IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

JAMES JOHNSON, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) No. 12-cv-05712 

 v. ) 

 ) Judge Andrea R. Wood 

IMHOTEP CARTER, et al., ) 

 ) 

Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Plaintiff James Johnson claims that while in the custody of the Illinois Department of 

Corrections at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”), he was denied proper medical care by 

Defendants Imhotep Carter, Darryl Edwards, and Nwadiutor Ifezue, in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 Accordingly, Johnson has brought this civil rights 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief. Before the Court 

are two motions for summary judgment—one filed by Defendant Carter and the other by 

Defendant Edwards. For the reasons detailed below, Defendant Carter’s summary judgment 

motion (Dkt. No. 186)is denied and Defendant Edwards’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 

No. 189) is granted.

BACKGROUND 

Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are undisputed. At the time of the actions 

alleged in Johnson’s complaint, Defendant Carter was the medical director at Stateville and 

Defendant Edwards was an assistant warden at Stateville. 

                                                            

1

 In addition to these three Defendants, Johnson also initially named Wexford Health Services, Inc., Jane 

Doe Nurse, and Marcus Hardy. On August 9, 2012, Johnson’s claims against Wexford Health Services, 

Inc. were dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 6.) On February 7, 2013, Jane Doe and Marcus 

Hardy were dismissed as Defendants due to Johnson’s lack of prosecution. (Dkt. No. 23.) 
2 

 On March 25, 2012, Johnson was involved in a fight with another inmate. (Carter’s Stmt. 

of Material Facts ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 187; Edwards’s Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 190.) 

Stateville correctional officers responded to the scene and broke up the fight, macing Johnson in 

the process. (Carter’s Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 34; Edwards’s Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 5.) The 

officers managed to restrain Johnson and place him in handcuffs. (Id.) As the officers were 

pulling Johnson’s hands behind his back, Johnson heard his finger pop. (Carter’s Stmt. of Material 

Facts ¶ 34.) After he was handcuffed, Johnson was taken to the Stateville healthcare unit where he 

was treated by a nurse. (Carter’s Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 11; Edwards’s Stmt. of Material Facts 

¶ 7.) The nurse flushed Johnson’s eyes with water and a saline solution to remove the mace. 

(Carter’s Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 11; Edwards’s Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 8.) According to 

Johnson, he told the nurse that his finger hurt badly and that he had heard and felt it “pop.” 

(Johnson’s Stmt. of Add’l Facts ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 194, 196.) Johnson testified during his deposition 

that the nurse did not provide him with any medical treatment for his broken finger. (Id. ¶ 7.) 

Instead, he was sent to segregation after his eye treatment concluded. (Carter’s Stmt. of Material 

Facts ¶ 11; Edwards’s Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 11.) Johnson also claims that his finger caused 

him extreme pain while he was in segregation and that he had trouble sleeping because of the 

pain. (Johnson’s Stmt. of Add’l Facts ¶ 8.) 

 Johnson testified that he made several attempts to contact both Defendant Edwards and 

Defendant Carter regarding his injured finger. For example, Johnson claims that on March 27, 

2012, he sent letters to sick call, Defendant Carter, and Defendant Edwards. In the letter to 

Defendant Edwards, Johnson wrote: 

 I have written to the hospital and let them know that my finger was broken on 3/25/12 . . . 

 I showed [the nurse] my finger, but she refused to treat my finger. I am in a lot of pain. 

 Could you please tell someone in the hospital about my finger and tell them to see me 

 please? 
3 

(Edwards’s Stmt. of Material Facts Ex. H, Dkt. No. 190-2.) Defendant Edwards has no 

recollection of receiving or reading this letter. (Id. ¶ 17.) Nonetheless, he claims that if he had 

received the letter, it would have been forwarded to the health care unit administrator. (Id.) 

 The letters Johnson allegedly sent to sick call and Defendant Carter contain the following 

statement: “Could I please be seen because I think my finger is broken. . . . I was brought up to 

the hospital and the African nurse told me that the officer came first and she [refused to treat me]. 

I am in a lot of pain.” (Carter’s Stmt. of Material Facts Ex. A, Dkt. No. 187-1 at 107 of 120, 109 

of 120.) According to Johnson’s testimony, he sent follow-up letters to both sick call and 

Defendant Carter on April 6, 2012. In his letter to Defendant Carter, Johnson states: 

 Could you please see me because my finger is broken. I was seen by the med-tech and 

 showed her my finger and she said that she thought that my finger looked broken, but she 

 refused to give me a splint or anything for my pain. . . . I am unable to sleep because of the 

 pain I’m in. 

