F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee
,

v

.

M I G U E L D E L

A T O R R E -J I M E N E Z , aka Mig uel de la Torre, aka Mig uel Delatorre, aka Mig

uel Ang el J imenez
, Defendant-Appellant

. N o. 13-50438

D.C. No. 2:12-cr-00828- GHK-1

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Georg e H. King , Chief District J u d g e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted O ctober 8, 2014—Pasadena, California

F iled November 7, 2014

B e fore: David M. Ebel, * Andrew J . Kleinfeld, and Susan P. Graber, Circuit J udg es.
Opinion by

J udg e Graber

* T h e Ho n o rab le D a v i d M. Eb el, Sen i o r Circu it J u d g e f o r th e Un ited States Co u rt o f

A p p eals f o r th e T en t

h Circu it, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. D E L A T O R R E -J I M E N E Z 2

SUMMARY * *

Crim inal Law

The panel affirmed a sentence for being a deported alien found in the U nited States after removal, in violation o f 18 U.S.C. § 1326, in a case in which the district court, a pply ing the modified categ o rical approach, concluded that the d e f endant’s prior conviction for possession of cocaine f o r sale, in violation of California H ealth and Safety Code section 11351, was for a “drug trafficking offense” under U.S

. S

. G

. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A).

Apply ing Coronado v. Holder
, 7 5 9 F .3d 977 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that C a lifornia H ealth a nd Safety Code section 1137 7 ( a ) is divisible), the panel held that section 11351 is divisible within the meaning o f Descamps v. U ni t e d States
, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), with respect to the ty pe of controlled substance, such that the modified categ o rical a p p roach may be applied. The panel also held that there is no irreconcilable

c o n flict, in result or methodolog y , between Coronado a n d Rendon v. Holder
, 764 F

. 3d 1 0 7 7 (9th Cir. 2014), which considered the divisibility of a burg lary statute with respect to an intent element.

The panel held that the district court properly concluded under the modified categ o r ical approach that the defendant had been convicted o f a “ d rug trafficking offense” under § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)
, w here the criminal complaint specified in Count 1 that the defendant possess e d o r purchased cocaine,

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p ar t o f t h e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. D E L A T O R R E -J I M E N E Z 3

and the abstract of

judg ment stated that the defendant pleaded
g uilty to Count 1.

COUNSEL

J ames H. L ocklin ( arg ued), Deputy F ederal Public Defender, and Sean K

. Kennedy
, F e deral Public Defender, L o s Ang eles, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

L

. Ashley Aull (arg

ued) and Robert E. Dug d a l e, Chief, Criminal D ivision, Assistant United St a tes Attorney s, a nd André B irotte, J r., United S t a tes A ttorney , L os Ang eles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OP INION

GRAB ER, Circuit J udg e:

Defendant Mig uel de la Torre-J imenez appeals his 1 8

- month sentence following a g uilty plea to one count of being a deported alien found in the United States after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. A p ply ing the modified categ orical approach, the distri ct court concluded that Defendant’s p rior c onviction f or possession of c o c a ine for sale, in violation of California Health and Safety Code section 11351, was for a “drug trafficking offense” u n d e r U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A). Defendan t o bjected, arg u ing that (1) the
court cou ld not use the modified categ orical approach because section 11351 is not “divisible” within the meaning of Descam

p s v

. United S

tates , 1 33 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), a nd (2) even if that a p p roach is p ermissible, the documents presented by the g overnment did not demonstrate that hisU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. D E L A T O R R E -J I M E N E Z 4

prior conviction was for a “d ru g t rafficking offense.” Reviewing de novo, U

nited States v. G omez-Leon
, 545 F .3d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 2 008), we reject both arg uments. B ecause th e district court correctly a pplied the 16-level sentencing enhancement, we affirm.

D I SCUSSI ON

Sentencing Guideline § 2 L 1.2(b )(1)(A) directs the sentencing c o u r t to increase the offense level by 16 if the defenda n t w a s removed after “a conviction for a felony that is (I ) a drug traf

f i c king offense f

or which the sentence imposed ex c eeded 13 months.” H ere, there is no dispute that Defendant was removed af t er he was c onvicted of a felony for which the sentence imposed ex c e eded 13 months. The

on ly question is whether the prior conviction qualifies as a “drug trafficking offense.” “W e apply the categ o rical a nd modified c ateg orical a

p proaches describe d i n Taylor v

. United States
, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), to determine whether

a d e f e n d a n t ’ s p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s a t i s f i e s U

. S

. S

. G

. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A).” United States v. Leal-Veg a , 6 8 0 F .3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 2012).

