UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

CLINTON DIXON, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.;

MARCUS HARDY; DARRYL EDWARDS;

IMOTEP CARTER; MILTON JONES; and

RICARDO TEJEDA, 

 Defendants. 

 

 No. 12 C 5531 

 Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Clinton Dixon is an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of 

Corrections (“IDOC”) at Menard Correctional Center in Illinois. In his amended 

complaint, he alleges that, while he was in custody at Stateville Correctional 

Center, IDOC staff and medical service providers were deliberately indifferent to 

his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Counts I & II), and 

retaliated against him for filing this case (Counts III & IV). R. 75. Specifically, 

Dixon has sued Stateville’s former Warden, Marcus Hardy; Stateville’s former 

Assistant Warden, Darryl Edwards; correctional officer, Ricardo Tejeda; clothing 

room supervisor, Milton Jones; the IDOC’s medical services provider, Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc.; and a doctor employed by Wexford, namely Imotep Carter, 

who served as Stateville’s medical director. See id. Defendants have filed motions 

for summary judgment. R. 104; R. 109. The Court appointed counsel for Dixon, and 
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his counsel has prepared the amended complaint and papers opposing Defendants’ 

motions. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions are granted in part and 

denied in part. 

Legal Standard 

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

322-23 (1986). The Court considers the entire evidentiary record and must view all 

of the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light 

most favorable to the nonmovant. Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir. 2013). 

To defeat summary judgment, a nonmovant must produce more than “a mere 

scintilla of evidence” and come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Harris N.A. v. Hershey, 711 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Ultimately, summary judgment is warranted only if a reasonable jury could not 

return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986). 

Background

 Dixon worked as a “cellhouse worker” in Stateville. R. 117 ¶ 10. Dixon 

requested gloves for his job, but was told that he would not be provided gloves 

because he did not work outside. Id. ¶ 12. As part of his duties, on August 4, 2011, 

Dixon was pushing a heavy cart when another cellhouse worker’s chart pushed the 

cell house’s door into Dixon’s cart, and Dixon’s middle finger was smashed between 
3

the cart and the wall. Id. ¶ 10. The tip of his middle finger was severed. Id. Dixon 

claims that Stateville’s failure to provide him with gloves caused his injury, and has 

sued Warden Hardy, Assistant Warden Edwards, and clothing room supervisor 

Jones, with regard to this claim. 

 After he injured his finger, Dixon was immediately treated by Dr. Carter at 

Stateville and then transferred to a private hospital, where his finger’s condition 

was stabilized. R. 121 ¶¶ 9-13. Over the next six days, Dixon was examined several 

times by a hand specialist at the medical offices of Alan Chen Surgical Associates, 

namely Dr. Victor Tsai, and had two surgeries. Id. ¶¶ 14-27. Dr. Tsai was 

ultimately unable to re-attach the tip of his middle finger. Id. Dixon does not

dispute that his finger healed adequately despite Dr. Tsai’s inability to reattach the 

tip of his finger. Dixon also does not claim that he received inadequate medical care 

with respect to the efforts to repair and heal his finger. 

 Dixon alleges that he was given inadequate pain medication and was not 

provided necessary physical therapy, and has sued Warden Hardy, Assistant 

Warden Edwards, Dr. Carter, and Wexford with regard to these claims. At his 

initial hospital visit to treat his injury, Dixon was prescribed Norco, which is opioid 

pain medication. R. 121 ¶ 17. But when he returned to Stateville, Dixon was instead 

given Tramadol, a narcotic-like pain reliever with the brand name Ultram. R. 106-4 

at 5. On August 5, 2011, Dr. Tsai prescribed Vicodin. R. 121 ¶ 22. But upon his 

return to Stateville, Dixon was again given Tramadol. Id. ¶ 23. Dixon saw Dr. Tsai 

again on August 9, 2011, but he was not prescribed any pain medication. Id. ¶ 25; 
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R. 121-9 at 16. After performing surgery on Dixon’s finger on August 11, 2011, Dr. 

Tsai prescribed Tylenol #3, R. 121 ¶ 28, but Stateville provided Dixon with Motrin. 

R. 121-7 at 14. Stateville continued to provide Dixon with Tramadol through the 

date of his transfer to Menard on September 17, 2012. See R. 121 ¶¶ 30, 43, 47, 53, 

60; R. 121-7 at 36; R. 106-4 at 64. 

