 

retirement benefits completely preempted by ERISA). In determining whether a 

plaintiff’s state law claim is completely preempted by ERISA, a court assesses whether 

the claim is, in essence, a claim to recover benefits due under the terms of an ERISAgoverned plan. Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1489 (7th Cir. 

1996). 

 There is no doubt that the pension plans offered by both Central States and 

Western Pennsylvania are ERISA plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1002. Moreover, the only relief 

Schatzel requests is an order directing defendants to award him a pension. Schatzel 

contends that he is entitled to this relief because defendants made written promises to 

him that his pension had vested and he had a right to it when he reached age sixty. He 

contends, in essence, that the defendants’ promises regarding his eligibility estop them 

from relying on the language of the pension plans to deny him a pension. The Court 

notes that there is some uncertainty in the Seventh Circuit regarding when estoppel 

principles may apply to claims for benefits under ERISA. See, e.g., Pearson v. Voith 
12

Paper Rolls, Inc., 656 F.3d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 2011) (expressly declining to determine 

whether estoppel principles may be invoked against a defined-benefit, funded pension 

plan); Coker v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 1999) (equitable 

principles cannot override rule forbidding oral modifications to ERISA plans); Black v. 

TIC Investment Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 115 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying estoppel principles 

against unfunded, single-employer welfare benefit plans). Even in situations where 

estoppel principles may apply, however, courts consider them only in the context of an 

ERISA section 502 claim for benefits. Russo v. Health, Welfare & Pension Fund, Local 

705, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 984 F.2d 762, 767 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Thomason v. 

Aetna Life Ins. Co., 9 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 1993) (“We must therefore look to the 

emerging federal common law of ERISA, utilizing state law as a basis of the federal 

common law only to the extent that such state law is not inconsistent with congressional 

policy concerns.”). Schatzel’s promissory estoppel claim, by contrast, is expressly 

based on state law. 

 Additionally, Schatzel’s claims do not involve any legal duty implicated by 

defendants’ actions that exists independent of their duties under ERISA. Schatzel may 

succeed in claiming that defendants should be estopped from denying him coverage 

based on written misrepresentations, but their obligations to pay him a pension would 

nevertheless fall under ERISA, not any state law. Russo, 984 F.2d at 767; see also 

Vanderwiel v. Schawk USA, Inc., No. 12 C 4178, 2012 WL 3779040, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 

30, 2012) (“[T]he alleged legal duty owed to [the plaintiff] cannot be decided without 

reference to plan documents and is not independent of an ERISA eligible plan.”). 

Schatzel’s state law claims for promissory estoppel are, in essence, claims for benefits 
13

properly brought under section 502(a). 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a); Russo, 984 F.2d at 767. 

As noted above, Schatzel has also brought federal ERISA claims, and thus the Court 

need not “recharacterize” his state law claims as ERISA claims. The Court accordingly 

dismisses Schatzel’s state law claims and need not address defendants’ alternative 

arguments in support of dismissal. 

 2. ERISA fiduciary duty claims

 Schatzel has also alleged that both Central States and Western Pennsylvania 

ran afoul of their fiduciary duties under ERISA by misinterpreting the terms of the plans 

and by failing to review and investigate his claim in good faith. Defendants argue that 

these claims are merely repackaged claims for benefits under ERISA section 

502(a)(1)(B) and thus fail as a matter of law. Defendants argue alternatively that the 

claims are barred by the statute of limitations specified in section 413. 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1113. Because the Court agrees that Schatzel’s claims fail as a matter of law, it need 

not determine whether they are timely. 

 Schatzel does not specify the provision of section 502(a) under which he asserts 

his fiduciary duty claims. Thus the Court will consider the two possible alternatives: 

section 502(a)(2), which limits fiduciary violations to those specified in ERISA section 

409, and section 502(a)(3). 

 ERISA section 409 provides that 

[a]ny person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of 

the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this 

subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any 

losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such 

plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of 

assets of the plan by the fiduciary . . . . 

29 U.S.C. § 1109; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (providing cause of action for 
14

violation of party’s fiduciary duties). The pension to which Schatzel claims entitlement is 

a defined benefit plan, which “assure[s] participants whose rights had vested that they 

will receive a specified payout upon retirement” that is typically paid out of “a pool of 

assets in trust for the plan,” administered by trustees with a fiduciary duty to maintain 

the pool responsibly. Spano v. The Boeing Co., 633 F.3d 574, 578–79 (7th Cir. 2011). 

For defined benefit plans, the rule under section 409 is clear: it provides a remedy 

solely for a plan-wide breach and limits the available remedy to what the statute 

expressly provides. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985); 

Spano, 633 F.3d at 579 (rules from Russell “apply in a straightforward way to definedbenefit plans”). Because Schatzel’s requested relief—payment of a pension to him—is 

not authorized by section 402 and because he does not allege a plan-wide breach, his 

fiduciary duty claims cannot be brought under section 502(a)(2). 

