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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JACQUES RIVERA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 12-CV-4428

v. )

) Judge Joan B. Gottschall

REYNALDO GUEVARA et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

This civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law comes before the court on 

four post-judgment motions either renewing a pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law 

(“JML”), see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), or seeking a new trial, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). The court 

denies the motions. 

The issues at trial largely mirrored those that arose at summary judgment. The summary 

judgment opinion set out and discussed the factual background and contested issues in detail. 

See Rivera v. Guevara, 319 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1020–38 (N.D. Ill. 2018). Plaintiff Jacques Rivera 

(“Rivera”) has maintained throughout this litigation that the City of Chicago (“the City”) and 

several former Chicago police officers fabricated and suppressed evidence in an effort to frame 

him for the 1988 murder of Felix Valentin (“Valentin”). Rivera spent more than 20 years in 

prison for the Valentin murder before the sole eyewitness to the shooting, Orlando Lopez 

(“Lopez”), recanted his identification of Rivera as the shooter.

Some defendants were dismissed at summary judgment, and Rivera dismissed others 

voluntarily during trial. By the end of the trial, the City of Chicago and four former Chicago 

police officers remained as defendants. The jury found in favor of one defendant, Gillian 

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McLaughlin (“McLaughlin”), and held liable the other defendants, the City, Reynaldo Guevara 

(“Guevara”), Steve Gawrys (“Gawrys”), and Edward Mingey (“Mingey”), (collectively “officer 

defendants”). The jury awarded plaintiff $17 million in compensatory damages and the 

following punitive damages as follows: $75,000 against Guevara, $75,000 against Mingey, and 

$25,000 against Gawrys. Verdict, ECF No. 673.

Renewed Motions for JML: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendants renew written motions for JML made during trial. ECF Nos. 707, 711. This 

court reserved ruling on the pre-verdict motions for JML until the jury returned its verdict. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). Once that occurred, the court ruled on the motions in an 11-page order 

entered July 20, 2018. ECF No. 676.

Defendants have forfeited many of the grounds on which they now seek JML. A postverdict Rule 50(b) motion “is only a renewal of the preverdict motion[;] it can be granted only on 

grounds advanced in the preverdict motion.” Passananti v. Cook Cty., 689 F.3d 655, 660 (7th

Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), comm. note (2006 amend.)) (other citation omitted). 

With the exception of the issue discussed below, defendants advance sufficiency of the evidence 

challenges in their Rule 50(b) motions. They argue that they did not have the opportunity to 

present these issues before the jury retired to deliberate. But in this case, defendants filed briefs 

on these issues before the jury retired. The issues defendants raise do not involve pure questions 

of law such as contract interpretation. The Rule 50(b) cases defendants cite do not, therefore, 

help them.

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 1 See Lawson v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 791 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 2015) (“although a Rule 50 motion ordinarily 

is required to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the trial evidence, questions of contract interpretation are 

different. They involve pure questions of law unrelated to the sufficiency of the trial evidence.”); Petit v. City of 

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The following arguments made by the City have been forfeited: Part III.C; Part I.E., and

Part III. The court also agrees with the City and plaintiffs that a Rule 50(b) analysis of the issues 

briefed for purposes of preserving the record in Part III of the City’s Rule 50(b) motion is 

unnecessary given the court’s ruling on the jury instructions at the Rule 50(a) stage. See ECF 

No. 707 at 13–16; Rule 50(a) Mot. Ruling at 9, ECF No. 676. Furthermore, defendants Mingey 

and Guevara offer no reason to depart from the court’s waiver ruling at the Rule 50(a) stage. 

Given that they failed to develop adequately any sufficiency of the evidence arguments in their 

pre-verdict motion, all of the sufficiency arguments they join in the officer defendants’ joint postverdict motion for JML (ECF No. 711) are forfeited. See Rule 50(a) Mot. Ruling at 6 (citing 

Williams v. Dieball, 724 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2013)). Finally, defendant Gawrys failed to 

preserve the following sufficiency of the evidence arguments made in his pending Rule 50(a) 

motion: the arguments in Part I.A; Part I.C; and Part II and III (these are based expressly on 

forfeited arguments).

Even if the court were to reach the foregoing sufficiency of the evidence challenges, 

defendants have given the court no adequate reason to enter JML. 

[I]n entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court should review 

all of the evidence in the record. In doing so, however, the court must draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make 

credibility determinations or weigh the evidence . . . . Thus, although the court 

should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the 

moving party that the jury is not required to believe. That is, the court should give 

credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence 

supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the 

extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.

