U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

45–990 PDF 2010

S. Hrg. 110–1036 

WORLD AT RISK: A REPORT FROM THE 

COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

DECEMBER 11, 2008 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

ERIC P. ANDERSEN, Professional Staff Member 

AARON M. FIROVED, Professional Staff Member 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ROBERT L. STRAYER, Minority Director for Homeland Security Affairs 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 18 

Senator Warner ................................................................................................ 22 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 25 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 27 

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 30 

Senator Nelson (FL) ......................................................................................... 33 

Senator Thune .................................................................................................. 34 

Prepared statement: 

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 43 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2008 

Hon. Bob Graham, Chairman, and Hon. Jim Talent, Vice Chairman, Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and 

Terrorism, accompanied by Hon. Tim Roemer, Commissioner, and Robin 

Cleveland, Commissioner, Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism .................................................. 5 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Cleveland, Robin: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

Graham, Hon. Bob: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

Roemer, Hon. Tim: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

Talent, Hon. Jim: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

APPENDIX 

‘‘World at Risk, The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism,’’ by Bob Graham, Chairman, and Jim Talent, Vice-Chairman ................................................................ 58 

(1) 

WORLD AT RISK: A REPORT FROM THE 

COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2008 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Pryor, 

McCaskill, Collins, Voinovich, Coleman, and Warner. 

Also Present: Senators Nelson, Thune, and Martinez. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. I would 

ask everyone here to take their seats. I thank everyone for being 

here. Good morning. 

Let me say that the importance of today’s hearing is summed up 

in the stark opening paragraph of the recently released report of 

the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Proliferation and Terrorism. 

It says, ‘‘Unless the world community acts decisively and with 

great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world 

by the end of 2013.’’ 

In those 38 words, the Commission compels us to focus our 

minds and steel our resolve to confront the deadly, global threat of 

Islamist terrorists using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

against innocent people, and coming as it does such a short time 

after terrorists engaged in conventional urban warfare against innocent people in Mumbai, India. The Commission’s work, warning, 

and recommendations deserve extra serious attention. 

This Commission was established by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, which our Committee 

had a primary role in passing in 2007. We are, therefore, particularly grateful to the Commission and its leadership for its excellent 

and timely report, and we welcome this morning its Chairman and 

Vice Chairman, our distinguished former colleagues, Senators Bob 

Graham and Jim Talent. Two of its commissioners—our former colleague from the House, a member of the 9/11 Commission Tim RoeVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:11 May 17, 2010 Jkt 045990 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\45990.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
2 

mer, and Robin Cleveland whose governmental experience is too 

distinguished and long to list, though she remains very youthful, 

nonetheless—I thank each of you, as well as your fellow commissioners and staff members, for all the hard work that I know went 

into this insightful and really gripping report. 

I also want to welcome our colleagues from the Senate Armed 

Services Committee whom we have invited to join us at this hearing. There is actually a lot of overlap between the membership of 

the two committees. We invited our colleagues to join us because 

confronting and dealing with weapons of mass destruction requires 

the combined efforts of many departments and many committees, 

and none more so than the two that are represented here at the 

table this morning. 

As I mentioned, we hold this hearing in the wake of last month’s 

terrorist attacks in Mumbai, which originated in Pakistan. That 

fact comes as no surprise to members of this Commission. In fact, 

your report says clearly, ‘‘Were one to map terrorism and weapons 

of mass destruction today, all roads would intersect in Pakistan.’’ 

But you also note quite correctly that Pakistan itself has repeatedly been a victim of the same Islamist terrorism. Most poignantly, 

in 2007, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated 

and 20 bystanders killed just 2 weeks before the parliamentary 

elections. 

The point here is that no one is safe from Islamist extremism 

and terrorism because these people have no respect for national 

borders, religious identification, or the lives of innocent people living within those borders. London, Madrid, Bali, Mumbai, Jerusalem, New York, the Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania countryside 

have all suffered grievous losses of life at the hands of these terrorists. And as brutal and as blood-stained as their course has been, 

unfortunately this Commission’s report tells us it can get worse, 

much worse, because the terrorists have dedicated themselves to 

acquiring weapons of mass destruction so they can murder and destroy on a scale previously unimagined and unconfronted. 

Just last year, the head of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA), Mohamed El Baradei, said this in the case of nuclear terrorism, but it applies to all forms of weapons of mass destruction: ‘‘For an extremist group, there is no concept of deterrence. If they have it, they will use it.’’ 

In fact, the IAEA handles about 150 cases a year involving trafficking of nuclear material. Some of that material reported stolen 

is never recovered, and some of the material recovered has never 

been reported stolen. 

The Commission, whose leadership is before us, also found that 

biological weapons pose a very real threat—in fact, according to the 

Commission, one more likely to materialize than other forms of 

WMD attack for reasons that will be explained by the Commission’s representatives during their testimony. One conclusion I 

draw from your work is that the global proliferation of legitimate 

biotechnology research and expertise, while so much of a benefit in 

so many ways, also creates this problem because that work can be 

used to create weapons of mass bioterror. And much of this research takes place in very poorly secured or, in fact, totally unsecured facilities. 

3 

So the bottom line is that we need a strong homeland and international response now to protect us from the dangers that you have 

described. Your report comes at an opportune moment, as a new 

Administration and a new Congress get ready to take a new look 

at our Nation’s homeland security and our global war against the 

terrorists who attacked us on September 11, 2001. 

Your range of recommendations provides a truly bipartisan or 

nonpartisan road map for the urgent action needed to protect the 

American people. And, in fact, I would say that your recommendations will constitute a centerpiece of this Committee’s agenda and 

perhaps others’ in the coming 111th Congress. Your report and recommendations, together with the work our Committee has done 

previously on WMD terrorism, the questions we both have raised, 

and the specter of a WMD terrorist attack that we have foreseen 

are not topics that are pleasant to discuss, but they are real, and 

it is our responsibility post-September 11, 2001, to discuss them 

and act upon them. 

For me, one of the most chilling sentences in the 9/11 Commission Report, which Commissioner Roemer helped to draft and see 

through to implementation, was that September 11, 2001, occurred 

because of a failure of imagination, which is to say a failure to 

imagine that people would do to us what they did on September 

11, 2001. Since then, it has been our urgent responsibility to imagine the worst, and, frankly, working together with the 9/11 Commission and others, as well as with the Administration and Members of the House, this Committee and other committees have tried 

to do exactly that. And I take some satisfaction in believing that 

is certainly a significant part of the reason why, thank God, we 

have not suffered another terrorist attack. But we live in very dangerous times, as this Commission has documented once again, and 

these times call on us to consider and imagine the worst possibilities and then act to both prevent them and prepare to respond to 

them. 

Again, I thank the members of this Commission for joining us 

today and for your extraordinary work, and at this time I am 

pleased to call upon the Ranking Member, Senator Susan Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The ‘‘World at Risk’’ report reinforces the sense of urgency that 

this Committee has felt during its many hearings on deadly threats 

to the American people—threats that include terrorists dispersing 

anthrax spores, detonating a nuclear device in a major city, or 

striking with other weapons of mass destruction. 

As the Chairman has indicated, the Commission bluntly warned 

that it is ‘‘more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction 

will be used in a terrorist attack sometime by the end of 2013.’’ 

That warning and the Commission’s report are a call to action. 

This Committee has created the Department of Homeland Security, 

reformed our intelligence agencies, strengthened the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), increased grants for State and 

local first responders, and enhanced the security of our seaports 

and our chemical facilities. As the Commission observes, however, 

‘‘the terrorists have been active, too,’’ and we must continue our efVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:11 May 17, 2010 Jkt 045990 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\45990.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
4 

forts. Nuclear proliferation and advances in biotechnology have 

given terrorists new means to carry out their avowed intention to 

commit mass murder. 

The Commission has laid out three main sources of concern: The 

proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, the growing threat of 

biological weapons, and the special challenges relating to Pakistan. 

Having heard chilling testimony on the effects of even a suitcase 

nuclear weapon in a city like New York or Washington, I share the 

Commission’s deep concern about nuclear developments in places 

like North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan, as well as the challenge of 

securing nuclear materials in the former Soviet bloc. 

The mental images of nuclear blasts and mushroom clouds are 

powerful and frightening. But as the Commission rightly notes, the 

more likely threat is from a biological weapon. In contrast to nuclear weapons, there is a lower technological threshold to develop 

and disseminate bio-weapons, access to pathogens is more widespread, and pathogens are harder to contain. The spread of biotechnology, the difficulty of detecting such pathogens, and the terrorists’ known interest in bioterrorism combine to produce an even 

greater menace. Bio-weapons are appealing to terrorists in part because we are unlikely to realize that an attack has occurred before 

it begins to kill many of its victims. In the early stages of an anthrax attack, for example, health care providers are likely to believe that they are simply seeing an outbreak of flu. That worldwide security has lagged behind the growth of this threat is sobering. Even within our own country, the Commission found that we 

fail to secure potential biological weapons effectively. 

Thousands of individuals in the United States have access to 

dangerous pathogens. Currently there are about 400 research facilities and nearly 15,000 individuals in the United States authorized to handle the deadly pathogens on what is called the ‘‘Select 

Agent List.’’ Many other research facilities handle less strictly controlled, yet still dangerous, pathogens with little or no regulation. 

In addition to the concerns about controls within our own country, the global security concerns are daunting. There are certain 

countries, like Syria, that have never adhered to the Biological 

Weapons Convention. There are concerns that other countries that 

signed the treaty may, nevertheless, be violating it. 

Beyond these security considerations, there is also more that our 

country should be doing to develop effective countermeasures and 

vaccines. 

As the Chairman has noted, the recent attacks in Mumbai and 

Afghanistan have focused the world’s attention on another tinderbox identified by the Commission, and that is the nation of Pakistan. The confluence of terrorist mindsets, nuclear capability, and 

political instability in Pakistan creates enormous challenges. That 

country’s history of poor control over its nuclear technology, heightened tensions with its nuclear-armed neighbor India, and the existence of terrorist training camps and safe havens are a dangerous 

combination. 

The Commission has offered us 13 key recommendations which 

we will hear more about today. We may differ on some of the details of specific recommendations, but I believe that the Commission has ably identified the vital threats that our country faces and 

5 

1The combined prepared statement of Mr. Graham and Mr. Talent appears in the Appendix 

on page 45. 

has given us a clearly drawn road map toward improved security 

against terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. 

The Commission has produced exactly the kind of independent 

analysis that Senator Lieberman and I envisioned when we included the language creating the WMD Commission as part of the 

2007 homeland security legislation. I commend the commissioners 

and their staff for their very valuable contributions, and I look forward to hearing the testimony this morning. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

We will go now to the witnesses. Before we do, I want to express 

a little parochial pride from both Committees here. The Executive 

Director of the Commission is Evelyn Farkas, who used to be a 

staff member for the Senate Armed Services Committee. The General Counsel for the Commission is Raj De, who used to be a staff 

member of the Homeland Security Committee. So this explains the 

extraordinary quality of the work product that is the subject of our 

hearing today. 

I gather that the four of you have decided to divide the time with 

approximately 5 minutes each, and, again, I want to thank you. All 

of you have been involved in public service for varying lengths of 

time. This is really a great service to your country, and I thank you 

for it. 

Senator Graham, welcome and let us begin with you. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. BOB GRAHAM,1 CHAIRMAN, AND HON. 

JIM TALENT, VICE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM; ACCOMPANIED BY HON. TIM ROEMER, COMMISSIONER, AND ROBIN CLEVELAND, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS 

OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Chairman, and thank 

you, Senator Collins, and the other members of the two committees. We appreciate the opportunity—and this is our first opportunity—to present our report to an official body, these two committees of the U.S. Senate. Mr. Chairman, we have provided a written 

statement for the record. We will each use our time to summarize 

and elaborate on that written report. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. 

Senator GRAHAM. You have indicated that our Commission is the 

product of your work. You established this Commission and gave 

us two principal responsibilities: First was to assess the current 

governmental policies to prevent the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction; and, second, to make recommendations as to how 

we can enhance our national and global security. This report is the 

result of a nine-member—I would not use the word ‘‘bipartisan’’— 

I would say ‘‘nonpartisan’’ Commission, the membership of which 

was selected by the leaders of the Senate and the House. Our report is a unanimous recommendation with the full support of all 

of our nine members. 

6 

This report was developed first by putting together staff—and I 

appreciate your recognition of two of our very able staff members, 

but also some 20 or more others coming from a wide range of backgrounds. Scientific, law enforcement, military, intelligence were all 

part of the capability that supported this effort. 

Over the duration of the Commission’s work, which has been approximately 6 months, we interviewed over 250 individuals—academics, scientists, intelligence, military, political—both in the 

United States and abroad. The opinions of that broad array of individuals was very influential on the findings and recommendations 

that we bring to you today. 

We held eight major Commission meetings, including one public 

hearing, and I would like to recognize, if I could, two people who 

are with us today who were witnesses at that public hearing that 

was held on September 10, 2008, in New York: Carie Lemack, who 

many of us know from her great work over many years representing the families of September 11, 2001; and Matt Bunn, of 

the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, who was one of the 

leading experts on nuclear proliferation and has just completed this 

very thoughtful annual report on the status of preventing nuclear 

terrorism. 

We also augmented those interviews and hearings with travel. 

We visited the Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque to 

learn more about our state of nuclear preparation and the great 

support which Sandia gives to the International Atomic Energy 

Agency. It is their principal reservoir of scientific knowledge on nuclear issues, and it is regularly called upon to assist nations around 

the world on these issues. 

We also visited the United Kingdom. We visited Vienna, the 

home of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Russia. We 

were going to visit Pakistan. We had flown from Washington to Kuwait and were awaiting our flight to Islamabad, when we received 

the message that the Marriott Hotel in which we were going to 

spend the night had just been bombed. That made this effort a 

highly personal one for the members of the Commission, and it impressed upon us the seriousness of our responsibility. 