(Id. at 110 of 120.) Johnson makes similar complaints regarding his broken finger in his letter to 

sick call. (Id. at 108 of 120.) But according to Defendant Carter, even if those letters were actually 

sent, it was not part of his responsibilities as medical director to receive sick call requests or 

letters from inmates; those responsibilities are delegated to other employees. (Carter’s Stmt. of 

Material Facts ¶ 19.) 

 On April 10, 2012, Johnson’s medical records reflect a note from a Correctional Medical 

Technician that Johnson was complaining about an injury to his right hand and that he needed to 

see a doctor. (Id. ¶ 18.) Johnson claims that sometime before April 20, 2012 he was called to the 

health care unit. (Edwards’s Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 20.) Johnson states that he was put in a 

segregation holding cell for approximately 30 minutes before a medical technician informed him 

that he would not be seen because he was not scheduled to attend the health care unit. (Johnson’s 
4 

Stmt. of Add’l Facts ¶ 14.) Johnson claims that he showed the medical technician his swollen 

finger and she placed his name on the sick call. (Id. ¶ 15.) Afterwards, according to Johnson, 

while he was waiting to be returned to his cell, he saw Defendant Carter coming out of the back of 

the health care unit. (Id. ¶ 16.) According to Johnson, he stopped Defendant Carter and showed 

him his broken finger. (Id.) Defendant Carter responded: “OK. It’s swollen and bent. What do you 

want me to do about it?” (Id.) Upon learning how Johnson injured his finger in a fight, Johnson 

asserts that Defendant Carter denied him medical treatment, saying, “Oh, you fighting with 

officers, I can’t do nothing for you. You got what you deserve.” (Id. ¶ 17.) Defendant Carter does 

not recall this conversation. (Carter’s Response to Johnson’s Stmt. of Add’l Facts ¶ 16, Dkt. No. 

204.) 

 On the same day, Johnson claims to have spoken with Defendant Edwards and shown 

Defendant Edwards his swollen finger. (Johnson’s Stmt. of Add’l Facts ¶ 18.) Johnson asked 

Defendant Edwards to help him get medical attention because his hand was hurting so badly he 

could not sleep. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 19.) Defendant Edwards told Johnson to wait in the hospital holding 

cell and he would inquire about medical treatment. (Id. ¶ 20.) Defendant Edwards went into the 

health care unit, and when he returned he told Johnson he needed to drop a sick call request into 

the sick call box in order to receive treatment. (Id. ¶ 21.) 

 On or around April 20, 2016—26 days after his finger was injured—Johnson was seen by 

a physician’s assistant. An x-ray of Johnson’s hand was ordered, he was prescribed Tylenol, and 

his finger was splinted. (Carter’s Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 13.) On April 26, 2012, the x-ray was 

performed and it indicated that Johnson had an “avulsion fracture base of distal phalanx at 

insertion of extension tendon.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Johnson was told that his finger was broken but healing. 

(Id. ¶ 42.) Defendant Carter has testified that he reviewed the x-ray report on April 30, 2012, and 
5 

directed the physician’s assistant to tape Johnson’s fingers together and repeat the x-ray in ten 

days. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 15.) The second x-ray was performed on May 6, 2012 and showed an 

“undisplaced bone base of distal phalanx 4th finger at insertion of extension tendon.” Defendant 

Carter has testified that he reviewed the second x-ray report. (Id. ¶ 16.) Johnson was seen again on 

May 21, 2017 for a follow-up appointment, at which time his x-rays were discussed and Johnson 

stated, “I’m better.” (Id. ¶ 17.) 

DISCUSSION 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the admissible evidence considered as a whole shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law, even after all reasonable inferences are drawn in the nonmovant’s favor. See 

Dynegy Mktg. & Trade v. Multiut Corp., 648 F.3d 506, 517 (7th Cir. 2011). “A factual dispute is 

‘genuine’ only if a reasonable jury could find for either party.” Nichols v. Mich. City Plant 

Planning Dep't, 755 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 A “person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 

State” deprives another “person within the jurisdiction of [the United States] . . . of any 

[constitutional] rights . . . shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Prisoners 

enjoy a constitutional right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. 

amend. VIII. That right includes “a right to adequate medical care.” See Berry v. Peterman, 604 

F.3d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 2010). “To determine if the Eighth Amendment has been violated in the 

prison medical context, [the Court] perform[s] a two-step analysis, first examining whether a 

plaintiff suffered from an objectively serious medical condition, and then determining whether the 

individual was deliberately indifferent to that condition.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 727–28 

(7th Cir. 2016). 
6 

 Defendant Edwards and Defendant Carter each have filed a motion for summary judgment 

in this case. Only Defendant Carter argues that Johnson was not suffering from an objectively 

serious medical condition. Both Defendants, however, contend that summary judgment in their 

favors is warranted because there is no proof of deliberate indifference, as neither of them was 

subjectively aware of Johnson’s condition nor did they consciously disregard a risk to Johnson’s 

health or safety.

