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i 

55–191 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–78] 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS RESET 

REQUIREMENTS (PARTS I AND II) 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

AND

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARINGS HELD 

JULY 9, AND DECEMBER 10, 2009 
(II) 

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, JR., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

MEGAN PUTNAM, Staff Assistant 

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, JR., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 1

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

DOUG ROACH, Professional Staff Member 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

1Mr. Owens joined the subcommittee on November 20, 2009. 
(III) 

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

WILL EBBS, Professional Staff Member 

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARINGS: 

Thursday, July 9, 2009, Army and Marine Corps Reset Requirements (Part I) 1 

Thursday, December 10, 2009, Army and Marine Corps Reset Requirements 

(Part II) ................................................................................................................. 55 

APPENDIXES: 

Thursday, July 9, 2009 ............................................................................................ 23 

Thursday, December 10, 2009 ................................................................................ 83 

THURSDAY, JULY 9, 2009 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS RESET REQUIREMENTS (PART I) 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman, Air and 

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 3 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Ranking Member, 

Readiness Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 2 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Readiness 

Subcommittee ....................................................................................................... 1 

Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman, Seapower 

and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee ........................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps ...... 5 

Chiarelli, Gen. Peter W., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ........................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Abercrombie, Hon. Neil .................................................................................... 29 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, 

Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee .................................. 35 

Amos, Gen. James F. ........................................................................................ 43 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking 

Member, Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ............................................ 34 

Chiarelli, Gen. Peter W. ................................................................................... 36 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 33 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P. ..................................................................................... 27 

Taylor, Hon. Gene ............................................................................................. 31 
Page

VI 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[The information was classified or not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[See Appendix, Part II, December 10, 2009.] 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2009 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS RESET REQUIREMENTS (PART II) 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Readiness 

Subcommittee ....................................................................................................... 55 

Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman, Seapower 

and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee ........................................................... 55 

WITNESSES 

Amos, Gen. James F., USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps ...... 57 

Chiarelli, Gen. Peter W., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ........................... 56 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

[See Appendix, Part I, July 9, 2009.] 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 87 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Ortiz ........................................................................................................... 91 
(1) 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS RESET REQUIREMENTS 

(PART I) 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE, MEETING JOINT- LY WITH AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE AND

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUB- COMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, July 9, 2009. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 9:33 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon Ortiz (chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ORTIZ. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Today, the Readiness, Air and Land Forces, and Seapower and 

Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee meet to receive testimony on 

the status of the Army and Marine Corps equipment reset requirements. 

I thank our distinguished witnesses, the Vice Chief of Staff of the 

Army and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, for appearing before these subcommittees today to discuss reset. 

Since 2006, the Congress has authorized more than $55 billion 

for the reset of Army equipment and more than $14 billion for Marine Corps equipment reset. For fiscal year (FY) 2010, the Army 

has requested another $11 billion, and the Marine Corps is seeking 

$2 billion. 

What we would like to hear from our witnesses today is, what has almost $70 billion bought and what differences has it made to 

Army and Marine Corps warfighting capability and overall readiness? 

We also need to understand how long the Army and the Marine 

Corps estimate that they will need to continue to request reset 

funding and at what level. What is the future of reset? 

In support of reset, Army and Marine Corps depots are operating 

at historically high levels. Since the start of combat operations in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has reset more than 480,000 

pieces of equipment. And over the past 3 fiscal years, the Marine 

Corps has reset more than 60,000 pieces of equipment and plans 

to reset almost 41,000 pieces in fiscal year 2010. 

As we prepare for Army forces to leave Iraq and as Marine forces 

are increasing in Afghanistan, we need to know how the depots are 

preparing to handle anticipated changes in reset workloads. 

The redeployment of U.S. forces and the associated equipment 

from Iraq will be a monumental undertaking. The Army alone has 
2 

more than 31 million items, 100,000 vehicles, 120,000 containers, 

and tens of thousands of tons of ammunition in Iraq, and must be 

moved or otherwise disposed. 

The subcommittee needs to understand the role reset will play in 

this retrograde of equipment, and how much it is expected to cost, 

and what planning is being done to ensure parts, people and equipment are in place. We need to understand all these things so that 

the Congress can ensure a reset continues in a way that best supports our warfighters. 

Drawing down in Iraq at the same time we are building up forces 

in Afghanistan presents daunting logistical challenges. Congress 

cannot ensure the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military 

services have the resources they need to meet those challenges unless we have a full understanding of the reset requirements. 

Our witnesses today are two distinguished military leaders: General Peter W. Chiarelli—he is Vice Chief of Staff of the Army—and 

General James F. Amos, Assistant Commandant of the Marine 

Corps. 

The chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman and my friend 

from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, for any remarks that he would like to 

make. 

Mr. Forbes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As always, we appreciate your leadership in holding this hearing. And I will keep my 

remarks brief. 

I would like to welcome General Chiarelli and General Amos 

back to the committee. Gentlemen, we thank you for being here 

today. And thank you for all that you have done and continue to 

do for our Nation. 

This committee has been actively engaged in the issue that impacts the readiness of our forces in light of the ongoing combat operations. The Army and Marine Corps reset programs are a critical 

part of that. 

Although the 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) 

budget request included $13 billion for Army and Marine Corps 

reset efforts, it is very clear that the request was at best a guess. 

Despite the agreed-to framework for withdrawal in Iraq, there is 

much that is not known, and many critical decisions have yet to 

be made. 

And we must not forget that the framework for withdrawal is 

contingent on conditions on the ground and the capability and capacity of the Iraqi security forces. 

This is an important hearing, and I really appreciate the chairman asking General Chiarelli and General Amos to join us today, 

because I think they can help us better understand the dynamics 

of the situation we face. 

As General Chiarelli notes in his written testimony, reset costs 

for future years will depend on several factors, such as responsible 
3 

drawdown requirements, the level of force commitment, the activity 

level of those forces, and the amount of destroyed, damaged or 

worn equipment. 

We face an enormous challenge as we work to rebuild, reset, 

modernize, transform, and grow our armed forces while actively engaged in combat. The redeployment of forces from Iraq and the increase in forces in Afghanistan greatly increased the complexity 

and the resourcing requirements for reset. 

I look forward to the discussion today, and I hope it will provide 

us with a better understanding of the Army and Marine Corps efforts to reset the force in light of these challenges. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the time, and I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. I will yield to Mr. Taylor for a short statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our very 

distinguished witnesses. In particular, General Chiarelli, I want to 

make note of your efforts to stay in touch with the Seapower Committee, letting us know the progress with the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle (MRAP) program. I think you have gone out 

of your way to do that. I am very, very grateful for that. 

I have a statement for the record. In the interest of time, I will 

submit it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Abercrombie. 

STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND FORCES 

SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Mr. Forbes, thank you for your observations. I would like to submit my statement for the record and move to the main business at 

hand, Mr. Chairman, with your permission. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Abercrombie can be found in the 

Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Bartlett. 

All the statements will be submitted for the record, hearing no 

objections. 

General Chiarelli, you can proceed with your testimony, and then 

you will be followed by General Amos. So proceed whenever you 

are ready, sir. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF 

OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY 

General CHIARELLI. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Forbes. 

Distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss Army reset in view of the 
4 

fiscal year 2010 annual budget and Overseas Contingency Operations supplemental request. I have submitted a statement for the 

record, and I look forward to answering your questions at the conclusion of my opening remarks. 

As you know, it has been a busy time for our Nation’s military. 

We are at war. We have been at war for the past seven-plus years, 

and that has undeniably put a strain on our people and our equipment. In particular, the increased wear and tear caused by high 

usage rates and harsh environments on items ranging from individual weapons to helicopters to combat and tactical vehicles has 

taken a significant toll. 

As such, the Army’s capability and capacity for reset have been 

critically important. Since the beginning of combat operations, the 

Army has reset over 470,000 items, including aircraft, track vehicles, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (Humvees or 

HMMWVs), trucks, trailers, small arms, and generators. 

As you would expect, over the past several years, we have become increasingly proficient at resetting our equipment. In particular, we have steadily improved the productivity and capacity of 

Army Materiel Command depots to meet our increased maintenance needs. 

Red River Army Depot in Texas, for example, has streamlined its 

Humvee process. Now the depot is turning out 32 mission-ready 

Humvees per day, compared to the previous rate of 3 per week. 

The commercial pace has also surged to meet the requirements 

we have placed on our partners in industry. I am proud of all that 

has been accomplished. 

However, a tremendous amount of work still remains to be done. 

While we are preparing to draw down operations in Iraq, we are 

continuing to expand our efforts in Afghanistan. This will require 

that at a minimum we maintain the same capability and capacity 

for reset. 

As the Army has consistently pointed out, due to the unprecedented stress placed on our equipment as a result of this war, reset 

funding will also be required for a period of two to three years beyond the cessation of operations in theater. 

Our military must always be prepared to respond to contingency 

operations around the world, and a critical part of our reset program will be to rapidly and successfully reconfigure the Army’s 

prepositioned stocks and to fill unit shortages, including homeland 

defense and homeland security requirements. 

Over the past 7-plus years, with the support of Congress, the 

United States Army has deployed the best manned, equipped, 

trained, and led forces in our 234-year history, and I assure the 

members of this committee that we will continue to coordinate with 

you and your esteemed colleagues on ways we might further improve our reset process in the future. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you again for 

your continued generous support and demonstrated commitment to 

the outstanding men and women of the United States Army and 

their families. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Chiarelli can be found in the 

Appendix on page 36.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 
5 

General Amos. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, ASSISTANT 

COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General AMOS. Thank you, Chairmen and Ranking Members and 

distinguished members of this committee, for the opportunity to report to you today about resetting your Marine Corps. 

On behalf of the more than 241,000 active and reserve Marines 

and their families, I would like to extend my appreciation for the 

sustained support Congress has faithfully provided its Corps. 

As we begin this hearing, I would like to highlight a few points 

from my written statement. 

As we sit in this hearing room today, there are more than 32,000 

Marines deployed across the globe supporting exercises, security cooperation activities, and overseas contingency operations. For the 

first time in over 5 years, we have less than 15,000 Marines in 

Iraq, while an additional 10,600 Marines are establishing a presence in the Helmand province of southern Afghanistan. 

Combined with our forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary 

Units, your Corps is fulfilling its role as the Nation’s premier force 

in readiness. Despite high operational tempo, your Marines are resilient, motivated, and performing superbly in missions around the 

globe. 

For the past seven years, they have been fully engaged and winning in combat operations as part of a generational struggle 

against global extremism. This sustained effort and performance 

has not come without costs, costs to the institution, to our equipment, to our strategic programs, and most importantly to our Marines and their families. 

Our forward-deployed units are manned, trained and equipped to 

accomplish their assigned missions, and these units are reporting 

the very highest levels of readiness for those missions. 

To ensure our deployed and next-to-deploy units have sufficient 

personnel, equipment and training, we have taxed our non-deploying forces and strategic programs as the bill payers. 

Although the current security environment has justified the 

trade-offs we have made to support the long war, we must maintain a balanced force capable of responding to crises across the full 

range of military operations. 

The goals of our reset and modernization programs are to sustain 

the current fight by repairing or replacing worn-out equipment 

while enhancing our support to the warfighter by reconstituting 

our force with new or more capable gear. We expect to see reset 

requirements increase as a result of force reductions in Iraq and 

a growing presence in Afghanistan. 

To prepare for the reset of equipment redeploying from Iraq, we 

have created an Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) reset plan. We 

have completed the first wave or phase of our retrograde from Iraq 

with over 36,000 principal end items having been processed. 

Our second wave is underway right now, with equipment flowing 

from Iraq to Kuwait and back to the United States for disposition. 

We expect a final phase of our retrograde from Iraq to be complete 

by about this time next year. Our reset actions will continue beyond next summer, as they include not only the retrograde, but 
6 

also depot and field-level maintenance of our retrograded equipment, and procurement of replacement equipment as needed. 

The velocity with which we can process and repair our returning 

equipment is directly related to the handling capacity at our main 

port of entry into the United States, Blount Island, Florida. This 

year’s unfunded priority list, totaling $188 million, includes modest 

requirements at both Blount Island and our depot in Barstow, California, that will, if funded, markedly accelerate our equipment 

processing abilities. 

I have appeared before you several times discussing reset costs. 

Thus far, Congress has generously supported our reset efforts by 

appropriating over $14 billion to ensure that Marines have the 

equipment and maintenance resources that they need. Continued 

congressional support of future funding requests will be necessary 

to improve equipment readiness levels across the Corps. 

It is hard to predict what the Marine Corps’ reset costs are going 

to finally be, because it is difficult to estimate the total cost of reconstitution of our gear returning from Iraq until that evolution is 

complete. Complicating reset estimates is the recent sizable deployment of Marine forces into Afghanistan. 

All of that said, we estimate in the near term that we need an 

additional $6 billion in reset funding. 

As your Marines continue to serve in combat, they need the sustained support of the American people and Congress to maintain 

their readiness, to reset the force during an extended war, and to 

modernize such that we can face the challenges of the future. 

On behalf of your Marines, I extend our appreciation for your 

faithful support and thank you in advance for your ongoing efforts. 

The Corps understands the value of each dollar provided by the 

American taxpayer and will continue to provide maximum return 

for every dollar spent. 

Today, over 202,000 active and 39,000 reserve Marine forces remain ready, relevant and capable as the Nation’s force on readiness. And with your help, we will stay that way. 

[The prepared statement of General Amos can be found in the 

Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. You know, we have to respond 

to our taxpayers. And, of course, we have a great committee and 

members of other subcommittees and two outstanding chairmen 

and ranking members. 

But some of the questions that we are asking today—and one of 

them is, what has the reset funding done—and I think you touched 

on it a little bit—to improve readiness rates across the board for 

the Army and Marine Corps. And maybe both of you could specify 

a little bit, with the money that we have given you in the past, how 

has that helped readiness across the board, Army and Marines? 

General AMOS. Mr. Chairman, when I look at reset, it is sustained readiness. As you know, under the old supplemental rules 

and the old OCO rules, we were not only allowed to reset, but we 

could recap certain pieces of equipment, meaning that we could— 

when we, in fact, brought them back for reset, if we recapped a 

piece of equipment, we not only brought it up to 10/20 standards. 

We went beyond that, brought it to zero miles, zero hours, and 

added any additional upgrades to that piece of equipment. 
7 

Beginning in fiscal year 2010, we will not be able to do that. We 

will only reset equipment, equipment brought back from theater, 

and it will be brought up to 10/20 standards; 10/20 standards does 

mean a piece of equipment that is fully mission capable with 

maybe only minor deficiencies on that piece of equipment. 

As we get further into the drawdown, much of the theater-provided equipment will be brought back. And as that is added to 

units that are back here in the United States and other units, that 

will cause readiness levels to go up. 

But we are not expecting that to happen in the next year or so, 

and it will be totally dependent upon requirements in Afghanistan 

as we draw down in Iraq. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I think that we can understand your answers better 

now that we have got more light. 

General CHIARELLI. Mr. Chairman. 

General AMOS. I thought I was having a vision here. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to talk about this, 

this issue, because Congress has been very, very generous thus far. 

When I appeared before you the last time, Congress had given the 

Marine Corps $14 billion. We are now—excuse me, $12 billion. We 

are now at $14 billion this year. 

We have seen, as I said in my opening statement and my written 

one, the levels of all the deployed forces, both the training readiness and the equipment readiness, is very, very high. It is exactly 

what you would want it to be, supporting our efforts there. 

It is the stuff that is back home; it is the equipment back home. 

And I don’t want to mislead the committee, because the equipment 

that is back home, with the exception of that that is actually working its way through the depots and through the repair and reconstitution efforts, I mean, that gear is clearly down. 

But the gear that is back at our bases and stations is at a very 

high state of readiness. There is just not enough of it, because we 

have taken that gear that we would normally have back in the 

rear, we have moved it forward to supply the forces that have been 

in Iraq and now in Afghanistan. 

So the gear that is forward is very healthy. The gear that is back 

is healthy. There is just not enough of it. 

What we have received, what you have done in helping us with 

$14 billion thus far, just to give you a sample for what we have 

been able to do, first of all, $1.8 billion of that has gone to depotlevel maintenance over the last 4 to 5 years. In other words, that 

is all the gear that has worked its way through Albany and Barstow, $1.8 billion. 

We bought 6,400 Humvees, and now the newest version, which 

is the expanded capacity vehicle—that is the up-armored Humvee 

that you are seeing out that is being fielded now and in use—400 

mine rollers, 140,000 tactical radio sets. And you might say, ‘‘Well, 

why did you need that? Why didn’t you have that before the war 

started?’’ We didn’t understand we would be in the dispersed environment that we are in right now, where we have platoons up in 

the mountains of Afghanistan, 80 Marines and 1 second lieutenant, 

up there and they need communications gear, they need satellite 

communications, they need to be able to pass digital information. 
8 

1The information referred to is incorrect. The statement is renounced and corrected in part 

two of the hearing held on December 10, 2009. 

So over the last several years, the reset has helped us actually 

be able to fight the kind of fight that we are in right now, both in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. We bought 12 KC–130Js, 6 MV–22s, 4 H– 

1s that have been the replacement airplanes, and the list goes on. 

So, sir, it is depot-level maintenance, is a big chunk of it, but it 

has been to reset airplanes that we have lost, equipment that we 

have lost, Humvees that have been blown up, seven-ton trucks that 

have been blown up, and that type of thing. 

So we will see our readiness levels back home. Now that we are 

coming out of Iraq, you will begin to see those readiness levels next 

year begin to creep up. I can’t tell you how much they are going 

to be, but intuitively it has to, because we will be down, we will 

be out of Iraq, the Marines will be, with the exception of just a few 

by this time next year. The equipment will be out of Iraq by this 

time next year, being repaired and going to the home stations. You 

will see the readiness at home station begin to increase next year. 

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, the reset of all the equipment back from 

theater, I think this is new guidance. Why the change in fiscal year 

2010? Maybe you can enlighten us a little bit on that. 

General AMOS. Sir, I want to make sure I understand your question. Why does it—— 

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, maybe General Chiarelli can also add to that. 

This is new guidance coming out for only equipment coming from 

theater, and this is new guidance for 2010. Has the new policy 

changed, the new guidance? Are we getting new guidance now? Or 

is it the same? Or—— 

General AMOS. The overseas contingency operations rules have 

changed. And my understanding, that in fiscal year 2010, except 

for very few systems—and nothing is certain in this business— 

there are different definitions—but as a general rule, we will not 

be able to bring back and recap, and that means add upgrades to 

equipment in 2010. 

We are still doing it in 2009. And we will continue to do it 

throughout this year. But when we start executing the fiscal year 

2010 program, the new OCO rules do not allow the recap of equipment as a general rule.1

Mr. ORTIZ. We have a good turnout of Members, and I would like 

to give ample time for Members to ask questions. 

Now I yield to my good friend, Mr. Forbes, for any questions. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, once again, gentlemen, thank you for being here. And, you 

know, one of the things we are going to see is this drawdown of 

all of our equipment in Iraq. And, General Amos, you talked about 

how that was going to help our readiness here. 

