United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-1417

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Darren M. McDonald

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri 

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Submitted: November 14, 2022

Filed: February 16, 2023

[Unpublished] 

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Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Darren M. McDonald pled guilty to unlawfully possessing methamphetamine 

and fentanyl with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), and unlawfully 
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possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court1

sentenced McDonald to 43 months of imprisonment. 

McDonald appeals, arguing the district court miscalculated the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) range from which it based its sentence. 

McDonald specifically contends the district court wrongly determined his base 

offense level by concluding his past conviction under Missouri Revised Statute

§ 571.030.1(4) was a “crime of violence” for purposes of the Guidelines. 

Section 571.030.1(4) makes it a crime to “knowingly . . . [e]xhibit[], in the 

presence of one or more persons, any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an 

angry or threatening manner . . . .” McDonald maintains that because a person could 

be convicted for violating this Missouri statute without intending to injure or threaten 

another person, it does not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 

use of physical force” as necessary to be considered a crime of violence as defined 

by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). Our precedent has long held otherwise. See United 

States v. Pulliam, 566 F.3d 784, 787–88 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding Mo. Rev. Stat. 

§ 571.030.1(4) is a “violent felony” for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act); 

United States v. Hudson, 851 F.3d 807, 808–10 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding the same

Missouri offense is a “crime of violence” as defined by § 4B1.2 of the Guidelines). 

In Pulliam, we explained “displaying an operational weapon before another 

in an angry or threatening manner qualifies as threatened use of physical force 

against another person.” 566 F.3d at 788. Under this same rationale, we later held 

a conviction under this Missouri statute qualified as a crime of violence for purposes 

of the Guidelines. See Hudson, 851 F.3d at 808–10. McDonald argues Pulliam and 

Hudson no longer control in light of the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Borden 

v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1833 (2021) (plurality opinion). According to 

McDonald, Borden established that the “use of force” definition excludes state 

1

The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, then Chief Judge, now United States 

District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
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crimes defined by the creation of risks of injury not requiring an intentional design 

to cause harm to another person. We previously rejected a similar characterization 

of the case, explaining that “[w]hen the plurality and concurring opinions are read 

together, . . . Borden holds only that the force clause categorically excludes offenses

that can be committed recklessly.” United States v. Larry, 51 F.4th 290, 292 (8th

Cir. 2022). Because Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1(4) “plainly requires that the crime 

be committed with knowledge[,] . . . . Borden’s holding . . . does not affect our circuit 

precedent[.]” Id. We are bound to follow this precedent and thus affirm the 

judgment of the district court. See id. 

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