IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL CRAWFORD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 12 C 5289

 )

CITY OF CHICAGO, SERGEANT BOONE ) Judge John Z. Lee

#1751, OFFICER JACKSON #6335, AND )

OFFICER JOHNSON #14318, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Michael Crawford has sued Sergeant Ricky Boone and Officers Jamesa Jackson 

and Courtney Johnson of the Chicago Police Department (collectively, the “Individual 

Defendants”) for false arrest, conspiracy to falsely arrest, and failure to intervene in a false arrest 

in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”). 

Crawford also has filed suit against the City of Chicago in its capacity as a potential indemnitor 

under Illinois law.1 Boone, Jackson, and Johnson now move for summary judgment pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56 on Counts I (false arrest), II (failure to intervene), 

III (conspiracy), IV (Illinois state law false arrest/imprisonment), and V (Illinois state law 

malicious prosecution). For the reasons provided herein, the Court grants in part and denies in 

part the motion.

Factual Background

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. On November 30, 2011, 

Crawford drove his car to a location near 110th Street and Michigan Avenue in Chicago, Illinois,

1 Crawford has also sued the City of Chicago for conversion under Illinois law; the City of Chicago has 

not moved for summary judgment as to such claim. (Compl. at ¶¶ 37-39.)

 
to pick up his friend, Tamila Smith (“Smith”), from her cousin’s house. Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s LR 

56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. at ¶¶ 1-2. Crawford could tell that Smith had been drinking and was 

intoxicated when he picked her up. Id. at ¶ 4. After driving around the neighborhood for some 

time, Crawford informed Smith that he was going to drive her home because she was not 

wearing a coat or shoes. Smith replied that she wanted to talk to Crawford and was not ready to 

go home. Id. at ¶¶ 6-8. When Crawford started to drive Smith home against her wishes, Smith 

began to kick the dashboard, at which point Crawford pulled his car over and parked on the side 

of the road near the intersection of 101st Street and Vincennes. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. From this 

location, Crawford and Smith were close enough to Smith’s mother’s house that they could see it 

from the car. Pl.’s Resp. Br., Ex. 1 (“Crawford Dep.”) at 44:7-18.

After Crawford stopped the car, he called Smith’s mother and told her that she should 

come outside to get Smith from his car because Smith had been kicking his dashboard and did 

not want to leave on her own. Id. In response, Smith’s mother told Crawford to put Smith on 

the phone so that she could talk with her daughter. But when Crawford handed Smith the phone,

she threw it out of the window. Id. at 44:19-45:3; Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. at ¶

12. Crawford exited his car and went outside to retrieve his phone, walked to the passenger’s 

side of the car, and told Smith that she needed to get out of his car. Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s LR 

56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. at ¶ 13. Smith, however, refused to exit Crawford’s car. See id. at ¶¶ 14-16. 

Crawford then noticed a police vehicle driving northbound on Vincennes towards him and hailed 

it as he would a taxi. Id. at ¶ 17.

The events that followed are in dispute. According to Crawford, when Smith saw him 

hailing the police car, she opened the car door and jumped out, landing upright on the sidewalk 

roughly five feet away from Crawford. Id. at ¶ 18. Once Smith exited the car, Crawford closed 

2
the passenger-side door, walked around to the driver’s side, got into his car, and drove 

southbound on Vincennes. Id. at ¶ 19. Smith states that she tried to grab onto the passenger 

door handle of the car as Crawford drove away and stumbled backwards onto the ground when 

she was unable to do so. See Pl.’s Resp. Br., Ex. 2 (“Smith Dep.”) at 24:24-25:14. Both 

Crawford and Smith state that Crawford never touched, pulled, or hit Smith at any point during 

the evening of November 30, 2011. Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. at ¶ 38.

Defendants recount a different version of the facts. Boone testified that he was driving 

northbound on Vincennes when he observed Crawford and Smith parked on the west side of the 

street. see Defs.’ Br., Ex. C (“Boone Dep.”) at 52:20-24. While driving, and from only twenty 

to twenty-five feet away, Boone saw Crawford pull Smith from his car and strike her to the 

ground with his hand. Id. at 53:18-54:13, 55:8-11, 56:5-19, 57:7-12, 57:17-58:2, 64:8-11, 64:16-

20.

