THE U.S. ARMY

CORPS OF ENGINEERS

RESPONSE TO THE

EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL

Janet A. McDonnell

Office of History

United States Army Corps of Engineers

Fort Belvoir, Virginia

1992
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

McDonnell, Janet A., 1952-

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers response to the Exxon Valdez oil

spill/Janet A. McDonnell.

p. cm.

Cover title.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 154-170).

1 . Oil spills - Environmental aspects - Alaska - Prince William

Sound Region. 2 . United States. Army. Corps of Engineers. 3. Exxon

Valdez (Ship) 4. Tankers - Accidents - Environmental aspects - Alaska

- Prince William Sound Region. I. Title. II. Title: U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill .

TD427.P4M39 1992

628 .1'6833'097983 - dc20 91-43183

CIP
Foreword

The Exxon Valdez oil spill was the largest and most destructive in United States history. In the wake of this disaster,

the Army Corps of Engineers joined the team headed by

the United States Coast Guard to mount a massive cleanup

effort. This was the first time the Corps and the Coast Guard

had worked together on such a grand scale, and the results

were dramatic.

The record clearly indicated that Corps personnel, in

concert with other federal, state, and local agencies, made

significant contributions in all phases of the operation. Of

particular note were achievements in the area of dredging,

contracting procedures, and application of state-of-the-art

remote sensing technology.

Dr. Janet A. McDonnell's account of events both during

and after the March 24, 1989, spill provides valuable insight

into the myriad complex problems that must be considered

and overcome when confronting a disaster of this magnitude.

The Exxon Valdez incident and other subsequent spills clearly

indicate the need for better planning and improved cooperation among all agencies involved. By documenting these

"lessons learned" from the Exxon Valdez experience, we now

are able to learn from the past and to prepare ourselves for

better response in the future.

NANCY P DORN

Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Civil Works)
The Author

Janet A. McDonnell received her Ph.D. from Marquette

University and is a senior historian with the U.S. Army Corps

of Engineers. She has published The Dispossession of the

American Indian: Indian Land Policy, 1887-1934 as well as

several articles on Indian land policy. She has also completed

a history of the Corps of Engineers' response to the Loma

Prieta earthquake. Currently she is writing a history of the

Corps' support to U.S. forces during the Gulf War and a

history of the Army's role in the reconstruction of Kuwait.
Introduction

The Exxon Valdez oil spill in March 1989 was the largest

and most destructive in United States history. When the spill

occurred, officials in the Pentagon could find little informa

tion on previous oil spills that would help them in planning

a response. As a result, Assistant Secretary of the Army

(Civil Works) Robert Page directed the Army Corps of Engineers to document its oil spill activities so that the "lessons

learned" would not be lost. This history chronicles the Defense Department and Corps response to the spill and evaluates specific problems such as dredge operations, shoreline

cleanup, and funding and reimbursement and the efforts to

resolve these problems.

Although Exxon and the Coast Guard had responsibility

for the cleanup operations and played a larger role than the

Army Corps of Engineers, the Corps nonetheless made signifi

cant contributions. As part of the Department of Defense

response, the Corps provided dredges, which proved to be the

most effective equipment for recovering oil that had been

collected on the water; advanced the ability to locate oil on

the water surface and the shoreline using remote sensing;

and provided officials in the White House and Pentagon with

information on the scope of the problem that they could use

in decision making.

In looking at the Corps' response, certain themes become

apparent. Most striking is the proactive nature and flexibility of the Corps of Engineers as an organization. The

response clearly indicated the Corps' willingness and ability

to assume new missions. It also reflected the dedication and

innovation of Corps personnel, particularly Alaska District

staff and the dredge crews. They walked into a tense, confused

situation, carved out a mission, and executed that mission

successfully. The Corps proved itself to be a worthy partner

in oil spill response.
Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Chapter

I. The Grounding and Early Response . . . . . . 3

II. Department of Defense/Corps of

Engineers Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

III. Growing Corps of Engineers Involvement . . 31

IV Command and Control/Communications . . . 49

V Corps Dredge Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

VI. Shoreline Cleanup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

VII. Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

VIII. Funding and Reimbursement . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

VIX. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111

Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121

Appendix A: Oil Spills Since Exxon Valdez . . . . . . . 133

Appendix B: Acronym Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Appendix C: List of Oral History Interviews . . . . . . 139

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141

Photos and Illustrations

Exxon Valdez off-loading into the

Exxon San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Alaska oil spill, command, control

and coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Lieutenant Colonel Ray Carlson,

John Elmore, and Colonel William Kakel . . . . . . 22

Army Corps of Engineers dredge

Yaquina in Alaska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Typical hopper dredge components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Inverted dragheads on the Yaquina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Oil skimming operations in

Prince William Sound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Oil collection in "donuts" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Corps of Engineers officers Brigadier General

Patrick Stevens, Brigadier General

Patrick Kelly, and Colonel William Kakel . . . . . . 56

Captain Brice discusses shoreline

cleanup operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Shoreline cleanup operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Page
THE U.S. ARMY

CORPS OF ENGINEERS

RESPONSE TO THE

EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL
CHAPTER I

The Grounding and Early Response

The Alaska pipeline carries crude oil from the Arctic

coast south to the Port of Valdez on Prince William Sound,

where it is loaded onto tankers for transport to refineries in

the lower forty-eight states. Prince William Sound is in south

central Alaska, about eighty or ninety air miles southeast

of Anchorage. This transportation system had been in use

since 1977 without any major oil spills. The pipeline and

Valdez terminal are operated by Alyeska Pipeline Service

Company, a consortium of the seven major oil companies,

including Exxon, involved in North Slope oil production.

Shortly before 9:30 PM. on Thursday, 23 March 1989, a

tanker owned by Exxon, Inc., the Exxon Valdez, departed

Valdez bound for Long Beach, California, loaded near capacity

with 1 .2 million barrels (53 million gallons) of Prudhoe Bay

North Slope crude oil . The ship was 987 feet long, 166 feet

wide, and 88 feet deep and traveled at about 12 knots. Turning or stopping required several miles to accomplish . As was

customary, the ship was piloted by a local marine pilot and

accompanied by a tug from the port to the three-mile neck

known as the Valdez Narrows. At 10:17 it turned left into

the narrows, which is less than a mile wide at its tightest

point. At Rocky Point, five miles out of the narrows, the local

pilot left the ship.

From the narrows to Hinchinbrook Entrance, the passage

into the Gulf of Alaska, specially designated deep-water corridors were reserved for tanker traffic. There was an inbound

lane, a buffer zone, and an outbound lane, each roughly three

miles wide. Outbound tankers traveled in the west lane and

inbound tankers in the east. Tanker captains were required

to notify the Coast Guard before leaving their lanes.

A tanker that had left Valdez a few hours before the

Exxon Valdez reported that ice from the Columbia Glacier

had drifted into the shipping lanes. At 11 :31 PM. Captain
4 The Grounding and Early Response

Joseph Hazelwood notified the Coast Guard that he was

diverting his ship from the outbound lane to the inbound

lane, and he retired to his cabin leaving his third mate in

charge. The third mate was not certified to pilot through that

particular part of Prince William Sound. The tanker passed

through the inbound lane and into the vicinity of Bligh

Island. The crew attempted to correct their course, but they

were not able to turn the ship in time.

At 12 :04 A.M. local time on a dark, drizzly Good Friday

morning, 24 March 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground on

a pinnacle at Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound. Eight

of its eleven cargo tanks extending the full length of the

ship were ripped open and three saltwater ballast tanks

were pierced. At 12 :28 Hazelwood informed the Coast Guard

Marine Safety Office (MSO) in Valdez of the collision and

spent an hour trying to maneuver the tanker off Bligh Reef

despite warnings that his ship might be too unstable to float.

Oil gushed from the ruptured tanks. Over the next day, the

crippled ship would pour roughly eleven million gallons of

North Slope crude oil into the icy waters of the Prince William

Sound.

The Coast Guard Marine Safety Office at Valdez immediately began the state and federal notification process. At

12:30 the Coast Guard vessel tracking center in Valdez con

tacted Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, and Alyeska in

turn notified Exxon officials, as well as state and federal

officials. The ship was in danger of capsizing if it floated off

the reef, so oil spill response and the removal of the remaining

oil from the ship became the top priorities. In the first hour

the Captain of the Port, Steve McCall, closed the Port of

Valdez to vessel traffic and the rescue tug Stalwart was

dispatched from the Alyeska Marine Terminal to aid the

stranded Exxon Valdez. It took the tug two hours to make

the twenty-five mile trip to Bligh Reef.

At 2:49 A.M. the Coast Guard put out an urgent call to

its Pacific Strike Team for pumps and personnel to off-load

the barge. Team members would arrive in Alaska that even

ing. Around noon Exxon relieved Alyeska of financial and

logistical responsibility for the response.

Although the state-approved oil spill contingency plan

called for a quick response, there were frustrating delays at
The Grounding and Early Response

the Alyeska terminal. Employees and contract laborers who

came to pick up their gear so they could head to the spill scene

found that vital cleanup equipment had to be dug out of

warehouses and loaded on vessels. Deep-water skimmers and

booms designed for a spill in the sound, rarely brought out

in the dozen years of pipeline operations, were buried under

stacks of the heavy booms used to contain oil in a warehouse.

Huge ship fenders -used to hold two ships apart while one

takes on the other's cargo -could not be found initially. They

were later discovered under several feet of Valdez snow.

A contingency barge that state and federal officials

thought was always kept loaded with containment equipment

so it could be launched at a moment's notice was empty. Its

cargo had been stacked in a warehouse. Alyeska officials later

contended that the contingency plan did not require the barge

to be loaded, but state and Coast Guard officials were stunned

to find that the barge was not ready.

Workers described the scene early that Good Friday morning as frantic as people ran around trying to get equipment

ready. They had to fill boats with gas, patch booms, and load

the barge. For several hours only one person was on hand

to drive the forklift and operate the crane to load the barge.

The barge finally left the terminal at 11 :00 A.M. with 50,000

pounds of equipment onboard. Tugs carried another 22,000

pounds. Despite existing response plans that required Alyeska

to be on scene and placing containment booms within five

hours, it was between 12 :00 PM. and 5:00 PM. on 24 March,

twelve to seventeen hours after the grounding, before the first

booms were deployed.

Later that evening a smaller vessel, the Exxon Baton

Rouge, came alongside and began pumping oil off' the Exxon

Valdez. By then the oil slick covered roughly thirty square

miles south and west of the reef.

All available oil spill response equipment was mobilized

from the Alyeska Pipeline terminal and both Exxon and the

Coast Guard began mobilizing equipment from other areas.

Operators tested dispersants with little success; Prince

William Sound was too calm for adequate mixing of the

dispersant with the oil. On Saturday morning, 25 March,

Exxon announced that 175,000 barrels had spilled. By noon

this figure reached 260,000 barrels.

5
Exxon Valdez off-loading oil into the Exxon San Francisco after the spill in

Prince William Sound.

On Easter Sunday morning, 26 March, Alaska Governor Steve Cowper declared a state of emergency. The slick

stretched one hundred square miles, and only about three

thousand barrels (126,000 gallons) had been skimmed off the

water. State, federal, and Exxon officials made plans to use

air-delivered dispersants, fire, and skimmers in a full attack

on the spill beginning Monday, but early Monday morning, 27 March, high winds exceeding seventy miles an hour

developed in the sound. The heavy winds grounded aircraft,

prevented boat operations, and emulsified the oil so that

both dispersants and burning became ineffective. The winds

pushed the oil slick to the southwest in the shape of a fortymile-long spear. The next day calm weather returned to the

sound, but significant amounts of oil hit the shores of Smith,

Green, Knight, Naked, and Eleanor Islands about 35 miles

southwest of Bligh Reef. The spill was out of control . Following the prevailing currents, the oil would begin entering the

Gulf of Alaska through Montague Straits on 30 March. It

continued to follow the Alaska Stream, which flows southwest

along the coast until it splits around Kodiak Island.

On 28 March operators abandoned the use of dispersants because of the size of the spill and the cold water

temperatures. Attempts to burn the oil in concentrated slick
The Grounding and Early Response 7

areas failed because the volatile ingredients had evaporated .

The mixture in the burning areas was 23 percent oil and

77 percent water, which would no longer support combustion.

At midnight a large group of distraught fishermen from

Cordova, about eighty water miles southeast of Valdez, left

by boat with oil containment booms provided by the state.

They attempted to block the oil from entering the major fish

hatcheries on the southwest edge of the sound (Main Bay,

Eshamy Bay, Ester Bay, and Sawmill Bay). By 5 :00 PM.

fishermen had deployed oil booms in the fish hatchery areas.

On Monday, 3 April, the Coast Guard reopened the port

to tanker traffic during daylight hours only. Two days later

the Exxon Valdez, drained of most of its oil, was refloated by

Exxon and taken to Outside Bay on the west side of Naked

Island for temporary repairs.l

On 5 April, Governor Cowper delivered a letter to Rear

Admiral Edward Nelson, Jr., Commander, 17th Coast Guard

District, requesting that the Coast Guard take over coordi

nation of the cleanup under the National Oil and Hazardous

Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (40 CFR 300). Exxon

would continue to retain primary responsibility. Less than

four percent of the spilled oil had been recovered, and the

oil slick had moved into the Gulf of Alaska . "Under these

circumstances;" Cowper declared, "the State of Alaska, many

of the federal agencies, and the participating citizen groups

believe that a change in approach to the management of this

disaster is necessary. . . . Due to its formal responsibilities

and familiarity with the Alaska coastline, we believe the

Coast Guard is uniquely suited to coordinate the response

to this disaster." 2

A carefully crafted national contingency response system

had been developed over a twenty-year period. In 1967 after

the tanker 7brrey Canyon grounded off' the British coast,

spilling millions of gallons of oil, the need for effective contingency planning to respond to the environmental threat

posed by the bulk transport of oil became more apparent

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

1972 (33 USC 1321), also known as the Clean Water Act, provided for a National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution

Contingency Plan.
8

The National Contingency Plan was developed to insure

that the resources and expertise of the federal government

would be immediately available for serious oil and hazardous

substance incidents that required a regional or national

response. It applies to all federal agencies and provides the

framework for management of cleanup activities. Responsibilities are divided into two zones, inland and coastal. The

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has jurisdiction in

the Inland Zone and the Coast Guard has jurisdiction in

the Coastal Zone (all U.S. waters subject to the tide, U.S.

waters of the Great Lakes, and specified ports and harbors).

If the responsible party does not take proper action or is

unknown, under the Clean Water Act the on-scene coordinator determines whether the federal government should

take over.

The National Contingency Plan requires three activities:

planning and coordination, on-scene operations, and communications. Planning and coordination are done at the

national, regional, and local levels. At the national level they

are done by the National Response Team (NRT), which is

usually chaired by a representative of EPA and made up of

representatives of federal agencies that have responsibilities

outlined in federal regulations or executive orders. The Coast

Guard provides the vice chairman and manages the Revolving Fund established by section 311(k) of 33 USC 1321

that is used for the cleanup of oil and hazardous substances

discharged into navigable waters of the United States.

The Defense Department provides expertise through the

Corps of Engineers and the Navy. The Corps has specialized

equipment and personnel for use in ship salvage, shipboard

damage control, and diving. Fourteen federal agencies have

roles in response. 3 Oil pollution response is not a new role

for the Corps of Engineers. The Oil Pollution Control Act of

1924 gave the Corps primary responsibility for controlling

problems caused by pollution of navigable waters. The Corps

continued to play a leading role in regulating pollution until Congress passed the first Water Pollution Control Act

(33 USC 1151) of 1948 . 4

At the regional level, the Regional Response Teams (RRT)

provide regional planning and preparedness before a pollution incident occurs, and they coordinate and advise after an

The Grounding and Early Response
The Grounding and Early Response

incident. RRTs have two principal components, the Standing

RRT and the Incident Specific RRT. The Standing RRT is

comprised of representatives of departments and agencies on

the NRT plus the involved states. The Incident Specific RRT

is comprised of RRT members that have equipment and

expertise that could help the on-scene coordinator (OSC) in

combating a specific incident . There are thirteen RRTs with

geographically defined zones of jurisdiction.

The next level of pollution response is performed by the

OSC, usually Environmental Protection Agency or Coast

Guard staff who have been trained to respond to pollution

incidents. Coast Guard OSCs are the designated Captain of

the Port for the various ports of the United States. Their

jurisdiction is outlined in federal regulations. The OSC can

draw on the expertise and resources of the RRT. His primary

focus is to ensure a timely, effective response, and his duties

include : assessing the extent of the spill, the potential hazards, the types of resources needed, and the ability of the

spiller or local officials to handle the spilled oil ; monitoring

the cleanup activities of the spiller; and determining if federal

management and federal funds are needed to handle the

incident (i .e., whether to "federalize"). Once federal funds are

activated, the on-scene coordinator is in charge of the response. Using the Oil Revolving Fund, the OSC can secure

contractors and mobilize response equipment, resources, and

personnel. 5

The traditional role of the Corps of Engineers under the

National Contingency Plan is to respond to requirements

from the National Response Team and to provide general

engineering and construction support to that body. In responding to the Exxon Valdez spill, however, the Corps would

go beyond its traditional role.

9
CHAPTER II

Department of Defense/

Corps of Engineers Response

By 6 April the stage was set for a dramatic increase 

the level of federal involvement in the cleanup operation

By that time there were roughly five hundred federal pe

sonnel in the Prince William Sound area, including fo

hundred Coast Guard (USCG) personnel and one hundr

from other agencies. Government equipment on scene i

cluded three USCG cutters, six USCG aircraft, one Nation

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) aircraf

six USCG portable pumps which were used to offload t

barge, one USCG open water skimming system, seven Nav

skimmers, and over thirty-six thousand feet of boom. Th

spill, which now covered an area sixty by one hundred mile

was moving in a southwesterly direction into the Gulf 

Alaska. The heaviest concentrations of oil extended sou

from Smith Island in a nearly continuous sheen with heav

patches of emulsified oil between Knight Island and Gre

Island and in the passages between Bainbridge Pass a

Latouche Pass.

Although operators had used chemical dispersants a

burning on a limited basis, the actual cleanup was bei

done by mechanical means. Exxon was performing all of t

cleanup work through a contract with VECO, Inc., a lar

local construction contractor that specialized in the suppo

of oil companies in Alaska. Through VECO, Exxon essential

cornered the market in Alaska and in the Pacific states 

available oil booms, skimmers, oil barges, floating hotels, a

small skiff-sized work boats.

The spill affected one of the largest and most producti

fishing regions in the world. The livelihoods of hundreds 

fishermen from Valdez, Cordova, Seward, and other sma

villages were at risk . With the assistance of local fisherm

VECO had set up booms and skimming operations at fo

hatcheries located in Prince William Sound. The salm
1 2 Department of DefenselCorps of Engineers Response

smolt were due to be released from the hatcheries into the

sound within weeks. Cleanup work underway in critical seal

pupping areas had to be completed within two or three weeks.

White House officials were following events in Alaska

with keen interest. President Bush, who had been elected

with the pledge that he would be the "environmental presi

dent," was under intense pressure from the media, the public,

and Congress to respond. He directed Transportation Secretary Samuel K. Skinner and EPA Administrator William K.

Reilly to evaluate the situation in Alaska first hand. Four

days after the spill Reilly and Skinner hurried to Alaska

where they spent a day and a half flying over the spill area

and meeting with officials in Valdez. Secretary Skinner was

briefed by the current on-scene coordinator and by Admiral

Nelson. The delegation also met with Governor Steve Cowper,

Director of the Alaska State Department of Environmental

Conservation Dennis Kelso, and representatives of other

interested organizations. They focused on the question of

whether the federal government should assume control of the

cleanup. Was Exxon doing everything that could be done or

were there additional needs? Skinner and Reilly concluded

that there was no need to federalize the cleanup operations.

They later submitted a detailed report to the President with

their assessment of the response and the effects of the spill.l

While White House officials tracked the spill, an outraged

Congress debated the nature of Exxon's liability and questioned whether the spill should be federalized. At hearings

on 6 April Admiral Paul A. Yost, Commandant, U.S. Coast

Guard, assured the Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and

Navigation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and

Fisheries that President Bush was "deeply concerned" about

the environmental issues and "very interested" in the

Coast Guard's marine safety and environmental protection

missions. He also assured them that the Coast Guard was

exercising more control over the cleanup. "Frankly, we want

to take full advantage of Exxon's willingness to open their

checkbook and fund this cleanup. "2 Admiral Yost indicated that the fund for oil spill cleanup contained only

$3-$4 million, and he was reluctant to federalize a spill that

was costing over $1 million a day with only $4 million in

his pocket . If the spill was federalized the USCG would have
Department of Defense/Corps of Engineers Response 13

"massive" contracting problems. Exxon, which was not bound

by federal procurement procedures, could simply write out

checks. Rather than federalizing the spill, Yost observed,

"it would be much better if we could manage this spill,

using Exxon as the checkbook." In his testimony, however,

Secretary Skinner now conceded that the response was

"totally inadequate." 3

Members of the Senate Committee on Science and Transportation meeting the same day also seemed anxious to

determine who was in charge in Alaska. Representatives of

the Bush administration (i.e., Reilly and Skinner) defended

Exxon. Reilly observed that Exxon had done everything that

it was told to do, though Senator Ted Stevens from Alaska

disagreed. Skinner assured the committee that the Coast

Guard was directing the operations. He reminded the committee that there was no magic fix to the problem: "When

you get up there you watch how it has moved and the vastness

of it and you understand it is not a problem that is fixed by

throwing money and equipment at it at this point" The Coast

Guard Commander was directing Exxon resources and telling

Exxon officials what needed to be done. In a written statement to the committee, Admiral Yost noted that Exxon was

"making every effort to fulfill its responsibilities in that area."

Despite the optimistic testimony, some committee members

continued to favor federalizing the cleanup. The American

people, they observed, were concerned that the federal government was not doing enough.

Officials in the Pentagon also followed the situation

closely. Major General James D. Smith, Director for Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization for the Deputy Chief of

Staff' for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army,

began monitoring the news reports as he would in the case

of any catastrophic event in U.S territory. Smith also served

as Director of Military Support (DOMS) for the Defense

Department in instances where the Secretary of the Army

was designated as Executive Agent for a specific event, such

as disasters or civil disturbances. As DOMS he took actions

as directed by the Secretary of the Army and worked directly for the Secretary of Defense through the Secretary of

the Army.

Early on Smith contacted the Chief of Engineers and

Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Lieu-
14 Department of DefenselCorps of Engineers Respons

tenant General Henry J. Hatch, and Brigadier Genera

Patrick J. Kelly, Director of Civil Works, USACE. Smit

recognized that the Corps would be a key player if the Defens

Department became involved and that it had tremendous con

tracting capabilities. 5

Both the Army and the Corps were eager to respond t

the cleanup operations aggressively. In an era of improve

relations with the Soviet Union, some suggested that th

Army should emphasize its traditional role over the past tw

hundred years as nation builder rather than focusing on th

forty years of the Cold War. Officials in Washington perhap

saw an opportunity to go back to that early role of servic

to the nation. In addition to looking back at the Army'

historic nation building role, General Hatch had establishe

a vision of the Corps as an environmental engineer agency

Corps staff supported the Chief's vision and looked for oppor

tunities in the environmental arena. The Assistant Secretar

of the Army for Civil Works, Robert W. Page, also advocate

a stronger role for the Corps in environmental areas. The da

after the grounding he called Governor Cowper and Com

mandant Yost to offer the Corps' assistance. 6

General Kelly met with President Bush's Chief of Staff

Governor John Sununu, before the President directed th

Department of Defense to become involved in the cleanup an

had followup meetings with Sununu's representative, Richar

Breeden, Assistant to the President for Issues Analysis. A

week after the spill Assistant Secretary Page, Kelly, an

Smith attended a White House meeting with Breeden

Sununu, and Skinner at which Yost requested that the Army

supply troops. Page, Smith, and Kelly argued against this

Using troops to wipe rocks was not good training for soldier

and would deprive civilians in Alaska of employment. I

addition, supporting troops in Alaska would present grea

logistical problems.

At a meeting with Secretary Cheney, Smith and Kell

laid out a series of options that the Defense Department coul

take if it became involved. Smith and Kelly emphasized th

Corps' contracting capability and its ability to set up th

structure required for the cleanup. They needed to establis

a way to control resources that DOD might place in th

area. They discussed moving command and control facilities
Department of DefenselCorps of Engineers Response 

transportation resources, and medical evacuation assets 

Alaska and putting Engineer brigades in until contract

arrived. In such an isolated area, they observed, the f

requirement was to establish command and control and c

munications. The structure was needed whether troops w

used or not. Smith and Kelly recommended the use of 

or more Navy command and control ships with the pro

radios and helicopter landing platforms and the use of la

ing craft .

Smith and Kelly argued that with the high unempl

ment in Alaska and on the western seaboard they would h

little trouble finding contractors to do the work. Smith a

argued that if it came down to wiping rocks with rags

would be better to do that with contractors than with soldi

Soldiers' pay was much less than what Exxon was pay

contract workers. Secretary Cheney concurred. The strat

that DOD recommended was to keep Exxon in as a pla

and to provide Exxon with any special equipment and exp

tise that it might need.?

On 6 April Richard Breeden advised Secretary Chene

assistant, David S. Addington, that Governor Sununu 

instructed him to prepare an action plan and president

statement for use that day on federal assistance for 

Alaska oil spill cleanup. Breeden had been working w

Secretary Skinner and Commandant Yost on the plan 

had presented it to Sununu, but Sununu wanted to be s

that DOD was "on board:" Breeden's plan called for the Pr

dent to announce that he was directing the Secretary 

Defense to make available DOD facilities, equipment, 

personnel to assist in the cleanup. Breeden intended for D

to participate as follows: Navy personnel would provide 

prepare floating facilities for logistics, equipment stor

communications, and dormitory service; Air Force wo

provide airlift for equipment and personnel for the clea

Army would provide 1,500 menfor "on-the-ground" clea

duty. Breeden had not consulted anyone in DOD about t

Addington recommended that the Secretary of Defense as

the DOD focal point responsibility to the Secretary of 

Army, whose DOMS had the proper coordination capabil

On 7 April Kelly and Smith accompanied Secre

Cheney to a cabinet meeting at the White House. They fo
16 Department of DefenseXorps of Engineers Response

the cabinet members gathered informally in a meeting room

outside the Oval Office. It quickly became clear that Secretary

Skinner, Admiral Yost, and Interior Department and EPA

people favored "throwing the massive cleanup problem square

into the hands of the Defense Department." Smith and

Kelly had already informed Secretary Cheney that they

strongly opposed any plan to put uniformed soldiers on the

beaches in Alaska to clean rocks.

Yet, the Alaska congressional delegation called loudly for

increased federal activity to demonstrate to their constituents

and the rest of the American people that the federal govern

ment was doing something. At the informal cabinet meeting

Cheney stated very strongly that he would not put troops on

the beaches, and he was countered by the strident voices of

the other cabinet members who disagreed with him. Standing outside the Oval Office Cheney saw for the first time the

planned policy statement for Bush's press conference, which

provided for using troops, and he asked to see the President.

After a minute's pause while someone went in to check with

the President, Cheney was ushered into the Oval Office and

Secretary Skinner followed.

A few minutes later Skinner came out and informed

General Smith that Secretary Cheney had prevailed. There

would be no troops on the beaches. As President Bush stepped

out of his office, he was confronted by some of the Alaskan

congressional delegation, who complained that DOD would

not have an active enough role if troops were not put on the

beach. Bush held firm. The room emptied, and after exchanging a few words with General Smith and General Kelly, Bush

went on into his press conference. " to

At the 7 April press conference President Bush announced

that he was appointing Skinner to be responsible for mobilizing and coordinating all federal departments and agencies

for the cleanup and directing DOD to assist by providing

personnel, equipment, and facilities . Finally, President Bush

named EPA Administrator William Reilly as coordinator of

the long-term recovery of the ecology of the area.

Smith was gratified that Cheney, a relatively new

Secretary of Defense, had so staunchly defended the proposed

policy that he and General Kelly had laid out earlier, a policy

that did not include using Army troops for shoreline cleanup.
Department of DefenselCorps of Engineers Response 

The result was, said Smith, "an intelligent application of DO

assets to assist in the oil spill "11

In anticipation of the Bush announcement, on 6 Apr

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney designated Secreta

of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., as Executive Agent for DO

assistance to the cleanup operations. As Executive Agen

Marsh would be responsible for planning, coordinating, a

executing DOD participation. The Secretary of the Ar

has a long-standing responsibility for support to non-D

agencies in the continental United States and its possessio

In 1968 the Secretary of the Army was designated Executi

Agent for employment of federal resources during domest

civil disturbances. As Executive Agent, the Secretary of 

Army acted with the full authority of the Secretary of Defe

and was responsible to him and had full authority over 

DOD components. At the same time Defense leaders

created a separate office directly under the Secretary of 

Army to provide adequate management-the Directorate 

Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations, which was 

organized as the Director of Military Support (DOMS) 

1970. In 1973 the Director of Operations, Readiness, a

Mobilization on the Army staff assumed additional resp

sibility as the DOMS.

At the time of the oil spill, in addition to the direct

General Smith, and his deputy, there were seven officers 

DOMS, including two from the Air Force, and one civil

secretary assigned to the Military Support Division of 

Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operati

(ODCSOPS), which was responsible for the DOMS missi

DOMS normally established a multiservice task force 

provide broad capabilities to plan, coordinate, and mana

Defense support and to maintain adequate command a

control. Although there was a basic task force structure, e

task force organization changed depending on the curr

mission requirements. 12

Later that day General Smith convened an oil spill DO

joint task force (DOMS-JTF) with representatives from 

the key elements of the armed services and set up busin

in the Army operations center in the Pentagon to coor

nate military support at the DOD level. He told them wh

he thought the initial requirements would be and orde
18

" Contracting " Federal On-Scene

" Restoration Coordinator

" Priorities

" Requirements

" State/Federal Coordinator

" Interagency Interface

" DoD On-Scene Commander

" Single Point of Contact

for Requirements

Alaska Oil Spill Command, Control & Coordination.

24-hour operations. The Secretary of the Army designated

DOMS as the action agent to coordinate, manage, and task

all DOD support to the Department of Transportation (DOT),

and General Smith served as the Secretary's action officer

to oversee the DOD effort. The DOMS staff then alerted the

commands with potentially major roles: Pacific Command,

Military Air Command, Army Forces Command (to which

most Army units in Alaska were assigned), and the Corps

of Engineers. 13

Following established procedures DOD designated Lieutenant General Thomas G. McInerney, Commander of the

Alaska Joint Task Force at Elmendorf Air Force Base, as

the Defense Senior Representative (DSR) for Department of

Defense assistance to the Coast Guard. Whenever a disaster

strikes in the United States or its territories, DOD designates the senior flag level officer from the nearest military

headquarters as DSR. As DSR, General McInerney provided

on-scene DOD representation with the USCG for support

requirements.