I n apply ing the categ o rical approach, we must “compare the statutory definition of the underly ing o f f e n s e to the Guidelines definition of a ‘drug trafficking offense.’” Gomez-Leon , 545 F

. 3d at 783. California Health and Safety Code “ [ s] e ction 11351 is categ or i c a lly broader than the Guidelines definition of ‘drug trafficking offense’ because it criminaliz es possession or purchase o f certain substances that

are not covered by the CSA [F ederal Controlled Sub s tances Act] .” Leal-Vega , 680 F .3d at 1167.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. D E L A T O R R E -J I M E N E Z 5

The nex t step is t o a p ply the modified categ orical approach in order to d etermine w hether Defendant’s conviction involved a c o n t rolled substance covered by the C S A. Id. at 1167–68. Apply ing the modified catego r i c al approach, the district court ruled that Defendant’s conviction involved c ocaine. B ecause cocaine is a controlled substance under the CSA, 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) sched. I I (a)(4), the district
court c oncluded that Defendant was convict e d of a “drug trafficking offense” under U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A).

Defendant arg ues that the d istrict c ourt erred by a pply ing the modified categ orical approa c h
, because the California
statute is n ot “divisible” within the meaning of Descamps

. I n the alternat i v e , he a sserts that, even if the modified categ orical approach applies, the records s u b mitted by the
g overnment are insufficient t o d e m o n s t r a t e that his conviction was for possession of cocaine. W e address those arg uments in turn.

A. Divisibility of California Health and Safety Code Section 11351

I n Descamps
, 133 S. Ct. at 2 281, the Supreme Court h eld that the modified c ateg orical approach may b e used for a “‘divisible statute’”—one that “sets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative.” B ut the modified categ orical approach does n o t a pply to “an ‘indivisible statute’— i.e.
, one not c ontaining alternative e lemen t s

. ” Id. Defendant arg ues that California Heal t h and Safety Code section 11351 is not divisible.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. D E L A T O R R E -J I M E N E Z 6

W e do not write on a clean slate. I n Coronado v. H older
, 759 F .3 d 9 7 7
, 983–85 (9th Cir. 2 014), we considered a similar California dru g l a w, California Health and Safety Code section 11377(a). That statute p rovides that “every
person who possesses any controlled substance [ in v arious statutory lists] ” has committed a crime. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11377(a). W e held that, because the statute contains

a “list ing o f alternative c ontrolled substances,” the statute was divisible within the meaning of Descamps

. Coronado
, 759 F .3d a t 9 8 5

. I n reaching that conclusion, we looked to California law in rejecting the petitioner’s arg ument that “‘the precise controlled substance p ossessed is not a n essential element’ of § 11377(a).” Id. at 985 n.4. Ac c o r d i n gl y , we applied the modified categ orical approach. Id. at 985–86.

On the q uestion of divisibility with respect to the ty pe o f controlled substance, there is no m eaning ful distinction between sections 11377(a) and 11351 of the Californi a H e alth and Safety Code. I d entically to sectio n 1 1 3 7 7(a), section 11351 c ontains a “listing of alternative controlled substances.” Coronado
, 759 F .3d at 985; see also Ragasa v

. Holder , 752 F

. 3d 1 1 73, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) ( holding that a Hawaii d rug law was d ivisible because the statute lists various c ontrolled substanc e s )

. L ooking to California law,

we find no meaning ful distinction b e tween the two sections

on the q uestion whether the controlled sub s tance is an essential element.

T h e two sections criminaliz e different drug -related behavior (simple possession versus possession for s a l e o r purchase for purposes of sale) and c over differ ent statutoryU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. D E L A T O R R E -J I M E N E Z 7

lists of controlled substances. 1 B ut D efendant h a s offered—and we h ave discovered—no reason, under California law or othe r w i s e , w hy those facts or any other difference between the statutes is r elevant to the q uestion o f divisibility concerning the ty p e o f controlled substance. I n sum, Coronado controls. W e are bound to conclude that, like section 11377(a), section 11351 of the California Health a nd Safety Code is divisible within the meaning of Descamps

.

