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NIST Special Publication 862 (ICSSC TR14)

1994 Northridge Earthquake

Performance of Structures, Lifelines,

and Fire Protection Systems

Diana Todd, Nicholas Carino, Riley M. Chung, H. S. Lew, Andrew W. Taylor,

William D. Walton, James D. Cooper, and Roland Nimis

j

.U57

NO. 862

1994
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NIST Special Publication 862 (ICSSC TR14)

1994 Northridge Earthquake

Performance of Structures, Lifelines,

and Fire Protection Systems

Diana Todd

Nicholas Carino

Riley M. Chung

H. S. Lew

Andrew W. Taylor

William D. Walton

James D. Cooper

Roland Nimis

Building and Fire Research Laboratory Federal Highway Administration

National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Transportation

Gaithersburg, MD 20899-0001 Washington, DC

May 1994

U.S. Department of Commerce

Ronald H. Brown, Secretary

Technology Administration

Mary L. Good, Under Secretary for Technology

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Arati Prabhakar, Director
National Institute of Standards U.S. Government Printing Office

and Technology Washington: 1994

Special Publication 862

Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol.

Spec. Publ. 862

181 pages (May 1994)

CODEN: NSPUE2

For sale by the Superintendent

of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, DC 20402
ABSTRACT

A magnitude 6.8 (Mg) earthquake centered under the community of Northridge in the San

Fernando Valley shook the entire Los Angeles metropolitan area at 4:31 a.m. local time on Monday, January 17, 1994. Moderate damage to the built environment was widespread; severe damage included collapsed buildings and highway overpasses. A total of 58 deaths were

attributed to the earthquake by the Los Angeles Coroner. About 1,500 people were admitted

to hospitals with major injuries; another 16,000 or so were treated and released. Estimates of

the number of people tem.porarily or permanendy displaced because of damage to their houses

or apartments ranged from 80,000 to 125,000. Estimates indicate that this will be the United

States' most cosdy natural disaster ever. A muld-agency team, organized under the auspices of the Interagency Committee on Seismic

Safety in Construcdon and headed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, arrived

at the earthquake site within days of the event to document the etfects of the earthquake. The

team focused on the effects to the built environment, with the goal of capturing perishable data

and quickly identifying situadons deserving in-depth study. This report includes a summary of

the team's observations. While most structural damage occurred in buildings and bridges of

construction type and vintage known to be vulnerable to earthquake shaking, there were some

unexpected failures. Notable among these were the collapses of reladvely modern parking

structures and a bridge that appeared to be adequate by today's standards. Recommendations

are made for further studies of the Northridge earthquake that can lead to improved mitigation

of earthquake effects.

Key words: bridges; building technology; buildings; earthquake; fire; lifelines; Northridge;

overpasses; seismic.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Immediate Impact of the Earthquake 1 1.2 Overview of Report 2

2.0 SEISMOLOGICAL AND GEOTECHNICAL ASPECTS 5

2.1 Seismological Aspects 5

2.2 Strong Ground Motion 9

2.3 Geotechnical Aspects 15

2.4 Summary , 16

3.0 PERFORMANCE OF BUILDINGS 17

3.1 General Observations 17

3.1.1 The Goal of Building Code Adoption and Enforcement 17

3.1.2 Behavior of Buildings 19

3.2 Single and Multi-Family Residences 22

3.2.1 Low-Rise Apartment Buildings 22

3.2.2 High-Rise Apartment Buildings and Hotels 28

3.2.3 Single-Family Dwellings 32

3.2.4 Manufactured Housing 32

3.3 Commercial and Institutional Buildings 36

3.3.1 Hospitals and Medical Facilities 36

3.3.2 Commercial Buildings 41

3.3.3 Unreinforced Masonry Buildings 47

3.3.4 Office Buildings 50

3.4 Parking Structures 62

3.5 Comparison with Effects of the 1971 San Fernando Quake 69

3.6 Summary 71

3.7 Suggestions tor Improving Practice 72

4.0 PERFORMANCE OF BRIDGES 75

4. 1 Overview 75

4.2 Review of Caltrans Seismic Design and Retrofit Program 76

4.2.1 Chronology of Seismic Design Criteria Adoption 76

4.2.2 Seismic Retrofitting of Bridges 77

4.3 Descriptions of Observed Damage 83

4.3.1 Interstate 5 (The Golden State Freeway) at Gavin Canyon Undercrossing 83

4.3.2 State Route 14 (The Antelope Freeway) Interchange with

Interstate 5 (The Golden State Freeway) 87

4.3.3 State Route 118 (The Simi Valley Freeway) 98

4.3.4 Interstate 10 (Santa Monica Freeway) Ill

4.3.5 Bearing Damage at Ventura Freeway/Hollywood Freeway

Interchange 122

4.3.6 Interstate 5, State Route 118, Southwest Connector 126

4.3.7 State Route 90/Interstate 405 Interchange, Jefferson Blvd.

V
Undercrossing 128

4.3.8 Abutment Damage 131

4.3.9 Other Bridge Damage 132

4.4 Summary 134

5.0 PERFORMANCE OF LIFELINE SYSTEMS 137

5.1 Introduction 137

5.2 Water and Wastewater Systems 138

5.3 Gas and Liquid Fuels 144

5.4 Electric Power 149

5.5 Transportation 152

5.6 Summary 155

5.6.1 Observations 155

5.6.2 Suggestions for Improving Practice 156

6.0 POSTEARTHQUAKE FIRES 157

6.1 Introduction 157

6.2 Fire Events Following the Earthquake 158

6.3 Fire Causes 159

6.4 Fire Spread 164

6.5 Performance of Fire Protection Systems 166

6.6 Summary 167

7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 171

7.1 Conclusions 171

7.1.1 General 171

7.1.2 Building Performance 171

7.1.3 Bridge Performance 172

7.1.4 Performance of Lifelines 173

7.1.5 Fire 173

7.2 Recommendations 174

7.2.1 Performance of All Structures 174

7.2.2 Building Performance 174

7.2.3 Bridge Performance 176

7.2.4 Performance of Lifelines 176

7.2.5 Fire Safety 177

8.0 REFERENCES 179

vi
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A strong earthquake centered under the community of Northridge in the San Fernando Valley

shook the entire Los Angeles area at 4:31 a.m. local time on Monday, January 17, 1994. The

surface wave magnitude, originally estimated at 6.6, was later revised upward to 6.8. January

17 was a federal holiday (Martin Luther King's Birthday) and, because of this and the early

morning hour, most nonresidential buildings were empty and traffic was light. This fortuitous

circumstance helped limit the number of deaths and injuries.

This earthquake, though not as large as the 1989 magnitude 7.1 Loma Prieta earthquake,

affected more people and caused more damage because it occurred in a heavily populated area. The epicenter of the Loma Prieta quake was about 95 km from downtown San Francisco, in a

sparsely populated region of the Santa Cruz mountains. The epicenter of the Northridge quake

was directly beneath a suburban area of houses, apartment buildings, shopping malls, hospitals,

schools, and a university campus. Estimates indicate that this will be the United States' most

costly natural disaster ever.

1.1 Immediate Impact of the Earthquake

The impact on the built environment was high. Many two and three-story apartment buildings

collapsed or were severely damaged. Hundreds of single-family homes suffered minor, but

disruptive damage. Several large commercial buildings collapsed. Hundreds of shops and

offices were closed because of nonstructural damage such as fallen ceiling tiles and broken glass.

Several hospitals were forced to evacuate their patients. The entire Los Angeles County school

system was shut down to allow for cleanup and damage repair. Eight large public parking

garages suffered partial or complete collapse. Seven major highway bridges were severely

damaged or destroyed by the shaking. Water mains broke and flooded streets; gas lines broke

and in some instances started significant fires. The entire Los Angeles area lost electric power.

As of Feb. 14, the Los Angeles Department of the Coroner had attributed a total of 58 deaths

to the earthquake. About 1500 people were admitted to hospitals with major injuries; another

16 000 or so were treated and released. Estimates of the number of people temporarily or permanendy displaced because of damage to their houses or apartments ranged from 80 000 to 125 000. As of early February, over 400 000 people had registered for various types of Federal

disaster assistance.

The normal functioning of the Los Angeles area was significantly disrupted by the highway

overpass failures. Most people in the area depend on personal automobiles for transportation;

the public transportation capacity is not as sizable as in large cities elsewhere in the country.

The failures in the interconnected electric power grid had a wide impact. Power was disrupted

briefly throughout the western United States and Canada. Water service was also disrupted.

Where water was flowing, a "boil-water" order was in effect in the epicentral region until late January.

1
Although the earthquake caused unprecedented damage and disruption, it also created an unprecedented opportunity to learn about earthquake mechanisms and effects. The earthquake

triggered more recordings of strong-ground motion than have ever been captured before. This

information on the response of the ground surface, buildings, and bridges, coupled with widereaching damage surveys and analysis of specific structures, can provide a wealth of new insight

into and understanding of earthquakes and their effects. Studies of the effectiveness of

emergency response and recovery can provide similar new knowledge that can help other

communities plan for disasters.

Twenty-three years prior to the Northridge earthquake, the same area was badly shaken by the

Richter magnitude 6.6 San Fernando earthquake. The 1971 earthquake was centered about 25

km northeast of the 1994 event. This provides an opportunity for studies to be made comparing

the performance of structures, the effectiveness of emergency response, and the robustness of

the recovery.

1.2 Overview of Report

Within hours of the quake. The Interagency Committee on Seismic Safety in Construction, a part

of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, began to organize a multi-agency

Federal reconnaissance team. Team members included:

National Institute of Standards and Technology

H.S. Lew

Riley M. Chung

Nicholas Carino

Andrew W. Taylor

Diana Todd

William D. Walton

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Michael Mahoney

Federal Highway Administration

James Cooper

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Sam Hacopian

U.S. Geological Survey

E.V. Leyendecker

Joining the team in the field was Los Angeles resident LeVal Lund, Civil Engineer. Most of

the team members arrived in the Northridge area on Wednesday, January 19, 1994. The team

noted and documented the effects of the earthquake, focusing on the effects to the built

environment and on the performance of lifelines and fire protection systems, with the goal of

capturing perishable data and quickly identifying situations deserving in-depth study. The team

was also available as a resource to Federal agencies that needed assistance in documenting

damage to their facilities.

Chapter 2 of this report presents basic information on seismological aspects of the quake and

availability of strong-motion records. Geotechnical effects, such as landslides, liquefaction, and

2
surface rupture, are also reviewed in Chapter 2. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 the performance of

selected buildings, bridges, and lifeline structures, respectively, is discussed. The cause of,

spread, and response to earthquake-induced fires are examined in Chapter 6. This report is not

a comprehensive compilation of damage. Selected examples of poor and good performance are discussed. The report concludes with recommendations for further studies which can lead to improved earthquake mitigation practices.

3

CHAPTER 2

SEISMOLOGICAL AND GEOTECHNICAL ASPECTS

2.1 Seismological Aspects

The epicenter of the earthquake that occurred in the Los Angeles area at 4:31 a.m. local time on January 17, 1994, was located at 34°12'N, 118°32'W, about 30 km west-northwest of Los

Angeles in Northridge (fig. 2.1). The National Earthquake Information Center has calculated

the surface wave magnitude of the quake as Ms = 6.8, an increase over their original estimate

of Ms=6.6. The focal depth has been estimated at about 15-20 km [1,2]. The strong shaking

lasted about 15 seconds in the epicentral area.

The Northridge earthquake is the largest event to have occurred in the Los Angeles area in this

century. The second largest, the Richter magnitude 6.6 San Fernando earthquake of 1971 (also

known as the Sylmar earthquake), was centered about 25 km to the northeast of the 1994

epicenter (fig. 2.2). Other notable earthquakes in the area, as documented in Catalog of

Significant Earthquakes 2150 B.C - 1991 A.D, published by the National Geophysical Data

Center [3], include the 1925 magnitude 6.2 Santa Barbara earthquake, the 1933 magnitude 6.4

Long Beach earthquake, the 1973 magnitude 5.9 Oxnard earthquake, the 1987 magnitude 5.9

Whittier Narrows earthquake, and the 1991 magnitude 5.8 Sierra Madre earthquake. In the

nineteenth century, a moderate quake with estimated maximum Modified Mercalli Intensity VIII

shook the Los Angeles area in 1855 and generated a tsunami. In 1812, forty people were killed

by an earthquake at San Juan Capistrano.

The San Andreas fault, generally acknowledged to be the boundary between the North American

and Pacific tectonic plates, which in this area trends southeast-northwest about 60 km northeast

of Los Angeles, has not experienced a significant earthquake along this portion of its length in the last two centuries. The scenario earthquake dubbed "The Big One" in the media is postulated as a magnitude 8 event occurring on the San Andreas fault.

The Northridge earthquake occurred on an unidentified fault. Because there was no distinct

surface rupture, definitive attribution to a specific fault may not be possible. However, records

from the mainshock and the aftershocks indicate that the rupture had a thrust focal mechanism,

striking 10° north of west and dipping 30° to 45° south [2,4,5] (fig. 2.3). Nearby known faults

include the Frew fault and the Santa Susana fault.

The entire San Fernando Valley and adjoining regions such as west and central Los Angeles,

Santa Monica, Malibu, Santa Clarita and the Simi Valley, were strongly or moderately shaken.

The shaking was reportedly felt as far south as the Mexican border and as far north as Oregon

(Los Angeles Times, January 18, 1994). Damage was concentrated in Los Angeles, Orange and

Ventura counties.

The aftershock activity is distributed largely to the north and northwest of the mainshock location

(fig. 2.2). The Southern California Seismographic Network reports that some aftershocks

occurred on the rupture surface of the 1971 event [4]. On the day of the event, two aftershocks

5
greater than magnitude 5 were recorded (5.9 and 5.6). As of late March, 1994, the largest

aftershock to have occurred since the date of the main event was a magnitude 5.3 shock on

Sunday, March 20, about 9 km east of the epicenter. The March 20 shock was the seventh

aftershock of magnitude 5 or greater.

Figure 2. 1. The epicenter of the January 17, 1994 Northridge earthquake was centered about

30 km northwest of Los Angeles in the San Fernando Valley.

6
Known faults Aftershock Zone

(EERC 1994)

Figure 2.2. The Northridge epicenter was about 25 km southwest of the epicenter of the 1971

magnitude 6.6 San Fernando earthquake. Aftershock activity of the 1994 event

has been concentrated to the north and northwest of the epicenter. Other past

earthquakes in this area are shown.
Santa Susana Mts.

Figure 2.3. The mainshock occurred on a previously unidentified thrust fault, near the Frew

and Santa Susana faults.

8

i
2.2 Strong-Ground Motions

Over a hundred strong-motion recorders were triggered by the event, including instruments

operated by the U.S. Geological Survey, the State of California, and several universities.

Instruments recorded free-field surface motions as well as the responses of a variety of buildings,

bridges, dams, and other structures. Record peak accelerations were recorded, both horizontally

and vertically. In the epicentral area, peak horizontal ground accelerations approached or exceeded Ig in several locations [1]. Among the nearly 100 permanent stations operated by the

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), peak horizontal ground accelerations exceeding 0.25g were

recorded at 11 sites. The Los Angeles Building Code specifies a design acceleration of 0.4g.

Figure 2.4 shows the locations of selected peak horizontal and vertical ground accelerations

recorded at sites operated by the USGS's National Strong Motion Program. Table 2. 1 lists peak

horizontal and vertical accelerations at selected ground and building sites 5 to 38 km from the

epicenter. The furthest USGS station triggered was at Skinner Dam, 153 km from the epicenter.

An accelerograph recorded on the grounds of the Veterans Affairs Hospital in Sepulveda is shown in Figure 2.5. Peak horizontal accelerations of 0.74g in the east-west direction and 0.94g

in the north-south direction were recorded. These transient peak accelerations were each one- time events and not typical of the body of the shaking. The peak vertical acceleration was

0.48g.

The strong-motion records, when analyzed, will provide a substantial body of information.

Preliminary acceleration response spectra show that in some locations and for some periods of

motion, the single-degree-of-freedom elastic response (5% damping) induced by the recorded

ground accelerations was significantly larger than the spectral acceleration specified as the basis

for design by the Uniform Building Code [6] for this region.

Figures 2.6 and 2.7, calculated by Hart Consultant Group from strong-motion data from the

California Strong Motion Instrumentation Program, present the spectral accelerations for five

percent damping of north-south, east- west, and vertical components of motion at two ground

sites, in Sylmar and Santa Monica. Also plotted is the lateral seismic design spectrum for the

Los Angeles area calculated using the design criteria of the Uniform Building Code [6].

In the parking lot of the county hospital in Sylmar, at a distance of about 15 km from the

epicenter, spectral accelerations in the north-south direction exceeded the design spectrum across

the entire range of periods (fig. 2.6). A significant peak of about 2.5 times the design value occurs between periods of about 0.3 to 0.5 seconds. For periods over 1.2 seconds, values of

about two times the design value were calculated. This suggest that both mid-rise and high-rise

buildings were severely tested at this location. The spectral accelerations associated with east- west motion exceed the design values for periods from about 0.5 to 1.0 seconds, but not to the

extent exhibited by the north-south motion. The peak horizontal acceleration recorded at this

site was 0.91g.

On the grounds of the Santa Monica City Hall (fig. 2.7), about 25 km south of the epicenter,

it was the east-west component of motion that created significantly high spectral accelerations,

exceeding design values by a factor of 1.5 to over 2.5 for periods from 0.1 to 0.5 seconds.

Values were at or below the design spectrum for higher periods, indicating that low-rise

9
buildings experienced more violent shaking than mid and high-rise buildings. The north-south

component generally did not generate values in excess of the design spectrum at this site. The

maximum horizontal acceleration recorded was 0.93g.

These spectral analyses are for two of the most extreme records recovered from this earthquake.

When all of the available records have been analyzed, substantial information will be available

for a fuller assessment of the appropriateness of the current design spectrum.

The high vertical accelerations recorded in numerous locations have induced discussions among

the engineering community over the need to consider vertical accelerations in design. Currently,

the model codes that serve as a basis for most building codes in this country only require

consideration of vertical accelerations in the design of cantilevered elements and post-tensioned

horizontal elements, and those only in regions of high seismicity. In the Northridge event, a

free-field vertical acceleration of 1.1 8g was recorded at Tarzana, about 6 km south of the

epicenter, and maximums of about 0.6g occurred at several other locations.

The strong-motion records obtained from instrumented buildings, bridges, and other structures

will provide information that can be used to calibrate and improve design and analysis

procedures. Some exceptionally high peak response accelerations in structures were recorded:

2.3 Ig horizontal acceleration on the roof of the county hospital in Sylmar; greater than 1.7g

vertical on the Pacoima Dam.

10
Source: USGS Legend: a 0-13 = Horizontal

0.06= Vertical

Figure 2.4. Peak horizontal and vertical ground accelerations recorded at some of the

instruments in the affected area operated by the USGS's National Strong Motion

Program.

11
Table 2.1. Peak Accelerations, January 17, 1994 Northridge Earthquake.

Location

Lpicentral

Distance

Peak Accel.

Horiz. Vert.

Los Angeles, 6301 Owensmouth Ave., Roof, 12 stories 5 km 0.48g 0.48g

Los Angeles, Sepulveda VA Hospital, Ground 7 km 0.94g 0.48g

Los Angeles, 5805 Sepulveda Blvd., Roof - 9 stories 7 km 0.76g 0.50g

Los Angeles, 16000 Ventura Blvd., Roof - 13 stories 8 km 0.41g 0.37g

Los Angeles, 15250 Ventura Blvd., Roof - 13 stories 8 km 0.61g 0.43g

Jensen Filter Plant, Administration Building, Basement 12 km 0.62g 0.40g

Jensen Filter Plant, Generator Building, Ground 12 km 0.98g 0.52g

Sepulveda Canyon, Spillway Building, Ground 14 km 0.43g 0.1 6g

Topanga, Fire Station, Ground 15 km 0.34g 0.19g

Los Angeles, Brentwood VA Hospital, Ground 18 km 0.29g 0.1 6g

Los Angeles, 10920 Wilshire Blvd., 19th Level 19 km 0.17g 0.24g

Los Angeles, 10751 Wilshire Blvd., Roof - 12 stories 19 km 0.40g 0.39g

Los Angeles, 10660 Wilshire Blvd., Roof - 19 stories 19 km l.OOg 0.51g

Los Angeles, Wadsworth VA Hosp., North Ground Site 19 km 0.26g 0.17g

Los Angeles, Wadsworth VA Hosp., South Ground Site 19 km 0.39g 0.14g

Los Angeles, 2029 Century Park East, 43rd Floor 20 km 0.32g 0.46g

Malibu Canyon, Monte Nido Fire Station, Ground 21 km 0.20g 0.17g

Los Angeles, 2121 Ave. of the Stars, Roof, 36 stories 21 km 0.43g 0.63g

Los Angeles, 1955 1/2 Purdue Ave., Basement 21 km 0.44g 0.1 6g

Los Angeles, 1955 1/2 Purdue Ave., First Level 21 km 0.50g 0.48g

Los Angeles, 1955 1/2 Purdue Ave., Third Level 21 km 0.63g 0.46g

Los Angeles, Griffith Observatory, Ground 24 km 0.29g 0.15g

Los Angeles, 1111 Sunset Blvd., Basement 31 km 0.13g 0.06g

Los Angeles, 1111 Sunset Blvd., 4th Floor 31 km 0.1 8g 0.09g

Los Angeles, 1111 Sunset Blvd., Roof - 8 stories 31 km 0.23g 0.1 6g

Lawndale, 15000 Aviation Blvd., Ground 38 km 0.1 8g 0.09g

Source: Porcella et al. 1994, USGS Open File Report 94-141

12
c

o

CO

CDO

<

Figure 2.5 Accelerograph record from the grounds of the Sepulveda Veterans Affairs Hospital,

7 km from the epicenter.
Figure 2.6 Response spectra, 5 percent damping, county hospital parking lot, Sylmar. (Source

Gary Hart, Hart Consultant Group; CSMIP records).

at

to

k—o

a>o

o

<

CO

1—

-*—

»

o

a>Q. CO

1.0

Period (s)

Figure 2.7 Response spectra, 5 percent damping, City Hall grounds, Santa Monica. (Source

Gary Hart, Hart Consultant Group; CSMIP records).

14
2.3 Geotechnical Aspects

The fracture of the thrust fault apparently did not reach the surface. No major surface faulting

had been identified as of late March. Because of the developed nature of large portions of the

affected area, surface distortions were not always readily visible, but had to be inferred from

crushed curb stones, buckled sidewalks, and wrinkled pavement. In the undeveloped hills and

canyons, fissures, slumps and other phenomena could be observed directly.

Landslides, rock slides and slope failures were the most visible geotechnical effect caused by the

earthquake. Landslides along the Pacific coast in Santa Monica and Malibu damaged several

buildings (fig. 2.8). Rockfalls in the Santa Monica, Santa Susana, and San Gabriel Mountains

closed roads. Mulholland Drive in Sherman Oaks was temporarily closed because of the threat

of slope failure.

Soil liquefaction was widely reported, but apparently caused little structural or agricultural

damage. Sand boils (surface eruptions of fine sand and water due to sub-surface liquefaction) were reported along the Pacific coast from Mugu Lagoon to the north to the Port of Los Angeles

in the south, and inland in the epicentral area, near the junctions of interstate highways 5 and

210 and 5 and 405 and in areas around Simi Valley northwest of the epicenter [2,5].

Liquefaction-related surface cracking and vertical offsets were reported at all sites where sand

boils were observed. At other sites, such as the Jensen Filtration Plant in Sylmar and the nearby

San Fernando Juvenile Hall, no sand boils were reported but lateral spreading and ground

settlement indicate that liquefaction occurred. Minor breaks in water, sewer, and other pipe

systems were widespread in areas of lateral spread and liquefaction.