Department of DefenselCorps of Engineers Response

" Develop Cleanup Strategy " Medevac Cap " Worksite Coordinator/CDR " Airlift

" OP/Exec Agency " Heavy Lift " C3 " Airfield Operations " Contract Agency " Logistics Support " Berthing " Logistics Support

" Environmental Svcs " Troop Special Skills " Air Lift " Oil Spill Recon

" Requirements " Small Boats Operations

" Logistics Support
Department of DefenselCorps of Engineers Response 

DOD officials activated the Alaska Joint Task For

(AK-JTF) on 7 April. The AK-JTF was a small standi

nucleus of people assigned for planning purposes and 

logistical operations and operations in general. Gener

McInerney formed a task force around that nucleus. 

augmented the team initially with people from the Alas

Air Command and then with additional personnel from t

lower forty-eight states. The Joint Task Force was normal

tailored to the particular emergency. Thus the Corps of Eng

neers, which is not normally a member of the task for

became involved. The JTF staff had recently gone throu

an exercise so it was relatively easy to pull together 

effective operational staff quickly. 14

General McInerney requested the assignment of a Na

flag officer as his deputy in anticipation of the major r

projected for the Navy. Rear Admiral Edward B. Baker, Co

mander, Amphibious Group III in San Diego, was designat

the Deputy Commander of the Alaska Joint Task Force

On 7 April General McInerney, accompanied by the Cor

Alaska District (NPA) Engineer Colonel William Kakel, sp

eight hours touring the oil spill area and met with Exx

and the Coast Guard representatives. He received briefi

from Admiral Nelson, who served as the federal on-sc

coordinator at the time. He determined that committi

Defense Department personnel to perform cleanup would 

be an effective use of that agency's resources. Both Kakel a

McInerney saw clearly that they needed to do whatever t

could to keep troops off the beaches because it would be v

difficult to support them. McInerney's preliminary commen

indicated that: everyone involved, including DOD,, had to 

prepared for extended operations; troops should be used 

a last resort, only after all available local residents h

been hired; early deployment of MEDEVAC assets might 

desirable; and the U.S. Navy should be tasked to prov

representatives on the assessment team with surface ope

tions and oil spill salvage experience. 15

When the President called upon the Defense Departm

to respond, the Corps became officially involved in the cle

up operations. On 6 April General Kelly and Brigad

General Patrick Stevens, Division Engineer, North Pac

Division, were attending a Department of Energy briefin
20 Department of Defense/Corps of Engineers Response

Washington about the importance of oil from Alaska's North

Slope when Kelly received an urgent call from General Hatch.

Hatch informed Kelly that the Defense Department was

going to be activated and directed him to contact General

Smith about potential Corps involvement. Kelly and Stevens

returned to Corps headquarters and then went to the Pentagon to meet with Smith. 16

HQUSACE officials activated the Emergency Operations

Center (EOC) at 3:00 PM. on 7 April for 24-hour operation.

All information entering or leaving headquarters concern

ing oil spill activity would be coordinated through the EOC.

An hour later, after briefing General Hatch, officials in headquarters notified the divisions. A crisis management team

made up of representatives of various HQUSACE elements

began meeting in the Emergency Operations Center every

morning at 8:00 to review situation reports that had come

in and to prepare information for the center's own report. The

EOC held briefings twice a week to keep headquarters command and staff' informed and remained in operation until

16 June, when the Corps' oil spill response mission ended.

Meanwhile, General Stevens returned to North Pacific

Division on 6 April and left the next day for Alaska to work

with Colonel Kakel to determine the Corps' program. Kakel,

who had just returned from his visit to Valdez with General

McInerney, had a somewhat different perspective than

Stevens, who had just come from Washington. The next day

they went to Valdez and flew over the sound. They received

briefings from Coast Guard and Exxon officials at Valdez and

discussed potential Corps support . During the visit Kakel

and Stevens reached agreement on what the Corps could do.

They recognized that the Corps should be supportive without

offending the Coast Guard. Stevens observed some confusion

about who was in charge, how the operation was going to be

conducted, the scope of the operation, and the nature of DOD

support and how would it be rendered.

General Stevens activated a division task force in North

Pacific Division to keep him advised of the oil spill activities.

He decided not to activate the Division's emergency opera

tions center, but rather to have Alaska District's EOC be the

central point for disseminating information . 17

On Thursday, 6 April, Alaska District formed a crisis

management team for the oil spill cleanup and opened its
Department of DefenselCorps of Engineers Response

emergency operations center, a combination lunchroom an

conference room that converted to an emergency operatio

center. Alaska District's emergency operations center wen

to 24-hour operation the next day. Much of the job of t

NPA EOC was to coordinate activities and information. 

was the channel for information and taskings in and out 

the District. The District's EOC collected reports put out b

Exxon, the Coast Guard, the Regional Response Team (RRT)

and the Joint Task Force and generated its own report. 

did contingency planning, evaluated the types of contracti

mechanisms that would be available on short notice, and co

tacted suppliers to find out what kind of equipment wa

available for use in the cleanup. Alaska District's EOC wou

operate sixty-five days, from 6 April to 9 June, in its longe

emergency operation.

Alaska District's deputy emergency manager, Emergenc

Management Section ChiefMerv Mullins, had begun partic

pating in RRT meetings on 27 March where he received i

formation from the Coast Guard to pass on to the District

executive staff.

As the Army Corps of Engineers began to prepare its ow

response to the spill, the Director of Military Support mad

plans to send a team of experts to Alaska to assess the sit

ation. There was pressure on the federal government a

the Pentagon to pump money into the cleanup and to 

something to provide quick visibility, but Pentagon officia

did not want to commit a lot of resources and make mistak

that the media would pick up on. These officials needed 

put experts in the field to observe the problems and mak

recommendations so that they could make intelligent dec

sions. The team was a means of getting the best inform

tion possible before making concrete recommendations f

DOD involvement.

General Smith and hisjoint staff organized the team wi

help from General Kelly. They first identified specific skil

that they thought would be required to clean up the spill a

then designated certain types of people. General Kelly plac

John P Elmore, Chiefof the Headquarters Operations, Co

struction, and Readiness Division, on the team, where Elmo

would play a key role as the senior DOD civilian . He, 

turn, obtained Corps assistance and expertise in areas whe

2
Lieutenant Colonel Roy Carlson (left), John Elmore (center), and

Colonel William Kakel (right).

he anticipated the Corps might be involved.l8 From North

Pacific Division Elmore requested a biologist or environmental specialist (James R. Reese); a dredging expert (Robert

J. Hopman); a contracting specialist (William J. Doran); and

an emergency operations specialist (Paul Zepernick). Team

members from the Division had little instruction beforehand,

just one conference call with Alaska District. They met

Elmore in the Seattle airport on Saturday, 8 April, and during

the flight he briefed them and showed them the first oil spill

documents that they had seen. Elmore instructed them that

they were going to Alaska to look for a way for DOD to help

in the cleanup effort. The five men arrived in Anchorage later

that afternoon.l 9

The team, headed by Colonel Thomas Wilson, Deputy

Commander and Chief of Staff, Alaska Joint Task Force, consisted of nineteen representatives from the Navy, Corps of

Engineers, AK-JTF, Office of the Surgeon General, and USA

Health Service Command, plus a Coast Guard liaison, Lieutenant Commander Glenn A. Wiltshire. Wilson and Elmore
Department of Defense/Corps of Engineers Response 2

emphasized that the mission of the DOMS team was not 

take over the cleanup but to determine the available r

sources within their particular areas of expertise that could 

brought to bear and to offer those resources to the FOSC an

Exxon. If there were requirements for additional expertis

the members were to inform General Smith. Colonel Wils

conceded, however, that beyond this mission there were som

"political aspects" It was important to have a "visible feder

presence involved;" and the team considered this in its asses

ment. Corps members of the assessment team had a du

mission: to evaluate DOD resources in general and look 

possible roles for the Air Force, Army, and Navy, and 

evaluate Corps resources specifically. 2o

The DOMS team focused on the following areas: logistic

support, including billeting, messing, and morale suppo

for military, civilian, contractor, and volunteer personne

transportation requirements in Alaska; command and contr

requirements; communications presently in place and add

tional requirements; missions the Navy could execute; avail

bility of docking facilities and support; air support, includi

airfield availability, air traffic management, and contr

requirements; assistance to decontamination efforts ; t

number of military personnel required and what missio

they could perform; methods for disposal of contaminat

materials ; reimbursement for DOD efforts, including t

procedures for recording DOD costs at the JTF level; and add

tional equipment requirements, specifically Corps dredg

in Portland. 21

The team met for the first time on 9 April and was brief

by General McInerney and his staff. The team would me

with Colonel Wilson every day at 8.00 A.M. Most of the int

action between team members from different service branch

occurred at these morning briefings. Corps members gather

each evening to discuss possible Corps involvement and 

work on contingency plans. The Division members work

closely with their Alaska District counterparts (Tom Cart

Kirk Shadrick, and Guy McConnell). The team worked ei

days straight, fifteen hours a day, constantly observing, d

cussing, and planning. 22

On 10 April the DOMS team had discussions with Coa

Guard and Exxon representatives and state officials at Vald
24 Department of Defense/Corps of Engineers Response

and toured the spill area by helicopter. Light snow, low visibility, and high winds in the spill area hampered the assessment. Around midnight that evening the last of the team

representatives, Navy representatives from U.S. Pacific Command, arrived at Elmendorf.

John Elmore returned to Valdez on 11 April, accompanied

by Colonel Kakel, Hopman, and Reese. There they coordinated with the on-site technical experts and made helicopter

overflights in the spill area . Elmore, Kakel, and the DOMS

team members discussed the possible deployment of an Army

Corps of Engineers dredge and other items with Admiral

Nelson. Elmore and Kakel presented an overview of Corps

expertise and capabilities that could be made available.

DOMS team representatives returned to Valdez and Cordova

again the following day. Personnel in Cordova assessed the

feasibility of staging and supporting Army MEDEVAC helicopters there. The team also provided input into the update

briefings for Admiral Yost. Team personnel met with General

McInerney to receive guidance and make recommendations

about possible DOD support. 23

Team members initially concluded that the cleanup strategy was satisfactory and effectively addressed local concerns,

specifically economic and environmental issues. Colonel

Morton V Plumb, USAF, Director of Joint Operations for

AK-JTF, reported, "The general consensus of the team members was that the strategy formulated by Exxon/USCG is

thorough and represents the best efforts of a large group of

very talented specialists" As details of their plan became

known, he added, "much of the criticism leveled at their

organizational effort will be allayed

*

1124

Throwing in troops was the first action that the team considered, but they rejected that idea because of the infrastructure required to support those troops. The first possibility for

Corps involvement that stood out was the use of the dredges.

Team members recognized that the dredges would have to

be converted in order to recover oil, but concluded that, once

converted, they could be useful as skimmers, as containment

barges, and as command and control platforms. 25

In his initial observation, the Corps environmental

specialist, James Reese, noted that the Corps could call in

its archaeologists and environmental assessors and could help
Department of DefenselCorps of Engineers Response 

move fish if hatcheries were threatened. Contracting specia

ists Bill Doran and Paul Zepernick observed that Exxon co

tracting with VECO was working well . Corps members we

frustrated that they could not do more. Their recommend

tions were tempered by the stiff restrictions that the sta

of Alaska had put on the cleanup. 26

On Friday, 14 April, John Elmore accompanied Gener

McInerney to Valdez to briefCommandant Yost and Admir

Robbins on the team's findings and recommendations. T

briefing covered the results of the DOMS team study a

DOD resources available for possible support activity. Aft

conducting final briefings with Assistant Secretary of t

Army for Installations and Logistics John W. Shannon a

General McInerney on 16 April, the team dispersed. Robe

Hopman stayed behind for another week to help depl

the dredges. 27

The team's final recommendations dealt with support 

the following areas: communications, logistics and tran

portation, medical, naval support, aviation movement, a

the Corps of Engineers. In the area of communications, t

team noted that existing communications at Valdez met t

current requirements. For ship to shore communication

there were enough UHF and VHF nets that linked the stat

Coast Guard, and Exxon representatives and the contr

vessels at sea as well as beach parties ashore. More UH

satellite communications radios would be needed if addition

forces were deployed.

In looking at logistics and transportation the team fou

that General McInerney had already dispatched a logisti

liaison team to Valdez to handle requirements. An AK-JT

response team was in place at ElmendorfAFB to handle t

requirements for the operations. The capability to suppo

non-Alaska-based forces was "extremely limited" Howeve

most Alaska-based forces had sufficient organic support 

deploy within the operations arena. Using troops would 

quire the establishment of base camps with appropria

support (i.e., billeting, messing, shower facilities, laundry, a

associated sanitation facilities).

The team observed that naval support already consist

of 22 oil skimmers and a command, control, communicatio

van for coordinating these skimmers. The Navy could provid
26 Department of DefenselCorps of Engineers Response

if needed, the U.S.S. New Orleans, U.S.S. Juneau, U.S.S.

Fort McHenry, LCM-8 landing craft, CH-46 helicopters, and

two non-self-propelled barges. There was at that time a need

to house roughly four hundred workers in Valdez. Rental of

a Navy berthing barge would solve this problem.

In the area of aviation, the team found that space was

limited at the Valdez and Cordova airports. Each could handle

up to two C-141s or one C-5A aircraft. Valdez and Cordova

would require aviation support personnel and equipment.

Major activities could be supported from ElmendorfAFB and

Seward, which could accept increased aviation support.

Finally, the team reported on potential Corps of Engineers

contributions such as engineering services and design support. The Corps could manage large design projects and pro

vide engineering support in these ways: develop initial and

long range plans for cleanup operations; design temporary

camp facilities and utilities; design incineration facilities for

oil work and debris; provide photo surveillance and remote

sensing; and provide sampling and testing of contaminated

water, soils, and hazardous and toxic waste. The Corps dredging fleet of four could be used for oil skimming, as command

and control centers, or to support a number of satellite oil

skimmers while serving as a command and control center

for the surrounding vicinity.

The Corps could also provide support in the areas of construction, contract administration, technical advice, and environmental evaluations. It could provide laboratory and

research assistance from its five major research and development labs and eight Division labs, which performed a wide

range of material, water quality, and chemical testing and

sampling. These labs could provide oversight of the cleanup.

In the area of power generation, the Corps had eleven emergency power generators, located at Fort Belvoir, Toole Army

Depot, and Fort Monmouth, that could be in Prince William

Sound in 56 to 104 hours. 28

Although the team investigated and reported potential

Defense Department contributions and costs, it never recommended that DOD take over the work. Secretary Skinner,

EPA Administrator Reilly, Assistant Secretary Shannon,

Breeden, Addington, and General Smith, as well as representatives from DOMS and from the Coast Guard, reviewed the
Department of DefenselCorps of Engineers Response 

teams' recommendations on 17 April at a meeting at 

Department of Transportation . 29

By the time the DOMS team submitted its final repo

the Defense Department was already providing considera

support to the cleanup operations. DOD support had actua

begun on 25 March, the day after the grounding, when 

Coast Guard asked the Navy for support. The first airlift 

Navy equipment occurred on Sunday, 26 March, when t

Marco Class V skimmers and associated equipment a

operators were flown from Travis AFB to Anchorage. 

Friday, 31 March, in response to a second Coast Guard 

quest, the Navy arranged to fly five additional skimmers 

Alaska. During the weekend, 1-2 April, one C-5A with t

skimmer systems departed Travis AFB' and one C-5A a

one C-141 with three skimmer systems, 6,000 feet of offsh

oil containment booms, and associated equipment left fr

Williamsburg, Virginia. On 4 April an additional 16,000 f

of containment boom departed Travis AFB, one C-5 fr

Norfolk Naval Air Station, and one C-5 from Travis AF

The next day the Navy mobilized fifteen additional skimme

from Stockton, California, and Williamsburg for transp

to Anchorage. This equipment was in place by 10 April. T

Navy later established a management and support compl

at Valdez to assist the Coast Guard and Exxon in effectiv

using Navy assets.

When DOD became involved General McInerney a

Colonel Wilson sent logistics teams to Valdez to provide 

link between Exxon, the Coast Guard, and DOD concerni

defense resources. Exxon requested the equipment, USC

verified the need for the equipment, and the logistics peop

forwarded requests to the Pentagon and followed the mov

ment of the resources until they got where they needed 

go in Alaska. On 8 April, twenty-four hours after the Bu

speech, General McInerney deployed Captain Greg Helles

and Master Sergeant Steven Patterson of Alaska Air Co

mand (AAC) logistics, Captain Monica Aloisio from AA

public affairs, and Master Sergeant William Reavis from t

1931st Communications Wing to Valdez to work with Coa

Guard and Exxon officials. The 616th Aerial Port Squadr

at Elmendorf AFB continued to receive and offload C-5 a

C-141 aircraft from Europe and the lower forty-eight stat
28 Department of DefenselCorps of Engineers Response

By 27 April they had handled at least twenty-four Military

Airlift Command transport aircraft bringing in over 1,063

tons of cargo for the cleanup. The 1931st Communications

Wing established an extensive communications system using

satellite radios and computers to aid coordination between

Exxon command center, the Coast Guard Marine Safety

Office in Valdez, the air operations center at the Valdez airport, and the Joint Task Force command center.

The largest DOD contributions were Navy berthing ships.

Because of the remote location of the cleanup sites, there was

a desperate need for floating facilities to house shoreline

cleanup workers. In response the Navy provided amphibious

transport docks (LPDs) or dock landing ships (LSDs). The

U.S.S. Juneau left its home port, San Diego, California, on

18 April and arrived in Alaska on 24 April. The U.S.S. Fort

McHenry left San Diego on 28 April and arrived in Alaska

on 4 May.

Over the summer months the Navy replaced the Juneau

first with the Cleveland and the Ogden, and then with the

Duluth. Meanwhile, the U.S.S. Mount Vernon relieved the

Fort McHenry and then left the cleanup operations on 18 July

without a replacement, reducing the naval presence to one

ship. The U.S.S. Duluth sailed without replacement on

16 September, ending the naval ship presence in the oil spill

cleanup operations.

The ships functioned as "floating hotels" providing medical, laundry, housing, dining, and sleeping facilities for shoreline cleanup workers. They also provided communications

support and functioned as command and control platforms

and helipads for forward deployment of helicopters. They

supported base operations of the landing craft, providing

maintenance, fuel, and docking. Deployed with the ships

were Marine Corps CH-46 helicopters and Army medical

evacuation helicopters, which performed a variety of essential

missions. Naval ship operations centered in Prince William

Sound and were especially important in open sea areas because commercial berthing vessels could not operate in the

rough water. 3o

DOD also provided military airlift support. U.S. Air Force

airlift operations peaked during the period 4 to 9 April. The

Air Force flew over forty sorties of C-141, C-5, and C-130
Department of Defense/Corps of Engineers Response 

aircraft, ferrying more than 1,100 tons of cargo from as f

away as Helsinki, Finland. They transported oil skimmer

communications trailers, tow boats, boom and rigging van

boom mooring systems, general purpose boats, power pack

and generators.

In addition to Navy berthing ships and Air Force airl

support, the Army provided helicopters. With the arrival 

the first Navy ship, a large contingent of military personn

were present in Alaska. This required that helicopters 

on-site to provide emergency MEDEVAC. Initially two UH

(MEDEVAC) and two CH-47 (non-MEDEVAC) helicopte

from the 6th Infantry Division, Fort Richardson, Alaska, m

this requirement. Because most operations were over wate

MEDEVAC aircraft with a twin-engine capability were 

quired; three MEDEVAC UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters we

deployed from Fort Benning, Georgia, to Alaska via Air For

cargo airlift on 19 April. By 21 April the Army had provid

seven helicopters and thirty-six helicopter crews.

Helicopter crews underwent deck training to permit th

to land and take off from helipads aboard ships at sea. Th

helicopters could operate from aboard ships and respo

better in an emergency. These helicopters performed ma

functions ranging from utility missions, such as the transpo

of supplies, to the evacuation of military and civilian pe

sonnel. After the last Navy ship departed, the helicopte

returned to Fort Benning.

DOD also contributed essential landing craft, which f

ried crews from berthing/support vessels anchored offsho

onto contaminated beaches. Nine Navy landing craft arriv

with the U.S.S. Juneau on 24 April and ten more arrived wi

the U.S.S. Fort McHenry on 4 May. Exxon subsequently leas

the following quantities of landing craft from the Army

reserve component: four from the California Army Reserv

eight from the Washington State National Guard, and thr

from the Alaska National Guard. These lease agreemen

required Exxon to transport them to the oil spill area (rat

than them arriving under their own power) and to provi

them with maintenance, fuel, and crews.

At the Coast Guard's request, DOD provided 251 Ligh

weight Decontamination Apparatus units for use by Exx

shoreline cleanup crews. These units are power driv
30 Department of DefenselCorps of Engineers Response

portable devices capable of producing and spraying hot water

to decontaminate personnel and equipment. They were carried on shore to provide high pressure heated water.

By 25 April, a month after the grounding, DOD had.

committed substantial resources to the cleanup effort. The

Army had put into action three UH-60 Blackhawk heli

copters, three UH-1HHuey helicopters, and two Army Corps

of Engineers dredges. Three Army air traffic controllers,

helicopter crews, and fifty crewmen on the dredges were

involved in the cleanup. The Navy contributed 20 skimming

vessels, 2 Voss skimmers, 10 tow boats, a 2,000-foot boom van,

20 mooring systems, 2 rigging vans, 2 cleaning vans, 4 inflatable boats, 3 Navy personnel, and 87 contract personnel in

addition to the Juneau and McHenry. DOD support to the

cleanup peaked in the week 4 to 8 May. On 4 May there were

854 DOD personnel assigned to the oil spill joint task force. 32

Initially there was a great deal of uncertainty and controversy about the role that the Defense Department should

and could play in the cleanup operations. Through weeks

of discussions in Washington and the efforts of the DOMS

Assessment Team in Alaska, the role became more clearly

defined. The Defense Department ultimately provided a broad

range of resources from berthing ships to decontamination units.
idea of using dredges in oil recovery operations was not ne

In the 1970s Congress discussed equipping vessels for o

recovery as well as dredging but concluded that this woul

be too expensive. When the Corps designed its dredges in t

mid to late 1970s officials discussed outfitting them for o

skimming. A few days after the spill, on 28 March, at 

meeting of the National Ocean Pollution Policy Board, A

Hurme from the dredging branch in Corps headquarters i

formed Dave Barrows of the Office of the Assistant Secreta

of the Army for Civil Works and other board members abo

past discussions.l

The next day Assistant Secretary Robert Page informe

Alaskan Senators Ted Stevens and Frank Murkowski, Repr

sentative Don Young, and Governor Cowper that he ha

alerted the Corps of Engineers to review its capabiliti

"anticipating that we may be called upon to assist as pa

of a federal team" Secretary Page also notified EPA, DOT

the Department of the Interior, and the Federal Emergenc

Management Agency that the Corps had been monitori

the oil spill situation "in anticipation of being asked to assi

in the recovery effort as part of a federal team" The Cor

had "vast experience" in emergency response and enviro

mental issues, technical expertise in contracting, and was i

vestigating the use of its seagoing hopper dredge as an o

recovery means. Secretary Page received no response. 2

On 30 March General Kelly informed the North Pacif

Division that Secretary Page had agreed to use a Cor

hopper dredge if called upon to assist in the oil spill recove

efforts. He directed NPD immediately to develop a plan 

action so that the dredge could respond quickly once giv
32 Growing Corps of Engineers Involvement

the word to deploy. The Division was to conduct an on-site

investigation with dredge operations personnel to consider

the following issues: availability of oil collection boom equipment and ways to use it effectively; availability of oil skimmers which could be used in conjunction with booms; estimated time required to outfit the dredge ; estimated travel

time to Prince William Sound; and estimated mobilization

costs and daily rental costs. "It is particularly important,"

General Kelly explained, "that we have laid all the necessary

groundwork to respond rapidly and effectively should the

Corps be called upon to respond:'3

Specifically, Corps officials considered using two dredges

based in Portland: the Yaquina, which had come out of dry

dock a few weeks earlier, and the Essdyons, which was sched

uled to begin work in San Francisco. The two dredges normally help maintain adequate navigation depths in river

channels and harbors on the coasts of Alaska, California,

Oregon, Washington, and Hawaii. Crews remove silt and sand

off the channel bottom, move it into the hoppers, and later

off-load it into a disposal site. Neither dredge had ever been

used to recover spilled oil .

The Essayons, constructed in 1982, was the larger of the

two dredges: 350 feet long with a 68-foot beam and a hopper

capacity of 6,000 cubic yards. It had four dredge pumps: one

1,650 horsepower mounted on each dragarm and. two 1,500

horsepower pumps mounted in the hull . The dredge could

carry 26,000 barrels (over 1 million gallons) in its hopper and

travel at 13 .5 knots an hour fully loaded. The Yaquina, built

in 1981, was 200 feet long and 58 feet wide with a capacity

of 875 cubic yards and could carry 4,000 barrels (168,000

gallons). Both dredges were highly maneuverable, and the

Yaquina, with its shallow draft, functioned well in small

inlets. Each dredge had two dragarms used to suck up the

dredge material. The pump horsepower per dragarm was

1,650 for the Essayons and 565 for the Yaquina. The Essayons

pumped at a rate of 30,300 gallons a minute and the Yaquina

at a rate of 5,454 gallons a minute.

The Essayons had just reached the Oregon-California

border on its way from Astoria to San Francisco on 29 March

when General Stevens ordered it to turn around. It returned

to Astoria at 5:00 PM. the next day. After being informed
Growing Corps of Engineers Involvement 

that the Essayons' services would not be needed, ho

ever, General Stevens directed the dredge to return 

San Francisco for dredging operations.

Meanwhile Portland District staff went into action 

prepare for a possible oil cleanup assignment. On 31 Mar

Leroy Johnson from Portland District and Ron Henry, Mast

of the Essayons, traveled to Valdez to gather information a

coordinate with cleanup officials. There they contacted 

leader of the Coast Guard strike team as well as the he

of Exxon operations in Valdez . Ken Patterson, Chief, Na

gation Branch, Portland District, and his staff contacted c

tractors in Portland, San Francisco, and Seattle who were 

the oil spill business to find out what they needed for 

cleanup operations. Without a formal mission, however, t

did not have authority to make commitments to contracto

and when they later received word to send the dredges t

found that most of the suppliers that they had contac

earlier had already shipped their equipment to Alaska

As Portland District staff struggled to locate supplies a

equipment, officials in Alaska and in Washington, D.C., mov

closer to a decision about sending the dredges. The decis

was political as well as operational. Pentagon officials justif

sending dredges on the purely functional lines of provid

communications and command and control in a remote, ha

environment. They contended that their prime motive w

a sense of responsibility. The President had indicated 

desire for the Defense Department to become involved, a

Pentagon officials felt a responsibility to take action. Y

it should also be noted that the White House was und

pressure from the media and Alaska's congressional de

gation to take bold action and commit DOD resources, a

Pentagon officials felt this pressure. As General Stev

explained, it was "very inviting to consider using Co

dredges to provide visibility of presidential support for 

cleanup effort and getting valuable experience for possi

future missions." 6

As days passed after the President's press announceme

and no major requests came from the Coast Guard, Gener

Smith and Kelly became anxious. Smith had set up the jo

staff' at the Pentagon, designated General McInerney as 

Defense Senior Representative, and made a number of tr
34 Growing Corps of Engineers Involvement

to the White House. He had set everything in motion to provide support. The Secretary of the Army had even given

General Smith permission to issue warning orders on equipment that might be needed soon, such as Navy berthing

vessels and Corps dredges. When Smith asked Coast Guard

officials where the request for the berthing vessel was, they

indicated that they did not want to request the ship because

of the expense. Nor were they willing to pay for Corps dredges

at that point. Smith and Kelly went back to the Secretary

of the Army and the Secretary of Defense and explained that

they were not getting any requests. They argued that the Defense Department should mobilize whether the Coast Guard

made a request or not. Secretary Cheney agreed, and he directed General Smith to send the ships to Alaska. Smith observed that none of the dredges' success would have occurred

if the military had not forced the issue. "As it turned out,"

he concluded, "it was a good decision." Admiral Robbins also

acknowledged that if not for the political push, no one would

have discovered the dredges' capabilities.?

Meanwhile in Alaska, DOMS team members discussed

possible use of Corps dredges with General McInerney and

with Coast Guard officials. John Elmore discussed the use

of the Yaquina with Admiral Nelson. Elmore believed the

dredge would be useful because it could chase the oil, boom

it, pump it, put it in the hoppers, and off-load it. Although

it had never been used to recover oil, Elmore said, "all the

basic factors were there to make the machine work:" On

12 April General McInerney requested the Yaquina and

Nelson concurred. The AK-JTF sent the request to DOMS,

and DOMS dispatched the message to the Corps. 8

Since the dredges had never been used in oil recovery

before, some Alaska District officials were not as confident

about the potential contributions as Elmore, but once the

decision was made they responded enthusiastically. Hopman

and Elmore convinced Colonel Kakel that the vessels could

be used as floating platforms and berthing ships if for nothing else. 9

While officials debated the use of the dredges, General

Stevens put the Yaquina on standby. On Friday, 7 April,

word came to have the Yaquina ready to leave Portland at

8:00 A.M. on Monday, 10 April. Portland District staff quickly
Army Corps of Engineers dredge Yaquina in Alaska.

fitted the dredge with a thirty-day supply of fuel, rations, and

water as well as 36-inch oil containment boom (the only kind

available in Portland), absorbent pads and rolls, extra sleeping

bags, extra foul weather and cold weather gear, heating coils,

and steam hoses to keep the dredge clean. They stacked

roughly two thousand yards of yellow rubber oil boom on the

deck and placed on board petroleum products and repair parts

needed for extended operations without support.

Portland District staff rented additional equipment necessary to support the operation including an air compressor

and a three-inch submersible and a three-inch diaphragm

pump. They fastened on the deck of the Yaquina a 34 foot

by 10 foot belt-driven inland Marco skimmer rented from

ChemPro Environmental Services in Seattle. This Marco

skimmer was a standard skimmer design for oil recovery, but

it would not be very effective because of the viscosity of the

oil . The small pump on board the skimmer used to move

materials from a collection tank to a larger holding tank

was incapable of moving the thick oil . District personnel

also placed on board a small survey vessel (survey boat 205)

that had electronic positioning capability as well as normal
36 Growing Corps of Engineers Involvement

fathometers for hydrosurvey, but ultimately no hydrosurvey

was required. They would supply both dredges with charts

of the areas where they expected the dredges to work. They

placed cold weather gear on board but were unable to locate

the necessary exposure/flotation suits for either dredge. 10

After a frenzied weekend of preparation, the dredge was

ready. On 11 April DOMS informed Corps headquarters

that the Coast Guard had requested the assistance of the

Yaquina and directed the dredge to leave Portland for Valdez

as quickly as possible. Upon arrival the captain was to report

to the FOSC. After thirty hours of waiting, the crew departed for Alaska at 7:00 PM. on 11 April. Late that night

Charles W. Hummer, Chief of Dredging, HQUSACE, commended Ken Patterson and his staff. "You have done a superb

job of being ready and also to arrive and make a difference . "

Early the next morning the dredge crossed the Columbia

River bar into the Pacific Ocean, two hours behind schedule

because of fog. Rough weather in the Gulf of Alaska forced

the Yaquina to take the inside passage route, which added

a day to her transit time. 11

When the Yaquina left Portland it carried, in addition to

its normal crew of twenty-two, a public affairs specialist, a

safety officer to insure that there were no accidents related

to handling the oil, two contractors for the skimmer, two for

the survey boat crew, and one radio operator, for a total of

twenty-nine. After arrival the crew would be augmented with

a photographer and a wildlife biologist (Eric Braun).

Portland District Engineer Colonel Charles A. Cowan had

organized Task Force Castle and assigned a young, energetic

Army captain, Kevin Brice, who was deputy project manager

for the Dredge and Plant Project in Portland District, as Task

Force Commander to coordinate the dredges and insure that

they were prepared to do what was needed. Cowan anticipated

that Brice would handle the expected VIP visits, serve as

liaison with Coast Guard and Exxon representatives, and

coordinate with the command post on the ground. Brice met

the dredge crew in Alaska. 12

After the Yaquina departed, General Kelly placed the

Essayons on standby for possible deployment to Alaska.

