SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0362-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CRISTINO SANTIAGO, a/k/a

CRISTINO SANTIAGO, III,

and CRISTINO A. SANTIAGO,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Submitted September 29, 2022 – Decided October 5, 2022

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 19-06-0325.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Michael Denny, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney 

for respondent (Boris Moczula, Deputy Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM

Defendant Cristino Santiago appeals from a November 12, 2020 

conviction entered after a guilty plea for second-degree unlawful possession of 

a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). On appeal, defendant asserts that violations 

of the knock-and-announce rule requires the reversal of the trial court's 

December 19, 2019 denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence obtained 

by police during the execution of an arrest warrant. We affirm.

We discern the following facts from the record. On March 1, 2019, 

defendant was charged with animal cruelty and multiple weapons offenses for 

which a warrant was issued for his arrest. Following issuance of the warrant, 

Trenton Police Detective Tara Dzurkoc, who was assigned to the U.S. Marshals 

fugitive taskforce, opened a fugitive investigation into defendant's whereabouts. 

During her investigation, Dzurkoc utilized CLEAR, a public records database, 

which revealed that defendant was residing at the subject residence—an address 

on Chambers Street, Apartment 1 in Trenton—with his mother and girlfriend, 

co-defendant Ashley Cedeno.

1

 

The Chambers Street residence is a two-family apartment building. There 

is an outside, common doorway that leads to the entrances for Apartments 1 and 

1

 Cedeno is not a party to this appeal. 
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2. On the left side of the home, there is a concrete sidewalk that leads to the 

back yard. The back yard is enclosed by a four-foot-high plywood fence. The 

back door of Apartment 1 opens to a small concrete patio. 

On March 11, 2019, prior to executing the warrant, Dzurkoc testified that 

she briefed the U.S. Marshals on the warrant, defendant's criminal history, 2and 

disseminated a photo of defendant from his Facebook page. At approximately 

noon that same day, members of the U.S. Marshals taskforce established a 

perimeter around the outside of the residence.

In forming a perimeter, the taskforce was broken up into two teams.

Dzurkoc, the case detective, assisted the front entry team, which included six or 

seven officers. New Jersey State Police Detective Anthony Pompeo was 

assigned to the rear team, which included two other officers.

Pompeo testified that, once his team reached the back gate, he encountered 

a barking pit bull. After entering the back yard, Pompeo set up in the center of 

the yard facing the rear of the home. He then observed defendant open the back 

door of the residence and step out onto the concrete patio. After the rear team 

announced themselves, defendant hastily retreated back inside the residence. 

2

 Defendant has five prior convictions, including one for a weapons offense.
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Pompeo radioed to the front entry team to alert them that he saw defendant exit 

and then reenter the residence.

After receiving the alert that defendant had reentered the dwelling, the 

front entry team knocked and announced their presence on the outside, common 

door; entered into the hallway with both apartment doors; and, after receiving 

no response, forced entry into the door of Apartment 1 without knocking.

3

 Upon 

entry, Dzurkoc observed a semi-automatic handgun in the living room by the 

couch.

Dzurkoc also heard running water coming from a bathroom adjoining the 

living room; the door was partially open. Upon opening the bathroom door, 

Dzurkoc observed Cedeno wrapped in a towel. Around the same time, Pompeo 

radioed Dzurkoc that defendant was arrested after running out the back door for 

a second time. 

Dzurkoc testified that she then detained Cedeno while officers cleared the 

adjoining rooms; an infant was located asleep in a bedroom next to the 

bathroom. Cedeno requested permission to put on some clothing since she was 

3

 At the suppression hearing, Dzurkoc testified that the front entry team 

"rammed" the door to Apartment 1, however, she stated that she did not witness 

it occur. 
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only in a towel. Dzurkoc testified that she escorted Cedeno to the bedroom, due 

to concerns for officers' safety. 

Immediately upon entering the bedroom, Dzurkoc testified that she 

observed a handgun on a desk. The detective further testified that, while Cedeno

was gathering clothes from a bin on the floor, she told the officers that she felt 

another gun in the bin. Dzurkoc told Cedeno to remove her hands and looked

for herself; Dzurkoc saw a black M4-style rifle with a large capacity magazine 

in the bin. 

A search warrant for the apartment was subsequently obtained and 

executed that same day. A search of the apartment's interior yielded a total of 

five guns and a large capacity magazine, marijuana, mail addressed to defendant 

at the Chambers Street address, and defendant's wallet.

On June 6, 2019, a Mercer County grand jury returned a six-count 

indictment,4charging defendant with: second-degree unlawful possession of a 

weapon, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count one); second-degree 

possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)

(count two); third-degree animal cruelty, contrary to N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1) and 

4

 Mercer County Indictment No. 19-06-0325.
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4:22-17(d)(1)(b) (count three); fourth-degree possession of a large capacity 

ammunition magazine, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j) (count four); and seconddegree possession of a weapon by certain persons not to have weapons, contrary 

to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) (count six).