Figure 2.8. A landslide along the Pacific Coast Highway north of Santa Monica undermined

the foundation of a house at the crest of the slope, bringing a portion of the house

down.

15
2.4 Summary

Spectral analyses of the strong motion records generated by the quake should be correlated to damage states of constructed facilities to assess the need for modifying design requirements. It would be premature to call for an increase in design values based on the high peak accelerations

recorded in this event without such an analysis. The maps that codes currently use to specify

design values are not intended to be predictions of maximum ground accelerations. Instead they

present "effective peak accelerations" related to the response characteristics of structures. Modern seismic design procedures are intended to produce structures with sufficient strength and

ductility to retain their integrity when cyclically stressed beyond their elastic limits. Thus,

buildings designed using modern code requirements should be able to resist transient

accelerations that exceed the design acceleration. A thorough assessment of the good and poor

performances of modern buildings relative to recorded ground motions will illuminate this issue.

16
CHAPTER 3

PERFORMANCE OF BUILDINGS

3.1 General Observations

The magnitude 6.8 Northridge earthquake provided the first full scale "test" of modern (post1970' s) seismic building codes in this country. For the first time, a large and varied population

of buildings was subjected to ground shaking equal to or exceeding that recognized in modem

codes for design. While the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake south of San Francisco was of larger

magnitude (7.1), the population of buildings in the epicentral region was relatively low. The

ground acceleration caused by that event in the urban areas of San Francisco and Oakland was,

in most cases, not as large as the design ground acceleration set for those locations by the

building code [7]. The epicenter of the Northridge earthquake was located in a heavily

populated urban/suburban area, the San Fernando Valley northwest of Los Angeles. In the

epicentral region, most buildings experienced ground accelerations equal to or greater than that

upon which the code design values are based.

The building damage caused by a magnitude 6.6 earthquake that occurred in the San Fernando

Valley in 1971 prompted significant revisions to earthquake design requirements. The 1976

Uniform Building Code (UBC) [6] is often specified as a "benchmark" code that ushered in "modern" seismic design methods [8]. Comparisons of building response in the 1971 and 1994

quakes give some insight into the efficacy of earthquake mitigation practices that have been

undertaken in the Los Angeles area in the intervening years.

3.1.1 The Goal of Building Code Adoption and Enforcement

The intent of building codes is to specify the minimum requirements needed for a structure to provide acceptable life-safety. For example, the 1990 National Building Code [9] states in Section 100.4,

"This code shall be construed to secure its expressed intent, which is to insure public

safety, health and welfare insofar as they are affected by building construction ..."

The 1991 Uniform Building Code Section 102 states,

"The purpose of this code is to provide minimum standards to safeguard life or limb, property and public welfare by regulating and controlling the design, construction, quality of

materials, use and occupancy, location and maintenance of all buildings and structures."

The seismic provisions of the Uniform Building Code are based on Recommended Lateral Force

Requirements and Commentary [10]. The commentary to that source document describes the

intent of the seismic provisions thus:

"Structures designed in conformance with these Recommendations should, in general, be

able to:

17
1. Resist a minor level of earthquake ground motions without damage;

2. Resist a moderate level of earthquake ground motion without structural damage, but

possibly experience some nonstructural damage;

3. Resist a major level of earthquake ground motion having an intensity equal to the strongest

either experienced or forecast for the building site, without collapse, but possibly with

some structural as well as nonstructural damage.

These expressed intents suggest that adherence to the minimum requirements of a building code

is not sufficient in itself to prevent damage from an earthquake. However, the damage that does occur should not be life-threatening. Viewed in this light, the Northridge earthquake

demonstrated the success of modern building codes. Of the 58 deaths attributed to the

earthquake by the Los Angeles Department of the Coroner as of February 14, 1994, only 22 were caused by structural failures of buildings. The population of the three affected counties

(Los Angeles, Ventura, and Orange) totals about nine million people; the number of earthquake

deaths represents only a very small fraction of the affected population.

However, 80 000 to 125 000 people were made temporarily or permanently homeless because

of damage to their homes and apartments. Schools, hospitals, offices, stores, and other

commercial and industrial enterprises were forced to close due to damage, much of it nonstructural. Viewed in this light, the Northridge earthquake demonstrated the limitation of

modem building codes. Because they do not include postearthquake serviceability requirements

for most buildings, they do not ensure preservation of normal building function after an

earthquake. Because they are not intended to prevent property damage in a large earthquake,

economic losses can be high.

Greater levels of protection can be provided. Our understanding of earthquake motions and

building responses is sufficient to allow buildings to be designed and constructed to be functional

after a design-level quake. For example, the state of California requires special consideration

of earthquake resistance for hospitals, with the intent of providing superior levels of protection

of function as well as occupants. However, this added protection adds to the cost of design and

construction. The question of how much protection to provide is not one for engineers to answer alone. All affected parts of society should participate in the weighing of costs against

benefits to determine how much protection of property and function should be required by

building codes.

In most circumstances, building codes cover only new construction or changes to existing

construction. Rarely does a jurisdiction adopt and enforce a building code requirement that

requires improvements to be made to existing buildings. For example, the city of Los Angeles

established a requirement that all unreinforced masonry buildings larger than a specified size that were constructed prior to 1934 be assessed for seismic adequacy and, if necessary, rehabilitated.

Requirements such as this can improve the seismic safety of a jurisdiction, but at potentially

significant cost to specific building owners. While engineers can identify classes of seismically

vulnerable buildings and develop requirements for upgrading those buildings, the decision to adopt and enforce such requirements is the responsibility of policymakers.

18
3.1.2 Behavior of Buildings

Within 10 km of the epicenter, unusually high ground accelerations were recorded. (See ch. 2.)

The Los Angeles building code is based on the Uniform Building Code [6], which specifies a zone factor for the Los Angeles area which is equivalent to a design acceleration of 0.4g. In some locations the actual peak ground accelerations exceeded the specified design acceleration

by a large margin. High vertical accelerations were also recorded. Current seismic design

practices require consideration of vertical accelerations only in horizontal post-tensioned or

cantilevered elements.

Buildings of all ages and types were damaged in the quake. However, it also should be noted

that many buildings of all ages and types performed well. In the epicentral area, from the

California State University, Northridge campus, to the Northridge Fashion Center mall, serious

damage occurred. Several pockets of severe damage occurred at widely separated locations,

such as downtown Santa Monica, along Ventura Boulevard in Sherman Oaks, downtown

Glendale, and Hollywood Boulevard in Hollywood (fig. 3.1).

Accelerograms reveal that north-south shaking greatly exceeded east-west shaking in many

locations [1]. The effects of this phenomenon were evident in the damage patterns, particularly

in the epicentral area.

After an earthquake, the safety of damaged buildings must be assessed. All jurisdictions in the

affected area used a system of red, yellow and green "tags" to indicate the condition of a damaged building as assessed by an official inspector. Red tags indicate a building is unsafe and

presents an extreme hazard. No one may enter a building once it has been posted with a red

tag. Yellow tagged buildings may be entered, but not reoccupied. In buildings posted with a green tag, the inspector found the level of damage would not pose a threat to life-safety; entry

and use of these buildings is not restricted [11].

A red tag does not automatically mean a building will be demolished. Jurisdictions typically use

red tags to denote buildings classified as a "public nuisance". In the city of Los Angeles, owners of red tagged buildings must complete repairs within thirty days or face demolition by

city-hired contractors (Los Angeles Times, March 25, 1994). Many red-tagged buildings are

repaired. All red and yellow-tagged buildings must be repaired to the satisfaction of the local

jurisdiction before they can be reoccupied.

In Los Angeles alone, over 60 000 buildings were damaged to some degree and required

inspection. Of these, 2076 were red-tagged as of early March, consisting of 1608 residential,

459 commercial, and 9 mixed-use buildings [2]. Yellow tags were issued to over 7000

buildings. The total number of red-tagged buildings throughout the affected area is estimated

to be about 3000 [2]. The distribution of red and yellow-tagged buildings in the affected area

is shown in Figure 3.2.

19
Figure 3.1. Serious damage to buildings caused by the magnitude 6.8 Northridge

earthquake was widespread, but, outside of the epicentral area, seriously

damaged buildings tended to occur in pockets.

20
Figure 3.2, Solid squares indicate locations of red-tagged buildings. Open circles indicate

yellow-tagged buildings. (Source: Integration Technologies)

21
3.2 Single and Multi-Family Residences

3.2.1 Low-Rise Apartment Buildings

Collapses in a single apartment complex caused sixteen of the twenty-two deaths related to building failures [12]. The Northridge Meadows complex, constructed in 1972 (Los Angeles

Times, January 19, 1994), consisted of several three-story wood-frame buildings, arrayed around

courtyards on two sides of a mid-block alley. About half of the units had open spaces for

parking on the street level. Typically these were around the perimeter of the complex. Most

of the interior courtyard-facing units had living space at the ground level rather than parking.

About half of the buildings in the complex collapsed. In all of the collapses, the first story gave

way while the second and third stories remained largely intact. The 16 people killed were in

first story apartments. All the buildings in the complex suffered some damage (figs. 3.3 and

3.4) .

The buildings were predominantly wood-frame, with wire mesh and stucco walls. Rows of steel pipe columns supported the upper stories along the building perimeter between parking bays (fig.

3.5) . Transverse walls were typically spaced about every three parking bays. Longitudinal

walls separated the parking areas from first story living spaces. The wire mesh and stucco

coating on these walls provided insufficient resistance to the lateral earthquake forces generated

by this earthquake.

The upper stories of the collapsed buildings were displaced laterally and in some cases came to

rest offset by as much as three meters from their original locations. The steel pipe columns,

which hinged at their bases, apparently controlled the distance of the offset as they bent to the

ground under the load of the building above (tig. 3.6). Collapses occurred in buildings aligned

longitudinally east-west as well as those aligned north-south. At the southeast end of the

complex, some building portions collapsed to the north, and other portions collapsed to the

south, which indicates that no one extreme pulse of energy brought all the buildings down.

The Northridge Meadows building configuration, two stories of living space in a long, narrow

building above one level of parking, is common in the San Fernando Valley. Many buildings

of this type sustained serious damage, and some collapsed. The typical apartment building

collapses occurred in buildings which had stiff, box-like upper stories supported by few walls

and flexible pipe columns in the parking areas below. Typical damage included racking of the

first story (fig. 3.7), horizontal cracks at the foundation-tlrst floor interface (fig. 3.8), and

diagonal cracking in stucco at corners of windows (tig. 3.9).

The Northridge Meadows apartment buildings and many others that suffered serious damage

were built in the late 1960's or early 1970's, when use of stucco for seismic resistance in lowrise buildings was not uncommon. Current codes require that when stucco is used for

earthquake resistance in areas of high seismicity, the entire building be designed to resist 1.33

times the earthquake force that is required in design of a plywood-sheathed building [6]. This

requirement effectively eliminates the use of stucco as a lateral force resisting element due to economic concerns. The 1970 Uniform Building Code did not have a similar requirement.

A more unusual collapse occurred in an apartment building of more recent vintage with the

22
entire first story used for parking, located on Sherman Way in Sepulveda. In this building, the

first story parking area was open only on the transverse ends. Concrete block walls formed the

longitudinal walls at the first story and a row of concrete columns supported the mid-span of the

flat plate concrete floor slab above. The two stories of living space over the parking level were wood-framed with a stucco facade. The entire line of mid-span concrete columns failed. The

two halves of the upper stories settled in towards the middle (figs. 3.10 and 3.11), essentially

destroying the structure.

Damage to low-rise unreinforced masonry apartment buildings was similar to damage to unreinforced masonry commercial buildings, as discussed in section 3.3.3.

Figure 3.3. This plan of the Northridge Meadows apartment complex shows the

distribution of parking and living spaces at the first level, and locations of

deaths (source: Los Angeles Times, January 24, 1994). The shaded areas

indicate the portions of the complex which collapsed.

23
Figure 3.4. At the Northridge

Meadows apartment complex near the

epicenter the first story in several of the

buildings collapsed, killing sixteen

people. The second and third stories

remained essentially intact. Large

portions of the first story in these

buildings were open space for parking.

This type of collapse occurred in a

significant number of similar apartment

buildings throughout the affected area.

Figure 3.5. Steel

pipe columns

between parking

bays supported the

upper stories of the

Northridge

Meadows apartment

buildings. Few of

the buildings in the

north half of the

complex collapsed,

but all were

damaged.
Figure 3.6. At

Northridge Meadows, the first story

steel pipe columns

generally hinged

near their bases but

retained their

length, controlling

the displacement of

the upper stories.

25
Figure 3.8. Horizontal cracks at the interface of the foundation wall (usually concrete) and

the first story (typically wood-framed with stucco facade) were often seen in

damaged low-rise apartment buildings.

Figure 3.9. Typical damage in to low-rise apartment buildings included diagonal cracks in

the stucco facade at the corners of windows and other openings. i

26

i
Figure 3.10. The central row of concrete first-story columns in a three story apartment

building on Sherman Way in Van Nuys collapsed, causing the wood-framed

upper stories to settle inward.

Figure 3.11. This overhead view of the partially-collapsed apartment building on Sherman

Way shows the solid concrete masonry block perimeter walls along the

longitudinal axis of the building. Access to the first story parking was

limited to the transverse ends of the building. When the row of interior

columns failed, both sides of the building settled in towards the middle.

27
3.2.2 High-Rise Apartment Buildings and Hotels

Champagne Towers on Ocean Avenue in Santa Monica, a 16-story concrete apartment building,

suffered serious damage. The condition of this building illustrates two classic examples of

earthquake damage: damaged coupling beams between linked shear walls and shear failure of

unintentionally short columns.

The transverse end walls are pierced by a single vertical row of window openings. The wall

segments between the windows act as coupling beams linking the wall segments on either side.

These coupling beams suffered serious diagonal cracking, increasing in severity from top to bottom of the building (fig. 3.12).

In the longitudinal direction, the lateral-force resistance is apparently provided by concrete

moment frames. The front of the building shows no sign of damage (fig. 3.13). At the back,

the columns and transverse wall ends are diagonally cracked (fig. 3. 14). Doors in the transverse

walls and open passageways connect the spaces behind these cracked columns in the middle third

of the building (fig. 3.15). The solid infill railings which rise to about mid-height of the

columns create an unintentional "short-column" effect. The solid railings made the bottom half

of each column extremely rigid. This forced the top half of the column to accommodate all of

the differential movement between stories. These shortened columns, apparently not detailed

to accommodate the motion, failed in shear. At the front of the building, metal pipe railings are provided at the balconies rather than solid infill, as at the back. This may partially explain why

there is no apparent damage at the front of the building.

The high-rise concrete apartment buildings directly adjacent to Champagne Towers were also

damaged, but to a lesser extent. Diagonal cracks in the facade of the building to the north were

already being repaired four days after the quake.

Several mid to high-rise concrete hotels in the Van Nuys area were damaged. Of particular

interest is the seven-story Holiday Inn. The building has end shear walls in the transverse

direction and a perimeter concrete moment resisting frame in the longitudinal direction.

Columns in the lower two stories were damaged in the 1971 San Fernando earthquake. These were subsequently repaired with epoxy injection and strengthened. Damage caused by the 1994

quake was concentrated at the top of the fourth-floor columns (fig. 3.16). This seems to suggest

that the dynamic characteristics of the building were changed due to the rehabilitation work in

1971. As a result, damage appears to have occurred in concrete members which did not sustain

damage in the 1971 event. This building was instrumented with strong-motion recorders, and

records are available from both the 1971 and 1994 quakes.

28
Figure 3. 13. The

front of the 16-

story Champagne

Towers building

had no apparent

damage. Note the

steel pipe railings at the balconies.

29
Figure 3.14. The

back of the Champagne Towers

building was badly

damaged. The

railings here are

solid infill, which

effectively stiffen

the lower half of

the columns. The

shortened upper

half of the columns were forced to accommodate all the displacement,

and they failed in

shear.

Figure 3.15. A closer view of the failed

columns at the back of Champagne Towers

shows minimal transverse reinforcement.

30
Figure 3.16. The bottom two stories of the concrete frame Holiday Inn in Van Nuys were damaged in the 1971 San Fernando quake and subsequently repaired. In the

1994 Northridge quake, damage was concentrated at the top of the fourth

floor columns.

31
3.2.3 Single Family Dwellings

Only a handful of single-family homes collapsed. One collapse was caused by a landslide which

undermined the foundation of a house overlooking the Pacific Coast Highway north of Santa

Monica. (See ch. 2.) A landslide in Malibu damaged several buildings at the foot of the slope.

In Sherman Oaks, two houses collapsed down steep hillside sites. Three people were killed in

these failures. The team did not observe any collapse of a single-family home that was unrelated

to a slope failure or hillside site.

The most common and easily visible damage to single family homes was damaged and collapsed

masonry chimneys (fig. 3.17). In some cases, the chimney fell onto and through the roof.

Cracked stucco, fallen roof tiles, and racked garage door openings were visible throughout the

affected area. Some houses shifted on their foundations. In the epicentral area, damage to concrete masonry fences at the edges of lots was almost universal (fig. 3.18). Piles of debris

outside many homes attested to widespread interior nonstructural and contents damage.

3.2.4 Manufactured Housing

The vulnerability of mobile homes to earthquake ground shaking was demonstrated once again

by the Northridge earthquake. For example, in a trailer park near the epicenter, at the

intersection of Nordhoff Street and Tampa Avenue, nearly every home had moved on its supports. These types of homes are usually supported on small concrete and metal base supports

(figs. 3.19, 3.20, and 3.21). These supports provide little resistance to lateral movements, and

toppled during the quake (fig. 3.22). The identical failure was observed in the 1971 San

Fernando earthquake. It is clear that no improvements in the practice of supporting

manufactured homes adequately against lateral loads have been made during the past twentythree years.

In some cases, the metal base supports were braced with small steel angle members. However,

they were not adequately fastened to the supports and did not prevent the supports from rocking.

Chapter 6 discusses fire ignition and spread in several trailer park communities.

32
Figure 3. 17. Failure of masonry chimneys was common.

Figure 3.18. Damage to masonry privacy fences was ubiquitous. Many of tiiese fences were

tall enough to have been a serious threat to passersby when they failed.

Luckily, due to the early morning hour of the quake, yards and sidewalks were

essentially deserted.

33
Figure 3.19.

Damage to manufactured

homes caused by

collapsed supports was common.

Figure 3.20. Small concrete base supports

are a common foundation system used to support manufactured housing. This type

of system provided little resistance to

lateral forces.

34
Figure 3.21. Another foundation system used for manufactured housing consists of

supports constructed of small metal angles.

35
3.3 Commercial and Institutional Buildings

3.3.1 Hospitals and Medical Facilities

Following the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, California enacted the California Hospital Act,

which attempted to improve the earthquake resistance of California hospitals by mandating

enhanced levels of design and construction. (The Hospital Act does not apply to convalescent

homes, nursing homes, or medical office buildings, only to acute-care facilities.) Despite these

strict requirements, two hospitals constructed after 1971 were inoperable after the earthquake:

the Holy Cross Medical Center and the Olive View Medical Center. Neither of the closures was

due to structural damage [2].

At both Holy Cross and Olive View, the original hospitals at the sites were badly damaged in

the 1971 San Fernando earthquake. The damaged structures were demolished and new facilities

constructed following the requirements of the Hospital Act. At both facilities, the structural

systems performed very well in the 1994 quake. At Olive View, damage to the sprinkler and

chilled water systems made the building temporarily unusable. Several air handling units on the

roof came off their supports. At Holy Cross, damage to the air handling system forced the

closure. A large portion of the facade of the roof-enclosure was detached when it was struck

by the damaged fan. The facility also suffered water damage from broken sprinklers and other

piping. These failures illustrate the need for all systems within critical facilities, not just the

structural system, to be sufficiently earthquake-resistant.

St. John's Hospital in Santa Monica was closed due to structural damage. The seven-story

northwest wing, which was about fifty years old, had severe diagonal cracks in the piers between

the windows (figs. 3.23 and 3.24). In the circa-1960's southeast wing, horizontal constructionjoint cracks were visible in the exterior walls.

Many buildings had significant amounts of damage in the few blocks surrounding the St. John's

Hospital complex. The concrete parking garage at the northwest end of the complex was

damaged; the exterior facade panels had diagonal cracks across each panel, and crushed toes

(fig. 3.25). To the southeast, a six-story concrete office building had cracked shear walls and

broken glass. Several of the columns in this building were also cracked.

To the southwest, the Bay Vista Health Care Center, a three-story concrete frame convalescent

home with parking space in the back half of the first story, was closed because of damage. At

the front of the building, earthquake forces had shifted the exterior facade relative to the

concrete foundation wall below, crushing the toe of the facade and spalling the corner of the

foundation wall (fig. 3.26). The second-story exterior facade panel over the south opening to the garage fell to the alley below. Two rectangular concrete piers in the garage area had

diagonal cracking, but did not spall significantly. Smaller square columns on the perimeter of

the garage area spalled at the top, revealing limited transverse reinforcement in the columns.

At the first floor parking area, concrete block infill walls laid in stack bond had diagonal cracks

running through the masonry units. Infill walls laid in running bond lost the top row of units

but did not crack diagonally.

The Berkley East Convalescent Hospital, directly northwest of the St. John's Hospital complex.

36
was also closed due to damage. The five-story building, constructed in the 1969, has an interior

concrete frame with shear walls, and exterior walls of reinforced clay masonry. In the basement

level parking area, none of the concrete slabs, columns, or shear walls showed any significant

cracking or spalling. The exterior masonry walls, constructed of two wythes of brick masonry

with a fully-grouted and reinforced space between them, were heavily damaged (fig. 3.27). The

walls on the southeast and northeast sides of the building had short perpendicular wing walls

separating balconies. The ends of many of these walls spalled at the first story, often at locations of lap splices of reinforcement at the wall ends (fig. 3.28). Between the wing walls,

the masonry above the windows had diagonal cracks. The northwest and southwest walls did

not have wing walls. The northwest wall suffered severe diagonal cracking and dislodging of

bricks in the piers between the first story windows. The southwest wall, which had fewer

windows, was not as badly damaged.

The Granada Hills Community Hospital on Balboa Avenue is directly adjacent to the five-story

Kaiser Permanente oftlce building that collapsed. (See section 3.3.4 for a description of the

Kaiser Permanente building.) There was no evidence of structural damage to this three-story

building. The hospital continued to operate, despite loss of water and heat (Los Angeles Times,

January 19, 1994). An emergency care center was established in the parking lot.

37
Figure 3.23. The seven-story northwest wing of St. John's hospital in Santa Monica

experienced severe X-cracking in the piers between the second story

windows.

Figure 3.24. The transverse reinforcement in the St. John's hospital window piers was

spaced at about 150-200 mm on center with 90^ hooks at the ends, typical for

construction of its age (about 50 years old).

38
Figure 3.26. The

Bay Vista Health

Care Center was

closed due to damage. Differential

movement between

the building and its base was indicated

by the crack at the

foundation line. The

comer of the concrete foundation wall

spalled, apparendy

due to crushing. A

facade panel over the

garage opening was

dislodged.

Figure 3.25. The concrete facade

panels of the St. John's hospital parking

garage had diagonal cracks and crushed

toes.

39
Figure 3.27. The facade of the five-story

Berkley Convalescent Hospital directly

adjacent to the St. John's Hospital

complex consisted of two wythes of brick

masonry with a reinforced and grouted

space between. In some places, all three

layers of this facade were destroyed

along lines of diagonal cracking. The

facility was evacuated.

Figure 3.28. Two

faces of the Berkley

Convalescent

Hospital had wing

walls separating

balconies. The

ends of these wing

walls spalled at the

lower stories.