 

Chicago, 239 F. Supp. 2d 761, 767–69 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding party failed to preserve issues raised for the first 

time in Rule 50(b) motion because party had opportunity to raise them pre-verdict).

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Robinson v. Perales, 894 F.3d 818, 833 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson 

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000)). The court’s prior rulings, 

particularly the summary judgment opinion and the order on pre-judgment Rule 50(a) 

motions, address the sufficiency of the evidence issues defendants raise in detail, and the 

court hews to those decisions.

One issue defendants raise could not have been anticipated before the verdict. 

Defendants argue that the jury’s finding of no liability for McLaughlin is inconsistent with 

holding them liable.2

 They contend that the verdict on McLaughlin requires entry of JML for 

them or a new trial. The court addresses this issue here under both the Rule 50(b) standard and 

the Rule 59 standard discussed below. “If possible, this court must reconcile apparently 

inconsistent verdicts, rather than overturn them. A party claiming that inconsistent verdicts have 

been returned is not entitled to a new trial ‘unless no rational jury could have brought back’ the 

verdicts that were returned.” Deloughery v. City of Chicago, 422 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2005) 

(quoting Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 677 (7th Cir. 1985)) (internal 

citation omitted). The verdicts here can be reconciled, so neither JML nor a new trial is 

warranted.

The court understands the common elements of defendants’ argument to run this far.

Among other thing as to McLaughlin, Rivera sought to prove that McLaughlin supervised a 

lineup on August 31, 1988, evidence of which was suppressed allegedly by McLaughlin. By 

rejecting liability for McLaughlin, the jury must have concluded either that the lineup did not 

 2 Given the ruling that follows, the court does not find it necessary to address the potential conflict in defendants’

contention that all defendants must be found not liable given that McLaughlin was found not liable. 

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occur or that evidence of it was not suppressed or exculpatory for Brady3 purposes. See Officer 

Defs.’ Mot. JML at 10–11, ECF No. 711; City Mot. JML at 4, ECF No. 707. The officer 

defendants’ argument ends here; they submit that holding them liable is inconsistent with any of

the jury’s conclusions about McLaughlin. See ECF No. 711 at 11. But the verdicts can be 

reconciled in many ways. For example, defendants ignore the possibility that the jury believed 

McLaughlin’s testimony that she was not involved with the Valentin investigation after August 

31, 1988, and found that McLaughlin did not join a conspiracy with the other officer defendants. 

This is but an example. To say the least, defendants ignore a substantial body of evidence 

supporting the jury’s verdict on independent grounds. See generally Rivera, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 

1020–38. As the verdict on plaintiff’s due process claims rests on sufficient evidence, even 

putting aside plaintiff’s theories about McLaughlin’s role in the August 31, 1988, lineup, the 

officer defendants’ inconsistency challenge fails as does the City’s challenge to the extent it is

based on the argument that the no liability finding for McLaughlin means that no officer 

defendant could have been individually liable. 

The City appears to make another argument, but it is underdeveloped. The City points 

out that McLaughlin was the sole detective named as a defendant. Without McLaughlin’s

liability the City reasons that “[t]he jury could not have found the City liable for any of its 

alleged Brady-compliance policies, as they pertain to detectives.” ECF No. 707 at 4. What the 

City means by this is not at all clear to the court, for the City does not explain which policies it

thinks relate to detectives and which do not. See id. In any event, the jury had an ample basis in 

 3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

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the record to impose Monell liability on several policies not facially related to detectives, such as 

customs and practices concerning disclosing and maintaining investigative files. The court 

therefore rejects this underdeveloped argument as a basis for entering JML or ordering a new 

trial.4

 

Motions for New Trial

Defendants make partially overlapping arguments in their Rule 59(a) motions for new 

trial. The following list uses a single sequence to number the issues. The City argues that: (1) 

the verdict on Rivera’s Monell5 claims was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the 

verdict resulted from erroneous evidentiary rulings; and (3) errors in instructing the jury require a 

new trial. See City Mot. New Trial, ECF No. 708. The officer defendants move for a new trial 

on the following grounds: (4) the court’s evidentiary rulings concerning defendants Guevara and 

Mingey’s invocation of their Fifth Amendment testimonial privilege were erroneous and 

prejudicial; (5) the court made erroneous evidentiary rulings by (a) excluding evidence regarding 

Felipe Nieves, (b) barring one of defendant’s experts from testifying, and (c) admitting allegedly 

undisclosed opinions from one of plaintiff’s experts; (6) the verdict was against the great weight 

of the evidence; (7) the conduct of Rivera’s trial counsel throughout considered cumulatively 