Defendant directs us to ex amine our re c e n t d ecision in Rendon v. Holder
, 764 F .3d 107 7
, 1 081 (9th Cir. 2014), in which we h eld that the Californ i a b urg lary statute is not divisible with respect to an intent element. W ere we to look
t o C alifornia law in the w ay Rendon instructs, he contend s ,

1 Ca l i fo rn ia Health an d Saf ety Co d e s ectio n 1 1 3 7 7 (a) co v ers an y

su b stan ce
(1 ) classif ied in Sch ed u le III, IV, o r V, an d w h ich is n o t

a n arco t i c d r u g , (2 ) sp ecif ied in su b div isio n (d ) of Sectio n 1 1 05 4
, ex cep t p arag rap h s (1 3 ), (1 4 ), (1 5 ), an d (2 0 ) of su

b d iv i si o n (d ), (3 ) sp ecif ied in p arag rap h (1 1 ) o f su b d iv isio n (c) o f Sectio n

1 1 0 5 6 , (4 ) sp ecif

ied i n p arag rap h (2 ) o r (3 ) of su b d iv isio n (f

) o f Sect i o n 1 1 0 5 4
, or (5 ) sp ecif

i ed in su b div isio n (d ), (e), o r (f

) of Sectio n 1 1 0 5 5

. . . .

Sectio n 1 1 3 5 1 co v ers
(1 ) a n y co n tro lled su

b stan ce sp ecif

i ed in s u b d iv isio n (b ), (c), o r (e) of Sectio n 11 05 4
, sp ecif ied in p arag rap h (1 4 ), (1 5 ), o r (2 0) of su

b d iv isio n (d ) o f Sectio n 1 1 0 5 4
, o r sp ecif ied i n su bd iv isio n (b ) o r (c) o f Sectio n 1 1 0 5 5
, o r sp ecif ied in s u b d i v isio n (h ) o f Sectio n 1 1 0 5 6
, or (2 ) an y co n tro lled su

b s tan ce classif

i ed in Sch ed u le III, IV, o r V w h ich is a n arco tic d ru g

. . . .U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. D E L A T O R R E -J I M E N E Z 8

w e w ould conclude that California drug crimes are n o t divisible. W e are unpersuaded.

As a three-judg e panel, we are bound by Cor o nado

. Miller v. Gammie
, 335 F .3d 8 89, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). W e cannot disreg ard binding precedent, as Defendant asks us to do. B ecause Coronado controls, w e must follow it.

Moreover, if we thoug ht that two controlling ca ses were in irrecon ci l a b l e conflict, we could not simply pick one to follow—we would be required to c all this case en banc. See Atonio v. W

ards Cove P acking Co.
, 810 F .2d 1477, 1478–79 (9th Cir. 1987) (en b a n c ) (holding that “the appropriate mechanism for resolving an irreconcilable conflict is a n en banc de c i s i on. A panel faced with such a conflict must c all for en banc review”). B ut no irreconcilable conflict ex ists.

There c ertainly is no conflict in res u l t : Coronado (like

our case) pertains to the divisibility o f a drug statu t e w i t h respect to a list of controlled substa n c e s , whereas Rendon considered the divisibility of a burg lary statute with respect to an intent element. Defendant r ec og niz es that d istinction,
arg uing instead that the method of analy sis describ e d in Rendon is inconsistent with the method used in Coronad o

. B ut, in Rendon
, we ex pressly considered Coronado ’s method of determining divisi b ility and held that, because Coronado looked to Californ i a l a w , its approach was “ c onsistent with

our approa c h ” i n Rendon
, 764 F .3d at 1087 n.11 (emphasis added). Acco r d ing ly
, there appears to be no conflict in methodolog y , either.