But there is invariably going to be some disputes between perhaps U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and some of the services 

where that equipment goes, whether it is utilized continually in 

theater, perhaps, with some of the Iraqis or whether it is brought 

back here for the services. 

If there is a dispute there, who arbitrates that, as to the drawdown of that equipment? 
9 

General AMOS. Sir, within the Marine Corps, it is done two 

places. Number one, the equipment is actually reconciled by our 

forward commander on the ground in Iraq right now, General 

Tryon. And we have got Marine Forces Central Command, which 

is three-star, has his headquarters in Bahrain, as well as his headquarters in Tampa. 

So they actually do the first reconciliation. In other words, what 

is on the ground? The gear that is available to come out, what 

needs to come out? 

Just to give you a sense for the magnitude, we changed Marine 

forces and commanders in March of this year. If you took 100 percent of what we call the equipment density list on the ground in 

Iraq, we have brought out over 51 percent of that since March of 

this year. Just since March, we have moved out all 51 percent of 

what we have had on the ground there for the last 5 to 6 years. 

So that was a call by the local commander and by General 

Helland. And then once those numbers are put into the system— 

in other words, we know what is coming back—and, actually, the 

decision as to where it is distributed is not at Headquarters Marine 

Corps, but at what we call the Strategic Ground Equipment Working Group, and it is all done by virtue of the Commandant’s priorities. 

So that is handled internally to the Marine Corps. And just to 

give you a sense for what I am talking about, we took 27 percent 

of the gear we had—27 percent of the 44,000 end items that went 

into Afghanistan this year to support the operations that are underway right now, 27 percent of that actually came from Iraq, and 

that was gear that was new, gear that had been refurbished, gear 

that was kind of sitting up what we call in stores up against the 

fence, that it has been preserved. We ship that gear into Afghanistan. 

So that is all done internally to the Marine Corps. Some of it is 

done forward-deployed by the commanders, as it should be. Some 

of it is done back here at Headquarters Marine Corps. 

General CHIARELLI. Sir, we recently received a list from theater 

that I have not seen, but is currently being evaluated by the Army 

staff. And the kind of things we would have to evaluate is, first, 

is the equipment excess to our tables of organizational equipment? 

If it is excess and not required, then the decision is much easier. 

But when we get to equipment that is part of our table of organizational equipment, required equipment, and needed to fill units back 

here in the United States, it becomes a much more difficult issue. 

And should DOD be given the authorization to direct that we 

leave that equipment behind, we will, of course, have to ask that 

we be reimbursed for whatever equipment we are told to leave behind that will affect a readiness level. And if we are not, it will, 

by definition, show up in readiness levels. We will not be as ready 

in all our units as we were before if we can’t replace that equipment, and we are required to leave it in theater. 

But we will work very, very closely with DOD to ensure that as 

much as possible we can avoid those kinds of situations. 

Mr. FORBES. Just one last question. It is two parts, really. But 

what was the process to develop the budget reset funding line? And 
10 

have the current rules for determining the budget request for reset 

adequately resourced the Army’s reset requirements? 

General CHIARELLI. We believe they have. Given the rules have 

changed for recap, that portion of the budget that would normally 

be used to do that is smaller. But we expect in fiscal year 2010 to 

have to reset a total of 27 Brigade Combat Teams. 

And we believe, even with the drawdown, that will occur sometime in fiscal year 2010, we will not see the effects of that drawdown in Iraq as quickly as the Marine Corps will see that. We believe we have the necessary money for reset to handle those brigades coming back in fiscal year 2010. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Chairman Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. General Chiarelli, I know that, by no choice of the 

military, particularly the Marine Corps, General Brogan that handled the program, but in order to field the MRAPs as quickly as 

we could, if my memory is, we had five different chassis, three different engines on those five different chassis, which, considering 

the part of the world you are operating in, had to be a logistical 

nightmare keeping up with the parts. 

I am curious on the vehicle that we are designing for Afghanistan, are you going to be able to consolidate your chassis more? Are 

you going to be able to consolidate your engines? Or, because of the 

industrial base problem, are we going to have to spread the workload and the engines and chassis like we did before? 

General CHIARELLI. There is no doubt, sir, that that created 

problems for us. But I have to tell you, hats off go to the logisticians who have kept the MRAP Operational Readiness (OR) rates, 

even with 5 different chassis, at over 90 percent, both in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, dipping possibly below 90 percent for very short periods of time, but they have just done an amazing job, even with 

those 5 different chassis. 

As you know, the MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV), as I understand it, is sole source. There will be one MRAP ATV. The good 

news is, as you know, we don’t have the all-terrain capability in 

those five different models you talk about, but both the Army and 

the Marine Corps are exploring and right now adding an upgrade 

to some of those MRAPs, certain models, that will give them allterrain capability. 

So in my opinion, the decision was the right decision. We got five 

different variants down range. If we had gone to a single variant, 

we would not have gotten as much protection down range. We have 

saved lives, arms and legs with that decision. 

It creates logistics issues, but we are working through them. And 

hats off to the logisticians for keeping the OR rates up so high. 

Mr. TAYLOR. My second question for both of you gentlemen is, as 

you do have a monumental task to buy these things, keep these 

things running, fixing things, and I realize it is someone else’s job 

to get them to theater and get them out of theater, but it wasn’t 

that long ago that the folks from Maersk made me aware that they 

have lost about 130 drivers just transiting Pakistan to get their 

equipment into Afghanistan. You know, one of the other contractors I think has lost about 20 drivers. 
11 

I am curious to what extent the recent events in Pakistan, the 

recent uptick in violence there, has affected your ability to get 

equivalent into or out of Afghanistan. And there is a purpose for 

all this—it is not to put you on the spot—is, if we are going to face 

a situation at some point where we are going to need an enormous 

amount of additional airlift because of the problems on the roads, 

that is where this question is leading. 

Are you able to get things through Pakistan in volumes sufficient 

to do your job? 

General CHIARELLI. I owe you a rundown of where we are today 

as opposed to where we were in January. My understanding is, 

things have improved significantly. And we are able to get equipment in and out of country with far less loss than was reported at 

the first of the year. 

I know that Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has worked 

contingency operations to ensure, should those lost become untenable, that they can, in fact, continue to supply the force levels and 

predicted force levels we are going to have in Afghanistan. And I 

have all the confidence that they will be able to do that. 

As for the amount of improvement that we have had in the last 

six to seven months, if I could get that to you to show you exactly 

how it has improved, but I can state with some certainty that it 

has improved. And I feel comfortable and confident we will be able 

to supply our forces. 

Mr. TAYLOR. General Amos. 

General AMOS. Mr. Chairman, it is a little bit easier for us in the 

southern part of Afghanistan. The ships come in—we get our 

equipment really two ways. They either fly it in, goes into 

Kandahar, or now Bastion, now that the airfield at Bastion is large 

enough to accommodate the Marines, or we drive it up, it comes 

in by ship to Karachi and then takes what we call the southern 

route into southern Afghanistan. 

I don’t have the numbers of interdictions. I will get that for you. 

That is easy to get. It is my understanding, having gone over there 

recently and talked to the J4, the head logistics guy for International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), that the southern route 

is almost—very little interdiction going on in the southern route. 

It is just a cleaner, safer way to go. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

General AMOS. So at our point right now, other than just distance, time to distance and physics, it is just—which takes time— 

we are actually, I don’t believe, experiencing any trouble getting 

the gear into theater. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I thank both of you gentleman for what you do for 

our Nation. 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Before I yield to my good friend, Mr. Bartlett, I understand that, at the G–8 summit, there was an agreement between our President and the Russian president to allow us to fly 

over Russia and help us deliver some of the equipment. It maybe 

is too early. Are you up to date on that? 

General CHIARELLI. On my part, Mr. Chairman, only what I have 

read in the press and only my understanding that any time you get 
12 

multiple ways to enter into a very difficult theater such as Afghanistan, it cannot be anything but good news that we have that ability 

to do that. But all I have read is press reports. 

Mr. ORTIZ. General Amos. 

General AMOS. Sir, I agree. All I know about that is what I have 

read in the paper. I have not seen anything specific within the Department of Defense on it. I did read, though, which was encouraging, that the agreement was signed to keep Manas open, and 

Manas is a port of exit for a whole lot of our young Marines. 

It is interesting how many of those young kids down in the 

Helmand province understood the value of Manas, and they wanted 

to make sure it stayed open so that they could go home someday. 

But that is very encouraging. 

Mr. ORTIZ. And I hope we can work on that, because it would be 

a tremendous asset for us to utilize if this agreement can be 

worked out further. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

I want to follow up with a question asked by Mr. Forbes. The Army’s 2010 request for reset is about $11 billion, of which nearly 

$8 billion, $7.9 billion, is for Operation and Maintenance (O&M) 

and $3.1 billion for Procurement. 

Now, from 2007 to 2010, the O&M portion has been pretty con- stant at about $8 billion, but the Procurement portion has dropped 

to less than 50 percent of what it was in 2007. Now, I know 2007 

was a bit higher than it might have been because we were short 

in 2006, but at just the time when we need more money because 

of all this reset, now we have less money. 

And if we are going to justify that on the basis of this new rule 

that says that you can’t upgrade when you are repairing the equipment, then I have a problem with that, because what an opportunity we have when it is in there for maintenance repair. Why 

can’t we upgrade? That seems to me to be very shortsighted, and 

I am wondering why the money wasn’t there. 

Did the Army ask for more than $11 billion, $11 billion was all 

you could get? 

General CHIARELLI. My understanding is, no, sir, we did not. We 

understood what the new overseas contingency operation rules 

were going to be. That amount, that $3 billion-plus, can only—in 

Procurement—can only be used for washouts or vehicles or aircraft 

that are destroyed. 

And for the most part—although, like all these rules, they 

change—for the most part, the recap or adding on, upgrades to 

equipment is not allowed in fiscal year 2010. And that drove down 

the amount of money that we needed for Procurement. 

Mr. BARTLETT. But, sir, why not? Isn’t it our goal to have a better and better military to support our people? Why shouldn’t we 

upgrade? And isn’t this a very shortsighted program? 

General CHIARELLI. Sir, you would have to ask the folks who 

wrote the new rules. I think that it makes a lot of sense to upgrade 

when we can. It is kind of like paving a road. You know, it is better 

to put the sewer system in before you pave the road. It is not a 

good idea to, in fact, pave the road and then decide to dig it up to 

put the sewer system in. 
13 

So when we have equipment in or are able to do that, that was 

a plus and allowed us to recap equipment. But the new rules are 

that we cannot do that. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, I think Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution says that the Congress makes the rules. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I think we need to take a look at that. 

Thank you very much. And I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Chairman Abercrombie. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I want to follow up, General, on what Mr. 

Bartlett just was dealing with when he said that the Congress 

makes the rules. I am not clear from your answer to Mr. Bartlett 

what part of what the Congress wants you to do is being thwarted 

by whoever making these rules. Who made this rule? 

General CHIARELLI. Sir, my understanding is they come out of 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am sorry? 

General CHIARELLI. Sir, my understanding is they come out of 

OMB. They write—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. It is very important to me—you take orders 

from OMB and not from the Defense bill? 

General CHIARELLI. I can only tell you what I know right now, 

sir. The rules and—and I don’t question who makes rules. The 

rules that we—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, maybe rules is the wrong way. I am not 

trying to be argumentative here at all. But this is serious business 

because of the questions I have, have to do with inventory and our 

capacity to actually do an accurate inventory so that I can make 

from—Mr. Bartlett and I, I should say, because we do this together, make recommendations to the committee—to our subcommittee members and the committee as a whole, we try to do 

this in a way that reflects your needs. 

And if you are telling me that—or telling Mr. Bartlett that someone in the Office of Management and Budget is able to countermand, I guess, what we are doing, how on Earth are we supposed 

to make an accurate assessment, let alone recommendation, to follow up on requests that you are making today, let alone what has 

been made in the past? 

I am not quite sure about your answer. Are you saying that your 

present course of action, when you make decisions with regard to 

the context established by Mr. Bartlett, that you are not paying 

any attention to the Defense bill? 

General CHIARELLI. I am not saying that. I am saying—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Then I really need to know what it is that we 

are dealing with here. 

General CHIARELLI. I can only tell you what the people that I 

trust to put together our request to Congress have indicated to us. 

And in fiscal year 2010, as a general rule, we are not allowed to 

recap equipment. And that has dropped down the amount of money 

that we requested for Procurement as part of reset. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So you don’t need additional funds? Is that 

right? 

General CHIARELLI. I am telling you—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Because we could reallocate funds. Believe 

me, I have got requests. Mr. Bartlett has requests right now. If 
14 

your answer is, is that you don’t need this money and that which 

was presented to us when—whether I was in the minority or the 

majority, because we have been on this subcommittee for some period of time now—so those estimates from before were inaccurate? 

General CHIARELLI. Let me be perfectly clear. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I hope so, because, believe me—— 

General CHIARELLI. This—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Believe me, I will make some recommendations for reallocation. Absolutely, I will. 

General CHIARELLI. We are, in fact, able, with the budget that 

we have and what we have requested to you, to do what you asked 

me to come here and talk about today, and that is reset our equipment. That is, bring our equipment up to 10/20 standards, and 10/ 

20 standards meaning that it is fully capable to do its mission with 

minor deficiencies, at best. 

We do not bring it to a recap situation, but we are able to reset 

our equipment exactly as defined with the money that we have 

been given by Congress. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. If that is the case, then, what system 

is in place, then, whether it is from the OMB or yourself to accurately assess inventory? The reason that I ask this question, in following up on Mr. Bartlett’s observations and inquiry, is that, just 

on shipping containers alone, you read the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports—on shipping containers alone, we can’t 

get—our subcommittee staff is unable to get an accurate answer as 

to what we need even from containers for equipment, because we 

can’t get a handle on your inventory. 

What inventory process is in place right now? And do you have 

confidence in it? 

General CHIARELLI. I have confidence in our inventory. And I 

have confidence not only that commanders down range, like I was 

twice, are maintaining inventory of both their Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) equipment that they bring over with 

them, plus the troop-provided equipment. 

We have had many looks at our equipment down range to ensure 

that accountability standards are high. And they are. And we feel 

very, very good that we know what we have got down range and 

what we will, in fact, be bringing back and what is in troop-provided or theater-provided equipment that is issued to units when 

they arrive in theater. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the GAO reports on the capacity for you 

to accurately assess inventory is incorrect? 

General CHIARELLI. I believe—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I will send it to you. 

General CHIARELLI. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And I would appreciate your response. It is 

a serious question, because, again, this involves numbers including 

billions of dollars. Believe me, we are looking right now for billions 

of dollars possibly for reallocation because of other demands. 

So if you don’t need this money and you are satisfied that your 

inventory assessment is absolutely correct, it seems to me I am 

going to have a hell of a lot more flexibility than I thought I had. 

General CHIARELLI. We, too, understand the tremendous fiscal 

crisis that our country has gone through, the economic situation. 
15 

And one of the reasons why there is no question, as long as we can 

reset our equipment, we understand that, because of fiscal requirements, it may be in the best interest of our country as a whole to 

cut back on the amount of recap we are doing. So it did not seem 

odd to me—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay, time. Excuse me. In the fiscal interests, 

is that the basis—have you had conversations with these folks at 

OMB? 

General CHIARELLI. I have not, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Who would have had these conversations? 

General CHIARELLI. It would have taken place at the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, OSD. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the Secretary of Defense is saying that you 

need, at least from my calculations here, approximately $2 billion 

less than you said you needed previously with regard to reset for 

equipment on the basis of—what was the phrase you used, fiscal 

discipline or fiscal necessity? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, we understand that we all have to be 

very, very careful with the dollars that we spend. And people have 

made a decision that we will not recap equipment in fiscal year 

2010. And that seems to me to be understandable. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay, it is understandable, yes. Do you think 

it is good policy? 

General CHIARELLI. If I had the ability to recap equipment, if we 

had the money to recap equipment, I think it would make sense 

to recap equipment. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is not the question I asked. Do you 

think you need the money to recap, in your professional judgment? 

That is what we are asking for today, not from a politician appointed in the OMB. I am asking for your professional judgment 

today with regard—do you need money to recap? 

General CHIARELLI. If I had the ability to recap, I would recap, 

for all the reasons I have stated. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You think the policy, then, of not being able 

to do that, which is reflected in your—in the numbers that are 

given to us, is not good policy? 

General CHIARELLI. I can’t say that, and I won’t say that. And 

I won’t say that because I understand that people that make those 

rules and make those decisions have to take many other things into 

consideration. And that is why I do not—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, they have to take into consideration 

what we say is in the Defense bill, because we are reflecting—we 

are trying to reflect—I am trying to help you here, because, believe 

me, if you give me this answer, I want to know—and, right now, 

what you are telling me is, is that, in your professional judgment, 

the rules or the policy or the admonitions that you have been given 

or the direction that you were operating under reflects your professional judgment as to what the necessities for the Army are right 

now? 

General CHIARELLI. If I had the authority and the ability to 

recap, I would. But I—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Thank you. If this Congress gives you 

the authority under the Defense bill, then that would reflect your 
16 

professional position that you could use at least $13 billion per 

year, rather than $11 billion? 

General CHIARELLI. I can’t give you those numbers. I cannot—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, okay. You don’t have to—well, those are 

the numbers we have been given previously. 

General CHIARELLI. In previous years. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. 

General CHIARELLI. I would have to go back and ask—we just 

don’t go and—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I won’t go further. 

Mr. Chairman, this is serious business. We are under the gun 

here in the Defense bill to make accurate numbers and put them 

forward for everybody to consider. 

Now, we have to make a decision whether OMB does this, because we don’t—what the hell, we don’t need a committee here if 

somebody down in OMB—it is a political appointment. It is all political appointments. And if we are going to do it on the basis of 

what somebody else decides in the Executive is a budget number 

as opposed to what our obligation is, which is to provide for you 

and the people who serve under you and under your command, 

then we have a real dilemma here. 

I have a real dilemma, because I can’t accurately—or I cannot in 

conscience say to Chairman Ortiz or to the other Members that we 

are giving a number that adequately responds to what you believe 

to be, in your professional judgment, a necessity. Do you understand my motivation here? 

General CHIARELLI. I hope you understand mine. I understand, 

also, that you have to take many, many things into consideration 

when putting together our budget, and that is all I am saying to 

you. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

General CHIARELLI. We have the money we need to reset the 

equipment, and that is what I am here to talk about today. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. And sometimes, you know, we have to— 

we are all a team working together. And sometimes we have to depend on other agencies to help out and to kind of a check-and-balance system. 

But Mr. Abercrombie is right. As long as we can try our best to 

get the best information—because our concern, the bottom line is 

that we want to be in a position to where we can help our warriors 

who are out there. But I am also dependent on other agencies to 

help me put this thing together, but I think that he has a very, 

very valid question. 