Patterson initiated plans to lease and purchase equipment

for the Essayons and to deliver it to Astoria where the
Growing Corps of Engineers Involvement 37

Essayons would change crews and take on fuel and stores. 13

Once again Portland District staff worked around the clock

to procure pumps, hoses, cleanup gear, absorbent pads, chemicals, and fire protection equipment. They sent all of this

material by truck to Astoria where it could be loaded on the

Essayons when it arrived. Two trucks from Seattle brought

an oil skimmer and booms to load, along with personnel to

operate the skimmer. They ended up with a pile of support

gear on the dock half as long as the ship and almost as wide

On 13 April General Kelly directed that the Essayons

be staged forward to Astoria and immediately provisioned

and equipped for a possible mission in Alaska. The dredge

left San Francisco that night. The next day General Kelly

sent the following message: "Once the Essayons has arrived

in Astoria, Oregon, she is to be immediately provisioned,

equipped and sailed immediately to Seal Rock, Prince

William Sound, Alaska, for use in oil spill cleanup and other

duties to be determined upon arrival

*

1114

Meanwhile, in Alaska, Elmore informed General

McInerney that the Essayons had been staged forward and

would be held at Astoria. McInerney responded that as long

as the Essayons was that far forward, he would recommend

bringing her to Alaska. On 14 April DOMS sent a message

requesting the Corps to prepare the Essayons for "likely"

deployment to Alaska. That same day in a videoteleconference between DOMS and AK-JTF, General McInerney

requested that the Essayons be sent along with two Navy

berthing ships. The Essayons left Astoria for Alaska early

the morning of 17 April, its exact mission still undetermined

Weather conditions were good, and it made better time than

the Yaquina. 15

Coast Guard and Exxon officials, however, were not con

vinced that the dredges would be useful and felt the ship

were being forced on them . Exxon was reluctant to enlis

unproven equipment, and Coast Guard officials were afrai

that if they brought the dredge up, Exxon would not pay fo

it. As the Yaquina headed toward Alaska, tension mounted

On 15 April, Otto R. Harrison, General Manager, Exxon Company, U.S.A., the Exxon official in charge at Valdez, informe

Admiral Yost that at the current stage of Prince Willia

Sound water surface oil recovery, "there is no use for thes
38 Growing Corps of Engineers Involvement

vessels." The amount of surface oil in the Sound decreased

daily. Nor were the Corps vessels needed in offshore Gulf of

Alaska operations, he added. 16

The reluctance of Coast Guard and Exxon officials to

request the dredges is understandable . Cleanup managers

at Valdez could see no use for the dredges. They had never

been used or equipped for oil recovery, so they were not listed

in the emergency oil spill manuals that Exxon and USCG

operators consulted. Yet, the manuals did list a Soviet vessel,

the Vaydaghubsky, which was equipped as a skimmer. At the

recommendation of the Coast Guard, Exxon had already

arranged for the use of the Vaydaghubsky, and it was on

its way to Alaska . The Vaydaghubsky, built in 1984 at the

Finnish shipyard Wartsila, was a special purpose vessel

capable of carrying out hopper dredging, fire fighting, oil spill

cleanup, and sewage disposal from offshore platforms. It was

425 feet long (compared to Navy skimmers that were 36 feet

long) and reportedly could work in winds up to 30 knots and

seas up to 8 feet. 17

On 16 April Captain Brice, Robert Hopman, and other

Corps officials went to Valdez to meet with Coast Guard representatives to define the dredge missions and to coordinate

crew changes, communication and reporting requirements,

and resupply needs. Their reception was chilly. Coast Guard

representatives bluntly asked what the dredges could do and

referred to Harrison's letter saying that Exxon did not want

the dredges. After responding as diplomatically as possible

that he was not sure exactly what the dredges could do, Brice

proceeded to outline possible dredge activities, from collecting

oil to serving as a command ship. There was apparently some

confusion. Coast Guard officials seemed to have the impression that the dredges had been refitted for oil skimming and

that they had high seas oil skimming capability. The DOMS

team had apparently described the Yaquina as having "high

seas" skimming capability. No one at the 16 April meeting,

however, made that claim. 18

When word that the dredge capabilities were unclear

went up through Coast Guard channels, Coast Guard officials

became upset that they did not have the super ocean-going

skimmer that they said they were promised. The FOSC complained to DOMS that the assessment team had presented
Growing Corps of Engineers Involvement 39

the Yaquina as having "high seas skimming capability," when

the 16 April meeting revealed little or no skimming capability. The FOSC reminded DOMS that Exxon had "firmly

declined" the use of the dredges and said there was no need

for them in the Prince William Sound recovery operations

Moreover no Coast Guard or Clean Water Act 311(k) funds

were available to pay for them. The FOSC requested more

information on the Essayons' cleanup capability before it

sailed and requested that the Yaquina proceed to Valdez for

an assessment of its oil spill cleanup capabilities. 19 In response to the USCG message, Corps dredging personnel

prepared a white paper outlining Corps dredge capabilities.

General Kelly also sent Charles Hummer to Alaska to help

make the dredge operational . The potential contribution of

the dredge, Kelly explained, was "too important a thing to

risk." Specifically, he directed Hummer to assess the Corps'

current role in the cleanup, help Colonel Kakel use the two

dredges in oil recovery operations, and assess other potential Corps support. Hummer arrived in Anchorage on 18 April

where he met with Colonel Kakel and his staff. 2o

DOMS responded to the Coast Guard with a message on

18 April indicating that both dredges could skim in waves

of up to three feet and retain skimmed material (Essayons,

26,000 BBLs; Yaquina, 4,000 BBLs). Each vessel had command capability and could function as a repository for

skimmed oil from other vessels. 21 A message from Captain

Brice to Ted Hunt, the captain of the Yaquina, late on

17 April indicated the level of tension. Brice asked Hunt and

his crew to find a way to pump oil from skimmers into the

dredge hoppers; normal pumps were not working. He warned,

"The climate up here is very political! Please be very, very

cautious in your transmissions and discussions. The politics

is on the Washington, D.C. level. Exxon does not want the

dredges in Alaska. The dredges are being forced on the USCG

by DOD:

'22

It was into this highly charged political environment that

the dredge sailed. At 3:45 PM. on April 18 the Yaquina

arrived off Eleanor Point in Prince William Sound. A Coast

Guard inspector boarded the dredge to evaluate its capabilities. He and Captain Hunt discussed skimming operations

and berthing. Captain Brice and Robert Hopman, who had
40 Growing Corps of Engineers Involvement

flown from Anchorage, were also on board. They invited

the Exxon representative on site to use the dredge as his

command post. Brice and Hopman told the crew that their

mission was to "suck oil," enough oil to "make a difference."

The crew was somewhat apprehensive because they were not

sure they could recover oil, but they were optimistic and eager

to find a way. After this initial meeting, the FOSC sent

a message saying the dredge would be "most helpful" in

the operations. 23

The crew launched their skimmer and survey boat early

the next morning and the launch followed. The launch and

the survey boat dragged boom in a "v" formation away from

the skimmer. At 7:45 A.M. the Yaquina edged into position

close to two fishing boats that had a boom full of oil, the

7bwhee and the Tres Suertes. The two boats maneuvered their

"donut" into position next to the dredge. To test the consistency of the oil, a bucket attached to a rope was thrown overboard. The bucket sat on top of the oil. The thick "mousse"

was ten inches deep inside the boom and filled with debris

and seaweed.

The crew first tried the centrifugal pump that they had

brought to move oil into the hopper, but it worked too slowly.

Their concrete pump also failed. The only thing left was the

dredge pumps themselves. The crew did not know if this

would damage the pumps and dragarms or how to adapt the

dragarms to make it work . If the draghead sat too low in

the water it sucked too little oil and too much water. If it

sat too high on the water it would suck air and lose prime.

After tense hours of brainstorming and experimentation,

at the suggestion of Chief Mate Jimmy Holcroft, crew members inverted the draghead. Around 4:00 PM., workers

cheered as they began sucking up as much oil in seconds as

they had all day. In the first fifteen minutes using the inverted draghead, the dredge took an estimated 1,500 barrels

of oil (63,000 gallons) into the hoppers. As it turned out, oil

collecting was not very different from dredging. One captain

called it "mirror image dredging" because the dragheads were

inverted to suck oil from the top of the water instead of silt

from the bottom.

With this remarkable success, Coast Guard and Exxon

officials and others revised their assessment of the dredge
Typical Hopper Dredge Components. Hopper dredges are seagoing

vessels designed to dredge and transport dredged material to open-water

disposal areas. The working ofa hopper dredge is similar to that ofa home

vacuum cleaner.

Dragarms (A) with dragheads (B) extend from each side of the ship's

hull. The dragheads are lowered to the channel bottom and slowly pulled

over the area to be dredged. Pumps (Q create suction in the dragarm and

the silt or sand is drawn up through the arms and deposited in hopper bins

(D) in the vessel's midsection. When the bins are full, the dredge sails to the

designated disposal area and empties the dredged material through large

hopper doors (E) in the bottom of the hull.

Hydrographic survey boats, using sophisticated electronic equipment,

survey the river and harbor bottoms to determine if dredging is required and,

after dredging is completed, to insure that the desired channel depths have

been attained.

capabilities . General Kelly called their success a "miracle."

It set the tone for the Corps' oil recovery mission. Colonel

Kakel must have been particularly gratified because of the

skepticism he had faced. In the face of stern questioning

early that morning at a Joint Task Force briefing, he had

been forced to admit his uncertainty about the dredge's capability. The Corps was now vindicated.24

On 19 April DOMS sent a message to the Corps directing the Essayons to depart immediately for Valdez and to

contact the Coast Guard there for instructions . When the

Essayons arrived in Alaska, the Coast Guard denied the

Corps' request for the dredge tojoin the Yaquina long enough

to witness the inverted dragarm technique, so the Yaquina

crew explained the procedure by radio. Later Captain Brice

"hitchhiked" to the Essayons to explain the procedures in

person. The procedure, however, would be more difficult to

implement in the Gulf of Alaska, where the Essayons would
Dragheads on the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers dredges were turned upside

down to suck oil out of "donuts," or circles made ofboom material. Normally,

the dragheads dredge or "vacuum" sand from the bottoms ofriver and harbor

navigation channels, primarily along the West Coast. The Yaquina, the first

ofthe two dredges to reach the spill, tried pulling in oil with the draghead

in its normal, bottom-vacuuming position, but pulled in too much water in

proportion to the oil pumped aboard. Crew members turned the draghead

upside down to suck the oilfrom the surface ofthe water. That relatively simple

innovation quickly and efficiently turned the hopper dredges from bottomdredging vessels into oil-hungry pumpers

work, than in Prince William Sound because the high waves

made it harder to hold the dragarms in the proper position. 25

On 20 April Kakel, Miguel Jimenez, Captain of the

Yaquina, Kirk Shadrick, and Hummer traveled by float plane

and boarded the dredge to see the Yaquina in operation. They

met with Hopman, Brice, Captain Hunt, Exxon representatives, and Coast Guard representatives to review the previous

day's successes and to plan for the future. There was no

more work in the immediate area of Perry Passage, so around

4:30 PM. the dredge moved toward Hidden Bay to meet boats

with boomed oil. There Captain Jimenez and his crew adopted

new booming procedures. Instead of simply pulling in the oil

collected by the two boats, one end of the 610-foot boom was

tied to the Yaquina. One boat kept the other end out in front

of the dredge and collected oil, using the dredge as a boom
Oil skimming operations in Prince William Sound.

ship. The oil was pumped into the hopper and the boom stayed

attached to the dredge. Other boom boats in the area pulled

their loads toward the Yaquina and released their oil into

the giant boom created by the Tres Suertes and the Yaquina.

At the end of the day the hopper held 1,100 barrels of oil.

After the water decanted, the crew refigured the amount

gathered on 19 April at roughly 500 barrels plus 600 collected

on 20 Apri1. 26

The dredges quickly provided other support too. They

loaned boom to smaller vessels and provided those crews with

hot meals and showers and fresh water. 27

As the dredges began to carve out their role in Alaska,

the Corps of Engineers also became involved in contingency

planning. While an anxious President and nation waited to

see if Exxon would remain committed to effective cleanup

operations, Corps personnel became more deeply involved in

planning for the possibility that DOD and the Corps might

assume a much larger role in the cleanup operations. Senior

officials in the White House and the Pentagon needed reliable

information that they could use to weigh options and make

decisions about future actions. As DOD poured resources into

Alaska in response to FOSC and Exxon requests, it prepared
In Prince William Sound, and ofKodiak Island and the Alaskan Peninsula,

oil collected by small skimmers and fishing boats was contained in circles

of boom material nicknamed "donuts." The oil collected in donuts such as

this one was then pumped aboard two Corps dredges, the Essayons and the

Yaquina, where the oil was stored in the dredge hoppers until it could be

ofloaded into barges. Neither dredge was equipped to work with oil, and

both had to modify the dragheads by reversing them to pull in oil from the

surface of the water instead of using them in the traditional way by vacuuming

up from a channel bottom.

for the contingency that it might be called upon to take over

all or part of the cleanup if Exxon failed to meet its obligations. The Corps of Engineers, with its extensive engineering, construction, and contracting capabilities, played a

major role in the contingency planning.

In the first weeks of April, Secretary Skinner, Secretary

Cheney, Secretary Marsh, Admiral Yost, General Smith,

and General Kelly held meetings in Washington to discuss

Defense Department activities. At a White House meeting

Kelly and Smith laid out a plan for the way DOD would

approach the cleanup problem if it received the mission.

At one point, they recalled, they were down on their knees

at the coffee table in Governor Sununu's office spreading

out their charts and maps and explaining how DOD would
Growing Corps of Engineers Involvement 

conduct the cleanup operations. Both White House and Pent

gon officials were committed to keeping Exxon as a play

If Exxon backed out, however, DOD would be ready to st

in with a plan that Sununu had approved. 28

In addition to the White House meetings, there was 

series of teleconferences between Secretary Marsh, Addingto

Breeden, Smith, and occasionally other officials in the Pen

gon and General McInerney, Colonel Wilson, and Colon

Kakel in Alaska to discuss contingency plans for increas

DOD involvement. During one teleconference Addingt

passed a note to General Kelly indicating that DOD and t

Corps should be prepared to act . The Corps did not want 

"come up short;" as Kelly put it, if that happened. 29

The Corps involved the Coast Guard in the planni

process. A Coast Guard representative, Commander Dav

Pascoe, came to Corps headquarters and reviewed a dra

plan. Generals Kelly and Smith also met with Commanda

Yost and Rear Admiral Joel D. Sipes, Chief, Office of Mari

Safety, Security and Environmental Protection, around 

table in Coast Guard headquarters in Washington to discu

the potential role of the Army. 3o

At a 21 April briefing, officials presented the White Hou

with the outline of a proposed DOD contingency plan for t

oil spill . DOMS, in turn, requested that AK-JTF use th

outline to develop a detailed contingency plan for an increas

DOD role in the cleanup and coordinate those sections rela

to the private sector with Alaska District. The next day t

Joint Task Force initiated a contingency plan as directed

Part of the contingency planning involved determini

the extent of the damage, the type of beaches affected, a

the problems involved. Using this information, the Cor

would then plan its response; i.e ., equipment, manpowe

and schedule. The Corps looked at how much of the wo

Exxon would retain and how much the government wou

take, the availability of contractors, safety and health me

sures, and ways to feed and house workers. It pulled all 

these factors together in contingency plans that were brie

at the White House.

Most of the actual planning work fell to North Paci

Division and Alaska District. General Stevens' task fo

coordinated between Alaska District and headquarters. T
46 Growing Corps of Engineers Involvement

District and the Division supplied each other with such information as estimates of the number of miles of contaminated

shoreline, discussed each other's estimates, and reached a

consensus. District and Division staff continually grappled

with the question of whether the Corps could be any more

successful than Exxon given the restrictions on shoreline

cleanup. They were also concerned that the Corps might

not be able to provide adequate equipment and housing

for workers.

HQUSACE requested cost, manpower, and logistics estimates daily. The responses were "best guesses" based on

limited and sketchy information. For example, when asked

to determine how much money, manpower, or time it would

take to clear the shoreline, no one in the Coast Guard, Joint

Task Force, or Alaska District had a clear definition of "clean"

or an accurate assessment of the length of time it would take

to reach "clean." NPD and NPA relied on Exxon reports and

their own site visits for their figures and worried that officials

in Washington would represent their numbers as fact rather

than as their best guess. Colonel Kakel asked Colonel Wilson

to remind DOMS that the estimates were based on assumptions and should not be used as positive indicators of later

performance. He cautioned against reaching decisions based

on miles of shoreline, slope of beach, and work rates. 32

The requests for contingency plans occasionally frustrated

District staff, who did not understand the decisions or motives

at higher levels in the Corps or have a full picture of what

was going on. The contingency planning between mid-April

and mid-May went through three phases for Alaska District

- the original engineering plan, the engineering annex to

the JTF plan, and finally plan refinement and an analysis

of Exxon's plans and procedures. In the first phase the District

worked on the Corps' Engineer Task Force (ETF) operations

plan. The task was difficult because the District had no

reliable information on the amount of shoreline to be cleaned,

quantity of oil to be removed, exact location of oil, funding,

proven techniques for oil spill cleanup, or command and

control organization.

In phase two the focus of the planning shifted from directing the oil spill cleanup to a support role for JTF, but the

JTF did provide a mission statement to Alaska District. The
Growing Corps of Engineers Involvement 

roles of the Navy, Air Force, Army, and NPAwere not clea

defined. NPA was not sure whether JTF would get the m

sion to clean the entire spill area or just designated zo

Over time the mission was limited to designated zones 

the role was more clearly defined. The ETF Plan of Ope

tions (OpPlan) became an appendix to the JTF OpPlan

If implemented, the contingency plan would have crea

an Engineer Task Force to provide open water and shorel

cleanup in a sector of the spill area. The ETF's mission wo

have been to contain and recover spilled oil, clean oil f

the shoreline, protect sensitive areas from further dama

and restore the affected environment. The concept for ope

tion was for ETF to provide command and control, contr

administration, and coordination for shoreline and open wa

cleanup under the leadership of AK-JTF The plan provi

for extensive use of contractors and local labor and use 

military resources for specific purposes to augment the c

tractor effort as necessary. The plan included an operat

plan with a timeline for shoreline cleanup, floating oil 

covery, contracting, and research and development. It a

included plans for public affairs, service support, person

requirements, and command relationships.

Because of the time constrictions, the plan required c

plus contracts that the Corps does not normally use. C

tracts would have been negotiated on a cost plus profit ba

Under this type of contract there are no controls on the c

The contingency plan called for five large contracts : th

options for beach cleanup, one for hiring dredges, and 

for waterborne cleanup. 33

In addition to work on the OpPlan, the JTF asked 

Corps to do technical assessments of Exxon's cleanup pl

With the possibility of greater federal involvement, the J

wanted a government assessment of the effectiveness 

Exxon's approach. The JTF requested an analysis of Exx

labor required on the shoreline. In response Alaska Distr

developed a paper entitled "Shoreline Cleanup Analysi

General McInerney asked Colonel Kakel to provide h

with an assessment of effective shoreline cleanup methodo

gies. He also wanted to know what role the Corps dred

might play in this cleanup or techniques the dredges co

apply on their own. He was especially interested in knowi
48 Growing Corps of Engineers Involvement

the practicability of dumping large amounts of hot water on

the oiled shorelines. McInerney wanted all of this information tempered with what the Shoreline Priority Committee

had reviewed up to that time, and how they were making

their decisions about what shoreline cleanup methods to

allow. Colonel Kakel asked James Reese and Jake Redlinger

from NPD to respond to this tasking. North Pacific Division

submitted three sets of papers: one on the use of dredges

in shoreline cleanup, one on hot water flushing systems to

clean shoreline, and a paper on other shoreline cleanup techniques written by scientists at the Waterways Experiment

Station. 34

Although DOD never received responsibility for the cleanup and the contingency plans were not activated, Corps personnel learned from the process. After they submitted their

contingency plans, they continued to refine their estimates

as more information became available. Their estimate of miles

of contaminated shoreline was close to what the number

actually turned out to be - roughly 1,500 miles. 35

In the first weeks of April, then, the Corps searched for

ways that it could contribute to the cleanup effort. No one

knew with certainty how to equip the dredges for oil recovery

or if they could function as oil skimmers, but officials were

eager to respond to the President's call . This same desire

to respond and to be prepared for a possible expanded role

led to weeks of frenzied contingency planning. The value of

the dredges was quickly apparent, but assessing the value

that the information provided in the contingency plans had

for decision makers in the Pentagon and White House is

more difficult.
CHAPTER IV

Command and Control/Communication

One of the most significant problems in the oil clean

operations was confusion in the command and control str

ture. The problem was compounded by the remoteness, 

difficulty of communicating between all the key players, 

mixture of the civilian and military worlds and the Coa

Guard, and the high level of national attention. The con

sion sometimes hampered operations and left the public wi

the impression that nothing was being done and no one w

in charge.

The Coast Guard altered its traditional response struct

in the Alaska operation because of the immense size of 

spill and the intense presidential and media interest. N

mally the local on-scene coordinator assumed responsibil

for the cleanup. In this instance, however, the predesigna

on-scene coordinator, the commanding officer at the Mari

Safety Office in Valdez, was quickly overwhelmed by the sc

of the spill and the cleanup effort and the high-level intere

The on-scene coordinator at the time, Steve McCall, wa

commander in the Coast Guard, and officials with hig

rank outside the Coast Guard were reluctant to deal w

him. Moreover, McCall had to devote much attention to pub

and media concerns about the potential environmental a

economic impacts of the spill. To alleviate some of the pr

sure on the on-scene coordinator, Vice Admiral Clyde 

Robbins, Commander of the Pacific Area, directed that 

Commander of the Coast Guard's 17th District in Alas

Rear Admiral Edward Nelson, take charge of the operati

Robbins and Nelson were in daily communication f

24 March until 7 April. Robbins traveled to Alaska o

during this period, but he was not directly responsible 

the day-to-day operations.

At one point President Bush directed Commandant Y

to take charge in Alaska personally, but Yost did not beli
50 Command and Control/Communications

this would benefit either the Coast Guard or its constituencies. He suggested that Admiral Robbins, who had previous

oil spill experience, go to Alaska instead. After a meeting

at the White House on 7 April, Admiral Yost directed Robbins

to go to Alaska, and two days later Robbins flew to Valdez

with directions from the White House to get the spill off

the front pages of newspapers. After working with Admiral

Nelson for a week, Robbins officially assumed responsibility

as the federal on-scene coordinator on 16 April and would

remain in that post until 30 September. Nelson returned

to Juneau to resume command of the 17th Coast Guard

District.l

The function of command and control in Alaska was made

more difficult for Robbins because he had to assume a dual

role. He not only had to direct the day-to-day operations of

the cleanup, but he also had to handle a steady stream of

visiting dignitaries, representatives from the media, and

representatives from federal agencies, some of whom arrived

uninvited . Political posturing and publicity seeking at times

seriously affected operational decisions. 2

Because of the large number of state and federal agencies

involved and the complexities of the cleanup problem, the

FOSC had difficulty creating an organizational structure for

command and control . "Putting that structure together so

that you had a nice, clean flow in determining how a beach

or shore area was to be cleaned," Robbins observed, "is a

monumental task for people who have not been organized

like that before:" The Coast Guard and Defense Department

routinely wrote operations orders and followed them, but

civilian agencies had their own agendas and procedures.

Robbins' greatest challenge was to create an organization

that worked smoothly and then insure that everyone understood how that organization worked. The tendency to rotate

people every thirty days or so made it difficult to keep people

adequately trained and informed. 3

The National Contingency Plan failed to give the federal

on-scene coordinator adequate authority to direct the cleanup

operation. Robbins was frustrated by the lack of authority

and believed that it impeded operations. No matter what the

public might have perceived or wanted, the FOSC was a

"coordinator," not a "commander." He could suggest that
Command and ControllCommunications 

Exxon do something, but could not coerce Exxon. Ex

was, after all, paying the bill. If Exxon refused a request, 

only enforcement mechanism that the FOSC had was 

"federalize" the cleanup.

The FOSC had to coordinate with Exxon and with ma

federal and state agencies and create a consensus rather t

dictate to them, which was a difficult and time-consum

process. Often other agencies did not fully understand 

the National Contingency Plan operated or the FOSC's r

so Robbins had to educate them. For example, a controve

developed over the use of incinerators. The Environmen

Protection Agency labeled the waste from the spill a haza

ous substance and it had to be removed, but it could 

simply be dumped anywhere. It had to be burned or go 

a hazardous waste landfill . Operators soon decided that 

best way to dispose of the waste was to burn it, and Ex

spent $5 million to bring in two incinerators. However, s

EPA had the final authority on incineration, Robbins co

not order Exxon to burn the contaminated materials. 4

In another instance, Exxon and USCG officials were 

cerned about transporting workers to a remote island 

back to their hotel boats in bad weather. At Robbins' requ

Exxon purchased tents for a campsite on the beach. 

that point, Occupational Safety and Health Administrat

(OSHA) officials complained that the tents violated re

lations because they had no windows. Robbins pressed 

issue with the OSHA commissioner in Juneau, threaten

to go to the news media, and the commissioner relented. 

so much time had passed that the tents were never us

In any kind of operation, Robbins observed, there are 

types of people - the operator in the field who is mak

the decisions and trying to get the job done and the bur

crat back in the office. The bureaucrat wants to make 

risk" decisions, and the operator knows that there is no s

thing as a "no risk" decision if he is going to get thejob d

The bureaucrat does not have to make the fast on-the-

decisions, and yet he feels responsible and refuses to dele

that authority to the operator in the field. Robbins found s

agencies to be "very bureaucratic" and unaccustome

making quick risk decisions on a daily basis-5
52 Command and Control/Communications

Robbins often had to delay operations while he waited for

decisions to go up through agency channels. He tried to get

agencies to delegate authority to their local representatives,

but officials such as the Director of Alaska's Department of

Environmental Conservation (DEC) did not do this well . 6

The DEC on scene representative felt that he had to refer

most of his decisions to his superiors and never had any real

control over what would come out of the decision-making

process. Meanwhile, the higher level official was being pressed

by many political interests.

Robbins decided to involve local communities in the

decision-making process. Rather than making the decision

for local communities, he preferred to give them time to study

the situation and make their own recommendations. Once

they became part of the decision-making process, they could

see some of the problems and feel some of the frustration.

If they could not make a decision by the deadline that Robbins

set, then he acted.?

Another aspect of the command and control problem

involved the relationship between the Coast Guard and the

Defense Department. The President directed DOD to "assist"

DOTbut there was confusion over what this meant. Initially

some Coast Guard officials had the mistaken impression that

DOD was coming in to take over and that they would become

a "back seat player." There were heated discussions between

General Smith and Admiral Yost. Yost argued that DOD

resources should be placed under the USCG, but Smith refused to place military assets under an outside organization.

"You give the military the mission," Smith explained, "put

somebody in charge up there and give that person the mission

to work directly with the Coast Guard. But you don't pull

units out and assign them to another organization that

doesn't normally command DOD assets." When Yost realized

that DOD resources would not come under the USCG, he

relented and an "efficient" relationship evolved.$ However,

some confusion remained. General McInerney was supposed

to provide support to the Coast Guard, but what happened

if the Coast Guard did not ask for the support?

Despite the occasional confusion between the Defense

Department and the Coast Guard, Admiral Robbins had experience working with DOD in exercises and was comfortable
Command and Control/Communications 5

with the military structure and discipline. As soon as Arm

officers understood the organizational structure, Robbin

asserted, they were very cooperative. General McInerney tol

his officers that if Robbins requested something, he was th

only person who could turn Robbins down . McInerney neve

turned Robbins down . 9

Command and control and communications between th

FOSC and JTF worked well. Using the telefax and phone

Robbins received good, timely information. To promote coord

nation and communication, he maintained a watch staff o

four Coast Guard officers at Elmendorf AFB. A Coast Guar

liaison to the JTF, Commander Robert Luchen, provide

Admiral Robbins with current information on the status o

FOSC requests for equipment. Colonel Wilson in turn pro

vided logistics support to the FOSC to facilitate the move

ment of cargo. These logistics people arranged flights fro

all over the world. Wilson also placed JTF representative

on site at the combined FOSClExxon headquarters in Valde

so that they could talk directly about capabilities and clarif

requests.lo

The FOSC operations center submitted requests 

General McInerney in writing. The JTF validated them an

occasionally went back to the FOSC to insure that they wer

exactly what he wanted. The JTF preferred that the FOS

tell the JTF his requirements rather than ask for specif

resources. If General McInerney agreed that the request wa

valid and involved resources under his control, he sent it dow

the line, or if the request involved resources outside his co

trol, such as a berthing ship or dredges, he sent it on 

DOMS for action. McInerney's staff also dealt directly wit

Robbins' staff because many requirements did not have 

be handled at the three star level .

Although the relationship between the FOSC and the JT

was generally good, Robbins and McInerney did not alway

agree on the need for particular resources. For example, whe

McInerney requested some H-60 helicopters, Robbins told hi

that DOD would have to pay for them. Normally Robbin

directed Exxon to acquire certain equipment, and Exxon co

tracted with a company or organization to get it. In oth

instances, Exxon requested the FOSC to get particular equi

ment (i .e., Air Force decontamination units). In both instance
54 Command and ControUCommunications

Exxon was obligated to pay for the assets. If DOD or any

other organization provided something that Robbins had not

requested or that Exxon had not requested from Robbins,

then Robbins could not approve the request and submit it

to Exxon. If DOD or another agency sent a bill for Robbins

to forward to Exxon, and if the bill included something that

Robbins had not asked for but he honestly believed was

needed, then he directed Exxon to pay. But if organizations

provided items that Robbins specifically told them were not

needed, they were on their own. McInerney agreed to pay

for the H-60s because he believed they were important for

safety reasons. 11

Under the chain of command, decisions and directives

went from the FOSC to the JTF to DOMS, and DOMS was

the action agency that had the authority to task any of the

services for resources and to coordinate DOD operations.

Technically, General Smith was not in the direct chain of

command. He was staff for the Secretary of the Army, so in

effect General McInerney went to the Secretary of the Army

with his requests. Smith functioned as a conduit, packaging

the request and sending it to the Secretary for decision.

Generals Smith and McInerney communicated often, sometimes three or four times a day.

General Smith had clearly defined authority and with his

ready access to Secretary Cheney could get quick decisions.

As the action agent for the Secretary of the Army, he had

the authority to task all the major commands and services

directly. According to Smith, it was "a very efficient organization because the responsibility lines are very clear. I don't

have to go around and discuss whether I have the authority

to do this." Smith had the direct authority as long as the

request came to the Secretary of the Army staff.

Early in the crisis, Smith conducted a briefing in the

Army Operations Center in the Pentagon for all the leadership and all the services, and the Secretary of Defense and

his staff explained what DOMS was doing. After that DOMS

distributed daily information memorandums to other agencies and the White House.12

Confusion existed not only in the command relationship

between DOD and the Coast Guard, but within the Corps

of Engineers as well . General Stevens was named AK-JTF
Command and ControUCommunications 5

Engineer to provide Engineer advice and support to Genera

McInerney and to take his directions from the AK-JT

Stevens in turn designated Alaska District Engineer Colone

Kakel to fill this role, and Kakel personally attended th

Joint Task Force meetings every morning for two months

Operating under a JTF in a peacetime emergency operatio

was unusual for the Corps. Ordinarily in an emergency, suc

as a flood, the Corps has authority to mobilize and act o

its own. The Alaska operations were more like a wartim

organization with Kakel answering to the commander of 

special joint task force.

