IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RICHARD MATLAND,

Plaintiff,

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v. ) No. 12 C 5165

LOYOLA UNIV. OF CHICAGO,

Defendant.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In this suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq., Richard Matland (“Matland”)

claims that Loyola University of Chicago (“Loyola”) denied him a

reasonable accommodation and terminated his appointment as the

Helen Houlahan Rigali Professor of Political Science (“Rigali

Chair”) because of his disability. Loyola counters that Matland

(1) did not make a timely request for a reasonable accommodation

and (2) was not reappointed as the Rigali Chair because of his

thin record of publications. 

The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. 

I deny both motions for the reasons stated below.

I.

In 2005, Loyola formed a search committee to fill the newly

created Rigali Chair in political science. Matland was a tenured

professor at the University of Houston when he applied for a five

1
year renewable term as the Rigali Chair at Loyola. After

attempting to negotiate a guarantee of two terms, Matland signed

an offer letter that contained the following language about the

standards for reappointment: 

Criteria to determine possible reappointment as the

Rigali Professor may include a sustained record of

excellence in research and teaching, continued

recognition for a record of excellence in research and

scholarship internal and external to the University,

and an ongoing contribution to your field of learning

and to the University.

Def.’s Ex. A-5.

Matland began his appointment as the Rigali Chair during the

2006-2007 academic year. After experiencing severe respiratory

problems, Matland was diagnosed with an interstitial lung disease

in May 2007 and advised that he may need a lung transplant. 

Pl.’s Statement of Facts (“PSOF”) at ¶ 15. He started a four to

six month course of chemotherapy during the fall semester in

2007. Id. at ¶ 17. Matland carried an oxygen tank around campus

during his tenure as the Rigali Chair and had a noticeable cough. 

Id. at ¶¶ 19, 38. 

Matland disclosed his lung condition to Claudio Katz, Chair

of the Political Science Department from 2003 to 2008, on two

occasions. In the fall of 2007, Matland told Katz he had been

diagnosed with an autoimmune disease for which he was taking

steroids and being considered for a lung transplant. Def.’s

Statement of Facts (“DSOF”) at ¶ 60. Katz asked Matland whether

2
he needed to take a medical leave of absence. Id. Matland told

Katz he could continue working given that he only needed to be in

the classroom for three hours each week. Id. The next time

Matland mentioned his health to Katz was during his annual

assessment in January 2008. In his written self-assessment,

Matland stated that his lung condition prevented him meeting his

publishing goals in 2007. Id. 

Matland’s most significant accomplishment as the Rigali

Chair was securing a $375,000 grant from the National Science

Foundation (“NSF”) in 2008 to research “Women Candidates in

Regional Russia.” Id. at ¶ 19. The parties dispute how many

publications Matland prepared during his tenure as the Rigali

Chair. Compare Def.’s SOF at ¶¶ 22-25 with Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s

SOF at ¶¶ 38-39. However, it is undisputed that Loyola rated

Matland as meeting or exceeding its expectations with regard to

“scholarship” in its annual assessments for each year from 2006

to 2010. See Def.’s Exs. A-14 to A-18.

In May 2010, Provost John Pelissero (“Provost Pelissero”)

sent Matland a letter explaining the five year review process for

endowed chairs. Pelissero’s letter referred to a “Protocol

Document” that was in effect when Matland assumed the Rigali

Chair in July 2006:

[E]very five years the university shall conduct a

summative evaluation of the person’s accumulated

contributions and achievements. The process used shall

3
be parallel to the process for promotion to full

professor...[A] faculty member who has made

consistently excellent contributions in scholarship,

teaching, and service may be recommended to enjoy

another five year term as the holder of the endowed

chair or endowed professorship.