And now let me yield to my good friend, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General Chiarelli, thank you for being here. I am so grateful to represent Fort Jackson. I trained there 31 years, and 3 of my 

sons have had the privilege and opportunity of spending a lot of 

time at Fort Jackson in training, just a great facility. 

And, General Amos, I am so grateful. I also represent Parris Island, Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort Naval Hospital, and I 

know that you have spent significant time in our community. Next 

weekend is the Beaufort Water Festival, and that is a time to celebrate the great affection that people in the low country have for the 
17 

Marine Corps. And so, next weekend, you are invited to come back 

home. 

I wanted to let you know, as we talk about reset, I am thinking 

of assembling equipment, retrofitting equipment. To me, it has 

been an incredible success story of how the equipment got there in 

the first place. And hundreds of millions of parts and weapons, munitions, vehicles, it is just an incredible success story to me. 

And I know, as a parent who had two sons serve in Iraq, I always felt like I knew they could get the equipment because of what 

I had seen, and that is that, in visiting Kuwait, I visited the Theater Distribution Center. And I saw firsthand—and I wish the 

American people know about this—and that is that the—down to 

the smallest part, using a bar code that the parts, the different vehicles, the, again, munitions, the weapons, that they are monitored 

using the United Parcel Service (UPS)-Federal Express (FedEx) 

models of delivery. 

They are stored in areas, square miles, with bermed spaces so 

that they can be secure, but yet they can be easily recovered and 

sent straight to the warfighter so that they can be protected. 

And so, as we look now at returning the equipment, I am counting on the same level of professionalism, and the logisticians, I just 

truly wish the American people knew how extraordinary it was of 

what they did. 

But as we look to the future, I am particularly interested in any 

preference given to the National Guard, given to the Reserves. Can 

the Adjutant Generals and Army and Marine Reserve generals and 

the logisticians develop a list of equipment for their missions in 

training? Is that being done? 

General AMOS. Sir, I will take the first stab at that. We have, 

within the Marine Forces Reserve, we look at equipment holistically across the Marine Corps. They have what we call a training 

allowance in every Reserve unit across America, which is a small 

slice of what they would need. 

If they had the full thing, if you were an infantry battalion, first 

of all, they are not all co-located, so they are spread out across in 

some cases many, many states. So they have a slice of equipment 

that they can train with and they can adequately maintain. 

But we holistically as a Marine Corps, when we start taking a 

look at deploying Reserve forces, and we have got a Reserve battalion right now that is in Iraq, and we are cranking another one 

up to go to Afghanistan, they will come together at Twentynine 

Palms, and they will fall in on gear that we have there. And then 

we will ensure that they have the right equipment overseas. 

So we look at it holistically. It is not a ‘‘this is Reserve equipment and this is that.’’ So I don’t know whether that answers your 

question, but they are part of the greater requirement and reset 

and kind of rearming and refitting effort that the Marine Corps 

has. I don’t know whether that answered your question. 

General CHIARELLI. Sir, I would add that we are all proud of 

what has happened. And I just need to give this one comment. I 

think it is absolutely amazing, after 71⁄2 years of war, we have 

operational readiness rates down range that in excess of 90 percent. 
18 

And it is in no small part due to what you have done for us, in 

allowing us to reset that equipment throughout this 71⁄2 years of 

war. We bring that equipment back; we put it into reset for 180 

days; and we issue it out to our soldiers. 

Now, when it comes to Reserve components, Reserve components 

have the same priority as Active components. Whoever has the 

highest priority, be it for a homeland defense mission or for a mission overseas, regardless of whether it is an Active component unit 

or a Reserve component unit, gets the equipment. 

Currently, we are at 83 percent fill for National Guard units for 

critical dual-use equipment that is not only needed here for homeland defense-type issues, but down range. 

Some of that dual-use equipment is deployed with some Reserve 

units, which brings down that percentage of fill when you look 

across the entire force. However, most states have compacts with 

other states where they can get at that equipment, should it be 

needed here at home. 

But we have made great progress in filling up Reserve component equipment needs across the force, particularly in a critical 

dual-use equipment category, that which is used both down range 

in theater and back home for homeland defense-type missions. 

Mr. WILSON. And what you are into, to me, is a challenge and 

an opportunity, particularly for the most modern equipment, for 

Guard and Reserve forces to be able to train, but also, as you indicated, dual use, as we have the hurricane season approaching the 

southeastern part of the United States, and we want the best 

equipment for evacuation, recovery and relief. 

A final question is that, General Chiarelli, there has been a reset 

pilot program that has been implemented. Have there been any lessons learned? 

General CHIARELLI. We have had four different periods where we 

have taken lessons learned from reset pilots to continue to improve 

the system. As you know, based on the Army’s Army Force Generation Model, as we bring units back, we reset their equipment, both 

their ground tactical vehicles and aviation equipment, in that first 

180 days. 

The goal here was to give our soldiers and families the predictability that, in that 180 days, we would bring all that equipment 

back, reset it, and have it available for those soldiers, as they move 

in, out of reset, that 180-day period immediately after they return 

back home, and into their train and ready phase, where they train 

up for their next deployment. 

We have learned a lot from the reset pilot program and have instituted that into the force. And, in fact, we just recently conducted 

a very, very successful reset Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drill 

under the auspices of the United States Army Forces Command 

(FORSCOM) commander, General Campbell. Over 250 general officers got together to look at the entire reset process and how we 

could make it more efficient and provide equipment back to the 

force as quickly as we possibly can. 

Mr. WILSON. I want to commend and thank both of you for your 

professionalism. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Before I yield to Chairman Reyes, I understand that 

we are going to have around 15 votes in the next—which means 
19 

that we might be on the House floor for the next 2 hours. And I 

know that both of you have very important jobs and very important 

responsibilities, so we don’t want to keep you here. 

I would suggest to the members of these three subcommittees 

that maybe we can reconvene so that we can continue with this 

hearing later on, because, to keep you waiting for two or three 

hours would be a long time. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be brief. 

My question is for General Chiarelli, and it relates to the fact 

that you were still in the planning stages for drawdown of U.S. 

forces from Iraq when the fiscal year 2010 and OCO budget requests were submitted. 

My question is, did these requests include adequate funding for 

both the withdrawal and the reset of the forces and the equipment 

that goes along with that? That is number one. 

And number two is, if, in fact, it wasn’t, do you foresee requesting additional funding for the drawdown in fiscal year 2010? 

General CHIARELLI. Sir, as you know, we will not see a drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq as quickly as the Marines see it. And 

we believe that we have enough money in the fiscal year 2010 reset 

request to do the necessary reset we will have to do, with an understanding that the elections will take place sometime in the January time period, if everything goes, that it may be 30 to 90 days 

after that before we start to see a large amount of additional units 

coming out of Iraq, Army units coming out of Iraq. 

And given the time it takes to get to the depots, we feel we will 

be in good shape to continue the necessary reset work, even with 

those forces coming back, and make the adjustments in 2011. 

As you know, the key to reset is timely funding, because timely 

funding gives us the capability at our depots. It takes us about 90 

days to bring on additional workers. But it can take us as long as 

12 to 14 months for some critical long lead parts. So the key for 

us is the timely receipt of funding and the availability to go ahead 

and forecast and look forward and get those critical long lead parts. 

We think we are going to be in good shape in 2010 with the 

money that you have so generously—we hope you will so generously give us to complete that reset work. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, I will yield to Mr. Akin for a motion to submit 

something for the record. 

Mr. AKIN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just wish I could submit my opening statement for the record, 

if I could. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. And we will going to continue with questions until we 

have about 5 minutes, because—and what we are going to do once 

we reconvene the hearing, because of the votes that we are having—we have 10 minutes left right now, right, 10 minutes left—I 

would like for Members to know that, when we close this hearing 

today and postpone it, we will start again from where we left and 

the Members will follow on the order that we have now. 
20 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So we will reconvene another day? 

Mr. ORTIZ. That is right, in another day. And you will be notified 

by the staff. 

Okay, Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, very much. You know, there is never 

a way to express to you the gratitude that all of us feel for the lifetime commitment that you have shown for the cause of human 

freedom. I don’t think I can repeat that often enough. 

General Chiarelli and General Amos, how many years do you expect to have to fund reset costs as a result of the Iraq war? And 

has this been discussed with the current Administration’s officials, 

in terms of long-term funding? 

I mean, the point is, I am concerned that we may have to continue this process for a significant length of time, and perhaps we 

are not thinking far enough ahead. 

I will direct it to you, General Chiarelli, first. 

General CHIARELLI. I will be quick. We have been consistent in 

stating that reset will go on for two to three years after the cessation of hostilities. And that has been a consistent Army position 

throughout the 71⁄2 years of this war. 

General AMOS. Sir, it will take between two to three years just 

to—if everything came to all stop, and you brought, started moving 

all the equipment to ports of debarkation, and then got it back to 

America, it will take two to three years to get the stuff through the 

depots. 

That doesn’t include procurement with replacement equipment 

that may be in competition in an assembly line somewhere and 

where we fall in behind somebody else’s priorities. So those things 

could take three or four years on a procurement timeline, but two 

to three years to get the equipment fixed at the depots, and then 

whatever else time piles on top of that as a result of procurement. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, a part of the reason for the 

question is just to remind the committee that, you know, this drawdown in Iraq should not be considered a bill-payer for everything 

else, because we do have some ongoing responsibilities there, especially in terms of the reset in the future. 

Let me just quickly ask one other question, because I want to 

give someone else a chance here, so I am not going to go through 

the others. Both of you have discussed disposal and replacement of 

equipment that is beyond repair as part of your reset strategy, and 

I guess this percentage could be fairly high. 

Can you discuss for a moment how you plan to dispose of unserviceable equipment? I mean, for example, will it be disposed of in 

the area of operations, or will it be shipped somewhere else and 

disposed of? Tell us what the process is there and the policy. 

General CHIARELLI. I will have to get back to you. My understanding is the majority of it would—if it is a washout, would be 

brought back home. It would not be left in theater, possibly taken 

to Kuwait. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 
21 

Mr. FRANKS. Not going to fall into the bad guys’ hands? 

General CHIARELLI. Absolutely not. Absolutely not. 

General AMOS. Sir, unless it is just a pile of scrap metal, we are 

going to bring it home. That is the plan. It may not have a cap on 

it. It may not have a motor in it. But we are going to bring it home. 

And our plan is to get it to Kuwait, get it on ships, bring it back 

to Blount Island, and then process it through the depots. 

We have a figure of roughly 65 percent of the value of the vehicle. If it costs more than that, then we will discard it back here in 

America. And you go to our depots and they are taking pieces off 

of different vehicles that have been discarded to build one. So they 

are pretty good stewards of the money. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, again, gentlemen, thank you for your gallant 

service. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I hope to give someone else another shot at it here. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much, both of you, for your testimony. 

And I think that we have a lot to learn and a lot to do. And the 

committee staff will let you know when we are going to reconvene 

this meeting with these three subcommittees. 

And at this point, the subcommittees stand recessed. 

[Whereupon, at 10:37 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JULY 9, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JULY 9, 2009 

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ARMY AND MARINE CORPS RESET REQUIREMENTS 

(PART II) 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE, MEETING JOINT- LY WITH AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE AND

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUB- COMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, December 10, 

2009. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz (chairman 

of the Readiness Subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. ORTIZ. The subcommittee will come to order. We are limited 

as to the amount of time that we are going to have here. It will 

be about less than two hours. I know, and I want to say that we 

are sorry that we did not finish this hearing when it was supposed 

to be finished. We were interrupted by votes. But thank you so 

much for joining us today. 

Today the Readiness, Air and Land Forces and Seapower and 

Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee meet to continue our hearing 

on the status of the Army and Marine Corps equipment reset requirements. I thank our distinguished witnesses, the Vice Chief of 

Staff of the Army and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine 

Corps, for returning today to discuss reset. 

You will recall that our July hearing was cut short by a prolonged series of votes, so today our primary purpose is to give those 

Members who did not get a chance to ask questions in July, to give 

them an opportunity to do so today. But before we move to the 

Members’ questions, I would like to ask if any of the other chairmen or ranking members would like to make an opening statement. 

And we have our subcommittee chairman Mr. Taylor, if you 

would like to make any statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I understand the need for brevity. 

Gentlemen, it has come to my attention that on some of the 

items we are trying to bring home from Iraq, that the Iraqi Government, in what appears to be—and I will use the words—which 
56 

strikes me as a scam, is demanding importation documents on the 

things we brought to that country before they will issue exportation 

documents. And as I have recently written their ambassador and 

reminded him that there are no importation documents in a war 

zone, and that this whole thing really does strike me as a shakedown. 

So I know you were not prepared for this question today, but I 

would ask you at your convenience, hopefully within the next couple of weeks, to get back to me as to whether or not you have seen 

any evidence on this on those things that you are trying to either 

redeploy over to Afghanistan or bring back to the States. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 87.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

Before we move to Members’ questions, I would like to say that 

we are very fortunate to have two outstanding military men with 

us today, and we are happy that you are here with us today. As 

in July we did not finish our hearing, but today we are going to 

hopefully finish because we should be out of here before 12:00. 

We have with us today General Peter W. Chiarelli and General 

James Amos, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. When 

the subcommittee met in July, the President had not yet announced his strategy for Afghanistan, but much has changed in the 

past five months. To get us started today, could each of you please 

give us a brief summary of what has changed regarding the reset 

requirements for the Army and Marine Corps equipment since July 

when this was the last time you testified before our committee. 

Following General Chiarelli’s and General Amos’ statements, we 

will go directly to Members’ questions, and we will name those 

Members who did not have a chance to ask a question last time. 

General Chiarelli, whenever you are ready to start your testimony, sir. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF 

OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY 

General CHIARELLI. Well, Mr. Chairman, in answer to your question, I will tell you that the big thing that has changed is 22,000 

soldiers additionally being sent to Iraq—to Afghanistan, and a requirement for quite a bit of the equipment from Iraq coming out 

of Iraq and out of Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) to be used to 

support those soldiers as they deploy to Afghanistan in the next 

months ahead. That will mean, as we begin the Iraq drawdown in 

earnest, that there will be less equipment coming back to the 

States for reset. 

But one thing I want to make sure that I clear up is that when 

I initially appeared before the committee, I pledged to always provide you with an honest and forthright assessment and my best 

military advice as requested. In keeping with this promise, I would 

like to take this opportunity to correct some inaccurate information 

I provided at the last hearing in response to a series of questions 

posed by Congressman Bartlett and Congressman Abercrombie. 

During my latter exchange, I stated my belief that at the time that 

in fiscal year 2010 as a general rule we would not be allowed to 
57 

recap equipment with funds requested in the Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO) budget. It was my sincere belief that this policy 

represented a change to OCO ground rules as signed out by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in March of 2009. 

Overall, the lesser requests for fiscal year 2010 as compared to 

fiscal year 2009 was based primarily on the limited amount of 

equipment expected to be redeployed from theater during this period. This was due in part to the realignment of equipment from 

Iraq to Afghanistan, and the retention of equipment in Iraq until 

the planned drawdown of forces is underway in that second half of 

fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011. 

I apologize for any confusion, and I will confirm for the record, 

as members of this committee have accurately stated, that current 

rules do allow the Army to use OCO funding to recap or upgrade 

equipment returning from theater if the upgrades are war related 

and there is a production line available. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, ASSISTANT 

COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General AMOS. Chairman, thanks for the opportunity to come 

back. I want to tell you what has changed in the landscape since 

we met in the early part of July. 

Before I begin, Chairman Taylor, I had not heard about the importation guidance, so we will get back to you on that thing. That 

is breaking news for us, and we will dig through that between Pete 

and I and sort out what is going on on the ground. I had not heard 

that. 

When we spoke the last time in July, I think it was July the 9th, 

the Marine Corps had 15,000 Marines on the ground in Iraq, and 

we were just getting started with—just getting started with putting 

some Marines on the deck in Afghanistan. We actually had about 

2,500, 2,600 Marines on the deck at that point. 

But we had 15,000 Marines on the ground in Iraq, and since 

then, since July of this year, we have redeployed 10,000 of those 

Marines, roughly, 10,000 back home, and we have redeployed or 

taken out of Iraq 97 percent of what we call the equipment density 

list, and that is—that would be a combat table of equipment, to put 

it in kind of common terms. So all that equipment that has been 

building up for 6 or 7 years since we went back in February of 

2005, we have redeployed 97 percent of that equipment out of Iraq. 

We are down to just about 5,000 Marines, and by the time we 

hit January/February of this coming year, we will be down below 

2,000 Marines. And really their job—their job in Iraq is to—is to 

facilitate to get that equipment out. So the plan that we devised 

about a year ago is to try to get the equipment out, get it back 

down to Kuwait, get it triaged and then get it on ships and back 

to our depots. And Congress has been very generous with OCO 

funds to help us fund our depot. 

So we had this grand plan until recently. And I want you to 

know that a big chunk of that equipment now that found its way 

to Kuwait and was being triaged and was waiting to go to—get on 

ships when we first started hearing inklings of a plus-up of forces 

in Afghanistan, we took the equipment that we knew was serviceable and in good condition and set that off on a lot off to the side 
58 

in Kuwait in anticipation of the President’s direction. And, in fact, 

it has happened. 

You might be interested to know that within 24 hours of the 

President’s speech that night, the lead elements of 1st Battalion, 

6th Marines from Camp Lejeune were airborne on Marine C–130s, 

closing in on Afghanistan. That battalion, that first surge battalion, 

will be closed into Afghanistan, people-wise, by the 20th of December. We will have taken—our contribution, our part of the plus-up 

of the forces in Afghanistan is roughly 9,000 Marines and our sailors. We will have that force commanded by a two-star general, a 

Marine Expeditionary Force forward, all on the deck and ready to 

go by the end of April. 

So much has changed. As we take a look at our depot-level maintenance, we have actually had to release some contractor support. 

We have had to release some temporary employees, and we have 

had to release some folks that were not permanent personnel both 

at Barstow and at Albany simply because the work is not going to 

be there. It will someday, but right now our greatest priority is to 

get the equipment into Afghanistan and get it there for the forces 

that are on the ground. 

My final thing I would like to say is that I want this committee 

to understand that the Commandant’s number one priority are 

those forces that are in Afghanistan. We will have 100 percent of 

every piece of equipment that they need and all the capabilities. 

We are closing adequate now, and we are going across the Marine 

Corps now to source that equipment to get it either in Kuwait or 

to get it at home stations, and get that stuff on ships, and get it 

up—get it in Afghanistan. But I want everybody to know that we 

will—that those units that are going in will be well trained, highly 

focused on Afghanistan operations, and they will be 100 percent 

equipped. Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

We are going to yield to those Members who were here at the 

last hearing, but did not have a chance to ask questions. And I 

would like now to yield to Mr. Shuster. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Generals, for being here today and for your service. 

My question is about procurement dollars and reset. And I certainly understand and support it, but the priority is to make sure 

that those troops and units that are going to Afghanistan need to 

be ready to go 100 percent. My concern, though, is on these procurement dollars, especially High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicles (Humvees or HMMWVs), we are down $2 billion from last 

year’s budget, and it has been $5 billion down over the last 3 years. 

