COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Annunziata, Agee and Senior Judge Coleman 

PATRICIA F. MILLS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0388-02-2 PER CURIAM 

 JULY 16, 2002 

FALLING CREEK SPORTSWEAR, INC. AND 

 STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Mark M. Esposito; Jay Tronfeld & Associates, 

 on brief), for appellant. 

 (Kathryn Spruill Lingle; Theisen & Lingle, P.C., 

on brief), for appellees. 

 Patricia F. Mills (claimant) contends the Workers' 

Compensation Commission erred in finding that (1) the statute of 

limitations contained in Code § 65.2-601 barred her claim filed 

on May 10, 2001, alleging a neck injury as a result of her 

April 23, 1999 compensable injury by accident; (2) the doctrine 

of imposition did not apply to toll the statute of limitations 

in this case; and (3) her change in work capacity was not due to 

a condition causally related to her April 23, 1999 compensable 

injury by accident.1 Upon reviewing the record and the parties' 

briefs, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

1

 In her brief, claimant withdrew this assignment of error 

because the commission did not reach this issue. Accordingly, 

we will not address it on appeal. 
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Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. 

Rule 5A:27. 

I. Statute of Limitations

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). 

Factual findings made by the commission will be upheld on appeal 

if supported by credible evidence. See James v. Capitol Steel

Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989). 

However, the commission's application of statutory and case law 

is a legal ruling subject to review by this Court. See Robinson 

v. Salvation Army, 20 Va. App. 570, 572, 459 S.E.2d 103, 104 

(1995). 

 The evidence established that while working for employer on 

April 23, 1999, claimant sustained an injury by accident when 

she tripped over a telephone cord and fell. Employer accepted 

the claim as compensable and the parties executed and filed a 

Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") with the commission. The MOA 

listed claimant's injuries sustained as a result of the 

compensable accident as "shoulder & knees." The Employer's 

First Report of Accident confirmed that claimant reported 

injuries to her arm and knees. 

 On June 4, 1999, the commission entered an award pursuant 

to the MOA for temporary total disability benefits beginning 

April 30, 1999. 
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 On February 28, 2000, claimant filed an application seeking 

to hold employer responsible for the cost of a MRI of her left 

shoulder and the cost of breast implant replacement surgery. 

The February 28, 2000 claim listed injuries to claimant's left 

arm, a torn rotator cuff, and ruptured breast implants. The 

claim did not identify a neck injury. At the September 26, 2000 

hearing on the claim, claimant's attorney asked her to identify 

the injuries she suffered as a result of her fall. Claimant 

responded, "Well, I broke my arm and tore a rotator cuff and 

ruptured my implants." Employer's July 12, 2000 application 

seeking suspension of claimant's benefits due to her release to 

return to pre-injury work was also before the deputy 

commissioner at the September 26, 2000 hearing. 

 In an October 11, 2000 opinion, the deputy commissioner 

granted claimant's request that employer pay for her left 

shoulder MRI, but denied claimant's request to hold employer 

responsible for the cost of breast implant replacement surgery. 

The deputy commissioner terminated claimant's benefits as of 

July 13, 2000, based on the finding that she had been released 

to return to her pre-injury work. On April 27, 2001, the 

commission affirmed the deputy commissioner's decision on 

review. Claimant did not appeal that decision. 

 On May 10, 2001, claimant filed a Claim for Benefits 

alleging a neck injury causally related to her April 23, 1999 

compensable injury by accident and seeking reinstatement of 
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compensation benefits commencing April 23, 2001. She also 

requested that employer be held responsible for the cost of a 

cervical spine MRI ordered by Dr. Kenneth Zaslav. 