 Defendants argue that Schatzel’s fiduciary duty claims are similarly improper 

under ERISA section 502(a)(3). They rely on Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 

(1996), which construed section 502(a)(3) as a “catchall” provision that “acts as a safety 

net, offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that [section] 

502 does not elsewhere adequately remedy.” 516 U.S. at 512. Thus, the Court 

concluded, “we should expect that where Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief 

for a beneficiary’s injury, there will likely be no need for further equitable relief, in which 

case such relief normally would not be appropriate.” Id. at 515 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). As one judge in this district has noted, the trend among the circuit courts is to 

interpret Varity “to hold that a plaintiff ‘whose injury creates a cause of action under 

[section 502(a)(1)(B)] may not proceed with a claim under [section 502(a)(3)].’” Schultz 
15

v. Prudential Ins. Co., 678 F. Supp. 2d 771, 778 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (quoting Korotynska v. 

Metro. Life Ins. Co., 474 F.3d 101, 106 (4th Cir. 2006)). Though the Seventh Circuit has 

not expressly decided the issue, it has also observed that “a majority of the circuits are 

of the view that if relief is available to a plan participant under subsection (a)(1)(B), then 

that relief is unavailable under subsection (a)(3).” Mondry v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 

557 F.3d 781, 805 (7th Cir. 2009). Other courts in this district have agreed that a claim 

under section 502(a)(3) for conduct that is actionable under another part of the statue is 

improper. See, e.g., Krase v. Life Ins. Co., No. 11 C 7659, 2012 WL 4483506, at *3 

(N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2012) (relevant inquiry is whether adequate remedy exists under 

section 502(a)(1)(B)); Hakim v. Accenture U.S. Pension Plan, 656 F. Supp. 2d 801, 808 

(N.D. Ill. 2009) (equitable claim cannot proceed when identical claim exists under 

ERISA section 204(h)); Jurgovan v. ITI Enters., No. 03 C 4627, 2004 WL 1427115, at *4 

(N.D. Ill. June 23, 2004) (section 502(a)(3) claim must be dismissed because duplicative 

of relief sought under section 502(a)(1)(B)). 

 Section 502(a)(1)(B) allows a plan participant to “recover benefits due to him 

under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify 

his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 

That section expressly provides Schatzel with a remedy for a wrongful denial of 

benefits. Schatzel has not provided any reason to depart from the trend followed by 

both a number of federal circuit courts and a number of judges in this district. Because 

the actions of which he complains in his fiduciary duty claims are cognizable under 

section 502(a)(1)(B), the Court dismisses the fiduciary duty claims. 

D. Central States’s motion for summary judgment 
16

 Central States has moved for summary judgment on Schatzel’s claim for benefits 

under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B). 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). Western Pennsylvania, on the 

other hand, has not moved for summary judgment on Schatzel’s section 502(a)(1)(B) 

claim. Thus in addressing Central States’s motion, the Court will address only 

Schatzel’s claim vis-à-vis Central States and will not comment on his claim against 

Western Pennsylvania. 

 Under ERISA, a court reviews the denial of benefits de novo, “unless the benefit 

plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for 

benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 

489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); Tompkins v. Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund, ___ F.3d ___, 

No. 12-1995, 2013 WL 952424, at *3 (7th Cir. Mar. 13, 2013). If the plan gives the 

administrator discretionary authority, a court applies an “arbitrary and capricious” 

standard of review. Hess v. Reg-Ellen Mach. Tool Corp. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan, 

502 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2007). The parties agree that Central States’s pension plan 

provides such discretionary authority and thus the arbitrary and capricious standard 

applies. 

The Court’s review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is deferential. 

Davis v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 444 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2006); Semien v. Life Ins. Co., 

436 F.3d 805, 812 (7th Cir. 2006). A plan administrator’s interpretation of a plan “is not 

arbitrary and capricious if it falls within the range of reasonable interpretations. 

Interpretations that controvert the plain meaning of a plan, however, may be 

overturned.” Green v. UPS Health & Welfare Package for Retired Employees, 595 F.3d 

734, 738 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
17

 The trustees of the Central States plan determined that Schatzel was not entitled 

to pension benefits. Specifically, the trustees noted that the plan does not provide for 

payment of a partial vested pension, and that to qualify for a vested pension, Schatzel 

must have earned ten vesting service years by participating with Central States solely 

and directly. The plan itself imposes an additional limitation on qualifying for a vested 

pension, requiring a participant to have a retirement date prior to January 1, 1987. (All 

fund participants who retired after that date are eligible for a contribution-based pension 

instead of a vested pension.) The trustees also noted that Schatzel had lost his vesting 

service years based on an extended break in service. The trustees made reference to 

the September 1986 letter to Schatzel in which Central States warned him of this “break 

in service” policy and advised him of the precise date on which credit for his vesting 

service years would expire. 