And it would seem to me that—you said, General Amos, someday 

the money will be there. My concern is that someday may be sooner than we want it to be. 

So my question is what part of the workload is going unfunded? 

I go back to the President’s budget. I don’t think we put enough 

money into the budget, and it is—I think it is a 1 percent or 11⁄2

percent increase, which I think needs to be greater because with 

inflation, and you are going to see a flatline or decrease in spending. But what portion of the workload is going unfunded as a result 
59 

of these reductions; and specifically the HMMWVs, what percentage of them are not going to be reset or are just going to—I know 

the operation maintenance accounts are flatlined. Are we just going 

to be patching them up and hopefully not having to use them? 

General AMOS. Sir, I will take a stab at it first, and then Pete 

can pile on. 

As it relates to HMMWVs and basically ground tactical mobility, 

the Marine Corps right now is—we have been doing this for about 

two or three years—really trying to just zero in on the bull’s-eye 

on just what that balance of ground mobility equipment should 

look like. Two years ago, when I was the head of requirements, it 

was a different picture than it is right now. There is no question 

that HMMWVs, what we call the expanded capacity vehicle, the 

up-armored HMMWV with all of the extra equipment on it and 

safety features, is going to be a staple item for the forces. I cannot 

tell you how many we are buying to replace. I don’t have that information. I can get you that. 

But if I just kind of back out of that just a little bit and tell you 

that within the Marine Corps—and we will take—the guy who took 

my job’s requirement is he is supposed to sit down with us in the 

January/February time frame and try to give us the entire landscape of what the ground tactical vehicle strategy will look like in 

the Marine Corps. As you know, we would like to get away from 

flat-bottom vehicles. The vision always was to go to this Joint Light 

Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The Army and the Marine Corps have 

partnered on that effort. It is not here yet. There are some issues 

with it. But with that vehicle you get a V-shaped hull, and you 

get—I am going to use this loosely—Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)-like protection. That is, I think, where we would all 

like to go to protect our Marines and soldiers and sailors and airmen. But that is out there. 

So we have a dilemma within the Marine Corps, and it is near 

term, about what are we going to do. Are we just going to continue 

to recapitalize and reset with more HMMWVs, or are we going to 

try to find an interim vehicle that has a V-shaped hull, that might 

not be a JLTV yet because it is not developed, but we hope to get 

there someday? That is what we are struggling with right now, and 

we are working through that. 

But on a broader scale, if you take a look at reset dollars and 

reset—the definition of ‘‘reset’’ and things that we can spend supplemental money on or OCO money on, the things that have been 

destroyed, worn out, have gone beyond their service life, they have 

been blown up, those kinds of things, and when I testified the last 

time, I said Congress had been gracious enough to give us I think 

it was $14 billion at that point to help the Marine Corps reset as 

a result of combat. And I said I needed about $20 billion all total 

within the Marine Corps. So I needed about another $6 billion to 

reset the Marine Corps. That wasn’t to modernize it or recapitalize 

it, that was just to replace the stuff that is worn out and blown 

up. 

Well, since I testified in July, that the longer we stay in combat, 

and now we have redeployed to a harsher environment by a factor 

of probably 3 or 4, with mountains and deserts, spread out, that 

figure has jumped for the Marine Corps $10 billion for reset and 
60 

another $5 billion to buy the equipment that we had not had to accommodate the lessons learned from this war. So it is about a $15 

billion bill, sir. And that is a long answer, but I think I had to kind 

of paint the landscape. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I appreciate that. 

That goes back to one of the points I made. What you are saying 

is you are confirming to me we are not investing enough in the procurement, in the reset for the Marine Corps and our military in 

general. 

General AMOS. I would say that the 2010 OCO has not been approved yet, so I cannot tell you what that is going to look like. It 

is up on the Hill. But prior to this, the former supplemental, now 

OCO money, has for the most part helped us recapitalize with regards to reset. That has actually worked. I cannot tell you how this 

is going to work this year in the 2010 budget. 

Mr. SHUSTER. I see my time has expired. And, again, I want to 

make the point that I believe in it. Again, it sounds to me what 

you have laid out is that the budget does not provide adequately 

for procurement, and that is something that we in Congress need 

to fight to make sure the funding is there and fight the Administration if they are not willing to invest more in what we need, as 

the last thing I want to have is the Secretary of Defense having 

to say to the American people, we fight a war with what we have. 

And I am concerned we are not going to have the HMMWVs, and 

we are not going to have the tactical ground forces that we need 

in the future, God forbid, if something else flares up in the world. 

So thank you very much for your answer. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wonder if both of you could answer—and thank you for your 

service as well to our country. I wonder if both of you could answer 

a question related to the MRAPs and the status of depot-level facilities in the continental United States (CONUS), and what is 

being done to deal with this. When do you anticipate having a national repair capability and strategy for MRAP sustainment? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, sir—Congressman Taylor, if I could 

quickly answer as best I can your question. I am riding with General Amos. Neither one of us—I have not heard of that either. But 

we do do an Equipment Review Board every two weeks, and I am 

really surprised it didn’t come up at that Equipment Review Board. 

So I will ask that question downrange the next time we meet, 

which should be in about a week. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, General. 

I am going to supply to Colonel Glaze a copy of the letter we sent 

to the ambassador, and we will have it in his hands today. Thank 

you. 

General CHIARELLI. Thank you, sir. 

Sir, I will tell you the Army is looking at establishing Red River 

Army Depot as our national facility for the rebuild of the MRAPs. 

We have initiated a reset pilot program there in fiscal year 2010. 

That pilot program—we have vehicles en route to begin that pilot 

program for reset. They are going to get 5 MAX Pros and 31 

Kamans to begin with to establish that capability. And we look at 

that being full up in fiscal year 2011. 
61 

We have put money in our budget for the required Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA), almost $58 million for the MRAPs, although the MRAP is not a program of record as of yet. It meets 

all the requirements, and we are moving, having integrated 3,700 

of those into our formations and into our tables of organization and 

equipment. And a lot of the sustainment for the MRAP still flows 

out of the Joint Program Office (JPO), which has about $1.7 billion. 

So I think we are embracing the MRAP and doing everything we 

can to ensure that when those vehicles start flowing back out of 

theater, we are ready to accept them and reset them. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Amos. 

General AMOS. Sir, I know that when I was—the last time, probably three months ago, when we were looking at how we were 

going to bring all of this equipment back from Kuwait that I talked 

to in my opening remarks, and MRAP was part of that. It has only 

been within the last six to seven months that the Marine Corps has 

determined that MRAP is actually going to be part of the total 

ground tactical vehicle strategy that I referred to just a second ago. 

There was a period of time where we thought it was too big, it was 

too heavy for us, and it just didn’t fit our expeditionary kind of flavor. And we have kind of come full circle right now. So our anticipation is we were going to have 2,346 of these rascals that are 

going to become part of our regular inventory. 

It is not a program of record per se in the Marine Corps either. 

We have been living graciously off contractor logistics support that 

have come from, in our case, Force Protection, Incorporated, which 

is the organization in Charleston that builds most of our MRAPs. 

But we are at a point now where we are going to have to get serious within the Marine Corps, and I suspect it will find its way to 

Albany, but I cannot give you a firm answer on that right now. 

But we haven’t sorted out yet where we are going to do that. All 

of our vehicles that are back in the continental United States, and 

there is a pretty good slice of them for training, their bases and 

stations and training areas like Twentynine Palms, they are a long 

ways away from needing depot-level repair yet. It is just the ones 

in Iraq and Afghanistan and Kuwait and Bahrain, and we have not 

brought any of those back yet. When we do, we will have a plan 

for that. We just don’t have it yet, Congressman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

General Amos, a couple of things that you said talking about the 

lightweight vehicles, that is kind of something we want, but just 

kind of keeps hangs out there, what is the problem, and what is 

the delay? And if we are looking at spending lots of money to reset, 

and this is what we want, and we are having to make decisions 

about what we might have to use, what is the delay? 

General AMOS. Sir, good question. When former Vice Chief of the 

Army and former Assistant Commandant pulled industry together 

about two years ago, they called this thing a Manhattan Project, 

and they had really the kind of heads of industry there, and they 

said, we want you to push technology. We want this vehicle to be 
62 

light enough—in our case something around a 13,000-pound vehicle—so we can pick it up with a heavy-lift helicopter and it is part 

of our expeditionary way we employ our forces. But we wanted to 

have that MRAP-like protection, and we were hoping that ceramic 

armor, we were hoping that a whole host of things were going to 

develop and give us this little capsule kind of vehicle that had high 

mobility and high protection. 

It is not there yet. We have variants of it out there. Different 

companies have their version of what they hope to become the 

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, but it doesn’t meet all the needs yet. 

It doesn’t provide the explosive safety. It doesn’t necessarily provide, in our case, the weight. You are talking vehicles that are 

23-, 24,000 pounds. That is not what the Marine Corps is interested in. We can’t put that on ships. We just don’t—we can’t do 

that. That is why we are struggling with this Joint Light Tactical 

Vehicle. 

There is a slug of money in the budget for this thing, and there 

are folks working it pretty hard, but it has not manifested itself 

yet. So we find ourselves now with this little bit of a gap. What 

do we do in the meantime? Do we continue to buy flat-bottom 

HMMWVs, or is there an alternative out there that can be a gap 

filler? And we are looking at an alternative right now that actually 

fits on top of a HMMWV frame manufactured by an outfit down 

in North Carolina, and it is a capsule, V-shaped hull kind of a 

thing. So that is kind of where we are with it, sir. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Chairman, I am not sure there is any additional role the 

committee could play, but it would seem like that would be, if there 

is. And if we could expedite that, it would certainly be worth our 

while. 

General Amos, you also said something to—and I think you said maybe $5 billion of lessons learned. 

General AMOS. Right. 

Mr. KISSELL. Can you expand upon what you meant there? 

General AMOS. Sure, I sure can. And let me tell you, I am going 

to get you some—this is actually a good news story. When we 

crossed the border in March of 2003, we were just like Pete’s soldiers; we were a major land force moving forward to engage the 

enemy in standard kind of place, set kind of tactics. As things 

evolved, we found ourselves settling into Iraq and now in Afghanistan—we found ourselves in what Secretary Gates calls this hybrid 

warfare. We found ourselves dispersed. We had one infantry battalion in Afghanistan that had over 10,000 square miles. So you 

had basically 1,000 Marines with 10,000 square miles. 

So what we found now in the kind of environments—this hybrid 

nasty kind of warfare that we think we are going to be into for the 

next couple of decades, it takes a different kind of table of equipment, and I will give you an example. We used to have 80 of these 

little handheld radios, personal radios, for a 900-Marine infantry 

battalion. We now have 800 of them. We used to have satellite communication (SATCOM) that would only go down to the regimental 

level and maybe down to the battalion level. Now we have got platoons, you know, 80 Marines up in the mountains in places like 

Golestan, that have to have their SATCOM so that they can com-
63 

municate, they can receive their digital information, their maps 

and overlays. 

We have increased the amount of crew-served weapons almost 

300 percent, because we are putting—these are .50-caliber machine 

guns and these kinds of things on the tops of HMMWVs. When you 

see the convoys going out, every one of those vehicles has got a 

young soldier or Marine with his head sticking out the top with a 

.50-cal or a 240 Gulf or something like this. 

So these are the lessons learned. So the old table of equipment 

that we started across the border with in March of 2003 was good 

then, but now that table of equipment has—and we have spent almost a year going through lessons learned, how much of this stuff 

do we need, not gold-plating it. We didn’t buy enough for all 27 infantry battalions and for the entire world, but we did say each infantry battalion is going to need to have—instead of 56 vehicle 

HMMWVs, it will have to have 86 vehicles that are HMMWVs. 

And that is what I mean by that. And that comes with a cost. We 

haven’t—we haven’t—I have talked about it in my statements this 

year and earlier this year, but we haven’t presented that bill yet, 

but we have just totaled it within the last month, and it is about 

$5 billion. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Loebsack. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to both of you for your service and for appearing before 

our committee today, again, on what really is a pretty critical 

issue. I think everyone here on this committee knows that since I 

have been in Congress, I have expressed real concerns about the 

availability of equipment, especially for our National Guard, for 

both training purposes and for their State and homeland security 

responsibilities, and I don’t mean just in Iowa, but across America. 

Just this week the Iowa National Guard responded to the heavy 

snowstorms, the heavy snowstorm that hit Iowa, and, of course, 

last summer we had the great flood of 2008, and they partnered 

with the Iowa Department of Transportation just recently in assisting stranded motorists. This service to our State is particularly 

poignant and, I think, important, given the recent announcement 

that upwards of 3,500 Iowa soldiers will be deploying to Afghanistan by the fall of 2010. This will mark the largest deployment of 

Iowa National Guard since World War II, and I firmly believe that 

it is critical that they and all members of the Reserve components—and again, not just in Iowa, but across the country—have 

sufficient equipment to train on for their overseas mission as well 

as to respond to emergencies at home. 

And I just visited a newly opened readiness center in Iowa City 

on Saturday night, and we are going to have another one in Cedar 

Rapids soon and some other places in my district. Those buildings 

are wonderful, but we have to make sure we have the equipment, 

obviously, and not just for their deployment when they deploy overseas, but also for their—as I said, their homeland security missions. 

So, General Chiarelli, given the demands being placed on Army 

equipment by the President’s strategy in Afghanistan, given the 
64 

amount of the equipment that the National Guard and Reserve 

units left in Iraq at the end of their deployments, the question is 

how will you ensure that Reserve components are sufficiently 

equipped both for training and for their homeland responsibilities? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, Congressman, the Army has made significant progress in equipping the Army National Guard to enhance its role both in the homeland defense area and when deployed. 

The numbers I show is that we are anticipated to average $3.9 

billion a year from fiscal year 2002 to 2013, and that is a 290 percent increase in equipping the Guard. As you well know, most of 

our formations that are going over to Afghanistan today are following in on theater-provided equipment. And for the Army, the 

employment of the MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (ATV), a new vehicle 

that currently we are buying 6,000 of them, the Joint Program Office is, and we expect that number to go up with the increase in 

Afghanistan, will allow most of the Guard HMMWVs and some of 

their medium trucks to remain back when your soldiers deploy. 

These forces that we have coming out of Iraq with responsible 

drawdown will be able to redeploy with their equipment and certain items of theater-provided equipment that has been used in 

Iraq as long as that theater-provided equipment is not needed in 

Afghanistan. 

So we feel we are going to continue to be able to make progress 

in equipping our National Guard formations, of course, when they 

are deployed, but most importantly on that critical dual-use equipment that they need at home to do their homeland requirements. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. So you are coordinating with the National Guard 

Bureau on these matters as well. 

Mr. CHIARELLI. I just talked to Ray Carpenter yesterday about 

our status moving ahead for medium trucks. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Chair, I will yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thanks for what you do. And this is kind of a 

burdensome, really detail-oriented job when it comes to this. So 

thank you for everything. 

The question is this: When we talk about—actually let us start 

with an explanation. What is cross-leveling? Could you explain 

what cross-leveling is to me? 

General CHIARELLI. Cross-leveling is a requirement that we do 

either in equipment or personnel to fill out formations that are not 

fully filled out with Military Occupational Specialities (MOS) or 

numbers when it comes to personnel or with equipment for units 

that may, in fact, be short equipment. 

Mr. HUNTER. So you cross-level units that are going to deploy in 

the near future, and you start doing that at what point prior to 

their deployments? 

General CHIARELLI. For National Guard units—— 

Mr. HUNTER. For Active units. 

General CHIARELLI. We are not in a position where we are having to cross-level for Active units. We are, in fact—as you well 
65 

know, the Army has adopted a fourth-generation model which has 

us going from reset to train-ready to deploy. 

Mr. HUNTER. I actually don’t. Could you explain that one? 

General CHIARELLI. Yes, I can, sir. 

The Army’s Force Generation Model provides for a unit returning 

from deployment to have six months in what we call a reset phase. 

During that time equipment and personnel are, in fact, reset. They 

enter out of that six-month period with certain goals for personnel 

fill and equipment fill to begin their train-ready phase that goes on 

for a minimum of the next six months, possibly longer. If they are 

going to get more than 12 months ‘‘boots on the ground’’ (BOG), it 

can go 7, 8, 9, 10 months before they deploy again. Over that time 

we have minimum equipment goals. We attempt to get units to 

coming out of reset for train-ready phase. But I will tell you, given 

the tempo we are on, we continue to fill units as they move toward 

their latest arrival date. 

Mr. HUNTER. So can you stick with that plan with this surge? I 

mean, how is the surge affecting that when you have units that are 

not going to have as much dwell time, and you are having to reset 

them sooner; you might not have that 12 months of dwell time 

back at home or 18 months? The question is basically how does 

that affect it, and are you going to have to cross-level Active units 

with this surge? 

General CHIARELLI. We are not. We are not. Quite frankly, with 

the drawdown in Iraq and the increase in Afghanistan, we see 

about a month, a month and a half where we will have about 2,000 

more soldiers deployed than we have right now. Now, some of that 

is just dependent on the election and when General Odierno begins 

major troop movements out of Iraq. And we expect that to occur 

sometime after the elections in order to meet the President’s goal 

of having us down to 50,000 soldiers by September of 2010. But because of that drawdown, we only see about a month to two month 

period where we will have more soldiers deployed than we have deployed today. 

Mr. HUNTER. So it almost evens out? 

General CHIARELLI. It almost evens out. And it will go down the 

more soldiers we get out of Iraq. 

Mr. HUNTER. So you are fine with the surge when it comes to 

reset—well, you have already said that what you needed has not 

changed much. 

General CHIARELLI. Right. And we feel that we have got the right 

amount of money in our reset OCO. We feel we are in pretty good 

shape. We will, in fact, coordinate with Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) if we see additional requirements. But we feel that 

we are in pretty good shape when it comes to reset and the movement of equipment into Afghanistan. But the big issue—— 

Mr. HUNTER. But folks here training, they are going to be fine, 

too, just like normal? 

General CHIARELLI. They will be. 

Now, at the same time, the Army is coming off a stop-loss, And 

there are some requirements of coming off a stop-loss that are unpredictable. But our very first unit off of stop-loss, the 110th Infantry, is looking at about 48 percent of the soldiers who would be on 

stop-loss who have signed up for the additional bonus and to com-
66 

plete the rotation for their unit. That will add about 200 folks to 

the rear detachment. But we believe with the 21,000 temporary 

end strength increase that we received, that we will be able to fill 

our formations to 90 to 95 percent before deployment. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General. 

I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Chiarelli, I am curious to know what sort of legs the 

work being done by Rhonda Cornum, General Cornum, on posttraumatic growth as opposed to post-traumatic stress and thoughts 

concerning how we reset personnel-wise, how we train, how we 

deal with our soldiers, and the sort of studies that she and others 

are engaged in to try to address the problem of mental strain and 

breakdown—what kind of legs is all that getting in the Army? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, sir, the program you speak of is Comprehensive Soldiers Fitness, and it is a relatively new program to 

increase the resiliency of soldiers from the day they enter the Army 

until the day they leave the Army. We are currently in a training 

phase where we are sending what we call master resiliency trainers to the University of Pennsylvania where they attend a course 

and go back to their units. 