40
3.3.2 Commercial Buildings

The collapse of large portions of the roof and floors of the three-story concrete Bullock's

department store at the Northridge Fashion Center mall could have caused more deaths than any

other single building failure in this earthquake. Many multi-story columns were left intact as the concrete slab floors and roof fell on top of each other to the basement, presumably due to punching shear failure of the slabs. The still-standing columns showed no evidence that slab

reinforcement had been continuous through the columns (tig. 3.29). At the roof level, about a

half meter of the column bar ends were bent over into the slab. The original building was

extremely irregular, with a non-rectilinear vertical profile (fig. 3.30). Even in extremely regular

buildings, this type of construction, which depends on the slab-column connection for momentframe action, is vulnerable to damage from earthquake forces.

Other stores at the Northridge Fashion Center were damaged, but none collapsed. The threestory Broadway, north and west of Bullock's, had horizontal cracks in the clay masonry facade

at each floor level, and crushing and spalling at the building corners at each floor level. The

soffits were also cracked (fig. 3.31). The Robinsons-May department store at the west side of

the mall had almost no visible exterior damage. Sears, to the south, lost facade and cornice

panels. Three of the parking garages at the Northridge Fashion Center were damaged. These

are discussed in section 3.4.

The area around the Northridge Fashion Center showed evidence of having been severely

shaken. Significant damage of many types occurred. South of the Northridge Fashion Center,

several single story retail structures were damaged; at least one, the Wherehouse, collapsed (fig.

3.32).

In the same area, the entire south wall of the concrete tilt-up Levitz furniture store fell away

from the building to the south (fig. 3.33). In tilt-up construction, the concrete walls are formed

and poured on the ground and, after the concrete cures, rotated into their final erect position.

The remains of the damaged roof of the Levitz store, a plywood diaphragm, appeared to be

supported by the top of the racks holding furniture.

To the south of the Levitz store/warehouse is a concrete stream channel and a set of railroad

tracks. A freight train derailed during the earthquake directly behind the Levitz, but neither

incident appeared to have caused the other. The embankments of a city street overpass to the

west of the Levitz store settled by about 350 mm. The overpass had to be closed.

To the south of the railroad tracks and channelized stream, damage fell off dramatically. A tilt- up concrete building to the west showed no evidence of damage. No structural damage was

visible in the modern single-story, reinforced masonry, garage-fronted commercial buildings (fig.

3.34), neither in the parapets nor the piers around the garage openings, doors, or windows.

Clean-up activities in progress suggested that damage did occur to contents of these buildings.

Numerous two and three-story buildings at the Topanga Plaza mall on the east side of Topanga

Canyon Boulevard in Canoga Park suffered damage to their facades, but none collapsed. A few

blocks to the north, the two story Chatsworth Post Office was closed due to damage: an exterior

41
being

facade panel had become detached and interior ceiling panels had fallen (fig. 3 35) Mail was collected in the parking lot. v^. jj;. man was

42
Figure 3.29. A portion of the concrete

waffle slab roof and the interior floor

slabs at the Bullock's department store

at the Northridge Fashion Center mall

fell to the basement, leaving many of

the columns standing. No reinforcing

steel can be seen in the remaining

columns that would have connected the

columns to the floor slabs.

HP

Figure 3.30. The

Bullock's department store had an extremely irregular

vertical geometry.

At the northeast end

it was shaped like a

truncated pyramid.

43
Figure 3.31. The Broadway department

store at the Northridge Fashion Center

had horizontal cracks in the facade and

spalled corners at each floor level, and

cracks in the soffit.

Figure 3.32. Many

commercial buildings were damaged

in the blocks south

of the Northridge

Fashion Center.

The single-story

Wherehouse collapsed completely.

44
Figure 3.33. The south wall of the concrete till- up i_evitz furniture store/warehouse south

of the Northridge Fashion Center fell away from the building into the alley

and stream channel. The damaged roof was being supported by the racks of

furniture. On the south side of the stream channel a freight train derailed

during the earthquake. That clean-up effort was still underway three days

after the quake.

Figure 3.34. The single-story modern masonry commercial buildings directly south of the

damaged Levitz furniture store and train derailment were apparently

undamaged. All parapets and piers between garage openings appeared intact.

45
Figure 3.35. The Chatsworth Post Office was closed due to damage. Mail was being

collected in the parking lot. ^

Figure 3.36. Damage to unreinforced masonry buildings, even those that had been

rehabilitated, was common. Upper stories and corners were particularly vulnerable to damage. The rows of light-colored diamonds on the face of

this building are the end plates of through-bolts used to connect the wall to the floor joists, a typical rehabilitation technique. The remains of parapet braces can be seen on the roof.

46
3.3.3 Unreinforced Masonry Buildings

Modem masonry construction in regions of high seismicity provides the ductility necessary for

the building to survive earthquake shaking by incorporating reinforcing steel and fully grouting

all the void spaces. This approach to masonry construction, known as reinforced masonry,

began to be used in California in 1934, after dramatic building failures caused by the 1933 Long

Beach quake demonstrated the vulnerability of unreinforced masonry.

Many pre- 1934 unreinforced masonry buildings still exist in the Los Angeles area. The

earthquake resistance of these buildings can be improved through rehabilitation. Most

rehabilitation schemes use through-bolts and face plates to connect the wood floor and roof

diaphragms to the masonry walls. These bolts are clearly visible on the exterior of a building,

simplifying identification of rehabilitated structures. Los Angeles has mandatory rehabilitation

requirements for unreinforced masonry buildings constructed prior to 1934. One and two-family

dwellings and small apartment buildings are exempted, so the statute affects primarily

commercial buildings. These rehabilitation requirements, known as Division 88, establish

criteria for "complete" strengthening, which, in addition to through-bolts, may require adding

interior wood shear wall partitions, incorporating new posts or other supplemental vertical load

resisting elements, infilling openings, or increasing wall thicknesses [13]. From exterior

inspection, it is not possible to tell whether a rehabilitation is "complete."

The business districts in Santa Monica and along Hollywood Boulevard in Los Angeles both

have significant populations of one to four-story commercial buildings of unreinforced masonry.

While Los Angeles has a mandated rehabilitation requirement for these types of structures, Santa

Monica does not. Nevertheless, rows of through-bolts can be seen on most unreinforced

masonry buildings in Santa Monica. Despite rehabilitation, many of the unreinforced masonry

buildings in Santa Monica and in Hollywood were badly damaged.

As a life-safety measure, rehabilitation was somewhat successful in the Northridge earthquake;

there were no complete collapses and no deaths of occupants. There were also no deaths or

injuries on the sidewalks adjoining the damaged unreinforced masonry buildings, but this was

due only to the early morning hour. Rehabilitation was not successful at preventing damage.

Serious damage occurred to many structures. Portions of buildings disintegrated; top stories and

corners were particularly vulnerable (figs. 3.36, 3.37, and 3.38). Common damage included

loss of significant areas of wall between rows of through-bolts. In some instances, only a single

wythe was dislodged (fig. 3.39); in others the entire thickness of the wall crumbled (fig. 3.40).

The same types of damage to rehabilitated buildings were noted following the 1987 Whittier

Narrows earthquake and the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake [7, 14]. In the 1989 Loma Prieta

earthquake, a significant portion of the people killed by building failures were outside

unreinforced masonry structures that lost portions of walls [7].

47
Figure 3.37. The corner of this rehabilitated unreinforced masonry apartment building in hast Hollywood crumbled on ail four stories.

Figure 3.38. A Close-up view of the third-story tloor diaphragm of the building picture above shows (lower right) a rehabilitation bolt still holding a few bricks to the floor joists, after all the walls on three out of four sides of the bolts had

disintegrated.

48
r

Figure 3.40. In other rehabilitated unreinforced masonry buildings, such as this two story

structure in Hollywood, entire wall thicknesses were lost between rows of

through-bolts.

49
3.3.4 Office Buildings

The most spectacular damage to office buildings occurred in mid-rise structures: the five-story

Kaiser Permanente office building on Balboa Avenue, the six-story Barrington Building on Olympic Boulevard, and the five-story Digital office building on Sherman Way.

The concrete frame Kaiser Permanente office building on Balboa Boulevard in Granada Hills

was badly damaged. The second story columns disintegrated, causing the upper stories to collapse onto the first story, which remained intact (fig. 3.41). At the ends of the building,

damage to the frame caused partial collapses, but the mid-section of the building remained intact.

The apparently nonstructural end walls became detached at both ends of the building and slid to the ground (figs. 3.42 and 3.43). The failure of these end walls may have contributed to the

damage to the frame at the ends of the building.

The bare frame exposed by the damage suggests that the buildings had a strong-beam/weakcolumn configuration (fig. 3.44). The damage appears to have initiated at the joints. At the

damaged ends, the beams and columns remained essentially intact, but the joints disintegrated.

The L-shaped concrete frame Barrington Building in West Los Angeles also had damage

concentrated in the second story columns (tig. 3.45). In this building, the horizontal

architectural panels stiffened the lower half of the columns at each story, creating a short-column

effect. The effectively shortened columns failed in shear between the windows, creating a

pattern of X-cracking in the columns that diminished in severity towards the top (fig. 3.46). At

the second story, the cracking was severe enough to cause a loss of vertical-load-carrying

capacity; the bulging window frames indicate about a 50 to 100 mm reduction in height (fig.

3.47). The building was demolished within a few days of the quake.

The column-shortening effect of the infill panels was apparently not considered in the design.

Where column reinforcing was exposed, transverse bars of undeformed steel spaced at about 300

mm on center could be seen (fig. 3.48), not suftlcient to provide confinement of the concrete

in a region of high shear.

A five-story steel and concrete office building occupied by the Digital Equipment Corporation on Sherman Way lost the enclosing masonry end wall and stair tower (fig. 3.49) on the east side

of the building. The corresponding wall on the west side of the building was damaged, but

remained standing. The masonry facade did not continue to the ground, but was supported on

a steel angle at the level of the second-story tloor. On the west side of the building, this wall

was crushed at the toe (fig. 3.50). On the east side of the building, the entire wall came off the

supporting angle. The connections between the wall and the building frame appeared to be

minimal (fig. 3.51). Other than these end walls, the building performed well. In the

longitudinal direction, only a few panes of glass were broken on the tlrst story.

A steel-frame office building on the west side of Topanga Canyon Boulevard in Canoga Park,

housing the American Savings Bank, experienced significant movement in its first story columns,

apparently swaying in a north-south direction during the quake. It did not return to its original

position, but suffered a permanent offset to the north (fig. 3.52). A nearly identical building on the same site, oriented at right angles to the tlrst, had only minor damage to glass at the first

50
story. The first-story column heights of the two building differed significantly: the columns in

the undamaged building were noticeably shorter than the columns in the damaged structure. The

damaged building illustrates the classic problem of a "soft" first story. It is interesting to note

that several glass-clad high-rise buildings in the vicinity showed no evidence of damage.

The business district along Ventura Boulevard in Sherman Oaks was another area with

significant numbers of badly damaged buildings. The 13-story Trans World Bank Building is located at 15233 Ventura Boulevard (fig. 3.53). There is a two-level underground garage below

the building and a mechanical penthouse on the roof. This reinforced concrete frame building

was designed under the 1964 Los Angeles City code. Structural damage was in the first-story

columns, primarily at the second-floor beam-column joints. Identical failures occurred during

the 1971 San Fernando earthquake. The damaged joints were repaired with epoxy shortly after

the 1994 earthquake (fig. 3.54).

The Radisson Valley Center Hotel is located at 15433 Ventura Boulevard in Sherman Oaks (fig.

3.55). This 13-story concrete structure sustained serious damage to columns located at the first and fifth stories. Exterior columns which support the three-story appendage at the front of the

hotel were also damaged (fig. 3.56)

The 22-story American Pacific State Bank is located diagonally across from the damaged

Radisson Hotel (fig. 3.57). The building is clad with large glass windows, and there was no

evidence of window or other damage. However, the eight-story parking garage behind the bank

sustained damage to columns. They were being repaired shortly after the quake.

A four-story steel frame structure located at the intersection of Moorpark Street and Cedros

Avenue in Sherman Oaks was shaken seriously during the earthquake (tig. 3.58). The exterior

reinforced masonry wall was cracked in many places, particularly at the second floor level (fig.

3.59). The evidence of large ground shaking in the Sherman Oaks area was also seen by serious

lateral displacements of single family houses and three-story apartment buildings from their

foundation. In fact, a strong-motion instrument station in Tarzana located only a few kilometers

away from this general area recorded the largest acceleration in this earthquake (1.82g

horizontal, 1.1 8g vertical).

In the weeks following the quake, reports surfaced about surprisingly large numbers of damaged

steel-frame buildings, which, as a class, have been considered relatively earthquake-resistant.

Failure modes reported include brittle fractures of column flanges, base plates, and welds at connections; and buckling of diagonal tube bracing (Los Angeles Times, Feb. 27, 1994) [2].

The team did not observe any of this damage, which is ordinarily concealed behind fireproofing

and finish materials. Further documentation of failures in steel frame buildings is needed.

51
Figure 3.41. The second story of the concrete frame Kaiser Permanente office building on

Balboa Avenue in Granada Hills completely collapsed. The first story was

relatively undamaged, suggesting it was far stiffer than the story above.

Figure 3.42. Both end walls of the Kaiser Permanente building slid, partially intact, to the

ground. The south wall is pictured here. Both ends of the building suffered

damage to the concrete frame at all story levels, while the middle half of the

building, except for the second story, remained intact.

52
I

53
Figure 3.45. The

six-story L-shaped

concrete-frame

Barrington Building on Olympic Boulevard in West Los

Angeles lost its vertical-load

carrying capacity at the second story.

Figure 3.46. The stiff infill panels of

the Barrington Building effectively

shortened the concrete columns, forcing

all the displacement into the column

sections bounded by windows.

Diagonal X-cracking decreased in severity towards the top of the building.

54
Figure 3.48. A close up of the damaged

southeast corner of the Barrington Building

shows the widely spaced, undeformed bars

used for transverse reinforcement.

Figure 3.47. The cracking in the

concrete columns at the second story

was so extensive that the vertical-load

carrying capacity of the building was

affected. The building settled 50-100

mm at the second story, as these

bulging window frames attest. The

worst damage was at the southeast

corner, the outside corner of the Lshape, pictured here. The building,

which developed a slight list, was

demolished within days of the quake.

55
Figure 3.49. The east end wall and

stair tower of a five-story apparently

steel-framed office building on Sherman

Way in Reseda collapsed. The

enclosing masonry wall became

detached from the structure and slid to the ground, with the upper stories

remaining intact. The doorway opening

in the wall, shown here resting at about

the second story level, originally

provided access from the top story to the stair tower.

1 Figure 3.50. The

similar west wall of

was damaged, but did

not peel away from

the structure. This

close up of the

interface between the

first and second stories

shows that the

masonry facade is supported on a steel angle. At the west

end of the building,

the facade was crushed

at the toe where it is supported by the

angle.

56
Figure 3.51. The exposed structure of

the Sherman Way office building shows

remains (at the floor level and the

column) of the minimal ties that

anchored the masonry facade.

Figure 3.52. The

first-story columns

of the steel-framed

building housing

the American

Savings Bank on Topanga Canyon

Road in Canoga

Park flexed during

the quake and

ended up slightly

displaced from

their original

positions.

57
Figure 3.53. The Trans World Bank

building, in Sherman Oaks, was damaged

in both the 1971 San Fernando and 1994

Northridge earthquakes.

Figure 3.54. The cracked beam-column

joints between the first and second stories

of the Trans World Bank building were

repaired using epoxy injection.

58

I
Figure 3.55. The concrete Radisson Valley Center Hotel in Sherman Oaks had serious

damage to the columns at the tlrst and fifth stories.

Figure 3.56. The columns supporting the three-story appendage at the front of the

Radisson Hotel had serious shear cracks and related spalling.

59
Figure 3.57. There was no evidence of

damage to the 22-story American Pacific

State Bank in Sherman Oaks. The

adjacent eight-story parking garage had

damaged columns.

Figure 3.58. The

reinforced

masonry facade of

this steel-framed

building in

Sherman Oaks

was badly

damaged.

60
61
3.4 Parking Structures

Eight major public parking structures suffered collapse or severe damage: two at the Northridge

Fashion Center, and one each at California State University at Northridge, Sherman Oaks

Fashion Square, Glendale Fashion Center, Glendale Civic Center, the Trans World Bank in

Sherman Oaks, and the Kaiser Permanente West Los Angeles Medical Center (Los Angeles

Times, February 4, 1994). Many other parking structures suffered less spectacular, but

nevertheless serious, damage. The damaged parking structures were scattered throughout the

affected area.

The four-level parking garage at the California State University at Northridge campus was built

in 1991 of precast concrete with cast-in-place concrete slabs. The lateral resisting system was

an exterior perimeter frame constructed of precast "trees" (columns with half-length beams cast as one piece) connected in the field to form a moment frame. Major portions of the structure collapsed.

The collapse apparently started at the interior of the building. The exterior perimeter frame was

pulled over towards the center of the structure (tig. 3.60), suggesting that interior beams had

lost their vertical support, causing the floor plates to collapse and pull the exterior walls in with

them. While some interior columns had collapsed, others were left intact, jutting up above the

fallen floor slabs (fig. 3.61).

The five-level parking garage at the Kaiser Permanente medical complex on Cadillac Avenue

in West Los Angeles experienced a similar collapse. All four facades were pulled inward,

suggesting that an interior failure precipitated the damage (fig. 3.62). This garage was a posttensioned cast-in-place concrete structure with shear walls providing the lateral-force resisting

system at the east and west ends, and moment frames at the north and south perimeter. The

shear walls were cracked horizontally throughout their height due to the out-of-plane bending

(fig. 3.63). There was minor diagonal cracking, suggesting that the lateral load was not fully

transmitted to the shear walls. The stair towers remained standing. Typically, these towers are

structurally isolated from the post-tensioned slab to minimize potential deformations in the

towers due to creep and shrinkage in the post-tensioned slabs.

The two-level concrete parking structure adjacent to the Trans World Bank in Sherman Oaks had

been seismically strengthened after suffering serious damage in the 1971 San Fernando quake.

Flared extensions were cast next to the interior columns along their north-south axes (fig. 3.64),

creating short wing walls supporting the precast beams. During the 1994 quake, the

unrehabilitated exterior columns were badly cracked (fig. 3.65). The ramp was also heavily

damaged. The interior columns were relatively undamaged.

At the Northridge Fashion Center, three parking structures suffered damage. A large three-level

concrete garage at the south end of the site, approximately 10 years old, suffered an almost

complete collapse. The largely pre-cast concrete structure had intermittent shear walls which

remained standing (fig. 3.66). The lack of diagonal cracks in these walls suggests that, like the

walls at the Kaiser Permanente garage, they were never fully loaded. A similar, but smaller,

precast garage at the north end of the Northridge Fashion Center also partially collapsed (fig.

3.68). At the east end of the site, an older two-level cast-in-place concrete garage showed

62
evidence of movement. All visible columns had spalled at the top, implying that the beams and

slab had interacted in a weak-column/strong-beam frame action.

Common types of damage in other parking garages included shear-failure in unintentional short

columns created by ramps or split-level decks (fig. 3.67) and collapsed decks caused by invertedT's or concrete planks pulling off supports (fig. 3.68).

Much of the damage in parking structures was due to configuration problems inherent in garages: there are minimal amounts of nonstructural elements such as walls and facade that add

stiffness and energy-absorbing capacity in other types of buildings; configuration requirements can lead to lack of redundancy in the structural systems; long spans are common; inclined ramps

cause incomplete diaphragms and short columns; topping can create an artificially thick slab

which may lead to weak-column/strong beam action. Precast concrete also has inherent seismic

problems: precast buildings are typically massive and thus generate high inertial forces; it is difficult to provide ductility in the joints; because it is necessary to allow for movement due to shrinkage, creep, thermal changes, etc. , it can be difficult to ensure a complete load-path. When

garages are constructed of precast concrete members, special care must be taken to address all these potential problems.

63
Figure 3.60. The three-year old four-level parking garage at the Northridge campus of

California State University partially collapsed in the earthquake. The

collapse apparently started at the interior, causing the exterior frame to be

pulled in to the middle of the structure. Precast concrete "trees" were

connected to form a moment-resisting frame at the exterior of the structure.

Figure 3.61. Some interior columns of the Northridge campus parking garage remained

standing.

64
Figure 3.62. The

cast-in-place concrete

parking garage at the

Kaiser Permanente

Hospital complex in

West Los Angeles

collapsed in on itself. The moment frame

that provided lateral resistance on the south

face of the structure could not resist the

out-of-plane forces

apparently caused by

the collapse of interior

elements.

Figure 3.63. At the east and west faces

of the Kaiser Permanente Hospital

parking garage, shear walls made up

the lateral force resisting system. Both

walls had horizontal cracks caused by

the out-of-plane bending when the walls were pulled inward. Neither wall had

major diagonal cracking, suggesting that

the lateral load was never fully

delivered to the walls. The stair towers

remained erect. The east wall and stair

tower are shown here.

65
Figure 3.64. The

interior columns of

the two-level

parking garage at the Trans World

Bank in Sherman

Oaks had been

seismically

strengthened after it suffered damage in

the 1971 San

Fernando quake.

The interior

columns fared well

in the 1994

Northridge quake.

Figure 3.65. The exterior columns of

the Trans World Bank parking garage,

which had not been strengthened, were

badly damaged.

66
mi mm

Figure 3.66. At

the Northridge

Fashion Center,

major portions of

the three-level south

parking garage collapsed. The garage

was precast concrete with intermittent shear walls.

Most of the shear

walls remained

standing, largely

undamaged, indicating that the lateral load was not adequately transmitted

to these walls.

Figure 3.67. In parking garages, ramps

can cause unintentionally shortened

columns, which are vulnerable to damage, as shown here.

67
Figure 3.68. In precast parking garages, the support of the double-tees that comprise the

NonhHH ' '^'T^'V'''' " ^'^'^ g^^^g^' the north end of the No thndge Fashion Center, illustrates a common failure: the double-tees

pulled off their supports, leaving the supporting elements essentially intact

68
3.5 Comparison with Effects of the 1971 San Fernando Quake

In 1971, the San Fernando Valley was devastated by a magnitude 6.6 quake centered in Sylmar,

about 25 km northeast of the Northridge epicenter. These two quakes provide a unique

opportunity for us to examine how well the U.S. earthquake engineering community learned the

lessons of the 1971 quake.

Some of the findings and recommendations published after the 1971 event sound almost identical

to those heard in the days and weeks following the Northridge event.

"Numerous recordings of horizontal accelerations which greatly exceeded those envisioned

in formulating the current lateral force requirements are reason to review and possibly

increase seismic coeftlcients currently in use." [15]

"In view of records of vertical ground accelerations of the same order of magnitude as horizontal accelerations, the presence of vertical seismic forces can no longer be ignored."

[15]

"Deformation and deflection, as well as strength, should be considered in earthquake-resistant

design." [15]

"Numerous failures were observed in apartments and single-family homes where large

openings in walls were provided for garages or entranceways." [15]

"Comfort must not be sought in the fact that there was only minimal structural damage to the

new buildings because, in some instances, these same buildings suffered considerable

nonstructural damage which could have been an extreme hazard to its occupants." [15]

"Improved methods for supporting mobile homes should be developed and implemented."

[15]

However, the fact that each of these observations and recommendations could be made again

today in light of the Northridge earthquake does not mean that no progress has been made in the

intervening years. In fact, the Northridge earthquake demonstrated some dramatic improvements

in seismic hazard mitigation practices for buildings.

