PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 16-2644

_______________

ANTHONY ALLEN, for himself and as parent of A.A.; 

TODD BENNETT, for himself and as a parent of E.B.; 

SCOTT EDELGLASS; SHARIR FELDMAN, for himself 

and as parent of A.F. and J.F.; WERNER GRAF, for himself 

and as parent of A.G. and A.G.; 

KARL HAGBERG, for himself and as parent of E.H., A.H. 

and C.H.; CLIFTON HILL, for himself and as parent of A.H.; 

SAMIR JOSHI, for himself and as parent of J.J., J.J. and J.J.; 

YEHUDA B. LITTON; SURENDER MALHAN, for himself 

and as parent of E.M. and V.M.; CARLY OLIVIER, for 

himself and as parent of M.O.; ANTONIO QUINLAN, for 

himself and as parent of K.Q.; ZIA SHAIKH, for himself and 

as parent of M.S., S.S., and H.S. for themselves and on behalf 

of all others similarly situated

v.

LAWRENCE DEBELLO; TIMOTHY CHELL; KATHLEEN 

DELANEY; JAMES M. DEMARZO; MADELIN

EINBINDER; MARLENE LYNCH FORD; CHRISTOPHER 

GARENGER; LAWRENCE JONES; SEVERIANO

LISBOA; ANTHONY MASSI; JOHN TOMASELLO;

SHERRI SCHWEITZER; NANCY SIVILLI; MAUREEN 

SOGLUIZZO; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; MICHELLE M.
2

SMITH, in her official capacity as Clerk, Superior Court of 

New Jersey; JOHN L. CALL, JR., in his official capacity as

Presiding Judge Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington 

County; CATHERINE L. FITZPATRICK; LISA

THORTON; PATRICIA B. ROE, in her official capacity as

Presiding Judge, Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean

County

 (D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00760)

ANTHONY ALLEN for himself and as parent of A.A.;

TODD BENNETT, for himself and as parent of E.B.;

SHARIR FELDMAN, for himself and as parent of A.F. and

J.F.;

KARL HAGBERG, for himself and as parent of E.H., A.H.

and C.H.; CLIFTON HILL, for himself and as parent of A.H.; 

CARLY OLIVIER, for himself and as parent of M.O.;

ZIA SHAIKH, for himself and as parent of M.S., S.S. and 

H.S. for themselves and on behalf of all other similarly 

situated

v.

TIMOTHY CHELL; KATHLEEN DELANEY; JAMES 

DEMARZO; MADELIN EINBINDER, LAWRENCE 

JONES, SEVERIANO LISBOA; JOHN TOMASELLO; 

SHERRI SCHWEITZER, NANCY SIVILLI AND 

MAUREEN SOGLUIZZO

(D.C. No. 3:15-cv-03519)

Anthony Allen; Todd 

Bennett; Scott Edelglass; 
3

Sharir Feldman; Werner 

Grag; Karl Hagberg; 

Clifton Hill; Samir Joshi;

Yehuda B. Litton; 

Surender Malhan; Carly 

Olivier; Antonio

Quinlan; Zia Shaikh,

 Appellants

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Nos. 3:14-cv-00760 & 3:15-cv-03519)

District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson

_______________

Argued November 17, 2016

Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit 

Judges

(Opinion Filed: June 27, 2017)
4

Paul A. Clark, Esq. [ARGUED]

Suite 1N

10 Huron Avenue

Jersey City, NJ 07306

Attorney for Appellants

Daniel J. Kelly, Esq.

Eric S. Pasternack, Esq.

Akeel A. Qureshi, Esq.

Benjamin H. Zieman, Esq. [ARGUED]

Office of Attorney General of New Jersey

P.O. Box 112

25 Market Street

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

Trenton, NJ 08625

Attorneys for Appellees

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

In this case, Plaintiffs, fathers of minor children in 

New Jersey, challenge the state law governing child custody 

proceedings between New Jersey parents. Seeking dramatic 

changes in the way New Jersey conducts these proceedings, 

Plaintiffs contend, among other things, that the “best interests
5

of the child” standard that New Jersey courts use to determine 

custody in a dispute between two fit parents is 

unconstitutional. To bring about their desired changes, 

Plaintiffs bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 

Declaratory Judgment Act against state court judges who 

presided over their custody disputes, and seek declaratory and 

injunctive relief: a declaration that the challenged standards 

and practices are unconstitutional and unlawful, and an 

enforceable injunction against their use. But before reaching 

the merits of Plaintiffs’ arguments, we first answer a 

threshold question: whether these state court judges are 

proper defendants in this Section 1983 suit.