The official chain of command then went from the FOS

to AK-JTF to DOMS to Alaska District. If McInerney aske

Kakel for a resource that he did not have (e.g. laborator

assistance or dredges), Kakel forwarded the request to Nort

Pacific Division and the Division either furnished it or sen

the request on to HQUSACE. Colonel Kakel and his staf

believed their mission was to assist in the cleanup as muc

as possible. Kakel's directive from headquarters was to ge

in the game and make Alaska District "players." Official

in headquarters sometimes pressured District staff to d

things that they might not have done on their own becaus

they were sensitive to angering the people they worked wit

in the field. Kakel tried to be as diplomatic as possible, skil

fully balancing the pressure he and his staff were under t

make things happen with the need to maintain the coopera

tion of the Coast Guard. 13

In effect, the Corps had two lines of command and con

trol, which at times caused conflicts. General Kelly, as Direc

tor of Civil Works, supported the AK-JTF commander and

as part of the DOMS task force, advised the Secretary of th

Army. Colonel Kakel had two bosses: AK-JTF (McInerney

and HQUSACE (Kelly). On some issues, such as shoreli

cleanup, Kakel gave General McInerney a different opini

than the one Kelly expressed to DOMS. As JTF Engineer

Kakel might suggest to McInerney that a particular resour

was not needed, and McInerney would report that to DOM

The DOMS task force, on the other hand, concerned wit

showing the flag, might disagree over the assessment. Kake

was now in conflict with Kelly, who represented the Cor

on the DOMS task force and viewed the matter from a DOM
Corps ofEngineers officers Brigadier General Patrick Stevens (left), Brigadier

General Patrick Kelly (center), and Colonel William Kakel (right) .

perspective. General Stevens sometimes found himself caught

in the middle. General Kelly was constantly concerned that

the Corps be prepared to assume a larger role in the cleanup

in case Exxon's response was inadequate. He appreciated

Kakel's difficulties and later observed that Colonel Kakel

handled the awkward situation "superbly." 14

Although Kakel and his staff officially worked for the

JTF, they continued to receive taskings from North Pacific

Division and Corps headquarters. General Kelly requested

information from North Pacific Division and Alaska District

in order to fulfill his staff role for the Secretary of the Army.

Field personnel, particularly the staff of Alaska District's

EOC, were confused about where the taskings were coming

from and had difficulty establishing clear priorities. 15

Confusion also characterized the command and control

structure for directing the dredges in the actual oil recovery

operations. Dredge crews had difficulty determining who was

in charge, for whom they worked, and who controlled their

efforts . Normally, the dredges belonged to Portland District

for administrative and logistical purposes but were under the
Command and Control/Communications 

operational control of the Civil Works Directorate, whi

determined their priorities and programs. When the Direct

of Civil Works sends dredges to a District, their operatio

are the District's responsibility. Thus, when they reach

Alaska they came under the operational control of Colon

Kakel. Yet some confusion existed initially about who co

trolled the dredges. Colonel Kakel correctly maintained th

the dredges came under his control when they enter

Alaskan waters, but Portland District Engineer Colon

Cowan took a different view. When Captain Brice arriv

in Alaska, he was unsure whether the dredges worked f

Alaska District, Portland District, or the Coast Guard.

Colonel Kakel insisted that an officer be on board ea

vessel to serve as liaison between the dredge and the nume

ous organizations involved and to relieve the crew of reporti

requirements and other details so it could concentrate sole

on the operation of the dredge. 16

Exxon and the Coast Guard placed representatives 

board the dredges, and the dredge crews took orders fr

both. Much seemed to depend on the strength of the perso

alities of these representatives and the Corps personnel. So

Coast Guard officials were aggressive about making decisio

and taking action; others were more passive. Sometimes t

Exxon representative gave the crew direction; sometimes t

Coast Guard representative did; and sometimes neither d

Coast Guard and Exxon representatives and Corps personn

usually decided together what to do, but the chain of co

mand was never refined. It was never clear who ran t

dredges.

In one instance a dredge was near a bay on its way 

Seward. Enroute there were several small bays where the 

had been collected in booms. The Coast Guard personnel 

site told the dredge to pick up the oil, but Coast Guard of

cials in Anchorage became upset when they found out. T

confusion was compounded initially by the fact that t

Coast Guard Marine Safety Offices (Anchorage and Valde

gave directions, but on 17 April, the day after he took charg

Robbins changed the organization, placing all the clean

activities directly under his control in Valdez.

Much of the time the dredges functioned on their own 

independent task groups, organizing fishing vessels to p
58 Command and Control/Communications

boom, working with aircraft to spot oil, and sending out

the Corps' launch to track oil. When neither Exxon nor

Coast Guard representatives were on board, the dredges made

their own decisions. Captain Brice and others on the dredges

quickly created a role for themselves by providing command

and control for fishing vessels in the area where the dredges

were working. Fishing vessels gravitated to the dredges not

only for the hot showers and meals but for direction. The

fishing vessels were eager to stay with the dredges when the

dredges were successfully locating and recovering oil. 17

Robbins conceded that at times the great distances hampered command and control. Having the dredges direct their

own operations, he said, "is probably the best way to do it:"

His first concern was that the dredges be in the oil as much

as possible. Robbins recommended that in the future operators

put a landing pad on the dredges, assign them a small helicopter, and equip them with boom and skimmers so that they

can conduct their own operations. He maintained that operators in Valdez would not be as effective as on-site crews in

running oil removal. 18

Dredge crews found that Exxon and the Coast Guard were

not organized well enough for such a large operation. Exxon

had people in charge who did not know how to handle fishing

vessels and did not have a readily available communications

system. When the Corps arrived, operators were relying on

Marine Band radio to communicate with the fishing vessels.

Initially, the cleanup operation was very disorganized with

some boats not doing anything and some boats going to the

wrong locations.

The dredge crews complained about delays and imprecise

instructions. The dredges were not used as constructively as

possible. In some instances the crew would hurry to some loca

tion fifteen miles away only to find the oil gone. Because of

the urgency, the emphasis was on getting the dredges to

Alaska, not on establishing effective command and control.

In future emergencies, Captain Brice cautioned, the Corps

must clarify the command and control structure early on and

establish who directs the dredges. 19

While the dredge crews struggled to sort out the confusion,

command and control problems surfaced within HQUSACE.

Under current standard operating procedures, when the
Command and ControllCommunications 

Emergency Operations Center in HQUSACE is activated

becomes a staff level organization and receives the author

to task other functional elements in headquarters with

going through the established chain of command. The E

becomes the conduit for all taskings and information to ot

elements within the command. A crisis management te

with representatives from various functional elements 

headquarters is activated to handle the requests for in

mation and the taskings.

During the oil spill response, however, the EOC did 

operate according to standard procedure. Officials establis

a special task force to develop a plan for a DOD response 

the spill, but they did not activate the crisis manageme

team. General Kelly and John Elmore issued requests 

information and directives for action directly to other fu

tional elements. Responses sometimes came back to the E

and sometimes went directly to Kelly or Elmore. At ti

Elmore personally ran the EOC operations. He and Gene

Kelly attended high-level interagency meetings, and so

times neglected to provide adequate feedback on what tr

spired at those meetings. Thus, Robert Fletcher, Chiefof 

Readiness Branch, who was responsible for the day-to-

operations of the EOC, had difficulty executing his traditi

responsibility as the single point of contact for headquart

concerning emergency operations. 2o

Readiness Branch personnel usually represent the Co

at National Response Team (NRT) meetings, but the Co

had no formal representative on the NRT at the Coast Gu

Response Center. Fletcher, however, sent one of his staf

Coast Guard reserve officer, Michael Hartley, to functio

an unofficial liaison in the Coast Guard Command Cen

Kelly and Elmore might well have been so consu

by the intensity of the operation that they overlooked 

emergency management staffs need for more informat

They might also have felt that the Readiness Branch wo

only respond within its traditional scope, within exis

plans and procedures, when new initiatives were nee

Centralized management of the operation may have b

necessary in part because of the heavy media attention. M

agencies were directing the effort from the national l

Fletcher, however, recommended that in the future the se
60 Command and Control/Communications

officials either take along operational people or provide better

feedback on what transpired at their interagency meetings.21

In addition to the confusion in command and control at

almost every level of the cleanup operation, there was the

problem of providing and maintaining adequate communications in a remote, harsh environment. Radio operators had

to work through repeaters to relay information and had to

place retransmittal stations on top of mountains to communicate from Valdez out into Prince William Sound or into

the Gulf of Alaska. Operators learned that they had to be

flexible and willing to adapt the technology at hand and use

every resource available. 22

To improve communications, Exxon, state, and federal

officials adopted a computer system designed to help wartime

military commanders deploy troops, aircraft, and armor in

battle. The Alaskan Command and Control Military Automated Network (ACCMAN), which was based on 120 Apple

MacIntosh II computers installed several months before the

spill, served as the primary means of coordinating the military's response to the oil spill. As DOD units became increasingly involved in assisting in the cleanup, the Alaska Air

Command (AAC) adapted its ACCMAN system to the oil spill

and developed the Oil Spill Computer Aided Response program (OSCAR) for channeling information about the cleanup effort.

The AAC installed OSCAR in the Exxon headquarters

in Valdez and set up a central command and control facility

at ElmendorfAir Force Base. With the graphics capabilities

of the MacIntosh computers interconnected by the OSCAR

network, DOD could send information almost instantly. Military and Exxon computer programmers entered the location

of environmentally sensitive areas, bird rookeries, hatcheries,

monitoring stations, and oiled beaches, as well as statistics

which showed the number of barrels still at sea and the

number recovered. Next they put in the location of the skimmers, fishing vessels, and cleanup crews.

The Alaska Air Command used the OSCAR system to

give morning briefings to General McInerney. McInerney and

senior staff sat in a darkened secure room, the "command

bridge;" around a huge computer screen while an operator

projected information from the system on a screen: assets
Command and Control/Communications 

deployed, weather, daily oil recovery. The AAC relayed th

data to a MacIntosh in the Pentagon that served as a foc

point for coordinating support from Washington.

The Anchorage Daily News called the system "one of t

more tangible results of President Bush's decision to empl

the military in the cleanup" Anyone from a crew membe

on a Coast Guard cutter in Prince William Sound to an Exx

official in Houston or a general in the Pentagon could u

OSCAR to pull up the latest information on the location 

the oil and the status of the cleanup. It provided timely info

mation on oil spill activities and allowed operators to tra

the large number of vessels involved. The system gave USC

and Exxon operation centers current information (at t

minute intervals) that included maps and graphic displa

of affected areas, and locations of oil booms, cleaning crew

wildlife areas, and hatcheries. By late April over three hu

dred vessels were being tracked by OSCAR. 23

Early in the response, Colonel Kakel discovered that t

Alaska Air Command had three computer systems to coord

nate the AK-JIrF effort, two of them running only on an App

MacIntosh. Kakel directed that the District link into t

system, and the District installed a MacIntosh to commun

cate with the AK-JTF. The computer provided the Distri

with access to JTF maps, chain of command charts, a

weather reports.

Briefing slides generated at the JTF were hand-carri

on a floppy disc to Alaska District where they were load

on the MacIntosh and presented during the EOCs briefin

OSCAR provided mail, taskings, and daily log informatio

District staff could enter the coordinates of any location 

Alaska into the computer and the computer would provi

a full color map of the area. It could also display the ar

where the dredges were working and change the dredge lo

tion. OSCAR allowed the District to track all the vessels a

determine where they were, what they were doing, and w

they were working with.

HQUSACE EOC used a MacIntosh II and a 9600 mod

to access OSCAR, so it could maintain current data on t

oil spill in the form of data and graphics, an incident l

taskers, and maps which indicated the current location of t

spill. An electronic mail feature allowed EOC to communica

with other OSCAR users.
62 Command and Control/Communications

Although the computer system provided a valuable communications link, it was only as accurate as the information

it received. Bill Lamoreaux of the Alaska State Department

of Environmental Conservation charged that in the first

weeks Exxon officials in Valdez provided inaccurate information. They reported several skimmers working in Resurrection Bay, but when the department flew out, it could not

find them. 24

In addition to computers, decision makers relied on video

teleconferences to improve communications. When General

McInerney became the Defense Senior Representative, he

quickly contracted with a local television station in Anchorage to get a direct line into his headquarters and tied it to

the existing video teleconference facility in the Army Operations Center (AOC) at the Pentagon. On 14 April the link

was complete, and in the first video teleconference General

McInerney provided Secretary Marsh with his assessment

of DOD support to the cleanup effort. This was the first time

that Pentagon officials used video teleconference capability

to coordinate an ongoing operation in the field. 25

At critical stages in the cleanup operations, video teleconferences occurred once or twice a week. On a number of

occasions when there was great political interest in a par

ticular action or decision, General Smith set up video teleconferences between Secretary Marsh, Richard Breeden,

senior Coast Guard representatives, and senior Transportation Department officials in the AOC and General McInerney

and his staff in Alaska. At times the participants were limited

to Marsh, Smith, and one or two others with McInerney on

the other end, and they candidly discussed what they would

recommend to Secretary Cheney. After a video teleconference,

Marsh and Smith could walk down the hall and quickly lay

out for Secretary Cheney the information they had just received from General McInerney. The capability simplified and

accelerated the decision-making process.

In addition to expediting the decision-making process,

Colonel Wilson observed that the video teleconferences

greatly improved the quality of communication. Looking at

someone rather than just hearing his voice gave participants

a better feel for the person's credibility. Video teleconferencing

was not a new technology but it had not been widely accepted
Command and ControllCommunications 

or widely used before the oil spill. Wilson believed the Alas

experience demonstrated how effective it could be in t

decision-making process. 26

Despite OSCAR and the teleconferences, the Corps 

Engineers continued to face communications problems. Ge

eral Stevens decided early that reporting would be done fr

Alaska District's EOC rather than North Pacific Divisio

with simultaneous reports going to the Division and hea

quarters. As the reports came in, District staff was suppos

to send them to Portland and Washington via ONTYME, 

electronic mail system, but sometimes they could not se

information to the headquarters EOC on this system becau

no one there knew how to get the information off ONTYM

So the District EOC had to fax documents - a very tim

consuming process. Alaska District's EOC was "severely ove

burdened" by the necessity to use different methods of co

munication to forward its pollution reports to headquarter

AK-JTF, the Division, and Seattle District. 27

No one in headquarters or in Alaska District apparent

considered whether every office on the distribution list act

ally needed copies of each of the six or seven reports generat

each day. The EOC simply tried to get out as much inform

tion as it could. Initially, it took Regional Response Tea

reports and others, digested them, and incorporated them 

its own Pollution Report -a cumbersome undertaking Lat

the EOC simply attached the entire RRT report to its poll

tion report. Offices interested in this report couldhave gott

it quickly on computer. One District official observed th

there were too many reports and misinformation was pass

from one report to another. There were RRT reports, Exx

reports, Alaska District pollution reports, Coast Guard 

ports, JTF reports, EOC situation reports, and all the

reports came from the same basic sources. If the District d

not have anything to write beyond what it had collected fr

the other reports, Kirk Shadrick concluded, then it shou

not write anything. 28

In addition to keeping NPD and HQUSACE informe

NPA also had to maintain communications with the dredg

When the spill occurred, Alaska District's information ma

agement personnel had already begun installing a 1,000-wat

high frequency, single side band (SSB) radio transmitter 
64 Command and Control/Communications

the EOC. A radio control unit installed in the EOC and a

transmitter installed in a converted semi-trailer parked in

the District's storage yard interfaced with a computer. Signals

from the EOC bounced off the ionosphere to get to Prince

William Sound. Because of solar activity there were several

times when the District could not communicate with the

dredges. Communication was difficult when weather was poor

or when dredges were in sheltered coves.

The Yaquina was equipped with SSB, UHF, VHF, and

bridge-to-bridge communication. The Essayons had one SSB

radio on board that worked . When Coast Guard and Exxon

representatives were on board, eleven reports had to be transmitted (four Corps, four Coast Guard, and three Exxon). The

radio was also used for contact and coordination with fishing

boats.

Initially Alaska District had four radio checks a day for

the dredges, and later two. The dredges called up at the

designated times and provided the information the Coast

Guard required, such as weather, location, how much fuel

they had used, future plans, and master's concerns. The

District EOC sent the dredge reports directly to the Coast

Guard's Anchorage and Valdez Marine Safety Offices. Later

it transmitted the information directly to the JTF through

OSCAR. 29

Command and control and communication remained

serious problems throughout the operation. The FOSC never

had adequate authority to direct the response. There were

too many agencies involved in the decision-making process

and too many competing interests. In addition, there was

confusion in the Coast Guard's relationship with the Defense

Department and within the Defense Department itself, which

filtered down to the operators in the field. =Using new technology, officials improved communications, but the command

and control problems persisted.
CHAPTER V

Corps Dredge Operations

In addition to the overall problems of command and co

trol and communication, the Corps of Engineers faced oper

tional problems in the dredge oil recovery activities. Alas

District staff had difficulty providing logistical support to t

dredges while they operated in remote areas of the Gulf 

Alaska and Prince William Sound. Even more significa

were the problems that the dredge crews faced in locati

significant amounts of oil, collecting oil off the water, acc

rately measuring the amount of recovered oil, and removi

the oil from the dredge hoppers.

Political sensitivities sometimes prevented the dredg

from coming to port, so crew changes, VIP visits, and t

delivery of supplies were conducted in unprotected waters v

float plane, thus exposing Corps personnel to increased ris

Sudden relocations of the dredges forced Alaska District st

to devise logistical support plans for each resupply operati

In normal operations, crews changed weekly with a co

plete rotation of the crew on the Essayons every Tuesday a

on the Yaquina every Thursday. For the Alaska operatio

however, the crews elected to work on a two-week rotati

schedule (as they do in overseas operations) to minimize the

transportation costs.

The first crew change in Alaska was one of the mo

innovative, challenging, and dramatic that the Corps had ev

conducted. When the Yaquina arrived in Alaskan waters, t

crew's two-week tour was ending and they were due for 

change. Crew changes were normally done while a dred

was in port, but General McInerney ordered the dredge 

bypass port and go directly to work. 1

The decision to send the dredge directly to work w

prompted by both operational requirements and public re

tions concerns. The surface oil was dissipating rapidly, a

it was important to get the dredge into the field as quick
66 Corps Dredge Operations

as possible. Moreover, it did not look good to have the dredge

go all the way to Alaska and then go into port. On leaving

Anchorage, John Elmore had instructed the District to "hit

the beaches running." A Soviet skimmer had just arrived in

Alaska and officials in HQUSACE and in the Pentagon were

anxious that the Corps dredges reach the oil first. "There

is no doubt that our, mission was to get there before the

Russians did," Colonel Kakel explained. 2

Alaska District quickly developed new plans and procedures to conduct the crew change at sea. The replacement

crew for the Yaquina arrived from Portland and went from

the Anchorage airport to the District office where Colonel

Kakel briefed them. The next morning they boarded a one-car

train that the District had chartered for the 65-mile, threehour trip to Whittier. There is no road from Anchorage to

Whittier. In addition to the crew, the train carried provisions,

baggage, District officials, and Charles Hummer. On 20 April

two float planes, which Alaska District chartered out of

Cordova, flew to Whittier and shuttled the crew back and

forth to the dredge, which was working three hours away near

Perry Island.

The process took most of the day because the float plane

could ferry only four to six men at a time. Meanwhile, two

fishing boats rented by District staff' transported supplies to

the dredge. Although not coming into port for the first crew

change created what one official called a "logistical nightmare," it was also beneficial because the crew was in the

process of developing a technique to recover the oil and its

work could continue uninterrupted.3

Gradually a firm procedure for conducting crew changes

evolved. Corps personnel first located a town where the dredge

could connect with the new crew, and then got approval

through the AK-JTF, Exxon, and the Coast Guard to let the

dredge take half a day to run to one of these towns for a crew

change. Initially Joint Task Force and Coast Guard officials

resisted this interruption, but they came to understand the

necessity. After that the only problems involved logistics

and transportation.

The procedure varied only slightly depending on the

location. Corps personnel used several towns for crew changes

-Homer, Seward, and Whittier once. Alaska District rented
Corps Dredge Operations 

a Greyhound bus to transport the crew to Seward. The 

waited while one crew went on board and exchanged i

mation with the other, and then it returned to Anchor

with the old crew. The bus usually pulled into Anchor

about 7:00 PM. and some of the crew flew out on the 

eye special:" Others left the next day. When the crew cha

was in Homer, NPA chartered a plane to shuttle crews 

and forth.

A major resupply occurred every two weeks with the 

change. Alaska District staff' arranged for groceries and o

supplies to be available on a certain date and then 

the District's vans or a flatbed truck to run the supp

from Anchorage to the location of the crew change. Betw

crew changes, District staff sent emergency goods via 

plane. 4

Logistical support to the dredges in the oil spill op

tions was further complicated by changes in the comm

structure. Officially, the dredges were under the operati

control of the Alaska Joint Task Force. As the enginee

agency of the AK-JTF, Alaska District became respons

for supporting the dredges. Thus the established sup

relationship between the dredge and the owning Dis

(Portland) was severed and replaced with a system unfami

to both organizations. Alaska District did not have the or

ization and staff necessary to handle the volume and var

of requirements for supporting the dredges. Nor did it 

experience with this type of work . Moreover, the dre

changed location constantly. "The most significant revel

of this exercise," Alaska District staff conceded, "was 

we did not have a well-thought-out plan on how to equi

dredges or keep them supplied during remote operatio

Although Portland District sent personnel to augment Al

District's staff, the difficulties continued.

While Alaska District grappled with the problem of 

viding logistical support, the dredge crews struggled to l

and recover oil. By the time the dredges arrived on s

the oil had dispersed throughout Prince William Sound 

the Gulf of Alaska to such an extent that locating and 

taining it was a significant problem. Oil on the water 

very difficult to spot from the surface. People on the fi

vessels and dredges had to be in the oil in order to s
68 Corps Dredge Operations

Because of the vast distances and the difficulty in spotting

oil from the surface, it was essential to employ aircraft that

could fly at speeds low enough so spotters could distinguish

oil from other floating debris. Yet there were never enough

aircraft available, and low cloud cover and severe weather

conditions often made aerial reconnaissance impossible. Also,

the aircraft and the vessels they supported were often on different radio frequencies so that communications were impaired or nonexistent.

In early April, Exxon provided morning and evening

overflights through Prince William Sound and along the slick

past Seward to the leading edge of the spill. Exxon aircraft

had infrared capability to verify the presence of the oil . A

Coast Guard airplane also conducted overflights twice daily

to track the movement of the slick down the coast. The

Essayons had a helicopter pad, which it could have used to

provide aerial reconnaissance, but it was not operational . The

crew was not certified, nor did the dredge have the qualified

personnel on board to operate the landing pad: helicopter ofl"icer, flight deck officer, landing officer, and mate on watch.

There was reluctance to bring in trained non-Corps personnel

to man the pad.

Infrequent air support meant that the collection equipment was often in the wrong place. Dredge crews often hurried to locations only to find that the "oil" was not oil. They

were frustrated by the days without oil recovery assignments.

As the weeks passed it became increasingly difficult to find

significant amounts of oil on the water surface.

After locating the oil, cleanup workers faced the problem

of collecting this thick, sticky substance. The weathering of

crude oil in cold climates involves a number of physical,

chemical, and biological processes including evaporation,

dissolution into the water, dispersion, and emulsification. In

the first few days after oil is spilled, the lighter components

of the oil rapidly evaporate, the volume of the spill decreases,

and the physical and chemical properties of the oil change.

The amount and rate of evaporation decreases with time as

the lighter components diminish, leaving only the heavier,

less volatile components. With Prudhoe Bay crude oil, approximately 23 percent of the content is a relatively light component (i .e., octanes, benzene) that evaporates quickly. Most
Corps Dredge Operations 6

of this component is gone within one to two days, and th

evaporation process is essentially complete in five days.

In a high wave energy area, roughly twenty-four hour

after an oil spill, depending on temperature and wave action

the oil and seawater emulsify, forming a highly viscous ma

terial called "mousse" that contains roughly 70 percent wate

and exhibits properties very different from the original oi

This very sticky material adheres to almost all objects it en

counters (i .e., rocks, ships, birds, sea otters). Mousse develope

during many major tanker spills, including the Amoco Cadiz

The time it takes for mousse to form is a function of the typ

of oil spilled. In the Amoco Cadiz spill, mousse formed quickl

- soon after leaving the ship. Experience has shown tha

conventional spill response equipment is not very effectiv

with mousse.?

The dredge crews developed two reasonably effectiv

methods for collecting the surface oil. Either the crews use

the dragheads and dredge pumps to suck up oil that smalle

vessels had collected inside the booms, called "donuts;" or the

strung boom between the dredge and one or two suppor

vessels and slowly sailed through the large concentration o

oil, funneling the oil toward the dragheads to be drawn up

The best configuration was to have two booms, one on eac

side of the dredge with associated crafts. The vessel coul

theoretically make a swath of four hundred feet, perhaps mor

if workers attached additional boom. They were limited b

the strength of the booms, their heights and stability wit

respect to speed, and the horsepower of the associated craf

Towing the booms was a slow process. The booms con

tained many parts (air bags, metal struts, 36-inch facing, an

nuts and bolts) that required a great deal of maintenance

Unlike simple containment boom that can be patched easily

these booms required special parts and trained personnel fo

repairs. Air-filled sacks held the booms upright; each sac

had a square bag on the end to act as a weight that prevente

the bag from going vertical. When towing, the air bags wer

perpendicular to the booms, and the combined resistanc

when towing fifty to sixty air bags "significantly slowe

the boats:'$ In addition, the dredge could tow the heav

booms no faster than four knots or the booms would flip ove

The dredge had difficulty going slow enough to work wit
70 Corps Dredge Operations

smaller vessels in skimming operations. The Yaquina had

no space to carry the booms on board, so the crew used the

craft towing the booms to load each ninety-pound section, a

few bags at a time, across its stern. They righted each bag

manually. This arduous work required four people.

The crew quickly discovered that the 36-inch booms they

brought were too small and flimsy to hold the oil in the

choppy waters of Prince William Sound and the Gulf of

Alaska. The 84-inch roll booms (Swedish booms) worked best.

Booms with bridle around them did not work because the

bridle would catch in the dragarm. The Yaquina crew contended that if they had been assigned the proper booms

permanently, with a craft capable of maintaining them, they

could have recovered 20 percent more oil. 9

The thickness of the oil and the fact that it contained kelp

and debris made the task more difficult. The original plan

had been to pump oil out of small skimmers, but the actual

work evolved differently. The centrifugal and concrete pumps

that the dredges brought proved to be ineffective at loading

the thick product.

In normal operations, dragheads are drawn across the

channel bottom with the dredge pumps creating a vacuum

which discharges a slurry mixture of sand and water into

the dredge hopper. The hopper contents are later emptied

through bottom gates or doors. The crews modified the

dredges in order to recover oil. They inverted the dragheads

and constructed a cage around the dragheads to prevent

booms and debris from being sucked into the dragarm. The

inverted draghead proved to be the best readily available

configuration that did not require extensive structural modification. Bolt holes on the draghead did not match up in that

configuration so the crew turned the dragarm 180 degrees

at the swivel point in the center of the arm. This made

it impossible to reconnect the dragarm wire, so the crew

wrapped straps of heavy wire around the pipe and attached

a shackle. Using this procedure, it was possible to maneuver

the dragarm as usual.

After this technique proved successful, the crew refined

it . The crew discovered that effective use of the new system

required at least five people : a ship handler to control the

vessel alongside the boom; a dragarm/pumpman to control
The crew lowered the draghead into the water and th

raised it to within a few feet of the surface and turned 

the pumps to full capacity. Then the dragtender raised t

head slowly until the oil moved into it. The proper placi

of the draghead was the most critical part of the on-loadi

process. If the draghead came above the surface and pump

air, it lost prime ; if it was too far below the surface, too mu

water went into the hopper.

The Essayons tended to work in open water with rough

seas while the smaller Yaquina operated in more protect

areas. The Essayons started work at Gore Rock and mov

as far north as Resurrection Bay and as far south as Sutwi

Island in Shelikof Strait west of Kodiak Island, primari

along the Alaskan Peninsula. The Yaquina began wo

around Knight Island in Prince William Sound . As diffic

as sucking oil into the dredges was in heavy seas, on 8 M

the Essayons pulled in 200 barrels in five-foot waves. T

International Dredging Review observed: "Corps dredge cr

members are among the heros of the cleanup effort. Th

overcame the frustration of equipment that would not wo

and found a way to make it do the job . . . the Corps hopp

dredges Essayons and Yaquina, along with the Russi

dredge, are the most effective cleanup devices on the site, a

their crews are doing an outstanding job:' 11

A Portland District photographer, Billy Johnson, board

the Essayons to make a video of the dragarms in operati

The Alaska Oil Spill MultiAgency Coordination group 

Seward watched video footage of the Essayons' inverted dr

head in operation, and after seeing the footage, some me

bers of the group dubbed the dredge "mega-sucker." The vi

was flown to Washington where President Bush viewed 

Later United States Park Service spokesman John Quinl
72 Corps Dredge Operations

told the media that the Corps dredge "has proved to be one

of the most effective machines" in the oil recovery operations.

By 27 April the two dredges had collected 3,271 barrels of

oil, representing 36 percent of the oil collected since their

arrival. By 10 May they had collected 5,016 barrels. 12

The Yaquina crew recommended a new design for the

dragheads with smooth features rather than angular lines,

oil boom preventers, consistent 360 degrees draw of material,

and removable quick cleanout grates. They suggested using

lightweight plastic for construction material. 13

The Corps dredges were clearly the most successful oil

recovery vessels in Alaska. The Vaydaghubsky was configured

somewhat like the dredges, but it was equipped with its own

boom which it deployed from its hull . A cross beam attached

to the end of the boom allowed the vessel to hold its own boom

rather than have fishing vessels pull it. The huge skimmer

can create a catch width of sixty meters when the booms are

fully extended. The oil accumulating inside the boom is

transferred on board the vessel by two free-floating type

FRAMO oil skimmers which collect an aggregate rating of

800 cubic meters an hour. Oil can be stored in the hopper

or in four multipurpose tanks. Water settling from the recovered oil and water mixture is pumped back to the sea

through a 300 cubic meter an hour separator that draws the

remaining oil from the water before letting it overboard. 14

Although the Soviet skimmer had been tested in the field,

this was its first major oil spill. Initially Coast Guard and

Exxon officials considered the costly Soviet skimmer the best

hope for cleaning up oil on the high seas, but it did not meet

those expectations. By the time it arrived, the oil had either

dissipated or become too viscous for the skimmer to pick it

up. The ship spent much of its time chasing small patches

of oil in the Gulf of Alaska and in Shelikof Strait . Its pumps

continued to choke on the thick, debris-laden oil, and cleanup

officials appealed to the Corps. Late one night Colonel Kakel

received a call from Captain Rainey at the Coast Guard

Marine Safety Office in Valdez asking the Corps to help

the skimmer. In response, the Yaquina's captain offered the

skimmer advice about on-loading techniques, and the skimmer made some modifications. The skimmer, however, was

designed in such a way that operators could not unbolt the

draghead and invert it as the dredges had done. 15
Corps Dredge Operations 

In addition, the operations of the Vaydaghubsky we

significantly curtailed by severe weather and the lack 

aerial reconnaissance. The presence of the skimmer crea

some tension. There was a tendency to compare the perf

mance of the Soviet skimmer with the Corps dredges ev

though the vessels functioned differently and had differ

opportunities for oil collection. White House, State Depa

ment, and Coast Guard officials were anxious that the sk

mer be successful. Yet Colonel Kakel, his staff, and the dred

crews felt pressure from senior officials in the Pentagon a

HQUSACE to perform better than the Russians. Althou

he was placed in an awkward position, Colonel Kakel c

tinued to downplay the competitive aspect and to encoura

his staff' to function as "team players." Dredge crews felt t

they were held back at times so that the Russians co

collect oil, but Coast Guard officials denied this. 16

After the dredge crews loaded the oil, they faced 

another problem: how to measure and report the amount 

oil recovered accurately. The oil mixture contained a gr

deal of water and, as time passed, the oil and water in 

hoppers separated and the amount off=loaded would be l

than what was previously reported as stored in the hopp

The Corps calculated the oil off=loaded from the dredges 

measuring the difference between oil in the hoppers bef

and after the oil transfer. Exxon, however, based its figu

for off=loaded oil on the total liquid pumped into stor

barges and did not include the debris and water with the 

Dredge crews began letting the oil settle in the hopp

before measuring it to permit the oil and water to separa

Headquarters, however, pressured the crews to turn in bar

counts quickly before the oil and water mixture had had t

enough to decant. Speculative figures became etched in st

The crews simply tried to provide the most accurate figu

possible. 17

The crew based their initial calculations of oil spoils 

the hoppers of the Yaquina on the assumptions that the 

had a consistent viscosity and that water separated from 

spoils in a "reasonable" time. The crew developed spec

techniques for measuring the ever changing mixture in th

hoppers. Initially the crew used a procedure that was mu

like putting a dip stick in the oil tank of a car. They measu
74 Corps Dredge Operations

the mixture in the hoppers by pushing a metal tape coated

with water-sensing paste through the oil. This method failed

because water in the spoils activated the tape prematurely.

