UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Jeffrey Haynes, )

 )

Plaintiff, ) No. 12 C 2980

)

v. ) Judge Thomas M. Durkin

)

City of Chicago, Ed H. Smith, )

and Mort Levy, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jeffrey Haynes (“Haynes”), acting pro se, brings this action by way of 

an amended complaint against the City of Chicago (“The City”), former 28th Ward 

Alderman Ed Smith (“Smith”), and Mort Levy (“Levy). R. 69. The Court previously 

dismissed Haynes’s complaint for failure to state a claim, but granted him leave to 

file an amended complaint. R. 59; R. 65. Haynes’s amended complaint alleges the 

same causes of actions contained in his original complaint. Counts I and II allege 

violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 

U.S.C. 1961, et seq. Count III alleges violations of Haynes’s Due Process Rights 

under the 14th Amendment. Counts IV, V, and VI allege various state law causes of 

action. And Count VII puts forth a Monell claim against the City. See Monell v. 

Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). R. 69. The City and Smith have filed a 

motion to dismiss the amended complaint contending that it does not contain new 

factual allegations that cure the legal deficiencies in Haynes’s original complaint 

and, thus, should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

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R. 74. For the following reasons, the Defendant City and Smith’s motion to dismiss 

is granted.

BACKGROUND

The Court previously provided a detailed recitation of the pertinent facts in 

its Opinion and Order dated August 12, 2013, and thus presumes familiarity with 

the background for purposes of this ruling. R. 59. The only additional relevant 

factual allegations are that Haynes was asked to, and did, give Smith a $1,000 

campaign contribution on February 22, 2007 to secure Smith’s support of Haynes’s

development of the shopping center and grocery store, R. 69 ¶ 73, that Smith 

solicited a $5,000 campaign contribution on September 19, 2008, Id. ¶¶ 34-35, and 

that during a several month period in 2009, Smith repeatedly asked Haynes to host 

fundraisers for his benefit. Id. ¶ 73. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the amended complaint. 

See, e.g., Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7 570 F.3d 811, 820 

(7th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff’s amended complaint “must be enough to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007), and “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (quoting Twombly 550 U.S. at 570). “In evaluating the sufficiency of the 

amended complaint, [Courts] view it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 

taking as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and making all possible 

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inferences from the allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.” AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 

649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court liberally construes pro se amended 

complaints and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by 

lawyers. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Munson 

v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012).

ANALYSIS

I. RICO (Counts I & II)

Count I of Haynes’s amended complaint asserts that Smith violated § 1962(a)

of the RICO Act. R. 69 ¶¶ 72-76.

Previously the Court dismissed this cause of action for failure to adequately 

plead the elements of a § 1962(a) violation, namely: the receipt of income which was

then used in the operation of a RICO enterprise, and which proximately caused 

Haynes’s injury; and the commission of at least two predicate acts, constituting a 

“pattern” of racketeering activity. R. 59. Haynes’s amended complaint contains

additional factual allegations that Smith received income, and that Smith engaged 

in conduct that could be construed to constitute at least two predicate acts.1 R. 69 

¶¶ 34-35, 73. However, even if all the new facts alleged by Haynes are true (which 

the Court assumes for the purposes of a motion to dismiss), Haynes’s amended 

complaint still fails to sufficiently plead the requisite elements of a § 1962(a) 

violation for the reasons discussed below. 

RICO “does not cover all instances of wrongdoing. Rather, it is a unique cause 

of action that is concerned with eradicating organized, long-term, habitual criminal 

1 See supra Background.

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activity.” Gamboa v. Velez, 457 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Jennings v. 

Auto Meter Prods., Inc., 495 F.3d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 2007). “RICO has not 

federalized every state common-law cause of action available to remedy business 

deals gone sour.” Midwest Grinding Co. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1025 (7th Cir. 

1992); see also Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 918 (7th Cir. 2010); Dremco, Inc. v. 

Diver, 2013 WL 1873917, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2013). 

18 U.S.C § 1962(a) provides, in pertinent part, that: 

It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income 

derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering 

activity...to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such 

income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest 

in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is 

engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 

commerce.

Thus, to state a § 1962(a) claim, a plaintiff must adequately allege, among 

other things, the existence of an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity.

Vicom Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Servs. Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 1994). 

A. The Enterprise

“A RICO complaint must identify the enterprise,” Richmond v. Nationwide 

Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 1995), defined as “a union or group of 

individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity,” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). To 

make a showing of an enterprise, the association must have “an ongoing ‘structure’ 

of persons associated through time, joined in purpose, and organized in a manner 

amenable to hierarchial [sic] or consensual decision making.” Stachon v. United 

Consumers Club, Inc., 229 F.3d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1990).

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Haynes alleges that Smith used his 28th Ward office as an enterprise. R. 69 ¶ 

73. He further alleges that “Smith worked for and controlled the enterprise.” Id. 

Haynes, however, fails to identify a group of individuals within Smith’s office that 

were “joined in purpose” with Smith. Haynes does not allege any type of 

organization within Smith’s office, let alone one amenable to consensual decisionmaking. Rather, Haynes relies on the bald assertion that Smith’s office was the 

enterprise without naming any person within Smith’s office that participated in, or 

even knew about, Smith’s alleged scheme. As such, Haynes’s amended complaint 

fails to adequately allege the existence of an enterprise as required by § 1962(a). 

B. Pattern of Racketeering Activity

The Court’s prior Order addressed the inadequacy of Plaintiff’s original 

complaint in alleging a “pattern of racketeering activity,” as required by § 1962(a). 