I. Factual Background 

A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations

Plaintiffs allege that New Jersey’s family courts have 

unconstitutionally deprived them of custody of their children 

and have unconstitutionally interfered with their fundamental 

rights to the care, custody and control of their children 

without a full hearing, in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment.

In addition to raising the “best interests of the child” 
6

point identified above,1 Plaintiffs allege that their parental 

rights were restricted, or that they were permanently or 

temporarily separated from their children, by order of the 

New Jersey family courts without adequate notice, the right to 

counsel, or a plenary hearing, i.e. without an opportunity to 

present evidence or cross-examine. They allege that New 

Jersey state court policy, authorized by the New Jersey 

Supreme Court and Appellate Division, denies parents a 

plenary hearing when one parent loses custody to the other 

parent. Plaintiffs further assert that although mothers and 

fathers are, in theory, treated equally in custody disputes 

under New Jersey law, in practice courts favor mothers. 

Additionally, they assert that New Jersey discriminates 

against indigent parents by failing to provide them with 

counsel in a divorce proceeding or other inter-parent dispute 

that results in a loss of custody. In short, as the District Court 

explained,

Plaintiffs interpret the United States 

Constitution as requiring that when parents 

divorce or separate, each parent has a 

fundamental right to automatically receive 50-

 

1 Plaintiffs assert that a court should not deprive a parent of 

his rights unless the court finds exceptional circumstances or 

unfitness, which Plaintiffs allege is akin to the standard New 

Jersey courts use in determining whether to deprive a parent 

of custody in a dispute between a parent and non-parent. 

Plaintiffs allege that New Jersey courts should use the same 

standard when evaluating a dispute between two parents.

They allege that using separate standards denied them the 

equal protection of the law.
7

50 custody of his or her children, and that courts 

are limited to ordering a different custody 

arrangement only upon a finding, by clear and 

convincing evidence, in a plenary hearing (and 

with a right to counsel for both parents), that 

one of the parents abuses or neglects the child 

or is otherwise an unfit parent.2

This interpretation would, in the words of the District Court,

“dramatically change the legal landscape of New Jersey and 

the laws governing child custody proceedings between 

parents.”3

Plaintiffs bring suit under Section 1983 and the 

Declaratory Judgment Act4against New Jersey state court 

judges.5 They seek declaratory and injunctive relief requiring 

Defendants to, among other things, provide a plenary hearing 

within ten days to any parent who has his right to the care, 

custody, and control of his children reduced through state 

action. 

B. New Jersey’s Custody Regime

Plaintiffs challenge the New Jersey state statute 

 

2 A46.

3

Id.

4 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 

5 Plaintiffs initially sued other defendants, including the 

State of New Jersey, but those defendants were dismissed on 

bases that are not appealed here.
8

instituting the best interests of the child standard6and the 

New Jersey courts’ policy on plenary hearings in custody 

disputes, which has not been codified by statute but instead 

developed in the state case law.7 Under this case law, a

plenary hearing is not required in every contested motion in 

New Jersey state court; a trial judge has discretion to decide 

such a motion without a hearing.8“It is only where the 

affidavits show that there is a genuine issue as to a material 

fact, and that the trial judge determines that a plenary hearing 

would be helpful in deciding such factual issues, that a 

plenary hearing is required.”9

 

6 See Hand v. Hand, 917 A.2d 269, 271 (N.J. Super Ct. App. 

Div. 2007) (“Custody issues are resolved using a best 

interests analysis that gives weight to the factors set forth in 

N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c).”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:2-4 (setting out such 

factors and providing that “[t]he court shall order any custody 

arrangement which is agreed to by both parents unless it is 

contrary to the best interests of the child.”).