From here, the facts again are undisputed. After observing Crawford and Smith’s 

interaction on the west side of Vincennes, Boone radioed in a “battery in progress” over dispatch 

and reported that the suspect was heading south on Vincennes in a vehicle. Pl.’s LR 

56.1(b)(3)(A) Stmt. at ¶ 22. Boone then continued north on Vincennes, made a U-turn, and 

pulled up next to Smith as she stood on the west side of the road. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 24. Boone asked 

Smith whether she had just gotten out of Crawford’s car. When she told him that she had, Boone 

asked her to get into his squad car and asked her for a description of Crawford’s vehicle. Id. at 

¶¶ 25, 28. Boone then conveyed a description of Crawford’s vehicle, a 2004 silver Ford 

Explorer, over dispatch. Id. at ¶ 26; Crawford Dep. at 26:9-11; Boone Dep. at 58:10-19. Boone 

never asked Smith whether Crawford had hit her, and Smith states that she never told him or 

3
anyone else that Crawford had. See Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. at ¶ 22; Smith 

Dep. at 39:8-40:2. 

Officers Jackson and Johnson, who were nearby, heard Boone’s initial dispatch call and 

immediately drove west on 107th Street toward Vincennes in pursuit of Crawford. Id. at ¶ 23. 

Neither Jackson nor Johnson observed the interaction between Crawford and Smith; they only 

learned of the incident when they heard Boone’s dispatch call over the radio. Id. at ¶ 31. 

Shortly thereafter, Boone received a message over dispatch informing him that a vehicle 

resembling the one that he had described in his previous message had just been stopped at 105th 

Street and Vincennes. Id. at ¶ 27. When Boone and Smith arrived at that location, they saw that 

Crawford had already been handcuffed and was surrounded by roughly four Chicago police 

officers. Id. at ¶ 29. At this point, Boone exited his squad car and told the police officers that 

the person in handcuffs, Crawford, was the suspect whom he had witnessed earlier with Smith. 

Id. at ¶ 35.

At some point while the officers were discussing Crawford’s arrest, Smith was moved to 

Jackson and Johnson’s car. Id. at ¶ 40. Jackson and Johnson then asked Smith where she would 

like to be dropped off, and she responded that she wanted to go to her cousin’s house. Id. at ¶¶ 

43-44. During the drive, the officers asked her whether she wanted to sign complaints against 

Crawford. She declined. Id. at ¶ 46. After dropping Smith off at the home of one of her 

relatives, Jackson and Johnson returned to the police station. Jackson and Johnson were 

responsible for preparing the arrest report, case report, and the complaint against Crawford. Id. 

at ¶ 50. In preparing Crawford’s arrest report, Jackson relied heavily on Boone’s first-hand 

account that he had witnessed Crawford pull Smith out of his vehicle and hit her with a closed 

4
fist onto the pavement. Id. at ¶¶ 51, 53. Again, neither Jackson nor Johnson observed Crawford

committing any crimes but relied solely on Boone’s account. Id. at ¶ 54.

When Boone later discovered that Smith had chosen not to sign a complaint against 

Crawford, Boone filed a complaint himself pursuant to the Illinois Domestic Violence Act and

charged Crawford with one count of domestic battery. Id. at ¶ 56. The charge was subsequently 

dropped after the prosecutor discussed the events of November 30, 2011, with Smith. Id. at ¶ 57.

Discussion

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). The Court gives “the non-moving party the benefit of conflicts in the evidence and 

reasonable inferences that could be drawn from it.” Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & 

Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 794 (7th Cir. 2013); see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 

Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992). 