 4 Rivera also argues that the court should find that defendants waived any objection to an inconsistent verdict by 

failing to object before the jury was discharged. Pl.’s Combined Resp. 40, ECF No. 735. The Seventh Circuit has 

not ruled on this issue, but it has noted more than once that several other circuits have found waiver where a party 

failed to object timely to an inconsistent verdict. See, e.g., Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 844 (7th Cir. 2010); Pearson 

v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 739 (7th Cir. 2006). The court need not find waiver here, but it does find that no timely 

inconsistency objection was made. Defendants could have made such an objection before the jury was discharged. 

5 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691–95 (1978).

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prevented the officer defendants from receiving a fair trial; and (8) the foregoing errors 

cumulatively require a new trial. See Officer Defs.’ Mot. New Trial, ECF No. 713. 

“A new trial may be granted if the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or 

the trial was unfair to the moving party.” Clarett v. Roberts, 657 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2011) 

(quotation marks omitted); see also Marcus & Millichap Inv. Servs. of Chicago, Inc. v. 

Sekulovski, 639 F.3d 301, 313 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that parties seeking a new trial “bear a 

particularly heavy burden”). A new trial is warranted for purported errors in evidentiary rulings 

“only if the error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the determination of a jury 

and the result is inconsistent with substantial justice.” Lewis v. City of Chicago Police Dep’t, 

590 F.3d 427, 440 (7th Cir. 2009). “[E]ven if a judge’s decision is found to be erroneous, it may 

be deemed harmless if the record indicates the trial result would have been the same.” Id.; see 

also Alverio v. Sams Warehouse Club , 253 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2001).

Defendants have given the court no sufficient reasons to order a new trial by revisiting 

the evidentiary rulings at trial or the numerous motions in limine (items 2, 4, and 5). 

Defendants rehash rulings at the summary judgment and motion in limine stages. Specifically, 

defendants revisit rulings on the admissibility of Dr. Wells’ expert testimony, see Ruling on Mot. 

in Limine No. 7, ECF No. 547; the admissibility of “after-acquired” evidence regarding Felipe 

Nieves (including rulings on whether the proverbial door had been opened to this evidence at 

trial), see Ruling on Mot. in Limine No. 9, ECF No. 526; and the court’s handling of defendant’s 

expert Judge Wasilewski–a matter that was litigated exhaustively during trial through a motion 

for reconsideration, see ECF Nos. 550, 638. Defendants have not shown that any of these rulings

were wrong individually or cumulatively, much less that a new trial is warranted. Defendants

express disagreement with the rulings but little else of persuasive value. They cite no legal 

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authority that was, or could not have been, cited pre-verdict. Defendants have not carried their 

burden to establish either that these rulings were wrong or that, if errors they were, they were 

prejudicial enough to warrant a new trial. See, e.g., BP Amoco Chem. Co. v. Flint Hills Res., 

LLC, 697 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1037 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Goldberg v. 401 N. Wabash Venture LLC, 

2013 WL 4506004, at *25–30 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2013).

Defendants also assert that they were prejudiced by the questioning of defendants 

Guevara and Mingey (items 2 and 4). As was predicted before trial, both witnesses answered 

almost all the questions put to them by invoking the Fifth Amendment testimonial privilege. 

Defendants claim that the court allowed Rivera’s counsel to misstate the law and introduce

factual theories and a theory of Monell liability for which there was no other foundation in the 

record. Defendants lodged numerous foundation objections during Mingey and Guevara’s 

testimony, and the court ruled on them. Defendants argue that the court “inhibited” defendants 

from objecting by overruling their objections repeatedly, Officer Defs.’ Mot. New Trial 8, ECF

No. 713; see also id. at 14, 17 (acknowledging objections were made; conceding that claimed 

prejudice “may not have been apparent to the Court at the time’”). Defendants’ claim that the

court somehow cowed their lawyers is risible. The record of the testimony itself, defendants’ 

subsequent request for a mistrial on grounds similar to those raised here, and the entire trial 

transcript show that counsel on all sides of this very contentious trial were undeterred from 

preserving the record and objecting vociferously and often. Accordingly and in light of 

counsel’s failure to object and for all of the reasons stated at trial, a new trial is not warranted on 

this ground. See Willis v. Lepine, 687 F.3d 826, 838 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Bankcard Am., Inc. v. 