 Dr. Carter referred Dixon for physical therapy on November 23, 2011. R. 121-

7 at 36. Dr. Tsai also recommended physical therapy on December 8, 2011. R. 121 ¶ 

58. Dixon testified that he never received physical therapy, and Defendants have 

not identified any evidence in the record to show that he did receive physical 

therapy. The parties dispute whether Dixon was ever instructed on how to do range 

of motion exercises on his own. 

 Dixon filed this action on July 13, 2012. Two months later on September 17, 

2012, Dixon was transferred to Menard Correctional Center (which is 400 miles 

further away from his family) based on an investigation that revealed that Dixon 

had threatened another inmate saying, “I’m gonna bag and tag the b****.” R. 111-1 

at 101. Dixon contends that there was no basis for this investigation and that it was 

undertaken solely to create pretext for his transfer. See R. 116 at 6-7. 

Analysis

I. Gloves 

 Dixon argues that Warden Hardy, Assistant Warden Edwards, and clothing 

room supervisor Jones were deliberately indifferent to Dixon’s need to wear gloves 

to safely complete his duties as a cellhouse worker. “In the context of a conditions of 
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confinement claim . . . a convicted prisoner is entitled to be free from conditions that 

constitute cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015). To be cruel and unusual, “the 

alleged condition must be objectively serious . . . and the defendant prison official 

must possess a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. “An adverse condition 

amounts to a constitutional deprivation when it results in the denial of a basic 

human need, such as adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Id. at 309-

10; see also Grady v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016) (“lack of heat, 

clothing, or sanitation”). To have a sufficiently culpable state of mind a defendant 

must have been deliberately indifferent to the condition posing a serious risk. See

Smith v. Sangamon Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 715 F.3d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Deliberate indifference “requires a showing that the [defendant] was aware of a 

substantial risk of serious injury to [the plaintiff] but nevertheless failed to take 

appropriate steps to protect him from a known danger.” Id.

 Dixon has failed to demonstrate that performing his cellhouse duties without 

gloves was an objectively serious risk. Pushing a cart (even if it was large and 

heavy) around the prison is not objectively dangerous work. Notably, Dixon’s injury 

was caused by a freak accident when another cart was pushed into a door which in 

turn caused Dixon’s cart to smash his finger against a wall. Dixon has not argued, 

let alone presented evidence, that an accident such as this was foreseeable such 

that officials at Stateville should have taken additional precautions such as 
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equipping Dixon with gloves. Absent such foreseeability, Dixon performing his 

cellhouse duties without gloves is not an objectively serious condition. 

 Furthermore, even if such an accident was foreseeable, Dixon has presented 

no evidence that wearing cloves would have prevented his injury. Even work gloves 

are not so thick that they would protect a finger from injury when it is smashed 

between heavy and hard objects. If prison officials knew that carts pushed by 

cellhouse workers regularly crash, the solution is not gloves but better organization 

of the movement and use of the carts. Therefore, no reasonable jury could conclude 

that Defendants’ failure to provide gloves was deliberately indifferent. 

II. Retaliation

 Dixon also alleges that, in retaliation for his filing this case, Warden Hardy 

and Assistant Warden Edwards caused Officer Tejeda to create the Disciplinary 

Report that was the basis for Dixon’s transfer. Dixon alleges that being housed in 

Menard as opposed to Stateville is a hardship for him because it is 400 miles 

further away from his family. Such a transfer can be actionable if it is done in 

retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, like filing a civil 

action. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983); Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 

807, 810 (7th Cir. 1996). 

 Dixon has produced no evidence that his transfer was motivated by 

retaliatory intent. By contrast, Stateville’s records show that Dixon was transferred 

based on an investigation into a threat he made against another inmate. Dixon 

contends that the timing of the investigation, coming shortly after he filed this case, 
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is a sufficient basis to send this claim to a jury. He is wrong. “[T]emporal proximity 

between a[] . . . protected activity and an adverse . . . action is rarely sufficient to 

show that the former caused the latter.” O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 

625, 635 (7th Cir. 2011). “Close temporal proximity provides evidence of causation 

and may permit a plaintiff to survive summary judgment provided that there is 

other evidence that supports the inference of a causal link.” Scaife v. Cook County, 

446 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see also Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 

910, 918 (7th Cir. 2016) (“A causal link requires more than the mere fact that an 

employer's action happens after an employee’s protected activity.”); Lumpkin v. 