Def.’s Ex. A-7. In August 2010, Francis Fennell, Dean of the

College of Arts and Sciences (“Dean Fennell”), sent Matland a

follow up letter indicating that Loyola would not consider any

activities or accomplishments preceding his installation as the

Rigali Chair during the review process. Def.’s Ex. A-10. 1

In August 2010, Matland submitted a report of his activities

and accomplishments as the Rigali Chair. The second full

paragraph of Matland’s report described his illness:

While I have actively worked at reaching these goals

and establishing myself at Loyola, I also have had to

deal with a serious and debilitating auto-immune

disease that has attacked my lungs...For long periods

of time I have gone through chemotherapy, extremely

heavy doses of steroids resulting in only two [to]

three hours of sleep a night, and switching from drug

to drug to drug trying to find something that worked

effectively without debilitating side effects. I have

been in the hospital every year since coming to

Loyola...My condition fluctuates, but presently is

stable. This requires, however, a high dosage of

immuno-suppressants that have a variety of negative

side effects...Nevertheless, I have worked hard at

fulfilling my obligations and I believe I have [done]

so in a satisfactory manner.

 Matland continues to argue that Loyola assured him during the 1

recruitment process that his entire record would be considered

during the Rigali Chair review, but I have already dismissed his

promissory estoppel and fraudulent misrepresentation claims. See

Matland v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, No. 12 C 5165, 2012 WL

5949067 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2012).

4
Def.’s Ex. A-11. 

Loyola distributed Matland’s renewal application, including

the narrative quoted above, to four external reviewers before

starting its internal review process. PSOF at ¶ 27. All four

external reviewers recommended renewing Matland’s appointment as

the Rigali Chair. Id. at ¶ 28. Reviewer B described Matland’s

publication record from 2006 to 2010 as “thin,” but noted that he

has been “grievously ill for four years.” Def.’s Ex. I-1. She

concluded, “I don’t think you need an outside reviewer to tell

you that this has posed a major impediment to [Matland]

continuing to publish at the same rate he did before.” Id. 

Reviewer D also commented that Matland had “faced major health

problems of a truly frightening sort that have undoubtedly cut

into his research activity.” Id.

The first layer of Loyola’s internal review process was a

committee consisting of all full professors in the Political

Science Department. PSOF. at ¶ 24. After reading Matland’s

submission and the external reviews, a committee member inquired

whether it would be permissible to postpone the Rigali Chair

review process for a year or two because of Matland’s illness. 

Pl.’s Ex. 6. Vincent Mahler (“Mahler”), the new Chair of the

Political Science Department, asked Dean Fennell whether

Matland’s health should factor into the committee’s decision in

any way. Id. Fennell questioned the “appropriateness” of

5
Matland’s narrative about his illness and agreed with Mahler that

the departmental committee should make its decision based

strictly on academic merit. Id. On November 8, 2010, the

Political Science Department committee voted six to three against

reappointing Matland to the Rigali Chair based on his “very poor

publication record” and skepticism about whether his NSF-funded

research would result in publications. DSOF at ¶ 42.

Department Chair Mahler performed the next layer of internal

review and completed his report on November 15, 2010. After

acknowledging Matland’s “strong record of grantsmanship,” Mahler

concurred with the departmental committee’s recommendation to

terminate Matland’s appointment as the Rigali Chair because of

his thin record of publications from 2006 to 2010. Id. at ¶ 43. 

A majority of the Rank, Tenure, and Leave Committee in the

College of Arts and Sciences reached the same conclusion by vote

of six to one and submitted its recommendation to Dean Fennell on

November 22, 2010. Id. at ¶ 44. 2

Dean Fennell completed his own review on November 30, 2010

and concurred that Matland should not be reappointed as the

Rigali Chair. Pl.’s Ex. 16. Unlike previous internal reviewers,

 The college-level committee noted the “vague[ness]” of the 2

Protocol Document and wondered whether five years was not enough

time to evaluate work that is high-risk or long-term in nature. 

Def.’s Ex. G. 

6
who did not factor Matland’s illness into their recommendations,

Dean Fennell’s report included the following commentary:

[I] need to address the most salient argument made for

his retention [as the Rigali Chair], the one made by

his external reviewers and the minority of his

department committee: namely, that Dr. Matland’s

decline in productivity is owing directly to his

ongoing illness. He should not be “punished,” as it

were, for a very unfortunate circumstance over which he

has no control. I asked the department not to evaluate

the effect of his illness, since that lies outside its

area of competence. But illness is clearly a major

factor, and Dr. Matland’s raising of it in the very

first paragraph of his memo requires that I acknowledge

the issue in explaining my recommendation.

Here’s how [I] view it, and I will argue by analogy. 