I ndeed, we r e c ently applied the Rendon methodolog y to y et another California d

rug -related statute, California Health and Safety Code section 11378. Padilla-Martinez v. H older
,U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. D E L A T O R R E -J I M E N E Z 9

No. 11- 7 2 5 7 0, 2014 W L 5 421219 ( 9th Cir. Oct. 27, 2014). As in Coronado
, we held that the statute is divisible. Id. at *4 n.3. And as in Coronado
, the statute is divisible because it is d rafted in the disjunctive (listing several contro l l e d substances), and “Califo r n i a state law treats the ty pe o f controlled substance as a separate element” with respect to drug offenses. Id.

Viewed properly
, then, the ess e n ce of Defendant’s
arg ument is s imply that Coronado applied the methodolog y incorrectly or incorrectly a ssessed the content of California law. I n other wor d s , Defendant a rg ues that Coronado was wrong ly decided. As noted above, w e cannot overr u le Coronado

. Miller , 335 F .3d at 899–900.

I n conclusion, Coronado ex amined Ca lifornia law a nd held that a California drug law that covers a list of controlled substances is divisible. The California drug law at issue here also covers a list of controlled substances, and no meaning f ul distinction e x ists between the two statutes. B ecause there is

no irreconcilable conflict b etween Coron a do and any other

ca s e , we must follow Coronado

. According ly
, California Health and Safety Cod e s ection 11351 is divisible with respect to the ty

pe of controlled substance. W e turn, then, to the modified categ orical approach.

B

. Modified Categorical Approach

“The modified c at e g orical a pproach allows us to look bey ond the statute of conviction to determine whe t h e r the facts proven at trial or admitt e d b y the defendant as part o f his g uilty p lea establis h that the defendant was convicted o f all the elements of the r e l e v a n t federal g eneric offense.” Sanchez-Avalos v. Holder
, 693 F .3d 1011, 1 014–15 ( 9th Cir.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. D E L A T O R R E -J I M E N E Z 10

2 0 1 2 )

. Here, the g overnment presented three documents: a criminal complaint, a n abstract of judg ment, and a docket sheet. Those sources are appropriate for our review under the modified c ateg orical approach. See Shepard v. United States
, 544 U.S. 13, 2 6 (2005) (charg ing document); RamirezVillalpando v. Holder
, 645 F .3d 1 0 35, 1040 (9th Cir. 2 0 1 1 ) (abstract of judg ment); Co r o n a d o , 759 F .3d a t 986 (docket sheet).

T he criminal complaint alleg es in “COUNT 1” t h at Defendant “did unlawfully possess for sale and p u rchase for sale a controlled substance, to wit, cocai n e ” i n violation o f “HEAL TH & SAF ETY CODE SECTI ON 11351

. ” The abstract of judg ment states that “Defendant was convicted o f the c ommission o f the following felony
, ” followed by a chart listing Count “ 1,” Code “HS,” section “ 11351,” crime “ POSS NARCOTI C CONTROL L ED SUB ST F OR SAL E” b y “plea.” The criminal docket sheet s t at e s that Defendant pleaded g uilty to “Count 01.”

The criminal complaint specifies in Count 1 that Defendant possessed o r p urchased coc a i ne, a nd the abstract of judg ment states that Defendant pleaded g uilty to Count 1. “W h e re the minute order or o ther equally reliable document specifies that a defendant pleaded g uilty to a particular count of a criminal complaint, the court may consid e r the facts alleg ed in the complaint.” Coronado
, 759 F .3d at 986; accord Cabantac v. Holder
, 736 F .3d 787, 7 93–94 ( 9 th Cir. 2013) ( pe r curiam) (“[ W ] here, as h ere, the abstract o f judg ment or minute order specifies that a defendant pleaded
g uilty to a particular count of the criminal complaint o r indictment, we can consider the facts alleg ed in that count.”);

see also United States v. V a l d avinos-Torres
, 704 F .3d 679, 687–88 (9th Cir. 2012) ( looking to the facts alleg ed in theU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. D E L A T O R R E -J I M E N E Z 11

charg ing document where the chang e of plea form stated that the defendant p leaded g uilty to a specific count), cert. denied
, 134 S. Ct. 1873 (2014); Leal-Vega , 680 F .3d at 1168 (same, where the minute order, abstract of judg ment, and plea form
sta t e d that the defendant pleaded g uilty to a specific count); United States v. Snell e n b erger , 548 F .3d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (en banc) (same, where the minute order stated that the defendant pleaded g uil t y t o a specific count). According ly
, the r ecord clearly shows that Defendant’s conviction under California Health a nd Safety Co de section 11351 r elated to the specific controlled substance of cocaine.