Universal Bancard Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 477, 482 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming denial of Rule 59(a) 

motion and finding that defendant waived objections not made at trial).

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For similar reasons, defendants’ recycled arguments concerning limiting instructions and 

final jury instructions (item 3) were fully litigated at trial. Again, defendants offer no newly 

issued case law that should change the court’s mind, and their disagreement with the court’s 

rulings do not warrant a new trial here. 

Neither have defendants shown the verdict was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence (items 1 and 6). The City essentially recapitulates arguments against Monell liability 

considered and rejected at summary judgment, at the motion in limine stage, and when litigating 

jury instructions. The City catalogs the issues, but its arguments are ultimately reruns. See City 

Mot. New Trial 1–16, ECF No. 708. The verdict against the City was not against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. The court adheres to its prior rulings. 

Turning to the officer defendants’ manifest weight arguments, the court recognizes that it

has broader discretion when deciding whether to order a new trial than when considering a 

sufficiency of the evidence challenge. See Mejia v. Cook County, Ill., 650 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 

2011); Gen. Foam Fabricators, Inc. v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 695 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1982). 

Even so, “[a] verdict will be set aside as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only if 

‘no rational jury’ could have rendered the verdict.’” Willis, 687 F.3d at 836 (quoting Moore ex 

rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuelja, 546 F.3d 423, 427 (7th Cir. 2008)). Particularly in light of this 

standard, the officer defendants’ arguments fail to persuade. They first say that Rivera built his 

case primarily on adverse inferences improperly drawn from Mingey and Guevara’s testimony. 

ECF No. 713 at 30. The court has already dealt with this issue (see preceding page).

Defendants’ remaining arguments are unconvincing. The jury findings on the questions

whether the first lineup occurred (which was not corroborated by Lopez’s testimony alone) and 

whether the police officers to whom Lopez testified he recanted did not go against the evidence’s 

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manifest weight. Significant evidence, including written police reports, corroborate the existence 

of the first lineup. And it would be almost impossible to obtain further evidence corroborating 

Lopez’s testimony about his recantation to Guevara since only one other person (McLaughlin)

was alleged to have been in the room at the time. The court notes that the jury was particularly 

attentive to the testimony and evidence surrounding Lopez’s recantation, as indicated by the 

refusal to impose liability on McLaughlin, whom plaintiff argued was the other person in the 

room. For all of these reasons and more, the verdict will not be disturbed as against the manifest 

weight of the evidence.

The final two items charge cumulative error (items 7 and 8). Defendants say that the 

cumulative misconduct of plaintiff’s trial counsel plus all of the alleged errors they catalog 

warrant a new trial. See Whiting v. Westray, 294 F.3d 943, 944 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing 

standard for cumulative error based on alleged attorney misconduct). After applying the 

applicable standards, the court does not find that the trial was “fundamentally unfair.” Christmas 

v. City of Chicago, 682 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Powell, 652 F.3d 

702, 706 (7th Cir. 2011)). 

The lawyers fought each other tooth and nail for nearly four weeks, and it is fair to 

characterize the tactics used by counsel for all parties as hard-nosed at most times. Emotions ran 

high. Rivera spent more than 20 years in prison for a crime he did not commit. He argued that it 

was the defendants’ fault. The defendants had many responses, chief among them that Rivera’s 

ordeal was tragic but ultimately Lopez’s fault. 

From the court’s observations, the jury was unusually engaged and attentive. The 

seriousness with which it undertook its task and its attention to the details of the complicated 

facts showed great facility in penetrating the dense fog of facts and arguments created by counsel 

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on all sides. The court’s observations of the jury are borne out in the verdict itself. The jury did 

not give plaintiff all of the actual damages he sought, it declined to impose liability on one of the 

defendants entirely, and it apportioned punitive damages among the three officer defendants in a 

way that is consistent with careful consideration of their comparative culpability. To be sure, 

defendants have identified isolated incidents of conduct of plaintiff’s counsel that test the 

elasticity of the concept of zealous advocacy, see ECF No. 713 at 34-36. When objections were 

made, the court reigned plaintiff’s counsel in. Nevertheless, considering the trial as a whole and 

for the foregoing reasons, the court perceives nothing approaching fundamental unfairness here 

nor the sort of prejudicial misconduct that warrants a new trial. Accordingly and for all of the 

reasons stated herein and in the court’s prior rulings, defendant’s post-verdict motions under 

Rules 59(a) and 50(b) are denied.

It is so ordered.

Date: September 20, 2019 /s/ 

Joan B. Gottschall

United States District Judge

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