7 On appeal, Plaintiffs allege that they “do not seek to have 

any statute declared unconstitutional.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 4. 

However, this contention is inconsistent with the operative 

complaint, in which they do challenge the constitutionality of 

the best interest of the child statute.

8 Shaw v. Shaw, 351 A.2d 374, 376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 

Div. 1976).

9

Id.; see also Lepis v. Lepis, 416 A.2d 45, 55 (N.J. 1980) 

(“We therefore hold that a party must clearly demonstrate the 

existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a 

hearing is necessary . . . . Without such a standard, courts 

would be obligated to hold hearings on every modification 

application.”).
9

II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

“Because this case comes to us upon a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations contained in the 

Complaint as true, but we disregard rote recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and mere 

conclusory statements.”10 Our review of the grant of a motion 

to dismiss is plenary.11 However, to the extent the denial of 

declaratory relief was discretionary, we review for abuse of 

discretion.12

Before the District Court, the state defendants asserted 

that Plaintiffs’ suit improperly attempts to appeal concluded 

and pending state court proceedings—their final and ongoing 

divorce and custody proceedings—and that the District Court 

lacked jurisdiction to hear the case under the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine.13 The District Court found that Rooker-Feldman did 

not apply, because Plaintiffs do not challenge the state court 

custody decisions themselves, but instead the policies 

underlying those decisions. Defendants do not raise this 

 

10 James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 

2012).

11 Santiago v. GMAC Mortg. Grp., Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 386 

(3d Cir. 2005).

12 Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995); 

Rarick v. Federated Serv. Ins. Co., 852 F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 

2017).

13 D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983);

Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
10

doctrine on appeal, but because we have a continuing 

obligation to determine for ourselves whether subject matter 

jurisdiction is or was in question,14 we consider the doctrine’s

application to this suit.

Rooker-Feldman prohibits a federal court from 

exercising subject matter jurisdiction in “cases brought by 

state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 

commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of 

those judgments.”15 As both we and the Supreme Court have 

explained, the doctrine has narrow applicability. RookerFeldman does not bar suits that challenge actions or injuries 

underlying state court decisions—and especially those that 

predate entry of a state court decision—rather than the 

decisions themselves.16 Four requirements must be met in 

 

14 Bracken v. Matgouranis, 296 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 

2002).

15 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 

280, 284 (2005).

16 See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011) (finding

that Rooker-Feldman did not bar jurisdiction because 

“Skinner does not challenge the adverse [state court] 

decisions themselves; instead, he targets as unconstitutional 

the Texas statute they authoritatively construed”); Great W. 

Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 

167 (3d Cir. 2010) (“To the contrary, when the source of the 

injury is the defendant's actions (and not the state court

judgments), the federal suit is independent, even if it asks the 

federal court to deny a legal conclusion reached by the state 

court.”). 
11

order for Rooker-Feldman to bar suit: “(1) the federal plaintiff 

lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries 

caused by the state-court judgments; (3) those judgments 

were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the 

plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the 

state judgments.”17

In line with these decisions, our Circuit previously 

found that Rooker-Feldman did not bar suit in B.S. v. 

Somerset County, whose facts were similar to those in the 

present case.

18 In B.S., a mother sued after Somerset County 

Children and Youth Services obtained an order from a 

Pennsylvania state court judge transferring custody of her 

daughter to her father. We held that “[b]ecause the injury 

Mother claims is likewise traceable to [the defendants’]

actions, as opposed to the state court orders those actions 

allegedly caused, we reject [the defendants’] contention that 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal subject matter 

jurisdiction.”19

Like in B.S., Plaintiffs here are not challenging the 

state court judgments, but the underlying policy that governed 

those judgments: the alleged policy of the New Jersey state 

courts of stripping parents of custody, in favor of the other

parents, without a plenary hearing and employing an 

allegedly improper best-interests-of-the-child standard in such 

 

17 Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166 (internal citations, 

quotation marks, and alterations removed).

18 704 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2013).