I. Boone

Defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted as to Counts I, IV, and V

because: (1) Boone had sufficient probable cause to arrest Crawford; (2) Boone is entitled to 

qualified immunity; and (3) even if Boone lacked probable cause and is not entitled to qualified 

immunity, he is nonetheless entitled to partial immunity under the Illinois Domestic Violence 

Act. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Probable Cause 

“Probable cause to arrest is an absolute defense to any claim under Section 1983 against 

police officers for false arrest.” Mustafa v. City of Chi., 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Police officers have “probable cause to arrest when the facts and circumstances within their 

5
knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a 

prudent person in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” 

Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1246 (7th Cir. 1994). “Moreover, the court’s inquiry is 

limited to what the officer knew at the time of the arrest and not what has been gained from 

hindsight.” Harney v. City of Chi., 702 F.3d 916, 922 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Mucha v. Vill. of 

Oak Brook, 650 F.3d 1053, 1057 (7th Cir. 2011)). “In deciding this question of law as part of a 

motion for summary judgment, however, we must give the non-moving party the benefit of 

conflicts in the evidence about what the officers actually knew at the time.” Williams v. City of 

Chi., 733 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Here, the Court finds that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Boone reasonably believed that Crawford had committed or was committing a domestic battery 

when Crawford was arrested on November 30, 2011. In Illinois, “domestic battery is committed 

by (1) intentionally causing bodily harm to any family or household member, 720 ILL. COMP. 

STAT. 5/12–3.2(a)(1); or (2) making physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with 

any family or household member, id. § 5/12–3.2(a)(2).” De Leon Castellanos v. Holder, 652 

F.3d 762, 763 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphases added). Defendant Boone’s version of the incident at 

issue is worth a closer look. 

According to Boone, he was driving north on Vincennes when he witnessed Crawford’s 

car parked on the west side of the road. Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. at ¶ 18. From approximately 

twenty to twenty-five feet away, see Boone Dep. at 56:5-19, Boone witnessed Crawford

physically pull Smith out of the front passenger door of Crawford’s vehicle with one arm and 

proceeded to hit her once or twice with his other arm, forcing her to fall to the ground. Defs.’ 

LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. at ¶¶ 19-20; Boone Dep. at 57:7-12, 64:8-20, 65:17-23. According to 

6
Boone, the front passenger door of Crawford’s vehicle remained ajar when Smith fell to the 

ground. Boone Dep. at 67:23-68:6. As Boone proceeded to pass Crawford and Smith going 

northbound on Vincennes, Boone saw Crawford standing outside his vehicle while Smith 

remained on the ground. Id. at 69:3-6. After witnessing this series of events, Boone 

immediately radioed in “[e]mergency, battery in progress, 101st and Vincennes” over the 

dispatch, pulled a U-turn, and picked up Smith on the west side of Vincennes. Id. at 73:11-14, 

78:3-11, 84:7-14; Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. at ¶¶ 22, 28.

For his part, Crawford acknowledges that the incident in question transpired after he and 

Smith had pulled over in his car onto the west side of Vincennes. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. at 

¶ 10. Crawford’s version of events, however, differs from Boone’s in several key respects. 

First, while Boone states that he witnessed Crawford strike Smith to the ground, Crawford

testified that he and Smith were five feet away from each other when standing on the side of the 

street, and both he and Smith deny that Crawford ever hit or touched Smith that evening. 

Compare Boone Dep. at 57:7-12, 64:8-20, 65:17-23, with Crawford Dep. at 48:22-45:2, 80:8-14,

96:18-21, and Smith Dep. at 17:12-15, 24:8-20. Additionally, while Boone testified that 

Crawford forcefully removed Smith from the passenger side of the car, Crawford claims that 

Smith opened the passenger door on her own accord, jumped out of the car, and ended up 

standing upright on the sidewalk five feet from Crawford. See Crawford Dep. at 48:13-49:2,

100:14-19. Further, Smith herself denies that Crawford knocked her to the ground, stating 

instead that she stumbled backwards when she tried to grab onto the passenger door as Crawford

drove away. See Smith Dep. at 23:15-24:7, 25:10-14. 

Needless to say, the accounts differ dramatically. “Where the material facts specifically 

averred by one party contradict the facts averred by a party moving for summary judgment, the 

7
motion must be denied.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2003). Defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment based upon the existence of probable cause is denied.

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also seek summary judgment under the doctrine of qualified immunity. “The 

question of whether [an officer] had probable cause to arrest . . . is separate from the question 

relating to qualified immunity.” Fleming v. Livingston County., 674 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 

2012). “Qualified immunity protects officers who are ‘reasonable, even if mistaken’ in making 

probable cause assessments.” Tebbens v. Mushol, 692 F.3d 807, 820 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)). 

