UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

EDWARD WICKS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RANDY BARRON, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 12 CV 3478 

Judge Manish S. Shah 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Plaintiff, a landlord, alleges defendants, a city and city officials, violated his 

constitutional rights and Illinois law by unlawfully and baselessly interfering with 

his ability to maintain and operate residential rental property. Defendants deny 

these allegations and have moved for summary judgment on all claims. For the 

following reasons, the motion is granted. 

I. Legal Standard 

 Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 

2014). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment 

has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
2 

 Local Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary judgment to file a 

statement of material facts consisting of “short numbered paragraphs, including 

within each paragraph specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and 

other supporting materials relied upon to support the facts set forth in that 

paragraph.” LR 56.1(a). The non-moving party is then required to file a response to 

the movant’s statement, containing “a response to each numbered paragraph in the 

moving party’s statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific 

references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials 

relied upon.” LR 56.1(b)(3)(B). “All material facts set forth in the statement required 

of the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the 

statement of the opposing party.” LR 56.1(b)(3)(C). 

 In this case, defendants moved for summary judgment and complied with the 

requirements of Local Rule 56.1(a). Defendants also satisfied their obligation under 

Local Rule 56.2 to serve on plaintiff, who was pro se when the motion was filed, the 

“Notice to Pro Se Litigants Opposing Summary Judgment.” Despite being served 

with this notice, plaintiff failed to file either a brief in opposition to defendants’ 

motion or a response under Local Rule 56.1(b)(3). Accordingly, the material facts 

contained in defendants’ statement of facts are deemed admitted and undisputed for 

the purpose of the present motion. 
3 

II. Background 

 Plaintiff Edward Wicks and former-plaintiff Akmed Bey1 were landlords with 

properties in Calumet City, Illinois. [14] ¶¶ 4-6, 12-16. At all relevant times, Wicks 

owned a property at 1658 Patricia Court and Bey owned a property at 75 Paxton 

Avenue. Id. ¶ 14. Wicks and Bey rented these residences primarily to tenants who 

received assistance under Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. § 1437f). 

Id. ¶ 18. 

 The First Amended Complaint alleges that in April 2010, Bey and Wicks 

called Calumet City for assistance with a backed up sewer at the 75 Paxton 

property. [14] ¶ 20. The city refused to help, telling them instead to hire a private 

contractor. Id. Defendant Calumet City—through defendant Building Commissioner 

Randy Barron and defendant city employee Tom Gandolfi2—proceeded to take 

“multiple adverse and illegal actions” against Wicks and Bey, including forcibly 

entering the properties, evicting the tenants, fining Bey and Wicks, denying them 

permits, condemning the properties, instituting a demolition action, and towing 

Wicks’s van, all without a lawful basis. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 21-45.3 Allegedly, this course was 

followed because Wicks and Bey were African American as well as Section 8 

landlords. Id. ¶¶ 27, 63. 

 

1 This case was originally filed with Wicks and Bey as co-plaintiffs. [1]. On February 7, 

2013, it was dismissed as to them both for want of prosecution. [24]. The dismissal was 

later vacated as to Wicks alone. [40], [41]. 

2 Gandolfi died on August 15, 2013. [86] ¶ 7. 

3 The First Amended Complaint is also brought against “an unknown number of unnamed 

City of Calumet City Police Officers.” [14] ¶ 10. 
4 

 The First Amended Complaint alleges claims for (1) unreasonable search and 

seizure, (2) violation of due process, (3) violation of equal protection, (4) abuse of 

process, (5) Monell liability, (6) takings, and (7) injunctive relief. Calumet City, 

Barron, and Gandolfi have moved for summary judgment on all claims. 

III. Analysis 

 A. 75 Paxton Avenue 

 According to the complaint, Bey has owned the property at 75 Paxton Avenue 

since about September 15, 2004. [14] ¶¶ 14-15. The complaint alleges that Wicks 

served as Bey’s “agent in connection with all aspects of 75 Paxton,” but it does not 

explain what that means. Id. Nothing in the amended complaint or record suggests 

that Wicks ever lived at 75 Paxton Avenue. 

