Filed 9/11/13 P. v. Pierre CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
MARKUS PIERRE,
Defendant and Appellant. B244001
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NA088187)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superi or Court of Los Angeles County, Arthur Jean, Jr., Judge. Affirmed. Siri Shetty, under appointment by th e Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Atto rney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney Ge neral, and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________ _______________2 The jury convicted defendant and appellant Markus Pie rre in count 1of attempted murder (Pen. Code §§ 664, 187 subd. (a)), 1 in count 2 of first degr ee burglary (§ 459), in count 3 of aggravated mayhem (§ 205), and in count 4 of criminal threats (§ 422). 2 The jury found that defendant pers onally used a deadly and dange rous weapon in counts 1-3 (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1 )). The jury found no t true the allegation in count 1 that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and pr emeditated. The trial court found true the allegation that defendant served a prior prison te rm (§667.5, subd. (b)) as to counts 1-4.
The trial court sentenced defendant to seve n years to life on count 3, plus one year for each weapon use and prior prison term enhan cement for a total of nine years to life in state prison. The court imposed sentences as to counts 1, 2, and 4 but stayed the sentences pursuant to section 654.
Defendant contends the tria l court abused its discretion in dismissing a juror from
the case and that there is in sufficient evidence to support the conviction for aggravated mayhem. We affirm the judgment.

FACTS

Prosecution

Defendant was interested in Melissa D. romantically and sexually. Although Melissa knew defendant, she did not recipr ocate defendant’s feelings, nor was she
involved in either a sexual or romantic relationship with hi m. Defendant called Melissa
often between June 2010 and Fe bruary 2011. Melissa was c oncerned at the frequency of the calls. She felt defendant was stalking her and believed it was necessary to change her phone number. She called the police to ge t a restraining order against defendant.

1 All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code, unless otherwise designated.

2 Three additional counts were dismissed.3 At approximately 9:00 p.m. on February 25, 2011, Melissa re ceived a phone call from defendant. Defendant did not speak to her but instead just “h[e]ld the phone.” Melissa went home to her apartment alone and fell asleep on her bed next to the window. At approximately 11:30 p.m., Melissa awok e to find defendant leaning through the window next to her bed and choking her. Defe ndant was squeezing her neck so hard that Melissa could barely speak or breathe. He had a scalpel in his hand and threatened, “Bitch, I am going to kill you.” Melissa fought defendant and was able to br eak free of his grip. As she got out of
bed she noticed that her chest was cut. Me lissa screamed for help and ran out of her bedroom toward the door to her apartment. As she was fleeing, she felt a cutting
sensation on the left side of her back. Defendant caught Melissa on the front porch and started choking her a second time. Melissa’s neighbors, David Figueroa an d Darlene Cota, heard Melissa screaming to them for help. Figueroa heard Melissa scre am that she was being stabbed. Cota called 9-1-1 and told the operator a man was bea ting up a girl in the next apartment. 3 Cota then went out on her front porch and turned on th e light. She heard someone being choked
and saw defendant and Melissa on Melissa’s porch. Cota recognized defendant as
someone she had seen before. 4 Defendant explained that he was getting his clothes from Melissa’s laundry room. When defendant walk ed toward Cota, Melissa ran back into her apartment, locked the door, and screamed. Defendant ye lled that he wanted his things back and tried to get into Melissa’s apartmen t. He then screamed , “Bitch I am going to kill you. I am going to get you. I am goi ng to finish what I started.” Cota saw something shiny in defendant’s hand.