“In evaluating qualified immunity, the court asks two questions: (1) whether the facts, 

taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, make out a violation of a constitutional right, 

and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged 

violation.” Williams, 733 F.3d at 758 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).

“The way that the first inquiry is phrased is reminiscent of the approach to dismissals under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or rulings on summary judgment: the reviewing court 

takes the record in the light most favorable to the opponent of the motion and asks whether the 

case can proceed.” Jones v. Clark, 630 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2011).

To determine whether a right is “clearly established,” “we must look at the right violated 

in a ‘particularized’ sense, rather than ‘at a high level of generality.’” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 

843, 858 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)). In the context 

of a Fourth Amendment claim based on lack of probable cause, an officer is entitled to qualified 

immunity “when a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances . . . and possessing the 

same knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable cause 

8
existed in light of well-established law.” Fleming, 674 F.3d at 880 (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Where there is a genuine issue of material fact surrounding 

the question of plaintiff’s conduct, we cannot determine, as a matter of law, what predicate facts 

exist to decide whether or not the officer’s conduct clearly violated established law.” Arnott v. 

Mataya, 995 F.2d 121, 123-24 (8th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

Here, construing all disputed facts in Plaintiff’s favor, Crawford has established a 

violation of his constitutional right to be free from arrest without probable cause. See, e.g., 

Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis, 998 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1993). The adequacy of Boone’s 

qualified immunity defense thus depends on whether “that constitutional right was clearly 

established at the time of the alleged violation.” See Williams, 733 F.3d at 758. In the context 

of Crawford’s false arrest claim, this question can appropriately be phrased as, “whether a 

reasonable officer could have mistakenly believed that probable cause existed.” Id. (citing 

Fleming, 674 F.3d at 878). 

Viewing these disputed facts in the light most favorable to Crawford, the Court concludes 

that Boone is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity on summary judgment. For 

purposes of this motion, we must assume that Crawford never removed Smith from his vehicle 

nor touched her in any way during their interaction on Vincennes and that Crawford was in the 

car when Smith fell to the ground after she had unsuccessfully grabbed for the car’s door handle 

as it drove away. Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could infer that a police officer in 

Boone’s shoes could not have mistakenly believed he had probable cause to arrest Crawford for 

domestic battery that evening. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a reasonable police officer

could mistake a woman jumping out of a parked vehicle on her own accord and stumbling 

backwards, with a man pulling her from that vehicle and striking her twice to the ground. On 

9
this record, Defendant Boone is not entitled to summary judgment on the defense of qualified 

immunity.

C. Partial Immunity under Illinois Law

Defendants further assert that, even if Boone had lacked probable cause to arrest 

Crawford and is not entitled to qualified immunity, granting summary judgment on Counts I, IV, 

and V as to Boone is nonetheless appropriate because he qualifies for partial immunity under 

section 305 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (“section 305”). 

Section 305 states that law enforcement officials who act in good faith while enforcing 

the Act shall not be subject to civil liability absent willful and wanton conduct. See 750 Ill. 

Comp. Stat. 60/305. “The Illinois courts have held that a police officer is not guilty of willful or 

wanton conduct unless he acted with ‘actual or deliberate intention to harm or with an utter 

indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others.’” Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 

678, 693 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Breck v. Cortez, 490 N.E.2d 88, 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986))

Defendants argue that the summary judgment should be granted in Boone’s favor as to

Crawford’s § 1983 false arrest claim as well as the state law false arrest and malicious 

prosecution claims, because the undisputed facts establish that Boone was acting in good faith

when he initiated charges against Crawford pursuant to the Act. But Crawford’s section 1983 

claims are not precluded by section 305 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act. See Martinez v. 

Cal., 444 U.S. 277, 284 n. 8 (1980) (“Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which 

is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985 cannot be immunized by state law”); see also

Moore v. City of Chi. Heights, No. 09 C 3452, 2010 WL 148623, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 

2010) (“Because [plaintiff] alleges a violation of federal constitutional law under § 1983, the 

Illinois Tort Immunity Act does not, as Defendants claim, shield their conduct.”). 