 Because Wicks neither owned nor lived in 75 Paxton, he—the sole plaintiff—

has no standing to assert any of the claims brought in relation to it. See Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). For a particular plaintiff to have 

standing to sue in federal court, he must have suffered an invasion of a legally 

protected interest. Id. Neither the complaint nor the record evinces any legal 

interest Wicks had in the property. 

 Defendants’ motion is therefore granted as to all claims premised on the 75 

Paxton Avenue property. 

 B. Count I – Unreasonable Search and Seizure Claims 

 Wicks alleges three specific violations of his fourth-amendment right to be 

free from unreasonable searches and seizures: (1) the forcible entry into 1658 
5 

Patricia on April 6, 2011, without legal cause, including the eviction of all tenants 

without a court order; (2) the changing of the locks at 1658 Patricia on April 19, 

2011, without obtaining a court order; and (3) the towing of Wicks’s van on May 28, 

2011. [14] ¶ 52. These claims are brought against Barron and Gandolfi. 

 First, the touchstone of Fourth Amendment unreasonable-search analysis is 

whether a person has “a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 

privacy.” See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). Determining whether 

one has such an expectation involves a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the individual 

had a subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) whether that expectation of privacy 

is one that society accepts as reasonable. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211. Because a 

landlord has turned over possession and use of an apartment to his tenants, he does 

not have a protected reasonable expectation of privacy in a rented apartment. See

Johnson v. Weaver, 248 Fed. App’x 694, 697 (6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Wicks does 

not have standing to assert these unreasonable search claims concerning his rental 

property. 

 Second, a government official may be held liable under § 1983 only for his 

personal involvement in a constitutional violation. See Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517, 

528 (7th Cir. 2014). The record shows that Barron’s only involvement with 1658 

Patricia was (1) being told by the Fair Housing Administrator—who himself had 

been contacted by the tenants—that the building was in shambles (evidenced by 

pictures) and had gone without the required rental inspections since 2006; (2) going 

to the property one time and observing its broken windows from the outside; and (3) 
6 

approving the Fair Housing Administrator’s request, on that basis, that a “not 

approved for occupancy” sticker be placed on the property. [86] ¶ 52. The record 

contains no evidence that Barron or Gandolfi had any personal involvement with 

any tenants being evicted from 1658 Patricia or with the property’s locks being 

changed. 

 Likewise, the record contains no evidence from which a jury could reasonably 

conclude that Barron or Gandolfi was personally involved with Wicks’s van being 

towed. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that the van was towed by a 

Calumet City police officer because it bore a false registration. Id. ¶¶ 66-69. 

 Defendants’ motion is granted on Count I. 

 C. Count II – Due Process Claims 

 Wicks alleges four specific violations of his rights to procedural and 

substantive due process: (1) the searching and seizing of 1658 Patricia without 

proper notice or a court order; (2) the unreasonable denial of permits to perform 

work on 1658 Patricia which defendants said was necessary; (3) the submission of 

false inspection reports for 1658 Patricia; and (4) the failure to permit Wicks’s 

tenants to reside in 1658 Patricia. [14] ¶ 55. These claims are brought against 

Barron and Gandolfi. 

 “To state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for the deprivation of a property 

interest without due process, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he had a 

constitutionally protected property interest, (2) he suffered a loss of that interest 

amounting to a deprivation, and (3) the deprivation occurred without due process of 
7 

law.” LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 943-44 (7th Cir. 

2010). Where the deprivation is the result of “random and unauthorized acts”—as 

opposed to “established state procedure”—the deprived person is entitled only to a 

meaningful post-deprivation remedy. Id. at 944. Consequently, a plaintiff bringing a 

procedural due process claim must allege and prove either that he availed himself of 

the state post-deprivation remedies, or that the available remedies were 

inadequate. Id. Failure to do so is fatal to the claim. Id. 

 Here, the alleged deprivations, if true, were not the product of established 

Illinois procedures, so Wicks was entitled only to post-deprivation remedies. Yet 

Wicks does not allege that he availed himself of such remedies after these 

deprivations, or that the available remedies were inadequate. The record likewise 

contains nothing to suggest that either precondition was met. The procedural due 

process claims therefore fail. 