Cook Cty. Pub. Def’s Office, 640 Fed. App’x 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2016) (“But ‘suspicious 

timing’ alone is rarely sufficient to infer causation.”). Dixon has failed to provide 

any other evidence that Warden Hardy, Assistant Warden Edwards, and Officer 

Tejeda transferred him with a retaliatory motive. Thus, Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment on Dixon’s retaliation claim is granted. 

III. Pain Medication & Physical Therapy 

 Dixon alleges that Dr. Carter, Wexford, Warden Hardy, and Assistant 

Warden Edwards, deliberately disregarded his need for certain pain medication and 

physical therapy. “Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription 

against cruel and unusual punishment when they display deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs of prisoners.” Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 

2008). To establish a deliberate indifference claim under this standard, a plaintiff 

must show (1) that the plaintiff suffered an objectively serious risk of harm, and (2) 
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that the defendant acted with a subjectively culpable state of mind in acting or 

failing to act in disregard of that risk. Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 

2011). Nevertheless, the “Constitution is not a medical code that mandates specific 

medical treatment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). And 

“evidence that another doctor would have followed a different course of treatment is 

insufficient to sustain a deliberate indifference claim.” Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 

776, 786 (7th Cir. 2015). Rather, “medical professionals . . . are entitled to deference 

in treatment decisions unless no minimally competent medical professional would 

have so responded under the circumstances at issue.” McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 

474, 481 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). In other words, “[w]hen a medical 

professional acts in his professional capacity, he may be held to have displayed 

deliberate indifference only if the decision by the professional is such a substantial 

departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to 

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a 

judgment.” Id. 

A. Medication 

 Dixon alleges that Dr. Carter and Wexford were deliberately indifferent 

because they provided him with Tramadol instead of a narcotic pain medication. Dr. 

Tsai has passed away and was unavailable for a deposition in this case. Dr. Tsai’s 

former colleague who took over his practice, Dr. Alan Chen was deposed. Dr. Chen 

testified that “generally” Tramadol would not be given to a patient with an 

amputated finger. R. 106-5 at 11 (37:21-24). He estimated that “98 percent of the 
9

time, we do not” prescribe Tramadol in such circumstances, id. at 12 (38:1), and 

“Dixon clearly has a reason to require Norco.” Id. (38:6-7). But he also noted that it 

is a “judgment call” and not a “big departure . . . from accepted professional 

standards” to substitute Tramadol for Norco in Dixon’s case. Id. at 11 (37:24), 12 

(38:8), 17 (59:11-21). 

 Dr. Chen’s testimony is an insufficient basis for a reasonable jury to conclude 

that Dr. Carter’s decision to prescribe Tramadol for Dixon’s pain was a “substantial 

departure from accepted professional judgment.” Notably, as Defendants point out, 

the Seventh Circuit has held that a prison doctor’s decision to substitute a nonnarcotic medication for a narcotic medication prescribed by a doctor outside the 

prison does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Holloway v. Del. Cnty. Sheriff, 

700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[The plaintiff] did not present any evidence to 

show that [the doctor’s] decision not to prescribe Oxycontin was a substantial 

departure from accepted professional standards.”); see also Latham v. Mitcheff, 2016 

WL 3081932, at *2 (7th Cir. June 1, 2016) (“As for [the doctor’s] suggestion that a 

switch to ‘direct observation therapy’ should be made before introducing another 

medication for [the plaintiff’s] chest pain, [the plaintiff] does not point to any 

evidence suggesting that [the doctor] had failed to exercise medical judgment.”). 

Defendants ensured that Dixon’s pain was treated. It is not the Court’s job to 

“second-guess” the manner in which his pain was treated absent evidence that no 

“minimally competent medical professional” would have made the same decision. 

See Fitzgerald v. Greer, 324 Fed. App’x 510, 515 (7th Cir. 2009). And here, Dr. Chen 
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testified that such a decision was a judgment call and did not fall below accepted 

professional standards. Thus, summary judgment is granted to Defendants on 

Dixon’s claim regarding pain medication. 