 The trustees further concluded that because Schatzel could not qualify for any of 

the eight types of pension benefits that the plan authorizes the fund to pay as a partial 

pension, he was not entitled to any pension benefits from Central States. This, too, is a 

reasonable interpretation of the plan. Article IV of the plan sets out the relevant criteria 

that a participant must meet to be eligible for the eight types of benefits that may be 

paid as partial pensions. Under the clear language of the plan, Schatzel did not satisfy 

the criteria for any of them. In particular, he did not satisfy the criteria for an “early 

retirement pension” as the Central States plan defines it. This provision permits a 

participant who is under fifty years old at the time he stops working in covered service to 

receive a pension only if he has at least thirty years of service credit. It is undisputed 

that Schatzel did not satisfy this requirement. 
18

 In assessing Schatzel’s claim, the trustees identified the relevant provisions of 

the plan that barred his claim and explained to him the reasons that they were denying 

the claim. For this and the other reasons just described, the Court concludes that no 

reasonable fact finder could conclude that the trustees’ decision to deny his claim was 

arbitrary or capricious. See Hess v. Reg-Ellen Mach. Tool Corp., 423 F.3d 653, 658 

(7th Cir. 2005) (court should not set aside denial of benefits if based on any reasonable 

interpretation of a plan). 

 Schatzel alternatively argues that even if the trustees’ decision was not arbitrary 

and capricious, the trustees are estopped from denying him a pension because Central 

States’s July 14, 1989 affidavit of service was a promise to him that he had earned 4 

3/12 service years that would go toward a reciprocal pension with Western 

Pennsylvania. Schatzel contends that he relied on that representation to his detriment 

and that Central State reasonably could have expected its representation in the affidavit 

to induce Schatzel’s actions. As discussed more fully above, Schatzel originally 

asserted promissory estoppel as a separate state law claim, but because ERISA 

completely preempts that claim, the Court will consider his arguments in the context of 

his ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) claim. 

 Under federal common law, an ERISA plaintiff seeking to invoke promissory or 

equitable estoppel against a defendant must show: “(1) a knowing misrepresentation; 

(2) made in writing; (3) with reasonable reliance on that misrepresentation by the 

plaintiff; (4) to [his] detriment.” Coker, 165 F.3d at 585. The affidavit, dated July 14, 

1989, identifies Schatzel as the employee in question, identifies the two employers for 

which he worked while participating in the Central States pension fund, and identifies 
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the “Application” as one for “Pension Benefits.” Compl., Ex. 2. The affidavit then 

certifies that Schatzel “worked 4 3/12 years under a continuous labor contract 

negotiated by this Union.” Id. The affidavit did not include any representation, however, 

that Central States would participate in a reciprocal pension with any other fund, nor did 

it describe any benefits that Schatzel was entitled to receive based on his years of 

service. The reference to “Pension Benefits” in the “Application” line of the affidavit is 

somewhat ambiguous, and it is possible that a reasonable finder of fact, drawing 

inferences in Schatzel’s favor, could conclude that the affidavit suggests that those 4.25 

years of work have some import that is relevant to his entitlement to a Central States 

pension plan. Id. No reasonable fact finder, however, could conclude that based on 

this isolated ambiguous reference, Central States was representing to Schatzel that it 

would participate in Western Pennsylvania’s reciprocal pension plan. 

 In short, no rational finder of fact could conclude that Central States knowingly 

made misrepresentations in its June 1989 affidavit. Schatzel’s argument that Central 

States should be estopped from using the language of its pension plan against him 

therefore fails. Because the trustees’ decision to deny his claim for pension benefits 

was neither arbitrary nor capricious, Central States is entitled to summary judgment on 

Schatzel’s section 502(a)(1)(B) claim for benefits. 

Conclusion

 For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Western Pennsylvania’s motion 

to dismiss [docket no. 29], grants both of Central States’s motions to dismiss [docket 

nos. 26 and 44], and grants Central States’s motion for summary judgment [docket no. 

21]. Counts 1 through 4 and Count 7 of Schatzel’s amended complaint are therefore 
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dismissed. The Court denies Schatzel’s motions to strike [docket nos. 32, 33, and 34]. 

The case is set for a status hearing on April 29, 2013 at 9:30 a.m. to set a schedule for 

pretrial proceedings and trial on Schatzel’s remaining claim against Western 

Pennsylvania. 

 

 MATTHEW F. KENNELLY 

 United States District Judge 

Date: April 22, 2013