3 A recording of the 9-1-1 call was played for the jury and a tr anscript of the call was published to the jury.

4 Cota had seen defendant about four times . She initially met hi m in 2008 or 2009, when he introduced hims elf as Melissa’s husband.4 Cota walked past defendant and went into Melissa’s apartment. Melissa appeared hysterical. She told Cota that defendant stab bed her and tried to kill her. Melissa’s shirt was torn, but Cota did not no tice Melissa was bleeding until la ter, when she saw blood on Melissa’s chest, back, and side. While the women were inside, Figueroa observed defendant running toward the street. Figueroa recognized de fendant from the food bank. He had also seen defendant at Melissa’s apartment on occasion. Figueroa notic ed a small knife, whic h he identified as a scalpel, in defendant’s hand. 5 Figueroa warned defendant to leave before the police got there. Defendant responded th at he was going to come back and kill Melissa . Defendant made the threat when he was approxi mately 12 feet away from Figueroa. Long Beach Police Officer George Evans an d his partner responded to the scene. When they arrived, a woman came out of th e apartment and screamed that she had been stabbed. She was wearing a white T-shirt soak ed with blood. Offi cer Evans surveyed the area and observed the bedroom window open approximately two feet wide, and the screen lying outside on the grass. There was fresh blood on the porch leading to the
bedroom. There was also blood on the bed. Melissa told Officer Evans that defendant had come through the window while she was sleeping and slashed her with a scalpel. Soon afterward, the paramedics arrived a nd transported Melissa to the hospital for her injuries. Melissa’s treating physician, D r. Mauricio Heilbron, pe rformed surgery on a
minimum of six lacerations. The lacerati ons were serious. Some of them were disfiguring and penetrated he r skin and subcutaneous fat. One of the disfiguring
lacerations was made around the area of Me lissa’s right breast. The laceration was so deep Dr. Heilbron had to take special care to close the incision. He described it as a
“horrible slash across the woman’s chest and br east.” Melissa’s wounds were consistent with the type caused by a scalpel. He expl ained that her cuts were “extraordinarily
clean.” “The . . . breast wound has a curve to it. It is very hard to cut a curve with a

5 Figueroa had previously worked as a nurse.5 serrated knife. You have to saw. And th is wasn’t.” Melissa was hospitalized for approximately three weeks. After Melissa left the hospital, defendant left several voice mail messages on her phone. He called her a “cheap little b itch” and threatened to beat her. 6

Defense

Defendant testified that on February 25 , 2011, he and Melissa were having a difficult relationship. He had been at Melissa’s earlier in the day but left around 5:30 or 6:00 p.m., because Melissa accused him of havi ng an affair and hit him. As defendant was leaving, Melissa told him she planned to call her boyfriend, Junior Mack. Melissa
called defendant around 11:00 or 11:30 p.m. and sounded hysterical. She begged
defendant to come back. Defend ant testified that he could h ear a voice in the background yelling, “Bitch, you are not going to have this baby. I hope this baby dies.” Defendant heard a pounding noise and screaming. Then Mack said to defendant, “Yeah, I did that.” Defendant replied that he was co ming to Melissa’s apartment. When defendant got to Melissa’s apartm ent at approximately 1:00 or 2:00 a.m., there were no officers present. He saw blood on the porch. Defendant denied attacking Melissa with a scalpel. He did not tell the police that Mack had attacked Melissa when they questioned him later, because he was afra id for Melissa and her children. He told Long Beach Police Officer Eric Fernandez hi s name was Carlos Pierre because he was afraid of being attacked. Defendant denied telling Officer Fernandez his twin brother, Carlos Pierre, stabbed Melissa.

6 The messages were played for the jury and a transcript was published to them.6 Rebuttal

On rebuttal, Officer Evans testified that he was one of two o fficers who arrived at Melissa’s apartment at 11:48 p.m. Officer Evans did not leave until 3:24 a.m. He prevented anyone from entering the cr ime scene while he was there.
Officer Fernandez testified that he went to Lincoln Park on Fe bruary 28, 2011, at approximately 1:30 p.m., as part of his in vestigation of the case. He approached
defendant and asked him if his name was Mar kus Pierre. Defendant identified himself as
Carlos Pierre and stated that Markus was hi s twin brother. Officer Fernandez asked for
defendant’s identification at least five times , but defendant did not comply. Defendant got angry. He said he was tir ed of being harassed for things his brother did. Defendant yelled and clenched his fists. Officer Fernandez and two other officers at the scene
restrained defendant and arrested him. De fendant was taken downtown for booking. Without prompting, defendant said he would tell Officer Fernandez what happened. Defendant claimed his brother Mar kus hit Melissa and may have stabbed her. He drove Markus to the bus station and gave him $200. Markus was on his way to Las Vegas. Defendant did not elaborate beyond those facts, despite questioning. Officer Fernandez ran defendant’s fingerprints and searched his pockets. He discovered a California State Advantage card and another ac cess card on his person, which both bore
the name Markus Pierre.