R. 59. While Haynes has included additional allegations in his amended complaint 

intended to bolster the “pattern of racketeering activity” requirement, Haynes 

ultimately still fails to adequately allege a “pattern of racketeering activity.” 

A “pattern” for the purposes of RICO requires at least two predicate acts of 

racketeering activity within a 10-year period. 18 U.S.C § 1961(5). In addition to the 

existence of the two predicate acts, to sufficiently allege a “pattern,” a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that the predicate acts satisfy the “continuity plus relationship” test. 

Jennings, 495 F.3d at 473. The “continuity plus relationship” test requires: (1) that 

“the predicate acts [] be related to one another (the relationship prong)”; and (2) 

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that the acts “pose a threat of continued criminal activity (the continuity prong)”. 

Id.; see also Midwest Grinding, 976 F.2d at 1022. 

Continuity may be demonstrated by “a closed-ended conspiracy that existed 

for such an extended period of time that a threat of future harm is implicit or an 

open-ended conspiracy that, while short lived, shows clear signs of threatening to 

continue in the future.” Midwest Grinding, 976 F.2d at 1023. In assessing the 

presence of closed-ended continuity, “[r]elevant factors include the number and 

variety of predicate acts and the length of time over which they were committed, the 

number of victims, the presence of separate schemes and the occurrence of distinct 

injuries.” Jennings, 495 F.3d at 473 (quoting Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 

F.2d 970, 776 (7th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Seventh 

Circuit has repeatedly held that closed-ended continuity is not satisfied when the 

allegations are limited to a single scheme, victim, and injury. Roger Whitmore’s 

Auto. Servs. Inc. v. Lake County, Illinois, 424 F.3d 659, 674 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[t]he 

fact that we are faced with a single, isolated scheme with a confined set of victims 

also supports the conclusion that Roger has not shown closed-ended continuity”);

Sutherland v. O’Malley 882 F.2d 1196, 1204-05 (7th Cir. 1989) (single scheme,

victim, and injury insufficient to prove closed continuity); Jones v. Lampe, 845 F.2d 

755, 758 (7th Cir. 1988) (no pattern with a finding of one distinct injury); see 

McDonald v. Schnecker, 18 F.3d 491, 471 (7th Cir. 1994); see J.D. Marshall Intern., 

Inc. v. Redstart, Inc., 935 F.2d 815, 821 (7th Cir. 1991). 

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Under these cases, Haynes clearly does not satisfy the continuity prong of the 

“continuity plus relationship” test. Haynes does not, and cannot, allege an openended period of continuity because Smith is no longer in office. As such, the “threat 

of repetition” has been eliminated. Midwest Grinding, 976 F.2d at 1023. Likewise, 

Haynes also fails to sufficiently allege a closed-ended period of continuity. First, 

Haynes is the only alleged victim. R. 69 ¶ 71. Second, there is only a single scheme 

alleged: Smith’s soliciting and obtaining bribes from Haynes. Id. Finally, Haynes’s

loss of money from the failed project is the only injury claimed. Accordingly, 

Haynes’s amended complaint fails to adequately allege close-ended continuity. Luis 

v. Smith Partners & Assocs., Ltd., 2012 WL 5077726, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2012) 

(no pattern with one scheme, victim, and injury); Glenwood Halsted LLC v. Vill. of 

Glenwood, 866 F. Supp. 2d 942, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Haynes’s failure to allege facts 

satisfying the continuity prong of the “continuity plus relationship” test necessarily 

defeats the existence of a “pattern of racketeering activity.”2

As Haynes has failed to sufficiently plead the existence of an “enterprise” and 

a “pattern of racketeering activity,” both required elements of a § 1962(a) claim, 

Count I is dismissed.

C. RICO Conspiracy 

Haynes’s § 1962(d) claim is only alleged against Defendant Levy. While 

Defendant Levy did not join in Defendant City and Smith’s instant motion to 

dismiss, he did join in the prior motion to dismiss. Because Haynes’s § 1962(d) claim 

2 Because Haynes has failed to satisfy the “continuity plus relationship” test, the Court need not 

consider whether the additional allegations discussed in the Background section, supra, satisfy 

the “relationship” prong of a pattern of racketeering activity. 

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has not been substantively amended, and, as just discussed, Count One still fails to 

adequately allege a violation of § 1962(a), Haynes’s allegation of a conspiracy to 

commit a violation of § 1962(a) necessarily fails. Accordingly, Count II is dismissed 

for the same reasons cited in this Court’s Order dated August 12, 2013. R. 59.

III. Due Process (Count III)

Similarly, Haynes’s Due Process claim has not been substantively amended. 

As such, Count III is dismissed for the same reasons cited in this Court’s Order 

dated August 12, 2013. R. 59.

IV. Monell Liability (Count VII) 

These claims contain the exact same factual allegations as those in Haynes’s

original Complaint. Accordingly, they are dismissed for the same reasons cited by 

the Court in its August 12, 2013 Order. R. 59. 

V. State Law Claims (Counts IV, V, and VI)

As the Court has dismissed Haynes’s federal causes of action, the Court again 

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Haynes’s state law causes of 

action for the same reasons cited by the Court in its August 12, 2013 Order. R. 59. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants City and Smith’s motion to dismiss, R. 

74, is granted. Haynes’s federal claims as to all Defendants are dismissed, and the 

Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Haynes’s remaining state 

law claims. 

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ENTERED:

_______________________________

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

Dated: October 22, 2014

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