There is no doubt in my mind—and I had my first outbrief from the National Institute of Mental Health yesterday on the $50 million study that they have begun to look at behavioral health and 

suicide in the United States Army. There is no doubt in my mind 

that over time, as comprehensive soldier fitness gets set into the 

force, it will have a huge impact on the behavior health, the mental 

health, and will assist us in lowering our suicide rate. There is no 

doubt in my mind. 

Some of the interesting things—but that is going to take time. 

It is going to take time, given a program that we are going to implement for 1.1 million soldiers and their families. We will have a 

module available on line for families after the first of the year. It 

is going to take time for that to get totally in place and for us to 

see resiliency continue to grow or start to grow at appreciable rates 

in our service. I believe that—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. Is your view—it sounds like you are pretty enthusiastic about the possibility here. Is that widely shared at senior 

levels? 

General CHIARELLI. I just left our four-star conference this morning. It was one of the chief very first comments to the four-stars, 

and there is great anticipation and support for the program because we all realize it is going to have a huge impact. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Why weren’t we doing something like this previously? 

General CHIARELLI. I don’t think we had looked at it hard 

enough. I see other areas that we have got to look at harder. In 

the briefing I received yesterday, I found out that soldiers who are 

suffering from post-traumatic stress are six times more likely—and 

that is the general population—to commit suicide than those that 

are not. I know for a fact that the greatest single debilitating injury of soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan that have in 
67 

one injury, disqualifying injury, 30 percent or greater, is post-traumatic stress. And both General Amos and I have been working 

very, very hard to get at both post-traumatic stress (PTS) problems 

within our services and traumatic brain injury, which is also—that 

is my second leading problem I have got. 

Mr. MARSHALL. I guess that is a good segue to General Amos. 

I don’t know whether you are familiar with the work that is 

being done by General Cornum, but I have spent a little bit of time 

with her, and I am pretty impressed by what she has to say about 

possibilities here. I am just curious to know whether or not the Marine Corps is a tag-along or could be a tag-along or is independently pursuing something similar. 

I am very attracted to the idea that in some instances, what 

could turn into post-traumatic stress could, in fact, be post-traumatic growth; a person becomes stronger as a result of the experiences, the bad experiences, that they have had in combat rather 

than weaker mentally. Any comment from the Marine Corps’ perspective? 

General AMOS. Sir, first of all, I want to assure you that unlike 

probably five years ago, the whole post-traumatic stress disorder is 

taken very, very seriously within the Marine Corps, as it is in the 

Army. We are past the point of manhood on that, and I will tell 

you that at one point I think it was—it was a manhood issue. We 

are long past that because this is a serious, serious issue. 

We are not joined with the Army on this effort. I have heard 

pieces of it over the last three or four months, and it is something 

that Pete and I are very close on a whole host of other things that 

we are doing on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) protocols and the Defense Centers of Excellence (DCOE) effort trying to sort—you know, trying to actually 

get some capability out there to heal these kids that have got it. 

But what we are trying to do, I think what Pete is trying to do, 

is get out ahead of it. 

So we are not doing what they are doing, and I will—I will tell 

you what, just sitting there listening to it, it is interesting, and I 

will stick my nose into it. 

Mr. MARSHALL. I would encourage you, General, just to get General Cornum to come in and give you a brief. I was pretty impressed the two sessions I had with her at the possibilities here. 

I don’t know whether it will work out. 

To the extent that we—it is interesting. You know, it is not 

manly to acknowledge these kinds of problems. To the extent that 

we invite folks to talk about these things, you worry there may be 

some who will be encouraged to talk about them and sort of head 

in that direction. Well, none of us have the kind of expertise we 

need to have to really make that kind of judgment, so the kind of 

studies that the Army is going through and with General Cornum’s 

leadership, I think you all should be interested in it. 

General AMOS. We will do that. And I tell you, there is no corner 

on the market on this PTSD psychological health thing. There is 

no panacea on this thing. We have been looking for one. So I take 

your advice on it, sir, and I will do that. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the indulgence. 
68 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to get parochial and talk about the Anniston Depot, which 

is in my district. I would like to know if you could tell me a little 

bit about when, how and what maintenance standards you plan to 

reset the combat vehicles coming back from Iraq? 

General CHIARELLI. Sir, we plan on resetting every single combat 

vehicle that comes back to Iraq. Much equipment will be reset, and 

some will be recapped depending on the model. This year or next 

year a majority of our HMMWVs coming back will, in fact, be recapped. We have very few other lines that will require a recap, but 

they will receive a full reset, and we believe that we have what we 

need to do that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Over what timeline do you see most of those combat 

vehicles coming back. 

General CHIARELLI. That is difficult for me to tell you. Given the 

requirement, the additional requirement, in Afghanistan, the flow 

will, in fact, come out of Iran as planned. I honestly believe that. 

But some of the equipment that we expected to come back into the 

United States for full reset will be refurbished and redirected to Afghanistan to meet the requirements in Afghanistan. 

Mr. ROGERS. But all of the combat vehicles eventually you plan 

to bring back either—take out of Iraq and either take them to Afghanistan or bring them back for reset or recap? 

General CHIARELLI. We plan to reset every vehicle that comes 

out of Iraq or Afghanistan and comes back to the United States. 

And as we have stated, and I think it has been true, everyone who 

has sat in front of this committee and every other committee, the 

Army believes that will be at a minimum a two-year period after 

hostilities end before we get complete with that reset. 

Mr. ROGERS. One of the reasons I asked that last question is 

that, as you know, earlier this week there was an article in the 

Washington Post about leaving a lot of equipment in Iraq, and was 

curious if you could talk a little bit about the thought process as 

to what you do leave and don’t leave. I understand that the commander is allowed to leave up to $30 million worth of equipment 

from each facility, and that is up from what had been a $2 million 

threshold. What kind of equipment are you going to leave over 

there and why? 

General CHIARELLI. Most of the equipment you speak of, sir, is, 

in fact, not standard equipment. And all of the equipment you 

speak of, unless it is, in fact, excess to the United States Army, is 

equipment that is non-economically viable to bring back. 

I noticed in that same article a comment about temporary buildings. We just can’t get temporary buildings out of Iraq, down to 

Kuwait and into Afghanistan in any shape where they would serve 

any interest for anyone in Afghanistan. 

But I can tell you even with the limited drawdown that has come 

out of Iraq, the last number that I saw is that 27,000 pieces of 

equipment have moved from Iraq to Afghanistan to meet requirements in Afghanistan. And I chair, along with the Army Materiel 

Command (AMC) Commander, who has sent her three-star 

downrange to work with General Webster, our 3rd Army Commander, to work through these issues—we chair every two weeks, 
69 

General Dunwoody and myself, a video teleconference with all of 

the players. It talks about every single Foreign Military Sale (FMS) 

case; where equipment is going that is coming out of Iraq, and we 

are ahead of schedule right now with the drawdown of that equipment; and what pieces need to go to Afghanistan; and what are the 

requirements of the Iraqis in order to get their military to a minimal, acceptable level so we can turn everything over to them. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your great service to our country. 

General Amos, I wanted to ask on your comments about aircraft 

in page six of your testimony, you say that we are nearly tripling 

the utilization rates of our workhorses, and then you go through 

the FA–18C and D, the KC–130 aerial refuel platform, the EA–6B 

electronic warfare craft, and then you say even the new MV–22 Osprey. I know the Osprey now has been put into active service and 

utilized more widely. 

Can you update us on exactly how the Osprey is performing, 

given the concerns historically with the performance of that aircraft, now that is being more fully deployed? Can you tell us how 

that is helping you? Because later in that same paragraph you 

mentioned that you are short 248 aircraft across all type model series. Is the Osprey helping bolster that, or are you still short of the 

Osprey you need? 

General AMOS. Sir, we have about half the Ospreys we need. We 

have just finished fleshing out the squadrons on the East Coast 

down at the Marine Corps Station New River in just this past year, 

and we are just now in the process of transitioning out to the West 

Coast a Marine Air Corps Station Miramar with the stand-up of 

the 1st Osprey Squadron. The airplanes are not out there yet, but 

the squadron has—this transition between the old CH–46 helicopter, which has been our workhorse and we have had in service 

for well over 40 years, we stand those squadrons down, roll the flag 

up, take 60 percent of the people in that squadron, add another 40 

percent of new guys and gals, and we send them through 6 months 

of Osprey training, and then one day we unfurl that flag, and we 

have a stand-up ceremony, and that is kind of where we are out 

on the West Coast right now. 

So we are about—we are actually not even halfway through the 

transition of the CH–46s to the Ospreys. The Osprey has made 

three combat deployments now. It has had three deployments to 

Iraq. It just came off the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). 

Just within the last—in fact, that Marine Expeditionary Unit just 

pulled into the East Coast this past week. We took those 10 airplanes off of that—off of that Marine Expeditionary, the MEU. We 

took those 10 Ospreys off and flew them into Camp Leatherneck 

there in Afghanistan. We took the whole—we took a squadron that 

had already been to combat in Iraq, took that squadron and flew 

them into Afghanistan, and they fell in on top of those 10 airplanes. 

So today we have an Osprey squadron, 10 airplanes. We are 

about to put two more in there once we figure out how we are going 

to get them over there. But we have got an Osprey squadron that 
70 

has been flying in Afghanistan now for just a little over a month. 

By all accounts—and I watch this very closely, having been at the 

birth of this program—it is performing all of its missions really, 

really well. 

We are struggling right now with availability of the airplane. For 

instance, in Iraq, those 18 months of deployment, those 3 combat 

deployments, 62.8 percent mission capable was the percentage for 

those airplanes. On the Marine Expeditionary Unit, the one that 

just gave up those 10 airplanes and they flew into Afghanistan, 

they were 65.9 percent for the mission capable for their deployment. And that sounds—I mean, that is certainly unacceptable to 

us, but I think it is important to know, because the program had 

been drug out for so long. We really have—just in the last 2 years, 

we have got over 50 percent of the total Osprey flight time that has 

ever been logged on that airplane from the time it was conceived 

and came off many years ago off the assembly line, just in the last 

2 years. The bulk of that has been forward deployed in combat. 

So we are learning, we are basically learning the lessons of maintenance, we are learning there are suppliers, we are learning the 

lessons on equipment reliability and maintainability that probably 

should have been learned 5 or 6 or 10 years ago. They weren’t. So 

we are working very closely right now with industry. We have got 

a plan. We know where we are right now. We have got a plan to 

rectify this to get our availability back up in the 70s and 80 percent. 

But the airplane itself hasn’t failed to make a single mission either in the 18 months in Iraq or on the Marine Expeditionary Unit, 

and I anticipate it is going to be the same thing in Afghanistan. 

It is really performing well. And it does the kind of things, when 

you have a casualty evacuation out of on the Iranian border with 

a Special Operations Unit or whatever, you can now get that soldiers or Marines or SEALs—you can get them to a hospital pretty 

quickly in that airplane. So it is going to be a game changer in Afghanistan. It just got there. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. That was very good to hear. 

I went to the Osprey simulator training when that was put in 

at New River Air Station. My district goes up to the edge of Camp 

Lejeune, and, of course, Congressman Jones and I share a lot of 

common issues and concerns in that area. And that is a great report to hear. Thank you for your commitment and work on that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Heinrich. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the two 

of you for being here, for your service, and for being willing to come 

and testify before us today. I think you have sort of addressed this, 

and I just want to make sure I understand what you were saying 

a little bit ago, and sort of set to rest some of the issues that we 

have seen in the media regarding equipment in theater. So the intent, as I understand it, is when we are talking about things like 

wheeled vehicles that are in Iraq today, that those will be moved 

out of theater. And can you address sort of the path process there? 

They get refurbished and then those that are needed in Afghanistan will be transferred there. Is that an accurate articulation of 

what you have represented here today? 
71 

General AMOS. Sir, it is close. There is a significant amount of 

equipment that is finding its way from, in our case down from Iraq 

into Kuwait, staged, ready to go, as I talked about earlier. A significant amount of that equipment is finding its way into Afghanistan to sustain the fight and to augment the new 9,000 plus-up of 

Marines. Just to give you a sense for what I am talking about, just 

a level of effort, when we put the Marines on the ground, the 

10,600 Marines there, about 8 months ago, we put in 44,174 what 

we call principal end items. That can be vehicles. It can be a seventon truck. It can be an operations tent module. It can be a generator. It can be a water purification unit. But we put about 44,000 

of those major end items in; 22 percent of that number came from 

stuff that was already in Iraq, and we sent that right over there. 

As we transition to this latest plus-up of the 9,000 Marines, that 

is about 27,362 principal end items more. Even though the force is 

about the same size that is going in, part of what was there before 

provided the basic structure and some of the sustainment kind of 

things that you need to build a camp and that kind of thing. So 

a little over 27,000 new pieces of equipment are going in. Almost 

30 percent of that is coming from within theater, coming from Kuwait, or it is coming from Bahrain, or it is coming from Qatar. 

So all the rest of this stuff will find its way back on ships, and 

just like the Army is going to do, we will refurbish every single vehicle that is worthwhile. If it has got a 50 percent of its life left, 

then we are going to refurbish that thing. But we are sending a 

big chunk of that into theater. I don’t know whether that answers— 

Mr. HEINRICH. It does. And I just wanted to make sure I understood that correctly. And most of the things that are being left behind, then, are things that are specific to, and would not be, as you 

mentioned, you know, temporary buildings and other things that 

just don’t make sense to move out of theater. 

But to shift gears a little bit, General Amos, you spoke quite a 

bit about what you have learned in Iraq over the years and how 

that has changed, the utilization of equipment and how things are 

organized. I have heard a little bit about how the physical environment in Afghanistan is even more challenging on equipment. But 

how much of that is analogous in terms of what we have learned 

about making some of those changes as we transition to Afghanistan? Is it a very analogous situation, or are there a whole new set 

of things that we need to learn about how we equip? 

General AMOS. I don’t think it is a blank sheet. We are not starting from scratch. If I had to give a percentage, and this is just my 

personal opinion with no analysis behind it, I would say probably 

80, 80 to 85 percent of what we learned in Iraq over the last 5 

years—not to begin with, but this distributed, kind of irregular, 

nasty warfare we have been in, in a counterinsurgency environment, can be applied into Afghanistan. 

The other 20 percent or so is different. It is a different government. It is a different language. It is a different culture. The tribes 

don’t have the same amount of clout. You know, you remember, it 

was the tribal sheiks that started the Awakening and began to 

make the difference in Iraq. That is hard to do in this country. This 

country is about another 40 percent bigger; population is bigger. So 
72 

you are spread out in this thing. But the climates are harsher. 

What we would call a road in Iraq truly is almost a little bit bigger 

than a goat trail in Afghanistan. So that is why these MRAP allterrain vehicles, why the Marine Corps has put a new independent 

suspension upon the old MRAPs and stuff, trying to make use of 

them to get them off road. 

But there is a piece of this that doesn’t apply. And it is the lessons learned: We know how to operate in a counterinsurgency environment. We know how to live among the people, we know how to 

protect them. We know how to try to segregate the enemy. And 

that is exactly what we are all trying to do. 

But as it relates to equipment and the harshness on the equipment, that piece of it is a different animal. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you both. 

And I yield back, Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Chairman Spratt. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much for your testimony. I find it 

a little difficult to understand all the components here because I 

think there is some clarification of nomenclature that might help. 

As I understand it, reset means the overarching rubric; that is it 

comprehends a number of different things. First of all, it comprehends repair and maintenance. That would include routine repair and maintenance that is scheduled and expected. It would also 

include ad hoc maintenance for equipment that was not performing. Then we have replacement, and then refurbishment, and 

then routine field maintenance, as opposed to depot maintenance. 

Pretty soon, all of these items begin to wash into each other. 

And my interest in it from a budgetary standpoint is how do we 

get our hands around it so we can expect what the requirement is 

going to be here? For the last several years, reset has been pretty 

much of a wild card that shows up in the supplemental appropriations. To what extent are you now trying to define a number for 

the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) that will be the operative 

number for three to four years to come, as opposed to leaving it determined year by year based upon the supplemental for that year. 

General CHIARELLI. Well, sir, we are very specific in what we ask 

for. I think you know we asked for fewer procurement dollars in 

this year’s OCO. 

Mr. SPRATT. That tends to be year by year, though. Is there any 

sort of projection of what the cost is likely to be over a five-year 

budgetary period of time? 

General CHIARELLI. I don’t have that figure in front of me right 

now. I can try to get you that figure. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. SPRATT. My main interest is, do you actually do that? Do you 

develop a number that reflects the fact that you are probably going 

to have more repair, more refurbishment, more reset than previously because of the harsh environmental conditions you encounter in both theaters? 

General CHIARELLI. Yes, sir. But I will tell you that on reset, the 

only equipment that we are resetting is equipment that we are 

bringing back into the United States. What is difficult for us to do 

right now in telling you, in getting you that number is under-
73 

standing what the requirement is going to be in the outyears. Just 

the addition of the 22,000 additional soldiers to Afghanistan has 

changed the amount of equipment that, as we draw down in Iraq, 

that we are going to be able to bring back to the United States for 

full reset. And we will reset every single piece of equipment we 

bring back to the States, except for that that are washouts, that 

are non-economically feasible to reset. But that is reset to us, and 

that is bringing that equipment back to its original condition. 

Mr. SPRATT. Towards the end of your testimony, your prepared 

testimony, you indicated that the request for the 2010 supplemental was about $11 billion, of which about 30 percent is procurement and 70 percent is maintenance. 

General CHIARELLI. I am sorry if I misspoke, sir, it is not that 

high in procurement. Yeah, I think it is a little less than that in 

procurement. And that procurement will go for vehicles that have 

to be replaced because of combat losses and any kind of recap, 

which is reset plus bringing that vehicle up to the higher standard. 

Because that vehicle was built at a time when we had not added 

certain things that make it more modern, more survivable, more 

able to fight in the environments that we are in. 

Mr. SPRATT. If you would both present or prepare for the record 

what the five-year FYDP levels are of operation and maintenance 

(O&M) as well as procurement that comes under the rubric that 

comes under the rubric of reset. If we could have those numbers 

on a five-year basis on the current FYDP basis, it would be useful 

for the record, please, sir. 

General AMOS. Sir, I can tell you what the Marine Corps is right 

now. I stated in my statement that the total reset is estimated to 

be $10 billion. That will actually extend beyond the FYDP. But it 

is $8.2 billion for the Marine Corps is the prognosis today. For 

what reset will cost us in the FYDP is $8.2 billion. It will take another—— 

Mr. SPRATT. $8.2 billion all together? 

General AMOS. $8.2 billion reset for the Marine Corps. 