DISCUSSION

Discharge of Juror for Misconduct

Defendant contends the tria l court abused its discreti on in dismissing Juror No. 7 in violation of his constitutional right to due process and a full and fair trial. Defendant asserts there was no basis for dismissing Juro r No. 7 for serious and willful misconduct, and that dismissal of the juror, whom the parties believed was the lone “holdout” for7 defendant’s innocence, “raised th e possibility that th e juror was dismissed in part because she harbored doubts about the prosecution’s case . . . .” Defendant’s argument lacks
merit. After presentation of the ev idence, the trial court instru cted the jury that “[y]our first duty is to determine what facts have be en proved from the eviden ce received in the trial and not from any other source,” “[you mu st] conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence, apply the law and reach a just ve rdict regardless of the consequences,” and “you must not independently investigate the facts or the law or

. . . consult reference works or persons for additional information.” The jury began deliberating on July 25, 2012, at 10:45 a.m. At 3:20 p.m., the trial court received a note from the jury stating th ey were split on the a ttempted murder count (approximately 3 guilty votes and approxima tely 9 not guilty votes) and the mayhem count (approximately 11 guilty votes and approximately 1 not guilty vote). The note also indicated the lone holdout juror on the ma yhem count “feels that she has reasonable
doubt about the evidence.” The note stated: “We don’t think we can change her mind. Please advise.” The court advised the jury to “take a big deep breath” and come back in the morning. The court then reminded th e jury not to discuss the case amongst themselves or with anyone else. The jury resumed deliberations the next mo rning at 9:40 a.m. At 11:25 a.m., the trial court received another note from the jury . The note indicate d the jury was split on counts 1-4, and the votes were split 11 to 1 in favor of guilt fo r counts 2-4. The note also stated: “There is one juror that is FIRM that there is reasonable doubt regarding the
evidence and so far we have been unable to bu dge the opinion.” The court told the jury to return at 1:30 p.m., at which point th e attorneys would make additional arguments. At 11:35 a.m. that same day, Sandra Uceda, a clerk of the adjacent courtroom,
contacted the trial court. Uceda informed the court that a woman, later identified as Juror No. 7, asked her whether a hung jury would result in a retrial. Ten minutes later, Jonetta Allen, the district jury commi ssioner, also contacted the cour t. She informed the court8 that a woman, also later identified as Juror No . 7, asked her, “If a ju ry is hung, how many times can they retry the case?” Subsequently, Juror No. 7 appeared befo re the trial court and was questioned on
the record: “The Court: . . . Juror No. 7, it has come to my attention th at some things may have happened. One thing that is sugges ted is that you went next door and had a conversation with the clerk, Sa ndra Uceda, next door, and asked her if there was a hung jury, whether there would be a retria l or not. [¶] Did you do that?
“Juror No. 7: Did I do that? “The Court: Yes, ma’am.
“Juror No. 7: I don’t know who was over there. I just asked the question. “The Court: It was the clerk sitting behi nd the desk over here in Department D and you asked th at question. “Juror No. 7: I just said what wa s the procedure, that’s what I asked. “The Court: If there was a hung jury? “Juror No. 7: I just asked her what was the procedure. “The Court: She is right there and we can bring her over and ask her. She reported to me that you asked her if ther e was a hung jury whether there would be a
retrial. Is that what you asked her? “Juror No. 7: I asked her if I am sup posed to go up to the jury box and ask questions I have with anything to do with what the proce dure is and what the law is. “The Court: Did you go upst airs and ask the -- one of the jury commissioners, the jury people up there, whether there would be a retrial if there was a hung jury? “Juror No. 7: They just said that they couldn’t comment . So I took it that they could not say anything. “The Court: Did you ask that question?
“Juror No. 7: I don’t know if that wa s the specific words. I just said what happens.”9 After Juror No. 7 returned to the jury room, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter. Uceda testified that she worked as the clerk in the adjacent courtroom. Around 11:30 a.m., a woman wearing a green headband and blouse approached her. She asked Uceda if she coul d ask a general question, and Uceda replied