Suppose a star major league baseball player signs a

multi-million dollar five year contract. Further

suppose that two years into the contract the player

sustains, through no fault of his own, a career-ending

injury. Certainly the team is obliged to still pay him

until the end of his contract--presumably his agent put

in language to that effect. But when the five years

are up, is the team obliged to offer him a new five

year contract when he can no longer play the game at

the major league level? Clearly not. The same would

be true here, in my view: nowhere does Dr. Matland

claim his illness is going to ameliorate, that renewed

high productivity can be expected. So I do not see an

injustice in passing the responsibilities of the Rigali

professorship on to someone else.

Id. Dean Fennell did not ask Matland about his prognosis during

the Rigali Chair review process because he thought doing so would

have been inappropriate. PSOF at ¶ 41. 

The University Rank and Tenure (“URT”) Committee performed

the final layer of internal review before Provost Pelissero

decided whether to renew Matland’s appointment as the Rigali

7
Chair. On January 12, 2011, the URT committee concluded that

Matland’s “record of scholarship does not meet the expectations

of someone in such a prestigious position.” Def.’s Ex. H-1.

After reviewing Matland’s submission, the external

reviewer’s comments, and all internal recommendations, Provost

Pelissero informed Matland on January 26, 2011 that he would not

be reappointed as the Rigali Chair in political science,

“primarily due to a low record of published scholarship.” Def.’s

Ex. A-22.

On March 29, 2011, Matland appealed Provost Pelissero’s

decision, arguing, inter alia, that the decision not to renew his

appointment as the Rigali Chair constituted discrimination based

on his disability: “Despite my clear signaling that my health had

been a problem, at no point did [Loyola’s internal reviewers]

request any information and at no point, as far as I can tell,

was there any consideration that my health may have delayed some

of my productivity.” Def.’s Ex. A-23 at 5. “Surely if any

concession is made for the fact that moving and illness has

slowed my production, and any reasonable attempt is made to make

a prediction of pay off in the future, the record is more than

enough to deserve reappointment.” Id. at 10. 

The Faculty Appeals Committee (“FAC”) held a hearing on

Matland’s appeal in September 2011. After gathering evidence and

hearing testimony, the FAC “found no evidence that Dr. Matland

8
formally requested any accommodations due to his illness with

regard to his research productivity.” Def.’s Ex. A-24 at 2. The

FAC noted that Dean Fennell, “in consultation with the Provost,”

was the only internal reviewer who considered Matland’s illness

in making his recommendation. Id. at 2-3. Ultimately, because

“Dr. Matland’s illness was addressed inconsistently across the

review process,” the FAC recommended that Loyola should vacate

Provost Pelissero’s decision and assess “how to consider Dr.

Matland’s illness in light of the [ADA] and similar laws.” Id.

at 1. 

Loyola’s President, Father Michael Garanzini (“Father

Garanzini”), reviewed Matland’s appeal and the FAC’s

recommendation. DSOF at ¶ 55. After consulting with counsel,

Father Garanzini upheld Provost Pelissero’s decision not to renew

Matland’s appointment as the Rigali Chair based on his view that

the ADA did not require Loyola to grant Matland’s “retroactive

request for an accommodation that would now excuse [him] from

fulfilling an essential function of [his] appointment.” Def.’s

Ex. F at 4.

Matland’s tenure as the Rigali Chair expired in June 2011. 

DSOF at ¶ 56. He remains a tenured professor of political

science at Loyola. Id. 

9
II.

The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment on

Matland’s claims that Loyola (1) denied him a reasonable

accommodation and (2) terminated his appointment as the Rigali

Chair because of his disability.

Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant “show[s]

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). The ADA identifies which facts are “material” because

they “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A material fact is

genuinely in dispute “if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. In

ruling on cross motions, I must “construe all inferences in favor

of the party against whom [each] motion under consideration is

made.” Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 692 (7th

Cir. 1998).

A.

1.

Matland’s first claim alleges a violation of the ADA’s

reasonable accommodation mandate. See 42 U.S.C. §

12112(b)(5)(A). An employee’s initial duty to make his

limitations “known” to his employer “requires at most that [he]

indicate... that [he] has a disability and desires an

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accommodation.” EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 803

(7th Cir. 2005). The employee need not use the word

“accommodation” or any other magic words when making a request. 

See Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 100 F.3d 1281,

1285 (7th Cir. 1996). Once a request for accommodation is made, 3

“the employer and the employee must work together through an

‘interactive process’ to determine the extent of the disability

and what accommodations are appropriate and available.” Sears,

417 F.3d at 804.

Here, Loyola seeks summary judgment on Matland’s failure to

accommodate claim on two grounds: (1) Matland failed to request

an accommodation or otherwise trigger Loyola’s duty to engage in

the interactive process before Provost Pelissero decided not to

renew his appointment as the Rigali Chair and (2) to the extent

Matland requested a reasonable accommodation when appealing

Provost Pelissero’s decision, the ADA does not require employers

to grant “do-overs” or second chances. In short, Loyola argues

that Matland’s requests were either too ambiguous or “too little,

too late.” 

 Loyola relies on Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson 3

Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that

an employee must “assert not only a disability, but also any

limitation[s] resulting therefrom.” Id. at 898 (quoting Taylor

v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 1996)). 

The Jovanovic court noted that the Seventh Circuit “has never

adopted the triggering requirement in Taylor” and did not rest

its decision on the employee’s failure to request an

accommodation. Id. at 898-99. 

11
As a preliminary matter, Matland’s disability was or should

have been obvious to Loyola given that he carried an oxygen tank

around campus. See Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tele. Co, Inc., 47 F.3d

928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[S]ome symptoms are so obviously

manifestations of an underlying disability that it would be

reasonable to infer that an employer actually knew of the

disability.”). Matland also explained to the chair of his

department in January 2008 that his illness had slowed his

progress on preparing publications. Thus, the work-related

limitations resulting from Matland’s disability were at least

partially known to Loyola well before Matland applied for renewal

of the Rigali Chair in August 2010. 

A reasonable jury could find that Matland’s renewal

application included a request for accommodation sufficient to

trigger Loyola’s duty to engage in the interactive process. In

the second full paragraph of his application, Matland described

his illness as “debilitating” and his treatment regimen as a

“hassle” that required “a tremendous amount of both psychic

energy and time.” Def.’s Ex. A-11. Upon reading this narrative,

two external reviewers noted the connection between Matland’s

illness and his diminished scholarly output. They recommended,

in effect, that Loyola should renew Matland’s appointment as the

Rigali Chair as a form of reasonable accommodation. A member of

the Political Science Department committee also inquired whether

12
it would be permissible to postpone the Rigali Chair review for a

year or two as a form of reasonable accommodation. In light of

these facts, a jury could easily find that Matland requested a

reasonable accommodation, and was regarded as having done so

until Dean Fennell instructed Loyola’s internal reviewers to base

their recommendation strictly on academic merit. 

Loyola argues that Matland’s narrative cannot be construed

as a request for accommodation because Matland asserted that he

had “fulfill[ed] [his] obligations...in a satisfactory manner.” 

Def.’s Ex. A-11. This argument has no merit. Matland’s

application does not establish that he wanted Loyola to evaluate

him without considering reasonable accommodations, even if that

meant losing the Rigali Chair. To the extent Matland’s

assessment of his own performance created ambiguity about whether

he was seeking an accommodation, Loyola had a duty to inquire. 

“Where notice is ambiguous as to the precise nature of the

disability or desired accommodation, but it is sufficient to

notify the employer that the employee may have a disability that

requires accommodation, the employer must ask for clarification.” 

Sears, 417 F.3d at 804; see also Gile v. United Airlines, Inc.,

213 F.3d 365, 373 (7th Cir. 2000) (employer’s duty to engage in

interactive process includes an “affirmative obligation to seek

[employee] out and work with [him] to craft a reasonable

13
accommodation, if possible”). Loyola’s unilateral decision to 4

interpret Matland’s narrative about his illness as extraneous

information--rather than a request for accommodation--is not

entitled to deference under the ADA. 

In sum, a reasonable jury could find that Matland’s

application for reappointment as the Rigali Chair included a

timely request for a reasonable accommodation. Accordingly, I

need not decide whether Matland’s appeal was “too little, too

late” in the sense that he was requesting a “do-over” or second

chance. See Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d

664, 666-67 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that terminated employee’s

request for a “second chance” to control his diabetes did not

fall within ADA’s definition of “reasonable accommodation”).