B. Physical Therapy: Dr. Carter & Wexford 

 Defendants argue that Dr. Tsai taught Dixon how to do exercises with his 

finger such that physical therapy was not necessary. On this basis, Defendants 

argue that it was within Dr. Carter’s professional judgment to decide that Dixon did 

not require physical therapy. There are several problems with this argument. One 

is that Dr. Carter referred Dixon for physical therapy, indicating that Dr. Carter 

made a judgment that Dixon required physical therapy. R. 121-7 at 36. Defendants 

cite to Williams v. Fahim in which the Seventh Circuit held that it was within a 

prison doctor’s professional judgment to decide that an inmate could be trained to 

do range of motion exercises himself in lieu of physical therapy. 572 Fed. App’x 445, 

446 (7th Cir. 2014). But if Dr. Carter and his staff determined that physical therapy 

was necessary then Williams is inapposite. 

 Further, the evidence shows that Dr. Carter and Wexford did not provide the 

materials necessary for Dixon to follow Dr. Tsai’s instructions. As Dr. Tsai was not 

available to be deposed, Dr. Chen testified that it was Dr. Tsai’s custom and 

practice to demonstrate such exercises to his patients. R. 106-5 at 17 (61:10-22). 

Dixon also testified that Dr. Tsai showed him home to do exercises, but that these 

exercises required him to squeeze a rubber ball, which Dr. Carter and Wexford 

failed to provide. R. 121-2 at 7-8 (24:8–25:6). Defendants have not produced any 
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records to contradict Dixon’s testimony that he did not receive physical therapy. Id.

at 13 (45:5-9). Thus, Wexford and Dr. Carter’s motion for summary judgment on 

Dixon’s claim that they were deliberately indifferent to his need for physical 

therapy is denied. 

C. Physical Therapy: Warden Hardy & Assistant Warden Edwards 

 Dixon also testified that he addressed grievances to Warden Hardy and 

Assistant Warden Edwards telling them that he had not received prescribed 

physical therapy. R. 121-2 at 20 (73:14-16). But the grievances in the record do not 

indicate that either Warden Hardy or Assistant Warden Edwards received them. 

See R. 118-8 at 10-11. Thus, the grievances are not evidence that either Warden 

Hardy or Assistant Warden Edwards had knowledge that Dixon was not receiving 

the physical therapy he had been prescribed. 

 Dixon also testified that he personally told Warden Hardy that he was not 

receiving physical therapy when Warden Hardy made rounds through the prison. R. 

121-2 at 19-20 (72:17–73:10). (Dixon did not testify that he had a similar 

conversation with Assistant Warden Edwards.) Warden Hardy submitted a 

declaration that fails to address this allegation, and in any case the declaration is 

unsigned. R. 111-1 at 87-89. Dixon’s testimony is sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to find that Warden Hardy knew Dixon has been prescribed 

physical therapy, was not receiving it, and was deliberately indifferent to that 

information. 
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 Warden Hardy argues that his lack of medical training absolves him of 

responsibility since Dixon was receiving the attention of medical professionals and 

he was entitled to rely on their judgment. The problem with that argument is that 

the evidence in the record indicates that Warden Hardy was aware that Dr. Carter 

had made a judgment that Dixon required physical therapy but Dixon was not 

receiving it. The relevant medical judgment had already been made, and Dixon was 

complaining about a lack of provision of services. Presumably, ensuring that such 

services are provided is part of a warden’s responsibilities. Thus, Warden Hardy’s 

motion for summary judgment on Dixon’s claim of a failure to receive physical 

therapy is denied, but granted as to Assistant Warden Edwards. 

 
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Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the motions for summary judgment, R. 109; R. 104, 

are granted in part and denied in part. Summary judgment is granted with respect 

to Count I (gloves) and Counts II and III (retaliation). Summary judgment is 

granted with respect to Count II in so far as it alleges deliberate indifference to 

Dixon’s medication needs, and by Assistant Warden Edwards. Summary judgment 

is denied with respect to Count II is in so far as it alleges deliberate indifference 

with respect to Dixon’s physical therapy. The remaining defendants in the case are 

Warden Hardy, Dr. Carter, and Wexford. A status hearing is set for October 14, 

2016 to discuss how the parties would like to proceed and whether referral to a 

magistrate judge for settlement discussions would be helpful. 

ENTERED: 

 ______________________________ 

 Honorable Thomas M. Durkin 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: September 30, 2016