 “Both the Supreme Court and [the Seventh Circuit] have emphasized how 

limited the scope of the substantive due process doctrine is.” Lee v. City of Chicago, 

330 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted). “Unless a 

governmental practice encroaches on a fundamental right, substantive due process 

requires only that the practice be rationally related to a legitimate government 

interest, or alternatively phrased, that the practice be neither arbitrary nor 

irrational.” Id. “And when a substantive-due-process challenge involves only the 

deprivation of a property interest, a plaintiff must show either the inadequacy of 

state law remedies or an independent constitutional violation before the court will 
8 

even engage in this deferential rational-basis review.” Id. (internal quotation 

omitted). 

 As noted, Wicks has failed to allege or show that the state-law remedies for 

the claimed deprivation of his property interests were inadequate. In addition, as 

discussed above and below, the record contains no evidence that Wicks suffered any 

independent constitutional violation. The substantive due process claims therefore 

fail as well. 

 Defendants’ motion is granted on Count II. 

 D. Count III – Equal Protection Claims 

 Wicks alleges four specific violations of his right to equal protection of laws: 

(1) denying Wicks the ability to rent 1658 Patricia; (2) refusing to approve work and 

occupancy permits for 1658 Patricia; (3) “enforc[ing] Calumet City ordinances 

disparately to different classes”; and (4) “issu[ing] housing violation notices 

disparately to different classes.” [14] ¶ 59. Wicks contends that, in each instance, he 

was treated differently because he is African American. Id. ¶¶ 60, 63. These claims 

are brought against Barron and Gandolfi. 

 All equal protection claims are based on the principle that, under “like 

circumstances and conditions,” people must be treated alike, unless there is a 

rational reason for treating them differently. See Engquist v. Oregon Department of 

Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 601-02 (2008). Thus, a plaintiff bringing such a claim 

must present evidence of a similarly situated individual who was intentionally 

treated differently than the plaintiff. McDonald v. Village of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 
9 

992, 1009 (7th Cir. 2004). The record in this case contains no evidence of any 

similarly situated, non-African American landlords being treated differently from 

Wicks. Although Wicks testified that he observed repair work being performed at 

other properties in Calumet City, he had no knowledge of whether those properties 

had any code violations, whether the owners had obtained annual rental inspections 

or occupancy permits, or whether the owners had submitted appropriate permit 

applications. [86] ¶ 60. Nor did Wicks have any information about how Calumet 

City or its employees otherwise treated white landlords or other African American 

landlords. Id. ¶ 62. One witness, Marvin Newton, who is an African American 

landlord, testified that he never had any trouble with the city or its employees 

because of his race, and that he annually had inspections and received permits from 

the city. Id. ¶ 63. 

 Defendants’ motion is granted on Count III. 

 E. Count IV – Abuse of Process Claims 

 Wicks alleges four specific claims for the state-law tort of abuse of process, all 

of which pertain to the 75 Paxton property: (1) filing a demolition action in the 

Circuit Court of Cook County; (2) entering the property without a court order and 

breaking the door, gate, windows, and locks; (3) “appearing before a different Cook 

County Judge than the one assigned to the demolition action . . . in order to obtain a 

temporary restraining order . . .”; and (4) “issuing Plaintiffs a ticket for having grass 

too long on May 11, 2011, despite ordering Plaintiffs to leave the residence on May 

7, 2011, when they appeared at 75 Paxton for [the] intended purpose of cutting the 
10 

grass and weeds.” [14] ¶ 66. These claims are brought against Barron, Gandolfi, 

and, on the basis of vicarious liability, Calumet City. 

 For the reasons given in section III.A, Wicks lacks standing to bring the first 

three of these claims, which all have to do with alleged invasions of legally protected 

interests in 75 Paxton. The fourth claim is not precluded on this basis because it 

concerns “Plaintiffs” being individually issued a ticket. It is conceivable that some 

law enforcement officer issued Wicks a ticket for the grass, even though Wicks had 

no legal interest in the property. 