that she could. The woman then asked if a hung jury typically resulted in a retrial. Uceda recognized the woman because she had se en her wearing a juro r badge earlier that morning. Uceda asked which courtroom the woman was serving in. The woman did not answer. Uceda then asked, “Aren’t you an impaneled juror?” The woman did not answer the question but instead said, “It is ju st a general question. You can’t answer a general question?” Uceda in formed the woman she could not speak to an impaneled juror about such matters and suggested the woman go back to her courtroom and contact the bailiff. They “went back and forth,” and then the wo man asked if she could find out in the jury room. Uceda di d not know if the juror had been excused or not. She answered, “you might want to try that.”
Allen testified that she was the court’s di strict jury coordinator. Sometime after 11:30 that morning, she was approached by a fair-skinned African-American woman wearing a green top and a headband. The wo man asked if she could ask a question, and Allen responded, “Okay.” The woman asked how many times a case could be retried if the jury could not reach a unan imous verdict. Allen replied that she could not answer the question. The woman asked wh ere she could find the informa tion, and Allen stated that she could not answer that question eithe r. The woman said, “Oh, okay” and left. After this testimony, the trial court stated : “My inclination is to dismiss this juror
for misconduct. I think she has violated an or der that I have made several times not to
discuss the case or seek info rmation or consult referenc e works or persons for any
information. The nature of th e question goes right to the heart of the issue that is here before the jury. And I don’t know where she lies on the case, but I don’t think she belongs [on this] case.”10 Defense counsel objected, arguing there had been no misconduct. The trial court disagreed and dismissed Juror No. 7. An alte rnate juror was selected to replace her, and the jury reached their verdicts. Following the jury’s verdicts, defendant moved for a new trial. At the hearing,
defense counsel stated that he filed a declar ation executed by Juror No. 7 establishing she was the holdout juror. The trial court denied de fendant’s motion for new trial, stating: “I dismissed juror number seven because, either expressly or by implication, I found that her -- there was misconduct, there were at l east two instances of misconduct involving the clerk in department D next door, Ms. [Uce da] and up in the jury assembly room with our jury coordinator. It appears to me that these were willful instances of misconduct. Before, Ms. [Uceda], she didn’t have her ju ry badge on, she woul dn’t explain why she
needed this information and th en she went up and sought th e very same information from the jury coordinator. I think th ese were serious violations of court orders. [¶] In looking at your declaration or in lo oking at your filing, you brin g in [juror number] seven’s declaration, she says several of the jurors we re talking about the case when there wasn’t a full jury in the room. [¶] . . . [¶] Those seem to me to be, if true, and your juror number seven is not a particularly credible reporter in my view, if true, those appear to be violations of misconduct. But they don’t ap pear to me to be of the serious kind of misconduct and certainly no indication of prej udice. [¶] When I dismissed juror number seven, I didn’t know whether she was the hold-out juror or not and it didn’t make any difference to me. As you recall, you asked me to ask her and I wouldn’t do that. She could have been just as easily a juror who want ed to bring informati on before the jury to persuade the hold-out juror to vo te the other way. [¶] In e ither instance, this was [an] attempt by juror to bring inform ation into either her own decision-making process or into the decision-making process of the jury. Sh e may not do that. I believe she was unable to properly discharge her duties. [¶] If you r ecall during the course of the hearing when I was asking her about what she did or didn’t do, she was not forthcoming to this court in answering questions. She resisted telling th e truth until pushed, and even then I don’t
think a clear truthful answer came from juror seven. So I found and I do find that her11 conduct was misconduct, it was willful, serious, prejudicial, material to the proceedings
before the court and she should be -- should ha ve been and was properly removed by me. [¶] I must say that I’ve been a trial judge no w for, I’m in my 28th year of service, and I’ve had many instances where parties have as ked me to dismiss a juror. I never have,
never done that. But I’ve never faced quite this serious a viol ation of court order before by a juror.”