19 Id. at 260.
12

proceedings. Thus, Rooker-Feldman does not bar suit.20

III. Discussion

Plaintiffs challenge the two orders of the District Court 

granting the Defendants’ successive motions to dismiss on 

two bases.21 First, they appeal the District Court’s decision 

that Defendants were not proper parties to a suit brought 

under Section 1983. Second, they argue that the District Court 

should have granted them declaratory relief under the 

Declaratory Judgment Act, arguing that jurisdiction under the 

Act is co-extensive with jurisdiction under Article III.22

A. Are Defendant Judges Properly Sued under 

Section 1983?

“It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are 

 

20 Younger abstention, which requires federal abstention in 

limited cases involving parallel state proceedings, and the 

domestic relations exception also do not bar review of this 

case, for the same reasons cited by the District Court. See 

A19-21 (domestic relations exception); A21-24 (Younger

abstention).

21 The second motion was technically granted in part, but 

then became final when remaining claims were resolved.

22 In addition to responding to Plaintiffs’ arguments, 

Defendants ask us to rule on the merits of Plaintiffs’ 

complaint and find that on the merits Plaintiffs’ claims would 

not survive a motion to dismiss. We note, however, that the 

District Court did not rule on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims 

because it dismissed the complaint on procedural grounds. 
13

generally ‘immune from a suit for money damages.’”23

Although the Supreme Court in Pulliam v. Allen held that 

judicial immunity was not a bar to claims for injunctive or 

declaratory relief under Section 1983,

24 following this 

decision, in 1996, Congress passed the Federal Courts 

Improvement Act, amending Section 1983 with the intent to 

overrule Pulliam.

25 The amended Section 1983 clarifies that 

“injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory 

decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”

The amended language “does not expressly authorize suits for 

declaratory relief against judges. Instead, it implicitly 

recognizes that declaratory relief is available in some 

circumstances, and then limits the availability of injunctive 

relief to circumstances in which declaratory relief is 

unavailable or inadequate.”26

Two key Third Circuit cases address whether judges 

are proper parties to a Section 1983 suit: Reynolds27 and 

 

23 Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000) 

(quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam)).

24 466 U.S. 522, 540-42 (1984).

25 Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194, 

197-8 (3d Cir. 2000).

26 Id. at 197-98; see also id. at 198 (“The language is not an 

express authorization of declaratory relief, but simply a 

recognition of its availability or unavailability, depending on 

the circumstances, which the statute does not delineate.”).

27 Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 201 F.3d 194 

(3d Cir. 2000).
14

Georgevich.

28 These cases apply a test borrowed from the 

First Circuit’s seminal case on this subject, In re Justices.

29

Under the In re Justices test, a judge who acts as a neutral and 

impartial arbiter of a statute is not a proper defendant to a 

Section 1983 suit challenging the constitutionality of the 

statute. This is because “[j]udges sit as arbiters without a 

personal or institutional stake on either side of [a] . . . 

controversy” and they “have played no role in [a] statute’s 

enactment, they have not initiated its enforcement, and they 

do not even have an institutional interest in following their 

prior decisions (if any) concerning its constitutionality if an 

authoritative contrary legal determination has subsequently 

 

28 Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078 (3d Cir. 1985) (en 

banc). Section 1983 was amended between the issuance of 

our decisions in Georgevich and Reynolds. However, 

Reynolds cited and distinguished Georgevich with no mention 

that the Section 1983 amendments had called part of its 

holding into question. Thus, we continue to apply its holding. 

In any event, Plaintiffs do not persuasively argue that 

injunctive and declaratory relief warrant different “proper 

party” treatment under the amended § 1983. See Wolfe v. 

Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 365-66 (9th Cir. 2004) (analyzing 

whether judicial-capacity judges were appropriate § 1983 

defendants in a suit seeking “prospective injunctive and 

declaratory relief”). 