The oil soon became too thick for the tape to penetrate,

so the crew began to lower a weight into the hopper to determine the boundary between the oil and water layers. This

method was not very effective because the densities were

not consistent and separation did not occur within a reasonable time. The crew discovered that the material was hardening not only on the surface layer, which was expected, but

throughout the mixture. Results of additional tests and new

measurements confirmed that the oil and water were still

separating and the mixture was hardening and condensing

in volume over time. They also confirmed that earlier measurements were inaccurate because they did not allow enough

time for the oil and water to separate.

Captain Jimenez observed that to get an accurate measurement, operators must use a consistent methodology and

give the material enough time to separate. Also, the larger

the volume of spoils, the faster that volume will shrink; the

longer the spoils are left in the hopper, the harder it will

be to remove them. Jimenez recommended that the material

be left in the hopper no longer than forty-eight hours and be

agitated or broken up occasionally to prevent block solidification, and that water be introduced into the spoils before

discharging Also, by lowering the spoils below the center line

separator, the product was forced to flow and break up. Water

should be added at this time.l 8

After the oil in the hopper was measured, there were

problems and discrepancies in reporting the quantities of

skimmed oil. Initially, quantities of oil were reported at

different times of the day because reporting times differed

for various chains of command. This problem was later resolved by establishing a standard time (3:00 PM.) for all

reporting. The Corps itself had problems coming up with

accurate figures. For example, on 28 and 29 April there were

large discrepancies in the amount of oil product reported as

remaining in the hopper. On 28 April the Yaquina reported

805 barrels and on the 29th it reported 53 barrels. Investigation revealed that the Yaquina and the Alaska District

EOC were using different methods to account for the oil
Corps Dredge Operations 

product remaining in the hopper at the end of each report

period. The problem was eliminated by modifying the E

system to conform to the Yaquina system.l 9

The Yaquina crew recommended the development o

daily form for reporting which included reporting time, to

amount of product carried, vessel location, vessels on-load

and off-loading, and amount discharged. They also sugges

that reporting be done in the evening prior to off-loadin

Even more challenging than loading and measuring 

oil was the task of removing the oil from the dredge hoppe

The process of off-loading the heavy oil mixed with seawe

kelp, and debris in both Prince William Sound and west

Alaska was slow and difficult. The plan was to pump 

collected oil from the dredge hoppers into Exxon barges. Ov

time, however, the weathered oil in the hopper changed fr

a viscous liquid to a substance the consistency of tar, a

grease, or asphalt .

Operators in Alaska tried using various pumping syst

to move the mixture: Super Vac (a vane driven air mov

designed to move grain and modified for this operatio

Super Sucker (a high volume air conveyor), HydeVac 

air mover used in moving fish), archimedes screw-dri

pumps (includes GT-185, DESMI 250, DESMI 250A), a

the VacAll (both truck and portable units similar to Su

Sucker but with lower volume). The systems that Exxon p

vided worked but they were very slow because ofthe thickn

and debris in the oil . For example, in an eight-hour per

the HydeVac pumped about 4,200 gallons (or 100 barre

of oil out of the Yaquina's 180,000-gallon hopper. Dredge cr

simply did not have the right equipment for off-loading 

viscous mixture.

Captain Jimenez and his crew eventually discovered t

the Vac-UVator, a system sometimes used to throw chips 

sawdust piles, was the most effective pump for discharg

the oil mixture. Initially no one knew how to use it, so t

had to rely on the Super Vac, a truck type system used 

vacuum out sewage tanks. Super Vac's biggest drawback w

its discharge rate. The truck filled quickly, and the crew h

to stop operations to empty it. The truck's contents w

discharged from an opening in back through a hose int

hole in the barge. The opening would clog with oil, t
76 Corps Dredge Operations

slowing the discharge rate. The Yaquina crew increased the

discharge rate 20 percent by constructing a large rectangular

box around the hatch opening that allowed the truck to open

its back and, like a dump truck, empty its load quickly. Exxon

adopted the same technique on other barges. The Vac-UVator

was a smaller machine, half the size of the Super Vac truck,

but it functioned constantly so the crew never had to stop.

Also, it did not require a source of air because it brought air

from the outside. It required a 50/50 mixture of air/material .

The system broke down because of mechanical failure.

Submersible pumps did not have enough power to handle

the thick mousse. The worm types developed by Destoil were

very powerful. They could chew up the debris in the oil, but

their pulse volume was too short. The product moved too

slowly into the cavities so water quickly bypassed the product.

As a result, the crew had to float the pump at a critical water

boundary layer, which was difficult. Another problem was

that both Vac-UVator and Super Vac require that the crew

remove the deck grating and insert a 10-inch or 12-inch hose

down into the product. With the machines on, the hose ends

"danced" because of the powerful vacuum forces. Too deep

into the product and the hoses drew water, too high and they

drew air.

The thick mixture clogged the pumps and would not flow

toward the vacuum draw. Several pumps proved unsuccessful,

including diaphragm pumps and submersible pumps, both

of 3-inch hose diameter. Other pumps proved more successful,

specifically air vacuum pumps, where the suction could be

moved around the product surface, and worm pumps that

could be submerged and their surface height varied. 21

Portland District staff' had anticipated problems removing

the oil. They knew that the crude oil would be "chunky" and

that because of the cold water it would congeal . Therefore

they had equipped the dredges with special steam coils to

heat the oil, but the coils were not very effective, in part

because the dredge hoppers were too exposed on top. Heated

coils were usually put into enclosed barges. The dredge boilers

were not powerful enough to supply the steam necessary to

heat the coils to the point where they would liquify the oil.

The crew had to pump seawater into the hopper to keep the

mass of oil moving into the barge, and the steam coils could
Corps Dredge Operations 77

not produce enough heat to counterbalance the constant

influx of the cold waters.

Captain Jimenez and his crew later recommended that

an internal hopper steam heating system be developed. (Elec

trical heaters could pose safety hazards.) The simplest way

to implement such a system would be to have a "Donkey

Boiler" with the associated steam coils and lines. Another

possibility would be to build steam pipes in the hopper or

as a quick add-on feature. They also recommended that offi

cials upgrade the vessel's steam plant or install an auxiliary

plant. 22

In addition to steam coils, Corps officials purchased a

12-inch centrifugal pump for the Yaquina. When the crew

attempted to start the pump they found that the shaft was

bent and would not rotate. The crew later tested the 12-inch

pump and found that it was too small. Although the pump

was portable and powerful, the veins inside the pump were

too narrow. Twigs and other debris got caught in the veins,

which caused the pump to vibrate and reduced its efficiency

Also, by the time the pump arrived, the oil had become even

more viscous. If brought earlier, it might have been more

valuable. Although the pump did not work, the crew create

an innovative design to hook the pump up. Although they

spent $50,000 for a pump that did not work, from it they

learned a new off-loading process. 23

Faced with a painfully slow off-loading process and a

12-inch pump that did not work, Yaquina Chief Mate Neal

Nyberg and other crew members devised a way to use th

dredge's own pumps to remove the mixture from the hoppers

a process called self-off-loading. They put their plan on pape

and sent it to officials in Portland for their reaction. When

no response came, the crew decided to go ahead and make

the adaptations themselves. They "pirated" the necessary

materials. The Exxon representative on board helped them

get the hose and other equipment. Removing the starboar

draghead, they attached the suction hose to a flange over 

hole cut at the top of the hopper wall. Adding water to th

hopper, they floated the oil up to that opening, then turne

on the port side discharge pumps, bypassing the sidecast rout

and diverting the oil into the barge. Using this method, the

off-loaded 1,200 barrels in five hours. The only limitation wa
78 Corps Dredge Operations

that the oil had to be mixed with water, so the barge filled

up quickly and the Corps had to decant it by pumping the

water back to the dredge. 24

Unlike the Yaquina, the Essayons had pumpout capability,

a separate internal system to remove material from the hopper. The Essayons did not attempt to use its internal system

to off-load because of the high percentage of water which

would have had to be utilized in order to slurry the oil and

pump it . This would require a large barge with the capacity

to decant and none was available.

There were other aspects to the off-loading problem as

well . Exxon's barges had trouble decanting quickly because

of the amount of water being pumped with the oil. Offloading

efforts were also hampered by the fact that barge personnel

were inexperienced and overworked. Workers were very tired,

some having worked eighteen-hour shifts for three weeks.

Barge personnel also lacked adequate knowledge of how to

use the proper equipment for each job. 25

The Yaquina crew made various recommendations to

enhance off-loading in the future. Exxon barges were not

available when the Yaquina arrived. The crew recommended

that the Corps acquire its own barge, which could be used

for containment rather than the hopper. The Yaquina had

the internal piping for a process called sidecasting, which involves taking dredge material from the river bottom through

its pumps and then shooting it ofd' to the side without placing

the material in the hopper. The sidecasting piping could be

routed directly into the barge so that when boom offloading

began, the product would go directly from the boom through

the vessel's pumps and into the barge. This was the best procedure because the vessel transit time to an offloading barge

was eliminated; vessel cleanup time was cut 50 percent; and

the product could be safely contained off the vessel . The

dredge's overall production could be doubled.

The crew also recommended the addition of hopper

screens. When the hopper doors were opened and closed to

decant the water, debris tended to catch in the hopper doors

and prevent a tight closure. Large screens of "baseball fence

size openings" could be fitted above and across each of the

hopper doors to screen out any large debris that would keep

the door from closing. A stripper pipe could be installed in
Corps Dredge Operations 7

the hopper rather than installing screen and decantin

through the door. 26

By mid May the amount of recoverable oil on the wate

surface had decreased significantly and dredge activitie

declined. The focus of the cleanup had shifted to the shorelin

FOSC and Exxon representatives concluded that the Yaquin

was no longer needed, and on 26 May it arrived in Sewar

for cleaning. Local contractors labored to clean the dredge

often using high pressure hot water with detergent. Muc

of the work, however, involved wiping down and scrapin

by hand. 27

By 5 June the Yaquina was nearly clean and the FOSC

recommended that it be released for return to normal dut

JTF requested that DOMS authorize the dredge to leav

Alaska and release it to USACE upon arrival in Portland

DOMS directed that the Yaquina be returned to USACE n

later than 15 June and commended the crew for their dedi

cation: "Their achievement has been a significant contri

bution in the national interest:" The Yaquina arrived i

Portland on 15 June. Although environmentalists expresse

some concern that the returning dredge might contaminat

the Columbia River, Captain Brice countered that it was th

cleanest it had been in two years. 28

Meanwhile, cleaning crews continued work on th

Essayons. A decision had been made in mid May to allow th

oiled debris collected by shore operations to be dumped i

the Essayons' hoppers in order to ease the disposal problem

The Essayons was used as a "collection barge," for contami

nated materials from shoreline cleanup. Workers on-loade

roughly 180 cubic yards of the material during operation

at Katmai National Monument. On 17 May Colonel Kakel

who had objected to the dredge's use as a "garbage scow,

formally requested that the Essayons be released on 20 May

Exxon requested that the Essayons remain until a hop

per barge arrived at the end of May to perform basically th

same function. Exxon estimated the final release date to b

15 June. The Essayons arrived in Seward for cleanup o

31 May.29

Cleaning the Essayons at Seward proved to be a long, tiring

messy task. The oily sand, gravel, and debris mixture har

dened like asphalt. The Super Sucker broke down; the cla
80 Corps Dredge Operations

shovel did not work because there was not enough room in

the hopper for it or the personnel to operate it. Cleanup

started on the topside and outboard hull areas first and

work progressed from the top down. Dangerous gases in the

hopper forced workers to wear breathing apparatuses. The

smell of decaying matter and the oil mixture was likened to

a septic tank. Workmen became ill, and work was occasionally

stopped for safety reasons. Labor disputes also hampered

the cleanup.

By the end of June, eight to ten feet of rock remained in

the starboard hopper ## 1. The crew met with Exxon on the

27th and Exxon officials agreed that it was their decision to

put rock in the hoppers and they promised to remove it no

matter how long it took. 3o

On the bottom of the hopper there are twelve double-hung

doors roughly eight feet square with a linkage in the middle.

The seals on the hopper doors leaked because debris had

clogged in them and damaged the gaskets. Exxon contended

that the vessel owner (the Corps) was responsible for the

quality of the door seals and that it should complete the

repairs and pay the repair costs that had been incurred since

1 June. An Exxon official concluded, "We propose to take

no further action and consider the vessel released." The

Corps responded that the leakage was minimal. The Essayons

finally left for Portland on 19 July and JTF released it to

the Corps when it arrived in Portland on 24 July. 31

On 13 June Secretary Marsh wrote a letter to Commander, USAGE, commending the dredge crews. The Essayons and

Yaquina crews, he said, performed "magnificently," working

long hours and providing maximum support. "Your initiative

and ingenuity to extend the capability of the dredges to collect

and skim oil from the water surface," he said, "greatly assisted

the skimmer forces in collecting the maximum amount of

oil in the shortest possible period of time. I am proud of each

and every team member and their collective accomplishments

and contributions to overcoming this major environmental

disaster." 32

A very proud Portland District officially welcomed the

crew of the Yaquina with a ceremony on 20 June at which

Colonels Cowan and Kakel and Captain Miguel Jimenez

spoke. Captain Brice and Colonel Cowan handed out awards.
Corps Dredge Operations 

The District held a similar ceremony for the Essayons c

on 28 July with remarks by Colonel Cowan and dre

captains Ronald Henry and John Gallagher.

The dredge crews traveled to Alaska without any est

lished procedures for oil recovery operations or previous exp

ience. They faced severe problems in locating, loading, 

measuring the oil and removing the thick, sticky substa

from the hoppers. Yet, through experimentation and h

work, they devised techniques to minimize these probl

and to maximize their contributions.
CHAPTER VI

Shoreline Cleanup

Cleaning contaminated shoreline areas proved to be mo

challenging and costly than cleaning oil off the water surf

The affected shorelines in Alaska were in a remote a

characterized by abundant rainfall, gale-force winds, low cl

cover, and high waves that was difficult and dangerous 

reach and presented more severe working conditions th

anywhere in the contiguous United States. The coast, carv

by glaciers, was steep with little shoreline developme

Roughly 90 percent of the shoreline of the affected region c

sisted of rugged bedrock and boulders that stretched fr

below low tide mark to well above the high tide limits. T

steep, short "beaches" consisted of heavily weathered mate

ials ranging from sand to boulders in size.

In the remote, harsh environment of Prince Willi

Sound and the Gulf of Alaska, officials had difficulty plac

and supporting shoreline cleanup workers. Environment

objections prevented Exxon from establishing camps 

workers on the beaches, so Exxon transported them back a

forth to work sites from two Navy berthing ships. The 569-f

U.S.S. Juneau, for example, at one point housed 353 civil

technicians and laborers just off Smith Island. A flotilla 

six flat-bottomed landing craft ferried workers to beach

In addition to logistics problems, the cleanup effort w

hampered by confusion about responsibility. With so ma

state and federal agencies involved it was sometimes uncle

who had the final authority for determining which beach

would be cleaned and when. When the oil was on the wate

responsibility for the cleanup was comparatively well-defin

Under the National Contingency Plan, the Coast Guar

through the federal on-scene coordinator, had authority 

decide how the cleanup would be handled. After the sp

reached the beach, however, other agencies and inter

groups joined in the process of deciding how the oil shou
84 Shoreline Cleanup

be removed and from which shores it should be removed first

While the responsibility presumably still rested with Exxon

and oversight remained with the Coast Guard, the oil now

rested on beaches owned by the state of Alaska, and the fish,

mammals, and birds that might be affected were the special

province of the National Marine Fisheries Service and U.S

Fish and Wildlife Service. Several federal agencies were

responsible for regulations based on the Coastal Zone Management Act, Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and National

Historic Preservation Act that determined what could or

could not be done to clean the beaches.

Each agency had some veto power over cleanup actions

that might adversely affect the resources it regulated. No

single decision maker had complete authority to weigh the

benefits and adverse effects of possible cleanup methods and

decide on a course of action. Concern about the possible effects

of beach cleanup on the marine environment and the fishing

industry made decision makers cautious about adopting

methods that would put dispersants in the water or physically

disturb the beaches. Coast Guard officials often had difficulty

weighing competing authorities and dealing with the shifting

requirements of environmental groups and other interested

parties. For example, if Exxon washed the contamination off

the beaches back into the sea, the fisheries people objected,

while environmental groups who were interested in protecting seal pupping areas preferred to have the contamination

washed off the beaches.

Early in the cleanup officials created a Shoreline Cleanup

Committee, which included representatives from the Coast

Guard, Exxon, Alaska Department of Environmental Conser

vation, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration, Chucagh Alaska Native Corporations, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Forest

Service, and other state agencies, to weigh the competing

authorities and establish shoreline priorities. On 8 April these

agencies developed and signed shoreline cleanup priority

guidelines.)

Although media accounts left the impression that the

decisions were being made by committee, Admiral Robbins

made the final decision about cleanup priorities. Exxon teams

evaluated a particular shoreline and submitted a proposal
Shoreline Cleanup 85

to the Shoreline Cleanup Committee about how they would

clean it. The committee then made a recommendation to

Admiral Robbins, and if he agreed, he directed Exxon to do

the work on that particular beach. Two FOSC representatives

inspected the beach to determine if it had been adequately

cleaned and then asked the state representative for his opinion. Regulations required the FOSC to "consult" with the

state of Alaska in his decision-makingprocess, but Robbins

quickly added that "consult" did not necessarily mean "concur." If the FOSC and state representatives disagreed about

what should be done, the FOSC had the final decision-making

authority. Robbins explained, "It had to be that way. There

was no other way it would work. You can't have a committee

out there making decisions 72

There were many variables affecting how and when a

specific shoreline would be cleaned. Officials prioritized shorelines according to the degree of oiling (heavy, moderate, or

light), the presence of biological or ecological resources (pinnipeds, fisheries, aquaculture), and the presence of social resources (historical or archaeological). They ultimately developed a general strategy for cleaning shorelines. The first

priority was pinniped haulouts at Agnes, Smith, Little Smith,

Seal, and Green Islands and at Applegate Rocks where seal

and sea lion pups would soon be present. The second, third,

and fourth priorities were shorelines with biological resources

present and social resources absent. The only variable was

the level of contamination, the second priority having the

heaviest contamination and the fourth priority the lightest.3

Devising a detailed strategy for the cleanup operations

was complicated by the fact that no accurate information

existed on the scope of the problem. Policymakers had no

exact figures on the miles of contaminated shoreline. It was

difficult to determine the degree of contamination from the

air, because the gray lava rocks on the shoreline appeared

black when wet.

As part of the effort to develop an effective overall strategy

for the cleanup, Admiral Nelson directed Exxon to provide

a shoreline cleanup plan by 14 April, with timelines, long

term manpower requirements, and support requirements. By

that time the oil had already reached the western side of

Cook Inlet. Exxon officials submitted their plan on Saturday,
86 Shoreline Cleanu

15 April. When Admiral Yost reviewed the plan, he gave i

his blessing, but he later expressed "serious reservations" an

demanded more work on the plan. The Shoreline Cleanu

Committee complained that the 21-page plan, which calle

for Exxon to clean 305 miles of shoreline (mostly by flushin

with cold seawater) by 15 September, was too "sketchy" an

optimistic, based as it was on good weather conditions.

Admiral Yost gave Exxon until 1 May to come up wit

a revised plan that would deal with oil contamination outsid

Prince William Sound and the disposal of oily waste. The pla

that Exxon submitted on 1 May called for 3,400 cleanu

workers on the shoreline in Prince William Sound plus a

unspecified number outside the sound and targeted comple

tion by 15 September. The May plan proposed that worker

use cold water flushing and hot water pressurized hoses t

clean 85 miles of shoreline by 1 August and that 191 mile

of lightly oiled beach be left for natural cleansing. It calle

for the cleanup of 364 miles of shoreline as opposed to 30

in the 15 April plan. Alaska District staff' and Corps labora

tory personnel who were on temporary duty in Alaska spen

days evaluating the 1 May plan for the AK-JTF

Dennis D. Kelso, Commissioner of the Alaska Departmen

of Environmental Conservation, complained to Admiral Yos

that the revised plan did not adequately address the sign

ficant weaknesses that the state of Alaska had identified i

the initial 15 April plan and demanded that Exxon correc

these deficiencies. The plan should address affected area

outside of Prince William Sound that had received consider

able oiling since mid April, such as shorelines along Kena

Peninsula, Kodiak Island, and the Alaskan Peninsula. Kels

contended that Exxon's estimates on shoreline cleanup rate

were rooted in overly optimistic assumptions. The propose

method, cold water washings, he argued, would not clean th

shoreline adequately or even be appropriate for many shore

line areas. Finally, Kelso requested that Exxon provide mor

detail about milestones and how it reached its conclusions

Admiral Yost observed that the plan was "a little light

and a little thin on facts and substantiation :" Admira

Robbins also expressed reservations. After carefully reviewin

the plan, he wrote Otto Harrison, General Manager, Exxo

Company, "The approach you describe is a sound one, bu
Shoreline Cleanup 87

I remain seriously concerned that the investment of resources

you describe will not be able to clean the 300+ miles of

shoreline in the time allotted:' The plan was a "well designed

approach," he added, but "needs elaboration." Robbins requested that Exxon substantially increase its workforce to

increase the cleanup rate ; provide an inventory of potentially

critical path equipment items that they would need to accelerate their effort so that Robbins could help them locate such

equipment; submit a plan for beach cleanup work outside

Prince William Sound; anticipate a review of the cleanup in

the spring of 1990 ; and retain the U.S.S. Fort McHenry and

the U.S.S. Juneau as hotel and support ships for the duration of the high level cleanup effort. In response to intense

pressure from the Bush administration, which called the

1 May plan inadequate, Exxon later agreed to increase the

number of workers from 3,400 to 5,000. 5

Developing and implementing an effective shoreline cleanup strategy was also hampered by the lack of a clear definition of "clean" and acceptable standards. As Exxon devised

its ambitious shoreline cleanup plans for Prince William

Sound and the Gulf of Alaska, federal and state officials

grappled with the question, "What is clean?" Scientists said

they were working in a gray area where there were no generally accepted standards. Some cleaning could go too far.

Peter McGee, the on-site coordinator for the state environmental agency, complained that there was no fast, objective method to determine a standard of cleanliness for the

beaches. With no time to take samples and do the normal

kind of analysis, operators had to rely on visual, on-thespot determination.

State officials and the media criticized Admiral Robbins

for calling the shorelines "clean." After the crews finished

their work, the beaches were not as "clean" as they were

before the spill, so the Alaska Department of Conservation

refused to let the Coast Guard use the word "clean." When

Exxon officials suggested using the word "treated," Robbins

agreed. "Clean;' he observed, is a relative term. The shorelines were not totally "clean'" but a level of contamination

had been removed. Robbins believed the ultimate goal in

cleaning up a spill was to stabilize the shoreline to the point

where it would not cause more damage to the surrounding
88 Shoreline Cleanu

environment (i .e., to prevent winter storms from carrying th

oil offshore and redepositing it), and to clean the shorelin

as much as possible without damaging it more than yo

would by letting the oil degrade naturally. The standards fo

"clean" depended to some extent on the area. Cleanup official

had to decide, Robbins observed, how much they were goin

to do on each shoreline segment. Did they want to clean 

beach with such intensity that they chased away all of th

wildlife or just stabilize the oil?

As FOSC, Admiral Robbins decided when Exxon coul

move on to another shoreline. Robbins, however, never tol

Exxon that it would not have to return to a particular beac

at some time in the future. He believed that Exxon did a

much as could reasonably be expected. Exxon needed to trea

a beach to a certain point and then move on to one wit

more environmental impact or else it would spend the entir

summer on,. one beach. 6

In mid May the FOSC established a three-phased ap

proach to aid in determining cleanup priorities in Prince

William Sound and western Alaska . In phase one operator

stabilized the beach and removed gross contamination to th

extent that the oil would not migrate from the site. The sit

would have to be reassessed at a later date to determine i

further treatment was necessary. Phase two marked the

removal of the majority of surface oil contamination. The sit

required reassessment later. During phase three, all contamination was removed and no further treatment was required

unless the beach was re-oiled. The phased approach allowed

cleanup crews to make progress while maintaining the ulti

mate goal of removing all contamination. A Coast Guard

operations analysis team worked with the FOSC staff' to

design a system of tracking and productivity reporting that

would clarify what had been done and what remained to be

done.?

An even greater problem than priorities and strategies

was the primitive and ineffective techniques for shoreline

cleanup. To a great extent the techniques mimicked those

used after the 1978 Amoco Cadiz spill. In the Amoco Cadiz

cleanup 10,000 workers, including sailors, soldiers, hired

labor, volunteers, and the local population, struggled to clean

250 miles of contaminated French shoreline. They worked
Captain Brice (in uniform) discusses shoreline cleanup operations.

with their hands, wielding rakes, shovels, plastic buckets,

brooms, and garbage cans. They painstakingly poured the

contaminated matter from small buckets into larger buckets

and lugged them to gathering points. Workers were not always environmentally sensitive, however. On the bird sanctuary of the Ile Grande, for example, bulldozers scraped away

topsoil and ground cover, which promoted the erosion of

the marsh they were trying to clean. Some mayors sent

fleets of bulldozers and earth-moving equipment to do work

that should have been done by hand. The equipment destroyed substrata life and contributed to further erosion of

the shoreline.

Workers tried nine different sorbent products on the

French beaches: sawdust, vegetable fibers, leather scraps,

rubber powder, polyurethane foam, plaster, pine bark, perlite,

and shredded paper strips . The rubber powder proved most

useful. There were also inconclusive experiments with chemicals to promote biodegradation of the oil . Cleanup crews

washed beaches with water pumps. High pressure equipment

(400-900 kilograms per square centimeter) was quickly abandoned as too expensive, damaging to concrete structures,

and a danger to operators. Medium pressure (140 kilograms
Shoreline cleanup operations.

per square centimeter) hot (80-140 degrees Celsius) water

pumps were more effective, cheaper, and safer. 8

In the Alaska cleanup operations, state officials restricted

the cleanup operations to the following methods: wiping individual rocks by hand and absorbing surface oil from depres

sions and crevices, flushing the oil from the beaches with the

application of warm or cold saawater, and collecting the oilcontaminated seaweed and other organic matter on the shores

by hand. Other cleanup methods were tested with varied

results but were not widely used, including the spot application of hot water to beaches or rocky shoreline, burning,

vacuum collection of pooled oil, and bioremediation .

The most prevalent method was to pump huge amounts

of cold saltwater from landing craft offshore to the top of the

beaches, so it flooded the rocks as it ran back to the sea.

Meanwhile, workers with fire hoses squirted the surface of

the beach to knock oil off the rocks. The flood of water kept

the oil suspended while it was carried to the ocean where

the oil was captured in booms and retrieved by skimmers. 9

This technique proved ineffective. Oil seeped to a depth

of several feet. Each night the tide lifted oil to the surface

or washed the oil cleaned off the day before back ashore.
Shoreline Cleanup 91

Thus, despite six washings, a stretch of rocky beach on

McPherson Bay on Naked Island remained black. Five days

of intensive washing on Smith Island shortly before Vice

President Quayle's visit decreased the amount of oil, but each

morning discouraged workers found that the rocks they had

washed with such effort were black again.

As weeks passed the idea of using hot water rather than

cold became more popular. The vegetation on the beaches was

already dying, some reasoned, so it was time for more drastic

measures. The units that Exxon brought to the scene, however, could not produce enough hot water to work continuously. When they did work, they only applied hot water to

an area "the size of a postage stamp." Hot water pumps from

France, built for use in the Amoco Cadiz spill, worked better.

In the seal pup birthing areas, Exxon was allowed to cut and

remove seaweed from the rocks instead of washing it . Exxon

had also tried spreading peat moss on the rocks to absorb

the oil. Removing seaweed was easier than cleaning it and

prevented oil-soaked vegetation from polluting the water, but

seaweed was an important food source. 1o

By 25 May there were 386 Exxon employees, 4,306 VECO

contractors, 1,177 Norcon contractors, and 2,603 other workers involved in the cleanup. By 15 September, when Exxon

stopped its shoreline cleanup operations for the winter, a total

of 1,632 miles of shoreline (including 708.7 miles in Prince

William Sound) had been treated and approved for demobilization by the FOSC. 11

The 708.7 miles, however, were not completely free of

contamination. Operators were never able to find an effective

technique for cleaning shorelines. Despite Exxon's huge in

vestment in time, money, and manpower, after months of

intensive cleanup work, much contamination remained.
CHAPTER VII

Research and Development

The clear inadequacy of existing methods for locating a

cleaning spilled oil on the water and for cleaning the shor

line led the Corps of Engineers to focus its research a

development expertise and resources on these problems. So

after President Bush called on the Defense Department 

support the cleanup efforts, the Research and Developme

Directorate, HQUSACE, asked all Corps laboratories to pr

vide information on the kind of expertise they could offer a

the potential contributions they could make to the cleanu

Two Corps laboratories, the Waterways Experiment St

tion (WES) in Vicksburg, Mississippi, and the Cold Regio

Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) in Hanove

New Hampshire, were particularly well qualified to provi

technical assistance to the cleanup. WES had conduct

research on the disposal of contaminated materials and t

long-term effects of dredging operations and had provid

support to DOD and EPA in hazardous and toxic waste clea

up activities. The laboratory had extensive experience dea

ing with hazardous and toxic materials and contaminat

sediment.