Loyola’s motion for summary judgment on Matland’s failure to

accommodate claim is denied. 

2.

Matland’s second ADA claim alleges that Loyola terminated

his appointment as the Rigali Chair because of his disability.5

 Loyola has not cited any cases supporting its argument that 4

engaging in the interactive process when an employee’s request

for accommodation is ambiguous may expose the employer to

liability for “regarding” the employee as disabled. See 42

U.S.C. § 12102(3).

 Loyola’s argument that its decision to terminate Matland’s 5

appointment as the Rigali Chair is an academic judgment entitled

to deference misses the point. Matland’s claim is that Loyola’s

decision was not a purely academic judgment as evidenced by Dean

Fennell’s memo comparing him to an athlete who has suffered a

career ending injury.

14
At the summary judgment stage, Matland must present evidence that

would permit a reasonable jury to find that his disability was a

“but for” cause of his termination. Serwatka v. Rockwell

Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010)). 

Loyola contends that Matland cannot survive summary judgment

under the “direct” or “indirect” method of proving intentional

discrimination. “[D]irect proof of discrimination is not limited

to near-admissions by the employer that its decisions were based

on a proscribed criterion (e.g., ‘You're too [disabled] to work

here.’), but also includes circumstantial evidence which suggests

discrimination albeit through a longer chain of inferences.” 

Luks v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 467 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.

2006). “The focus of the direct method of proof...is not whether

the evidence offered is ‘direct’ or ‘circumstantial’ but rather

whether the evidence points directly to a discriminatory reason

for the employer's action.” Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 671

(7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). In contrast, under

the “indirect method,” an employee “can raise the inference of

discrimination by identifying a similarly situated employee

outside the protected class who was treated more favorably by the

employer.” Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 653 F.3d 582, 588

(7th Cir. 2011) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973)). 

15
Dean Fennell’s memo comparing Matland to a baseball player

who has suffered a career ending injury contains direct evidence

that Matland’s disability was a “but for” cause of Loyola’s

decision to terminate his appointment as the Rigali Chair. In 6

response to Mahler’s inquiry about whether the Political Science

Department committee should consider Matland’s disability, Dean

Fennell posed the following questions:

If one thinks the last [five] years is not okay, but is

explainable by the illness, then one has to decide

about the future: [W]ill the illness lift, so that one

is optimistic the next [five] years will be better? 

[O]r will it likely not lift, in which case where does

that leave us in terms of what we expect/need from that

chairholder?

Pl.’s Ex. 6. After consulting with Provost Pelissero, Loyola’s

final decision-maker, Dean Fennell made the following assumption 7

about Matland’s prognosis: “[N]owhere does Dr. Matland claim his

illness is going to ameliorate [or] that renewed high

productivity can be expected. So I do not see an injustice in

 Loyola’s argument that Dean Fennell’s memo does not express his 6

personal views about Matland’s disability is contradicted by Dean

Fennell’s own words: “Here’s how [I] view it, and I will argue by

analogy.” Def.’s Ex. A-21 at 3.

 Fennell’s consultation with Pelissero, the final decision-maker 7

in the Rigali Chair review process, makes it unnecessary for

Matland to rely on the “cat’s paw” theory of employer liability. 

See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S.Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011) (“[I]f a

supervisor performs an act motivated by [discriminatory] animus

that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment

action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate

employment action, then the employer is liable.” (emphasis in

original)). In any event, Pelisssero’s independent review of

Matland’s application does not automatically preclude employer

liability under the cat’s paw theory. See id. at 1193.

16
passing the responsibilities of the Rigali professorship on to

someone else.” Def.’s Ex. A-21 at 3. 

If Loyola wanted more information Matland’s prognosis, it

could have engaged in the interactive process to “identify the

precise limitations resulting from [his] disability.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(o)(3). Instead, Dean Fennell assumed that Matland’s

illness would remain a drag on his scholarly output and based his

recommendation on this assumption. A reasonable jury could find

that under Dean Fennell’s own reasoning, but for his assumption

about Matland’s prognosis, he would have recommended renewing his

appointment as the Rigali Chair. Accordingly, Loyola’s motion

for summary judgment on Matland’s disparate treatment claim is

denied. 

