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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

March 15, 2016 

v No. 324055 

Wayne Circuit Court 

EDWARD LEE DICKERSON, LC No. 14-003325-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant, Edward Lee Dickerson, appeals by right his bench convictions of two counts 

of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (Assault-GBH), MCL 750.84, 

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b, and 

felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f. The trial court sentenced 

Dickerson to serve 38 months to 10 years in prison for each Assault-GBH conviction, to serve 

two years in prison for the felony-firearm conviction, and to time served for the felon-inpossession conviction. For the reasons explained below, we affirm Dickerson’s convictions, but 

remand to the trial court for determination as to whether it would have sentenced Dickerson 

differently had it not been constrained by the sentencing guidelines. 

 In March 2014, Cierra Taylor, her sister Sada Taylor, their friend Delvon Barnett, and 

their cousin Jaylin McNeal, were dancing in the street in front of Cierra Taylor’s home in 

Detroit. Testimony established that Dickerson, along with others, came upon the group, and 

fired his pistol. Dickerson shot Cierra Taylor twice in the neck and Barnett once in the groin. 

 Dickerson first argues that his trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, 

he maintains that his lawyer should have questioned Barnett about his gang ties, should have 

confronted Cierra Taylor regarding her “fabrications,” and should have impeached Sada Taylor 

with her inconsistent statements. Because the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on 

Dickerson’s claim of ineffective assistance, our review is limited to mistakes that are apparent on 

the record alone. People v Gioglio (On Remand), 296 Mich App 12, 20; 815 NW2d 589 (2012), 

remanded for resentencing 493 Mich 864. This Court reviews de novo whether the defendant’s 

lawyer’s acts or omissions amounted to ineffective assistance. Id. at 19-20. 
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 In order to establish this claim of error, Dickerson must identify acts or omissions of 

counsel that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional 

norms and must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the unprofessional acts or 

omissions, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 22. In considering the 

acts or omissions, this Court must indulge a strong presumption that his trial lawyer’s decision to 

act or refrain from acting fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. Indeed, 

we must affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons that his lawyer may have had for 

proceeding as he did. Id. If there might have been a legitimate strategic reason for the decision 

to act or refrain from acting, we must conclude that Dickerson’s lawyer’s decision fell within the 

range of reasonable professional conduct. Id. at 22-23. 

 With regard to Dickerson’s claim that his lawyer should have questioned Barnett about 

his gang ties, Dickerson relies on a police report that was not introduced below. Dickerson 

acknowledges that he may not expand the record on appeal, see People v Powell, 235 Mich App 

557, 561 n 4; 599 NW2d 499 (1999), but asks us to consider the report under MCR 7.216(A)(4). 

Even considering the report, it merely suggests that Dickerson’s lawyer knew or should have 

known that Barnett might have had previous ties to gang activity. It does not, however, establish 

that a reasonable trial lawyer would invariably have questioned Barnett about those ties. 

 Dickerson’s trial lawyer mounted a vigorous alibi defense, which included two alibi 

witnesses, cross-examination of every prosecution witness, and a strong closing argument 

delineating the flaws in the prosecution’s case. Although a reasonable trial lawyer might have 

explored the potential gang ties to establish that someone other than Dickerson might have had a 

motive to shoot Barnett, we cannot say that no reasonable trial lawyer would have neglected to 

do so. Dickerson’s trial lawyer might reasonably have concluded that the better strategy was to 

emphasize the weakness of the identification testimony and the strength of Dickerson’s alibi 

rather than focus on a tenuous claim that Barnett’s possible gang ties were somehow involved. 

Gioglio, 296 Mich App at 22-23. 

 Even assuming that his lawyer’s failure to question Barnett about his gang ties fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness, we cannot conclude that there was a reasonable 

probability that, had his lawyer brought this out, the outcome of the proceeding would have been 

different. Id. at 22. The trial court, sitting as the finder-of-fact, heard the testimony of Cierra 

Taylor, who testified that she saw Dickerson shoot the gun at her and testimony from others who 

clearly stated that Dickerson was driving around the area in his van immediately prior to the 

shooting. Given the strength of this testimony, it is unlikely that the trial court would have been 

swayed by an argument concerning Barnett’s possible relationship with a gang. 

 We also do not agree that Dickerson’s trial lawyer’s failure to impeach Cierra Taylor 

with her previous “fabrications” fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Dickerson 

relies on alleged inconsistencies between the testimony by Cierra Taylor and Sada Taylor 

concerning him. When asked at the preliminary examination whether Dickerson had any 

relationships with anyone close to her, Cierra Taylor testified, “I know when I first moved over 

there, my sister was talking to him.” When the prosecutor asked, “So you didn’t actually see 

anything, but your sister told you about some incidents [between her sister and Dickerson],” she 

answered, “Yes.” At trial, when asked whether she had ever spoken to Dickerson, Sada Taylor 

testified that she “spoke to him a couple of times.” Sada Taylor testified that she did not know 
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Dickerson’s real name, but stated that they referred to him as “Wesley Snipes, though.” The 

cited testimony shows that Sada Taylor talked to Dickerson more than once. The statements do 

not contradict each other. Accordingly, Dickerson’s trial lawyer could not have impeached 

either Cierra Taylor or Sada Taylor with these statements. 