 In denying claimant's application, the commission found as 

follows: 

 [N]o claim of a neck or a neck injury 

was filed within two years of the date of 

injury. There was no indication on the 

Memorandum of Agreement, duly executed by 

the parties and filed with the Commission, 

of any injury to the neck; it only listed 

shoulder and knee injuries. . . . The 

claimant did not make any claim for a neck 

injury when the claimant filed her claim on 

February 28, 2000, nor did she identify her 

back [sic] injury in response to an 

interrogatory that asked for all her 

injuries.2 Therefore, the claim is barred by 

the statute of limitations. 

 The right to compensation under the Workers' Compensation 

Act "shall be forever barred, unless a claim be filed with the 

Commission within two years after the accident." Code 

§ 65.2-601. The Supreme Court made it clear in Shawley v. 

Shea-Ball, 216 Va. 442, 446, 219 S.E.2d 849, 853 (1975), that 

"an employee must assert against his employer any claim that he 

might have for any injury growing out of an accident. . . . 

[I]t is this notice to the employer and his insurance carrier 

 2

 In claimant's April 21, 2000 answers to employer's 

interrogatories, she identified only injuries to her left arm, 

rotator cuff, knees, and ruptured breast implants as a result of 

the April 23, 1999 compensable accident. 
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that gives them knowledge of the accident and of their potential 

liability." 

 The claimant was required to identify all of her injuries 

by April 23, 2001. Neither the Employer's First Report of 

Accident or the MOA identified a neck injury. Claimant did not 

identify a neck injury in her February 28, 2000 claim nor did 

she testify to a neck injury at the hearing on that claim when 

asked to specifically identify the injuries she sustained as a 

result of the April 23, 1999 compensable accident. The fact 

that claimant may have complained of neck pain to her physicians 

did not relieve her of the jurisdictional requirement that she 

file a timely claim for a neck injury, especially, where in this 

case, employer had denied any responsibility for payment of an 

MRI of claimant's cervical spine. 

 Claimant did not file a claim alleging a neck injury until 

May 10, 2001, more than two years after her April 23, 1999 

compensable accident. Therefore, the commission had no 

jurisdiction to consider the neck injury claim, made after the 

statute of limitations had run. See Code § 65.2-601. Under 

Shawley, claimant failed to file a timely claim for her neck 

injury within the meaning of Code § 65.2-601. 

II. Imposition

 The doctrine of imposition does not apply to toll the 

statute of limitations in this case. Imposition is based on the 

principle that "the commission has 'jurisdiction to do full and 
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complete justice in each case.' . . . even though no fraud, 

mistake or concealment has been shown." Avon Prods., Inc. v. 

Ross, 14 Va. App. 1, 7, 415 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1992) (quoting 

Harris v. Diamond Constr. Co., 184 Va. 711, 720, 36 S.E.2d 573, 

577 (1946)). 

 "The doctrine focuses on an employer's or the commission's 

use of superior knowledge of or experience with the Workers' 

Compensation Act or the use of economic leverage, which results 

in an unjust deprivation to the employee of benefits warranted 

under the Act." Butler v. City of Va. Beach, 22 Va. App. 601, 

605, 471 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1996). The doctrine does not apply 

where the employer's acts are consistent with an endeavor to 

comply with the Act. See Cheski v. Arlington County Pub. Schs., 

16 Va. App. 936, 940, 434 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1993). 

 Nothing in this record established that employer used 

economic leverage or superior knowledge of the Act to effect an 

unjust deprivation of benefits, and nothing indicated employer 

did not endeavor to comply with the Act. To the contrary, 

employer's conduct showed an intent to comply with the Act. 

Employer filed a First Report of Accident, the parties executed 

and filed a MOA with the commission, the commission entered an 

award, and employer paid benefits to claimant pursuant to that 

award. Moreover, claimant was placed on notice that employer 

denied responsibility for the cervical spine MRI before the 

statute of limitations expired, yet she failed to file a timely 
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claim for a neck injury and its associated medical expenses with 

the commission. Thus, claimant's evidence failed to prove that 

the doctrine of imposition was applicable to toll the statute of 

limitations in this case. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 

Affirmed.