CRREL had conducted studies of the biodegradation 

Prudhoe Bay crude oil in Arctic environments and had be

involved with the Environmental Protection Agency 

Alaska in the long-term evaluation of crude oil spills on te

restrial environments. It was also studying a naturally occu

ring bio-organism that fed on oil seeps on the North Slo

In 1976 CRREL participated in two experimental spills 

Alaska. Scientists applied two thousand gallons of h

Prudhoe Bay oil through a thirty-foot-long perforated pi

to one plot in February and the same amount to another pl

in June. For the next three years they carefully monitor

the sites to determine the effects on vegetation and s

properties.
94 Research and Development

CRREL also had ongoing research in the area of remote

sensing Through the Civil Works Remote Sensing Research

Program, CRREL had developed a technology that could be

applied in Alaska. The program sought to expand the use

of data from remote sensing in implementing the Corps'

water resource mission. At the time of the spill the Corps

could process, store, analyze, integrate, and retrieve aircraft

and satellite data quickly and then display graphically the

products using prototype software. The system was already

being used in a flood impact study in the Corps' Baltimore

District and in a real-time flood forecasting model under

development in Little Rock District.l

HQUSACE designated CRREL as the lead laboratory to

coordinate all Corps research activities relating to the Alaska

oil spill and to insure that all relevant laboratory resources

were considered. Robert Oswald, Director of Research and

Development, HQUSACE, directed CRREL to develop a proposal to support the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration's long-term environmental monitoring program, a strategy for direct technical support to the Coast

Guard in areas of remote sensing and oil spill dispersion

modeling, and a strategy for direct support to North Pacific

Division and Alaska District, along with Corps headquarters

EOC activities.

The Corps' research and development community outlined

potential contributions that laboratories might make to the

cleanup. WES said it could do some advisory work on shore

line cleanup, and CRREL offered to do remote sensing. At

briefings in HQUSACE on 11 April and 27 April, research

and development officials outlined their plan to process remote sensing data available in Alaska and use it to highlight

the oil slicks on a ship's radar. General Kelly and Assistant

Secretary Page enthusiastically supported the plan. 2

In a spill the size of the Exxon Valdez spill, it was much

easier and less expensive to recover oil while it was on the

water, before waves and currents and natural dispersion made

recovery more difficult. Use of multispectral sensors (sensors

that simultaneously sense data in a number of energy bands)

would enable scientists to locate and map the distribution

of oil over large areas and therefore enable operators to recover it more rapidly.
Research and Development 9

Oil on water can be detected through a combination 

sensors. Side-looking radar detects oil because oil damps th

wave action and reduces radar return. Optical sensors, whic

measure reflected light in the ultraviolet, blue-green, an

intermediate infrared bands, allow the detection of oil becaus

of the differences in the amount of solar energy reflected fro

the oil and from uncontaminated water. Thermal infrar

sensors have also been successful in detecting oil . Usin

a mixture of these sensing techniques in a multispectr

sensing package offered the greatest probability of accurate

detecting oil.

Multispectral sensors on satellites, such as Landsa

Thematic Mapper, had the appropriate spectral bands f

sensing oil over a large area, but satellite sensing did n

occur on a daily basis, which was essential. However, for o

spill operations, aircraft-based multispectral systems cou

provide data appropriate for processing with the CRRE

capability. The aircraft that had both the proper sensi

capabilities and video capability were a Falcon jet owned b

Innotech, Ltd., which had MEIS II and a Daedalus mult

spectral scanner, and two Twin Otters with dual ultraviol

and thermal infrared images. Exxon had contracted the

aircraft, which were in Valdez flying on almost a daily basi

The Innotech aircraft concentrated on beach and shorelin

while the Twin Otters flew over open water.

Exxon hired the Innotech Falcon jet, which had been fl

ing for Environment Canada, to survey shorelines in Prin

William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska. It was collecting a

of the frequency range spectral data that the Corps scientis

needed for their image processing system. The Falcon r

corded a portion of the information on a VHS videotap

which had to be digitized before it could be entered in

CRRELs processing system. Although Exxon collected t

remote sensing data, it had no capability to process that da

in Alaska, so it relied primarily on visual sightings. 3

CRREL proposed that its personnel periodically recei

imagery from the Exxon-directed aircraft in a VHS vide

tape format. Then CRREL and Joint Task Force officia

would review the videotape information and enter the appr

priate data into CRREEs Apple MacIntosh computer syste

CRREL would correlate the tape outputs with LANDSA
96 Research and Development

data through its software program to develop a map indicating the degree of shoreline contamination and oil contamination on the water. Once processed, the data would be

entered into the JTF's computer system for use in decision

making. The goal was to install the necessary computers on

large vessels, such as the dredges, and then to use the computer programs to guide the vessels toward large concentrations of oil . Scientists, however, did not yet have the ability

to image the data and put it rapidly into a management

system for decision makers. No procedure had been devised

to get information on the location of oil to cleanup vessels

in a timely manner. 4

At the request of the Corps, on 27 April the Director of

Military Support issued a formal tasking to CRREL to use

its remote sensing research and available resources to de

lineate the extent and relative thickness of the oil on the

water and shoreline. After verifying the information obtained

from the aircraft scanners and from photographs taken by

helicopters, it was to process the data and produce and display

graphic images indicating the distribution and relative thickness of oil. CRREL was then to provide this information to

the Joint Task Force. 5

The next day CRREL began establishing a support team

at the Joint Task Force headquarters at Elmendorf AFB

to carry out its mission. Other team members, headed by

Dr. Harlan "Ike" McKim, arrived in Anchorage over the

weekend 30 April-1 May and began setting up and testing their equipment. Meanwhile, the technical director of

CRREL, Dr. Lewis E. Link, Jr., contacted the Division Engineer in North Pacific Division, General Stevens, to make sure

that CRREL got the necessary aerial support to obtain the

imagery they needed to provide remote sensing products

tasked by DOMS. Proper aerial support, he explained, was

"critical" to the successful completion of their mission-6

The CRREL people quickly arranged for a room to set up

their equipment at Elmendorf AFB. Most of the equipment

arrived in Anchorage late in the afternoon on 4 May, and

team members spent the next few days setting up their systems. The biggest problem that CRREL personnel faced was

their inability to obtain data from aircraft and satellite sensors in a compatible format and the lack of an automated
Research and Development 

system to transmit the final oil spill map to the vess

doing the cleanup.?

In addition to the CRREL team, General Kelly sent 

scientists from WES to Alaska to provide technical assista

Their specific mission was to assess the effectiveness of c

rent shoreline cleanup methods. Dr. Ray Montgomery, Chi

Environmental Engineering Division, and Dr. Conrad 

Kirby, Chief, Environmental Resources Division, went 

Alaska on 2 May. The high rank of the scientists was 

indication of the importance that officials in headquart

placed on their mission.

On 3 May Kirby and Montgomery met with Ja

Redlinger and James Reese from North Pacific Division 

CRREEs Ike McKim. They visited the Alaska District off

where officials briefed them on the status of the clea

operations and the District's involvement. Colonel Kakel 

pressed concern that the presence of the research and devel

ment people would worsen an already tense situation. T

scientists had arrived at a politically sensitive time beca

of Vice President Quayle's visit and because of friction 

tween various government agencies. They quickly beca

aware of the political sensitivities in Alaska and foun

difficult to coordinate with other agencies. One CRREL te

member cautioned, "The political situation here is one of v

fields of eggshells."$

Despite their best efforts, the Alaska District staff w

unable to get the scientists into the field for the first few d

because of Quayle's visit and because the logistics were di

cult. Team members were frustrated by the delays, but t

quickly went to work helping District personnel review 

newly released drafts of Exxon's 1 May Waste Manageme

and Shoreline Restoration plans. 9

On 4 May the WES scientists continued to review 

tential methods for shoreline cleanup and acquired mo

information on Exxon's cleanup activities. The next day Kir

Montgomery, McKim, Redlinger, Reese, and Guy McConn

flew by float plane to the U.S.S. Juneau, anchored a sh

distance from the Smith Island shoreline cleanup activit

The team went from there on a Navy boat to Seal Rock C

and another beach on Smith Island that crews had flus

for days with hot and cold water. Crews had also wiped 
98 Research and Development

beach by hand with absorption materials. Both beaches had

a high priority because they would be used for seal pupping.

Because of Vice President Quayle's visit to Smith Island the

previous day, the cleanup crews had worked long hours, so

they did not leave the Juneau until about noon and then took

a lunch break when they got to the beach. As a result, the

team did not witness any actual cleanup work. Conversations

with workers, however, indicated that they did not think their

cleanup efforts were effective.

The Corps' scientists concluded that the hot water flushing and cold water flushing methods had been somewhat

effective in removing surface ponded oil but not in cleaning

oil that had seeped into the cobble and gravel materials below

the surface. When they dug into the beaches, they found

significant amounts of oil below the surface. Despite six to

eight passes of hot and/or cold water flushing, considerable

amounts of oil remained on the beach. Thus the team concluded that the effectiveness of the cleaning methods was

"marginal:' The team also observed that it was difficult to

provide for the health and safety of workers in this harsh

environment. They discussed various mechanical, chemical,

and biological cleanup methods and mitigation with North

Pacific Division and Alaska District representatives.

10

The team returned to Alaska District Friday evening

to report to Colonel Kakel, but he was still meeting with

General McInerney. The team returned to the District of

fice Saturday morning, shared their observations, and left

Anchorage that day without seeing the colonel. Colonel Kakel

and his staff' were upset by what seemed to be an abrupt

departure. The WES officials, however, believed that they had

completed their mission and there was nothing more that

they could contribute because Exxon had all the scientific

expertise needed. They concluded that cold water wash was

ineffective and that unless restrictions were removed the

Corps would be no more effective at cleaning the beaches than

Exxon. Reese and some others favored natural cleansing,

but they realized such a recommendation would be politically unacceptable. 11

Reese and Redlinger returned to Portland with bags of

rocks from a "clean" beach and from one not yet cleaned .

When they showed the rocks to General Stevens, he could
Research and Development 

not tell the difference . The rocks effectively illustrated t

ineffectiveness of cold water washing. 12

In their trip report, Montgomery and Kirby conclud

that the Corps would find it "very difficult" to provide eff

tive cleanup support during the short time remaining unt

mid-September. The contaminated shorelines were in remo

areas where housing was limited and transportation to wor

sites was dangerous. The short-term cleanup, they conclude

provided no "winning opportunities" for the Corps. Howeve

they recommended that the experience be documented in ca

the Corps was asked to support future oil spill cleanup activ

ties. The team saw opportunities for future research a

development but cautioned against getting involved in shor

term cleanup activities that had little chance of succes

Exxon had the experts, equipment, and manpower to do t

"best possible job" on the cleanup. Reese and Redlinger co

curred. They too saw contributions that the Corps cou

make in research and development, such as remote sensi

mapping techniques, but recommended against Corps involv

ment in shoreline cleanup. In interviews with the local pre

when they returned to Vicksburg, Kirby and Montgomer

reiterated that the Corps could do little to help because Exx

had hired most of the experts and purchased most of t

cleanup equipment. 13

Corps officials were disappointed in the results of bo

laboratory visits, but especially the WES visit. 14 Kirby a

Montgomery's blunt report and conservative statements 

the press did not fit in well with the Corps' proactive approa

to the cleanup. CRREL successfully established a data man

agement system used in Alaska District and the JTF, b

it had not accomplished its basic mission because the scie

tists could not get the instrumented aircraft data they need

from Exxon. Exxon refused to release any data that it ha

on the extent and location of the oil.

After the site visit, CRREL continued its efforts to g

the data that it needed. At the Corps' request, General Smi

informed General McInerney on 10 May that the Cor

needed the following Exxon tape output: VHS tape outp

from the Innotech Falcon jet that flew over the spill area dai

and videotape output from the Twin Otters flying each da

Smith requested seven days of output.
100 Research and Development

General McInerney asked FOSC Robbins to prod Exxon

to surrender the data. The alternative was to task Navy or

Air Force planes for a special imagery collection mission,

which would be very expensive. The Air Force, Navy, Coast

Guard, and NOAA each had aircraft that could collect the

data, but none had aircraft available in Alaska . Nor was

any agency willing to expend operational funds to send an

aircraft to Alaska. 15

In late May Exxon agreed to provide copies of video and

computer tapes. Dr. Hugh Brown, Exxon Director of Surveillance and Tracking in Valdez, authorized Innotech to prepare

some examples of the tapes and transmit them to CRREL.

Innotech agreed to mail by 22 June 1989 two or three tapes

for three or more sites, which would represent data for both

open water and shoreline, at a cost of $2,000 to $3,000. The

data would come from flight lines on or near 7 April, so that

CRREL could compare this to data they had already analyzed

from LANDSAT imagery for that date. 16

Months later the Corps received directly from Exxon a

video cassette on which Exxon had recorded samples of the

infrared and ultraviolet images collected during the daily

surveillance flights. The images on the tapes were of poor

quality and were not documented as to where, when, and

what they depicted. The data was for the most part unusable.

CRREL was able to put the data into its system to insure

that the system worked. CRREL also received samples of

Innotech data on computer compatible tapes. 17

In addition to the remote sensing technology, Corps elements made other contributions. At the time of the spill there

was no good accurate measurement of the miles of shoreline

in Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska. A team from

the Engineer Topographical Laboratory's Terrain Analysis

Center at Fort Belvoir measured 6,000 miles of Alaska coastline and offshore islands that were affected by the spill. They

also determined the general composition of the measured

coastline (i .e., sand, gravel, or large rocks) to help the Corps

estimate the extent of the damage and the amount of effort

required for the cleanup. In addition, the Navigation Data

Center, part of the Water Resources Support Center, provided

information about crude petroleum handling in general and

details specific to Valdez. With its new data base management
Research and Development 10

system, the center was able to program, produce, and dis

tribute this information within two hours.

WES's Coastal Engineering Research Center provide

statistical wind and wave information from the Wave Infor

mation Studies to CRREL to help predict the movement o

the oil slick. The wind and wave data covered a twenty-yea

period for the months of April and May at a site near th

disaster. 18

The Corps was also involved, if only to a minor extent

in another oil spill cleanup technology, bioremediation. Bio

remediation is the digestion or degradation of oil by naturall

occurring microorganisms (bacteria) . Bacteria degrade th

hydrocarbon molecules of oil into fatty acids, bacterial proto

plasm, and other by-products. The process of hydrocarbo

degradation is going on continuously in nature using variou

sources of hydrocarbon to include oil and products of photo

synthesis among many others. For years scientists have bee

developing techniques to increase the number of organism

per unit area and increase their effectiveness by adding cer

tain fertilizers -nitrogen and phosphorus -to accelerate th

digestion of hydrocarbons. Fifty tons of commercially prepare

microbes existed and were available for large scale applicatio

in Alaska.

Dr. Carl H. Oppenheimer, professor at the University o

Texas and owner of Alpha Environment, Inc., testified befor

a subcommittee of the House Committee on Merchant Marin

and Fisheries that he wanted to test a bioremediation pro

gram on three miles of representative shoreline and adjacen

waters in Alaska. 19

A briefing was held at the Pentagon on 14 April featur

ing Dan Kirkendall (a retired congressman from Memphis

Tennessee) in support of work being done by Oppenheimer

Kirkendall told the Corps' research and development peopl

about a workshop sponsored by EPA to consider bioremedi

ation technologies. At General Kelly's request, William R

Rushing from the Research and Development Directorat

in Corps headquarters arranged to attend the worksho

as an observer and to involve E.A. Theriot, a WES exper

in biotechnology.

The "Bioremediation of Oil-Contaminated Aquatic Envi

ronments" workshop was held on 17-18 April in Crystal City
102 Research and Development

Virginia. The purpose was to assemble a panel of experts

to assess the feasibility of bioremediation in Alaska and to

make recommendations to the EPA Administrator for further

action. The participants decided to recommend to the EPA

Administrator that the Alaska oil spill situation be treated

as a laboratory to increase the nation's knowledge and readiness for action in future oil spills. Workshop participants

agreed that test plans should be developed for using fertilizer

in a small-scale experimental project to study the impact.

These test plans would be reviewed by participants and final

recommendations would be made to the EPA Administrator.

Rushing recommended that the Corps offer engineering assistance to EPA. 2o

Rushing concluded that bioremediation could be effective,

especially if used immediately after the spill, and that the

risk factors were minimal. The engineering aspects of bio

remediation studies contemplated by EPA were "seriously

lacking" in application, techniques, equipment, etc. He recommended that the Corps offer assistance to EPA in the

engineering/research and development aspects of projects

because the Corps had the technical and logistical capabilities

that EPA did not have. He also recommended that the Corps

appoint a rapid response team to address future capability

to respond. 21

Research and development officials noted that it was too

late to consider using bioremediation to clean up the Alaska

oil spill but not too late for serious consideration of develop

ing a program to do field tests of existing technology in

preparation for future emergencies. "The situation in Alaska

presents a unique opportunity for research on this technology at a field scale which should yield significant results

and ultimately provide a capability to use this method of oil

spill cleanup.

"22

The results of the laboratory visits were not as successful as Corps officials had hoped in that the scientists could

do little to improve the current situation in Alaska. The

problems of locating oil and cleaning the shoreline persisted.

The Corps efforts, however, revealed that CRREL had an effective remote sensing technology that could be used in future

cleanup operations.
CHAPTER VIII

Funding and Reimbursement

In addition to all of the problems presented by wate

and shoreline cleanup operations, a shortage of funds an

confusion about procedures and authorities made it difficul

for the Corps of Engineers and other federal agencies t

obtain reimbursement for their expenditures. When the spi

occurred, officials in HQUSACE grappled with two difficul

questions: Did the Corps have the authority to commit re

sources to the cleanup effort? If so, what was that authorit

and could the Corps expect to be reimbursed for its expendi

tures? It was clear that the Corps of Engineers had no author

ity to act unilaterally and spend military or civil funds o

the oil spill cleanup. Under the Federal Water Pollution Con

trol Act (33 USC 1321), also known as the Clean Water Act

the Department of Transportation, specifically the Coas

Guard, was responsible for the cleanup and had the authorit

to request resources from other federal agencies.

Some Corps offcials assumed that the Economy Act sup

plied the authority to provide support to the Coast Guar

and that the Clean Water Act would be the vehicle for rei

bursement. The Chief Counsel for the Corps of Engineers

Lester Edelman, however, maintained that the Clean Wate

Act, which he had helped draft in the 1970s, alone provide

enough authority. The DOMS invoked the Economy Act, i

forming the Coast Guard, "It is our understanding unde

the national contingency plan, authority to provide militar

support to the Coast Guard (or to DOT) is provided for b

the Economy Act, 31 USC Sect. 1535 ." 1

The Economy Act allows one federal agency to provid

services and goods to another and to be reimbursed, base

on a signed agreement or order. In the case of the oil spil

however, the Department of Transportation had not mad

such an agreement with the Defense Department and th

Corps of Engineers.
104 Funding and Reimbursement

The Clean Water Act stipulates that the spiller is liable

for all cleanup costs and costs of restoration or replacement

of natural resources damaged or destroyed as a result of the

discharge of oil. Exxon accepted this liability. Section 311(k)

of the Clean Water Act established a revolving fund in the

U.S. Treasury to be maintained at the level of $35 million

to carry out the provisions of the Clean Water Act. The 311(k)

account is funded mainly from appropriations, with the spiller

reimbursing the federal government for the agency costs. The

Coast Guard administers the fund and is responsible for

recovering the costs on behalf of the federal government.

It has the authority and responsibility to determine which

agency costs were "reasonable" except where an agency's

actual costs had to be reimbursed under some other law.

Coast Guard regulations require that the Federal On-Scene

Coordinator preapprove activities stemming from the spill

in order to be reimbursed.

In the case of the Exxon Valdez spill, agencies submitted

their costs to the Coast Guard for approval, and the Coast

Guard passed the approved costs on to Exxon. Exxon was

expected to reimburse the 311(k) account for amounts approved by the Coast Guard, and the Coast Guard would then

reimburse the agencies from the 311(k) account for the submitted and approved costs. Initially federal officials were not

sure that Exxon would pay into the revolving 311(k) fund,

and without the fund, the Secretary of Transportation might

not have had sufficient funds to write an Economy Act order

to the Defense Department. The account was badly depleted

at the time of the spill. The Economy Act worked only if there

was money going into the 311(k) account. Despite the fact

that there was no Economy Act order, no formal guarantee

of reimbursement, Corps officials were determined to commit resources. 2

The Coast Guard began using the Clean Water Act reimbursement process after the spill because, although Exxon

remained in charge, federal involvement was substantial and

from the outset Exxon had been paying the cleanup costs.

Moreover, the 311(k) account was an existing and readily

accessible fund that the Coast Guard had authority to administer. The Coast Guard notified agencies that would be involved in the cleanup to prepare "sufficient, complete, and

correct" reports for all cleanup costs. 3
Funding and Reimbursement 1

One of the Corps' first tasks was to establish proc

dures for recording and reporting costs. On 8 April E. Sco

Chronister, Executive Director, Resource Managemen

HQUSACE, recommended that all Corps staff member

command-wide, keep careful records of all labor time spe

on the Alaska oil spill cleanup project, as well as recor

of travel orders, purchase orders, and any other releva

financial documents. When it completed its efforts, Chronist

emphasized, the Corps would need "clear, accurate, una

biguous financial information" in order to respond to 

questions about costs and to seek reimbursement.

Resource Management set up three categories for 

cording costs: dredge operations, including logistical a

administrative support; other support to JTF, including lab

atory operations; and command operations, including t

emergency operations centers. The first category included t

cost of the dredges plus any logistical and administrati

support to them. The second covered on-site miscellaneo

logistical support to the JTF and Alaska District and ev

tually Corps laboratory involvement. JTF officials later in

cated that they wanted an object class breakdown (i.e ., p

sonnel costs, supplies, equipment, travel). They also want

military costs separated out and a listing of the accounts 

which the Corps would charge them.

Pending resolution of the funding issue, the Corps us

the Civil Works Revolving Fund to pay for the dredge a

the laboratory costs. It charged the direct costs of the Alas

District EOC to Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies a

the cost of regular command and control activities at he

quarters and North Pacific Division to General Expens

Costs that did not fit any of these categories were put i

deferred accountt5

Meanwhile, anxious officials in Alaska District wai

for funding guidance. On 11 April Lieutenant Colonel R

Carlson, Chief of Alaska District's Crisis Management Tea

reported that the District's funding was "at a critical sta

"We will continue to perform our mission to the extent pos

ble;" he added, "however, an urgent requirement exists 

funding guidance." By 19 April the costs for the Distric

EOC operations, support to the DOMS team, and coordinat

with the Joint Task Force had reached $1,105,000 .6
106 Funding and Reimbursement

On 13 April DOMS reminded all DOD activities to capture and record all Alaska oil spill cleanup costs, including

both fixed costs such as salaries at standard rates as well

as variable costs. General McInerney planned to establish

procedures to ensure that bills were submitted to the Coast

Guard in a timely manner and with adequate documentation.

All bills had to be based on statements of expenses that were

validated and approved by the FOSC.

In a 20 April memorandum, Secretary Marsh urged

Secretary Cheney to resolve the funding issue with Secretary

Skinner. Marsh observed that the only authority available

to DOD for its support was the Economy Act and that the

Transportation Department was reluctant to enter into an

Economy Act arrangement because it might not have enough

funds to cover projected obligations. DOT, he added, had at

least three sources of funding: its own regular appropriations,

the 311(k) account, and another fund authorized by the TransAlaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA). DOT believed

the 311(k) funds should be used only for certain directed

expenses. Marsh received no reply.?

The Corps activated emergency operations centers, outfitted two dredges and sent them to Alaska, and took other

actions in HQUSACE, North Pacific Division, various Dis

tricts, and Corps laboratories. It had received three written

taskers from DOMS: one for each of the dredges and one for

CRREL. The Corps' claims for reimbursement provoked controversy. Exxon and Coast Guard officials contended that

they had not requested the Yaquina initially. Although the

11 April DOMS tasker for the Yaquina said "the Coast Guard

has requested" and "report to the Coast Guard for reimbursement," Coast Guard officials claimed that they had not asked

for the dredge and that Exxon did not want it. The Corps

activated the dredge on 11 April, but the Coast Guard did

not officially approve its use until 18 April, so the costs for

that period were disputed .

Questions also arose about reimbursement for Corps laboratory activity because the Coast Guard had not requested

laboratory involvement. The DOMS request for CRRELs in

volvement differed from the other taskers. It did not say "the

Coast Guard requests" or provide an account number. Thus,

when the Corps received the tasker, Resource Management
Funding and Reimbursement 1

officials informed DOMS that they would treat the tasker 

a reimbursable order. They also requested billing instructi

from DOMS and sent an initial cost estimate, but DOMS 

not respond. Initially the Corps billed only for dredge cos

later it billed for all costs. The Corps' negotiating posit

was to claim full reimbursement for all dredge and laborat

costs, which amounted to roughly $11 million, including t

cost of hiring dredges to complete the work that the Yaqui

and Essayons had been scheduled to do before they we

diverted to Alaska. 8

At a meeting at ElmendorfAFB on 25 April, Coast Gua

Captain Anderson indicated that Exxon had agreed to p

the "incremental" costs of the Army, including Corps 

Engineers dredges, and the Air Force. Costs such as milita

salaries that are funded by other appropriations would n

be reimbursed. Corps representatives gave Anderson the es

mated rental rates for the dredges (fourteen days of Yaqui

at $23,000 a day for a total of $322,000 and nine days 

the Essayons at $51,500 a day for a total of $463,500). Add

tional costs such as labor, equipment, and supplies broug

the total to $436,687 for the Yaquina and $602,732 for t

Essayons. The estimated cost of demobilization for the dredg

was $238,000 and $509,000. Thus the total costs would 

$674,687 for the Yaquina and $1,111,732 for the Essayo

One Corps official observed that Anderson "appear

reluctant to authorize payment of the expenses." Anders

argued that the Army, not the Coast Guard, had request

the services of the dredges (despite the DOMS taskers) a

implied that the Corps should look to the Army for reimburs

ment if Exxon refused to pay. 9

As the reimbursement problems dragged on, Corps hea

quarters once again directed the field offices to keep accura

records of oil spill cleanup costs. HQUSACE also provided t

following general guidance on costs: JTF taskers and simil

orders from the Coast Guard and the Transportation Depar

ment would be considered reimbursable; activities on t

Corps' own initiative were chargeable to appropriations c

rently available to the Corps; and costs could be reallocat

pending legal and fiscal determinations at Army hea

quarters and JTF.10

By 15 May the Defense Department and the services h

spent approximately $15 million, using their Operations a
108 Funding and Reimbursement

Maintenance funds to pay for their cleanup efforts. DOD now

requested that the Coast Guard begin reimbursement from

the 311(k) account in compliance with the Economy Act.

In early August the Corps submitted a bill for $9,730,000,

which included dredging operations ($7,500,000), alternative

dredging costs ($1,955,000), and other support to JTF including laboratory operations ($275,000). The actual costs

through 14 July totaled $10,045,967, and John F Wallace,

Director of Resource Management, HQUSACE, projected

$479,033 more through 1 October. So the total estimated costs

were $10,525,000. The amount on the bill represented the

minimum amount that the Corps required to protect the

integrity of its civil works accounts. 11 Captain Anderson

suggested that the Corps negotiate a dollar amount for reimbursement for the dredges rather than require the entire

$7,500,000 in light of the fact that "Exxon requested skimmers not dredges and the dredges did not perform at the level

the Corps had promised." 12 Exxon wanted to reimburse the

Corps at the lower rate for skimmers rather than at the

dredge rates that the Corps quoted.

The Corps of Engineers was not the only federal agency

with reimbursement problems. On 10 April Representative

Earl Hutto, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness, House

Committee on Armed Services, asked the General Accounting

Office (GAO) to conduct a review of federal costs incurred

as a result of the Alaska oil spill. The review would focus

on the accounting systems and methods that federal agencies, including DOD, used to track the costs associated with

the federal cleanup effort. GAO auditors went to Valdez a

month later.

GAO auditors investigated what the various federal agencies had spent, whether the agencies had procedures to seek

reimbursement from Exxon, and the extent to which they

had been reimbursed. GAO's interim report, which was completed in January 1990, covered the estimated costs reported

by agencies as of 30 September 1990 and reimbursements

received through 15 November 1989.

Nine federal agencies had incurred costs - costs totaling $125 .2 million during this time period. Of this total,

$111 .8 million was for the cleanup, $12.3 million for damage

assessment, and $1 .1 million for other costs resulting from
Funding and Reimbursement 1

the spill. DOD incurred the greatest costs of any fede

agency -$62.8 million. DOT was second with costs total

$33.3 million. Seven of the nine federal agencies had soug

reimbursement under Section 311(k) of the Clean Water A

and three of the agencies established direct agreements wi

Exxon. Two of the three agencies also used the 311(k) proc

for costs not covered under direct agreements.

As of 15 November 1989 Exxon had reimbursed $8

million of the $125.2 million. The unreimbursed balance 

$44.4 million - included amounts that agencies were s

processing and had not yet billed to Exxon or amounts t

the Coast Guard and/or Exxon challenged. Recovery of h

of the $44.4 million ($21 .6 million) was uncertain. Either t

Coast Guard or Exxon was questioning the allowability 

$17.8 million in costs, which included charges for the Cor

of Engineers dredges "which Exxon considers excessiv

activities that the FOSC did not approve in advance; a

costs for which the Coast Guard had requested more 

tailed documentation.

Department of Defense costs totaled $62.8 million, 

which Exxon had reimbursed $41.5 million and $4.6 mill

was still being processed. GAO indicated that the remaini

costs, $16.7 million, were either uncertain or had not be

reimbursed. DOD payments that were uncertain inclu

$7 .4 million, the cost of the two Corps dredges; $1 .8 mill

for MEDEVAC equipment and personnel; and $0.4 mill

for Air Force telecommunication services used to coordin

DOD activities. Exxon disputed the $7.4 million dredging c

because it wanted to pay skimmer rates rather than 

higher dredging rates that the Corps charged. In additi

Coast Guard officials contended that the FOSC had not 

quested or authorized either the MEDEVAC services or 

Air Force telecommunication services. 13

The Corps committed resources before its authority to 

so was clearly defined and before a proper mechanism 

reimbursement was in place. The uncertainties about autho

ties and funding procedures created reimbursement proble

for the Corps and for other agencies that have not yet be

fully resolved.
CHAPTER IX

Conclusion

The Exxon Valdez spill was the first time that the Coast

Guard had ever worked with the Army or the Corps in largescale oil recovery operations. DOD and Corps officials at

times became impatient waiting for political decisions when

they saw a job that needed to be done. They were uncomfortable in the "support" role, especially when the command

structure was unclear. The military prefers to be given a

mission and complete authority to carry out that mission.

In the Alaska operations, the National Contingency Plan

forced the Coast Guard to deal with a large cast of players

using consensus and cooperation, but military organizations

do not normally function this way. Colonel Kakel compared

the operation to a mass casualty exercise in which hard decisions have to be made about who lives and dies (or in this

case, hard decisions about resources and priorities). The Coast

Guard, Exxon, Defense Department, and Corps all performed

triage.l With so many agents involved in the decisionmaking process, however, Corps personnel at times found the

mission and the command structure to be muddled.

In the first weeks after the grounding, as the oil spread,

Assistant Secretary Page, General Kelly, and other officials

in headquarters became increasingly frustrated by the in

activity and the failure of Exxon and the Coast Guard to

request resources. These officials aggressively sought ways

for the Corps to contribute to the cleanup. They were confident of the Corps' capabilities and eager to respond to

President Bush's call for action. If they had not been so

aggressive about committing resources, the dredges would

not have recovered as much oil as they did and their capabilities would not have become known. The proactive approach, however, sometimes created confusion and tension

with Exxon and the Coast Guard and within the Corps of

Engineers itself, and it placed added strain on field personnel.
Conclu

In addition, there was an element of risk in pushing 

missions before the Corps was fully prepared .