29 In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 

17 (1st Cir. 1982). Although In re Justices was decided 

before Pulliam and before the 1996 amendment to Section 

1983, we have continued to adopt and apply its test. See 

Reynolds, 201 F.3d at 198.
15

been made.”30 However, a judge who acts as an enforcer or 

administrator of a statute can be sued under Section 1983 for 

declaratory or (if declaratory relief is unavailable) injunctive 

relief.31

 

30 Id. at 21; see also id. at 25 (“To require the Justices 

unnecessarily to assume the role of advocates or partisans on 

these issues would tend to undermine their role as judges. To 

encourage or even force them to participate as defendants in a 

federal suit attacking Commonwealth laws would be to 

require them to abandon their neutrality and defend as 

constitutional the very laws that the plaintiffs insist are 

unconstitutional—laws as to which their judicial 

responsibilities place them in a neutral posture. Indeed, a 

public perception of partiality might well remain even were 

the Justices to take no active part in the litigation. The result 

risks harm to the court's stance of institutional neutrality—a 

harm that appeal would come too late to repair.”).

31 See Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union of Am., Inc., 446 

U.S. 719, 736 (1980) (holding that plaintiffs could sue judges 

in their enforcement capacities to enjoin them from enforcing 

bar membership requirements that the judges themselves 

promulgated); In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 23 (“In Consumers 

Union, unlike the case before us, the requirements under 

attack were promulgated by the judges themselves in the form 

of court rules; the judges had acted in a legislative capacity, 

which made their involvement in the litigation more direct 

and which gave them an institutional stake in the litigation’s 

outcome. It is therefore not surprising that the Supreme Court 

in Consumers Union . . . treated the judicial defendants as 

having acted in a nonadjudicatory (enforcement) capacity.”).
16

In Georgevich and Reynolds, we have twice applied 

the In re Justices test to determine whether state court judges 

could face suit under Section 1983, coming to two different 

outcomes based on the role and authority of the state court 

judges. In Georgevich, we held that state court judges who 

were administrators of the parole power under state statutes 

were proper parties to a Section 1983 suit challenging the 

constitutionality of those statutes.32 In so holding, we

observed that “[t]he Pennsylvania statutory arrangement 

divides the authority to make parole decisions between the 

sentencing judges and the Board.”

33 Thus, there was “no basis 

for distinguishing the role of the sentencing judges from that 

of the Board” and “no reason why the Board, but not the 

judges, may be sued on a similar challenge.”34

In Reynolds, on the other hand, we found state court 

judges who had committed minors to involuntary drug and 

alcohol treatment services, as set forth by a state statute 

authorizing this commitment, to be improper defendants to a 

suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality of 

the statute. We considered these judges to be neutral 

adjudicators, not enforcers or administrators of the statute.35

As the judges did not initiate the proceedings under the 

 

32 Georgevich, 772 F.2d at 1087 (“This is not a case in 

which judges are sued in their judicial capacity as neutral 

adjudicators of disputes . . . . Rather, the judges are sued as 

enforcers of the statutes, in other words as administrators of 

the parole power.”).

33 Id. at 1088.

34 Id.

35 Reynolds, 201 F.3d at 199.
17

statute and were required to appoint counsel for the minors

and order an assessment of each minor’s alleged drug and/or 

alcohol dependency, we held that “[t]he judge’s position in 

the . . . proceeding is simply not adverse to that of the 

minor.”

36 We further explained that the informality of the 

process “[did] not alter the position of the judges as neutral 

arbiters.”

37 We explicitly distinguished Georgevich: 

“although in Georgevich we held the judges amenable to suit 

under § 1983, our decision nevertheless recognized the 

impropriety of such suits where the judge acted as an 

adjudicator rather than an enforcer or administrator of a 

statute.”38

Thus, the question here is whether, as the District 

Court found, the state court judges sued here are neutral 

arbiters of the New Jersey custody statute and its policies like 

the judges in Reynolds, or if instead they have enough latitude 

under the statute and policies that they become enforcers like

the judge defendants in Georgevich. The answer is not clearly 

decided by our case law, as the proceedings at issue here do 

not have all of the same protections as those in Reynolds—

mainly, the mandatory appointment of counsel.