Hospitals fared dramatically better in 1994. In 1971, three hospital complexes, the Olive View

Medical Center, the San Fernando Veterans Administration Hospital, and the Holy Cross

Hospital, suffered major structural damage, leading to collapse or demolition of some buildings.

Several other hospital complexes had serious structural damage but no complete collapses. In 1994, structural damage in hospitals built after 1971 was almost non-existent.

In 1971, a significant number of single family houses collapsed, particularly split-level houses

[15]. Relatively few single family houses collapsed in 1994.

As a class, unreinforced masonry buildings performed poorly in 1971 . There were two complete

collapses of pre- 1933 masonry buildings on the grounds of the Olive View Hospital complex

69
[16]. Another masonry building on site was so badly damaged it was later pulled down.

Portions of masonry walls were dislodged as far as 30 km away, in central Los Angeles.

Because the 1971 quake was centered in the northern section of the San Fernando Valley, areas such as Santa Monica and Hollywood, which have large concentrations of unreinforced masonry

buildings, were not severely shaken. One contemporary report speculated, "It is clear that if the earthquake had centered some 20 miles farther south, in the old part of town, many old

buildings would have collapsed." [16] The 1994 event did occur about that distance to the

south, but the predicted collapses did not occur. This must be attributed, at least in part, to the

fact that a significant portion of the vulnerable unreinforced masonry buildings in the area had

been seismically rehabilitated prior to the quake.

70
3.6 Summary

The strong shaking of the 1994 magnitude 6.8 Northridge earthquake challenged the lateral force

resisting systems of the buildings in the San Fernando Valley area. The vast majority of affected

buildings successfully met the challenge, retaining their structural integrity, even though nonstructural elements and contents were damaged. From the behavior of the buildings that did not

perform successfully, the following conclusions can be drawn:

In most cases, buildings designed and constructed using modern (mid-1970's or later)

seismic requirements performed well structurally. Most buildings that did collapse either:

- had a structural system known to be vulnerable to earthquake damage, such as unreinforced masonry walls or non-ductile concrete frames, or

- were sited in a situation known to be vulnerable, such as on or below a steep hillside.

Structural damage that was not due to one of these causes included fractures in steel frame

buildings (which have traditionally been considered inherently earthquake-resistant) and damage

to parking garages.

Many lessons learned from previous earthquakes were demonstrated again in the Northridge

quake:

- a complete load path is necessary to transmit the earthquake-induced forces to the

elements designed to resist them

- nonstructural damage can cause hospitals, schools, businesses, and industrial facilities to be inoperable, even if structural damage is slight or non-existent

- manufactured homes will be severely damaged or destroyed if they are not adequately

anchored

Soft first stories due to open parking space with few walls below stiffer upper stories are vulnerable to excessive distortion and collapse.

Structural elements that are not considered a part of the lateral-force-resisting system can

fail and initiate collapse if they are not detailed to accommodate drift.

The unique configuration problems of parking garages (ramps, short columns, incomplete

diaphragms) suggest that they need special design consideration.

Rehabilitation of unreinforced masonry buildings using bolts to connect horizontal

diaphragms to walls provides only limited improvement - most total collapses were avoided,

but serious cracking of masonry and some loss of brick was nevertheless widespread.

71
3.7 Suggestions for Improving Practice

From common aspects of the buildings that were damaged, suggestions for improving seismic

mitigation practices for buildings can be developed.

1. Involve the community in decisions on the level of performance to be required in the

building codes.

Our country's building codes are intended to protect life-safety but not to limit economic losses.

Greater levels of earthquake protection can be provided. In general, our understanding of

earthquake motions and building responses is sufficient to allow buildings to be designed and

constructed to be functional after a design-level quake. However, this added protection adds to the cost of design and construction. The question of how much protection to provide is not one

for engineers to answer alone. All affected parts of society should participate in the weighing

of costs against benefits to determine how much protection of property and function should be

required by building codes.

2. Educate code users to improve the quality of new buildings.

Many failures occurred at locations of abrupt changes in the strength or stiffness of a building:

the failed second story of the Kaiser Permanente building on Balboa Avenue; the sheared

columns stiffened by infill at Champagne Towers and the Harrington Building; the offset first story columns in the steel-frame building housing the American Savings Bank on Topanga

Canyon Boulevard. These failures emphasize the need for buildings to be designed as integral,

interactive systems rather than mere agglomerations of code-complying parts. Successful designs

will consider the behavior of the entire structure under earthquake loads.

Another significant category of failures resulted from incomplete or inadequate load paths.

Shear walls of the Northridge Fashion Center parking garage were left standing, uncracked,

when the columns and slabs around them fell, indicating that the lateral load was never

transferred to these elements that were intended to resist them. The oftlce building on Sherman

Way with inadequate connections between the masonry facade on the transverse end wall and

the structure is another example of costly damage caused by an incomplete load path.

Overall building behavior and complete load paths are not design aspects that lend themselves

to codification. No building code can anticipate every possible building design and be written

to prevent any possible problem. Insightful use of the code by the designers is required.

Significant improvements in the seismic capacity of our nation's building stock requires

education of building designers and constructors to impart an understanding of building behavior

in earthquakes, and how their efforts can affect that behavior. This earthquake has demonstrated

that the building codes in force in the affected area are very effective when they are insightfully

applied. Education of practicing architects, engineers, contractors, and building officials through

seminars, videos, pamphlets, and other methods, and education of future designers and builders

through universities and trade schools is recommended. Development and wide, low-cost

distribution of design guides for architects and engineers is also suggested.

72
3. Actively reduce the worst risks in existing buildings.

This earthquake demonstrated once again the imperative need to address the problem of

improving the seismic safety of existing buildings that are known to be vulnerable, particularly

unreinforced masonry and non-ductile concrete frame buildings.

A re-evaluation of the effectiveness and cost of rehabilitation of unreinforced masonry buildings

should be undertaken. Comprehensive studies of the performance of all unreinforced masonry

buildings in the affected area, both rehabilitated and unrehabilitated, should be performed to determine, statistically rather than anecdotally, the efficacy of various strengthening techniques.

This earthquake showed that the application of the current rehabilitation requirements does not

prevent life-threatening damage from occurring, but it does seem to prevent total collapse. The

cost and relative effectiveness of more drastic measures for minimizing falling brick, such as covering the masonry with a layer of shotcrete, should be investigated.

The impact of a mandated rehabilitation requirement for high-occupancy non-ductile concrete

frame buildings should be studied. The Bullock's department store and Kaiser Permanente office

building collapses demonstrated the potential for large loss of life that these buildings pose.

4. Develop improved requirements and design guidelines for specific building types and

systems.

Improved design guidance should be developed for nonstructural systems, with particular

attendon given to performance requirements of essential facilities.

The behavior of parking garages should be compared to the behavior of comparable buildings

(similar lateral force resisting systems, natural periods, level of ground shaking) to ascertain the

effect of interior partitions, exterior finishes, and other building-specific characterisdcs on

seismic performance. If found appropriate, special design provisions for parking structures should be developed.

73

CHAPTER 4

PERFORMANCE OF BRIDGES

4.1 Overview

The vast majority of bridges in the Los Angeles metropolitan area performed well in the

Northridge earthquake. Nonetheless, there were several cases of severe damage to bridges, or bridge collapses, which seriously impacted transportation patterns in the Los Angeles

metropolitan area. Besides the direct cost of repairing or replacing earthquake damaged bridges,

there were tremendous economic and social costs resulting from transportation delays. In addition, bridges which were taken out of service by the earthquake hampered emergency

response efforts immediately after the event.

According to statistics compiled by Willman et al. [17], there are approximately 12 000 state- owned highway bridges in California, and 2523 of these are located in Los Angeles County.

In California, 1313 highway bridges have been identified by the California Department of

Transportation (Caltrans) as needing seismic retrofitting, and of these about 20 percent have been

retrofitted. Of the highway bridges in Los Angeles County, 716 need seismic retrofitting, and

about 16 percent of these have been retrofitted.

Before 1971 the total cost of seismic damage to highway bridges in California was about

$100,000. In the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, the cost of damage to highway bridges totaled

about $15 million. In the Northridge earthquake, six major highway bridges collapsed, and 157

other highway bridges were damaged. The estimated cost to replace or repair these bridges is $1.5 billion. Before the Northridge earthquake, the estimated cost of retrofitting the

approximately 1000 bridges remaining on the Caltrans retrofit list was $1.1 billion.

In addition to the 2523 highway bridges in Los Angeles County, there are about 1500 street bridges owned by the Los Angeles County Government, and 800 street bridges owned by the

City of Los Angeles. Before the Northridge earthquake it was estimated that between one-fourth

and one-third of these bridges required seismic retrofitting, at a cost of approximately $250

million.

County and City bridges suffered less damage than Interstate and State highway bridges in the

Northridge earthquake. Only four of the bridges owned by Los Angeles County suffered

significant damage. The total cost of earthquake damage to County bridges is estimated at $1.6

million. Two City bridges (one a pedestrian overcrossing) were closed because of earthquake

damage, and another 60 suffered minor damage. The total cost of damage to City bridges was

estimated at $2 million. Since 1990, the City of Los Angeles has spent $12.9 million for

retrofitting bridges, and altogether $97 million will be spent by 1996 to retrofit 187 City bridges.

In this chapter an overview is presented of the evolution of seismic design and retrofit provisions

for bridges in California. This is followed by descritpions of damage to bridges observed

following the Northridge earthquake. Finally, conclusions are drawn and recommendations are made for future action to improve the seismic performance of bridges.

75
4.2 Review of Caltrans Seismic Design and Retrofit Program

4.2.1 Chronology of Seismic Design Criteria Adoption

Until relatively recently, almost all consideration of earthquake forces on structures and relevant

code provisions have been concentrated in building construction. The first requirement in the

United States for inclusion of seismic loading in the design of highway bridges was that of the

California State Highway Department in 1940 and the American Association of State Highway

Officials (AASHO)' in 1941.

The first edition of the Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges was issued by the American

AASHO in 1931. Since that time, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and its predecessor, the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR), have required that bridges constructed with

Federal funds be designed in accordance with these specitlcations.

Prior to 1941, AASHO bridge design specitlcations did not mention earthquake loads. However,

in 1933, the design calculations and specitlcations for the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge

required that a static force of 7.5 percent of the force of gravity be applied as an earthquake

load. The 1940 California State Highway Department (now known as Caltrans) bridge design

specifications indicated that the exact earthquake load applied to a structure should be determined

by the engineer; a specific value was not defined.

The 1941, 1944, and 1949 editions of the AASHO bridge design specifications in Article 3.2.1-

Loads, simply stated that "Structures shall be proportioned for . . . earthquake stresses." Article

3.4.1 of the specifications stated that structures designed for loads in combination with an earthquake load be designed for allowable stresses increased by 25 percent. However, there was

no recommendation or criterion as to how the earthquake load was to be determined or how it was to be applied to the structure.

Several revisions to the Caltrans and AASHO seismic design criteria were made between 1940

and 1971. The revisions were based on the same concept as the earlier criteria, namely the

application of a specified static lateral force to the structure.

The San Fernando earthquake of 1971 generated a revolution in earthquake design criteria.

Immediate changes were instituted by Caltrans to increase the 1963 code earthquake load level

by a factor of at least 2 for all bridges. In addition to the increased earthquake load level,

structural details were toughened considerably, and a seismic retrotlt program was instituted.

In 1972, the FHWA encouraged the use of the 1963 California formulation for lateral seismic

design force with the addition of a seismic risk zone coefficient for a more general application

throughout the country. The FHWA considered this formulation as an interim measure until the

AASHTO Specifications could be revised.

AASHO is the predecessor of AASHTO, the American Association of State Highway and

Transportation Officials.

76
In 1973, a major revision in seismic design criteria was instituted by Caltrans. It was initially

introduced in the form of a design memorandum, and was formally published as Design

Specifications in 1974. This utilized a maximum credible earthquake map developed by the

California Division of Mines and Geology to define earthquake potential in the State. It also

introduced the design of restraining features to limit the relative displacements of the

superstructure.

The 1975 AASHTO Interim Specifications were expanded to include the earthquake criteria

developed by Caltrans in 1973. A seismic risk map of the United States was included in this

edition.

In 1983 after substantial Caltrans- and FHWA-sponsored research, an AASHTO Guide

Specifications for Seismic Design of Highway Bridges was published. The 1983 AASHTO

Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges, retained the requirements of the 1975 AASHTO

Interim Specifications, but allowed the designer the option of using the Guide Specification.

The 1989 AASHTO Standard Specifications stated:

In regions where earthquakes may be anticipated^ structures shall be designed to resist

earthquake motions by considering the relationship of the site to active faults, the seismic

response of the soils at the site, and the dynamic response characteristics of the total structure in accordance with the following criteria or AASHTO Guide Specifications of

Seismic Design of Highway Bridges.

The criteria in the 1989 Standard Specifications generally were based on the 1973 Earthquake

Design Criteria for Bridges issued by the State of California. The California criteria were

developed for California conditions and subsequently modified to allow for their use in other

areas of the United States. The 1983 AASHTO guide specification was incorporated in the

standard specification in 1992, three years after the Loma Prieta earthquake.

The Caltrans design criteria have been revised periodically since 1974. The most recent update

was in 1989 with the refinement of its ARS elastic response spectra, where A, R, and S are

factors related to the maximum expected bedrock acceleration, a normalized rock response, and

a soil amplification spectral ratio. The Caltrans approach reduces the elastic response spectra

to strength design spectra through an adjustment factor, Z, to account for ductility and risk as a function of structure period, type, and component. Both the Caltrans and AASHTO design

approaches continue to be evaluated and refined.

4.2.2 Seismic Retrofitting of Bridges

The primary goal of seismic retrofitting is to minimize the risk of unacceptable damage during

the design earthquake. Damage is unacceptable if it results in the collapse of all or part of the

bridge or the loss of use of a vital transportation route which may pass over or under the bridge.

Seismic retrofitting of existing highway bridges is a relatively new concept in bridge

engineering = It was motivated by the damage sustained by highway bridges during the 1971 San

Fernando earthquake. The 1971 earthquake clearly pointed out the existence of a number of

77
deficiencies in the then current bridge design specifications. It also focused on the fact that

numerous existing bridges may be expected to fail in some major way during their remaining

life if subjected to strong ground shaking.

Following the poor performance of several bridges in the San Fernando earthquake, Caltrans,

FHWA, and subsequently other State highway agencies began studies into the seismic

performance of bridges. This effort resulted in a series of publications, interim specifications,

and seismic design guidelines for both new and existing bridges.

One such effort resulted in a report entitled "Seismic Retrofitting Guidelines for Highway

Bridges," in 1983 [18]. The report illustrates retrofit concepts that can be applied to existing

bridges to enhance the probability of their survival when subjected to postulated seismic motions.

In 1994, a report entitled "Seismic Retrofitting Manual for Highway Bridges," (1994) [19], was

published to reflect the development of technology during the previous ten years. The manual

offers procedures for evaluating and upgrading the seismic resistance of existing bridges. It does

not prescribe rigid requirements for when and how bridges are to be retrofitted. The decision

to retrofit a bridge depends on a number of factors, several of which are outside the realm of

engineering, such as the availability of funding as well as political, social, and economic

considerations. The manual assists in evaluating the engineering factors.

Because of the difficulty and cost involved in strengthening an existing bridge to comply with

new design standards, it is usually not economically justifiable to do so. For this reason, the

goal of retrofitting is limited to preventing collapse while permitting structural damage during

a major earthquake. In some cases, the ability of the bridge to carry light emergency traffic

immediately following an earthquake is also important. The threshold of damage that constitutes

unacceptable failure must be detlned by the engineer by considering the overall configuration

of the structure, the importance of the structure as a lifeline following a major earthquake, the ease with which certain types of damage can be repaired quickly, and the relationship of the

bridge to other structures that may be affected during the same earthquake. Because of the

complexity of these decisions and the many non-engineering factors involved, a considerable

amount of judgement is required.

The Caltrans seismic retrofit program began in 1971 after the San Fernando earthquake. The

heaviest concentration of highway damage caused by the 1971 earthquake occurred in the

vicinity of 15 and 1210. Portions of 15, 1405, State Routes 2 and 14 also sustained moderate to heavy damage. Five freeway overpasses collapsed.

The San Fernando earthquake prompted Caltrans to examine and extensively revise its seismic

design criteria, and to embark on a seismic retrotlt program for its vulnerable structures. The

retrofit program began with three phases:

Phase I - Superstructure joint and hinge restrainers, shear keys and vertical restrainers.

Phase II - Single column bents.

Phase III - Multi-column bents.

78
Phase I consisted of tying bridge spans together at joints and hinges with longitudinal steel cables or rod restrainers. This program also included installation of horizontal shear keys at many

superstructure joints to prevent lateral translation of the spans. Vertical restrainers were also

installed on some structures. In addition to the normal restrainer devices, innovative devices were developed to solve unusual problems. Massive truss and steel girder bridges on tall columns with narrow seats required larger restrainers than ordinarily used.

Phase I addressed what Caltrans considered to be the most critical bridge deficiency: the

potential loss of bearing support for girders. The goal of the program was to prevent bridge

collapse and allow passage of emergency vehicles. The possibility of significant damage to some

structures was not precluded. The retrofit philosophy was to minimize differential movements,

mobilize the damping effects of columns, and restrict longitudinal movement to existing bearing

seat widths.

Phase I took about 17 years to accomplish at a very low funding level of $3 to $4 million per

year. Approximately 1500 bridges were retrofitted under this program at a total cost of about

$55 million. Phase I was nearly complete when the Whittier earthquake struck the Los Angeles

area on October 1, 1987. The only bridge which sustained major damage was the 1605 overpass

structure of the 15/1605 interchange. The interchange was immediately closed, but was reopened

within 24 hours after Caltrans installed temporary falsework. The substructure on this bridge,

which consisted of five-column bents, suffered shear failure. Columns were severely cracked

and spalled. Cracking in the bent caps also occurred adjacent to the columns, probably as a the

result of plastic hinging in this area. Nine other bridges on various routes suffered minor

damage to bearing seats, wingwalls, bridge rails, joints, and curtain walls.

The Whittier earthquake was the first major test of the Caltrans retrofit program. In the area which experienced high intensity earthquake motion, 75 bridges were identified as vulnerable

to collapse. These bridges had been retrofitted with restrainers at a cost of about $3 million.

The replacement cost for these bridges at that time was estimated to be $98 million. The retrofit

cost was a modest amount compared with the replacement cost for these structures. The

successful performance of the restrainers during the Whittier earthquake seemed to confirm

retrofit design and program priorities of Caltrans.

However, on October 17, 1989, the devastating magnitude 7.1 Loma Prieta earthquake struck

Northern California. Strong shaking lasted only 10 to 15 seconds but resulted in the death of

62 people and injuries to more than 3 000 others. More than 12 000 people were displaced from

their homes and total property damage was over $6 billion [7].

The greatest tragedies, which accounted for two-thirds of the total deaths, were the collapse of

major sections of the 1880 Cypress Viaduct in Oakland where 42 people died, and the collapse

of a span of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge which resulted in two deaths. One other

bridge, the Struve Slough bridge near Watsonville, also collapsed, but fortunately the collapse

did not result in any deaths.

The Loma Prieta earthquake was the largest on the San Andreas fault since the great San

Francisco earthquake of 1906. The epicenter of the Loma Prieta earthquake was approximately

100 km south-southeast of San Francisco and 15 km northeast of Santa Cruz. The earthquake

79
was felt from Los Angeles to the south, Oregon to the north, and western Nevada to the east. The disaster caused a critical reexamination of seismic needs for State and local bridges and

resulted in a significant increase in State and Federal funding for seismic research and

retrofitting. Annual funding for seismic research increased from approximately $500 000 to $5

million and seismic retrofitting technology has advanced significantly in the past four years.

With the increased funding, Caltrans accelerated its seismic retrofit program which was

reorganized into a new Phase 2 to replace the old Phases II and III. Phase 2 will address singlecolumn bents, double-deck viaducts, multi-column bents and other complex bridges. All bridges

will be evaluated to determine their seismic vulnerability and retrofit priorities.

The current seismic retrofit philosophy of Caltrans is to increase the seismic resistance of a

bridge to the point of preventing collapse and thereby avoiding loss of life [20]. Bridges which

are identified as "important" will receive a higher level of retrofit so that they can remain

serviceable following a major (maximum credible) earthquake.

The design procedure for seismic retrofitting of bridges in California [20] has gained

sophistication over the past several years. Current analysis and design methods focus on several

key items which are fundamental to ensuring the desired performance of a retrofitted structure under seismic loads. These include understanding global structural behavior, displacement or

curvature ductility, beam-column joint performance, hinge and restrainer behavior, and

foundation interactions.

With approximately 24 000 State and local bridges in its inventory, Caltrans developed a

screening process for determining which bridges are the most critical. This screening process

considered the following items:

o year of construction

o expected ground acceleration, which takes into account distance from an active fault and

soil conditions

o number of columns in the bents

o existing confinement reinforcement in the columns

o length of the structure

o annual daily traffic o route type

o availability of detour

o structure skew

Of the approximately 12 000 State bridges, about 2500 are supported on single column bents and

9500 on multi-column bents. As of February 1, 1994, the Caltrans screening process and

follow-up structural analysis had identified about 259 bridges with single-column bents and 780

bridges with multi-column bents that needed seismic retrofitting [21]. For the 12 000 local

bridges, which are generally smaller in size, 173 bridges were initially identified as requiring

retrofitting. An additional 1500 local bridges still need evaluation by Caltrans.

Prior to the Northridge earthquake, approximately 120 structures in the Los Angeles area had

gone through Phase 2 retrofitting. Most of the projects included the application of steel jackets

80
around single column bents to better confine the core concrete. It is reported that none of the

120 bridges experienced any column damage with the exception of some minor flexural yielding

in the area between the top of the steel jacket and the soffit of the column cap beam [22].

The current seismic retrofit program is proceeding at an accelerated pace. The end of 1995 has

been identified as a target date for completion of retrofit of State bridges. Evidence indicates

that the original Phase I hinge and joint retrofit program was effective in preventing the collapse

of numerous bridges during the Whittier, Loma Prieta, and Northridge earthquakes. This gives

confidence that the implementation of hinge and joint restraint improvements represents one of

the most cost effective retrofit technologies that can be implemented. It does not "earthquake

proof a bridge, but it can reduce the potential for span collapse in moderate seismic events.

Caltrans has consistently taken full advantage of lessons learned from past earthquakes to update

its seismic design and retrofit procedures.

81
Santa

Susanna

Mountains

Bull Creek

San Gabriel Mountains

SR 118/1 210

20 km

Epicenter

30 km

10 km

^/ HollywoocWentura Fwv

Santa Monica Mountains

(27)

La Cienega/Venice

Santa Monica

Bay

Lo5-Arfgeles

Airport

_ Damage sites inspected by team

Figure 4.1. Bridge damage sites studied by the reconnaissance team.

82
4.3 Descriptions of Observed Damage

From January 19 to 23, the reconnaissance team conducted field inspections of highway bridges

damaged by the Northridge earthquake. Figure 4. 1 shows the locations of the bridges inspected

by the reconnaissance team. Because demolition work on collapsed spans was started less than

24 hours after the earthquake, in seme cases it was impossible for the reconnaissance team to inspect all of the debris from collapsed spans before it had been disturbed. However, through

inspections of the remaining debris, photographs and interviews with other engineers it was

possible to reconstruct the pertinent features of the collapses. Below are descriptions of the

condition of the most seriously damaged highway bridges.

The assistance of Caltrans in arranging for field inspections and in providing structural drawings

and other background information on bridges is gratefully acknowledged. The authors would

also like to thank the Earthquake Engineering Research Center (EERC) and the Federal Highway

Administration (FHWA) for providing several photographs for this report.