Mr. Chairman, just briefly, I would like to give the bad news of 

our findings, and then my colleagues will give some of the good 

news of the ways in which we can aggressively attack and reduce 

the probabilities of attack that we find under the current circumstances. 

Our first finding was that the risks that we are facing, in spite 

of all that we have done in the Congress and in the Executive 

Branch, and at State and local government, our margin of safety 

is declining, that we are becoming more vulnerable. You might ask 

why. Well, I analogize it to a canoeist who is canoeing upstream 

against a powerful current. You may be canoeing as skillfully and 

energetically as you can, but you are losing ground because the resistance that you are facing is even greater. In many ways, that 

describes the circumstances which we are in. Our adversaries are 

growing more nimble and effective, and the scene of scientific development, particularly in the biological area, is making the challenge greater. 

7 

1The combined prepared statement of Mr. Graham and Mr. Talent appears in the Appendix 

on page 45. 

Second, as the Chairman and the Ranking Member have both 

stated, the Commission finds that it is more likely than not that 

between now and the end of 2013, a weapon of mass destruction 

will be used somewhere on the globe. Now, that statement has received some pushback as being too alarmist. I might say that the 

same week we released this report, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Admiral McConnell, spoke to a group of new congressmen at the Kennedy School and made almost exactly the 

same assessment based on his agency’s perspective of what the 

threat of the use of a weapon of mass destruction might be. So, as 

grim as it may be, I believe it is a credible assessment. 

Third, we found that it was more likely that the attack would be 

by biological weapons rather than by a nuclear weapon for the reasons that the Chairman and the Ranking Member have already 

mentioned, and which particularly one of our commissioners, Robin 

Cleveland, will elaborate upon. 

We also found that in terms of intent, the terrorists are just as 

intent to use weapons of mass destruction today as they were almost 20 years ago when Osama bin Laden first attempted to acquire nuclear material while still living in the Sudan. That effort 

to obtain and use has been described by bin Laden as a ‘‘religious 

duty’’ of al-Qaeda. 

So, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, these are our 

blunt findings. We have stated it several places in our report that 

we think a key to winning this battle is for the U.S. Government 

to be open with its people, to understand both the reality of the situation and the steps that can be taken to change that reality. We 

have attempted to carry out that honesty and directness with the 

American people and with this Committee today. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I would like, if I could, to 

recognize the very distinguished Vice Chairman and colleague, 

Senator Jim Talent. We also have with us today two other Commission members—former Congressman Tim Roemer and Ms. Robin 

Cleveland. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Talent, welcome. Good to see you 

again. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JIM TALENT,1 VICE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM 

Senator TALENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins. 

I am going to embarrass Senator Graham just for a second by saying as difficult as this was—and I did not think anything would be 

more difficult, for example, than working on a Senate Committee 

and passing complicated legislation; you all know how difficult that 

is. This was hard, getting these strong-minded people to agree on 

a unanimous basis to a report that actually said something, and it 

would not have happened if not for the leadership of the gentleman 

to my right. And many of you know how good he is, and he sure 

proved it here. 

8 

We have two witnesses after me who are going to offer some 

comments in some very important areas, so I am going to make one 

brief observation about the threat, and then I have starred about 

five areas I am going to be very brief with. 

It occurred to me in the course of these deliberations that there 

are a lot of people, and I think even people in this room who focus 

on this a lot, who assume that we cannot really eventually lose in 

this conflict with the terrorists because they are relatively small, 

transnational conspiracies that do not even have a national base. 

But in reflecting on this, I think we tend to underestimate how formidable they are. The nature of the world today, the interdependency, globalization, and information technology, all of that gives 

them advantages in warfare and tends to disadvantage traditional 

First World powers like the United States. And they see this. I 

think it is one of the reasons they are so dangerous. They understand the world is a matrix of systems, really—financial, communications, transportation—that we need and rely on, and they do 

not need very much, and that are very easy for them to attack and 

very hard for us to defend. 

Now, one of the capabilities I think they would like to enhance 

is their weaponry. They have asymmetric weapons which are very 

powerful, but not quite as powerful enough as they need to really 

knock us out. And that is the context in which I think we ought 

to look at these weapons of mass destruction. If they are capable 

of increasing their capabilities by getting these weapons, and particularly—and this is one of the reasons we focus on biological attacks—if they get enough of the weapon material that they can repeat the attack at will, what Dick Danzig calls ‘‘reloading the bioweapon,’’ so they can hit an American city and then hit them again 

3 weeks later, we can lose this war. I think they get that, and that 

is one of the reasons for our threat evaluation, one of the reasons 

we have a 5-year limit in it. We think that, and we want everybody 

to understand, this is not just important, it is urgent. You know 

how the urgent always crowds out the important. This is urgent 

and important. 

Five comments about the recommendations, and they are organized in four areas: Biological, nuclear, government reform, and 

then the government’s role with the citizen. 

First, we think a lot of the big problem in the biological sector 

stems from the different cultural approach toward this issue as opposed to nuclear. The nuclear age began with the explosion of a nuclear weapon, so everybody in nuclear science got it right away. 

This science can be abused and used for destructive purposes. 

I think the assumption within the biological research community, 

quite understandably, is that this is benign research, and that is 

one of the reasons why I think it would be so good for you all to 

focus on this early because the very act of passing legislation—and 

these are important subjects; Ms. Cleveland is going to talk about 

this, changing the regulatory apparatus. But the very act of passing that legislation, I think, will raise the visibility of the issue and 

help with the underlying cultural change that we need. This is a 

case that Congress is a messenger—just as it was with the intelligence area. 

9 

Point two, Pakistan. We focus on Pakistan. I think, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, you guys understand. Everything that causes 

us to worry about both terrorism and proliferation in the context 

of weapons of mass destruction is centered in Pakistan. That is just 

unfortunate. It is the perfect storm. They are a substantial nuclear 

power. They are, not willingly, but they are a terrorist safe haven. 

They are a recruiting ground for terrorists, as you know if you have 

ever talked to the British. They have an unstable government, 

which, therefore, has to focus on its stability rather than on the 

things we would like to see them focusing on. And they have a 

competition with India which is raising the specter of a traditional 

nation-state kind of nuclear stand-off, which is very dangerous and 

complicates everything else. 

So we recommend continuing a lot of what we have been doing, 

eliminating the safe haven, safeguarding the material, and in addition, using Pakistan as a place where there is first a really intense 

effort at using the tools of soft power. And this means we have to 

have the tools of soft power, which means we think that the State 

Department and the civilian agencies of foreign policy need to go 

through the kind of self-analysis, cultural change, and integration 

that the military did beginning 40 or 50 years ago and completed 

with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and that the intelligence agencies 

have done since you all passed the legislation. That is point two. 

With regard to the nuclear regime, we have a lot of recommendations there, and I think the basic problem is the interest in things 

nuclear around the world. A lot of that interest is benign in nuclear 

power, but it is so great that it is straining the international regime for inspecting and controlling it. And so the IAEA needs more 

resources and more authority. 

We have a recommendation about shifting the burden of proof so 

that nations—I mean, internationally we all agree that, where necessary, where there is a good purpose for it, nations stop acting like 

the object of depositions, trying to hide everything they can unless 

you ask exactly the right question. And, actually, we shift the burden of proof so they have to be more forthcoming in trying to prove 

that they are in compliance. 

Then, finally, I will close so we can get to Mr. Roemer. One of 

the things that keeps popping up in our recommendations and that 

we kept noticing was the importance of human capital and the dangers we have in that area. The Chairman talked about Sandia in 

New Mexico. They told us down at Sandia Laboratories that if we 

do not do something, we are going to fall below the critical mass 

that we need in terms of scientific expertise to make this international nuclear regime work. It turns out the IAEA gets their expertise from us, and largely down in Sandia, and the cohort of people who understand this science and have made it work all these 

years are all retiring within the next few years. So intentional and 

deliberate efforts need to be made at increasing our human capital 

in that area. That is another area this Committee or the ones with 

appropriate jurisdiction probably could take on an effort early. 

I think I am going to end it with that, Mr. Chairman, and I know 

that it is the question section that is probably the most beneficial, 

but I appreciate the chance to be with you today. 

10 

1The report, titled ‘‘World at Risk,’’ appears in the Appendix on page 58. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Talent. That 

was excellent. 

Congressman Roemer, welcome back. Thanks for your uniquely 

extraordinary service post-September 11, 2001. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. TIM ROEMER, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM 

Mr. ROEMER. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for the honor 

to be before both of these committees. It is always a privilege to 

be back in the U.S. Senate, where I had my first job as a Senate 

staff member for Senator DeConcini back in the 1980s, and to see 

all these able and capable staffers up on the dais as well, too. 

Senator thank you for combining both committees here. I would 

like to start with some good news and then some of the bad news 

and the trends. The good news is we have people like Senator Graham and Senator Talent who can work in a bipartisan way to put 

forward 13 different recommendations and make our country safer 

from a very dangerous and urgent threat. 

More good news is that when the 9/11 Commission made 41 different recommendations to begin to try to transform our government from a Cold War structure to a new 21st Century hot war, 

proactive government, the Congress responded, for the most part. 

With your leadership, Senator Lieberman, Senator Collins, and everybody on this Committee, 39 of the 41 recommendations were 

passed into law to help transform our government to these new 

21st Century threats from al-Qaeda, from asymmetrical threats to 

biological and weapons of mass destruction types of threats. That 

is the good news. 

We now come out with a report, ‘‘World at Risk,’’ 1 that talks 

about trend lines that are very dangerous to the United States, the 

threat is growing and our margins of safety are shrinking, and 

shrinking very quickly, despite good action by Congress and the 

Executive Branch. 

Osama bin Laden, months after the attacks on September 11, 

2001, said it was not 19 Arab armies or 19 Arab states that attacked the United States on September 11, 2001. It was 19 postgraduate students who formed cells, penetrated our country, and 

killed over 3,000 people. 

Now we are starting to hear that bin Laden has been saying for 

a long time that it is a religious obligation to create Hiroshima-type 

activity on the United States with some kind of nuclear or biological device. Your religious obligation to attack the United States. 

And when we hear from biological experts that it is not very likely 

that a terrorist is going to become a biologist, but it is likely a biologist might become a terrorist, we are maybe a resume or two 

away from al-Qaeda having that biological capability of being able 

to potentially weaponize and disseminate very dangerous material 

against the United States or our allies. The threat continues to 

grow, and grow quickly. 

We tried to capture the 9/11 Commission’s phrase of ‘‘It was a 

failure of imagination.’’ We cannot have ‘‘World at Risk’’ be a failVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:11 May 17, 2010 Jkt 045990 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\45990.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
11 

ure of anticipation. We have anticipated what is likely to happen 

over the next 5 or 6 years. It would be a travesty if we did not take 

these steps and better protect the United States. 

Senator Talent and Senator Graham so capably and ably led this 

Commission in making these recommendations. We were on our 

way to Pakistan where so many of the roads to terrorism all meet, 

where the cauldron is boiling today: A fragile government of one of 

our allies; al-Qaeda and the Taliban metastasizing in the federally 

administered tribal areas (FATA); Pakistan continuing to build 

new nuclear capabilities; nuclear materials that we are worried 

may not be secured well enough in Pakistan; a Mumbai attack just 

a week ago that creates heightened tension between India and 

Pakistan; and our own intelligence people, General Michael Hayden and Ambassador Ryan Crocker saying the most likely threat 

to the U.S. homeland comes directly radiating out of the federally 

administered tribal areas of Pakistan. 

We centered, we really concentrated, and we urgently called on 

you to do more with respect to Pakistan. We have suggested five 

different steps with regard to Pakistan: 

First, that we continue to be very aggressive in going into the 

FATA and using our special operations, military, and unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAVs) to disrupt al-Qaeda and the Taliban and not 

create safe havens in that area. 

Second, that we increase our smart power. Secretary Gates talks 

so eloquently in a soon-to-be published article in Foreign Affairs in 

January 2009 that we are out of balance today, that we do not 

have the balance we need between our military, our State Department, and our U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

to have non-kinetic forces, our foreign service, our diplomats, to 

create an economic surge in this area, for education and economic 

opportunities for Pakistani citizens. 

Third, that we try to make sure that we look at ways to address 

the etiology of radical Islam and jihadists and try to dry this up 

and compete with it. After all, when we were headed to our hotel 

in Islamabad and 55 people were killed in Islamabad, they were 

Muslim. They were maids, they were cab drivers, they were people 

that worked at this hotel. This was not an attack on the United 

States. This was an attack on Pakistan, an attack on Muslims, an 

attack by al-Qaeda on Pakistan and their own people. And that is 

the way we need to portray this war—not a clash of civilizations, 

but al-Qaeda attacking its own citizens without any plan on jobs, 

on health care, in addressing some of the grievances in that part 

of the world. 

Fourth, one of the key areas I think that we had great discussion 

on was what to do regionally and international in this area when 

we see Kashmir continue to pop up as one of the key problems. Do 

we send an envoy into this area? Is this international engagement 

between China, the United States, Pakistan, India, and Russia? 

How do we bring the right people together to resolve an area where 

there could be a thermonuclear confrontation sometime in the future—as there already have been threats over the last 10 or 15 

years. This is an urgent area of concern for Congress and the Executive Branch. 

12 

Fifth, I would like to address for just a moment, the government, 

our own government—not the Pakistani government but our government. I mentioned that 39 of the 41 recommendations were 

passed into law. You took action. You insisted on Executive Branch 

reform and the creation of a new DNI that is working pretty well. 