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Of course, Section 305 arguably could apply to Crawford’s false arrest and malicious 

prosecution claims brought under Illinois law, but genuine issues of material fact remain as to 

whether Boone, in fact, exercised good faith when commencing charges against Crawford. For 

example, assuming Crawford’s version of the events to be true, a reasonable jury could conclude

that Boone never saw Crawford strike Smith and that Boone’s decision to pursue domestic 

battery charges against Crawford constituted willful and wanton conduct. For the reasons 

articulated above, the Court also denies Defendant’s summary judgment motion as to the state 

law false arrest and malicious prosecution claims based on the Illinois Domestic Violence Act’s 

partial immunity provision.

II. Jackson and Johnson

Defendants next argue that summary judgment should be granted with regard to as to 

Defendants Jackson and Johnson. In support, Jackson and Johnson contend that: (1) they did not 

actually participate in Crawford’s arrest; (2) they could safely rely on Boone’s account to believe 

probable cause existed to arrest Crawford; and (3) they are entitled to qualified immunity. Here, 

the Court finds that the two officers are entitled to qualified immunity. 

A. Qualified Immunity

As mentioned, “[q]ualified immunity protects officers who are ‘reasonable, even if 

mistaken’ in making probable cause assessments.” Tebbens, 692 F.3d at 820 (quoting Hunter, 

502 U.S. at 229). In the context of a false arrest claim, a court shall grant summary judgment in 

favor of the arresting officers if it finds that “a reasonable police officer in the same 

circumstances and with the same knowledge . . . as the officer in question could have reasonably 

believed that probable cause existed in light of well-established law.” Williams v. Jaglowski, 

269 F.3d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). 

11
Separate from but related to qualified immunity, “[t]he collective knowledge doctrine 

permits an officer to . . . arrest a suspect at the direction of another officer . . . even if the officer

himself does not have firsthand knowledge of facts that amount to the necessary level of 

suspicion to permit the given action.” United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 

2010) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1985)). “In a civil case for an 

arrest without probable cause, the collective knowledge doctrine means a defendant is entitled to 

qualified immunity if he relied in objective good faith on another officer as to the justification for 

the arrest.” Graham v. Blair, Nos. 10–cv–772–JPG–PMF, 10–cv–780–JPG–PMF, 2011 WL 

6888528, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 2011).

Here, Defendants argue that Jackson and Johnson are entitled to qualified immunity 

because they relied on Boone’s first-hand account of the incident. Crawford retorts that Jackson 

and Johnson are not absolved from liability because they deliberately chose not to ask Crawford

or Smith obvious questions that would have made it clear to them that Crawford had not 

committed a battery. Crawford cites to BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1986), in support 

of its contention that Jackson and Johnson cannot rely on the collective knowledge doctrine. 

In BeVier, the plaintiff-parents sued the defendant officer for arresting them for child 

neglect without probable cause in violation of § 1983. See id. at 126. The Seventh Circuit 

affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of plaintiffs and found that the defendant officer was 

not entitled to qualified immunity because he had acted unreasonably in not questioning the

parents or their babysitter before he arrested the parents. See id. at 128-29. Crawford argues that 

Jackson and Johnson’s qualified immunity defense is similarly deficient because they, like the 

defendant officer in BeVier, failed to question Crawford and Smith sufficiently before arresting 

12
Crawford. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 9-11. In response, Defendants argue that the facts in BeVier are 

distinguishable from those at issue here. The Court agrees.

In contrast to the defendant officer in BeVier, who acted alone, here Jackson and Johnson 

relied on the first-hand account of Boone, who as one of their direct supervising officers. See 

Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. at ¶ 28; see also Pl.’s Resp. Br., Ex. 4 (“Jackson 

Dep.”) at 37:13-16, 38:11-15. In fact, Boone specifically ordered Johnson and Jackson to place 

Crawford under arrest. Boone Dep. at 99:9-13, 101:20-102:2. On its facts, BeVier was not a 

collective knowledge case. 