On September 27, 2019, defendant filed a motion to suppress the physical 

evidence that had been seized by police on March 11, 2019. At the hearing, 

defendant testified that he was not living at the Chambers Street apartment in 

March of 2019, but was living on Randall Avenue with Cedeno, her mother, and 

her brother. Defendant testified that he never entered the Chambers Street 

residence on March 11, 2019; rather, defendant testified that he was immediately 

arrested in the back yard of the residence when the officers arrived and 

subsequently escorted to the front of the house. Defendant testified that, when 

he reached the front of the house and was being placed in a police vehicle, he 

observed one of the officers go through the front door and wave the other 

officers to come inside.

Based on this version of events, defendant argued that the court should 

suppress all physical evidence recovered, because "the police lacked a basis to 

conduct a 'protective sweep' where [defendant] was arrested outside of the 

residence and there was no information that suggested a risk of violence was 
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posed by anyone inside the residence." In addition, defense counsel submitted 

that "the evidence seized as a result of the search warrant is 'fruit of the 

poisonous tree' and should also be suppressed" because the affidavit for the 

search warrant was based on information gathered during the allegedly

unconstitutional protective sweep. Pertinent to this appeal, on the motion to 

suppress, defendant did not argue that officers were required to knock on the 

wooden back gate and announce before entering the back yard, nor did he argue 

that the affidavit in support of the search warrant to search the residence was 

fruit of the poisonous tree emanating from the initial knock and announce 

violation.

On December 19, 2019, the judge denied defendant's motion in an order 

and oral opinion. The judge found the testimony of Pompeo and Dzurkoc 

credible while finding that defendant's testimony was not believable. In his oral 

opinion, the judge held that "the officers lawfully entered the residence to 

execute the arrest warrant of [defendant]" and observed the first handgun in 

plain view, which provided the basis for the officer to obtain a search warrant 

for the premises. 

On September 10, 2020, defendant plead guilty to count one of the 

indictment, second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, contrary to 
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N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). Defendant further agreed to forfeit the five firearms 

seized by police on March 11, 2019. On October 20, 2020, in accordance with 

the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to a five-year prison term, with 

three and one-half years of parole ineligibility.

On appeal, defendant presents the following arguments for our 

consideration: 

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE POLICE 

UNLAWFULLY ENTERED THE FENCED-IN 

BACKYARD OF THE DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE 

AND BECAUSE THEY VIOLATED THE KNOCKAND-ANNOUNCE RULE.

1. Because the police entered the private backyard 

without abiding by the knock-and-announce 

precautions and prior to knowing that Santiago 

was actually present in the house, their entry was 

unconstitutional, requiring suppression of all of 

the evidence.

2. Because the police failed to announce their 

purpose prior to entry, the knock-and-announce 

rule was violated, requiring suppression of the 

evidence.

The scope of our review of a decision on a motion to suppress is limited. 

State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021); State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 551 

(2019). "Generally, on appellate review, a trial court's factual findings in 
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support of granting or denying a motion to suppress must be upheld when 'those 

findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. 

A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 395 (2019) (quoting State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017)). 

We give deference to those factual findings in recognition of the trial court's 

"opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, 

which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244

(2007). We "ordinarily will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless 

they are 'so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention 

and correction.'" State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022) (quoting State v. 

Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014)). However, legal conclusions to be drawn 

from those facts are reviewed de novo. State v. Radel, 249 N.J. 469, 493 (2022); 

State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015). 

"Appellate review is not limitless." State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19 

(2009). It is well established that we will not consider an argument which was 

not raised before the trial court. Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rothman, 208 N.J. 

580, 586 (2012). "[O]ur appellate courts will decline to consider questions or 

issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a 

presentation is available 'unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the 

jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest.'" Nieder 
10 A-0362-21

v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds Offset Co. 

v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)). 

Where an issue was "never . . . raised before the trial court, . . . its factual 

antecedents" were "never . . . subjected to the rigors of an adversary hearing," 

and "its legal propriety" was "never . . . ruled on by the trial court, the issue was 

not properly preserved for appellate review." Robinson, 200 N.J. at 18-19. We 

have extended this procedural bar to constitutional issues not raised before the 

trial court. State v. Jenkins, 221 N.J. Super. 286, 292 (App. Div. 1987) ("It is 

now well established that constitutional claims, such as Fourth Amendment 

rights, may be waived unless properly and timely asserted."); see State v. Cox, 

114 N.J. Super. 556, 559 (App. Div. 1971) ("R[ule] 3:5-7 is strictly adhered to 

. . . ."). 

With these guiding principles in mind, we decline to consider defendant's 

arguments because they were not preserved for our review. Defendant's knockand-announce claims were not "properly presented to the trial court" and do not 

"go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public 

interest." Robinson, 200 N.J. at 20. Defendant had an opportunity to present 

these claims at the December 10 and 17, 2019 suppression hearings, but failed 

to do so. Because our jurisdiction is rightly "bounded by the proofs and 
11 A-0362-21

objections critically explored on the record before the trial court," we must 

consider defendant's knock-and-announce claims waived.5 

To the extent that we have not addressed defendant's remaining 

arguments, we find that they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. Rule 2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

5

 On appeal, defendant did not pursue the arguments he made at the suppression 

hearing, the viability of which are dependent on a finding that defendant's 

version of the events was credible. We deem those issues waived. See Skl

odowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) ("An issue not 

briefed on appeal is deemed waived.").