Defendant does not challeng e that reasoning

. I nstead, he quotes o ne sentence from o u r deci sion in United S tates v

. Vidal
, 504 F .3d 1072, 1087 (9th Ci r

. 2 0 0 7 ) ( en banc), a nd
arg ues that the five cases cited above are irreconcilable with Vidal

. Defendant is mistaken.

I n Vidal
, we held: “I n order to identify a conviction a s the g eneric offense th r o ug h the modified categ orical approach, when the record of convicti o n comprises only the indictment and the judg ment, the judg ment must contain the critical phrase ‘as charg ed i n t h e I nformation.’” Id. (some internal quotation mar k s o m itted). Taken in isolation, that
sentence a

ppears to conflict w ith our later cases, which have
not required the “critical phras e ” noted in Vidal

. B u t we repeate d l y h ave ex plained w hy that one sentence in Vidal must not be viewed in isolation.

I n Valdavinos-Torres
, 704 F

. 3 d at 688, we held that, because the documents in V idal r aised doubt about the actual crime to which the defenda n t h a d pleaded g uilty
, requiring
t h e “critical phrase” made sense. B ut where, as in Valdavinos-Torres
, nothing raises doubt about the crime, theU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. D E L A T O R R E -J I M E N E Z 12

“critical phrase” is n ot r equired. I d

. W e recog niz ed this

s a m e distinction also in Leal-Vega
, 680 F .3d at 1168: “ N o evidence in the record sug g ests t h a t any modifications were

m a d e to the f

elony complaint in terms of the subst a n c e involved. T hus, no ambig uity e x ists and no further clarify ing lang uag e was n ecessary .” 2 Most recently
, in Medina-Lara v

. Holder
, No. 13-70 4 9 1
, 2 014 W L 5072684, at *4 (9th Cir. Oct. 1 0
, 2014), w e reiterated that the “critical phrase” is not required when the record is c l e ar

. B ecause the documents

were ambig uo us in that case—for ex ample, “[ t] he abstract
states M e d ina pleaded to count ‘3A,’ not count ‘3’ as it is denominated in the complaint”—we held that the record was insufficient. Id. at *5.

W h ere, as here, the abstract of judg ment unambig uously specifies that Defendant pleaded g uilty to a specific count, we look to the facts alleg ed in that count in the charg ing document. W e recog niz e that some think that a different rule should apply

. Cabantac
, 736 F .3d at 78 9 (order) (Murg uia, J
., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en b a n c ). Unless and until our cases are overruled by an intervening Supreme Court or en banc decision, thoug h, we are bound by that rule. Miller
, 335 F .3d at 899–900. L itig ants may , of course, preserve the arg ument for en banc or Supreme Court review. Or litig ants may arg ue that an ambi gu i t y ex ists in the particular documents at hand. B ut our preced e n t s q uarely forecloses the argu m e n t that one isolated sentence in Vidal controls; the phrase “ as charg ed i n the I nformation (or

2 T h e f act t h a t t h e t w o s i tu atio n s are d if f eren t m ay ex p lain w

h y , in S n ellen b erg er , w e d id n o t see th e n eed to m en tio n Vid a l

. N on eth eless, to th e ex ten t th at th ey co n f

lict, th e l ater en ban c d ecisio n co n tro ls. S a ffo n v. W ells Fa rg o & Co

. Lo n g Term Disa b ility Pla n , 5 2 2 F.3 d 8 6 3
, 8 7 2 n .2 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. D E L A T O R R E -J I M E N E Z 13

I ndictment)” is not r e q u i r ed where the documents a re unambig uous.

CONCL USI ON

California Health and Safety Code section 1 1351 is “divisible” within the meaning of Descamps
, 133 S. Ct. 2276. B ecause t h e criminal complaint specified that Count 1 involved cocaine and the abstract of judg ment specified that Defendant pleaded to Count 1
, the district court correctly concluded that Defendant h ad been convicted of a “drug trafficking offense” under U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A).

AF F IRMED.