Even if the Court assumes, however, that the defendant in BeVier relied on the advice or 

orders of another officer, BeVier remains inapplicable. There, the Seventh Circuit held that the 

officer had acted unreasonably in large part because he failed to obtain any evidence that tended 

to prove one of the required elements of the Illinois child neglect statute. See id. at 126. In 

contrast, here, Boone informed Jackson and Johnson that he had personally witnessed Crawford

remove Smith from his car and punch her to the ground, which, from Jackson and Johnson’s 

viewpoint, would satisfy the requisite elements of Illinois battery. See Jackson Dep. at 109:1-9, 

155:4-11; Pl.’s Resp. Br., Ex. 5 (“Johnson Dep.”) at 42:2-23, 43:11-17. The Court thus finds 

Crawford’s reliance on BeVier unavailing.

What is more, there is no evidence to suggest that Jackson and Johnson had reason to 

doubt the accuracy of Boone’s dispatch or his statements to them regarding what he had 

witnessed. Nor is there evidence that suggests that Jackson and Johnson were unreasonable in 

relying on Boone’s dispatch or that they acted in bad faith when they arrested Crawford. Rather, 

the record shows that Boone was one of their immediate supervising officers on the evening of 

November 30, 2011, and that Jackson and Johnson only began to pursue Crawford after they 

13
heard Boone’s dispatch call reporting a battery in progress. See Jackson Dep. at 37:13-16, 

37:21-24, 38:11-15; Johnson Dep. at 20:4-21, 21:11-17. Plaintiff argues that Jackson and 

Johnson should have asked Crawford and Smith independently about the incident before 

effectuating the arrest, but he has provided no legal authority recognizing a duty of independent 

inquiry under similar factual circumstances. 

Even when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Crawford, Jackson and 

Johnson did not have an obligation to take additional steps to ensure they had probable cause to 

arrest Crawford, nor did they have any reason to suspect that they did not have probable cause. 

The record shows that Jackson and Johnson acted reasonably from an objective viewpoint and in 

good faith reliance on Boone’s dispatch in pursuing and arresting Crawford. Defendants Jackson 

and Johnson are therefore entitled to qualified immunity. As such, the Court grants summary 

judgment in favor of Defendants Jackson and Johnson as to Count I of the Complaint. 

Having found that Jackson and Johnson are entitled to qualified immunity and that they 

did not act in bad faith in arresting Crawford, the Court grants summary judgment as to 

Crawford’s state law false arrest claim, Count IV, as to Jackson and Johnson. Indeed, there are 

no facts on the record from which a reasonable jury could infer that Jackson and/or Johnson 

acted with malice or that their pursuit and arrest of Crawford constituted willful and wanton 

conduct. See Daniels v. City of Chi., No. 08 C 6832, 2011 WL 887852, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 

2011). Jackson and Johnson are therefore entitled to partial immunity under § 305 of the Illinois 

Domestic Violence Act, as described above. Summary judgment on Crawford’s state law 

malicious prosecution claim, Count V, as to Jackson and Johnson is likewise granted. See

Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 251 (7th Cir. 2012) (Illinois law) (plaintiff’s Illinois 

malicious prosecution claim); see also Aleman v. Vill. of Hanover Park, 662 F.3d 897, 907 (7th 

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Cir. 2011) (Illinois law) (Illinois malicious prosecution requires “proof not only of lack of 

probable cause but also of ‘malice’”).

III. Failure to Intervene Claim

Defendants further urge the Court to grant summary judgment in their favor on 

Crawford’s § 1983 failure to intervene claim, Count II. Because of their different roles, the 

Court will address the officers separately.

A. Jackson and Johnson

An officer has “‘an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of 

citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers.”’ Randall v. Prince George's 

Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, 203 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 556 (2d Cir.

1994)). This duty attaches when the officer “observes or has reason to know that a constitutional 

violation is being committed and possess a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm 

from occurring.” Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994). Additionally, 

In order for an officer to be held liable under section 1983 in cases 

of inaction, the plaintiff must show (1) that excessive force was 

being used, (2) that a citizen has been unjustifiably arrested, or (3) 

that any constitutional violation has been committed by a law 

enforcement official; and that officer had a realistic opportunity to 

intervene to prevent the harm from occurring. 