I. Serious Medical Condition 

 Defendant Carter first argues that Johnson’s broken finger is not a serious medical 

condition. As explained by the Seventh Circuit, a serious medical condition is characterized by 

“the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or 

the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522–23 (7th Cir. 

2008). A condition also may be objectively serious if a “failure to treat it could result in further 

significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 522 (internal quotation 

marks). Thus, the Seventh Circuit has found that “a broad range of medical conditions may be 

sufficient to meet the objective prong of a deliberate indifference claim, including a dislocated 

finger, a hernia, arthritis, heartburn and vomiting, a broken wrist, and minor burns sustained from 

lying in vomit.” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 861 (7th Cir. 2011). 

 Here, Defendant Carter argues that nothing in the record indicates that Johnson’s injury 

was objectively serious. It is undisputed, however, that an x-ray performed on April 26, 2012 

indicated that Johnson had “avulsion fracture base of distal phalanx at insertion of extension 

tendon.” (Johnson’s Response to Carter’s Stmt. of Material Facts ¶ 14, Dkt. No. 194.) In layman’s 

terms, the x-ray indicated that Johnson had a broken finger. (Carter Dep. at 19, Dkt. No. 187-1.) 

Beyond the undisputed fact that Johnson had a broken finger, Johnson testified that this broken 
7 

finger was extremely painful, so much so that it prevented him from sleeping. This is sufficient 

evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson had an objectively serious 

medical condition. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has recognized a variety of similar medical 

conditions as objectively serious. See, e.g., Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 831 (7th Cir. 2007) 

(openly dislocated finger); Reynolds v. Barnes, 84 F. App'x 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2003) (broken 

foot); Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 654 (7th Cir. 1981) (broken wrist). Accordingly, 

Johnson has presented a genuine issue of material fact as to the objective seriousness of his 

condition. 

II. Deliberate Indifference 

 Both Defendant Edwards and Defendant Carter argue that, even if a jury could find that 

Johnson’s condition constituted an objectively serious medical need, he has not shown that either 

of them acted with deliberate indifference to that need. “Deliberate indifference requires that a 

defendant actually know about yet disregard a substantial risk of harm to an inmate's health or 

safety.” Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2017). “The standard is a subjective one: The 

defendant must know facts from which he could infer that a substantial risk of serious harm exists 

and he must actually draw the inference.” Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 804 (7th Cir. 2016).

Moreover, it is well established that “[f]or constitutional violations under § 1983 . . . a 

government official is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Locke v. Haessig, 788 F.3d 662, 

669 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, an “inmate’s correspondence to 

a prison administrator may . . . establish a basis for personal liability under § 1983 where that 

correspondence provides sufficient knowledge of a constitutional deprivation.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 

792 F.3d 768, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 1996) 

(“[A] prison official’s knowledge of prison conditions learned from an inmate’s communications 
8 

can, under some circumstances, constitute sufficient knowledge of the conditions to require the 

officer to exercise his or her authority and to take the needed action to investigate and, if 

necessary, to rectify the offending condition.”)). “In other words, prisoner requests for relief that 

fall on ‘deaf ears’ may evidence deliberate indifference.” Perez, 792 F.3d at 782. 

A. Defendant Carter 

Johnson describes communicating his serious medical need to Defendant Carter through 

both in-person and written communications. He testified at his deposition that he sent two letters 

to Defendant Carter asking for treatment of his broken finger and describing his pain: one letter 

dated March 27, 2012 (two days after he broke his finger) and one dated April 6, 2012 (twelve 

days after he broke his finger). Nothing in the record shows that Defendant Carter read or even 

received the letters, however. As such, the letters alone would be insufficient to prove deliberate 

indifference. But those letters are not the only evidence presented by Johnson as proof of 

Defendant Carter’s subjective awareness of his serious medical condition: Johnson also testified 

that he talked to Defendant Carter about his broken finger sometime before April 20, 2012. 

Although Defendant Carter denies that this communication occurred, a determination of whether 

Johnson’s story is more credible than Defendant Carter’s account is a job best left to the jury. 

Consequently, based on both the letters and the in-person communication, there is a genuine issue 

of fact as to whether Defendant Carter had actual subjective knowledge of Johnson’s broken 

finger. 

 Defendant Carter also argues that, even if he was subjectively aware of Johnson’s 

condition, he nevertheless cannot be held liable because there is no evidence that he acted with 

deliberate indifference. But “[a] delay in treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if the 

delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain.” McGowan v. Hulick, 
9 

612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010). In other words, “even if [an inmate’s] condition did not worsen 

from the delay, deliberate indifference to prolonged, unnecessary pain can itself be the basis for 

an Eighth Amendment claim.” Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (7th Cir. 2012). 