Because of the urgency of the situation in Alaska, 

DOD's request, Corps officials sent the dredges before 

issues of command and control, funding, and authority co

be resolved. In the future decision makers must clarify 

authority and funding issues beforehand to avoid the con

sion and the reimbursement problems that the Corps expe

enced. Before committing resources and personnel, they mu

define the command structure and mission as much as pos

ble so that personnel in the headquarters and the field kn

exactly what is expected of them . The Alaska experie

revealed a need to construct new response relationships, c

mand and control channels, and communications channe

but this should not be done during the tension and fre

of an actual response. The Corps not only needs to establ

agreements with other agencies but also needs to develop 

own standard operating procedures for how orders are giv

how to mobilize, and how to equip the dredges.

General Hatch observed that the Corps can make 

greatest contribution as part of a federal response te

providing its dredges, skimmers, contracting capabiliti

and other resources. There should be comprehensive pl

to respond that put all appropriate talent from federal ag

cies and the private sector under the control of one responsi

party. Any proposed Corps standard operating procedures, 

added, should be subordinated to the overall operational c

trol of some other agency. The Corps task, he concluded, w

"to press within the bounds of propriety for the preparat

of regional response plans, to be a very proactive suppor

of those plans, and to be prepared to execute any role t

we might have emerging therefrom"'

Despite some confusion, the Corps responded well. Colo

Kakel and his staff handled a steady stream of visitors 

provided valuable support to other Districts, North Paci

Division, Corps laboratories, headquarters, and the dredg

General Stevens praised Colonel Kakel and his staff for th

diplomatic approach and for demonstrating a "team eff

unmatched by other agencies. General Smith observed t

Kakel and his staff played an important role in helping 

Defense Department "make wise support decisions." Perh
Conclusion

John Elmore expressed the sentiment best when he explained

that occasionally a single District or Division gets the opportunity to "carry the flag" for the Corps of Engineers, and in

this instance Alaska District carried the flag well.

The dredge crews have been called the "heroes" of the

Corps' oil spill operations. They went to Alaska without

understanding what they were to do and with no experience

in an oil recovery mission and within days became key

players. Their initiative and innovation led to the recovery

of significant amounts of oil . "Inside of a week," Colonel

Wilson concluded, "they were probably one of the most effec

tive assets we had out there for really bringing in large

amounts of free floating oil." General McInerney observed

that the Yaquina crew "acquitted themselves admirably and

were superb representatives of DOD." "The Yaquina," he

added, "quickly became a valued asset in the oil spill cleanu

and earned the respect and admiration of the Federal OnScene Coordinator and Exxon officials. " 4

Hatch and Page also praised the dredge masters and crews

for their innovativeness and dedication. "It is this caliber o

extraordinary performance in the face of unknown and sever

conditions;" Page wrote, "that contributes to the Corps' out

standing reputation." Dredge captain Miguel Jimenez aptl

asserted that the dredges set a new standard for the oi

recovery industry. "The dredge has proven its capability t

be used in an oil spill scenario," he wrote. "Given proper ai

support, at least one sea skimming boom with craft for tow

ing and being deployed at the earliest possible time, th

dredges are without equal." 5

The Alaska experience provided ample evidence that th

Army and the Corps can make substantial contributions i

future oil spills and that the Corps should be involved i

response planning. The number of major oil spills that hav

occurred since the Exxon Valdez is appallingly large (se

Appendix I), and inevitably there will be more in the future

Perhaps a greater tragedy than the Alaska spill itself woul

be for the Corps and other agencies to fail to use their experi

ence to develop more effective procedures and relationship

and better response capabilities.
basis and occurred in one of the most remote areas of t

United States. The capability to respond adequately to 

spill of that magnitude in that place simply did not exi

Prince William Sound was an area with a potential for 

large spill, but there was a feeling that it would not happ

at Valdez. Valdez had roughly nine thousand ship trans

during its fourteen years of operation. Eight to nine bill

gallons of oil had been shipped out, and the largest sp

prior to 1989 was 2,000 gallons which occurred at the doc

Thus the reaction to the 24 March spill was one of disbeli

In discussing the complacency of Alaska, Exxon, the feder

government, Congress, and the state of Alaska, Govern

Cowper compared it to a nuclear attack - everyone realiz

that it is possible, but it is not very likely, so they dive

their attention to more pressing problems.l The Gener

Accounting Office called the response "inadequate" and in

cated that the Exxon Valdez and other recent oil spills h

raised concern about the capability of current oil containme

and recovery technology. 2

As a result of the Alaska spill, the Coast Guard has tak

certain initiatives. It is currently trying to define better t

organization that the federal government should put in pla

in a catastrophic spill and the role not only of the Coast Gua

but of other agencies. The Coast Guard had memorandu

of understanding in place with the Navy that helped provi

much of the equipment that Exxon requested. It is now 

the process of reviewing its agreements with other agenci

and revising some. Coast Guard officials plan to clarify th

new relationship with DOMS.

In addition, the Coast Guard is evaluating both its 

isting worldwide pollution response equipment and n
116 Epilogue

equipment and techniques that are available and its strike

team's adequacy. It is developing legislative proposals on

merchant vessel personnel ; reviewing all national, regional,

and local contingency plans; and studying the need for additional authorities under the Clean Water Act and the Port

and Tanker Safety Act. The Coast Guard hopes to establish

a "workable disaster management type super response

mechanism" for use in other catastrophic spills. 3 USCG

officials would like more authority to direct the activities of

the spiller without federalizing the cleanup.

The Coast Guard has also stepped up its effort in oil spill

research and development. After the Argo Merchant, 7brrey

Canyon, and Amoco Cadiz spills, interest in cleanup tech

nology increased. Between 1972 and 1984, the Coast Guard

spent roughly $68 million a year on oil spill research and

development. Other agencies also spent significant amounts.

After 1984, however, interest in research and development

declined and the Coast Guard's research and development

budget dropped to $4-$8 million a year. The Exxon Valdez

spill sparked renewed interest, and the Coast Guard research and development budget climbed to $150 million in

fiscal 1989 . 4

On 26-27 September 1989 the Coast Guard sponsored

an interagency planning workshop on oil spill research and

development at the University of Connecticut campus in

Groton. Thirty-six participants from government and private

industry met to exchange information, strengthen working

relationships, and initiate the development of a coordinated

national plan for oil spill research and development. William

Rushing from the Research and Development Directorate

represented the Corps, and because DOD sent no representative, he unofficially served in that capacity as well .

Secretary Skinner directed the Coast Guard and representatives from other federal agencies to develop a document on

federal plans for future research and development. The draft

document, which includes Corps items, will be finalized in

1991 and submitted to Congress. A Department of Transportation research and development committee was created

to coordinate research among agencies and present a plan

to Secretary Skinner. Rushing is the Corps' representative

on that committee.
Epilogue

The Alaska operations have led to reassessment an

planning not only by the Coast Guard but also by the Corps

Corps officials, support staff, and the dredge crews have mad

recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the dredges

They first emphasized the need for an early decision b

HQUSACE to get the dredges to the oil quickly before it i

widely dispersed and weathered (though not so quickly tha

there is still a risk of explosion from the volatiles left i

the oil) . In addition, the Alaska operations illustrated tha

reconnaissance capability is essential to keep auxiliary ves

sels from wandering aimlessly. Corps personnel recom

mended that the Corps get certification for the helipad o

the Essayons and that operators use a coordinate system t

direct the dredges. They also suggested that booms and 

barge be dedicated exclusively to the Corps dredge, as wel

as a fishing vessel or two to put out the boom.

The dredges also need to have the proper equipment. Th

Corps should purchase 84-inch containment booms and col

weather suits that it could put on-board if needed. Oil recover

equipment could either be carried on the dredges or store

in centralized warehouses. Carrying the equipment on th

dredges might create problems because of space limitation

and might result in a vessel that is capable of doing a litt

of everything but nothing well. Some officials recommen

storing 84-inch booms and pumps in centralized locations o

each coast. Furthermore, if the Corps brought all the equip

ment and stored it, someone would still need to exercise 

and make sure that it was the kind that was needed. Differ

ent types of spills require different equipment, and the Corp

should have the flexibility to go to various vendors to get wha

it needs. Rather than actually purchasing and storing equip

ment, the Corps could keep a list of vendors/suppliers tha

it could call or have a memorandum of understanding wit

the Coast Guard or Air Force to fly equipment for the Corp

with two to four hours notice.

Finally, the Corps needs to develop better offloadin

procedures, including perhaps a way to put the oil throug

the dragarms directly into a barge, bypassing the hoppe

completely. The Corps is presently studying ways to retr

fit the dredges to make them more effective at recoveri

oil . The Marine Design Center has a major role in th

feasibility study. The Corps, however, has no legislati
Epilogue

authority to make changes to the dredges, only to study

them. 6

It is cheaper and environmentally safer to catch the oil

while it is on the water than after it reaches shore. The Corps

has available four government-owned dredges and fifteen

industry dredges that are part of the reserve fleet that represents the potential for quick response in most areas of the

nation. All Corps minimum fleet dredges and industry hopper

dredges are monitored for their location on a weekly basis.

The large hopper dredges are usually within four days sailing

time of any area of the continental United States.

In addition to the efforts to improve the dredges' effectiveness, CRREL continues its remote sensing activities. CRREL

has processed the Innotech MEIS-II multispectral, Landsat

Thermatic Mapper, and certain NOAA data and demonstrated the usefulness of its equipment. Without ground verification it has not been possible to determine explicitly what

the various image segments are showing. To gain some criteria for interpreting the Innotech data, CRREL had Alaska

District send some oil samples to the Engineer Topographical

Laboratory for spectral analysis, and CRREL completed some

basic spectral measurements for oil, oil contaminated soil

(simulating beach sands), and uncontaminated soils. That

data indicates that detecting oil contaminated beaches will

not be straightforward because oil seeps into the soil and

the spectral signature becomes a mix. CRREL also sent an

analyst to Prince William Sound to make spectral measurements on the beaches. She visited the University of Alaska,

studied the image data there, and brought back additional

samples of crude so that CRREL could do spectral analyses.

With additional resources devoted to the remote sensing

program, CRREL expects to refine the Corps' remote sensing

capability in 1991. Although it is too late for the Exxon Valdez

spill, the work will provide the Corps with a greater response

capability in the future. One ongoing CRREL project seeks

to define a practical and optimum package for remote sensing of oil spills. The goal of the second project is to develop

data recording and rapid data management techniques to

exploit remote sensing for emergency operations.?

Although the planning and research efforts of the Coast

Guard, the Corps, and other agencies are promising, Coast
Epilogue

Guard officials and others warn that there is no panacea

no simple method that will greatly improve our capabili

to clean up a spill. Rather, USCG Captain Richard Larrabe

noted, "We continue to stress the area of prevention as t

primary means of dealing with oil spills such as the Exxo

Valdez." 8 After studying the Alaska operations, GAO an

lysts also concluded that the nation's limited ability to de

with large spills such as the Exxon Valdez indicated a nee

for greater emphasis on prevention. 9
Notes

Unless otherwise noted, all records cited below are located

in the Research Collections of the Office of History, U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers, Fort Belvoir, Virginia .

I. Grounding and Early Response

1 . Anchorage (Alaska) Daily News, 25 Apr. 1989; NPA Oil Spill

Special Edition, vol. 13, no. 1, Jan. 1990, p. 2, hereafter cited as

NPA Special Edition Newspaper; . "The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill:

A Report to the President from Samuel K. Skinner and William K.

Reilly, May 1989 ;' National Response Team, appendix, pp. 1-5;

NPA, POLREP # 2, 9 Apr. 1989; U.S. Congress, House, Committee

on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Subcommittee on Coast Guard

and Navigation, Hearing, 7bpics Concerning the Exxon Valdez Oil

Spill into the Prince William Sound ofAlaska, 101st Cong., 1st sess.,

6 Apr. 1989, pp. 132-35.

2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science,

and Transportation, Hearing, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and Its Environmental and Maritime Implications, 101st Cong., 1st sess.,

6 Apr. 1989, p. 5.

3. U.S. Coast Guard, "Situation Three: Environmental Emergencies, The National Response System," n.d.

4. Joseph Pratt, "The Corps of Engineers and the Oil Pollution

Act of 1924, unpublished manuscript, Office of History, U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers.

5. USCG, "Situation Three."

11. Department of Defense/

Corps of Engineers Response

1. Interview with Capt. Richard Larrabee, USCG, USCG Headquarters, Washington, DC, 30 Mar. 1990. All interviews cited herein

were conducted by the author. "The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill : A

Report to the President from Samuel K. Skinner and William K.

Reilly, May 1989," National Response Team.
122 Note

2. House, Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation, Exxo

Valdez Oil Spill, 101st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 19, 22.

3. Ibid., pp. 22-23, 62.

4. Senate, Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 101st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 20, 24, 29-30

33,71 .

5 . Interview with Maj . Gen. James D. Smith, DOMS, Penta

gon, Washington, DC, 17 Dec. 1989; interview with Lt. Gen. Henr

J. Hatch, HQUSACE, Washington, DC, 6 July 1990.

6. Interview with ASA/CW Robert W. Page, Pentagon, 5 Dec

1989; interview with John Elmore, HQUSACE, 28 Sept. 1989

interview with Brig. Gen . Patrick Stevens, NPD, Portland, OR

19 June 1989; Lt. Gen. Henry J. Hatch, "Our Vision;" n.d. ; Lt. Gen

Henry J. Hatch, "Beyond the Battlefield: The Other Dimensio

of Military Service," 1989 Kermit Roosevelt Lecture, n.d. ; Hatc

interview.

7. Interview with Maj . Gen. Patrick Kelly, HQUSACE, 8 Feb

1990; Smith interview; Page interview.

8. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from David S

Addington, 6 Apr. 1990, in Initial Information Memorandum

DOMS.

9. Smith interview.

10 . Kelly interview; Smith interview.

11 . Smith interview.

12 . "Script for Secretary of Defense Briefing Revised

31 March:"

13 . Smith interview.

14 . Interview with Col. Thomas Wilson, AK-JTF, Elmendor

AFB, Anchorage, AK, 15 June 1989.

15 . Information Memorandum #69, 28 Sept. 1989, DOMS

ibid. #2, 10 Apr. 1989; interview with Col . William Kakel, NPA

Anchorage, AK, 13 June 1989 .

16. Page interview; Kelly interview; Smith interview.

17. Kakel interview; RRT Report #58 ; OSC PWS POLRE

# 32, 9 Apr. 1989; Stevens interview; interview with Paul Zepernick

NPD, 24 June 1989 .

18 . Smith interview; Kelly interview; Elmore interview.

19 . Interview with James Reese, NPD, 20 June 1989 .

20. Reese interview; Wilson interview; Smith interview.

21 . Information Memorandum #2, 10 Apr. 1989, DOMS.

22 . JTFAK, Information Memorandum: Findings and Reco

mendations of DOD Assessment Team, 20 Apr. 1989; Reese inte

view; Elmore interview.

23. NPA POLREP #4, 11 Apr. 1989; Information Memoran

dum # 5, 13 Apr. 1989, DOMS.
Notes 123

24 . USCG HQ Telecommunications, 11 Apr. 1989, EOC #88 ;

Memorandum, Col. Morton J. Plumb, USAF, Director of Joint

Operations, JTF to DOMS, 10 Apr. 1989, in JTF SITREP # 2,

10 Apr. 1989; Report to Brig. Gen. Stevens from NPA, 1 May 1989,

NPA EOC #55/56.

25 . Wilson interview; interview with Kirk Shadrick, NPA,

12 June 1989 .

26. Reese interview.

27 . NPA POLREP # 8, 15 Apr. 1989; ibid. # 8, 15 Apr. 1989 .

28. Commander McInerney JTFAK to OAS/DAMO-ODS (Office of the Secretary of the Army/Operations Readiness and Mobilization Directorate-Operations and Contingency Plans Divisions),

Information Memorandum: Findings and Recommendations of

DOD Assessment Team, 20 Apr. 1989, DOMS.

29. Information Memorandum #8, 18 Apr. 1989, DOMS.

30. Ibid. # 40, 2 June 1989; ibid. # 69, 28 Sept. 1989.

31 . Memorandum for Director of Military Support from Capt.

Paul A. Cassiman, USN, 10 Apr. 1989, in Information Memorandum # 5; NPA Special Edition Newspaper; U.S. Congress, House,

Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Subcommittee

on Investigations and Oversight, Hearing, National Oil Spill Contingency Planning and Response Capabilities, 101st Cong., 1st sess.,

10 May 1989, p. 145 ; Information Memorandum # 11, 21 Apr. 1989,

DOMS.

32. Anchorage (Alaska) Times, 28 Apr. 1989; Information

Memorandum # 69; ibid. # 20, 4 May 1989.

III. Growing Corps of Engineers Involvement

1. Notes from conversation with Arthur K. Hurme, HQUSACE, 6 Sept. 1989; interview with Robert Hopman, NPD, 4 Aug.

1989.

2. ASA/CW to TAG AK Anchorage, Sen. Stevens, Sen.

Murkowski, Rep. Young, Gov. Cowper, 29 Mar. 1989, EOC #70;

ASA/CW to EPA, DOI, Secretary of Transportation, FEMA,

29 Mar. 1989, ibid. ; Page interview.

3. CECW-D (HQUSACE, Directorate of Civil Works, Dredging Division), Memorandum for the Commander, NPD, 30 Mar.

1989, NPD.

4. Interview with Charles Puch and Ronald Henry, 14 June

1989; Brig. Gen. Stevens, Memorandum for CECW-ZA (HQUSACE,

Director, Civil Works), 3 Apr. 1989, NPD.

5. "Preparations for Alaska Oil Spill Recovery Mission;"

24 Mar.-10 Apr. 1989, NPD; videotape, "Dredge Yaquina" ; interview with Leroy Johnson, NPP, Portland, OR, 21 June 1989.
124

Notes

6. Smith interview; Page interview; Stevens interview.

7. Smith interview; interview with Vice Adm. Clyde E.

Robbins, USCG, Coast Guard Island, Alameda, CA, 17 Apr. 1990.

8 . Elmore interview.

9 . Kakel interview.

10. Stevens interview; Kakel interview; NPA, "After Action

Report Review and Analysis: Alaska 1989 Oil Spill;" pp. 5-6, # 33 .

11 . Message, DOMS JTF to CDRUSACE, 11 Apr. 1989, EOC

# 79; Message # 273, Chuck Hummer to Ken and Jake, 11 Apr. 1989,

NPA EOC I-541 ; NPA POLREP #4, 11 Apr. 1989 .

12 . NPP SITREP #3, 11 Apr. 1989, EOC #76; NPP, Public

Affairs Office, Task Force Castle, Onboard the Yaquina; Sunday

April 16, memorandum, Ken Patterson, Chief, Navigation Branch

for Master, Yaquina, 14 Apr. 1989.

13 . CECW-D, (Chuck Hummer) memorandum to NPP, 11 Apr.

1989, NPA EOC I-932; message #267, reply from Patterson,

11 Apr. 1989, ibid.

14. Message, CDRUSACE (Larry Kissell) to CDR NPD, 13 Apr.

1989, NPA EOC I-220; message CECW-EOC (Larry Kissell)

to CDR NPD, 14 Apr. 1989; message, DOMS to CDRUSACE,

14 Apr. 1989, HQ EOC #250.

15 . Elmore interview; NPP SITREP #8, 14 Apr. 1989.

16 . O. R. Harrison to Adm. Yost,15 Apr. 1989, NPA EOC I-690.

17 . "Warsila Builds Special Purpose Dredges for USSR." World

Dredging and Marine Construction, Oct. 1986, pp. 18-23.

18. Message, Capt. Kevin Brice to George Kona, 16 Apr. 1989,

NPP; NPP SITREP #9, 15 Apr. 1989, EOC #160; interview with

Capt. Kevin Brice, 12 June 1989, Anchorage, AK; memorandum,

Bob Hopman to Paul Zepernick, Jake Schmidt, Gen. Stevens,

18 Apr. 1989, NPD.

19. Message, USCG Marine Safety Office, Valdez/FOSC to

RUEADAD/DOMS JTF, 17 Apr. 1989, EOC # 171 .

20. HQ EOC tasker to CECW-D, 18 Apr. 1989, EOC #207 ;

Kelly interview; Chuck Hummer memorandum, 21 Apr. 1989.

21 . Message, DOMS to MSO Valdez/FOSC, 18 Apr. 1989, EOC

# 189.

22 . Message, Brice to Ted Hunt, 17 Apr. 1989, NPD.

23 . Chuck Hummer Memorandum, 21 Apr. 1989; message,

USCG Marine Safety Office, Valdez to AIG Nine Nine One, 18 Apr.

1989, EOC # 197 ; interview with Capt. Miguel Jimenez, Portland,

OR, 20 June 1989; Brice interview.

24. Task Force Castle, April 19, Onboard the Yaquina; Brice

interview; Kelly interview; Shadrick interview.

25. Message, DOMS to CDRUSACE, 19 Apr. 1989, EOC # 250;

NPA POLREP # 13, 20 Apr. 1989; Brice interview.
Notes 125

26 . See Task Force Castle, 19 and 20 Apr. 1989, Onboard the

Yaquina, pp. 12-13.

27 . Ibid.

28 . Elmore interview; Kelly interview ; Smith interview.

29 . Information Memorandum # 14, 26 Apr. 1989, DOMS; ibid.

# 19, 3 May 1989; Elmore interview; Kelly interview.

30 . Elmore interview ; interview with Commanders David B.

Pascoe and Robert Luchen, USCG Headquarters, Washington, DC,

30 Mar. 1990 .

31 . Message, DOMS JTF to AK JTF, 22 Apr. 1989, NPA EOC

I-795 ; Report to Brig. Gen. Stevens from NPA, 2 May 1989, NPA

EOC I-56-57.

32 . Elmore interview; Stevens interview; interview with

George Zeiler, NPD, 22 June 1989; NPA EOC to Stevens, n.d., NPA

EOC 1-839; NPA, After Action Report, p. 18 .

33 . NPA, After Action Report, pp. 16-17 ; Shadrick interview;

NPA Special Edition Newspaper.

34 . Message, Zeiler to Elmore, 10 May 1989 ; Memorandum,

George J. Zeiler to CDR NPA, 12 May 1989, NPA EOC I-256;

Reese interview.

35 . Elmore interview; Stevens interview.

IV. Command and ControUCommunications

1 . Robbins interview; USCG videotape, "Exxon Valdez Oil

Spill: The First Forty Days"

2. Robbins interview; Pascoe/Luchen interview.

3 . Robbins interview.

4. Ibid.

5 . Ibid.

6 . Ibid.

7 . Ibid.

8 . Smith interview.

9. Robbins interview.

10. Robbins interview; Pascoe/Luchen interview; Wilson

interview.

11. Robbins interview.

12. Smith interview.

13. Stevens interview; Kakel interview.

14 . Kelly interview; Stevens interview.

15 . Kelly interview; interview with Richard Gutleber, NPA,

Anchorage, AK, 13 June 1989; Shadrick interview.

16. Kelly interview; Kakel interview; NPA, "After Action

Report;" p. 52 .
126 Note

17. Brice interview; interview with Eric Braun, NPP, Portland

OR, 21 June 1989; Kakel interview ; NPA, "After Action Report,

p. 51 .

18. Robbins interview.

19. Brice interview.

20 . Interview with Robert Fletcher, HQUSACE, 2 Mar. 1990

21. Ibid.

22. Wilson interview.

23. Bob Brewin, "Military Network Takes Lead in Oil Spil

Response," Federal Computer Weekly, 24 Apr. 1989; Informatio

Memorandum # 10, 20 Apr. 1989, DOMS; CG CC Incident Memo

#32, 30 Apr. 1989.

24 . HQUSACE EOC SITREP #7, 18 Apr. 1989 ; Anchorag

Daily News, 27 Apr. 1989.

25. Information Memorandum #7, 17 Apr. 1989, DOMS; Smit

interview; Wilson interview.

26. Ibid.

27 . Stevens interview; Gutleber interview; NPA, "After Actio

Report;' p. 47 .

28 . Shadrick interview.

29 . NPA Special Edition Newspaper; NPA, "After Action Re

port," p. 40.

V. Corps Dredges Operations

1. NPA, "After Action Report," pp. 26, 42; Johnson interview

Brice interview; EnginEars, May 1989.

2. Brice interview; Shadrick interview; Elmore interview

Kakel interview.

3. Kakel interview; Braun interview.

4. Braun interview; Brice interview.

5. NPA, "After Action Report," pp. 25-26.

6. Ibid., p. 32; memorandum, NPA EOC to Col. Plum, JTF

23 Apr. 1989, NPA EOC I-781.

7. "Weathering of Crude Oil," 12 Apr. 1989, EOC #97; "Oi

Spills," Science, vol . 244, no. 4905, 12 May 1989, p. 629.

8. Miguel Jimenez, Memorandum For Record, "Report on th

Recovering and Discharging Methodology United States Army

Corps of Engineers Dredge Yaquina," 3 May 1989 .

9. Ibid. ; Jimenez interview.

10. Ibid.

11. International Dredging Review, vol. 8, no. 6, June 1989, p. 7

12. EnginEars, May 1989; Pentagram, "Corps of Engineers

Helps Clean Up Alaska Spill," 4 May 1989 .
Notes

VI. Shoreline Cleanup

127

13. Miguel Jimenez, "Memorandum of Improving Hopper

Dredge Production When Used in Surface Contaminant Recovery,"

18 May 1989.

14 . "Warsila Builds Special Purpose Dredge for USSR;" World

Dreding and Marine Construction, Oct. 1986, pp. 18-23 .

15 . Kakel interview; Robbins interview; Brice interview.

16. Kakel interview; Robbins interview; Brice interview; Braun

interview.

17. NPA POLREP # 18, 25 Apr. 1989; Brice interview; conversation with Neil Neihburg, 20 June 1989.

18. Jimenez, "Memorandum of Change of Ullage Methodology," 23 Apr. 1989; Jimenez, Memorandum, 18 May 1989 .

19. NPA, "After Action Report," pp. 38, 45 .

20. Jimenez, Memorandum, 18 May 1989.

21 . Message, FOSC to AIG Four Nine Nine One, 27 Apr. 1989,

HQ EOC #340; Jimenez, MFR, 3 May 1989.

22 . Johnson interview; Puch/Henry interview; Daily Report for

MSO Valdez, Yaquina, 14 May 1989; Jimenez interview; Jimenez,

Memorandum, 18 May 1989.

23 . Daily Report for MSO Valdez, Yaquina, 12 May 1989; NPA,

"After Action Report," p. 12 ; Jimenez interview; Brice interview.

24. Conversation with Neihburg; International Dredging Review, vol. 8, no. 6, June 1989, p. 6.

25. Daily Report for MSO Valdez, Yaquina, 17 May 1989 .

26. Jimenez, Memorandum, 18 May 1989.

27. Memorandum, Col. Jouni Keravouri, DOD JTF, for CDR

Corps, 26 May 1989 .

28. NPD, Nor'wester, vol. 12, no. 3, July 1989 .

29. Kakel interview; memorandum, Col. Kakel for CDR

JTFAK, 17 May 1989; M. J. Friesenhahn, Exxon Co., to FOSC,

22 May 1989.

30. Daily Report for MSO Valdez, Essayons, 26 June 1989; ibid.,

28 June 1989 .

31 . Puch/Henry interview; Carpenter to Capt. J. G. Schmidtman, 17 June 1989, USCG; NPA POLREP #66, 20 July 1989.

32. Secretary Marsh to CDRUSACE, 13 June 1989, EOC # 689.

1 . Message, CG MSO Valdez to ZEN/CCGD Seventeen,

Juneau, 8 Apr. 1979, EOC #55.

2. Robbins interview.

3. Message, CG FOSC and AIG Four Nine Nine One, 2 May

1989, EOC #430.
128

VII. Research and Development

Note

4. Dennis Kelso to Adm. Yost, 4 May 1989, NPA EOC I-260 

5. Anchorage (Alaska) Times, 3 May 1989; Vice Adm. Clyde E

Robbins to Otto Harrison, 9 May 1989, NPA EOC I-260; New Yor

Times, 11 May 1989.

6. Robbins interview.

7 . Message, FOSC to AIG Four Nine Nine One, 21 May 198

message, CDR Luchen to Corps 1, 24 May 1989, NPA EOC I-899 

8. Frank N. Schubert, "The Amoco Cadiz Cleanup," Office o

History, HQUSACE; Rudolph Chelminski, Superwreck, Amoc

Cadiz. The Shipwreck That Had to Happen (New York: Willia

Morrow and Company, Inc., 1987), p. 155.

9. Anchorage (Alaska) Daily News, 23 April, 4 May, 13 Ma

1989.

10. Ibid.

11 . Message, FOSC to JTF, 25 May 1989, NPA EOC I-387 

Information Memorandum #69, 28 Sept. 1989, DOMS.

1 . WES Fact Sheet, "Effectiveness of Cleanup Methods," n.d

Elena B. Sparrow and Stephen D. Sparrow, "An Oil Spill Stud

Ten Years Later," Agroborealis, vol. 21, no. 1, Jan. 1989; CRRE

Fact Sheet.

2. Robert Oswald to CDR and Director, CRREL, n.d . ; memo

randum, Lewis E . Link to CECW-O, 11 Apr. 1989, EOC # 112 ; o

spill briefings, EOC HQUSACE, 11 Apr. 1989 and 27 Apr. 1989 

3. Lewis E. Link, Memorandum for CERD-ZA (Rober

Oswald), 8 May 1989.

4. Message, CECRL-CD-TR (CRREL Counsel) to CERD-C

(HQUSACE Research and Development Directorate), 28 Apr. 198

interview with William Rushing, HQUSACE, 16 Mar. 1990.

5 . Message, DOMS to USAGE, 27 Apr. 1989, EOC # 342.

6 . Message, CECRL-PP to CERD-C1, 28 Apr. 1989, Researc

and Development Directorate, HQUSACE.

7 . Message, CECRL-TD (Lewis E. Link) to CECRL-PP

4 May 1989; message, Joe to Greg, 5 May 1989 .

8. Shadrick interview; Kakel interview; message, Joe to Greg

4 May 1989.

9. Shadrick interview.

10. Pete Kirby and Ray Montgomery, Memorandum For Re

cord, 16 May 1989 ; Jacob F Redlinger and James R. Reese, Memo

randum thru Chief, CENPD-CO-C for Division Commander

11 May 1989 .

11 . Reese interview; conversation with Ray Montgomery, WES

31 May 1989; Kakel interview; Rushing interview.
Notes

12. Reese, Memorandum for Chief, CENPD-PL-ER,

26 Nov. 90.

13. Kirby and Montgomery, MFR, 16 May 1989; Reese and

Redlinger memorandum, 11 May 1989; Clarion (Mississippi) Ledger,

18 May 1989; Vicksburg (Mississippi) Evening Pbst, 18 May 1989.

14. Kakel interview; Kelly interview.

15. Memorandum, Maj. Gen. J D. Smith to Lt. Gen. McInerney,

10 May 1989, NPA EOC I-209 ; message, McInerney to Vice Adm.

Clyde E. Robbins, 16 May 1989, EOC #559; memorandum, Col.

Keravuori, Chief, DOD-JTF for CDR US Corps (EOC), 26 May

1989, EOC # 613.

16. Memorandum for CDR, USAGE, Daily Staff Journal,

26 Apr. 1989.

17. Lewis E. Link, Memorandum for CDR USAGE (William

Rushing), n.d.

18. Memorandum for CDR, USAGE, Daily Staff Journal,

26 Apr. 1989; James R. Hanchey, Memorandum for the Director of

Civil Works, 18 May 1989; Tech-Tran, vol. 14, no. 3, summer 1989.

19. Fact Sheet, 24 Apr. 1989, WES; U.S. Congress, House,

Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Subcommittee on

Coast Guard and Navigation, Hearings on H. R. 2158, 7b Provide

Better Maritime Safety For Prince William Sound, Alaska, and For

Other Purposes, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 11 May 1989, pp. 97-109.