B.

I turn now to Matland’s cross motion for summary judgment on

his two ADA claims. 

1.

Matland seeks summary judgment on his reasonable

accommodation claim based on Loyola’s failure to engage in the

interactive process. Summary judgment may not be granted on this

basis. “The interactive process the ADA foresees is not an end

in itself; rather it is a means for determining what reasonable

accommodations are available to allow a disabled individual to

perform the essential job functions of the position sought.” 

17
Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir.

1997). Accordingly, “it is not sufficient for [Matland] to show

that [Loyola] failed to engage in an interactive process or that

it caused the interactive process to break down.” Rehling v.

City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1016-17 (7th Cir. 2000). 

 The statutory framework for Matland’s reasonable

accommodation claim remains the same notwithstanding Loyola’s

failure to engage in the interactive process: “To establish a

claim for failure to accommodate, [Matland] must show that: (1)

[he] is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the

employer was aware of [his] disability; and (3) the employer

failed to reasonably accommodate the disability.” Sears, 417

F.3d at 797. Matland is “qualified” under the ADA only if he

could “perform the essential functions” of the Rigali Chair with

or without a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). A

desired accommodation is unreasonable when it would require the

employer to eliminate or reallocate an essential job function. 

See Peters v. City of Mauston, 311 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2002).

Here, Loyola has raised a genuine issue of material fact

about the extent to which publishing was an “essential function”

of the Rigali Chair. Loyola, citing its Protocol Document,

contends that Matland was required to produce a body of

scholarship from July 2006 to August 2010 that would have been

sufficient to earn tenure because the endowed chair renewal

18
process is “parallel” to tenure review. To the extent Matland 8

sought a “concession” in Loyola’s expectation for scholarly

output, Loyola argues that publishing at a tenure-worthy rate is

an “essential function” of holding an endowed chair. 

Matland counters with evidence that Loyola granted one of

his colleagues, Endowed Chair E, a one year extension of the five

year review process in 2011 and later renewed his appointment

without a full, multi-layer review process. The work experience

of other endowed chairs is relevant in determining the essential

functions of the Rigali Chair. See Miller v. Ill. Dept. of

Transportation, 643 F.3d 190, 198 (7th Cir. 2011) (employer’s

judgment about which job functions are essential “is not

controlling” because courts may “also look to evidence of the

employer’s actual practices in the workplace” (citing 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(n)(3)(vi)-(vii)). In fact, Loyola comes close to

admitting that producing a tenure-worthy body of scholarship

between 2006 and 2010 was not an essential function of the Rigali

Chair: “If Matland had asked for more time at any point before he

was denied reappointment, it is possible, even likely, that

Loyola would have given him more time.” Dkt. No. 46 at 14. 

 In rejecting Matland’s contention that the Dean of the Graduate 8

School should have participated in the Rigali Chair review if the

process is truly “parallel” to tenure review, Father Garanzini

commented that “the process for evaluation of an endowed chair is

to be ‘parallel’ to the process for promotion to full professor--

there is no requirement that it be identical.” Def.’s Ex. F at 3

(emphasis added).

19
Loyola’s apparent willingness to postpone the Rigali Chair review

suggests that its expectations regarding scholarly output were,

in fact, flexible. 

The bottom line is that a genuine dispute exists over the

essential functions of the Rigali Chair and, by extension,

whether Matland is a “qualified individual” with a disability

under the ADA. Therefore, Matland’s motion for summary judgment

on his failure to accommodate claim is denied.

2.

Matland’s disparate treatment claim also turns on whether he

is a “qualified individual” who could perform the “essential

functions” of the Rigali Chair with or without a reasonable

accommodation. See Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 838-39

(7th Cir. 2012) (stating elements of ADA disparate treatment

claim). Summary judgment for Matland is inappropriate given the

genuine dispute about the extent to which publishing at a tenureworthy rate between 2006 and 2010 was an essential function of

the Rigali Chair position.

III.

The parties’ cross motions for summary judgment are DENIED

for the reasons stated above.

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ENTER ORDER:

_____________________________

 Elaine E. Bucklo

United States District Judge

 

Dated: October 28, 2013

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