“Of course, delays are common in the prison setting with limited resources.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 

730. Thus, “[d]elay is not a factor that is either always, or never, significant. Instead, the length of 

delay that is tolerable depends on the seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing 

treatment.” McGowan, 612 F.3d at 640; accord Berry, 604 F.3d at 442 (“[W]e do not suggest that 

a minor delay in treatment constitutes deliberate indifference.”). 

 In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Johnson, he broke his finger on 

March 25, 2012 but it was not treated until 26 days later. During those 26 days, Johnson’s finger 

was extremely swollen and painful; so much so that he had trouble sleeping at night. Defendant 

Carter knew about Johnson’s injury and pain, and had the ability to end his suffering early—either 

by treating Johnson himself or instructing another physician to treat Johnson. This constitutes 

sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference for Johnson’s claim to survive a motion to dismiss. 

Because Johnson has presented sufficient evidence of Defendant Carter’s deliberate indifference 

to his objectively serious medical need, Defendant’s Carter’s motion for summary judgment is 

denied. 

B. Defendant Edwards 

 As with Defendant Carter, Johnson claims that he informed Defendant Edwards of his 

serious medical need through both letters and an in-person discussion. But unlike Defendant 

Carter, Defendant Edwards is not a medical professional and therefore his conduct is judged by a 

slightly different standard. Namely, non-medical prison staff “can rely on the expertise of medical 

personnel. . . . [I]f a prisoner is under the care of medical experts, a non-medical prison official 
10 

will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Arnett v. Webster, 

658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(stating that a prison warden “is entitled to relegate to the prison’s medical staff the provision of 

good medical care”). Once alerted, however, “[n]on-medical defendants cannot simply ignore an 

inmate’s plight.” Id. A non-medical officer is alerted of a constitutional violation if the inmate 

sends a communication which, “in its content and manner of transmission, gave the prison official 

sufficient notice to alert him or her to ‘an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Vance v. 

Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 1996). Upon receiving such a communication, the official’s 

“refusal or declination to exercise the authority of his or her office may reflect deliberate 

disregard.” Id.

 Johnson has provided the following as evidence of his communications with Defendant 

Edwards regarding the medical staff’s refusal to treat his broken finger: (1) a letter, which 

Johnson states he sent to Defendant Edwards, and (2) Johnson’s testimony regarding an in-person 

communication between himself and Defendant Edwards. With regards to the letter, Defendant 

Edwards testified that he had no recollection of seeing or receiving this communication. Of course 

Defendant Edwards’s lack of memory that he received the letter is not the same as testimony that 

he did not receive it. But even assuming that Defendant Edwards did see and read Johnson’s 

letter, this evidence would not be sufficient to establish liability. The letter is dated a mere two 

days after Johnson’s finger was broken and, according to the letter, after Johnson’s finger injury 

he was immediately taken to the health care unit where he was denied treatment. After reading the 

letter, it would have been reasonable for Defendant Edwards to rely on the medical professional’s 

determination that immediate treatment of Johnson’s finger was unnecessary. Given that less than 
11 

two days had elapsed since the decision by the nurse was made, it is unreasonable to conclude that 

Defendant Edwards was alerted to a serious risk to inmate health and safety. 

 As for Johnson’s in-person communication with Defendants Edwards, even assuming the 

conversation did occur, it also would not be enough to establish Defendant Edwards’s deliberate 

indifference. According to Johnson, sometime before April 20, 2012, he showed Defendant 

Edwards his broken finger and asked Defendant Edwards to help him get medical attention. In 

response, Defendant Edwards went to the healthcare unit to inquire about Johnson’s medical 

treatment, ultimately returning with the information that Johnson would not be treated until he 

dropped a sick call request in the sick call box. Even assuming that Johnson sufficiently alerted 

Defendant Edwards to a potential health risk, Defendant Edwards did in fact exercise his authority 

to act on Johnson’s behalf. And Johnson has presented to no evidence that he followed up with 

Defendant Edwards later on to let Defendant Edwards know that Johnson’s problems still had not 

been resolved. According to Johnson’s own testimony, Defendant Edwards went into the 

healthcare unit to investigate medical treatment in response to Johnson’s request for help. 

Johnson may not have liked the help that Defendant Edwards provided, but a reasonable jury 

could not conclude based on his actions that he deliberately disregarded Johnson’s serious 

medical needs. Because Johnson has failed to prove deliberate indifference, Defendant Edwards’s 

motion for summary judgment is granted. 
12 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Carter’s summary judgment motion (Dkt. No. 186) 

is denied and Defendant Edwards’s summary judgment motion (Dkt. No. 189) is granted. 

ENTERED: 

Dated: September 18, 2017 __________________________ 

 Andrea R. Wood 

 United States District Judge