Analysis

Pursuant to section 1089, a trial court ma y discharge a juror if it finds the juror is unable to perform his or her duty. We review the trial court’s dismissal of a juror for abuse of discretion and will uphold the tria l court’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 843 ( Marshall ).) “A juror who refuses to follow the court’s instructions is ‘una ble to perform his [or her] duty’ within the meaning of Penal Code section 1089. As soon as a jury is selected, each juror must agree to render a tr ue verdict ‘“according only to the evidence presented . . .
and to the instructions of the court .”’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Williams (2001) 25 Cal.4th 441, 448.) A trial court may excuse a juror who expresses an unw illingness to follow the court’s instructions. ( Id . at p. 461; People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 483-484 ( Cleveland ).) A dismissed juror’s inability to perform his or her du ty “must ‘“appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.”’ [Citation.]” ( Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 843.)
The trial court abuses its discretion if its dismissal is based on the juror taking a position contrary to that of the other jurors ( People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Cal.2d 105, 128, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 865-866) or based upon the juror’s doubts about prosecution evidence ( Cleveland, supra, at p. 483).
The trial court did not abus e its discretion in this case. As the Attorney General highlights, Juror No. 7 was specif ically instructed “not to c onsider outside sources, not to independently investigate the la w, not to consult people for additional inform ation, not to12 discuss the case with any person other than a fellow juror, and not to consider the consequences of the verdict.” She acted agains t all of these instructions shortly after they were given, when she asked first Uceda, and th en Allen, what the consequences of a hung jury would be. Juror No. 7 wa s aware that the procedure for asking questions was to send a note to the trial court through the bailiff. And, in fact, the jury had done this twice
before Juror No. 7 elected to seek outside in formation concerning the consequences if the jury was not able to reach a unanimous vote in the case. Juror No. 7’s misconduct was
demonstrated on the record : she admitted to questioni ng both Uceda and Allen “what was the procedure” and “what happens,” alth ough she was evasive in doing so. Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision. Defendant’s argument that Juror No. 7’s di scharge was based on the fact that she could not reach agreement with the other jurors is belied by the record. The trial court was not aware of her position on defendant’s guilt when it disc harged Juror No. 7 and, in fact, refused to question her rega rding her position. As the co urt stated at the hearing for the motion for new trial, Juror No. 7 may have been the “hold-out” seeking the
information to make her own decision or she may have been another juror seeking to use the information to sway the “hol d-out” to vote with the majority . In either case, the juror improperly sought outside info rmation concerning the conseq uences of the jury’s votes,
which was misconduct in direct contrave ntion of the court’s instructions.