20 . William Rushing, Memorandum for Record, 15 Apr. 1989,

R&D.

21 . Rushing, Fact Sheet, 24 Apr. 1989, WES.

22 . Information Paper, "Bioremediation of the Alaska Oil

Spill)" EOC SITREP # 27, 16 May 1989 .

VIII . Funding and Reimbursement

129

1. Hatch interview; notes from conversation with Lester

Edelman, HQUSACE, 14 Sept. 1990; message, DOMS-JTF to

Commandant USCG, 15 May 1989, EOC #543.

2 . Interview with Dale Ringer, HQUSACE, 1 Sept. 1989 .

3. General Accounting Office, "Federal Costs Resulting From

the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill," Jan. 1990, p. 19.

4. E. Scott Chronister, Memorandum for John Elmore, 8 Apr.

1989, EOC #37.

5 . Ringer interview; GERM-B (Bronel Jennell), Information

Paper, 11 May 1989.

6 . Lt. Col . Roy Carlson, Memorandum for CDR, USAGE,

11 Apr. 1989, EOC # 77; POLREP # 12, 19 Apr. 1989.

7. Message, DOMS JTF to RUEADWD/DIRMILSPT

DCSOPS, etc., 13 Apr. 1989, EOC # 167; Ringer interview.
130

Conclusion

Epilogue

Notes

8. Ringer interview.

9. Memorandum, CENPD-RM-B (Tim Hiller) to Brig. Gen.

Stevens, 26 Apr. 1989.

10. Message, HQUSACE to NPP, NPD, and other field offices,

1 May 1989.

11. Message, DOMS-JTF to Commandant USCG, 15 May

1989, EOC # 543; memorandum, John F Wallace, Director Resource

Management, to Michael Melburne, Director of Financial Management, DOD, 4 Aug. 1989, RM.

12 . Phone conversation, Capt. Anderson with Tim Hiller, NPD,

14 July 1989, copy of phone log in records of Resource Management, HQUSACE.

13 . GAO, "Federal Costs Resulting from the Exxon Valdez Oil

Spill)" pp. 2-3. 23-24 .

1 . Kakel interview; Robbins interview; Stevens interview;

Elmore interview.

2. Hatch interview.

3. Smith interview; Stevens interview; Elmore interview.

4. Wilson interview; message, Lt. Gen. Thomas G. McInerney

to CDR NPP, 13 June 1989, NPA EOC I-531 .

5 . Robert W. Page to Lt. Gen. Henry J. Hatch, 8 June 1989,

NPA EOC I-945 ; notes from conversation with Capt. Miguel

Jimenez, 20 June 1989; Jimenez, MFR, 3 May 1989 .

1 . Larrabee interview; U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee

on Environmental Protection, Hearing, Adequacy and Effectiveness

of the Oilspill Cleanup in Prince William Sound, Alaska, 101st

Cong., 1st sess., 19 Apr. 1989, p. 46 .

2. GAO, "Adequacy of Preparation and Response to Exxon

Valdez Oil Spill," Oct. 1989, p. 1.

3. Larrabee interview; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on

Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Subcommittee on Coast Guard

and Navigation, Hearings on H.R. 2158, Prince William Sound

Oil Spill Response Act, 101st Conga, 1st sess., 11 May 1989, p. 5 .

4 . Larrabee interview.

5 . "Interagency Planning Workshop: Oil Spill Research and

Development, Report of the Workshop Conducted September 26-27,

1989, Coast Guard Research and Development Center Groton,

Connecticut," Revised 1990; interview with William Rushing,

HQUSACE, 16 Mar. 1990.
Notes

6. Kakel interview; Wilson interview; Shadrick intervie

Johnson interview; Jimenez conversation; Brice interview.

7. Lewis E. Link, Memorandum for CDR USAGE (Willia

Rushing), n.d. ; Rushing interview.

8. Larrabee interview.

9. GAO, "Response to Exxon Valdez Oil Spilli" p. 1.
APPENDIX A

Oil Spills Since the Exxon Valdez

Between June 1988 and June 1989 there were five to si

thousand spills involving oil and other toxic substances alon

the coasts and in other navigable waters of the United States

Of these spills, twelve were classified as major because the

involved 100,000 gallons or morel The months since th

Valdez spill have clearly demonstrated that the problem o

oil spills will continue. Three significant oil spills tha

occurred between 23 and 25 June 1989 involved over 1.2

million gallons together. The Corps of Engineers monitore

each of these spills and offered support .

The first of these spills occurred on the Delaware River. A

4:40 A.M. on Friday, 23 June 1989, the 749-foot Uruguaya

tanker Presidente Rivera, fully loaded with 430,000 barrel

of #6 crude oil, ran aground in the Delaware River at Marcu

Hook, Pennsylvania. Roughly 800,000 gallons of the heav

crude poured into the water and spread over a fifteen-mil

stretch of the river. The vessel agent/owner hired cleanup con

tractors (Underwater Technics). Initially the contractors coul

not get enough equipment or personnel to contain the spil

effectively, and the Coast Guard had no available alternative

so the National Guard was called in. The National Guar

provided 300 people and local contractors had 250 worker

on-site, plus roughly 150 local volunteers. The America

Dredging Company furnished three bucket dredges and nu

merous barges for containment of contaminated material

The standard response failed. On Monday, 26 June, hun

dreds of thousands of gallons of thick oil, in chunks varyin

from the size of golf balls to six feet in length, continue

spreading over the Delaware River and its tributaries, push

ing aside booms or slipping under them and clogging skim

ming equipment. At a bird rookery, Pea Patch Island, worker

supplemented the booms with nets and shovels, but foun

their bare hands to be the most effective tool. The Corps
134 Oil Spills since the Exxon Valdez

Philadelphia District EOC sent a representative to the MultiAgency Local Response Team meetings twice a day. The Coast

Guard initially asked for certain Corps resources: a driftmaster from New York District; small boats to supplement

the Coast Guard capability; and a survey boat to assist in

identifying the location of oi1. 2 The Corps dispatched the

surveyboat Buckley from the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal

on Saturday, 24 June, and the next day it began a survey

of federal navigation channels in areas designated by the

Captain of the Port in Philadelphia .

Brigadier General Kelly sent Robert J. Hopman, acting

Chief of Dredging, Navigation Branch, HQUSACE, to find

ways that the Corps could provide assistance. After meeting

with Philadelphia District officials, Hopman toured the

cleanup site by boat. The Corps mobilized the crane barge

Titan and two deck cargo barges, but on 28 June the Coast

Guard cancelled all requests for Corps resources. The Titan

resumed normal operations on the Delaware River; the two

cargo barges returned to Fort Mifflin; and the driftmaster

returned to New York harbor. 3

At 6:20 PM. on 23 June 1989 a Panamanian freighter,

Rachel B., collided with a barge owned by the Coastal Towing Company near the mouth of the Houston Ship Channel.

Although the Rachel B. was not damaged significantly, three

damaged port tanks on the barge poured approximately six

thousand barrels of heavy # 6 crude oil into Galveston Bay.

The Coast Guard temporarily closed the ship channel to

traffic. A coastal towing contractor, Garner Environmental,

arrived on-site around 8:30 that night and began cleanup

operations. Adverse weather conditions throughout the week

hampered cleanup efforts. Some oil escaped into the bay

where containment booms broke in the severe weather. Small

oil patches and larger surface slicks washed onto the bird

islands and the oyster reefs about three quarters of a mile

off Smith Point. 4

On 23 June 1989, a medium-sized oil tanker with a cargo

of heating oil hit a reef near the entrance to Narragansett

Bay, near Newport, Rhode Island, spreading a slick five miles

long in the first few hours. The 532-foot World Prodigy, a

Greek-registered tanker with a cargo of 195,000 barrels

(8 .1 million gallons) of oil hit Breton reef, two miles off' shore,
Oil Spills since the Exxon Valdez 13

about 4:20 PM. The Coast Guard reported that the tanke

was surrounded by boom within three hours, but roughl

420,000 gallons of highly toxic #2 fuel oil spilled in Narragan

sett Bay. The oil, which was lighter than that at Valdez

evaporated quickly. Seventy percent of the oil evaporated i

the first two days. By 25 June the spill had spread 20 mile

to the north, endangering the rich marine resources of th

bay and contaminating beaches. 5

On 24 June the Corps notified the Coast Guard tha

it had equipment, personnel, and expertise ready to assis

them in any or all of the three spills. A dredge available i

New York District could be converted to recover oil. Distric

Engineers in each of the three locations were in constant com

munication with the Coast Guard and awaited instructions

to assist. The Coast Guard, however, had the spills under con

trol . General Kelly contacted Rear Admiral Joel D. Sipes in

Coast Guard headquarters and offered Corps assistance.6

The three spills in June posed less of an environmental

threat than originally feared, but they did focus attention

on the system of transporting oil through the nation's water

ways and on the question of whether there should be tougher

laws and tougher enforcement. The weakness of the National

Contingency Plan was again apparent. Only if the spiller

cannot be identified or refuses to respond can the federal

government step in. In the case of the spills in Rhode Island

and Delaware, which involved foreign tankers, the federal

government took on cleanup duties immediately.

Oil spills continued throughout the year, both large and

small. On 13 September 1989 the barge Morania, carrying

4,000,000 gallons of gasoline, ran aground in the East River,

spilling approximately 100,000 gallons of gasoline. The

Coast Guard closed the waterway to marine traffic because

of the potential fire hazard. The gasoline dissipated and the

East River Bridge was reopened the next morning.?

On 14 November 1989 a Greek cargo ship, Milos Reefer,

ran aground in the Bering Sea at the national wildlife refuge

off Matthew Island in Alaskan waters. The 485-foot ship was

loaded with 71,320 gallons of diesel oil and 285 gallons of

intermediate fuel oil. Oil seeped from the vessel, leaving a

2,000-gallon trail several miles long. Two weeks later, on

28 November, a government contractor, Olshan, Inc., broke
136

an abandoned underground pipeline while performing a dem

olition contract on the Fort Point Reservation in Galveston

Texas. The break resulted in a fifty-gallon spill of an un

identified petroleum product.$

In early June 1990 an explosion occurred on the Meg

Borg sixty miles southeast of Galveston, and the resultin

fire raged for days. By 12 June the crude oil spill stretche

for thirteen miles and spread into light scattered pocket

along the Gulf. Galveston District stood by ready to provid

manpower and contracting capability. On 13 June the fir

was under control and the slick was no longer burning, bu

a major cleanup effort remained. 9 In addition to the spill

described above, there were many others of varying size, eac

presenting its own unique problems.

Notes

1 . New York Times, 29 June 1989.

2 . Philadelphia District, POLREP #1, n.d.

3. Philadelphia District, POLREP # 2, 27 June 1989 ; Assistan

Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), Memorandum for the Secre

tary of the Army, 28 June 1989.

4 . Galveston District, SITREP #2, 25 June 1989; New Yor

Times, 25 June 1989 .

5 . New York Times, 24 June 1989; ibid., 25 June 1989.

6. Page Memorandum, 27 June 1989; Brig. Gen. Patrick Kelly

Memorandum Through Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civi

Works) for Secretary of the Army, 28 June 1989 . 7. New York District, SITREP, 3 Oct. 1989.

8. New York Times, 18 Nov. 1989 ; Galveston District, Situatio

Report, 29 Nov. 1989 .

9. Galveston District, POLREP #3, 12 June 1990 ; ibid. #4

13 June 1990.

Oil Spills since the Exxon Valde
APPENDIX B

Acronym Glossary

ASACW Assistance Secretary of the Army

(Civil Works)

AFB Air Force Base

AK-JTF Alaska Joint Task Force

AOC Army Operations Center

CMT Crisis Management Team

CWA Clean Water Act

CRREL Cold Regions Research and

Engineering Laboratory

DEC Alaska Department of Environmenta

Conservation

DOD Department of Defense

DOMS Director of Military Support

DOMS-JTF Director of Military Support Joint

Task Force

DOT Department of Transportation

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

ETL Engineer Topographical Laboratory

FWS Fish and Wildlife Service

FOSC Federal On-Scene Coordinator

GAO General Accounting Office

HQUSACE Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers

MAC Military Airlift Command

MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation

NCP National Contingency Plan

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

NPA Alaska District, U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers

NPD North Pacific Division, U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers
138 Acronym Glossary

NPP Portland District, U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers

NRT National Response Team

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health

Administration

POLREP Pollution Report

PACAREA Pacific Area, U.S. Coast Guard

RRT Regional Response Team

SITREP Situation Report

SUPSALV Supervisor of Salvage, U.S. Navy

TAC Terrain Analysis Center

USCG U.S. Coast Guard

WES Waterways Experiment Station
APPENDIX C

List of Oral History Interviews

Eric Braun Portland District (NPP),

6/21/89

Capt. Kevin Brice Dredge and Plant

Project, NPP, 6/12/89

John P Elmore Chief, Construction,

Operations, and

Readiness Division,

HQUSACE, 9/28/89

Robert P Fletcher Chief, Readiness Branch,

HQUSACE, 3/2/90

Richard Gutleber Alaska District (NPA),

6/13/89

Lt. Gen. Henry J. Hatch Commander and Chief o

Engineers, USAGE,

7/6/90

Robert Hopman Chief of Navigation

Plant, North Pacific

Division (NPD), 8/4/8

Miquel Jimenez* Captain of Yaquina, 6/20

Leroy Johnson Acting Project Manager,

Dredge and Plant

Project, NPP, 6/21/89

Col. William Kakel District Engineer, NPA,

6/13/89

Maj. Gen. Patrick Kelly Director of Civil Works,

HQUSACE, 2/8/90

Capt. Richard Larrabee Chief, Marine and

Environmental

Response Division,

USCG, 3/30/90

Dr. Raymond Montgomery** WES, 5/31/90

Robert W. Page Assistant Secretary of

the Army (Civil

Works), 12/5/89
*No transcript available.

**No tape or transcript available.

140 List of Oral History Interviews

Cmdr. David B. Pascoe Chief, Environmental

Coordination Branch,

USCG (and Cmdr.

Robert Luchen),

3/30/90

Charles Puch Project Coordinator

(and Ron Henry,

Captain of Essayons),

6/14/89

James Reese Environmental Resources, NPD, 6/20/89

Dale Ringer Chief, Budget and

Program Analysis

Branch, Resource

Management,

HQUSACE, 9/1/89

Vice Adm. Clyde Robbins Pacific Area Commander,

USCG, 4/17/90

William Rushing Research and Development, HQUSACE,

3/16/90

Kirk Shadrick Asst. Chief,

ConstructionOperations Division,

NPA, 6/12/89

Maj. Gen. James D. Smith Director of Military

Support, Department

of the Army, 12/17/89

Brig. Gen. Patrick M. Stevens Division Engineer,

NPD, 6/19/89

Col. Thomas Wilson Deputy Commander and

Chief of Staff, Alaska

Air Command,

6/15/89

George Zeiler Chief, Construction

Branch, NPD, 6/22/89

Paul Zepernick Chief, Emergency

Management Branch,

NPD, 6/24/89
A

Addington, David S. : 15,

26,45

Aerial reconnaissance : 68,

73, 95, 96, 99, 100, 117

Air vacuum pumps: 76

Alaska, Gulf of 3, 6, 7, 11,

36, 38

Alaska, state of 25, 84, 85,

86 ; Department of Environmental Conservation, 52, 62, 84, 87

Alaska Air Command: 19,

27, 60, 61

Alaska Command and Control Military Automated

Network (ACCMAN): 60

Alaska District (NPA): 19,

22,23,34,45,46-47,55,

56, 57, 61, 65, 66, 67, 86,

94,97,98,99,105,113 ;

Emergency Operations

Center, 20-21, 56, 61,

63, 64, 74-75, 105

Alaska Joint Task Force:

18, 19, 21, 22,24, 25, 34,

37,45,54-55,56,61,66,

67, 79, 86, 95-96, 99,

105, 107, 108

Alaska Oil Spill MultiAgency Coordination

group: 71

Index

Alyeska Pipeline Servic

Company: 3, 4, 5, 6

Amoco Cadiz oil spill: 69

88-90, 91, 116

Anchorage Daily News : 6

B

Baker, Rear Adm. Edwar

B. : 19

Barges: 26, 75, 78

Berthing ships: 26, 28, 29

34, 37, 83, 87

Biologists: 36

Bioremediation : 101-102

Bligh Island: 4, 6

Breeden, Richard: 14, 1

26, 45, 62

Brice, Capt. Kevin: 36, 3

39, 40, 41, 42, 57, 58, 7

80 ; photo, 89

Brown, Hugh: 100

Burning of spilled oil: 6-7

11

Bush, George : 12, 15, 1

17, 19, 49, 61, 71, 93

C

Carlson, Lt. Col. Roy: 10

photo, 22

Carter, Tom: 23

Centrifugal pumps: 77

ChemPro Environmenta

Services: 35
142

Cheney, Richard: 14, 15, 16,

17, 34, 44, 54, 62, 106

Chucagh Alaska Native

Corporations : 84

Civil Works Remote Sensing Research Program:

94

Clean Air Act: 84

Clean Water Act (Federal

Water Pollution Control

Act): 7, 8, 84, 103, 116;

311(k) revolving fund,

39, 104, 106, 108, 109

Coastal Zone Management

Act: 84

Cold Regions Research and

Engineering Laboratory

(CRREL): 93, 94, 95

96,97,99,100,101,102,

106, 118

Communications: 25, 28,

58,60-64,109

Computers: 28, 60-64, 95-

96, 99, 100-101

Containment booms: 5, 6,

7, 11, 27, 29, 30, 35, 37,

40,42-43,57-58,61,71,

72, 117; maintenance of,

69-70; illus., 44

Contaminated materials,

research on disposal of:

93

Contingency planning for

oil spill response: 43-48

Contract workers: 15, 36,

91

Cordova, AK: 7, 24, 26

Cost accounting: 105-109

Cowan, Col. Charles A. : 36,

57, 80-81

Cowper, Steve: 6, 7, 12, 14,

31, 115

D

Debris, problems with: 40,

70,72,75,76,77,78-79

Destoil: 76

Director of Military Support

(DOMS): 13, 15, 17, 21,

23, 24)25,26,27,34,36,

37, 38, 39, 41, 45, 46, 53,

54, 55, 79, 96, 103, 105,

106, 107, 115; Joint

Task Force, 17-18, 28,

30, 41, 46, 47, 53, 54, 64

Dispersants, use of 6, 11

DOMS. See Director of Military Support

Doran, William J. : 22, 25

Dredges: 24, 25, 26, 30,

31-48,65-81,112,113,

117-118; air supply support, 68; cleaning of, 79-

81; command problems,

56- 58, 67; communications with, 63-64; costs,

105- 109; crew changes,

65-67; dragarm alterations, 40- 41, 70-71;

problems off-loading oil,

75-78; reporting problems, 74-75; resupply

operations, 65, 66, 67 ;

tracking of, 61 ; use as

boom ship, 43; use as

command post, 40; use

for skimming oil, 31,

69-72, 111; use for storage of oil, 39, 79; volume

of oil collected, 73-74;

illus., 41, 42

Index

CRREL. See Cold Regions

Research and Engineering Laboratory
Index

E

Economy Act: 103, 104,

106, 108

Edelman, Lester: 103

Elmendorf Air Force Base:

18, 25, 26, 27, 53, 60, 96

Elmore, John P: 21-22, 24,

25, 34, 37, 59, 66, 113;

photo, 22

Environmental groups: 84

Environmental monitoring:

94

Essayons : 32-33, 36-37,

3%41,64,65,68,71,78,

79-81, 107, 117

106, 107, 108, 111; plan

for shoreline cleanup,

85-87, 97; reimbursements to federal agencies, 103-109

Exxon Baton Rouge: 6

Exxon San Francisco: photo,

5

Exxon Valdez: 3-4, 6, 7;

photo, 5

F

Federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC: 19, 23,

36, 38, 39, 40, 43, 50,

51, 53, 54, 55, 64, 79,

83, 85, 88, 91, 100, 104,

106, 109. See also Rear

14

Adm. Edward Nelson

Jr., and Vice Adm

Clyde E. Robbins

Federal Water Pollutio

Control Act. See Clea

Water Act

Fish hatcheries: 7, 11, 25

61,84

Fishermen: 7, 11

Fishing boats: 40, 57-58

64,66

Fletcher, Robert: 59

Float planes: 65, 66, 67

FOSC. See Federal on-scen

coordinator

Funding problems: 39, 54

103-109,112

G

Gallagher, John: 81

General Accounting Offic

108-109, 115, 119

Green Island: 6, 11, 85

H

Harrison, Otto R. : 37, 38

86

Hartley, Michael: 59

Hatch, Lt. Gen. Henry J

14, 20, 112, 113

Hazelwood, Joseph: 4

Helicopters: 15, 24, 26, 28

29, 30, 53, 54

Helipads : 15, 28, 29, 68

117

Henry, Ron: 33, 81

Holcroft, Jimmy: 40

Homer, AK: 66, 67

Hopman, Robert J. : 22, 2

25, 34, 38, 39, 40, 42

Hummer, Charles W. : 3

39, 42, 66

Exxon: 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13,

15, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 28,

33, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43,44,

45, 46, 47, 51, 53,54, 56,

57, 58, 60, 61, 62,64, 66,

68, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78,

79, 80, 83,84, 85, 87, 88,

91, 95, 98, 99, 100, 104,
144

Hunt, Ted: 39, 42

Hutto, Earl: 108

HydeVac: 75

I

Incinerators: 51

Innotech, Ltd. : 95, 99, 100,

118

International Dredging Review : 71

J

Jimenez, Miguel: 42, 74,

75, 77, 80, 113

Johnson, Billy: 71

Johnson, Leroy: 33

K

Kakel, Col. William: 19,

20, 24, 34, 39, 41, 42, 45,

46, 47, 48, 55, 56, 57, 61,

66, 72, 73, 79, 80, 97, 98,

111, 112 ; photo, 22, 56

Kelly, Brig. Gen. Patrick J. :

14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 31,

32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 41,

44, 45, 55, 56, 59, 94, 97,

101, 111; photo, 56

Kelso, Dennis: 12, 86

Kirby, Conrad J. : 97, 99

Kirkendall, Dan: 101

Knight Island: 6, 11, 71

L

Lamoreaux, Bill: 62

Landing craft: 15, 26, 28,

29,83

Landsat Thematic Mapper:

95, 100, 118

Larrabee, Capt . Richard:

118-119

Link, Lewis E., Jr. : 96

Luchen, Comdr. Robert: 53

Index

M

McCall, Capt. Steve: 4, 49

McConnell, Guy: 23, 97

McGee, Peter: 87

McInerney, Lt . Gen

Thomas G. : 18, 19, 20,

23, 24, 25, 27, 33, 34, 37,

45, 47, 48, 52, 53, 54, 55,

60, 62, 65, 98, 99, 100,

106, 113

McKim, Harlan "Ike" : 96,

97

Marine Design Center: 117

Marsh, John O., Jr. : 17, 44,

45, 62, 80, 106

MEDEVAC: 19, 24, 28, 29,

109

Media influence : 33, 49,

50, 51, 59

MEIS 11: 95, 118

Military Airlift Command

18,28

Military airlift support: 28-

29,53

Montgomery, Ray: 97, 99

Mousse: 69, 76

Mullins, Merv: 21

Multispectral sensors: 94-

95

Murkowski, Frank : 31

N

Naked Island: 6, 7, 91

National Historic Preserva

tion Act: 84

National Marine Fisherie

Service: 84

National Ocean Pollutio

Policy Board: 31

National Oceanic and At

mospheric Administra

tion: 11, 84, 94, 100

118
Index

National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan:

7-9, 50-51, 83, 111. See

also Clean Water Act

National Response Team: 8,

9,59

Nelson, Rear Adm. Edward,

Jr. : 7, 12, 19, 24, 34, 49,

50,85

North Pacific Division

(NPD): 19-20, 22, 23,

31, 45, 46, 48, 55, 56, 63,

94, 97, 98, 105

NPA. See Alaska District

NPD. See North Pacific

Division

NPR See Portland District

Nyberg, Neal: 77

O

Occupational Safety and

Health Administration :

51

Offloading oil : 75-78, 117

Oil: assessment of spill, 24,

30 ; distribution of spill,

94-96, 101; problems

locating spill, 67-68, 95 ;

research on biodegradation of, 93, 101; solidification of, 74; viscosity,

35, 40, 73-74, 75, 76 ;

volume collected, 72-74;

weathering of, 68-69

Oil Pollution Control Act of

1924: 8

Oil Spill Computer Aided

Response program

(OSCAR): 60-64

Oil spill contingency barge:

5

Q

Quayle, Dan: 91, 97, 98

Quinley, John: 71

1

Oil spill dispersion mode

ing: 94

ONTYME: 63

Oppenheimer, Carl H. : 1

Optical sensors: 95

Oswald, Robert: 94

P

Page, Robert W. : 14, 31, 

111, 113

Pascoe, Comdr. David: 4

Patterson, Ken: 33, 36

Photographers: 36, 71

Plumb, Col. Morton V. : 

Political considerations: 

39, 50, 65, 73, 97, 

111

Port and Tanker Safety A

116

Portland District (NPP): 

34, 35, 37, 56, 57, 67, 

76, 80-81; Task For

Castle, 36

Pumps: 11, 32, 35, 39; pr

lems with, 40, 70, 75-

R

Radio communications: 

58, 60, 63-64, 68

Redlinger, Jake: 48, 97, 

99

Reese, James R. : 22, 24, 

97, 98, 99

Regional Response Tea

8-9,21, 63

Reilly, William K. : 12, 

16,26
146

Remote sensing: 68, 94-96,

99, 100, 102, 118

Robbins, Vice Adm. Clyde

E. : 25, 34, 49, 50, 51,

52-53,54,57,58,84-87,

88, 100

Rushing, William R. : 101-

102, 116

S

Safety issues : 36, 51, 54,

80,98

Satellite radios: 28

Satellite sensors: 95-96

Seal pupping areas: 12, 84,

85, 91, 98

Seal Rock, AK: 37, 85, 97

Seward, AK: 26, 66

Shadrick, Kirk: 23, 42, 63

Shannon, John W.: 25, 26

Shore decontamination

apparatus: 29-30

Shoreline, measurement of:

100

Shoreline cleanup: 29, 46,

55, 83-91, 94 ; absorption, 90, 98; assessment

of area to be cleaned, 85 ;

assessment of Exxon

plan for, 47-48, 85-86,

97-98; cold water flushing, 84, 86, 90-91, 97,

98, 99 ; disposal of contaminated materials,

79, 86; hand-wiping, 90,

97-98; hot water flushing, 48, 86, 90, 91, 97,

98; natural cleansing,

86, 98 ; priority guidelines, 84-85, 88; progress reports, 88 ; reIndex

sponsibility for, 83-84;

standards of cleanliness,

87-88; workers, 28, 61,

83, 86, 87, 91, 98

Shoreline Cleanup Committee: 48, 84, 85, 86

Side-looking radar: 95

Sipes, Rear Adm. Joel D. : 45

Skimmers: 5, 6, 11, 25, 27,

29, 30, 35, 37, 38, 40, 72

Skinner, Samuel K. : 12, 13,

14, 15, 16, 26, 44, 106,

116

Smith, Maj. Gen. James D. :

13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20,

21, 23, 26, 33,34, 44, 45,

52, 54, 62, 99, 112

Smith Island: 6, 11, 83, 85,

91, 97, 98

Stalwart: 4

Steam heat, use in dredge

hoppers: 76-77

Stevens, Brig. Gen. Patrick:

19,20,32,33,45,54-55,

56, 63, 96, 98, 112;

photo, 56

Stevens, Ted: 13, 31

Sununu, John: 14, 15, 44,

45

Super Sucker: 75, 79

Super Vac: 75, 76

Surgeon General, Office of

the: 22

Survey boats: 35-36, 40

T

Theriot, E.A. : 101

Thermal infrared sensors

68, 95, 100

Towhee: 40
Index

Trans-Alaska Pipeline

Authorization Act: 106

7~-es Suertes: 40, 43

U

U.S.S.R . : 66 . See also

Vaydaghubsky

U.S. Air Force: 15, 23, 28,

47, 100, 107, 109

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: 8, 9, 13-15, 18,

19-21, 24, 26, 54-55,

58-59, 63, 103; HQ

Emergency Operations

Center, 20, 59, 61, 94;

Engineer Task Force,

46-47; Engineer Topographical Laboratory,

100, 118; laboratory

costs, 106, 107, 108. See

also Alaska District;

Cold Regions Research

and Engineering Laboratory; North Pacific Division; Portland District;

Waterways Experiment

Station

U.S. Coast Guard: 3-4, 6, 7,

8, 9, 11, 12, 18, 19, 20,

21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29, 33,

34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 45, 51,

52, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 61,

62, 64, 66, 68, 72, 73, 83,

84, 85, 87, 88, 94, 100,

103, 104, 106, 107, 108,

109,111,115-116,118-

119; Marine Safety Office, 4, 28, 49, 57, 64, 72

U.S. Department of the

Army: 13, 15, 23 ; use

of troops in shoreline

cleanup, 15, 16, 24, 

29, 30

U.S. Department of 

fense: 8, 13-30, 60-

103,104,107-108,1

111, 112; Defense Sen

Representative : 18, 

relations with Co

Guard, 52-54. See a

Director of Milit

Support

U.S. Department of Tra

portation : 18, 103, 1

106, 107, 109, 116

U.S. Environmental Prot

tion Agency: 8, 9, 51, 

93,101-102

U.S. Fish and Wildl

Service: 84

U.S. Forest Service: 84

U.S. House of Represen

tives: Committee 

Merchant Marine a

Fisheries, Subcomm

tee on the Coast Gua

and Navigation, 12, 

U.S. Marine Corps: 28

U.S. Navy : 8, 15, 19, 22, 

24,25-26,27,34,37,

83, 100, 115

U.S. Pacific Command: 

24

U.S. Senate, Committee 

Science and Transpor

tion: 13

U.S.S. Cleveland: 28

U.S.S. Duluth: 28

U.S.S. Fort McHenry: 

28, 29, 30, 87

U.S.S. Juneau: 26, 28, 

30, 83, 87, 97, 98
148

U.S.S. Mount Vernon: 28

U.S.S. New Orleans: 26

U.S.S. Ogden: 28

USA Health Service Command: 22

V

Vac-All: 75

Vac-UVator: 75-76

Valdez, Port of 3, 4, 7, 115

Vaydaghubsky: 38, 72-73

VECO, Inc. : 11, 25, 91

Video teleconferences: 62-

63

Videotaping: 95, 99, 100

W

Wallace, John F: 108

Water Pollution Control Act

of 1948: 8

Water Resources Support

Center, Navigation Data

Center: 100-101

Waterways Experiment

Station (WES): 48, 93,

94, 97-99; Coastal Engineering Research

Center, 101

Index

Weather problems: 6, 68,

73

WES. See Waterways Experiment Station

Whittier, AK: 66

Wilson, Col. Thomas: 22,

23, 27, 45, 46, 53, 62,

113

Wiltshire, Lt. Comdr. Glenn

A. : 22

Worm pumps: 76

Y

Yaquina: 32, 34-36, 37,

38-39,40,41,42,43,64,

65-66, 70, 71, 72, 73,

74-75,76,77,78,79,80,

106, 107, 113; photo, 35

Yost, Adm. Paul A. : 12, 13,

14, 15, 16, 24, 25, 37,44,

45, 49-50, 52, 86

Young, Don: 31

Z

Zepernick, Paul : 22, 25