You created a new Homeland Security Department that is not 

working so well. But you did not pass reforms to look at yourselves, 

to reform Congress. Article I, Section 1 of our Constitution states 

that the Legislative Branch is one of the key powers of accountability and oversight to our people. And to concentrate that oversight capability and that accountability in our Congress, directly 

elected by our people, so that we know what is going on in our intelligence community and the secret community, so that when the 

call is there and recommendations are put forward, it does not take 

3 years to pass legislation, we recommend an Intelligence Subcommittee on the Appropriations Committee that can be the power 

of the purse. And the Speaker of the House has taken an important 

step creating a Select Intelligence Oversight Panel (SIOP), a panel 

on the House side on the Appropriations Committee to oversee this. 

I think the Senate has an opportunity to act on this. 

We have also recommended, Senators, that we do more on homeland security to focus that oversight and that accountability so that 

the new Secretary of Homeland Security, unlike Mr. Chertoff, does 

not have to come up here and report to 88 different committees and 

subcommittees between the Senate and the House; and that when 

you come up with good legislation to better protect the United 

States, it does not go to 88 different committees and subcommittees 

to try to pass legislation through our bodies. So that is a key reorganization that we recommend for the U.S. Congress. 

We also say in the intelligence community that you recommended that there might be an office that be created to oversee 

WMD. We slightly disagree with that. We say it should be a person. It should not be confirmed necessarily by the Senate. It should 

be appointed with three options by the President: It could be a deputy in the National Security Council, it could be run out of the Vice 

President’s office, or it could be some other person or entity outside 

of the White House that would be responsible for WMD every day. 

We also recommend combining the Homeland Security Council 

and the National Security Council to better streamline accountability in the White House and not have redundancies created 

there. The way you do that is important, and we can talk more 

about that in the question and answer period. 

Finally, in terms of responsibilities, we have talked about responsibilities for the President in terms of this new position that is created. We have talked about congressional responsibilities. We really think citizens can play an important role in this effort. We think 

that can be part of a checklist, that we work with the Homeland 

Security Department and our local law enforcement communities to 

create the kind of checklists and participation from our citizenry 

that really makes them part of helping in a vigilant way to help 

protect this country, with information, with access to the right kind 

of family plan should something happen, and with better information than color codes and duct tape and plastic sheets. We find peoVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:11 May 17, 2010 Jkt 045990 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\45990.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
13 

ple really want good information, even if it is dangerous or a threat 

is out there. 

We are very pleased, I think, with these 13 recommendations. 

We hope the Congress will act on these, and we look forward to 

working with you and implementing these and not letting these go 

by the wayside. 

Thank you so much for the time. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Congressman Roemer. As you 

know, this Committee tried to convince the Congress to adopt the 

recommendation to reform congressional oversight, but that was 

not one on which we succeeded. But your Commission report calls 

us again to go back into that battle and make some good arguments for it, and I promise you we will try. 

Mr. ROEMER. I hope you will keep fighting, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Cleveland, thanks for being here. 

Senator TALENT. Mr. Chairman, I should say that Senator Graham and I were very pleased to allow Mr. Roemer to address this 

subject. [Laughter.] 

Mr. ROEMER. That is why I was invited. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, very gracious of you. Thank you. 

Ms. Cleveland, please proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBIN CLEVELAND, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM 

Ms. CLEVELAND. I appreciate being here. I now know how Tom 

Brokaw felt when he appeared before our Commission when he 

said that he was used to being on the other side of the table, and 

so this is a new experience for me. 

I would like to start with his testimony before the Commission 

because I think we all felt it was very compelling. He received an 

anthrax letter, as we know, and in the weeks after September 11, 

2001, described the harrowing experience of trying to identify what 

was happening to his two assistants. One of them broke out in terrible black lesions across her body, and with all the resources that 

he had available to him in terms of access to people, access to 

money, for 3 weeks he kept getting wrong diagnoses. He finally 

sent a biopsy to Fort Detrick, Maryland, and even there he was 

told that his assistant suffered from a brown recluse spider bite. 

And so it speaks powerfully, I think, to the lessons that we learned 

across the whole biological area in our inquiry. 

There were any number of problems, including the fact that 

there were multiple entities involved in the supervision of biological research and regulation, including the Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of 

Defense, elements of the intelligence community, Food and Drug 

Administration (FDA), and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). And there are constant turf fights, something that 

you all are familiar with, but I was surprised to learn that CDC 

and FDA currently are going over who is responsible for regulating 

the technical procedures—not the equipment—for investigating bioterrorism incidents and for determining the cause of outbreaks of 

14 

disease. There are not community-wide standards in the definition 

of what constitutes a biosecurity level 3 (BSL–3) lab versus a BSL– 

4 lab—and if you do not have common standards in terms of how 

you operate, you are likely to end up with gaps and weaknesses in 

your security system. And it is not clear who should be setting 

those standards. Should it be the Department of Army because 

they are host for the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick? Or should it be the 

Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), which has far more experience in terms of security procedures? 

So you have too many agencies, too many turf fights, and unclear 

oversight entities. There is no single point where you can go and 

determine who is the right authority for oversight. 

So 7 years later, we struggled with: What is at the heart of the 

problem? Why hasn’t there been a clearer and more compelling 

structure set up to oversee the biological area? And, in part, it 

seems to stem from the fact that the need to protect the country 

has to be balanced against the understandable goal of the private 

sector and academics for freedom of research, which has certainly 

produced extraordinary accomplishments in science and medical 

miracles. So we struggled with trying to strike the right balance 

between freedom of research and protecting the country, which led 

us to several key recommendations. 

We think that it is past time for HHS to lead an interagency review of the Select Agent Program. The Congress in its wisdom in 

2002 added agents to that list, but there has been no subject review of whether or not the list is sufficient, whether or not the procedures and reporting mechanisms in place are doing their job. 

We think the Department of Homeland Security should lead a 

national effort to develop a strategy on microbial forensics. The fact 

that it took 7 years to identify Bruce Ivins as the alleged culprit 

in the anthrax case, I think, points clearly to the fact that we do 

not have an adequate capability in microbial forensics and do not 

have a pathogen library. 

We think that HHS and DHS together need to step up efforts to 

improve management and security of high-containment labs and 

consider how to manage pathogen research at lower-level facilities. 

And what that really means is it is key for Congress to be engaged. 

I think that is probably one of our most compelling recommendations. 

The only way that we are going to improve oversight, regulation, 

and security and safety when it comes to the biological area is for 

the life sciences community to step up to their responsibility and 

to promote a culture of security awareness. And I do not think that 

is going to happen on its own. I think it is key for Congress to hold 

hearings and reach out to the life science community to develop a 

code of conduct, hopefully voluntary, but in the absence of a voluntary code, something that the Congress can prescribe. 

Finally, notwithstanding the fact that we are making efforts in 

terms of improving security and safety in our labs, I think the 

Commission concluded that we cannot do this alone; that we could 

have the best procedures in place at our labs, but with the emerging markets in India, Malaysia, Brazil, and Pakistan, medical 

science is advancing across the globe. And so we urge a convening 

15 

by the State Department of a biotechnology powers conference, 

again, with a view to trying to establish some kind of international 

norm or code of conduct when it comes to security and safety. 

And, finally, when it comes to international standards, the Commission did not endorse a revival of the protocol associated with 

the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). We do think that 

the BWC itself is essential and is a key establisher of international 

norms in terms of transfer of biological weapons, but we do not 

think that the effort to revive the protocol would make sense. We 

heard from multiple witnesses that the dual-use nature of much of 

this material complicates verification and so would not be a wise 

course of action. 

Finally, the Administration, we concluded, has done a good job 

investing on the first priority of consequence management and 

taken that important step. But 7 years later, I think we all felt it 

was time to step up the effort in terms of preventing as opposed 

to protecting against the transfer of biological agents to hands of 

people that should not have them. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you all. You have laid out the essence of your report and made some recommendations. 

We will now do 6-minute rounds because we have a number of 

people here. Senator Collins and I will start, and then we will ask 

Senator Levin and Senator Warner from the leadership of the 

Armed Services Committee. And then we will go on our traditional 

early-bird rule. 

Much of your work jumps out at me, but the major conclusions 

that draw our attention are that it is more likely than not that 

there will be a WMD terrorist attack somewhere in the world by 

2013, 5 years from now; and it is more likely than not that the attack will be biological. And both of those are riveting, first, because 

of the time frame; and, second, because I think the instinct would 

be that our minds have been focused more on a nuclear terrorist 

attack than a biological attack. And you have explained why you 

have reached those conclusions and also offered some very good 

suggestions about what we have to do to prevent such an attack— 

remember, this Commission is called the ‘‘Commission on the Prevention.’’ We have spent some time on this Committee and many 

other places in our government on response, asking how we respond to a nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack. But, 

obviously, the more critical question is how do we prevent these attacks from occurring at all. 

Let me begin by asking you by what standard did you arrive at 

the 2013 date, that is to say, that within 5 years it is more likely 

than not that there will be an attack. Senator Graham? 

Senator GRAHAM. Obviously, that is a judgment. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Senator GRAHAM. It was a judgment reached in part by the wide 

net that we put out to people that we thought were capable of having a sound judgment on that. But the events are what is driving 

that schedule. Here are some of the things that are happening. 

There is a nuclear race underway in South Asia today among 

China, India, and Pakistan. In the not too distant future, it is quite 

probable that the third, fourth, and fifth largest nuclear arsenals 

in the world will not be held by places like the United Kingdom 

16 

or France, but will be held by those three South Asian states, significantly increasing the tension in the region and the possibility 

of proliferation from one of those sites. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In other words, all of these are nuclear 

powers now, but are expanding their inventory of nuclear weapons 

much more rapidly than the other countries. 

Senator GRAHAM. And, second, we are in what has been called 

the ‘‘nuclear renaissance’’; after Chernobyl, there was a long period 

where there was virtually no nuclear activity in the world, particularly in the United States. Now, the world is becoming reinterested, re-engaged, and the global climate, which I know is an 

issue that you are going to be dealing with, is a factor. Energy is 

a factor. But it also has the risk of having this technology and this 

base of science in the hands of states that may not have the capability of appropriately securing it from proliferators. So that is another risk. 

But overwhelming those two is the biological risk, dramatic increases in number of sites, number of scientists, the ease with 

which this material can be converted from a benign, healthy, positive pathogen into a lethal pathogen. And the possibility of creating 

new pathogens that are more difficult to suppress than anthrax, 

which is the pathogen of choice today. In a laboratory somewhere 

in the world, the influenza strain, which in 1918 killed 40 million 

people and which has been extinct for most of the intervening 90 

years, has now been re-created. If that were to get out, there is no 

defense. And the death toll of the last century might just be a 

shadowing of what it could be in the 21st Century. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Is part of the reason why the Commission 

has decided that a biological attack is more likely than the other 

forms of weapons of mass destruction, that it is both less expensive 

to convert a biological pathogen into a weapon; and, second, it is 

easier to conceal it and, therefore, to deliver it, for instance, by 

bringing it into the United States? Are both of those factors? 

Senator GRAHAM. Both of those are factors, and Richard Danzig, 

whose name was used earlier, has said that the only thing that 

protects us now is a thin wall of the ignorance of our adversary. 

And as our adversary, as the scientist becomes the terrorist, as 

they gain access to this growing number of people who are capable 

of converting good into evil, that makes us more vulnerable. 

Senator TALENT. Mr. Chairman, could I have just 30 seconds? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead. 

Senator TALENT. I have put it this way: Two and two and two 

and two make eight. We know they want to get it—we know that— 

and that they have tried to get it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Senator TALENT. We know if they get it, they cannot be deterred, 

or it is very unlikely we can deter them from using it. We know 

it is within their organizational sophistication. They do not have to 

move to a new level of organizational sophistication to get either 

nuclear or biological material. And we know that their opportunities to get the material are growing. 

So you put all that together, and it is the conclusion of all these 

people we talked to and it is our gut instinct that this is a nearterm risk, which is, I think, very key. It is not something that is 

17 

in the intermediate or long term. It is near term. They are close 

to it and, hence, the 5-year period. 

Now, we do not have intelligence already that says 2013—and I 

do not think that was accidental—shortly after we said this Admiral McConnell basically confirmed it to the Kennedy School. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate what you have said, and if 

we combine it with what we saw in Mumbai a few weeks ago, 

which seemed to me to be a new chapter in terrorist activity, creating what one commentator, Walid Phares, has called ‘‘urban 

jihad,’’ and contemplate that kind of terrorist activity in a city not 

just being the use of firearms and explosives but biological weapons, you can imagine with horror the multiplication of the panic, 

which was clearly a major aim of the terrorists in Mumbai. 

Senator TALENT. Biological material is easier to weaponize and 

easier to reload. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Thank you. My time is up. Senator 

Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Talent, let me pick up on 

this discussion on biological weapons. Your report raises a lot of 

concerns about the lax or absent regulation of biological labs, and 

I was astounded in reading your report that there were 15,000 employees working at these labs in our country with, in some cases, 

very light regulation. 

When we passed a chemical plant security bill 2 years ago, we 

required a risk assessment of virtually all chemical plants in this 

country, and then DHS was in charge of reviewing these risk assessments and coming up with a risk-based security plan working 

with the private sector. So there was a risk-based system of regulation. 

Do you think that is the kind of regulatory scheme that we 

should be looking at imposing on these biological labs? 

Senator TALENT. I am going to defer, with your permission, Senator, to Robin Cleveland because she has really studied that. I 

would just say that I agree with your concern, and the 15,000 employees, as I understand it, are just the ones working in the labs 

that we regulate, which are the ones that get Federal funds. If you 

do not get Federal funds, you are not regulated at all. If you do, 

you are regulated by three different agencies, at least three, including USDA and CDC, so it is a major issue. 

I would just say I think that is one way we could go. Personally, 

I would not want to individualize too much because I think you can 

use a categorical approach, but certainly some kind of regulation 

based on an intelligent assessment of the risk would make a lot of 

sense. 

Senator COLLINS. Ms. Cleveland, I would like you to address 

that, but I also want you to address the issue of who the regulator 

should be, because that is a major issue. 

Ms. CLEVELAND. It is. 

Senator COLLINS. When you look at the current system, the CDC 

is regulating certain labs that deal with human pathogens, and 

then you have the Department of Agriculture regulating those dealing with plant or animal pathogens. The fact is that while both are 

very concerned about health and safety, neither the CDC nor the 

Department of Agriculture brings a homeland security perspective 

18 

to the regulations. So that, too, is of great concern, and it also leads 

to inconsistent levels of regulation. 

Ms. CLEVELAND. You have identified the problem that we tackled. I think there is a third area, which is that there are pathogens 

and agents that fall in between that both CDC and the Department 

of Agriculture have concerns about because they jump species. 

They go from animals to humans. So you have an emerging area 

where no agency essentially is in charge. 

I think I would agree that a risk-based approach is the right approach. I think the key is going to be to engage with Homeland Security and in turn with the life sciences community, because none 

of this is going to happen unless there is cooperation on that front. 

And I agree with Senator Talent that the risk-based approach is 

one option, but the key is having one point of contact and one set 

of security rules, safety rules, and a governing institution, in part 

so that folks working in the labs know who to go to, to get guidance 

in terms of what the standards for research should be. 

Senator COLLINS. You also mentioned the possibility of a voluntary code, and I have a lot of reservations about that approach 

based on what we saw with chemical plant security. Sure, you have 

some great companies who adopt excellent practices, but then you 

have the outliers who do not. And it is not really fair to rely on 

a voluntary system which may result in competitive disadvantages 

as well. So this is an area where I personally believe that we need 

to have a mandatory regime, but one that works, where the Federal Government works with the private labs as well as with the 

government-funded labs, to come up with a very workable regulatory scheme. And I continue to think also that when you have 

agencies involved that have very different missions and whose missions are not homeland security, you are not going to have the regulation have as its mission the homeland security perspective. So 

this is an area that I hope our Committee will look at. 

In my time that is remaining, let me also ask for your advice. 

It is not just regulating the control of the pathogens or the security 

of the site. It is also vetting individuals who work there as your 

term of a ‘‘biologist becoming a terrorist’’ suggests and as the Bruce 

Ivins case is a clarion call for action, where there were all these 

warning signs, and yet he maintained his access to these pathogens. 

So what are your recommendations in that area? 

Ms. CLEVELAND. Again, I think that the most—can I comment 

just first on the voluntary code. I think the reason the Commission 

endorsed the concept of some kind of voluntary code is because that 

has not been tried yet, and I think it is important to engage in 

good faith with the life sciences community, because I think there 

are many willing and interested parties. There has been some extraordinarily good work at the University of Maryland on what a 

code of conduct might look like, and I think it is an important first 

step in terms of, as I said, engaging in good faith with the life 

sciences community. But I think inevitably there will need to be 

some kind of mandatory rules and regulations. The key then will 

be, of course, trying to figure out how to engage our global partners 

to assure that they, too, support those standards because we do not 

19 

want to disadvantage the U.S. medical or life sciences communities. 

On the question of vetting and procedures, I think first and foremost an entity has to be established to be in charge. I do not know 

if it should be the FBI, that they should be responsible for all vetting, and then follow-up investigations, whether or not in the case 

of Fort Detrick it was the Army that was responsible for supervision of security procedures. Just as there is when you apply for 

a Federal Government job, there is one entity now responsible for 

background investigations and follow-up. I think the Commission 

felt strongly that there ought to be one entity in charge of supervision of this area and to start at that point. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

Senator Levin, we welcome you in your dual-hatted capacity, as 

a senior Member of this Committee and Chairman of the Senate 

Armed Services Committee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Senator 

Collins. Thank you for holding this hearing. Thanks for inviting the 

Members of the Armed Services Committee, who are not dualhatted, to join us here this morning. We were planning on having 

our own hearing, but given the time constraints and the fact that 

we have so many members on both committees, we thought this 

would be a more efficient way to have the Commission before us, 

for us to welcome our former colleagues, Senator Graham and Senator Talent, and other members of the Commission for the tremendous job that you have done, to thank you and thank your staff, 

because we know how important staff members are in all of this 

work. 

Let me start by raising the question of our relationship with Russia, and I think that relationship is going to require a lot more attention in a positive way. It has had a lot of attention in a negative 

way. But it is going to need a lot of attention positively for many 

reasons, and I think this is one of them. 

The U.S. bilateral effort with Russia to reduce the threat of 

WMD has always been a bedrock of the U.S.-Russian relationship, 

and there have been a number of significant accomplishments 

there. Now, I am not sure which of you or how many of your staff 

have traveled to Russia, but I know there has been some travel. 

And you have had discussions with senior military and government 

officials, and I am wondering what conclusions or insights in particular you can share with us about our future relationship with 

Russia, our cooperative relationship, which is so essential to address the WMD proliferation issue and terrorism generally and to 

try to further reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons. So, Mr. Chairman, maybe you could start on that. 

Senator GRAHAM. We did travel and spent 4 days in Russia. I 

was, frankly, a little surprised that we got visas because this was 

shortly after the Russian invasion of Georgia and all the tension 

that came out of that. 

We not only received visas, we received a surprisingly constructive and hospitable reception. This was a common theme. The 

20 

United States and Russia are two great powers. They are going to 

exist on this planet for a long time. There will be some good periods, and there will be some bad periods. But there is one thing that 

we share in common. Over 95 percent of the nuclear material on 

the globe is in our control, one of these two countries. We have a 

responsibility to the world to see that they are properly secure. 

These cannot become part of the transitory disputes between our 

two countries. 

We went to our Department of Energy, Secretary Bodman and 

our representatives who are in Russia monitoring Russian compliance, and they said that on the ground that statement was being 

realized, that, in fact, there had been no diminution in the Russian 

effort to secure their materials. We found that to be very encouraging. 

So our recommendation is that we continue to recognize the primacy of security of nuclear weapons in our relationship and that 

we do some things that would tell the world that we are serious 

about this. 

As two examples, a number of the agreements that were entered 

into after the end of the Cold War are about to expire. Some of 

them require that renewal negotiations start several years before 

the treaty is going to expire. We think that we should take the initiative in restarting those negotiations to indicate that we think— 

the relationship may change. It is not going to be as much of the 

United States providing money for the Soviet Union’s benefit, it 

will be more of a partnership, a relationship of two equals, but that 

the relationship be established is very important. 

Another area that I might say I am personally very interested in 

is I visited Pakistan in 2002, and I was struck with the fact that 

their Joint Chiefs of Staff said that we have virtually no relationship with the Indians analogous to what you had with the Soviet 

Union during the Cold War, relationships to try to avoid an accidental launch or an overreaction to an unintended, potentially provocative event. 

I think that the United States and Russia could play a great 

service to the world if they could go to India and Pakistan and say, 

‘‘Look, we have 40 years of experience with how you do this, and 

we would like to share that experience and maybe encourage you 

to develop some similar protocols,’’ so that what may well soon be 

the fourth and fifth largest nuclear powers in the world will have 

that degree of additional security in how they are managing these 

terrific sources of destruction. 

Senator LEVIN. Did you reach any conclusions about the IAEA, 

particularly in terms of the adequacy of funding of the IAEA? 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, we found that the funding is inadequate, 

that their job has multiplied by several factors in the last 25 years 

without any commensurate increase in resources, and that actually 

the level of surveillance at individual plants around the world is 

lower today than it was 25 years ago. And we are facing this nuclear renaissance where there will be many more plants. Also, a lot 

of the increased funding that they have gotten have been for specific projects not in their base budget. So it has been difficult for 

them to plan, to hire the scientists, build the labs that are going 

21 

to be required in this enlarged nuclear age when there is not an 

assured, reliable funding base. 

So I think, again, this is an area in which the United States 

should take leadership in analyzing what is going to be required, 

what we want for our own safety the IAEA to be able to do and 

step forward with the support and resources to make that happen. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROEMER. Senator, can I jump in at the end of Senator Graham’s remarks? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go ahead. 

Mr. ROEMER. We had several meetings in Moscow over a significant number of days, and after we talked about Georgia and the 

United States’ profound disappointment there and after we talked 

about human rights issues and after both sides were able to express their grievances and their concerns, we found that there was 

a great deal of commonality and interest in working together on 

counterproliferation initiatives. 

We outline in our report ways to strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative. We talk about extending the essential verification 

and monitoring provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. 

We talk about the role of encouraging China, Pakistan, and India 

to announce a moratorium on the production of fissile materials 

and reduce their existing nuclear stockpiles. 

But we also found, in addition to five or six things of common 

interest and where we could develop some joint initiatives, when 

we talked to a couple different generals that we had meetings with 

about their own threat, Chechnya, they quickly go back to the 

Beslan attacks in their school, where their schoolchildren were attacked by terrorists. And so they have a real common interest here, 

despite other disagreements in the world, to work together with us 

on this terrorism proliferation issue. And the more we can propose 

new initiatives to work with them and outline these issues and 

have the congressional oversight do it, the new Administration can 

initiate these things, and you can follow through on your oversight 

committees. We need meetings with the U.S. Ambassador to Russia 

and the Russian Ambassador to the U.S., and to stress this partnership with other meetings with China and Pakistan, I think we 

are going to find that this is a real area of productive joint initiative in the future. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Levin. 

Ms. CLEVELAND. Just one thing on the IAEA resource issue, I 

would be remiss if I did not say that I think there was consensus 

on the question of increased resources, but it ought to be performance based. And I think there are real concerns about the management of the institution. And so in my former capacity of not desiring to create unfunded mandates, I think that performance standard is critical. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, Commissioner Roemer I know 

is going to have to leave shortly, and I know he regrets that necessity. So I would suggest if anyone has a question that they would 

like to direct to Mr. Roemer, if they might do so soon. 

22 

Mr. ROEMER. I apologize. I have an event at the Center for National Policy that I am hosting with Ambassador Thomas Pickering 

and the author of ‘‘Victory on the Potomac,’’ who helped organize 

the successful efforts on the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and we are trying to look at ways to get this intergration in our foreign policy 

arena and our national security. So we are having an event at the 

center at noon, and I have to excuse myself for that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Roemer. We understand 

completely, and I think we will ask Members who have questions 

for you to file them with you in writing. 

Mr. ROEMER. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I just want to say very briefly, because 

Senator Graham said something about how important it would be 

for Pakistan and India to develop the kind of high-level communications about their nuclear systems that we have had with the 

Russians. I was in New Delhi and Islamabad last week, and what 

was apparent to all of us—and probably to anybody who was not 

there—is that the terrorist attack in Mumbai was not solely or 

even primarily an expression of the classic jihadist goals. It probably had a specific aim here, which was to disrupt—I do not want 

to overstate it—the improving relations between Pakistan and 

India, particularly since President Zardari took office. In fact, it 

was perhaps intended to disrupt the increasing cooperation between the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan with regard to 

striking at terrorist basis in the federally administered tribal 

areas. 

So it just reminds us of the way in which non-state actors using 

conventional or unconventional weapons of mass destruction can 

not only carry out fanatical ideological aims, but also can actually 

influence and sometimes control the behavior of state actors. Of 

course, I hope that we can get back on the trail that you, Senator 

Graham, have suggested. 

Senator Collins and I wanted to hold this hearing as quickly as 

we could after your excellent 9/11 Commission Report. I think we 

had a secondary subconscious aim, which was to have one more 

hearing at which we could have the honor of the presence of John 

Warner. With that, I am honored to call on Senator Warner. 

OPENING TESTIMONY OF SENATOR WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

commend you and the Ranking Member and my distinguished colleague Senator Levin for having this hearing. I am delighted. I 

guess this is my last appearance in 216 times on this side of the 

dias, and then maybe after 2 years I can get on the other side. But 

I have a hiatus to fill under the current laws. 

Commissioner Roemer, I do appreciate your reference to the old 

days on the Intelligence Committee with Senator DeConcini. I was 

Vice Chairman, I think. Was that during the period you were 

there? 

Mr. ROEMER. Yes, sir, and I neglected to mention how instrumental you were—— 

Senator WARNER. No, that is all right. I just wanted to—— 

Mr. ROEMER [continuing]. In helping to pass the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

23 

Senator WARNER. Do not worry about any neglect. I have received more than my share of references to the past. 

I am a believer in the work of commissions, and they serve a 

very important advisory role to the Executive and Legislative 

Branches and to inform the public. And I wish to commend each 

of you individually for a job well done. 

I simply want to ask a question, too, on process because undoubtedly the new Administration will reflect on the use of commissions. 

Do you feel that the Federal Executive Branch responded fully and 

adequately to your several requests for information and discussions 

at various levels? 

Senator GRAHAM. Senator, let me say how much the Nation has 

been honored and benefited by your service. We wish you well. 

Senator WARNER. Well, I thank you, Commissioner Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. And I doubt that there is going to be a 2-year 

hiatus in your—— 

Senator WARNER. The law requires that. Otherwise, I go to prison. [Laughter.] 

Senator GRAHAM. But there certainly are lawful ways in which 

you can—— 

Senator WARNER. Well, I am not sure. I have studied this law at 

great length, and I believe at my age it really is not good for my 

health to be in prison. [Laughter.] 

Senator GRAHAM. We submitted our report to President Bush, 

Vice President Cheney, and other members of the current Administration, and while some might interpret some of our observations, 

particularly the one that we are losing ground to our adversaries, 

as being negative, I think there was a general recognition that is 

true not because of our inactivity but because the game has 

stepped up another notch, and we have got to do likewise. 

We also submitted it to our former colleague, Senator Biden, on 

behalf of the new Administration, and he pointed out that Senator 

Obama has already, for instance, committed to establishing a position within the Executive Branch that will have singular responsibility for the oversight of these issues and, without making any 

specific commitments, indicated a general support for the thrust of 

the recommendations that we have. And we submitted our report 

to the leadership in the House and the Senate. 

Senator WARNER. I saw all the entries in this well-prepared dossier. 

Senator TALENT. Senator, I would say that we received good cooperation. I understood your question to be did they cooperate with 

us? 

Senator WARNER. Yes. 

Senator TALENT. And I think they did. In fact, I would really say 

the cooperation was very good. There were the usual issues once 

we got our clearances, those of us who needed it, about how many 

could go in and see this classified thing and that. 

Senator WARNER. On the whole, you think it was—— 

Senator TALENT. I do, and I think that everybody we dealt 

with—and we worked with congressional bodies, also, as well as 

third parties—wished us well. We put this, I think, in the Executive Summary. Really, we are trying to reassure the American people that we did not encounter anybody in any agency obviously of 

24 

either party in either branch of government who did not want the 

government of the United States to succeed in stopping weapons of 

mass destruction. I mean, everybody is working very hard to 

achieve that goal, and I think there was good cooperation. 

Senator WARNER. Do the other two Commissioners likewise feel 

that is the case? 

Mr. ROEMER. I would agree with the Chairman and Senator Talent, Senator Warner. But on to your larger question about commissions in general, which you said you generally support, as you 

probably know the history of these commissions, I believe, our first 

President created the first commission and picked average citizens 

to help advise him on what happened after the Whiskey Rebellion 

and what he should do about it. And there were a couple people 

that recommended what he should do as a response to that rebellion, and I believe he took their advice. So the first one was fairly 

successful. 

We have had commissions on war, on race relations, on intelligence gathering, and on the September 11, 2001, attacks, and I 

think generally commissions can serve a very important, worthwhile, and earnest purpose. But I also think that they can be 

overdone, and Congress can begin to punt some of its responsibilities to outside commissions when Congress itself needs to concentrate on its own oversight, accountability, and reorganization. 

So I think there is a balance to be achieved here in the future. 

I may be talking myself out of future jobs, Senator Warner, and 

never be on a commission again. But I think that we might be tipping the balance here and creating too many of these commissions. 

And the hard work of oversight and making our government accountable, of knowing what is going on in the Executive Branch, 

holding them accountable and being responsible to our citizenry is 

a key job done in our committees. 

As Richard Fenno, the scholar on committees, said, ‘‘The work of 

Congress is the work of its committees.’’ And that includes oversight. 

Senator WARNER. Ms. Cleveland, do you have any view? 

Ms. CLEVELAND. I concur. We got full cooperation. 

Senator WARNER. Good. 

Ms. CLEVELAND. I think we met with more than 200 staffers and 

various agencies, and they were very frank, I think, in their assessment of some of the challenges they face. 

Senator WARNER. As I have stated, you did a remarkable job in 

a short time. 

To what extent have any of the entities of the Federal Government, particularly the DNI, come back and commented on your report? And if so, how do those comments then become incorporated 

in such reports as are made permanent? 

Senator GRAHAM. Senator, our report was issued on December 3, 

2008, so it has been just a bit over a week. To my knowledge, there 

has been no formal comment by any agency. I mentioned the one 

statement that Admiral McConnell made, which—— 

Senator WARNER. Yes, I have read that. 

Senator GRAHAM [continuing]. Seemed to be parallel with our assessment of the risk. Our report is our report. It is now bound. In 

fact, if I could give a commercial, it is being printed by Vantage 

25 

1The report, titled ‘‘World at Risk,’’ appears in the Appendix on page 58. 

Books and will be sold broadly. The proceeds that would normally 

be the author’s royalty will go to a U.S. foundation which is working to build schools and hospitals in Pakistan, which we think underscores the centrality of that country in accomplishing our objective of avoiding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

Senator WARNER. Senator Graham, just on process again, obviously you had to get into classified material. I think you mentioned 

that. But you elected not to file a classified annex to your report. 

If so, for what reason did you decide not to do that? 

Senator GRAHAM. First, we did submit the report to the appropriate agencies for clearance. 

Senator WARNER. I am not suggesting that, but there is obviously 

some material you unearthed in your hard work that would be of 

advice to both the Executive and Legislative Branches in the nature of classified observations. 

Senator GRAHAM. At this point it was our feeling that the essential message that we wanted to convey and the supporting rationale and documentation for that position could be conveyed in the 

declassified form and be available to all the American people as 

well as decision makers. 

Senator TALENT. I just confirmed with staff, because Senator 

Graham and I talked about this late in the stages, we did not think 

that there was enough that relied upon classified material for us 

to have to do that, Senator. And we ended up not having to do that. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much. I thank the Chairman 

and Ranking Member. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner. 

Let me now indicate for the information of the Members here 

what the early-bird order suggests, and obviously we can only call 

on people if they are here: Senators Akaka, Voinovich, Carper, 

Coleman, McCaskill, Nelson, Martinez, Thune, and Pryor. 

Senator Akaka. 

OPENING TESTIMONY OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would 

like to thank you and Senator Collins for holding this hearing 

today. And I want to also welcome our Senators here, Bob Graham 

and Jim Talent, and also Tim Roemer and Robin Cleveland, and 

along with your welcome is a welcome to other Commissioners, as 

well as staff. Thank you for your efforts in completing this report, 

‘‘World at Risk.’’ 1 And I share your concerns that WMD proliferation and terrorism are critical national security issues. 

I want to be a little more specific in asking you this question. 

The Commission recommends building a national security workforce for the 21st Century with the related goal of creating a culture of interagency collaboration, flexibility, and innovation. And 

along with this in your report, you focus on WMD proliferation and 

terrorism, and you have highlighted the need for improved government operations as well as improved coordination throughout government to counter these threats and strengthen our national security workforce. 

26 

In terms of creating this culture, can you name which departments and agencies would benefit in particular from greater participation in these joint duty programs? 

Senator TALENT. Thanks for your question, Senator, and for spotlighting a really important part of the report. It is one of the reasons I mentioned it in my very brief summary. 

I would say everybody benefits because it is agency-wide, but the 

ones who, I think, were the most concerned were probably the intelligence agencies, their ability to analyze data and continue to 

promote a joint culture. One of the good-news stories of this report 

is the progress that has been made within the intelligence community in accomplishing culture change, operating in a more synergistic fashion along the lines of a Goldwater-Nichols model in the 

military. But to do it, they have got to increase joint curriculum, 

joint education within the service. They have to continue to recruit 

effectively and step up their efforts to recruit among the right national communities, people who can analyze this data. 

And then, second, the labs were very concerned, Sandia was very 

concerned that if something specific is not done, long-term type of 

recruiting of people into those kinds of sciences, they are not going 

to be able to continue providing the expertise that they provide 

across all agencies. As you know, Senator, a huge number of agencies contract with the labs in various kinds of purposes. And if they 

do not have this ability, they are not going to be able to provide 

the needs for our government, much less international organizations like the IAEA. 

Senator AKAKA. This report references the need for more individuals with language skills in the Federal Government. As you may 

know, I have been a strong advocate for the need for a more comprehensive approach to increase language education and training 

in order to grow the number of qualified applicants and ensure that 

the current gap in language skills does not expand. 

What do you believe are the most significant challenges to recruiting and training individuals in these skills? 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, first, I think we do not have today a pipeline that is manageable to give us some confidence that there will 

be those follow-on personnel to carry out important national missions. Contrast the civilian side of the government with the military. The military not only has military academies, but also in 

many universities and colleges, Reserve Officer Training Corps 

(ROTC) programs, so that the Army, Navy, and Air Force can tell 

what their flow of young officers will be and can plan to carry out 

their missions based on that human capital. We do not have that 

in other areas. 

I will say I have personally been interested in establishing a very 

similar process for the intelligence community where we could 

bring young people in at a university level, have them study for 3, 

4, or 5 years these difficult strategic languages, as well as study 

some of the science that the intelligence community will need so 

that it, like the military, will have an assured source of new personnel. I think that is one idea that could be expanded to substantially accomplish overcoming the concerns that you have expressed. 

Senator TALENT. If I could add very briefly, Senator, to that, 

there are some practical issues involved that you keep running 

27 

into. The kind of people we want are highly skilled people who 

have a lot of opportunities in a lot of areas, and it just takes a lot 

longer for the government to hire them. They have to go through 

the security clearances and the rest of it. These are individuals getting out of a post-graduate course; they cannot wait around for 14 

or 15 months to find out whether they get a job or whether they 

will be able to go to work. 

So we have to balance better the need for the security clearances 

and all the things the government does before it hires people with 

the need for speed as well so that we can continue to recruit the 

best people. 

Senator GRAHAM. And if I could just add another element to that, 

today there are groups of Americans who in many ways represent 

the most immediate source of assistance who have been largely excluded, particularly from the intelligence community, and those are 

persons of Middle Eastern background. It is very difficult for a 

young person, let us say, from an Iranian ancestry to get into the 

intelligence agencies. A large part of that has to do with the clearance process that puts a lot of emphasis on your family background. It is hard to get access to the family if the family is in 

Iran, and it is not unlikely that you have an uncle or some family 

member who may be holding a position that raises some concern. 

I think another benefit of a program like the military’s ROTC is 

that these young people would be under very personal, close surveillance for 4 years, and you could make a judgment as to their 

reliability more based on your assessment of their character than 

what their family may be doing back in their home countries. 

Senator AKAKA. Let me finally comment that I believe there is 

a need for a comprehensive strategy that needs to be developed regarding critical language skills, and I take it that you also believe 

that, and I hope we can move in that direction. 

Mr. Chairman, I have a full statement that I would like to be included in the record. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection, it will be included in 

the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:] 

OPENING PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

I would like to thank Senator Lieberman for holding this hearing today. I also 

want to welcome Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent, along with Commissioners 

Tim Roemer and Robin Cleveland, and thank them, along with the other commissioners and staff, for their efforts in completing this report. I share your concerns 

that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism are critical national security threats. 

Your report comes at a crucial time. Tensions between India and Pakistan remain 

high in the wake of the horrific terrorist attacks in Mumbai. We must not forget 

that both countries have nuclear weapons and both are beneficiaries of new nuclear 

trade agreements with major powers. At the non-state actor level, al-Qaeda has not 

disavowed its desire to obtain weapons of mass destruction. History suggests that 

terrorists often attempt attacks shortly before or after governmental transitions, 

and the Department of Homeland Security is preparing for its first-ever presidential 

transition. These are challenging times. 

Along with your report’s focus on WMD proliferation and terrorism, you highlighted the need for improved government operations and the vital role of the citizen. The report asserts that we must improve coordination throughout our government to counter these threats and strengthen our national security workforce. I 

have long maintained that we cannot counter national security threats, including 

WMD proliferation and terrorism, without a workforce that has the full range of 

28 

language, cultural, scientific, and technical capabilities. In addition, we must ensure 

that we openly and honestly inform citizens about the threats facing them and what 

role they can play in our Nation’s homeland security. 

At a critical point in our Nation’s history, almost 50 years ago, an agency designed to address the challenges of arms control was created. In 1999, that agency 

was eliminated and its functions merged into the State Department. At the current, 

critical point in history, we may need a new agency focused on nonproliferation and 

arms control that is designed to meet 21st Century threats. The hearings that I held 

earlier this year made it clear that the State Department is not fully capable of facing these threats. I plan to continue focusing on this issue during the 111th Congress. 

I want to thank again our witnesses for being here today. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Akaka. Senator Carper, 

welcome. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I want to say to our colleagues, Senator Graham and Senator Talent, it is great to see you 

both. Welcome. And Tim Roemer slipped out of the room, but I 

served with him in the House and am very much appreciative of 

his continued service to our country. 

Ms. Cleveland, you are in good company, and they tell me that 

they are in good company with you, too. So thank you for the work 

that you have done on this. 

I have a question first for Senator Graham, maybe a couple of 

questions, and then I have a question that I would like to direct 

to anyone on the panel who might wish to respond. But I am especially interested in the part of your report that focuses on Pakistan 

and your recommendations there, too. 

Senator Graham, my understanding is that you strongly believe 

that our country should appoint a special envoy to deal with IndiaPakistan tensions. Was that recommendation actually included in 

the report that you have prepared? 

Senator GRAHAM. The answer is no. 

Senator CARPER. Could you talk about that? 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, that was part of a general policy that we 

wanted to focus our recommendations on goals to be accomplished 

and strategic steps necessary to accomplish those goals. We 

thought it was inappropriate for us to be at what I would call the 

tactical level: First, in many cases it went beyond our expertise, 

and us saying it did not add much to the force of the argument; 

and, second, that is a decision which either Congress or a new 

President or some other responsible person has, and they should 

have the latitude to determine what tactics they want to follow. 

I understand that this idea of having a person who specifically 

will be focused on our interests in this part of the world—and we 

think Pakistan, while there are some things that are Pakistan-specific, it also has to be dealt with in a larger regional context. You 

are not going to bleed off a lot of the bad feeling between Pakistan 

and India unless you can help deal with questions like Kashmir, 

which has been a 60-year thorn in the side of that relationship. So 

whoever performs this function needs to have a portfolio that is not 

singularly Pakistan, but allows the region to be part of the solution 

to the problem. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Let me come back at this just in a little different way. I appreciate why you did not include it in your 

29 

report. But could you explain to us how such an envoy could be effective given that India has, I think, firmly and consistently taken 

a position for a long time that they are not interested in outside 

mediation of their disagreements with Pakistan? 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, the landscape is littered with failures of 

efforts to have special envoys, and many of those bodies are in the 

Middle East. But there also have been successes. For instance, I 

think the work that Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and General 

Wesley Clark did in Bosnia to try to defuse that very contentious 

part of the world and to stabilize it was very successful and has 

largely helped keep the peace in the Balkans. So that would be an 

example of effective diplomacy in a very contentious area that may 

give you some hope that a similar initiative could be helpful in 

Central Asia. 

Senator TALENT. Senator, on this issue—and we did discuss 

this—I did not personally have a dog in that hunt, as we say back 

in Mississippi. And I think everybody believes that it is important 

to pay very high level attention to Pakistan. How the Presidentelect chooses to do that, whether through a special envoy, which is 

certainly a possibility—and you see this in several places in the report where we did not want to presume to make tactical choices for 

the President or, for that matter, for Congress. Where we felt 

strongly about a position, we said it, like the WMD Coordinator. I 

think we all agree with the thrust of what you are saying, that, 

look, it needs to be regional, there needs to be somebody who is 

senior, who has the attention of the President and the foreign policy establishment who is paying attention to that. I do not think 

anybody here would disagree with that, for all the reasons you are 

saying. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

I noticed that the Commission came down in support of the Bush 

Administration’s decision 5 or 6 years ago to walk away from the 

negotiations on an Inspections Protocol to the Biological Weapons 

Convention. And I think you also recommended that the next Administration resist international pressure to resume negotiations 

on such a protocol. 

Ms. Cleveland, I think you may have addressed this briefly this 

morning, but could one or several of you elaborate on why you 

think it would be a mistake to try to set up an international inspections regime for biological weapons and what steps you recommend instead to reduce the risk of a biological weapons attack? 

Ms. CLEVELAND. Senator, we heard from a number of people that 

had been involved in those negotiations early on, and we are looking at them with fresh eyes. And I think the concern was, given 

the dual-use nature of so much of the material that we are talking 

about, it would be virtually impossible to come up with a credible 

regime. And rather than tilt at windmills, I think the sense was 

that it was more important to come up with a framework where 

there would be international adherence to the norms and standards 

in the underlying treaty. 

I am trying to think if we heard from any witnesses that actually 

argued in favor of proceeding with a revival of the protocol. I think 

on a bipartisan basis we heard generally that it would not be a 

30 

well-advised course. It would be expending an enormous amount of 

time to pursue a fleeting possibility. 

I think what we learned was that when you had demands imposed by Iran and some other countries as to what would the cost 

be in terms of the verification protocol, they were suggesting, for 

example, suspension of all U.S. export controls in return for establishing a verification regime that the cost was perceived as too high 

and probably would not yield the kind of result we want in terms 

of access to information. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Let me say as one who came to the conclusion 

that is in our report with some reluctance, because I recognized the 

importance of having a strong international convention to govern— 

biological weapons are distinctly different than nuclear where we 

do have an agency, the IAEA, that does that. There are a definable 

number of sites around the world where nuclear material is being 

produced, used, or stored. So it is possible to have the list of the 

addresses of all those places and have a meaningful set of inspections. With biological, the number is so enormous and constantly 

changing that we felt that you might create false expectations if 

you said we were going to have effective international inspection. 

What we suggested was that there should be two objectives now 

with the biological weapons. One is to get all the countries that are 

in this business members of the convention. There still are a handful of important countries that are not even members of the Biological Weapons Convention. And then, second, have a verification 

regime which is nation-based. I am now sort of stating my own definition of what that means, but maybe coming up with some standards of what does a nation have to have in terms of regulations and 

enforcement capability to give the world confidence that their laboratories are not being used for inappropriate purposes, and then 

monitor whether the nation is complying with those standards of 

regulations and enforcement capability. 

One of the things about biological is it is in everybody’s interest 

not to let this leak out. No country, no matter how big or small, 

wants to be fingered as the contributant to thousands of people 

being killed because biological weapons leaked out of their laboratories into the hands of terrorists. So we think you can build on 

that common interest of all the nations of the world to have an effective verification scheme that does not overstate what a biological 

IAEA might be able to accomplish. 

Senator CARPER. OK, thanks. My time has expired. Let me just 

say again thank you for your continued service and for the good 

work that you continue to do for our country. Much obliged. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Carper. 

Next is Senator Coleman. It strikes me I talked about the various reasons we are holding this hearing. Perhaps one unconscious 

one was to give you an opportunity, Senator Coleman, to focus your 

considerable talents on something other than the recount going on 

in Minnesota. We welcome you to the meeting and thank you for 

being here. 

31 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually, this is a 

good opportunity to talk to my colleague from Florida about that 

when this is all over. But let me say to my colleagues, by the way, 

I do thank you for this tremendous continued service. We use the 

term ‘‘friends’’ in this body sometimes too loosely, but Senator Talent I consider a dear friend and a great American, and, Senator 

Graham, I have always had great respect for your leadership in 

this area. And, Ms. Cleveland, you are obviously in great company. 

I want to talk a little bit about the biological threat and just step 

back. One of the things that we did in the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations was look at how easy the possibilities 

of obtaining nuclear material were to create a dirty bomb by setting up a bogus facility. And that is an area where it is highly regulated. A specific agency has the responsibility, regulated both on 

the State and Federal level, and we have found gaps in the system 

and were able to set up a bogus company to get access to material 

that could be used to create a dirty bomb. So I look at that area 

that is regulated, and then I look at the biological area, and the 

regulation that we have is a regulation with a specific select agent 

list. The nature of biological materials is that you can create new 

agents today that are not on any list. So the first question, then 

perhaps to Ms. Cleveland, how easy would it be to create a bogus 

BSL–3 lab to get pathogens? Then, if in operation, what is the capability at the State and Federal level to know that there is a problem? 

Ms. CLEVELAND. Senator, I do not think you need to create a 

bogus lab because I think that the oversight and regulation in 

place already presents a risk. With the proliferation of labs that we 

have in the United States and the lack of clear accountability, it 

does not need to be bogus. 

So I think what is important is to establish a single-point contact 

in terms of agency oversight and supervise the labs that we have. 

Senator COLEMAN. And I believe Senator Collins pursued this 

area in her question, but the report talks about at times coordination between DHS and Health and Human Services. You do not 

want to look back and said that it did not happen. Is there a recommendation for a single source where the regulation should be 

centered, where the responsibility is so that we are not caught in 

a ‘‘he said, she said’’ situation? 

Ms. CLEVELAND. I think we all felt that Homeland Security had 

the mission to protect the country, and that ought to be the beginning point. And I think we had a sense in talking to Governor 

Napolitano, the designated Secretary, that she was seized with the 

urgency of that task. But I think an agency with the focus of the 

homeland security mission probably should be in charge. 

Senator TALENT. If I could respond to this area, because you 

were kind enough to be complimentary toward us, we before emphasized our recommendations for congressional change, but I 

think it is important to look—it is important to emphasize how 

hugely effective the role of this Committee and the Congress will 

be in this area, more so than if just Executive action is taken. 

Probably in theory this could be done by Executive order. But one 

of the things we found in talking to the intelligence community 

32 

about the intelligence reforms was the prominence of congressional 

action in that law in their thinking. Even the ones who did not like 

the idea of cultural jointness and the rest of it kept saying when 

Congress passed that law, we knew we had to salute and go on. 

So this is an area where if you all follow up, even if theoretically 

the President can do it—it is weird, but I think the Executive 

Branch people may be more impressed by you all doing something 

than an order from the President in this area. I am sorry to take 

up your time, but I just—— 

Senator COLEMAN. No. My next question would have focused on 

that action. This is an area that needs great oversight in a way 

that does not diminish the scientific capability or capacity of folks 

in research to do the things they do. But here is an area of great 

vulnerability, and I presume at the State level there is not a lot 

of oversight here. 

Ms. CLEVELAND. You have problems at the Federal, State, and 

local level, and you currently have a system in place that requires 

voluntary reporting of the transfer of these lethal pathogens from 

lab to lab. But as we all know, when you have voluntary reporting, 

if it does not happen and there is no follow-up and accountability 

in terms of Federal oversight or congressional oversight, voluntary 

reporting sometimes falls between the cracks. 

Senator COLEMAN. I would hope and anticipate that we will continue to move down this path. 

Let me shift gears a little bit. In the area of citizen response and 

the things that we can do to facilitate—I think the report says, 

‘‘Quick access to information can save lives.’’ And I have looked at 

some of the things we have done in the past, and I think the report 

talks about it, recommendations about duct tape and even the color 

coding level that we have today, and I am not sure how helpful 

that is to most citizens. Who takes the bull by the horns on this 

one and really ups the level of citizen awareness of very concrete 

steps that can and should be taken, when something like this happens somewhere, so that the response is one that saves lives, minimizes the damage, and ameliorates some of the terrible things that 

might otherwise follow? 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, let me suggest that this Committee 

would be an appropriate place to take that leadership. As an example, let me just suggest areas of citizen involvement. 

Every community in this country is going to need to have the capability to respond particularly to a biological attack. While our 

focus is on preventing it, the reality is that is very difficult to do, 

and there may be a biological attack. How well is St. Paul, Hartford, or Portland prepared to deal with that? I think laying out 

what are some of the standards that a community should strive for, 

what is the gold standard of a community being prepared for this, 

so that citizens could then hold their local officials responsible for 

that level of protections. 

A second area is that we think that the American people, in large 

and in specific groups, need to be better informed. The question has 

been raised going back to this anthrax incident of 2001. The FBI 

carried out that investigation in a very closed manner. It has been 

suggested that maybe if they were more open and had involved 

more scientists in this process, it would not have taken 7 years to 

33 

have found out what the nature of the attack was. So using the 

population broadly, but also specific groups of the population more 

effectively. 

Another area, the British, when we met with Scotland Yard, MI– 

5, and MI–6 in London, they said there was no terrorist attack inside Great Britain that had been aborted without citizen involvement. They have used their citizens very effectively as the front 

line of knowledge of what is going on in the community. 

Now, they have a different history and culture, from World War 

II when they were under attack for such a long period of time, to 

the Irish Republican Army (IRA) since World War II. We, fortunately, avoided both of those experiences. So it is going to be a 

heavier lift to get U.S. citizens engaged at that level, but it would 

certainly be a tremendous asset in our arsenal of avoiding a weapon of mass destruction if we could do so. 

Senator TALENT. And we recommend the Secretary of Homeland 

Security take the lead in this public information ‘‘campaign,’’ which 

is maybe the wrong word for it. Actually, when we briefed the Secretary-designate, she indicated a real eagerness to roll up her 

sleeves and get involved in this. And I think it is natural to come 

from her. It would vindicate the credibility of the agency, which 

was hurt 6 or 7 years ago with the initial discussions of it. So it 

ought to come from them. 

It is not good that the American public is as unaware of the nature and potential consequences of a biological attack as they are. 

It will just promote panic if something happens. So I think it is at 

that level that it ought to occur, and I think our report says so. 

And, again, this is an example of why we were saying that, for the 

sake of public safety and Congress’ participation in this, it would 

be good to get a more unified oversight of that agency so you all 

can play your role in making certain that they do what they are 

supposed to do. And right now, oversight in that area is not what 

it ought to be. 

Ms. CLEVELAND. Can I correct something that I said earlier? 

There is a mandatory requirement to report on transfer of a select 

group of pathogens. The problem is that there is no enforcement 

mechanism. There is no way to determine whether or not that code, 

in fact, is being observed. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Coleman. Senator 

Bill Nelson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. Thank you all for your continued public service. 

The Congress has been repeatedly assured by the Bush Administration that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is safe. What if the worst 

took place that you had a fall of the government into the hands of 

some terrorist group? Do you all want to comment? 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, today the nuclear arsenal in Pakistan is 

under the control of the military, as it has been traditionally, and 

there are strained relations between the military and the civilian 

government. Witness this recent incident where the civilian government ordered the military intelligence head to go to Mumbai to 

34 

help with the investigation, and then the military reversed those 

orders and the intelligence officer stayed home and did not go to 

India. So that is an unstable relationship. 

I think what would be ideal is if we could work with the Pakistanis and maybe with the Russians and some other entities so it 

is not just a total U.S. operation to try to internationalize the security of both Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and India’s nuclear weapons. That would be a source of comfort to both of those countries 

and to the world. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Graham, you mentioned earlier most 

insightfully that what we need to do, you were building on the idea 

of the soft power in Pakistan, and it underscores one of your recommendations that we need to counter and defeat extremist ideology in Pakistan, and you said with schools and hospitals. I agree. 

Do you want to for the record amplify? 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, what I said was that this report that we 

have, the royalties for the sale of this book will go to a U.S. foundation whose purpose is to build schools and hospitals in Pakistan. 

We thought that was an appropriate way to underscore the centrality of Pakistan in responding to the challenge of proliferation. 

Senator Talent has spent a great deal of time thinking about this 

issue of the use of soft power generally, but with Pakistan being 

the initial point of impact, and I think I will turn it over to him. 

But basically I think it says that we cannot depend just on the 

sword to achieve our objectives. We cannot continue to deal with 

the symptoms of terrorism. We have to start to understand what 

are the root causes of terrorism and where, through soft power and 

diplomatic, economic, and human interchanges, we can begin to 

bleed some of that extremism out of the system. 

Senator TALENT. And I think to answer the thrust of your question, the answer is yes. I think we have a unique time because 

there is really a pretty broad consensus, including within the military, and Secretary Gates, that we need to have this capability as 

a government. In addition to the traditional military and intelligence capability, this is also very important. This is a full-spectrum type of engagement with the terrorists. 

Now, what we did, Senator, was we took it a little step further, 

and we said we just cannot think of it in vague terms of foreign 

assistance. Our agencies that do this have to sit down and ask 

themselves what capabilities do we need. Just as the military interact when the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) started hitting 

us; they said, OK, we have to be able to identify the signatures of 

the bomb makers, and so there are some capabilities we need, and 

how do we get that organically? We need the State Department to 

do the same thing. What does this really mean? And we said in the 

report as a minimum it is the ability to project targeted, effective 

messages about our intentions and to use communications to 

counter what the terrorists are saying, and at least in a targeted 

way—and this is what you are referring to—help people build local 

social, economic, and educational institutions that are a bulwark 

against radicalism. We all want to do that, but we do not want to 

be in a situation where President Obama says, ‘‘Boy, I really like 

that,’’ issues a presidential directive, and nothing happens because 

nobody has the capability to do it. 

35 

And so the same thing you all achieved in the intelligence community that is going on there now needs really to happen in the 

State Department, and we have not briefed Secretary-designate 

Hillary Clinton about this. I cannot imagine she would disagree, 

and I just think it needs to be a priority. 

Senator NELSON. Looking back on the issue, Ms. Cleveland, of 

Dr. Ivins being a rogue scientist, what did we learn that we could 

use to prevent that kind of action in the future? 

Ms. CLEVELAND. Senator, we did not look specifically at the Ivins 

case, I think in part because the Congress has determined that another commission will take a look at it. We did not choose to look 

backwards in terms of specific events. But I think what we established in looking at management of labs and anthrax in general as 

a threat, I think we have come to terms with the fact that there 

needs to be improved management and oversight of the labs. There 

needs to be some kind of regulatory body that has specific responsibility for oversight and establishing security and safety procedures. 

But we did not look specifically at the Ivins case. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Thune. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN THUNE, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, want to 

echo the words of my colleagues and thank you all for lending your 

experience and your skill to this very important mission. Both of 

you, Senators, and Ms. Cleveland as well are people who are very 

accomplished, and I know from personal experience, having served 

with Senator Talent on the Armed Services Committee, the knowledge you have of these issues and the passion you have for making 

sure that we are taking the steps that are necessary to keep our 

country safe in what is an increasingly dangerous world. So thank 

you all for your efforts, and also I note that I suspect that when 

you got into this, you did not realize that you would be putting 

yourselves in peril on your trip to Pakistan. That had to have been 

a reminder of the dangerous world in which we live. And I think 

that your principal finding that we would experience some sort of 

an attack in the next 5 years came as a shock to a lot of people, 

but also a reminder to us how important it is that we double down 

in our efforts to make sure that we prevent that sort of thing from 

happening. 

I want to follow up on the question that Senator Nelson raised 

about Pakistan because your findings did, I think, talk about the 

use of soft power initiatives. And, of course, as you know, a number 

of things have happened there recently, which have drawn into 

question their ability to carry out those types of initiatives. I am 

just wondering in terms of current events in Pakistan that have occurred subsequent to the submission of your report, do you think 

that any of the recommendations may need to be modified to take 

into account the likelihood that we may have to deal with Pakistan 

in terms of it being a failed state? There is growing belief and consensus that could be the case. So do you believe that Pakistan is 

on the brink of becoming a failed state? 

36 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, if I could first comment on your introductory statement and thank you for your generous remarks, we do 

not mean to be the Commission of doom and gloom, because as we 

stated, this risk assessment is on the assumption that we do nothing over the next 5 years. There are many things that are available 

to us which will reduce that probability, more likely than not that 

it will occur. The challenge is going to be do we have the will and 

the wisdom to do so? That will be something for historians to recount. 

As to Pakistan, I remember when President Kennedy made his 

announcement that we were going to go to the moon in this decade 

and put an American on the moon and bring them safely back, he 

said, ‘‘We do this not because it is easy but because it is hard. It 

will test our capabilities.’’ Well, I would apply the same thing to 

the whole issue of bleeding extremism out of the world, beginning 

with Pakistan. It is hard, and probably nothing of the scale that 

we think is required has ever been attempted before. So we think 

it is going to challenge the imagination and the creativity of the 

United States and its leadership as to what are effective strategies 

and then it will require the will to implement them. 

I will just state one thing that gives me some encouragement. 

About 60 years ago then-Vice President Nixon had a 12-stop visit 

to Latin America planned. The first two stops he met insults, vulgarity, and tomatoes. And after two stops, he terminated the trip 

and came back home. That probably was the nadir of U.S. relations 

in Latin America. Although there are still rough spots, such as Mr. 

Chavez in Venezuela, the general relationship between the United 

States and our Latin American neighbors is dramatically improved. 

I think that a fundamental reason for that is that over a period of 

half a century, thousands of young people from the United States 

went to Latin America, and they learned something about that region not by theory but by actual personal experience. And, similarly, thousands of young people came from Latin America particularly to study at our colleges and universities, and they have now 

returned home to occupy leadership positions. 

That may or may not be a model that has some application here, 

but it does say that a hard problem, improving U.S. relations in the 

hemisphere, with creativity and commitment can be, if not solved, 

substantially mitigated. And I think we have the same potential in 

Pakistan and in the Muslim world. 

Senator TALENT. As you know, Senator, the definition of a failed 

state is difficult. People argue over what is and what is not. There 

are certain elements that I am concerned personally—I do not 

know if the Commission said anything about this—are present, the 

instability within certain aspects of their territory, the fact that, as 

Senator Graham was mentioning, the government does not entirely 

control the government. And the attack on Mumbai does highlight 

all of that. 

I do not know how useful it is, though, to conclude they are a 

failed state. I think that it presents some of the risks of that. And 

this is why we think this is a really good place to begin applying 

both the traditional power because we recommend continuing to be 

very active in reducing the safe havens, and then also the smart 

power or soft power. 

37 

And I want to echo something Senator Graham said. We ought 

to be saying this to the public. This is hard. I mean, this new President faces a really difficult task, just like the old President did. 

And I do not want the public to think that there is some silver bullet out there and if everybody up here was not dumb, we would 

have found it and shot it a long time ago. I mean, this is hard. 

These people are a very formidable enemy, and they get the strategy of this. And Pakistan is going to be very difficult. But as Senator Graham said, we just think it has to be taken on. 

Senator THUNE. Just one more question, if I might, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead. 

Senator THUNE. That has to do with the particular attention that 

the report made regarding biological weapons threats. I think, too, 

in terms of those being more likely to be attainable, it does not 

seem to translate into as significant a threat as the threat of a nuclear strike or, for that matter, some of the conventional weapon 

strikes. The attack in Mumbai managed to kill an awful lot of people using conventional weapons, firearms, explosives, more so than 

the anthrax attacks that we experienced here back in 2001. 

You are aware from your experience with this institution some 

of the constraints that we have to deal with in terms of finite resources and we have to make some very hard choices when it 

comes to allocating homeland security resources. So in light of the 

historical record with bioterrorism, should we be focusing more 

funding on the biological threat than we already do when the evidence in terms of the lethality of some of these conventional attacks have been far more effective and when we have far more to 

fear, obviously, from a nuclear strike? 

Senator TALENT. That is a fair question. I would say yes, I think 

you do need to invest the resources, which fortunately—I do not 

think it is beyond the ability or the capacity of the government to 

come up with that. Here is a scenario that is very worrisome. The 

threshold for weaponizing a biological agent is lower than the 

threshold for weaponizing nuclear material. Now, they have the sophistication to do that, too. But it is lower. Once you isolate the 

pathogen, it is easier to get large enough amounts of it to be able 

to do more than one weapon. The concern I really have is, they go 

to the top of the Sears Tower in Chicago—and I will just say Chicago but it could be any densely populated area. And they release 

anthrax, botulism, or some new agent. You do not even know you 

have been attacked until people start going to the hospital 2 or 3 

days later. And by that time, of course, if you were exposed with 

the initial one—you do not know where the footprint is going to be, 

the wind and the rest of it. And by that time it is too late to get 

the ciprofloxacin out, if it is anthrax. So the initial attack may kill 

thousands of people, and what is to keep them from going up in 

a different building in the same city 3 weeks later and releasing 

another one? And if you hit an American city like that three or four 

times, there is a point where you may kill the city. And if they 

have the demonstrated capability to do that, what does our government do? Do you continue to fight against them if they have—we 

are not saying this is going to happen. But while we looked at this 

on biological weapons, nuclear is harder to weaponize, and if they 

38 

get it, it is harder for them to get enough material to do more than 

one bomb. I mean, they could again, but it is a little harder. 

So we are not at all downgrading the nuclear threat, and the attack—a nuclear device that was properly put together probably 

would have a bigger initial impact than a biological one. But for 

those reasons, I think it is a fair statement of why we highlighted 

biological and why we think you should also. 

Ms. CLEVELAND. I think the Commission draws a distinction between the mass casualties that would be a consequence of a nuclear event versus the mass consequence of a potential biological 

event. It would not take very much in terms of material to create 

panic or the economic dislocation we experienced in the anthrax attack, where there are estimates as high as $6 billion in terms of 

economic consequence, and severe psychological and social consequence as well. So I think you are right to say the bigger event 

would be nuclear, but there is consequence versus casualty. 

I think the Administration has invested heavily on the question 

of biodefense and on assuring that response to an event, whether 

it is biological or nuclear, is robust. I think what we have tried to 

focus on is how do you prevent it from happening in the first instance, and I am not sure that is as much an investment of resources as it is intellectual and policy issues. I think that these 

committees could have a huge impact in terms of preventing with 

relatively little in terms of financial resources involved. 

Senator GRAHAM. Without denigrating what has been said about 

the importance of this investment for the specific purpose of avoiding a biological attack, it is also true that many of the areas of investment to avoid a biological attack or reduce its severity serve 

other purposes. As an example, we learned with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) that a disease that breaks out in one 

distant part of today’s flat world quickly moves across national borders. So we have an interest here in the United States and globally, if there is an outbreak, whether its origin is terrorism or nature, that we know that it has happened as soon as possible so that 

we can try to put a fence around it to keep it from spreading to 

our country. 

One of our major recommendations is we need to increase the 

surveillance capabilities to know that there is something beyond ordinary influenza happening out there so that we can respond 

quickly, whether it is a benign or a violent attack and confine its 

consequences and its lethality. 

Ms. CLEVELAND. Senator, there is one other point Senator Graham raised early on in our review, and I am not sure that any of 

us have emphasized it sufficiently. Part of prevention is blunting 

a terrorist’s presumptions about success. And so to the extent that 

we have good consequence management in place, which I think we 

concurred we do, and to the extent that we engage the citizens and 

the Congress in conveying that we have effective consequence management, that has the potential to blunt a terrorist’s assumptions 

about success. And that is key to prevention. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence on the time. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Not at all. Thank you. 

39 

Senator THUNE. I thank you all very much for your continued 

service to our country. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Thune. Important questions. If the three of you have time, I have a few more questions. 

I do not know whether my colleagues do, but just do one more brief 

round. 

The first thing I want to say in regard to Pakistan, having just 

come back from there, if there is any piece of encouragement, it is 

that every time the Pakistani people get to vote, they vote for the 

moderate candidates and against the extremists. So it is not an inherently extremist country. Nonetheless, it is obviously under siege 

from a minority who are extreme and terrorists, and, unfortunately, there continues to be evidence that some parts of the government, particularly the intelligence service, have contacts—and 

perhaps more than that—with different terrorist groups. And that 

is the challenge. 

So I think your recommendation that we really focus on the soft 

power but really on a long-term plan of both civil and military soft 

power or hard power aid and partnership with Pakistan is key. Obviously, we have developed an extraordinarily important bilateral 

relationship with India. It is really one of the foundations of our 

foreign policy. And both our Indian allies and we have an interest, 

I think, in that long-term plan and partnership with both Pakistan 

and Afghanistan. 

The second thing I want to say by way of some reassurance to 

the public—because we are talking about nightmare scenarios here, 

and we have to do that—is that I believe that the intelligence reforms we have adopted over the last several years can and hopefully will act as a form of prevention, too, in breaking plots to carry 

out a biological attack on the United States. 

Let me go to a few questions quickly. We know from our attempt 

to keep nuclear devices out of the hands of terrorists that the 

source of those often is, of course, nations that have nuclear capacity. So we have the A.Q. Khan case from Pakistan. We have the 

North Koreans proliferating. In your report, you mention that no 

nation admits to having a biological weapons development program, but six nations are suspected of having one. What are those 

six nations, to the best of your knowledge? 

Senator GRAHAM. This is the final exam. 

Senator TALENT. Naturally, we could answer that, but since it is 

Ms. Cleveland’s area, we thought we—— 

Ms. CLEVELAND. It is always the hardest questions that come 

last. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, I must admit, I think it said ‘‘about 

a half dozen,’’ so I will give you a little leeway there if you cannot 

reach six. 

Ms. CLEVELAND. We know that several important countries remain outside the Biological Weapons Convention, including Egypt, 

Israel and Syria. The U.S. State Department has also expressed 

concern that some parties to the treaty, such as Russia, China, 

Iran and North Korea, may be pursing offensive biological weapons 

programs in secret. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Has there been any international attempt 

to try to stop biological weapons proliferation from those nations? 

40 

Ms. CLEVELAND. I would not want to get into a discussion of how 

that might be confirmed. I think that the issue we face here—and 

we heard this when we were in Russia—is that there is enormous 

sensitivity about protection of medical and science equities. And so 

I think the short answer is no, there has not been a coordinated 

effort to secure multi-party or global adherence to the Biological 

Weapons Convention. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I have another question regarding international relations. Is there any other country, for instance, in Europe, that is doing a better or a different job than we are at overseeing biological laboratories to prevent the weaponization of biological pathogens? 

Senator GRAHAM. I think the United States is today the standard 

of the world. What we are saying is that our standard needs to be 

taken up a notch, and then we can use our standard as the inspiration for other countries or as the example of what can be done. 

So our domestic recommendations not only will help us here at 

home, they will also increase our moral suasion with other countries. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you for that. 

Let me ask a final question, which goes to our governmental affairs jurisdiction as well as homeland security, because you have 

called for the Homeland Security Council and the National Security 

Council to be merged. And this is an idea that has been talked 

about, so your recommendation is significant. 

Obviously, there are a number of the risks involved in WMD prevention that bridge the realms of homeland and national security. 

So I wanted to ask you to talk a little bit more about this. The first 

concern is will the homeland security functions of the Homeland 

Security Council be lost if there is a merger into the National Security Council? 

Senator GRAHAM. That was not our intention or belief. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Senator GRAHAM. In fact, we think like in so many things in life, 

if you have multiple entities responsible, then nobody feels the ultimate accountability for results—we think that there is some of 

that—and then just the bureaucratic demands of working across 

two agencies which have such similar responsibility. 

Our recommendation is that the National Security Council be the 

survivor in that merger and that the National Security Council 

possibly have within it a core of individuals led by a person who 

would be particularly focused within that context on the subset of 

issues that could be described as homeland security. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And that person might, for instance, be a 

Deputy National Security Adviser. Is that what you are thinking 

about? 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, and this is also in the context that we are 

also calling for there to be a senior adviser or coordinator for the 

President who would focus even more specifically on this issue of 

weapons of mass destruction and the interface with proliferation. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That was my next question, which is, if 

we are going to create a position to oversee WMD prevention, why 

not have it be part of the National Security Council as opposed to 

being another special adviser to the President? 

41 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, my feeling is that the only strength that 

this position will have will be the degree to which the President of 

the United States resides confidence in the position. And so with 

that as a starting premise, we felt that the President should decide 

how he would like to organize his executive team in order to secure 

a position that he will have that kind of respect and confidence in. 

One thing that came out during the course of our hearings which 

concerned a number of us, including myself, was that there have 

been a number of instances over the last 20 or 30 years where on 

one side of the argument was counterproliferation and on the other 

side was a geopolitical or economic objective. In almost all of those 

stand-offs, proliferation has lost, and part of the reason is that you 

have a Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, or Secretary 

of Commerce arguing for the geopolitical and the economic reasons 

and someone who is down in the bureaucratic ranks defending the 

counterproliferation argument. So we think that this position needs 

to be one that is sufficiently attractive that it will draw someone 

of gravitas to it who can make the case against proliferation. 

Now, it may be that for good and sufficient reasons, we are willing to accept an increase in our vulnerability to proliferation in 

order to achieve some economic or geopolitical objective. I think 

there has not been a sufficient exposition of what those consequences were when many of these decisions were made in the 

past. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I agree. Very well said. Senator Akaka, do 

you have any more questions? 

Senator AKAKA. Yes. Mr. Chairman, let me ask a final question. 

In September, I held a hearing that focused on public diplomacy reforms. A State Department witness testified that the current national strategy for public diplomacy was useful, and that there are 

three public diplomacy priorities. They are: Expand education and 

exchange programs, modernize communications, and promote the 

diplomacy of deeds. 

How would your recommended new public diplomacy strategy 

and its implementation differ from the strategy that is currently in 

place? 

Senator TALENT. I think it is an attempt to make that kind of 

thinking more effective, Senator, is what I would say. There has 

been a fair amount of activity in this regard within the State Department and some of the other civilian agencies. But they are 

much like where the intelligence community was before you all 

passed the bill. They are not looking at it strategically saying what 

is the purpose of these capabilities. 

I was going to say in response to one of the Chairman’s questions 

because he was talking about the fact that the vast majority of the 

people of Pakistan do not want these extremists to be controlling 

things. Now, if we all looked at that as we might look at a political 

problem in a campaign—I mean, we had a whole set of voters who 

we knew really agreed with us. But how do we get them to join us 

in our efforts? I think if we can create within the State Department 

and these agencies that targeted thinking, what is the point of the 

public diplomacy? Well, in Pakistan it is to get them to oppose the 

terrorists and more actively support the civilized community and 

what are we trying to do and what capabilities do we need to 

42 

achieve that, which is going to include everything you talked about, 

but done in a more intentional way. And we think the kind of organic reform that you all achieved in the intelligence community is 

what we need there. That is what is so significant about this 

progress. That bill you passed—and this Committee is responsible 

for it—has actually reversed the momentum of the culture within 

a set of agencies within the government of the United States, 

which a lot of people thought could not be done. 

So it is a long answer, Senator, and one of the reasons we did 

not get into specifics is there is a commission report that has actually just come out, and it is called ‘‘Forging the New Shield,’’ by the 

Project on National Security Reform, and they talk a lot about the 

integrators that they think are going to be necessary to accomplish 

what you are talking about. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, I have other questions, but I may submit 

them for the record. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Akaka. 

I want to thank the witnesses and, in absentia, Congressman 

Roemer. It has been a very important hearing. 

Senator Collins and I talked during the hearing, and we decided 

this is so urgent, we are going to go ahead and try to convert a fair 

amount of your report, particularly the parts about increasing oversight of the high-containment biological laboratories, into legislation. In other words, rather than going through a lengthy process 

of consulting with stakeholders, we think it is a better idea to try 

to force the issue by drafting legislation based on your recommendations and then going through the hearing process as soon 

in the next Congress as possible. So you have certainly had that 

effect. 

You may know that yesterday Senators Kennedy and Burr initiated a letter based on one of the recommendations in your report 

that I think more than 15 of our colleagues, including Senator Collins and myself, signed and sent to the bipartisan Senate leadership urging funding of $900 million in public health and weapons 

of mass destruction medical countermeasures, which is one of the 

things you called for. So you have done a great job really remarkably quickly for a commission, for Washington, and I think we owe 

it to you to respond in light of the urgency of the subject matter 

and your recommendations and conclusion with similar urgency. So 

thank you very much. 

We are going to keep the record of the hearing open for 15 days 

if any of you want to submit additional testimony or our colleagues 

want to submit questions to you. I cannot resist saying to you, Senators Graham and Talent, that your presence and the high quality 

of your work here reminds us once again that there is life after the 

Senate. This is very reassuring. [Laughter.] 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the Committee was adjourned. 

(43) 

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

I commend the Commission’s efforts and find the recommendations right on target 

and timely. The Commission’s report serves as a good reminder that the United 

States must bolster efforts to develop and implement policies and projects to combat 

the threat of a biological or nuclear attack. Our vigilance and resolve must remain 

strong in the face of these enemies, and we will prevail. 

Let me quote one of the report’s conclusions which resonated with me: ‘‘There are 

serious uncertainties about how the government will replace individuals with highly 

specialized skills as they retire, especially in light of the competition for these skills 

from the private sector. No concerted effort has yet been made to recruit the next 

generation workforce—but without that workforce, our long-term national security 

is threatened.’’ 

The report cites Defense Secretary Gates’ concern that, ‘‘Half of our nuclear lab 

scientists are over 50 years old, and many of those under 50 have had limited or 

no involvement in the design and development of a nuclear weapon. . . . By some 

estimates, within the next several years, three-quarters of the workforce in nuclear 

engineering and at the national laboratories will reach retirement age.’’ 

As many of my colleagues on this Committee know that this issue has been something that I have been concerned about and have worked hard to find ways to address this issue. My continued work in enacting positive human capital reform in 

our intelligence and homeland security agencies stems back to March 2001, when 

I chaired a Subcommittee hearing entitled, ‘‘National Security Implications of the 

Human Capital Crisis.’’ During the hearing, former Defense Secretary Schlesinger, 

a member of the U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, testified ‘‘We must take immediate action in the personnel area to ensure that the 

United States can meet future challenges . . . fixing the personnel problem is a precondition for fixing virtually everything else that needs repair in the institutional 

edifice of U.S. national security policy.’’ Similarly, the 9/11 Commission concluded, 

‘‘We know that the quality of the people is more important than the quality of the 

wiring diagrams. Good people can overcome bad structures. They should not have 

to.’’ The report from the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism serves as a good reminder that the Federal Government’s most valuable resource is the men and women it employs. 

Senator Akaka and I have enacted a number of flexibilities to provide the government with the tools necessary to put the right people in the right place at the right 

time. However, agencies seem to be struggling to produce the strategic human capital plans necessary to make appropriate use of existing flexibilities and meet their 

short and long term workforce needs. 

As Chairman and Ranking on the EPW Clean Air and Nuclear Safety Subcommittee, Senator Carper and I learned through our oversight hearings that the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was facing the very same problems. One of 

the things we did was to include three pieces of legislation as part of the Energy 

Policy Act of 2005, authorizing the NRC to take innovative steps to attract both 

young talent and retired experts to address the agency’s anticipated shortages in 

technical capabilities. 

Senator Carper and I also held a nuclear energy roundtable with representatives 

from organized labor, industry, academia, professional societies, and government 

agencies. The roundtable was very productive as it raised an awareness of the impending shortage of the skilled workers needed to support the nuclear renaissance. 

Everyone at the roundtable agreed that the construction of more than 30 new reactors over the next 15 to 20 years could present an enormous challenge for the nuclear industry. 

44 

The roundtable resulted in a number of recommendations such as: (1) use recent 

retirees as instructors, mentors, and advisors; (2) provide more flexibility to a 

younger generation of workers; (3) invest in training—the philosophy of ‘‘just-intime’’ inventory does not work with human capital; (4) identify all existing public 

and private-sector training programs, and then leverage and fund those that are 

successful (e.g., Helmets to Hardhats and the Building Construction Trade Department’s training program); and (5) provide adequate and consistent funding in 

science and technology for universities and colleges. 

The recently enacted America Competes Act establishes a solid policy framework 

for addressing the science, technology, engineering, and math workforce challenges 

identified in the National Academies’ report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future. But we must adequately fund these programs to make them work. 

When Senator Bingaman and I have to fight the Administration each year to restore Federal funding to support nuclear and engineering programs at universities 

across the country, we are not sending the consistent message. 

I also took to heart the Commission’s views on Congress’s unwillingness to reform 

itself in accordance with the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation to provide better 

and more streamlined oversight of the Department of Homeland Security. I remember when the Sense of the Senate that was accepted during this Committee’s markup of the 9/11 Commission bill, calling on the Senate to reorganize itself, was removed from the bill before floor consideration. 

I continue to believe that Congress could do a better job if we were willing to set 

aside the turf battles and reorganize our own Committee structure to provide more 

efficient oversight over homeland security. I plan to reintroduce the legislation in 

the 111th Congress and hope my colleagues will work with me to push forward this 

much needed change. 

45 


45990.001
46 


45990.002
47 


45990.003
48 


45990.004
49 


45990.005
50 


45990.006
51 


45990.007
52 


45990.008
53 


45990.009
54 


45990.010
55 


45990.011
56 


45990.012
57 


45990.013
58 


45990.014
59 


45990.015
60 


45990.016
61 


45990.017
62 


45990.018
63 


45990.019
64 


45990.020
65 


45990.021
66 


45990.022
67 


45990.023
68 


45990.024
69 


45990.025
70 


45990.026
71 


45990.027
72 


45990.028
73 


45990.029
74 


45990.030
75 


45990.031
76 


45990.032
77 


45990.033
78 


45990.034
79 


45990.035
80 


45990.036
81 


45990.037
82 


45990.038
83 


45990.039
84 


45990.040
85 


45990.041
86 


45990.042
87 


45990.043
88 


45990.044
89 


45990.045
90 


45990.046
91 


45990.047
92 


45990.048
93 


45990.049
94 


45990.050
95 


45990.051
96 


45990.052
97 


45990.053
98 


45990.054
99 


45990.055
100 


45990.056
101 


45990.057
102 


45990.058
103 


45990.059
104 


45990.060
105 


45990.061
106 


45990.062
107 


45990.063
108 


45990.064
109 


45990.065
110 


45990.066
111 


45990.067
112 


45990.068
113 


45990.069
114 


45990.070
115 


45990.071
116 


45990.072
117 


45990.073
118 


45990.074
119 


45990.075
120 


45990.076
121 


45990.077
122 


45990.078
123 


45990.079
124 


45990.080
125 


45990.081
126 


45990.082
127 


45990.083
128 


45990.084
129 


45990.085
130 


45990.086
131 


45990.087
132 


45990.088
133 


45990.089
134 


45990.090
135 


45990.091
136 


45990.092
137 


45990.093
138 


45990.094
139 


45990.095
140 


45990.096
141 


45990.097
142 


45990.098
143 


45990.099
144 


45990.100
145 


45990.101
146 


45990.102
147 


45990.103
148 


45990.104
149 


45990.105
150 


45990.106
151 


45990.107
152 


45990.108
153 


45990.109
154 


45990.110
155 


45990.111
156 


45990.112
157 


45990.113
158 


45990.114
159 


45990.115
160 


45990.116
161 


45990.117
162 


45990.118
163 


45990.119
164 


45990.120
165 


45990.121
166 


45990.122
167 


45990.123
168 


45990.124
169 


45990.125
170 


45990.126
171 


45990.127
172 


45990.128
173 


45990.129
174 


45990.130
175 


45990.131
176 


45990.132
177 


45990.133
178 


45990.134
179 


45990.135
180 


45990.136
181 


45990.137
182 


45990.138
183 


45990.139
184 


45990.140
185 


45990.141
186 


45990.142
187 


45990.143
188 


45990.144
189 


45990.145
190 


45990.146
191 


45990.147
192 


45990.148
193 


45990.149
194 


45990.150
195 


45990.151
196 


45990.152
197 


45990.153
198 


45990.154
199 


45990.155
200 


45990.156
201 


45990.157
202 


45990.158
203 


45990.159
204 


45990.160
205 


45990.161
206 


45990.162
207 


45990.163
208 


45990.164
209 


45990.165
210 


45990.166
211 


45990.167
212 

Æ 


45990.168