IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MARY SOENKSEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 12 C 2437

)

TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICALS NORTH )

AMERICA, INC., etc., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Takeda Pharmaceuticals North America Inc. (“Takeda”) and

Aetna Life Insurance Company (“Aetna”) have filed their joint

Answer and Affirmative Defenses (“ADs”) to this action, in which

Mary Soenksen (“Soenksen”) contends she was improperly denied

long term disability benefits under the employee benefit plan

(“Plan”) maintained by Takeda and underwritten by Aetna. This

memorandum order is occasioned by some problematic aspects of

that responsive pleading. No effort will be made here to be

exhaustive--instead what follows identifies some illustrative

examples of a mindset at odds with the basic purposes of federal

pleading.

For example, given the notice pleading principles that

govern federal pleading--principles that apply to plaintiffs and

defendants alike--it is always troubling to encounter unjustified

quibbles that some defense counsel seem to regard as appropriate. 

Thus Answer ¶3 admits an allegation that the Plan “is

underwritten by Aetna,” yet Answer ¶11 denies a virtually

Case: 1:12-cv-02437 Document #: 15 Filed: 06/25/12 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:89
identical allegation. That sort of quibble also mars Answer ¶10,

which would appear to call for a simple “admit.”

In much the same vein, Answer ¶13 denies that Soenksen

“became disabled and was unable to perform her regular occupation

as a Senior Account Receivable Coordinator,” while Answer ¶14

admits that Soenksen applied for and received short term

disability benefits (no doubt because such a disability and

inability to do her job were found to exist). And it is likewise

difficult to square the Takeda-Aetna admission in the first

sentence of Answer ¶17 with the second sentence’s denial of “the

remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 17--for there don’t

seem to be any “remaining allegations.”

Next, Answer ¶19 denies the allegations in Complaint ¶19,

the principal aspect of which refers to Soenksen’s doctor having

“indicate[d] Soenksen is ‘unable to perform any past relevant

work’” in the doctor’s January 28, 2009 submission attached as

Complaint Ex. D. But in fact Ex. D, in addition to providing

particulars, stated this in its Paragraph 5(a) statement of

Soenksen’s “Abilities/Limitations”:

No ability to work. Severe limitation of functional

capacity; incapable of minimal activity.

Although Soenksen’s counsel can thus be faulted for putting “any

past relevant work” in quotation marks instead of the language

quoted here, the flat-out denial in Answer ¶19 tends to leave a

misleading impression.

2

Case: 1:12-cv-02437 Document #: 15 Filed: 06/25/12 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:90
As indicated at the outset there is a good deal more, but

what has been said to this point should suffice to encourage

defense counsel to substitute a common sense approach for the

nitpicking that occupies too much of the current pleading. It

can only be hoped that the manner in which this dispute is

litigated will reflect a more open effort to pose disputed

issues in a more constructive way.

________________________________________

Milton I. Shadur

Senior United States District Judge

Date: June 25, 2012

3

Case: 1:12-cv-02437 Document #: 15 Filed: 06/25/12 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:91