The definitions that we live by, Chairman, is reset and reconstitution. Refurbishment is part of reset. The purchasing new stuff, 

in some cases, is part of reset. Because when you take a look at 

what reset is allowed, what is allowed in reset, it is equipment replacements for items not already included in the FYDP; combat 

losses; replacement of equipment that is given to coalition partners; 

replacement or repair of equipment due to original—get it to its 

original capability because it has been worn out. Those are the two 

things we deal with. 

Reset is combat losses, stuff that is worn out, and will get you 

back to where you were when you started. Reconstitution of a 

unit—and by the way, most of that reset is done in OCO dollars. 

It is supplemental. And the longer we stay in this fight, the more 

that that supplemental, that reset dollars are going to slide to the 

right. So it is not something that you can nail down today and say, 

that is all it is going to be, and that is all the requirement. It will 

continue to change the longer we are engaged. 

Reconstitution for the most part is in our baseline budgets. And 

that is procurement of some equipment. That is the training. That 

is the buying of people. That is the buying of the people’s equip-
74 

ment and that kind—that is a reconstitution. Those are the two 

terms that we deal with in Department of Defense (DOD). 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you both very much. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Akin. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The world of how these numbers are put together and graphs 

and all this is also a little new to me. But what I am seeing here, 

for instance, in the Army reset-over-time graph that has been provided for me, one of the things I am noticing, first of all, is that 

in 2007, you had $16.4 billion; 2008, $16.1 billion; and then 2009 

is $13 billion; and coming down to $11 billion in 2010. And yet I 

am not so sure that the rate that we are going through equipment 

has changed all that much. I guess my concern is, if this is all supplemental-type of dollars, what happens if the supplemental bill 

doesn’t go through this year and we end up with another continuing resolution? And to what degree are we just postponing this 

reset over time? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, we are in fact providing you with the 

numbers that we need to reset the United States Army equipment 

that comes back to the States. And that number has gone down, 

as indicated. And one of the reasons is we have less procurement 

money in there as we have recapped fewer and fewer vehicles. We 

have not had a requirement to do that. And we have seen that 

number go down. But we feel—— 

Mr. AKIN. Excuse me, can I interrupt? Because you are using 

terms that I am not sure I understand. Are you saying that what 

you actually feel that you need is less than what you had before; 

therefore, the numbers go down because you don’t have as much 

equipment as you had previously? Is that what you are saying? 

General CHIARELLI. We have not brought as much equipment 

back that required reset. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. So, in other words, we have less equipment in 

States than we had before, and therefore, the reset has gone down. 

General CHIARELLI. You have an increase in Afghanistan as well 

as a relatively small decrease in Iraq. And in addition to that, 

there has been a requirement to replenish our Army preposition 

stocks. 

Mr. AKIN. So, in other words, it is not that we have like less 

pieces of mobile equipment in the Army. It is just that we have less 

of that back in country. 

General CHIARELLI. Less of it has come back for reset. 

Mr. AKIN. For reset. 

General CHIARELLI. For reset. And we would expect, and even if 

the Iraq drawdown goes as promised, our 2010 number is a little 

bit lower, because by the time we get it back over the ocean and 

to the depots, we will be into the next fiscal year. And I would expect to see that number increase if those larger numbers of pieces 

of equipment come back home. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. So this number is not the overall measure then 

of how we are doing in keeping up or keeping our equipment base 

where it should be. This is more numbers as to how that base is 

only with equipment in the United States. 

General CHIARELLI. And it keeps—that number is used in the 

Army sense to refurbish equipment, equipment that comes out of 
75 

Iraq that has to go into Afghanistan. When we bring it down to Kuwait, we make sure we look over that equipment so we are not 

sending a whole bunch of problems to the folks in Afghanistan. So 

they get a piece of equipment within the capability of our workers 

in Kuwait to return that equipment as best as they can so that Afghanistan gets a good piece of equipment that they can use. That 

number is also included in there. But that is not the same as reset. 

It is not the same level of a maintenance you are going to get if 

you fully reset a piece of equipment, which we do in our depots. 

Mr. AKIN. Right. And the depots are more in this country, then, 

when you do that total rebuild kind of thing. 

General CHIARELLI. They are. 

Mr. AKIN. Now, when you do that, there are two categories within that, I gather. One is to reset it to what the equipment was like 

when it left. Another is to add, if there have been some modifications or changes to the design, you bring it up to the higher level. 

And you make a distinction between those two. But they are still 

all coming out of supplemental money in the past. 

General CHIARELLI. A majority of that is. A majority of that is; 

that recap is coming out. We have a certain amount of procurement 

money in there. Now, there are some that it may not be in the supplemental, but we will look to our base to get to if we feel it needs 

to be done. 

Mr. AKIN. So, just last, if we do not get the supplemental 

through, we do a continuing resolution, will we then have to go 

back to the drawing board as to how we are going to fund this? 

General CHIARELLI. We are at this time—we will continue to do 

the work that we need to do, but if we were never to get that—— 

Mr. AKIN. It would be a problem? 

General CHIARELLI [continuing]. That would be a huge problem. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Abercrombie. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, aloha to both of you. Thank you for your attendance here today. I need to make a little bit of a preamble, and then 

I have less of a question than I have a comment. And if you can 

comment in turn, that would be fine. But I leave it to your discretion on that. 

General Chiarelli, on page six of your testimony, you have referred about resetting and multiyear requirements. Due to unprecedented stress placed on our equipment as a result of the war, reset 

funding is required, underlined, in your testimony for a period of 

two to three years beyond the cessation of the current conflict, 

which may be quite extensive. Any reset requirements that go unfunded in one year will roll over and increase the following year’s 

requirement. 

And then, General Amos, in your testimony, on page eight, I 

think is the one I want to refer to. As our focus shifts to greater 

support for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), costs will continue 

to rise over time. Continued congressional support of future funding requests will be necessary to improve equipment readiness levels across the Corps. Then you go on to talk about the future of 

reset. 
76 

Based on what we now know, we estimate the near term we have 

the $6 billion. You referred to that. And then you revised that in 

your commentary to 10 plus 5, and the plus 5 really referring to 

the table of equipment numbers and also in the context of 

prepositioning equipment. All of this takes place in the context, 

which you mention on page one, of Secretary Gates in a commentary in Foreign Affairs, whether it was a speech or an article 

I don’t remember, but it was, I believe the subtitle of it was ‘‘Balanced Strategy for a New Age.’’ 

So I bring all of that up in saying with all of this forward looking, and then your final statement from you, General Amos; we are 

mindful the Corps cannot rely on supplemental appropriations for 

baseline operations. Now, we have talked on the committee, and 

the Secretary has talked, and you folks have talked now about not 

wanting to rely on supplemental budgets. On the other hand, supplemental budgets are not going to disappear because we have contingencies that we can’t anticipate, and that is what a supplemental is all about. 

But given the fact that both of you stated you know pretty clearly what your requirements are going to be in terms of resetting 

with all of the definitions that you just outlined with Mr. Spratt, 

what I recommend here for your consideration is you are going to 

have to take something up in terms of capital budgeting. You have 

got to separate operational requirements from capital asset acquisition. And reset here seems to me an ideal way to get to the question of capital budgeting, of looking ahead, of getting a budget proposal on the table that is multiyear, that you know has to be done 

multiyear. 

You know that you are going to have to make these purchases. 

And to simply come in every year with each Defense bill and each 

Defense appropriations bill hoping you are going to be able to get 

the money for reset in competition with all of the other capital 

asset acquisitions you do year by year puts us in the position we 

are in right now. Every single service is now having to scramble 

internally to have one kind of equipment, one kind of a capital 

asset, a carrier, a Joint Strike Fighter, a combat—a new combat 

vehicle, and they are in competition with all the rest of it. We don’t 

want reset in this category. 

I am just saying to you, by way of conclusion to my remarks, that 

this is something I put forward for your consideration and Secretary Gates’ consideration, that a capital budget or its equivalent 

be established where reset is concerned so that you don’t become 

dependent on a supplemental budget which may or may not come 

in an appropriate time frame to meet your needs. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know it took some time to do that, 

and I don’t know if they can comment or not at this point. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Go ahead, if you have a comment, either one of you. 

Just go ahead. 

General AMOS. Sir, your point is well taken. We are kind of stuck 

because—and you know that—— 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is why I brought it up. I believe you are 

stuck. I believe you are now having to set a competition between 

the reset necessities and other capital acquisitions. And I will stop 

with that. 
77 

General AMOS. Exactly, sir. And in both our services, and really 

in all four services, the focus is on succeeding in the fight that they 

are in. You know, we have been sent to do this; our Nation expects 

us to succeed, so we are going to do whatever is required. And 

when you do that, there are the trade-offs. There are the decisions 

you are making back home in what we don’t call it a capital budget, we certainly call it our baseline budget. And so now we are robbing Peter to pay Paul, and all of a sudden, it just continues to 

snowball. 

I think if we were at war for three years, you could probably hold 

your breath on the back side and say, okay, we are going to figure 

it out. We actually can do this inside of FYDP. But we can’t. We 

have been at this now since we crossed the border in March of 

2003. 

So your point is well taken, sir. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 

General CHIARELLI. I would just say your point is well taken, and 

we will look very, very hard at attempting to do that. 

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

We are going to have a series of votes in about six minutes, so 

we have two more members who will have a question. 

Mr. Reyes and then Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Generals, thank you for being here this morning. 

I think most of my questions have been asked already, but I 

think it might be useful if we have for the record an understanding 

percentage-wise of how it impacts our training capability, because 

obviously our number one priority is making sure that our troops 

in combat have the best equipment out there. But I am curious, as 

we rotate through what soon will be, we hope, only the Afghanistan 

theater, how are we affected percentage-wise in our capability to 

train? Are we at 50 percent capability in training? Because for the 

doctrine of we train how we fight, I am a little bit concerned of everything I have heard here this morning. I think it is having an 

impact on that ability to do that. 

General AMOS. Sir, I will tell you that I can’t give you a percentage-wise, but this equipment that is now flowing into Afghanistan, 

and we talked about what came from Kuwait, but just to give you 

kind of an order of magnitude on what has come from the United 

States, which is the training piece that you are talking about and 

you are referring to, when we put the 10,600 Marines in there 

about 8 months ago, we took 15 percent of that 44,000 came from 

the United States, bases and stations. When we took this 27,000- 

plus, 33 percent of that has come from the bases and stations. So 

it is cumulative. 

And so what we are finding is that we are having less of those 

kind of principal types of pieces of equipment that we need to be 

able to train on back here in the continental United States, so that 

we do what we said to begin with when we came in here; have no 

fear, we are going to have those units fully equipped that are forward deployed. We have been able to do that in the past and kind 

of robbing Peter to pay Paul, moving things around back home to 

ensure that those battalions we start—Congressman Hunter asked 
78 

and talked about kind of the stand up of the training cycle and 

cross-leveling. 

Our model is 180 days out we stabilize the unit. And then we 

stabilize it with manpower. And about 120 days out, we try to stabilize it with its equipment, so that, as it gets inside of 120 days, 

it is in the final preparatory training phase prior to going to Iraq 

before and now Afghanistan. So it has 100 percent of what it needs, 

training opportunity and training equipment and people-wise. 

But what has happened, and we have been able to kind of hold 

our breath on all those forces that have just returned and those 

forces that are kind of not in the training cycle yet, they haven’t 

entered their 180-day mark. But I will tell you what is going to 

happen now as a result of this latest move is there is going to be 

fewer of that kind of equipment that is going to be back in home 

station. And we are going to find ourselves still really trying to juggle that very carefully to make sure that those units that get inside 

that 180-day pre-deployment training cycle have exactly what they 

need. And we will do that. 

But everybody else, there are going to be hungry children back 

there. And they have to train as well. Their training is not nearly 

as important as those units that are inside the 180-day window, because they are going to go, but they will eventually themselves 

move inside that 180-day window. But when they are on the outside, they are going to be hungry children. But I don’t have a percentage for you. 

General CHIARELLI. Thirty-two percent of the vehicle requirements in Afghanistan will come from theater in the United States 

Army. Those are the numbers that I asked for the other day; 25 

percent of the overall equipment will come from theater. So you 

have a higher percentage of vehicles that will come from theater 

than you do overall equipment, which is at about 25 percent. And 

I asked for that exact figure and how it was going to affect the 

training base back home, and I am told it will be anywhere from 

5 to 10 percent less vehicles and equipment will be available during the training phase back here for about 24 to 36 months, is what 

we are looking at, sir. But we believe we can train our soldiers up 

given the equipment sets that we will have back home. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank both of you gentlemen for being here, and 

General Chiarelli, in particular, for the work you are doing on 

MRAPs to get them to the stateside stations for training. 

I wish I had more time to brag on what you are doing right, but 

I really want to spend the time I have asking you some questions, 

hopefully preventing some problems that may occur as we leave 

Iraq. I was just curious, you know, when a nation is $12 trillion 

in debt, it can’t afford to waste anything. And I know that, as 

warfighters, both of you gentlemen’s first priority is get the best 

stuff in the hands of the warfighters. But I was wondering, to what 

extent, as we are leaving these things behind in Iraq, are you trying to get maybe some folks from the National Guard or the State 

emergency management agencies to let them have a look at what 

we are leaving behind to see if they have any use for this? 
79 

And obviously, a guy who is a small town alderman is going to 

look at something differently than you, the warfighter. And things 

that you may think are not worth bringing home, they may look 

at as gold. And again, it is just the difference in philosophy. And 

I very much respect the philosophy you two gentlemen have because you are warfighters, and our Nation needs you, and I respect 

you for that. But I do think a guy who may be a National Guard 

major who just came from being an alderman back home, from 

being a highway patrolman back home, a hospital administrator 

back home, he is going to look at some of these things differently. 

And I am just questioning, how are you getting different sets of 

eyes on the same pieces of equipment so some of the mistakes that 

we know we made in Panama, in the Philippines, when we left 

things behind aren’t being made again in Iraq? 

General CHIARELLI. Well, one is the tremendous focus you and 

everybody else has. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I am several thousands miles away, General. 

General CHIARELLI. We instituted this Equipment Review Board 

here two months ago to look at exactly that. And what I am told 

right now is, we will leave behind no piece of equipment that in 

fact is economically—it makes sense to bring back economically. 

But you bring up an excellent point about asking some of our National Guard formations and the soldiers that are inside those National Guard formations to look at some of the things we may be 

leaving behind to get their take on whether they would be of value 

to them. And I will use the Expanded Defense Resources Board 

(EDRB) video teleconference that I have next week to tee that up 

for theater to get another look to ensure we are doing exactly what 

you ask of us, Congressman Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. I very much appreciate that. And again, I supplied 

that letter to Colonel Glaze. We have been informed by some of the 

State emergency managers that this is something that is occurring, 

and that the Iraqis—and again, from several thousand miles away, 

it sure strikes me as a scam that they are asking for what documents did we import these goods with, and obviously, we are not 

issuing importation documents in 2003 during an invasion or any 

time since then, since, early on, there was no government of Iraq 

to be dealing with. And so, again, whatever you can do on your end 

to help resolve that I would greatly appreciate. 

General CHIARELLI. I will immediately tee that up, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I have a question, General Chiarelli. 

If 30 percent of your equipment is not returning to the United 

States for reset, how is the Army or how are you going to be able 

to accomplish your training requirements back home? Because you 

know, at the beginning of the war, this is one of the huge problems 

that we were having, that some of the recruits were not getting 

proper training because they didn’t have the equipment. Is this 

going to present a huge problem to you? 

General CHIARELLI. We believe we can work around it. It is 32 

percent of the vehicle requirements with the increase in Afghanistan are being met by vehicles that are currently in theater. That 

is what that says. And they have been in theater. We expect it only 
80 

to be 5 to 10 percent. But we believe, given the fact that our units 

come back and go into the six months of reset, that we will be able 

to immediately move that equipment around to ensure that they 

are properly trained up on post camps and stations. 

And one of the great improvements we have made, I believe, is 

getting MRAPs out to the individual post camps and stations so we 

can train our soldiers on driving MRAPs. We don’t have nearly 

enough to outfit a combat formation, but we can at least give them 

drivers training. And we have done that with the MRAP ATV, too. 

We asked early on to take some of those early vehicles, do the licensing requirement for units deploying over here so when units 

arrived in Afghanistan they could more quickly be issued that 

equipment with less training time required in theater. 

In addition to that, we have an unbelievable common trainer 

that we are using that has done just wonderful things for MRAP 

training. So I think, in many ways, we might be in a little bit better situation today than we were in before. But there is going to 

be about a 5 to 10 percent decrease in the amount of equipment 

we have got back home for about a 24- to 36-month period. That 

period is as long as it is because when the equipment comes back, 

before we can reissue it to units, it will have to go through a reset 

program. 

Mr. ORTIZ. See because another area that concerns me is the 

equipment that we need for the pre-stocking stocks throughout, you 

know, reset. Are we going to be able to provide the training equipment and then be able to give the pre-stocking areas to be filled 

up for them to have the right equipment? This is the thing that 

worries me. 

General CHIARELLI. And, sir, I will tell you, some of that 32 percent is coming out of Army prepositioned equipment. So we are 

going into the APS stocks, which in reality are theater stocks, but 

that is part of that 32 percent. That is why it is a 5 to 10 percent 

decrease back in the United States. But we really believe we will 

be able to work this through smart management of our assets. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, sir. And I just have one last question. When did 

replacement of equipment given to coalition partners and foreign 

military sales become part of the definition of reset? 

General CHIARELLI. I didn’t mean to infer that it did, sir. I just 

meant to infer that, in order to get the Iraqi army up to the level 

that we need to, when we have a FMS case that comes out of Iraq, 

because that system can be very, very slow, and we know that the 

Iraqi army must be equipped in order for us to leave, we are following every single one of those. We are not in fact providing the 

Iraqis any equipment that would in fact impact Army readiness. 

The only equipment would be excess equipment. And then we have 

certain requirements to come to Congress in those cases to make 

sure that we report to you before any of those transfers are made. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

General Amos, would you like to make a further statement before we shut down this hearing? 

General AMOS. Sir, I want to thank you for your continued support. You really do, we have had a good discussion on 

supplementals and OCO, and I think the thing I would like to 

leave with to this committee, Mr. Chairman, would be, again, the 
81 

war in Afghanistan will be fought well by young men and women 

fully equipped and fully trained. I want you to know that and have 

confidence in that. 

But there is this continuing drain of equipment back home to do 

this. So there are two things that come to mind that are troublesome. One, eventually it will begin to impact home station training. 

It has not yet. And my prognosis is, because of the way we train 

in the Marine Corps, it probably won’t, even in the future over the 

next year. We will probably be able to manage it. The micromanaging of that will be very, very, very time-consuming, and it is 

going to be an all Marine force effort. 

The second piece is our ability to be able to go someplace else in 

the world and do the Nation’s bidding. I think that would be something that—and I get asked the question what would you do? We 

would cobble it together just like we did when we put the Fifth Marine Regiment together just out of just a skeleton and went to Inchon, but it was very, very painful. So that is kind of the danger 

part of the home station piece just being eaten at. And that is why 

supplementals, we have had the discussion on, should you, or 

shouldn’t you? And I will be honest with you, without it, without 

being able to replace those vehicles that are being combat lost and 

worn out, we would find ourselves further in the hole and less capable than we are today. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ORTIZ. We appreciate your service. 