Sufficiency of the Evidence Supportin g the Aggravated Mayhem Conviction

Defendant contends the evidence is insuffi cient to prove that he intended to maim or disfigure Melissa, and his conviction fo r aggravated mayhem should therefore be reversed. We disagree.
The Fifth and Sixth Amendmen ts, which apply to the stat es through the Fourteenth Amendment, require the prosecution to prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 2 75, 277-278.) A conv iction supported by
insufficient evidence violates the Due Process Clause of th e Fourteenth Amendment and13 must be reversed. ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318.) “‘In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence . . . , the question we ask is “wheth er, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorab le to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ”’ [Citations.] . . . ‘In determining whether a reasonable trier of fa ct could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellate court “must . . . presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reason ably deduce from the ev idence.”’ [Citation.] The same standard also applies in cases in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]” ( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal. 4th 1149, 1175 ( Young ).)
We review the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether the challenged conviction is supp orted by substantial evidence, meaning “evidence which is reasonable, cred ible, and of solid value.” ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) “[M]ere speculation cannot support a conviction. [Citations.]” ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 35.) Nor does a finding that “the circumstances also might reasonably be reconciled with a c ontrary finding . . . warrant reversal of the judgment.” ( People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 528- 529.) The reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the cr edibility of witnesses, or decide factual conflicts, as these are the provi nce of the trier of fact. ( People v. Culver (1973) 10 Cal.3d 542, 548; In re Frederick G . (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 353, 367.) “Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inhe rently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction. [Citation.]” ( Young , supra , 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181.) “A person is guilty of aggravated mayhem when he or she unlawfully, under circumstances manifesting extreme indiffere nce to the physical or psychological well-being of another person, intentionally causes permanent disability or disfigurement of another human being or deprives a human being of a lim b, organ, or member of his or her body.” (§ 205.) The defe ndant must have the specific intent to maim the victim. ( People v. Park (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 61, 64 ( Park ).) Evidence of only an14 “indiscriminate” or “random” attack or “expl osion of violence” upon the victim is not sufficient to support a conviction. ( People v. Quintero (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1162) “‘Evidence of a defendan t’s state of mind is almost inevitably circumstantial, but
circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] In particular, ‘[a] ju ry may infer a defendant’s specific intent from the circumstances attending the act, th e manner in which it is done, and the means used, among other factors.’ [Citation.]” ( Park
, supra , at p. 68.) “‘[E]vidence of a
“controlled and directed” attack or an attack of “focused or limited scope” may provide
substantial evidence of’ a specific intent to ma im. [Citations.]” ( People v. Szadziewicz (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 823, 831 ( Szadziewicz ).) Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that defendant had the specific intent to maim or disfigure Melissa. The attack was not indiscriminate, random, or an explosion of violence. Defendant came th rough Melissa’s bedroom window wielding a scalpel, a sharp instrument especially we ll-suited for causing pr ominent and lasting wounds, as Dr. Heilbron confirmed when he opined that a knife would have required a “sawing action,” whereas Melissa’s wounds were consistent with a scalpel, which is designed to cut through fl esh with little resistance. Melissa was asleep and not alerted to de fendant’s presence until after the wound to
her breast had been inflicted. Defendant fo cused his initial attack on her breast area, slicing through her skin to cr eate a wound that Dr. Heilbron ha d to take special care to close, and which he described as “disfiguring.” The wound wa s deep and took significant time to heal, evidenced by Me lissa’s three-week stay in the hospital. Several photographs of Melissa’s wou nds, including the wound to her breast, were admitted into evidence, and the jury had the opportunity to view their gruesome nature. Moreover, defendant’s attack was controlled when he entered the window. He did not plunge the scalpel into Melissa’s chest or immediately attack her in some other way
that would have been more lik ely to cause immediate death. He instead chose to inflict an injury on a very pe rsonal, defining part of her body in a manner that would leave her scarred and degraded sh ould she live. (See People v. Keenan (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 26,15 36 [sufficient evidence supported mayhem c onviction where wounds to the breasts “[were] a deliberate effort to degrade Ms. H. Because the disfiguration of Ms. H.’s breasts represents such an inte ntional violation of the integr ity of her person, and because of the emotional disability that frequently attends a mutilation of th is sort . . . .”].) To the extent the attack may have later become i ndiscriminate, this was due only to Melissa’s escape from the bed. While she remained in his control, defendant’s attack was directed at permanently scarring her breast. (See Szadziewicz
, supra , 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 832 [evidence sufficient to support mayhem convic tion where attack became indiscriminate only after victim was able to get out of his bed and offer resistance].) An intent to cause a disfiguring wound to the breast is also consistent with
defendant’s motive for attacki ng Melissa. Defendant wanted an emotional and physical relationship with her, which he ardently pursued to the point where Meli ssa felt that she needed to protect herself by changing her ph one number and obtaining a restraining order against him. The jury could infer in the face of such sexual rejection, defendant retaliated by disfiguring Melissa on an intimate part of her body. The cases upon which defendant relies are inapposite. As th e Attorney General

argues, People v. Sears (1965) 62 Cal.2d 737 ( Sears ) and People v. Anderson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 351 ( Anderson ) both involved felony murder w ith simple mayhem as prohibited by section 203 as the underlyi ng felony. The intent to commit mayhem under section 203 is not equivalent to the intent to commit mayhem under section 205, because the sections vary in their scope. “Section 205 broadly prohibits intentionally causing ‘permanent disability or disfigurement . . . or depriv[ing ] a human being of a lim b, organ, or member of his or her body,’ while the injuries whic h are the subject of section 203 are more narrowly and precisely defined.” ( People v. Ferrell (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 828, 835.) In these cases, as in People v. Lee (1990) 220 Cal. App.3d 320 ( Lee ), which defendant also cites, there were not controlle d and directed injuries to sp ecific areas of the victim’s bodies, as in the present case. The victims were attacked horrifically, but indiscriminately. (See Anderson
, supra , at pp. 355-356 [defenda nt became enraged when
a child cursed him and sta bbed the child more than 60 times over her entire body]; Sears ,16 supra , at pp. 740-741 [child unexpectedly in tervened when defe ndant attacked her mother with a pipe; and defendant hit th e child several times, and killed her by puncturing her jugular vein with a knife]; Lee , supra , at p. 326 [defendant suddenly punched and kicked his neighbor several time s without provocation, leaving him partially paralyzed].) Here, sufficient evidence of a controlled and directed attack was presented to support defendant’s convic tion for aggravated mayhem.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

KRIEGLER, J.

We concur:

TURNER, P. J.

MOSK, J.