Id., 37 F.3d at 285.

Here, the Court grants Defendants’ summary judgment motion on Count II of the 

Complaint as to Defendants Jackson and Johnson. Defendants correctly assert that officers can 

only be found liable for failing to intervene under § 1983 if they: “(1) had reason to know that a 

citizen was unjustifiably arrested, and (2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent that 

harm from occurring.” Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1019 (7th Cir. 2006) 

(emphasis added) (citing Yang, 37 F.3d at 285). Here, the Court has already found based on the 

15
undisputed facts that Jackson and Johnson had arguable probable cause to arrest Crawford and 

are entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the summary judgment record fails to contain 

any facts from which a reasonably jury could infer that Jackson and/or Johnson had reason to 

know that Crawford was unjustifiably arrested and failed to intervene. See Smith v. Daniels, No. 

01 C 4157, 2003 WL 1717635, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2003) (dismissing plaintiff’s failure to 

intervene claim after finding that defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity). 

B. Boone

In contrast to Defendants Jackson and Johnson, the Court denies Defendants’ summary 

judgment motion with respect to Count II of the Complaint as to Defendant Boone. The 

Complaint alleges that Boone failed to intervene to prevent Crawford’s false arrest. Taking as 

true Crawford’s version of events, Jackson and Johnson were the arresting officers. The Court 

must also assume at this stage that Boone never saw Crawford hit Smith, but fabricated the

information in his dispatch call. A reasonable jury then can conclude that, upon arriving at the 

scene of Crawford’s arrest, Boone knew that Crawford’s detention was premised upon false 

information and, as the supervising officer, could have prevented Crawford’s arrest but failed to 

do so. For these reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ motion with respect to Count II as it 

relates to Boone.

IV. Conspiracy Claim

Finally, Defendants contend that summary judgment is appropriate with regard to 

Crawford’s conspiracy claim, Count III, as to all Defendants. The Court agrees.

“To establish a prima facie case of civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show (1) an express 

or implied agreement among defendants to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and 

(2) actual deprivations of those rights in the form of overt acts in furtherance of the agreement.” 

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Thurman v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1029 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (citing Scherer v. 

Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1988)). To sustain their civil conspiracy claim, the 

plaintiff must allege that defendants “directed themselves toward an unconstitutional action by 

virtue of a mutual understanding[,]” and support such allegations with facts suggesting a 

“‘meeting of the minds.’” Thurman, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1029 (quoting Amundsen v. Chi. Park 

Dist., 218 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2000)). As the Seventh Circuit has stated, however, “‘[a] party 

may not cry ‘conspiracy’ and throw himself on the jury’s mercy.’” Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 

641, 649 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 

1986)); see also McAfee v. 5th Circuit Judges, 884 F.2d 221, 222 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 

493 U.S. 1083 (“‘mere conclusory allegations of conspiracy cannot, absent reference to material 

facts,’ state a substantial claim of federal conspiracy”) (citation omitted).

Here, the summary judgment record is devoid of any facts from which a reasonable jury 

could infer the existence of an express or implied agreement among Boone, Jackson, and 

Johnson to deprive Crawford of his constitutional rights. Tellingly, Crawford does not defend 

his conspiracy claim in his response brief, nor does he offer any facts to support this claim. The 

Court thus grants Defendants’ summary judgment motion on Count III of the Complaint as to all 

Defendants.

Conclusion

For the reasons provided in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court grants in 

part and denies in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. [Dkt. 33.] The motion is 

granted in favor of Defendants Jackson and Johnson as to Counts I through V, and they are 

hereby terminated as defendants. The motion is granted in favor of the City of Chicago as to 

Count VII (indemnification) with regard to Defendants Jackson and Johnson. The motion is 

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also granted in favor of Defendant Boone as to Count III. The motion is denied as to Counts I, 

II, IV, and V as to Defendant Boone and Count VII as to the City’s indemnification of Defendant 

Boone. Because the City did not move for summary judgment as to Count VI (conversion), that 

count also remains for trial. 

SO ORDERED ENTER: 4/25/14

__________________________

JOHN Z. LEE

United States District Judge

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