 Nevertheless, the record contains insufficient evidence to support an abuse of 

process claim. “Abuse of process is defined as the misuse of the legal process to 

accomplish some purpose outside the scope of the process itself.” Kumar v. 

Bornstein, 354 Ill.App.3d 159, 165 (2d Dist. 2004). The elements necessary to prove 

this claim are “(1) the existence of an ulterior purpose or motive and (2) some act in 

the use of legal process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings.” Id. 

“In order to satisfy the first element, a plaintiff must plead facts that show that the 

defendant instituted proceedings against him for an improper purpose, such as 

extortion, intimidation, or embarrassment.” Id. Here, the record contains no 

evidence that could reasonably support the inference that the person who issued 

Wicks the ticket for the grass (assuming Wicks received a ticket), actually had an 

ulterior purpose or motive. There is likewise no support for the inference that either 

Barron or Gandolfi issued the ticket. Finally, the city is not liable under a 
11 

respondeat superior theory because there is no evidence that a city employee is 

liable. 

 Defendants’ motion is granted on Count IV. 

 F. Count V – Monell Claims 

 Wicks’s Monell claim alleges that the City of Calumet “knowingly, and with 

willful and deliberate indifference . . . maintained a widespread custom and practice 

of allowing Randy Barron and the Inspection Services Department . . . to engage in 

multiple unlawful acts,” including: (1) “searching and seizing properties without 

proper notice or a Court order in violation of the Fourth Amendment”; (2) “issuing 

false inspection reports”; (3) “filing demolition actions in the Circuit Court of Cook 

County without legal cause to do so”; (4) “enforcing Calumet City ordinances 

disparately to different classes”; and (5) “issuing housing violation notices 

disparately to different classes.” [14] ¶ 73. 

 After a defendant moves for summary judgment on a Monell claim, the 

plaintiff is “merely required to document sufficient evidence to allow a jury to make 

a reasonable inference that [the municipality] had a widespread custom or practice 

that caused a cognizable injury to [the plaintiff].” Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 692 

(7th Cir. 2006). In this case, defendants moved for summary judgment but plaintiff 

documented no evidence at all. Further, the record that does exist offers no support 

for the inference that the few alleged actions taken toward Wicks were anything 

other than one-off incidents. See Wilson v. Cook County, 742 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir. 

2014). 
12 

 Defendants’ motion is granted on Count V. 

 G. Count VI –Takings Claims 

 Wicks alleges four specific takings claims: (1) conducting a regulatory taking 

of 1658 Patricia without just cause; (2) denying access to, and the ability to rent, 

1658 Patricia; (3) refusing to approve work and occupancy permits for 1658 Patricia; 

and (4) using the Calumet City housing code to prohibit habitation in 1658 Patricia 

without just cause. [14] ¶ 78. These claims are brought against Barron, Gandolfi, 

and Calumet City. 

 “[U]nder Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton 

Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 192-94 (1985), . . . a federal takings claim is not 

ripe until the decision to ‘take’ property is final and the plaintiff has exhausted 

state mechanisms for obtaining compensation.” Everson v. City of Weyauwega, 573 

Fed. App’x 599, 600 (7th Cir. 2014). Illinois provides mechanisms for obtaining 

compensation. See Sorrentino v. Godinez, 777 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 2015). Yet 

Wicks neither alleged nor demonstrated that he exhausted them. 

 Defendants’ motion is granted on Count VI. 

 H. Count VII – Injunctive Relief Claims 

 Wicks claims he is entitled to injunctive relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 248(c)(1)(B)—a criminal civil rights statute entitled “Freedom of access to clinic 

entrances,” which prohibits people from obstructing access to reproductive health 

services. This claim is plainly brought in error and, needless to say, nothing in the 

pleadings or record supports it. 
13 

 Defendants’ motion is granted on Count VII. 

IV. Conclusion 

 Defendants’ motion [84] is granted. Enter judgment in favor of defendants, 

and terminate civil case. 

ENTER: 

 ___________________________ 

 Manish S. Shah 

 United States District Judge 

Date: 4/8/15