4.3.1 Interstate 5 (the Golden State Freeway) at Gavin Canyon Undercrossing Caltrans

bridge number 53-1797

This bridge was designed in 1964 and constructed in 1967. It carries Interstate 5 over Gavin

Canyon, about 3 km (2 mi) north of the intersection of Interstate 5 and State Route 14. An

aerial photograph of the damaged bridge, after demolition had begun, is shown in figure 4.2,

and a ground level view is shown in figure 4.3. Schematic structural drawings are shown in figures 4.4 and 4.5. The structure consists of two parallel bridges, with about a 66 degree skew

alignment. Each bridge is composed of five spans. Each bridge has four two-pier bents, and

there is a structural hinge near each of the two center bents (figs. 4.3 and 4.4). The

superstructure consists of reinforced concrete box girders, and the central portion (between

hinges) is post-tensioned. The bridge survived the 1971 San Fernando earthquake with virtually no damage. In 1974, the hinges were retrofitted with cable restrainers, as shown in figure 4.5.

The seat length at the hinges is 200 mm (8 in), which by current design standards would be

considered inadequate, especially for a structure of this size and flexibility.

Despite the presence of cable restrainers at the hinges, failure of three of the four end spans of

the bridge was apparently initiated by the spans falling off the hinge seats. The fourth end span,

at the far western corner of the bridge, partially came off its hinge seat but did not collapse, as indicated in figure 4.4. After support was lost at the hinges, a triangular portion of three of the

end spans collapsed, as shown in figure 4.4. Demolition of the remaining portions of the end

spans was carried out very soon after the earthquake, as shown in figure 4.2. It is likely that

the skewed alignment of the bridge was an important contributing factor in this failure. The

skewed alignment permitted rotation of the superstructure in a counter-clockwise direction, when

viewed from above. The tall, flexible piers of the two center bents would have offered relatively

little resistance to rotation in a horizontal plane. (EERC reconnaissance team members noted

cracking patterns at the bases of the piers, which may have been evidence of such rotation [5]).

Rotation of the superstructure would have resulted in differential displacements at the hinges,

and eventually unseating of the end spans at the hinges. Demolition of the bridge was completed

a few days after the earthquake.

83
Figure 4.2. Aerial view of the bridges at Gavin Canyon, looking to the east, showing

appearance of the four end spans shortly after demolition had begun.
85
86
4.3.2 State Route 14 (The Antelope Valley Freeway) Interchange with Interstate 5 (the

Golden State Freeway)

Two bridges partially collapsed at this interchange: the Route 14/15 Separation and Overhead

Ramp C, which is the ramp linking westbound SR14 to southbound 15; and the North Connector

Overcrossing Ramp M, which is the ramp linking westbound SR14 to northbound 15. The

general layout of the interchange and the locations of the collapsed spans are shown in figure

4.6. In addition to the two collapsed ramps, there was evidence of pounding between spans at several hinges, and permanent differential offsets (both horizontal and vertical) were observed

between the ends of the spans, as shown in figure 4.7. The cable restrainers installed at hinges

in this interchange during the early 1970's may have been responsible for preventing further

collapses during the Northridge earthquake.

This interchange was designed in 1968 and was under construction in 1971 when portions were damaged by the San Fernando earthquake. At that time, one of the completed ramps in the

interchange collapsed, and two ramps which were under construction were damaged. The

portion which collapsed in 1971 was the South Connector Overcrossing, connecting southbound

15 with eastbound SR14. A photograph of the collapsed ramp, taken in 1971, is shown in figure

4.8. This ramp was later rebuilt, with improved pier reinforcement, and it suffered no

significant damage in the Northridge earthquake. The damaged portions of the other two ramps

under construction in 1971 were repaired in place, but not strengthened; the portions not yet

constructed were completed with limited seismic upgrading. Both of the ramps which partially

collapsed in the Northridge earthquake were under construction at the time of the 1971

earthquake.

Figure 4.6. General layout of SR14/I5 interchange.

87
Figure 4.7. Example of pounding and offset

r rmiii

at a hinge in the SR14/I5 interchange.

Figure 4.8.

88
4.3.2.1 Route 14/5 Separation and Overhead Ramp C

Caltrans bridge number 53-1960F

This ramp was designed in 1968 and constructed in 1971. Plan and elevation views of this ramp

are shown in figure 4.9. The structure consists of multiple-cell concrete box girders, most of

which are post-tensioned, supported on single pier bents with flared tops. The portion of the

ramp which collapsed was between Abutment 1 and the hinge located near Pier 4. A groundlevel view of the collapsed span is shown in figure 4. 1 1, and a view of damaged Pier 3 is shown

in figure 4.12. The mode of failure of this ramp has not yet conclusively been determined, but

the following scenario appears likely. Because Pier 2 was the shortest and stiffest pier in the

structure, it probably attracted a large share of the horizontal seismic forces. The reinforcing

details of the pier, shown in figure 4.10, indicate that the pier contained quantities of lateral

reinforcement which would be considered inadequate by current standards. Thus it is likely that

Pier 2 was damaged and collapsed, pulling the superstructure off the seat at Abutment 1^. It was reported that Pier 2 had completely disintegrated in the collapse. This observation is consistent with the conjecture that the pier was initially severely damaged in shear, and was then

so badly weakened that it was crushed in compression. Following the collapse of Pier 2, a

failure of the superstructure was initiated by excessive shear and negative bending moment at Pier 3. The superstructure sheared off on either side of Pier 3, leaving the pier standing nearly

intact, as shown in figure 4.12. The span between Piers 3 and 4 then collapsed, pulling the

superstructure off the hinge seat near Pier 4.

When the 1971 San Fernando earthquake occurred this ramp was under construction. Piers 2

and 3 had already been completed, and the bottom soffit and webs of the box girder between

Abutment 1 and the hinge near Pier 4 had been cast and were resting on falsework. Settlement

and shifting of the falsework resulted in damage to the parts of the ramp already constructed.

After the San Fernando earthquake investigators noted cracking in the caps of Piers 2 and 3,

consisting of cracks in the soffit slabs radiating 45 degrees from the pier corners, and vertical

cracks in the box girder webs at the face of the pier cap, as shown in figure 4.13 [23]. It is not

known how these cracks were treated in the repair work following the 1971 earthquake, or whether they were a contributing factor in the Northridge earthquake failure.

It has been suggested that the superstructure was first pulled off the abutment seat, transferring excessive loads

to Pier 2, causing it to fail. However, this appears unlikely as the bearing seat length at Abutment 1 was rather

long: 24 inches (610 mm).

89
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SR14/I5 Separation and Overhead Ramp C - Piers 2 and 3

Section A-A

12' (3660 mm)

\<— 1'-2" (355 mm)

V»..%>..>rg^

1'-2" (3 55 mm)

32-#18 (57 mm)

Longitudinal Bars #5 (16 mm) Ties "@ 12 " (305 mm)

Section C-C

4' (1220 mm)

-26 ' (7925 mm)-

1 '-2" (355 mm) i ..2" (355 mm)

1'-2" (355 mm)

1'-2" (355 mm)

32-#1 8 (57 mm)

Longitudinal Bars

#4 (13 mm)

@12" (305 mm Vertical

#5 (16 mm) Ties @ 12 " (305 mm)

Section B-B

gure 4.10. Details for Piers 2 and 3 of the SR14/I5 Separation and Overhead, Ramp C.

91
Figure 4,11. Overview of the collapse of the SR14/I5 Separation and Overhead, Ramp C,

looking to the south at Abutment 1. Pier 3 can be seen at the right of the

photograph (Photo courtesy of EERC).
Figure 4.13. Cracking reported at Piers 2 and 3 following the 1971 San Fernando earthquake

(reproduced from "The San Fernando Earthquake: Field Investigation of Bridge

Damage," State of California, 1971).

93
4.3.2.2 North Connector Overcrossing Ramp M

Caltrans bridge No. 53-1964F

This ramp was designed in 1968 and constructed in 1971. Photographs of the collapsed portion

of the ramp are shown in figures 4.14 and 4.15. Plan and elevation views of this ramp are shown in figure 4.17. The portion of the ramp which collapsed was located between Abutment

1 and Pier 3. As with the Separation and Overhead Ramp C, described above, this ramp was

under construction in 1971. However, unlike Ramp C, this ramp was nearly completed when

the San Fernando earthquake occurred. Only the portion from the hinge near Pier 8 to Abutment 11 remained to be constructed. The portion which collapsed in the Northridge

earthquake, between Abutment 1 and Pier 3, was already constructed when the San Fernando

earthquake occurred. Only minor damage to this ramp was reported following the 1971

earthquake [23]. This damage consisted of permanent offsets at the hinges near Piers 4 and 6.

The collapse in the Northridge earthquake appears to have been initiated by the failure of Pier

2. After Pier 2 failed, the simply supported span between Abutment 1 and the hinge near Pier

2 collapsed, and, as shown in figure 4.15, the superstructure failed near Pier 3 due to a large

negative moment. Pier 2 completely disintegrated, as shown in figure 4. 16. This is the shortest

pier in the structure, so it is likely that it attracted a high level of lateral force, was damaged in

shear, and finally collapsed in compression. Pier 10 is similar in height to Pier 1, but the

quantities of lateral reinforcement in Pier 10 are greater than those in Pier 1, as shown in figure

4.18. This is because Pier 2 had already been completed, but Pier 10 had not yet been

constructed, when the 1971 earthquake occurred. Following the 1971 earthquake the plans for

Pier 10 were revised to provide increased lateral reinforcement, as shown in figure 4.18.

Figure 4.14. Collapsed portion of the SR 14/15 North Connector Overcrossing, looking east. Pier 2 was at the left, near the broken hinge on the ground (Photo courtesy of

EERC).

94
Figure 4.15. View of the flexural failure at Pier 3 of the SR14/I5 North Connector

Overcrossing, looking to the south.
96 I
SR14/I5 North Conncetor O C Ramp M - Pier 2

Elevation at Pier

1 - 2" (355 mm

4' (1220 mm

8' (2440 mm)

5'-8" (1725 mm)

r.-.'W.-.'li'.'.-.lS

42- #18 (57 mm)_

Longitudinal Bars

1 - 2" (355 mm)

1 - 2" (355 mm)

1'-8" (510 mm)

1 - 2" (355 mm)

#4 (13 mm) Ties

@12 " (305 mm)

Section B-B

@ 3.5" (90 mm)

Pier 10 Reinforcement - 1972 Plans

ure 4.18. Reinforcement details for Pier 2 of tiie SR14/I5 North Connector Overcrossing,

Ramp M.

97
4.3.3 State Route 118 (The Simi Valley Freeway)

SR118 is the major east-west transportation route for northern Los Angeles County. It begins

in the east at San Fernando, where it intersects Interstate 210 (the Foothill Freeway), and runs

to Simi Valley in the west, passing just north of the epicentral region of the Northridge

earthquake. The reconnaissance team inspected bridges on SRI 18 from Interstate 210 in the

east, westward past the epicentral region, to White Oak Avenue. A number of bridges along

SRI 18 received minor, repairable damage, but two bridges were damaged severely: portions of

a bridge collapsed at the intersection of San Fernando Mission Boulevard and Gothic Avenue;

and nearby there was severe pier damage and a near collapse of the bridge at Bull Creek Canyon

Channel. The performance of these two bridges is described in detail below. In addition, two

other bridges on SRI 18, which were less severely damaged, are described: the Ruffner Avenue

Overcrossing and the Balboa Avenue Overcrossing.

As a result of the bridge damage at Mission-Gothic and Bull Creek Canyon Channel, SRI 18 was

closed for about 2 weeks following the Northridge earthquake. Temporary repairs eventually

permitted a partial re-opening of the westbound spans of SRI 18, however the traffic volume will

be limited until both bridges can be replaced.

4.3.3. 1 State Route 118 (Sum Valley Freeway) at San Fernando Mission Blvd. and Gothic Ave.

Caltrans bridge No. 53-2205

An aerial view of the collapsed eastbound lanes of the Mission-Gothic Undercrossing is shown

in figure 4.19. Because the Mission-Gothic Undercrossing was designed in 1972, after the San

Fernando earthquake, the bridge contains seismic details which are improved over the details

used in designs of the 1960's and earlier. Most notably, the spiral hoops in the bridge piers are spaced closely together, as shown in the pier details of figure 4.24. Nonetheless, the piers of

the Mission-Gothic Undercrossing suffered severe damage in the Northridge earthquake, and one

of the two parallel spans partially collapsed. Damage to piers at Mission-Gothic is shown in

figures 4.20, 4.21 and 4.22. In addition to pier damage, there was also severe damage to the

abutments, including cracked wing walls, settlement of soil behind the abutments, and apparent

shifting of the abutments.

There are two notable features of this bridge which contributed to the damage caused by the

Northridge earthquake: the geometry of the overall structure, and the geometry of the bridge

piers:

The first important feature of the bridge is the its irregular geometry. Figure 4.23 shows that

the plan shape of the bridge is a trapezoid. Thus, because of the orientations of the abutments,

the structure was constrained to move in only one lateral direction during the earthquake,

roughly to the southwest. Indeed, figures 4.21 and 4.22 show that the superstructure moved in

this direction, creating a diagonal shear failures in many of the piers. There is also a highly

irregular placement of piers, dictated in part by the trapezoidal plan shape of the bridge, and in

part by right-of-way restrictions. The irregular plan shape and placement of piers created

asymmetric stiffness and mass distributions, which undoubtedly lead to some piers being more

heavily loaded than others during the earthquake. Detailed analyses will be required to determine how lateral earthquake loads were distributed among the piers.

98
The second, and perhaps more important, feature of this bridge is the geometry of the bridge

piers. Pier details are shown in figure 4.24. The piers were all relatively short, roughly 7200

mm (24 ft) tall by 1800 mm (6 ft) across, making an aspect ratio of only 4:1. However the

piers also featured architectural flares at the tops, roughly 3600 mm (12 ft) tall. These flares were intended to be non-structural features of the piers . It was believed that the flares would

spall or otherwise deteriorate during earthquake loading so that they would not contribute to the

bending stiffness of the piers. However, it is clear that in actual performance the flares created a zone of added stiffness, reducing the aspect ratio of the piers to approximately 3:1. Thus the

piers were very stiff laterally, and were dominated by shear rather than bending. The detail at the footing/pier interface was also somewhat unusual for this bridge. Figure 4.24, section B-B,

shows that the base of the pier rested inside a collar at the top of the pier footing. This detail

was intended to permit free translation of the pier base during post-tensioning operations of the

superstructure, before the collar was cast. The detail also had the effect of creating a hinge at the pier base. It is not immediately apparent whether this hinge improved or worsened the

seismic performance of the bridge, although for a given lateral force the bending moments at the tops of the piers were greater than if the hinges at the bases of the piers had not been

present.

The likely failure mode of the bridge was that the piers initially suffered severe shear damage,

followed by crushing of a number of piers in compression. The structure may also have shifted

to the southwest, as constrained by the geometry of the abutments. Although unseating at Abutment 5 did occur, this was probably a secondary effect, as the seat lengths were generous

by current standards. Rather, failure was probably initiated by damage to the piers. In this case

the failure of piers has important theoretical implications, as the piers of this bridge contained

quantities of lateral reinforcement similar to those required by current seismic design standards.

Therefore, further research will be required to determine why the pier reinforcement was

inadequate in this case.

99
Figure 4.19. Aerial view of the SRI 18 Mission-Gothic Undercrossing, looking to the north

showing collapsed eastbound bridge (Photo courtesy of FHWA).

Figure 4.20. Damage to piers of the SRI 18 Mission-Gothic Undercrossing, looking to the

northwest at the north face of the westbound bridge, Bents 3 (foreground) and 2.

100
Figure 4.21. Damage to a pier of the SRI 18 Mission-Gothic Undercrossing, looking to the

northwest at the southernmost pier of Bent 3 of the westbound bridge.
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102
SR 118 - Mission-Gothic Undercrossing Pier Details

#5 (16 mm) Spiral

@ 3 1/2" (90 mm)

45 - #1 1 (35 mm)

Lontgitudinal bars

Section D-D

2'-6" (760 mm

Construction

joint

Greased neoprene

sheet Neoprene seal

2" (50 mm)

Exp. joint filler

Varies

5' to 6'-6" (1520 to 1980 mm

Section B-B

Section A-A

Figure 4.24. Pier details for the SRI 18 Mission-Gothic Undercrossing.

103
4.3.3.2 Stare Route 118 (The Simi Valley Freeway) at Bull Creek Canyon Channel.

Caltrans bridge No. 53-2206

Figure 4.25 shows an aerial view, and 4.26 a ground-level view, of the SRI 18 bridge at Bull

Creek Canyon Channel. The bridge did not collapse completely, but many of the piers were

severely damaged, as shown in figures 4.27 and 4.28. In addition to pier damage, there was

significant damage to the abutments, including cracked wing walls, settlement of soil behind the

abutments, and possible shifting of the abutments. Plan and elevation views of the bridge are shown in figure 4.29, and pier details in figure 4.30.

This bridge was designed just after the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, so it contains some

seismic detailing which is improved over earlier bridge designs. However, since it was not until

several years after the San Fernando earthquake that seismic design codes for bridges were

significantly changed, the design of this bridge would be considered substandard by current

design codes.

All ten of the piers in Bent 3 failed in combined shear and compression near their bases, as shown by figures 4.27 and 4.28. In Bent 2, Piers on the south side of the span failed near their

top end, as shown in the left foreground of figure 4.26, and the damage became progressively

less for piers to the north in Bent 2. The farthest north piers in Bent 2 showed relatively little damage - only diagonal shear cracks near the base, with no spalled concrete. This uneven

distribution of damage to piers was probably caused by the asymmetric plan geometry of the

bridge, as shown in figure 4.29.

The confining reinforcement in the piers, shown in figure 4.30, is inadequate by current

standards. Spiral confining hoops were spaced at 76 mm (3 in) near the top and bottom, of each

pier (presumably to provide confinement in potential plastic hinge regions), but the spacing was

305 mm (12 in) over most of the pier height. All pier failures occurred in the zone of wide

spiral spacing. Another factor contributing to pier failure was that the effective lengths of the

piers were much shorter than the distance between the footings and the girder soffit. The

lengths of piers varied between roughly 6000 and 9100 mm (20 and 30 ft). In Bent 2, the

effective pier lengths were decreased roughly one-third by compacted backfill soil above the pier

footings. In Bent 3, the pier lengths were also decreased roughly one-third, but by a reinforced

concrete channel liner wall, which was cast abutting the piers (fig. 4.30, section C-C). The

shortened effective pier length resulted in stiffer piers, which were more susceptible to sheardominated failure than bending-dominated failure.

104
Figure 4.26. Ground-level view of State Route 118 at Bull Creek Canyon Channel, looking

along the south edge, towards the east.

105
gure 4.27. Damage to pier 3S-1 of State Route 1 18 at Bull Creek Canyon Channel, looking

to the northwest.

Figure 4.28. Damage to piers of Bent 3S of State Route 118 at Bull Creek Canyon Channel,

looking to the southeast.

106
SR 118 Bull Creek Canyon Channel Bridge

Plan

i

Figure 4.29. Plan and elevation views of State Route 118 at Bull Creek Canyon Channel.

107
SR 118 Bull Creek Canyon Channel Bridge Piers

(1220 mm) i

18" y (460 mm)

A f

4' (1220 mm)

Spiral

Spacing

M

4' U(i220mm) \i (76 mm)

(1220 mm)

3"

12" (305 mm)

3" I

(76 mm)

u u u u

Bent 2 - Elevation

18" (460 mm)

' ~1

(1220 mm) y

Bf

Wall cfl

18" y (460 mm)

Spiral

Spacing

A

4' V (1220 mm)

3" I

(76 mm)

D

(1220 mm)

4' (1220 mm)

12" (305 mm)

3" i (76 mm)

Bent 3 - Elevation

18" (460 mm)

(1220 mm)

#5(16 mm) Spirals 36 - #9 (28 mm)

Longitudinal Bars Section A-A

(1220 mm)

(28 mm)

#5(16 mm) Spirals Longitudinal Bars Section B-B

5' 6" (1680 mm)

12" (305 mm)

Section C-C Section D-D

Figure 4.30. Pier details for State Route 118 at Bull Creek Canyon Channel.

108
4.3.3.3 State Route 118 (The Simi Valley Freeway) Ruffner Avenue Overcrossing

Caltrans bridge No. 53-2396

This bridge was designed in 1971, after the San Fernando earthquake. It was not damaged

seriously in the Northridge earthquake. The bridge has a fairly simple configuration: a two-span

prestressed concrete box girder superstructure (spans of 50.3 m and 52.4 m [165 and 172 ft]),

continuous over a central two-pier bent, with the superstructure resting on seats at each

abutment. The seat lengths were generous: approximately 1500 mm (5 ft). The bridge

alignment is skewed about 21 degrees. The only significant damage suffered by the bridge was

extensive spalling at one of the central piers, as shown in figure 4.31. The pier damage

appeared to be limited to the cover concrete. This pier could be repaired relatively easily, and

the bridge returned to full service. The spiral hoop reinforcement in the piers was #5(16 mm)

spirals spaced 89 mm (3.5 in), which is similar to the level of confining reinforcement required

by current design codes. It is interesting to note that these piers have similar geometry and

reinforcement content as the piers at the nearby Mission-Gothic Undercrossing, which were

severely damaged. However, these piers are more flexible because they are taller and have a somewhat smaller diameter than the piers at the Mission-Gothic Undercrossing.

The good seismic performance of this bridge can probably be attributed to two factors. First,

the central piers performed well because they contained adequate confining reinforcement and

they were slender enough that they were not prone to a shear-doininated failure mode. Second,

the overall geometry of the bridge is fairly compact, so that much of the lateral forces were

carried by the abutments rather than the central piers. It is not common to see extensive seismic

damage to short-span overpasses of this type.
4.3.3.4 State Route 118 (The Simi Valley Freeway) Balboa Avenue Overcrossing

This bridge is a two-span overpass, very similar to the Ruffner Avenue Overcrossing, described

above. The two bridges are located only a few hundred meters apart on SR118. The Balboa

Avenue Overcrossing suffered very little damage due to ground shaking, except for some minor

spalling at the tops of the central piers. (Although there was considerably more spalling of cover concrete of the piers of the Ruffner Avenue Overcrossing, the degree of damage to both

bridges was relatively minor, and the response of the two bridges to ground shaking could be

considered similar).

During the earthquake a water main, which was contained inside the bridge superstructure,

ruptured. The water released by the broken main flowed under and around the south abutment,

and caused extensive erosion on both the east and west flanks of the abutment. Soil was washed

away beneath about one-third of the abutment foundation. The top ends of abutment piles were

visible on both flanks of the abutment. A view of the washout on the east flank of the abutment

is shown in figure 4.32.

Figure 4.32. SRI 18 Balboa Avenue Overcrossing, view of the washout on the east side of the

south abutment, caused by a ruptured water main.

110
4.3.4 Interstate 10

Interstate 10 is a major east-west artery running between Santa Monica and downtown Los

Angeles. The freeway was constructed in 1966. Major bridge collapses occurred at two

locations: (1) the La Cienega Blvd. -Venice Blvd. Separation and (2) the Fairfax Ave.-

Washington Blvd. Undercrossing.

Between the two bridges which collapsed, 110 passes over Ballona Creek. Figure 4.33 is a view

looking toward the southwest of the spans over the creek. There was essentially no damage to the supporting piers. Adjacent to the bridge over Ballona Creek, there is a westbound ramp

which exits from 110 to Cadillac Ave. A portion of this ramp is supported by single piers which

have been retrofitted with steel jackets, as shown in figure 4.34. No damage was noted to these

retrofitted piers. The Cadillac Ave. ramp represents the only case known to the authors where

undamaged retrofitted piers were located close to major collapse sites. However, because the

retrofitted Cadillac Ave. ramp piers were immediately adjacent to an older, non-retrofitted

multispan bridge which was undamaged (the Ballona Creek overpass), it is not known whether

the Cadillac Ave. ramp piers were subjected to the same levels of lateral forces as piers at the

two collapse sites at La Cienega-Venice and Fairfax-Washington.

4.3.4.1 Interstate 10 La Cienega Blvd./ Venice Blvd. Separation,

Caltram Bridge No. 53-1609

Figure 4.35 is an aerial view of 110 where it passes over La Cienega Blvd. and Venice Blvd.

The view is toward the south, and Venice Blvd. is the diagonal street on the left side of the

photograph. The portion of the westbound lane which collapsed to ground level can be seen. However, there was extensive damage to most of the supporting piers of the eastbound and

westbound lanes.

Figure 4.36 shows elevation and plan views of the nine- span bridge structure. Solid wall piers

provided support adjacent to the abutments, and the remainder of the supports were multiple-pier

bents. Two expansion joints (hinges) were provided as shown. Bents 3 to 7 included three

supporting piers for each lane, while Bent 8 had four piers per lane. The exit ramp to La

Cienega Blvd. and the eastbound collector-distributor did not collapse. Figure 4.37 shows the

pier details. The piers had circular cross sections with a diameter of 1220 mm (4 ft), and the

longitudinal reinforcement consisted of #11 (35 mm) or #18 (57 mm) deformed bars. The

different pier reinforcement configurations were identified by pier "types" as shown in figure

4.37. These pier types are indicated in the plan shown in figure 4.36. The lateral reinforcement

consisted of #4 bars (13 mm) at 305 mm (12 in) vertical spacing.

Figure 4.38 is a ground-level view of the portion of the westbound lane that collapsed to the

ground at the hinge located between Bents 7 and 6. The pier in the foreground is the

northernmost pier of Bent 7. It is seen that there was extensive column shortening due to the

failure of the lateral reinforcement to provide adequate confinement of the core concrete.

Fractured lateral reinforcement can be seen to the right of the failed portion of the pier. Figure

4.39 shows the other two piers of Bent 7 which supported the westbound lane. Extensive failure

and column shortening is evident. The concrete block wall behind the piers is part of a storage

building that was constructed beneath the bridge structure. The storage building extended from

111
Venice Blvd. to La Cienega Blvd. The piers of Bent 7 which supported the eastbound lane

suffered relatively minor damage, and the roadway to the east of Bent 7 remained largely at its original elevation.

Figure 4.40 shows the northernmost pier of Bent 6, located just to the west of the hinge. This

pier totally disintegrated, but the storage building prevented the roadway from collapsing to the

ground. Figure 4.41 shows the southernmost pier supporting the eastbound lane at Bent 3. The top of the pier is severely damaged and it is likely that the storage building prevented the

total collapse of the roadway.

In summary, the bridge structure spanning La Cienega Blvd. and Venice Blvd. was extensively

damaged. The failure is attributed to the small amount of lateral pier reinforcement. As the

piers cracked due to the lateral loading, the lack of adequate confinement resulted in a reduction

of the vertical load capacity because of core concrete loss and buckling of the longitudinal bars.

Had it not been for the storage building located beneath the bridge, it is likely that more spans

would have collapsed to the ground.

Figure 4.33. 110 Bridge over Ballona Creek, looking to the southwest.

112
Figure 4.34. Cadillac Ave. ramp; view to east showing jacketed pier.

Figure 4.35. Aerial view (looking south) of 110 Separation at La Cienega Blvd. and Venice

Blvd., (Photo courtesy of FHWA).

113
114
1-10 La Cienega-Venice Separation Pier Details

6' 3"T

(1905 mm)

i_

Hinge joint for Bent 4

4' 6" (1370 mm)

-<—>

»'•.« '".•<

KJD

Section A-A

See Table

#4 (13 mm) Spirals

at 12" (305 mm)

(1220 mmf

Section B-B

Typical Pier Elevation

Longitudinal Reinforcement

Type Bar Size No. of Bars

H #11 (35 mm) 12

1 #1 1 (35 mm) 18

J #11 (35 mm) 24

K #1 1 (35 mm) 36

L #1 1 (35 mm) 42

M #1 1 (35 mm) 48

N #18 (57 mm) 20

P #18 (57 mm) 24

ure 4.37. Pier details for 110 Separation at La Cienega Blvd. and Venice Blvd.

115
Figure 4.38. Collapsed westbound lane of 110 at Venice Blvd.; pier of Bent 7 in foreground.

4.3.4.2 Interstate 10 Fairfax Ave. -Washington Blvd. Under Crossing

Caltrans bridge number 53-1580

Figure 4.42 shows the elevation and plan of the Fairfax Ave. -Washington Blvd. Undercrossing.

The eastbound and westbound lanes of 110 were supported by solid wall piers adjacent to the

abutments and by multiple-pier bents at the remaining locations A construction joint (hinge) was

located to the west of Bent 4. Because of the skewed alignment of 110 relative to Washington

Blvd., the westbound lane of 110 was designed with an additional bent (Bent 4A) compared with

the eastbound lane. The piers were of circular cross section with a diameter of 1220 mm (4 ft). The longitudinal reinforcement consisted of #11 (35 mm) deformed bars. The number of

longitudinal bars in each pier is shown adjacent to the pier locations in figure 4.42. It can be

seen that the piers in Bent 4 had significantly more longitudinal bars compared with the other

piers. The lateral reinforcement was #4(13 mm) bars at a vertical spacing of 305 mm (12 in).

The earthquake caused partial collapse of two spans of the eastbound and westbound lanes on

either side of Bent 3 (fig. 4.42). When the reconnaissance team arrived at the site, the collapsed

spans had been completely removed and workmen were preparing to open up traffic on Fairfax

Ave. Hence it was not possible to examine the collapsed structure. Conversations with Caltrans

engineers at the site revealed that the piers in Bent 3 had failed and caused the girders to sag at this location. However, cable restrainers at the hinge west of Bent 4 prevented the girders from

falling off of the hinge seats (fig. 4.43). Figure 4.44 is a photograph provided by EERC which

shows the westbound lane of 110 over Fairfax Ave. It can be seen that the piers in Bent 3

shortened and caused the girder to sag. It can also be seen that the span to the west of Pier 2

lifted off of the abutment. Figure 4.45 is a close up view of one of the piers in Bent 3. The

failure mode is similar to that observed at Venice Blvd. and La Cienega Blvd. When the piers were subjected to lateral ground motions, the lateral reinforcement was not able to adequately

confine the core concrete. As a result of lateral load damage, there was a loss of axial load

capacity and the piers shortened under the action of the vertical loads. As mentioned, the piers

at Bent 4 had considerably more longitudinal reinforcement than the other piers. Examination

of the piers in Bent 4 revealed varying degrees of diagonal cracking and spalling of the concrete

cover. At the time of the site visit, these piers were surrounded with wooden shoring as a

precautionary measure during the demolition of the collapsed spans.

118
119
Figure 4.43. Hinge adjacent to Bent 4 of I 10 at Fairfax Ave.; cable restrainers prevented loss

of support (Photo courtesy of EERC).
121
4.3.5 Bearing Damage at State Route 134 (The Ventura Freeway) / USIOI (The

Hollywood Freeway) Interchange

Caltrans bridge No. 53-1339P

The interchange of the Ventura Freeway and Hollywood Freeway was designed in the late

1950s. The eastbound and westbound lanes of the Ventura Freeway pass over the northbound

and southbound lanes of the Hollywood Freeway. The bridges are made of multiple-cell

reinforced concrete box girders supported by multiple-pier bents. At the abutments, the girders are supported by sliding-type bearings or rocker-type bearings. Examination of some of the

accessible bearings of the eastbound lane of the Ventura Freeway revealed serious damage.

Figure 4.46 shows a simplified plan of the eastbound lane of the Ventura Freeway and the

Riverside Drive ramp. Figure 4.47 is a ground level view of the eastbound lane as seen from

the northbound lane of the Hollywood Freeway. At Abutment 1 (fig. 4.46), bearing supports

are provided at the locations of the webs in the box girder. As shown in figure 4.46, the

longitudinal axes of the bearings are aligned at right angles to the longitudinal axes of the girder

webs. The four bearings on the north side of the eastbound lane of Ventura Freeway are of the

sliding-type. Figure 4.48 shows the type of damage that was observed at these locations.

Apparently, the dynamic frictional resistance of the bearing resulted in forces sufficient to spall

off the shell of the abutment. The remainder of the bearings supporting the eastbound lane and

the Riverside Drive ramp are of the rocker type. Figure 4.46 shows a schematic of this type

of bearing. A steel bearing block with cylindrical surfaces is located between steel plates set into the abutment and girder end diaphragm. The blocks are kept in position with a system of

guide plates and restraining plates as shown in figure 4.46. All of the rocker bearings showed

some type of earthquake damage. The bolts for the restraining plates were sheared off at many

locations, and the sheared bolt heads were found at distances of up to several meters from their

original position. Some of the bearing blocks were skewed from their original positions (fig.

4.49). In one case, the bearing block had tipped over resulting in a complete loss of support

at that location (fig. 4.50).

These observations highlight the unsuitability of rocker-type bearings to withstand the effects of

seismic deformations. Because of redundancy, the failure of one bearing may not result in

serious damage to the supported girder. However, multiple bearing failures could drastically

alter the forces in the girder, and these forces could exceed the girder capacity.

122
Rocker Bearing Schematic

Figure 4.46. Eastbound lane of Ventura Freeway crossing over Hollywood Freeway; site plan

and bearing details.

123
124
Figure 4.49. Displaced bearing block in rocker-type bearing.
4.3.6 Interstate 5 (The Golden State Freeway), State Route 118 (The Simi Valley

Freeway), Southwest Connector

Caltrans bridge number 53-2329

This is a long, curved ramp structure with piers of varying height. The last pier before the west

abutment, adjacent to Sharp Avenue, exhibited severe shear cracking. This was one of the

shortest and stiffest piers in the structure, so it probably attracted large lateral forces. Damage

to the pier is shown in figures 4.51 and 4.52. Note that when the photos in figures 4.51 and

4.52 were taken the loose cover concrete had been removed by Caltrans workers to inspect

damage to the core. It appeared that cracks extended into the core of the pier. The pier is octagonal in cross section, measuring 2440 mm (8 ft) across, and has a flared section at the top.

Longitudinal reinforcement consists of 64 #11 (36 mm) bars (EERC 1994). This pier contains

high levels of shear reinforcement: #4 (13 mm) spirals spaced at 89 mm (3.5 in). Damage to the abutment just to the west of this pier was also observed. This damage was apparently due

to pounding between the superstructure and the abutment.

Figure 4.51. View of the westernmost pier at the Interstate 5, State Route 118, Southwest

Connector, looking to the southeast. Loose cover concrete has been removed by

Caltrans.

126
Figure 4.52. Close-up view of the westernmost pier at the Interstate 5, State Route 118,

Southwest Connector, looking to the southeast. Loose cover concrete has been

removed by Caltrans.

127
4.3.7 State Route 90 (Marina Freeway) / Interstate 405 (San Diego Freeway)

Interchange, Jefferson Blvd. Undercrossing

Caltrans bridge number 53-1255

This is a cast-in-place reinforced concrete bridge which carries Interstate 405 over Jefferson

Blvd. The bridge consists of four spans: two 8.5 m (28 ft) long end spans and two 16.0 m (52.5

ft) long center spans. The bridge is supported on three six-pier bents, making a total of 18

piers. The piers are circular and 1220 mm (4 ft) in diameter. All but two of the eighteen piers

have structural hinges at the top of the pier footing. The outer piers of each bent are located

outside the bridge girders, creating an "outrigger" configuration, as shown in figure 4.53. After

the Northridge earthquake, diagonal cracks were observed in all six outrigger joints at the ends

of the three bents. The cracking was most serious on the east end of the center bent. A closeup photograph at that location are shown in figure 4.54.

This bridge was constructed in about 1961, so generally speaking it does not meet current

seismic design standards. The bridge is somewhat unusual because in the original design

allowances were made for future construction of the ramps of the SR90/I405 interchange passing

overhead: the outermost piers of the bridge were more heavily reinforced to allow for later

extensions of the height of those piers. The reinforcement in the exterior piers consisted of 22

#18 bars (57 mm) longitudinally, and #5 bar (16 mm) spiral hoops spaced at 114 mm (4.5 in);

the inner piers were reinforced with 14 #9 bars (29 mm) longitudinally, and #4 (13 mm) spirals

spaced at 305 mm (12 in). The exterior piers were later extended in height, as can be seen in

figure 4.53. It is not clear how structural continuity was achieved between the original exterior

piers and the pier extensions, since no explicit provisions were made in the original design for

extending the longitudinal reinforcement.

The damage observed in the Northridge earthquake possibly arose from three factors. First, the

joint regions where cracking occurred are not as heavily reinforced as they would be under

current design standards. Second, the structural hinges at the bases of most outrigger piers

tended to increase the moments imposed on the outrigger joints. Third, the Jefferson Blvd.

Undercrossing shares piers with the SR90 ramp above, as shown schematically in figure 4.55.

The upper SR90 structure is more flexible than the lower Jefferson Blvd. Undercrossing,

possibly resulting in further concentrations of moments at the outrigger joints.

128
Figure 4.54. Close-up of the outrigger joint at the SR90/I405 interchange, Jefferson Boulevard

Undercrossing, center bent, east side, looking to the south.

[ 129

i
SR 90

ure 4.55. Schematic cross section, showing columns shared by SR90 and the Jefferson

Boulevard Undercrossing.

130
4.3.8 Abutment Damage

There were many bridges which suffered no damage, or very minor damage, to the bridge

structure itself - the superstructure, piers, and pier foundations - but which experienced damage

to the abutments. Abutment damage is not widely reported because it usually does not threaten

to cause collapse of a bridge. Nonetheless, repairs to abutments can be costly and disruptive.

The seismic performance of bridge abutments is not well understood. Seismic design, evaluation

and retrofit methods for abutments require further study.

In the Northridge earthquake, bridge abutment damage ranged from minor settlement of backfill

soil at the approaches, to cracking of wing walls, to permanent displacement of the entire

abutment. For example, at the intersection of State Route 118 and Interstate 210, there was

damage to the abutment at the east end of the long elevated structure connecting eastbound

SRI 18 with northbound 1210. An overview of the abutment is shown in figure 4.56, and a close-up of some of the abutment sidewall cracking is shown in figure 4.57. At the interchange

of USIOI, SR134 and SR170, at the Riverside Drive Offramp Overcrossing (Caltrans bridge No.

53-1493S, described above) the abutments at both ends of the offramp exhibited severe cracking

in the wing walls. Damage to concrete abutment piles was reported [5] at the Las Virgenes

Overcrossing on USlOl (Caltrans bridge No. 53-1442). There were many other cases of bridge

abutment damage observed by the reconnaissance team, and reported by other investigators,

which are too numerous to list here.

Figure 4.56. Overview of abutment at the east end of the ramp connecting eastbound SRI 18

with northbound 1210.

131
Figure 4.57. Close-up of abutment wall cracking at the east end of the ramp connecting

eastbound SRI 18 with northbound 1210.

4.3.9 Other Bridge Damage

The reconnaissance team inspected the sites of major bridge damage, however, other damage

sites have been reported by other investigation teams. A brief summary of the nature of the

damage is provided below.

4.3.9.1 Interstate 5/Interstate 210 Interchange

The 8-span southwest connector (bridge number 53- 1989F), which carries traffic from East 1210

to South 15, was supported by single piers. Both abutments were damaged. At the north

abutment (Abutment 9), there was horizontal and vertical offset between the approach slab and

the bridge girder. The damage is attributed to failure of the transverse shear keys [24]. In addition, there was some pounding damage where Pier 4 passes through the girder of the San

Fernando Rd. elevated structure. At the south abutment (Abutment 1), there was evidence of

pounding damage and twisting of the girder. Spalling was also observed in several piers [5].

The following damage was also observed where 15 crosses over San Fernando Rd. [5]: o pounding damage at the abutments,

o pounding damage at hinges,

o pullout of girder at abutments.

132
o wing wall damage, and

o spalling at the tops of the piers in the multiple-pier bents.

4.2.9.2 Interstate 405/Interstate 10 interchange

At this interchange, 110 passes ovei I 405, and connectors pass over I 10. In 1990, piers were

retrofit with steel jackets, hinge restrainers were added, and foundations were strengthened [5].

It was found that there was evidence of movement and pounding at the hinges and there was a

seat failure at a hinge supported by a drop bent cap. No damage was observed in the retrofitted

piers.

4.3.9.3 Santa Clara River Bridge

Interstate 5 crosses the Santa Clara River by means of two, skewed, seven span bridges, one in

each direction (bridge number 53-0687). The bridges are composed of steel plate girders with

composite concrete decks. The girders are simply supported by wall piers and abutments.

Reported failure included the following [5]: o failure of anchor bolts attaching the girders to the wall piers, o spalling of concrete wall piers at girder anchorages,

o failure of cables in the cable restrainer assemblies.

4.3.9.4 Las Virgenes Road Overcrossing at Ventura Freeway

The overcrossing was originally built in 1961 as a two-lane bridge (53-1442). In 1974, the

bridge was widened with the addition two lanes. The four-span bridges are composed of steel plate girders with a composite concrete deck. The girders are supported on multiple-pier

concrete bents. The reported damage included the following [5]: o pounding damage at hinges,

o abutment fill settlements of about 100 mm (4 in), and

° damage (cracking and spalling) to the top end of a concrete pile supporting the south

abutment; the pile was excavated after the earthquake for inspection.

133
4.4 Summary

1) On the whole, bridges performed well in the Northridge earthquake. Nonetheless, there were

several failures which proved to be extremely disruptive to automobile traffic in the region.

There will be large and immediate economic costs for the repair or replacement of the bridges

which were heavily damaged. Perhaps more costly, however, will be the long-term indirect

economic costs due to disruptions in transportation patterns throughout metropolitan Los

Angeles. This highlights the critical importance of highway bridges to the economic and social

vitality of the region, and the need to press forward with seismic retrofit and seismic research

programs.

2) Generally speaking, bridges designed using standards developed after the late 1970's

performed very well. Most bridges that were severely damaged were designed earlier. While

this implies that the current seismic design standards for bridges are adequate, we should not be

lulled into a false sense of security. For example, the SRI 18 bridge at Mission-Gothic was

designed in 1973 with piers containing high levels of spiral confining reinforcement, similar to the levels of confining steel that would be specified today. Yet these piers failed

catastrophically, possibly because they were short and stiff, and because architectural flares at their tops further increased their stiffness. It is also important to bear in mind that despite the

good performance of many bridges in this earthquake, we cannot yet predict the level of damage

to bridges which would be caused by an earthquake with a larger magnitude (around 8.0) or which would be more centrally located in the Los Angeles area.

3) Unusually high vertical accelerations were recorded at several locations near bridge structures during this earthquake. Further research is required into the influence of such high accelerations on the performance of bridges, and on whether or not high vertical accelerations were a

contributing cause of bridge failures in this earthquake.

4) Although there were few reports of significant damage to older bridges which had been

seismically retrofit, it is not clear that this earthquake provided a conclusive test of the

performance of various retrofit methods. For example, the cable restrainers of one bridge - the

Interstate 5 bridge at Gavin Canyon - were unable to prevent parts of the bridge deck from

falling off the supports. Further evaluations of cable restrainers design criteria, and seat retrofit

methods may be necessary. Detailed studies of how jacketed piers and reinforced foundations

performed in this earthquake should be carried out. It should be determined how severely this

earthquake tested field applications of these techniques, so that they can continue to be employed

with confidence.

5) Older bridge bearings, of the steel rocker type, are highly susceptible to damage in strong

ground shaking. Rocker bearings are inherently unstable under lateral loading. Loss of rocker

bearing support can lead to a broad range of bridge damage, including cracked girders, loss of

roadway elevation alignment, and complete collapse of the superstructure. Rocker bearings are widely used in the Central and Eastern United States. Since there is an increasing awareness

of the potential for damaging earthquakes in these regions, it should be a national priority to study the performance of rocker bearings and methods for retrofitting or replacing them.

6) Bridges which were damaged often had skewed alignments or irregular plan configurations.

134
Damage to skewed bridges was exemplified by the performance of tiie 15 bridge at Gavin

Canyon, and the SRI 18 bridges at Mission-Gothic and at the Bull Creek Canyon Channel. The

potential for seismic damage to bridges having skewed or irregular alignments was known before

this earthquake, yet relatively little has been done to address this problem.

7) Failures were often associated with short bridge piers. Example include the failures at the

I5/SR14 interchange, on SRI 18 at Mission-Gothic, and the I5/SR1 18 Southwest Connector. In these cases the piers were not only short, but they were also flared at the top, creating a zone

of increased stiffness, decreasing the effective pier length. The piers at the I5/SR14 interchange

contained low levels of confining reinforcement by today's standards. However, the piers on SRI 18 at Mission/Gothic, and at the I5/SR118 Southwest Connector, contained high levels of

confining reinforcement, and they still failed. Thus, there may be problems with short piers in general, whether or not the confining reinforcement meets current standards. A better

understanding of the seismic performance of short piers, including piers with flares, is needed.

In addition, the role short piers play in the overall seismic response of bridge structures,

particularly those structures with a mixture of short and tall piers, needs to be investigated

further.

8) Many of the bridges damaged in the earthquake had multiple-pier bents. To date, because

of the obvious seismic vulnerability of single-pier bents, most seismic retrofit efforts have been

directed towards retrofitting isolated piers; comparatively little has been done to address the

strengthening of multiple-pier bents. Further research is required to develop cost-effective

seismic retrofit guidelines for multiple-pier bridge bents.

9) The failure of the water main contained within the Balboa Boulevard overpass at SRI 18

highlighted an important secondary function of bridge structures: bridges often carry utilities such as power, water, gas and telephone lines, which are critical to the emergency response and

well-being of a community following a major earthquake. Guidelines and standards need to be

established for the safe routing of utility lines within bridges.

10) There was widespread damage to bridge abutments. The seriousness of this damage ranged

from minor backfield settlement, to cracked wing walls, to shifting of entire abutment structures. Relatively little is known about the seismic behavior of bridge abutments, particularly the

interaction between soils and the abutment structure. Further research is needed to develop

methods for the design of effective earthquake-resistant bridge abutment structures.

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CHAPTER 5

PERFORMANCE OF LIFELINE SYSTEMS

5.1 Introduction

Lifelines include water, sewer, gas, fuel, electric power, telecommunications, and transportation

systems. These systems are critical to the vitality of the built environment and the functioning

of modem society. They provide services to the community to maintain its safety, health, and

economic activities. Damaged lifelines can impede emergency response following an

earthquake, and can hinder postearthquake recovery. Disruption of regional lifeline systems due

to a major natural disaster such as an earthquake can have a profound effect on the entire nation

because of the economic interdependence of lifeline systems and the functions they support.

The Northridge earthquake is expected to be the costliest natural disaster this country has

experienced to date. A significant portion of those losses is due to the loss of function of lifeline

systems and the cost for their repair and replacement.

This chapter offers a brief overview of the performance of lifeline systems, including

observations made by many investigators, but with particular emphasis on the sites that the team

visited personally. Gratitude is extended to the reconnaissance team members of the American

Society of Civil Engineers Technical Council for Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, many of

whom also served on the EERI reconnaissance team. In regard to transportation systems, this

chapter addresses only the performance of airports and railways. The performance of highway

bridges is presented in chapter 4.

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5.2 Water and Wastewater Systems

Water supply from local sources has always been a problem for Southern California. In addition

to limited sources from the region's local groundwater basins, the main water supply is from

Northern California and the Colorado River. January 17, 1994 was the first time in history that an earthquake resulted in the breakage of all four pipelines that feed water to the region's three

water treatment facilities.

Compared with the extensive damage caused by the 1971 San Fernando earthquake to the Jensen

treatment plant in Sylmar (under construction at the time), the 1994 earthquake caused only

minor damage. The 1994 damage included lateral spreading of the ground or soil settlement

around the facilities, leaks in pipelines, and leaks at construction joints. While water supply to these facilities was available once the major pipelines were repaired, the system nevertheless

failed to provide water to customers because of damage to the water supply distribution network,

especially the network serving areas near the epicenter. Thousands of main line leaks were

reported and repairs were time-consuming.

Among the numerous situations that contributed to the disruption of the water supply system was

damage to Los Angeles Aqueduct No. 2 at Terminal Hill. Aqueduct No. 2 is made of 2.1-m

(77 in) diameter steel pipes. Terminal Hill is located about 20 km (12.5 mi) north-northeast of

the epicenter, southeast of the intersection of 15 and SR14. There is no strong motion record

available for the site. However, two stations maintained by the California Division of Mines

and Geology (CDMG) and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) about 5 km (3 mi) south of the

site showed peak ground accelerations over 0.9g, indicating that the site probably was strongly

shaken by the earthquake. Other indications of strong shaking can be seen from the numerous

landslides along the mountainside to the north of the site (fig. 5.1), and the bridge failures at the

intersection of 15 and SR14.

The reinforced concrete relief tank (surge chamber) on top of the hill appeared to perform well

through the earthquake—no damage was observed (fig. 5.2). A steel pipe brings water up from

the canyon below (fig. 5.3). The pipe is supported on concrete saddles built along the mountain

slope. At a few places, the pipe separated from the saddles creating 50 to 80 mm (2 to 3 in)

gaps. In at least one location, the pipe crashed vertically into the saddle. At two other

locations, the pipe sections bulged 80 mm and 150 mm (3 and 6 in), however, no rupture or leakage was noticed. The ruptured section of the 2.1-m pipe is located near the hilltop. The

two sections where the rupture occurred were connected using a mechanical coupling system

(fig. 5.4). The pipe sections were connected by eight pairs of restrainer rods 35 mm (1-3/8 in)

in diameter and 2.2 m (7 ft) long. The rods were attached to brackets, which were welded to the pipes. These welds broke during the earthquake (fig. 5.5) and resulted in the separation of

the two pipe sections.

Repair of the pipe sections began immediately after the earthquake. The repair work was

completed in the evening of January 19 and the aqueduct started operation at 2:00 a.m. on

January 20. However, leakages occurred shortly thereafter, and the pipeline had to be shut

down. Excavation was required to repair two other sections. The pipeline was back in

operation on January 21.

138
The earthquake resulted in numerous breaks of water lines. Two water mains were ruptured at a site along Balboa Boulevard adjacent to the rupture of a 0.6-m (22 in) gas main. A major fire

resulted, which is described later in this chapter.

There are two water reclamation plants in the Los Angeles area. The small one has a capacity

of 75 000 mVd (20 mgd) and the large one 300 000 mVd (80 mgd). The larger facility, the

Donald C. Tillman Water Reclamation Plant, is located in Van Nuys, southeast of the

intersection of Woodley Avenue and Victory Boulevard. The inflow goes through primary,

secondary, and tertiary treatment before the water is released for landscape irrigation and to a nearby lake for recreational use.

The earthquake resulted in damage to five out of twenty-two final clarifier tanks built in 1991

as part of the Phase II expansion. Twenty-two Phase I tanks built in 1983 were not damaged.

Figure 5.6 shows a typical undamaged final claritler tank. The scrapers are supported by

railings attached to the walls with brackets. Chains are used to move the scrapers. All these

components were made of plastic in the Phase II construction, whereas the brackets were made

of metal and railings and sludge scrapers were made of redwood in the Phase I construction.

Pins about 10 mm (3/8 in) in diameter and 19 mm (3/4 in) long connected the brackets to the

railings. In the tanks where there was damage, it is suspected that the pins dislodged due to wave action in the tank and the railing became displaced. This caused jamming of the chain

movement, which disabled the system (fig. 5.7).

Commercial power was lost at the Tillman plant during the earthquake. Interviews with plant

personnel indicated that the emergency system, a 1500 kW diesel generator, was shut down by

the operator when strange noises were heard. When the generator was restarted, sparks

appeared and the emergency system was shut down again. As a result, the plant lost power for

about eight hours. Fortunately, the plant did not lose its biological system, which is vital to restore normal plant operation. There was a low demand on the plant because the earthquake

happened very early in the morning before daily activities normally begin to produce large

quantities of wastewater.

Repair of the plant facilities was delayed due to nonstructural damage to the maintenance

building. Warehouse stock which fell from shelves covered needed repair tools and equipment.

It was two days before equipment could be moved out to repair the water treatment systems.

The maintenance building offices suffered fallen ceiling tiles and air ducts. A few large glass

panels in the reception area of the administration building were broken, but the building itself

sustained no structural damage.

139
Figure 5.1. Strong shaking at Aqueduct No. 2 at Terminal Hill can be inferred from the

numerous landslides along the mountain slopes to the north of the site.
Figure 5.3. The steel pipeline at Terminal Hill separated from its supporting saddle at several

places and pipe sections bulged at other locations along the alignment.

8 pairs of restrainer rods 1-3/8" (35 mm )

77" (1955 mm) diameter pipe

Section A-A

Figure 5.4. Schematic drawing of connection of the two steel pipe sections which were pulled

apart during the earthquake.

141
Figure 5.6. Undamaged clarifier tank at the Tillman Water Reclamation Plant.

142
Figure 5.7. A damaged sludge

scraper in a clarifier tank

at the Tillman Water

Reclamation Plant.

143
5.3 Gas and Liquid Fuels

Natural gas systems consist of transmission, distribution, and service lines. In the earthquakeaffected area, transmission lines are steel pipes with diameters ranging from 0.3 to 0.8 m (12

to 30 in). Most of the failed lines were of pre- 1971 construction. The distribution lines are

either steel or plastic pipes. Compared with the 1971 San Fernando earthquake [15], this

earthquake resulted in more ruptures in distribution lines than in transmission lines. Most breaks

occurred to old steel pipes. Plastic pipes used in the distribution system seemed to perform

well. About one hundred fires resulted from the rupture of gas lines. A number of fires were

associated with the premature restoration of utilities, as discussed in chapter 6.

As in earlier earthquakes, such as the 1987 Whittier Narrows earthquake and the 1989 Lx)ma

Prieta earthquake, tens to hundreds of thousands of gas supply outages occurred. Most outages were due to customers shutting off gas valves for fear of gas explosions or fires. While the

intent of this action is immediate safety, it can result in a long delay before service is restored

because gas company technicians must test each system before turning the valve back on.

The rupture of a 0.6-m (22-in) gas main occurred along Balboa Boulevard between Rinaldi Street

to the south and Lorillard Street to the north (fig. 5.8). Along this stretch, compressional

ground failures occurred between Rinaldi Street and Halsey Street, and extensional ground

failures occurred between Bircher Street and Halsey Street. Ground extension at this location

is prominently exhibited by the transverse cracks in the pavement as shown in figure 5.9.

Further, lateral spreading of 25 to 100 mm (1 to 4 in) toward the west was observed along the

sidewalk on the west side of Balboa Boulevard north of Halsey Street, whereas no lateral

spreading was observed on the east side of Balboa Boulevard.

Three pipelines ruptured as the result of ground contraction; a 150-mm (6-in) gas distribution

line, the 1.8-m (68-in) Rinaldi trunk water line, and a 0.6-m (22-in) gas main (fig. 5.10). The

Rinaldi trunk line was of post-1971 construction, and the gas main was of 1930 vintage. These

pipes showed a shortening of 125 to 150 mm (5 to 6 in).

About one block north, the ground extension caused rupture of the same 0.6-m (22-in) gas main

and a 1.2-m (48-in) water main (fig. 5.11). These pipes were pulled apart as the result of the

ground extension. The rupture of the gas main caused a major fire at the site that destroyed five

houses (figs. 5.12 and 5.13). The loss of both water mains at this location and the difficult access to the site due to the tire and street flooding made fire fighting difficult.

An excavated section just north of the tire site revealed some additional underground lines (fig.

5.14). The 460-mm (18-in) crude oil line in the middle of the photo performed well. The 150- - mm (6-in) gas distribution line shown at the top of the photo is a replaced section.

In addition to the above damage in the epicentral area, the strong shaking from the earthquake

cracked welds at several locations along a 250-mm (10-in) pipeline transporting crude oil from

the San Joaquin Valley. As a result, there was an oil spill along the Santa Clara River.

144
Figure 5.8. Location of the 0.6-m gas main rupture on Balboa Boulevard.

145
Figure 5.10. Ground contraction along Balboa Boulevard caused the rupture of a gas

distribution line (top), the Rinaldi trunk 1.8-m (68 in) water main (center), and

a gas main (bottom). The pipes were being repaired at the time this

photograph was taken.

146
Figure 5.11. Ground extension along Balboa Boulevard resulted in the rupture of the same

gas main shown in figure 5.10 (top) and a 1.2-m (48 in) water main (bottom).

The rupture of the gas main here caused a major fire that engulfed five houses

147
Figure 5.13. Houses destroyed by a fire resulting from the rupture of the 0.6-m gas main

along Balboa Boulevard.

Figure 5.14. Some of the buried pipelines located near the intersection of Balboa Boulevard

and Bircher Street showing the potential hazard of co-location of lifeline

systems. At this site are three water lines (two of them main lines); three gas

lines; two sewers; one crude oil line; overhead power, telephone, and cable

TV lines; the street lighting system; and the street itself.

148
5.4 Electric Power

Power was lost to most of the Los Angeles basin area after the earthquake. Nearly 2 million

customers were without service immediately after the quake. About half of them had power

restored within one day and over 95 percent had power restored by midnight Tuesday, January

18. All power was restored within ten days after the earthquake.

Some transmission towers suffered significant damage, many as the result of foundation failure.

Damage to several high voltage substations near the epicenter, such as Sylmar, Pardee, and

Rinaldi, led to the widespread power outage in the Los Angeles basin, as well as isolated outages

throughout seven western states (fig. 5.15). As happened during the 1971 San Fernando

earthquake, porcelain elements of 230-kV and 500-kV equipment suffered the most damage (fig.

5.16). This highlights the urgent need for developing new earthquake-resistant materials to replace porcelain, which is very brittle. Furthermore, most of the 230-kV circuit switchers,

similar to those at the Sylmar substation shown in figure 5. 17, were damaged. However, none were damaged during the 1971 earthquake, a possible indication of much stronger ground

shaking by the Northridge earthquake. Most of the capacitor banks, similar to those in the

background in figure 5.17, performed well in this earthquake, whereas most collapsed during

the 1971 quake. Better performance of the capacitor banks is the result of stricter seismic

requirements in equipment qualification and in installation practices.

149
Figure 5. 15.

Damage to DC

equipment at several

high voltage

substations, such as

this one at Sylmar,

led to widespread

power outages in the

Los Angeles area as well as isolated

outages throughout

seven western states. (Photo courtesy of

Edward Matsuda,

Pacific Gas and

Electric Company.)

Figure 5.16. Porcelain is an integral part

of high voltage electrical equipment due to insulation requirements and is also the

most vulnerable to damage during strong

earthquake shaking. (Photo courtesy of

Edward Matsuda, Pacific Gas and Electric

Company.)

150
Figure 5.17. Most of the 230-kV circuit switchers (in the forefront) at the Sylmar substation were damaged. Most of the capacitor banks (in the background) performed

well in this earthquake, whereas most collapsed during the 1971 quake.

(Photo courtesy of Edward Matsuda of Pacitlc Gas and Electric Company.)

151
5.5 Transportation

All airports in the affected region survived the earthquake with no major problems. The airports were shut down immediately after the quake as a precautionary measure to allow inspection of

runways and taxiways. All airports were re-opened for operation once the inspections had been

completed. No structural damage was observed in airport facilities. However, they suffered

some typical types of non-structural damage, such as fallen ceiling tiles and leakage of water

pipes.

The earthquake caused a freight train derailment in Northridge (fig. 5.18). The 64-car freight

train belonged to the Southern Pacitlc Railroad and was on its way from Houston to Sacramento.

Twenty-five cars derailed, sixteen of which carried sulfuric acid or diesel fuel. The derailment

resulted in the spill of 30 000 L (8000 gal) of sulfuric acid and 7500 L (2000 gal) of diesel fuel. There were no casualties in this incident. About 200 m (650 ft) of railroad tracks were replaced

immediately following the earthquake and rail service was restored at 2:00 a.m., January 19.

Removal of damaged cars and cleanup of debris were completed on January 21.

Strong ground shaking and lateral movement of subgrade materials resulted in numerous ruptures

of asphalt pavement and concrete sidewalks in the epicentral area (figs. 5.19 and 5.20). In some

instances, local traftlc was interrupted temporarily until these cracks were repaired. In most

cases, damage was minor and local traffic was not interrupted. The south approach of Balboa

Boulevard at SRI 18 caved in because of loss of abutment fill due to a water main break (fig.

5.21). This bridge was closed for traffic due to some structural damage to the piers and the loss

of the south abutment fill, as described in chapter 4.

152
Figure 5.18. Derailment of a 64-car

freight train in Northridge. The

incident resulted in the spill of 30 000

L of sulfuric acid and 7500 L of diesel

fuel. (Photo courtesy of LeVal Lund.)

Figure 5.19.

Transverse cracks

in pavement along

Balboa Boulevard

in Northridge area.

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Figure 5.20. Transverse cracks in pavement near the intersection of Balboa Boulevard and

SR118.
5.6 Summary

The Northridge earthquake offered an excellent opportunity to assess how the technology that

has been used to shape the built environment performs when it is subjected to extraordinary

natural forces such as those generated by a strong earthquake. A number of observations and

some related conclusions can be drawn from the observations made immediately after the

earthquake. Suggestions for improved practice are also provided.

5.6.1 Observations

- The earthquake resulted in much less damage to water treatment plant facilities than was

caused by the 1971 San Fernando earthquake.

- The water supply system failed to provide service to customers because of widespread damage

to the distribution system.

- Repair of water and gas lines is a very time-consuming process. Repairs should be

thoroughly checked against leakage before backfilling pits.

- Repair of the Tillman Plant clarifiers was delayed due to nonstructural damage to the

maintenance building that prevented operators for retrieving needed parts and tools. This

delay could have been avoided if the building contents had been secured against earthquake

motions.

- The earthquake resulted in relatively more ruptures in the natural gas distribution lines than

in the transmission lines, when compared with the 1971 earthquake. Most of the breaks

occurred in older steel pipes, whereas plastic pipes performed well.

- Power was lost to nearly 2 million people immediately after the earthquake. However,

because of redundancy within the system, service was restored to over 95 percent of this

population within 2 days.

- Some transmission towers suffered significant damage due to foundation failures.

- Damage to several high voltage substations near the epicenter contributed to the power

outages in the epicentral area and to isolated outages throughout seven western states.

- Porcelain elements of 230-kV and 500-kV equipment showed high vulnerability to strong

shaking, as they did in the 1971 earthquake.

- Lessons learned from the 1971 earthquake helped improve the performance of electric power

systems, such as the capacitor banks, through stricter equipment qualification requirements

and better installation practices.

- All airport facilities performed well. Some airport buildings suffered nonstructural damage.

- The spill of sulfuric acid and diesel fuel caused by the railroad derailment in Northridge was

155
brought under control within two days after the quake. Nevertheless, it demonstrated the

potential hazard to an urban environment caused by spills of toxic materials.

5.6.2 Suggestions for Improving Practice

- There is a need to replace older gas lines built with brittle materials and connected with

oxyacetylene-welded joints. Modern pipelines using ductile steel pipes and flexible joints

performed well. Research is needed to develop cost effective methods to maintain the

integrity of gas service lines during an earthquake to prevent the ignition of fires. Research

is also needed to develop techniques to restore gas service to customers expeditiously without

compromising fire safety.

- Reliability of the water supply after an earthquake is extremely important for fire fighting and

for providing the water needed for other emergency purposes. Cost-effective techniques

should be developed to replace older water mains. This is important because repair is extremely time-consuming and costly, especially for major pipelines. Improved techniques

should also be developed to test the water-tightness of the repairs to avoid unnecessary delay

in the restoration of service.

- Improved methods for avoiding damage to high voltage substations should be developed.

New materials are needed to replace the brittle porcelain insulators. Better switch systems

should be developed and installed to prevent blackouts. Failures of foundations for

transmission towers should be thoroughly investigated.

- Disruptions of lifeline systems by an earthquake result in significant economic losses to society, even though loss of life may not be significant. Yet, lifelines have no nationally

recognized seismic rehabilitation or design standards. Design criteria have been developed,

updated, and used by individual utility companies. There is an urgent need for a national

effort by the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program to develop nationally accepted

design guidelines and standards for lifeline systems.

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CHAPTER 6

POSTEARTHQUAKE FIRES

6.1 Introduction

The Northridge earthquake resulted in fires which challenged the resources of the fire service

due to the number of fires, disruption of the water supply, and damage to fire protection systems

within buildings. The majority of the estimated 30 to 50 significant fires were located in the San

Fernando Valley and confined to the building of fire origin either by separation or by fire

department action. Fortunately there was no loss of life from fire. A principal cause of the

fires involved natural gas leaks. A small number of fires were caused by hazardous chemical

interactions. The only major instances of building-to-building fire spread occurred in three

manufactured housing developments (mobile home parks). Fire incidents occurred at a greater

than normal rate in the days following the earthquake with the cause of some of the fires directly

attributable to the restoration of power and gas to buildings shaken in the initial earthquake and

aftershocks. Fire sprinkler systems sustained damage in some buildings although the number

and extent of damage is not known at this time.

Fire protection in the municipal environment is derived from private and public systems

including building construction, building fire protection systems, land use, public and private

water supplies, public and private fire departments, and communication and utility systems. In the aftermath of a major earthquake the normal interactions between these systems are disrupted.

Even though emergency operational plans exist, the interaction between these systems in reducing the loss from fire is complex since it involves decisions on the part of a great many

people.

The loss of life and property caused by fire occurs in a different time frame than the structural

and property damage caused directly by the earthquake. While most of the loss caused by by

an earthquake occurs during the time of ground movement, there is basically no fire loss during

that time. Fire loss directly attributable to the earthquake begins immediately following the

ground shaking and can continue for days after the shaking has stopped.

This chapter examines the factors contributing to the cause, spread of and loss from fire in selected buildings affected by the earthquake. It is based on observations and interviews

conducted primarily during the week following the earthquake, preliminary reports, and news

media coverage and should not be considered comprehensive. The information presented is believed to be accurate although all of the facts could not be independently confirmed. A

number of public and private agencies continue to compile and analyze more detailed

information.

157
6.2 Fire Events Following the Earthquake

Immediately following the earthquake, the Los Angeles City Fire Department initiated the

Earthquake Operational Mode which included placing emergency equipment on patrol throughout

the city and dispatching fewer pieces of equipment to each incident in order to accommodate the

increased number of incidents. Earthquake damage was widespread but occurred mostly within

the City of Los Angles and most of the fire incidents were within the San Fernando Valley.

Immediately following the earthquake, electrical power was lost and telephone service was

disrupted throughout the city. At 5:45 a.m. Mayor Riordan declared a state of emergency. By

6:45 a.m. as many as 50 structure fires had been reported and over 100 incidents were being

handled by the fire department. By 9:45 a.m. all fires were under control.

Although the epicenter was located within the City of Los Angeles, there was damage in

surrounding counties and emergency resources throughout the region were utilized. In addition

to responding to fire incidents, the fire department provided emergency medical, hazardous

materials, and urban search and rescue services. The Los Angles City Fire Department responds

to over 900 fire, medical, and other emergences on a typical day. This number increased to over 2200 on the day of the earthquake and remained at twice the normal level in the following

days. The continued high number of incidents was due in part to fires associated with the

restoration of utilities.

Water available for fire fighting was generally adequate in the San Fernando Valley area during

the day following the Earthquake. The exceptions were in areas near the boundaries of the

system and in areas at higher elevation. In the hours following the earthquake pressure in the

water system dropped due to disruptions in supply and more than 3000 leaks. By the day after

the earthquake, water tankers had been deployed throughout the San Fernando Valley to assist

in fire fighting operations. On January 20th, fire department pumpers were used to pump water

from areas with adequate pressure within the system to areas with low pressure.

158
6.3 Fire Causes

The 30 to 50 fires reported initially following the earthquake occurred in a variety of residential

and commercial occupancies. Predictions of the number of fires following an earthquake have

been made for some parts of the Los Angeles area, but not for the San Fernando Valley [25].

The majority of buildings in the San Fernando Valley are four stories or less in height and

therefore the fires occurred primarily in these types of buildings. Figures 6. 1 to 6.4 show some

examples of buildings involved in postearthquake fires. The fire in the rear of the apartment

complex shown in figure 6.4 was the only fire observed in a completely collapsed portion of a

structure.

This chapter does not include a detailed investigation of the individual fires which occurred

following the earthquake. Preliminary indications are that a significant number of fires were

associated with natural gas leaks. Natural gas is the predominant fuel used for space and water

heating in the Los Angeles area and can therefore be found in most buildings. Natural gas is not in itself a source of ignition, but is relatively easy to ignite in confined spaces. Although

electrical power was lost throughout the area immediately after the earthquake, the most likely source of ignition was a combination of electrical sources and flames in the gas appliances

themselves. Gas leaks occurred both inside and outside of buildings. As discussed in chapter

5, the fire resulting from a leak in a gas main under a street destroyed several nearby houses.

Figure 6.5 shows a gas meter in a manufactured housing development (mobile home park) in

which there were at least six individual ignitions. Although there was no leak in the gas service

shown, it demonstrates how the movement of the manufactured homes during the earthquake

damaged the gas service, resulting in leaks which were ignited by unknown sources. There were

no postearthquake fires in the newest section of the development where an improved gas service

design was used. As in past California earthquakes, water heaters appear to be a source of gas

leaks [26]. Inadequately secured water heaters are likely to tip over during an earthquake. The

fire which destroyed the multi-family housing unit shown in figure 6.6 was reported to have

started as the result of damage to a water heater. An undamaged housing unit, similar to the one which was destroyed, can be seen in the background. Even though natural gas leaks may

have played a role in a significant number of the 30 to 50 reported fires, this number is very

small when compared with the total number of buildings exposed to significant shaking during

the earthquake. Since residents of this area are aware of the dangers of gas leaks following an earthquake many fires may have been averted by individuals shutting off the gas to buildings or

appliances.

The rapid failure of the electrical power distribution system probably resulted in fewer fires than

might have been expected. As electrical and gas services were restored in the days following

the earthquake, a significant number of fires were reported. Some of these fires were a result

of earthquake damage to electrical and gas equipment which went unnoticed or unattended.

Electrical and gas services were not disconnected in all red tagged buildings which were

identified by authorities as unsafe to enter. These, and additional fires, may have all occurred

immediately following the earthquake if electrical service had been maintained.

As in past California earthquakes, a small number of fires appear to have been caused by

flammable liquid or chemical spills. Figure 6.7 shows a science building at the California State

University at Northridge in which the fire was reported to have been the result of a chemical

159
spill. No fires were known to have occurred at service stations. Since the earthquake occurred

when most people were asleep, fire causes such as overturned candles and barbecue grills and

fires associated with industrial processes appear to be nearly nonexistent.

A small number of wildland fires were attributed to earthquake related causes, most likely arcing

in overhead power lines. Since the wind was light and the vegetation was not excessively dry,

these fires were easily extinguished.