Decisions from our sister Circuits applying the In Re 

Justices test help to clarify. In Grant v. Johnson,

39 the Ninth 

Circuit found that a judge had acted in his adjudicative 

capacity by appointing a guardian for a person deemed 

 

36 Id.

37 Id. at 200.

38 Id. at 199. 

39 15 F.3d 146, 148 (9th Cir. 1994).
18

mentally incompetent. Although the proceeding did not 

require notice or hearing, it was initiated by a third party (in 

this case, the plaintiff’s former husband) and was not initiated 

by the judge himself. Because the judge had acted in his 

adjudicative capacity, he was not a proper party to the suit.

In Bauer v. Texas,

40 the plaintiff sued the presiding 

judge of a probate court in his official capacity, seeking

declaratory judgment under Section 1983 that Section 875 of 

the Texas Probate Code was unconstitutional. That Texas 

statute permitted the court to appoint a temporary guardian 

for an incapacitated person after three conditions were 

satisfied: 1) there was substantial evidence establishing 

probable cause, 2) an attorney was appointed to represent the 

incapacitated person, and 3) notice was given and a hearing

was held. The Fifth Circuit found that “judicial 

determinations [under] section 875 are . . . clearly within a 

judge’s adjudicatory capacity, as this statute requires notice 

and a hearing, among other safeguards and limitations.”41

Like in Grant, the Fifth Circuit further noted that the Texas 

court did not initiate the request for temporary guardianship.42

Thus, it found that the state court judge was not a proper party 

to the suit.43

The First Circuit has affirmed the dismissal of a suit 

 

40 341 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2003).

41 Id. at 360-61.

42 Id. at 361.

43 That decision ultimately rested its conclusion on Article 

III grounds, finding that there was no case or controversy, but 

is nonetheless relevant to our discussion.
19

even more similar to the present case, Nollet v. Justices of the 

Trial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

44 In 

Nollet, men who were litigants in domestic relations and/or 

abuse prevention matters in the trial courts of Massachusetts 

sued state court judges under Section 1983, seeking 

declaratory and injunctive relief. They objected to state

statutes that permitted the granting of temporary restraining 

orders at ex parte hearings.

45 In spite of the “wide latitude” 

the state statutes gave the state court judges “in fashioning the 

conditions of both temporary and permanent restraining 

orders,” the judges were found to have acted in their 

adjudicatory capacity, “because the statute neither confers 

upon them the power to initiate actions, nor does it delegate 

to them any administrative functions.”46

In this case, because we conclude that the judicial 

defendants have acted in an adjudicatory capacity and not in 

an enforcement capacity, they are not proper defendants. To 

be sure, the best-interests-of-the-child standard statute gives 

state court judges broad discretion to determine a custody 

situation. State court judges also have broad discretion to 

decide motions on the papers under New Jersey Supreme 

Court and Appellate Division precedent. However, like in 

Reynolds, Grant, Bauer, and Nollet, the state court judges 

themselves do not have any right to initiate these actions.

Instead, a parent must initiate a custody dispute. Nor were the 

state court judges here given any administrative function. 

 

44 83 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Mass.), aff’d, 248 F.3d 1127 (1st 

Cir. 2000) (unpublished per curiam table decision). 

45 Id. at 206.

46 Id. at 211.
20

Moreover, the state court judges did not promulgate either the 

statutes or the judicial standards to which the Plaintiffs object. 

Furthermore, where the judge determines that there is a 

genuine issue as to a material fact relating to the custody 

dispute, a plenary hearing must be held, providing Plaintiffs 

with additional procedural safeguards. Thus, this case is more 

similar to Reynolds than Georgevich. Accordingly, the 

Defendants here are not proper parties to this action under

Section 1983 for declaratory or injunctive relief.

47 48

B. Did the District Court Abuse its Discretion in 

Failing to Exercise Jurisdiction under the 

Declaratory Judgment Act?

Plaintiffs argue that even if the District Court

determined that declaratory relief was unavailable under 

Section 1983, the District Court should have separately 

determined whether declaratory relief was available under the 

 

47 Because we determine that the judges were not proper 

Section 1983 defendants for declaratory or injunctive relief, 

we need not reach or comment upon the District Court’s 

separate “available remedy at law” basis for denying 

injunctive relief. 