Another thing that worries me is that our National Guard, our 

Reserves, I have visited some of them, and some of the equipment 

has been left behind for the active Army. You know, but I know 

you are doing your best, and we are going to have to do with what 

we got. And we want to be sure that this committee provides you 

what you need. There has been some good questions asked by the 

members, and there have been some good responses. 

And now I would like to allow, for those members who couldn’t 

be here with us today, for them to be able to submit, you know, 

questions for the record. 

We do not have any other questions? 

Thank you so much for joining us today. And this hearing now 

stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

DECEMBER 10, 2009 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

DECEMBER 10, 2009 

(87) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR 

General AMOS. No. As we have been retrograding our equipment over the past 

year, we have not seen any evidence of this documentation requirement in Iraq. [See 

page 56.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

DECEMBER 10, 2009 

(91) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ 

Mr. ORTIZ. Who will make the decision about what equipment in Iraq will be reset 

into the Army (or Marine Corps) and what will be provided to the Iraqis? What factors figure into that decision? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What has been done to increase depot capacities in preparation for the 

potentially huge influx of equipment from Iraq or the need to surge reset equipment 

into Afghanistan? 

To what extent have the Army and Marine Corps developed strategies for 

workloading their depots over the next 5 to 10 years to satisfy reset requirements? 

Based on these workloading plans, what confidence do the Army and Marine 

Corps have that they will be able to obligate the reset funds they have requested 

in fiscal year 2010 and beyond? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What plans are there for the replenishment of Army and Marine Corps 

pre-positioned stocks through reset? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. We understand that at present there are no depot-level facilities for 

MRAPs in the United States. What is being done to deal with this? When do you 

anticipate having a national repair capability and strategy for MRAP sustainment? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. At what point will DOD move all funding for equipment into the base 

budget, given that contingency operations have been going on for several years and 

it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between equipment requirements 

related to base and contingency operations’ needs? What are the risks of continuing 

to fund reset, and in the Army’s case, the majority of the depot maintenance account, through contingency operations funding? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Operations overseas in harsh conditions affect equipment’s long-term 

condition and expected useful lifetime. For purposes of projecting the equipment 

that the Army has on hand and will have for the next several years, the Army assumes that equipment now being used overseas will be returned to the United 

States and fully rehabilitated as part of its reset program. 

a. Has the Army assessed the percentage of equipment that is now in Iraq and 

Afghanistan that may not be able to be rehabilitated (wash-out rate) and the effect 

that this rate may have on its longer-term plans for equipment availability? 

b. Has the Army performed a cost/benefit analysis on the relative advantages of 

returning used equipment to the United States for repair and rehabilitation as opposed to purchasing new equipment that may have a longer service life? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Army is implementing a rotational force readiness model, called 

the Army Force Generation Model or ARFORGEN. The cycle is intended to increase 

unit readiness over time from when a unit returns from deployment for rest and 

resetting through training phases until it is available to deploy. The Army recognizes that implementation of this model will affect the way it equips the force to 

increase their readiness over time to reach deployment readiness. Currently, the 

Army’s requirements processes still reflect the Army’s acquisition goal of providing 

all units all the equipment they need for their missions at all times, and this assumption drives the Army’s Acquisition Objective (AAO). However, officials acknowledge that units in a rotational force generation cycle may need less than 100 percent 

of some equipment requirements in the early phases of their training cycle but may 

need more than 100 percent of some items to account for situations such as having 

some equipment unavailable because of maintenance, for example. 

What plans does the Army have to adapt its current equipment strategy as it 

resets the force and implements the ARFORGEN readiness model? 

For what types of equipment does the Army anticipate needing greater than 100 

percent of current requirements and why? 

For what types of equipment does the Army anticipate needing less than 100 percent of requirements? 
92 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the theater communicate and coordinate equipment retrograde and reset requirements to the Army and Marine Corps? How much equipment 

do the Army and Marine Corps plan to reset in fiscal year 2010? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What determinations went into your Overseas Contingency Operations 

reset budget request for fiscal year 2010? How will the fiscal year 2010 budget be 

executed? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. How long will reset continue and what do you expect the annual recurring cost to be? How long do you anticipate funding for reset will be paid for by 

supplemental or Overseas Contingency Operations funding only? How will the Army 

and Marine Corps prioritize resources between your many initiatives and programs, 

including reset and future modernization investments? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. How do non-deployed systems figure into the Army’s and Marine 

Corps’ reset programs? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the Army’s and Marine Corps’ approach to reset management 

and planning? How do the Army and Marine Corps determine which equipment will 

be repaired, recapitalized, or replaced? What percentage of equipment being reset 

in fiscal year 2010 will be repaired? What percentage will be recapitalized? What 

percentage will be replaced? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What life-cycle extensions and additional capabilities will result from 

recapitalization? By how much does recapitalization extend the life of equipment? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. How do you respond to the GAO’s criticism that the Army and Marine 

Corps are sacrificing short-term equipment needs are for long-term modernization? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Can the industrial base meet the demand the Army and Marine Corps 

have for maintenance, recapitalization, and new production, particularly in light of 

the reduction of forces in Iraq and the increased forces in Afghanistan? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Does reset need to be accelerated? If so, what could the Army and Marine Corps do to accelerate resetting the force? Is additional depot capacity needed? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the impact of service support contracts on Army and Marine 

Corps equipment reset? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the relationship between the drawdown of military forces and 

contractor personnel in Iraq to the Army’s and Marine Corps’ ability to execute 

equipment retrograde and reset? That is, how reliant are you on specific levels of 

military or contractor personnel in theater to support your requirements for equipment retrograde or reset? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Please explain the goals of the Army’s reset pilot program. What lessons were learned and how have they been applied to redeploying units? What has 

been the practical impact of the pilot program on how units reset themselves at 

home station? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the Army balance operational equipment needs versus Title 

32 responsibilities assigned to the reserve components in terms of reset 

prioritization? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. The Army has spent more than $70 billion over the past four years 

on equipment reset. Why, then, are some Army units reporting C–4 readiness because of equipment shortages or training shortfalls due to lack of equipment? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Where will the Army find enough mission-capable equipment to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? Where will it come from? Will the Reserve 

Component be a source? 

General CHIARELLI. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ORTIZ. Who will make the decision about what equipment in Iraq will be reset 

into the Army (or Marine Corps) and what will be provided to the Iraqis? What factors figure into that decision? 

General AMOS. The decision about what equipment in Iraq will be returned from 

theater to reset into the Marine Corps will be made by MARCENT with Head-
93 

quarters Marine Corps based on operational requirements for OEF. OEF operational 

requirements will also factor into the final decision on what equipment is available 

to source to the Government of Iraq. 

The Joint Staff directed, under an operational planning team construct, the Services review their capability to transfer defense articles to the Government of Iraq 

in an effort to facilitate a responsible drawdown of U.S. forces. All Services were 

in attendance in the 8 month-long planning process, to include the Army National 

Guard. 

On 6 Oct 09, the FY10 NDAA, Section 1234 was passed. This will allow the Serv- ices the ability to direct up to $750 M worth of equipment to the GOI in FY10 and 

FY11. SECDEF will not execute the authority provided in FY10 NDAA Section 1234 

until 30 days after the ‘‘Report on the Transfer of Defense Articles and the Provision 

of Defense Services to the Militaries and Security Forces of Iraq and Afghanistan’’ 

has been submitted to Congress. The report is currently in staffing. At this time, 

no Marine Corps equipment has been transferred to coalition forces under the Section 1234 legislation. 

If directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Marine Corps would only transfer 

equipment that does not pose a risk to the Marine Corps or would impact the Marine Corps Reserve. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What has been done to increase depot capacities in preparation for the 

potentially huge influx of equipment from Iraq or the need to surge reset equipment 

into Afghanistan? 

To what extent have the Army and Marine Corps developed strategies for 

workloading their depots over the next 5 to 10 years to satisfy reset requirements? 

Based on these workloading plans, what confidence do the Army and Marine 

Corps have that they will be able to obligate the reset funds they have requested 

in fiscal year 2010 and beyond? 

General AMOS. Marine Corps Logistics Command, Maintenance Centers in Albany 

Georgia, and Barstow California increased production in 2008 and executed 4.4 million direct labor hours. In 2009, we estimated 5.45 million direct labor hours in 

preparation for a potentially huge influx of equipment. We hired additional personnel for these years in consonance with section 2472 of Title 10, U.S.C., with the 

expectation that the workload, and therefore the workforce, would remain throughout reset. However, CY09 workload did not materialize due to equipment sourcing 

requirements to support the Afghanistan troop levels. As a result, Maintenance Centers Albany and Barstow were forced to decrease the work force in order to meet 

this lessened workload requirement. Now that the decision has been made on the 

deployment and timeline of additional USMC forces to Afghanistan, we can now expect that depot maintenance will be performed on approximately 6,100 retrograded 

items and field maintenance on approximately 10,000 items during FY-10. Only 

items that have a continued requirement within the Marine Corps will be reset. The 

Marine Corps is confident that it will fully obligate depot maintenance reset funds 

in FY-10 and beyond. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What plans are there for the replenishment of Army and Marine Corps 

pre-positioned stocks through reset? 

General AMOS. As equipment is retrograded from Iraq and reset through either 

maintenance or procurement actions, it will be issued to Marine Corps activities 

(e.g. Home Station Units, Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), Marine Corps 

Prepositioning Progam-Norway (MCPP–N) Supporting Establishment Units) according to their prioritization as established by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Therefore, prepositioning stocks will be replenished through reset based on the 

availability of reset equipment and relative priority of distribution as determined by 

the Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Mr. ORTIZ. We understand that at present there are no depot-level facilities for 

MRAPs in the United States. What is being done to deal with this? When do you 

anticipate having a national repair capability and strategy for MRAP sustainment? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps has been assigned as the Primary Inventory 

Control Activity (PICA) for the Cat I and Cat II Cougar MRAP. As such, we solicited 

and received a Depot Source of Repair (DSOR) designation through the Joint Depot 

Maintenance Activity Group (JDMAG) for the Marine Corps Depot facilities at Albany and Barstow. We also solicited and received DSOR assignment for the Buffalo 

Cat IIIs fielded to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is currently conducting a 

proof-of-principle (POP) on the Buffalo Cat III to develop the National Maintenance 

Work Requirement (NMWR). Additionally, Marine Corps Maintenance Centers Albany and Barstow both plan to start maintenance production on CAT I, II and III 

MRAPs by 1st Qtr FY11. 

Mr. ORTIZ. At what point will DOD move all funding for equipment into the base 

budget, given that contingency operations have been going on for several years and 
94 

it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between equipment requirements 

related to base and contingency operations’ needs? What are the risks of continuing 

to fund reset, and in the Army’s case, the majority of the depot maintenance account, through contingency operations funding? 

General AMOS. Equipment needs resulting from Overseas Contingency Operations 

(OCO) have not been in the baseline because both Congress and OSD have generally 

agreed that war related costs should be part of the Service’s OCO submissions. No 

determination has been made to move away from this funding strategy as long as 

we are engaged in OCO activities. There is more risk associated with moving Reset 

requirements in the baseline than continuing to fund in the OCO requests because 

our ability to recover from this current conflict would come at the expense of the 

modernization necessary to meet future threats. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How have Marine Corps reset requirements changed as a result of additional personnel and equipment purchases? 

General AMOS. As personnel have been added to the Marine Corps as part of the 

202K initiative, associated equipment to outfit those additional Marines is also identified as an element of increasing our end strength. Such additional equipment is 

distinct and separate from reset requirements of existing forces. Equipment purchases to support Overseas Contingency Operations are used to fill deficiencies in 

two areas: replacement of equipment due to combat loss/increased usage due to high 

operational tempos, and equipment purchases above established table of equipment 

allowances to enable units to perform missions different from what they were originally intended to perform. Reset requirements are constantly changing to meet the 

constantly changing needs of equipment replacement due to combat loss/wear and 

tear from increased usage due to high operational tempos. Additionally, reset requirements are impacted when home station equipment is sent overseas to fulfill 

immediate emerging equipment needs due to mission analysis of our forces going 

into combat. As our forces continue to adapt to meet the enemy, equipment needs 

also continue to change 

Mr. ORTIZ. At what capacity are Marine Corps depots operating? If not full capacity, should they be? 

General AMOS. USMC depot capacity is elastic. The Marine Corps depots have the 

ability to expand and contract as necessary to meet workload requirements. There 

are multiple options to adjust depot capacity including overtime shifts, multiple 

shifts, hiring of contract and/or temporary labor, hiring full time additional labor or 

contracting with commercial vendors. We can also utilize capacity at other Service 

depots. Currently, we have the ability to expand if necessary. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What lessons has the Marine Corps learned from Iraq and Afghanistan 

regarding its unit table of equipment requirements that apply to reset? How have 

those lessons been applied and what is the impact? 

General AMOS. Lessons learned from 8 years of major combat have led the Marine 

Corps to change the baseline it uses for the ground equipment requirement. This 

change—as well as critical funding to reset and reconstitute the force—will posture 

the Corps for tomorrow’s challenges and ensure the Corps’ standing as the nation’s 

expeditionary force in readiness. 

The old metric for the ground equipment requirement, which worked well in 

peacetime, did not work well in war when equipment requirements changed rapidly 

and new units were created. 

The benefits of using a new baseline are as follows: 

• Provides more accurate measure of the ground equipment requirement 

• Supply readiness is now calculated against the unit’s stable, actual requirement vice a floating metric. 

• It enables commanders to conduct a more accurate and useful assessment of 

their ability to accomplish the mission. 

• Demonstrates stronger linkages between force structure, materiel readiness, 

operational readiness, and funding. 

• Better linkage between equipment fielding and improved unit readiness. 

• Easier to articulate our equipment requirement shortfalls to Congress. 

• Facilitates better acquisition decisions and cross-leveling of equipment based on 

requirements. 

The impact of applying the lessons learned on Marine Corps readiness: 

• Deployed forces still have the equipment required to do their mission. 

• There has been a drop in equipment readiness levels for non-deployed forces. 
95 

Mr. ORTIZ. What new equipment needs have emerged for Afghanistan and how 

will these new needs affect Marine Corps reset? How has the Marine Corps dealt 

with the evolution of personal protective equipment through the reset process? 

General AMOS. With regard to the first part of this question, ‘‘What new equipment needs have emerged for Afghanistan and how will these needs effect Marine 

Corps reset?’’ we continually work with our deployed units via the Urgent UNS 

process, lessons learned reviews, and our deliberate combat development process. 

Meeting the immediate needs of units deployed to Afghanistan will certainly have 

an effect on our reset, although the full effect is difficult to determine since the 

length and level of our commitment there is not fully known. We continue to take 

risk in the readiness of our home station units by drawing their equipment, and by 

redirecting equipment that was scheduled for reset from Iraq to Afghanistan. As far 

as response to urgent needs goes, since February 2008 we have received known cost 

estimates totaling $490.2M from units deployed to Afghanistan. We also have received known-cost estimates totaling $58.1M from units inbound to the theater. 

Most of these in-bound U–UNS address shortfalls generated by growth of the OEF 

MAGTF to a MEF(Forward). 

Examples of equipment needs identified in OEF U–UNS include: 

Persistent Surveillance. Family of systems to enhance surveillance capabilities at 

Forward Operating Bases and other areas where there are no co-located coalition 

forces. Twice requested for quantity increases by OEF forces and is now 

MARCENT’s number one priority to field. Recently approved U–UNS of 121 additional systems at cost of $147M; delivery pending. 

Mobile Armored Trauma Bay. Newly developed armored, mobile facility that provides the ability to conduct forward resuscitative care as close to the point of injury 

as possible. First 6 units were delivered to theater. Cost for 8 units is $8.2M. 

Scalable Plate Carriers. Provides commanders with a scalable body armor option 

to maximize individual ballistic protection balanced with mobility as dictated by 

mission requirements. This capability has been increased twice by U–UNS request 

to outfit to forces deploying to OIF and OEF. The most recent request delivers 

17,636 units to OEF at a cost of $20.7M. 

Robots. Source of multiple U–UNS requests for counter IED capability fielded to 

EOD, engineer and infantry forces. Five different OEF centric U–UNS requests 

have been approved since July 2009 providing an increase of 71 units across two 

variants for surveillance and IED interrogation at a USMC cost of $9.2M. 51 additional units were obtained as Theater Provided. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What additional capability and capacity, if any, is needed at Blount 

Island to accommodate Marine Corps reset? 

General AMOS. Blount Island Command is already operating as an integral part 

of the MCLC Field Level (Intermediate Maintenance) Reset Plan. Blount Island 

Command supports the Marine Corps’ strategic prepositioning programs. Their seasoned contractor workforce possesses the skill sets to perform less than depot-level 

repairs on nearly the full range of USMC equipment retrograded from the 

CENTCOM AOR. The limiting factor at Blount Island continues to be the lack of 

suitable facilities to improve the infrastructure capacity for the reset effort. In 2006, 

the Marine Corps identified the need to accelerate 10 planned MILCON projects to 

address this concern. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What guidelines are Marine Corps operational commanders given for 

assessing equipment and who makes the decisions on what to repair and what to 

dispose? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps’ overall reset strategy was developed with the 

technical advice of the equipment Total Life Cycle Managers based on current and 

future requirements for Marine Corps equipment. This was the initial guide used 

for determining what equipment will be reset. If a requirement exists, then maintenance experts from the Marine Corps operating forces and the Marine Corps Depots 

conduct a thorough technical serviceability inspection of each individual item of 

equipment to determine if it is repairable or if the costs to repair exceed the benefit 

and the item must be disposed. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How does the theater communicate and coordinate equipment retrograde and reset requirements to the Army and Marine Corps? How much equipment 

do the Army and Marine Corps plan to reset in fiscal year 2010? 

General AMOS. Retrograde requirements are identified back to the Marine Corps 

in CONUS via Marine Corps Logistics Command Forward in the MARCENT AOR. 

All major items of Marine Corps equipment are transferred to Marine Corps Logistics Command Forward, which then coordinates the physical movement of equipment either back to CONUS for reset or to Afghanistan to meet operational requirements. Retrograded equipment is assessed and placed into one of five reset cat-
96 

egories: depot maintenance candidate, field maintenance candidate, no reset action 

required, i.e. immediately available for re-issue, or disposal candidate. Equipment 

disposed of will be for one of two reasons: the item is beyond economical repair, or 

the item is obsolete and no longer a part of the Marine Corps inventory. Items disposed of due to obsolescence will be reset through new procurement of replacement 

equipment. 