Figure 6.1. Fire damage in a single story commercial building.

160
Figure 6.3. Fire damage in a three story commercial building.

161
Figure 6.5. Damaged gas service in a manufactured housing development.

162

6.4 Fire Spread

Most building fires were confined to the building of fire origin due to a combination of factors

including light winds, building construction, building separation, and the actions of the fire

department. Experience and predictions of the impact of fire following earthquake indicate that

at wind speeds above 9 m/s (20 mi/hr) the fire spread and associated loss will increase

dramatically [25].

Building-to-building fire spread was limited to three manufactured housing developments (mobile

home parks). Figure 6.8 shows the typical spacing between units in one of these developments.

Figure 6.9 shows an area of the development destroyed by fire. Observations made at this

development indicate that the method of unit-to-unit fire spread was primarily through windows.

Once a unit became completely involved in fire, the thermal radiation was sufficient to cause the

breakage of windows in an adjacent unit or to ignite combustibles within the unit directly

through the windows. The fire department reported low water pressure in the area which

combined with multiple independent tires and limited resources hindered fire fighting operations.

The fire spread was stopped either by separation such as roads and open areas or by fire fighting

operations.

A unique aspect of the construction of these manufactured units played a role in limiting fire

spread and assisting fire department actions. As the units burned from the inside, the carport

roofs collapsed from the building side, coming to rest on the outside supporting columns. In

this way the carport roofs formed fire breaks as shown in figure 6.10. Although these roofs

would not necessarily have survived the fire by themselves, they reduced the fire exposure on

adjacent units and thus enhanced fire fighting operations.

Figure 6.8. Typical unit spacing in a manufactured housing development.

164
Figure 6.9. Impact of a multiple unit fire in a manufactured housing development.

Figure 6.10. Collapsed roof which acted as a fire break in a manufactured housing

development.

165
6.5 Perfoimance of Fire Protection Systems

Immediately following an earthquake, it is difficult to determine the performance of fire

protection systems. Most of the systems can be inspected only from the inside of buildings,

many of which are private, and the access to buildings is frequently restricted until structural

safety can be determined. The most reliable source of data concerning these systems will come

from repair and inspection records in the months to come.

Some damage to fire sprinkler systems has been reported but the full extent is not known.

Damage to these systems is frequently the most visible of the fire protection systems since it may

result in water leaks. Interviews with persons who entered buildings in the earthquake area

indicate that many sprinkler systems remained intact, particularly those installed in accordance

with latest seismic standards. Typical damage to fire sprinkler systems included broken pipes

due to differential building movement or the sway generated in long pipe runs without adequate

bracing. Sprinklers installed in the downward or pendent position from piping above ceilings were in some cases sheared off. In other cases, pendent sprinklers installed in drop ceilings were pulled through the ceiling by the upward movement of the pipes and punched new holes

in the ceilings during the downward movement. While the punching may not have resulted in

leaks, it damaged the sprinkler deflectors which generate the desired spray pattern. Damaged

deflectors usually result in a significant decrease in sprinkler performance requiring the

sprinklers to be replaced.

Sprinkler systems normally have one or more check valves to prevent water from flowing from

the sprinkler system into the water supply system. In the most common wet pipe system, the

sprinkler system piping will have the highest pressure attained in the water supply system over

time. In the days following the earthquake, as the fire department pumped water from one part

of the municipal water supply system to another, there were significant local increases in

pressure. These higher pressures were then "trapped" in the sprinkler systems. Although it can

easily be remedied by bleeding off the pressure, these higher pressures could lead to premature

failure of the system and reduced effectiveness at the time of activation until the system returns

to the design pressure.

Damage to fire alarm, detection, smoke control, other extinguishing systems, and passive

building fire protection systems such as fire and smoke barriers has not been reported at this

time. The disruption of land based communication systems is reported to have affected the

ability of systems to dispatch alarms.

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6.6 Summary

The Northridge earthquake provided the opportunity to examine the strengths and weaknesses

of the infrastructure designed to deal with postearthquake fires. Examining fire events associated

with each major earthquake provides a means to reinforce continually the successes and provide

insight into possible improvements.

The following items contributed to the low loss of life and property due to fire following the

Northridge earthquake.

The time of day during which the earthquake occurred reduced traffic and hazardous

operations

The earthquake occurred before the start of morning traffic on a federal holiday and most

people were at home and tratTic was light. This resulted in few traffic accidents which

would have required fire department resources, and minimized traffic would have

impeded the flow of emergency vehicles. Since most business and industries were not

operating at the time of the earthquake, the fires and injuries associated with these types

of activities were minimal. Most people were at home and relatively few were trapped

in collapsed structures. Trapped victims require significant emergency resources to locate and rescue, and some of these resources are the same as those used for fire

fighting.

Light winds lead to reduced fire intensity and spread

On the day of the earthquake, the winds were light and, based on news media video

coverage, played almost no role in increasing fire intensity within buildings or promoting

building-to-building fire spread. This was a most fortunate circumstance since high

winds would have certainly lead to a far more serious fire situation. There is no

practical method available to protect large numbers of closely spaced buildings from

building-to-building fire spread, particularly during high wind conditions.

Adequate moisture content in wildlands reduced the fire hazard of natural fuels

The wildland fires reported immediately following the earthquake were quickly

extinguished. If the wildland moisture content and relative humidity had been low and

the winds had been high, major wildland fires could have followed the earthquake. The

devastation caused by wildland fires has been experienced many times in the past in the

Los Angeles area.

Fire department plan for responding to postearthquake emergencies

Following an earthquake, the fire department has primary responsibility for responding

to a wide variety of emergencies, and the ability to manage the emergencies effectively can substantially reduce the loss of life and property. The Los Angeles City Fire

Department has a comprehensive plan for dealing with postearthquake emergencies which

is reevaluated following each major earthquake. The state of California has a

167
sophisticated system to provide mutual-aid from neighboring communities during major

emergencies which was utilized during the Northridge earthquake.

Improvements in seismic building and fire standards

An analysis of code compliance and recent seismic related changes is beyond the scope

of this investigation. There is some evidence however, that in the area of fire sprinkler

systems for example, systems installed in accordance with the latest seismic standards

withstood the earthquake with little damage. Since most of the fire safety systems are not visible from the outside of buildings a complete analysis of these systems can be

made only when repair and inspection records become available.

The following have been identified as areas for possible improvement in reducing the loss of

postearthquake fires.

Protection of natural gas service lines and appliances

Although the absolute numbers are relatively small, damage to natural gas pipelines and

appliances resulting in leaks contributed to a significant fraction of the postearthquake

fires. This would indicate that a further study of the impact of earthquakes on building

gas service and appliances is warranted.

Plan to restore utilities after the earthquake

Fires directly attributable to earthquake damage continued to occur in the days following

the earthquake. Most of these fires were caused by the restoration of power to buildings

damaged in the earthquake. Some of these were red tagged buildings which had been

identified by authorities as unsafe to enter. Others were buildings which were either

unoccupied or in which hazards had not been identified. This issue places at odds the

desire to restore utility service as quickly as possible and the desire not to cause

additional fires. There are no nationally recognized standards or recommended practices

which address this issue. The state-of-the-art computer-assisted dispatching system being

installed by the Los Angles City Fire Department may offer a means of maintaining

building status and perhaps, via sensors, utility system status and even seismic activity

[27].

Improve means of communicating emergencies to authorities

This is perhaps one of the most challenging opportunities for reducing the loss of life and

property following an earthquake. Following the Northridge earthquake there was

significant disruption to telephone and other land based communication systems.

Although government agencies such as fire, law enforcement, and utilities maintained

contact with field units via radio, many citizens were unable to report requests for aid

via telephone. The present method of locating emergencies by placing public service

personnel on patrol and utilizing helicopters, while most likely the best method presently

available, is still inadequate. This is an area where emerging communications

technologies may provide significant improvements. It should be noted that even if there

168
had been no damage to communications systems, processing the vast quantities of

information needed to make critical decisions is a significant challenge in itself.

Predictions of postearthquake fire losses

Models which predict the number of postearthquake fires and the spread of those fires can be useful tools for developing earthquake response plans. Predictions have not been

developed for an earthquake centered in the Northridge area. At this time it cannot be

determined if the available models would have accurately predicted the fire loss

experienced in the San Fernando Valley or the loss which would have occurred with

higher winds. The fire loss data which will become available for the Northridge

earthquake can be used to verify the predictions of the fire loss models.

Fortunately the Northridge earthquake occurred when winds and traffic were light, most people were at home, and the humidity was relatively high. If the earthquake had occurred when there were Santa Ana winds, a high volume of traffic, and low humidity, the loss of life and property

from fire most certainly would have been far greater.

169
J 1.

1
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Conclusions

The initial assessment of the Northridge earthquake of January 17, 1994, provides significant

lessons for public policies and construction practices in earthquake prone areas throughout the

United States. While it was not in a category of large earthquakes in terms of its magnitude,

the Northridge earthquake caused severe damage to a wide range of structural types because the

epicenter was located in a populated urban area. Damaged structures revealed a number of

deficiencies in current construction practices and areas needing improvements in code provisions.

Implementing lessons learned about structural performance and postearthquake fires will reduce

seismic hazards throughout the United States.

7.1.1 General

1. The Northridge earthquake claimed 58 lives and caused over 1500 serious injuries.

However, fewer than half of the deaths were attributed directly to structural failures.

Because it occurred at 4:31 a.m., on a holiday, life loss was limited to a small number. Had

the earthquake occurred during business hours, the collapse of parking structures alone could

have caused a large number of deaths.

2. Although a number of fires started immediately following the earthquake, calm winds limited

spreading of fires in residential and commercial districts. At mobile home parks, fires

spread from unit to unit. In most instances, fires were caused by natural gas leaks.

3. Damage to multi-family dwellings contributed significantly to the over 25 000 dwelling units

that became unhabitable. Providing adequate shelter for displaced persons is a major task

after an earthquake. Special attention should be paid to improving the seismic performance

of existing dwelling stock.

4. At many locations, peak ground acceleration exceeded 0.4g, the maximum design value in building codes. However, most buildings met code expectations for performance. Because

many strong motion records and response measurements are available from this earthquake,

valuable opportunities exist for in-depth studies of building performance to assess the

adequacy of design values for earthquake forces and provisions for seismic resistance.

7.1.2 Building Performance

1. In many cases, buildings designed and constructed in accordance with modern (mid-1970's

or later) seismic requirements performed well structurally. This clearly shows the value of

incorporating modern seismic design and construction requirements into building codes.

However, failures of structures characterized as "Undefined Structural Systems" (Uniform

Building Code Section 2333(i)2), such as the parking garage at California State University

171
at Northridge, indicate that the performance of such structural systems needs to be evaluated

carefully to update code provisions.

2. Damage to unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings was widespread. In most cases, those

URM buildings rehabilitated with parapet braces and floor-wall ties, such as those

rehabilitated in response to the Los Angeles Division 88 ordinance, escaped total collapse.

However, walls sustained severe cracking and, in many cases, pieces fell onto sidewalks.

This posed life-threatening hazards to pedestrians.

3. Nonstructural damage caused hospitals, schools, businesses, and industrial facilities to be

inoperative even though structural damage was minimal or non-existent. An in-depth review

of current code requirements and standards for nonstructural elements is needed to improve

their seismic performance.

4. Damage to steel structures was not readily visible from the exterior of buildings because

most steel members are hidden behind architectural finishes and fire proofing. Removal of

such coverings revealed brittle failures of welds and connections in many steel frame

structures. Because owners of damaged structures often wish to keep damage reports

confidential, damage information is not forthcoming. Detailed failure analyses of available

data should be performed to understand the underlying causes of these failures.

7.1.3 Bridge Performance

1. In general, bridges designed using standards developed after the mid-1970's performed well.

Several bridges near the epicentral region, which were designed and constructed in the

1960's and early 1970's, sustained severe damage. Of the seven major bridges which

sustained severe damage, six failed due to inadequate lateral reinforcement of the bridge

piers.

2. Most older bridges which had been seismically retrofitted (with cable restrainers, pier

jacketing or foundation strengthening) performed well in the Northridge earthquake.

However, because this earthquake was relatively moderate in magnitude, it should not

necessarily be concluded that all seismic retrofit methods for bridges have been adequately

proof tested by this event. Design criteria for cable restrainers may need to be reviewed.

Even though jacketed bridge piers apparently performed well in this earthquake, it would be

valuable to study the intensity of ground motions experienced at the specific bridge sites

where jacketed piers have been employed, so that the performance of jacketed piers in larger

events can be estimated.

3. It is likely that some bridge piers were damaged because their effective lengths had been

reduced. Several factors reduced the effective lengths: architectural fiares at the tops of

piers; backfill soil over a portion of the pier height; and concrete walls cast integrally with, or directly abutting, piers. Such constraints need to be minimized, or the effects of the

constraints must be considered carefully in the design of piers.

172
4. In bridges with piers of varying heights, the shortest piers tended to sustain the most

damage. This is apparently because short piers have high lateral stiffnesses, and therefore

attract a large share of the seismic loads. A better understanding of the role of short piers

in overall bridge performance, is needed.

5. Bridge spans which had skewed alignments or irregular plan configurations often sustained severe damage. Special attention should be paid to the potential for problems with bridges

having skewed alignments or irregular plans.

6. Older bridge bearings, of the steel rocker type, are highly susceptible to damage during

strong ground shaking. Loss of rocker bearing support can lead to a broad range of bridge

damage, including cracked girders, loss of roadway elevation alignment, and complete

collapse of the superstructure.

7.1.4 Performance of Lifelines

1. Damage to older trunk lines and main lines for water distribution caused serious disruptions

in water supply in the epicentral region. About 50 000 Los Angeles Department of Water

and Power customers were without water on the first day after the earthquake. About 10 000

customers were still without water one week after the earthquake.

2. Buried pipelines which carry natural gas and oil fractured at many locations due to ground

motion. Over 1300 breaks and leaks in the gas piping system were reported,

3. As in past earthquakes, brittle ceramic elements, which are often the weak links in circuit

breaker assemblies, were damaged.

7.1.5 Fire

1. The occurrence of the earthquake before the start of morning traffic on a federal holiday

allowed the fire department to respond to fires promptly without delays.

2. Damage to natural gas pipelines and appliances resulting in leaks contributed significantly

to postearthquake fires.

3. In many cases, electric power was restored to buildings which were identified as unsafe for

entry. The desire to restore utility service as quickly as possible is at odds with the desire

not to cause fires.

4. In general, fire sprinkler systems designed and installed in accordance with the latest seismic

standards withstood the earthquake with little damage. However, in some instances,

sprinkler pipes ruptured where sprinkler systems interacted with suspended ceilings.

173
7.2 Recommendations

7.2.1 Performance of All Structures

1. A comprehensive assessment of the performance of structures in relation to ground

motions of the Northridge earthquake should be made.

Preliminary spectral analyses of free-field strong motions revealed that many structures may

have been subjected to a seismic demand greater than that prescribed by the current code.

This earthquake provides a valuable opportunity to evaluate successful and unsuccessful

performance of structures designed according to the modern seismic design requirements.

The reliability of currently used vulnerability assessment methodologies can also be assessed.

2. The effects of vertical accelerations on the performance of structures need to be

investigated.

Unusually high vertical accelerations were recorded at several locations in the epicentral

region. Studies of the influence of such high accelerations on structural performance are needed to determine whether high vertical accelerations were a contributing cause of

structural failures. The adequacy of current design provisions for effects of vertical

accelerations should be evaluated.

7.2.2 Building Performance

1. Develop design and construction criteria that provide protection against property loss

and maintain postearthquake functionality.

Current building codes are intended to protect life safety. Thus, adherence to the seismic

requirements of building codes is not sufficient to prevent damage. The Northridge

earthquake again demonstrated this limitation of modern building codes. Reliable tools

should be developed to allow designers and constructors to serve owners who desire

buildings that can remain functional after a design-level earthquake with a limited level of

damage.

2. Educate building designers, constructors and regulators to recognize and produce

earthquake resistant structural systems.

Buildings having stiffness and geometric irregularities performed poorly during this

earthquake. No building code can anticipate every possible building design and be written

to prevent all potential undesirable performance. It is possible for every element of a

building to meet code requirements, yet for the building as a whole perform poorly in an

earthquake. Insightful use of the code by the designers, constructors and regulators is needed to obtain the desired performance. Education is needed to transfer the knowledge

on building performance gained from this and other earthquakes to the people who can apply

these lessons on a daily basis.

174
3. Code requirements for the deformation compatibility of structural members need to be

re-examined.

The lateral displacement capacity of structural members which are designed to carry

primarily vertical loads may not be compatible with that of lateral load resisting structural

members. Due to this incompatibility, failures of vertical load carrying members may occur. This may precipitate total or partial collapse of a structure.

4. Comprehensive studies of the performance of unreinforced masonry buildings, both

rehabilitated and unrehabilitated, should be carried out to evaluate the effectiveness of

rehabilitation methods.

Although parapet braces and floor-wall ties apparently prevented total collapse of

unreinforced masonry buildings during the earthquake, large pieces of walls fell, creating

life-safety hazards. More effective measures are needed to reduce life-threatening hazards.

5. In-depth evaluation of current code requirements and standards is needed for

interactions between and attachments of nonstructural elements.

Structurally sound buildings sustained major damage to nonstructural elements such as suspended ceilings and light fixtures. These failures can be a life safety issue. Attachment

of nonstructural elements and displacement compatibility of nonstructural systems with

structural elements and with each other should be examined.

6. Ductility and energy absorption capacity of welded connections and joints of steel frame

structures need to be investigated to improve design and construction requirements in

codes and standards.

Many failures of weldments, welded connections and joints have been reported since the

initial field investigations of the earthquake affected area. Damage was found at beam-tocolumn connections of a building located at as far as 32 km from the epicenter. Brittle

failures of welded connections should be documented and evaluated carefully to assess the

reliability of this type of connection under seismic loading.

7. Performance of buildings that had been rehabilitated prior to the Northridge

earthquake should be studied to confirm the validity of, or to improve, standards for

strengthening existing buildings.

A variety of data on performance of rehabilitated buildings are available from the Northridge

earthquake. A significant opportunity is available to evaluate and improve practices for the

strengthening existing buildings, including rehabilitation methods for systems known to be

vulnerable, such as unreinforced masonry and non-ductile concrete frames.

175
7.2.3 Bridge Performance

1. Cost-effective seismic retrofit guidelines should be developed for multiple-pier bridge

bents.

To date, most seismic retrofit studies have been directed towards strengthening isolated piers.

Comparatively litde has been done to address the strengthening of multiple-pier bents.

2. Specifications and guidelines should be developed for the design and retrofit of bridge

spans with skewed alignments or irregular plan configurations.

Skewed overcrossings on 15 at Gavin Canyon and on SRI 18 at Mission-Gothic sustained severe damage. Studies should be carried out with two objectives: to understand the

fundamental response of skewed bridges to seismic loads; and to develop methods for

mitigating damage in existing and planned skewed bridges.

3. The seismic performance of short bridge piers and the role which short piers play in the

overall seismic response of bridges should be studied.

A number of short bridge piers were severely damage in the Northridge earthquake. Some

of these piers were under-reinforced, but others contained amounts of reinforcement close

to those that would be specified using current design codes. The implications of these

failures for the design of future bridges should be studied. In addition, the effective lengths

of some piers were reduced by constraints such as adjacent concrete walls, backfill soil and

architectural column flares. The effects of such constraints on column behavior need to be

investigated.

4. The seismic performance of rocker type bridge bearings should be evaluated and

retrofitting techniques should be developed.

Rocker type bearings failed during the Northridge earthquake. Similar types of bearings are used throughout the Central and Eastern United States, where there is significant potential

for seismic activity. Studies should be carried out to develop methods for rehabilitating or

replacing steel rocker bearings.

7.2.4 Performance of Lifelines

1. Analytical, laboratory, and field studies of the performance of electrical distribution

systems, and of gas and water pipelines should be conducted to develop improved

vulnerability assessment and retrofit practices.

There were extensive failures occurred at electric switch yards and in buried pipelines in the

epicentral region. Similar failure potentials exist in all seismically hazardous areas of the

United States.

176
2. Develop cost effective methods to maintain the integrity of gas service lines during an

earthquake to prevent the ignition of fires.

There is a need to replace older gas lines built with brittle materials.

3. Develop methods for rehabilhating old steel water pipelines.

Older steel water pipes sustained damage during the earthquake, resulting in interruption of

the water supply to homes and businesses. More importantly, the loss of water lines

jeopardized fire fighting capabilities. Methods for rehabilitating water pipes without

replacing them are needed. Such methods can be used throughout the earthquake prone

regions of the United States.

4. Nationally applicable design and construction provisions for new and existing lifelines

should be developed.

The Northridge earthquake revealed again the importance of successful lifeline performance

for the prevention of life, property and other losses due to earthquakes. In contrast to buildings, no nationally applicable design and construction practices are available for new

and existing lifelines.

7.2.5 Fire Safety

1. Develop criteria to reduce the postearthquake fire hazards posed by gas service lines

and appliances.

A significant portion of the earthquake-induced fires were caused by damage to gas service

lines or to gas appliances. These failures should be studied so that improved criteria for

postearthquake fire safety of gas service lines and appliances can be developed.

2. Develop criteria and techniques to allow utility personnel to assess the safety of restoring

electricity to damaged buildings.

Building fires continued to ignite in the days following the earthquake. Most of these fires were caused by the restoration of power to buildings damaged in the earthquake.

3. Develop postearthquake fire models to aid emergency planning.

Fire hazard prediction methodologies should be developed so that emergency managers can

better plan pre-event prevention actions and post-event responses. Data from the Northridge

event and other recent earthquakes should be used to verify the efficacy of the model.

177

CHAPTER 8

REFERENCES

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[2] Hall J.F., editor, Northridge Earthquake January 17, 1994, Preliminary Reconnaissance

Report, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, 94-01, Oakland, CA, 1994.

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[14] Deppe, K., "The Whittier Narrows Earthquake of October 1, 1987 - Evaluation of

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Fernando Earthquake, Building Science Series 40, National Bureau of Standards,

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9, 1971, Earthquake Engineering Research Laboratory EERL 71-02, California Institute

of Technology, Pasadena, CA, 1971.

[17] Willman, David, et.al, "Shaky Bridges, Shaken Theories," The Los Angeles Times,

February 16, 1994, pp. S2-S3.

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Report FHWA/RD-83/007, 1983.

[19] Federal Highway Administration, "Seismic Retrofitting Manual for Highway Bridges,"

prepared by the National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, State University

of NY at Buffalo, FHWA Contract DTFH61-92-C-00106, November, 1993 (draft).

[20] State of California, Dept. of Transportation (Caltrans), Office of Structure Design, Memo

to Designers, Section 20, "Seismic", Sacramento, CA, 1989, with revisions to 1994.

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17, 1994, Damage Analysis of Selected Freeway Bridges, Report SSRP-94/06, Dept. of

Applied Mechanics and Engineering Sciences, University of California at La Jolla, CA,

Feb., 1994.

[23] State of California, Tlie San Fernando Earthquake: Field Investigation ofBridge Damage,

Business and Transportation Agency, Dept. of Public Works, Division of Highways,

Bridge Dept., 1971.

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Earthquake Engineering Research Center, University of California at Berkeley, March

1994.

180
[25] Fire Following Earthquake, Estimates of the Conflagration Risk to Insured Property in

Greater Los Angeles and San Francisco, All-Industry Research Advisory Council, Oak

Brook, IL, 1987.

[26] Mohammadi, J., Alyasin, S., Bak, D.N., Investigation of Cause and Effects of Fires

Following the Loma Prieta Earthquake, Illinois Institute of Technology, IIT-CE-92-01,

May, 1992.

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March/April 1994, pp. 66-70.

181

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