48 Plaintiffs argue that it was error for the District Court to 

dismiss the defendant judges as improper parties without 

specifying the “appropriate enforcement official” that would 

be a proper defendant to the action. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 26. 

But Plaintiffs do not offer any support for the assertion that 

the District Court was required to assist them in this way or 

otherwise to litigate on their behalf by identifying possible 

defendants to sue.
21

Declaratory Judgment Act. Plaintiffs argue that their case 

presents an Article III case or controversy,49 and that Article 

III jurisdiction and Declaratory Judgment Act jurisdiction are 

co-extensive.

50 Thus, Plaintiffs argue that the In Re Justices

test does not apply to declaratory relief under the Act—that 

the Act offers declaratory relief that is broader than that 

available under Section 1983.51 Plaintiffs further argue that 

the District Court erred in not considering the required factors 

before declining to exercise jurisdiction under the Act.52

The Declaratory Judgment Act states, in relevant part:

In a case of actual controversy within its 

jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, 

upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may 

declare the rights and other legal relations of 

any interested party seeking such declaration, 

whether or not further relief is or could be 

 

49 Like the District Court and the First Circuit in In Re 

Justices, we decline to rest dismissal of this case on Article 

III grounds. See In re Justices, 695 F.2d at 22 (“[W]e are 

reluctant to rest our decision directly on Article III when the 

case can be resolved on a nonconstitutional basis.”).

50 Plaintiffs’ Brief at 28 (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. 

Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126-27 (2007) and Aetna Life 

Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937), for the 

proposition that the phrase “case of actual controversy” in the 

Act refers to those “Cases” and “Controversies” that are 

justiciable under Article III).

51 Id. at 29-30.

52 Id. at 30.
22

sought. Any such declaration shall have the 

force and effect of a final judgment or decree 

and shall be reviewable as such.53

Given “[t]he statute’s textual commitment to discretion, and 

the breadth of leeway we have always understood it to 

suggest,” district courts “possess discretion in determining 

whether and when to entertain an action under the 

Declaratory Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise 

satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites.”54 Both 

the Supreme Court and our Court have established certain 

non-exhaustive factors that, in an ordinary case, guide a 

district court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction under the 

Act.55 Appellate courts review these discretionary

determinations for abuse of discretion.56

 

53 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

54 Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282, 286-87 (citing Brillhart v. Excess 

Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942)); see also id. at 287 

(“When all is said and done . . . the propriety of declaratory 

relief in a particular case will depend upon a circumspect 

sense of its fitness informed by the teachings and experience 

concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial 

power.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).

55 Id. at 283, 289-90; Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp., 751 F.3d 

129, 138 (3d Cir. 2014).

56 Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289; see also Reifer, 751 F.3d at 140 

(“Brillhart and Wilton stand for at least two broad principles: 

(1) that federal courts have substantial discretion to decide 

whether to exercise DJA jurisdiction, and (2) that this 

discretion is bounded and reviewable.”).
23

The Declaratory Judgment Act does not, however,

provide an independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction; it 

merely defines a remedy.57 The District Court thus properly 

understood that the Act does not render the state court judges 

appropriate defendants for declaratory relief, and the District 

Court properly applied the In re Justices test to Plaintiffs’ 

claims for declaratory relief. Because it correctly determined

that the Defendants were not properly sued in this action, it 

did not need to consider whether to exercise its discretion 

using the factors we and the Supreme Court have articulated.

 

57 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 

671 (1950) (“Congress enlarged the range of remedies 

available in the federal courts but did not extend their 

jurisdiction.”); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc., 

835 F.3d 388, 394 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that the Declaratory 

Judgment Act “does not itself create an independent basis for 

federal jurisdiction but instead provides a remedy for 

controversies otherwise properly within the court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction”); Ne. Dep’t ILGWU Health & Welfare 

Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 

F.2d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Congress did not intend the 

Federal Declaratory Judgment Act . . . to extend the 

jurisdiction of the federal courts.”). We note that the Act, 

which dates from 1934, see Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 

452, 466 (1974), has been in effect for all of the “appropriate

defendant” decisions that we now rely on. 
24

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 

of the District Court.