Prior to the decision to deploy additional forces to OEF, the Marine Corps planned 

on performing Depot maintenance on up to 12,241 retrograded items and field maintenance on 24,137 items in FY–2010. Due to the diversion of equipment to support 

expanded operations in Afghanistan, we now expect that depot maintenance will be 

performed on approximately 6,100 retrograded items, and field maintenance on approximately 10,000 items in FY–2010. Only items that have a continued requirement within the Marine Corps will be reset. Items that are now obsolete due to procurement of upgraded/improved equipment will not be reset. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What determinations went into your Overseas Contingency Operations 

reset budget request for fiscal year 2010? How will the fiscal year 2010 budget be 

executed? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps uses a Reset Cost Model to evaluate OIF/OEF 

equipment status and requirements and to identify cost factors and strategies by assessing historical operational tempo, equipment demand, combat losses, and degradation to equipment on a two year basis. Current year requirements are then developed and scrubbed for executability prior to inclusion in the OCO request. The 

Fiscal Year 2010 budget is expected to be fully executed. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How long will reset continue and what do you expect the annual recurring cost to be? How long do you anticipate funding for reset will be paid for by 

supplemental or Overseas Contingency Operations funding only? How will the Army 

and Marine Corps prioritize resources between your many initiatives and programs, 

including reset and future modernization investments? 

General AMOS. Reset efforts will continue as long as the Marine Corps is fighting 

in Overseas Contingency Operations and an annual recurring cost is not easily captured (nor accurate) as our requirements have continued to, and will continue to, 

change as long as we are engaged in contingency operations. Reset requirements 

will continue to be requested via OCO submissions until the current conflict is concluded or a change in policy is implemented. The Marine Corps prioritizes Reset and 

future modernization requirements the same way as any baseline budget—we build 

and submit a fiscally balanced, defendable, and executable budget based on the 

warfighting and readiness priorities as directed by the Commandant of the Marine 

Corps. Even in a fiscally constrained environment, Marines will always be equipped 

with the best equipment that the Marine Corps can provide. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How do non-deployed systems figure into the Army’s and Marine 

Corps’ reset programs? 

General AMOS. Marine Corps forward deployed forces have the resources and 

equipment needed to train for and conduct operations but it has come at the expense of home stations. Equipment from OIF that was scheduled to go through a 

depot overhaul has now been redirected to support OEF efforts, thus accelerating 

the stress on equipment and having to globally source an expanded Equipment Density List has created additional equipment shortfalls and lowered home station readiness. Reconstitution efforts are being supported in our baseline requests as they do 

not fall under the current definition of Reset. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the Army’s and Marine Corps’ approach to reset management 

and planning? How do the Army and Marine Corps determine which equipment will 

be repaired, recapitalized, or replaced? What percentage of equipment being reset 

in fiscal year 2010 will be repaired? What percentage will be recapitalized? What 

percentage will be replaced? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps manages its reset liability and plans reset actions via individual ‘‘reset strategies’’ specifically designed for each type of equipment item in theater. Each strategy is developed by the equipment item’s life cycle 

manager in coordination with the Marine Corps’ requirements determination 

branch. Equipment strategies are designed around five possible categories: procure 

new; depot-level maintenance/modernization; field-level maintenance; no reset required; and obsolete/disposal. Each strategy is designed based on an item’s age, estimated life-span, estimation of its usage in theater, and finally the Marine Corps 

long-term requirements for that item. In general, equipment whose repair cost exceeds 65% of the new procurement cost is replaced. For equipment repair costs that 

fall between 20% and 65% of the new procurement cost, the equipment is sent for 

depot-level maintenance for repair. For equipment that does not exceed 20%, maintenance is performed at the field level where capable. Many items being retrograded 

will have a ‘‘no reset’’ strategy because they are obsolete and no longer a part of 
97 

the Marine Corps inventory. Items disposed of due to obsolescence will be reset 

through new procurement of replacement equipment or modernization. Current estimates project that approximately 47% of the equipment repaired in 2010 will be repaired either at a depot or field level maintenance facility, and 36% of the returning 

equipment will have to be replaced. The remaining 18% includes items for which 

no reset action is necessary. This includes theater-specific items which have no intended usage beyond OIF, or items that can be put directly back into the Marine 

Corps inventory with no maintenance actions. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What life-cycle extensions and additional capabilities will result from 

recapitalization? By how much does recapitalization extend the life of equipment? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps does not use the term recapitalization as it relates to returning equipment to zero hours, zero miles condition. For the response 

to this question the definition of recapitalization is the process to procure a new system, or enhancing a system as part of rebuilding the system or modernization. 

The Marine Corps uses the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and the Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability/Rebuild to the Standard (RAM R/S) to ensure the Marine Corps attains the full program life of the equipment and implements upgrades to equipment capabilities. 

The current operational tempo creates challenges in maintaining optimal readiness levels on legacy systems resulting in additional resource requirements. In order 

to mitigate this challenge, the Marine Corps seeks to expedite Initial Operation Capability (IOC) of replacement items, conduct continuous product improvement 

through modernization, and continue the SLEP to extend the life of aging ground 

equipment assets in the inventory. 

By how much does recapitalization extend the life of equipment? 

The following are prime examples of systems used in OIF and the results to extend the life of equipment. 

The Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) SLEP and RAM R/S were designed to extend service life and improve combat readiness and effectiveness of the legacy fleet 

until fielding of a replacement vehicle. The Program Service Life is until the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is fully fielded in 2025 which equates to 42 years. 

The average age of the AAV is 35 years. While the EFV is being developed to replace AAVs and remains the Commandant’s top ground combat priority, the projected pace of EFV fielding will result in significant quantities of AAVs remaining 

in service until at least 2025. 

The LAV fleet was fielded in the first half of the 1980s with an expected end-ofservice date of 2008. The LAV SLEP upgrade was designed to extend the service 

life of the legacy fleet to 2015 by replacing obsolete or soon to be obsolete components in the legacy vehicle. As a result of the initiation of OIF, a second upgrade 

was made to incorporate additional survivability into the platform in response to the 

new threats. With the release of this new configuration, the LAV A2, the end-ofservice date was extended to 2025. The LAV A2 upgrade was accomplished to add 

more capability to the platform at the same time as the platform was undergoing 

a complete refurbishment (via the Specified Overhaul and Repair statement of work) 

at the Marine Corps depots. This approach justified the end-of-life extension to 

2025. With the replacement of combat losses as well as the new platforms procured 

as the result of a force restructure increases, leaves the average age of the a LAV 

at 23 years. The Program Service Life is now 42 years. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How do you respond to the GAO’s criticism that the Army and Marine 

Corps are sacrificing short-term equipment needs are for long-term modernization? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps employs a documented, standardized, and flexible reset strategy designed to meet both current operational requirements and longterm reconstitution strategies. First, regarding the formulation of budget requirements, Programs and Resources (P&R) develops requirements for both short-term 

and operational needs and longer term reset needs without prejudice or constraint 

beyond that levied by OSD and Navy guidance. 

Second, tactical level execution of reset, most notably equipment distribution, is 

also a comprehensive process involving the evaluation of short term deployment 

needs and long term modernization efforts. The Commandant of the Marine Corps 

prioritizes equipment and manning priorities in a joint message to all Marine Corps 

commands. This document serves as the basis for equipment distribution 

prioritization conducted by the Marine Corps’s Strategic Ground Equipment Working Group (SCEWG). This group is entrusted specifically with the priority distribution of equipment across Marine Corps units and initiatives. The SGEWG works 

diligently to ensure that equipment availability for all units and over the long term 

to meet our modernization goals. Predeployment training (Mojave Viper, Desert 

Talon, and Mountain Warrior exercises) is afforded the #1 equipping priority. Likewise, in generalized equipping, operational requirements (OIF, OEF) are given high-
98 

er priority than longer-term reset initiatives (such as prepositioning reconstitution 

or filling supporting establishment shortfalls). Furthermore, units preparing to deploy are afforded higher priority than non-deploying units per the Commandant’s 

message. Most importantly, all Marine Corps units are 100% equipped upon arrival 

in theater. 

The Marine Corps understands that every unit experiences change as it participates in the unit life cycle process, i.e., return from deployment (rest/refit/reset) 

predeployment training (individual and collective combat skills/mission essential 

tasks/core competencies)—deployment. The Marine Corps recognizes the inherent 

differences in an individual unit’s maturity and readiness as a reflection of where 

it is in this deployment preparation cycle. The SGEWG is the Marine Corps’ way 

of meeting each unit’s equipment needs based on where it is in the deployment/ 

predeployment life cycle process. Regarding the operations of the SGEWG, in the 

general priorities, the Marine Corps does not identify individual units, but treats 

every unit in accordance with its individual needs and challenges commensurate 

with its continual development as a cohesive, combat-ready unit as it prepares for 

deployment. In the event there is a priority conflict between a specified or general 

priority, the requirement is returned to Plans, Policies, and Operations Division 

(PP&O) and a decision is made on where we can best accept risk. Discussions on 

risk are coordinated between all affected commanders before a decision is made. The 

SGEWG is the venue for working those matters of prioritization and distribution. 

The SGEWG and prioritization list is an inherently flexible tool for assessing distribution and recommending where to accept and how to mitigate risk to the force 

as a whole. 

Consequently, the Marine Corps has a concrete and comprehensive plan of equipment distribution explicitly targeting short-term operational requirements over 

longer-term reset initiatives, making the overarching theme of the report factually 

inaccurate. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Can the industrial base meet the demand the Army and Marine Corps 

have for maintenance, recapitalization, and new production, particularly in light of 

the reduction of forces in Iraq and the increased forces in Afghanistan? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps expected to receive a large amount of equipment from Iraq to be repaired and reset but as operational commitments have 

grown overseas, much of the expected equipment has not materialized, and is being 

retained to support other operations. This means that the Reset workload is not as 

large as expected. The size of the industrial workforce constantly flexes to meet 

workload needs and to best utilize taxpayer dollars, the workload requirement is 

continually assessed and adjusted as appropriate, to include workforce cuts when 

requirements have decreased. Should there be an increase in the workload; expedited hiring processes are in place to rapidly expand the workforce as required. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Does reset need to be accelerated? If so, what could the Army and Marine Corps do to accelerate resetting the force? Is additional depot capacity needed? 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps reset does need to be accelerated, however due 

to a combination of circumstances, this will not be achieved through the maintenance of equipment returning from Iraq. The Marine Corps was poised to accelerate 

reset at our maintenance centers, however, because of the requirement to rapidly 

build up forces in Afghanistan in the midst of retrograding forces and equipment 

from Iraq, the Marine Corps transferred significant amounts of equipment directly 

from Iraq to Afghanistan without a full reset action. For that reason, capacity at 

our depots does not need to be increased further. Without an adequate Depot Maintenance Float Allowance (DMFA), we can’t conduct robust PEI rotation. Therefore, 

the maintenance reset action will be delayed until MARCENT releases equipment 

from OEF into the depot system. Increasing procurement resources and procuring 

new equipment however, is an effective way to accelerate reset of home station 

forces. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the impact of service support contracts on Army and Marine 

Corps equipment reset? 

General AMOS. Service support contracts in the MARCENT AOR are used to repair equipment en route to or in Afghanistan. This will diminish reset workload in 

CONUS but gets the required equipment to the war fighter faster. 

Service support contracts in CONUS, are used to support equipment reset. This 

compliments our depot or organizational unit organic maintenance capabilities. 

Mr. ORTIZ. What is the relationship between the drawdown of military forces and 

contractor personnel in Iraq to the Army’s and Marine Corps’ ability to execute 

equipment retrograde and reset? That is, how reliant are you on specific levels of 

military or contractor personnel in theater to support your requirements for equipment retrograde or reset? 
99 

General AMOS. The majority of USMC equipment in OIF has been turned in for 

retrograde and is either in CONUS or located in specific retrograde pipeline nodes. 

MARCENT and LogCom have worked as a team during this time to evaluate and 

implement the proper mix of military and contractor personnel to perform care and 

storage, and to expedite equipment movement. As long as USMC equipment remains in Iraq, there will be a requirement for this mix of military/contractor personnel, corresponding to the type and amount of equipment. This is determined by 

COMUSMARCENT aided by the planning and support of MARCORLOGCOM. 

Specific contractor personnel, such as MRAP, communications, AT/FP (GBOSS), 

etc. are rare in their expertise and crucial to the smooth extraction and retrograde 

of forces and equipment. Thus far, they have been a critical cog as II MEF FWD 

executes a near flawless retrograde of equipment from Iraq. These critical contractors have also been instrumental in the smooth reception, staging, washdown, and 

manifesting of equipment for shipment to CONUS as well as supporting the receipt 

and support of equipment redirected to OEF 

Mr. ORTIZ. Please provide background on the logistics teams that have been sent 

into theater to assess Marine Corps equipment reset needs in light of potential increased equipment requirements in Afghanistan. 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps has tasked forward deployed operational commanders with assessing the condition of equipment being retrograded in order to determine what equipment could be categorized as fully mission capable and redeployed into Afghanistan for combat operations. Additionally, the Marine Corps exercised a standing MOA with the Army Material command Forward (AMC) Forward 

to have less than depot repairs made on select tactical wheeled vehicles to support 

the increased Afghanistan requirement. Finally, the Marine Corps assigned additional maintenance personnel to Marine Corps Logistics Command (Forward) to 

make minor repairs on equipment in theater in order to satisfy increased Afghanistan equipment requirements. 

Mr. ORTIZ. How, if at all, is the Marine Corps’ readiness affected by the continued 

delay in the construction of new vessels for the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)? Specifically, what impact will the delay in construction of the MPF(F) amphibious assault ship, the LHA(R), and the Mobile Landing Platform have on the 

service life of the existing MPF ships or the risk associated with the Marine Corps’ 

ability to generate Marine Expeditionary Brigades capable of conducting major combat operations? 

General AMOS. 

USMC Power Projection Doctrine 

While the basic building blocks of combat power are frequently expressed as a 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), it is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) 

around which the USMC’s combat planning revolves. The MEF provides the full 

complement of ground and aviation warfighting capability, together with the logistics support, to sustain the force. Doctrinally, and as stipulated in Combatant Commander war plans, the Marine Corps is tasked to fight in major combat operations— 

which require a 3.0 MEB force. While the first two of these MEBs are delivered by 

Assault Echelon shipping, the third MEB, the reinforcing and supporting element, 

is provided by the afloat prepositioning force in what is envisioned to be the MPF(F) 

with all of its vertical and surface maneuver and sustainment capabilities. 

Assault Echelon Lift Requirements and Current Capabilities 

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commandant of the Marine Corps 

(CMC) have determined that the requirement for shipping to support a 2.0 Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) lift is 38 total amphibious assault ships as stated in 

a 7 January 2009 letter to HASC, SASC, HAC–D, and SAC–D committee chairmen. 

Assuming that the current operational availability for these ships is maintained 

over the long term, a 38 ship inventory will ensure there are at least 34 ships available at any time. This 34 ship inventory best fits the load requirements in terms 

of vehicle square, cargo cube, aviation deck spots and personnel necessary to support the timely offload and sustainment of a 2.0 MEB force should it be called upon 

to conduct amphibious operations. Understanding this requirement, and in light of 

the fiscal constraints with which the Navy is faced, the SecNav, CNO and CMC 

stated in the same 7 January 2009 letter to HASC, SASC, HAC–D, and SAC–D 

committee chairmen that the Department of the Navy would sustain a minimum of 

33 total amphibious ships in the assault echelon. This 33 ship force accepts risk in 

the arrival of combat support and combat service support elements of the MEB but 

has been adjudged to be adequate in meeting the needs of all parties within today’s 

fiscal limitations. 
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With this basis in mind, the Navy currently has a total of 31 Assault Echelon 

ships in commission, which does not meet the standard for providing 2.0 MEBs of 

amphibious lift. 

As directed by the FY 2009 NDAA, the Navy moved funding for the two MPF(F) 

LHA(R)s in the FY09 President’s Budget from the MPF(F) budget line to the Assault Echelon budget line to mitigate risk, increase operational flexibility, and provide a more robust aviation capability within this force thus enabling the 2.0 MEBs 

to be sourced from both the East and West coasts. This move was reflected in the 

Navy’s FY10 program submittal to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Though 

integral to reinforcing and supporting the USMC’s 2.0 MEB Assault Echelon force, 

MPF(F) MEB is not considered a part of the Assault Echelon since it does not have 

a capability to conduct forcible entry. 

Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) Squadron Capabilities and Enhancements 

The Marine Corps estimate is that the loss of the MPF(F) LHA(R), MLP, and the 

Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships does not have a direct impact 

on the service lives of existing MPF ships. However, it is expected that a full recapitalization of legacy MPS squadrons must occur in the 2020s. By that time, existing 

MPF AMSEA and WATERMAN ships will have reached the end of their expected 

service lives. In anticipation of that eventuality, the Marine Corps, as part of a 

wider Department of the Navy effort, is seeking key enhancements to our current 

MPS program to give legacy Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadrons additional atsea vehicle and equipment transfer and selective offload capabilities in the near 

term, and to emphasize capabilities that will guide development of MPF (Future) 

squadrons and seabasing capabilities over the long term. 

We are pursuing specific enhancements that provide for increased battle force engagement, irregular warfare, and security force assistance capabilities, as well as 

improved selective offload and in-stream offloading options in austere locations. 

(1) Incorporating MPF(F)-designated T–AKE’s 12–14, previously funded in FYs 09 

and 10, into our current MPS squadrons, thereby enabling pallet-level stowage of 

approximately 25 percent of MPS sustainment stocks for at-sea selective offload to 

support exercises, experimentation/demonstrations, and contingency operations. 

(2) Development and operational testing of a revised Mobile Landing Platform 

MLP to enable at-sea transfer of vehicles, personnel, and supplies from MPS LMSRs 

to Landing Craft Air-Cushioned (LCAC) for delivery ashore. 

(3) Technology insertion and integration of sea state-3 capable ramps, pendulation 

controls system cranes, and LCAC interface features within Joint High-Speed Vessels, MPS LMSRs, and Roll-On/Roll-Off Discharge Facility(s) (RRDF), respectively. 

These enhancements will increase the Department of the Navy’s ability to engage, 

respond, and project power across the range of military operations. 

Conclusion 

The loss of MPF(F) LHA(R), MLP, and LMSR lift capacity significantly jeopardizes the established Marine Corps 3 MEB, MEF-level doctrine for sustained major 

combat operations forcible entry requirements and does not enable maneuver and 

sustainment operations from the seabase as conceptually envisioned. Effective MEFlevel vertical and surface maneuver capabilities are necessary to provide the full 

complement of warfighting capabilities and longer-term sustainment capacity. 

The loss of the MPF(F) MEB’s MEF-level reinforcing and supporting capabilities 

will require continued reliance on today’s Maritime Prepositioning Ships program 

which possesses less overall operational speed and employment flexibility, when 

compared to MPF(F), and poses greater operational risk. 

While potential enhancements to today’s MPS squadrons would provide vastly improved capabilities for in-stream offloading and delivery of personnel, supplies, and 

equipment ashore, such enhancements would not fully enable legacy MPS squadrons 

to provide the full range and depth of vertical and surface maneuver capabilities 

necessary to reinforce and support 2.0 MEB assault echelon forces during MEF-level 

forcible entry operations from the seabase. 

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