 Dickerson similarly notes several instances where Sada Taylor made inconsistent 

statements, which he claims his lawyer should have further explored. On the first day of trial, 

Sada Taylor testified that she saw two individuals walk from the scene of the shooting through a 

field to a car, which then drove off. However, on the second day of trial, she testified that one of 

the two people going through the field was Dickerson, and that they actually ran across the field. 

She also stated that Dickerson got into a van, not a car. 

 Given that these inconsistencies were minor, we cannot conclude that Dickerson’s trial 

lawyer’s failure to more thoroughly explore the inconsistencies fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness. The fact that these statements were inconsistent was obvious and Dickerson’s 

trial lawyer could reasonably assume that the trial court noted them without further exploration. 

In addition, Dickerson’s lawyer might reasonably have determined that further emphasis would 

only result in Sada Taylor clarifying her testimony and more emphatically implicating 

Dickerson. That is, his lawyer’s failure to impeach might have been a strategic choice, as 

picking at minor inconsistencies may have drawn the focus of cross-examination away from the 

larger inconsistencies and flaws in the prosecution’s case. Thus, there might have been a 

legitimate strategic reason for Dickerson’s lawyer’s decision for proceeding in this way. Id. at 

22-23. 

 Dickerson failed to establish that his trial lawyer did not provide effective assistance. 

 Next, Dickerson argues that the trial court impermissibly calculated the sentencing 

guidelines using facts that it did not find beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v Lockridge, 

498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). Because Dickerson did not object to the scoring of the 

offense variables on this basis, we will review the claim for plain error. Id. at 392-393. 

 In Lockridge, 498 Mich at 364-365, our Supreme Court held that, because Michigan’s 

formerly mandatory sentencing guidelines required increasing a defendant’s mandatory 

minimum sentence on the basis of facts not found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt or 

admitted by the defendant, the mandatory aspect of the sentencing guidelines was 

unconstitutional. Accordingly, the sentencing guidelines are now advisory. Id. at 392. Under 

the new regime, “cases in which (1) facts admitted by the defendant and (2) facts found by the 

[jury] [are] sufficient to assess the minimum number of OV points necessary for the defendant’s 

score to fall in the cell of the sentencing grid under which he or she was sentenced” are not 

tainted by plain error, as there is no prejudice resulting to the defendant. Id. at 394-395. 

Conversely, “cases in which facts admitted by a defendant or found by the [trier of fact] . . . were 

insufficient to assess the minimum number of OV points necessary for the defendant’s score to 

fall in the cell of the sentencing grid under which he or she was sentenced” constitutes potential 

plain error. Id. at 395. Therefore, defendants “who can demonstrate that their guidelines 

minimum sentence range was actually constrained by the violation of the Sixth Amendment . . . 

can establish a threshold showing of the potential for plain error sufficient to warrant a remand to 

the trial court for further inquiry.” Id. On remand, the trial court must consider whether it 
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“would have imposed a materially different sentence but for the unconstitutional constraint . . . .” 

Id. at 398. 

 Here, the trial court scored Offense Variables (OVs) 1 and 2 on the basis of facts that it 

found beyond a reasonable doubt; it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Dickerson discharged 

a firearm: “I am persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant . . . he did shoot.” 

And, on the basis of that finding, properly scored OV 1 at 25 points. See MCL 777.31(1)(a). 

The trial court also found beyond a reasonable doubt that Dickerson “committed this assault with 

intent to commit great bodily harm less than the crime of murder with a handgun while ineligible 

to do so.” This finding supported a score of five points under OV 2. MCL 777.32(1)(d). 

 The trial court did not, however, properly score OV 3 in accordance with Lockridge. The 

trial court assessed 10 points under OV 3 for “[b]odily injury requiring medical treatment [that] 

occurred to a victim.” MCL 777.33(1)(d). The trial court never explicitly found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that anyone was injured in the case. The record and testimony make clear that 

Cierra Taylor and Barnett were shot and seriously wounded. And the trial court stated that it 

found “Cierra Taylor was in fact shot in the back of her neck . . . [and] [that] Delvon Barnett was 

shot in the . . . groin area.” But it did not explicitly state whether it was finding this fact beyond 

a reasonable doubt. 

 Likewise, the trial court did not score OV 9 using facts found beyond a reasonable doubt 

or admitted by Dickerson. The trial court assessed 10 points under OV 9 for the fact that “2 to 9 

victims . . . were placed in danger of physical injury or death . . . .” MCL 777.39(1)(c). 

Although the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Dickerson and his unknown 

compatriots were “firing at this group,” the trial court did not discuss whether the “group” was 

actually placed in danger of physical injury or death. Also, it did not explicitly state that it found 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Cierra Taylor and Barnett were both injured or were placed in 

danger of physical injury or death. 

 When the points scored on the basis of facts not found beyond a reasonable doubt are 

subtracted from the tally, the new score changes Dickerson’s minimum sentence range. 

Therefore, we remand this case to the trial court for a determination of whether it would have 

sentenced Dickerson differently had it not been constrained by the mandatory nature of the 

sentencing guidelines. See Lockridge, 498 Mich at 398. 

 We affirm Dickerson’s convictions, but remand to the trial court for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh