IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

KENNETH APPIAH, § 

 § No. 30, 2020 

 Defendant Below, § 

 Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court 

§ of the State of Delaware 

v. § 

 § Cr. ID. No. N1808022193 

STATE OF DELAWARE, § 

 § 

Plaintiff Below, § 

 Appellee. § 

 

Submitted: November 18, 2020 

Decided: December 22, 2020 

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, 

Justices. 

ORDER 

 This 22nd day of December 2020, having considered the parties’ briefs and the 

record below, it appears to the Court that: 

 (1) On January 10, 2020, a Superior Court jury found Kenneth Appiah 

guilty of multiple felonies. A Superior Court judge sentenced him to 17 years in 

prison followed by probation. In this appeal from his convictions, he raises two main 

arguments - first, whether the Superior Court denied his constitutional right to 

confrontation and a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense; and 

second, whether the Superior Court compromised his Sixth Amendment right to self-
2 

representation by denying his requests for new counsel or self-representation. We 

find no merit to his arguments and affirm his convictions. 

 (2) Aruna Kanu, his girlfriend Aimee Kamara, and their son rented an 

apartment in Newark, Delaware. They sub-let a second bedroom in the apartment 

to Appiah. Appiah paid Kanu a security deposit and received two keys to the 

apartment. After living in the apartment for only two weeks of the agreed sevenmonth rental term, Appiah told Kanu that he accepted a job in Philadelphia and left 

the apartment. Kanu refused to return Appiah’s security deposit after Appiah moved 

out. After Appiah left, Kanu rented the apartment’s spare bedroom to Ricardo 

Campbell. Appiah never returned the two keys to the apartment. Appiah 

unsuccessfully tried to involve the police to get the security deposit back. Appiah 

also continued to text and email Kanu demanding his security deposit. In a final 

October 16, 2017 text, Appiah told Kanu “you need to stop playing with me.”1 

 (3) On December 13, 2017, Kanu, Kamara, and their son were home at the 

apartment when a man in a black outfit and black mask entered the apartment using 

a key and pointed a gun at Kanu and gestured like he was demanding money. Kanu 

went into the bedroom, shut the door, and yelled for Kamara to call 911. While 

Kanu was on the floor, the man shot two times through the bedroom door. The 

 

1

 App. to Opening Br. at A064 (Trial Tr. at 26). 
3 

gunshots did not hit anyone but damaged the child’s crib. At trial, Kanu testified 

that the man was Appiah.2 

 (4) Appiah fled the apartment before police arrived. Police collected two 

spent .32 caliber shell casings from outside the bedroom door and projectiles from 

the baby’s crib and the wall. An officer’s body camera from the night of the incident 

showed an officer going into Campbell’s room, saying that the room smelled like 

drugs, and pointing out a drug scale and drug packaging. 

(5) Police interviewed Appiah that night but did not arrest him. Appiah 

was wearing black clothes when the police conducted the interview. Two days later, 

police interviewed Appiah again. He admitted that he owned a .32 caliber handgun. 

Police arrested Appiah, seized the gun, and had the gun tested. A forensics expert 

testified that the shell casings from the apartment were consistent with having come 

from Appiah’s gun, though the examiner could neither identify nor eliminate the 

projectiles as having been fired from Appiah’s gun. 

 (6) The State charged Appiah with Home Invasion, Burglary in the First 

Degree, five counts of Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Felony, 

Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, three counts of Reckless Endangering in the 

First Degree, and a misdemeanor count of Criminal Mischief. After a three-day trial, 

a Superior Court jury convicted Appiah of all charges, except Home Invasion and 

 

2

Id. at A066 (Trial Tr. at 34). 
4 

instead of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, of the lesser-included offense of 

Aggravated Menacing. The Superior Court judge sentenced Appiah to seventeen 

years at Level V, followed by probation. 

 (7) On appeal, Appiah raises three claims of error relating to the Superior 

Court’s denial of his request to inquire into drug paraphernalia found in Campbell’s 

room—(a) the evidence could be used under D.R.E. 616 to show bias; (b) the 

evidence could be used under D.R.E. 404(b) to rebut the State’s motive argument; 

and (c) precluding its use violated the Confrontation Clause and Appiah’s Due 

Process right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations. He also 

claims that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the Court refused to 

appoint new counsel or allow him to represent himself. We review the Superior 

Court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.3 We review alleged 

constitutional violations related to the trial court’s evidentiary ruling de novo.

4

 (8) Addressing first the Superior Court’s refusal to let defense counsel 

cross-examine a witness about drug paraphernalia found in the apartment, the State 

called Campbell to testify about his lack of keys to the apartment and his need to use 

a set of keys Kanu left under the floor mat in Kanu’s car. The State used the 

testimony to show that Appiah kept the keys to the apartment and used the keys to 

 

3 Allen v. State, 878 A.2d 447, 450 (Del. 2005). 

4 Smith v. State, 913 A.2d 1197, 1233 (Del. 2006). 
5 

gain access to the apartment for the robbery. On cross-examination, Appiah’s 

counsel asked Campbell about a drug scale in his room. The State objected, and the 

court called for a sidebar. 

(9) Appiah’s counsel explained that he wanted to use the evidence to 

establish that other people involved in drug transactions might have been coming 

and going from the apartment using Campbell’s key. This proved, according to 

Appiah’s counsel, that someone other than Appiah could have entered the apartment 

on the night in question. The trial judge told Appiah’s counsel that she might allow 

her to ask about the drug evidence if counsel could lay a foundation about Campbell 

or Kanu loaning the apartment keys to others. After the sidebar, the court instructed 

the jury to disregard Appiah’s counsel’s question to Campbell about the drug scale.5 

At the end of that day of trial, Appiah’s counsel raised the issue again and the court 

ruled that she was not satisfied that it was admissible under D.R.E. 403 because it 

was too speculative.6 

(10) Appiah argues that the drug paraphernalia evidence was relevant to 

Campbell’s bias as a witness because, according to Appiah, the evidence “provided 

a reasonable basis to suggest that Kanu, Campbell and Kamara had a motive to tailor 

 

5

 App. to Opening Br. at A051 (Trial Tr. at 86-87). 

6

Id. at A059 (Trial Tr, at 130) (“[The Court]: At this point, I’m not satisfied it’s admissible under 

[Rule] 403. I’m just not. I think it’s – too much of a stretch.”). 
6 

their testimony to curry favor with the prosecution in an attempt to avoid criminal 

charges.”7 It is arguable whether Appiah made this argument below and thus we 

should review for plain error. Regardless, even if we review for abuse of discretion, 

the court did not err. 

 (11) D.R.E. 616 provides that “[a] witness’s credibility may be attacked with 

evidence of the witness’s bias, prejudice or interest for or against any party to the 

case.” This rule is not, however, without limits. The impeachment evidence must 

be relevant to bias and not cause unfair prejudice, confusion, or undue delay.8 Here, 

the trial judge gave Appiah the opportunity to lay a foundation that Campbell was 

allowing others to use his key to enter the apartment and make drug deals. The 

evidence was not forthcoming. The court eventually found that the speculative use 

of the evidence was “very prejudicial and takes away from the main reasons [they 

were at trial].”9 The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it weighed the 

speculative and marginal relevance of the evidence against the prejudice to the State 

of allowing cross-examination on—at best—a tangential issue. 

 (12) Second, Appiah argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied admission of the drug evidence under D.R.E. 404(b) to rebut the State’s 

motive evidence that Appiah was after his security deposit. D.R.E. 404(b) provides 

 

7

 Opening Br. at 17. 

8 Wilkinson v. State, 979 A.2d 1111, 2009 WL 2917800, at *2 (Del. 2009) (TABLE). 

9

 App. to Opening Br. at A051 (Trial Tr. at 84). 
7 

that evidence of “other crimes, wrongs or acts” can be admitted “for other purposes, 

such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity 

or absence of mistake or accident.” 

 (13) When a defendant seeks to use evidence under D.R.E. 404(b), it is 

called “reverse 404(b) evidence” because evidence is typically introduced under 

Rule 404(b) against the defendant.10 In a reverse 404(b) instance, the trial judge 

examines “(1) whether the evidence is being offered for a purpose permitted by Rule 

404(b); (2) whether the evidence is relevant under Rule 402; and (3) any argument 

by a party that the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by 

potential prejudice, undue delay, or confusion of the issue under Rule 403.”11 As 

has already been shown, the court fairly concluded that the probative value was 

outweighed by confusion of the issues, undue delay, and unfair prejudice. 

 (14) The defense relies on Norwood v. State.12 In Norwood, this Court found 

that evidence of a third party’s involvement in an almost identical crime to the one 

at issue was relevant to the defense’s theory of misidentification. This court held 

that the evidence was admissible because the State did not articulate any prejudice, 

the evidence would not cause undue delay, and the jury would not be confused about 

 

10 See Norwood v. State, 95 A.3d 588, 596 (Del. 2014). 

11 Id. at 598. 

12 95 A.3d 588 (Del. 2014). 
8 

the main issue in the case–the identity of a third robber.13 Here, unlike Norwood, 

the State showed that the drug paraphernalia evidence was speculative and unfairly 

prejudicial to the State’s case.14 The court was also concerned about starting a minitrial about the drug evidence, which would confuse the jury and waste time.15 The 

court did not abuse it’s discretion by excluding the evidence. 

 (15) Appiah also claims that even if this court finds no reversible error in 

denying the opportunity for cross examination under D.R.E. 616 or D.R.E. 404(b), 

this Court should nonetheless find that, cumulatively, the denial of his use of the 

evidence amounted to a violation of the Confrontation Clause and Appiah’s Due 

Process right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations. 

 (16) The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to 

confront witnesses against him.16 An essential component of this right is the 

defendant’s right to conduct adequate cross-examination of adverse witnesses. A 

trial court’s discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination is guided by our 

decisions in Snowden v. State and Weber v. State.

17 In those cases, the court looked 

to “(1) whether the testimony of the witness being impeached is crucial; (2) the 

logical relevance of the specific impeachment evidence; (3) the danger of unfair 

 

13 Id. at 599. 

14 App. to Opening Br. at A050 (Trial Tr. at 83). 

15 Id. at A051 (Trial Tr. at 84). 

16 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 

17 Williams v. State, 141 A.3d 1019, 1033 (Del. 2016). 
9 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, and undue delay; and (4) whether the evidence is 

cumulative.”18 The question boils down to “whether the jury had in its possession 

sufficient information to appraise the biases, credibility, or motives of the witness.”19

 (17) Even if the reviewing court finds that the trial court violated the 

defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation, however, “a reversal is required 

only if the reviewing court cannot conclude that the error was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt.”20 Whether an error is harmless depends on “(1) the importance 

of the testimony of the challenged witness; (2) whether his [or her] testimony was 

cumulative; and (3) the presence or absence of overwhelming evidence of guilt.”21 

The ultimate question for the reviewing court is whether the error may have affected 

the outcome.22

 (18) We have already found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in limiting the cross-examination of a State witness about drug paraphernalia 

evidence because the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh the prejudice 

and risk of confusing the jury. But, even if the trial court erred, it is highly doubtful 

that the drug paraphernalia evidence would have affected the jury’s decision. The 

 

18 Id. 

19 Id. at 1034 (citing Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 682 (Del. 1983)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

20 Wilson v. State, 950 A.2d 634, 639 (Del. 2008) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 

(1967)). 

21 Williams, 141 A.3d at 1035 (quoting Wilson, 950 A.2d at 639, citing Van Arsdall v. State, 524 

A.2d 3, 8 (Del. 1987)). 

22 Id. (citing Van Arsdall, 524 A.2d at 11). 
10 

evidence was speculative and minor in importance to other evidence of guilt such as 

the .32 caliber weapon, shell casings, Appiah’s access to keys to the apartment, and 

Kanu’s identification of Appiah as the intruder. 

 (19) Finally, Appiah argues that his conviction should be reversed because 

the Superior Court denied his request for new counsel and denied his Sixth 

Amendment right to represent himself. The right to proceed pro se is reviewed de 

novo.

23 Because Appiah made his request to change counsel just before trial and 

during trial, under this Court’s decision in Briscoe v. State, the trial court must 

inquire whether the reasons offered by the defendant to discharge his attorney 

constitute good cause to justify a continuance of the trial.24 If the court does not find 

good cause, the defendant must choose either to continue with his existing counsel 

or proceed to trial representing himself.25 If the defendant decides to proceed pro 

se, the trial court must engage in a further colloquy to ensure that the defendant 

understands the consequences of the decision.26 

(20) Here, different Superior Court judges made the necessary inquiry into 

whether new counsel should be appointed along with the timing of the request. 

Appiah was able to express his reasons for wanting new counsel. Appiah stated that: 

(a) he wanted defense counsel to get a medical report about Kanu being shot even 

 

23 Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d 477, 479 (Del. 1996). 

24 Briscoe v. State, 606 A.2d 103, 107 (Del. 1992). 

25 Id.

26 Id.
11 

though it was undisputed that Kanu falsely told the 911 operator he had been shot; 

(b) defense counsel supposedly contacted Appiah’s wife without his permission and 

discussed the case; (c) he questioned whether defense counsel understood the 

ballistics report; (d) defense counsel supposedly spoke to him in a demeaning 

manner; and (e) he doubted her abilities and argued when they were together.27 

Some tension is unavoidable between counsel and client. Without facts showing a 

complete breakdown in communication with counsel, a conflict of interest, or an 

irreconcilable interpersonal conflict, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion 

before or during trial when it denied Appiah’s request for new counsel.28 

(21) Appiah’s self-representation claim is also without merit. Before 

Appiah is entitled to a colloquy with the court about representing himself, he must 

make a timely request to represent himself and must do so clearly and 

unequivocally.29 Before trial, the Superior Court asked Appiah if he wanted to 

represent himself, and Appiah responded that he did not.30 During trial, the State 

had already presented most of its case, and Appiah’s complaints were not new. The 

Superior Court was well within its discretion to deny the request when the same 

 

27 App. to Opening Br. at A022–28 (Tr. of Case Review Colloquy at 6–12). 

28 United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1982)). 

29 Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 792 (3d Cir. 2000). 

30 App. to Opening Br. at A024 (Tr. of Case Review Colloquy at 8) (“[The Court]: Mr. Appiah, 

you don’t get to choose your attorney. So, is your proposal, then, to represent yourself? [The 

defendant]: I can’t represent myself.”). 
12 

request was thoroughly considered a week before trial. Granting Appiah’s request 

on the second day of trial would have delayed the trial and caused prejudice to the 

State, trial witnesses, and the court in a trial that was fully underway.31 

 NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that the judgment of the 

Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 

 BY THE COURT: 

 

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 

 Chief Justice 

 

31 On March 4, 2019, Judge Scott met with Appiah, his attorney, and the prosecutor and thoroughly 

reviewed Appiah’s request for new counsel. President Judge Jurden also held an office conference 

with Appiah’s counsel and the prosecutor to discuss what Appiah said to Judge Scott about 

terminating his trial counsel. President Judge Jurden found that Appiah’s counsel had acted 

appropriately in the circumstances. App. to Opening Br. at A037 (Office Conference Tr. at 8).